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## Chapter 5

### KEY ISSUE ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

The U.S. Review Team's research relied upon textual material found in the National Archives, press reports, official histories, and Korean and American witness statements, and other sources. By comparing and contrasting all of these available information sources, the U.S. Review Team developed a clearer picture of the events that occurred in the vicinity of No Gun Ri in July 1950. These findings represent the conclusions the U.S. Review Team could derive based on the availability or absence of 50-year-old evidence and memory.

This report uses the terms "civilians" and "refugees". For the purpose of this report, refugee is defined as a person who is fleeing to a place of safety; implied within that definition is that a refugee is an innocent person. During the Korean War, NKPA soldiers infiltrated refugee columns, and civilian collaborators or persons assisting the NKPA were also in refugee parties. The NKPA collaborators and soldiers dressed in civilian clothing so that they could pass as refugees and blend in with refugees traveling through the U.S. forces' lines. Therefore, the term civilian is used if it could not be determined that civilians being described were "refugees" as defined above. If the sentence or paragraph is a quotation, reference to a witness statement, or document that used the word refugee, the word refugee is used.

For reference, an organizational chart of the 1st Cavalry Division is included in Appendix E. The major subordinate units of the 1st Cavalry Division were the 5th Cavalry Regiment, the 7th Cavalry Regiment, and the 8th Cavalry Regiment.

#### **I. Key Issue 1: Condition of U.S. Forces in July 1950**

U.S. soldiers were young, under-trained, under-equipped, and unprepared for the tactics used by the North Korean People's Army (NKPA). The soldiers of the Army of Occupation in Japan functioned primarily as a constabulary in a conquered land and not as combat-ready war fighters. Their training was hampered by the lack of adequate equipment and proper training areas. While company and battalion training had been completed in the 1st Cavalry Division within a year of the war's outbreak, regimental training, which involves more complex maneuver and coordination, had not been conducted.<sup>1</sup> Classes for critical specialties such as maintenance and communications were also inadequate. They simply did not have all the means necessary to prepare for war. Complicating the problem of training was a lack of combat experience; most of the leaders at company and below had none. The condition of U.S. forces in July 1950 is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2.

Compounding the 1st Cavalry Division's personnel problems was the requirement to bring the 24th Infantry Division up to strength prior to that division's

earlier departure for Korea. The 1st Cavalry Division transferred nearly 800 men, most of them from the top four senior non-commissioned officer grades, to the 24th.<sup>2</sup> This loss of noncommissioned officers with whom the soldiers had trained weakened the cohesion of the division and further reduced the number of leaders with combat experience at the small-unit level. The Army made every effort to correct these shortfalls through promotion and reorganization, but no unit can effectively perform its mission with so many critical non-commissioned officers missing.

The authorized peacetime manning levels for 1950 meant that the three infantry regiments in each division had only two of the three battalions normally assigned. Likewise, each regiment lacked its authorized tank company. The division artillery battalions were also reduced from three to two firing batteries. In addition, the 1st Cavalry Division's equipment was largely of World War II vintage. The under-strength regiments, loss of noncommissioned officers, and World War II equipment significantly weakened the combat power of the 1st Cavalry Division when it deployed to Korea.

The lack of training also left soldiers unprepared for the North Korean tactics they encountered. Unlike the expectations expressed by one veteran who thought they were going to fight guerillas, the NKPA was well trained and nearly a third had combat experience in the Chinese Communist Forces during the Chinese civil war. The North Koreans were well supplied with tanks and artillery and used their equipment skillfully in massed, combined-arms attacks. The NKPA also used envelopment tactics that were unfamiliar to the U.S. soldier coming from Japan.<sup>3</sup>

Documentary evidence also reflects U.S. concern with the particularly troublesome and constant infiltration techniques of North Korean soldiers who routinely slipped through American lines disguised as civilians and then attacked the American positions from the rear. From the earliest days of the war, U.S. soldiers routinely captured infiltrating NKPA soldiers wearing peasant clothing over their uniforms.<sup>4</sup>

During U.S. Review Team interviews, Army veterans indicated that they were warned of incidents in which North Korean soldiers wore civilian clothes, intermingled with civilians to infiltrate U.S. lines, and ambushed U.S. forces from the rear. Likewise, the soldiers received instructions to be wary of groups of individuals dressed in civilian clothes. Sixteen of the 17 USAF veterans interviewed believed that NKPA soldiers were infiltrating civilian refugee groups. At least five USAF veterans testified to having visually confirmed that this infiltration was taking place.

**Finding:** Based on the documentary evidence, as well as the statements by U.S. veterans, the U.S. Review Team concluded that most American units and soldiers were not adequately prepared for the combat conditions that they

confronted in Korea in June and July 1950. No experience or training equipped them to deal with an aggressive enemy that employed both conventional and guerilla warfare tactics or with a large refugee population, which the enemy was known to have infiltrated. Shortages of experienced noncommissioned officers, along with inadequate equipment and doctrine, made it difficult for individuals or units to adapt to these conditions.

## **II. Key Issue 2: U.S. and ROK Refugee Control Policies**

The U.S. troops were completely unprepared for the stark reality of dealing with the numerous, uncontrolled refugees who clogged the roads and complicated the battlefield to an unexpected degree. U.S. forces also encountered the NKPA practice of using civilian dress as a cover for infiltration early in the war. U.S. and ROK refugees control policies are outlined below and are discussed more extensively in Chapter 2.

In late July 1950, the ROK government and the Eighth U.S. Army headquarters issued refugee control policies to protect the U.S. and ROK forces from NKPA infiltration and attacks from the rear. Additionally, these policies were aimed at reducing the adverse impact of refugees on military operations. This adverse impact included the crowding of main supply routes, which stymied the U.S. and UN troops' ability to rush ammunition forward and evacuate casualties to the rear. These U.S. and ROK refugee policies depended heavily upon the constant presence of, and coordination with, the ROK National Police to handle the uncontrolled refugee population.

Despite comments attributed to Major General Gay, the 1st Cavalry Division Commander, that he would not employ the Korean National Police in his division's area of operations, the official records, including his refugee policy directive of July 23, 1950, made the National Police responsible for handling refugees.

The first policy document to address controlling of refugee movement, titled "Control of Refugee Movement", was issued by Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division (Infantry), on July 23, 1950. The movement of civilians and refugees in the 1st Cavalry Division area was permitted from 10:00 AM to 12:00 noon only; no ox carts, trucks, or civilian cars were allowed to operate on highways; no fields could be worked; no school, shops, or industries could be operated unless they were essential to the war effort; and municipal authorities, local police, and National Police were to enforce this directive. The policy makes no mention of the use of force by soldiers. The National Police would collect all refugees from the countryside and highways, and carry them by rail or trucks to screening points. Division Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC) personnel would screen the refugees at established roadblocks and checkpoints. Units within the 1st Cavalry Division had instructions to turn over refugees to CIC or G-2 (Intelligence) Interrogation for screening.<sup>5</sup>

On July 25, 1950, a conference took place at the Capitol Building in Taegu. Participants from the Republic of Korea Government, American Embassy, National Police, United Nations, and the Eighth U.S. Army Korea (EUSAK) agreed upon a plan to control refugee movement.<sup>6</sup> As a result of this meeting, EUSAK issued a four-part, detailed message on July 26, 1950:

Part I: Effective immediately the following procedure will be adhered to by all commands relative to the flow or movement of all refugees in battle areas and rear areas. No refugees will be permitted to cross battle lines at any time. Movement of all Koreans in groups will cease immediately. No areas will be evacuated by Koreans without a direct order from Commanding General EUSAK or upon order of Division Commanders. Each division will be assigned three National Police liaison officers to assist in clearing any area of the civilian populace that will interfere with the successful accomplishment of his mission.

Part II: Procedure for clearing areas. Division commanders will inform National Police Officers of the area or sector to be evacuated, the route, and the time the area will be cleared. National Police will immediately clear the area. Food, water, and comfort items for these refugees will be provided by the Vice Minister of Social Affairs through the National Police. All refugees will move along their predetermined route to selected concentration areas from sunup until sundown. This will be a controlled movement under the direction and supervision of the National Police and representatives from the office of Korean Welfare Affairs.

Part III: Movement of Korean civilians during hours of darkness. There will be absolutely no movement of Korean civilians, as individuals or groups, in battle areas or rear areas, after the hours of darkness. Uniformed Korean police will rigidly enforce this directive.

Part IV: To accomplish the procedure, as outlined in this directive, leaflets will be prepared and dropped in all areas forward and rear of the battle line to effectively disseminate this information. National Police will further disseminate this information to all Korean civilians by means of radio, messenger, and the press.<sup>7</sup>

The NKPA frequently used civilian clothing and refugees to conceal their movements. The Eighth Army's policy was intended to deny the NKPA that tactic while also safeguarding civilians by prohibiting refugees from crossing battle lines (Battle lines are the areas where there is contact with the enemy or contact is about to occur).

The policy did not state that refugees could not cross friendly lines and contains instructions for the handling of refugees in friendly areas (friendly lines are forward troop positions not in contact with the enemy). The policy empha-

sized the Korean government's responsibility for the control and screening of refugees to provide for their welfare. Nothing in this policy was intended to put refugees at risk.

On July 27, 1950, Lieutenant General Walker's Headquarters EUSAK (Eighth U.S. Army, Korea) G-2 (Intelligence Staff Section) issued Intelligence Instruction No. 4 describing actions Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC) teams must take relative to the movement and interrogation of refugees. These instructions included maintaining daily contact with the South Korean Army and local Korean law enforcement agencies; conducting surveillance and inspections of police and South Korean Army refugee checkpoints; screening, checking, and interrogating detainees deemed to be of counter intelligence value; and checking and reporting on curfew regulations and enforcement.<sup>8</sup>

Leaflets also provided a method of conveying the theater policy on refugee movement to civilians in or near the combat zone. An order issued sometime in 1950 for these leaflets from the Far East Command's Psychological Warfare Branch stipulated that the leaflets would say that civilians are forbidden to move through the battle lines, that the civilian residents of some areas may be evacuated under the supervision of the Minister of Social Affairs and the National Police, and that refugees will move only by daylight. The leaflets also had to state that the National Police would rigidly enforce these orders to protect the ROK and UN forces.<sup>9</sup>

The UN forces and the Eighth Army relied heavily upon the ROK National Police's assistance in controlling the refugee problem and executing the joint Eighth Army and ROK refugee policy. An example of the ROK National Police's indispensable help appears in a monograph written by Lieutenant Colonel J.P. Powhida entitled "Civilian Control in South Korea."<sup>10</sup> As a member of the 1st Cavalry Division's G-3 (Operations) section and liaison officer to two of the infantry regiments in mid-July 1950, Lieutenant Colonel Powhida described how he arrived in Yongdong on or about July 21 and directed the Korean police chief to use his 90-man police force to move the teeming refugee columns down trails and off of the highways. The police then directed the refugees to Kumchon for screening and subsequent evacuation. Even though Lieutenant Colonel Powhida rated the effectiveness of this hasty operation at 50 percent, the presence of the ROK National police certainly brought greater order to the chaos and helped the ground forces keep the lines of communication open.

Most veterans from the 7th Cavalry Regiment interviewed by the U.S. Review Team were enlisted men during the Korean War. They did not receive copies of policies from higher headquarters. In general, the U.S. veterans' recollection of refugee control policies was they should be careful with refugees. These soldiers received instructions and orders from their sergeants and platoon leaders. Many U.S. veterans remember receiving warnings that there were North Korean infiltrators among the refugees. A few soldiers do not remember hearing

that there were infiltrators among the refugees. The veterans who remembered more specific details about refugee control remembered specific actions to be taken; for example, keep refugees off the roads, do not let refugees pass, or search refugees and let them pass. One veteran, when asked about refugees, said they were supposed get them off the road, keep them off the road, and send them south.

The policy not to let refugees cross battle lines was designed to protect U.S. forces in light of the infiltration tactics used by the North Koreans and the congestion on the roads.

**Finding:** From its study of the refugee control policies in effect during the last week of July 1950, the U.S. Review Team found that the Eighth U.S. Army published, in coordination with the ROK government, refugee control policies that reflected two predominant concerns: (1) protecting U.S. and ROK troops from the danger of NKPA soldiers infiltrating U.S. - ROK lines, and (2) precluding uncontrolled refugee movements from impeding flows of supplies and troops. The published 1st Cavalry Division refugee control policy dated July 23, 1950, reflected the same two concerns. The task of keeping innocent civilians out of harm's way was left to ROK authorities. By implication, these policies also protected refugees by attempting to ensure they were not in harm's way.

### **III. Key Issue 3: Tactical Situation July 22-29, 1950**

Immediately after the 1st Cavalry Division disembarked in Korea, the Eighth Army directed the division to move forward to the Yongdong-Kumchon area. The 1st Cavalry Division deployed both the 5th and 8th Cavalry Regiments to defend Yongdong. The 8th Cavalry Regiment moved forward to relieve the 24th Infantry Division's 21st Infantry Regiment and to prevent the occupation of Yongdong from the northwest and southwest.<sup>11</sup> A more detailed picture of the tactical situation is found in Chapter 3. (Also, see the maps in Appendix E, which show the locations of units during the last week of July).

With the 8th Cavalry initially deployed north and west of Yongdong, the 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry, dug in east of the town in the vicinity of the village of Kwan ni to prevent a possible envelopment. The 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry, remained in Hwanggan for the moment.<sup>12</sup>

On July 22, 1950, the 8th Cavalry received their first enemy contact in the 1st Battalion's sector northwest of Yongdong. Heavy artillery and mortar fire fell throughout the day, and reports of enemy tanks surfaced for the first time. Southwest of town, the 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry, area remained quiet. Artillery fire from the 11th, 77th, and 99th Field Artillery Battalions accounted for five enemy tanks and 15 other vehicles. The threat of envelopment became a real concern to the 8th Cavalry as an aerial observer saw groups of NKPA soldiers dressed in white southwest of Yongdong.<sup>13</sup> The threat of envelopment meant

that the enemy would penetrate their positions and move in behind them, thus cutting them off and destroying them.

Realizing the serious danger to the 8th Cavalry, the 1st Cavalry Division ordered the regiment to disengage and withdraw to keep the NKPA from out-flanking the regiment and decisively engaging it in Yongdong. Eighth Army's strategy did not include fighting for every town and village. The Eighth Army lacked the necessary strength for that purpose. Instead, the Eighth Army opted to withdraw behind the last major defensible terrain feature, the Nakdong River. The division's withdrawal became part of this Army-level strategy. The plan called for the 5th Cavalry to support the 8th Cavalry's disengagement and rearward movement out of Yongdong to Hwanggan, where the 8th Cavalry would assume the role of the division's reserve.<sup>14</sup> Hwanggan is approximately 2.5 road miles east of No Gun Ri.

The 7th Cavalry, meanwhile, had arrived in Korea as part of the division's second lift from Japan. The east coast of Korea suffered a determined NKPA attack, and the 1st Battalion remained in the Pohangdong area to defend the port and adjacent airfield. The remainder of the 7th Cavalry moved forward to the Yongdong area, arriving in its designated assembly area near the village Sot Anmak in the late afternoon of July 24. The 7th Cavalry's mission was to prevent enemy infiltration while also supporting the 5th Cavalry in the event the 8th Cavalry could not break contact and move east from Yongdong.<sup>15</sup>

On July 25, the 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry, had to break through an NKPA roadblock in order to extract themselves and reposition east of Yongdong. The 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry, broke contact and escaped from Yongdong thanks to the division artillery's superior firepower. The 5th Cavalry withdrew from Yongdong and occupied defensive positions east of town. The day's operations proceeded as planned.<sup>16</sup>

The 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, moved forward with elements of the Regimental Headquarters to support the withdrawal of the 8th Cavalry from Yongdong on the evening of July 25. The regiment reported its command post location to the division at 8:25 PM, giving the grid coordinates of a position directly across the road (today known as Highway 4) from the 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry. The 7th Cavalry Regiment's commander later reported that the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, had contact with 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry, and that the regiment had no contact with the enemy. What happened during the next several hours remains unclear, particularly with regard to the actions of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry.<sup>17</sup>

Several factors require careful consideration when evaluating the 7th Cavalry's performance on July 25. The 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, was in Pohangdong and had not yet joined the regiment, which gave the 7th a distinct disadvantage in strength. Likewise, the 7th Cavalry did not have an assigned artil-

lery battalion in direct support. July 25 was the regiment's second day in the forward area and it was in its first week in Korea. Soldiers were aware of the enemy's infiltration tactics. In the words of the commander of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, refugees clogged the roads, and he heard a vehicle pass his location, possibly a tank.<sup>18</sup> Military traffic and refugees crowded the road from Yongdong to Hwanggan, but no other reports of a tank in the rear area exist. The battalion commander most likely heard a vehicle from a withdrawing element belonging to the 8th Cavalry and not a North Korean tank. The fear of NKPA tanks may have caused the commander to identify the vehicle as a tank.

Pressure increased on the 25th Infantry Division's 27th Infantry Regiment on the right flank of the 1st Cavalry Division. Continuing the division's withdrawal became necessary to avoid a North Korean flanking movement. 1st Cavalry Division regimental operations officers arrived at the division forward command post to receive orders for the next stage of the withdrawal. Sometime during, or shortly after, this conference late on the night of July 25, the 7th Cavalry received a report that a breakthrough had occurred in the 25th Infantry Division sector to the regiment's north.<sup>19</sup> Without specific orders and not in contact with the enemy, the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, began a disorganized and undisciplined withdrawal, believing that the NKPA had attacked and would envelop the battalion. The Regimental War Diary suggests that the battalion was under extreme NKPA pressure and withdrew to avoid envelopment.<sup>20</sup>

It is very important to understand what was happening throughout the daylight hours of July 26 within the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, as they spent the day reorganizing and locating stragglers. The battalion's soldiers had abandoned a significant amount of equipment, including vital radios and crew-served weapons during their disorganized withdrawal in the early morning hours of that same day. Nearly 200 men were unaccounted for. Major Witherspoon, the Regimental S-3 (Operations Officer), set up a collection point by the roadside, probably in the vicinity of Andae Ri, and consolidated the battalion. The battalion spent the entire day going back and forth recovering the abandoned equipment and rounding up the stragglers. This activity would have placed the soldiers and their vehicles exactly in the same location west of the No Gun Ri double railroad overpass where the Korean witnesses claimed (a) the air strike occurred in the early afternoon of July 26 and (b) the Americans engaged them with machine gun fire and drove them into the double overpass. It also placed these soldiers directly to the front of 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry positions in the vicinity of Andae Ri and on Hill 207 throughout the entire day. 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, which had arrived from Pohang during the afternoon of the 26th, relieved 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry, later that day. Hill 207 was the high ground west of what is now Highway 4, overlooking the double railroad overpass. Other elements of the 1st Cavalry Division were also passing through the vicinity of the double railroad overpass throughout the day on the 26th as the Division executed its withdrawal to Hwanggan.

According to the 7th Cavalry Regiment War Diary, the battalion's leadership did not regain full control of the situation until 9:30 at night on July 26. After the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, reorganized, the soldiers dug in on a ridgeline overlooking the hamlet of No Gun Ri and across the road and railroad to the north of the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry.<sup>21</sup> As they reorganized, they recovered much of their equipment, but 119 men remained unaccounted for.

On July 27, 1950, the division occupied positions in the Hwanggan area with the 8th Cavalry in reserve, the 5th Cavalry Regiment southwest of the town, and the 7th Cavalry Regiment to the west of town. The 7th Cavalry Regiment was the farthest forward with the 25th Infantry Division's 27th Infantry Regiment still on the 7th Cavalry's right and the 5th Cavalry Regiment to the left and rear. The 7th Cavalry Regiment was not in immediate contact with the enemy, but learned from the division that no friendly troops occupied the areas to their south and west in the direction of Yongdong. Throughout the day, patrols reported enemy forces nearby, including tanks spotted in the village of Sot Anmak in front of the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, and columns of enemy troops advancing from Yongdong on the railroad tracks. In the afternoon, the regiment took fire from tanks in the vicinity of Sot Anmak; timely mortar fire drove off the NKPA armor. However, apart from some artillery and mortar fire, the day proved relatively quiet.<sup>22</sup>

The 77th Field Artillery Battalion supported the 7th Cavalry, and the battalion commander visited the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, to ensure that the unit received adequate fire support. Additionally, an observer team from the Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces arrived to evaluate the state of Army units in Korea and spent the day with the 7th Cavalry.<sup>23</sup> A group of seven journalists, including Tom Lambert of the Associated Press and Dennis Warner of the *Daily Telegraph and London Herald* of Melbourne, also toured the 7th Cavalry's front lines.<sup>24</sup> They would have been in position to hear about an event involving refugees taking place in the immediate area. They did not report an incident involving refugees.

The 1st Cavalry Division's 6:00 PM July 27 Periodic Intelligence Report (PIR)<sup>25</sup> reported extensive NKPA patrolling to identify gaps in the division's new positions east of Yongdong. During the day on July 27, the division's artillery suffered "heavy counter battery fire." The division continued to evaluate the combat efficiency and morale of the opposing NKPA units as good. The PIR warned that the "enemy continues his standard tactic of infiltration, assembl[ing] and attack[ing] our flanks, gaps and rear areas with emphasis on dislodging the supporting artillery." The division intelligence staff evaluated this activity together with reports that enemy troops were moving out of Yongdong, suggesting that the enemy intended a double envelopment of the division.

On July 28, the situation on the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry's right flank turned critical. The NKPA 4th Division launched an all-out attack against the

27th Infantry, forcing that regiment to tighten and contract its front-line positions. This movement opened a gap between the two divisions and offered the 3rd NKPA Division advancing from Yongdong an opportunity to outflank the 1st Cavalry Division. The 8th Cavalry, then in division reserve, counterattacked to restore the divisional boundary. The 27th Infantry also counterattacked and regained contact with the right flank of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry.<sup>26</sup>

The risk of the NKPA cutting off the American troops was not over, however. The 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry's Commanding Officer reported NKPA attempts to penetrate both the right and left flanks of the regiment's position throughout the day. Reports suggested that the NKPA pushed civilians, as human shields, ahead of them during their attacks. The NKPA attacked the regiment frontally, but American artillery drove the North Koreans back with great success. On July 28, Navy aircraft from the *USS Valley Forge* were directed into the area and attacked a railroad tunnel and other targets forward of the 7th Cavalry in the direction of Yongdong with bombs and machine guns.

To eliminate the growing threat of envelopment, the 7th Cavalry received orders at 8:30 PM on July 28 to withdraw to the southeast at first light on July 29. With the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, in the lead, the regiment passed through Hwanggan and occupied positions adjacent to the 5th Cavalry. The withdrawal of the 7th Cavalry from the vicinity of No Gun Ri early on the morning of July 29 marked the end of friendly activity in the area. The area was then under NKPA control. No U.S. troops returned to this area until after the breakout from the Naktong River defenses in September 1950. The NKPA's first patrols entered Hwanggan later that day.<sup>27</sup>

**Finding:** The U.S. Review Team found that, in the early morning hours of July 26, 1950, the 2nd Battalion of the 7th Cavalry Regiment, without specific orders, but believing they were being enveloped, conducted a disorganized and undisciplined withdrawal from a position east of Yongdong to the vicinity of No Gun Ri. They spent the remaining hours of July 26 until late into that night recovering abandoned personnel and equipment from the area where the air strike and machine-gun firing on Korean refugees is alleged to have occurred. On July 26, 1950, at 9:30 at night, 119 men were still unaccounted for. It will probably never be possible to reconstruct the activities of the scattered soldiers of the 2nd Battalion.

The U.S. Review Team determined that the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, arrived in the vicinity of No Gun Ri in the afternoon of July 26, 1950. They relieved the 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment, and established their position east of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment.

The U.S. Review Team found that there was repeated contact reported between the 7th Cavalry and enemy forces in the vicinity of No Gun Ri on July 27 and July 28. The records indicate by this time that the 7th Cavalry had been told

that there were no friendly forces to the west and south of No Gun Ri (i.e. back toward Yongdong). The 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, reported an enemy column on the railroad tracks on July 27, which they fired upon. On July 29, the battalion withdrew as the NKPA advanced.

The U.S. Review Team concluded that, based on the available evidence, the 7th Cavalry Regiment was under attack, as they believed, between July 27 and July 29, 1950, when in position near No Gun Ri.

#### **IV. Key Issue 4: Assembly and Movement of Villagers**

The U.S. Review Team cannot rule out the possibility that U.S. soldiers told the civilian refugees at Im Gae Ri to evacuate the village. The U.S. and ROK policy in July 1950 stated that Korean civilians (with key exceptions) should not evacuate their villages. The U.S. Review Team could not determine the reasons why the refugees gathered in Im Gae Ri; but, based on the absence of historical documentation, statements by Korean witnesses, and the lack of mention in the U.S. statements, this gathering of refugees was probably not the result of any U.S. action. The Korean statements indicate that over 400 Koreans were present in Im Gae Ri on July 25. Some of the Koreans who assembled at Im Gae Ri were from other villages and were probably unknown to the Im Gae Ri residents. Twenty-eight Korean witnesses stated that U.S. soldiers told them to evacuate Im Gae Ri on July 25. According to several Korean witnesses, soldiers warned them of potential fighting in the area through a translator. Some witnesses stated that the Americans told them that they were being moved for their safety. Some U.S. veterans remember escorting refugees from villages, but these veterans cannot remember the villages' names or the dates the evacuations occurred. Therefore, the U.S. Review Team cannot rule out the possibility that U.S. soldiers told the villagers at Im Gae Ri to evacuate the village. A detailed analysis of U.S. and Korean interviews is located in Chapter 4.

While the U.S. Review Team cannot rule out the possibility that the movement of the villagers occurred as described by the Korean witnesses, there was no sound military reason for soldiers to travel approximately three miles off their designated movement route to the village of Im Gae Ri during a hasty withdrawal for the purpose of encouraging an additional 400 refugees onto the already crowded roads and aggravating further the congested conditions. It is also unlikely that the soldiers would have performed this evacuation given the widespread knowledge and fear of North Korean infiltrators believed to be present in refugee concentrations.

Following their departure from the village of Im Gae Ri, the Korean witnesses state that they spent a night on a riverbank. Some witnesses describe what appears to be artillery firing nearby. Most Korean witnesses describe the night on the riverbank as uncomfortable. When they awoke in the morning, the soldiers were gone. Four Korean witnesses state that U.S. soldiers shot and

killed some refugees on the riverbank who attempted to leave during the night. A small number of Korean witnesses further stated that the U.S. soldiers behaved violently toward anyone who tried to leave the riverbank that night. Based upon the limited available evidence, the U.S. Review Team cannot establish if these incidents occurred as described.

Korean witness statements suggest that Korean refugees encountered U.S. forces in the vicinity of No Gun Ri as both the soldiers and the refugees moved east. Some Korean witnesses believed that the U.S. soldiers escorted them. It is possible, given the misunderstandings created by language barriers and cultural differences, that as the southward flow of refugee and military traffic merged together, soldiers and refugees moved side by side. Resultantly, the refugees may have incorrectly believed that the U.S. soldiers were escorting them. As the refugees moved toward Hwanggan, some Korean witnesses state that the U.S. soldiers directed them from the road (what is now Highway 4) onto the railroad tracks.

Three 7th Cavalry Regiment veterans recalled displacing South Koreans from unknown villages on unknown dates.<sup>28</sup> The U. S. Review Team assesses that the 7th Cavalry Regiment was not in the vicinity of Im Gae Ri on July 25 based upon official records and operational overlays of the Regiment's positions. Seven veterans of the 5<sup>th</sup> Cavalry Regiment indicated that they evacuated or escorted Korean civilians from their villages in late July and early August 1950. The veterans could not name the village. A patrol from the 5th Cavalry Regiment may have told the villagers who had assembled at Im Gae Ri to leave. In addition, 28 U.S. veterans who were interviewed remembered seeing refugees in the vicinity of No Gun Ri, but their estimate of how many is imprecise.

Generally, the veterans who remembered evacuating refugees said they evacuated civilians based upon instructions from their units' chain of command. The primary reasons the veterans cited were to improve local security and to remove the non-combatants from the combat zone for their (the refugees') own protection. All U.S. veterans stated that they never used deadly force while evacuating the civilians. Most soldiers believed that the Koreans returned to their villages as soon as the U.S. units moved out of the area. The veterans do not have detailed recollections of their actions and do not remember places, names, or dates.

As mentioned earlier, U.S. and ROK policy in July 1950, stated that Korean civilians should not evacuate their villages, and the 1st Cavalry Division Commander prohibited refugee travel by night to protect friendly troops from North Korean infiltration.<sup>29</sup> The 1st Cavalry Division Artillery reported the only documented case of 1st Cavalry Division soldiers clearing civilians from a village. On July 23, southwest of Yongdong, Division Artillery soldiers told villagers to leave their homes, which were located close to the artillery positions.<sup>30</sup>

If U.S. soldiers encountered a refugee group on the road at night, these soldiers may have tried to prevent the group from moving because they feared infiltrators. The soldiers may have also tried to prohibit movement at night because this movement violated the existing U.S. refugee control policy. Also, if soldiers directed refugees off the road, this action would have been consistent with refugee control policies designed to keep the roads clear for troop movement.

**Finding:** The U.S. Review Team could not determine the reasons why the refugees gathered in Im Gae Ri, but the U.S. Review Team concluded that this gathering of refugees was probably not the result of U.S. action. Based on some of the available evidence, the U.S. Review Team cannot rule out the possibility that U.S. soldiers told the villagers at Im Gae Ri to evacuate the village, but the soldiers who did so were not from the 7th Cavalry Regiment.

## **V. Key Issue 5: Air Strikes in the Vicinity of No Gun Ri**

The U.S. Review Team concluded that the air strikes / strafing during the last week of July 1950 that may have caused casualties was not the result of a pre-planned or directed strike on civilian refugees. The U.S. Review Team concluded that any air strikes / strafing that hit Korean civilians were due to misidentification of targets or that civilian casualties occurred because civilians were in the area of military targets. The U.S. Review Team's conclusions were based on witness statements, a review of official records, and the NIMA imagery analysis (Appendix C). See Chapter 3 for details of air operations in Korea.

The South Korean witness' statements collectively paint a picture of a horrific air attack occurring on July 26, 1950; but many of these witnesses do not agree on the details. They agree only on the fact that an air strike / strafing occurred as the refugee group stood upon the railroad tracks. Some U.S. veterans' statements indicated they saw some strafing. Most of the veterans could not or did not see any aircraft firing on civilians. All but one of those veterans who witnessed such a strike on civilians stated that the civilians either rode upon, or moved beside, an advancing North Korean tank or tanks.

Many Korean witnesses stated that U.S. soldiers directed the refugees onto the railroad tracks in the vicinity of No Gun Ri and then used a radio to request an immediate air strike on the group. The Korean witness statements do not agree on all the details surrounding the air strike or strafing. Ten of the witnesses mention seeing a radio in use among the U.S. soldiers.<sup>31</sup> The air attack's timing may have led them later to perceive incorrectly a connection between the radio operator and the aircraft.<sup>32</sup> By contrast, a large number of the witnesses, 34 out of 49, stated that a strafing attack hit the refugees on the railroad tracks.<sup>33</sup> Many Korean witness accounts of the air strike / strafing indicate that more than one aircraft was involved in the attack. In response to some U.S. questions, several witnesses described the attacking aircraft as jets as opposed to propel-

ler-driven aircraft.<sup>34</sup> In addition, some Korean statements simply state that some type of high explosive ordnance fell upon the refugees. Three Korean witnesses clearly mentioned that the planes used on-board machine-guns in addition to the bombs.<sup>35</sup> At least three witnesses suggested that the aircraft made several passes on the group.<sup>36</sup>

The Korean descriptions of the air strike / strafing are compelling. One eight-year-old witness never mentions bombs or aircraft, but instead remembers flames everywhere searing his face and bullets piercing his legs.<sup>37</sup> An eleven-year-old witness remembers machine-gun bullets riddling her mother's legs, while at the same time losing her left eye from an explosion.<sup>38</sup> A witness who was an 18- or 19-year-old adult at the time recounts that the explosions blew a large piece of flesh onto him; his own injuries left him barely able to walk.<sup>39</sup>

An investigation of the Air Force's documented role during this period of the Korean War yielded no evidence to suggest that Air Force aircraft strafed Korean refugees or enemy soldiers at, or near, No Gun Ri on July 26, 1950. The U.S. Air Force History Team found most mission reports for jet aircraft flying missions over Korea on July 26, 1950. However, the Fifth Air Force final recapitulation report for the day shows no target struck in the vicinity of No Gun Ri on July 26.<sup>40</sup>

The only documented USAF air strike in the immediate vicinity of Hwanggan area occurred southwest of No Gun Ri on July 27. This was a friendly fire incident in which an F-80 accidentally strafed the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment's command post at 7:15 in the morning. A Fifth Air Force ADVON message acknowledged that the plane was a F-80 from one of the 35th Fighter-Bomber Squadron's first three missions of the day (call sign Contour). The 8th Fighter-Bomber Wing fragmentary order for July 27, 1950, matched the F-80 squadron mission summary reports; the requirements and take-off times agreed with each other. The F-80 strafed a "wooden area into which many vehicle tracks were leading", undoubtedly the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry's command post. The strafing destroyed two U.S. trucks but claimed no lives. As a result of the careful scheduling of the air assets, as expressed in the daily frag order, 5th Air Force ADVON could, within a half-hour, identify the aircraft involved. If a similar incident occurred on July 26, it would have been detected and reported as was the one on July 27.

The Navy discovered no evidence of naval aircraft operating in the vicinity of No Gun Ri on July 26 or 27. However, on July 28, Navy aircraft from the *USS Valley Forge* were directed into the area and attacked a railroad tunnel and other targets forward of the 7th Cavalry in the direction of Yongdong with bombs and machine guns.

At least 10 of the Korean witnesses stated that they observed a U.S. soldier using a radio to call for the air strike. It is important to note that an ordinary

ground soldier could not talk directly to a T-6 and request an air strike. Only the TACP with the jeep-mounted AN/VRC-1 radios could talk to the Air Force elements, including the strike aircraft. At best, the infantry or cavalry soldier carried a hand-held "walkie-talkie" radio or the larger backpack SCR-300 radio. To request an air strike, an Army unit, usually at the battalion level or higher, passed a request up through Army channels to the Joint Operations Center; the Joint Operations Center would validate the request and pass it to the Tactical Air Control Center (Mellow). This process included Mellow checking with the deployed Tactical Air Control Parties (ground-based U.S. Air Force elements that controlled U.S. Air Force close air-support missions), Mosquitoes, and Army liaison aircraft to acknowledge the target and direct the next available F-80 jets, propeller-driven F-51s, or Navy aircraft to attack the target. This procedure was slow. A moving target could easily have vanished between the time a ground soldier reported something up through channels and an aircraft arrived.<sup>41</sup> There was only one Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) operating in support of the 1st Cavalry Division during this period of time. This TACP was not located in the vicinity of No Gun Ri during the period of July 26 to July 29, 1950. The accidental air strike on the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, caused the 7th Cavalry Regimental Commander to request immediately that he be assigned a Tactical Air Control Party in order to control aircraft in his area and to preclude further friendly fire incidents.<sup>42</sup>

The U.S. Air Force History Team found 8th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron film of the No Gun Ri area dated August 6 and September 19, 1950. The Air Force Team showed this film to four retired photo interpreters of national reputation. All of these interpreters agree that there is evidence of probable bomb craters in the vicinity of the various tunnel openings to the west of No Gun Ri near Yongdong. They also state that the film shows no signs of bombing or strafing on the railroad tracks just west of No Gun Ri. A National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) photo interpreter maintains that some patterns near the tracks approximately 350 yards from the double railroad overpass show "an imagery signature of probable strafing" but no bomb damage. The NIMA interpreter's view specifically states that probable strafing occurred in two locations along the western track bed. One of these locations coincides with the location identified by the Korean witnesses as the area where they were strafed. The four retired photo interpreters disagree with this conclusion. Determining the exact date when this damage occurred is not possible, but the NIMA interpreters' viewpoint is that some evidence exists to suggest that an air strike could have occurred in late July in the vicinity of No Gun Ri.<sup>43</sup>

If the air strike occurred as described by the Koreans, and if American soldiers fired on the Koreans as they were taking cover under the double railroad overpass, the Koreans moved across open ground for a distance of approximately 300 meters. Their movement would have been directly into the line of fire from American soldiers in the vicinity of the double railroad overpass. What is more likely is that, if the civilians were receiving fire from the vicinity of the double

overpass, they would have moved west, away from the incoming fire and away from the double railroad overpass in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. This movement would have placed the civilians behind the safety of a ridgeline and out of the alleged line of fire.

Interviews with U.S. Army veterans also suggest the possibility that an air strike / strafing may have occurred on July 26, 1950, but only one veteran could give a date while the others could not provide dates. Sixteen U.S. veterans interviewed said they saw what they believed were U.S. aircraft on strafing runs.<sup>44</sup> The breakdown of what the veterans saw is as follows: Ten veterans did not see the target strafed. Only six veterans could identify the target that the aircraft strafed. Of these six, two veterans identified the target as a tank that had people, perhaps refugees, moving near it or riding on the tank's outer hull. One veteran said refugees mixed with an enemy column were strafed,<sup>45</sup> and one veteran said he saw refugees strafed in July - August 1950. Finally, two veterans from the 7th Cavalry Regiment said their own position was hit by strafing and in fact they were strafed on July 27, 1950.

Although some U.S. veteran's statements indicate they saw strafing, other U.S. veteran' statements support the U.S. Review Team' s conclusion that soldiers could not have called for an air strike. In their statements, U.S. veterans said communications were very difficult, and at times they did not have radio communication with Battalion and Regiment due to equipment shortages (batteries). In late July they relied primarily on landlines. One veteran stated his company could not have communicated with aircraft given their equipment.

The statements of the U.S. pilots interviewed do not support the description given by the Korean witnesses of the air strike / strafing. Several U.S. Air Force veteran pilots that the U.S. Review Team interviewed remembered the name Yongdong and knew that they flew missions there on July 26, 1950. None of these veterans remembered any mission resembling the alleged events in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. Sixteen of the 17 U.S. Air Force veterans interviewed believed that the NKPA soldiers were infiltrating civilian refugee groups. At least five pilots interviewed visually confirmed that this infiltration was taking place.<sup>46</sup> A Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) veteran regularly observed NKPA soldiers dressed in civilian clothing.<sup>47</sup> Several pilots stated that they would have refused any orders to strafe civilians intentionally, although they never received any such orders.

No USAF veteran that the U.S. Review Team interviewed participated in, or had any knowledge of anyone participating in, the strafing of civilians in the vicinity of No Gun Ri in late July 1950. U.S. Air Force interviewees vividly recalled stern verbal policies implemented to prevent the attack of non-combatants; although no one recalled any written policies on this subject. Furthermore, all pilots interviewed stated that the visibility from their F-51, F-80, and T-6 cockpits was excellent. Although visibility was good, nearly all pilots interviewed (espe-

cially F-80 pilots) said that distinguishing between enemy troops and friendly forces proved very difficult or impossible, primarily as a result of the high air-speeds flown. None of the U.S. Air Force veterans interviewed had heard of any incident in the vicinity of No Gun Ri until the recent media coverage.

**Finding:** An exhaustive search of U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy records, and interviews with U.S. pilots did not identify an air strike in the No Gun Ri area on July 26, 1950. The number of Korean witness statements describing the strafing and the photograph interpretation by NIMA does not permit the U.S. Review Team to exclude the possibility that U.S. or allied aircraft might have hit civilian refugees in the vicinity of No Gun Ri during an air strike/ strafing on July 26, 1950. On July 27, 1950, an air strike did in fact occur on the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry's position near No Gun Ri that both the Air Force and Army recorded in official documents. On July 28, there was also an air strike on NPKA forces near 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment. If Korean civilians were near the positions of these strikes, they could have been injured.

The U.S. Review Team concluded that strafing may have occurred near No Gun Ri in the last week of July 1950 and could have injured or killed Korean civilians but that any such air strikes were not deliberate attacks on Korean civilians. The U. S. Review Team concluded that any air strikes / strafing occurring on July 26 took place under the same conditions as the air strikes / strafing on July 27, specifically an accidental air strike / strafing caused by the misidentification of targets and not a pre-planned strike. An accidental air strike / strafing could have happened due to several factors: target misidentification, lack of reliable communications, absence of a Tactical Air Control Party in the 7th Regiment, and the fluid nature of the battlefield. It was not a pre-planned strike on civilian refugees.

## **VI. Key Issue 6: Ground Fire in the Vicinity of No Gun Ri**

The U.S. Review Team concluded that ground fire, including small-arms, artillery, and mortar fire, hit and injured or killed some Korean refugees in the vicinity of No Gun Ri during the last week of July, 1950. The U.S. Review Team's research found no official records describing the shooting of a large number of refugees in the No Gun Ri area during the last week of July 1950.

Some U.S. and Korean witness statements indicate that U.S. ground forces fired toward refugees in the vicinity of No Gun Ri during the period July 26-29, 1950, as discussed below. Briefly, the Korean description of the events on July 26, 1950, is that refugees were strafed or bombed on the road. Some fled the area or hid in ditches and others went into the double railroad overpass tunnel where they were fired upon from different locations, for a period of up to four days, with the heaviest fire occurring on July 26 (which was the first day they report spending in the double railroad overpass). See Chapter 3 for details on U.S. tactical operations.

On the afternoon of July 26, 1950, the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, replaced the 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry, in the vicinity of Hill 207 near the village of Andae Ri. Records of the 5th Cavalry for July 26-29 indicate no incident involving refugees.<sup>48</sup> The 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, was reorganizing on July 26, after a disorganized night withdrawal from a location east of Yongdong to the vicinity of No Gun Ri. The 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, completed this reorganization at about 9:30 PM on July 26; however, 119 men were still unaccounted for. It took a position on the ridgeline overlooking the hamlet of No Gun Ri and across the road (what is now Highway 4) from 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment. In order for soldiers from the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, to reach their position on the ridgeline as they reorganized, they would have used this road. If there was heavy firing from the higher ground above the road into the double railroad overpass, soldiers from the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, would have also been in the path of that fire.

On July 27, the 1st Cavalry Division informed the 7th Cavalry Regiment that no friendly troops were operating to their south or west. The 7th Cavalry Regiment would then have considered movement to their front as probable North Korean activity. Therefore, the regiment may have believed that, with the possible exception of a friendly patrol, nothing but the enemy existed between them and Yongdong.

The reported position of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, on the ridgeline overlooking the village of No Gun Ri is inconsistent with the positions the veterans remember occupying. Some veterans described positions that are on the opposite side of the road (Highway 4) in the area initially occupied by the 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry, and later on the 26th by the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment. While the U.S. Review Team cannot resolve this inconsistency, there are some possible explanations. Some soldiers from the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, were unaccounted for following the disorganized withdrawal on the night of July 25 / 26. They may have dug into the positions they described for some period of time, possibly temporarily mixing in with another unit. Some soldiers may simply have dug in the wrong positions on the other side of the road near Hill 207, even after the reorganization. The veterans may also have been confused as to the north / south orientation of the area. At this time, the unit was retreating along the road, which ran to the northeast, not toward what most of them believed was the south. The veteran's memories may also be flawed and confused. After the passage of 50 years, some inconsistencies will never be explained.

U.S. veterans from the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, described several terrain features in the vicinity of No Gun Ri, including a double railroad overpass, single culvert, and a single tunnel.<sup>49</sup> The only way the directional orientation of their descriptions can be correct is if one assumes that they were at those positions on Hill 207 instead of along the ridgeline overlooking the village

of No Gun Ri in the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment's reported position. Given the degree of disorganization of the battalion, some soldiers, including possibly some of the 119 men missing, may not have been at their battalion's reported position. Korean witnesses describe these same terrain features. The features are also shown on the August 6, 1950, U.S. Air Force aerial reconnaissance photograph.

In interviews, twelve U.S. veterans stated that firing of various types including machinegun, mortar, and rifle firing occurred near unidentified people in civilian clothing outside the tunnels/ bridges in the vicinity of No Gun Ri (See Chapter 4). Some veterans stated that they fired over the heads of civilians to prevent movement toward U.S. positions. Some veterans stated that they observed U.S. fire as a response to perceived hostile fire from the refugee positions in the double railroad overpass and elsewhere. Three veterans remembered seeing fire from U.S. soldiers directed at a double railway overpass. Some veterans also remember intermittent NKPA and U.S. artillery and mortar fires throughout this period.

In all of the U.S. interviews, the firing described occurs for short periods of time (less than 60 minutes), unlike the descriptions of some Korean witnesses that the firing continued up to four days. However, there is no indication that anything resembling mass killings took place. The U.S. veterans did not receive orders to kill civilian refugees. Some U.S. veterans received an order to stop refugees and not to let them pass at No Gun Ri. As a result of that order, soldiers fired over the heads or in front of refugees to prevent their movement. Soldiers also fired in response to perceived hostile fire. The issuance of orders is discussed in Finding 7. Finally, the events as described in the U.S. witness interviews could not have caused the large number of casualties attributed by Korean witnesses to the ground fire at the double railroad overpass.

Based on interviews, the U.S. Review Team found that soldiers believed that they could take action in self-defense. Soldiers believed they could fire when fired upon or when they perceived hostile intent. Some of the ground fire was in self-defense; that is, in response to perceived hostile fire.

Some Korean witnesses estimated that the firing in the vicinity of No Gun Ri, which they state occurred during the day and night, lasted up to four days. Some Korean witnesses statements provide a range of times for the duration of the events at the double overpass from three to five days, but the statements are not consistent and the estimates of the duration of the event do not corroborate each other. The Korean statements suggest there were a large number of casualties, and a number of Koreans state that U.S. soldiers offered them assistance or medical aid.

Korean witnesses describe the same terrain features as the U.S. veterans, but Korean accounts focus on the double railroad overpass. Korean witnesses

stated that there was heavy firing on the double railroad overpass from U.S. soldiers on the afternoon of July 26. Some Korean witnesses stated that they went under the double railroad overpass after being strafed on the railroad track above it but that others also fled the area. After entering the tunnel, Korean witnesses state that they received heavy fire from outside the tunnel for an undetermined number of days. They remained prone in the tunnel to avoid being hit by weapons firing into the tunnel. Most of the deaths occurred on the first day; at some point, some younger men and children escaped from the tunnel. Nine Korean witnesses believed that the firing was coming from the hill above the overpass. Other descriptions imply that firing was coming from both sides of the tunnel.

Multiple Korean witnesses said that soldiers came to the tunnel to check on the civilians on the first day. Yet this is also the day on which the Korean witnesses indicated that they received the heaviest fire that killed many people and the day, on which they remained prone on the tunnel floor, placing bodies at the entrances of the tunnels to shield people in the tunnel. It is also the day on which two Korean witnesses indicate that soldiers transported Koreans from the tunnel in a jeep and on a truck. The U.S. Review Team cannot explain these inconsistencies.

In the Korean description of the events at No Gun Ri, Korean witnesses state that at some point younger men and children escaped over the mountain in the dark, and only women, children, and the elderly remained under the railroad overpass. If, as some Korean statements imply, both openings of the tunnel were covered by weapons fire during the day and night, the escape to either the west or east was unlikely. If, however, the firing was brief and sporadic, people could have fled the tunnel area.

A more plausible explanation of events, based on the available evidence, is that there was sporadic firing on July 26, as described above, for very short periods of time; there was much more intense fire beginning on July 27 as the 1st Cavalry Division retreated and the NKPA advanced toward Hwanggan. Official records indicate that the NKPA attacked the 7th Cavalry on July 27 and 28, and the 7th Cavalry employed every means at its disposal to defend itself, including the use of small-arms fire, mortars, and artillery.

Even after the heaviest documented fighting, the aerial reconnaissance photograph of August 6, 1950, shows no bodies, animal carcasses, or signs of graves in the vicinity of the double overpass (See Appendix B, Tab 3, and Appendix C). Some Korean witnesses stated they recalled returning to the area to look for family members during the period of early to mid-August and that there were numerous bodies in the area. Fighting positions and vehicle tracks are visible in the aerial photograph while human and animal remains are not.

Forensic examinations of the site around the double railroad overpass found bullets and bullet marks that were analyzed. Analysis of the bullets found

in the area of the double railroad overpass showed they were of U.S. manufacture. Soviet bullets were also found in the area. The bullets could have come from U.S. weapons or captured U.S. weapons being used by NKPA soldiers who passed through this area. U.S. Forces moved back through this area in September 1950. For a review of the forensic work, see Appendix C, Tab 2.

**Finding:** Although the U.S. Review Team cannot determine what happened near No Gun Ri with certainty, it is clear, based upon all available evidence, that an unknown number of Korean civilians were killed or injured by the effects of small-arms fire, artillery and mortar fire, and strafing that preceded or coincided with the NKPA's advance and the withdrawal of U.S. forces in the vicinity of No Gun Ri during the last week of July 1950. These Korean deaths and injuries occurred at different locations in the vicinity of No Gun Ri and were not concentrated exclusively at the double railroad overpass.

Some U.S. veterans describe fire that lasted for a few to fifteen minutes. Some Korean witnesses describe fire day and night on the tunnel for as long as four days. Because Korean estimates of the length of time they spent in the tunnel are so inconsistent, the U.S. Review Team drew no conclusion about the amount of time they spent in the tunnel.

The firing was a result of hostile fire seen or received from civilian positions or fire directed over their heads or near them to control their movement. The deaths and injuries of civilians, wherever they occurred, were an unfortunate tragedy inherent to war and not a deliberate killing.

## **VII. Key Issue 7: Issuance of Orders to Fire on Refugees**

The U.S. Review Team interviewers asked the U.S. veterans if they received orders or heard orders given to shoot civilian refugees. The veterans interviewed stated that they were not given orders to fire on refugees, and they did not hear orders to fire on refugees. However, the U.S. Review Team found that U.S. soldiers were given an order to stop the refugees or not let the refugees pass. In the absence of any other guidance this order could have been misunderstood or misconstrued. A more extensive review of the U.S. veterans' statements is found in Chapter 4.

Most U.S. veterans did not believe they were authorized to use deadly force against civilian refugees. Several veterans who received the instruction / order "do not let refugees pass" either "assumed" or "believed" that if the refugees tried to pass, they could use deadly force. A platoon leader who said that deadly force was not authorized against refugees also knew of the instruction "do not let the refugees pass." The platoon leader said that a soldier might have misunderstood this instruction and believed he could use deadly force to prevent civilian refugees from passing if they did not stop when directed to do so.

In interviews with the U.S. Review Team, several veterans stated they assumed there was an order to fire on civilians because artillery and mortar fires were used that may have hit civilians.<sup>50</sup> These veterans were adamant that there was an order, but they had no information to support their assertions. When interviewed, the veterans did not know who gave the order, they did not hear the order, they did not know when the order was given, and they personally did not receive the order.

Some U.S. veteran interviews indicate that U.S. ground forces fired at or towards civilians in the vicinity of No Gun Ri during the period July 26 - 29, 1950. The reasons the soldiers took these actions are discussed in the next two paragraphs.

Some firing at civilians occurred because soldiers said that they were told to keep the civilians pinned down or stopped. Two soldiers said they fired shots over their heads to keep the civilians from moving; they were not ordered to target and fire on the civilians. The only reference to orders prompting these actions was the order that the refugees were to be stopped or would not be allowed to approach and pass through friendly positions.

Several other veterans stated they observed firing at the civilians in response to perceived hostile fire from the positions near the double railroad overpass and elsewhere. Based on veteran's interviews, the U.S. Review Team found that soldiers believed that they could take action in self-defense against civilians; that is, if they were fired upon or if they saw actions that indicated hostile intent. Some veterans said they observed firing in the direction of the double railroad overpass in response to fire from that location. Return fire in this case would have been an action in self-defense, and no orders were required. The U.S. soldiers were repeatedly warned that North Korean soldiers wore civilian clothing over their uniforms in order to infiltrate U.S. positions. The U.S. soldiers were also told that North Korean soldiers would hide within refugee columns.

Former officers of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, that the U.S. Review Team interviewed remain adamant that the battalion commander issued no order to fire on refugees at any time. One former member of the battalion believed he saw a small group of civilians on the railroad tracks and that soldiers fired warning shots over their heads to stop them and keep them away from the battalion's position.

While conducting research, the U.S. Review Team found four references containing entries regarding actions against civilians.

The first reference was an abbreviated message which appeared in the 8th Cavalry Regiment message log dated 10:00 AM on July 24, 1950, that stated: "No refugees to cross the frontline. Fire everyone trying to cross the lines. Use discretion in case of women and children." This message did not

constitute an order from the 1st Cavalry Division to fire upon Korean civilians at No Gun Ri. There is no evidence that this message was retransmitted to, or received by subordinate units within the 8th Cavalry Regiment.

The 7th Cavalry Regiment was the unit in the vicinity of No Gun Ri on July 26. By July 26, 1950, the last elements of the 8th Cavalry Regiment were withdrawing from the vicinity of No Gun Ri to the division rear near Hwanggan. The U.S. Review Team found no evidence that the 8th Cavalry message was transmitted to the 5th or 7th Cavalry Regiments or any other subordinate element of the division.

The policy set by the 1st Cavalry Division Commander in his order of July 23, 1950, titled "Control of Refugee Movement" makes no mention of the use of force by soldiers. It stated: "Municipal authorities, local police and the National Police will enforce this directive." The U.S. Review Team concluded that the 8th Cavalry Regiment log entry did not constitute an order to fire upon Korean civilians at No Gun Ri.

The second reference was a 25th Infantry Division Commander's memorandum to commanders, issued on July 27, 1950. On the 25th of July, 1950, the 25th ID Activities Report stated: "Refugees and Korean Civilians were ordered out of the combat zone in order to eliminate possible serious traffic problems and to aid in blocking the infiltration of North Korean Forces through the lines. These instructions were passed to the civilians through the Korean Police."<sup>51</sup> The July 27, 1950 memo to Commanders reads: "Korean police have been directed to remove all civilians from the area between the blue lines shown on the attached overlay and report the evacuation has been accomplished. All civilians seen in this area are to be considered as enemy and action taken accordingly."<sup>52</sup> The area "between the blue lines" was in front of the 25th Infantry Division's main line of defense -- no-man's-land at best -- an area about to be occupied by the enemy. Two things are clear: actions had been taken in conjunction with the Korean National Police to clear the civilians out of the danger area; and, those actions were intended to ensure that noncombatants would not find themselves in harms way when the advancing NKPA subsequently made contact along the Division's front. After the area was deemed to be cleared, anyone caught in civilian clothes and suspected of being an enemy agent was to be turned over to the Counter Intelligence Corps, and not to the Korean Police immediately. There is nothing to suggest any summary measures were considered against refugees, or people dressed like them. The 25th Infantry Division was not in the vicinity of No Gun Ri.

The third reference was a memorandum, written by Major General (Retired) Turner C. Rogers, then Colonel Rogers, the Deputy Chief for Operations, Advanced Headquarters Fifth Air Force, to his commander on July 25, 1950, with the following subject: Policy on Strafing Civilian Refugees. This memorandum is not an order. It is a written record reflecting one officer's concerns about the

strafing of civilians. Some people have interpreted the memorandum to mean that blanket orders to fire on civilians existed. The U.S. Review Team does not agree with this interpretation.

The memorandum was prepared a few days after Colonel Rogers arrived in Korea. The memorandum expressed Colonel Rogers' concern about an unspecified Army request to strafe civilians approaching U.S. positions and recommended a policy be established "whereby Fifth Air Force aircraft will not attack civilian refugees, unless they are definitely known to contain North Korean soldiers or commit hostile acts." The recommended policy appears to be the practice followed by the USAF pilots the U.S. Team interviewed. Pilots sought out targets such as trucks, tanks, moving troops,<sup>53</sup> and groups of men in uniform.<sup>54</sup> The pilots fired when they were told a target was hostile<sup>55</sup> and fired back when fired upon.<sup>56</sup>

Despite the memorandum by Colonel Rogers, no USAF veteran that the U.S. Review Team interviewed participated in, or had any knowledge of anyone participating in, the strafing of civilians in the vicinity of No Gun Ri in late July 1950. U.S. Air Force interviewees vividly recalled stern verbal policies implemented to prevent the attack of non-combatants, although no one recalled any written policies on this subject. No USAF veteran that the U.S. Review Team interviewed participated in, or had any knowledge of anyone participating in, the strafing of civilians in the vicinity of No Gun Ri in late July 1950. Furthermore, all pilots interviewed stated that the visibility from their F-51, F-80, and T-6 cockpits was excellent. Although visibility was good, nearly all pilots interviewed (especially F-80 pilots) said that distinguishing between enemy troops and friendly forces proved very difficult or impossible, primarily as a result of the high air-speeds flown. None of the U.S. Air Force veterans interviewed had heard of any incident in the vicinity of No Gun Ri until the recent media coverage.

The U.S. Review Team interviewed Major General Rogers, but he did not remember the July 25, 1950, memo and did not remember any details about his duty position at Advance Headquarters Fifth Air Force.<sup>57</sup>

The fourth entry the U.S. Review Team found was a statement similar to the Colonel Rogers' memorandum in an extract from the *Aircraft Carrier Valley Forge* Activity Summary, a Navy document describing operations conducted on July 25, 1950:

Several groups of fifteen to twenty people dressed in white were sighted. The first group was strafed in accordance with information received from the Army that groups of more than eight to ten people were to be considered troops, and were to be attacked. Since the first pass indicated that the people seemed to be

civilians, other groups were investigated by non-firing runs.<sup>58</sup>

Like the U.S. Air Force's official records, no documentary evidence exists that shows that Navy aircraft willfully attacked civilian targets. A study of the command histories and after-action reports held by the Naval Historical Center indicates that the only units available for missions on July 26, Attack Squadron Fifty-Five (VA-55) and Fighter Squadron Fifty-Three (VF-53), were not used near No Gun Ri. Both squadrons deployed aboard the Aircraft Carrier *Valley Forge* (CV 45) as part of Carrier Air Group Five (CVG-5) from May 1 through December 1, 1950. In addition, the Navy leadership, down to the individual pilot, recognized fully the presence of civilians in the war zone, and leaders at each level of command acted to avoid engaging these non-combatants.<sup>59</sup>

Since both the Rogers' memorandum and this document are dated July 25, 1950, it is possible that they are referencing a single discussion in the Joint Operations Center, where both USAF and USN operations officers were co-located. The Navy statement reinforces the judgment that pilots were expected to exercise between selecting targets and the Army's desire to target NKPA troops wearing white, not noncombatants.

During the U.S. Review Team's research, no other documents or policy directives relating to the COL Rogers' memorandum or the U.S. Navy extract, such as the originating Army request for strafing action or any implementing documents prepared in reply to Colonel Rogers' memorandum, were located. After the passage of 50 years, determining why this memorandum was written is impossible.

**Finding:** Based upon the available evidence and despite some conflicting statements and misunderstandings, the U.S. Review Team concluded that U.S. commanders did not issue oral or written orders to shoot and kill Korean civilians during the last week of July 1950 in the vicinity of No Gun Ri.

A veteran stated that soldiers could have misunderstood the order not to let refugees pass or to stop refugees. Some veterans did believe that if a civilian would not stop, they could use deadly force to prevent civilians from passing.

Some veterans stated that there was an order to shoot civilians at No Gun Ri but had no information to support their assertions. These soldiers did not know who gave the order, did not hear the order, did not know when the order was given, and personally did not receive the order. As a result, the U.S. Review Team concluded that these veterans assumed that an order was given because artillery and mortars were fired. The U.S. Review Team also considered media statements quoting veterans who claimed that an order to shoot Korean civilians was given at No Gun Ri. The U.S. Review Team was unable to confirm these

reports because the witnesses either were not at No Gun Ri at the time or refused to speak to the U.S. Army.

Although the U.S. Review Team found four references (entry in the 8th Cavalry Regiment Message Log, 25th Infantry Division Commander's order, Colonel Rogers' memorandum, and an extract from the U.S. Navy's Aircraft Carrier *Valley Forge* Activity Summary) discussing actions against civilians, it did not find evidence of an order given to soldiers by a U.S. commander, orally or in writing, to kill Korean civilians in the vicinity of No Gun Ri in the last week of July 1950.

### **VIII. Key Issue 8: Number of Korean Deaths and Injuries**

The U.S. Review Team cannot conclusively determine the number of Korean deaths and injuries resulting from U.S. combat action in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. During meetings with the U.S. Review Team, ROK Review Team on August 3, 2000 and November 3, 2000 reported an unverified number of 248 casualties, which they stated was provided to them by the Yongdong County Office. The ROK Steering Group, at a meeting on December 7, 2000, in Seoul, ROK, repeated that the unverified number of casualties was 248. The initial Associated Press articles reported hundreds of people killed.<sup>60</sup>

Korean witness statements contain different estimates of how many people were killed or injured and how the bodies were buried. These witness statements described refugees piling dead bodies at the entrances of the tunnel,<sup>61</sup> dead cows on the railroad tracks,<sup>62</sup> bodies scattered near the railroad tracks,<sup>63</sup> and dozens of people dying.<sup>64</sup> Six Korean witnesses described the use of a mass grave or heard that a mass grave near the double tunnels was used.<sup>65</sup> Seven Korean witnesses said that they returned to the tunnel area four to seven days after the incident to recover bodies.<sup>66</sup> These witnesses said they saw some or many dead decomposing bodies in the area and that some bodies had been temporarily buried.<sup>67</sup> One Korean witness reported that refugee bodies from villages other than Im Gae Ri and Joo Gok Ri were not buried until mid August.<sup>68</sup> Despite these reports, no bodies or animal carcasses, or signs of the decomposition of bodies, were observed on the August 6, 1950, U.S. Air Force aerial reconnaissance photograph that was analyzed by the National Imagery and Mapping Agency and the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology. Some Korean statements describe only the deaths or injuries of family members,<sup>69</sup> and others only estimate the total number of deaths and injuries.<sup>70</sup> Korean witness estimates range between 60 -100 dead in the double tunnel and 50 - 150 dead or injured from strafing / bombing.<sup>71</sup> An evaluation of Korean and U.S. veteran witness statements is found in Chapter 4.

The U.S. Review Team's research revealed no official records of refugee deaths or injuries in the vicinity of No Gun Ri between July 26 and July 29, 1950. Some U.S. veterans describe dead or injured civilians.<sup>72</sup> These estimates range

from a few to a single veteran who gave a number of 200. The soldiers did not check bodies, and some estimates appear to be guesswork or not related to this incident. Most U.S. veterans who passed through the vicinity of No Gun Ri in late July 1950 during their withdrawal toward the Nakdong River did not observe human or animal remains or graves in the area.<sup>73</sup> The U.S. Review Team believes that it is unlikely that hundreds of dead bodies were present in the vicinity of No Gun Ri during the last week of July 1950 based on the statements of U.S. veterans and the examination of the August 6, 1950, aerial photograph by the National Imagery and Mapping Agency and the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology.<sup>74</sup>

**Finding:** Based on the available evidence, the U.S. Review Team is unable to determine the number of Korean civilians who were killed or injured in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. During their investigation, the ROK Review Team reported that the Korean survivors' organization claimed an unverified number of 248 South Korean civilians killed, injured, or missing in the vicinity of No Gun Ri between July 25 and 29, 1950. This report was recorded by the Yongdong County Office. The ROK Steering Group, at a ROK-U.S. Steering Group meeting on December 6-7, 2000, in Seoul, ROK, reiterated the claim of 248 casualties.

The actual number of Korean casualties cannot be derived from the U.S. veteran statements and Korean witness statements. The U.S. Team believes that number to be lower than the Korean claim. An aerial reconnaissance photograph of the No Gun Ri area taken on August 6, 1950, shows no indication of human remains or mass graves in the vicinity of the No Gun Ri double railroad overpass. Korean burial customs, farming in the area, lack of reliable information, wartime disruptions of the countryside, and the passage of time preclude an accurate determination of the numbers involved.

## **Conclusion**

During late July 1950, Korean civilians were caught between withdrawing U.S. forces and attacking enemy forces. As a result of U.S. actions during the Korean War in the last week of July 1950, Korean civilians were killed and injured in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. The U.S. Review Team did not find that the Korean deaths and injuries occurred exactly as described in the Korean account. To appraise these events, it is necessary to recall the circumstances of the period. U.S. forces on occupation duty in Japan, mostly without training for, or experience in, combat were suddenly ordered to join ROK forces in defending against a determined assault by well-armed and well-trained NKPA forces employing both conventional and guerilla warfare tactics. The U.S. troops had to give up position after position. In the week beginning July 25, 1950, the 1st Cavalry Division, withdrawing from Yongdong toward the Nakdong River, passed through the vicinity of No Gun Ri. Earlier, roads and trails in South Korea had been choked with civilians fleeing south. Disguised NKPA soldiers had mingled with these refugees. U.S. and ROK commanders had published a policy designed to limit the

threat from NKPA infiltrators, to protect U.S. forces from attacks from the rear, and to prevent civilians from interfering with the flow of supplies and troops. The ROK National Police were supposed to control and strictly limit the movements of innocent refugees.

In these circumstances, especially given the fact that many of the U.S. soldiers lacked combat-experienced officers and noncommissioned officers, some soldiers may have fired out of fear in response to a perceived enemy threat without considering the possibility that they might be firing on Korean civilians.

Neither the documentary evidence nor the U.S. veterans' statements reviewed by the U.S. Review Team support a hypothesis of deliberate killing of Korean civilians. What befell civilians in the vicinity of No Gun Ri in late July 1950 was a tragic and deeply regrettable accompaniment to a war forced upon unprepared U.S. and ROK forces.

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> Book 2, Combat Effectiveness Reports 1st Quarter, and Book 3, Combat Effectiveness Reports 2nd Quarter, enclosures to Headquarters Eighth U.S. Army, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, "Command Report G-3 Section, 1 January 1950 thru 30 June 1950," Box P726, Historical Section, Eighth United States Army, RG 338, NARA.

<sup>2</sup> War diary, 1st Cavalry Division, June-July 1950. In the Records of U. S. Army Commands, Cavalry Divisions 1940-1967, Box 131, RG 338, NARA.

<sup>3</sup> Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 20-105, *Army Four-Hour Pre-Combat Orientation Course (Korea)*, August 1950. In Army Intelligence Decimal Files 1950, Entry 2A, Box 572, RG 319, NARA.

<sup>4</sup> Narrative Historical Report, 25th Infantry Division, 8-31 Jul 50. In AG Command Reports (War Diaries) 1949-1954, 25th Infantry Division History Jul 50, Entry 429, Box 3746, RG 407, NARA.

<sup>5</sup> Memorandum, Headquarters (HQs) 1st Cavalry Division (1CD), 23 Jul 50, sub: Control of Refugee Movement. In Records of U.S. Army Commands, Cavalry Divisions 1940-1967, 1st Cavalry Division, Box 127, RG 338, NARA; see Chapter 2 of this report for a more detailed discussion of the refugee control policies.

<sup>6</sup> Informal Check Slip, Eighth United States Army Korea (EUSAK) HQs, 26 Jul 50, sub: Control of Refugees. In Records of U.S. Army Commands, 8th Army Adjutant General Section 1944-1956, Security-Classified General Correspondence 1950, Box 729, RG 338, NARA.

<sup>7</sup> Message, EUSAK. CNR: G 20578 KGP. 26 Jul 50, sub: Controlled Movement of All Refugees, In Records of U.S. Army Commands, Korean Military Advisory Group, Box 23, RG 338, NARA.

<sup>8</sup> Intelligence Instruction No. 4, EUSAK, 27 Jul 50. In Records of the Army Staff, Army Intelligence Project Decimal Files 1951-1952, Korea, Entry 47G, Box 163, RG 319, NARA.

<sup>9</sup> Order for Korean Leaflet, General Headquarters (GHQ), Far East Command (FEC) Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, Psychological Warfare Branch, circa 1950. In Records of the Army Staff; Records of the Executive Office, Unclassified Decimal File 1949-1950, Entry 260A, Box 17, RG 319, NARA.

<sup>10</sup> Monograph, "Civilian Control in South Korea," by LTC J.P. Powhida. In Records of the Office of the Provost Marshal General; Administrative Division Mail and Records Branch, Classified Decimal File 1951-1952, Entry 433B, Box 221, RG 389, NARA.

<sup>11</sup> War diary, 1st Cavalry Division, June-July 1950. In the Records of U. S. Army Commands, Cavalry Divisions 1940-1967, Box 131, RG 338, NARA.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid

<sup>15</sup> Ibid and Activities report, Headquarters 1st Cavalry Division (Inf), July 1950. In the Records of the Adjutant General's Office, AG Command Reports 1949-1954, Box 4405, RG 407, NARA.

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- <sup>16</sup> War Diary , 8th Cavalry Division, 18-30 July 1950. In the Records of U.S. Army Commands, Cavalry Regiments 1940-1967, Box 42, RG 338, NARA.
- <sup>17</sup> War diary summary, Headquarters 7th Cavalry (Infantry), June-July 1950. In the Records of the Adjutant General's Office, AG Command Reports 1949-1954, Box 4431, RG 407, NARA.
- <sup>18</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>19</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>20</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>21</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>22</sup> Activities report, Headquarters 1st Cavalry Division (Inf), July 1950. In the Records of the Adjutant General's Office, AG Command Reports 1949-1954, Box 4405, RG 407, NARA.
- <sup>23</sup> "Report of the First OCAFF (Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces) Observer Team to the Far East Command", 16 August 1950, RG 387, entry 55, Box 171, NARA.
- <sup>24</sup> War diary summary, Headquarters 7th Cavalry (Infantry), June-July 1950. In the Records of the Adjutant General's Office, AG Command Reports 1949-1954, Box 4431, RG 407, NARA.
- <sup>25</sup> Headquarters 1st Cavalry Division (Infantry), Periodic Intelligence Report #5, 1800 26 July 1950, Box 45, 1st Cavalry Division, Cavalry Divisions 1940-1967, RG 338, NARA.
- <sup>26</sup> War diary, 1st Cavalry Division, June-July 1950. In the Records of U. S. Army Commands, Cavalry Divisions 1940-1967, Box 131, RG 338, NARA.
- <sup>27</sup> War diary, 1st Cavalry Division, June-July 1950. In the Records of U. S. Army Commands, Cavalry Divisions 1940-1967, Box 131, RG 338, NARA.
- <sup>28</sup> Interviews with three soldiers March 3, 2000.
- <sup>29</sup> Memorandum, Headquarters (HQs) 1st Cavalry Division (1CD), 23 July 1950, sub: Control of Refugee Movement. In the Records of U.S. Army Commands, 1st Cavalry Division 1940-1967, Box 127, RG 338, NARA.
- <sup>30</sup> Periodic Operations Report No. 13, 23 July 1950. In the Records of U.S. Army Commands, 1st Cavalry Division 1940-1967, Box 56, RG 338, NARA.
- <sup>31</sup> Korean witnesses are not identified by name but are identified by their status in July 1950, that is adult, teenager, or child. 4 children, 4 teenagers and 2 adults saw the radio.
- <sup>32</sup> Five Korean witness statements (3 teenagers, 1 child, and 1 adult).
- <sup>33</sup> Korean witness statements (including 8 children, 4 teenagers, 2 adults and one person whose age was not provided).
- <sup>34</sup> Korean witness statements (3 children, 2 teenagers and 3 adults).
- <sup>35</sup> Korean witness statements (3 adults).
- <sup>36</sup> Korean witness statements (1 child and 2 teenagers).

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- <sup>37</sup> Korean witness statement (child).
- <sup>38</sup> Korean witness statement (child).
- <sup>39</sup> Korean witness statement (child).
- <sup>40</sup> See Chapter 3.
- <sup>41</sup> See Chapter 3.
- <sup>42</sup> HQ, 7th Cavalry (Infantry) War Diary, June-July 1950, in the records of the Adjutant General's Office, AG Command Reports 1949 - 1954, Box 4431, RG 407, NARA.
- <sup>43</sup> See Appendix C.
- <sup>44</sup> U.S. interviews with 4 officers, 2 noncommissioned officers, and 10 enlisted soldiers.
- <sup>45</sup> U.S. interviews with 2 noncommissioned officers, 1 officer and 1 enlisted soldier.
- <sup>46</sup> U.S. interviews with 4 pilots.
- <sup>47</sup> U.S. interview with pilot.
- <sup>48</sup> Based on the statements of Korean witnesses, the refugees who were fired on did not arrive in this area until after or about the same time the 5th Cavalry Regiment was departing.
- <sup>49</sup> While these terrain features are located in the No Gun Ri area, similar terrain features in Korea may contribute to confusion in the veteran's memories.
- <sup>50</sup> One of the soldiers who believed there must have been an order to fire mortar rounds conceded that he believed the mortar round he saw fall was a warning round. Several veterans including 3 noncommissioned officers and 2 enlisted soldiers believe there must have been an order.
- <sup>51</sup> Memorandum, Commander, 25th Infantry Division, 27 Jul 50.
- <sup>52</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>53</sup> U.S. interview with pilot.
- <sup>54</sup> U.S. interview with pilot.
- <sup>55</sup> U.S. interview with pilot.
- <sup>56</sup> U.S. interview with pilot.
- <sup>57</sup> U.S. interview with officer.
- <sup>58</sup> Valley Forge (CV 45), *Report of Operations*, 16 July to 31 July 1950, 16.  
<<http://www.history.navy.mil/branches/v-forge.htm>>
- <sup>59</sup> See Chapter 3.
- <sup>60</sup> See Chapter 1.

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- <sup>61</sup> Korean witness statements (1 child and 1 teenager).
- <sup>62</sup> Korean witness statement (adult).
- <sup>63</sup> Korean witness statement summarized in ROK, "On-Site Technical Investigation." provided to the U.S. Review Team in August 2000.
- <sup>64</sup> Different Korean witnesses give different estimates including the following: 60 dead bodies in the tunnel; 60 to 100 people died in the tunnels; the bombing killed about 100 -150 people and there were 50 -60 bodies were on the railroad track.
- <sup>65</sup> Korean witness statements summarized in ROK "On-Site Technical Investigation" provided to U.S. Review Team in August 2000.
- <sup>66</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>67</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>68</sup> Korean witness statement summarized in ROK "On-Site Technical Investigation."
- <sup>69</sup> Korean witness statements (3 children and 1 teenager) and witness statements summarized in ROK "On-site Technical Investigation."
- <sup>70</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>71</sup> See note 5.
- <sup>72</sup> U.S. Veteran estimates of wounded and dead varied for example 8 - 9 who could have been dead or injured, possibly several dead or injured, close to two hundred, and maybe 50 -60 killed or injured I am just not sure. At least ten veterans talk about refugees being killed or injured in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. However, some of the veterans who observed dead or injured refugees and do not know how or when they were wounded.
- <sup>73</sup> Appendix B, Tab 1.
- <sup>74</sup> Appendix D and Appendix B, Tab 2.

## **Appendix A**

### **RECORDS RESEARCH**

#### **I. Research Methodology**

The Inspector General's Office was tasked by the Secretary of Defense through the Secretary of the Army to conduct research to enable a full and fair accounting of incidents alleged to have occurred involving citizens of the Republic of Korea in, or traveling through areas under the control of the U.S. Army operating in the Republic of Korea in the vicinity of No Gun Ri, during the last week of July 1950. The research project would include but not be limited to aerial photography and map analysis, interviews from veterans, primary source textual documentation, and still photography. The multi-pronged research project began by establishing teams in the different areas focusing on textual documentation, interviews, and map analysis of the area in question. A research team, an interview team, and a mapping/aerial photography team began piecing together the early days of the Korean War. The textual research team's efforts are described in length later in this section.

The interview team's main goal was identifying individuals with firsthand knowledge of the area in question and the activities occurring there during the last week of July 1950. Personnel payroll records, Veterans Service Organizations, Korean War web sites, the Inspector General's No Gun Ri web site, and media accounts were used to create a listing of potential interviewees who had served during the Korean War. Further information regarding the interview team's methodology and findings are covered in Chapter 4.

The mapping/aerial photography team began by locating historical aerial photography, contemporary with the alleged incident. Additional information on the mapping/aerial photography team's efforts are covered in Appendix C.

A diverse research team consisting of elements from the Army Inspector General's Office and professional researchers from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, St. Louis District undertook the textual documentation research project. Simultaneously the Air Force and the Navy conducted independent research regarding allegations of a strafing incident involving civilian refugees just prior to the No Gun Ri alleged incident. While conducting their research, the Air Force research staff reviewed records pertaining to the Army's investigation. They informed the Army of any significant documents or grouping of documents pertaining to the alleged incident. Their research methodology and findings are found in Chapter 3.

The textual research team began by identifying repositories with the greatest possibility of having pertinent information. Then they visited each location to conduct research. A research team systematically reviewed records

for approximately eight months and a detailed listing of the repositories selected and their activities are described in the following paragraphs.

## **II. Research Repositories**

The following sections describe in lengthy detail records reviewed and/or research strategies at each of the research locations identified as having information on the Korean War.

### **National Archives and Records Administration**

**8601 Adelphi Road  
College Park, MD 20740  
(301) 713-6800**

The National Archives is the main repository for relevant records pertaining to operations in the Republic of Korea during 1950. Since there are few electronic finding aids and no Korean War era textual documents on computer, the research team did a manual review of paper documents. The research team took a very broad, expansive approach to conducting the research at the National Archives. Numerous record groups were identified as potentially useful. The research team consulted and included the recommendations of senior archivists and reviewed numerous finding aids to pinpoint pertinent records dealing with activities in Korea during the first year of the war. Generally military records for 1950 were reviewed. Appropriate Command, division, and unit records were reviewed as well as non-military and captured North Korean documentation. While reviewing captured materials particular emphasis was placed on information pertaining to combat operations occurring between Yong Dong and Hwanggan, reports of alleged atrocities, instructions or orders on the use of ROK civilians on the battlefield, any maps showing positions in the area being examined, and reconnaissance reports. Still pictures, motion pictures/films, cartographic, and microfilm holdings were also reviewed by the research team.

The following paragraphs describe the numerous avenues of research conducted by the research team. The detailed listing describes record groups and entries reviewed as well as the individual boxes.

### **Record Group 59 General Records of the Department of State**

Entry 205L: Interfiles to the Decimal Files, 1950-1955  
Boxes 1-10

Entry 229A: Country Files, 1934-1953  
Boxes 1-2

- Entry 399A: Top Secret Subject File (Lot 56D 151), 1945-1950  
Boxes 12-19
- Entry 399B: Regional Affairs Subject Files, 1929-1953  
Boxes 1-6
- Entry 399C: Country Files, 1929-1953  
Boxes 7-20
- Entry 436: Division of Historical Policy Research and Its Predecessors, Special Studies and Reports, 1944-1950  
Boxes 1-16
- Entry 697: Miscellaneous Subject Files (Lot 55D 560), 1946-1954  
Boxes 1-8
- Entry 719: Working Papers and Source Material for Miscellaneous War Histories, 1940-1950  
Boxes 60-68
- Entry 1130: Subject File (Lot 53D 26), 1949-1953  
Boxes 1-14
- Entry 1138: Miscellaneous Correspondence and Memorandums (Lot 55D 458), 1950  
Box 1
- Entry 1193: Records of Dean Acheson, Country File, 1949-1953  
Boxes 23-24
- Entry 1196: General Correspondence Files (Lot 53D 444)  
Boxes 30-33
- Entry 1198: Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, 1953  
Boxes 1-3
- Entry 1199: Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, 1948-1959  
Box 3
- Entry 1203: Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (John Moore Allison) (Lot File 55D 282), 1950-1952  
Box 1
- Entry 1208: Numerical File, 1949-1955  
Boxes 34, 40

- Entry 1215: Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs Subject Files, 1948-1955  
Box 1
- Entry 1225: Briefing Books and Reference Materials Relating to Korea, 1947-1956 (microfilm C0044)  
Reels 14-19
- Entry 1228: Miscellaneous Records Relating to Japan and Korea, 1945-1953  
Boxes 1-2
- Entry 1231: Alpha-Numeric File of Korea, 1952-1957  
Boxes 1-5
- Entry 1251: Korean Project of the Division of Historical Policy Research  
Boxes 1-45
- Entry 1260: General Records of the Executive Secretariat (Lot 56D 459), 1948-1956  
Boxes 1-9
- Entry 1360: Special Assistant to Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence, Division of Research for Far East, 1946-1952  
Box 1-5
- Entry 1361: Records of Division of Research for Far East (Lot 58D 245), 1946-1952  
Boxes 6-9
- Entry 1420: Records Relating to the International Refugee Organization and the Displaced Persons Commission, DP Subject File, 1944-1952  
Boxes 1-16
- Entry 1460: Office Files of Marshall D. Shulman Special Assistant to the Secretary of State (Lot 53D 403), 1950-1953  
Boxes 1-30
- Entry 1469: Records of the Historical Studies Division Research Memorandums (Slash Series), 1946-1954  
Boxes 1, 2
- Entry 1471: Records of the Historical Studies Division Research Projects, 1945-1954  
Boxes 2, 6, 11-21
- Entry 1508: Office of the Deputy Undersecretary for Administration Subject Files, 1946-1953

Boxes 1-2

Entry 1526: Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, Subject Files, 1949-1953

Boxes 1-2

Entry 1530: Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, Subject Files of Francis H. Russell, 1945-1952

Box 5

Entry 1559: Records Relating to International Information Activities, 1938-1953

Boxes 97, 113, 162

Entry 1583A: Records of Policy Planning Staff Relating to State Department Participation in the National Security Council, 1935-1962

Boxes 19-21

Entry 1595: Bureau of Intelligence and Research, 1947-1963

Boxes 1-21

Entry 1603: Records Relating to Bacteriological Warfare (Lot File 65D 473)

Box 1

Entry 1605: Department of State Documents Relating to United Nations Affairs (Lot File 71D 440), 1945-1964

Boxes 1-8

Entry 1620: General Records of the Executive Secretariat (Lot 56D 459), 1948-1956

Boxes 1-9

Entry 3069: Subject and Country Files, 1941-1962

Boxes 1-4

Entry 5224: Records Relating to Korea, 1952-1966

Boxes 1-6

Entry 5298: Records Relating to Military Matters, 1942-1966

Boxes 5-23

Entry 203C: Decimal File, Purport Card Index, 1950-1954, Dispatches/Telegrams/Airgrams/Instructions

Boxes 378-383

Entry: Decimal File, 1950-1954

Boxes 2882-2888

Entry: Records Relating to Worldwide Program Objectives, 1948-1957  
Boxes 7, 8

Entry C0012: Records of the Chinese Affairs, 1945-1955 (microfilm)  
Reels 15, 16, 21, 22

Entry C0043: Confidential U.S. State Department Special Files Japan, 1947-1956 (microfilm)  
Reels 26, 27

Entry C0042: Confidential U.S. State Department Files Korea, 1940-1957 (microfilm)  
Reels 1, 2

Entry LM081: Records of the U.S. Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Korea Decimal Files, 1950-1954 (microfilm)  
Reels 1-32

#### **Record Group 84 Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State**

Entry 2845: Seoul (Korea) Mission and Embassy General Records, 1953-1955  
Box 1

Entry 2846: Seoul Korea Mission and Embassy Classified General Records, 1952-1955  
Boxes 1-19

Entry 2847: Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Korea: Seoul Mission and Embassy, Miscellaneous Classified Records, 1948-1955  
Box 1

Entry 2848: Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Korea: Seoul Mission and Embassy, Miscellaneous Classified Records, 1948-1955  
Box 1

#### **Record Group 92 Records of the Office of the Quartermaster General**

Entry 1892C: General Correspondence Geographical File, 1949-1950  
Box 78

Entry 1892F: Classified Geographic File, 1946-1952  
Box 39

Entry 1894A: General Correspondence Miscellaneous File, 1939-1959

Boxes 497-498, 507-508

Entry 1894D: Classified Miscellaneous File, 1946-1952  
Boxes 3-4, 15-18, 36-38, 42-43

Entry 2116J: Copies of Formerly Security-Classified Documents relating to the  
Quartermaster Corps in the Korea War, 1950-1951  
Boxes 1-24

### **Records of the Office of the Surgeon General**

Entry 1014: Refiles from the U.S. Army Center for Military History (DA Form 543)  
Boxes 4, 6-50

Entry: Historical Medical Units  
Boxes 217-251, 261, 285, 289, 290, 296, 297, 317, 318, 336, 337, 341,  
342, 347, 354, 475-500, 566-568

Entry: General Headquarters Records of the U.S. Army Hospitals  
Boxes 1, 85-111

Entry: Minutes of the Surgeon General's Early Morning Conference  
Boxes 2, 3

Entry: Psychiatry and Neurology Consultant  
Boxes 1-8, 10

Entry: Legal Office  
Boxes 1-11

Entry: AMEDD Office of the Surgeon General  
Boxes 1-8, 51-54, 269

Entry: Office of the Surgeon General (AMEDD), 1947-1961, Dental Activities,  
Far East, 1950-1951  
Boxes 199, 202, 208, 210, 211

### **Record Group 153 Records of the Office of the Judge Advocate General**

Entry 181: International Affairs Division War Crimes Branch; Investigations of  
Atrocities Against POWs in Korea, 1952-1954  
Boxes 911, 915-962

Entry 182: War Crimes Division, Historical Reports of the War Crimes Division,  
1952-1954  
Boxes 1, 3

Entry 183: Operation Big Switch Interrogation Reports, 1953-1954  
Boxes 1-6

Entry 186: War Crimes Division, Historical Reports of the War Crimes Division,  
1952-1954  
Boxes 1-2

Entry 306: International Affairs Division War Crimes Branch, Investigations of  
Atrocities Against POWs in Korea, 1952-1954  
Boxes 910, 916, 964-976

Entry 1029: War Crimes Branch; Records Regarding War Crimes in Korea,  
1950-1953  
Box 1

Entry 1030: War Crimes Branch; Reading File, 1951-1957  
Box 1

Entry 1031: War Crimes Branch; Historian Background Files  
Boxes 1-2

**Record Group 159 Records of the Office of the Inspector General (Army)**

Entry 25C: Index to Decimal Correspondence, 1917-1954  
Boxes 1-26

Entry 25D: Office of the Inspector General (Army) Subject, Name, and Military  
Unit Indexes to Formerly Secret Correspondence, 1917-1954  
Boxes 1-27

Entry 26G: Administrative Office Mail and Records Section Decimal File  
Unclassified through Secret Correspondence, 1947-1962  
Boxes 781, 782

Entry: Administrative Office Mail and Records Section, Decimal File, June 1952-  
June 1953  
Box 1668

**Record Group 218 Records of the U.S. Joint Chief of Staff**

Entry 5: Central Decimal File, 1948-1950  
Boxes 1-93, 231-253

Entry 7: Geographic File, 1948-1950  
Boxes 1-24

Entry 48: Chairman's File, General Bradley, 1949-1953  
Boxes 1-8

Entry 94A: Incoming Messages (Declassified)  
Boxes 1-10

Entry 100: JCS Report for Senate Committee on Korean Operations Korean Highlights  
Boxes 1-7

Entry 101: History of the Korean Conflict: Korean Armistice Negotiations, May 1952-July 1953  
Boxes 1-3

Entry 102: JCS Historical Office, Dr. Edward P. Lilly (Papers) on Psychological Warfare  
Boxes 1-21

Entry 103: The Joint Chief of Staff and National Policy  
Boxes 1-2

#### **Record Group 242 National Archives Collection of Foreign Records Seized**

Entry 299: Captured Korean Documents  
Boxes 17-185

#### **Record Group 247 Records of the Office of the Chief of Chaplains**

Entry 484: Chaplain's "201" Files  
Boxes 1-26 (RA)  
Boxes 1-80 (ROTC)

#### **Record Group 263 Records of the Central Intelligence Agency**

Entry 19: Records Relating to the CIA History Staff's History Source Collection, 1946-1978  
Boxes 1-5

Entry 21: (Record Copy of) G.S. Jackson and H.P. Claussen Organization of the CIA, 1950-1957  
Boxes 1-2

Entry 24: Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Reports, 1941-1959  
Boxes 325-382

Entry: (Record Copy of) G.S. Jackson and H.P. Claussen  
"Organization of the CIA," 1950-1957  
Boxes 1-2

**Record Group 319 Records of the Army Staff**

Entry: Records of the Medical History Division  
Box 1

Entry: ATIS-FEC  
Boxes 309-316

Entry 2A: Army Intelligence Decimal Files, 1950  
Boxes 464-484, 548-556, 558-564, 566-624, 625, 751-753, 760

Entry 4: Top Secret Correspondence, 1948-1962  
Boxes 1-19

Entry 14: General Council Minutes, 1942-1952  
Boxes 896-911

Entry 26: G-1 Decimal Files, 1951-1952  
Boxes 442, 443, 751-770, 773, 798, 1273-1280, 1286, 1287

Entry 33: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 (Intelligence) Counter Intelligence Corps  
Collections  
Boxes 1-5

Entry 47: Army Intelligence Decimal File, 1949-1950  
Boxes 143-151, 167

Entry 47E: Army Intelligence Decimal File, 1949-1950  
Boxes 1-7

Entry 47E: Secret Records Regarding Miscellaneous Organizations,  
Associations, Subject and Titles, 1942-57  
Boxes 1-3

Entry 47F: Army Intelligence Project Decimal File, 1949-1950  
Boxes 53-55, 127-130, 170

Entry 47F: Foreign Training Program Control Files 1950-1956  
Boxes 1-19

Entry 47G: Army Intelligence Project Decimal Files, 1951-1952  
Boxes 1-18, 24, 33, 163, 164

Entry 47I: Army Intelligence Decimal File, 1951-1952

Boxes 1-3, 162-170, 183

Entry 51: Records of the Office of the Chief of Information, Summaries of Korean War Armistice Negotiations, July 1951-July 1953

Boxes 1-2

Entry 57F: Incoming and Outgoing Messages, 1950

Boxes 1-95

Entry 57G: Assistant Chief of Staff G-2 (Intelligence) Incoming and Outgoing Messages, 1951

Boxes 1-75, 82-105

Entry 60: Records of the Public Affairs Division, Security Classified Correspondence, 1950-1964

Boxes 1-24

Entry 61: Record of the Public Affairs Division Correspondence, 1951-1954

Boxes 1-24

Entry 63: Microfilm Copy of Unpublished History Studies, 1943-1965

Boxes 1, 2, 3, 5

Entry 64: Security Classified Correspondence of the Economics Division Relating to Korea, Japan and the Ryukyu Islands

Boxes 1-24

Entry 65: Records of the Economic Division Relating to Korea, Japan, and the Ryukyu Islands, 1949-1959

Boxes 1-10

Entry 82: Assistant Chief of Staff G-2 (Intelligence) Administrative Division, Library Project File, 1946-1951

Boxes 279, 313-317, 807-833, 937, 938, 1053, 1173, 1174, 1175, 1176, 1180, 1181, 1182, 1348-1354, 1397-1416, 1432, 1433, 1435-1437, 1458-1460, 1470, 1477-1481, 1526, 1767, 1768, 1775-1777, 1796, 1996, 1997, 2019, 2220, 2143-2150, 2189-2192, 2233, 2352-2364, 2378, 2373, 2318, 2428-2436, 2537, 2629, 2630, 2634, 2636, 2649, 2695-2700, 2717-2725, 2765-2767, 2780, 2974, 2975, 2987, 2997, 3214-3216, 3263, 3247, 3302, 3324-3338, 3406, 3462-3490, 3491-3534, 3548, 3691, 3713-3716, 3801

Entry 82A: Reports and Messages, 1918-1951

Boxes 20-23, 26, 40-45, 95, 403, 404, 439, 911, 1135, 1171, 1175-1214, 1225, 1229, 1235, 1237

Entry 84E: Geographical Index to the Numerical Services of Intelligence Documents (ID File), 1944-51

Boxes 83-87

Entry 85: Army-Intelligence Document File

Boxes 2859, 3084, 3136, 3143, 3165, 3242, 3253, 3267, 3274, 3299, 3326, 3330, 3353, 3360, 3431, 3472, 3513, 3628, 3664, 3669, 3697, 3736, 3745, 3782, 3815, 3817, 3827, 3855, 3868, 3980-3982, 3988, 4006, 4016, 4018, 4019, 4032, 4037, 4038, 4043-4045, 4053, 4061, 4069, 4070, 4079, 4092, 4095, 4098, 4101, 4104, 4142, 4147, 4153, 4171, 4221, 4240, 4245, 4250, 4266, 4275, 4278, 4286, 4290, 4292, 4296, 4300, 4301, 4308, 4311, 4375, 4377, 4425, 4435, 4451, 4452, 4443-4445, 4458, 4463-4465, 4467, 4468, 4475, 4473, 4470, 4483, 4486, 4488, 4505, 4508, 4513, 4518, 4520, 4521, 4526, 4540, 4541, 4550, 4566, 4570-4572, 4586, 4605, 4623, 4626, 4632, 4639, 4649, 4657, 4674, 4679, 4691, 4703, 4704, 4710, 4712, 4740, 4750, 4761, 4795, 4789, 4821, 4822, 4837, 4866, 4882, 4901, 4920, 4931, 4938, 4953, 4959, 4986, 5059, 5078, 5130, 5282, 5297, 5298, 5359, 5364, 5405, 5458, 5459, 5473, 5500, 5504, 5529, 5544, 5625, 5652, 5741, 5761, 5767, 5786, 5813, 5838, 5850, 5855, 5866, 5867, 5888, 5890, 5903, 5936, 5939, 5948, 5957, 5975, 5990, 6019, 6839, 7511, 9919

Entry 95: Assistant Chief of Staff G-3 Operations, Decimal File, 1950-1951

Boxes 529-600

Entry 97: Assistant Chief of Staff G-3 Operations, General Decimal File, 1950-1951

Boxes 118-127, 174-185

Entry 99: Korean Armistice Negotiations

Boxes 698-723

Entry 99A: Korea Message File, June 1950-May 1954

Boxes 724-727, 737-746, 748-751

Entry 101: General Administrative Files, 1947-1952

Boxes 9-11

Entry 101A: Special Correspondence Maintained by the Top Secret Control Office, 1943-1952

Boxes 1-7

Entry 103: Classified Decimal File, 1949-1954

Box 1

Entry 109: Bulky File, 1944-1950

Boxes 19-32

Entry 111: Records Relating to the Ammunition Shortage During the Korean Conflict, 1953  
Boxes 1-24

Entry 113: G-4 Decimal File, 1949-1950  
Boxes 626, 698, 904, 905, 1083, 1084

Entry 143: Records of the Office of the Chief of Military History, Correspondence Relating to the Historical Program of the U.S. Army, Pacific, 1949-1960  
Boxes 1, 2, 62-65

Entry 145: Records of the Historical Services Division, Publications, S/D Report Korea  
Box 10

Entry 145: Records of the Historical Services Division, Publication, Personnel Policies in the Korea Conflict  
Box 1

Entry 145D: Security Classified Microfilm, Copies of Unpublished Studies in the History of World War II and the Korean Conflict  
Boxes 15-25

Entry 146: Records of the Office of the Chief of Special Warfare, Minutes of Staff Meetings, 1950-1954  
Box 1

Entry 147: Records of the Office of the Special Warfare Reports, 1951-1954  
Box 1

Entry 148: Records of the Office of the Chief of Special Warfare, Organizational Records, 1950-1953  
Box 1

Entry 153A: Record of the Office of the Chief of Special Warfare Correspondence, 1951-1954  
Boxes 1-40

Entry 154: Records of the Plans and Operations Division, Records Maintained by the Records Message Branch Decimal File, 1949-1950  
Boxes 1-30, 190-268

Entry 158: Records of the Office of the Chief of Special Warfare Security Classified Intelligence Studies of Communist Nations (Country Books), 1951-1958

Boxes 1-60

Entry 160: Records of the Plans and Operations Division, Combined Forces Planning Memoranda, November 1948-July 1951

Boxes 1-4

Entry 233: Records of the Congressional Investigations Division, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 1943-1951

Boxes 78-90

Entry 241: Records of the Office of Plans and Policies Subject File, 1947-1954

Boxes 709-725

Entry 260A: Records of Executive Office, Unclassified, Decimal File, 1949-1950

Boxes 1-24

Entry 287: U.S. Army Chief of Information, Troop Information and Education Division, Decimal File, 1949-1950

Boxes 418-437

Entry 1013A: CI Files, 1950-1958

Boxes 1-46

Entry 1037: U.S. Army Center of Military History

Boxes 14, 15, 21, 38

Entry 1084: Counter Intelligence Corps Collection Numbered CHIC Reports

Boxes 1-14

Entry 1085: Counter Intelligence Corps Collection Numbered CHIC Reports

Boxes 1-14

Entry: Subject Index to Miscellaneous Top Secret Documents, 1950-1959

Box 1

Entry: Top Secret Intelligence Documents

Boxes 1-13

Entry: Records of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Records Re Military Attaches, Personnel Related Records

Box 2

Entry: U.S. Army Center of Military History, Background Papers (Korea)

Boxes 714-748

Entry: U.S. Army Center of Military History "Strategy and the Army"

Boxes 5 - 6

Entry: Records of the Historical Services Division, Personnel Policies in the Korean Conflict

Box 1

Entry: Top Secret Classified Subject and Administration Records, 1941-1962

Boxes 12-13

Entry: Correspondence Relating to the Historical Program of the U.S. Army, Pacific, 1949-1960

Boxes 1-2

Entry: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 (Intelligence) CIC Collection; Historians Background Material Files Concerning CIC History

Boxes 5-10

Entry: G-2 ACSI, CIC Files, Korea

Boxes 1-46

Entry: S-Series Dispatches and Cables, 1941-1964

Boxes 1-70

Entry: Records of the Military Assistance Division, General Correspondence, 1950-1962

Boxes 1-26, 30, 31

Entry: Counter Intelligence Corps Collection, Historian's Source-File of CIC Publications

Boxes 1-4

Entry: Counter Intelligence Corps Collection Command Reporting Files

Boxes 1-25

Entry: Counter Intelligence Corps Collection Historical Photographic Files

Boxes 1-5

Entry: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 (Intelligence) Counter Intelligence Corps Collection; Organizational History Files, 1950-1957

Boxes 65-66

Entry: Assistant Chief of Staff, Force Development Troop Basis Files, 1950-1970

Boxes 1-24

Entry: Army Intelligence Project Decimal File, 1950

Boxes 6, 23

Entry: Army Intelligence Project Decimal File, 1951-1952  
Boxes 29, 73

Entry: Army Intelligence Project Decimal Files, 1953  
Boxes 6, 21, 70, 71, 72, 75

Entry: Army Intelligence Project Decimal Files, 1954  
Boxes 8, 22, 28, 72, 76

Entry: CIC Historians Background Material  
Boxes 1-5

Entry: CIC Collection Historians Miscellaneous Source File  
Boxes 1-7

Entry: CIC Collection, Historians Background Material Files  
Boxes 1-15

Entry: CIC Collection Historian's Background Material Files Concerning CIC  
History  
Boxes 1-35

Entry: Records Relating to Army Attaches, Station Files, 1943-1956  
Boxes 1-24

Entry: Clandestine Intelligence Operation Controlled Files Section I, 1946-1963  
Boxes 1-47

Entry: CIC Organizational History Files, Histories of Numbered CIC & MI Units,  
1941-1942  
Boxes 1, 2, 3, 4, 53, 54, 55, 63, 64, 82

Entry: Records of the Military Assistance Division General Correspondence,  
1950-1962  
Boxes 3, 5, 21-26, 30, 31

Entry: Records Relating to Special Studies of the Army Intelligence System,  
1944-1953  
Boxes 16-31

Entry: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 (Intelligence), List of Special Dispatches,  
Intelligence Documents  
Boxes 8, 48

Entry: Records of the Special Programs Branch General Records of the Special Programs Branch, 1951-1965  
Boxes 1-8

Entry: Investigative Records Repository  
Box 113

**Record Group 330 Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense**

Entry 22: Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) Office of Military Assistance, Statistical Section Subject File, July 1950-August 1952  
Boxes 111-120

Entry 133: Office of the Secretary of Defense Decimals Files, Legislative and Public Affairs, Office of Public Information  
Boxes 17-41

Entry 138: Newspaper Clippings and Digests November 1948-July 1952  
Boxes 585-608, 609-632, 633-656

Entry 185: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Van Fleet Report Files  
Boxes 10-24

Entry 198: Office of the Administrative Secretary, Correspondence Control Section, Index Classified Numeric File, September 1947-December 1951  
Boxes 1-14

Entry 199: Office of the Secretary of Defense Decimal Files, Office Administration Secretary Correspondence Control Section, 1943-1953  
Boxes 171-218

Entry 200: Office of the Secretary of Defense Numeric File, Office of the Administration Secretary, Correspondence Control, July-December 1950  
Boxes 557-606

Entry 207A: Reports on Special Investigations, 1948-1951  
Box 1

Entry 207B: Reports on Special Investigations, 1948-1951  
Boxes 1-2

Entry 208: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Messages and Teletypes  
Boxes 403-428

**Record Group 331 Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters World War (II)**

Entry 26: SCAP (Formerly Top Secret) Decimal Files, 1948–April 1952  
Boxes 1, 3, 4, 8, 12

Entry 26: SCAP, Decimal Files, 1948-1952  
Boxes 785, 1224, 3163, 3681, 3682, 8660, 9330, 9331, 9400

**Record Group 333 Records of International Military Agencies**

Entry: General Subject and Message File, 1953-1957  
Boxes 8, 9

Entry: HQ United Nations Command  
Boxes 25-40

Entry: United Nations Command Armistice Affairs, Division General Subject  
Files, 1951-1952  
Boxes 1-9

Entry: HQ United Nations Command  
Boxes 1-24, 41-47

**Record Group 335 Records of the Office of the Secretary of the Army**

Entry 3A: General Correspondence Security Classified, July 1947-1950  
Boxes 1, 2, 17, 26-31, 61, 63, 67, 84, 85, 145, 147, 148

Entry 3B: Security Classified General Correspondence, July 1941-December  
1964  
Box 62

Entry 5: General Correspondence, July 1947–December 1950  
Boxes 1-70, 491-496

Entry 9: Confidential Weekly Foreign Information Policy Guidance Papers, July  
1950-July 1952  
Box 1

Entry 12: National Security Council Numbered Documents  
Boxes 5-12

Entry 14: National Security Council Progress Reports, 1950-1961  
Boxes 12, 13

Entry 15: Policies of the Government of the United States Relating to National  
Security, 1947-1952

Box 14

Entry 24A: Under Secretary of the Army General Decimal Files, 1949-1950  
Boxes 23, 26-41

Entry 24B: Under Secretary of the Army, General Decimal Files, 1947-1952  
Boxes 1-22, 24, 25

Entry 26: Office of the Secretary of Army, Security Classified General  
Correspondence, January 1949-December 1950  
Boxes 59-127

Entry 26A: Under Secretary Security Classified General Correspondence, 1947-  
1954  
Boxes 1, 2, 29

Entry 66: Civilian Personnel Division; Administrative Management Office  
Historical Reports and Surveys Subject File, 1947-1954  
Boxes 1-4

Entry 67: Civilian Personnel Division; Administrative Management Office Current  
Special Reports Subject File, 1947-1954  
Boxes 1-6

**Record Group 337 Records of the Headquarters Army Ground Forces**

Entry 1: Inspection Reports, 1948-1954 (Combat Arms Advisory Group FECOM)  
Box 25

Entry: 29K Army Field Forces, G-3 Troop Training Division, Maneuvers, Special  
Projects and Ammunition Branch, Army Secretary, Joint Tactical Air Support  
Board Decimal File, 1949-1951  
Boxes 476-487

Entry 30C: Army Field Forces HQS, General Staff, G-3 Section, Plans Division,  
Army Mobilization Plan I, 1959-1950  
Boxes 490-496

Entry 31: Headquarters Army Ground Forces, Army Field Forces Headquarters  
General Staff, G-4 Section Administrative Division Classified Decimal File, 1949-  
1950  
Boxes 17-20

Entry 32B: Headquarters Army Ground Forces, Army Field Forces Headquarters  
General Staff, G-4 Section Administrative Division Decimal Files, 1949-1950  
Boxes 35-64

Entry 51A: Army Field Forces Headquarters, Subject File, 1941-1950  
Boxes 16-26

Entry 54A: Top Secret Decimal Files  
Boxes 1-22

Entry 54B: Classified Central Files, 1949-1950  
Boxes 71-93, 99

Entry 55B: Classified Central Files, 1951-1952  
Boxes 1-106

Entry 55C: Classified Central Files, 1951-1952  
Box 99

Entry 55D: Classified Central Files, 1953  
Boxes 1-47

Entry 55F: Classified Central Files, 1954  
Boxes 1-24

Entry 55H: Secret Decimal File, March 17-December 1948  
Boxes 1-24

Entry 55I: Secret Decimal File, 1949-1950  
Boxes 25-47

Entry 103A: Decimal File, 1949-1954  
Box 2

Entry: Classified Central Files, 1953  
Boxes 48-50

Entry: Eighth U.S. Army 1944-56, Adjutant General Section, Awards Case Files,  
1950  
Boxes 1215-1222

Entry: Eighth U.S. Army 1944-56, Adjutant General Section, Awards Case Files,  
1950  
Boxes 1223-1229

Entry: General Staff, G-4 Section, Administrative Division, Classified Decimal  
File, 1948  
Boxes 1, 13-18

Entry: Classified Decimal File, 1949-1950  
Boxes 171-179

**Record Group 338 Records of U.S. Army Commands**

Entry: Eighth U.S. Army, Office of the Chief of Staff , 1946-1956  
Boxes 1, 2, 4

Entry: Eighth U.S. Army, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, 1946-1956  
Boxes 5, 11, 15

Entry: Eighth U.S. Army Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, 1946-1956  
Boxes 33-40, 44-48, 50-55, 57, 58, 61, 62, 80, 81

Entry: Eighth U.S. Army, Adjutant General Section, 1944-1956  
Boxes 4, 5, 457, 458, 464, 471-477, 485, 486, 491, 494-502, 505, 710, 711, 713-723, 725-731, 734-737, 739, 740, 750, 751, 752, 754, 755, 766, 767, 783, 799, 801, 802, 806, 1179, 1180, 1181, 1183

Entry: Unprocessed Records-War Diaries, 15 July 1950 - 4 August 1950  
Boxes 1-6

Entry: Eighth U.S. Army, Historical Section  
Boxes P533, P725-P727, P7889-P796, P798-P813, P816-P818

Entry: Records of General Headquarters FEC, SCAP, and UNC, Inspector General's Section, 1946-1951  
Boxes 35-42

Entry 34065A: Records of General Headquarters, FEC, SCAP, and UNC, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, General Correspondence, 1949-1950  
Boxes 44-46

Entry 34124: Records of General Headquarters FEC, SCAP, and UNC, Inspection General's Section Reports of Investigation, 1950-1951  
Boxes 1-22

Entry: Records of General Headquarters FEC, SCAP, and UNC, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1  
Box 1

Entry: Records of General Headquarters FEC, SCAP, and UNC, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 Co-ordination, 1950  
Boxes 17-19, 23, 24

Entry: Records of General Headquarters, FEC, SCAP, and UNC, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Theater Intelligence Division, Intelligence Reports of the Targets Branch, 1950-1951

Boxes 1-7

Entry: Records of General Headquarters, FEC, SCAP, and UNC, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, General Correspondence, 1949-1950

Boxes 7-10, 16

Entry: Records of General Headquarters, FEC, SCAP, and UNC, Adjutant General Section, Operations Division, Top Secret General Correspondence, 1949-1950

Boxes 1007-1010, 1012-1026

Entry: Records of General Headquarters FEC, SCAP, and UNC Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 MIS (D/A) Intelligence Division Targets Branch General correspondence, 1945-1951

Boxes 2-15

Entry: Records of General Headquarters, FEC, SCAP, and UNC, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence Division, General Correspondence, 1952-1951

Boxes 1-4

Entry: Records of General Headquarters, FEC, SCAP, and UNC, Medical Section

Boxes 1-2

Entry: Records of General Headquarters, FEC, SCAP, and UNC Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 Administration Division General Correspondence, 1946-1951

Box 55

Entry: Records of General Headquarters, FEC, SCAP, and UNC, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 Administration Division, General Correspondence, 1946-1952

Boxes 56-61, 66-69, 73-76, 81-84

Entry: Records of General Headquarters FEC, SCAP, and UNC, Assistant Chief of Staff G-3, Administration Division, General Correspondence, 1946-1952

Boxes 62-65

Entry: Records of General Headquarters FEC, SCAP, and UNC, Assistant Chief of Staff G-3, Administration Division, Top Secret General Correspondence, 1946-1951

Boxes 70-72, 78-80

Entry: Records of General Headquarters FEC, SCAP, and UNC, Assistant Chief of Staff G-3, Troop Control Division, Memorandum and Endorsements ("Action File") January-July, 1950

Box 1

Entry: Records of General Headquarters FEC, SCAP, and UNC, Assistant Chief of Staff G-3, Administration Division, General Correspondence, 1946-1952

Boxes 1-56

Entry: Records of General Headquarters FEC, SCAP, and UNC, Assistant Chief of Staff G-3, Administration Division, Staff Studies and Intelligence Estimates, 1958-1951

Boxes 1-12

Entry: Records of General Headquarters FEC, SCAP, and UNC, Assistant Chief of Staff G-3, Planning Division, Memorandums ("Action File"), 1949-1950

Boxes 1-2

Entry: Records of General Headquarters FEC, SCAP, and UNC, Inspector Generals Section, Reports of Investigation, 1950-1951

Box 18

Entry: Records of General Headquarters FEC, SCAP, and UNC, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, MIS (DIA) Intelligence Division, Translator and Interpreter Service, General Correspondence, 1947-1950

Boxes 5-14, 18-21

Entry: Records of General Headquarters FEC, SCAP, and UNC, Adjutant General's Section, Operations Division, Secret General Correspondence, 1950

Boxes 611-622

Entry: Records of General Headquarters FEC, SCAP, and UNC, Assistant Chief of Staff G-3 Administration Division Daily Journals

Boxes 1-24

Entry: Records of General Headquarters FEC, SCAP, and UNC, Adjutant General's Section, Operations Division, General Correspondence, 1950

Boxes 170, 171, 174-217, 267-269

Entry: Records of General's Section, Operations Division, General Correspondence, 1950

Boxes 218-281

Entry 15041: Miscellaneous Classified Records of U.S. Army Schools, 1947-1963

Boxes 11, 12, 14-19, 21-24

Entry: Records of General Headquarters FEC, SCAP, and UNC Military History Section, Command and Staff Section Reports, 1947-1952  
Boxes 336-356

Entry: 25th Infantry Division, St. Louis Refiles Wartime Awards, 1950  
Boxes 1-3

Entry: Records of General Headquarters FEC, SCAP, and UNC Adjutant General's Section Operations Division, Secret General Correspondence, 1950  
Boxes 628, 638, 639, 679, 721

Entry: Records of General Headquarters FEC, SCAP, and UNC, Military History Section, Command and Staff Section Reports, 1947-1952  
Boxes 357-369

Entry: Records of General Headquarters FEC, SCAP, and UNC Medical Section Radio Messages, 1951-1952  
Box 4

Entry: Records of HQ, U.S. Army, Pacific Military History Office, Organizational History Files  
Boxes 27-32, 73

Entry: Miscellaneous Awards Case Files  
Boxes 128-129

Entry: Records of HQ, U.S. Army Pacific, Military Historian's Office Organizational History Files  
Boxes 42, 44, 46, 48, 50, 56-58, 73, 77, 79, 80, 85, 88, 89, 93, 130, 131, 139, 187, 242, 276, 279, 280, 290

Entry 34065A: Far East Command Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4 General Correspondence, 1949-1950  
Boxes 1, 23-27, 119-121

Entry: Far East Command, Chemical Section, General Correspondence, 1949-1951  
Boxes 2-5

Entry: Unit Records, 1st Cavalry Division (Artillery)  
Boxes 105-110

Entry: 1st Cavalry Division  
Boxes 1-23, 25-27, 34, 39, 41, 42, 45, 46, 54-57, 127, 131, 140, 141, 165, 806

Entry: 5th Cavalry Regiment  
Boxes 3-22

Entry: 7th Cavalry Regiment  
Boxes 25-42

Entry: 7th Reconnaissance Troop (7th Infantry Division)  
Box 1

Entry: 8th Cavalry Regiment  
Boxes 43-66

Entry: 24th Infantry Division  
Boxes 504, 505, 512, 515, 516, 528-532, 538-540, 545-547, 606-608

Entry: 25th Infantry Division  
Boxes 606-608, 616, 634-640, 664-669, 680-691, 735, 736, 740, 753,  
760, 761, 765-772, 784, 788, 790, 804, 805, 807-816, 829-841, 881, 890-892

Entry: 27th Regimental Combat Team  
Boxes 268-281

Entry: UNCACK  
Boxes 608, 621, 623

Entry: 9th Corps  
Box 46

Entry: Korean Military Advisory Group Decimal File, 1948-1953  
Boxes 18-35

Entry: Unit Records KMAG Historical Reports, 1950  
Boxes 4-6

Entry: KMAG Unit Histories, 1950-1952  
Box 13

Entry: 8th Army  
Boxes 1, 2, 4, 5, 11, 15, 16, 27, 33-48, 710, 711, 713, 735-737, 739, 740,  
754, 750-752, 755, 766, 767, 783, 799, 801, 802, 806, 1179-1183

Entry: 8th Army General Correspondence, 1950  
Boxes 714-731

**Record Group 349 Records of Joint Commands**

Entry 21: Confidential and Secret Decimal Correspondence File, November 1950-1954

Boxes 1-42

Entry 23: Publications File, 1950-1954

Boxes 43-44

Entry 70A: Far East Command Joint Welfare Board Subject File, 1945-1955

Boxes 11-22

Entry 74: General File, January 1946-October 1953

Boxes 7-16

Entry 84: Decimal and Subject Correspondence File (Northeast Command), 1950-1956

Boxes 1-8

Entry 96: Formerly Security Classified General Correspondence, 1948-1950

Boxes 1-16

Entry 115: Security Classified Operations Plans, 1950-1960

Boxes 4-5

### **Record Group 389 Records of the Office Provost Marshal General**

Entry 433A: Classified Decimal File, 1941-1950

Boxes 50-184

Entry 433B: Administrative Division Mail and Records Branch, Classified Decimal File, 1951-1952

Boxes 187-222

Entry 437: Records Relating to the Participation of the Provost Marshall in the Preparation of the Geneva Convention, 1946-1949

Boxes 669-679

Entry 439A: Historical File, 1941-1958

Boxes 1-53

Entry 452B: Security Classified General Correspondence, 1942-1957

Boxes 1-113

Entry 467D: Records of the Legal Branch, General Correspondence, 1942-1957

Boxes 1-15

Entry 467E: Records of the Legal Branch, Miscellaneous Records, 1942-1957  
Boxes 1-8

Entry 470: Reports, 1942-1950 (Statistical Reports of Criminal Investigations  
1944-1950)  
Boxes 1709-1713

Entry 470A: Monthly Statistical Reports of Criminal Investigations, 1950-1954  
Boxes 1-5

Entry 481: Operations Division Confinement Branch Subject File, 1947-1950  
Boxes 2044-2057

#### **Record Group 407 Records of the Adjutant General's Office**

Entry 360B: Records Maintained by the Communications Branch; Army AG  
Classified Decimal File, 1948-1954  
Boxes 3851-3874, 3898-3921, 4020-4043

Entry 361A: Army-AG Decimal File, 1940-1950  
Boxes 1-25

Entry 361B: Army AG Decimal File, 1951-1952  
Boxes 1-30

Entry 363C: Army AG Decimal File, 1949-1950  
Boxes 1-24, 360-383, 449-454, 457, 458, 690-704

Entry 368B: Foreign Occupied Areas  
Boxes 1998-2007, 2064-2103

Entry 428A: Army AG Command Reports, 1949-1951  
Boxes 1-36

Entry 429: AG Command Reports (War Diaries), 1949-1954  
Boxes 1081-1100 (8th Army), 3470-3559 (24th Infantry Division), 3746-  
3770 (25th Infantry Division), 4404-4427, 4429-4451, 4497-4520 (1st  
Cavalry Division)

Entry 429B: U.S. Army Forces-Far East  
Boxes 1-8

Entry 1027: Administrative Service Division, Special Reports Branch, Civil Affairs  
Reports, 1955-1958  
Boxes 1-10

Entry: United Nations Command/Far East Command General Headquarters  
Boxes 346-384

**Record Group 500 (This record group was unnamed at the time of report publishing, but consists of records from Eighth Army).**

Entry: Historical Section Eighth Army  
Boxes 14-16, 19, 23-25, 49, 55-57, 272-280, P631, P725-P729

Entry: G-2 Classified Correspondence, 1950  
Box 45

Entry: G-2 Action Files, 1950  
Box 57

Entry: G-2 Administrative Files, 1950  
Boxes 51 - 52

Entry: Adjutant General Section Classified General Correspondence, 1949  
Boxes 421 - 422

Entry: Adjutant General Section Classified General Correspondence, 1950  
Boxes 714, 719-725

Entry: Adjutant General Section General Correspondence, 1950  
Boxes 475 - 476

**Motion Pictures Branch**

Film: 342 Control # NWDN(m) 342-USAF-18823

**Still Pictures Branch**

**Record Group 111 Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer**

Entry: Overseas Geographic File Albums, 1870-1955  
Volumes 38-134, 184-201, 2329, 2337-2339, 2377-2382, 2490-2500a, 2501, 2502, 2507, 2509, 2515-2517, and 2522-2558

Entry 111-SC: Prints: Signal Corps Photographs of American Military Activity, 1900-1981  
Boxes 137, 184-192, 194-200

**Record Group 319 Records of the Army Staff**

Entry: Staff Prints: Photographs of the U.S. and Foreign Nations, 1942-1964

Box 38

**National Personnel Records Center  
Military Personnel Records  
9700 Page Avenue  
St. Louis, MO 63132  
(314) 538-4216**

Since the research plan included interviewing veterans of the Korean War, a listing of soldiers was needed. Personnel from the Corps of Engineers, St. Louis District began the enormous task of compiling unit rosters of those individuals who served in Korea during the first year of the war. The National Personnel Records Center, Military Personnel Records (NPRC, MPR) houses the entire collection of retired military personnel records including unit payroll rosters. An accurate listing of soldiers who served during the Korean War was not available at any other repository, therefore, one had to be created.

The research team's first task was to copy from microfilm all the applicable unit payroll rosters. In most cases unit rosters were updated semi-annually in July and January including additions and subtractions from the roles. Most of the time the July 1950 rosters were used for the listing. However, in some cases other months were used if the July 1950 roster was unavailable or non-existent. Due to the poor condition of the microfilm, several different months of the rosters were acquired so that they could be compared for accuracy. The January 1951 rosters were the latest rosters used for verification. Once all of the rosters were photocopied, a database was constructed identifying the soldiers. A file was created for each soldier, with name, rank, army service number, and unit. Upon completion the list was turned over to the Inspector General's Office interview team. Their methodology and actions are discussed in Chapter 4.

The following list describes the Divisions and units who served in the Korean War during 1950. Names of soldiers in each of these units was created from the best possible sources, however, may not be completely accurate since the clarity of the rosters was poor. Rosters were obtained for all of the activities, units, and organizations listed below.

- 1st Cavalry CIC
- 1st Cavalry Division
  - HQ HQ Company
- 5th Cavalry
  - Companies: A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, K, L, M, HQ HQ 1st Bn, HQ HQ 2nd Bn, HQ HQ 3rd Bn, HQ HQ, Medical, Mortar, Service, Officers
- 7th Cavalry
  - Companies: A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, K, L, M, HQ HQ 1st Bn, HQ HQ 2nd Bn, HQ 3rd Bn, HQ, Medical, Mortar, Service, Officers
- 8th Cavalry

- Companies: C, D, E, F, G, H, I, K, L, M, Medical, Mortar, Officers
- 14th Infantry Regiment
  - Companies: A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, K, L, M, Heavy Tank, HQ HQ 1st Bn, HQ HQ 2nd Bn, HQ HQ 3rd Bn, HQ HQ, Medical, Mortar, Service
- 15th MD Detachment
- 19th Infantry Regiment
  - Companies: A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, K, L, M, HQ HQ 1st Bn, HQ HQ 2nd Bn, HQ HQ 3rd Bn, HQ HQ, Medical, Mortar, Service, Officers
- 21st Infantry Regiment
  - Companies: A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, K, L, M, Heavy Tank, HQ HQ 1st Bn, HQ HQ 2nd Bn, HQ HQ 3rd Bn, HQ HQ, Medical, Mortar, Service, Officers
- 24th Infantry Division
  - Companies: HQ HQ Company
- 24th Infantry Regiment
  - Companies: A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, K, L, M, HQ HQ 1st Bn, HQ HQ 2nd Bn, HQ HQ 3rd Bn, HQ HQ, Medical, Mortar, Service, Officers
- 24th MI Detachment CIC
- 25th Infantry Division
  - Company: HQ HQ Company
- 25th MI Detachment CIC
- 27th Infantry Regiment
  - Companies: A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, K, L, M, HQ HQ 1st Bn, HQ HQ 2nd Bn, HQ HQ 3rd Bn, HQ HQ, Medical Mortar, Service, Officers
- 27th Ordnance Maintenance Company
- 34th Infantry Regiment
  - Companies: A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, K, L, M, Heavy Tank, HQ HQ 1st Bn, HQ HQ 2nd Bn, HQ HQ 3rd Bn, HQ HQ, Medical Mortar, Service, Officers
- 35th Infantry Regiment
  - Companies: A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, K, L, M, Heavy Tank, HQ HQ 1st Bn, HQ HQ 2nd Bn, HQ HQ 3rd Bn, HQ HQ, Medical, Mortar, Service, Officers
- 24th MP Company
- 25th MP Company
- 545th MP Company
- KMAG
- 8063rd MASH
- Operations Section ("Mosquito" Unit)

**Washington National Records Center  
4205 Suitland Road**

**Suitland, MD 20409  
(301) 457-7000**

The Washington National Archives was visited by the research team. The 01 master accession listing was consulted and all pertinent accession were reviewed. Some of the accessions identified were in the process of being transferred from the records center to the National Archives in College Park.

Accession 338-78-0010 8th U.S. Army Command Report Files, 1952-1957  
Boxes 1-5

Accession 338-78-0013 8th U.S. Army Historical Background Materials, 1952-1954  
Boxes 1-7

Accession 338-78-0029 Far East Historical Background Files, 1950-1953  
Boxes 1-2

Accession 338-78-0657 Annual Historical Summary File, 1951-1979  
Box 1

Accession 338-81-0504 Korea, 1951-1976  
Box 1

**Federal Records Center  
2306 East Bannister Road  
Kansas City, MO 64131  
(816) 926-6272**

The research team visited the Federal Records Center. After reviewing SF 135s it was determined that all pertinent accessions of records had been shipped to the National Archives in College Park. These identified records had not yet been processed or accessioned into their inventories, however these unprocessed documents were reviewed at College Park.

**Harry S. Truman Library  
US Highway 24 and Delaware Street  
Independence, MO 64050  
(816) 833-1400**

The Truman Library is one of the Presidential Libraries operated under the auspices of the National Archives system. The research team visited the library and reviewed unit histories, state department records, photographs, and personal papers. The following describes actual records reviewed by the research team.

Harry S. Truman Library Student Research File, (43) Korean War: N. Korea's Invasion of S. Korea; Boxes 1-2

Papers of George M. Elsey, Harry S. Truman Administration; Subject File: Korea, Japan Surrender of August 1945-Korea, July 1950; Box 71

Papers of George M. Elsey; Harry S. Truman Administration; Subject File: Korea, 19 July-November 1950; Box 72

Papers of Harry S. Truman, President's Secretary's Files; Subject File; Foreign Affairs File, (J-Luxembourg); Box 182

Papers of Harry S. Truman, President's Secretary's Files; Korean War File, Wake Island Conference; Box 244

Papers of Harry S. Truman, President's Secretary's Files; Korean War File, V-W; Box 243

RG 407; U.S. Army Unit Diaries, Histories and Reports, 1944-1951; Sixth-Eighth U.S. Army; Boxes 5-18

Harry S. Truman, President's Secretary's Files, CIA Index to Daily Korean Summaries, June 1950-June 1951; Box 248

Harry S. Truman, President's Secretary's Files, Intelligence File, Situation Reports; Box 262

Selected Records Relating to the Korean War, DoD, Misc., Pertinent Papers on the Korean Situation, Volumes 1-2; Boxes 15-17

Department of State Records; Boxes 2,3, 8

Papers of Harry S. Truman, 471 (Misc.) to 471 B (Korea); Boxes 1305, 1383

Harry S. Truman; WHCF: Confidential File; Justice Department: (7 of 10, Soviet Espionage Report; November 1946 to Korean Emergency [3 of 3, Terrain Study, Seoul and Environs]); Box 22

State Department-White Paper on China-Galley Proofs, Annexes, Chapter V to State Department Weekly Review, September-October 1950; Box 59

President's Secretary's Files; Subject File, NSC (Reports-5-Sowers); Box 198

President's Secretary's Files; NSC Meetings: Meeting 56 (4 May 1950 to Meeting 64 (10 August 1950); Box 208

President's Secretary's Files; NSC Meetings: Meeting 65 (17 August 1950) to Meeting 70 (2 November 1950); Box 209

President's Secretary's Files, NSC Meetings: Meeting 71 (9 November 1950) to Meeting 79 (12 January 1951); Box 210

Memoranda for the President, Meeting Discussions to Meetings Personnel; Box 220

President's Secretary's Files, O.R.E., 1949 to O.S.I., 1950; Box 257; O.S.I.-I.S. Reports to Situation Report #6; Box 258

Papers of Harry S. Truman; Naval Aide Files; State Department Briefs, 1950; Box 22

Selected Records Relating to the Korean War, Department of State; Chronology, June 1950-February 1951; Box 1. Box 2, UN Security Council, 1950

Topical File; Civil Affairs in Korea; ROK Executions in December 1950; File 30; Box 8

Korea Bulletins, 1950; Box 3

Papers of Eben A. Ayers; Korean War; Box 9

**Military History Institute  
Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013  
(717) 245-3131**

Research was conducted at the Military History Institute (MHI). Primary and secondary source documentation including background information of Roy Appleman was reviewed. MHI has undertaken an oral history project whereby Korean War Veterans have and continue to complete surveys regarding their experiences in Korea. These surveys were reviewed and they provided background information. They also provided names of potential interviewees. The research team reviewed maps and still photography collections.

Korean War Surveys, Boxes 1-2

Office of Center of Military History, Korean War Notes, Boxes 1-2

The Hobart R. Gay Papers, Oral History Transcripts, Box 1

The S.L.A. Marshall Papers, Korean War 24th and 25th Division by Gen. Barth, Box 1

KORS 25th Infantry Division, Surveys, Boxes 1-2

The Clay and Joan Blair Collection, Combat Leadership in Korea, Boxes 1-2

The Roy Appleman Collection, Chronological files: 25 June 1950 to 30 November 1950, Box 1

The Thomas W. Herren Papers, Korean Communication Zone and Northern Area Command 1952, 1953, 1956, Boxes 1-3

**MacArthur Memorial  
Archives and Library  
MacArthur Square  
Norfolk, VA 23510  
(757) 441-2965**

The holdings at this library consist of primary and secondary documentation, including donated items. The main body of records reviewed included Far East Command and Message Traffic. The holdings included personal papers and scrapbooks. The following describes a detailed listing of all reviewed items.

#### **RG 6 Far East Command, 1947-1951**

Box 2, Correspondence Korean War, June-September 1950

Box 9, FECOM General Orders, January 1951

Box 24, CIC District Field Reports, 22 January-7 July 1950

Box 25, CIC District Field Reports, 22 July 1950-15 March 1951

Box 100, Series 3: Operation; Administrative Order-Op Plan, Chow Chow

Box 102, Operation Plan "Linter"; Outline of Planning Data, 19 July 1950; Staff Study "Undershot," October 1948

#### **RG 9 Messages (Radiograms), 1945-1951**

Box 6, Air Force, November 1949-June 1950

Box 7, Air Force, July 1950-February 1951

Box 13, China, July 1950-April 1951; CINCAL, May 1947-March 1951; CINCFE sitrep, 28 June-15 July 1950

Box 29, War CX DA, January-April 1951; War CX Miscellaneous, 25 June 1950-19 July 1950

Box 34, Eighth Army, August 1949-December 1950; Army Eighth (JL Com), August-December 1950; Eighth Army Incoming, August-December 1950

Box 35, Eighth Army Incoming, July-October 1950

Box 36, Army Eighth Incoming, November 1950-January 1951

Box 37, Eighth Army Outgoing, August 1950-March 1951

Box 38, Army 8 Outgoing, August-December 1950

Box 39, EUSAK Incoming, 29 July-September 1950; EUSAK Outgoing, 13 July-August 1950

Box 40, FEAF Incoming, 25 June-December 1950; War FEAF, January-11 April 1950; FEC, January-August 1947; FEC Formosa, August 1950

Box 43, Japanese Government Outgoing, August-October 1945; JLCOM, January-April 1951; War JLCOM Incoming, August-October 1950

Box 44, JLCOM Incoming, November 1950-April 1951; JLCOM Outgoing, August 1950-April 1950

Box 45, JLCOM Outgoing, January-April 1951; JCS November-December, 30 June 1950-5 April 1951; JCS Outgoing, October 1945, July 1950-April 1951; KMAG, July 1949-June 1950

Box 46, KMAG, August 1950-April 1951

Box 83, State Department, July-December 1949; State Department Incoming, January 1950

Box 84, State Department Incoming, February 1950-12 July 1950

Box 85, State Department Incoming, 13 July 1950-April 1951; State Incoming, July-October 1950

Box 86, State Incoming, November 1950-April 1951; State Miscellaneous Incoming, June-December 1950

Box 87, Incoming State Department, June 1950-April 1951; Outgoing State Department YTS, June 1950-April 1951; State Outgoing, January 1950-April 1951; War State Outgoing, 1951

Box 88, State Department Korea Incoming, June-December 1950; State Outgoing, Korea, July-December 1950; X Corps Incoming, September-15 November 1950

Box 98, XXIV Corps, December 1948-January 1949; USAFIK, September-October 1945, April-June 1949; USAFIK Outgoing, 25 June-12 July 1950; USARPAC, 18 November 1947-30 October 1948; USARPAC, 18 November 1947-June 1949

Box 121, Personal for #1, July 1946-March 1951; Personal for Generals Almond, Brooks, Irwin, People; Telecons DA-CINCFE, July 1950-April 1951; Telecons, June-25 August 1950

**RG 16a Major General Courtney Whitney**

Box 5, MacArthur Official

Two Korean War Scrapbooks

**Appendix B**  
**ANALYSIS OF FORENSIC EVIDENCE**

**Introduction**

This appendix provides the analysis of casualty estimates (Tab 1) and an analysis of the forensic evidence collected in the vicinity of the No Gun Ri site. The casualty estimate analysis is an attempt to answer the question: can either the U.S. or ROK Review Team verify how many refugees were killed in the vicinity of No Gun Ri during the last week of July 1950? As a result of consultations between them, both Review Teams agreed that the ROK Review Team would be responsible for recovery of ballistics evidence and firearm examinations. The ROK Review Team would report their results to the U.S. Review Team.

This appendix includes the assessments of ROK forensic testing conducted by the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Division (CID) Laboratory and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) (Tab 2). This appendix also contains a forensic pathology analysis by the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology of the USAF reconnaissance photograph taken of the No Gun Ri area on August 6, 1950 (Tab 3).

Enclosed:

Tab 1 (Casualty Estimates)

Tab 2 (Analysis of ROK Forensic Testing - Ballistics and Firearms)

Tab 3 (Forensic Pathology Analysis)

## **Appendix B**

### **Tab 1**

#### **CASUALTY ESTIMATES**

The U.S. Review Team was directed to answer the question: can either the U.S. or ROK Review Team verify how many refugees were killed in the vicinity of No Gun Ri during the last week of July 1950? The answer is the U.S. Review Team cannot verify how many refugees were killed or injured. The ROK Review Team believes further investigation is required.

The allegations in the initial Associated Press articles described hundreds of people killed.<sup>1</sup> Korean witnesses reported piling dead bodies at the entrances of the tunnel,<sup>2</sup> dead cows on the railroad tracks,<sup>3</sup> bodies scattered vicinity of or near the railroad,<sup>4</sup> and dozens of people dying.<sup>5</sup> U.S. veterans who passed through the vicinity of No Gun Ri in late July 1950, during their withdrawal toward the Naktong River, did not observe human remains or graves in the area.<sup>6</sup> USAF reconnaissance imagery taken over the area on August 6, 1950 did not show evidence of human remains or graves.<sup>7</sup> After interviewing U.S. veterans and examining the aerial photograph, the U.S. Review Team asked the ROK Review Team if they had evidence of human remains or graves in the vicinity of No Gun Ri.

The U.S. Review Team received a report from the ROK Review Team on the number of Koreans killed and injured and "handling of the dead."<sup>8</sup> The U.S. Review Team initially believed this document reflected the official position of the ROK Review Team. The ROK Review Team indicated in a meeting with the U.S. Review Team that the information in the report they had provided to the U.S. Review Team must be verified by a subsequent investigation. Nonetheless, the Korean report, which includes summaries of investigative work and witness interviews, the witness statements discussed described in Chapter 4, the analysis of the aerial photograph described in Appendix B, Tab 3, and Appendix D, comprise the material that the U.S. Review Team evaluated in responding to the question; can the U.S. or ROK Review Team verify how many refugees were killed in the incident?

Based on a Korean survey, the ROK Review Team indicated some refugees from different locations went to the vicinity of a village called Im Gae Ri (sometimes spelled Imkyeh-ri and Im Ga Ri) and that villagers of Im Gae Ri and others who had sought refuge there were told by American soldiers to evacuate the village. The ROK Review Team reported that approximately 477 people left the village and went south on along Road #4 (now Highway 1) and later moved on to the railroad tracks, where these refugees were strafed and bombed by U.S. aircraft and then fired upon while in the double tunnel near No Gun Ri by U.S. soldiers.

The ROK Review Team indicated that there were several Korean estimates of the number of people killed and injured which were derived from different sources. Some of the estimates reported by the ROK Review Team are:

- Based on a reenactment of the incident there could have been 240 - 290 victims: 50 -100 injured on the railroad track and 190 in the tunnel.
- In August 1950, an Im Gae Ri village official reported the number of dead as 120. He made this report to the North Korean People's Army on August 7- 8, 1950 at their request. He arrived at that estimate by subtracting the number of villagers who returned to the village from the number of villagers who left.
- ROK "victim" reports show 175 dead, 51 wounded and 20 missing.
- A document seized from the North Korean People's Army indicated one hundred deaths occurred in a tunnel or railroad tunnel near Yongdong.
- North Korean reports in North Korean newspapers indicated 400 deaths, (North Korean People's Herald, August 19, 1950) and 200 deaths (The Democratic Korea, September 7, 1950) at the double railroad overpass.

According to the ROK Review Team, only a small number of bodies or identified graves can be accounted for because:

- Many bodies were not buried in marked graves. Korean burial customs at that time were that children and unmarried minors were buried in unmarked graves. Many of the refugees were reported to have been children and unmarried minors.
- Some gravesites have not been maintained because all descendants of the family have died.<sup>9</sup>
- The bodies of strangers<sup>10</sup> and the bodies of refugees whose entire family died were left untouched until August 10, 1950. After that date, they were buried in a mass grave, which has been disturbed in the intervening years by family members searching for bodies and farming activity in the area. When farmers uncovered bones, they removed and disposed of bones.

Korean witness statements contain different estimates of how many people were killed or injured and how the bodies were buried. Six Korean witnesses report the use of mass graves or hearing that a mass grave near the double tunnels was used.<sup>11</sup> Some Korean statements describe only the deaths or injuries of family members<sup>12</sup> and others estimate the total number of deaths and injuries.<sup>13</sup> Some U.S. veterans describe dead or injured refugees.<sup>14</sup> The U.S. veterans' estimates range from several to two hundred, but the soldiers did not check bodies and some estimates appear to be guesswork. Korean witness estimates include 60 -100 dead in the double tunnel and 50 - 150 dead or injured from strafing/bombing.<sup>15</sup>

Another source of casualty estimates is as reported by the Associated Press<sup>16</sup> on June 15, 2000. It was a document captured from a North Korean Cultural Officer (North Korean Communist political cadre serving with the armed forces). The document contained a story that the NKPA had found bodies in a tunnel near Yongdong. This story as related in instructions to cultural officers on "Cultivation of Hatred to Obtain Revenge" dated August 2, 1950 and signed by Kim, Cheh Ouk, of the Military Affairs Committee, 1st Army Group, might contain an element of truth in spite of its propagandistic purpose. The NKPA may have found civilian bodies in a tunnel, not in the railroad overpass near No Gun Ri but in one of the railroad tunnels in the vicinity of Yongdong on the main double railroad line. One of these tunnels was bombed with high explosives and napalm on July 28, 1950 as reported in the Eighth Army Operations Journal. At that time the NKPA was probably using the tunnel to store ammunition and other supplies. The area around the tunnel would also have been subject to artillery fire intended to delay the advance of the NKPA 3rd Division out of Yongdong. This propaganda states that artillery fire and strafing caused the deaths, but does not mention any other type of ground fire, including machine guns. The NKPA was in desperate straits when this report was distributed, unable to break through the Naktong defenses.

Propaganda about alleged atrocities was one of many ways to bolster the lagging fighting spirit of the NKPA. In the same article, the AP also mentioned an article in the August 19, 1950 (issue #49) Chosun In Min Bo, the NKPA newspaper, which carried a story relating the finding of bodies in the Hwanggan area on July 29, 1950. The details are graphic and follow a propaganda line commonly used by the North Koreans who regularly accused South Korean and United Nations forces of the very atrocities they themselves were committing: In its description of the Chosun In Min Bo article, the AP article reports North Korean troops moving through the Hwanggan area "encountered... indescribably gruesome scenes under the railway tunnels and in nearby fields... About 400 bodies of old and young people and children covered the scene so that it was difficult to walk around without stepping on corpses." This depiction of hundreds of casualties is unsupported either by the reconnaissance film analysis discussed in Appendix C or the forensic pathology analysis in Tab 3 to this Appendix.

According to the information the ROK Review Team provided to the U.S. Review Team, Koreans returned to retrieve bodies from July 29, 1950 to November 15, 1950. According to the information provided there were bodies inside the double railroad overpass, along the side of the railroad and two bodies retrieved were in other areas.

Based on the available evidence, the U.S. Review Team cannot determine the numbers killed or injured in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. However, the U.S. Review Team concluded that it is unlikely that hundreds of dead bodies were present in the vicinity of No Gun Ri during the last week of July 1950, based on the testimony of U.S. veterans and the examination of the August 6, 1950 aerial

photograph by Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (AFIP) and National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA).<sup>17</sup> The U.S. Review Team concluded that some Koreans were killed and injured in the vicinity of No Gun Ri in the last week of July 1950 but that the precise number may never be determined for many reasons. The reasons include Korean burial customs, farming practices (when farmers uncovered bones, they removed and disposed of the bones), lack of reliable information, wartime disruptions of the countryside, and the passage of time.

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<sup>1</sup> See Chapter 1.

<sup>2</sup> Korean witness statements (2 children).

<sup>3</sup> Korean witness statement (teenager).

<sup>4</sup> Korean witness statement summarized in ROK "On-site Technical Investigation" provided to the U.S. Review Team, August 2000.

<sup>5</sup> Korean witness statements indicate there were 60 dead bodies in the tunnel. 60 to 100 people died in the tunnels, the bombing killed about 100 - 150 people and there were 50 - 60 bodies were on the railroad track.

<sup>6</sup> Chapter 4, p. 136.

<sup>7</sup> See Appendix B, Tab 3 and Appendix C.

<sup>8</sup> ROK "On-site Technical Investigation" provided to U.S. Review Team, August 2000.

<sup>9</sup> Presumably the locations of these graves are also unknown.

<sup>10</sup> People from places other than the local villages.

<sup>11</sup> Six Korean witness statements summarized in ROK "On-site Technical Investigation" provided to the U.S. Review Team in August 2000.

<sup>12</sup> For example a child's grandfather was killed, child's mother and aunt were killed, and teenager's sister was killed.

<sup>13</sup> For example one Korean witness stated 50 - 60 bodies were scattered on the railroad track and the double tunnel was packed with bodies. See ROK "On-site Technical Investigation" provided to U.S. Review Team August 2000.

<sup>14</sup> U.S. Veteran estimates of wounded and dead varied for example 8 - 9 who could have been dead or injured, possibly several dead or injured, close to two hundred, and maybe 50 - 60 killed or injured I am just not sure. At least ten veterans talk about refugees being killed or injured in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. However some of these veterans observed dead or injured refugees and do not know how or when they were wounded.

<sup>15</sup> See note 5.

<sup>16</sup> CHOE, Sang-hun, "Document cites Korean War Killings", <http://wire.ap.org/APnews>, June 15, 2000.

<sup>17</sup> See Appendix C and Appendix B, Tab 2.

## **Appendix B**

### **Tab 2**

#### **ANALYSIS OF ROK FORENSIC TESTING - BALLISTICS AND FIREARMS**

##### **I. Introduction**

The U.S. Review Team believed that in a search, bullets would be recovered from the double overpass area located near No Gun Ri. The U.S. Review Team had multiple reasons for that belief including: (a) Korean and U.S. witness statements that firing occurred; (b) combat action in the area<sup>1</sup>; and (c) the NKPA presence in this area after U.S. Forces left.<sup>2</sup> As noted in Chapter 3, prior to July 26, 1950, the NKPA captured many weapons and used the weapons, so when one finds a U.S. bullet, one cannot assume a U.S. soldier fired it.<sup>3</sup> The U.S. Review Team does not know exactly what action occurred in and around this area after July 29, 1950; for example, strafing or gunfire could have occurred. Because the U.S. Review Team does not know what happened in the vicinity of the double overpass before, during or after the last week of July 1950, the U.S. Review Team cannot draw any firm conclusions about the significance of physical evidence recovered at the location in July 2000. The U.S. Review Team believes that the ROK Review Team, based on comments they made at a meeting in November 2000, believes the bullets that were recovered from the area are conclusive evidence that the events occurred as described by the Korean witnesses.

As a result of consultations between the U.S. Review Team and the ROK Review Team, The Inspector General agreed that the ROK Review Team, the counterpart of the U.S. Review Team, would be responsible for recovery of evidence and forensic examination of the evidence recovered to include bullets, cartridges, and other material in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. It was agreed that the ROK Review Team would report their results to the U.S. Review Team.

In July 2000, the Republic of Korea's Defense Investigative Command (DIC) No Gun Ri Investigation Team conducted a forensic assessment of the No Gun Ri incident site and tested materials recovered at the site.<sup>4</sup> The ROK Review Team reported the results of the DIC assessment and testing to the U.S. Review Team. In addition, the ROK Review Team provided a six-piece sample of material that they stated was recovered by the DIC Team to the U.S. Review Team. Based upon interactions with our Korean counterparts, the U.S. Review Team believes the DIC Team retained all remaining items found at the site.

Firearms examiners and ballistics experts perform two different roles. Firearms examiners determine if a particular weapon fired a bullet or cartridge.<sup>5</sup> Ballistics experts study the projectiles fired by firearms and the effect of the projectile on a target.<sup>6</sup> These experts address questions such as what weapon was fired and where was the weapon fired from.

The U.S. Review Team asked for technical assistance from two agencies, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Laboratory and U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Division (CID) Laboratory. No firearms examiners or ballistics experts were detailed to the U.S. Review Team. The U.S. Review Team relied upon the technological and forensic expertise of the CID and the FBI to review the DIC's conclusions and assessment. Specifically, the U.S. Review Team asked the laboratories to review the DIC Team's assessment of the site and the items recovered at the site, to review and comment on the methodology, and to assess the Korean conclusions.<sup>7</sup> After the U.S. Review Team received the CID evaluation of the DIC Report, the U.S. Review Team requested additional information from the ROK Review Team. The U.S. Review Team provided copies of the DIC response<sup>8</sup> on the methods that the DIC Team used to reach four of their conclusions to CID and the FBI who provided additional comments.<sup>9</sup> CID and the FBI concurred one could use the Korean methods to determine the difference between 7.62 millimeter (mm) Soviet and .30 caliber U.S. bullets, to determine that the extracted and unextracted bullets were identical, to determine that the marks were bullet marks and to determine the firing directions.<sup>10</sup> However, the methods used by the DIC Team are not the methods used by CID and the FBI.

FBI examiner noted from a purely forensic science perspective, any conclusions drawn from an unprotected area where weapons were discharged fifty years ago should be viewed with extreme caution.<sup>11</sup> The U.S. Review Team's position is that one cannot conclusively say who fired the bullets and when the bullets were fired.




## **II. DIC Team's Assessment and Conclusion**

The DIC Team provided the following "assessment and conclusion."<sup>12</sup>

- The marks on both ends of the double overpass and both ends of the culvert "were caused by real shooting in short distance."
- They found a total of 316 marks at the overpass and culvert, and found 59 bullets embedded in the concrete. Only 20 bullets were removed. The DIC Team removed bullets that had special features. The DIC team defined special features as bullets that had different sizes, types and markings. The DIC considered the other 39 unextracted bullets to be identical to the removed 20 bullets.
- There were six possible firing positions from which fire was directed on the double overpass and culvert areas. The DIC Team called the areas that could be hit by weapons fire from these six firing positions targets.

- They found 193 items at the double overpass and culvert. The items included .30 caliber empty cartridges, bullets, unfired cartridges, one M1 rifle cartridge clip, one LMG (light machine gun) link, and other fragments. In addition, the DIC team found Soviet-manufactured material. This material included empty cartridges and bullets for the Soviet-made Mosin-Nagant rifle and DP/DT MG (machine gun).

- The DIC Team stated all bullets embedded in both ends of the double overpass and culvert were confirmed as U.S.-made .30 caliber and .50 caliber cartridges. No Soviet-made bullets were detected.



For reference, the DIC Team provided the above photographs of the double overpass and culvert areas in the vicinity of No Gun Ri.<sup>13</sup>

### **III. Discussion of the DIC Assessment and Conclusions**

The DIC Team determined the distance between the firearms fired and the target. The DIC Team's determination was the shootings at the double overpass and the culvert occurred at short distances because the bullets were deeply embedded. The U.S. Review Team does not accept the DIC's conclusion that the firing was from a short distance because they did not use the methods that the FBI would have used. The FBI indicated that gunshot residue and angle determination examinations are two main factors that they use to determine weapon discharge distances, not how deeply bullets are embedded.<sup>14</sup> The DIC Team also did not define short distance.<sup>15</sup>

The U.S. Review Team does not accept DIC's conclusion about all 316 marks in the overpass and culvert.<sup>16</sup> They may be bullet marks. In fact, some appear to be bullet marks based on visual examination by non-experts,<sup>17</sup> but based on the DIC work we cannot be certain. As the CID reviewer stated, to conclusively make this determination one needs to detect traces of bullet jacketing (copper) of bullet cores (lead), or trace amounts of both lead and copper. The DIC Team's report did not indicate that such traces were found in any of the 316 wall marks. The DIC Team conducted a visual examination of the marks.<sup>18</sup> CID agrees one can do an inspection, but they would also do the work described above.<sup>19</sup> Even if they are bullet marks we do not know when they were made.

The DIC Team concluded there are six possible shooting locations. The U.S. Review Team cannot agree that there were six possible shooting positions based on the DIC Team's work and the passage of time. The FBI indicated after reviewing the initial DIC assessment that in the absence of additional firearm examinations, the actual number of firers, number of weapons, type of weapons fired (Soviet or American) and their locations cannot be determined. Additional firearms identification-type examinations could determine how many weapons were involved at each of the suspected shooting sites.<sup>20</sup> To properly complete this examination, one must recover all of the bullets at all of the sites and compare them microscopically.<sup>21</sup> The FBI and CID agree one can use the method described by the DIC Team to determine firing angles.<sup>22</sup>

The ROK Team provided the U.S. Review Team with a six-piece sample from the materials found in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. The FBI examined the material and reviewed the DIC's assessment and conclusions. The DIC assessment does not clearly indicate how many bullets and cartridges cases were recovered and whether or not these specimens were intercompared to each other. These intercomparisons are the basis on which FBI examiners determine the number of weapons and firers in an incident.<sup>23</sup> The material samples provided included three .30 caliber bullets fired from a barrel rifled with four grooves with a right twist.<sup>24</sup> The FBI used a search of the General Rifling

Characteristics file and determined that U.S. military M1 firearms produced such rifling marks on the bullets.<sup>25</sup> As noted in Chapter 3, prior to July 26, 1950, the NKPA captured many weapons and used the weapons.<sup>26</sup>

The DIC Team stated no enemy bullets were found in the walls.<sup>27</sup> To firmly conclude there were no enemy bullets at the site, CID states all bullets present would have to be removed and analyzed.<sup>28</sup> Further, there were two Soviet type .30 caliber (7.62X54R) bullets included in the bullet sample.<sup>29</sup> These bullets had no rifling marks, and the FBI could not determine from the report or samples if these bullets were recovered as fired bullets.<sup>30</sup> The U.S. Review Team does not know if the DIC Team conclusion is correct.

The DIC team removed only 20 of the 59 bullets identified as embedded in the double overpass, but they concluded the remaining 39 unextracted bullets were identical without a microscopic examination. The Koreans did a visual examination of the bullets embedded in the wall and extracted a sample to examine. They concluded that the bullets left unextracted were identical to the bullets extracted. They concluded the unextracted bullets were .30 and .50 U.S. caliber bullets. The FBI and CID concur that the DIC could visually examine the bullets embedded in the wall to determine if the unextracted bullets matched the extracted bullets.<sup>31</sup> However, the FBI's and CID's method of determining if bullets are identical is microscopic examination.<sup>32</sup> Also, research indicates that the barrels of some .30 caliber firearms used by U.S. forces and North Korean Forces display the same characteristics of four lands and grooves with a right twist.<sup>33</sup> To determine if a bullet was fired from a U.S. firearm or a North Korean firearm, the FBI firearm examiners would measure the width of the lands and grooves and compare them to known published specifications.<sup>34</sup> The DIC Team did not state that they did this.

#### **IV. Conclusion**

The Republic of Korea's Defense Investigative Command No Gun Ri Investigation Team's report is an extensive report. However, as the FBI examiner noted from a purely forensic science perspective, any conclusions drawn from an unprotected area where weapons were discharged fifty years ago should be viewed with extreme caution.<sup>35</sup> The bullets and bullet marks although not conclusive, do corroborate the statements of U.S. veterans and Korean witnesses that weapons were fired. The U.S. Review Team views the presence of bullets and bullet marks in the double overpass and in the culvert area as another piece of evidence to be weighed with all other evidence.

The ROK investigation team stated that Soviet bullets and casings were found on the north side of the railroad tracks in two separate locations.<sup>36</sup> This is an area from which U.S. veterans said they received fire. If one assumes that the U.S. bullets and bullet marks found in the vicinity of the double railroad overpass were the result of U.S. soldiers firing toward that point, as reflected in

some of the witness statements, then it logically follows that one must also believe that the Soviet bullets and cartridges found in the vicinity of the overpass resulted from hostile fire directed at the U.S. soldiers from the vicinity of the double railroad overpass, as reflected in several U.S. veteran statements.

The Korean peninsula was a war zone as noted in the narrative; combat forces passed through this area after July 29, 1950. We do not know exactly what action occurred in and around this area after July 29, 1950; for example strafing, firefights or isolated gunfire could have occurred. The uncertainty generated by a lack of knowledge means that drawing firm conclusions based on physical evidence recovered from the site to include bullets or cartridge material is impossible.

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<sup>1</sup> Chapter 3, p. 88 - 89.

<sup>2</sup> Chapter 4, p. 160.

<sup>3</sup> Chapter 3, p.13.

<sup>4</sup> Korean Defense Investigative Command No Gun Ri Investigation Team Report (DIC Report) dated 12- 26 July 2000.

<sup>5</sup> Giannelli, Paul C., and Imwinkelreid, Edward J., Scientific Evidence, 3rd Edition, Lexis, Charlottesville, VA 1999, p. 607.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid. p. 608.

<sup>7</sup> Memorandum for FBI, Subject: Forensic Analysis Request, dated 2 October 2000 and Memorandum for U.S. Army. Crime Laboratory, Subject: Analysis Request dated 8 August 2000.

<sup>8</sup> The standard working practice of the DAIG Review Team is to send copies of documents to our Korean counterparts. The Korean response is undated but titled "Response to U.S. Questions on DIC Report"

<sup>9</sup> Memorandum for United States Army Inspector General, DAIG, Subject: Request for Assistance, dated 31 October 2000. Written memorandum for the FBI pending, results summarized to U.S. Review Team on 31 October 2000.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> FBI Laboratory Report of Examination (FBI Report), Case No. 95A-HQ-1326915, dated 16 October 2000.

<sup>12</sup> DIC Report, dated 12 -26 July 2000.

<sup>13</sup> Photos, Korean Defense Investigative Command No Gun Ri Investigation Team Report, dated July 2000, pg. 1 insert.

<sup>14</sup> FBI Report.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

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<sup>16</sup> Memorandum for United States Army Inspector General, Subject: Request for Assistance, dated 31 October 2000.

<sup>17</sup> Members of the DAIG Review Team have visited the double overpass and seen what appear to be bullet marks.

<sup>18</sup> Undated "Response to US Questions on DIC Report" p. 3.

<sup>19</sup> Memorandum for Inspector General dated 31 October 2000.

<sup>20</sup> FBI Report, p.1

<sup>21</sup> Ibid. p.1

<sup>22</sup> See note 5 above

<sup>23</sup> See note 16.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid. pgs. 1-2

<sup>25</sup> Ibid. p. 2.

<sup>26</sup> Chapter 3, p.13.

<sup>27</sup> DIC Report, p. 23

<sup>28</sup> Memorandum, Subject: Evaluation of a report titled "Forensic Test Results of the No Gun Ri Incident" for the Department of the Army Inspector's General's Office (USACIL Case Number 2000-CID131-0730) dated 30 August 2000 (CID Report).

<sup>29</sup> During a meeting in December 2000 with the ROK Review Team. LTG Ackerman, The Inspector General, was told that Soviet bullets and casing were found on the north side of the railroad tracks in two separate locations.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid. p. 2

<sup>31</sup> See note 5 above.

<sup>32</sup> CID Report and FBI Report.

<sup>33</sup> FBI Report.

<sup>34</sup> FBI Report.

<sup>35</sup> FBI Laboratory Report of Examination (FBI Report), Case No. 95A-HQ-1326915, dated 16 October 2000.

<sup>36</sup> See note 28.

## **Appendix B**

### **Tab 3**

#### **FORENSIC PATHOLOGY ANALYSIS**

##### **I. Introduction**

The Department of the Army Inspector General Agency Review Team (U.S. Review Team) requested expert forensic assistance from the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (AFIP) during the No Gun Ri Review.<sup>1</sup> The AFIP is a Department of Defense tri-service agency with specialized departments and more than 120 staff pathologists.<sup>2</sup> As a part of its mission, AFIP consults on death investigations throughout the world.<sup>3</sup>

The U.S. Team sent the following items to AFIP for analysis:

1. National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) produced contour maps. In its report AFIP refers to NIMA as the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA).
2. Recent color photographs of the No Gun Ri area.<sup>4</sup>
3. A black and white U.S. Air Force aerial reconnaissance photograph dated August 6, 1950 taken in the area where the No Gun Ri incident is alleged to have occurred.<sup>5</sup>

AFIP has conducted thousands of investigations into deaths and has considerable experience in the recovery of bodies.<sup>6</sup>

##### **II. Armed Forces Institute of Pathology Observations**

Based on the material provided for review, AFIP stated that the condition of the open area to the South (upstream) of the double overpass is not consistent with the condition you would expect the site to be in if multiple deaths from machine gun fire had occurred at this location. The site condition is also not consistent with bodies being dragged through the area.

If hundreds of deaths had occurred in the vicinity of the identified area, you would expect to see evidence of decomposition, body parts and scavenger activity. AFIP detected no evidence of decomposition, such as ground staining caused by fluids from decomposing bodies including blood. There were no signs of scavenger activity.

##### **III. Conclusion**

Based on their review of the materials provided, AFIP concluded there was no evidence that there were hundreds of deaths in the open areas in the vicinity of No Gun Ri.

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<sup>1</sup> Per unwritten request from U.S. Review Team in July 2000.

<sup>2</sup> <http://www.afip.org>

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<sup>3</sup> <http://www.afip.org> and Memorandum, Subject: Review of material relating to an alleged incident in the area of No Gun Ri. ROK in July 1950, AFIP-OME, dated 25 July 2000.

<sup>4</sup> U.S. Eighth Army, photograph book, "No Gun Ri Terrain Orientation, 8th U.S. Army and U.S. Forces Korea" dated 23 November 1999. The U.S. Review Team requested that the EUSA IG office take still photographs of the No Gun Ri area on 23 November 1999.

<sup>5</sup> Defense Intelligence Agency, photograph, "No Gun Ri" dated 6 August 1950. DIA identified two aerial reconnaissance missions flown on 6 August and 19 September 1950 that were catalogued as mission numbers R-377A and R-110A flown over the No Gun Ri area along a mission track.

<sup>6</sup> Memorandum, Subject: Review of material relating to an alleged incident in the area of No Gun Ri, ROK in July 1950, AFIP-OME, dated July 25, 2000, p. 4.

## **Appendix C**

### **IMAGERY RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS**

#### **I. Introduction**

In November 1999, The Department of the Army Inspector General Review Team (U.S. Review Team) requested that the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) survey its archives for photographic or textual records of the Republic of Korea (ROK) during the Korean War. The U.S. Review Team asked DIA to focus on the period from July 25 to November 1, 1950. DIA found no textual records but identified two aerial reconnaissance missions flown on August 6 and September 19, 1950, that were catalogued as mission numbers R-377A and R-110A flown over the No Gun Ri area along a mission track that included the Yongdong-Hwanggan corridor.

Following this discovery, the U.S. Review Team formally requested that the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), the Department of Defense functional proponent on matters relating to imagery and aerial reconnaissance, perform an analysis of the aerial reconnaissance film<sup>11</sup>. The Republic of Korea's Image Analysis Team, Aerial Imagery Intelligence Squadron, 39th Tactical Reconnaissance Group, Republic of Korea analyzed the film on behalf of the ROK Review Team<sup>2</sup>. Both examinations focused on the road, rail lines, tunnels and bridges<sup>3</sup>. NIMA was further tasked to search for possible mass gravesites and evidence of human remains along the Yongdong-Hwanggan portion of the film.

#### **II. Imagery Research Chronology of Events**

Defense Intelligence Agency Holdings.

DIA searched its holdings after receiving the U.S. Review Team's request in November 1999. DIA 's first search parameter was for any material showing the No Gun Ri area during the period 25 July to 1 November 1950. Although this search produced no textual records, DIA did find two canisters of overhead reconnaissance film dated August 6 and September 19, 1950. Continuing its search, DIA found 148 more canisters of imagery that were candidates for review. A physical examination of these 148 canisters in December 1999 and January 2000 determined that this film did not contain pictures of the No Gun Ri area. Throughout the searches, the advanced age and fragile condition of the film required special handling, to protect the film.

## Washington National Record Center Holdings.

In mid-January 2000 the U.S. Review Team expanded its film search into the holdings of the Washington National Records Center (WNRC), Suitland, Maryland, and to the National Archives and Records Administration II (NARA II), College Park, Maryland to ensure our search was as thorough as possible.

In November 1999, DIA had compiled a massive list of aerial photography held by WNRC that might contain reconnaissance film over the Republic of Korea and the Yongdong-No Gun Ri Area of Interest (AOI). The U.S. Review Team, with the DIA list as a finding aid, narrowed the timeframe parameter for the physical search to the period July 25 to August 5, 1950 using the August 6, 1950 film as a data point.

From March to June 2000, the U.S. Review Team members, assisted by WNRC employees, painstakingly searched through individual film canisters (each one approximately 12 inches high, six inches in diameter, and weighing several pounds). The imagery is stored in boxes with up to five cans in a box, two boxes deep on a shelf and up to seven rows high. The imagery on the original negatives was handled carefully. Ultimately, the U.S. Review Team examined over 45,000 film canisters. The WNRC search occurred in three phases:

Phase one was a database survey of records DIA had identified as likely candidates containing Republic of Korea, 1950, aerial photography. This database had complete identification information (such as location and date) that greatly expedited locating these materials in the stacks. This identification information permitted rapid culling of relevant boxes in which to search. Many of the canisters had complete labels that made determining relevance easy. However, some of the canisters identified in this phase had incomplete identification data on them. For the canisters with incomplete data, the U.S. Review Team physically examined each canister. None of the canisters contained No Gun Ri related material.

Phase two was the physical search of more record groups, derived from a second database that DIA identified as possibly containing 1950 Republic of Korea aerial photography. However, this database listing contained no inventory of the individual cans in the record groups. Therefore, this phase took longer because the researchers needed to open every box in the record groups. This task involved thousands of boxes and film canisters. No relevant materials were discovered.

Phase three, the final phase consisted of physically searching unlisted record groups that might fit our parameters. This phase used the NARA Accession Number Master List, WNRC, as a search tool. This method represented the least specific data tool. It would cover the remainder of any

known or suspected Korean War materials for the period in question and fulfill our mandate. No relevant materials were discovered.

Upon completion of the search, the U.S. Review Team surveyed and examined over 45,000 canisters of aerial reconnaissance film that yielded a total of 260 canisters of potentially relevant aerial imagery. Close examination of these 260 canisters revealed that none were from the No Gun Ri area. The August 6 and September 19, 1950 film were the only useful photographic products derived from this effort.

## National Archives and Records Administration II

In January and February 2000, the U.S. Review Team examined NARA II holdings and found several canisters of Korean Era gun-camera footage. No footage was from the No Gun Ri area. As the search continued, the U.S. Review Team located additional gun-camera film in June 2000. The U.S. Review Team asked NIMA to assess this imagery. The film segment consisted of 31 usable frames of film covering approximately 1.25 seconds in "real time." The scene consisted of a double railroad track with a road paralleling it. Both the road and railroad crossed a secondary stream where it joined a larger primary stream. Although analysts could not determine the location of the activity, it was evident, when compared to the August 6 and September 19, 1950, film, that this was not the No Gun Ri area. Therefore, it will not be discussed any further.

### **III. The August 6 and September 19, 1950 Film**

The 8th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, 5th Air Force, flew both reconnaissance missions. The film sets contained embedded reconnaissance track frames that enabled the analysts to identify positively the Yongdong-Hwanggan corridor, the No Gun Ri railroad overpass, Highway 1, and other salient features<sup>4</sup>.

The film format is 9 inch X 9 inch taken by vertical cameras with a focal length of 152mm (6 inch). NIMA rated the quality of the film as "good" with a National Imagery Interpretability Rating Scale (NIIRS) of "7" (Cultural Features: Identify individual railroad ties). The altitude for the August 6 mission was 3500 feet while the 19 September's mission was 3800 feet. The August 6, 1950 film was the primary focus for analysis since it was closer to the time frame of the alleged incident. Analysts used the September 19 film for comparison with the August 6 film, looking for changes or other disturbances in the terrain for comparative purposes.

The U.S. Review Team asked NIMA to analyze the two reconnaissance missions along the track from Yongdong to Hwanggan. NIMA's task was to analyze and assess the state of the road, rail lines, tunnels and bridges, and look for possible gravesites and evidence of human remains.

The ROK Review Team's imagery analyst also examined and provided an analysis of the August 6, 1950, aerial reconnaissance film. The ROK Review Team raised several independent concerns and noted differences between the US and ROK evaluation. Therefore, the U.S. Review Team requested NIMA reexamine the film with the intent of responding to the concerns expressed by the ROK Review Team in an effort to answer remaining questions and ensure that a thorough analysis of the August 1950 film had been achieved<sup>5</sup>. After review of the ROK analysis of the aerial reconnaissance film and a meeting with the ROK Team's imagery analyst and a reexamination of the film, NIMA's original conclusions remained unchanged.<sup>6</sup>

#### **IV. Description and Analysis**

The description and analysis of the area shown in the photographs follows below.<sup>7</sup>

A loose surface, all-weather road runs parallel to the east side of the dual rail line. This road is identified as Route 1 on the 1957 Yongdong map (designated as the Highway 4/Kyoung Bu Expressway on contemporary maps)<sup>8</sup>. Approximately 30 meters east of the double overpass on Route 1 is an intact highway bridge. This bridge is approximately 5 meters wide, 20 meters long, and 3.5 meters high; it spans the same streambed as the double overpass. Approximately 220 meters south of the double overpass on the west rail line is a 50-meter section of track that has damage patterns consistent with the results of possible strafing (361249N 1275244E). Just east of the damaged area, and at the base of the rail embankment, is a line of fighting positions. Between the double overpass and the Route 1 highway bridge are vehicle tracks fording the stream.

Approximately 55 meters further upstream from the ford to the east is the start of a line of fighting positions on the south bank of the streambed. This line of fighting positions starts at the bend of the stream and extends for approximately 250 meters to the south.

Approximately 300 meters east of the double overpass along Route 1 is a disrupted road bridge as it appears on the August 6, 1950 film. The bridge is reconstructed in the September 19, 1950 film.

Approximately 260 meters due east of the double overpass is Hill 207, which reveals burial mounds and fighting positions. There is evidence of ordnance impact throughout the area.

Located about 200 meters southwest of the No Gun Ri Railroad Bridge is a small area<sup>9</sup> (361226N 1275231E) that has damage patterns consistent with the

results of probable strafing<sup>10</sup>. This field extends about 50 meters along the west track bed.

Located about 1200 meters southwest of the No Gun Ri Railroad Bridge is a large area<sup>11</sup> (36126N 1275231E) that has damage patterns consistent with the results of probable strafing. This field extends about 50 meters along both sides of the track bed.

The August 6 imagery appears to have been taken during midday as indicated by the limited shadowing exhibited by the various structures and vegetation. This is verified by annotations that appear on the various frames throughout out the reconnaissance track.

## V. Conclusions

The NIMA analysis drew the following conclusions:

There are no indications of human remains or mass graves in, under, or around the No Gun-Ri overpass or culvert or surrounding area<sup>12</sup>.

The road bridge immediately east of the double overpass does not appear to have undergone recent construction prior to the date of the image<sup>13</sup>.

Probable strafing occurred in two locations along the western track bed<sup>14</sup>. The analyst ruled out that artillery, mortars, or standard aerial bombs caused the ground marks.

Entrances to the various tunnels all appeared intact and open. There is evidence of probable bomb craters noted in the vicinity of the various tunnel openings.

The September 19, 1950 images showed that the disrupted road bridge in the August 6, 1950 film had been rebuilt.

The September 1950 film provided no **significant** additional information.

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<sup>1</sup> NIMA Imagery Analysis Report No Gun Ri, Republic of Korea 6 August 1950 and 19 September 1950.

<sup>2</sup> Working papers provided to the US Team entitled Analysis on Overhead Imagery.

<sup>3</sup> The U.S. Review Team provided a duplicate negative of the 6 August and 19 September 1950 missions to the ROK Team.

<sup>4</sup> Lead frame is a photograph of a section of a 1:250,000 map reference J52T - J52U showing the flight path and approximate location of film frames.

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<sup>5</sup> NIMA Imagery Analysis Review and Comments on the Republic of Korea's No Gun-Ri Investigation Team's "Analysis on Overhead Imagery" Date of Imagery 6 August 1950.

<sup>6</sup> Supplemental comments were provided by NIMA on 3 November 2000.

<sup>7</sup> See Figures 1 - 4 NIMA Imagery Analysis Report No Gun Ri, Republic of Korea 6 August 1950 and 19 September 1950

<sup>8</sup> Map Sheet HWANGGAN, Series L754, Sheet 3318 III

<sup>9</sup> NIMA Analyst identified this area as "probable northeast strafed area." (See Tab 2, App D, P.11)

<sup>10</sup> The ROK analyst identifies this area as "artificial patterns... (Estimated not due to air strike)"

<sup>11</sup> NIMA Analyst identified this area as "probable southwest strafed area." (See Tab 2, App D, P.11)

<sup>12</sup> The ROK imagery analyst concurred with this conclusion. It had been reported that remains were present as late as 10 August 1950. According to NIMA, the quality of the 6 August 1950 film was good enough that an object the size of a human body roughly between 4 and 6 feet in height would have been visible.

<sup>13</sup> It was reported that the bridge was down between 26 July 1950 and was rebuilt prior to the date of the aerial photograph

<sup>14</sup> These are the two areas described on page 7

## **Appendix C**

### **Tab 1**

NIMA Imagery Analysis Report No Gun-Ri, Republic of Korea 6 August 1950 and  
19 September 1950