

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title:

Korea

Staff Office-Individual:

Defense Policy-Binnendijk, Hans

Original OA/ID Number:

2576

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
31	6	5	1	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. fax	cover, Longstreth to Binnendijk re CFC Deficiencies (1 page)	c 09/1999	P1/b(1)
001b. report	re CFC Deficiencies (11 pages)	c 09/1999	P1/b(1)
002. memo	information, Hans Binnendijk and Joseph Bouchard to Samuel Berger re Defense Situation in Korea (2 pages)	09/09/1999	P1/b(1)
003a. memo	information, Hans Binnendijk and Joseph Bouchard to Samuel Berger re Defense Situation in Korea [duplicate of 002] (2 pages)	09/09/1999	P1/b(1)
003b. memo	information, Hans Binnendijk and Joseph Bouchard to Samuel Berger re Defense Situation in Korea (2 copies of Page 2) (4 pages)	09/03/1999	P1/b(1)
003c. paper	re Improvements (1 page)	c 09/1999	P1/b(1)
003d. paper	re Readiness (3 pages)	c 09/1999	P1/b(1)
003e. briefing slides	re status and concerns Korea (2 pages)	c 07/1999	P1/b(1)
004a. memo	action, Hans Binnendijk to Samuel Berger re Readiness in South Korea (2 pages)	10/12/999	P1/b(1)
004b. paper	CFC Deficiencies [duplicate of 001b] (11 pages)	c 09/1999	P1/b(1)
004c. memo	information, Hans Binnendijk and Joseph Bouchard to Samuel Berger re Defense Situation in Korea [duplicate of 002] (2 pages)	09/09/1999	P1/b(1)
004d. email	Wendy Gray to @Defense re Readiness in South Korea #7525 (1 page)	10/14/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Hans Binnendijk (Defense Policy and Arms Control)
OA/Box Number: 2576

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea

2009-0528-F

kc1401

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004e. drafts	action memo, Hans Binnendijk to Samuel Berger re Readiness in South Korea [close copies of 004a] (4 pages)	10/12/1999	P1/b(1)
005a. fax	cover, Gai to Fallin re Force and Family Protection in Korea (1 page)	10/07/1999	P1/b(1)
005b. cable	re Force and Family (22 pages)	10/06/1999	P1/b(1)
006. notes	handwritten, re Defense Situation in Korea (3 pages)	09/08/1999	P1/b(1)
007a. memo	information, Hans Binnendijk and Joseph Bouchard to Samuel Berger re Defense Situation in Korea [duplicate of 003b] (3 pages)	09/03/1999	P1/b(1)
007b. paper	re Improvements [duplicate of 003c] (1 page)	c 09/1999	P1/b(1)
007c. paper	re Readiness [duplicate of 003d] (3 pages)	c 09/1999	P1/b(1)
007d. briefing slides	re status and concerns Korea (2 pages)	c 07/1999	P1/b(1)
008. memo	nformation, Hans Binnendijk and Joseph Bouchard to Samuel Berger re Defense Situation in Korea [1st page only] [duplicate of 003b] (1 page)	09/03/1999	P1/b(1)
009. briefing paper	re Counterproliferation (1 page)	c 09/1999	P1/b(1)
010. report	Military Intelligence Digest Supplement (6 pages)	11/18/1999	P1/b(1)

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Hans Binnendijk (Defense Policy and Arms Control)
OA/Box Number: 2576

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea

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001a. fax	cover, Longstreth to Binnendijk re CFC Deficiencies (1 page)	c 09/1999	P1/b(1)
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. report	re CFC Deficiencies (11 pages)	c 09/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Hans Binnendijk (Defense Policy and Arms Control)
OA/Box Number: 2576

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea

2009-0528-F
kc1401

RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. memo	information, Hans Binnendijk and Joseph Bouchard to Samuel Berger re Defense Situation in Korea (2 pages)	09/09/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
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OA/Box Number: 2576

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea

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kc1401

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TO: BERGER

FROM: BINNENDIJK
BOUCHARD

DOC DATE: 09 SEP 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOREA

DEFENSE POLICY

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: DEFENSE SITUATION IN KOREA -- SUPPLEMENT

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER W/ COMMENT

DUE DATE: 07 SEP 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BINNENDIJK

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BINNENDIJK

BOUCHARD

NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By CH NARA, Date 02/06/15

2009-0528-F

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTCG

CLOSED BY: NSDMK

DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 9906474

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER
001 BINNENDIJK
001
002 BERGER
002

Z 99090317 FOR INFORMATION
Z 99090711 FOR REDO
X 99090914 NOTED BY BERGER W/ COMMENT
Z 99090911 FOR INFORMATION
X 99092713 NOTED BY BERGER W/ COMMENT

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

9/10

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 6474

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG 12 A/O 01

458

GIRE

JACOBSON

POWELL

SARGEANT

BRADTKE

RUDMAN

STEINBERG

BERGER

SITUATION ROOM

WEST WING DESK

RECORDS MGMT.

SEQUENCE TO

INITIAL/DATE

DISPOSITION

8/9

1

2

MR 9/9

3

4

Q

5

9/27

1

6

9/27

2

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

HAB, JFB

CC:

99 SEP 9 AM 11 02

COMMENTS:

Korea-Defense Situation

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

9/3

PROOFED BY: D LOG # 6474
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG D A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
578 GIRE			
JACOBSON	1	9/13	
POWELL			
SARGEANT			
BRADTKE			
RUDMAN			
STEINBERG	2		
BERGER	3		
SITUATION ROOM			
WEST WING DESK	4	9/7	SHAS
RECORDS MGMT. NB	5		FFA

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:

99 SEP 3 00 5:27

COMMENTS:

Korea-Defense Situation

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE yes

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003a. memo	information, Hans Binnendijk and Joseph Bouchard to Samuel Berger re Defense Situation in Korea [duplicate of 002] (2 pages)	09/09/1999	P1/b(1)

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TO: CRIBBS, M

FROM: BRADTKE

DOC DATE: 25 OCT 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOREA SOUTH
DEFENSE POLICY

KOREA
READINESS

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR QUARTERLY UPDATES ON READINESS OF COMBINED FORCES
COMMAND

ACTION: BRADTKE SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 18 OCT 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BINNENDIJK

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
BINNENDIJK
BOUCHARD
EXECSEC
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By W NARA, Date 02/06/15

2009-0528-F

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTCG

CLOSED BY: NSTCG

DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 9907525

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER
001 BINNENDIJK
002

Z 99101217 FOR DECISION
Z 99101421 FOR REDO
X 99102519 BRADTKE SGD MEMO

SECRET

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 1525 Redo
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOC PR A/O _____

AS8

SEQUENCE TO INITIAL/DATE DISPOSITION

GIRE			
JACOBSON	1	10/15	
POWELL			
SARGEANT			
BRADTKE	2	10/19	Tab I please
RUDMAN	3	10/19	
STEINBERG	4		
BERGER	5		
SITUATION ROOM			
WEST WING DESK	6	10/25	N
RECORDS MGMT.	7	10/25	N

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC: H-3, Loh

99 OCT 15 04:12:07

COMMENTS:

Readiness in South Korea

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE yes

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

REDO

THE WHITE HOUSE

PROOFED BY: DOV LOG # 7525
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM ~~PRG~~ INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG D A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
GIRE	_____	_____	_____
JACOBSON	_____	_____	_____
POWELL	_____	_____	_____
SARGEANT	<u>1</u>	<u>10/12</u>	<u>W/redo</u>
BRADTKE	<u>2 (not read)</u>	_____	_____
RUDMAN	<u>3</u>	<u>MA 10/14</u>	<u>see notes for redo</u>
STEINBERG	<u>4</u>	_____	<u>also Bradtke should review</u>
BERGER	<u>5</u>	_____	_____
SITUATION ROOM	_____	_____	_____
WEST WING DESK	<u>3</u>	<u>10/14 PK</u>	<u>✓</u>
RECORDS MGMT.	_____	_____	_____
<u>Bennendijk</u>	<u>4</u>	_____	<u>FFA</u>

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:

COMMENTS:

South Korea - Deadlines

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE _____

- Considering, in the context of the fy 2001 budget proposals, ways to increase/adopt funding for Korean readiness.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504


7525

October 25, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR COL. MARIA I. CRIBBS
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Request for Quarterly Updates on Readiness of
Combined Forces Command

The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs requests that the Department of Defense provide him with an update on the readiness of Combined Forces Command (CFC) to execute its contingency plans for the Korean Peninsula. This report should reflect the conclusions of the Senior Readiness Oversight Council (SROC) as well as the views of CINCCFC, and should address long-term programmatic issues as well as near-term force allocation issues.


Robert A. Bradtke
Executive Secretary

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004a. memo	action, Hans Binnendijk to Samuel Berger re Readiness in South Korea (2 pages)	10/12/999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Hans Binnendijk (Defense Policy and Arms Control)
OA/Box Number: 2576

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea

2009-0528-F
kc1401

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004b. paper	CFC Deficiencies [duplicate of 001b] (11 pages)	c 09/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Hans Binnendijk (Defense Policy and Arms Control)
OA/Box Number: 2576

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea

2009-0528-F
kc1401

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004c. memo	information, Hans Binnendijk and Joseph Bouchard to Samuel Berger re Defense Situation in Korea [duplicate of 002] (2 pages)	09/09/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Hans Binnendijk (Defense Policy and Arms Control)
OA/Box Number: 2576

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea

2009-0528-F
kc1401

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004d. email	Wendy Gray to @Defense re Readiness in South Korea #7525 (1 page)	10/14/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Hans Binnendijk (Defense Policy and Arms Control)
OA/Box Number: 2576

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea

2009-0528-F
kc1401

RESTRICTION CODES

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004e. drafts	action memo, Hans Binnendijk to Samuel Berger re Readiness in South Korea [close copies of 004a] (4 pages)	10/12/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Hans Binnendijk (Defense Policy and Arms Control)
OA/Box Number: 2576

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea

2009-0528-F
kc1401

RESTRICTION CODES

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

7525

MEMORANDUM FOR COL. MARIA I. CRIBBS
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Request for Quarterly Updates on Readiness of
Combined Forces Command

The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs requests that the Department of Defense provide him with ~~an~~ ^{an} ~~quarterly~~ update on the readiness of Combined Forces Command (CFC) to execute its contingency plans for the Korean Peninsula. ~~These reports~~ should reflect the conclusions of the Senior Readiness Oversight Council (SROC) as well as the views of CINCCFC, and should address long-term programmatic issues as well as near-term force allocation issues.

MS

Robert A. Bradtke
Executive Secretary

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005a. fax	cover, Gai to Fallin re Force and Family Protection in Korea (1 page)	10/07/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Hans Binnendijk (Defense Policy and Arms Control)
OA/Box Number: 2576

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea

2009-0528-F
kc1401

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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~~CONFIDENTIAL (WHEN WITH ATTACHED)~~

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1400

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

07 OCT 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

(ATTN: VADM JOHNSON)
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(ATTN: BRIGADIER GENERAL ROCHELLE)
GENERAL COUNSEL
(ATTN: MS. MILLER)
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PERSONNEL AND READINESS)
(ATTN: MR. DE LEON)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS)
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(SENATE AFFAIRS)
(ATTN: MR. FARRAR)
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNSEL
(ATTN: CDR FALLIN)
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF (PUBLIC AFFAIRS)
(ATTN: CAPT PIETROPAOLI)

SUBJECT: Public Affairs Guidance for Force and Family Protection in Korea

Proposed Public Affairs Guidance for the subject matter was staffed and coordinated with the interagency in August. RADM Quigley wants to ensure you are aware of the current public affairs guidance and United States Forces Korea's intentions to implement the initiative. Our intention is to sign out this guidance on Friday, October 8, 1999. Respectfully request your review and comments.

Please respond with concurrence not later than 0900, October 8, 1999. Response by email or phone to the OASD (PA) Plans point of contact is preferred. Please provide significant changes in writing.

The OASD(PA) Plans point of contact is LT David Gai, USN, Room 2D757, telephone (703) 697-9845, dave.gai@osd.pentagon.mil. The fax telephone number 693-6853.

Miles C. Wiley III
Colonel, USAF
Director for Plans

Attachment:
Public affairs guidance

~~CONFIDENTIAL (WHEN WITH ATTACHED)~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005b. cable	re Force and Family (22 pages)	10/06/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Hans Binnendijk (Defense Policy and Arms Control)
OA/Box Number: 2576

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea

2009-0528-F
kc1401

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. notes	handwritten, re Defense Situation in Korea (3 pages)	09/08/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Hans Binnendijk (Defense Policy and Arms Control)
OA/Box Number: 2576

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea

2009-0528-F
kc1401

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007a. memo	information, Hans Binnendijk and Joseph Bouchard to Samuel Berger re Defense Situation in Korea [duplicate of 003b] (3 pages)	09/03/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Hans Binnendijk (Defense Policy and Arms Control)
OA/Box Number: 2576

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea

2009-0528-F
kc1401

RESTRICTION CODES

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007b. paper	re Improvements [duplicate of 003c] (1 page)	c 09/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Hans Binnendijk (Defense Policy and Arms Control)
OA/Box Number: 2576

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea

2009-0528-F
kc1401

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007c. paper	re Readiness [duplicate of 003d] (3 pages)	c 09/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Hans Binnendijk (Defense Policy and Arms Control)
OA/Box Number: 2576

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea

2009-0528-F
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007d. briefing slides	re status and concerns Korea (2 pages)	c 07/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Hans Binnendijk (Defense Policy and Arms Control)
OA/Box Number: 2576

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea

2009-0528-F
kc1401

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008. memo	information, Hans Binnendijk and Joseph Bouchard to Samuel Berger re Defense Situation in Korea [1st page only] [duplicate of 003b] (1 page)	09/03/1999	P1/b(1)

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009. briefing paper	re Counterproliferation (1 page)	c 09/1999	P1/b(1)

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Mister Chairman and distinguished committee members, it is my distinct honor to appear before you again as Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, Republic of Korea (ROK)- United States (U.S.) Combined Forces Command, and Commander, United States Forces Korea (CINC, UNC/CFC/USFK). I welcome this opportunity to present the current security situation in the Korean Theater of Operations. I will focus on the threat, the status of the ROK-US alliance, the key issues facing us today, and my vision for the future of U.S. interests in the region.

I want to begin by thanking the Members of this Committee for the support you provided to USFK over the years. For example, the prompt assistance Congress provided in passing \$253.8 Million in Emergency Supplemental Appropriations provided the funds to restore badly damaged facilities caused by the August 1998 floods. The soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, and civilians of USFK all benefited from that support. Overall, your support enables us to achieve our theater mission of maintaining the Armistice, deterring aggression, and remaining ready to fight and win if necessary. To accomplish this mission we pursue a strategy based on a strong forward presence, a vibrant combined exercise program, and rapid reinforcement of forces from the U.S. This strategy has enabled over 45 years of relative peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia. I believe continued U.S. support of the ROK and

a meaningful U.S. military presence are the keys to continued stability in Northeast Asia. The recent economic crisis in Asia makes this support even more critical since history shows economic instability often leads to political instability. USFK and ROK forces provide deterrence for these security challenges and ensure continued stability in this most important region.

THE THREAT

First, let me stress that the greatest threat to peace and security in Asia is Kim Jong-il's North Korea. North Korea remains the country most likely to involve the U.S. in a large-scale regional war over the near term. This unpredictable regime is perhaps the last aggressive, hard-line remnant of the Cold War. As such, it is still enduring the political, economic, and social pressures associated with a stagnant, isolated, and failing communist system. North Korea is struggling with international economic isolation and chronic food, fuel, and hard currency shortages that stem from their mismanaged, centrally controlled economy; decades of huge expenditures on military and propaganda projects; and a loss of support from the former Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc.

By any measure, the North Korean economy is failing. Following a decade of steep decline, North Korea's centrally-planned national economy is in the latter stages of collapse. Juche (North Korea's tenet of self-reliance) is not working.

The components of North Korea's economic infrastructure are dysfunctional. Raw material stockpiles are almost non-existent and very little capital is left in the country. Shortages of food, energy, and foreign exchange have crippled industry and trade. The mutual interlocking network of support is broken. Outside of a very few limited sectors, North Korean industrial activity has ceased, and specialization of labor has eroded. The economy cannot meet the basic needs of substantial portions of the population. The central rationing system is also broken. Almost the entire population suffers from an inadequate diet. Starvation, malnutrition, and related illnesses have affected perhaps tens of thousands of North Koreans during the past few years alone, and hundreds of thousands more are at risk. Medical care is nonexistent for the vast majority. For many of the North's citizens, life is reduced to basic survival. The quest for food resulted in significant population shifts, an increasing number of defections across the Chinese border, and a dramatic rise in vagrancy. Typical North Korean citizens are becoming increasingly tired, hungry, sick, and desperate.

Meanwhile, the enigmatic Kim Regime remains firmly in charge. Lacking his father's charisma and revolutionary credentials, Kim Jong-il has increased his reliance on the military and draconian security measures to maintain his position and control of the populace. Kim's inner circle

remains a relatively small, tightly-knit oligarchy in which relations by blood or marriage followed closely by revolutionary ties and loyalty are the primary prerequisites for power. The regime's foremost concern is self-preservation. Despite the hardships of the people, massive amounts of precious resources are spent on their own comforts, monumental construction projects, and propaganda events to glorify and perpetuate the Kim family and its supporting elite. With every economic indicator in decline, the leadership is well aware of the need for drastic reform. However, fear of internal instability deters them from initiating meaningful reform. Their minor incremental attempts to cope, such as allowing farmers increased autonomy and the tightly-controlled opening of the Kumgangsan resort area have all fallen short. Consequently, the regime continues to demand increasing amounts of aid and assistance from the international community to support the growing number of citizens who receive no support from their own government.

The most puzzling paradox for many outsiders is the continuing strength of the North's military power. I am often asked why the Kim Regime devotes the bulk of their limited national resources to sustaining and further improving its formidable armed forces, while the civilian sector continues its steep downward spiral. It is important to understand the critical role of the military in North Korean society. North

Korea is a state built around the armed forces. The army is more than a military organization; it is North Korea's largest employer, purchaser, and consumer. North Korea's industrial infrastructure focuses on military production and support, and its distribution systems are designed to resupply the military. The North Korean People's Army is the central unifying structure in the country and the source of power for the regime. In other words, the North Korean military is the embodiment of North Korea's national identity. Without the military, the regime is simply not viable. It is truly the last remaining element of national power through which the regime achieves its objectives.

Over the last four decades the leadership has specifically designed and tailored the size, organization, equipment, and combat capabilities of the military to support attainment of their reunification goal. Economic problems and hardships do not deter North Korea from sustaining and enhancing the capabilities of the 5th largest military force in the world. The North Korean People's Army includes over 1 million active duty soldiers supported by an air force of over 860 combat jet aircraft, a navy of more than 800 ships, and over five million reserve troops. This forward-deployed, offensively-oriented military machine also includes weapons of mass destruction, hundreds of theater ballistic missiles (primarily Scuds), tremendous special operations capabilities, and a huge artillery

force. This force works hard to train, modernize, and prepare for war. Each year they execute summer and winter training cycles that include combined arms and joint service training. Last year's extensive missile activity included the late August launch of a long-range Taepo-Dong missile, which is indicative of North Korea's unwavering commitment to upgrade its missile force and make it capable of reaching far beyond the peninsula. Pyongyang continues work on the Taepo-Dong-2, a two stage missile which, when operational, could potentially deliver payloads to mainland Alaska and the Hawaiian Islands and smaller payloads to other parts of the United States. The fact that Pyongyang is eager to sell missile technology to anyone with hard currency compounds our concern. North Korea is the third major global proliferator, and its sales have dramatically heightened the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) threat posed by other aggressive countries. Included in the threat are also stockpiles of chemical weapons that we believe the North is likely to use. These weapons endanger both military personnel and defenseless civilian population centers. Indications that the North is continuing research and development of biological warfare weapons are of great concern. With regard to the nuclear issue, we are deeply concerned that the North is continuing a covert nuclear weapons program. Among the facilities we are closely monitoring is the underground

construction project at Kumchang-ni, which the intelligence community assesses is large enough to house a plutonium production facility and possibly a reprocessing plant. We are hopeful that current negotiations will provide access to that facility. On the tactical level, the North continues a reorganization of artillery assets and the fielding of long-range systems near the Demilitarized Zone. Pyongyang is in the final stages of a force enhancement, which, when completed, will result in the deployment of over 10,000 artillery systems and more than 2,300 multiple rocket launcher systems in the forward area. This large number of long-range artillery provides devastating indirect fire support. In sum, left unchecked, the North's conventional and asymmetrical capabilities are capable of ranging the entire Korean peninsula and causing great destruction throughout the South.

Concurrent with the military buildup, the rhetoric coming from Pyongyang is increasingly hostile toward both the U.S. and the ROK. Local provocations by the North continue to threaten the delicate balance on the peninsula. The December 1998 discovery of North Korean infiltrators in a landing operation on the southwestern coast of the Republic is only the latest in a series of high-risk incursions by the North. Prior to this most recent incident, in June 1998, the ROK captured a P-4 midget submarine that was involved in infiltration activities off the

Southeast coast. Such gambles always have potential to escalate into more serious situations.

In conclusion, I concur with the CIA Director's recent remarks to the Senate Armed Services Committee that "...concern for North Korea can hardly be overstated and that ...in nearly all respects, the situation there has become more volatile and unpredictable." In my view instability plus unpredictability equals increased danger. The Kim Regime will sacrifice everything to keep itself in power and maintain its trump card, a powerful military force. Barring any major changes such as unification, economic collapse, or a dramatic change in leadership, North Korea's military strategy will continue to follow the same path: prepare for reunification, by force if necessary. We remain in a situation wherein Kim Jong-il could decide at any moment his prospects are so bleak that his best chance for survival is to use his military rather than risk losing that capability forever.

THE ROK-US ALLIANCE

The ROK-US alliance remains a model for alliances around the world. Our continuing cooperation and understanding is a success story in many ways, but particularly in terms of combined defense efforts. Our ability to work together toward common goals is represented in our Mutual Defense Treaty and in our Security Consultative and Military Committee Meetings.

This is a time of unprecedented change in the Republic of Korea. A year after the first-ever election of an opposition presidential candidate, President Kim, Dae Jung is receiving broad public support for his leadership, and his domestic and foreign policies. He fully supports the ROK-US alliance and has repeatedly stated his administration will coordinate closely with the United States on policies toward North Korea.

The current mix of political and economic initiatives coupled with our continued warfighting readiness is a good formula for success. The Four Party Talks, General Officer Talks, MIA repatriations, and economic initiatives are important episodes of communication with a regime that otherwise shuns such relations. These varied efforts are not separate responses to random opportunities, but part of a coherent and focused strategy to deter war, reduce tensions on the Korean peninsula, and bring about normalization in relations. Progress is slow, but developments like the use of North Korean airspace for international flights can help break down old barriers.

The economic crisis that swept across Asia last year hit Korea hard. The International Monetary Fund reforms were difficult, but President Kim and the National Assembly are moving ahead with reforms. In some respects, the economy appears well positioned to recover from the financial crisis. Interest rates declined, the currency regained ground, and

investor confidence sparked a market recovery. The trade balance is positive and repayment to the International Monetary Fund is ahead of schedule. It is my assessment that the Korean people have the values, discipline, and drive to work through this crisis and grow from the experience. An immediate concern is the impact on defense spending.

Before the economic crisis, the ROK spent a significant amount of their national budget on defense. They had an aggressive modernization program and contributed significantly toward U.S. stationing costs. However, the economic crisis forced them to cut defense spending. The defense share of the overall budget has declined from over 20% from 1994-1997 to 18.3% in 1998 and to 17.2% for 1999. Last year's \$10.6 Billion defense budget was largely spent to increase readiness. Foreign Military Sales purchases from the U.S. totaled \$357 Million in 1998. These purchases were primarily for sustainment items since the acquisition of end items was delayed. Several military related co-production efforts with U.S. industries continued, including the Korean F-16 Fighter, the UH-60 Blackhawk Helicopter, and the Amphibious Assault Vehicle. Recent major end item purchases from the U.S. included the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) and Target Acquisition systems.

The economic crisis also affected the ROK cost sharing program. Following Secretary Cohen's direction of "no shortfall, no windfall," the 1998 Special Measures Agreement (SMA) was adjusted so the majority of the ROK contribution could be made in Korean won. This saved the ROK Government approximately \$100 Million while USFK maintained our original purchasing power. The new SMA commits the ROK to \$333 Million for 1999 and sustains the purchasing power over the next three years. It is fair and equitable to both sides and confirms that the ROK is a full and stable partner in our common defense.

READINESS, OPERATIONS, AND TRAINING

UNC/CFC/USFK epitomizes the model of Goldwater/Nichols reforms in that we are joint and combined everyday. We not only train as we would fight, but also work every day in a combined/joint environment. The forces of our two great nations complement each other in warfighting capabilities. My staff, subordinate commanders, and the soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, and civilians of the command are some of the best and brightest our countries has to offer. They are committed to our theater strategy of promoting permanent stability on the peninsula and in the region by maintaining the Armistice; deterring North Korean aggression; and if deterrence fails and North Korea attacks, to fight and win. Our forces are deployed in a defensive posture, arrayed to stop the North Korean Army's

advance into the South and prevent the capture of Seoul. If attacked, we will interdict and defeat the North's lead and follow-on forces. When the proper combat ratio is achieved, we will destroy their remaining forces.

I will not tell you defeating North Korean aggression will be easy. The casualties on both sides will be large, and the longer it takes us to build up the necessary combat power to destroy the invading forces, the higher the casualties and devastation will be.

The current force structure provides the minimum capability to support two near-simultaneous Major Theater Wars (MTW). Force projection of trained and ready units from the United States is vital to the execution of our campaign, but limited airlift and fast sealift assets will slow the rapid movement of forces and supplies to Korea if we are the second of two MTWs. Pre-positioned stockpiles of equipment and supplies reduce the strategic lift shortfall, but continued acquisitions and improvements are required. I strongly support our strategic lift programs. The C-17 Globemaster and fast sealift must remain high priorities for acquisition at the Department of Defense level.

There are assets available that upgrade our warfighting capabilities and increase our margin of success. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles will strengthen our counterfire and rear area

fights in the early stages of a conflict. The increase of six A/OA-10 aircraft in Fiscal Year (FY) 99 gives us a higher concentration of forces for 24-hour coverage.

We continue to work on interoperability with C4I systems. Each service is working with legacy stove-piped computer operating systems that inhibit information flow. This impacts our ability to plan and execute a joint campaign. This problem is aggravated by reliability problems in the combined arena. We need to develop interoperable C4I systems that are easily modified to operate in a combined environment.

Precision munitions are critical assets to counter North Korean underground facilities. Recent advances in precision weapons increase capability, but we should not reduce lower cost weapon's inventories. These lower cost precision weapons (Paveway I, II, III) should be maintained for two reasons. First, a significant number of precision weapons are required to sustain a major conflict. A mix of high and low cost weapons give planners flexible options and increase our ability to sustain the fight. Second, we can provide aircrews realistic training with the lower cost weapons since they use similar delivery procedures.

I would like to turn briefly to the subject of Anti-Personnel Landmines (APL). A study was recently completed, confirming the requirement for APL in the prosecution of CFC's

latest war plan. Let me be very clear here, these weapons, both the non-self destructing and self destructing types are absolutely vital to the success of UNC/CFC's mission to deter North Korean aggression and defend the ROK. I'm grateful that Congress repealed the APL Use Moratorium this past year. Additionally, I support the intent of the Ottawa Convention, but we must satisfy a balance between military effectiveness and protection of non-combatants.

The chemical and biological weapons threat from North Korea is very real. CFC is working diligently to improve our capability to operate in a contaminated environment. Our current and planned actions are sound, deliberate, and prudent steps enabling our forces to operate effectively. The Anthrax immunization program is on track. Even with the continuous turnover in personnel, we plan to sustain a immunization rate of nearly 100%.

We are also taking steps to increase the warning time and reduce the probability of success of a North Korean ballistic missile attack. Improvements in data and voice warning allow timely and accurate Theater Ballistic Missile Warning (TBMW), resulting in fewer casualties. Advances in detection and tracking systems will improve our success in engaging ballistic missiles.

Readiness is maintained through an extensive Combined Forces Command exercise program. We hold three theater-wide exercises each year. Ulchi Focus Lens (UFL) is our primary warfighting exercise. UFL is the largest computer-driven exercise in the world and involves the entire combined headquarters in a war plan simulation. Foal Eagle is our rear area operations exercise, which builds into a corps-level, force-on-force training event. Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (RSOI) exercises our ability to accept and integrate forces from off the peninsula. In addition to these exercises, each component commander conducts a myriad of field training and computer simulation exercises. These exercises demonstrate that we can execute our defense of the ROK with forces currently in country when rapidly reinforced by U.S. forces off the peninsula.

PRIORITIES AND RESOURCES

Your support and continued resourcing allowed me to address many of my priorities. Unfortunately, these fiscally constrained times do not allow us to address every issue, so I am forced to prioritize. My priorities are Combat Readiness, Force Protection, Force Development, and Quality of Life.

In the area of readiness, I focus on personnel, equipment, modernization, and training. All the services give Korea high priority, so I do not have a significant personnel problem. An

example of our success is the recent approval to strengthen the Eighth United States Army (EUSA) Headquarters to levels that support our peacetime and wartime requirements. I expect to complete this plus-up by September 1999. Additionally, EUSA exceeded all reenlistment retention objectives for 1998. Conversely, my biggest personnel challenge is the 90% turnover rate associated with the one-year tour most personnel in Korea serve. We mitigate this by our robust training and exercise programs.

In the equipment and modernization arena we have upgraded our armor, artillery, attack aviation, and counterfire capabilities. The prepositioned brigade set equipment is now 92% complete. This prepositioned equipment allows forces to flow into theater and "fall in" on equipment. As a result units can join the fight far faster than if they brought their own equipment from home station. We must continue to capitalize on technological advances to maximize our potential to engage the enemy with precision lethality. I am satisfied with the efforts in this area, and we now field first-line equipment in nearly every category.

Current Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funding presents some risk. The FY99 funding constraints reduced my Base Operations (BASOPS) and Operational Tempo (OPTEMPO) programs to below adequate levels. Eighth United States Army O&M funding is

approximately \$25 Million less than it was in FY98. A pay raise for local nationals of 3.1% and a 7% Korean inflation rate erode my buying power. Even after funding Ground Operational Tempo programs to maintain readiness in FY99, I must divert \$25 Million Ground OPTEMPO and BASOPS dollars into Headquarter's accounts that directly effect my warfighting capability. Principal among these is funding for the Korean Simulation Center and several contracts that model our various war plans. I must strike a balance between readiness and quality of life. Given my reduced funding level, my flexibility is reduced to the point where I can sustain OPTEMPO readiness, but not maintain adequate OPRED, BASOPS, and Quality of Life (QoL) programs.

Force protection is an issue we take seriously in Korea. I assess the current threat to be low, but our vulnerability is high due to urban sprawl. We have directed an extensive assessment of our facilities to find ways to lessen this vulnerability. We have put procedures in place that reduce the risks, and we formed a task force that reviews every new construction project for force protection concerns. We are working on several small projects that will help ensure the safety of our service members and their families. While we have not experienced any significant hostile activities directed against our forces, I refuse to allow the command to become complacent in this area.

In the operational sense of force protection, theater missile defense remains one of my highest priorities. We have one battalion of Patriot missiles with six firing batteries. I use them to protect the three most important airbases for both the warfight and reception of follow-on forces. This leaves the majority of my command and the rest of the ROK virtually unprotected from the theater ballistic missile threat. We rectify this situation in a crisis by placing Patriots early in the scheduled deployment flow. I fully support the development of a comprehensive system capable of protecting the force from these indiscriminate weapons.

The quality of life of your soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines is very important to me. Their Personnel Tempo (PERSTEMPO) is 365 days a year in this hardship area. They wake each day to face one of the most threatening situations in the world today. They deserve our support and a quality of life comparable to their peers. The interruption of Military Construction (MILCON) dollars for four years in the early 1990s has limited my ability to give our service members that quality of life. We continue to make progress with the reemergence of MILCON funding, but there is still much to be done. Underfunding of Real Property Maintenance and Repair (RPM) exacerbate an already serious problem with troop housing, dining facilities, and infrastructure. Overcrowded facilities force us

to billet many accompanied personnel off-post where the cost of living is high. Existing unaccompanied housing and dining facilities continue to suffer from rapid deterioration and excessive wear and tear due to overcrowding. Some soldiers still live in Quonset huts and Vietnam-era pre-fabricated buildings. My goal for housing service members is the DoD's 1+1 Standard. If current MILCON and Host Nation Funded Construction levels remain constant, we will meet these goals for the Air Force component by program year 2010 and for the Army by 2012. Your continued support is vital to achieve this goal. Additionally, we rely heavily on Host Nation Funded Construction to upgrade the standard of living of our service members and their families. The ROK is continuing this support by providing \$80 Million in 1999.

THE AGREED FRAMEWORK

The situation in North Korea remains very volatile and unpredictable. The recent disclosure of a possible underground nuclear facility at the Kumchang-ni site has increased tensions and threatens this existing agreement. We will not ignore these developments. The North must satisfy us that they are continuing to comply with agreements that prohibit the development of nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula. It is essential that our concerns be removed as soon as possible.

Hopefully, ongoing negotiations concerning this site will be successful.

The Agreed Framework has provided the U.S. the legitimacy to question and maintain surveillance on the North's nuclear program. Additionally, it includes provisions for normalizing US-NK relations. While these provisions are largely unrealized in tangible ways, they have established a foundation for further progress. Actually, the Four-Party Talks continue to build upon the more comprehensive provisions of the Agreed Framework and the successful achievements thus far.

We are working closely with Dr. Perry and his North Korea Policy Coordination team to ensure that all the facts and pertinent information are available. Dr. Perry continues to review and formulate U.S. policy recommendations regarding North Korea. At this point, the Agreed Framework provides the U.S. with an ongoing means for denying North Korea unfettered access to nuclear material. Dr. Perry fully understands this, as well as the importance of retaining the support of the ROK, Japan, and China when dealing with North Korea.

STRATEGIC VISION

At the beginning of my tour almost three years ago the economies of East Asia were vibrant and strong. I don't need to remind you that this prosperity was responsible for more than three million jobs in the United States. But now, many of these

economies are suffering from structural problems that threaten their social order and, in some cases, their security policy.

During my tour the ROK-US Alliance has maintained a successful deterrence and defense posture while North Korea has evolved, almost surrealistically, through paradoxical military expansion and socio-economic decay. These two seemingly contradictory developments create unique challenges not only to the stability of the Korean Peninsula, but also to the stability of the entire region. The continued economic slide of North Korea forces the Kim Jong-il Regime to rely on its military for Regime survival.

The Kim Jong-il Regime worsens North Korea's profound economic and social problems by not introducing required reforms. The Regime survives by sacrificing the North Korean economy and people in order to develop asymmetric capabilities meant to threaten the ROK, the region, and the U.S. homeland.

The resulting challenges place our sense of compassion for those who suffer, against the need for security. These challenges and developments create uncertainties on the Korean Peninsula and for neighboring states and demand new approaches to regional problems. The bedrock of any approach to solving the enigma of a decaying North Korea with expanding asymmetric military capabilities is our position of strength--a credible deterrence and ready defense posture. This position is the

surest way to prevent the Kim Regime from externalizing its problems, regardless of its internal instability.

The ROK-US Alliance has maintained a credible posture of deterrence and defense. However, as the threat evolves and changes, so must our defense posture. Our nation's diplomatic, political, and economic efforts to bring North Korea into the family of nations must be supported by a position that clearly demonstrates our resolve to carry out the regional components of our national security strategy. Our relations with North Korea must continue to be conducted from a position of strength.

Deterrence and defense are more important than ever. We must still deter a North Korean decision to initiate an attack upon the ROK. We must also deter the proliferation of WMD and compatible delivery systems to other unstable regions of the world. We must continue to deter open acts of provocation against the ROK and our allies in the region. Finally, we must be prepared to fight and defeat a militarily substantial foe whose calculus for survival may degenerate into a belief that war is the only remaining path.

Today, North Korea is developing a capability that could potentially range the western-most reaches of the United States with a ballistic missile. Continued prioritization of this program will eventually result in Kim Jong-il's ability to reach the western contiguous United States. Unchecked, the Kim

Regime's missile program will ultimately threaten U.S. vital interests in other parts of the world as North Korea sells its only viable export to hostile nations. From my view the greatest threat is the possibility that the Kim Regime will couple its ballistic missile program with an unchecked nuclear program.

The Kim Regime develops these and other asymmetric capabilities for more than reasons of self-defense. This willingness to proliferate the threat beyond its borders is an obvious attempt to bolster North Korea's bargaining position. Thus, deterrence and defense take on a whole new urgency. The Kim Regime's conventional force may be slowly deteriorating but, he can still attack using that force.

Though the ROK is experiencing economic difficulties that affect their defense budget, the readiness of our combined forces continues to provide an effective deterrence and defense posture. The Kim Regime continues its attempts to infiltrate the ROK and continues its threatening propaganda toward the alliance. The combined ROK-US team deals with these tactical provocations daily.

Meeting these challenges requires patience, resolve, vision, and readiness. Our resolve to preserve democracy, freedom, and the interests of both the U.S. and our allies in Northeast Asia is the foundation of our collective efforts.

This resolve demonstrates our national wills to preserve our cultures and ways of life. To shape that resolve we must maintain a common vision. That vision must reflect our intent and strategy for meeting end-states that preserve the interests of our alliances and our nations. Our strategic vision must rely upon deterrence and defense while accounting for uncertainty, provocation, and aggression. As uncertainty on the Korean Peninsula grows, and as North Korea attempts provocation designed for extortion, we must maintain our readiness. Our deterrence and defense posture includes our ability to face instability, deter further acts of aggression on the peninsula and in the region, and fight and win a war if necessary.

This year is pivotal for the security environment in Northeast Asia. Our deterrence and defense posture enable us to pursue our national interests from a position of strength while we continue to communicate the means for a peaceful solution through the Four Party Talks, General Officer Talks, and other diplomatic efforts.

CLOSING

The bottom line is: I would like to emphasize that the support of this Committee, the Congress, and the American people is vitally important to our future in Asia. As we move into the 21st Century we must ensure that our resolve is visible so that North Korea, or any other potential adversary, cannot

misinterpret it. I urge committee members to come to Korea and see first-hand the importance of the American military presence and the US-ROK Alliance. Again, thank you for this opportunity to share my thoughts with you.

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