

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

Korea, November - December 1994 [2]

Staff Office-Individual:

Defense Policy-Bell, Robert

Original OA/ID Number:

941

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
31	4	4	1	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	action, Steven Aoki to Anthony Lake re phone call scheduling request (1 page)	12/22/1994	P1/b(1)
001b. form	re schedule proposal for POTUS phone call (1 page)	12/22/1994	P1/b(1)
002. memo	Stanley Roth et al to Sandy Berger re initial thoughts (4 pages)	c 12/1994	P1/b(1)
003. report	re North Korea Update (1 page)	12/20/1994	P1/b(1)
004. report	re helicopter incident update (2 pages)	12/19/1994	P1/b(1)
005. report	National Military Joint Intelligence Center Executive Highlights Vol 240-94 (12 pages)	12/19/1994	P1/b(1)
006a. memo	memcon, DAS Hubbard and Counselor Han (1 page)	12/18/1994	P1/b(1)
006b. memo	Ambassador Gallucci to Minister Kang, text of oral message (1 page)	12/18/1994	P1/b(1)
007. cable	re helicopter incident (3 pages)	12/17/1994	P1/b(1)
008. report	Situation Room morning summary (2 pages)	12/17/1994	P1/b(1)
009. paper	re helicopter incident - proposed response to query (3 pages)	12/17/1994	P1/b(1)
010. report	Operations Center Overnight Brief (1 page)	12/23/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Robert Bell (Defense Policy and Arms Control)
OA/Box Number: 941

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea-November-December 1994 [2]

2009-0528-F

kc1385

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011. report	re Korea update (2 pages)	12/23/1994	P1/b(1)

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Bell, Robert G.

From: Sestak, Joseph A.
To: Bell, Robert G.
Cc: /R, Record at A1
Subject: Korea
Date: Wednesday, December 21, 1994 11:17AM

Bob,

Legal officer who drafted JOint staff memo on legal position of viewing CWO in NK as a POW "heard" the comment from J-3 that CWO Hilemon was shot fleeing. When tracked it today, he found that J-3 could not provide where it came from/where they had heard it. While issue of memo may soon be OBE, he will revise it for his files for historical accuracy so it doesn't talk about unconfirmed reports of shooting, as well as revising their position that we should also treat the two CWOs as alive since we have no corroboration.

Joint Staff feels that cable to International Red Cross should probably not be sent due to developments and will be talking to State about this. Jamie is also. vr, Joe

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J-5

Date/Time: 19 Dec / 1305

Pages: 7 W/Cover

From: TCS JS/APAC/CTC Baier

Duty Phone: (703) 695-8134

Unclass Fax: (703) 695-8137

To: NSC/CPT Joe Sestak

Unclass Fax: 202-456-9190

Duty Phone: 202-456-9191



Politico-Military Affairs

SUBJ: Armistice Agreement

Asia Pacific
Division

REMARKS: Attached are pages from the
July 27, 1953 Armistice Agreement on the
Military Armistice Commission
and

Table of Contents for Subsequent Agreements
more indicate this registration is a
United Nations Command matter.

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shall appoint to the Secretariat a Secretary and an Assistant Secretary and such clerical and specialized personnel as required by the Secretariat. Records shall be kept in English, Korean, and Chinese, all of which shall be equally authentic.

See note # 12

23. a. The Military Armistice Commission shall be initially provided with and assisted by ten (10) Joint Observer Teams, which number may be reduced by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Military Armistice Commission.

b. Each Joint Observer Team shall be composed of not less than four (4) nor more than six (6) officers of field grade, half of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and half of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. Additional personnel such as drivers, clerks, and interpreters shall be furnished by each side as required for the functioning of the Joint Observer Teams.

2. FUNCTIONS AND AUTHORITY

24. The general mission of the Military Armistice Commission shall be to supervise the implementation of this Armistice Agreement and to settle through negotiations any violations of this Armistice Agreement.

25. The Military Armistice Commission shall:

See note # 13

a. Locate its headquarters in the vicinity of PANMUNJOM (37°57'29"N, 126°40'00"E). The Military Armistice Commission may re-locate its headquarters at another point within the Demilitarized Zone by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Commission.

b. Operate as a joint organization without a chairman.

See note # 13a

c. Adopt such rules of procedure as it may, from time to time, deem necessary.

d. Supervise the carrying out of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement pertaining to the Demilitarized Zone and to the Han River Estuary.

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Note # 12: Refer to the "Subsequent Agreements" - TAB "H" (1) and "H" (2)
Note # 13: Refer to the "Subsequent Agreements" - TAB "H" (1) and "H" (2)
Note # 13a: Refer to the "Subsequent Agreements" - TAB "H" (1) and "H" (2)

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e. Direct the operations of the Joint Observer Teams;
f. Settle through negotiations any violations of this Armistice Agreement;

g. Transmit immediately to the Commanders of the opposing sides all reports or investigations of violations of this Armistice Agreement and all other reports and records of proceedings received from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission.

h. Give general supervision and direction to the activities of the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War and the Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians, hereinafter established.

i. Act as an intermediary in transmitting communications between the Commanders of the opposing sides; provided, however, that the foregoing shall not be construed to preclude the Commanders of both sides from communicating with each other by any other means which they may desire to employ.

j. Provide credentials and distinctive insignia for its staff and its Joint Observer Teams, and a distinctive marking for all vehicles, aircraft, and vessels, used in the performance of its mission.

See note # 14

26. The mission of the Joint Observer Teams shall be to assist the Military Armistice Commission in supervising the carrying out of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement pertaining to the Demilitarized Zone and to the Han River Estuary.

27. The Military Armistice Commission, or the senior member of either side thereof, is authorized to dispatch Joint Observer Teams to investigate violations of this Armistice Agreement reported to have occurred in the Demilitarized Zone or in the Han River Estuary; provided, however, that not more than one half of the Joint Observer Teams which have not been dispatched by the Military Armistice Commission may be dispatched at any one time by the senior member of either side on the Commission.

See note #15

28. The Military Armistice Commission, or the senior member of either side thereof, is authorized to request the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to conduct special observations and inspections at places outside the Demilitarized Zone where violations of this Armistice Agreement have been reported to have occurred.

29. When the Military Armistice Commission determines that a violation of this Armistice Agreement has occurred, it shall immediately report such violation to the Commanders of the opposing sides.

30. When the Military Armistice Commission determines that a violation of this Armistice Agreement has been corrected to its satisfaction, it shall so report to the Commanders of the opposing sides.

3. GENERAL

31. The Military Armistice Commission shall meet daily. Recesses of not to exceed seven (7) days may be agreed upon by the senior members of both sides; provided, that such recesses may be terminated on twenty-four (24) hour notice by the senior member of either side.

32. Copies of the record of the proceedings of all meetings of the Military Armistice Commission shall be forwarded to the Commanders of the opposing sides as soon as possible after each meeting.

33. The Joint Observer Teams shall make periodic reports to the Military Armistice Commission as required by the Commission and, in addition, shall make such special reports as may be deemed necessary by them, or as may be required by the Commission.

34. The Military Armistice Commission shall maintain duplicate files of the reports and records of proceedings required by this Armistice Agreement. The Commission is authorized to maintain duplicate files of such other reports, records, etc., as

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Note # 16: Refer to the "Subsequent Agreements" - TAB "H" (1), (2) and (3)
Note # 17: Refer to the "Subsequent Agreements" - TAB "H" (1)

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may be necessary in the conduct of its business. Upon eventual dissolution of the Commission, one set of the above files shall be turned over to each side.

35. The Military Armistice Commission may make recommendations to the Commanders of the opposing sides with respect to amendments or additions to this Armistice Agreement. Such recommended changes should generally be those designed to insure a more effective armistice.

C. NEUTRAL NATIONS SUPERVISORY COMMISSION

1. COMPOSITION

36. A Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission is hereby established.

37. ~~The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be composed of four (4) senior officers, two (2) of whom shall be appointed by neutral nations nominated by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, namely, SWEDEN and SWITZERLAND, and two (2) of whom shall be appointed by neutral nations nominated jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, namely, POLAND and CZECHOSLOVAKIA.~~ The term "neutral nations" as herein used is defined as those nations whose combatant forces have not participated in the hostilities in Korea. Members appointed to the Commission may be from the armed forces of the appointing nations. Each member shall designate an alternate member to attend those meetings which for any reason the principal member is unable to attend. Such alternate members shall be of the same nationality as their principals. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission may take action whenever the number of members present from the neutral nations nominated by one side is equal to the number of members present from the neutral nations nominated by the other side.

38. Members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be permitted to use staff assistants furnished by the neutral nations as required. These staff assistants may be appointed as alternate members of the Commission.

INDEX TO AGREEMENTS SUBSEQUENT
TO THE SIGNING OF THE
ARMISTICE AGREEMENT

(Revised 1 Oct 1976)

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Definition of the term "Combat Aircraft"	TAB "B"
Understanding on Administrative Details for the Delivery and Reception of Bodies of Military Personnel of Both Sides	TAB "C"
Agreement on the MAC Headquarters Area, its Security and its Construction	TAB "D" (1)
Use of Public Address System in the Headquarters Area	TAB "D" (2)
Understanding on Administrative Details for Assisting the return of displaced Civilians and the Proceeding of Civilians of Foreign Nationality to Territory Under the Control of the other side	TAB "E"
Amendment to Agreement on Entry into and Departure from the Demilitarized Zone by Civilians	TAB "F"
Agreement on Credentials, Distinctive Insignia and Markings for the MAC, its Agencies and the Personnel of such Organizations	TAB "G"
Revised General Rules for the Control, Organization, Operation and Support of the Joint Observer Teams	TAB "H" (1)
Chronology of Negotiation for Reduction of Joint Observer Teams and Revised General Rules for Joint Observer Teams	TAB "H" (2)
✓ Understanding concerning the Repair and Maintenance of the MDL Markers on both banks of the Imjin River, North Han River and Kumsong River Where the MDL runs down the center of the Rivers	TAB "H" (3)
Designation of "A" and "B" Sectors of MDL and Numbering System and Marker Designs	TAB "H" (4)
Agreement on Chinese Linguists on JOC Meetings	TAB "H" (5)
Agreement on Intermission of MAC Meetings Every three hours	TAB "I"
Agreement concerning the Logistical Support and Expense of the MAC, the NNSC, the NNRC, their respective subordinate bodies and other personnel	TAB "J"
✓ Provisions regarding the attendance of news media representatives in the Demilitarized Zone	TAB "K"

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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)

Memorandum for supervising and reporting the entry and departures from Korea of Military Personnel and Replacement Items	TAB "L"
Operating Procedure for Joint Duty Office	TAB "M"
Tentative Rules of Procedure of the Military Armistice Commission	TAB
Addenda to Tentative Rules of Procedure of the Military Armistice Commission	TAB "N" (1)
Agreement on calling Military Armistice Commission Meetings	TAB "N" (2)
Agreement on reduction of NNITS	TAB "O"
Agreements on use of Chinese Linguists at Secretary Meetings	TAB "P"
Agreement on use of Military Police as Civil Police in the DMZ and use of types of weapons	TAB "Q"
Agreement on number of copies of communications to be passed between Sr Mbrs of both sides	TAB "R"
Agreement that the MDL has been marked	TAB "S"
Agreement on calling Secretaries' Meetings	TAB "T"
Disarmament List	TAB "U"

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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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006a. memo	memcon, DAS Hubbard and Counselor Han (1 page)	12/18/1994	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Robert Bell (Defense Policy and Arms Control)
OA/Box Number: 941

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea-November-December 1994 [2]

2009-0528-F

kc1385

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006b. memo	Ambassador Gallucci to Minister Kang, text of oral message (1 page)	12/18/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Robert Bell (Defense Policy and Arms Control)
OA/Box Number: 941

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea-November-December 1994 [2]

2009-0528-F

kc1385

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

B

S/S #

MESSAGE NO. 015274 CLASSIFICATION UNCLAS No. Pages 3

FROM: Bill Davnie (Officer name) _____ (Office symbol) _____ (Extension) _____ (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION _____

<u>TO: (Agency)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO:</u>	<u>Extension</u>	<u>Room No.</u>
<u>WHR</u>	<u>Tom Ross</u>	_____	_____
_____	<u>Steve Niemerski</u>	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

FOR: CLEARANCE ☐ INFORMATION ☐ PER REQUEST ☐ COMMENT ☐

REMARKS: _____

S/S Officer: Bill Davnie

INQUIRE=DOC25D
ITEM NO=00219493

ENVELOPE

CDSN = LGX200 MCN = 94038/01430 TOR = 940380302
RTTUZYUW RUEKJCS0938 0380300-UUUU--RUEALGX.

ZNR UUUUU

HEADER

R 070300Z FEB 94

FM SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

INFO RUEADTS/USDP:DTSA

RUEKMDT/USDP:CCC

RUEALGX/SAFE

R 062251Z FEB 94

FM SEC UNCMAC SEOUL KOR

TO RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASH DC//J5/APAC//

INFO RUEHUL/AMEMB SEOUL KOR

RUEHBJ/AMEMB BEIJING

RUEHIC/SECSTATE WASH DC//EAP-K//

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASH DC//USDP/OSD/RSA/EAPR//

BT

CONTROLS

UNCLAS

BODY

SUBJECT: 509TH MAC SECRETARIES MEETING

REFERENCE: FBIS SEOUL 011418Z FEB 94, SUBJ: RADIO REPORTS RETURN OF TWO SOLDIERS "ABDUCTED" BY SOUTH

1. ON 1 FEB 94 AT 1500 HRS, THE 509TH MAC SECRETARIES MEETING OCCURRED, WITHOUT INCIDENT, TO REPATRIATE TWO KPA SOLDIERS TO NORTH KOREA.

2. ROK NAVAL FORCES DISCOVERED THE TWO KPA SOLDIERS, PFC KIM KYONG-CHOL (DOB 7 APR 75) AND CPL KIM CHOL-CHIN (DOB 4 SEP 71) AT 1130 HRS 27 JAN 94, IN A SMALL BOAT ON THE WEST SEA, SOUTH OF THE NORTHERN LIMIT LINE (IN THE VICINITY OF THE ISLAND OF PAENGYONG-DO), AFTER SPENDING APPROX 41 HOURS ADRIFT. THE WIND AND CURRENTS APPARENTLY CARRIED THEM AWAY WHILE THEY TENDED A FISHING NET OFF OCHASIN-RI (VILLAGE) IN YONGYON-KUN (COUNTY). WITHIN 30 MINUTES OF THE ROK NAVY RESCUE, THE UNCMAC SECRETARY PERSONALLY MET WITH THE KPA/CPV MAC SECRETARY. THE UNC ASKED FOR THE KPA TO HAVE THE DPRK NAVY CEASE PURSUIT OF THE ROK NAVAL VESSELS INVOLVED, IN ORDER TO PREVENT ESCALATION TO A SERIOUS INCIDENT. EXERCISING RESTRAINT, THE DPRK FORCES WITHDREW.

3. THE TWO SOLDIERS WERE UNCONSCIOUS WHEN FOUND. BOTH SUFFERED FROM EXTREME EXHAUSTION AND HYPOTHERMIA. THE SUPERIOR HUMANITARIAN WORK BY THE ROK NAVY PROBABLY SAVED THE LIVES OF THESE YOUNG MEN. THE ROK GOVERNMENT PROVIDED THE NECESSARY SPECIALIZED CARE, TREATMENT, AND MEDICALLY SUPERVISED RECOVERY.

4. BOTH SOLDIERS EXPRESSED A DESIRE TO RETURN HOME. THE ROK, SHOWING COMMENDABLE GOOD WILL HONORED THEIR REQUEST. AS SOLDIERS, THEIR RETURN HOME CAME UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE KOREAN ARMISTICE AGREEMENT.

5. THE UNC SIDE CALLED FOR THE 509TH SECRETARIES MEETING. BY

UNCLASSIFIED

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PAGE:0002

AGREEMENT REACHED BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES' SECRETARIES AT AN EARLIER INFORMAL CONTACT, EACH SIDE READ A SHORT STATEMENT. THE SECRETARIES THEN MET AT THE MDL, AND CONTROL OF THE TWO SOLDIERS WAS PASSED FROM THE UNC TO THE KPA.

6. BEFORE TRANSFER TO THE NORTH, THE TWO DETAINEES WERE ALLOWED TO CHANGE INTO FRESH KPA WINTER UNIFORMS, WHICH HAD BEEN PROVIDED BY THE KPA SHORTLY BEFORE THE MEETING. AFTER TRANSFER, THEY WERE WELCOMED ON THE NORTH SIDE OF THE MDL BY A CLAPPING, CHEERING CROWD.

7. DURING THE COURSE OF THE SECRETARIES MEETING, THE KPA MADE NO CLAIM, AS SUBSEQUENTLY BROADCAST BY PYONGYANG KOREAN CENTRAL BROADCASTING NETWORK (REF), THAT THE TWO KPA SOLDIERS HAD BEEN ABDUCTED BY THE ROK.

ADMIN
BT

#0938

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JOINT STAFF
INFO SERVICE CENTER

ZYUW RUAGHYT0082 2210803

1 AUG 94
 CC UNCMAC SEOUL KOR
 JOINT STAFF WASH DC//J3/APAC/POW-MIA/J2/MJIC//
 INFO AMEMB SEOUL KOR AMEMB BEIJING CH
 SECSTATE WASH DC//EAP-X/PM//
 SECDEF WASH DC//USDP/ISA/EAPR/PO-MIA//
 DIA WASH DC//OIO// OICEUSALNTM ALEX VA
 USCINCPAC CP SMITH HI//J-8/J-30-M//
 CORPERSCOM ALEXANDRIA VA//PAPC-PEZ/TAPE/PSZ//
 CONUSACILM: HICKHAM AFB HI//TAPE-PEZ-M//
 SEN COMUSKOREA SEOUL KS/CC/BJ/CJ/EJ/PAJ/SJS//

UNCLAS

SECTION 00: OF 002

SUBJECT: MEETING ON 8 AUGUST 1994 WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE KOREAN PEOPLES ARMY (KPA)

1. AT THE REQUEST OF KPA SENIOR COLONEL PARK RIM SU, THE SECRETARY, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND MILITARY ARMISTICE COMMISSION (UNCMAC), AND SECRETARIAT STAFF OFFICERS, MET WITH MEMBERS OF THE KPA MISSION TO PAMMUNJOM FROM 1800 TO 1945 ON 8 AUG 94. THE KPA SIDE HAD REQUESTED THE 1800 MEETING ON UNUSUALLY SHORT NOTICE (AT 1449 ON 8 AUG), STATING THEY HAD "URGENT BUSINESS" TO DISCUSS. HOWEVER, DURING THE ACTUAL MEETING, THE KPA PRESENTED NOTHING TRULY URGENT.

2. MEETING TOOK PLACE IN THE JOINT DUTY OFFICER (JDO) CONFERENCE ROOM, CONFERENCE ROOM, PAMMUNJOM. KPA SROOL PAK WAS ACCOMPANIED BY MAJ LI GWON AS INTERPRETER, AND LTC RI JONG SUP, A STAFF OFFICER OF LONG STANDING (17 YEARS) FROM KARSONG. COL CHILTON, LTC BERGZEL, LTC MARTIN, AND MR. HONG H. X. ATTENDED AS UNCMAC REPRESENTATIVES.

3. SUMMARY OF THE MEETING:

A. SROOL PAK APOLOGIZED FOR THE SHORT NOTICE GIVEN FOR THE MEETING, AND INDICATED THE "URGENCY" WAS THAT HE WOULD BE LEAVING PAMMUNJOM ON 10 AUG 94 FOR HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS IN PYONGYANG TO REPORT TO THE SUPREME COMMANDER ON CURRENT MATTERS. HE COMMENTED THAT HE THOUGHT THE U.S.-DPRK TALKS IN GENEVA WERE GOING WELL AND HOPED THEY COULD, IN TIME, LEAD TO HIS BEING ABLE TO ESCORT U.S. OFFICERS TO PYONGYANG.

B. KPA "NEW HOUSE" PROPOSAL:

(1) SROOL PAK OPENED BY STATING IT HAD BEEN ONE HUNDRED DAYS SINCE THE KPA ESTABLISHED THEIR MISSION TO PAMMUNJOM AND MADE THEIR POSITION CLEAR ON THEIR NEW HOUSE, A REPLACEMENT MECHANISM FOR THE MAC. FURTHER, THE KPA EXPECT A RESPONSE FROM THE UNC SIDE, BY GIVING THE KPA A COUNTER PROPOSAL ON WHAT THE UNC WANTS. HE ASKED SEVERAL TIMES WHEN THE UNC SIDE COULD GIVE THE KPA SIDE A RESPONSE. HE ALSO ASKED REPEATEDLY IF THE UNC WAS WILLING TO NEGOTIATE A REPLACEMENT FOR THE MAC.

(2) HE FURTHER INDICATED THAT IF THE UNC GIVES NO AFFIRMATIVE RESPONSE, THE KPA SIDE WILL TAKE THE "NEXT STEP." HOWEVER, THE "NEXT STEP" WAS NOT SPECIFIED.

(3) THE UNC SIDE FIRMLY INDICATED THAT THE UNC POSITION REMAINS AS PREVIOUSLY GIVEN AND RESTATED, I.E., "THE UNC REJECTS THE KPA WITHDRAWAL FROM THE MAC AS AN ATTEMPT TO UNILATERALLY DISMANTLE THE MAC. PARA 81 OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT CLEARLY REQUIRES AGREEMENT OF ALL THREE COMMANDERS TO CHANGE THE ARMISTICE. THE UNC IS WILLING TO DISCUSS CHANGE, BUT ONLY UNDER THE FRAMEWORK OF THE

JOINT STAFF V1

ACTION JS/11

INFO SJS-N-11 CMAS(1) SJS-C(1) CJCS-PA-J(1) J1-J(1)

NMCC-GWO(1) J3(3) J3-JOOPAC-J(1) NIDS(1)

J4-LPEILDJ-J(1) QUAL CONTROL(1) J6-PAC-J(1) JBT-J(1)

J5(1)

CJCS NMCC SITE R FT RITCHIE MD

SAFE

SECDEF V2

ACTION USDP:AP(2)

INFO SECDEF-N-11 SECDEF-C(1) USDP:FILE(1) USDP:PL(1)

USDP:AM(1) USDP:IP(1) ATSO:PA(1) DIR:PAE:EPF(1)

USDP:OSAA(1) USDP:STRAT(1) USDP-CHI(1) USDP:SR(1)

USDP:TECH(1) USDP:PPEAP(1) USDP:OPNO(1) USDP:MAR(1)

ARMISTICE, AND THEN TAKING FINAL ACTION ONLY AFTER MUTUAL AGREEMENT FROM ALL SIDES."

C. REMAINS ISSUE:

(1) SROOL PAK STATED THEY HAD RESUMED EXHUMATION OF U.S. REMAINS ON 20 JUL 94. HE REPORTED THEY ARE USING THE PROCEDURES JOINTLY DISCUSSED DURING THE KPA-CILMI CONFERENCE IN JAN 94, AND ARE TRYING TO SCIENTIFICALLY EXHUME AND RETURN THE REMAINS. FURTHER, THE DISINTERING PARTIES HAVE REPORTED GOOD NEWS. THERE ARE, HOWEVER, OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS TO SOLVE WITH REMAINS RETURNED IN THE PAST. HE FELT THESE PROBLEMS ARE DELAYING THE DISINTERING AND RETURN OF REMAINS, AND THAT WE SHOULD CALCULATE PAID WORK AND IMPROVE THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BOTH SIDES. HE SAID THE SUPREME COMMANDER (KIM JONG-IL) IS SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING PERMITTING JOINT EXCAVATION. THIS IS, HOWEVER, A VERY SENSITIVE AND COMPLICATED ACTION MILITARILY. TO START JOINT INVESTIGATIONS, THERE SHOULD BE SOME TRUST.

(2) IN RESPONSE, THE UNC SIDE SAID THAT IF THE KPA WERE REALLY SERIOUS ABOUT JOINT EXCAVATIONS, THEY WOULD HAVE WAITED FOR THE UNC BEFORE RESUMING EXHUMATION OR INVITED US TO ATTEND. UNC FURTHER STATED WE CONTINUE TO AWAIT THE 22 JUN 94-PROMISED KPA PROPOSAL ON JOINT EXCAVATIONS, WHERE THE KPA SAID: "THE UNC SIDE WILL SOON BE INFORMED OF THE PROPOSAL FOR THE JOINT RECOVERY OF U.S. REMAINS."

D. APPRECIATION: SROOL PAK STATED THAT THE SUPREME COMMANDER PERSONALLY EXPRESSED THANKS FOR THE RETURN ON 1 FEB 94 OF THE TWO KPA SOLDIERS INADVERTENTLY WASHED OUT TO SEA. THE SUPREME COMMANDER WAS ALSO THANKFUL FOR THE EXPRESSIONS OF CONDOLENCES (SIC) AT THE DEATH OF THEIR FORMER PRESIDENT, (GESTURES UNPRECEDENTED IN THE LAST FORTY YEARS).

E. A FURTHER GOOD GESTURE: SROOL PAK REPORTED THAT RECENT FLOODING ALONG THE YE-SONG RIVER NEAR LUM CHON ON 4 AUG 94 HAD RESULTED IN THE LOSS OF KPA MILITARY EQUIPMENT: AN ANTI-TANK WEAPON (A WIRE-GUIDED MISSILE LAUNCHER), A MANUAL, A MONITORING DEVICE, A CIRCUIT CHART, A MAP, AND SOME PEOPLE. HE BELIEVED THAT UNC FORCES IN THE VICINITY OF KYO DONG ISLAND, WEST OF KANG HWA HAD RECOVERED THE EQUIPMENT, FOLLOWING THE PRECEDENT DURING PAST FLOODS. HE BELIEVED IT WOULD BE A GOOD EXPRESSION OF KINDNESS IF THE UNC WOULD RETURN ANY REMAINS DISCOVERED INHUMAN PAMMUNJOM. HE ALSO ASKED FOR THE RETURN OF THE MILITARY EQUIPMENT. (COMMENT: THE EQUIPMENT WAS RECOVERED BY CPC PERSONNEL ON 8 AUG 94, AND FOLLOWING COORDINATION WITH ROKG, WILL PROBABLY BE RETURNED WITHIN DAYS. NO HUMAN REMAINS WERE RECOVERED.)

4. UNCMAC CONCLUSIONS:

A. SROOL PAK WILL APPARENTLY ATTEND HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS WHEN HE TRAVELS TO PYONGYANG ON 10 AUG 94, POSSIBLY WITH HIS SUPREME COMMAND. WE BELIEVE THAT HE DID NOT WANT TO GO EMPTY-HANDED.

B. THEY ARE TRYING TO FORCE THE "NEW HOUSE" ISSUE, I.E., THEIR WITHDRAWAL FROM THE MAC AND SUBSEQUENT APPOINTMENT OF KPA LIAISON MISSION TO PAMMUNJOM. THEY MAY BE TRYING TO LINK REMAINS AND THE "NEW HOUSE" TO THE OVERALL U.S.-DPRK RELATIONSHIP. THEY MAY EVEN BE LAYING THE GROUNDWORK TO RETURN MORE REMAINS TO GARNER GOOD WILL.

C. ALTHOUGH SROOL PAK NEVER MENTIONED COMPENSATION, HIS COMMENTS ABOUT PROBLEMS WITH PAST RETURNS PROBABLY REFERRED TO SETTLEMENT OF OUTSTANDING COMPENSATION ISSUES.

5. THE UNC PLANS TO PUSH THE KPA TO CONTINUE WORK UNDER THE ARMISTICE AND SUBSEQUENT AGREEMENTS. FURTHER, THE UNC REMAINS FIRMLY THAT ANY CHANGE MUST FIRST BE MUTUALLY AGREED UPON UNDER THE ARMISTICE. THE UNC WILL TRY AND HELP THE KPA OUT OF THE BOX THEY ARE NOW IN BY FORCING THE ISSUE UNDER PARA 81 OF THE ARMISTICE, TO INCLUDE THE RETURN OF THE CHINESE PEOPLES VOLUNTEERS (CPV) AS ACTIVE PARTICIPANTS.

6. THIS MESSAGE HAS BEEN COORDINATED WITH THE AMERICAN EMBASSY, SEOUL.

BT

UNCLAS

FINAL SECTION OF 002

BT

CLASSIFICATION

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007. cable	re helicopter incident (3 pages)	12/17/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Robert Bell (Defense Policy and Arms Control)
OA/Box Number: 941

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea-November-December 1994 [2]

2009-0528-F
kc1385

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008. report	Situation Room morning summary (2 pages)	12/17/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Robert Bell (Defense Policy and Arms Control)
OA/Box Number: 941

FOLDER TITLE:

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CURRENT NEWS **EARLY BIRD**

MONDAY, December 19, 1994

20/4

NEW YORK TIMES

Dec. 19, 1994

Pg. 1

Troops Clash in Chechnya as Peace Efforts Falter

Moscow Rules Out Sending an Envoy to Rebel Region

By STEVEN ERLANGER

Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, Dec. 18 — Russian troops were reported tonight to be moving toward the outskirts of the capital of the breakaway Chechen region against strong resistance, according to the Itar-Tass news agency. But there was no indication that an assault on the capital, Grozny, had begun.

The troop movements were reported after an aide to President Boris N. Yeltsin said no Russian envoy would be sent to Grozny to talk to the Chechen President, Dzhokhar M. Dudayev.

In a telegram today, Mr. Yeltsin told Mr. Dudayev: "If today the appropriate document on a cease-fire and the handing in of weapons is signed with your personal participation, I will view this as proof of serious intentions to normalize the situation and restore peace and calm in Chechnya for the good of all the peoples of Russia."

But Mr. Dudayev said tonight that he would discuss the status of Chechnya only with President Yeltsin or Prime Minister Viktor S. Chernomyrdin.

By only specifying Mr. Dudayev's "participation" in the document, rather than his signature, Mr. Yeltsin appeared to be offering a fig leaf of sorts to the Chechen President, who might object to signing an agreement with lower-ranking Russian officials.

But Mr. Dudayev's problem may be that in the fierce, proud culture of Chechnya, entering an agreement would be perceived as capitulation on the issue of independence, which he has vowed to die defending. Mr. Yeltsin may be hoping that an agreement would so weaken Mr. Dudayev that the Chechens would remove him, sparing the Russians the trouble.

Other Russian officials were skeptical that Mr. Dudayev was sincere in saying that he would be willing to talk, but only on his own ground.

Dleg Soskovets, the powerful First

Deputy Prime Minister, said that the administration in Grozny "tries in every way to drag out the process, hoping to win time for the consolidation of its supporters both inside and outside Chechnya."

An official of the Presidential press service told Itar-Tass today that the telegram from Mr. Dudayev was not regarded as a sufficient answer to Mr. Yeltsin's message urging him to agree to talks with two senior Russian officials in the nearby North Ossetian town of Mozdok: Nikolai Yegorov, Mr. Yeltsin's representative for Chechnya, and Sergei Stepanishin, director of the Federal Counterintelligence Service, were waiting tonight in Mozdok.

"There will be no more answers to Dzhokhar Dudayev's telegrams," the official said.

Mr. Yeltsin's spokesman, Vyacheslav Kostikov, described the Russian President's offer as "yet another gesture of good-will with a view to ensuring a political settlement of the situation in the Chechen republic."

The Yeltsin telegram was a response to Mr. Dudayev's successful effort late Saturday night to forestall a Russian military operation against Grozny by offering to negotiate in person, and without conditions.

But the stress in Mr. Yeltsin's telegram was on "today," and Mr. Kostikov repeated that Russia's requirements remained the same: "the recognition that the Chechen republic is an integral part of the Russian Federation and that all unlawful armed forces should be disarmed." Mr. Dudayev's latest telegram evidently promised nothing more than talks.

For three years the mostly Muslim people of Chechnya have asserted their right to be an independent republic, and for three years Russia has refused to recognize that independence, but it has also declined to wage a major war on its own citizens.

Mr. Yegorov said that if Mr. Dudayev is engaged in "yet another attempt to stall and muddle the situation," he would have only one way out: surrender.

Still, Mr. Yeltsin would be very relieved not to have to send troops into Grozny, a city of 400,000 people, where Chechen fighters have had time to prepare bunkers, booby traps and redoubts. Nor does he want to have up to 40,000 troops in position as potential targets for terrorism — or anyone with a rifle — throughout a Russian winter. There have already been some spectacular cases of dissent and insubordination among army officers who are not trained for police actions and do not want to fight on Russian territory.

Opinion polls show that most Russians do not favor sending troops into Chechnya. In Parliament, Mr. Yeltsin's actions have been sharply criticized by liberal democrats and Communists, though he has found support from the ultranationalist, Vladimir V. Zhirinovskiy, and from the liberal economist Boris G. Fyodorov, who has said that the territorial integrity of Russia requires the state to act.

But Yegor T. Gaidar, a former Prime Minister, sent a telegram to Mr. Yeltsin today urging him not to escalate military activity and to correct this "tragic mistake."

"Storming Grozny will lead to a huge loss of life," Mr. Gaidar said. "It will worsen the political situation inside Russia. It will be a blow against the integrity of Russia, against our democratic gains, against all that you have achieved in the past years." At a press conference, Mr. Gaidar called on Mr. Yeltsin to negotiate directly with Mr. Dudayev.

In Grozny, Sergei Kovalev, head of the Russian Government's human rights commission, also sent a telegram to Mr. Yeltsin urging him "to go all the way to find a negotiated settlement" and "avoid further casualties."

There was scattered fighting today around Grozny and near the border with Ingushetia as well as some reports of bombing.

Just after midnight early this morning, Russian planes dropped bombs on Shali airport and used heavy artillery and rockets to hit Chechen armored columns and ammunition depots on the southeastern edge of Grozny, Russian officials said. The Russian Government Press Office said the strikes came "in retaliation for unceasing, audacious sallies by unlawful armed formations."

During the day, the officials said, close to the village of Assinskaya, near the Ingush border to the west, "a large detachment" of Chechen fighters equipped with tanks, artil-

WASHINGTON POST

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North Korea Says 1 Pilot Was Killed

U.S. Demands Return Of Body, Survivor in Helicopter Downing

By John F. Harris and T.R. Reid

Washington Post Staff Writers

North Korea has told the United States that one of the Army pilots whose helicopter was downed after inadvertently flying over North Korean territory is dead, but his partner is alive and uninjured.

President Clinton announced the death of Chief Warrant Officer David Hilemon in a White House statement yesterday afternoon, as administration officials labored to free the other aviator, Chief Warrant Officer Bobby Hall, while avoiding a major new rupture with North Korea.

The United States was told of Hilemon's death by Rep. Bill Richardson (D-N.M.). He is in Pyongyang, the North Korean capital, on a previously scheduled visit and is serving as an administration envoy to the North Koreans, who U.S. officials said are frustrating them with elusive and conflicting statements.

Richardson, Clinton said, "has, at my instructions, told the North Korean government that we want prompt access to Chief Warrant Officer Hall and his return to a U.S. facility immediately, along with the remains of Chief Warrant Officer Hilemon."

"We are using all available channels to press for an early resolution of this matter," Clinton said. "This tragic loss of life was unnecessary."

Clinton's tone reflected the deli-

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MONDAY, December 19, 1994

NEW YORK TIMES

Dec. 19, 1994

Carter Is in Sarajevo, But No Progress Is Reported

By ROGER COHEN

Special to The New York Times

SARAJEVO, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dec. 18 — Former President Jimmy Carter stepped into the war-torn vestiges of Sarajevo today, proclaiming that Bosnia was a "fine country" but saying nothing to suggest that he could resolve its deep divisions.

After 32 months of a war that has scarred Europe, Mr. Carter's visit indicated a new level of American involvement to end the conflict. But his arrival came on a day in which a mortar fired from Serbian positions hit the Holiday Inn, home to many journalists and diplomats, and sniper fire wounded a French United Nations soldier outside the hotel.

Among several promises made to Mr. Carter last week by Bosnian Serb leader, Radovan Karadzic, was a cease-fire in and around Sarajevo.

The former President, who was accompanied by his wife, Rosalyn, and several aides, had insisted that complete Serbian compliance with Dr. Karadzic's promises was a condition for his visit. But today he brushed aside questions on this issue, saying he hoped to bring a complete Bosnian cease-fire and renewed peace negotiations.

There have been no peace talks, as fighting has continued, since the Bosnian Serbs rejected an international plan in July that would oblige them to give up about one-third of the territory they hold and accept 49 percent of Bosnia. The rest would go to a Muslim-Croat federation.

"There is no other basis for future negotiations than the contact group plan," Mr. Carter said, referring to the proposed map drawn this year up by the United States, Russia, France, Britain and Germany. He also said he hoped to encourage "negotiations based on the contact group proposals."

The irrevocability of the plan has been hammered home to him in briefings over the last few days from Clinton Administration officials, who initially viewed his visit with some skepticism but who now see it as a possible means to end the impasse.

His room for maneuver is limited. The central question is how much flexibility is permissible in interpreting the contact group's map, described today by Mr. Carter as no more than "proposals."

Dr. Karadzic, who invited Mr. Carter to seek a way out of the Bosnian

impasse, argues that the flexibility is now considerable. The Bosnian Government disputes this. Officials close to Dr. Karadzic said he had been told by contact group officials that his troops need not withdraw to the lines on the map until further talks on territory take place and until an equitable constitutional arrangement is found for the Serbs.

"Any solution has to be just, and the contact group map is completely unjust," Biljana Plavcic, vice president of the republic proclaimed by the Bosnian Serbs, said today in an interview in their stronghold at Pale.

The Serbs objected to the peace plan because it fragmented their Bosnian territory and because they felt it left them with few cities and a meager share of industrial resources. Thus, the Serbs believe that the revision of the map in any further negotiations must be radical, so radical, it seems, that the original plan will cease to mean much.

But the Bosnian President, Alija Izetbegovic, whose Government has accepted the plan as it is, sought today to hold Mr. Carter strictly to the current proposal.

"Mr. Carter has not come to change the contact group plan," Mr. Izetbegovic said after a meeting with the former President. "He has come to make sure that it is accepted by the Serbian side. He will try that in Pale on Monday, and he understands from Mr. Karadzic that there is a readiness to do that."

Mr. Carter seemed somewhat taken aback by this assertion that Mr. Karadzic was ready to accept the contact group plan. He is to meet the Bosnian Serb leader on Monday and declined speculation on his Dr. Karadzic's intentions.

Indeed, Mr. Carter appeared reluctant to be drawn into any identification with Bosnian Government positions, leaving a joint news conference with Mr. Izetbegovic while the Bosnian President was speaking.

It appears clear that the Serbs hope that Mr. Carter's visit will bring a change to American policy in Bosnia. Convinced that the Clinton Administration has previously encouraged the Muslim-led Government to pursue the war, they hope that Washington is now prepared to put pressure on Mr. Izetbegovic to enter serious peace negotiations.

Mila Plavcic, the Bosnian Serb vice president, said an essential sign of such seriousness was that the Bosnian Government should agree

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to an open-ended cease-fire.

But Mr. Izetbegovic, whose Government fears that a long cease-fire would just cement the Bosnian Serbs' hold on 70 percent of Bosnia, said he had reiterated to Mr. Carter that only a limited cease-fire was acceptable. His Government has suggested a three-month cease-fire.

Mr. Izetbegovic said any Bosnia-wide cease-fire would have to begin with "an immediate stop to the offensive on Bihac." A Serbian counteroffensive on the northwestern Muslim enclave of Bihac began a month ago, and led this weekend to the fall of Velika Kladusa, the second largest town in the enclave.

Mr. Carter is expected to remain until Tuesday in the former Yugoslavia, shuttling between Sarajevo and Pale, and perhaps visiting Belgrade.

Carter Meets Croatian Leader

Special to The New York Times

ZAGREB, Croatia, Dec. 18 — On his way to Sarajevo, Mr. Carter met here with President Franjo Tudjman of Croatia and said their talks had been "interesting and fruitful."

Mr. Tudjman made no statement, and pro-Government television broadcast only a terse report saying Mr. Carter was in the region "on a private visit and not as an official representative of the United States."

Mr. Carter also met here with Bosnia's Prime Minister, Haris Silajdzic, who said later that peace could be achieved only if Dr. Karadzic accepted the peace plan and stopped the fighting in Bihac.

RUSSIA... from Pg. 1

lery and multiple-rocket launchers attacked a regiment of Russian Interior Ministry troops.

"In a retaliatory strike," the Government press office claimed, "the grouping was destroyed."

Mr. Yegorov's spokesman also reported air strikes and artillery barrages against Chechen command posts in the eastern suburbs of Grozny and against five bridges over the Terek River at about 10 A.M., but Chechen officials denied any attacks at that time.

At about 2 P.M., Russian helicopters fired rockets against Chechen positions near Pervomaiskoye and Dolinsky, about 10 miles to the west and northwest of Grozny, Chechen officials told the Interfax news agency, but he had no casualty figures.

[Reuters reported from Grozny that bombs fell close to the city center about 1:30 A.M. Monday, but there was no immediate word of casualties or damage.]

More than 14,000 refugees have

WASHINGTON TIMES

Dec. 19, 1994

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Army's war on crime moves to Rio beaches

RIO DE JANEIRO — Brazilian troops will patrol Rio's beaches throughout the summer — which starts this week in the Southern Hemisphere — as part of a larger campaign to crack down on crime, the newspaper O Globo reported yesterday.

The anti-crime operation, ordered by President Itamar Franco on Oct. 31, is directed mainly against drug trafficking in the city's shantytowns. Over the past month, troops have occupied a number of slums for up to several days, confiscating drugs and guns and reportedly reducing drug dealing.

Kurdistan death toll tops 5,000 this year

NICOSIA, Cyprus — Fighting between Kurdish separatist guerrillas and Turkish forces claimed more than 5,000 lives in the first 10 months of this year, Turkey's Anatolia news agency said yesterday.

Interior Ministry sources said the toll included 807 civilians, 893 members of the security forces and 3,430 militants.

From wire dispatches and staff reports

left Chechnya so far, said Sergei Shoigu, the Russian Minister for Civil Defense and Emergency Situations.

A carload of refugees was fired on today by Russian troops near Nesterovskaya at the Ingush border, and nine people were killed, Reuters reported. Reuters quoted an eyewitness as saying that as a convoy of 10 cars of refugees fleeing Chechnya came to a Russian checkpoint, soldiers stopped the eighth car, shot the driver, and then fired on the last three cars.

An armored vehicle then flattened one of the cars. Russian photographers who went to the scene found three wrecked cars, one crushed, one half-crushed and the third full of bullet holes.

In Moscow, security is tight and spot checks are being made in an effort to thwart any attempts at terrorism by Chechens. Officials said they had detained four groups of Chechens and charged them with illegal possession of weapons. There have also been 24 bomb threats, all of which proved to be hoaxes, the officials said.

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ROOM 4C851, PENTAGON, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-7500
Tel: (703)695-2884/697-8765 Fax: (703)695-6822/7260

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USA TODAY

Dec. 19, 1994

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Another brush with N. Korea

U.S. pilots no stranger to border

By Steve Kornarow
USA TODAY

U.S. pilots in Korea navigate by a system they jokingly refer to as IFR: I Follow Roads.

And the road they watch for most is the one that runs along the edge of the DMZ, the 2 1/2-mile wide no-man's land that separates the hostile North from the friendly South.

The problem is, "if there's snow all over the ground, you can't see it," says Bob Gaskin, a former Air Force pilot with three tours in Korea.

And on Saturday, there was 3 feet of snow in the mountains, where a speedy little Army observation helicopter strayed a couple of miles into North Korean territory.

The unarmed OH-58 Kiowa Scout was on a training mission, U.S. officials say. North Korean officials say they shot it down.

While awaiting release of the surviving pilot from Saturday's crash, U.S. officials can't say for sure what happened.

"We still do not know," says Jim Coles, an Army spokesman in South Korea. "They say they shot it down, and that's all we have to go on."

"The Defense Department has launched an investigation

of the circumstances that led to this tragic loss on a routine training flight," says Defense Secretary William Perry.

President Clinton on Sunday said one of the pilots was killed, while the other apparently was uninjured.

"This tragic loss of life was unnecessary," Clinton said in a statement in which he demanded that North Korea release the survivor and the pilot's body.

It's the most serious border incident with the North Koreans in recent years, but it's not surprising.

U.S. helicopters routinely operate near the border and sometimes get lost.

Last spring, a transport carrying Defense Department officials and a group of journalists covering Perry's visit to Korea got lost near the DMZ, even though it was on a routine route. It landed at a U.S. garrison near the border to get directions.

Fortunately, the weather was good and the pilots never went too far north.

But it has happened before.


In July 1977, a U.S. Army helicopter was shot down and three people killed when it flew into North Korea.

Despite some rhetoric accusing the United States of hostile intent, this incident doesn't appear to be anything more than an isolated one to the North

BRUSH...Pg. 18

Helicopter downed in North Korea

The United States is asking for the prompt return of the crew of a U.S. Army helicopter that went down over North Korea Saturday. One pilot died in the incident; the other was uninjured.



Source: USA TODAY Research

By Mary Beaumont, USA TODAY

A HISTORY OF HOSTILE INCIDENTS

Some past North Korean-U.S. incidents:

► May 22, 1967: North Koreans blow up 2nd Infantry Division barracks, killing two U.S. soldiers.

► Jan. 24, 1968: North Korean gunboat seizes the USS Pueblo in Sea of Japan. Eighty-five U.S. crew mem-

bers held until Dec. 23.

► April 15, 1968: A U.S. reconnaissance plane shot down off North Korea, killing 31 crewmembers.

► Aug. 18, 1976: North Koreans attack U.S. troops trimming trees in Demilitarized Zone; two U.S. officers killed.

► July 14, 1977: U.S. Army

helicopter shot down over east coast of North Korea; three U.S. soldiers die.

► Dec. 7, 1978: One U.S. soldier killed by land mine when a patrol crosses inadvertently into North Korea.

► May 22, 1992: Armed North Koreans intercepted in the DMZ.

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Gore, Russia's Chernomyrdin Sign Cooperation Agreements

Reuters

MOSCOW — Vice President Al Gore and Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin signed a series of cooperation agreements Friday, putting behind them a cool period in U.S.-Russian relations.

"The prime minister and I have just concluded three very full and fruitful days," Mr. Gore told a news conference after the fourth session of the Joint Commission on Economic and Technological Cooperation.

Relations between the two countries have been soured in recent weeks by differences over policy in

the former Yugoslavia and over North Atlantic Treaty Organization's planned expansion into Eastern Europe.

Fifteen agreements were signed during the Gore-Chernomyrdin session, covering such areas as prevention of pollution in the Arctic, customs cooperation, space, energy, health and defense conversion.

The two sides agreed to carry out joint space research to gather data on the earth's atmosphere and to

SIGN...Pg. 18

JOURNAL OF COMMERCE

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Va. Shipyard to Cut Pay For Salaried Workers

NEWPORT NEWS, Va. — Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. has cut the pay of 1,800 of its salaried workers.

In a letter from Vice President Tom Schiavello dated Dec. 12, the yard announced it would eliminate the overtime it had paid to about 1,100 workers and the 7% night-shift premiums it had paid to about 700 workers.

The cuts, effective the first of the year, will save the company \$5 million to \$10 million annually, said Mike Hatfield, a spokesman.

The changes, which also include giving some workers merit raises

and incentive pay, could eventually affect all 7,500 salaried workers at the yard, Mr. Hatfield said.

They are necessary if the yard wants to survive cuts in defense spending.

WASHINGTON POST

Dec. 17, 1994 Pg. B1

SynCorp has agreed to pay the federal government \$250,000 to settle claims that the Raston contractor failed to complete work on buildings at Fort Belvoir. The agreement stemmed from suits filed by two former employees. DynCorp has denied the allegations.

MONDAY, December 19, 1994

BALTIMORE SUN

Dec. 19, 1994

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Active duty requirement questioned

Naval Academy cites drop in applications

By Tom Bowman
Sun Staff Writer

Alarmed by a drop in applications for admission, officials at the U.S. Naval Academy are asking President Clinton to review the suspected reason, a one-year increase in the time graduates must spend as military officers.

The academy's advisory Board of Visitors says the increase from five years to six years in active duty service time, which starts with the 1996 graduating class, has been eroding interest in the academy.

The Board has serious concern about the six-year active duty service obligation," the 15-member board said in a draft of its annual report to the president, expected to be sent this week. "These changes, enacted by Congress ... are beginning to have an adverse impact on the mission of the Naval Academy."

Applications dropped 12.8 percent in the past year, from 9,867 in the first week of December 1993 to 8,601 in the first week of December 1994.

For the past three years, an average of 23 percent annually of prospective midshipmen have declined an academy admission offer, citing the six-year service obligation, academy officials said.

The troubling trend, said the board, "warrants a review of the active duty service obligation."

"To the 17-year-old mind, six years is not just an eternity but their whole conscious life," said Chase Untermeyer, incoming board chairman. "Five years is the way to go."

Mr. Untermeyer, a former special assistant to President George Bush, said academy officials fear the

shrinking pool of young people will mean the academy won't get the "best pick of prospective applicants."

The U.S. Military Academy at West Point and the U.S. Air Force Academy at Colorado Springs have noticed an 11 percent decline in applications since the six-year service obligation went into effect. While Army admissions officials say they doubt the longer obligation has been a factor, their Air Force counterparts agree with the Naval Academy.

"I do think the increased commitment from five to six years has been one of the primary factors," said Col. Robert Y. Foerster, director of admissions at the Air Force Academy.

Sen. John Glenn, a member of the Armed Services Committee, pressed for the six-year obligation in the fiscal 1992 defense bill, hoping to achieve a bigger bang for the taxpayers' buck. A service academy education costs about \$250,000.

The Ohio Democrat could not be reached, and his office had no comment on the report by the Naval Academy board.

The board, made up of presidential and congressional appointees,

has tracked the drop in academy interest since the Glenn measure was approved.

During the past three years, applications dropped by 8 percent between the classes of 1996 and 1998. Academy officials also saw a 10 percent decline over the same period in congressional nominations.

"It's been brewing," said John W. Renard, the academy's dean of admissions, who expects the declines to continue. "The trend says we're going to be down."

Applicants are telling admissions counselors that a six-year commitment after four years at the academy is too much. "These kids don't think past a burger Saturday night," the dean said. "And they're saying, 'That's 10 years of my life.'"

Mr. Renard said the service obligation should be lowered two years. "My personal preference would be a four-year obligation," he said, citing the same commitment for ROTC graduates. "You come here for four years, you have a four-year obligation."

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WALL STREET JOURNAL

Dec. 19, 1994

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In Chechnya, Old Soviet Ways Resurface

Assault May Undermine Yeltsin's Bid to Hold Russia Intact

By CLAUDIA ROBERT

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

NAZARAN, Russia — "President Yeltsin should hang," says Mohammed Katsiyev, speaking from a shabby hospital bed in Russia's republic of Ingushetia, which borders on the besieged breakaway republic of Chechnya.

Mr. Katsiyev is from this small Ingush republic, but like many here has relatives in Chechnya — where Russian tank columns and troops have been maneuvering these past eight days to surround the capital of Grozny and force the surrender of Chechnya's president Dzhokhar Dudayev. On Saturday, shortly before the deadline of Mr. Yeltsin's latest demands for Chechnya to disarm, Mr. Katsiyev made a fruitless expedition into Chechnya to find his relatives, then turned toward home. Near the border, Russian troops opened fire on his red Zhiguli sedan and two other civilian cars, killing most of the passengers. Trying to escape through the snow Mr. Katsiyev was hit by shrapnel from a tank shell.

For Mr. Katsiyev, as for many in Russia's Caucasus Mountain region, Mr. Yeltsin's forceful attempt to hold Russia together is backfiring. Arguments that in recent years Russia has developed "new charms" as a ruling state count for little here. And in Moscow, this action is now being undermined by Mr. Yeltsin's escalating military assault on Chechnya, where bombs began falling early Monday morning. Progress in democratic and economic reform is overshadowed by the Russian tanks parked along Ingushetia's main road and the warplanes roaring

overhead.

Fresh jockeying yesterday over terms for peace talks between Mr. Yeltsin's government and Mr. Dudayev offered little hope for resolving this conflict. Scores, perhaps hundreds, of people have already died. Equipment for killing thousands has now been positioned in and around Chechnya.

In Russia's march toward a stable democracy, this is a dim hour. Since the 1991 Soviet collapse, Mr. Yeltsin's government has vacillated between wooing Russia's 149 million people and dictating to them. There have been reforms such as privatizations, meant to deliver a better life. And there have been bouts of force, such as the 1993 dissolution and shelling of the former Soviet-installed parliament and subsequent two-month period of rule by presidential decree. As recently as this September, reforms seemed to be edging ahead. Mr. Yeltsin, in a Kremlin press conference, heralded the dawn of a more normal society in Russia: Inflation was dropping, foreigners had begun investing in the nascent stock market.

Then suppressed troubles bubbled back up. In October the ruble took a beating and inflation soared. Fraught with weird and vague regulations, the stock market went limp. By late November, the project of forcefully bringing Chechnya back under Russian rule — three years after Mr. Dudayev had declared independence — had moved to the top of Mr. Yeltsin's agenda.

Intervention in Chechnya has been exploding this past week into a military strike that rivals the Soviet invasion of



Afghanistan. The reaction has been frantic criticism of Mr. Yeltsin by the Russian parliament, and horror and resentment in the Caucasus, where signs of war are everywhere.

Driving past a Russian army checkpoint yesterday evening, miles from the Chechen border, this reporter had to wait in a traffic jam of dozens of tanks and armored personnel carriers bound for Chechnya — where somewhere between 10,000 and 40,000 troops with heavy weapons are already digging in.

Mr. Yeltsin's Soviet-style act of removing himself from public view for nose surgery just before sending in the troops has further left many people across Russia questioning whether their government is retreating from democratic debate.

Near Chechnya, this whole scene is stirring trouble already simmering from past conflicts. Scores of ethnic minorities live in the Caucasus Mountains. Soviet rule did nothing to promote harmony among them. Instead, the old command economy wrecked chances for trade that might have taught the benefits of tolerance. Much of the anger festering here is now turning toward Moscow.

For example, in 1992, soon after Soviet control collapsed, the Caucasus republics of North Ossetia and Ingushetia — near Chechnya — went to war with each other. Russian troops imposed peace but in a way that left bad scars. They set up a military cordon between the two peoples and deported tens of thousands from a disputed area along the shared border.

Some of the reshuffled Ingushetian refugees moved to the other side of their republic, near Chechnya, where they are still living in cramped housing now filling up with Chechen refugees as well.

Over tea in a three-room apartment now filled with eight people near the Chechen border, a recent refugee from Grozny introduced his friends who are refugees from Russia's 1992 peacekeeping operation in Ingushetia. They said they'd just like Russia to leave them alone.

"If they'll be good, then we'll stay with them," says one man who moved here in 1992, Yanus Albakov, referring to the leadership in Moscow.

But listening to a Russian warplane flying overhead, Mr. Albakov insists that the Russians have not been good. He says that Moscow is spending plenty of money on the war in Chechnya, but nothing to help people already uprooted here by past conflicts. "To talk of modern Russia, I don't know what it means," says Mr. Albakov. But he knows now he feels: "If instead of sugar they show us a fist, then we'll show them the same."

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WASHINGTON POST

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For Pilots' Families, Joy and Grief Mark the Day

Fallen Army Aviator, 29, Had Won Air Medal for Combat Service in Persian Gulf War

By Kathy Sawyer
Washington Post Staff Writer

One woman wept with joy and the other issued a plea for privacy in her grief. They are the wives of the two pilots at the controls of a U.S. helicopter downed in North Korea on Saturday after it reportedly strayed across the demilitarized zone.

Chief Warrant Officer Bobby Hall of Brooksville, Fla., was alive, uninjured and in the custody of North Korean officials, the White House said yesterday. Chief Warrant Officer David Hilemon, 29, was killed "in the downing of the helicopter."

Hilemon, a Persian Gulf war veteran, was from Washington state,

according to an Army official, but lived with his wife Berit in Clarksville, Tenn., near Fort Campbell, Ky., his home base. They had no children.

Berit Hilemon issued a statement saying: "I can find comfort in the fact that David died doing something he loved, flying and defending our country. He was a dedicated and loving husband, who enjoyed flying and his life as an Army aviator. I ask that everyone honor my wishes and respect my privacy and the privacy of the rest of David's family during our time of grief."

Army Maj. Paul Aswell, a public affairs officer from Fort Campbell, was with Berit Hilemon at her

home. He said in a telephone interview that family, friends and other Army associates were with her. "She's not going to be alone," he said.

Aswell said no arrangements for burial have been made yet. "We are just hoping for a prompt return of the remains."

President Clinton yesterday demanded that the North Koreans quickly return Hall as well as Hilemon's remains.

Defense Secretary William J. Perry called Hilemon "a true patriot who served his country with professionalism and dedication."

Hilemon was assigned to the 101st Aviation Regiment of the 101st Airborne Division (air assault) from June 1990 to March

1994, Fort Campbell officials said. He arrived in Korea in November.

Hilemon joined the Army in February 1988 and had been an Army aviator since August 1988. He was qualified to fly several types of Army aircraft, including the AH-64 Apache, as a test pilot, and the AH-1 Cobra. He served with the 101st Airborne Division in the Gulf war and received the Air Medal for combat service.

The survivor's wife cried what she described as "tears of joy" when she answered a phone call from the Associated Press at the couple's home in Brooksville.

"I'm elated that my husband is safe, but my heart goes out to the family of the other man," Donna Hall said.

WASHINGTON POST

Dec. 19, 1994

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Arriving in Sarajevo, Carter Sets Modest Goals for Peace Mission

By John Pomfret
Washington Post Foreign Service

SARAJEVO, Bosnia, Dec. 18—Former president Jimmy Carter flew into this crumbling capital at sunset this evening and immediately played down hopes that his dramatic mission to Bosnia could help bring an end to Europe's bloodiest conflict since World War II.

The difficulty of the mission was underscored by reports from U.N. and Bosnian army sources that Bosnian Serb troops had taken a strategically located Muslim-held town in northwestern Bosnia. Carter told reporters he has a "limited role to play here."

"What I'd like to do obviously is to understand the situation and contribute to some alleviation of tension," Carter said upon arriving in a U.N. plane at Sarajevo's shell-scarred airport. Other goals include a reopened Sarajevo airport, free passage for U.N. aid convoys, the release of U.N. personnel whose freedom of movement is still restricted by the Serbs, a cease-fire and "some attention given to protecting human rights"—all points that Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic, the man who invited Carter, has promised before.

Asked if he had not been a little too hasty in coming to Sarajevo, Carter replied: "I don't want to comment on the specifics... I think I've received enough assurances." Carter will meet Karadzic Monday,

Carter's minimalist goals belied the international attention focused on his mission and his past record as a skilled and stubborn independent mediator in Angola, Haiti and North Korea. They also did not answer the


question, asked by Bosnian Muslim officials here, whether the Clinton administration might be using the Carter mission to renege on its commitments to the Sarajevo government by forcing it to accept painful

revisions to an internationally brokered peace plan that the U.S. government had called the final deal for Bosnia. Bosnia's Muslims already have accepted the plan, but the Serbs have rejected it.

Carter's visit, expected to end Tuesday, comes as the international community is exhausted by the 32-month-old war and its inability to stop it. About 250,000 people have died since war erupted here in April 1992, and more than a million have been forced from their homes. In addition, the war has strained the NATO alliance and threatened relations between the United States and Russia. The U.N. mission, the biggest peacekeeping operation ever mounted, was sent in to settle the conflict, but it now stumbles from crisis to crisis and is routinely brought to its knees by the belligerence of the Bosnian Serbs, whom the world body has been unwilling to crack down on for fear of losing men.

U.S. officials said today that within several hours Saturday their instructions on Carter's visit changed from passive cooperation to active support, a sign that some agreement had been reached with Carter during meetings in the United States last week. Several of the officials said they were surprised that the Clinton administration appeared to be backing the mission.

"Somebody is throwing dice in the



PEACE...Pg. 15

MONDAY, December 19, 1994

BALTIMORE SUN

Dec. 17, 1994

Pg. 1

Marines to help U.N. exit Somalia

Clinton orders 2,000 to prepare for deployment

By Gilbert A. Lewthwaite
Washington Bureau of The Sun

WASHINGTON — In another commitment of U.S. forces overseas, President Clinton ordered a 2,000-strong Marine unit yesterday to prepare to re-enter Somalia for the evacuation of the last United Nations peacekeepers from that African nation.

Defense officials said the withdrawal of the 15,000 international peacekeepers — none of them U.S. combat troops — would likely take place early next year and last a few days, with the Marines providing cover for the final stages of the pull-out of both men and machines.

Mr. Clinton's decision came just

one week after he agreed that as many as 23,000 U.S. forces should join other NATO troops for a possible evacuation of U.N. peacekeepers from Bosnia, potentially a much larger and more dangerous operation than Somalia.

Defense officials said a few hundred Marines would likely be landed in Mogadishu, the Somali capital, with the rest waiting offshore to join them if they encountered any resistance. The Pentagon's doctrine of applying "overwhelming force" to combat situations would dictate the size of the deployment, defense officials said. The evacuation would be under U.S. command, and the Pentagon would foot the bill, they added.

The troops of the 18th Marine Expeditionary Unit are sailing with a three-ship, amphibious-ready group, led by the helicopter carrier USS Essex, on routine deployment to the Persian Gulf. They are expected to be ordered to sail for Somalia in coming weeks. A fourth ship, the helicopter carrier USS Belleau Wood, with another 1,900 Marines aboard, could be ordered to join the group, officials said.

With them are Harrier attack jets, amphibious assault craft and howitzers. According to a defense official, the Marines, who are trained in evacuation techniques, could be reinforced with AC-130 gunships. The

Marines are to help the U.N. forces remove military equipment, including tanks, armored personnel carriers and helicopters that could further destabilize the situation in Somalia if they fell into the hands of the warring factions.

"We feel comfortable it is the right level of force to ensure minimal risk to American soldiers and at the same time to help our allies and to get this important equipment out of the country," said Adm. William A. Owens, deputy chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Asked about the likelihood of the Marines coming under hostile fire, he said: "It's very difficult to say. Our view is that with this kind of presence and visibility of this kind of presence, it would be unwise for anyone to interfere with this type of operation. So our hope would be that the amount of resistance to this would be very limited."

Chief Warrant Officer Bill Wright, a Marine spokesman, said: "To say this is a cakewalk... I would not say that. To say it has the possibility of catastrophe, I don't think that's the right description either. It is prudent to say that whenever you get into harm's way, there is a danger."

Two Marines were killed in combat during the initial deployment in Somalia. The United States was part

of the U.N. humanitarian mission there from December 1992 until March of this year. At the peak of U.S. presence, in January 1993, 25,400 U.S. troops were deployed. U.S. forces suffered a total of 30 combat deaths, including 18 Army Rangers killed in a single gunfight in Mogadishu with supporters of Gen. Mohamed Farah Aidid in October 1993. That toll persuaded Mr. Clinton to recall the U.S. troops.

Yesterday he decided it was "the right thing to do" to send a limited number of U.S. troops back for a limited time, for a limited operation, after U.N. commanders asked for help.

Deputy Defense Secretary John Deutch said there was "almost universal agreement" from members of Congress for providing "limited assistance" and added: "The president decided we must help those nations which joined with us in 1992 at the beginning of this operation, to help them get out of harm's way."

The remaining U.N. forces are mainly from Egypt, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Malaysia. They have been facing increasing hostility in Mogadishu. A defense official said the U.S. operation would be wholly under U.S. command, avoiding the confusion in the former Yugoslavia, where NATO operations have to have the approval of the United Nations force commander.

WASHINGTON POST

Dec. 19, 1994

Pg. 23

Japanese Hope African Peacekeeping Sets Precedent

By Keith B. Richburg
Washington Post Foreign Service

GOMA, Zaire—Enter the Japanese military camp situated among Goma's squalid refugee camps, and your shoes are sprayed with disinfectant by a soldier fitted with a yellow tank on his back. Fresh vegetables and meat are flown in on Japanese air force C-130 transport planes from Nairobi, prepared Japanese style, then served in a spotless mess tent.

After dinner, troops can call home twice a week on satellite phones or relax at the "Goma Hot Springs," a traditional Japanese bathhouse constructed in tents complete with slippers lined up at the entrance, potted plants and a view of Goma's Nyiragongo volcano as a scenic backdrop through an opening.

The 260-man Japanese military contingent here is served in style. It is the last foreign military unit assisting more than 1 million Rwandan Hutus who fled to Zaire in July after the takeover of their country by the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front.

This operation is considered a first for Japan, an economic powerhouse still feeling its way to a larger political role—the first time Japanese troops have been dispatched overseas, under their own command, for a humanitarian mission.

Japanese troops assisted in Cambodia and Mozambique, but both of those missions were defined as "peacekeeping" operations, under a United Nations command, and the Japanese were given a

limited role in areas considered safe and protected by troops from other nations.

After three months in Goma, the Japanese now are leaving—they are due home before the end of the year—but their officers hope their brief tour has advanced an image of Japan in a little-known corner of this poor continent.

"When I arrived here, I asked, 'Do you know Japan?' and they said yes, because they know Toyota... and other products made in Japan," said U.N. refugee official Yoshio Nagawa, who laid the groundwork for the arrival. "But they never saw the face of a Japanese."

That has changed. Japan's military doctors at the Goma hospital treat about 50 patients each day. Its military engineers are building a drainage system at one refugee camp, and its volcanologists have installed five monitoring stations around nearby volcanoes.

"Our mission is to conduct this operation successfully," said Col. Minamoto Kamimoto, the Japanese commander here. "If our operation succeeds, Japan will conduct more humanitarian operations."

The Japanese Self-Defense Force sees itself as particularly well-suited for this type of humanitarian mission, since in Japan the soldiers are routinely called in to assist after natural disasters such as earthquakes and volcanic eruptions.

The mission was made possible after the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata, made an impassioned appeal during a one-week vacation in her native Japan that Tokyo assist in

the Rwandan crisis not simply with money but with manpower.

"Without Mrs. Ogata, I don't think the Japanese Self-Defense Force would have been mobilized for this type of activity," said Nagawa, a U.N. refugee agency officer in Tokyo who was dispatched here to act as liaison between the Japanese troops and international relief agencies.

But as in the two previous cases when Japanese troops went overseas, this mission has attracted controversy back home, particularly among lawmakers and others who see in it a heightened military role, and a possible violation of Japan's post-war "peace" constitution.

Members of parliament and officials from the prime minister's office have visited, and the 260 soldiers have been closely watched by an almost equal number of Japanese journalists. Many were waiting mainly to see if this operation might mark the first time since World War II that Japanese troops would be forced to fire their weapons in hostilities.

The Japanese have faced no conflict, although they, like other relief workers, say gunfire is heard nightly. "Sometimes near this camp, we hear rifles, even hand grenades," said the press officer, Maj. Katsuyuki Kamiguchi. "In the night, it's very dangerous."

Kamimoto, the commander, said security in the camp was one of his biggest worries.

The only Japanese casualties in the Goma oper-

JAPAN...Pg. 15

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009. paper	re helicopter incident - proposed response to query (3 pages)	12/17/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Robert Bell (Defense Policy and Arms Control)
OA/Box Number: 941

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea-November-December 1994 [2]

2009-0528-F

kc1385

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE - OH-58A + INCIDENT 17 DEC 84, REPUBLIC OF KOREA

1. (U) MISSION BACKGROUND

A. (U) ARMY AVIATION UNITS IN KOREA ROUTINELY CONDUCT FLIGHT TRAINING IN THE AREA NORTH OF SEOUL KNOWN AS "P-518" (PROHIBITED AREA #518) OR THE "TACTICAL ZONE." THIS AREA EXTENDS FROM COAST TO COAST AND IS VITAL TO THE DEFENSE OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA. P-518 EXTENDS NORTH TO A LINE 8-15 KILOMETERS SOUTH OF THE MILITARY DEMARCATION LINE (MDL), AND THAT LINE IS KNOWN AS THE "NO FLY LINE." THE NO FLY LINE IS AN ADDITIONAL BUFFER ZONE FROM THE MDL. THE NO FLY LINE WAS ESTABLISHED TO PREVENT ACCIDENTAL OVER FLIGHTS AND RESULTING HEIGHTENED TENSIONS ON THE PENINSULA.

B. (U) ORIENTATION FLIGHTS ALONG THE NO FLY LINE ARE ONLY DESIGNED TO FAMILIARIZE AVIATORS WITH THE NORTHERN LIMITS OF THE TACTICAL ZONE. EVERY PRECAUTION IS TAKEN TO ENSURE AVIATION OPERATIONS ARE UNDER POSITIVE CONTROL MEASURES, THAT CREWS ARE PROPERLY TRAINED AND THAT MISSION PROFILES HAVE BEEN SCREENED TO ENSURE THEY ARE NOT PROVOCATIVE IN NATURE.

C. (U) THE ORIENTATION FLIGHT BY THE UNARMED OH-58A + ON 17 DEC 84 WAS A NO FLY LINE ORIENTATION. THE MISSION WAS PLANNED TO LAST TWO AND ONE HALF HOURS, AND WAS TO PROCEED FROM ITS TAKE OFF POINT AT CAMP PAGE, IN CHUNCHEON, TO A SPECIFIED CHECK POINT [CHECK POINT 84] ALONG THE NO FLY LINE, 18 MILES FROM THE EAST COAST OF SOUTH KOREA.

D. (U) THE MISSION WAS TO FLY A WESTERLY COURSE FOR 100 MILES AND RETURN TO CAMP PAGE. THE MISSION'S PLANNED ROUTE KEPT THE AIRCRAFT A MINIMUM OF TWO MILES FROM THE MDL AT ALL TIMES. HOWEVER, THE CREW APPARENTLY BECAME DISORIENTED DURING THE MISSION AND INADVERTENTLY STRAYED INTO NORTH KOREAN AIRSPACE.

2. (U) MISSION CHRONOLOGY (TIMES ARE LOCAL KOREAN TIME)

*D.O.D is
checking -- on
Saturday. They
thought it was
50 hours.*

A. (U) 1002 THE UNARMED OH-58A+ DEPARTED CAMP PAGE, CHUNCHEON, FOR A ROUTINE BORDER ORIENTATION FLIGHT ALONG THE NO FLY LINE. THE AIRCRAFT WAS CARRYING ITS CREW OF TWO PILOTS, CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER (CW2) DAVID HILEMON, OF CLARKSVILLE, TENN., AND CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER (CW2) BOBBY HALL, OF BROOKSVILLE, FLA., AND NO PASSENGERS. THE PILOT IN COMMAND (HALL) HAD 1,000 HOURS OF FLIGHT TIME INCLUDING 10 HOURS ALONG THE NO FLY LINE. AFTER AN INTENSE PROGRAM OF INSTRUCTION -- INCLUDING CLASSROOM AND FLIGHT TRAINING -- THE PILOT IN COMMAND BECAME QUALIFIED TO OPERATE NEAR THE NO FLY LINE. [HIS PROFICIENCY WAS VALIDATED BY A QUALIFIED INSTRUCTOR PILOT.] THE CO-PILOT WAS RECEIVING HIS FIRST NO FLY LINE ORIENTATION.

B. (U) 1002-1026 THE AIRCRAFT HAD FILED A PROPER FLIGHT PLAN. UPON DEPARTURE FROM THE AIRFIELD, THE AIRCRAFT ESTABLISHED POSITIVE RADAR CONTACT WITH THE MASTER CONTROL AND REPORTING CENTER (MCRC), WHICH IS LOCATED AT OSAN AIR BASE, ROK. THE CREW ALSO ESTABLISHED RADIO CONTACT WITH FLIGHT COORDINATION CENTER (FCC) EVENREACH, A U.S. ARMY FLIGHT FOLLOWING FACILITY. THE AIRCRAFT FOLLOWED A PUBLISHED ROUTE NORTHWARD TOWARD THE NO FLY LINE. AT 1020, THE CREW CONTACTED FCC LEE, A ROK ARMY FLIGHT FOLLOWING FACILITY, AS THEY LEFT FCC EVENREACH'S AIRSPACE AND ENTERED FCC LEE'S, PER STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES. THE MCRC MAINTAINED RADAR CONTACT WITH THE AIRCRAFT UNTIL 1026 WHEN THE RUGGED, MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN OBSCURED THE AIRCRAFT FROM RADAR COVERAGE. [LOSS OF RADAR CONTACT IS NOT UNCOMMON. HELICOPTERS TEND TO FLY LOW AND HUG TERRAIN WHICH CAN PRECLUDE UNINTERRUPTED RADAR COVERAGE.] STANDARD FLIGHT PROCEDURES REQUIRED THE CREW TO REPORT THEIR LOCATION TO THE FCC EVERY 30 MINUTES. BASED ON THE TIME OF THE CREW'S INITIAL CONTACT WITH FCC LEE, THE NEXT POSITION UPDATE WAS DUE AT 1050.

2. (U) MISSION CHRONOLOGY (CONTINUED)

C. (U) 1025-1027 THE PLANNED ROUTE WOULD HAVE TAKEN THE AIRCREW NORTH AND EAST TO THE DESIGNATED CHECKPOINT ON THE NO FLY LINE. IT IS SUSPECTED THE CREW BECAME DISORIENTED SHORTLY AFTER RADAR CONTACT WAS LOST AT 1026, BUT CONTINUED FLYING TO THE NORTHEAST. RADAR CONTACT WAS MOMENTARILY RE-ESTABLISHED AT 1037, AND THE RADAR TRACK PLACED THE AIRCRAFT AT THE PREVIOUSLY DESIGNATED CHECK POINT. MCRC CONCLUDED OPERATIONS WERE NORMAL, SINCE THE AIRCRAFT WAS AT THE START POINT FOR THE FLIGHT ALONG THE NO FLY LINE.

D. (U) 1038 A ROK OBSERVATION POST (#1) REPORTED A U.S. ARMY OH-58 FLYING TO THE NORTH EAST OF THEIR LOCATION.

E. (U) 1040 APPROXIMATELY TWO MINUTES LATER, ANOTHER ROK OBSERVATION POST, ABOUT FIVE KILOMETERS AWAY, OBSERVED A U.S. OH-58 CROSS THE MDL. SOLDIERS MANNING THE OBSERVATION POINT REPORTED THAT THE AIRCRAFT FLEW BY TOO QUICKLY AND TOO LOW FOR THEM TO WARN THE AIRCREW ABOUT THE IMPENDING BORDER CROSSING.

F. (U) 1042 THE CREW OF THE OH-58A+ CONTACTED FCC LEE AND REPORTED THAT THEY WERE AT THE CHECKPOINT ON THE NO FLY LINE (AS FILED) AND BEGAN TO FLY WEST AS IF ALONG THE NO FLY LINE. BASED ON THE ROK OBSERVATIONS AND RADAR CONTACT AT THE CHECKPOINT SIX MINUTES EARLIER, IT IS SUSPECTED THE OH-58A+ WAS ACTUALLY FLYING ON THE NORTH KOREAN SIDE OF THE MDL AT THIS TIME, APPROXIMATELY 20 KILOMETERS NORTH OF WHERE THEY LIKELY BELIEVED THEY WERE (ALONG THE NO FLY LINE).

G. (U) 1048-1102 THE AIRCRAFT APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN FORCED DOWN (THIS IS STILL UNCONFIRMED) (NEAR THE TOWN OF IPO-NI (EE-PO-NEE)) IN KUMGANG (KOOM-GONG) COUNTY. THERE WAS NO RADIO OR RADAR CONTACT WITH THE AIRCRAFT AT THE TIME OR SINCE. THE AIRCRAFT AND CREW WERE PRESUMED CAPTURED BY THE (NORTH) KOREAN PEOPLES ARMY (KPA).

*4 reports
might
advise
the ROK
Observatory
Report had
time to
reach FCC
Lee in the
3 minute
interval to
then report
report it to the
rebo under it
checked in*

*if thought
this was
too "sure"
of how it
happened,
Y Doj
said
they'd be
recreating
it.*

*(i.e. unsure of crew
landing or shallow, or...)*

2. (U) GENERAL. ABOVE INFORMATION WAS PASSED THROUGH OPERATIONS CHANNELS TO J-3, NMCC AT @ MIDNIGHT KOREAN TIME (10 A.M. EST) WITH MAPS.

6. (U) QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q1. WHAT WAS THE AIRCRAFT'S MISSION?

A1. THE AIRCREW WAS CONDUCTING A LOCAL AREA ORIENTATION FLIGHT, USED TO FAMILIARIZE AVIATORS WITH LOCAL TERRAIN AND ROUTES.

Q2. WAS THE PILOT QUALIFIED?

A2. THE PILOT IN WAS QUALIFIED TO FLY ALONG THE NO FLY LINE. HE HAD RECEIVED INTENSIVE CLASSROOM AND FLIGHT TRAINING IN KOREA PRIOR TO THIS QUALIFICATION. HE HAS FLOWN 1,000 FLIGHT HOURS, 900 IN THE OH-58.

Q3. WHY WAS THE CREW NOT WARNED ABOUT CROSSING THE MDL?

A3. BECAUSE OF THE MOUNTAINS, THE HELICOPTER WAS OBSCURED FROM RADAR, SO THE RADAR CONTROLLING CENTER (THE MASTER CONTROL AND REPORTING CENTER, AT OSAN AIR BASE) WAS UNAWARE OF THE AIRCRAFT'S IMMINENT INCURSION INTO NORTH KOREAN AIRSPACE. THE FLIGHT FOLLOWING FACILITY, FLIGHT COORDINATION CENTER LEE, DOES NOT HAVE RADAR. IT USES A PILOT'S FLIGHT PLAN AND POSITION REPORTS THE CREW CALLS IN OVER RADIO TO DETERMINE THE AIRCRAFT'S LOCATION. THE LAST INDIVIDUALS TO SEE THE HELICOPTER SOUTH OF THE MDL INDICATED IT FLEW BY TOO FAST TO WARN VISUALLY.

Q4. WHAT DO "VISUAL WARNINGS" CONSIST OF?

A4. VISUAL WARNINGS INCLUDE: FLARES LAUNCHED BY PERSONNEL MANNING THE OBSERVATION POINTS AND WARNING SHOTS (TRACERS) (AS A LAST REPORT) TO WARN AIRCRAFT OF THEIR PROXIMITY TO THE DMZ.

4. (U) QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS (CONTINUED)

Q5. WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE DMZ AND THE MDL?

A5. THE MILITARY DEMARCATION LINE, OR MDL, IS THE ACTUAL BOUNDARY DRAWN AT THE END OF THE KOREAN CONFLICT, THAT DIVIDES NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA. THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE, OR DMZ, IS A 4,000 METER-WIDE BAND THAT RUNS EAST TO WEST ACROSS THE LENGTH OF THE PENINSULA, 2,000 METERS ON EACH SIDE (NORTH AND SOUTH) OF THE MDL.

Q6. WASN'T THE PILOT A MAINTENANCE TEST PILOT? WHY WOULD A TEST PILOT NEED TO GO NEAR THE DMZ?

A6. YES, BOTH CREW MEMBERS WERE MAINTENANCE TEST PILOTS. EACH COULD BE ASKED AT ANY TIME TO RECOVER AN AIRCRAFT IN THE AREA OF OPERATIONS. BOTH NEED TO BE FAMILIAR WITH THE TERRAIN AND THE POTENTIAL HAZARDS TO MAINTENANCE AND RECOVERY OPERATIONS.

Q7. HOW LONG HAD THE CREW BEEN IN KOREA?

A7. THE CREW MEMBERS BOTH ARRIVED IN KOREA 43 DAYS PRIOR TO THE INCIDENT.

Q8. IS IT UNUSUAL TO HAVE PEOPLE FLYING NEAR THE DMZ SO SOON AFTER THEIR ARRIVAL IN COUNTRY?

A8. SINCE TOURS OF DUTY IN KOREA ARE PREDOMINANTLY ONLY ONE-YEAR LONG, AVIATORS' ORIENTATION TO THE UNIT'S AREA OF OPERATION -- EVERYTHING FROM THE NO FLY LINE SOUTH -- MUST BE CONDUCTED SHORTLY AFTER THEIR ARRIVAL. THE TRAINING IS REGULARLY INTENSE, COMPRESSED, YET THOROUGH. IN THESE 43 DAYS, MORE THAN ONE-TENTH OF THE AVIATORS' TOURS HAD ALREADY PASSED.

Q9. ARE INCURSIONS INTO NORTH KOREA COMMON?

A9. IN FACT, THESE INCIDENTS ARE VERY INFREQUENT. THE LAST OF WHICH WAS IN 1977.

Q10. WHAT IS THE DESIGNATION OF THE AIRCRAFT? OH-58A + OR OH-

58C OR OH-58D?

*Paper today said
we have flown
into N. Korea
at times
in past
by mistake
not been
shot down --
however, DoD
likes this phrasing.*

*Had said was
OH-58D before --
it was just a mistake.*

A10. THE AIRCRAFT INVOLVED IS AN UNARMED, OH-55A+, A FIELD-MODIFIED VARIANT OF THE OH-55A. THE ARMY UPGRADED THE ENGINES ON OH-55A MODELS TO MAKE THEM MORE LIKE THE NEWER, FACTORY-PRODUCED, OH-55C.

Q11. WHAT WAS THE AIRCRAFT USING FOR NAVIGATION? WAS THERE ANY SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT ON BOARD?

A11. THE AIRCREW WAS USING MAPS TO NAVIGATE. THE OH-55A+ HAS NO HIGH-TECHNOLOGY NAVIGATIONAL EQUIPMENT, SUCH AS GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM, ON BOARD. ADDITIONALLY, BOTH THE AIRCRAFT AND CREW WERE UNARMED. [THE OH-55A+ DOES USE THE "AUTOMATIC DIRECTION FINDER" SYSTEM, A NON-PRECISION RADIO TRANSMITTER AND RECEIVER SYSTEM THAT REQUIRES THE AIRCRAFT TO BE WITHIN RANGE AND IN LINE OF SIGHT WITH THE TRANSMITTING RADIO BEACON. THE NEAREST BEACON WAS AT CAMP PAGE. THE AIRCRAFT WOULD HAVE BEEN OUT OF RANGE AND LINE OF SIGHT ALONG THE NO FLY LINE.]

Q12. WAS THE WEATHER A FACTOR?

A12. THE WEATHER FOR THE FLIGHT WAS A 10,000 FOOT CEILING AND SIX MILES OF VISIBILITY. THE AIRCRAFT WAS ON A VISUAL FLIGHT PLAN. OTHER THAN THESE FACTS, I WOULD NOT WANT TO SPECULATE ON HOW WEATHER MAY HAVE AFFECTED THE FLIGHT.

Q13. HOW COULD THIS HAPPEN?

A13. THIS UNFORTUNATE, TRAGIC INCIDENT APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN THE RESULT OF TWO PILOTS, WHO, WHILE CONDUCTING DIFFICULT TRAINING UNDER STRESSFUL CONDITIONS, MISREAD THE RUGGED TERRAIN OF THE NORTH CENTRAL REPUBLIC OF KOREA. THERE ISN'T ANY AVIATOR AROUND WHO HASN'T AT ONE TIME OR ANOTHER BEEN DISORIENTED. WHY IT HAPPENED AT THE MOL IS BEING INVESTIGATED. WE HAVE SYSTEMS TO PREVENT THIS IN PLACE, RANGING FROM STANDARD PROCEDURES TO APPROVED ROUTES TO VISUAL AND AURAL WARNING SYSTEMS. ALL THE SYSTEMS WERE OPERATIONAL AND ALL PERSONNEL INVOLVED PERFORMED THEIR DUTIES CORRECTLY.

*DOD intends
to rephrase
so not so
"5 wrong"
on why "pilot
error" occurred.*

June Thursday — Hall's Congressmen

Galucci → Kahn

(Richmond could
ask to see
Kahn)

~~S. Korea~~

State Dept cool
but what is pt
of channel

Ross / Johnson

3rd DRAFT STATEMENT (1130 dec17)

MEMORANDUM FOR CORRESPONDENTS

No. XXX-M
December 17, 1994.

NMCC
2403 EST.

Secretary of Defense William J. Perry confirmed that an unarmed U.S. Army OH-58C observation helicopter strayed into North Korean airspace at about 10:00 a.m. Saturday Korean time (9:00 p.m. Friday EST) and went down in Kumgang County in the Democratic Republic of North Korea. It is unclear whether the helicopter made an emergency landing or was shot down, as the North Korean press has reported. At this time the condition of the two-man crew is not known.

Secretary of State Warren Christopher has been in touch this morning with Congressman Bill Richardson (D-NM), who arrived in Pyongyang on a previously scheduled trip, accompanied by a State Department official, shortly after the incident occurred. Congressman Richardson, who was first informed of the incident by the DPRK Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, expressed his deep concern, asked for an explanation, and urged immediate steps to ensure the welfare and prompt return of the crew. In phone conversations with Secretary Christopher and senior State Department offices, Mr. Richardson reported that his North Korean hosts described the incident as unfortunate and said that it was under investigation. At the request of Secretary Christopher, Mr. Richardson will continue to press the North Koreans for further information, for access to the crew and their prompt return.

them

State Department officials have also communicated with the North Koreans through Mission to the UN in New York to insist on the urgency of information on the incident, as well as for prompt access to the crew.

US Forces Command Korea has identified the crewmen as CW2 David Hilemon of Clarksville, TN and CW2 Bobby Hall of Brooksville, FL. Both are members of A Company, 4th Battalion, 501st Aviation Regiment of Camp Page, South Korea. Their families have been notified. The crew was undertaking a routine training mission.

We have conflicting reports about the incident and will provide more information as soon as we can confirm the details.


Kim Jong II

We have been informed by the Government of the Democratic Republic of North Korea, through Congressman Bill Richardson who is in Pyongyang, that one of the pilots of the U.S. Army helicopter that strayed into North Korean airspace on December 16 -- Chief Warrant Officer David Hilemon of Clarksville, TN -- was killed in the downing of the helicopter. North Korean officials have told Congressman Richardson that the other crewman -- Chief Warrant Officer Bobby Hall of Brooksville, FL -- is alive and reportedly uninjured. Our thoughts and prayers are with the families of both of these dedicated aviators.



Congressman Richardson, who has been in continuing contact with Secretary of State Warren Christopher during this period, has at my instructions told the North Korean Government that we want prompt access to Chief Warrant Officer Hall and his return to a U.S. facility along with the remains of Chief Warrant Officer Hilemon. We are using all available channels to press for an early resolution of this matter.


This tragic loss of life was unnecessary. Our primary concern now is the welfare of Chief Warrant Officer Hall and his return along with the body of Chief Warrant Officer Hilemon. Congressman Richardson, who has worked tirelessly to resolve this matter over the past two days, is staying in North Korea for now and will remain in constant contact with North Korean officials on our behalf.

Joint Security Area, DMZ, Korea



The Korean Peninsula Demilitarized Zone Area





WASHFAX

JCS/PENTAGON

20 DEC 94 17 15

TIME TRANSMITTED (LOCAL)

MSG NBR

#117

WHITE HOUSE
NOV 20 1994 15:29

TIME RECEIVED (LOCAL)

FROM DDI OFFICE/DESK OASD/PA PHONE NBR 79312

SUBJECT DoD's News Briefing

DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS:

PAGES 8

(INCLUDING COVER)

☐ HOLD FOR NORMAL DUTY HOURS/ROUTINE☐ IMMEDIATELY/URGENTNOTE: FURNISH AFTER DUTY HOUR CONTACT TELEPHONE NUMBER
FOR EACH ADDRESSEE REQUIRING AFTER DUTY HOUR DELIVERY

TRANSMIT TO

AGENCY	INDIVIDUAL (NAME)	OFFICE	ROOM NBR	PHONE NBR
White House	George Stephanopoulos		WWH	456-2580
White House	Dee Dee Myers	Press	WWH	456-6688
White House	Leon Furth	VPress	OEOP/298	395-4213
State	Mike McCurry	PA	6800	647-6607
NSC	William Itoh (for distr)	WWH	SITROOM	456-2225
CIA	Kent Harrington	PAS	7C35	482-7677
NSC	BOB BELL		RM 386	(202)395-1185

REMARKS:

See [Signature] man etc MA

WASHFAX COVER SHEET

WASHFAX OPERATOR (703) 695-2427

Unclass
CLASSIFICATION

DoD News Briefing
Mr. Dennis Boxx, DATSD PA
Thursday, December 15, 1994 - 1:30 p.m.

Mr. Boxx: Good afternoon.

I have no announcements. I'll be happy to try to take your questions.

Q: Anything new on the Korea helicopter downing? And are you all getting frustrated with the lack of progress?

A: There was a meeting held today about 5:30 p.m. Korea time in Pyongyang. At that meeting, we passed along a message strongly requesting more information on the condition and location of Chief Warrant Officer Hall and confirmation that Chief Warrant Officer Hilemon is, in fact, dead. We've asked for an early resolution to this issue. We also urged for another meeting. At this point we have not seen any resolution to it.

Q: Are you going to have another meeting, and when?

A: We have not been given a date or time certain yet for another meeting. That is one level of activity that's taking place. As you know, there are other levels in other departments. Department of State has actively been engaged in trying to push the diplomatic side of this. Secretary Perry and Secretary Christopher are also involved in a number of efforts on the diplomatic front. So there are efforts underway at every level. This is a very high priority, as you have heard. We are pushing to an early resolution to this and we hope to see a positive outcome very soon.

Q: Are you frustrated or angry about this?

A: We continue to believe that this needs to be resolved at the earliest possible moment. We see no reason for a delay and urge for the quick return of the remains of the one pilot, the safe return of the other, and the return of the helicopter.

Q: Do you know--or have you heard... Is there a difference in attitude with this meeting at Pyongyang than with previous negotiations with the North Koreans? And particularly, after the deal was struck when the U.S. gave megabucks in return for them shutting down their nuclear weapons plant? Has there been any easing? Are the negotiations pretty hard ball? Anything you can tell us about any change in attitude?

A: I really can't characterize the discussions. They've been at a mid-level. I don't have any way to characterize their intensity of how they compare to past discussions. We've made our position clear, and we've encouraged that information to be passed quickly up their chain of command.

Q: You said Secretary Perry is engaged at a very high level. Doing what? With other governments?

A: There are efforts underway with other governments at a number of levels. I'd rather not be more specific. As you can appreciate, these are very delicate, and I think I'd rather just leave it at that for now.

Q: Is there anything equipment-wise in the helicopter--that's still in North Korea--that can pose any kind of security risk if they examine that, take it apart? Are they carrying any systems that might...

A: Not that I'm aware of, no. I think, as you heard in great detail yesterday, that was a very basic piece of equipment that should be quickly returned. It should offer no particular military value to them.

Q: You said you made the U.S. position very clear. Have they made their position clear at all? What is the delay as they explain it?

A: The only thing I can tell you is that they have indicated that they are investigating it. That's the information that I have.

Q: Does that investigation mean interrogation of Mr. Hall?

A: I can't speculate on what their definition of anything would be.

Q: Have you gotten a look at it yet with any overhead intel of any sort? Have you seen the crash site? Can you tell us what you saw?

A: I don't believe we have any more information than we had yesterday, no.

Q: You're still not sure whether it was shot down or fell down? You're not sure exactly how it went down?

A: That is correct. We have nothing new to tell you from what we briefed yesterday.

Q: Have you any indication on whether the helicopter is intact or whether it's... In other words, whether it might have...

A: We have no information on the craft itself.

Q: There was a wire report last night that said the copter had been fired upon... Not fired upon, but warning shots had been fired by the North Koreans. This is apparently their claim, and that the chopper had turned and headed south when it was fired upon. Is there any indication at all from any evidence that there were warning shots or that the copter was fleeing to the south?

A: Nothing beyond what we briefed yesterday on... I've seen those reports. We have nothing that can verify them. Obviously, a major piece of this, in order for us to put all of it together, is going to be the return of the pilot and [for us to] be able to talk to that pilot and find out what happened. That's going to answer a lot of these questions, but I can't address that one specifically.

Q: Secretary Perry and Deputy Secretary Deutch, I believe, were both important Administration players in reviewing the deal that was struck last October over the nuclear issue. How can we go ahead with the deal with a country that keeps one of our pilots in their custody? How on earth could we do business with them?

A: These are two separate issues that we are pursuing. One issue clearly is--the most dominating one right now--the resolution of the return of the pilots. That issue needs to be pursued and is being pursued aggressively. We need to seek quick resolution to that so that we can move on to improvements with our relations with North Korea as we move down the road. The first issue that needs to be grappled with is the return of these pilots.

Q: Isn't it unusual, Dennis, for one pilot, if the reports are correct, to be dead and the other to be uninjured? You would think, in a crash or a shoot-down, it would be highly unlikely for one to walk away when the other one was killed.

A: There's no way I can speculate about what may have happened on the ground. I don't know that it is unusual for one person to be able to walk away. I think, again, we have to talk with the pilot involved--talk to the people that were there and see what happened. That's the only way we're going to get to the bottom of those kinds of questions.

Q: Do you have a feasible explanation for why there appears to be no visible imagery--no visible image--of this helicopter down? Can you help us explain how that might be the case with all of our great overhead capability, air breathing and satellite capability?

A: That would just drag me into a discussion of how we gather intelligence and what they may be doing to defeat the way we gather intelligence. I think I'll stay away from that. But thank you for the opportunity. (Laughter)

Q: Do we yet know what his last words were, the pilot's last words?

A: I can't give you the verbatim words. They were, as was briefed yesterday, that the pilots had reached Checkpoint 84. They believed they were at Checkpoint 84. Obviously, that was not correct. They were in North Korea at that moment, we believe. That was the last communication that we're aware of.

Q: In Pyongyang or in any other communications, has our government expressed the evidence--presented the evidence--that this was an unintentional, accidental, and non-hostile incursion, and that the snow depth might have fouled up the navigation?

A: I'm not sure about the last piece. I don't think we've tried to offer every possible scenario that may have contributed to this very tragic event. But there should be no question that we have communicated at every possible turn that this was unintentional, accidental, non-hostile, non-threatening. There is no question but that this is simply a mistake, and that's how it should be viewed by the North Koreans. And we encourage them to resolve it quickly, return the pilots, return the aircraft, and let's move on.

Q: Has there been an apology, or is that not appropriate?

A: Apology by who?

Q: By the United States for violating, apparently, North Korean airspace.

A: I don't think we're at the apology stage. I think we have acknowledged that this is probably a mistake--that we did violate their airspace apparently. That seems to be what all the evidence is. We need to confirm that by talking with the pilots. We'll see where we go from there.

Q: How about Richardson? Is there anything new from Richardson on...

A: I know that Congressman Richardson met with the Deputy Foreign Minister--I believe it would be today, our time--and again pressed for a quick return of the remains of the one pilot and the living pilot and the aircraft. There had also been contact through the State Department at the UN mission in New York.

Q: Any reaction from...

A: Not at this point.

Q: Do you see any unusual military activity on the north side of the border? Any heightened state of readiness while this crisis has gone on?

A: No, Jack. We don't, on either side, see any increased readiness. As you know, both sides of the DMZ are in a high state of alert all the time. But we see no increase to their posture.

Q: You mentioned that you were encouraging the North Koreans at the greatest possible speed to finish their inquiry into this matter. So I take it we are asking them to evaluate the fact that it was an error on our part and would rather they release the pilot, is that correct?

A: I think so. I think there was a question there, but I'm not sure what it was. I get your point: yes, we are doing everything we can to move the diplomatic process along so that everyone understands what our position is, what our role was in this mission, and that we can bring it to a close.

Q: In a clumsy way I was asking if we understood that they had a need to do an inquiry, to know what the intent was of this incursion. We do give them that, do we not?

A: I think that's reasonable.

Q: Just so I understand this linkage or non-linkage that you're making to the nuclear aspects of this. Am I correct in saying that the U.S. government is going out of its way not to threaten the nuclear agreement because of this incident?

A: We are simply recognizing this incident as a single, isolated incident which we need to resolve with the North Korean Government as quickly as possible so that we can move on in future relationships and enhancing our relationship with them down the road if, in fact, that is what they desire.

Q: If it is not resolved, then what?

A: I'm not going to do what if's. I think we need to press ahead with getting it resolved. This is being handled at the highest levels of government. You've heard the President speak. Secretary Perry has spoken to it. Secretary Christopher has spoken to it. Congressman Richardson has been very helpful in this. There's a lot of focus on this--a very high priority on this--by the U.S. government, and we think we can press it to resolution, and we hope we can press it to resolution very quickly.

Q: [Lt.] General Shelton is being honored at the White House today for the Haiti situation. I wonder if you, in light of that, could just bring us up to speed on Haiti? What the situation is there, and your readout of the mission so far?

A: I'd love to. The Haiti story is truly a great success story. Stability has returned to the country; democracy has returned to the country; security has returned to the country. We continue to draw down our forces there--now at about 5600. We hope to have a few more home by Christmas. We look forward to a quick and smooth transition to the UN early next year.

Q: When do you believe we'll have all of our forces out?

A: As you know, the plan calls for the transition to the UN mission in Haiti, which would be a total of about 6,000 forces in UNMIH. Of that number, between 2,000 and 3,000 would be U.S. So those forces--that number of U.S. forces would be involved in the UN mission--probably [would leave] into the point at which there is an election for a new president which is, at this point, scheduled for early '96.

Q: Has there been any more violence in the area recently?

A: I'm not certain of any particular isolated incidents. There may well have been some isolated cases, I'm not sure. Generally, though, the climate security situation there is excellent. The U.S. forces there, particularly the special operations forces that are out in the region, are doing a remarkable job of securing the environment and trying to make it a safe and secure place for democracy to return.

Q: Most of the role of the police keeping is now back to the Haitians? Or will U.S. forces get a large part of that?

A: There's really three tiers. You've got the police trainees who are growing in number literally by the week. You have the UN police monitors who then back up the police trainees. Behind them, you have U.S. military forces. So that's the process by which we hope to ensure the secure environment, and at the same time, bring the police force up to speed so that when these forces begin to withdraw, there will be a better environment there.

Q: You're satisfied everything is going well?

A: Everything is going remarkably well.

Q: On the subject of highly successful operations, have you any indication when the U.S. Marines are going into Somalia to help the UN beat a final retreat?

A: I'm sorry. When did you say?

Q: Yes.

A: I think--as we briefed the other day--we will be dealing with the UN and the UNOSOM force putting the final finishing touches on the withdrawal plan. We would look for that to be in the January/February/March period. As you know,

Q: Is that ARG headed from the Gulf towards Somalia now?


Q: What about the (inaudible), General Shali?

The next step in that process will be for the individual chiefs of the military to go back to their governments and discuss the plan as it was laid out, or the plans as they were laid out, for some concurrence within each of the capitals.

-END-

BELL

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Department of State
Office of Korean Affairs
Phone: 202/647-7717
Fax: 202/647-7388

TODAY'S DATE: 12/21

TO: Sandy Berger

PHONE#: _____

FAX#: _____

FROM: David Brown

Number of pages including this cover sheet 3

COMMENTS: FINAL version of press guidance
on Hilemon's remains

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FINAL
EAP PRESS GUIDANCE
December 21, 1994

KOREA: RETURN OF HILEMON'S REMAINS

Q: What new information do you have regarding the incident?

A: — EARLY THIS MORNING, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DPRK, BOTH THROUGH ITS MISSION IN NEW YORK AND THROUGH CONGRESSMAN RICHARDSON IN PYONGYANG, INFORMED US THAT THE DPRK WILL SOON RETURN THE BODY OF CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER DAVID HILEMON TO THE U.S. VIA PANMUNJOM. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, THE NORTH KOREAN OFFICIAL NEWS AGENCY (KCNA) STATED THAT HILEMON'S REMAINS WILL BE RETURNED TO THE U.S. SIDE.

- WE WELCOME THIS HUMANITARIAN MOVE, AND URGE THE DPRK TO FULFILL THE PROMISE AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE.**
- WE HOPE THE NORTH KOREANS PROMPTLY WILL TURN OVER THE SURVIVING CREW MEMBER, CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER BOBBY HALL AND THE HELICOPTER.**
- A U.S. ARMY MAJOR GENERAL REPRESENTING THE UN COMMAND MET WITH A GENERAL OFFICER OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY IN PANMUNJOM EARLY THIS MORNING WASHINGTON TIME TO DISCUSS THE INCIDENT.**
- IN THAT MEETING THE KPA SIDE CONFIRMED THAT CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER HILEMON'S BODY WILL BE RETURNED. MAJOR GENERAL SMITH CALLED ON THE KPA TO RETURN CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER HALL PROMPTLY. THE KPA SIDE RESPONDED THAT THEY ARE STILL INVESTIGATING.**

-2-

- WE EXPECT FURTHER MEETINGS IN THIS CHANNEL WILL OCCUR.
- SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER WAS IN CONTACT WITH CONGRESSMAN RICHARDSON SEVERAL TIMES DURING THE NIGHT AND EARLY MORNING. CONGRESSMAN RICHARDSON HAS PLAYED A CENTRAL ROLE IN OUR EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THIS INCIDENT, AND THE ADMINISTRATION APPRECIATES HIS SKILLFUL AND TIRELESS EFFORTS. HE DESERVES THE GRATITUDE OF THE NATION.
- LATE LAST NIGHT, WE RECEIVED THROUGH THE DPRK UN MISSION AN ORAL MESSAGE FROM FOREIGN MINISTER KIM YOUNG NAM TO SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER IN WHICH KANG PROMISED THAT THE DPRK WILL DO ITS BEST TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE IN A HUMANITARIAN MANNER.

Q: Why do you think the DPRK is taking so long to return the surviving pilot? Is there a power struggle going on between the North Korean military and the foreign ministry?

A: - THE NORTH KOREAN GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO MAINTAIN THAT IT CANNOT RETURN CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER HALL PENDING THE COMPLETION OF THE KPA INVESTIGATION INTO THE INCIDENT.

- WE CONTINUE TO URGE THE DPRK TO REPATRIATE CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER HALL AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF THE UPCOMING CHRISTMAS HOLIDAY.

-3-

Q: What are Congressman Richardson's plans?


A: - WE UNDERSTAND THAT CONGRESSMAN RICHARDSON INTENDS TO DEPART NORTH KOREA VIA PANMUNJOM WHEN CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER HILEMON'S REMAINS ARE REPATRIATED.

Q: How will this incident affect prospects for improved U.S.-DPRK relations?

A: - AS THE SECRETARY SAID YESTERDAY, A PROMPT RESOLUTION OF THIS ISSUE COULD GIVE ADDED IMPETUS TO OUR EFFORTS TO IMPROVE U.S.-DPRK RELATIONS. AS THE SECRETARY ALSO NOTED, HOWEVER, A FAILURE TO RESOLVE THE HUMANITARIAN ISSUE EXPEDITIOUSLY WOULD INEVITABLY AFFECT THE ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH WE SEEK TO MOVE FORWARD.

Bell

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Department of State
Office of Korean Affairs
Phone: 202/647-7717
Fax: 202/647-7388

TODAY'S DATE:

12/21

TO:

NSC - Skoth

DoD - K Weidemann / S. Loeffler

PHONE#:

FAX#:

FROM:

J. Goldstein

Number of pages including this cover sheet

4

COMMENTS:

communication from NY

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File:
North Korean
Helicopter
Incident



Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Permanent Mission to the United Nations
515 East 71st Street, 307, New York, N.Y. 10021
Tel. (212) 772-0712 (0726) FAX (212) 772-0736

FAX COVER

TO: MR. LYNN TURK / MR. JEFF GOLDSTEIN

FAX NO: (202) 647-1738

FROM: NAM SONG RYOL

FAX NO: (212) 772-0735 (Telephone 772-0712)

PAGES INCLUDING COVER: 3

DATE: DEC 21, 1994

NOTE:

- p/s. convey this message from MR. Kang
to Amb. Rob Gullucci

NOTE

→

- And we are prepared to return
the remain of co-pilot at 10.00 Am
of Dec 22, 1994 through Panmunjon
when the U.S. congressman is
expected to ~~cross~~ cross DMZ to
go to Seoul.

ORAL MESSAGE

Pyongyang, December 21, 1984

Mr. Robert L. Gallucci
Ambassador at Large
Department of State
United States of America

I have received your December 18 oral message concerning the downing of a US military helicopter.

This incident happened because of illegal intrusion by the US military aircraft into the DPRK air space, which is a gross violation of our sovereignty. Indeed, we consider this as regrettable.

As I had contacts with our competent authorities, our military takes this issue very seriously. The predominant view of our Army and people here is that certain officials in the United States, who posed military threat against the DPRK during the early period of the DPRK-U.S. talks in Geneva with the deployment of the "Kitty Hawk" carrier battle group off the Korean coast, must have deliberately engineered this incident in an attempt to derail the on-going implementation of the DPRK-U.S. Agreed Framework.

Our military authorities are making close investigation to get to the bottom of this incident, as they are suspicious of the real intention behind this incident. I am also watching the investigation for its result.

As we have exercised our sovereignty against the helicopter which illegally intruded into our air space, so the investigation into and dealing with this incident belong to our sovereignty.

The U.S. side is making an awkward noise for access to and return of the crew even before our investigation into the incident is over. This action will only complicate the matter, rather than help the resolution of the issue.

Our competent military authorities are strictly following their own legal procedures for detailed investigation about the military purposes and political motives behind the case of this intrusion into our air space and then will take appropriate steps on the basis of the results of their investigation.

Since this matter stands beyond my competency, my influence over this incident is very limited. However, I will certainly do my best, to the best of my ability, to settle this incident as soon as possible on a humanitarian basis.

I hope that Mr. Gallucci will promptly take appropriate steps on your part to prevent any unsavory things happening which will hinder a smooth resolution of the issue concerning the downing of the helicopter.

Kang Sok Ju
First Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs
Democratic People's Republic of Korea

.....

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- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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WHouse	Dee Dee Myers	Press	WWH	456-6688
WHouse	Leon Furth	VPress	OE08/298	395-4213
State	Mike McCurry	PA	6800	647-6607
NSC	William Itoh (for distr)	WWH	SITROOM	456-2225
CIA	Kent Harrington	PAS	7C35	482-7677
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NEWS BRIEFING



Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Public Affairs)

**DoD News Briefing
Mr. Kenneth H. Bacon, ATSD/PA
Thursday, December 22, 1994 - 1:30 p.m.**

Mr. Bacon: Good afternoon.

I'd like to start by giving you a few facts on the return of the remains of Warrant Officer David Hilemon. His remains are expected to arrive at Travis Air Force Base in California at 3:15 [p.m.] our time--that's 12:15 West Coast time. He will be examined there by a team from Walter Reed Medical Center. There will be a complete forensic autopsy at Travis, and then his remains will be transported to the burial site in the state of Washington, probably on the 23rd of December.

The family has asked that no press coverage be allowed either at Travis or in Washington where the remains are going. The military will do its best to help the family honor that request.

If there are any questions, I'm prepared to take them.

Q: Is there a preliminary indication of how he died, if you're running an autopsy? Was it a gunshot wound or shrapnel...

A: The autopsy hasn't been done yet.

Q: That would be pretty obvious.

A: Not that I know of. I don't know anything more than what Congressman Richardson reported today.

Q: There will be no video or photograph of this body arriving at Travis Air Force Base?

A: That is my understanding. The family has requested no press coverage. It seems like a reasonable request and a reasonable request for all of us to honor.

Q: If he is going to be released on the 23rd--which is tomorrow--to go to Washington, one assumes the autopsy will be complete. When do you expect to release the results...

A: I can't give you any details on that. I think it's not correct to assume the autopsy will be complete, particularly if there are any sort of chemical analyses that have to take place in connection with the autopsy. I'm not an expert on autopsies, but you could imagine that there would be some analysis that would have to take place.

Q: If it's determined tonight or tomorrow morning that he died of a gunshot wound--or that he was shot three times--will that be released?

A: Eventually it will be released, yes. When it will be released, I don't know. Whether we'll discuss this before Warrant Officer Hall gets home, I have no idea. But as soon as we can give you that information we will. It should be clear to you, [we have] no specifics on when it will be released.

Q: Anything new on Warrant Officer Hall?

A: No. You probably saw what Congressman Richardson said this morning. We hope for a speedy return, but we have no details.

Q: The way you keep saying, "Soon, very soon," it sounds like you've got a specific day in mind or have been told to expect it on a specific day. Is there a specific day when he has been told that they might release Hall?

A: Not that I know of.

Q: Secretary Perry mentioned in his interview today that the North Koreans were apparently examining some of the paperwork that was on the helicopter. Is there any concern that there might be some classified or some kind of compromise as a result of their examination of that?

A: I don't believe so. This was a routine orientation flight. It was a training flight. They were flying by maps. It was a fairly austere helicopter, used in this case for training--no other mission. I don't believe there's anything we have to worry about on that helicopter.

Q: On a little different angle, was there any equipment on that helicopter that could be even remotely construed as being intelligence gathering or incriminating of their mission?

A: There was not a camera on the helicopter. We don't know if one of the pilots may have taken a personal camera with him because we haven't had a chance to talk to the surviving pilot. It would be very atypical for a pilot to take a personal camera on such a flight. There was a radio on the helicopter--but not a radio that--I mean, a standard radio for that type of helicopter. I don't think it should be seen as anything but that for communication.

Q: Was Hall at the time of this helicopter downing, or in his previous assignment before that, in a situation that he would possess sensitive information personally? I don't know where he was before, but is there some reason... Something they could learn from continuing to interrogate him?

A: I don't know the answer to that question. If I knew it, I probably wouldn't answer it.

Q: You said that you didn't have any indication whether Richardson had had a definite indication from them when he'd be released. Has the United States received any indication from the mission to the UN where negotiations are also going on when he might be released?

A: No. We do not have firm information on that. Our information comes from Congressman Richardson. I believe Congressman Richardson has said publicly--on probably every network represented in this room--that he hopes that the pilot or co-pilot will be released soon. I think he said he hoped it would come before Christmas, but he has no firm information on that.

Q: Do you happen to know when Congressman Richardson is going to return? Has he communicated anything to Secretary Perry about his plans?

A: I do not know when he is returning, and I am not aware that he has spoken with Secretary Perry. Most of his conversations have been with Secretary Christopher and other people at the State Department.

Q: He is not flying back with the body?

A: I don't know the answer to that question. I don't know what his travel plans are. We'll try to find out. [Note: Congressman Richardson did not accompany CWO2 Hilemon's remains back to the U.S.]

Q: We were told that there was a great deal of diplomatic effort--pressure being put on the North Koreans both by Secretary Perry and the Secretary of State. Is that continuing, or is the assumption that whatever deal is going to be made is done and the pressures are eased off?

A: I wasn't aware that we were making a deal.

Q: Not a deal. Has the pressure on the North Koreans to release him... You said there was diplomatic negotiations--diplomatic pressure--being placed on the North Koreans. I'm asking, "Is that continuing?"

A: Yes.

Q: Are you satisfied with whatever Congressman Richardson has negotiated is all that's going to be...

A: No. We are not satisfied until Warrant Officer Hall is returned.

Q: So diplomatic pressure is continuing?

A: Yes. We're continuing to work by any means we can to secure the prompt relief of Warrant Officer Hall.

Q: Yesterday, Senator Frank Murkowski, after his news conference in an interview, was asked about... He had been in Beijing, had just come back I think the day before yesterday. He was asked about the naval incident of October 27 through 29 that had to do with the naval task force being in the Yellow Sea. He was told in response to his inquiry about that, that the United States was perceived to have violated the territorial integrity of China, violating their air space in that particular incident, which of course we have denied. I've been told we were no closer than 29 miles.

Then this morning, in a call to the embassy, I learned that, indeed, there was a statement out from Beijing that was condemning this kind of aggressive behavior, I believe it was aimed at us. I do not have the full statement, but it was a confirmation of what Senator Murkowski was saying.

Do you have, first, any information on that? And secondly, when will we be meeting with the PRA, the People's Republic Army? When will we be meeting with them to kind of iron these kind of things out, these military exercises, etc., out with them? Do you have any knowledge?

A: Did the embassy of the People's Republic of China give you a copy of their statement?

Q: I think they're going to be able to. I did not take it down in toto, but they have a statement.

A: I'm not aware of a statement, but that doesn't mean they haven't issued one. I haven't seen their statement.

Q: As far as I know, it's only at the embassy. It has not been registered with the State Department yet. It has not arrived there. I will further pursue it.

A: Thank you.

This is the last formal briefing we're going to have for the next two weeks. So I hope you all have happy holidays. Of course, if there is news to announce, we will be here to announce it and to answer your questions with typical forthrightness and frankness.

Press: Thank you.

-END-

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
011. report	re Korea update (2 pages)	12/23/1994	P1/b(1)

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National Security Council
Robert Bell (Defense Policy and Arms Control)
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Korea-November-December 1994 [2]

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISER
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520



DATE: 12/26

TO: Robert Bell

FAX: 456 - 9190

PHONE: 456 - 9191

FROM: L - Bruce Rashkow

PHONE: (202) 647 - 6771

FAX: (202) 736-7116

SUBJECT: LEGAL STATUS OF US PILOT IN N. KOREA

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/MESSAGE:

Attached is revised cable - reflecting
current status of situation. This revision
is being circulated to DOD and others.

NUMBER OF PAGES:

3

(PLUS THIS COVER SHEET)

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IMMEDIATE GENEVA

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USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PINS, PREL, MOPS, ICRC

SUBJECT: LEGAL STATUS OF U.S. PILOT IN NORTH KOREA AND
APPLICATION OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS

1. SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST: MISSION IS REQUESTED TO
DELIVER A DIPLOMATIC NOTE TO THE ICRC {1} STATING THE USG
VIEWS ON THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE U.S. PILOT BEING HELD IN
NORTH KOREA AND THE APPLICABILITY OF THE GENEVA CONVENTION
RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR OF AUGUST
12, 1949 {GPW} TO THIS SITUATION AND, {2} REQUESTING ICRC
EFFORTS TO ENSURE THAT THE U.S. PILOT IS TREATED IN A
MANNER CONSISTENT WITH NORTH KOREA'S GPW OBLIGATIONS. END
SUMMARY.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

{COMPLEMENTARY OPENING} ON BEHALF OF THE SECRETARY OF
STATE, THE MISSION HAS THE HONOR TO REFER TO THE FOLLOWING.

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ON DECEMBER 17, 1994 A U.S. ARMY HELICOPTER ON A LOCAL ORIENTATION MISSION STRAYED INTO NORTH KOREAN AIRSPACE. PRESS REPORTS FROM NORTH KOREA INDICATED THAT THE HELICOPTER WAS SHOT DOWN BY NORTH KOREAN FORCES. THE CREW INCLUDED TWO U.S. ARMY WARRANT OFFICERS. WHILE NORTH KOREA HAS RETURNED THE REMAINS OF ONE OF THE PILOTS, THEY CONTINUE TO HOLD THE OTHER INDIVIDUAL.

THE UNITED STATES TAKES THE VIEW THAT THE GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR OF AUGUST 12, 1949 {GPW} IS APPLICABLE IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES AND, ACCORDINGLY, THE U.S. ARMY HELICOPTER PILOT MUST BE RELEASED AND REPATRIATED WITHOUT DELAY, PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 118 OF THE GPW. FURTHER, ALL PROTECTIONS OF THE GPW ARE APPLICABLE, INCLUDING VISITS BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS {ICRC}

SPECIFICALLY, NORTH KOREA, AS A PARTY TO THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS, IS BOUND BY COMMON ARTICLE 2, WHICH EXTENDS THE GPW TO "ALL CASES OF DECLARED WAR OR OF ANY OTHER ARMED CONFLICT WHICH MAY ARISE BETWEEN TWO OR MORE OF THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES . . ." THE INDIVIDUAL IN QUESTION WAS TAKEN PRISONER BY THE USE OF ARMED FORCE BY NORTH KOREAN. SINCE THE UNITED STATES, AS A MEMBER OF THE UNITED NATIONS FORCES IN KOREA, IS STILL OPERATING IN KOREA PURSUANT TO THE ARMISTICE OF JULY 27, 1953, WHICH SUSPENDED THE ACTIVE HOSTILITIES OF THE KOREAN ARMED CONFLICT, THIS INDIVIDUAL IS A MEMBER "OF THE ARMED FORCES OF A PARTY TO THE CONFLICT" PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 4{1} OF THE GPW. HE IS, THEREFORE, SUBJECT TO THE PROTECTIONS OF THE GPW, INCLUDING THE REQUIREMENT, IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 118 OF THE GPW, FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE UNDER THE CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES.

FURTHERMORE, THIS INDIVIDUAL IS ENTITLED TO ALL THE PROTECTIONS OF THE GPW INCLUDING, QUARTERS, FOOD, CLOTHING, AND HUMANE TREATMENT; VISITS BY THE ICRC; AND PROTECTION FROM EXPLOITATION.

THE UNITED STATES REQUESTS THE ASSISTANCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS IN ENSURING THAT THE U.S. PILOT IS TREATED IN A MANNER CONSISTENT WITH NORTH KOREA'S OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE GPW AND RELEASED WITHOUT DELAY. THE EFFORTS OF THE ICRC IN THIS REGARD ARE DEEPLY APPRECIATED.

COMPLIMENTARY CLOSING.

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L/PM: NHIGHSMITH
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