

Case Number: 2009-0528-F-2.

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

Korea-MIAs [Missing In Action]

Staff Office-Individual:

Asian Affairs-Suettinger, Robert

Original OA/ID Number:

1044

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30	3	7	1	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	draft, Korean War Remains (4 pages)	08/15/1994	P1/b(1)
002a. fax	cover sheet re response to KPA invite to UNC to visit recovery sites (1 page)	09/06/1994	P1/b(1)
002b. cable	Korean People's Army reimbursement for remains recovery (1 page)	09/01/1994	P1/b(1)
003. paper	MIA Remains Issue (4 pages)	06/28/1994	P1/b(1)
004a. memo	Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/MIA Affairs to Under Secretary of Defense for Policy re KPA Remains Compensation Claims (4 pages)	c 1994	P1/b(1)
004b. cable	draft, re KPA Remains Compensation Claims (3 pages)	c 1994	P1/b(1)
005. cable	draft, re KPA Remains Compensation Claims (5 pages)	03/31/1994	P1/b(1)
006. paper	KPA Remains Compensation Claims (2 pages)	c 03/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Robert Suettinger (Asian Affairs)
OA/Box Number: 1044

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea-MIAs [Missing in Action]

2009-0528-F

kc1362

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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June 28, 1995

MIA Remains Interagency Meeting

1. Status of MIA Remains talks

- Aug 1993 UNC-KPA MOU on remains recovery signed
- U.S. Payment to KPA made in Aug 1993 (\$897,300)
- Working groups called for in MOU not formed
- Further KPA repatriations made unilaterally
- U.S. desire for joint recovery teams due to poor KPA recovery techniques; KPA invited to CILHI
- KPA presents bill (\$3.5 mil); we offer \$1 mil; talks stalemate, no further repatriation of remains
- Carter-Kim agreement on joint recovery teams; KPA ignores it
- DoD suggestion to increase U.S. offer to \$2 mil pending
- June 1995, DPRK complains at U.N. that lack of progress is U.S. fault
- USLO in Pyongyang could raise issue with MOFA/Party and possibly sidestep KPA, but USLO delayed

2. Frank Matersky's view (Matersky, of The Chosin Few, is the driving force among vet groups on this issue)

- UNC/MAC-KPA channel hopeless; two antagonistic armies; KPA has fiduciary interest; "buying" remains dishonors the dead
- Need to open bilateral channel and make serious attempt to settle the issue
- President should call on DPRK to settle the issue in his speech at the dedication of War Memorial (this would be the first public call for settlement by a U.S. President)
- Matersky claims to have the support of at least two major veterans organizations
- Matersky sees next few weeks as his window of opportunity to push the issue; claims contacts with Parade Magazine and CBS and working on other media

3. Questions

- Does Matersky in fact have the backing of vets groups?
- If so, what degree of pressure will veterans groups put on the White House to include the MIA issue in the President's speech?
- Will veterans groups ask for a specific course of action (bilateral talks) or will a general appeal suffice?
- Will the issue capture the attention of 1) vets groups 2) congress 3) the media/public? If so, what linkage may arise to "force" the DPRK to cooperate on MIA issue?
- How to keep the MIA remains issue segregated from the Agreed Framework?
- What is the most effective way to get North Korea to move on the issue? Should we open bilateral channel?

4. ROK Attitude

- Wanted representation on MOU working group
- Did not demand ROK go on joint recovery teams into DPRK
- Does not have high intrinsic interest in the issue
- Would be nervous about a non-Panmunjom military to military bilateral channel; would be more comfortable with a nonmilitary, or civilian DoD-led bilateral channel
- Would be careful to remind U.S. not to give up ROK equities in return for DPRK movement on the MIA remains issue

UNCLASSIFIED

MIA/POWs

The remains of over 8,100 American servicemen from the Korean War have never been returned or identified. In 1954, the North Koreans returned the reported remains of 1,934 American servicemen (866 of which were unidentifiable). After a 36-year hiatus, the Korean People's Army (KPA) returned 16 unilaterally recovered remains in 1990. Since 1992, another 192 remains have been repatriated via the United Nations Command (UNC), for a total of 208.

All remains are being processed for possible identification at the Central Identification Laboratory in Hawaii (CIL-HI). To date, CIL-HI has identified only four sets of remains. Identification is extremely difficult, primarily because of poor recovery techniques on the part of the KPA, but also because of the length of time elapsed, antiquated record keeping, and the destruction of many personnel records in a 1973 fire. Although the more recent returns reflect some improvement in KPA recovery techniques, CIL-HI officials believe that the likelihood of positive remains identification would be significantly higher with the participation and technical expertise of joint recovery teams.

Progress toward joint operations, however, has been stalled over the issue of compensation to the KPA. After the UNC and KPA signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in August 1993, the U.S. -- with explicit stipulations that this compensation was not to be considered a precedent and that we would move toward joint recovery -- paid the DPRK \$897,300 for the expenses the latter reportedly incurred in connection with recovery operations. In disregard of our stipulations, and despite the fact that before his death DPRK President Kim Il-sung made a commitment to former U.S. President Carter to permit joint U.S.-DPRK remains recovery teams, the North Koreans continued unilateral recovery efforts and presented a bill for \$3,500,000. This was unacceptable and the issue remains unresolved.

Another impediment to progress is that the KPA makes continuous efforts to remove remains discussions from the UNC-MAC venue and tie them to potential U.S.-North Korean bilateral talks. We continue to rebuff these attempts, and we remain hopeful that new ground can be broken in joint recovery operations. In the meantime we have asked the KPA to halt further unilateral recoveries.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

MIA/POWs

- The USG appreciates the efforts of the DPRK in returning the remains of over 200 American servicemen since 1990.
- We hope that progress can soon be made toward joint recovery operations in the spirit of the agreement made between North Korean President Kim Il-sung and Jimmy Carter.
- We are concerned that the remains talks continue to be stalled over the issue of compensation. We hope the compensation issue can soon be resolved, and that we can then carry out joint operations.
- Joint operations will lead to increased identifications and a better accounting of our servicemen lost in the Korean Conflict. Progress in joint operations would be a dramatic sign of your humanitarian concern and could win the appreciation of the American people.

UNCLASSIFIED

Agreement on Remains-related Matters

The Korean People's Army (KPA) and the United Nations Command (UNC) recognize the importance, for humanitarian reasons, of full and regular cooperation for the recovery, repatriation, and identification of UNC war remains located north of the Military Demarcation Line (MDL). Therefore, both sides agree as follows:

1. Both sides shall cooperate with each other in locating, exhuming, repatriating and identifying the remains of UNC personnel located north of the MDL.
2. The KPA will search for and exhume the remains of UNC soldiers buried north of the MDL and repatriate those remains to the UNC.
3. The UNC will render support, as necessary, to aid the KPA's search, exhumation and repatriation efforts.
4. Both sides agree to actively exploit all available information in the search, exhumation, and repatriation effort. Both sides will exercise the necessary scientific care in exhuming, repatriating and handling remains to ensure a reasonable chance of identification.
5. To achieve the objectives of this agreement, both sides agree to form a working group to exchange information and coordinate remains recovery, repatriation and identification efforts. This working group will be chaired by 0-6 representatives from each side and will consist of seven regular members from each side. Technical specialists and observers can participate in working group activities as required by each side. Each side will determine its own working group membership, specialists and observers. Working group operating procedures will be determined jointly by the chairmen of each side.
6. Both sides will continually assess the progress made towards achieving the objectives of this agreement. If significant progress is not being achieved, both sides will consider additional measures to enhance the effectiveness of this agreement.
7. This agreement will become effective upon its signing by both sides. The working group established by this agreement will begin operation within 30 days of the effective date.

Nels Running
NELS RUNNING
Major General, USAF
UNC Representative

LI DOK KYU *[Signature]*
Major General, KPA
KPA Representative

August 24, 1993

Confirmatory Note

Representatives of the Korean People's Army and of the United Nations Command have completed discussions on procedures to compensate the Korean People's Army for expenses associated with the repatriation of remains from 1990 to 1992. These compensation discussions are concluded under the following provisions.


The United States Government paid compensation to the Korean People's Army in the amount of \$897,300.


This payment sets no precedent for future compensation talks. Any future compensation claims will be resolved in a UNC-KPA working group.

Both sides agree that compensation will be through a U.S. Government Treasury check delivered to the Korean People's Army Representative at Panmunjom on 24 August 1993.

The U.S. will provide a military representative to assist the KPA representative in negotiating the U.S. Treasury check at a mutually agreed bank.

Done in Panmunjom Korea on 24 August 1993 in duplicate in the English and Korean languages.


MICHAEL A. COLE
LTC, USA
UNC Representative


PAK RIM SU
SR COL, KPA
KPA Representative

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1995/461
6 June 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

I wish to clarify once again the real facts of and our positions on the issues of the "United Nations Command", the Korean armistice system and the remains of the United States soldiers in response to the 1994 report on the activities of the "United Nations Command" that was circulated a few weeks ago as a document of the Security Council (S/1995/378).

As everyone knows, the "United Nations Command" is a brainchild of the United States of America which arbitrarily usurped the name of the United Nations in order to cover its real colour of aggression after provoking the Korean war in 1950 and still remains a camouflage today serving the military and strategic purpose of the United States.

As for the illegal resolution of the United Nations Security Council of 7 July 1950 (resolution 84 (1950)), which is claimed to be the legal foundation of the "United Nations Command", it did not decide to organize the "United Nations forces" but recommended that the armed forces and other assistance provided by United Nations Member nations should be used by the United States-led combined forces command.

The "United Nations Command" is in reality the product of the United States that emerged as a result of the arbitrary attachment of the name of the United Nations to the armed forces of the satellite nations under the command of the United States.

It was long ago that all countries except the United States withdrew their forces from the "United Nations Command", and today there are absolutely no other foreign troops dispatched to the "United Nations Command".

The "United Nations Command" is a bogus organization created by the United States and serves the unjust strategic aim of the United States to isolate and stifle the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and control the Asia and Pacific region regardless of the United Nations mission for peace.

Hence, General Assembly resolution 3390 B (XXX) calling for the dissolution of the "United Nations Command" and the replacement of the Armistice Agreement with a peace agreement was adopted at the thirtieth session of the General Assembly in 1975.

In fact, the Korean Armistice Agreement concluded on 27 July 1953 was a tentative measure pending a future peace agreement after the suspension of the military actions between the two belligerent parties.

The United States should take an urgent step to dismantle the "United Nations Command" as was stipulated by the resolution adopted at the thirtieth session of the General Assembly.

As for the Korean armistice system, it has been completely paralysed as a result of the systematic acts of the United States to destroy the Korean Armistice Agreement and armistice machinery.

The United States side forced the inspection teams of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, which had been formed according to paragraphs 40 and 43 of article II of the Armistice Agreement, to withdraw from its side's area in June 1956 and then unilaterally abrogated subparagraphs 13 c and 13 d of the Armistice Agreement on stopping the introduction of reinforcing military personnel and combat materials into Korea, the main duty of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, in June 1957.

As a result, paragraphs 41 and 42 of the Armistice Agreement, defining it as the mission of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to supervise and investigate the introduction of reinforcing military personnel and combat materials, lost their legal effect.

Since then the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission has existed only in name.

Worse still, the United States side paralysed even the function of the Military Armistice Commission, the main truce supervisory machinery, by unilaterally appointing a "general" of the South Korean army, with neither the qualification nor legal ground, as its senior member of the Military Armistice Commission on 25 March 1991.

Given the grave situation threatening peace on the Korean peninsula and non-existence of the appropriate mechanism to provide a check thereto, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea initiated a proposal to the United States for holding negotiations to replace the useless and obsolete armistice system with a new durable peace mechanism, and took further practical measures to recall all the members of the Korean People's Army side from the Military Armistice Commission and establish the Panmunjom Mission of the Korean People's Army as a new negotiating institution to deal with the United States Army side.

These measures were indeed innovative and well-intentioned ones to make a breakthrough for the new security mechanism guaranteeing the peace on the Korean peninsula and also peace-loving ones, reflecting the internationally recognized

/...

practice through which several countries had abrogated belligerent relations and proclaimed peaceful relations after World War II.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States, a signatory to the Armistice Agreement and virtual operational controller of the army in south Korea, are the parties directly responsible for the establishment of the peace mechanism on the Korean peninsula.

As for the remains of the United States soldiers, we had long ago exhumed and returned the remains of the United States army on several occasions out of the humanitarian principles.

We returned 145 additional sets of the United States army remains in 5 repatriations even after the conclusion of the agreement on remains-related matters on 24 August 1993.

Though we have repatriated 194 remains of the United States army remains as humanitarian gestures, the United States is intentionally not implementing the relevant provisions of the agreement, politically abusing the remains issue.

According to the agreement on remains-related matters, our side, under article 2, is to search for and exhume the remains of the United States soldiers buried north of the military demarcation line and repatriate those remains to the United States side, and the United States side, under article 3, is to render necessary support to aid the Korean People's Army's search, exhumation and repatriation efforts.

However, the United States side, after the conclusion of the agreement at its will, today now withdrew its commitment to support for our exhumation efforts, asking for the suspension of an unilateral exhumation and demanding a joint exhumation quite contrary to the relevant provisions of the agreement.

The current difficulty is therefore attributable to the political misuse of the remains matter and the deliberate non-compliance with the agreement by the United States side.

I would be grateful if you could kindly arrange to have my letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) PAK Gil Yon
Permanent Representative

Dan -

OK with me if OK with you + Gallucci.
Should we run it by Sandy or Tony? The ROKE?

Stanley

In reply refer to:
I-94/22177

*Steve
Marty
to WWS
D-2*

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

FROM: Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (POW/MIA
Affairs)
Prepared by LTC Wisda, ODASD (POW/MIA Affairs)
284-0940

SUBJECT: KPA Orientation Visit To CILHI
ACTION MEMORANDUM

ISSUE: The attached message directs the Joint Staff to authorize UNC to formally offer an invitation for a 5-member KPA delegation to visit CILHI for an OSD-sponsored orientation on forensic recovery and identification concerns related to Korean War remains. The initial concept was approved but deferred pending completion of most recent round of US-DPRK talks in Geneva.

DISCUSSION: In early September 1994, the United Nations Command (UNC) requested OSD funding of a Korean Peoples Army (KPA) delegation's orientation trip to the U.S. Army Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii (CILHI). The purpose of the trip is to familiarize the KPA with the techniques and constraints involved in our recovery and identification of remains, particularly, remains from the Korean War. The KPA believes the USG is actively withholding identification of Korean War remains to deny the North Koreans any favorable media attention. This orientation is vital if we are to convince the KPA to agree to meaningful joint recovery operations. Finally, the CILHI orientation provides some face-saving gesture for the KPA in light of our refusal to meet their expectations for compensation.

UNC envisions a 2-3 day orientation for 4-5 KPA representatives. OSD has sponsored similar orientations in the past for the Vietnamese, Cambodians, Lao and Chinese. The cost would be approximately \$20-25,000. UNC will coordinate directly with CILHI on dates and itinerary. My office will act as the OSD sponsoring agency and request a fund cite through the Director, Budget and Finance, WHS. My office will also coordinate all details of the orientation and final approval with State and the NSC.

RECOMMENDATION: ASD/ISA approve OSD funding for KPA delegation orientation visit to CILHI, and release message to the Joint Staff authorizing UNC to offer the invitation to the KPA.

COORDINATION: NSC_____, State_____, OASD/ISA(AP)_____
Joint Staff_____, CILHI_____

APPROVED_____

NOT APPROVED_____

OTHER_____

01 02

PP RR UUUU

4115

SECDEF WASH DC//USDP:ISA/DPMO//
 JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J5/APAC/POW-MIA//
 INFO SECSTATE WASH DC//EAP-K//
 CINCUNC SEOUL KOR//UNCMAC//
 AMEMB SEOUL KS
 SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OASD-ISA/EAP-K//
 DIA WASHINGTON DC
 HQSDA WASHINGTON DC//DAPE-MBB//
 USCINCPAC CAMP SMITH HI//J5/J3D-M//
 CDRPERSCOM ALEXANDRIA VA//TAPC-PEZ/TAPC-PDZ//
 CDRUSACILHI FT SHAFTER HI//DAPC-PED-H//

^N
 U_A C L A S S I F I E D

JOINT STAFF PLEASE PASS TO UNCMAC

MSGID/GENASDMIN/OASD:ISA//

SUBJECT: KPA ORIENTATION VISIT TO CILHI//

REF/ JOINT STAFF MESSAGE/251053ZSEP94//

AMPN/KOREAN WAR REMAINS ISSUES/KPA ORIENTATION VISIT TO CILHI//

1. THE INTERAGENCY GROUP HAS APPROVED THE OFFERING OF A FORMAL INVITATION FOR FIVE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE KOREAN PEOPLES ARMY TO VISIT CILHI FOR A 2-3 DAY ORIENTATION ON US FORENSIC RECOVERY AND IDENTIFICATION CONCERNS RELATING TO KOREAN WAR REMAINS.

USDP:FILE
 USDP:DPMO
 USDP:AP

DRAFTER
 LTC MARTIN J. WISDA, ASST FOR KOREA/CHINA

RELEASES

JSISC ALTERNATE MESSAGEFORM

02 02

PP RR UUUU

4115

2. REQUEST JOINT STAFF DIRECT UNCMAC SECRETARY TO OFFER THE INVITATION AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. UNCMAC SECRETARY SHOULD COORDINATE DATES AND ITINERARY WITH CILHI AND DPMO. DPMO WILL CLEAR FINAL DETAILS WITH NSC AND STATE DEPARTMENT. OSD WILL FUND ORIENTATION WITH DPMO SERVING AS SPONSORING AGENCY.

3. DPMO POC IS LTC WISDA DSN 283/CML {703} 907-0940/1297.//

NNNNN



FAX COVER SHEET

DEFENSE POW/MIA OFFICE

Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301-2400

Date: <i>15 August 1994</i>	Time: <i>0915</i>	Pages: (w/cover) <i>5</i>
From: <i>LTC Martin Wiesha OSD (POW/MIA)</i>	Phone: <i>(703) 284-0940</i>	FAX: <i>703-284-0924 DSN 428-0924</i>
To: <i>Mr. Stanley Roth / Bob Suttenger NSC/AD</i>	Phone: <i>(202) 395-5672</i>	FAX: <i>(202) 395-1206</i>
Subject: <i>Korean War Remains - Memo to HRC/MAC to request halt to NK unilateral recovery operations and resolve issue of compensation.</i>		
Comments: <i>5 in</i> <i>Please review this memo. NK announced 6 Aug to HRC that they have restarted unilateral recovery operations and im- plied they are still expecting major compensation (beyond what we are prepared to pay). Holding off further contacts is only complicating the issue. We need HRC to address both issues to their NK counterparts ASAP. We would like to send this memo late this week.</i> <i>V/R LTC Wiesha</i>		

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RELEASER _____

FROM/LOCATION

ATC WISDA

TO/LOCATION

BOB SUETTINGER

INFO/LOCATION

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS _____

(P-1)
TIME OF RECEIPT

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2009-0528-F

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To: CLARKER, ROTHS, SUETTINGERR, MCGEATHT, SIGLERR
cc:
From: SITREPR
Date: 09/12/94 01:38:41 PM
Subject: r i AM-NorthKorea-USRemains 09-12 0456

a0603-----

r i AM-NorthKorea-USRemains 09-12 0456

AM-North Korea-US Remains,0459

North Korea to Hand Over Remains of 14, Said to Be U.S. Soldiers

Eds: Lead prospects uncertain. Exchange expected after 11 p.m. EDT

By J.H. YUN=

Associated Press Writer=

PANMUNJOM, Korea (AP) _ North Korea, seeking improved ties with the United States, on Tuesday is handing over 14 coffins it claims contain the remains of American soldiers killed in the 1950-53 Korean War.

The exchange comes as the two longtime enemies move to improve ties in the midst of the longstanding dispute over the Communist North's nuclear program.

Last weekend, five U.S. diplomats visited the North's capital of Pyongyang for the first time and began talks on exchanging liaison offices, the first step toward normalizing relations.

Simultaneous talks are under way in Berlin to replace the North's old-fashioned nuclear sites with technology less adaptable to weapons development.

The United States has said resolving nuclear tensions is essential to improving ties with the North, with which it has no formal relations. Another condition is the return of American war dead.

At the North-South border village of Panmunjom, 36 miles north of Seoul, North Korean soldiers are to hand over 14 coffins to U.N. honor guards.

U.S. officials say the remains will be sent to an army laboratory in Hawaii for evaluation and identification.

Tuesday's transfer will bring to 208 the total number of sets of remains returned by North Korea since 1990. U.S. officials say only one set of remains has been positively identified.

Most are badly damaged, with many of the skulls missing their facial bones. Some of the bones have been found to belong to animals.

About 8,140 American servicemen are listed by the U.S. government as unaccounted for from the Korean War. That includes 866 bodies returned in 1954 but never identified. Those bodies were buried in Hawaii.

No more remains were returned until 1990 when North Korea turned over five sets, followed by 11 in 1991, 30 in 1992 and 148 in 1993. The 14 will be the first this year.

North Korea has never said how many war remains it holds but the number may be in the thousands.

Last year, the Clinton administration adopted an agreement with

the North to cooperate in finding, exhuming, and repatriating remains of U.S. and allied servicemen. A joint group was formed to coordinate the process.

The United States and 14 other Western allies fought on South Korea's side in the Korean War. China fought on North Korea's side.

Of the more than 5 million American soldiers who fought in the Korean war, 54,000 were killed.

The peninsula was divided into the communist North and the capitalist South in 1945.

APTV-09-12-94 1331EDT
v51240dc--

cc: Roth

THE WHITE HOUSE**Office of the Press Secretary**

For Immediate Release**August 10, 1994****PRESIDENT CLINTON NAMES PHILLIPS TO KOREAN WAR ADVISORY BOARD**

President Clinton today announced his intention to appoint John C. Phillips of the District of Columbia to be a member of the Korean War Veterans Memorial Advisory Board.

Mr. Phillips is the acting chief of staff of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, where he usually serves as an administrative law judge. He served with the U.S. Army Seventh Infantry Division, 31st Infantry Regiment and fought in the battle of Pork Chop Hill during the Korean War. As a result, he earned the Korean service Medal with one Bronze Service Star and the Combat Infantryman's Badge. For six months during 1993, Mr. Phillips was detailed to the Office of Presidential Personnel.

The Korean War Veterans Memorial Advisory Board is responsible for recommending a site and selecting a design for a memorial to honor members of the Armed Forces of the United States who served in the Korean War, particularly those who were killed in action, are still listed as missing in action, or who were held as prisoners of war. The Board is also responsible for encouraging the donation of private funds for the construction and maintenance of the memorial.

-30-30-30-

KOREAN WAR VETERANS MEMORIAL ADVISORY BOARD

Office of the Executive Director
U. S. Department of the Interior, Main Building
18th & C Streets, NW, Room 7424
Washington, DC 20240

202-208-3561
FAX 202-208-3459

FACSIMILE TRANSMITTAL FORM

DEDICATION COMMITTEE

JULY 26-30, 1995

DATE: 6/20/94 TO: Robert SuettingerFAX #: 395-1184FROM: Bob HansenNumber of Pages, including the cover sheet: 2

MESSAGE: 1. Dedication is scheduled for 27 July -
The Anniversary of Armistice. It is the
actual Dedication where President Clinton +
President Kim would be participating.
2. Appreciate your help!

Shirley
B.

KOREAN WAR VETERANS MEMORIAL IN THE NATION'S CAPITAL

DEDICATION — Schedule of Activities

July 26 - 30, 1995

	Wednesday July 26	Thursday July 27	Friday July 28	Saturday July 29	Sunday July 30
AM	ALL DAY Check In, Register, Reunite with "Buddies."	Wreath Laying, Tomb of the Unknowns, Lighting Freedom Torch	Visit the Memorial	Memorial Church Services - all denominations, Visit the Memorial	Check out of hotel, Visit the Memorial
PM	ALL DAY Check In, Register, Reunite with "Buddies."	DEDICATION**	Mass Muster,*** Joint Chiefs Inspection	Parade, Visit the Memorial	Visit the Memorial
EVE	ALL DAY Check In, Register, Reunite with "Buddies."	Visit the Memorial	Visit the Memorial	Major Entertainment**** and Fireworks, Visit the Memorial	Visit the Memorial
Ongoing	receptions of units, hospitality suites, Mall Activities *	Mall Activities * Entertainment, tours, Visit the memorial	Mall Activities* Entertainment, tours, Visit the memorial	Mall Activities * Entertainment, tours, Visit the memorial	Visit the Memorial

* Mall Activities include tents to visit from all Veterans Organizations, The Department of Veterans Affairs, Other Government agencies, Memorabilia sales, Mess tent, Master Registration Log, Embassy Tents, 24 hour vigil reading the names of KIA/MIA/POW, first aid, general information and command post, reception area, meeting and greeting and reuniting with buddies, the Memorial will be available for visitors 24 hours a day in order to accommodate everyone, only about 2000/hour can flow through the Memorial so schedule your time accordingly. Embassies of those members of the United Nations who participated with the United States and The Republic of Korea may be open for tours. (Australia, Belgium, Canada, Columbia, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, Greece, India, Italy, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Netherlands, Norway, Philippines, South Africa, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom.)

** Because of the huge crowds (over 500,000 veterans and their families) anticipated, the actual Dedication ceremonies will be short (about 30 minutes in length), there will be jumbo TV screens on the Mall so everyone will be able to see, but there will be no seating available, standing room only. All living Presidents will be invited.

*** Mass Muster - ceremonial activation of those units who bear battle honors from Korea and not now on the active rolls. It is anticipated that the colors of these units will be uncased and join the active units who bear battle honors from Korea at this muster and stand for inspection by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

**** The Major entertainment show will include such celebrities as Bob Hope, Rosemary Clooney, Ed McMahon, Mickey Rooney, Gregory Peck, Frank Sinatra and many others. pending their availability. There will be an ongoing international film festival showing movies of the Korean War. Entertainment troupes from Korea and all nations who fought under the UN Flag will also participate.



THE KOREAN WAR VETERANS MEMORIAL

IN THE NATION'S CAPITAL

DEDICATION ACTIVITIES DETAILED SCHEDULE (SUBJECT TO CHANGE)

27-Jul-95	EVENT - ON SITE	SPONSOR	EVENT - OFF SITE	SPONSOR
08:00	MEMORIAL STAGE CLOSED			
09:00	MEMORIAL STAGE CLOSED			
10:00	MEMORIAL STAGE CLOSED		WREATH LAYING	KWVA
11:00	MEMORIAL STAGE CLOSED		WREATH LAYING	KWVA
12:00	MEMORIAL STAGE CLOSED			
13:00	MEMORIAL STAGE CLOSED			
14:00	MEMORIAL STAGE CLOSED			
15:00	MEMORIAL STAGE CLOSED			
16:00	DEDICATION	KWVMAB		
17:00	DEDICATION	KWVMAB		
18:00	MUSIC/ENTERTAINMENT	KOREA		
19:00	MUSIC/ENTERTAINMENT	USA		
20:00	MUSIC/ENTERTAINMENT	KOREA	KENNEDY CENTER	KOREA
21:00	MUSIC/ENTERTAINMENT	INTERNATIONAL	KENNEDY CENTER	KOREA
22:00	MUSIC/ENTERTAINMENT	USA	KENNEDY CENTER	KOREA

Ongoing Activities: 1. Visit the Memorial 24 hours a day; 2. Continuous entertainment, 3. Film Festival, 4. 24 hour vigil reading the names of KIA/MIA/POW's, 5. Visit Embassies, 6. Veterans reunions, 7. Exhibitions and art shows



THE KOREAN WAR VETERANS MEMORIAL

IN THE NATION'S CAPITAL

DEDICATION ACTIVITIES DETAILED SCHEDULE (SUBJECT TO CHANGE)

28-Jul-95	EVENT - ON SITE	SPONSOR	EVENT - OFF SITE	SPONSOR
08:00	RECORDED MUSIC	KWVMAB		
09:00	RECORDED MUSIC	KWVMAB		
10:00	MUSTER	KWVMAB		
11:00	MUSTER	KWVMAB		
12:00	MUSIC/ENTERTAINMENT	KOREA		
13:00	MUSIC/ENTERTAINMENT	USA	SEMINARS	KWVMAB/KOREA
14:00	MUSIC/ENTERTAINMENT	INTERNATIONAL	SEMINARS	KWVMAB/KOREA
15:00	MUSIC/ENTERTAINMENT	KOREA	SEMINARS	KWVMAB/KOREA
16:00	MUSIC/ENTERTAINMENT	USA	SEMINARS	KWVMAB/KOREA
17:00	MUSIC/ENTERTAINMENT	KOREA	SEMINARS	KWVMAB/KOREA
18:00	MUSIC/ENTERTAINMENT	USA	SEMINARS	KWVMAB/KOREA
19:00	MUSIC/ENTERTAINMENT	INTERNATIONAL		
20:00	MUSIC/ENTERTAINMENT	KOREA	KENNEDY CENTER	USA
21:00	MUSIC/ENTERTAINMENT	USA	KENNEDY CENTER	USA
22:00	MUSIC/ENTERTAINMENT	USA	KENNEDY CENTER	USA

Ongoing Activities: 1. Visit the Memorial 24 hours a day; 2. Continuous entertainment, 3. Film Festival, 4. 24 hour vigil reading the names of KIA/MIA/POW's, 5. Visit Embassies, 6. Veterans reunions, 7. Exhibitions and art shows



THE KOREAN WAR VETERANS MEMORIAL

IN THE NATION'S CAPITAL

DEDICATION ACTIVITIES DETAILED SCHEDULE (SUBJECT TO CHANGE)

29-Jul-95	EVENT - ON SITE	SPONSOR	EVENT - OFF SITE	SPONSOR
08:00	RECORDED MUSIC	KWVMAB	MEMORIAL SERVICES	KWVMAB
09:00	RECORDED MUSIC	KWVMAB	MEMORIAL SERVICES	KWVMAB
10:00	MUSIC/ENTERTAINMENT	USA	MEMORIAL SERVICES	KWVMAB
11:00	MUSIC/ENTERTAINMENT	USA		
12:00	MUSIC/ENTERTAINMENT	KOREA	PARADE	KWVMAB
13:00	MUSIC/ENTERTAINMENT	KOREA	PARADE	KWVMAB
14:00	MUSIC/ENTERTAINMENT	INTERNATIONAL	PARADE	KWVMAB
15:00	MUSIC/ENTERTAINMENT	USA	PARADE	KWVMAB
16:00	STAGE CLOSED			
17:00	STAGE CLOSED			
18:00	STAGE CLOSED			
19:00	MAJOR ENTERTAINMENT	KWVMAB		
20:00	MAJOR ENTERTAINMENT	KWVMAB		
21:00	MAJOR ENTERTAINMENT	KWVMAB		
22:00	FIREWORKS	KWVMAB		

Ongoing Activities: 1. Visit the Memorial 24 hours a day; 2. Continuous entertainment, 3. Film Festival, 4. 24 hour vigil reading the names of KIA/MIA/POW's, 5. Visit Embassies, 6. Veterans reunions, 7. Exhibitions and art shows

Mr. SAM GEJDENSON
U.S. Representative, 2nd District CT
74 West Main Street
Norwich, CT 06360

Re: US POW & MIA - North Korea.

Dear Mr. Gejdenson

The purpose of this letter is to inform you about my connection with the above subject.

My name is Serban Oprica and I am U.S. citizen. I emigrated to United State from Romania in 1985. In Romania I worked as engineer and ^{presently} I work as engineer today too. One of ~~my~~ ^{my} jobs was to design and oversee construction of a new TV factory in North Korea I was send and I lived there during 1979-1980. I worked there with other Romanians. Almost each Sunday (the only free day of week), we were send taken by bus on visits to museums (war memorial most of them) or around the country. During on one such trip, along a rural road we (bus occupants) noticed working on field persons with European faces. Later, from my colleagues I learn that they were U.S. POW, which was and my believe. I like to explain that other Romanian worked in N. Korea for a long period of time (4-5 years) and they had more contacts with Korean people. Also a lot a Korean people knew romanian language because they lived in Romania during many years. (They were taken in Romania during 1953-59 war ~~for~~ as orphan children).

My written statement and more detailed information was send to Government Agencies (FBI, CIA, Defence, etc), but I don't know why my former colleagues working in N. Korea were not connected.

Thank you for willingness to provide a help in the above subject.

Sincerely
SERBAN OPRICA

'94 JUN 30 AM 10:23

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

B

S/S #

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

1994 JUN 30 AM 10:24

MESSAGE NO. 006475 CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL No. Pages 84
FROM: LTURK EAP/K 7717 5313
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)
MESSAGE DESCRIPTION MIA REMAINS ISSUE

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
<u>DDP-POW/MIA</u>	<u>A Liotta</u>	<u>(F) 284 0947</u>	
<u>DDP-ISA</u>	<u>W Knowles</u>	<u>(F) 697-4089</u>	
<u>NSC-EAP</u>	<u>S Roth</u>	<u>(F) 395-3740</u>	

FOR: CLEARANCE ☒ INFORMATION ☐ PER REQUEST ☐ COMMENT ☐

REMARKS:

S/S Officer: BIS

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: WA Date: 01/21/15
2009-0528-F

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. paper	MIA Remains Issue (4 pages)	06/28/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Robert Suettinger (Asian Affairs)
OA/Box Number: 1044

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea-MIAs [Missing in Action]

2009-0528-F

kc1362

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Mr. Suttenger

1
Now is the KPA remains compensation
action memo to go to USOP. TAB A is
not included. It will be the action memo
per the "Recommendation" paragraph in this
paper. I'll provide your comments ASAP. Thank.
HRC Wisla.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004a. memo	Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/MIA Affairs to Under Secretary of Defense for Policy re KPA Remains Compensation Claims (4 pages)	c 1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Robert Suettinger (Asian Affairs)
OA/Box Number: 1044

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea-MIAs [Missing in Action]

2009-0528-F

kc1362

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.


PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TAB B



Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004b. cable	draft, re KPA Remains Compensation Claims (3 pages)	c 1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Robert Suettinger (Asian Affairs)
OA/Box Number: 1044

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea-MIAs [Missing in Action]

2009-0528-F
kc1362

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TAB C



UNCLASSIFIED

ISSUE: Historical background and current issues regarding the repatriation and identification of Korean Conflict remains.

BACKGROUND: There are over 8,100 American servicemen from the Korean War whose remains were never returned or identified. These include men lost over water or at sea, those buried in temporary United Nations Command (UNC) cemeteries that were overrun, servicemen whose remains were returned but not identified, and those whose fates simply remain unknown. It also includes servicemen known to have died in captivity, but whose remains were not returned.

In 1954 the North Koreans returned the reported remains of 1,868 American servicemen in Operation Glory (66 additional remains were returned several months later, for a total of 1934). Of these, 1,068 were identified. The remaining 866 were declared unknown and, except for one serviceman who was interred in the Tomb of the Unknowns, were buried in the American National Military Cemetery in Hawaii (known as the Punchbowl).

In 1990 and 1991, the North Koreans turned over a total of 16 remains to U.S. Congressmen. In 1992 thirty more remains were repatriated, this time to the United Nations Command (UNC). Since then, another 148 remains have been returned to the UNC (17 in July 1993, 131 from 30 Nov-21 Dec 1993). All remains are now at the Central Identification Laboratory in Hawaii (CIL-HI), where they are being processed for possible identification. Any name association which can be established between remains or personal effects and unaccounted for servicemen is immediately passed to the next of kin, if they can be found.

Identification is extremely difficult due to the length of time elapsed, antiquated record keeping, a 1973 fire which destroyed many personnel records, and poor recovery techniques employed by the Korean People's Army (KPA). Early repatriations displayed significant commingling, though recent returns exhibit a greater degree of remains integrity. CIL-HI officials still firmly believe that their technical expertise is essential to potential identification of remains.

Despite KPA efforts to portray remains discussions as a U.S.-North Korean bilateral effort, the USG continues to view this as a UNC-KPA humanitarian initiative. The UNC and KPA concluded a formal agreement to regularize the repatriation of remains in August 1993. We expect, however, that the actions of the KPA will be influenced by developments in their current dispute with the International Atomic Energy Agency

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(IAEA), the status of U.S.-ROK defense agreements, and the ongoing talks between North and South Korea. For our part, we will continue to press for joint UNC-KPA operations that would ensure the best chance of retrieving identifiable remains, and verifying any possible claims for reimbursement. We will also insist on protecting UNC and Republic of Korea (ROK) equities by avoiding any secondary U.S.-Democratic People's Republic of Korea bilateral agreements on remains-related matters.

Current Issue:

Reimbursement The KPA, well aware of USG reimbursement in Southeast Asia for third country remains recovery efforts, has asked for similar financial compensation. Though we refused their initial requests for "gratuity" payments, we agreed to reimburse fair, reasonable and verifiable expenses incurred during remains recovery efforts. As a measure of USG commitment to this issue, and in response to the North Korean's insistence on resolving "old" business before undertaking any "new" business, we compensated the North Korean \$897,300 (comparable to compensation paid Vietnamese for joint operations) for expenses incurred in recovering the 46 remains repatriated between 1990-1992. The payment in no way established precedent for future compensation, and no additional claims would be accepted until verification had been ironed out in a working group to be established between the UNC and the KPA. This working group, however, has failed to materialize because of KPA objections to ROK membership. An ad hoc series of meetings has continued between the MAC staffs.

The North Koreans have now submitted a second list of itemized expenses related to the most recent repatriations (131 in Dec 93). DPMO is leading an interagency group (State, JCS, NSC, DA and OSD/EAPR) in developing a coordinated response to this and future claims. This position is based on the following points:

- The most recent repatriations, though in somewhat better shape, still reveal a significant degree of commingling. Almost 50% indicate poor recovery techniques and storage for more than a year, despite KPA claims that all were recently recovered. To date, only one identification has been made, with only a few more possibly to follow.
- Per discussions with its Deputy Commander, CILHI feels its direct involvement is still the key to recovering identifiable remains. The KPA still have little regard for chain of custody or the value of detailed, painstaking recoveries. They prefer recovery operations on a large

UNCLASSIFIED

scale, which is exactly what we do not want. If CILHI cannot participate, then they would prefer close coordination on a few recovery sites at a time, possibly as few as one. This would maximize the involvement of the limited number of North Korean scientists available.

- If the KPA are basing their expectations for compensation of the current claim on the previous, nonbinding payment, then their expectations have become unrealistic. We would consider full itemization of their expenses with joint operations, but not for anything less. We are prepared to offer compensation for unilateral efforts exactly as we would in Southeast Asia. Any significant compensation payment to the current claim would only encourage the KPA to continue their less than satisfactory recoveries, leaving us in the role of "cash cow." The KPA have implied that anything less than several million would be insufficient, and would break off the remains talks. Our feeling is that we cannot be held hostage to the KPA's financial expectations. If the KPA walks, so be it. We cannot be perceived as "buying" their cooperation, especially when the current degree of cooperation is far less than satisfactory.

Prepared by LTC Martin J. Wisda, OASD-RSA (POW/MIA Affairs), (703)
284-0942/1297

UNCLASSIFIED

TAB D



UNCLASSIFIED

JOINT STAFF
INFO SERVICE CENTER

ROUTINE
R 182348Z MAR 94
4 SEC UNCMAC SEOUL KOR
3 JOINT STAFF WASH DC//J5/APAC/POW-MIA//
INFO AMEMB SEOUL KOR
SECDEF WASH DC//USD/OSD/RSA/EAPR//
USCINCPAC CAMP SMITH HI//J30-M//
SECDEF WASH DC//OASD-RSA/PW-MIA//
ZEN COMUSKOREA SEOUL DOR//CC/BJ/CJ/EJ/PAJ/SJS//
SEC UNCMAC SEOUL KOR

WOULD EITHER JUSTIFY OR DISCOUNT KPA CLAIMS TO HAVE PERFORMED SPECIFIC KINDS OF RECOVERY WORK. SUCH A COURSE WOULD OPERATE WITHIN A FRAMEWORK CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD AND ACCEPTED BY BOTH SIDES AND WOULD ENCOURAGE THE KPA TO CONTINUE RECOVERING REMAINS USING SCIENTIFIC TECHNIQUES THAT YIELD IDENTIFIABLE REMAINS.

6. THIS MESSAGE HAS BEEN COORDINATED WITH THE U.S. EMBASSY.
DECL: OADR BT

UNCLAS

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR REAPPRAISAL OF KPA COMPENSATION CLAIMS

1. THE UNC UNDERSTANDS THE USG INTERAGENCY VIEW THAT THE KPA HAS UNREALISTIC EXPECTATIONS ABOUT COMPENSATION FOR THE RETURN OF U.S. KOREAN WAR REMAINS. ON THE OTHER HAND, WE BELIEVE THAT THE NORTH KOREAN CASE IS NOT DIRECTLY COMPARABLE TO REMAINS REPATRIATION EFFORTS CONDUCTED ELSEWHERE. ESPECIALLY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, WE ARE STILL FAR FROM ACHIEVING A PERMANENT PEACE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA. SHORT OF THE POLITICALLY UNTENABLE POSITION OF REFUSING TO ACCEPT REMAINS, WE MUST WORK WITH A SITUATION UNDER WHICH U.S. PERSONNEL ARE CURRENTLY NOT PERMITTED TO ENTER NORTH KOREA FOR EXHUMATION WORK.

2. TWO RECENT KEY DEVELOPMENTS CONNECTED WITH COMPENSATION ARE: (A) A CHANGE IN KPA POLICY FROM PASSIVELY "DISCOVERING" TO ACTIVELY "SEARCHING" FOR REMAINS; AND (B) THE INCREASINGLY OPEN UNC-KPA MILITARY COMMUNICATION.

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4. POSSIBLE DAMAGE TO KPA-UNC COMMUNICATION IS ANOTHER CONCERN. ALTHOUGH THE UNC BELIEVES THE KPA WILL NOT CUT OFF COMMUNICATIONS OVERALL, THEY COULD DECIDE TO SLOW DOWN THE RECENT TREND TOWARDS IMPROVED COOPERATION IN KPA-UNC MILITARY COMMUNICATION.

5. WE REQUEST THAT THE USG RECONSIDER THE KPA'S COMPENSATION REQUEST AND SEEK A BALANCE BETWEEN THE GOALS OF REMAINS RETURN, REMAINS IDENTIFICATION, AND THE CONSTRAINTS OF USG POLICY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. WE SHOULD AGREE TO FULLY REIMBURSE THE KPA ONLY WHEN U.S. PERSONNEL ACCOMPANY KPA EXHUMATION TEAMS. COMPENSATION SHOULD BE BASED ON MEASURABLE CRITERIA, SUCH AS THE NUMBER OF REMAINS RECENTLY EXHUMED, DIFFICULTY OF TERRAIN IN THE RECOVERY AREA, AND STORAGE COSTS FOR THOSE CURATED. PER OUR EARLIER REQUESTS, THE NORTH HAS ALREADY AGREED TO PROVIDE REMAINS RECOVERY AND PROCESSING DATA (E.G., MILES DRIVEN, FUEL USED, HOURS WORKED) AND NOT A DOLLAR AMOUNT. TO REPLY THAT WE WOULD GIVE A FIXED AMOUNT OF DOLLARS PER SET OF RETURNED REMAINS WOULD GIVE THE APPEARANCE THAT WE ARE BUYING REMAINS. WE RECOMMEND THAT COMPENSATION BE BASED ON AN ANALYSIS OF KPA-PROVIDED DATA THAT

JOINT STAFF V1

ACTION J5(1)

INFO SJS-N(1) CMAS(1) CJCS-PA-J(1) J1-J(1) NMCC-CWO(1)
J3-JODPAC-J(1) NIDS(1) QUAL CONTROL(1)
J5-AFRICA-J(1) J5-PAC-J(1) J5-ASIA-J(1)
J5-WTCNP-J(1)
+NACEMEAF

13

SECDEF V2

ACTION USDP:POW/MIA(3)

INFO SECDEF-N(1) USDA:P&L(1) USDA:ADMIN(1) USDA:AM(1)
USDA:IP(2) ATSD:PA(1) USDP:EAP(2) USDP:DSAA(1)
USDP:S&R(1) USDP:TECH(1) USDP:PPEAP(1) USDP:MA&R(1)
USDP:PP&RS(1) USDP:RSA(1)
+USDP:DTSA
+USDP:CCC
+SAFE

19

TAB E



UNCLASSIFIED

FAX MESSAGE



UNITED NATIONS COMMAND MILITARY ARMISTICE COMMISSION

UNIT #15259 APO AP 96205-0032

DATE:

17 MAR 94

FROM:

LTC Cole

TO: LTC Marty Wisda FAX: 703 284-0924

RETURN FAX: 723-4315 COMM & OFF PENINSULA:
7913-4315 INTL: 011-822-7913-4315

MESSAGE:

On the evening of 16 MAR 94 COL Chilton had the opportunity to discuss the remains compensation issue with Mr. Frank Wisner, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and his party (Stanley Roth, Kent Wiedemann, and LTC Ryan). He made the points contained in these papers. This is for your information.

PAGE 1 OF _____

UNCLASSIFIED

REMAINS COMPENSATION

PREPARED BY	
DATE	17 MAR

POLICY CHANGE: KOREAN WAR MIA

For compensation verification the Southeast Asia policy does not apply. Korea is NOT Southeast Asia.

The preferred method to verify compensation claims for US Korean War MIA is for US personnel to participate in the recovery process on site (i.e. in North Korea). Since we only have an Armistice (not a peace treaty) an alternate method of verification will be analysis of data presented by North Koreans to determine the quality of remains processing as well as the resources used. A consideration is also the quality of the remains themselves, especially the presence of dentition and identification media.

PAGE NO.	2
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REMAINS COMPENSATION

PREPARED BY	
DATE	17 MAR

CURRENT KPA CLAIM: The UNC understands the estimate of the claim is about \$4.5 M. The KPA themselves feel they deserve about \$3.6 M. Both these figures are high based on the fact that some of the remains were curated.

Recommend payment of about 50% for legitimate work done (recent exhumations) and lack of commingling which shows good processing. Also some amount for the Korean "appreciation" would be appropriate. Somewhere between \$2M and \$3M is a good guess of a satisfactory answer. The factual analysis will probably support that figure.

WHITE HOUSE
COMMUNICATIONS CENTER
FACSIMILE COVER SHEET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JB

WHITE HOUSE COMMUNICATIONS CENTER
FACSIMILE COVER SHEET

PRECEDENCE:

FLASH

IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

SECURE FAX # 228

ADMIN FAX # _____

PAGES 6

DTG 311440Z MAR 94

RELEASER _____

FROM/LOCATION

LTC Wis DA

TO/LOCATION

MR. Bob Snettinger

TIME OF RECEIPT

311448Z

INFO/LOCATION


SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: W Date: 01/21/15

2009-0528-F



DPMO

**Department of Defense
Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Office
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Regional Security Affairs
Washington, D.C., 20301-2400**

5 pages

To: <i>MR. BOB SUETTINGER ASIAN AFFRS</i>		From: <i>LTC WISDA</i>
Fax Number: <i>(202) 395-1206</i>		Office: <i>OSD (POW/MIA)</i>
Date: <i>31 MAR 94</i>	Time: <i>0930</i>	For Information Call: <i>(703) 284-0940</i>
Subject: @U <i>KOREAN REMAINS COMPENSATION</i>		Fax Number: <i>284-0924 (CL) 0923</i>

Mr. Suettinger

Here is our proposed action being to be inserted as TAB A into the decision memo for Mr. Wisner on compensating the KPA for remnant-related expense.

Regards.

LTC Marty Wisda.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. cable	draft, re KPA Remains Compensation Claims (5 pages)	03/31/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Robert Suettinger (Asian Affairs)
OA/Box Number: 1044

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea-MIAs [Missing in Action]

2009-0528-F

kc1362

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]


C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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DPMO

Department of Defense
Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Office
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Regional Security Affairs
Washington, D.C., 20301-2400

To: <i>MR. BOB SUETTINGER</i>		From: <i>LTC MARTY WISDA</i>	
Fax Number: <i>(C) 202 395 1206</i>		Office: <i>OSD (POW/MIA AFFAIRS)</i>	
Date: <i>23 MAR 94</i>	Time: <i>1700</i>	For Information Call: <i>284-0940</i>	
Subject: @U <i>KPA Remains Compensation</i>		Fax Number: <i>284-0924 / (C) 0923</i>	

Mr Suettinger

(u) I am sending you the unclassified memo from Secretary UNCOMAC (with my annotations) requesting we reconsider our coordinated position in compensating the KPA for their and future claims. I am also sending a Confidential memo we prepared for USDP Wiesner before he arrived in Seoul on 14 March 94. We still feel our position is valid, regardless of the state of play w/ North Korea. We sense no strong domestic pressure to keep the KPA returning remains at all any cost. Our position still encourages KPA cooperation, but if they walk, so be it.

Regards,

LTC Wisda

UNCLASSIFIED

P.3

JOINT STAFF
INFO SERVICE CENTER

ROUTINE

ZYUW RUAGNVT0799 0770900

R 182348Z MAR 94

4 SEC UNCMAC SEOUL KOR

3 JOINT STAFF WASH DC//J5/APAC/POW-MIA//

INFO AMEMS SEOUL KOR

SECDEF WASH DC//USD/OSD/OSA/EAPR//

USCINCPAC CAMP SMITH HI//J30-M//

SECDEF WASH DC//OASD-PSA/PW-MIA//

ZEN COMUSKOREA SEOUL DOR//CC/BJ/CJ/EJ/PAJ/SJS//

SEC UNCMAC SEOUL KOR

WOULD EITHER JUSTIFY OR DISCOUNT KPA CLAIMS TO HAVE PERFORMED SPECIFIC KINDS OF RECOVERY WORK. SUCH A COURSE WOULD OPERATE WITHIN A FRAMEWORK CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD AND ACCEPTED BY BOTH SIDES AND WOULD ENCOURAGE THE KPA TO CONTINUE RECOVERING REMAINS USING SCIENTIFIC TECHNIQUES THAT YIELD IDENTIFIABLE REMAINS. NOT SO!!

6 THIS MESSAGE HAS BEEN COORDINATED WITH THE U.S. EMBASSY.
DECL: OADR BT

UNCLAS

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR REAPPRAISAL OF KPA COMPENSATION CLAIMS

1. THE UNC UNDERSTANDS THE USG INTERAGENCY VIEW THAT THE KPA HAS UNREALISTIC EXPECTATIONS ABOUT COMPENSATION FOR THE RETLAW OF U.S. KOREAN WAR REMAINS. ON THE OTHER HAND, WE BELIEVE THAT THE NORTH KOREAN CASE IS NOT DIRECTLY COMPARABLE TO REMAINS REPATRIATION EFFORTS CONDUCTED ELSEWHERE. ESPECIALLY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, WE ARE STILL FAR FROM ACHIEVING A PERMANENT PEACE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA. SHORT OF THE POLITICALLY UNTENABLE POSITION OF REFUSING TO ACCEPT REMAINS, WE MUST WORK WITH A SITUATION UNDER WHICH U.S. PERSONNEL ARE CURRENTLY NOT PERMITTED TO ENTER NORTH KOREA FOR EXHUMATION WORK.

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CONSISTING OF AMATEUR RECOVERY METHODS, POOR PROCESSING, AND COMINGLED REMAINS. YET THE KPA COULD EASILY REVERT TO USING THE OLD TECHNIQUES, WHICH YIELDED UNIDENTIFIABLE REMAINS. SUCH A DEVELOPMENT WOULD ALSO MEAN HIGHER USG COSTS BECAUSE MORE REMAINS WOULD HAVE TO UNDERGO DNA IDENTIFICATION ANALYSIS. WHILE PREVIOUS USG PAYMENTS TO THE KPA SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AS PRECEDENT-SETTING, THEY HAVE ENCOURAGED THE KPA TO SUBSEQUENTLY FOLLOW U.S. GUIDANCE ON REMAINS REPATRIATION. WE MUST ENSURE THAT THE KPA CONTINUES TO USE MODERN RECOVERY TECHNIQUES OR ELSE FACE THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE KPA MIGHT ONCE AGAIN REVERT TO PROVIDING UNIDENTIFIABLE REMAINS.

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6. WE WOULD GIVE THE APPEARANCE THAT WE ARE BUYING REMAINS. WE RECOMMEND THAT COMPENSATION BE BASED ON AN ANALYSIS OF KPA-PROVIDED DATA THAT AT LEAST 50% WOULD BE WORTH; HALF OF THE REMAINS WERE STORED.

JOINT STAFF V1

ACTION J5(1)

INFO SJS-N(1) CMAS(1) CJCS-PA-J(1) J1-J(1) NMCC-CWO(1)

J3-JODPAC-J(1) WIDS(1) QUAL CONTROL(1)

J5:AFRICA-J(1) J5:PAC-J(1) J5:ASIA-J(1)

J5:WTCNP-J(1)

+NACEMCAF

SECDEF V2

ACTION USDP:POW/MIA(3)

INFO SECDEF-N(1) USDA:P&L(1) USDA:ADMIN(1) USDA:AM(1)

USDA:IP(2) ATSD:PA(1) USDP:EAP(2) USDP:DSAA(1)

USDP:S&R(1) USDP:TECH(1) USDP:PPEAP(1) USDP:MA&R(1)

USDP:PP&RS(1) USDP:RSA(1)

+USDP:OTSA

+USDP:CCC

+SAFE

MCN=94077/04489

TOR=94077/0858Z

TAD=94077/1008Z

CDSN=MAU528

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 1 OF 1
182348Z MAR 94

① CILHI DOES NOT AGREE W/ THIS STATEMENT KPA IS NOT USING ACCEPTABLE METHODS; BETTER, YES; BUT STILL UNACCEPTABLE. KPA'S LARGE SCALE OF RECOVERY OPS AND LACK OF CHAIN OF CUSTODY ARE KEY CONCERNS.

② DEC REPATRIATIONS MAY YIELD ONLY 10 (MAX POSSIBLE) IDENTIFICATIONS. STILL NOT ANYTHING TO BRAG ABOUT.

③ REVERTING TO PREVIOUS PRACTICES WOULD ONLY BACKFIRE. IT ALSO LOOKS LIKE WE'RE PAYING \$ TO AUDIO THIS AND THE KPA HAVE US RIGHT WHERE THEY WANT US.

④ MORE SAMPLES TO PROCESS IS A TIME CONSTRAINT AT THIS POINT NOT A COST CONSTRAINT. AFDIC CAN ONLY DO 1-2 SAMPLES AT THE CURRENT TIME. R&D CURRENTLY IN PROGRESS WILL CHOP THE TIME DOWN.

⑤ WE HAVE BEEN REPEATEDLY TRYING TO TELL THE KPA THAT WE WANT OUR DIRECT INVOLVEMENT AND TO PROCEED ON A MORE LTD BASIS (SMALLER SCALE).

⑥ IF THIS IMPLIES THAT THIS NON-MAC CHANNEL IS KEY TO OTHER EXCHANGES BEYOND POW/MIA, THEN WE'RE PLAYING INTO THE KPA HANDS AGAIN; THE LESS MAC, THE BETT

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. paper	KPA Remains Compensation Claims (2 pages)	c 03/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Robert Suettinger (Asian Affairs)
OA/Box Number: 1044

FOLDER TITLE:

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kc1362

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