

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title:

Korea, July-December, 1994 [4]

Staff Office-Individual:

Asian Affairs-Roth, Stanley

Original OA/ID Number:

405

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
30	3	3	3	v

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	International Financial Contributions to Haiti (7 pages)	11/21/1994	P1/b(1)
002a. memo	information, Steven Aoki to Samuel Berger re Deputies Meeting on North Korea (4 pages)	11/01/1994	P1/b(1)
002b. paper	Implementation Issues (3 pages)	11/01/1994	P1/b(1)
003. cable	SCUD Transfers to Iran (2 pages)	11/02/1994	P1/b(1)
004. cable	UNSC Response to the US-DPRK Agreed Framework (5 pages)	11/01/1994	P1/b(1)
005a. memo	information, Steven Aoki to Samuel Berger re Deputies Meeting on North Korea (4 pages)	11/01/1994	P1/b(1)
005b. paper	Implementation Issues (dupe of 002b) (3 pages)	11/01/1994	P1/b(1)
006. cable	The UNSC Response to the US-DPRK Agreed Framework (3 pages)	10/24/1994	P1/b(1)
007. cable	Korean Embassy Discusses Geneva Agreement, Team Spirit (3 pages)	10/20/1994	P1/b(1)
008. cable	ROKG Ambassador on Public Portrayal of Framework Agreement (3 pages)	10/14/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Stanley Roth (Asian Affairs)
OA/Box Number: 405

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea, July-December, 1994 [4]

2009-0528-F

kc1348

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Washfax Receipt

Department of State

B

Cleared 11/28
w/o change P.H.

Clear
RSS

'94 NOV 26 P2:15
S/S#

Message No. 014232 Classification ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ No. Pages 14 7

From: LAUREL SHEA GALLIVAN S/S 647-8448 7224
(Officer name) (Officer symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

Message Description CABLE TO Seoul re International Financial Contributions
to Haiti

To (Agency):	Deliver To:	Extension	Room No.
NSCS	REDACTED	456-6534	WHSITRM
	REDACTED		
	Andy Sens		
	Executive Secretariat		
	SUETTINGER	CLARKE	FEINBERG
	KRISTOFF	ROSSIN	ROCHA

For: Clearance ☒ Information ☐ Per Request ☒ Comment ☐

Remarks: Please clear by: Monday, November 28, Hank Kyn
SC/POC: RCLARKE

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: CS Date: 12/30/14
2009-0528-F

S/S Officer: Laurel Shea Gallivan
LAUREL SHEA GALLIVAN

AJT

CROSSHATCH

Return Time-Stamped Coversheet to S/S

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	International Financial Contributions to Haiti (7 pages)	11/21/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Stanley Roth (Asian Affairs)
OA/Box Number: 405

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea, July-December, 1994 [4]

2009-0528-F

kc1348

RESTRICTION CODES

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Defo to
SENS/ITM

Deferred
11-9-94

Washfax Receipt

Department of State

B

NOV -8 P10:00

S/S #

C

Message No. 013415 Classification UNCLASSIFIED No. Pages One

From: DEBORAH E. GRAZE S/S 647-5302 7224
(Office name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

Message Description CABLE TO SEOUL: Access to NSC for Blue House Staff

<u>To (Agency):</u>	<u>Deliver To:</u>	<u>Extension</u>	<u>Room No.</u>
<u>NSCS</u>	<u>Nancy Soderberg</u>	<u>456-6534</u>	<u>WHSITRM</u>
	<u>Will Hoh</u>		
	<u>Andy Sens Col. REND</u>		
	<u>Executive Secretariat</u>		
	<u>SENS RATH</u>		
	<u>SWETTINKER</u>		

For: Clearance ☒ Information ☐ Per Request ☐ Comment ☐

Remarks: Please clear by: 11/9
is "NSC OPERATIONS CENTER" SUPPOSED TO BE WH SIT RM?

S/S Officer:

Deborah E. Graze
DEBORAH E. GRAZE

CROSSHATCH

Return Time-Stamped Coversheet to S/S

OUTGOING TELEGRAM
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

11/8
DRAFT

INITIAL HERE 5.1
AUTH TCH DRAFT RAC
CLEAR 1 DEB 2 NSC
3 SS 4 SSO 5 _____
6 _____ 7 _____ 8 _____

UNCLASSIFIED

EAP/K:RACHRISTENSON:JCM
11/08/94 7-7717 SEKPOL 7889
EAP:TCHUBBARD

EAP/K:DEBROWN
S/S:

NSC:
S/S-0:

PRIORITY SEOUL

FOR POL/REBECCA BROWN

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PGOV, KS

SUBJECT: ACCESS TO NSC FOR BLUE HOUSE STAFF

REF: SEOUL 9298

1. NSC WELCOMES VISIT OF BLUE HOUSE GROUP LED BY PROFESSOR CHAY PYUNG-GIL. NSC DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ANDREW SENS PROPOSES THAT AFTER LUNCH ON EITHER NOVEMBER 15 OR 17 HE BRIEF THE GROUP ON NSC OPERATIONS FOR ABOUT AN HOUR, FOLLOWING WHICH THE GROUP COULD OBSERVE THE WORK OF THE NSC OPERATIONS CENTER FOR ONE HOUR. TOTAL TIME AT NSC WOULD THUS BE ABOUT TWO HOURS; PRESS OF BUSINESS MAKES A LONGER SESSION IMPRACTICAL.

2. REQUEST CONFIRMATION THAT WE CAN SCHEDULE THE BLUE HOUSE GROUP AFTER LUNCH ON NOVEMBER 15 OR 16. YY

UNCLASSIFIED

OK
JR

Washfax Receipt

Department of State

B

NOV -4 P9:15

S/S #

C
Cleared?

Message No. 013242 Classification LIMITED OFFICIAL USE No. Pages 2

From: MICHAEL GUEST S/S 647-8448 7224
(Office name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

Message Description CABLE TO SEOUL: Outstanding Family Issue on KAL 007

To (Agency):

Deliver To:

Extension

Room No.

NSCS

Nancy Goddard

456 -9461

WHSITRM

William

Andy Sens

Executive Secretariat

Burns

Roth

Beyle / Stern

Suettinger

For: Clearance ☒ Information ☐ Per Request ☐ Comment ☐

Remarks: Please clear by: NOON MONDAY, NOVEMBER 7

NSC POC: J. Stern

S/S Officer: Michael Guest

MICHAEL GUEST
DCS

CROSSHATCH

Return Time-Stamped Coversheet to S/S

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OUTGOING TELEGRAM

11/4

INITIAL HERE

APPRV	DRAFT	12B
CLR 1 <u>ns</u> <u>For</u>	2 <u>ns</u> <u>For</u>	3 <u>ns</u> <u>For</u>
4 <u>ns</u> <u>For</u>	5 <u>ns</u> <u>For</u>	6 <u>ns</u> <u>For</u>
7 <u>ns</u> <u>For</u>	8 <u>ns</u> <u>For</u>	9 <u>ns</u> <u>For</u>
10 <u>ns</u> <u>For</u>	11	12

ORIGINAL

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

EUR/ISCA:WBELLIS:WBB
11/04/94 647-6749 SESOVEC 11849
EUR/ISCA:JHERBST

EUR/ISCA:CGBOND
IO/T:CENGLISH
L/CID:JOSBORN
NSC:

EAP/K:EC0BB
CA/OCS:BC00PER
L/EBC:JOETTINGER
S/S:

EAP/J:JMCVERRY
EB/TRA:CJONES
P:BLUCAS
S/S-0:

IMMEDIATE SEOUL

IMMEDIATE MOSCOW, TOKYO, MONTREAL

MOSCOW PASS TO VLADIVOSTOK

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: EAIR, CACS, PREL, RS, KS, ICAO

SUBJECT: OUTSTANDING FAMILY ISSUE ON KAL 007

REF: A) STATE 205525 B) STATE 113054 C) 93 STATE 371286

1. THIS IS AN ACTION CABLE. SEE PARAGRAPH 3.

2. REPRESENTATIVES OF THE KAL 007 FAMILIES MET WITH NSC AND DEPARTMENT REPRESENTATIVES ON OCTOBER 25. WHILE MOST OF THE DISCUSSION FOCUSED ON OUTSTANDING ISSUES WITH THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT, THE FAMILY REPRESENTATIVES, LED BY HANS EPHRAIMSON-ABT, ALSO ASKED US TO PERSUADE THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT TO PERMIT ICAO TO RELEASE TO THEM THE KOREAN DOCUMENTS UNDERLYING THE ICAO REPORT.

3. ACTION REQUEST: EMBASSY IS REQUESTED TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS TO APPROPRIATE SENIOR KOREAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS.

-- WE UNDERSTAND FROM THE ICAO AUTHORITIES THAT THE ROK HAS NOT BEEN WILLING TO GIVE ICAO PERMISSION TO RELEASE TO FAMILIES OF KAL 007 VICTIMS THE KOREAN DOCUMENTS AND COPIES OF THE COCKPIT VOICE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

RECORDER AND DIGITAL FLIGHT DATA RECORDER USED IN ITS INVESTIGATION OF THE KAL 007 INCIDENT.

- THE USG STRONGLY BELIEVES THAT ALL ICAO MEMBERS SHOULD BE AS COOPERATIVE AS POSSIBLE IN CLEARING UP THE UNCERTAINTY SURROUNDING THIS INCIDENT.
- THE U.S. WOULD APPRECIATE THE COOPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF KOREA IN TRANSMITTING TO THE ICAO, AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME, FULL PERMISSION FOR THE RELEASE OF ALL MATERIALS WHICH THE ICAO INVESTIGATING TEAM CONSIDERED IN DRAWING UP ITS REPORT.
- WE BELIEVE THAT A LETTER FROM AN APPROPRIATE KOREAN OFFICIAL TO ICAO WOULD PROBABLY BE SUFFICIENT.

YY

TO: BERGER

FROM: AOKI
PONEMAN

DOC DATE: 01 NOV 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NON PROLIFERATION
DC

KOREA NORTH

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: DC MTG NOV 2 TALKING POINTS ON NORTH KOREA

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER

DUE DATE: 04 NOV 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: AOKI

LOGREF:

FILES: IFM

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

AOKI
BERGER
CICIO
DARBY
GOTTEMOELLER
HAWKINS
JOSHI
NSC CHRON
PONEMAN
ROTH
SODERBERG
WOLIN

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By RA NARA, Date 12/30/14
2009-0528-F

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDRS

CLOSED BY: NSDRS

DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 9421277

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 BERGER
001

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 94110115 FOR INFORMATION
X 94110218 NOTED BY BERGER

~~SECRET~~

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 21277

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PPS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG 1 A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed	_____	_____	_____
Sens	<u>1</u>	<u>ADS</u>	_____
Itoh	_____	_____	_____
Soderberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	<u>2</u>	Deputy Nat Sec Advisor has seen	_____
Lake	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	_____	<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

CC: _____

COMMENTS:

North Korea DC

CC: NES

1 OCT 94 7:57

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. memo	information, Steven Aoki to Samuel Berger re Deputies Meeting on North Korea (4 pages)	11/01/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Stanley Roth (Asian Affairs)
OA/Box Number: 405

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea, July-December, 1994 [4]

2009-0528-F

kc1348

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DEPUTIES' COMMITTEE MEETING

DATE: November 2, 1994
LOCATION: SITUATION ROOM
TIME: 3:30 p.m. - 4:30 p.m.

NEXT STEPS ON NORTH KOREA

Agenda

- I. Introduction NSC
- II. Intelligence Overview CIA
- III. Security Update DOD
- IV. Issues for Discussion State
 - A. Negative Security Assurances
 - B. Organizing KEDO
 - C. LWR Contract Issues
 - D. Financing LWRs and Interim Energy Alternatives
 - E. Short-Term Spent Fuel Arrangements
- V. Next Steps: Diplomatic (including APEC bilaterals),
Congress and Public Diplomacy State
- VI Discussion All Participants
- VII. Conclusion NSC

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By WM NARA, Date 12/30/14
2009-0528-F

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002b. paper	Implementation Issues (3 pages)	11/01/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

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National Security Council
Stanley Roth (Asian Affairs)
OA/Box Number: 405

FOLDER TITLE:

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

21259

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 31, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER
FROM: DANIEL PONEMAN *DP*
SUBJECT: Deputies' Meeting on North Korea, Wednesday,
November 2, 1994, 3:30 p.m. - 4:30 p.m.

Attached at Tab I is a proposed meeting notice for the Deputies' meeting on North Korea. An agenda for the meeting is at Tab A. Please note that DOE and OMB are included in the invitees.

Concurrence by: Stanley Roth *SR/08*

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize William Itoh to sign the memorandum at Tab I and approve the Agenda at Tab A.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum for Signature
Tab A Agenda

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By *12* NARA, Date *12/30/14*
2009-0528-I

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

21259

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs
Office of the Vice President

MR. KENNETH BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COLONEL ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MS. ANN LAVIN
Director, Executive
Secretariat
Department of Energy

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for
National Security and
International Affairs
Office of Management and
Budget

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the UN
U.S. Department of State

MR. LEON PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the
President

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COLONEL T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MS. BARBARA STARR
Executive Secretary
Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency

SUBJECT: Deputies' Committee Meeting on North Korea ~~(S)~~

A Deputies' meeting to discuss Korea will be held on Wednesday, November 2, from 3:30 p.m. - 4:30 p.m. Participation will be limited to principal plus one. An agenda is attached.

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By CV NARA, Date 12/30/14
2009-0528-I

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

21259

~~SECRET~~
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DEPUTIES' COMMITTEE MEETING

DATE: November 2, 1994
LOCATION: SITUATION ROOM
TIME: 3:30 p.m. - 4:30 p.m.

NEXT STEPS ON NORTH KOREA

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- II. Intelligence Overview CIA
- III. Security Update DOD
- IV. Issues for Discussion State
 - A. Organizing KEDO
 - B. LWR Contract Issues
 - C. Financing LWRs and Interim Energy Alternatives
 - D. Short-Term Spent Fuel Arrangements
 - E. Negative Security Assurances
- V. Next Steps: Diplomatic (including APEC bilaterals),
Congress and Public Diplomacy State
- VI Discussion All Participants
- VII. Conclusion NSC

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By CU NARA, Date 12/30/14
2009-0528-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

TO: LAKE

FROM: PONEMAN

DOC DATE: 24 OCT 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NON PROLIFERATION
MP

KOREA NORTH

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SCOWCROFT / KANTER ISSUE BRIEF ON KOREA

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE

DUE DATE: 27 OCT 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PONEMAN

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
PONEMAN
ROTH

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDRS

CLOSED BY: NSDRS

DOC 2 OF 2

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9408623

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 PONEMAN
002 LAKE
002

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 94102415 APPROPRIATE ACTION
Z 94102416 FOR INFORMATION
X 94103116 NOTED BY LAKE

UNCLASSIFIED

Rec'd 10/25

National Security Council
The White House

6:10pm

PROOFED BY: BSU

LOG # 8623

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG 18K A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<i>15</i> Reed	<u>1</u>	<u>ADS</u>	
Sens			
Itoh			
Soderberg			
Berger	<u>2</u>	<u>sw</u>	
Lake	<u>3</u>		
Situation Room		<u>Natl Sec Advisor</u> <u>has seen</u>	
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>(H) 10/29</u>	<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>5</u>		<u>N</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: _____

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 24, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: DANIEL PONEMAN *DP*
SUBJECT: Scowcroft/Kanter Issue Brief on Korea

Nat'l Sec Advisor
has seen
NOTED

The attached issue brief spends three pages detailing the elements of the US-DPRK Agreed Framework, followed by two pages of "one-hand/other-hand" stocktaking. They gave us an opportunity to comment, and accepted more of our comments on the first than the second part. The result is reasonably fair in its description of the deal, but tilts toward the negative in its conclusions.

I believe that the posture this group takes toward the agreement will be influential. Probably the best we can do is to avert their open criticism of the framework. As you know, I briefed Scowcroft and Kanter last week, but I think a call from you to Scowcroft would be extremely useful.

I would expect Scowcroft to be somewhat skeptical, perhaps arguing that we gave up too much in energy assistance in exchange for too much delay in performance. I would recommend that you stress how much of their performance comes first, and reiterate our standing offer to brief President Bush. (You will recall Gallucci and I went up to Maine to do that in August.) Bush's chief of staff told me he appreciated the courtesy of receiving the agreement and read it immediately upon receipt.

President Ford called me on Saturday, and registered his concerns along the lines of the McCain-Dole critique. I countered on all points, and he expressed interest in more information and continuing the dialogue.

Don Gregg, who supports the agreement, could prove to be a key player in building a broader bipartisan base for the agreement.

Concurrences by: Stanley Roth *SR*

Attachment
Tab I Scowcroft/Kanter Issue Brief

8623

**THE
FORUM
FOR
INTERNATIONAL
POLICY**

staff Portman
Acker
Roth
cc back to
R/SRB.

OCTOBER 21, 1994

FAX COVER SHEET

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT & ARNOLD KANTER
SUBJECT: The North Korean Nuclear Agreement

Attached is our Issue Brief on The North Korean Nuclear Agreement. We hope you find it of interest. Please do not hesitate to call should you have questions or comments.

THE FORUM FOR INTERNATIONAL POLICY

1750 K Street, N.W. ♦ Suite 800 ♦ Washington D.C. 20006 ♦ 202-429-4299 ♦ Fax 202-429-4298

ISSUE BRIEF

OCTOBER 1994

NUMBER 94-11

President

Brent Scowcroft

Chairman of the Board

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THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR AGREEMENT

On October 21, the United States and North Korea signed an "agreed framework" which is intended to freeze and eventually dismantle the current North Korean nuclear program in exchange for modern light water nuclear reactors (LWRs) and other economic, political, and security benefits. The leadership in Seoul has expressed support for the agreement, but the initial domestic political reaction in South Korea has been critical.

Although the Administration is consulting with the Congress, there are no plans to submit the agreement for formal Congressional approval. The agreement is considered to be complete in the sense that no additional political-level exchanges are seen to be necessary or planned. Four "working groups" will develop and oversee implementation plans.

The agreement consists of an interlocking sequence of steps that each side must take. The main features are:

- Extending the freeze it accepted during the August round, North Korea agreed it would not reprocess the fuel rods it removed from its 5mw reactor earlier this year, and would not refuel and restart that reactor. It also agreed to seal its reprocessing facility.
- North Korea agreed that the fuel rods will be shipped out of the country before the first LWR is completed (in about 8 years). Until then, they will be stored in-country in a manner that will permit safe shipment.
- North Korea agreed that the reprocessing facility (and fuel processing fabrication facility) will be dismantled before the agreement is fully implemented.

- North Korea agreed to freeze construction of the 50mw nuclear reactor (slated for completion next year) and the 200mw nuclear reactor (due to be completed in 1996). If these reactors were to become operational, they could produce enough plutonium for dozens of nuclear weapons per year.
 - North Korea agreed to dismantle these two incomplete reactors, as well as its operational 5mw reactor, before the agreement is fully implemented.
 - It also agreed not to build additional graphite-moderated reactors or related facilities, e.g., other reprocessing plants.

The above actions would deny North Korea the nuclear infrastructure it could use to overtly produce additional plutonium for nuclear weapons.

- North Korea agreed to allow the IAEA access to whatever additional sites and information it requires to resolve "discrepancies" in North Korean declarations about its past nuclear activities. These IAEA "suspect site" inspections are intended to shed light on how much weapons-grade plutonium North Korea may have produced in the past.
 - North Korea would not be obliged to permit the IAEA to conduct its inspections until about five years into the implementation of the agreement.
- The U.S. agreed to organize and lead an international effort to construct a \$4 billion LWR facility in North Korea, probably consisting of two LWRs, with a total capacity of about 2000mw. Abandoning its earlier objections, North Korea has tacitly agreed that these can be South Korean-designed reactors. It may be ten or more years before these LWRs are fully operational.
 - South Korea and Japan are expected to pay the lion's share of the costs. Other countries also may contribute.
 - The LWRs nominally will be provided on the basis of a long-term, no-interest loan which North Korea will repay in barter.
- The U.S. has agreed to organize and lead an international effort to provide interim energy supplies to North Korea in the form of enough heavy oil to produce electricity at a rate of 255mw (i.e., the nominal combined electric generation capacity of the two North Korean reactors under construction and the one in operation) until the LWRs come on line. Heavy oil can be used in power plants and for home heating, but not in most military applications without further refining.

- The oil will be provided on a grant basis. The U.S. plans to provide the first three months' supply. (The Administration believes it already has adequate legal authority to provide and/or pay for this oil shipment.) Thereafter, South Korea and Japan (and perhaps other countries) are expected to provide or pay for the bulk of the oil.
- The U.S. has agreed to the establishment of diplomatic liaison offices in Washington and Pyongyang once several technical issues are resolved by a working group. The U.S. also has agreed to work toward full diplomatic relations, including an exchange of ambassadors, but noted that several other unspecified issues would have to be resolved before that point could be reached.
- The U.S. has agreed to lower barriers to telecommunications and trade.
- The U.S. has agreed to offer a version of the NPT "negative security assurance" to North Korea.
- In response to strongly expressed South Korean concerns, the agreement commits North Korea to resume dialogue with the South and references previously concluded agreements between North Korea and South Korea and the need to implement them, but draws no explicit linkages between specific steps in the North-South channel and this U.S.-North Korea nuclear agreement.

A key milestone in the agreement is the point in the LWR construction process at which significant nuclear components (defined in international guidelines) need to be installed. LWR planning and construction might have been underway for about five years before this point is reached. The agreement provides that:

- No significant nuclear components will be provided until the IAEA has resolved questions about past North Korean nuclear activities to its satisfaction.
- Fuel rods will be shipped out of the country as the significant nuclear components are delivered. All of the fuel rods will be exported before the first LWR becomes operational.
- Dismantling of the current North Korean nuclear infrastructure (the three reactors, the reprocessing facility, and the fuel fabrication facility) will begin as significant nuclear components start to be delivered to the second LWR (about 1 1/2-2 years after the first LWR deliveries begin). Dismantling will be completed before the second LWR becomes operational.

The IAEA will be asked to verify that North Korea is maintaining the freezes on construction, reprocessing, and refueling to which it has agreed.

Observations and Comments

- The agreement reflects the implementation of a strategy to "buy out" North Korea's nuclear program and an apparent willingness of North Korea to "sell" at the agreed price, with all of the advantages and disadvantages inherent in such a strategy.
- The agreement appears to address most of the North Korean nuclear issues of concern to the United States.
- Given the other provisions in the agreement, the LWRs which would be provided are not well suited to support a North Korean nuclear weapons program. LWRs are far less "efficient" producers of plutonium than the reactors the North Koreans now have. They also require enriched uranium for fuel, something the North Koreans could not produce indigenously without a substantial but additional investment. On the other hand, LWRs do produce spent fuel containing plutonium as an inescapable by-product of their operation. North Korea also might be able to obtain enriched uranium outside legitimate international channels.
- The agreement would impose an immediate freeze on the overt North Korean nuclear program, stopping both North Korean production of additional plutonium and expansion of the North Korean plutonium production capacity. Current overt North Korean nuclear capabilities, however, would remain intact for another five or more years, until they begin to be dismantled under the terms of the agreement. It may be a decade or more before that dismantling is completed.
- North Korea will begin to enjoy economic and political benefits from the agreement almost immediately, including the provision of substantial energy supplies on a grant basis. Although Pyongyang in return would accept an immediate and comprehensive freeze on its overt nuclear program, it could postpone implementing its hardest decisions (e.g., dismantling, suspect site inspections, fuel rod exports) for five or more years.
- The agreement is premised on the assumption that North Korea is prepared to forego its nuclear option--and undermine the longstanding military objectives it supports--in exchange for economic assistance and political acceptance. If,

however, North Korea has only decided (at least for now) to buy some time and breathing space, then one cannot rule out the possibility that as it begins to face implementation of the hard decisions, it might decide to "take the money and run."

- In any event, current and would-be proliferators may conclude that the United States not only is prepared to sign agreements that tolerate non-compliance with international obligations, but seems to be prepared to pay off rather than punish such cheaters.
- IAEA monitoring of the freezes to which North Korea has agreed will begin immediately, but inspections of suspect nuclear sites in North Korea, intended to shed light on past North Korean nuclear activities, may be deferred for about five years. On the one hand, there is no reason to believe that evidence regarding that past behavior will deteriorate further over time. On the other hand, uncertainties about the past behavior--and the leverage North Korea can derive from that uncertainty--will persist for several years.
- Although it may not have been an objective of the agreement, the political recognition and especially the economic assistance (i.e., oil now, electric power later) it provides, may help stave off the collapse of the North Korean regime.
- North Korea's obligations in this agreement are limited to its nuclear program and resumption of the North-South dialogue. Other objectionable North Korean activities are left to later discussion. Given the economic, political, and security benefits Pyongyang will receive under the terms of this agreement, it remains to be seen whether the U.S. has preserved enough leverage to address successfully these other problem areas.
- As difficult as it was to negotiate this agreement, it is only the beginning, not the end. The hardest part probably lies ahead:
 - Under the best of circumstances, full implementation may require ten years or more. A great deal can happen during that time, especially in the case of regimes with track records like Pyongyang's.
 - The ultimate success or failure of the agreement is largely in the hands of others. This includes not only North Korea, but also South Korea and Japan which will be footing most of what will be very large bills.
 - South Korea obviously will play a central role. It is equally clear that the U.S. agreement with North Korea is virtually certain to become and remain a pawn in the complex and highly charged South Korean politics surrounding the unification issue. At a minimum, Seoul will be sorely tempted to exploit its substantial leverage

over the LWR project to press North Korea to engage and compromise in the North-South channel, especially if it suspects that Pyongyang is using the U.S.-North Korea nuclear agreement to drive a wedge between Washington and Seoul. Such dynamics could put the U.S. in the position of having to choose between its South Korean ally and its nuclear non-proliferation objectives.

- It will be a major test of American leadership to sustain for the next ten years the stakes these and other key participants have in the success of this agreement

Principal Author

Arnold Kanter is a Senior Associate with The Forum for International Policy. He was Under Secretary for State for Political Affairs from 1991-1993, and Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control at the National Security Council from 1989-1991.

TO: LAKE

FROM: SCOWCROFT, BRENT
KANter, ARNOLD

DOC DATE: 22 OCT 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NON PROLIFERATION
MP

KOREA NORTH

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: FORUM FOR INTL POLICY BRIEFING PAPER ON NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR
AGREEMENT

ACTION: APPROPRIATE ACTION

DUE DATE: 27 OCT 94 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: PONEMAN

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
PONEMAN

FOR CONCURRENCE
AOKI
KRISTOFF
ROTH

FOR INFO
BERGER
GOTTEMOLLER
LAKE

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDRS

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9408640
RECEIVED: 24 OCT 94 16

TO: LAKE

FROM: PONEMAN

DOC DATE: 24 OCT 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOREA

MEDIA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: ANALYSIS OF SAFIRE ARTICALE ON KOREA

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE

DUE DATE: 27 OCT 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PONEMAN

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

NSC CHRON
PONEMAN
ROSS
ROTH
SODERBERG
SONENSHINE

COMMENTS: _____

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DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9408640

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE
001

Z 94102508 FOR INFORMATION
X 94103116 NOTED BY LAKE

UNCLASSIFIED

National Security Council
The White House

Rec'd 10/25
7:14 am

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 8640
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG MA A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
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Sens			
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Soderberg	<u>2</u>	<u>copy</u>	
Berger	<u>3</u>	<u>AM</u>	
Lake	<u>4</u>		
Situation Room		Natl Sec Advisor	
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>	has seen	<u>✓</u>
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: _____

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON D C 20506

October 24, 1994

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM:

DANIEL PONEMAN *DP*

SUBJECT:

Analysis of Safire Article on Korea

*8:15 meeting
Monday 8640*

*10/31
NSG/IR/TS
Need to respond.
Ross checking.
SL*

What's wrong and right with this article?

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

ASSERTION: "IAEA inspectors are denied access to those [Yongbyon] plants for five years."

FACT: IAEA inspectors gain access to all of those facilities now under the agreement.

ASSERTION: "Because Clinton backed down, North Korea's first two atomic explosives ... could menace Seoul and ... Tokyo."

FACT: We do not know whether North Korea has any bombs or not.

The President never backed down on insistence that North Korea could not have any nuclear weapons. That's what renewed commitment to NPT and North-South Denuclearization Declaration aim to accomplish.

ASSERTION: "[T]he US has agreed to supply the North with \$100 million' worth of oil each year and arrange with allies to build -- free -- a \$4 billion LWR that apologists claim would make it terribly difficult to produce weapons-grade plutonium, though experts disagree."

FACT: The US agreed to facilitate multilateral supply of the oil; we hope to get as close to 100% foreign supply as possible.

Our estimates are around \$50 million per year, not \$100 million per year.

The LWR will be paid for principally by South Korea and Japan, who obviously believe that investment to be in their own interests.

Nominally the LWRs are not "free" but rather will be financed by soft, long-term loans repaid in barter. (Admittedly, this is not a strong debating point.)

The LWRs and energy assistance will be carefully phased to require North Korean performance at each step.

LWR do produce weapons grade plutonium, but experts do agree that they are preferable from a nonproliferation standpoint. Specifically they (1) are far less efficient at producing plutonium than graphite reactors, (2) are less susceptible to diversion, since they cannot be refueled on line, and (3) give us greater leverage, since the DPRK will rely on foreign suppliers for its LWR reactor fuel.

ASSERTION: Substitute reactor won't be on-line for nine years, and complete elimination of nuclear program will only come when we have the LWR in our hands.

FACT: True, if by elimination he means completion of dismantlement; but a half-dismantled reactor or reprocessing plant is useless.

ASSERTION: Meanwhile, North's "existing nuclear program" goes on -- including work in sites forbidden to IAEA inspectors.

FACT: Existing nuclear program is frozen under the framework.

The only sites "forbidden" to IAEA inspectors are the two suspect waste sites. No work there would contribute to North Korea's nuclear weapon capability, though it could help the DPRK adulterate the waste to obfuscate past activities.

As for work in other sites, rumors aside, the existence of any other sites has never been established.

ASSERTION: IAEA inspectors are seething at the US cave-in.

FACT: Blix, while not thrilled at the delay in special inspections, believes we are on the right road. His public statement welcomes the agreement. It may well be true that inspectors who work for Blix are complaining; US national security interests, for

better or worse, extend to political-military spheres beyond the reach of IAEA theology.

ASSERTION: "Why pay billions while it retains a secret bomb capability for at least five years?"

FACT: The two sites to be inspected in five years contain waste, not "a secret bomb capability." North Korea's capability that we know about will be frozen now, under IAEA monitoring. North Korea's capability that we do not know about has nothing to do with the special inspections that will not occur for five years.

Concurrence by: Stanley Roth *SR*

OK
SR

Washfax Receipt

Department of State

B

94 OCT 33

PS

S/S #

cleared
11-4-94
C

013095

Message No. _____ Classification _____ No. Pages 2

From: LAUREL SHEA GALLIVAN S/S 647-8448 7224
(Offices name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

Message Description CABLE TO TOKYO: SCUD Transfers to Iran

To (Agency):	Deliver To:	Extension	Room No.
NSCS	Nancy Gorderberg	456-6534	WHSITRM
	Will Kohn		
	Andy Sens		
	Executive Secretariat		
	<u>Indyk</u> <u>Roth</u> <u>Poneman</u>		
	<u>Laipson</u> <u>Suettinger</u> <u>Harris</u>		

For: Clearance ☒ Information ☐ Per Request ☐ Comment ☐

Remarks: Please clear by this "must go". U/S Farnoff will use this
new intel info with the Japanese on 11/3. Embassy may
needs same information in discussions with Japanese.
Thank you

S/S Officer: Laurel Shea Gallivan
LAUREL SHEA GALLIVAN

CROSSEATCH

Return Time-Stamped Coversheet to S/S

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. cable	SCUD Transfers to Iran (2 pages)	11/02/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Stanley Roth (Asian Affairs)
OA/Box Number: 405

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea, July-December, 1994 [4]

2009-0528-F

kc1348

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

OBE but OK
SR
cleared 11/2/14
Washfax Receipt
Department of State

B

S/S #

013034

Message No. _____ Classification CONFIDENTIAL No. Pages 5

From: MICHAEL GUEST S/S 647-8448 7224
(Office name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

Message Description CABLE TO USUN NEW YORK: THE UNSC RESPONSE TO THE
U.S.-DPRK AGREED FRAMEWORK: DEMARCHING FRANCE AND RUSSIA

To (Agency):	Deliver To:	Extension	Room No.
NSCS	Nancy Soderberg	456 -9461	WHSITRM
	MSH/Moh		
	Andy Sens		
	Executive Secretariat		
	CLARKE ROTH VERSHBAW PONEMAN		
	RICE SUTTINGER LEBOURGEOIS AOKI		

For: Clearance ☒ Information ☐ Per Request ☐ Comment ☐

Remarks: Please clear ~~by~~ "as must-go" cable - Embassy Paris / Moscow
used to confirm demarche in NY ASAC as part of our efforts to
obtain desired UNSC intent on US-DPRK framework

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: MG Date: 12/30/14

2009-0528-F

S/S Officer: Michael Guest

MICHAEL GUEST

CROSSHATCH

Return Time-Stamped Coversheet to S/S

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. cable	UNSC Response to the US-DPRK Agreed Framework (5 pages)	11/01/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Stanley Roth (Asian Affairs)
OA/Box Number: 405

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea, July-December, 1994 [4]

2009-0528-F

kc1348

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

October 31, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: DANIEL PONEMAN *DP*

FROM: STEVEN AOKI *SA*

SUBJECT: North Korea

Senators D'Amato, McConnell, Helms and Murkowski wrote the President to oppose the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework. A proposed response is attached. It has been cleared by Bob Gallucci.

Concurrences by: Stanley Roth *SR*, William Danvers *WD*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Proposed Response

Tab B Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE
PATRICK GRIFFIN

SUBJECT: North Korea

Purpose

To respond to Senators D'Amato, McConnell, Helms and Murkowski, who wrote opposing the U.S.-DPRK agreement.

Background

The letter from the four Senators, written before the Geneva accord was actually signed, argues that the U.S. has made unwarranted concessions to North Korea in return for "paper promises" to freeze its nuclear program. It also charges that by delaying special inspections we have undermined the IAEA's credibility, and points out that there are many other U.S. concerns about North Korea's behavior. The four Senators assert that they will subject any legislative vehicle that seeks to implement this agreement to searching scrutiny, and that it does not have the support of the Senate.

We propose a response that vigorously argues the case for the agreement.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the response at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Proposed Response
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Senator D'Amato:

Thank you for your letter on North Korea. I believe we share the goal of a non-nuclear Korean peninsula, including full compliance by North Korea with its nonproliferation obligations. The Agreed Framework signed in Geneva on October 21 marks an important step towards this goal, and is strongly in the national security interest of the United States and of our allies in the Republic of Korea and Japan.

I would like to clarify what this agreement does and does not do.

North Korea is required immediately to freeze, and subsequently to dismantle, its existing plutonium production capability. Without this freeze, we face the prospect that North Korea will within the next few years complete two additional graphite-moderated reactors that could produce plutonium for dozens of nuclear weapons annually. In return for the elimination of this dangerous program -- an action that goes beyond any existing nonproliferation obligations -- the U.S. will lead an international consortium to supply conventional energy and a light water reactor (LWR) project to North Korea. The North Korean freeze is not a paper promise; it will be fully monitored by the IAEA, and if North Korea does not live up to its commitments, we will not go forward with the deal.

For the first time, North Korea agreed to take all steps the IAEA deems necessary to resolve questions about past DPRK nuclear activities. While it is true this step will not happen for some time, inspections to determine what happened in the past can be performed effectively at any point at no risk to our security or that of South Korea.

Moreover, the agreement explicitly provides that North Korea gets no significant nuclear components for the light water reactor project until IAEA concerns about the past are resolved. Far from undercutting the IAEA's authority, we have insisted on and achieved North Korea's commitment to full compliance with its NPT and IAEA safeguards obligations.

We have also obtained North Korea's commitment to permit the future transfer out of the country of its existing spent fuel. The North also undertakes to store the fuel under IAEA safeguards, in a manner permitting such export, a commitment we will be able to test quickly.

In short, while the deal struck in Geneva does provide benefits to North Korea, it does so only in return for clearly defined actions by North Korea to meet our nonproliferation requirements. It is based not on trust in North Korea's good intentions, but on verified performance, reflected in a carefully balanced sequence of reciprocal obligations that ensures we retain leverage at every point to obtain North Korean compliance.

As you note, there are other important issues on the table with North Korea. The agreement makes clear that fully normal U.S.-DPRK political and economic relations depend on satisfactory resolution of these other U.S. concerns. The Geneva accord does create an opening to reduce regional tensions and to bring North Korea into greater contact with the outside world. That is why South Korea and Japan, our regional allies, are prepared to support and invest in it.

In summary, the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework meets the critical test of achieving our national security objectives. This accord advances the cause of nonproliferation and strengthens the security of our friends and allies. It deserves the support of the Congress and of all Americans.

I appreciate receiving your views on this important subject. As always, we are prepared to consult fully with the Congress about implementation of the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework and other aspects of our policy toward North Korea.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Alfonse D'Amato
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

United States Senate
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-3202

94 OCT 24 A10:29

October 19, 1994

The Honorable William J. Clinton
President of the United States
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We write today to express our deep concern that the U.S. - North Korean negotiations in Geneva, Switzerland, have achieved an unacceptable resolution to the issues arising from North Korea's nuclear program. We strongly urge you to reconsider it and send the negotiators back to the table seeking a deal that will protect and advance U.S. interests in achieving a non-nuclear North Korea that is in full compliance with its international obligations under the NPT and its agreement with South Korea to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula.

Ambassador Gallucci returned to Geneva last week after consultations in Washington to offer additional concessions to North Korea. These concessions will reportedly result in delaying special inspections of the two suspect North Korean sites until five years from now or when the first of the light water reactors we propose to supply North Korea is seventy-five percent complete. Additionally, the accord commits the United States to ease trade restrictions on North Korea within three months, pledges to arrange for 500,000 tons of oil shipments annually to North Korea, and provides for opening a diplomatic liaison office in Pyongyang. Moreover, these concessions will allow the spent fuel rods North Korea removed from its graphite-moderated reactor to remain in North Korea under IAEA safeguards for a period of years.

These concessions essentially reverse longstanding U.S. policy concerning North Korea. We will have vitiated through substantial delay the IAEA special inspections process, leaving unresolved the question of how much plutonium the North recovered when it previously reprocessed fuel rods, and left in North Korea's hands the potential to trigger a major international crisis by reprocessing the spent fuel rods still under its control. In addition, we will have undermined the IAEA's credibility and made future special inspections of suspected violations virtually impossible by negotiating over IAEA's head and defining the terms of the special inspection regime bilaterally.

**The Honorable William J. Clinton
President of the United States
October 19, 1994**

Mr. President, U.S. policy toward North Korea is based on widely agreed goals. We want peace between North and South Korea. We want a North Korea without nuclear weapons and abiding by international restrictions on the spread of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. We want a North Korea open to the outside world for trade and travel. We want an end to North Korean state-sponsored terrorism and North Korean domestic human rights violations. Finally, we want North Korean cooperation in accounting for U.S. personnel missing in action in the Korean War.

This deal does not secure any of these goals on acceptable terms. All it does is paper over the crisis and delay its resolution. Worse, it will secure Kim Jong-Il's rule, just as he is trying to consolidate his power.

We believe that it is wrong to reward a state that is in breach of its international obligations, freely assumed, with diplomatic recognition, aid, and advanced Western nuclear technology in the form of two new light-water nuclear reactors in return for nothing more than a paper promise that it will "freeze" its illegal nuclear program, continue to allow formal IAEA inspections of the usual facilities, and, at some indefinite point in the future, allow IAEA special inspections of the two suspect sites. We are left wondering how to distinguish such a deal from U.S. submission to North Korean nuclear blackmail.


Any executive agreement that requires legislative authorization or appropriation to put any fatally defective agreement's provisions into full effect will be subject to the most searching, detailed, and critical examination and debate. Moreover, North Korea should be under no illusions that such a deal would be supported or approved by the United States Senate.

We appreciate your urgent consideration of our views on this critical matter.

Sincerely,




**Alfonse D'Amato
United States Senator**




**Mitch McConnell
United States Senator**

The Honorable William J. Clinton
President of the United States
October 19, 1994

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Jesse Helms". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, stylized initial "J".

Jesse Helms
United States Senator

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Frank H. Murkowski". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, stylized initial "F".

Frank Murkowski
United States Senator

10/18/94 10:01 AM
The Honorable William J. Clinton
President of the United States
October 18, 1994

Mr. President, U.S. policy toward North Korea is based on widely agreed goals. We want peace between North and South Korea. We want a North Korea without nuclear weapons and abiding by international restrictions on the spread of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. We want a North Korea open to the outside world for trade and travel. We want an end to North Korean state-sponsored terrorism and North Korean domestic human rights violations. Finally, we want North Korean cooperation in accounting for U.S. personnel missing in action in the Korean War.

This deal does not secure any of these goals on acceptable terms. All it does is paper over the crisis and delay its resolution. Worse, it will secure Kim Jong-Il's rule, just as he is trying to consolidate his power.

We believe that it is wrong to reward a state that is in breach of its international obligations, freely assumed, with diplomatic recognition, aid, and advanced Western nuclear technology in the form of two new light-water nuclear reactors in return for nothing more than a paper promise that it will "freeze" its illegal nuclear program, continue to allow formal IAEA inspections of the usual facilities, and, at some indefinite point in the future, allow IAEA special inspections of the two suspect sites. We are left wondering how to distinguish such a deal from U.S. submission to North Korean nuclear blackmail.


Any executive agreement that requires legislative authorization or appropriation to put any fatally defective agreement's provisions into full effect will be subject to the most searching, detailed, and critical examination and debate. Moreover, North Korea should be under no illusions that such a deal would be supported or approved by the United States Senate.

We appreciate your urgent consideration of our views on this critical matter.

Sincerely,



Alfonse D'Amato
United States Senator



Mitch McConnell
United States Senator

10/18/84 10:05. [REDACTED]

Jesse Helms
United States Senator

Frank Murkowski
United States Senator

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: OCTOBER 24, 1994

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE ALFONSE M. D'AMATO

SUBJECT: DISCUSSES THE U.S. POLICY CONCERNING
NORTH KOREA

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	ACTION		DISPOSITION	
		ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C COMPLETED D YY/MM/DD
PATRICK GRIFFIN		ORG	94/10/24		C 94/10/24
WILLIAM ITOH		RSA	94/10/24		
	REFERRAL NOTE:				
	REFERRAL NOTE:				
	REFERRAL NOTE:				
	REFERRAL NOTE:				
	REFERRAL NOTE:				

COMMENTS: ADDITIONAL SIGNEES

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: 3 MEDIA:F INDIVIDUAL CODES: 1220

MAIL USER CODES: (A)R_NY (B) (C)

```

*****
*ACTION CODES:      *DISPOSITION      *OUTGOING      *
*                  *                  *CORRESPONDENCE: *
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION *A-ANSWERED      *TYPE RESP=INITIALS *
*C-COMMENT/RECOM      *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL *          OF SIGNER *
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE      *C-COMPLETED      *          CODE = A   *
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET *S-SUSPENDED      *COMPLETED = DATE OF *
*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC*          OUTGOING  *
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *          *
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE      *          *
*X-INTERIM REPLY      *          *
*****

```

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

SCANNED

8659

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 20, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM ITOH

FROM: SUSAN BROPHY *SB*
LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: CONGRESSIONAL MAIL

Attached is a copy of the letter sent to the President from Senator Al D'Amato (R-NY) and others, concerning North Korea. I would appreciate your assistance in drafting a response.

Thank you very much for your assistance. If you have any questions, please feel free to call LeeAnn Inadomi at x7500.

Enclosure

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005a. memo	information, Steven Aoki to Samuel Berger re Deputies Meeting on North Korea (4 pages)	11/01/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Stanley Roth (Asian Affairs)
OA/Box Number: 405

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea, July-December, 1994 [4]

2009-0528-F

kc1348

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DEPUTIES' COMMITTEE MEETING

DATE: November 2, 1994
LOCATION: SITUATION ROOM
TIME: 3:30 p.m. - 4:30 p.m.

NEXT STEPS ON NORTH KOREA

Agenda

- I. Introduction NSC
- II. Intelligence Overview CIA
- III. Security Update DOD
- IV. Issues for Discussion State
 - A. Negative Security Assurances
 - B. Organizing KEDO
 - C. LWR Contract Issues
 - D. Financing LWRs and Interim Energy Alternatives
 - E. Short-Term Spent Fuel Arrangements
- V. Next Steps: Diplomatic (including APEC bilaterals),
Congress and Public Diplomacy State
- VI Discussion All Participants
- VII. Conclusion NSC

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By WM NARA, Date 12/30/14
2009-0528-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005b. paper	Implementation Issues (dupe of 002b) (3 pages)	11/01/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Stanley Roth (Asian Affairs)
OA/Box Number: 405

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea, July-December, 1994 [4]

2009-0528-F

kc1348

RESTRICTION CODES

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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9407866
RECEIVED: 27 SEP 94 17

TO: BILBRAY, JAMES H

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 29 OCT 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOREA NORTH
MIAS

CO
LEGAL ISSUES

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: REPLY RE RECOVERY OF REMAINS OF MISSING SERVICEMEN IN KOREA

ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE: 30 SEP 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ROTH

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

DANVERS
NSC CHRON
PONEMAN
ROTH

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY QPS DATE 10/31 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDRS

CLOSED BY: NSDRS

DOC 4 OF 4

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9407866

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 AOKI	Z 94092718	PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE
001	Z 94100510	ACTION TRANSFERRED
001 ROTH	Z 94100510	PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE
002 LAKE	Z 94101920	FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR SIG
003 PRESIDENT	Z 94102118	FOR SIGNATURE
004	X 94103111	PRESIDENT SGD LTR
004 WH STRIPPING DESK	X 94103111	FOR DISPATCH

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

003	941021		VICE PRESIDENT
003	941021		WH CHIEF OF STAFF
004	941029	BILBRAY, JAMES H	
004	941029	WH STRIPPING DESK	

UNCLASSIFIED

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: BILBRAY, JAMES H

DOC DATE: 23 SEP 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOREA NORTH

CO

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: US POLICY TWD NORTH KOREA RE RETURN OF REMAINS OF MISSING AMER

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE

DUE DATE: 30 SEP 94 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: AOKI

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

AOKI

FOR CONCURRENCE

DANVERS
KRISTOFF
PONEMAN
ROTH

FOR INFO

SENS
WALES

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDRS

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 29, 1994

Dear Jim:

Thank you for your recent letter concerning the appropriateness of paying North Korea for U.S. war remains.

I certainly agree with you that North Korea should not be permitted to acquire large amounts of hard currency by extracting excessive payments for U.S. war remains. The Administration has firmly rejected North Korea's latest demand for compensation for remains returned in 1993 and also 1994.

However, the United States is prepared to reimburse North Korea for actual expenses incurred in recovering the remains, up to \$2,000 per set of remains. This is the same policy that is in effect for Vietnam and other countries in Southeast Asia.

Given the difficulty we have had in identifying the remains returned by North Korea (only one set has been identified thus far), we have asked the North Koreans to halt their unilateral efforts to recover any additional remains until we can work with them to improve their excavation techniques and ensure a much higher rate of identification. We are also prepared to consider the offer that the late President Kim Il Sung made to President Carter to permit the joint excavation of remains, which could result in the recovery of large numbers of identifiable remains. We are attempting to ascertain if this offer is still valid under the new regime.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a large initial "B".

The Honorable James H. Bilbray
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

October 21, 1994 94 OCT 21 P6:31

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE *AL*
SUSAN BROPHY *SB*
SUBJECT: Letter from Representative Bilbray

Purpose

To reply to Representative Bilbray, who wrote you to urge that the United States not pay any compensation to North Korea for U.S. war remains.

Background

In 1993, the United States paid \$897,000 to North Korea to offset expenses incurred in the recovery of war remains repatriated during the preceding three years. The cost per set of remains far exceeded the standard of \$2,000 that we apply in other regions of the world, and it was subsequently decided not to exceed this norm in the future.

Your letter assures Representative Bilbray that the United States will not make excessive payments to North Korea for war remains, but will adhere to its global policy. Your letter also indicates that we are taking steps to try to ensure a higher rate of identification for any remains that are returned in the future.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Representative Bilbray
Tab B Incoming Correspondence from Representative Bilbray

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

JAMES H. BILBRAY
1ST DISTRICT, NEVADA

COMMITTEE ON
ARMED SERVICES

COMMITTEE ON
SMALL BUSINESS

CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON
PROCUREMENT, TAXATION
AND TOURISM

PERMANENT SELECT
COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE



7866

2431 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-2801
(202) 225-5965

DISTRICT OFFICE:
1785 E. SAHARA #445
LAS VEGAS, NV 89104
(702) 792-2424

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515-2801

94 SEP 26 A10:10

September 23, 1994

Hon. Bill Clinton
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I am writing this letter to express my deep concerns over the United States considering paying North Korea for the possible remains of U.S. personnel lost during the Korean conflict.


North Korean officials have requested that the United States provide them \$30,000 per set of remains they turn over. Last September, the Army provided \$897,000 to the North Koreans for remains turned over in 1990, 1991 and 1992. And currently negotiations are continuing over compensation for 148 sets of remains returned last year and 14 turned over this month.

They say the money is for expenses, however, we all know that North Korea's struggling economy is in dire need of hard currency.

Just a few years ago, I accompanied a congressional delegation to South Korea to return 5 sets of U.S. remains. To my knowledge, the officials in Hawaii have still not be able to identify the remains to determine if they are American personnel. How can we consider any form of compensation when we are unsure if the remains are indeed American.

I urge you to reject any requests for compensation. Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,


James H. Bilbray
Member of Congress

JHB:mt

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 17, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: STANLEY ROTH *SOR*

SUBJECT: Letter from Representative Bilbray

Attached at Tab I is a Memorandum for the President asking him to sign the letter at Tab A to Representative Bilbray who wrote you concerning compensation for U.S. war remains in Korea.

Concurrence by: Bill Danvers, Dan Roneman

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Representative Bilbray at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President

Tab A Letter to Representative Bilbray

Tab B Correspondence from Representative Bilbray

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

1] NBW TO SPB Date: 10/19
pu. size for TL. Thk.
N.

2] _____ TO _____ Date: _____

3] _____ TO _____ Date: _____

4] _____ TO _____ Date: _____

5] _____ TO _____ Date: _____

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 7866
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG [Signature] A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed	_____	_____	_____
Sens	_____	_____	_____
Itoh	_____	_____	_____
Soderberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	_____	_____	_____
Lake	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>1</u>	<u>[Signature] 10/24/31</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>	<u>[Signature] 10/24/31</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

CC: _____

COMMENTS:

PER ADS Date 10/24/31

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

National Security Council
The White House

100-10-10-10
8PM

PROOFED BY: MBN LOG # 7866
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG MBN A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed			
Sens	<u>1</u>	<u>ADS</u>	
Itoh			
Soderberg			
<i>rh</i> Berger <u>(note)</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>ok</u>	
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>MBN 10/20</u>	<u>D To Brady</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>	<u>MBN 10/21</u>	<u>D TO ROBERTA</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

CC: _____

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

OK
JR

Washfax Receipt

Department of State

B

94 OCT 25 P 8:49 S/S #

Message No. 012658 Classification CONFIDENTIAL No. Pages 3

From: DEBORAH E. GRAZE S/S 647-5302 7224
(Office name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

Message Description CABLE TO USUN NEW YORK - THE UNSC RESPONSE TO THE
US-DPRK AGREED FRAMEWORK

To (Agency):	Deliver To:	Extension	Room No.
NSCS	Nancy Soderberg	456-6534	WHSITRM
	ANDY SENS		
	Executive Secretariat		
	CLARK PONEMAN	SUETTINGER	
	RICE AOKI	ROTH	

For: Clearance ☒ Information ☐ Per Request ☐ Comment ☐

Remarks: Please clear by: 10/25. usun needs the guidance as soon as possible

NSCS fax is SRice

S/S Officer: Debra
DEBORAH E. GRAZE

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: DM Date: 12/30/14
2009-0528-F

BJS

CROSSHATCH
Return Time-Stamped Coversheet to S/S

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. cable	The UNSC Response to the US-DPRK Agreed Framework (3 pages)	10/24/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Stanley Roth (Asian Affairs)
OA/Box Number: 405

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea, July-December, 1994 [4]

2009-0528-F

kc1348

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

to
S/S #

Washfax Receipt

Department of State

B

DO NOT CLEAR - LETTER
SHOULD NOT BE
SENT

'94 OCT 21 19:4 S/S #

Message No. 012433 Classification UNCLAS No. Pages 2

From: LAUREL SHEA GALLIVAN S/S 647-8448 7224
(Office name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

Message Description CABLE TO SEOUL: PRESIDENTIAL RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT KIM'S
LETTER ON WTO CANDIDATE

To (Agency):

NSCS

Deliver To:

~~Nancy Soderberg~~

Andy Sens

Executive Secretariat

~~SVETTINGER~~

~~ROTH~~

Extension

456-9461

FAUVER

WHYMAN

FROMAN

Room No.

WHSITRM

For: Clearance ☒ Information ☐ Per Request ☐ Comment ☐

Remarks: Please clear by: Oct 22. Thank you

S/S Officer:

Laurel Shea Gallivan
LAUREL SHEA GALLIVAN

DCS

CROSSHATCH

Return Time-Stamped Coversheet to S/S

ORIGINAL

UNCLASSIFIED

10/20
DEB by mwb
LT by mwb
AL JRS by mwb
WEC LJJ
DAH
P
S/S-C
NSCS
S/S
S/S-0

EB/TDC/MTA/STA:L TAMLYN:LT
10/19/94 647-6324 SESTRADE 010308 94 EBL 0105
EAP/K:D E BROWN

EB:A LARSON, EB/TDC:J R SHELTON, EB/TDC/MTA:W E CRAFT,
EB/TDC/MTA/STA:L J LANGE, EAP/K:D A HUTCHENS
P:BHALL,S/S-C:TFILIPEK,NSCS:
S/S:

ROUTINE SEOUL

ROUTINE GENEVA

GENEVA FOR USTR

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: WTO, KS, GATT

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT KIM'S LETTER
ON WTO CANDIDATE

1. POST IS REQUESTED TO TRANSMIT THE FOLLOWING LETTER
FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT KIM IN RESPONSE TO
PRESIDENT KIM'S LETTER CONCERNING THE CANDIDACY OF
MINISTER CHULSU KIM FOR DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION {WTO}. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR RECENT LETTER CONCERNING THE CANDIDACY
OF MINISTER CHULSU KIM FOR THE POST OF DIRECTOR GENERAL
OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION {WTO}. I APPRECIATE YOUR
COUNTRY'S COMMITMENT TO THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM
AS DEMONSTRATED BY THE DECISION TO PRESENT MINISTER KIM'S
CANDIDACY.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

1

THE UNITED STATES IS PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN ENSURING THAT THE WTO BENEFITS FROM LEADERSHIP PREPARED TO LOOK AHEAD TO THE CHALLENGING NEW TRADE ISSUES FACING THE MULTILATERAL SYSTEM. THE NEW LEADER WILL ALSO HAVE TO GUIDE THE ORGANIZATION THROUGH THE TRANSITION FROM THE GATT, AS WELL AS OVERSEEING FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS.

MINISTER KIM'S CREDENTIALS ARE IMPRESSIVE, AND HE IS AN EXCELLENT CANDIDATE FOR THIS IMPORTANT POSITION. PLEASE BE ASSURED THAT WE WILL GIVE EVERY CONSIDERATION TO MINISTER KIM'S CANDIDACY.

I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU AT THE APEC LEADERS' MEETING IN NOVEMBER IN BOGOR, INDONESIA.

SINCERELY,

WILLIAM J. CLINTON.

HIS EXCELLENCY
KIM YOUNG SAM
PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF KOREA
SEOUL
END TEXT.

YY


UNCLASSIFIED

Washfax Receipt

Department of State

B

S/S #



002421

Message No. _____ Classification SECRET No. Pages 3

From: MARISA R. LINO S/S 647-5302 7224
(Office name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

Message Description CABLE TO SEOUL - KOREAN EMBASSY DISCUSSES GENEVA
AGREEMENT, TEAM SPIRIT

To (Agency):	Deliver To:	Extension	Room No.
NSCS	Nancy Goddard	456-6534	WHSITRM
	Will Itah		
	Andy Sens		
	Executive Secretariat		
	Poneman Bell Roth		
	Hoki Hahn Suettinger		

For: Clearance ☒ Information ☐ Per Request ☐ Comment ☐

Remarks: Please clear by: MUST GO BEFORE 10 P.M. WASHINGTON TIME
OCTOBER 20. NSC POC IS DAN PONEMAN (HOME - 703-765-2912)

S/S Officer:

Jo Korb for
MARISA R. LINO

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: (W) Date: 12/30/14

2009-0528-F

CROSSHATCH

Return Time-Stamped Coversheet to S/S

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007. cable	Korean Embassy Discusses Geneva Agreement, Team Spirit (3 pages)	10/20/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Stanley Roth (Asian Affairs)
OA/Box Number: 405

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea, July-December, 1994 [4]

2009-0528-F

kc1348

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Washfax Receipt
Department of State

B

94 OCT 17 11:32

S/S #

OK - No changes

Message No. 012180 Classification ~~SECRET~~ No. Pages 3

From: MARISA R. LINO S/S 647-5302 7224
(Office name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

Message Description CABLE TO GENEVA: ROKG AMBASSADOR ON PUBLIC PORTRAYAL
OF FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT

<u>To (Agency):</u>	<u>Deliver To:</u>	<u>Extension</u>	<u>Room No.</u>
<u>NSCS</u>	<u>Nancy Soderberg</u>	<u>456-6534</u>	<u>WHSITRM</u>
	<u>Will Kelt</u>		
	<u>Andy Sens</u>		
	<u>Executive Secretariat</u>		
	<u>Pencman Roth</u>		
	<u>Aoki</u>	<u>Sue Higgins</u>	

For: Clearance ☒ Information ☐ Per Request ☐ Comment ☐

Remarks: Please clear by: Oct. 18

8/8 Officer: *Marisa R. Lino*

MARISA R. LINO

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: ML Date: 12/30/14

2009-0528-F

CROSSHATCH

Return Time-Stamped Coversheet to 8/8

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008. cable	ROKG Ambassador on Public Portrayal of Framework Agreement (3 pages)	10/14/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Stanley Roth (Asian Affairs)
OA/Box Number: 405

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea, July-December, 1994 [4]

2009-0528-F

kc1348

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]