

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title:

Korea, January-June, 1994 [5]

Staff Office-Individual:

Asian Affairs-Roth, Stanley

Original OA/ID Number:

405

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
30	3	3	3	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	action, Daniel Poneman for Anthony Lake re North Korean Food Shortages (1 page)	05/16/1994	P1/b(1)
001b. memo	information, Anthony Lake to POTUS re North Korea (1 page)	c 05/1994	P1/b(1)
001c. note	handwritten, Berger to Poneman and Roth, cc Lake re food shortages (1 page)	05/11/1994	P1/b(1)
002. cable	Chinese Message (5 pages)	05/09/1994	P1/b(1)
003. letter	Minister Kang to Ambassador Gallucci re third round of talks (3 pages)	05/12/1994	P1/b(1)
004. cable	IAEA Inspections (3 pages)	05/07/1994	P1/b(1)
005. notes	re Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of NSC Principals' Committee (2 pages)	05/07/1994	P1/b(1)
006. fax	cover sheet, re Notice of Meeting (parital) (1 page)	05/07/1994	b(7)(C)
007. cable	IAEA Response (2 pages)	04/29/1994	P1/b(1)
008. letter	Minister Kang to Ambassador Gallucci re talks (3 pages)	05/05/1994	P1/b(1)
009. letter	Ambassador Gallucci to Minister Kang re negotiated resolution (3 pages)	05/02/1994	P1/b(1)
010. cable	Proposed reply to Kang letter (4 pages)	04/20/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Stanley Roth (Asian Affairs)
OA/Box Number: 405

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea, January-June, 1994 [5]

2009-0528-F

kc1335

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
011. cable	Instructions for Discussions (4 pages)	04/13/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Stanley Roth (Asian Affairs)
OA/Box Number: 405

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea, January-June, 1994 [5]

2009-0528-F

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Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. memo	information, Anthony Lake to POTUS re North Korea (1 page)	c 05/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Stanley Roth (Asian Affairs)
OA/Box Number: 405

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea, January-June, 1994 [5]

2009-0528-F

kc1335

RESTRICTION CODES

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involved in academics, sports, cultural and certain other areas. This change in regulations to facilitate unofficial, non-governmental exchanges with North Korea is consistent with current U.S. foreign policy under President Bush.

The steps taken in January, February and April 1989 implemented the policy initiative announced by the U.S. Government on October 31, 1988, to encourage a dialogue between North and South Korea and their respective allies.¹¹

Authority: Sec. 5(b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917 [P.L. 65-91; 12 U.S.C. 95a]; 31 CFR Part 500.569, as amended (54 F.R. 21, 11185).

See December 17, 1950, for original sanction.

FEBRUARY 2, 1989 -- MODIFIED: FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

An amendment in the Trade Act of 1988, ending the authority of the President to prohibit or regulate the exportation or importation of any informational materials not controlled for national security reasons, terminated previous prohibitions contained in the Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917. New Foreign Assets Control Regulations came into effect allowing the exportation of informational materials to North Korea and all financial transactions directly related to the purchase and shipping of the materials.

Authority: Sec. 2502(a)(1) of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act [P.L. 100-418; 102 Stat. 1107] amended the Trading With the Enemy Act [P.L. 65-91; 50 U.S.C. App. 5(b)]; 31 CFR Part 500.206 (54 F.R. 5229).

See December 17, 1950, for original sanction.

APRIL 24, 1989 -- MODIFIED: TRADE EMBARGO

Part 785 of the Export Administration Regulations was amended to allow the export to North Korea of commercially-supplied goods intended to meet basic human needs. The Regulations stipulated shipments would be authorized under an individual validated license on a case-by-case basis. This was the last of several policy changes intended to support South Korea's initiative to improve relations with the North and to encourage North Korea to end its policy of confrontation and international terrorism.¹²

Authority: 15 CFR Part 785.1, as amended (54 F.R. 16360).

See June 28, 1950, for original sanction.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001c. note	handwritten, Berger to Poneman and Roth, cc Lake re food shortages (1 page)	05/11/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Stanley Roth (Asian Affairs)
OA/Box Number: 405

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea, January-June, 1994 [5]

2009-0528-F
kcl335

RESTRICTION CODES

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Kare

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

13-May-1994 15:43 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Roseanne M. Hill
(HILLR)

SUBJECT: crosshatch 004036

Mr. Suettinger and Mr. Roth clear on the subject crosshatch
without change for the Asian Affairs Office.

Distribution:

FOR: Steven Aoki	(AOKI)
FOR: Daniel B. Poneman	(PONEMAN)
FOR: Robert G. Bell	(BELL)
FOR: Steven P. Andreasen	(ANDREASEN)
FOR: M. Brooke Darby	(DARBY)
FOR: Wendy E. Gray	(GRAY)
FOR: Brenda I. Hilliard	(HILLIARD)
FOR: M. Kay LaPlante	(LAPLANTE)
FOR: Cathy Millison	(MILLISON)
FOR: Allison M. Wright	(WRIGHT)
FOR: Ardenia R. Hawkins	(HAWKINS)
FOR: Katherine E. O'Loughlin	(OLOUGHLIN@WHSR@CCGATE@VAXA)
FOR: David R. Bailey	(BAILEY@WHSR@CCGATE@VAXA)
FOR: Stephen G. Niemerski	(NIEMERSKI@WHSR@CCGATE@VAXA)
FOR: Miles R. Murphy	(MURPHY@WHSR@CCGATE@VAXA)
CC: Non Records	(NONRECORD)
CC: Mary E. Quinn	(QUINN)
CC: Joan Edwards	(EDWARDS)

94 MAY 11 PB:38

Washfax Receipt

Department of State



S/S #

*Already
cleared by
plane*

Message No. 004036 Classification ~~SECRET~~ No. Pages 5

From: Ross Wilson S/S 647-5302 7224
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

Message Description CABLE TO BEIJING: MINISTER YANG DELIVERS CHINESE
MESSAGE ON THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR ISSUE TO A/S GALLUCCI
5/9.

<u>To (Agency):</u>	<u>Deliver To:</u>	<u>Extension</u>	<u>Room No.</u>
<u>NSCS</u>	<u>[REDACTED]</u>	<u>456-6534</u>	<u>WHSITRM</u>
	<u>[REDACTED]</u>		
	<u>Kristie Kenney</u>		
	<u>Executive Secretariat</u>		
	<u>ROTH FOWLER BELL</u>		
	<u>SVETINGER AOKI ANDRESEN</u>		

For: Clearance ☒ Information ☐ Per Request ☐ Comment ☐

Remarks: Please clear by: 5/11. MUST GO. This reporting message also contains
instructions/language for Embassy to use in responding to Chinese

S/S Officer: [Signature] GOR
Ross Wilson

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: W Date: 12/01/14

2009-0528-F **CROSSHATCH**

Return Time-Stamped Coversheet to S/S

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. cable	Chinese Message (5 pages)	05/09/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Stanley Roth (Asian Affairs)
OA/Box Number: 405

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea, January-June, 1994 [5]

2009-0528-F

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9404615
RECEIVED: 09 JUN 94 17

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: KIM YOUNG SAM

DOC DATE: 12 MAY 94
SOURCE REF: 9413064

KEYWORDS: KOREA SOUTH

HS

D/Krea

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: THANK YOU LTR RE 1994 WORLD CUP COMMEMORATIVE COINS

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES

DUE DATE: 13 JUN 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: NONE

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

AOKI
BAKER JANE
GRAY
KENNEY
KRISTOFF
ROTH
SODERBERG
WOLIN

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By *W* NARA, Date *12/01/14*
2009-0528-F

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJWF

CLOSED BY: NSJWF

DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9404615

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001

X 94060917 FOR RECORD PURPOSES

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By CU NARA, Date 12/01/914
2009-0528-F

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



S/S 9413064 4615

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

June 7, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. William Itoh
Executive Secretary
National Security Council Staff
The White House

SUBJECT: Alerting NSCS on Presidential
Correspondence

Enclosed is the original of a letter to President Clinton from South Korean President Kim Young Sam which is transmitted for your information.

This correspondence was received in the Information Resources Management Section of the Executive Secretariat on June 7, 1994. A copy has been assigned to the appropriate bureau for action.

Chief, S/S-IRM/RMD
Information Resources Management Section
Records Management Division
Executive Secretariat
647-2991

President of the Republic of Korea

(Translation)

May 12, 1994

Dear Mr. President :

It is with deep sense of gratitude that I received the beautiful collection of the 1994 World Cup commemorative coins which you sent me. No doubt, these commemorative coins will invariably serve as a precious reminder of this year's World Cup tournament.

I firmly believe that with the enthusiastic support and cooperation of American people, the World Cup games scheduled for this summer will be a great success. Moreover, I hope that this tournament will bring forth an opportunity for unity and friendship among the peoples of the world.

Thank you again for your thoughtfulness. I wish you continued good health and every success.

Sincerely yours,

/S/ Kim Young Sam

His Excellency
Bill Clinton
President of the United States of America

대한민국 대통령

1994년 5월 12일

각 하,

각하께서 '94 월드컵 기념주화 한 세트를 보내주신데 대해 감사드립니다. 보내주신 기념주화는 이번 월드컵대회를 기억하는 소중한 추억이 될 것입니다.

본인은 금년 여름 개최되는 월드컵대회가 모든 미국인들의 열렬한 성원과 협조속에 성공적으로 개최되리라 믿으며, 이번 대회를 통하여 전 세계인들이 다시한번 화합과 우정을 나누는 계기가 되기를 바랍니다.

각하의 후의에 다시 한번 감사드리며, 건안을 기원합니다.

김영삼

미합중국 대통령
빌 클린턴 각하

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. letter	Minister Kang to Ambassador Gallucci re third round of talks (3 pages)	05/12/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

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National Security Council
Stanley Roth (Asian Affairs)
OA/Box Number: 405

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea, January-June, 1994 [5]

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

09-May-1994 17:33 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Roseanne M. Hill
(HILLR)

SUBJECT: Crosshatch 003855 Calbe to US VIENNA

Mr. Roth and Mr. Suettinger clear the subject crosshatch
without change for the Asian Affairs Office.


Distribution:

FOR: M. Brooke Darby	(DARBY)
FOR: Wendy E. Gray	(GRAY)
FOR: Brenda I. Hilliard	(HILLIARD)
FOR: M. Kay LaPlante	(LAPLANTE)
FOR: Cathy Millison	(MILLISON)
FOR: Allison M. Wright	(WRIGHT)
FOR: Ardenia R. Hawkins	(HAWKINS)
FOR: Katherine E. O'Loughlin	(OLOUGHLIN@WHSR@CCGATE@VAXA
FOR: David R. Bailey	(BAILEY@WHSR@CCGATE@VAXA)
FOR: Stephen G. Niemerski	(NIEMERSKI@WHSR@CCGATE@VAXA
FOR: Elisabeth A. Healey	(HEALEY@WHSR@CCGATE@VAXA)
FOR: Miles R. Murphy	(MURPHY@WHSR@CCGATE@VAXA)
CC: Records	(RECORDS)
CC: Daniel B. Poneman	(PONEMAN)
CC: Steven Aoki	(AOKI)
CC: Stanley O. Roth	(ROTHS)
CC: Robert L. Suettinger	(SUETTINGER)

Washfax Receipt

Department of State

B



'94 MAY -7 P2:59

S/S #

[Handwritten signature]

003855

Message No. _____ Classification SECRET No. Pages 3

From: Max Robinson S/S 647-8448 7224
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

Message Description CABLE TO USVIENNA: IAEA INSPECTIONS OF NORTH KOREA

To (Agency):	Deliver To:	Extension	Room No.
NSCS	XXXXXXXXXX	456-6534	WHSITRM
	XXXXXXXXXX		
	Kristie Kenney		
	Executive Secretariat		
	ROTH POWEMAN		
	SWEETINGER ADFI		

For: Clearance ☒ Information ☐ Per Request ☐ Comment ☐

Remarks: PLEASE CLEAR BY: MAY 7, 1994 **MUST GO **

THESE INSTRUCTIONS MUST BE AT POST NO LATER THAN MONDAY, MAY 9

TO CONVEY THE NEW U.S. STRATEGY TO HOST COUNTRY OFFICIALS.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: CR Date: 12/01/14

2009-0528-F

S/S Officer: *[Signature]*
Max Robinson

CROSSHATCH

Return Time-Stamped Coversheet to S/S

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. cable	IAEA Inspections (3 pages)	05/07/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Stanley Roth (Asian Affairs)
OA/Box Number: 405

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea, January-June, 1994 [5]

2009-0528-F

kc1335

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: FURSE, ELIZABETH

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 09 MAY 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOREA NORTH
NAVY

NON PROLIFERATION
CO

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NORTH KOREA

ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE: 15 APR 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PONEMAN

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
WH STRIPPING DESK

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
AOKI
NSC CHRON
PONEMAN
ROSNER
SUETTINGER

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJDA

CLOSED BY: NSGP

DOC 4 OF 4

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9402801

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 KRISTOFF	Z 94041211	PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE
001	Z 94041316	ACTION TRANSFERRED
001 PONEMAN	Z 94041316	PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE
002 LAKE	Z 94050321	FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR SIG
003 PRESIDENT	Z 94050620	FOR SIGNATURE
004	X 94051019	PRESIDENT SGD LTR
004 WH STRIPPING DESK	X 94051019	FOR DISPATCH

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

003	940506		VICE PRESIDENT
003	940506		WH CHIEF OF STAFF
004	940509	FURSE, ELIZABETH	
004	940509	WH STRIPPING DESK	

UNCLASSIFIED

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 9, 1994

Dear Elizabeth:

Thank you for your letter on our policy towards North Korea. I agree that we should seek to resolve the nuclear issue through diplomatic means. We have consistently said that if North Korea honors its nonproliferation obligations, the way is open to better political and economic relations with the United States and other nations.

At the same time, I cannot ignore the threat posed by North Korea's nuclear program and conventional military to our ally, South Korea, and to the U.S. troops stationed there. To do so could invite aggression. We are therefore taking prudent measures to ensure that our military forces can continue to carry out their mission of defending South Korea.

I look forward to working with the Congress on a clear and steady policy to achieve a nonnuclear Korean peninsula and a strong nonproliferation regime.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Bill", written in a cursive, stylized script.

The Honorable Elizabeth Furse
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

ELIZABETH FURSE

1ST DISTRICT, OREGON

COMMITTEES:

BANKING, FINANCE
AND URBAN AFFAIRS

SUBCOMMITTEES:

HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

CONSUMER CREDIT AND INSURANCE

MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES

SUBCOMMITTEES:

ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES

MERCHANT MARINE

ARMED SERVICES

SUBCOMMITTEES:

RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-3701

360335

OREGON OFFICE:

MONTGOMERY PARK
2701 NW VAUGHN #880
PORTLAND, OR 97210
(503) 328-2901

WASHINGTON OFFICE

316 CANNON BUILDING
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, DC 20515
(202) 225-0855

April 8, 1994

The Honorable William J. Clinton
President of the United States
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:


The level of saber-rattling I see going on in our present relationship with North Korea is very disturbing. While no one condones the production of fissile material or nuclear weapons as the U.S. alleges North Korea may be doing, it is not in the best interests of the United States to be preparing for war with that nation. I believe we should be pursuing a policy whose ultimate objective includes normalization of relations with North Korea, rather than escalating tensions.

I am extremely concerned that we are sending additional weapons systems, conducting the Team Spirit war games and considering a naval blockade. We need to bring the tools of conflict resolution and continuing diplomacy to this situation, and be about working toward developing relations and eventually trading with North Korea.

According to recent press reports, South Koreans do not seem to be nearly so concerned about North Korea's intentions as the U.S. Perhaps they are aware that North and South Koreans are the same people and have a greater motivation to normalize relations than go to war with North Korea.

I look forward to hearing from you regarding the conflict resolution actions the U.S. is or could be taking at this time.

Sincerely,



Elizabeth Furse
Member of Congress

cc: The Honorable Ron Dellums, Chairman
House Armed Services Committee

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 6, 1994

94 MAY 6 P8:19

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE
PAT GRIFFIN *for PL*

SUBJECT: North Korea

Purpose

To respond to Representative Furse (D-OR) about North Korea.

Background

Representative Furse expresses concern at the level of saber-rattling she perceives in our policy towards North Korea and urges us to utilize conflict resolution tools and diplomacy to resolve the crisis.

North Korea may be close to agreement with the IAEA on allowing inspectors to observe the unloading of its nuclear reactor. We have coordinated with South Korea on a proposal that, if accepted by the North, would permit resumption of U.S.-DPRK dialogue. At the same time, we are continuing prudent upgrades to the defensive capabilities of our military forces in the South.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the proposed response at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A	Proposed Response
Tab B	Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON D.C. 20506

April 27, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: DANIEL PONEMAN *DP*

FROM: STEVEN AOKI *SA*

SUBJECT: North Korea

Attached is a proposed response to Representative Furse (D-OR), who wrote the President about North Korea.

Concurrences by: *SA* Robert Suettinger, *JP* Jeremy Rosner

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Proposed Response
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By (10) NARA, Date 12/01/14
2009-0528-F

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

2801

ID# 060335

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: APRIL 18, 1994

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE ELIZABETH FURSE

SUBJECT: EXPRESSES CONCERN REGARDING U.S. AND NORTH
KOREA

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY (STAFF NAME)		ACTION		DISPOSITION	
		ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C COMPLETED D YY/MM/DD
PATRICK GRIFFIN		ORG	94/04/18		C 94/04/18
WILLIAM ITOH	REFERRAL NOTE:	RSA	94/04/18		- - - / - / -
	REFERRAL NOTE:		- - - / - / -		- - - / - / -
	REFERRAL NOTE:		- - - / - / -		- - - / - / -
	REFERRAL NOTE:		- - - / - / -		- - - / - / -
	REFERRAL NOTE:		- - - / - / -		- - - / - / -

COMMENTS:

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: 1230 _____
 _____ MAIL USER CODES: (A) D OR (B) _____ (C) _____

```

*****
*ACTION CODES:          *DISPOSITION          *OUTGOING          *
*                      *                      *CORRESPONDENCE:   *
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION  *A-ANSWERED          *TYPE RESP=INITIALS *
*C-COMMENT/RECOM       *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL  *          OF SIGNER *
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE      *C-COMPLETED        *          CODE = A   *
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET  *S-SUSPENDED        *COMPLETED = DATE OF *
*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC*                      *          OUTGOING  *
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *                      *                      *
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE       *                      *                      *
*X-INTERIM REPLY       *                      *                      *
*****
  
```

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
 (ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590
 KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
 LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
 MANAGEMENT.

SCANNED

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

(File)

May 9, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM:

DANIEL PONEMAN *DP*

SUBJECT:

Summary of Conclusions from Principals' Meeting on
May 7, 1994, on North Korea

Attached at Tab I is the Summary of Conclusions from the
Principals' meeting held on May 7, 1994.

Concurrence by:

Stanley Roth *SR*RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize William Itoh to file the Summary attached at
Tab I for record purposes.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memo to Counterparts

Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By *CU* NARA, Date *12/01/14*
2009-0528-F

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. notes	re Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of NSC Principals' Committee (2 pages)	05/07/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Stanley Roth (Asian Affairs)
OA/Box Number: 405

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea, January-June, 1994 [5]

2009-0528-F

kc1335

RESTRICTION CODES

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 06 MAY 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOREA NORTH
AGENDA

PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 7 MAY PC MTG ON NORTH KOREA

ACTION: ITOH SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DUE DATE: 10 MAY 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: AOKI

LOGREF:

FILES: IFG

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

AOKI
BERGER
DARBY
LAKE
MILLISON
NSC CHRON
PONEMAN
ROTH
SODERBERG

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By W NARA, Date 12/01/14
2009-0528-F

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____

DATE 5/6

BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSKDB

CLOSED BY: NSKDB

DOC 2 OF 2

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9420572
DATE 06 MAY 94

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 7 MAY PC MTG ON NORTH KOREA

DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 290, OEOb WASHINGTON, DC 20506	_____	_____	_____ COPY: <u>1</u>
MR. MARC GROSSMAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520	_____	_____	_____ COPY: <u>1</u>
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505	_____	_____	_____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>
COL. T. R. PATRICK JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ROOM 2E865 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001	_____	_____	_____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: GD Date: 12/01/14
2009-0528-F

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOb

PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9420572
DATE 06 MAY 94

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 7 MAY PC MTG ON NORTH KOREA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MS. BARBARA STARR ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT AGENCY ROOM 5933, NEW STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20451	_____	_____	_____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: (M) Date: 12/01/14
2009-0528-F

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 GEORGE
PAGE 02 OF 01 PAGES

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
-6 MAY 94
7:28

WASHFAX
TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

-6 MAY 94 19 38
NMCC/JCS

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: Phh

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. 829 CLASSIFICATION SECRET PAGES 2

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) (202) 456-2585 (PHONE NUMBER) West Wing Desk (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION NOTIFICATION OF 7 MAY PC MTG ON NORTH KOREA

NSC LOG # 20572

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
ACDA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: DA Date: 12/01/14

2009-0528-F

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. fax	cover sheet, re Notice of Meeting (parital) (1 page)	05/07/1994	b(7)(C)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Stanley Roth (Asian Affairs)
OA/Box Number: 405

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea, January-June, 1994 [5]

2009-0528-F

kc1335

RESTRICTION CODES

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~

[006]

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

WHSR CONTROL
TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE

- ☐ FLASH
☒ IMMEDIATE
☐ PRIORITY
☐ ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

NSC LOG # 20572

FROM: National Security Council ~~PH~~ PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR
SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting 7 MAY PC MTG ON NORTH KOREA PAGES: 2

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
<u>USUN New York</u>	<u>Mr. Rick Inderfurth</u>	<u>212-415-4016</u>	<u>(b)(7)c</u>

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: DA Date: 12/04/14
2009-0528-F

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

May 6, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs
Office of the Vice President

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COLONEL ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the UN
U.S. Department of State


COLONEL T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MS. BARBARA STARR
Executive Secretary
Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency

SUBJECT: Meeting of the Principals on North Korea (S)

A Principals' meeting will be held on Saturday, May 7, 1994, at 8:45 a.m. to 9:30 a.m. in the White House Situation Room. Attendance will be limited to principals only. (S)

State will circulate an options paper separately. An agenda is attached. (S)


William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By DU NARA, Date 12/01/14
2009-0528-5

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL PRINCIPALS' COMMITTEE MEETING

DATE: May 7, 1994
LOCATION: SITUATION ROOM
TIME: 8:45 a.m. - 9:30 a.m.

NEXT STEPS ON NORTH KOREA

Agenda

- I. Introduction NSC
- II. Intelligence Update CIA
- III. Security Update Defense
- IV. Diplomatic Next Steps State
 - A. IAEA
 - B. Responding to North Korea
 - C. China
 - D. Other
- V. Congressional/Public Diplomacy State
- VI. Discussion All Participants
- VII. Conclusion NSC

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By DA NARA, Date 12/01/14
2009-0528-F

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET/PLUTO~~

20572

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 6, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: DANIEL PONEMAN *DP*

FROM: STEVEN AOKI *SA*

SUBJECT: Principals' Meeting on North Korea, May 7, 1994
from 8:45 a.m. to 9:30 a.m.

Attached at Tab I is a proposed meeting notice for the
Principals' meeting on North Korea. An agenda for the meeting is
at Tab A.

Concurrence by: *SR* Stanley Roth

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize William Itoh to sign the memorandum at Tab I
and approve the Agenda at Tab A.

Approve *SR* Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Signature
Tab A Agenda

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By *SA* NARA, Date *12/01/14*

2009-0528-F

~~SECRET/PLUTO~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

Washfax Receipt
Department of State**B**

S/S #

ABR 29 P10:20

DEFERRED
to date 4/29
on 4/29
Roth
1995 APR 29 PM 10:28Message No. 003475 Classification **~~SECRET~~** No. Pages 2From: Ross Wilson S/S 647-5302 7224
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)Message Description CABLE TO USVIENNA: IAEA RESPONSE TO DPRK

To (Agency):	Deliver To:	Extension	Room No.
NSCS	Nancy Soderberg	456-6534	WHSITRM
	William		
	Kristle Kenney		
	Executive Secretariat		
	Poneman Roth		
	Aoki Suthinger		

For: Clearance ☒ Information ☐ Per Request ☐ Comment ☐Remarks: PLEASE CLEAR BY: 4/29. URGENT. NSCS POC B
D. Poneman.UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTSInitials: (W) Date: 12/01/14

2009-0528-F

9/9 Officer: Ross Wilson

Ross Wilson

CROSSHATCH

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007. cable	IAEA Response (2 pages)	04/29/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Stanley Roth (Asian Affairs)
OA/Box Number: 405

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea, January-June, 1994 [5]

2009-0528-F

kc1335

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Press Conference Transcript

Seoul, R.O.K.

1 (The press conference convened at 0916 hours, 21 April
2 1994.)

3 MS. DeLASKI: Okay. He will make an opening statement
4 for you and then he will take some of your questions before we go
5 off to visit some troops. So with that, I give you Dr. Perry.

6 (Translation by the interpreter.)

7 MR. PERRY: Good morning. My visit to the Republic
8 of Korea is at a time of high political tension, but I want to
9 emphasize that there is not high military tension. That
10 is--please.

11 (Translation by the interpreter.)

12 MR. PERRY: That is, there is no imminent danger of a
13 military confrontation on the Korean peninsula. This is my
14 judgment and it's also the judgment of your Minister of National
15 Defense Rhee.

16 (Translation by the interpreter.)

17 MR. PERRY: What talk you hear of occasionally in the
18 media of war is, I think, entirely inappropriate.

19 (Translation by the interpreter.)

20 MR. PERRY: Certainly it is true that the United
21 States will not initiate a war.

22 (Translation by the interpreter.)

23 MR. PERRY: The United States will not provoke a war
24 by any rash actions on the peninsula.

25 (Translation by the interpreter.)

OPTIONAL FORM 98 (7-90)

FAX TRANSMITTAL

of pages 16

To	Tom Ross	From	K DeLASKI
Dept./Agency	NSC	Phone	703-697-9312
Fax #	202-456-7705	Fax #	

NSN 7540-01-317-788 MOSS-101 GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

(2)

1 MR. PERRY: Indeed, all of our efforts have been
2 directed to diffuse the political tension through patient
3 diplomatic actions.

4 (Translation by the interpreter.)

5 MR. PERRY: And that while we will not provoke a war,
6 the United States also will not invite a war.

7 (Translation by the interpreter.)

8 MR. PERRY: That is, we will not invite a war by
9 showing a lack of commitment to the Republic of Korea, by showing
10 a lack of solidarity with the Republic of Korea, or by showing a
11 lack of readiness.

12 (Translation by the interpreter.)

13 MR. PERRY: To put that same point in a more positive
14 way, I am here to affirm, to reaffirm, the commitment of the
15 United States to the security of the Republic of Korea--

16 (Translation by the interpreter.)

17 MR. PERRY: --to assure the solidarity between the
18 United States and the Republic of Korea--

19 (Translation by the interpreter.)

20 MR. PERRY: --and to assure the readiness of our
21 combined forces.

22 (Translation by the interpreter.)

23 MR. PERRY: I had several very specific objectives
24 for making this trip this week.

25 (Translation by the interpreter.)

(3)

1 MR. PERRY: First of all, I wanted to establish a
2 friendship and mutual understanding between your Minister of
3 National Defense Rhee and myself.

4 (Translation by the interpreter.)

5 MR. PERRY: We both came into office just a few
6 months ago and because of the significance of this defense
7 alliance and the crisis on the peninsula caused by the North
8 Korean pursuit of a nuclear weapon, we felt that it was important
9 that we talk at this time and we meet face to face.

10 (Translation by the interpreter.)

11 MR. PERRY: I also wanted to obtain a firsthand
12 appraisal of our defense planning and the readiness of our
13 forces, and by "our" forces I mean the Republic of Korea and
14 United States combined forces.

15 (Translation by the interpreter.)

16 MR. PERRY: And, finally, through consultations with
17 Minister Rhee and other senior Republic of Korea leaders, I
18 wanted to exchange views with them on how the United States and
19 the Republic of Korea jointly assessed the problems in security
20 and ensure that we have a common strategy to deal with them.

21 (Translation by the interpreter.)

22 MR. PERRY: Minister Rhee and I have made
23 arrangements to establish classified telephones on our desks so
24 that we can continue our communications on a frequent basis and
25 I've also invited Minister Rhee to come to Washington at an early

(4)

1 date to continue our security dialogue.

2 (Translation by the interpreter.)

3 MR. PERRY: I can report to you that after intensive
4 discussions with Minister Rhee, Foreign Minister Han, National
5 Security Advisor Chang, and President Kim Yong Sam, that I
6 believe there is solid agreement among all of us on a joint
7 strategy regarding the North Korean nuclear issue and on how to
8 maintain a deterrent posture in force readiness while we attempt
9 to resolve this nuclear issue through diplomacy.

10 (Translation by the interpreter.)

11 MR. PERRY: I want to comment briefly on the Team
12 Spirit agreement which was released yesterday.

13 (Translation by the interpreter.)

14 MR. PERRY: Minister Rhee and I agreed that while we
15 have resumed planning so that Team Spirit '94 can be held in
16 November, we are still willing to suspend this defensive exercise
17 in the context of implementation of arrangements for a third
18 round of talks between the United States and the Democratic
19 People's Republic of Korea. In short, we still hope that
20 diplomacy will work.

21 (Translation by the interpreter.)

22 MR. PERRY: Today I will go, accompanied by Minister
23 Rhee and Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Lee, to
24 visit some Republic of Korea and United States military units.

25 (Translation by the interpreter.)

1 MR. PERRY: I am confident that this visit will
2 verify the findings I've made to date of a strong and close
3 defence alliance between our two countries.

4 (Translation by the interpreter.)

5 MR. PERRY: I am going to open for questions now. I
6 would like to alternate between questions from Korean reporters
7 and American reporters who are here. Let me start off with a
8 question from a Korean reporter.

9 (Translation by the interpreter.)

10 (Mr. Song, Korea Daily News)

11 (Translation of reporter by interpreter.)

12 MR. SONG: Last month, Secretary Perry, you met with
13 the press people and said that in addition to the force
14 augmentation of the U.S. forces in Korea, you will be
15 transferring military equipment to the Republic of Korea forces
16 to augment their vulnerabilities. And you also mentioned that
17 you will discuss these matters with General Luck when you visit
18 in April, Korea, and I understand that there has been some
19 concrete discussions of the possible transfer of the U.S. modern
20 technology equipment to Korea.

21 Can you elaborate on that?

22 MR. PERRY: We had discussions both with General Luck
23 and with Minister Rhee about the progress of the modernization of
24 the Republic of Korea forces here. There have been many
25 important improvements made over the last--initiated over the

1 last 6 to 12 months by the Republic of Korea, improvements which
2 we felt were very important to strengthening the readiness of the
3 Korean forces on the peninsula.

4 We also discussed measures that involved assistance from
5 the U.S.. We discussed the, what I would call, pre-positioning
6 of equipment.

7 As some of you, perhaps, know, we decided in our
8 bottoms-up review last year, which was our basic planning
9 document, that we should put a greater emphasis on having
10 equipment pre-positioned in ships. And the equipment on those
11 ships, which would be the heavy equipment that goes for armored
12 brigades, for example, would be available to Korea in the event
13 of any military crisis here.

14 Charlie--

15 JAIMIE MCINTYRE: There needs to be a translation.

16 (Translation by the interpreter.)

17 CHARLIE ALDINGER: Dr. Perry, I'd like to ask you
18 about another area of the world which you would probably agree
19 that is another area of both political and military crisis, and
20 that's Bosnia.

21 President Clinton said today that the U.S.--the new
22 U.S./UN plan would create a Sarajevo-like cocoon, perhaps,
23 cluttered around six of the enclaves--of the six enclaves in
24 Bosnia. The Serbs have not shown any steps to be cooperative.
25 Would you rule out as part of that plan any strategic strikes

1 The exact details of how the plan is to be worked out remain
2 ahead of us yet.

3 (Translation by the interpreter.)

4 (Mr. Lee, Hanguk Daily News.)

5 (Translation of reporter by interpreter.)

6 MR. LEE: Mr. Secretary, as the problem solver for
7 war and peace, I hope you make a lot of contributions during your
8 tenure.

9 My first question is concerning your recent newspaper
10 interview in which you said that in order to prevent a North
11 Korean nuclear program you will take the risk of experiencing
12 another war in the Korean peninsula, if that is necessary, to
13 prevent from North Korea--North Korea from developing nuclear
14 weapons.

15 Does that mean that North Korea now has the
16 weapon--nuclear weapon or does that translate that they still do
17 not have any nuclear weapons?

18 Number 2 is concerning Patriot deployment. As you know,
19 in Korea there are some Congressmen and some opposition leaders
20 and some students' groups who are against deployment of the
21 Patriot missile to Korea, and if the tension on the Korean
22 peninsula decreases, does that mean that you will be able to--
23 That was the third question. The second question was, was there
24 any discussion about possible procurement by the Korean
25 government of the Patriot system for improving the defense of the

1 against Serbian targets, such as ammunition and fuel dumps and
2 supply lines to stand behind the threat?

3 (Translation by the interpreter.)

4 MR. PERRY: The plan or the proposal made by
5 President Clinton involves creating an exclusion zone around the
6 safe haven areas, and in this exclusion zone any heavy weapons
7 that are found will be subject to air attack by the NATO Air
8 Force.

9 In the course of this attack, it is proposed, also, that
10 related targets could also be attacked, including ammunition
11 dumps or supply areas. So, it is broader in that extent--to that
12 extent than the Sarajevo model.

13 I should mention, parenthetically, that in preparation of
14 this area of our plan, it was always envisioned that that would
15 be a backup tactic, if necessary, in Sarajevo. We have never had
16 to apply that air strike to Sarajevo so we have never had a
17 chance to see whether it was necessary to extend it beyond the
18 specific heavy weapon that was firing. But that was part of that
19 Sarajevo concept to begin with.

20 In terms of-- So, yes, that is--that is considered. It
21 differs from the Sarajevo plan-- I think that's all I'll say
22 about it right now. The important point to make at this stage is
23 that the proposal has been sent to the allies who would be
24 involved both in executing in the air and who would be affected
25 on the ground, and that's under intensive discussion right now.

(9)

1 Korean forces?

2 And number three was, if the situation in Korea enhances,
3 will the U.S. consider withdrawal of the Patriot systems?

4 And the number four question is, there are many
5 misunderstandings amongst Korean people about your role as the
6 Secretary of Defense, that is an arms seller. So, during this
7 visit to Korea, has there been any discussion about the selling
8 of the weapons system to the Republic of Korea?

9 MR. PERRY: You've got an awful lot in one question.
10 I'll see if I can deal briefly with each of those points.

11 (Translation by the interpreter.)

12 MR. PERRY: First of all, we intend to pursue
13 diplomacy, firmly and patiently, until or unless there is no hope
14 for success of diplomacy anymore.

15 (Translation by the interpreter.)

16 MR. PERRY: And if that happens, then we and the
17 Republic of Korea, together, would go to the United Nations and
18 propose that sanctions be imposed on North Korea.

19 (Translation by the interpreter.)

20 MR. PERRY: Secondly, in terms of the Patriot, it is
21 a purely defensive system. It is a system that has no offensive
22 capability at all and it is a part of a regular modernization
23 program. It has been planned, actually, for several years and
24 there's no reason to withdraw it. It's not here because of the
25 nuclear weapon program. It is designed to defend against

(10)

1 conventional SCUD attacks on airfields and ports and other
2 military installations,

3 (Translation by the interpreter.)

4 MR. PERRY: Third, let me make a point very clear, my
5 responsibility as Secretary of Defense is not to be a salesman
6 for U.S. equipment.

7 (Translation by the interpreter.)

8 MR. PERRY: My responsibility is to provide for the
9 joint readiness of the combined forces here in Korea to defend
10 this country.

11 (Translation by the interpreter.)

12 MR. PERRY: Most specifically, I have, at no time in
13 this meeting, including my meeting with Minister Rhee, I did not
14 discuss the procurement of the Patriot by Korea.

15 (Translation by the interpreter.)

16 MR. PERRY: Nor did I discuss the procurement of any
17 other American system by the Republic of Korea.

18 (Translation by the interpreter.)

19 MR. PERRY: Finally, on the question of the--whether
20 the North Koreans have zero or 1 or 2 bombs, let me see if I can
21 clarify that some.

22 (Translation by the interpreter.)

23 MR. PERRY: Because of the secret--secretive nature
24 of the North Korean government and society, it is difficult to
25 make fully confident estimates on every aspect of the North



1 Korean military forces.

2 (Translation by the interpreter.)

3 MR. PERRY: I will tell you, first of all, what we
4 know with full confidence, and that is that North Korea has a
5 major nuclear weapon program underway.

6 (Translation by the interpreter.)

7 MR. PERRY: We don't have the details of all of the
8 components of this program, but we know it includes a 25 mega
9 watt reactor, a 200 mega watt reactor under construction, a radio
10 chemistry laboratory, and high explosive testing facility.

11 (Translation by the interpreter.)

12 MR. PERRY: The only plausible explanation of these
13 facilities is a major nuclear weapons program.

14 (Translation by the interpreter.)

15 MR. PERRY: To have a complete nuclear weapons
16 program there have to be other components as well, which we do
17 not have detailed information about.

18 (Translation by the interpreter.)

19 MR. PERRY: Within weeks it will be necessary for the
20 North Koreans to remove the fuel, which is now in their 25 mega
21 watt reactor.

22 (Translation by the interpreter.)

23 MR. PERRY: This fuel would provide sufficient
24 plutonium to make 4 or 5 nuclear bombs.

(Translation by the interpreter.)

1 MR. PERRY: We believe that it is critical that that
2 operation be supervised closely by the Atomic Energy--
3 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

4 (Translation by the interpreter.)

5 MR. PERRY: At an earlier date, the North Koreans
6 removed a smaller amount of fuel from this reactor.

7 (Translation by the interpreter.)

8 MR. PERRY: We know that it was removed, but because
9 they did it, not under supervision, in fact, they did it without
10 observation at the time, we can only estimate how much fuel was
11 removed.

12 (Translation by the interpreter.)

13 MR. PERRY: We estimate that there was enough
14 plutonium in that fuel to make 1 or 2 bombs.

15 (Translation by the interpreter.)

16 MR. PERRY: We estimate that they probably have the
17 capability to convert that plutonium into bombs.

18 (Translation by the interpreter.)

19 MR. PERRY: And we estimate that they have had enough
20 time by now to have succeeded in doing that.

21 (Translation by the interpreter.)

22 MR. PERRY: Recently, Kim Woo Song made a statement
23 which we welcome, that North Korea has no bombs, no nuclear
24 bombs, no aspirations for nuclear bombs, and no secrets about
25 their nuclear bomb program.

13

1 (Translation by the interpreter.)

2 MR. PERRY: We call on him to allow the inspection of
3 the International Atomic Energy Agency so they can verify that
4 assertion as so it can remove the uncertainty in our present
5 estimates.

6 (Translation by the interpreter.)

7 MR. PERRY: Jaime.

8 MS. DeLASKI: I'm afraid Jaime is going to be the last
9 one.

10 JAIME McINTYRE: Okay, well then I'll have to ask
11 you about Bosnia if it's the last question.

12 Often at the Pentagon we've been given the rationale for
13 why the Sarajevo model might not apply to Gorazde, the small unit
14 fighting, the difficulty of targets, the lack of ground troops to
15 support the agreement. What has changed the thinking about that?
16 And the second part is will you then have to make adjustments in
17 numbers of ground troops, planes, or equipment to carry out this
18 proposal, if it's agreed to by the allies?

19 (Translation by the interpreter.)

20 MR. PERRY: First of all, let me clarify a point
21 which is that the role of the United States in Bosnia is not as
22 a combatant power. We are there to assist the peace-keeping
23 efforts going on by the United Nations.

24 (Translation by the interpreter.)

25 MR. PERRY: There has been real momentum in those

1 peace-keeping efforts during the last 2 months with the ultimatum
2 on Sarajevo, with the agreements in the Cienza (sic), and with
3 the peace agreement between--the tentative peace agreement
4 between the Croats and the Muslims.

5 (Translation by the interpreter.)

6 MR. PERRY: The Serbs shelling and assault on Gorazde
7 has been a real setback to the momentum of these peace
8 agreements.

9 (Translation by the interpreter.)

10 MR. PERRY: President Clinton's proposal is an
11 attempt to regain the momentum and to get back to the peace
12 agreement, the cessation of hostilities and the peace agreements.

13 (Translation by the interpreter.)

14 MR. PERRY: It is still not a decision for the United
15 States to become a combatant in the war.

16 (Translation by the interpreter.)

17 MR. PERRY: It's still limited to a U.S. and NATO
18 role as assisting in peace-keeping.

19 (Translation by the interpreter.)

20 MR. PERRY: It's still limited to the use of air
21 power. There is no decision in this proposal to use U.S. or NATO
22 ground combatant forces.

23 (Translation by the interpreter.)

24 MR. PERRY: And it is still not a proposal for
25 unilateral action. Whatever we're doing in Bosnia, we have to

(15)

1 take full account of the danger to the ground troops, UN ground
2 troops there, and any proposal has to be clearly coordinated with
3 the allies, both in the air and on the ground.

4 (Translation by the interpreter.)

5 MR. PERRY: Now with that background, let me try to
6 answer your question.

7 (Translation by the interpreter.)

8 MR. PERRY: The-- With those limitations, it is
9 clear that this proposal, even if accepted, will not guarantee
10 the security of the safe haven areas.

11 (Translation by the interpreter.)

12 MR. PERRY: But it will be very effective in reducing
13 the shelling that goes on into these cities and it will be very
14 effective in raising the price to the Serbs of continuing the
15 shelling.

16 (Translation by the interpreter.)

17 MR. PERRY: The real hope, real expectation, is that
18 this action will not be a decisive military action affecting the
19 battles going on into safe areas, but it will provide the impetus
20 to get back to the discussions, to get back to the cessation of
21 hostilities agreement and finally to a peace agreement in Bosnia.

22 (Translation by the interpreter.)

23 MR. PERRY: It is still a limited action dedicated to
24 supporting peace-keeping and if it is not successful, then we
25 will have to consider other actions.

1 (Translation by the interpreter.)

2 MR. PERRY: But we believe that when both combatants
3 on the ground, the Muslims and the Serbs, consider the situation
4 and consider the extent to which this dramatically increased use
5 of air power can affect it, that both sides will be willing to
6 agree to a cessation of hostilities.

7 (Translation by the interpreter.)

8 MR. PERRY: Finally, we do not see the requirement
9 for additional air power beyond what we already have in the
10 Adriatic and Aviano to carry out this ultimatum. We do believe
11 that additional United Nations peace-keeping forces will be
12 needed to go into the safe haven areas.

13 (Translation by the interpreter.)

14 MR. PERRY: Thank you very much.

15 (The press conference adjourned at 0955 hours, 21 April
16 1994.)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008. letter	Minister Kang to Ambassador Gallucci re talks (3 pages)	05/05/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Stanley Roth (Asian Affairs)
OA/Box Number: 405

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea, January-June, 1994 [5]

2009-0528-F

kc1335

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009. letter	Ambassador Gallucci to Minister Kang re negotiated resolution (3 pages)	05/02/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Stanley Roth (Asian Affairs)
OA/Box Number: 405

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea, January-June, 1994 [5]

2009-0528-F

kc1335

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DOC DATE: 26 APR 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOREA NORTH

MP

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: FULBRIGHT FELLOW & FORMER NEWS CORRESPONDENT RE RAIDO FREE ASIA &
INTERVIEWS W/ NORTH KOREAN DEFECTORS

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE

DUE DATE: 29 APR 94 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: ROTH

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FILES: PA

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5187 *Atty.*

Bradley K. Martin
3-302 Mansion Konri, 2-2-2 Rokugatsu
Adachi-ku, Tokyo 121 Japan
Tel./FAX (81-3) 3885-9899

April 9, 1994

Dr. Anthony Lake
National Security Advisor
The White House
Washington, D.C.


Dear Dr. Lake:

I am a Fulbright fellow, formerly a longtime correspondent for leading U.S. news organizations, currently at work on a book about North Korea. I'm taking the liberty of sending you on a confidential basis a paper I have prepared. It's too sensitive to publish in this form, I believe.

The paper sets out what I consider rather urgent findings regarding policy toward Pyongyang, based on my interviews in Seoul recently with a dozen North Korean defectors. Defectors told me their ex-countrymen not only believe that war against South Korea and the United States is inevitable; ordinary people actually *want* to go to war. As one defector put it: "The food shortage is terrible, grain-ration distributions are halted, so people figure they will either die of hunger or die in war. A hundred percent believe that North Korea would win, so they support war." Virtually the only bright spots in these interviews came when I asked about the proposed Radio Free Asia. Nearly all the defectors thought it could change North Korean attitudes.

I know you're very busy, but hope you and your colleagues can take the time to glance at the paper.

Sincerely,



North Koreans' War Fever and Radio Free Asia

By Bradley K. Martin

Summary and recommendations:

American policy toward North Korea has not sufficiently taken into account the fact that Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il consciously ratchet up external tensions, in order to channel domestic discontent away from their regime and thus preserve their power. The dynamic is fundamental to the political culture the elder Kim developed, unlikely to be reversed while they rule. Eventually it may well make coexistence with their regime impossible.

For a book in progress on North Korea, the author has conducted interviews with a dozen recent defectors from the North. Those interviews indicate that ***the Kim Il-sung-Kim Jong-il regime has inculcated in its subjects an expectation that war will break out. Worse, economic deprivation has transformed that popular expectation into an actual desire for war.***

The Kims themselves have a strong interest in averting a war that they know would devastate both halves of the peninsula and might leave them dead or imprisoned for war crimes. The conflict between that interest and what they teach their subjects creates an inherently unstable and dangerous situation. ***How long, after all, can they keep their people at fever pitch without giving them the war that they lust for?*** On the other hand, the alternative, which would be to relax external tensions, is unthinkable. The Kims know it would permit people to focus on internal causes of their troubles: the regime itself and the system it enforces.

Meanwhile, a populace eager to fight gives the Kims confidence that their war machine would perform single-mindedly in at least the crucial early stage of an attack on South Korea. That confidence no doubt contributes to the obduracy of North Korea's negotiators concerning nuclear inspections. And if the regime should get to the point of actively considering war, its ***confidence in the warlike mood of its people could make the option to fight more tempting than it might otherwise be.***

Facing this risk, the United States should move prudently but quickly to challenge the Kims' control over their subjects' minds.

Bradley Martin, longtime Asia correspondent for Newsweek, The Asian Wall Street Journal and The Baltimore Sun, now is a Fulbright research fellow based in Seoul and Tokyo. Publication of this paper in whole or in part without the author's express written permission is forbidden. ©1994

The most obvious means is to expedite the founding of Radio Free Asia's Korean-language service, giving it urgent priority among the various RFA broadcast services. Among other policy options now being considered, international economic sanctions or a strengthening of the American and South Korean military deterrent have the disadvantage that they would confirm North Koreans' image of the United States and South Koreans as predatory enemies. That would tend to inspire even greater unity of the people and the army around Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il. But cranking up Radio Free Asia in Korean should have the opposite effect. *The flow of information should enable ordinary people, military men and even some high officials to see that their interests differ from the Kims' interests.*

Of course, *a free flow of information would be perceived at the top in Pyongyang as a much greater threat to the regime than merely shoring up South Korea's military defenses.* And, although this thought should remain unspoken for now, no doubt the policy proposed could have the effect of hastening the downfall of the Kim Il-sung-Kim Jong-il regime--through an internal uprising or coup d'etat, or via collapse followed by merger with South Korea. South Koreans worry that a collapse would bring chaos. But *the Kim regime's collapse could hardly be worse than war.*

I thus recommend that RFA's Korean-language service *begin broadcasting as soon as possible.* Concerning a crucial technical question, it is well known that North Korean-made radios are fixed to the single official frequency. If those receivers remained the only ones available, Radio Free Asia broadcasts would fall on deaf ears in North Korea. But *in the last five years substantial numbers of people have acquired multi-frequency radios, mostly AM/FM,* my interviews reveal. To achieve the widest listenership, RFA's Korean-language service should *use medium-wave frequencies,* in addition to or instead of shortwave. Transmission could be from South Korea or perhaps from Khabarovsk in Russia.

To delay as long as possible the regime's angry response to RFA and its inevitable major crackdown on owners of multi-frequency radios, it is best to *avoid publicly describing the changes in availability of receiver equipment, since the top leadership in Pyongyang may not yet fully appreciate the extent of the changes. Radio Free Asia's crucial importance in overall U.S. strategy toward North Korea also should be played down publicly.* To avoid the appearance of singling out North Korea, at least one other RFA service should be started at the same time.

In an effort to preserve such options this paper is being distributed to a few concerned policymakers only, on a confidential basis. Details follow:

'War is coming, so let's get on with it':

Recent North Korean defectors to South Korea say their former countrymen believe almost to a person that another war against the United States and South Korea is inevitable. More horrifying still, the populace eagerly awaits the outbreak of hostilities, thinking that war would put an end to--and justify--years of hunger and sacrifice to build a war economy. After 1989, when they received what proved to be only a short-lived restoration of adequate food rations, North Koreans gradually lost hope that the economy could turn around so long as the peninsula remains divided. Over the last two or three years, the general attitude has become one of near-apocalyptic desperation. People await their salvation in the form of Korean reunification, to be achieved through the North's military victory.

Those popular attitudes increase the risks of another war on the peninsula. If fighting starts while North Koreans harbor such war fever, the Second Korean War may be bloodier than the first. Casualties will be enormous for all sides including the Americans. North Korean pronouncements have mentioned 1995 as the target date for reunifying the Korean peninsula. That year will mark a half century of rule by Kim Il-sung.

North Koreans' information sources:

Critics of the Radio Free Asia legislation focused on its plans for China. Typical was the argument that the Chinese already had access to plenty of straight news about their own country via phone, fax and satellite television--not to mention shortwave broadcasts from the British Broadcasting Corporation and the Voice of America.

No matter how those arguments play regarding China, they hardly apply to its smaller but far more troublesome neighbor. At present *no* regular source of straight news of North Korea is available to North Korean citizens. Forget using phone, fax or satellite T.V. as means of reaching substantial segments of the world's most tightly controlled and regimented populace. Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il for decades have isolated their subjects from outside influences. They see no reason to pull down the walls now, or to halt the massive indoctrination machinery that takes infants from their mothers' breasts to start teaching them fanatical devotion to a single view of reality.

Until around 1989, radio, too, could have been pretty much ruled out as a means of getting through to North Koreans. Most of the country's radios could be tuned only to the official frequency. Only certain members of the elite--diplomats, security officials and others whose work required

study of the outside world--had access to shortwave receivers and could listen to, say, the Voice of America's Korean-language broadcasts of world news.

Many more imported radios:

The regime's restrictions remain unchanged, but defectors report that the last five years have seen major expansion in ownership of imported radios, especially AM-FM radio/cassette-player combination units. In the case of those sold in North Korean foreign-currency stores, government personnel fixed the dials so that they could receive only official broadcasts. But the blockage is reversible. In many cases the radio owner removes the soldered blocking pin, listens to outside broadcasts and then solders it back every three or four months in time for the authorities' inspections of private radios. In other cases a person may own two radios: a legally altered one to show to the inspectors plus another, unaltered receiver, perhaps smuggled from China, that can be tuned to prohibited broadcasts.

Those defectors who mentioned the changes in radio-receiver availability during their interviews were, by and large, the most recent defectors. Some were on the margins of the elite, involved for some time in at least mildly dissident activities. People who defected earlier, ranked high in the elite or were assigned overseas at the time of their defections, on the other hand, tended to be unaware of the trend. They simply repeated the old truism that North Korean radios are fixed to a single frequency. Also, the only official North Korean pronouncement on Radio Free Asia that I have seen was not especially vociferous by Pyongyang standards.* These facts suggest that the top leadership itself may not be fully aware of the growth of capability to listen to foreign broadcasts--and thus may have a false sense of confidence that Radio Free Asia would not have a major impact. Any such sense of confidence should be encouraged for as long as possible, to allow RFA a head start on attracting listeners before any major crackdown begins.

The Pyongyang regime sooner or later will decry Radio Free Asia as a war provocation. Some American policymakers already see this concern as reason to go slow with RFA. It may be one factor behind what appears

* "This is an interference in the internal affairs of the DPRK and other Asian countries and a criminal act against them," said a Foreign Ministry spokesman in an interview with the official Korean Central News Agency. "What the United States really seeks to do in setting up the radio is to imbue the DPRK and other Asian countries with their "view of the value of American-style democracy" and the poison of bourgeois ideology, thus stifling socialism in this region and destroying the independent governments from within." *The People's Korea*, Tokyo, Feb. 12-19, 1994.

to be a lack of urgency in Washington regarding RFA's startup. However, against the danger that Radio Free Asia may provoke the Kims Washington must weigh the danger that benign neglect of the minds of North Koreans could itself lead to an explosion. If the issue remains too close to call, add into the balance the traditional American belief in truth as a liberating force.

Foreign broadcasts currently available:

Compiling the estimates of several defectors, it appears that around five to seven percent of the population now have the equipment to listen to broadcasts from outside and perhaps two percent actually do listen--at the risk of going to prison if they are caught. Unauthorized citizens daring to tune their AM-FM radios to foreign broadcasts usually listen to KBS-2, the educational service of Seoul's Korean Broadcasting System, or to Korean-language broadcasting from Yanbian, the ethnic Korean region of China just across the border.

While those broadcasts help change attitudes, their programming is not particularly specific to North Korea, defectors say. North Koreans may have to listen to the neighboring-country stations for years before they hear much to arouse serious doubts about their own leaders' statements and policies. With little news or analysis of North Korea itself, programs do not directly challenge North Korean listeners to recognize the connection between the poverty and repression all know they are experiencing and Kim Il-sung's Stalinist system. It is a connection that they are taught to ignore, in favor of blaming the United States and South Korea for their troubles.

Radio Free Asia's Mission:

This points to the compelling mission for Radio Free Asia: broadcasting trustworthy news and analysis not just of the outside world but, especially, of North Korea itself. On-air personnel should speak North Korean dialect, as it is quite different from the dialects spoken in the South.

The next question is how to get detailed and accurate news of the country out through North Korea's hermetically sealed borders, so that it can be reported back to Radio Free Asia listeners there. That is an almost unprecedentedly stiff reporting challenge, but it is doable. Since reporters will not be able to enter North Korea, it will be necessary to nibble around the edges and focus reporting resources on South Korea, China (especially, the Yanbian region on the North Korea border), the United States, Japan and Russia (Khabarovsk, near the North Korean-operated logging camps).

The Interviews

I interviewed a dozen recent defectors. Among other questions, I asked them how information and culture from outside reach North Koreans. I specifically asked them what they thought of the legislation to establish a new American service (Radio Free Asia) that would broadcast to North Korea, among other countries, providing news of North Korea in the Korean language. Most of the defectors were enthusiastic, some intensely so. None saw major negative factors. They differed mainly in their views on the availability of radio receivers capable of receiving outside broadcasts. Excerpts follow:

Kim Jong-min, former high-ranking official (brigadier general level) of the North Korean Ministry of Public Security, defected 1989, interviewed November 1993 and February 1994:

"North Korean people wouldn't believe all this [about the wild and extravagant private lives of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il]. If they found out, they would feel betrayed. They're leading such a poor life.

"Radio Free Asia would be a good thing. It would help to open up North Korea. It would be like a revolution to North Koreans. The U.S. should have done it several years ago. I'd like to be on it. You have to let them understand U.S. society and see the decency in the U.S."

Q. Are there enough receiver sets in North Korea?

A. "Of course ordinary citizens won't have the equipment, but the people specializing in relations with the U.S. and South Korea are very curious and lack information. Satisfying their curiosity will help to spread that influence to others.

"There are most definitely people inside North Korea who are against the regime. They don't feel they have any backing. Finding that the U.S. backs them would help."

Q. Can we combine a policy of guaranteeing North Korea's external security [as a way of resolving the nuclear weapons issue] while at the same time starting a radio service that would attack the ideology of its leaders?

A. "It would be possible only if you put some buffer between the U.S. government and this new station. You should give the feeling it's not dominated by the U.S. government."

Pak Su-hyon, 27 (b. Oct. 28, 1966), was forced out of college because his brother was caught stealing food, had to go to work in an electrical factory in N. Hamgyong Province, so defected in 1993. Interviewed Feb. 7, 1994:

"Real change started with the 1989 youth festival. During 1989 a lot of foreigners came into North Korea. We heard about this. And lots of music cassette tapes were brought in from Yanbian [Jilin Province's ethnic Korean region in] China. The foreigners brought their culture. That aroused curiosity. The regime loosened up a bit. When Kim Il-sung realized the people were getting a bit free, he put the lid back on. That aroused more curiosity: Why were we being suppressed?

Q. What did people say about Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il?

A. "Most people's opinions of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il haven't changed. Most ordinary people don't know about the extravagant lives of those two, or about their faults. They blame high officials under the Kims for their problems. They believe Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il are well-intentioned, but the high officials don't carry out their policies properly. But those high officials do know all the faults of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il. I've talked to some officials. While ordinary people blame them, the high officials blame Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il."

Q. While you were a member of Kim Il-sung's military bodyguard service in the 1980s, did you enjoy a special lifestyle? Were there things you could get away with that ordinary people couldn't do?

A. "One thing was listening to radio stations other than the official one."

Q. What radio stations did you listen to?

A. The ones I could identify were Korean-language broadcasts from Yanbian in China and KBS-2, the South Korean public educational network. When I heard other, English-speaking stations I had no idea what they were."

Q. What struck you about the South Korean broadcasts?

A. "In North Korea they would say, 'President Kim Young-sam is blah, blah, blah--criticize him. But the South Korean broadcasts didn't say much at all about Kim *puja* [Kim father and son--Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il]. Nothing bad was said. Once, though, I did hear some criticism. A broadcast quoted a French reporter as saying Kim Il-sung had put a lot of political offenders into prison. I was very surprised. Of course I knew about the political prisons, but how did people in France know so much about North Korea?"

Q. Were you listening to short-wave or AM-FM radio?

A. "Regular AM-FM radio. Starting in the 1990s lots of radios got into North Korea from China. [Often AM-FM-cassette players.] You could buy them in the dollar stores. When you bought one, the government person would fix it so only one frequency could be listened to. But high officials, national security and military people, can get radios without such blockage [both shortwave and regular AM-FM radios]. Kim Jong-il and Kim Il-sung also give radios as presents. As for the radios stuck on one frequency, you can reverse that. However, they check it periodically. If they find you've altered it, they'll take it away. A lot of people alter it, listen, then change it back before the next inspection."

Q. Do you expect the regime to collapse?

A. "Now, looking from South Korea, I believe it has to collapse--but when I was in North Korea I never thought such a thing. So why should others there think so? The authorities have this special magic: Even criminals in North Korea, if there's a war, would unite and fight for the country. I like the American radio idea. I hope it would help North Koreans open their eyes to the faults of the regime. I believe the regime will not collapse without outside influence such as the flow of foreign culture. Otherwise, unless high officials turn their backs on Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il and stage a coup, there won't be any collapse.

"People figure there has to be a war or something. The government has told us all the resources had to be devoted to military needs to prepare for a war. What Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il are saying now is that even if foreign nations force economic sanctions on the nuclear issue, we can survive. People believe that if there is a war, and if reunification comes, the sacrifice will have been justified. The problem is, people *want* war. They believe they are living this hard life because there's going to be a war. If there's going to be a war, why not just get it over with? They believe they'll die either way, from hunger or war. So the only solution is war.

"Foreigners and South Koreans believe it's the North Koreans who will bring war. But ordinary North Koreans believe the Americans will invade them. When I was in North Korea I myself believed the Americans were ruthless, scary people. If anything went wrong in North Korea, it was 'because of the Americans.' Still, North Koreans underestimate the United States. Despite the Americans' global policeman role, the North Korean mentality holds that Americans are no threat if a war breaks out. The real threat is Japan. They have experience with the Americans in the Korean War [which Kim Il-sung's propaganda machine claims the North won], and say, 'We can beat them again, any time.' Most people, civilian and military

alike, think that way. But university students know that the U.S. has great power. In university we study international institutions like the United Nations.

Q. Is it a case where the people are primed to fight but the very top leaders know they would lose?

A. "I think so. Lots of high officials when they talk say that war is out of the question."

Ko Young-hwan, b. July 14, 1953, defected May 2, 1991. Interviewed Nov. 1, 1993. Seven years in a foreign languages institute before going to Foreign Languages University. After graduation, joined the Foreign Ministry. Geneva one year, Zaire twice for a total of five, then the Congo. Was first secretary in DPRK embassy in the Congo when he defected. Now working at the government's Institute for North Korean Studies, Seoul.

Q. What about the reported jamming of VOA in 1993?

A. "Maybe the report that VOA had been jammed was mistaken. The main goal of the North Korean authorities is to keep people from listening to *South Korean* broadcasts. There is hardly any flow of information through radio. Very few people would possess radios capable of receiving VOA. Even in the embassy in the Congo there were pins in our radio so we could listen only to North Korean radio. Specialists can listen to Western radio, to monitor what's going on abroad."

Q. Suppose Kim Il-sung died and Kim Jong-il, feeling the pressure, ordered the military to attack South Korea. Would they do it?

A. "Yes, they would follow his orders. If asked to wage war, they would go for it. Nationalistic ideas would egg them on."

Q. Could there be a coup in response to such an order?

A. "I see no possibility of a coup because in the current situation there's a feeling among the North Korean people that whatever problems they have are due to South Korea and the United States."

Q. My own analysis is that the problems are internal, caused by contradictions in the system. Do people in the elite agree with that?

A. "All ranks, up to higher officials, still blame Americans and South Koreans as the problem. If some have a different view, they are probably diplomats or others who have traveled abroad."

Q. Why the hysterical reaction to the Team Spirit war games after all these years?

A. "Kim Jong-il and Kim Il-sung know that Team Spirit will not be an invasion. But they used that kind of mentality to manipulate North

Koreans' feelings. They're still using that mentality. Most people believe that it is true. You might speculate as to how the citizens of North Korea actually believe in the Team Spirit threat. You can't understand it unless you've lived in North Korea. They have regular civil-defense exercises. Black sheets over the windows. Such frequent practice makes people believe in the threat. "

Kim Young-song, architect-engineer, 59, born Aug. 12, 1934. Defected June 7, 1992 while working in Germany. Interviewed Feb. 7, 1994.

Q. What do you think of the American proposal to start a Radio Free Asia, which would broadcast news of North Korea into North Korea in the Korean language?

A. "It wouldn't affect ordinary people but could affect high officials. I don't see any negative aspects in influencing at least some people."

Q. Are those high officials getting the blame for what goes wrong?

A. "The people don't really blame the high officials. They just can't name Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il as the reason for their harsh lives, so they blame the other high officials. Especially the 10,000 members of State Security--if the regime collapses, they're gone, people hate them so much. The radio service wouldn't affect the State Security people, but other high officials will listen. Changing a little can be positive."

Chang Ki-hong, defected Nov. 1991 while working at a North Korean timber camp in the the Khabarovsk region of eastern Russia.

"I'm the curious type, and my friend and I started listening to South Korean broadcasts. He was caught and sent back. I was put under surveillance because we were such close friends. It was one month before I was due to go back to North Korea myself, but I was afraid if I went back I would be executed or sent to a prison camp."

Q. What had you heard on the radio?

A. "I heard KBS broadcasts on the election in Seoul, "Far East Broadcasts" [Radio Moscow?], and Korean-language radio from Yanbian. At night from 11 I could listen to KBS. At first I had a hard time understanding the dialect. They had people criticizing the government on various issues. And at that time they were running a series on the rise of the Kim Il-sung regime in North Korea. It was very interesting to get a different perspective. So I experienced some ideological change. My friend and I kidded each other, 'Let's go to South Korea.' Ultimately it was that

ideological change coupled with fear of execution that prodded me to defect."

Q. (Opinion of Radio Free Asia proposal?)

A. "Of course it would be good! What bad could come of it? But there's a saying in Korea: 'Listening 100 times is not as good as seeing it once.' In-person interchange is needed, too."

Ko Chung-song, employee of a district office for preservation of revolutionary historical sites, defected June 1993. Interviewed Feb. 8, 1994:

"I started listening to radio--KBS, radio from Yanbian, the Radio Moscow Korean-language service. I started listening in 1985 and began doubting the regime in 1989. The state doesn't know, but lots of people listen to secretly imported radios."

Q. How did you get your radio?

A. "I went on a business trip . . . and met a man who had access to a Japanese Sony. He sold it to me: a shortwave radio."

Q. What percentage of the population do you suppose can do what you did?

A. "Maybe five to six percent of the population have radios, and of those, 30 to 40 percent [two percent of the population] listen to foreign stations."

"My friends and I would even get together to listen to the South Korean broadcasts and debate what we had heard. Kim Il-sung was saying in his speeches that in order for us to prosper we must reunify. I wanted to learn the prospects for reunification. On the radio I heard about the downfall of foreign socialism and about the virtual capitalism rampant in China. I wanted to find out the prospects for Korea."

"I ultimately defected because I came to believe the regime could not survive for long. It's bound to fall. Everybody believes something is going to happen in a couple of years. When friends get together, they debate how North Korea will change. Someone might say, 'What do you think about the collapse of the U.S.S.R.? Do you think capitalism or socialism is better? What about Chinese-style, free-market socialism?' The regime's propaganda backfires. On North Korean news they show footage of students demonstrating in South Korea. Ordinary people say, 'Oh, society must be very harsh there.' Educated people think, 'To have such demonstrations, they must have a very democratic society.' Other issues people talk about in these private discussions include oil. The oil supply that the Soviet Union

used to provide is now cut, and oil from China has been drastically reduced. So what is the future of North Korea?"

Q. And what do they think?

A. "Everybody believes a war will break out sooner or later. A hundred percent want war to occur. The food shortage is terrible. Grain distribution is halted, so people figure they will die of hunger or die in war. They're even prepared to die in a nuclear war. A hundred percent believe that North Korea would win, so they support war. They were brought up to worship Kim Il-sung. No matter what changes occur, they always worship Kim Il-sung. They've been so brainwashed since birth that they're willing to die for the country."

Q. (What do you think of the idea of Radio Free Asia?)

A. "That's an exciting idea! A lot of people listen to the radio, so it has a high chance of disrupting the regime. It would be effective. Most North Koreans don't know what's happening in North Korea. When I was living there I was waiting for someone to tell me what I should do. No one ever did.

"On the Radio Free Asia programs, defectors should talk and persuade their friends in North Korea. Let them know we're alive. Maybe that would inspire them. Most of my friends have radios. The price of a suit in North Korea is equivalent to buying a Hyundai Sonata II [middle-priced car]. Instead of having someone say South Korea is experiencing an economic boom, get defectors on the radio to give examples of what can be bought down here. Put it in terms they can understand."

Q. How about the leaflets dropped by South Korean balloons?

A. "I've read them myself, although you're forbidden to read them. If word gets out that they have been dropped, State Security sends lots of people out to watch. If anyone is seen picking up one of the leaflets to read it, someone will tattle and the person reading it will go to prison."

Q. You listened to KBS?

A. "From around 11 p.m. to early morning you can get the KBS education station well.

Kim Nam-joon, was a second lieutenant, defected by swimming across the Imjin River with Kim Kwang-choon (quoted below) in Sept. 1989.

Q. [Radio Free Asia?]

A. "It's a very good idea. I have a lot of expectations for the U.S. role in opening up North Korea. South Korea has limitations in dealing with

that. The U.S. should do its utmost to knock at the door and make the North Koreans open up."

Q. (Radio availability?)

A. "Most people don't have radios. If people could listen to this kind of broadcast the regime would have collapsed years ago. The people who can listen are those who already have power--those in the central committee of the party."

Kim Kwang-choon, 29, defected Sept. 1989, by swimming across the Imjin River; was master sergeant serving at the front lines.

"Because of my education, I felt more gratitude to Kim Il-sung than to my parents. I believed that Kim Il-sung was a savior, providing my education and my food. I did my utmost to be faithful to Kim Il-sung."

Q. When you were planning your defection, did you feel any guilt toward Kim Il-sung?

A. "I think Kim Il-sung is basically a nice guy. He's not to blame. All the brainwashing is done by the high officials just for their vested rights. They make this ideology so their privileges will stand."

Q. It seems that North Koreans who are dissatisfied enough to do anything end up defecting instead of rebelling. What must happen before people will stay and struggle rather than defect?

A. "When I was in North Korea, after having all those complaints I wanted to form some kind of anti-regime movement. But I alone could do nothing, so I defected. But middle-level officials know about the outside world and they do nothing. There should be pressure from the outside world. Ordinary people need a *lot* of pressure from the outside."

Q. (What opinion of Radio Free Asia?)

A. "It would be very effective. I'd be very glad. I've heard them talking about it over at the [South Korean] Defense Ministry."

Q. What sort of programming should the service offer?

A. "Instead of looking at the big picture, take a more micro approach. Start reporting on North Korea's lifestyles, crime and so on. Then, later, tune it up a bit and talk about economics and politics. You would have to interpret this for people, make it simple and explain it in their terms, or they wouldn't be able to understand."

Q. Do people have radios that can tune in to foreign broadcasts?

A. "Only about one in 15 homes has the equipment. It would be difficult."

Q. Some civilian defectors told me the people of North Korea think it would be better to die in war than die of hunger, so they want war.

A. "That's a widespread attitude. When I was in North Korea, I myself thought war would have to break out. I was suffering too much from hunger. When I first entered the army, I was a hundred percent certain North Korea would win a war. But after four or five years of studying the South Korean enemy, I realized North Korea doesn't have the economy to support a war. So I thought a war would destroy both South Korea and North Korea. Officially the government warns that war between South and North would be the Third World War. But in military training we are taught we have to fight the South and win."

Ahn Hyuk, defected Aug. 1992 after escaping to China in January that year, had been a junior pingpong champion, then a political prisoner in a concentration camp:

"Before I was accused of political crimes, I didn't even know the word politics. But after I got out of the prison camp I was *really* a political offender. I talked with my friends. I almost got caught again for listening to KBS Radio. My whole family would have gone to a camp. That would have been the end of everything. There were about 90 party members in my family. My parents were forced to divorce on account of me. Someone in State Security said I might be sent back to the camp, and then all 90 would have gone, too. So the head of State Security advised them to make me an orphan by divorcing."

Q. (Radio Free Asia?)

A. "A good idea. But it's only a small percentage who get access to broadcasts. I don't know how much effect it would have."

Kim Ji-il, b. June 1, 1964, defected Aug. 4, 1990. Was a physics student in Kharkov, Ukraine 1984-90, secretly married to a local woman and with a daughter; it would have been out of the question to take them back to North Korea with him at the end of his studies.

Q. (Radio Free Asia?)

A. "Good idea. I listened to Radio Free Europe and Voice of America in Russian. They were a success in the Soviet Union. They reported stories that weren't in the Soviet press. My wife's family also listened."

Q. What sort of radio equipment do people have in North Korea for listening to foreign broadcasts?

A. "Some of the Japanese imports are shortwave. At customs they are stuck on one channel. But civilian and military high officials have shortwave radios that are not fixed to one channel."

Dong Young-jun, studied transport economics in Poland at Gdansk University, defected from there May 1989.

"After the 1988 Seoul Olympics, many Eastern European countries including Poland were eager to find out about South Korea. There were many special reports in the news--magazines, television, and so on--about how South Korea could develop into such an industrialized nation, and about how much power South Korea had to have to be able to host the Olympics. This was the channel I used to get knowledge of South Korea. I think it's a tragedy we had to get information that way.

"When I was in Pyongyang we could not learn such things. Radio is a product of capitalism. . . . People can't have access to radios, because that would allow them to hear broadcasts from all over the world. It's hard to buy radios except the one-channel radios. The central government sends people to inspect radios every three or four months, so just having a radio can put people under fear and apprehension."

Q. (Radio Free Asia?)

A. "It's a very good idea but not very practical. Not enough North Koreans have access to radios to receive the transmissions. Maybe one percent--only the high officials, a few people with power like those in State Security. The broadcasts won't be known nationwide. But the people with power to change things could listen and think. I myself got a lot of help from Radio Free Europe and BBC broadcasts."

Kang Chul-hwan (Chôl-hwan), b. 18 Sept. 1968 in Pyongyang. Parents and grandparents were Korean residents of Japan who returned eagerly to the North Korean "homeland" but eventually found themselves political prisoners. He and his family spent 10 years in a prison camp before relatives in Japan pressured and bribed officials to treat them better. Escaped to China January 1992 with Ahn Hyuk, defected to South Korea August 1992.

Q. What did you do after you got out of the camp?

A. "I was feeling negative about things, so I started participating in anti-regime activities. I was listening to South Korean broadcasts and telling friends what I heard. I would sing South Korean popular songs to them. This was while I was working at the shoe recycling factory. Because of my

work as manager of supply, I had a pass to travel all around North Korea. And because I was young I wanted to travel. My friends were all members of the elite classes. I would propagandize to them against the Kim Il-sung regime. Most university students have anti-regime feelings.

"At one a.m. we would put a blanket over our heads and listen to South Korean broadcasts. Most high officials have two radios--one that's fixed to the single station you're supposed to listen to and another one they would keep secretly to listen to forbidden broadcasts. A department store in Pyongyang deals in foreign goods, including radios that are not fixed to a single channel. You need foreign exchange to buy them, and they're intended for foreigners. I had a shortwave radio."

Q. (Radio Free Asia?)

A. "Very good idea."

Q. What percentage of people would have access to it?

A. "I guess about six to seven percent, usually high officials--the ones with the power."

Q. Does it make sense to try to reach those people?

A. "Of course. They already know a lot about the Western world and about discrepancies involving the Kim Il-sung regime. Giving them more access to the facts would change them more. The trend in North Korea today is to listen secretly to foreign broadcasts. Since there are so many fabrications in North Korea, people are interested in getting information from the outside world. All they get now is KBS, and it can only be tuned in from 11 p.m. to 2 a.m., so it's not very convenient. Usually KBS broadcasts talk just about South Korea. North Koreans sometimes can't even imagine what they're talking about. What's needed is to report on what happens in North Korea."

Q. What kind of equipment do those who might listen have available?

A. "Most of them have AM/FM radios with cassette decks."

Q. Would the people fight if a war came?

A. "People *want* war to break out. It's the only way to bring about the fall of the regime, or to end their misery. Young kids conscripted into the army at age 17 are all brainwashed to believe that South Korea and the United States are the enemy. Of course they would fight. But once they got to Seoul and saw the reality of South Korea, there would be chaos and they would change. And while the new recruits don't know the real world, I imagine the veteran soldiers have more understanding of reality."

###

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

21-Apr-1994 12:32 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Roseanne M. Hill
(HILLR)

SUBJECT: Crosshatch 002947

Robert Suettinger clears on subject crosshatch (Cable to Seoul) without change for the Asian Affairs office.

Distribution:

FOR: M. Brooke Darby	(DARBY)
FOR: Wendy E. Gray	(GRAY)
FOR: Brenda I. Hilliard	(HILLIARD)
FOR: M. Kay LaPlante	(LAPLANTE)
FOR: Cathy Millison	(MILLISON)
FOR: Allison M. Wright	(WRIGHT)
FOR: Katherine E. O'Loughlin	(OLOUGHLIN@WHSR@CCGATE@VAXA)
FOR: David R. Bailey	(BAILEY@WHSR@CCGATE@VAXA)
FOR: Stephen G. Niemerski	(NIEMERSKI@WHSR@CCGATE@VAXA)
FOR: Elisabeth A. Healey	(HEALEY@WHSR@CCGATE@VAXA)
FOR: Miles R. Murphy	(MURPHY@WHSR@CCGATE@VAXA)
CC: Records	(RECORDS)
CC: Daniel B. Poneman	(PONEMAN)
CC: Stanley O. Roth	(ROTHS)
CC: Robert L. Suettinger	(SUETTINGER)
CC: Steven Aoki	(AOKI)

Washfax Receipt
Department of State

'94 APR 20 P9:35

B

S/S #

OK No changes

Message No. 002047 Classification SECRET No. Pages 4

From: Max Robinson S/S 647-8448 7224
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

Message Description CABLE TO SEOUL: PROPOSED REPLY TO KANG LETTER

To (Agency):	Deliver To:	Extension	Room No.
NSCS	Nancy Soderberg	456-6534	WHSITRM
	Will Itch		
	Kristie Kenney		
	Executive Secretariat		
	<u>Roth</u> <u>Poneman</u>		
	<u>Swetinger</u> <u>Aoki</u>		

For: Clearance ☒ Information ☐ Per Request ☐ Comment ☐

Remarks: Please clear by: April 21

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: DR Date: 12/01/14

2009-0528-F

S/S Officer: Max Robinson
Max Robinson

CROSSHATCH

PNP

Return Time-Stamped Coversheet to S/S

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
010. cable	Proposed reply to Kang letter (4 pages)	04/20/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Stanley Roth (Asian Affairs)
OA/Box Number: 405

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea, January-June, 1994 [5]

2009-0528-F
kc1335

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]


b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

ODE

Washfax Receipt

Department of State

B



S/S #

WHITE HOUSE
SITING ROOM
1994 APR 15 PM 9:05

C

'94 APR 15 P8:03

Message No. 002718 Classification ~~SECRET~~ No. Pages 4

From: Deborah Graze S/S 647-5302 7224
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

Message Description NIACT IMMEDIATE CABLE TO SEOUL: Instructions for
Discussions with ROKG NOBIS PLUTO

<u>To (Agency):</u>	<u>Deliver To:</u>	<u>Extension</u>	<u>Room No.</u>
NSCS	XXXXXXXXXX	456-6534	WHSITRM
	XXXXXXXXXX		
	Kristie Kenney		
	Executive Secretariat		
	<u>ROTH POMERAN</u>		

For: Clearance ☒ Information ☐ Per Request ☐ Comment ☐

Remarks: PLEASE CLEAR BY 4/15 *Must go* instructions
San Gallucci's meetings
This weekend

S/S Officer: *Deborah Graze* **PNP**
Deborah Graze

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: *DE* Date: 12/01/14

2009-0528-F

CROSSHATCH

Return Time-Stamped Coversheet to S/S

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
011. cable	Instructions for Discussions (4 pages)	04/13/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Stanley Roth (Asian Affairs)
OA/Box Number: 405

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea, January-June, 1994 [5]

2009-0528-F
kc1335

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1** National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2** Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3** Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4** Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5** Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6** Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1)** National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2)** Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3)** Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4)** Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6)** Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7)** Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8)** Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9)** Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: GLENN, JOHN H

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 14 APR 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOREA

CO

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PRES LTR TO SEN GLENN RE KOREAN WAR MEMORIAL

ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE: 07 APR 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KRISTOFF

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

WH STRIPPING DESK

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

KRISTOFF
NSC CHRON
ROSNER
ROTH
SUETTINGER

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY  DATE 4/15 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP

CLOSED BY: NSKDB

DOC 4 OF 4

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH STRIPPING DESK

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION: TO: GLENN, JOHN H
SOURCE: PRESIDENT
DATE: 14 APR 94
SUBJ: PRES LTR TO SEN GLENN RE KOREAN WAR MEMORIAL

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE: 16 APR 94

COMMENT:




JOHN W. FICKLIN

NSC RECORDS MANAGEMENT OFFICE

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 14, 1994

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your letter about plans for the dedication of the Korean War Veterans Memorial on July 27, 1995. I am pleased that this project is approaching its completion and we will have a fitting memorial to those who served their country so honorably.

I readily agree that the South Korean President should be invited to the dedication ceremony and I intend to extend an invitation to President Kim Young Sam in the near future. It is important in these difficult times to reassure our South Korean allies of our respect and support, and this is an excellent opportunity to demonstrate the enduring strength of our ties.

Thank you again for your suggestion.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Bill Clinton", with a stylized, flowing script.

The Honorable John Glenn
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 13, 1994 94 APR 13 P7:36

ACTION

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

4/14/94

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE
SUSAN BROPHY
RICKI SEIDMAN

SUBJECT: Letter to Senator Glenn re Korean War Memorial

Purpose

To reply to a letter from Senator John Glenn, who wrote to ask you to invite South Korea's President Kim Young Sam to attend the dedication ceremony for the Korean War Veterans Memorial, scheduled for July 27, 1995.

Background

Although the dedication for the Korean War Memorial is more than a year away, it is useful to send the invitation now for scheduling purposes. Equally importantly, it will reinforce for President Kim your esteem for him personally and serve as an opportunity to remind all that relations between the United States and South Korea have a difficult but honorable past and that, in the face of a similar threat, our resolve is just as strong.

Your letter to Senator Glenn thanks him for suggesting the invitation to President Kim and assures him that you will follow up on it.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Senator John Glenn
Tab B Correspondence from Senator Glenn

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON D.C. 20506

April 5, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: STANLEY O. ROTH *SR*

FROM: ROBERT L. SUETTINGER *RS*

SUBJECT: Letter to Senator Glenn on Korean War Memorial

Attached at Tab I is a Memorandum for the President asking him to sign the letter at Tab A to Senator Glenn, who wrote to request that South Korean President Kim Young Sam be invited to attend the dedication of the Korean War Memorial on July 27, 1995.

Concurrences by: Jeremy Rosner, Sandy Kristoff

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Memorandum for the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Letter to Senator Glenn
Tab B Correspondence from Senator Glenn

JOHN GLENN

OHIO

2561
COMMITTEES.

- GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, CHAIRMAN
- ARMED SERVICES
- SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
- SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AGING

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-3501

34 MAR 1

19:42

March 28, 1994

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:


As you are aware, the Korean War Veterans Memorial in the nation's capital will be dedicated on July 27, 1995. The Memorial Advisory Board is working diligently to plan a suitable celebration and commemoration on and around that date.

The Advisory Board intends to invite the full and active participation of the Korean government and Korean people in the planned dedication. I believe it would be most appropriate that the President of the Republic of Korea, The Honorable Kim Young Sam, be officially invited to attend the dedication events of 1995. Hence I hope and trust that you will give every consideration to extending such an official invitation to President Kim as soon as possible.

For myself and the other 1.5 million Americans who served the cause of freedom in "the forgotten war" in Korea, this memorial represents a welcome measure of long overdue recognition and remembrance. I thank you in advance for your consideration of this request.

Best regards.

Sincerely,



John Glenn
United States Senator

JG/pb