

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title:

Korea, January-June, 1994 [1]

Staff Office-Individual:

Asian Affairs-Roth, Stanley

Original OA/ID Number:

405

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
30	3	3	3	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	re Light Water Reactor Question (3 pages)	06/25/1994	P1/b(1)
002. notes	re Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of NSC Principals' Committee (2 pages)	05/31/1994	P1/b(1)
003a. memo	action, Summary of Conclusions of the Principals' Committee Meeting (1 page)	06/23/1994	P1/b(1)
003b. notes	re Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of NSC Principals' Committee (2 pages)	06/14/1994	P1/b(1)
004. letter	Minister Kang to Ambassador Gallucci re talks (2 pages)	06/22/1004	P1/b(1)
005. letter	Boris Yeltsin to POTUS re North Korea (2 pages)	06/22/1994	P1/b(1)
006. memo	SecDef Perry to POTUS re Special Defense Report (2 pages)	06/20/1994	P1/b(1)
007. memo	action, Anthony Lake to POTUS re North Korea: Carter Meeting and Next Steps (2 pages)	06/19/1994	P1/b(1)
008. memo	telecon, VPOTUS and Former POTUS Carter (5 pages)	06/17/1994	P1/b(1)
009. cable	re Light Water Reactor Question [dupe of 001] (3 pages)	06/25/1994	P1/b(1)
010a. memo	information, Anthony Lake to POTUS re North Korea: Meeting with Senior Advisors (3 pages)	06/15/1994	P1/b(1)
010b. paper	re Possible Military Options (4 pages)	c 06/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Stanley Roth (Asian Affairs)
OA/Box Number: 405

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea, January-June, 1994 [1]

2009-0528-F

kc1330

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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OK
SP

94 JUN 25 P2 45

Washfax Receipt

Department of State

B

S/S #

1994 JUN 25 PM 3:44

Message No. 006221 Classification SECRET No. Pages 3

From: Wanda Nesbitt S/S 647-5302 7224
(Office name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

Message Description CABLE TO SEQU: THE LIGHT WATER REACTOR QUESTION
IN THE THIRD ROUND.

To (Agency):	Deliver To:	Extension	Room No.
NSCS	Nancy Soderberg	456-6534	WHSITRM
	Will Hob		
	Kristie Kenney		
	Executive Secretariat		

POM	PONEMAN	Bell	
KRISTOFF/SUETTINGER	HAHN	ANDERSON	

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: (W) Date: 11/25/14
2009-0258-F

For: Clearance ☒ Information ☐ Per Request ☐ Comment ☐

Remarks: Please clear by: Must be June 25 - needed in Seoul
to be presented to Pak on June 27

S/S Officer: Wanda Nesbitt
Wanda Nesbitt

Cleared w/o change
6/27-94
R/H

CROSSHATCH

Return Time-Stamped Coversheet to S/S

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~~SECRET/PLUTO~~

File

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20777

LIMITED ACCESS

June 24, 1993

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

ACTION

By (u) NARA, Date 11/25/14
2009-0328-F

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: DANIEL PONEMAN *DP*

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of the Principals'
Committee Meeting on North Korea

Attached at Tab I is the Summary of Conclusions of the
Principals' meeting held on May 31, 1994.

Concurrence by: Stanley Roth *NR*

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize William Itoh to file the Summary attached at
Tab I for record purposes.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab I Summary of Conclusions

~~SECRET/PLUTO~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

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FOLDER TITLE:

Korea, January-June, 1994 [1]

2009-0528-F

kcl330

RESTRICTION CODES

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003b. notes	re Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of NSC Principals' Committee (2 pages)	06/14/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

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FOLDER TITLE:

Korea, January-June, 1994 [1]

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File - N. Korea

5032



MEMORANDUM

June 21, 1994

TO: Tony Lake
FROM: Alan Romberg
SUBJECT: North Korea (What else?)

First, thank you for including me in yesterday's session. I don't know how all of you viewed it -- perhaps as a cacophony of voices that only confused things. But my sense was that you got a rich menu of opinions to help inform your deliberations. And I was impressed with the seriousness of purpose conveyed by not only the questions from "your side of the table" but the turnout itself.

Second, I wanted to follow up on one point regarding Kim Il Sung's detailed references to the light-water reactor in the Carter conversation and his apparent non-reference to normalization of relations. It is out of the question, in my view, that in national interest terms they actually assign higher priority to the reactor issue than to relations with the U.S. But it is striking that this is at least the third time Kim Il Sung has referred to the reactor, making clear on each occasion that he is willing to give up the reprocessing facility -- sorry, the radiochemical laboratory -- for it.

One gets the impression that someone convinced the Great Leader that LWR was a nifty idea, and that Kim has glommed onto it ever since. So, he mentioned it in his Washington Times interview, in his session with Sig Harrison, and to Jimmy Carter. One ought not be too surprised that it has thus acquired a certain salience in the North Korean position. I mean, after all, if you were the Vice Foreign Minister -- or let's say *anyone* else in North Korea, and the Great Leader had an idea he thought was nifty, you might come to think so too! (And, by the way, if he thinks it's nifty, we should not be backing away from our July 1993 pledge to assist them get it -- in the context of resolving the entire issue -- even if it is not the best option on technical or economic grounds.)

What I find most disturbing about this is that it may constitute further evidence that Kim does not have a full grasp of the issues. Rather, he is fixed on certain questions, and perhaps not the central ones. Still, while that may complicate things, it does not, in my mind, vitiate the need to connect Kim personally to the negotiation or to get him to cut his half of the Gordian knot. (Can one cut half a Gordian knot?) I remain concerned that the clock is ticking, both in terms of his health and in

terms of political dynamics in Pyongyang. His imprimatur could be crucial to get the deal done, and -- in addition to the point I made about not piddling away the negotiations -- that argues to move sooner and more boldly rather than later and by increments.

One final comment (for now). When the question came up of stopping movement toward sanctions during a third round, you jumped in with: "suspend." Let me suggest to you that "suspend" is exactly the wrong way to go. Pyongyang understands that if things go wrong we'll head back down the sanctions route (though, in my view, with no positive outcome in prospect). To shove in their face the fact that the decision is reversible is consistent with the kind of game they like to play, but in this circumstance not constructive. As Don Gregg advocated with regard to the Administration and its critics, I say with regard to North Korea and the United States: cut them a little slack. We're the big guys; we can afford to take some "chances" so long as we aren't risking anything vital.

Finally, you still only get one preference point, at the outside one and a half, for being follicly challenged.

Facsimile Cover Sheet

Please forward the
following pages to:

→ Staff: Penman
cc Roth

Recipient Anthony Lake
Organization The White House
FAX Number 456-2883

From:

Sender Alan Romberg
Organization USIP
FAX Number 429-6063

FAX Information:

Date June 21, 1994 5:40:45 pm
Pages 2, excluding cover sheet.

Cover Note:

Aren't you glad you don't get Rombergrams every day?

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D C 20506

June 30, 1994

ACTION

File?

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: DANIEL PONEMAN *dp*FROM: ERIN CONATON *ell*

SUBJECT: North Korea

You have received three experts' views on the North Korean situation.

Amos Jordan passed along the views of the US-Korean Wisemen Council (including Brzezinski and Carlucci) in support of closer coordination with China and more explicit description to North Korea of the benefits it will receive in exchange for abandoning its nuclear program.

Arnold Kanter argues that we need to move North Korea beyond its obligations under the NPT and IAEA agreements to the complete dismantling of its nuclear program, and that sanctions should be pursued even in the context of the third round of talks to obtain information on past reactor reprocessing.

Alan Romberg sent two papers. In one, he suggests that Kim Il Sung's fixation on the light-water reactor may signal that he does not have a full grasp of all of the issues and that his advanced age and internal North Korean politics argue for trying to seal a deal quickly with Pyongyang. In a second paper on U.S.-DPRK Relations, he argues that both sides have engaged in "flasher diplomacy", giving only glimpses of their respective negotiating positions and perpetuating miscommunication and mistrust. He further argues against insisting on complete parallelism between the U.S.-DPRK and DPRK-ROK tracks. He therefore argues for "a bold position that can engage Kim Il Sung's interest and authority in concluding a deal", while we maintain coordination with our allies and avoid a preemptive strike.

Concurrence by: Robert Suettinger *BSA*RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the notes at Tab I acknowledging receipt of these documents.

Attachments

Tab I Notes to be Signed

Tab II Experts' Letters

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Joe:

Thanks very much for your interesting comments on North Korea. I will, of course, share them with my staff.

Sincerely,

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Mr. Amos A. Jordan
Pacific Forum CSIS
1001 Bishop Street
Pauahi Tower, Suite 1150
Honolulu, Hawaii 96813

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Arnie:

Thanks very much for your interesting policy outline on North Korea. I will, of course, share them with my staff.

I also wanted to thank you for coming to the experts meeting last week and for sharing your insights with the President.

Sincerely,

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Mr. Arnold Kanter
RAND Corporation
2100 M Street, NW
Washington, DC 20037-1270

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Alan:

Thanks very much for your interesting memo on North Korea and for your article on U.S.-DPRK Relations. I will, of course, share them with my staff.

I also wanted to thank you for coming to the experts meeting last week and for sharing your insights with the President.

Sincerely,

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Mr. Alan D. Romberg
United States Institute for Peace
1550 M Street, NW, Suite 700
Washington, DC 20005

PRES. CORRESP

WE ARE NOT RESPONDING
TO THESE IF YOU DON'T
HAVE COPIES - I HAVE
ENCLOSED OURS.

RESPONSES SHOULD
BE SENT FROM THE
POTUS. THANKS.

LYNNA RAZIBONE

1989

PACIFIC FORUM CSIS

16 June 1994

The Honorable Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20500


Dear Mr. Lake:

Knowing of your incredible schedule, I hesitate to add to your in-box, but thought you might like to see the enclosed brief summary of the U.S.-Korean Wisemen Council meeting discussions on June 10-11. I know that the Korean members have already brought it to the Blue House's attention and, given his interest in the Council, I suspect President Kim has seen it.

Both the Korean and American members of the Council wished to stress the importance of more fully engaging China in the problem -- apart from that nuance, you will, of course, find this familiar terrain.

I hope that on one of my fairly frequent trips to Washington I can drop in on you for a brief get acquainted visit, as I have been scheduled -- unsuccessfully -- to do several times in the past year.

Yours sincerely,



Amos A. Jordan

P.S. I have given Secretary Christopher a copy of this summary as well.

HIGHLIGHTS OF DISCUSSIONS
U.S.-KOREA WISEMEN COUNCIL MEETING
WASHINGTON, D.C., JUNE 10-11, 1994

North Korea Nuclear Problem

Although it is possible that North Korea is developing its nuclear program as a bargaining chip, it is clear that Pyongyang is pursuing at least a rudimentary nuclear weapons capability. The principal ROK-U.S. aims in confronting this increasingly dangerous situation are three-fold: deter aggression on the peninsula, prevent North Korea from developing an offensive nuclear weapons capability, and preserve the credibility of the IAEA and NPT.

To that end, U.S.-ROK policy should: seek to engage China at the strategic level, offer more inducements to North Korea to ensure compliance, obtain international cooperation in the application of sanctions, and enlarge the credibility of U.S. deterrence.

Any genuine solution to the nuclear problem must involve the U.S., Korea, and Japan working in harmony, and in close coordination with China. Working with China is consistent with the important goal of a wider strategic dialogue with China (which should include security issues and U.S.-PRC military-to-military contacts).

There is some skepticism in the Council about the ability of sanctions to cause North Korea to reverse course and concern that their application could trigger conflict. In any event, for sanctions to be successful, they must have China's full support. At present, however, the Chinese do not appear to be convinced that a North Korean nuclear capability is imminent (perhaps even likely) but do believe that North Korea is unstable and could strike out if cornered. Nevertheless, the Chinese seem to share the ROK/U.S. desire for regional stability and a non-nuclear peninsula, so that there is the basis for concerted policies.

There is concern that neither the North Koreans nor the Chinese fully understand what the North is being specifically offered in return for abandonment of its nuclear program. Political, economic, and security "carrots" should be more clearly defined and conveyed to North Korea, preferably through China, both to pressure Pyongyang and to engage Beijing more fully.

The extension of diplomatic recognition must be included among the promised carrots along with clear milestones for achieving it. It should also be made clear that the credibility of the IAEA and NPT must be preserved and that this points to sanctions despite their limited prospects of success, if

Pyongyang refuses meaningful inspections. It is important, in this regard, to focus on future capabilities, intentions, and behavior.

Any recognition of North Korea by the U.S. should be as a consequence of close joint U.S.-ROK consultation and should be undertaken without prejudice to the centrality of the U.S.-ROK relationship, including the security alliance.

Given the bellicosity of North Korean threats, prudence indicates that if sanctions must be applied, the ROK and the U.S. should effectively increase their military readiness and capability. These measures should be pursued without fanfare to avoid escalating tensions. It should also be made clear to North Korea that, if it begins a conflict, the United States will use all means at its disposal to defeat aggression and that there will be no sanctuaries in North Korea.

International Trade Regimes

The Council encourages both countries to ratify promptly the Uruguay Round agreement and to work together to build a freer world trade environment. The Council also encourages the ROK and the U.S. to participate vigorously in APEC to strengthen it on the basis of open regionalism.

The United States needs to meet Korean and other Asian concerns about NAFTA's becoming inward-looking and their hopes that, in the spirit of WTO, the United States will refrain from unilateral trade measures and managed trade. The WTO will likely have to deal with environment, labor standards, technology policy, and other issues that are inevitably involved in international trade flows. In this regard, the Council is concerned that if these issues are pressed too far, too fast, they will weaken the basis of the international trading system.

U.S.-Korean Bilateral Economic Relations

Considerable progress has been made in U.S.-Korean bilateral economic relations in the last few years. The Council notes that substantial progress is being made in Korea in financial sector reform and in improving the climate for foreign direct investment. It particularly notes improvements in laws and enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPR); it believes that the ROK should be taken off the U.S. watch list with regard to IPR. Although the foregoing gains are impressive when compared with the past, more needs to be done to make Korea more attractive as a place to invest and do business. In particular, it is the Council's view that liberalization of Korea's financial sector should be further speeded up.

**U.S.-KOREA WISEMEN COUNCIL
PARTICIPANTS, JUNE 10-11, 1994**

U.S. Members

Zbigniew Brzezinski
CSIS Counselor
Former National Security Adviser

Frank Carlucci
Chairman, The Carlyle Group
Former Secretary of Defense

A.W. (Tom) Clausen
Chairman and CEO (Retired), BankAmerica
Former President, The World Bank

Amos A. Jordan
President, Pacific Forum/CSIS
Former President, CSIS

Jerry Junkins
Chairman, President, and CEO
Texas Instruments Inc.

David Roderick
Former Chairman and CEO,
USX Corporation

Korean Members

Chey Jong Hyon
Chairman, Sunkyoung Group

Kim Kyung-Won
President, Institute of Social Sciences
Former Ambassador to the United States and United Nations

Kum Jin-Ho
Chairman of ITBI
Former Minister of Trade and Industry

Nam Duk Woo
Former Prime Minister

SaKong Il
Chairman and President, Institute for Global Economics
Former Minister of Finance

U.S. POLICY TOWARD NORTH KOREA

Introductory caveat and issue:

- Following limited to consideration of North Korean nuclear issue.
- A key question in designing and implementing a negotiating strategy is what *other* changes in North Korean behavior (e.g., ballistic missiles, human rights, troop concentrations) will we require in exchange for our agreement to:
 - withhold or reverse coercive measures.
 - provide specified economic, political, and security benefits.

Overall goals:

- A non-nuclear Korean peninsula.
- Maintenance of strong, healthy relationships with South Korean and Japanese allies.
 - need to ensure they have no doubt about U.S. dependability and determination.
- A process and outcome which strengthen rather than undermine the global non-proliferation regime.

Requirements:

- Dismantle—not just freeze—North Korean nuclear program.
- By themselves, the NPT and IAEA are *insufficient* to achieve this outcome.
 - because North Korea could scrupulously follow the letter of the NPT while continuing to accumulate weapons-grade plutonium.
- *This means that it is not enough to bring North Korea back into compliance with its NPT obligations.*

- as a corollary, it is a mistake to define both our objectives and what we find objectionable about the North Korean nuclear program solely in terms of Pyongyang's obligations under the NPT.

Specific policy objectives:

- First (per Administration statements), *freeze North Korean nuclear program* to stop a bad problem from getting worse.
 - but also quietly make clear that, one way or another, the U.S. will do everything possible—including the use of military force—to ensure that North Korea does not reprocess any more nuclear fuel.
 - note that for technical—if not political—reasons, such a freeze could only be maintained for a limited time period because of need to reprocess (or re-clad) spent fuel.
 - if left unaddressed, that technical fact of life gives North Korea leverage by making us negotiate against a ticking clock.
 - accordingly, *consideration should be given to getting early North Korean agreement to transfer spent fuel to another country for reprocessing and safeguarding.*
 - perhaps U.S. (or another country or entity) should “buy” the spent fuel from North Korea, using the pretext of helping to provide Pyongyang with the financial wherewithal to build a light water reactor.
- Second, *dismantle the North Korean nuclear program*, beginning with steps to reduce and eliminate Pyongyang's ability to produce and stockpile weapons-grade material.
 - emphasize again that the NPT does not require North Korea to take this step.
 - but implementation of North-South denuclearization agreement could be an important step toward achieving this objective.
 - needs to become a real priority rather than just something to which lip service is paid.
- Third, *track down and eliminate plutonium which North Koreans may already have reprocessed* (as well as nuclear weapons they may already have constructed).

- The President must decide whether achieving this objective is essential, or merely desirable, i.e., are we prepared to live indefinitely with the ambiguity surrounding the question of whether North Korea already has one or two nuclear weapons.
 - earlier U.S. statements clearly implied that achieving this objective was necessary, not just desirable.
 - dropping (or at least deferring) issue in face of blatant North Korean defiance during reactor defueling suggests just the opposite.
- There are real costs to permitting continued uncertainty about current North Korean nuclear capabilities.
 - but a case also can be made for assigning lower priority to issue and/or deferring it.
 - worst outcome would be to continue to insist it is a key issue, but not to treat it seriously in U.S. strategy toward North Korea.
- *On balance, Administration should consider a two-prong "sanction and talk" strategy:*
 1. Begin third round of talks provided North Korea meets U.S. preconditions (i.e., no refueling and no reprocessing, as verified by the IAEA).
 2. But continue to press for increasingly stringent UN sanctions which would be lifted if and when North Korea provides required information on past reactor activity and reprocessing.
 - underscores importance of issue.
 - makes clear that blatant North Korean defiance is not cost free.
 - avoids any impression that U.S. is demandeur in going to third round.
 - insulates against criticism of Administration "flip flop."

Additional measures the Administration should consider:

- Quietly stepping up efforts to strengthen--both qualitatively and quantitatively--U.S. military capabilities in the region.
 - while quietly making clear that--in contrast to Team Spirit-- the build-up is neither a provocation nor a bargaining chip in U.S.-DPRK talks.
 - never a good time to take such military measures, but waiting until the crisis deepens is worse:
 - could undermine remaining stability by appearing to be deliberately provocative.
 - less time available to deploy necessary capabilities.
- Urging the IAEA to seek, and encouraging South Africa to be first to permit, "special inspections" of suspect sites to help North Korea save face.
- Offering an international alternative to official, formal "IAEA" inspections to help North Korea save face.
- Telling North Korea explicitly that, pending agreement between Seoul and Pyongyang on peaceful unification:
 - we are prepared to accept indefinitely a separate North Korea and the continuation of the Kim Il Sung regime.
 - *provided* North Korea agrees to become a responsible member of the international community.

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U.S.-DPRK Relations: "The Clash of Civilizations"?

Alan D. Romberg

→ DAN POMER

STANLEY RO

Introduction

There is considerable irony involved in writing about the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in a journal devoted to problems of *post-Communism*. For while North Korea is more Kim Il-Sungist than communist, more than any other state its tenets and system are a holdover from the Stalinist era.

U.S. relations with the North have been troubled since division of the Peninsula in 1945, but the trauma of the 1950-53 Korean War created deep mutual hostility. Even after Peninsular tensions became primarily an inter-Korean affair and no longer a function of East-West contention, total mistrust and animosity pervaded Washington and Pyongyang's attitudes.

To Americans, North Korea has evolved from a Soviet cat's paw to a heavily armed, ruthless dictatorship in its own right, employing mayhem and terror in its quest for domination. And now it is a potential nuclear threat, with its own weapons and as an exporter.

To North Koreans, the United States is determined to dominate the Peninsula and destroy the DPRK -- through subversion if possible, with nuclear weapons if necessary. Ironically, Pyongyang now also views the United States as the key to its future.

The Korean War is not over; no peace treaty has replaced the 1953 Armistice. Deterrence has kept the peace, but two million heavily armed troops face each other in close proximity across the demilitarized zone (DMZ), only 25 miles north of South Korea's capital city of Seoul.

The South's extraordinary successes, the North's growing economic problems, Soviet (1990) and Chinese (1992) normalization with the ROK, and the collapse of the socialist world and its Moscow center -- all during a DPRK leadership transition -- have produced dramatic changes in Pyongyang's priorities. Unable to achieve military conquest or even foment South Korean collapse from within, North Korea now concentrates, instead, on its own survival.

To outside observers, Pyongyang's actions have been frustratingly opaque and obstinate. From North Korea's perspective, however, any seeming violations or inconsistencies have arisen from U.S. provocations.

What follows is an assessment of what happened and why, and a projection of where we may be heading, keeping in mind that U.S.-DPRK relations are a moving target.

The Twisted Course of U.S.-DPRK Relations: A Brief History

As South Korea gained confidence and expanded its diplomatic relations in the late 1980s, it pursued a more conciliatory policy toward Pyongyang. The United States followed suit with a modest initiative in late 1988, permitting humanitarian trade and limited diplomatic contacts.

It was also about that time, however, that construction of major new nuclear facilities was detected -- unconnected to any electric power grid -- including a large reactor capable of producing substantial quantities of plutonium and a reprocessing plant capable of turning that plutonium into weapons-grade material. Moreover, a 5MWe experimental reactor shut down for an extended period in 1989, and despite DPRK denials, there is widespread suspicion a substantial number of fuel rods were removed and reprocessed, producing, according to some estimates, enough fissile material for one or possibly two weapons. In light of the North's violent history, its long-range missile program, and its past record of arms sales to the Middle East, concern grew about a nuclear-armed DPRK.

Having rejected earlier proposals to withdraw U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea, the Bush Administration finally acquiesced in the context of its September 1991 change in global deployment policy. By year end, Seoul and Pyongyang concluded an agreement on overall relations and initialed a denuclearization declaration. In January, North Korea agreed to sign a safeguards accord with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Team Spirit, a large-scale joint U.S.-ROK military exercise, was canceled for 1992. Later that month, U.S. Under Secretary of State Arnold Kanter met with Korean Workers Party Secretary Kim Yong Sun. Kanter affirmed that, in the context of implementing nuclear inspections with both IAEA and the South, significant progress in DPRK relations with the United States was possible.

IAEA conducted six "ad hoc" inspections of DPRK nuclear facilities in 1992, but problems soon arose over discrepancies between the Agency's analysis of nuclear samples and North Korea's claim of one-time reprocessing of a small amount of spent fuel. When the Agency sought to examine two suspected nuclear waste sites for clues about the discrepancies, Pyongyang

declared the sites "military" -- and off limits. IAEA eventually demanded "special inspections," long part of its formal arsenal, but never before invoked. The Agency was acting to restore its reputation, badly damaged by the post-Gulf War discovery of an advanced, secret nuclear weapons program in Iraq; North Korea saw IAEA demands as part of a US-orchestrated plot to crush it.

Meanwhile, North-South talks stalled and "Team Spirit," suspended the previous year, was reinstated in 1993.

Some combination of these factors -- and perhaps others related to the leadership succession from Kim Il Sung to his son and designated heir, Kim Jong Il -- led the North to slow cooperation with IAEA and eventually to declare on March 12, 1993, that it was withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Spurred by the UN, last minute negotiations with the United States in June led to "suspension" of the withdrawal one day before it was to take effect. A second round followed in July, and a third was to convene within two months.

Meanwhile, however, North Korea claimed "special status" under the NPT, insisting that in "suspending" its withdrawal it had not resumed the obligations of membership -- including for full IAEA inspections; that was possible only in the context of a comprehensive U.S.-DPRK agreement going beyond nuclear matters. To demonstrate good will, however, Pyongyang would allow inspections necessary to maintain "continuity of safeguards."

While not accepting the North's claim, the United States and IAEA agreed to set the issue aside so long as safeguards were maintained. Nonetheless, controversy immediately arose over the extent of inspections needed for safeguards purposes. As this argument continued through fall and winter 1993-94, IAEA surveillance cameras ran out of film and batteries ran down; North-South talks went nowhere; and U.S.-DPRK dialogue remained in limbo. Only on February 15, 1994, with IAEA on the verge of declaring a break in the continuity of safeguards, did North Korea agree on terms of inspection. Subsequently, on February 25, the United States and North Korea reached a four-part agreement: Washington a) set a date for the third round and b) called off Team Spirit '94; Pyongyang agreed a) IAEA could complete safeguards inspections and b) it would meet South Korea at the working level to prepare for a special envoys meeting.

When IAEA inspectors arrived, however, North Korea blocked two critical procedures. Pyongyang made known its action was in protest against a U.S. "precondition" that not only a working level North-South meeting take place before the third round but that a special envoys meeting itself also be held. Despite the published agreement, Washington claimed this was agreed in preliminary negotiations. Nonetheless, North Korea balked, the third round was canceled, and Team Spirit was reinstated.

North Koreans assert this imbroglio convinced them President Clinton was not serious about a third round but was bent on forcing North Korea to its knees. Thus, even though the special envoys meeting was dropped and IAEA inspectors returned to North Korea in May to complete the March inspection, the North decided to ratchet up pressure by unloading the core of the 5MWe reactor.

Earlier Pyongyang claimed that examination of the core would clear up alleged discrepancies; now North Korea said that accepting any IAEA handling of the rods would violate the DPRK's "special status." IAEA could verify non-diversion of the present core -- which it has done -- but nothing else.

As this confrontation developed, Washington asserted that destroying IAEA's ability to analyze the core -- if not immediately then in the future -- would cross a "red line." Nonetheless, defueling began, at first without IAEA inspectors present but with monitoring equipment running. IAEA wanted a *select* sampling of 300 out of the over 8,000 rods in the core, and although it had not identified those rods, the North evidently figured it out and for some time avoided them. In the jargon, it still "preserved history."

In mid-May, IAEA inspectors and negotiators went to Pyongyang. The latter presented three alternatives on the core but left without agreement.

By this time, the issue for North Korea was apparently not *whether* to unload the core but how to integrate defueling into its diplomatic strategy. Pyongyang promised access to the spent fuel rods once U.S.-DPRK third round dialogue had produced agreement. Moreover it claimed that, while unable to accept IAEA proposals, it had its own "scientifically proven" method that fully "preserved history." Pyongyang also asserts that, though unenthusiastic, the IAEA team agreed to examine this method further on its return to Vienna. On May 27, however, before the team got home, IAEA headquarters told the UN Security Council that North Korea was about to

"destroy history," implicitly rejecting the DPRK method. Considering this an IAEA provocation, Pyongyang accelerated the defueling, by June 2 removing all the key rods.

Pyongyang still insists its method preserves the ability to examine the rods in detail. But on June 10, IAEA reacted by cutting off its (limited) technical cooperation with the DPRK; Pyongyang countered three days later by quitting IAEA. Potentially far more significant, it also announced it would no longer allow continuity of safeguards inspections. If implemented -- as of mid-June inspectors remained in place -- not only would "history" be affected, but the ability to monitor future North Korean activity would be seriously damaged. Ominously, North Korea went on: "Without the Agency [IAEA], we can develop our independent nuclear power industry *and expand international cooperation in the realm of nuclear activities.*" (Emphasis added)¹

Perhaps North Korea never wanted agreement or, even if willing to "cap" its program for the right price, never intended to reveal history --*either* to protect what it *had* achieved *or* to hide what it *hadn't*. Still, to obtain the political legitimacy, security assurances and economic engagement that it badly wants -- and needs -- Pyongyang must negotiate seriously. At issue is the terms of the deal.

Making allowance for characteristic North Korean hyperbole and brinksmanship, many of the problems may stem from contradictory perceptions based on deep mistrust and substantial miscommunication and misunderstanding. Both sides have engaged in "flasher diplomacy," whipping open their negotiating overcoats, giving glimpses of what lay beneath, but without spelling out in detail what they wanted or what they were willing to give. While North Korea surely understands the U.S. is committed to a comprehensive negotiating approach, the American bottom line is put vaguely -- "movement toward more normal relations." And over the past year, a cacophony of voices from Washington has given inconsistent signals about everything from preemptive strikes to promoting implosion by offering "poisoned carrots" of economic engagement.

Seriously troubling for Pyongyang has been American insistence on parallel progress in North-South relations. By insisting that movement in

¹ Foreign Ministry Statement reported by KCNA (English), June 13, 1994 as carried by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS).

U.S.-DPRK relations be accompanied by developments in the complex and emotionally charged North-South relationship, Pyongyang sees Washington a) giving Seoul a veto over North Korea's fate and b) introducing issues so inherently difficult that they reflect a lack of seriousness.

Americans see a legitimate and essential interest in not allowing North Korea to divide us from our ally, and Pyongyang's position complicates our diplomacy. That said, to obtain progress on the nuclear front and in such areas as long-range missile development and export, we will need to make some accommodation. Though difficult, it should not be beyond the wit of U.S. and ROK officials to maintain alliance unity while developing flexible tactics. Otherwise, as repeatedly seen, negotiations will founder. Consider:

- Following the Kanter-Kim Yong Sun meeting of January 1992, while IAEA inspections proceeded, North-South inspections did not, thus blocking further progress.
- Stalemate in North-South negotiations throughout 1992 led to reinstatement of Team Spirit '93 which was a factor in North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT.
- After July, 1993, the absence of North-South negotiations stymied movement to a third round of U.S.-DPRK negotiations.
- The precondition of a North-South envoys meeting led Pyongyang to block completion of the March 1994 IAEA inspections and, reportedly, to unload the reactor core, leading, in turn, toward sanctions and the brink of a crisis.

The Future

Four major issues loom:

- Getting to the third round
- Determining our negotiating priorities
- Coordinating with South Korea, Japan, China and Russia
- Preparing for the consequences of failure

Getting Back to the Table

Whether or not Jimmy Carter's private diplomacy proves ephemeral, the situation is fraught with danger. Imprecision and confusion abound. The Administration must do more than move toward sanctions while waiting for Pyongyang to "create a new basis" for the third round.

One possibility is a presidential envoy. Avoiding threats or demands that would elicit automatic rebuttal, the envoy should go beyond generalities, laying out to top DPRK leaders the President's vision for the future, including the explicit prospect of full diplomatic relations on mutually acceptable terms.

Another -- far less desirable -- course is to accept Russia's proposal for an international conference *before* sanctions go into effect. The conference will likely be unproductive, but the "change of venue" would allow American and North Korean negotiators to bypass current constraints.

Negotiating Priorities

The United States must determine its basic objectives. However repulsive the DPRK system may be, U.S. policy should not seek to change it; time will do that. Our goal should be to change North Korea's external behavior, including its security policies.

Washington has approached North Korea largely as a non-proliferation problem. Tough talk about the "unacceptability" of DPRK nuclear weapons had to be walked back when the implications for war and peace were considered. Others -- South Korea, China, and Japan -- have a major stake in avoiding war, and have been increasingly outspoken.

That said, a sizable North Korean nuclear arsenal would threaten peace and stability in Northeast Asia as well as endanger the viability of the non-proliferation regime. Thus, while not abandoning "history," priority must be accorded to stopping further development of North Korea's nuclear program, and avoiding war in the process.

Nothing in Pyongyang's stated position precludes this, but the third round could be protracted and rancorous. If talks bog down in minutia of tit-for-tat negotiations -- and bureaucratic wrangling in both countries -- stalemate will recur, not only slowing progress, but throwing it off course altogether. Therefore, the United States should adopt a bold position that can engage Kim Il Sung's interest and authority in concluding a deal.

Coordination

The first task is coordination with Seoul. A chief ROK concern is that the United States will negotiate away its interests -- and its leverage. The answer is simple: "We don't do windows." While we can talk about U.S. troop withdrawals -- we can talk about anything -- Pyongyang must

understand the U.S. military presence in Korea is a matter between Seoul and Washington. We should express willingness, working with the ROK, to adjust troop levels in light of North-South agreements, but Pyongyang must negotiate with Seoul. (Pyongyang -- as Seoul -- might eventually want some U.S. presence as a hedge against ambitions of larger neighbors. But that is tomorrow's issue.)

Despite DPRK preferences, we are not the appropriate counterpart to negotiate a peace treaty. Nor, despite ROK preferences, is South Korea. The appropriate counterpart remains the United Nations. Though complicated by North Korea's UN membership, it is possible. Moreover, whatever the DPRK's objections, the United States and South Korea could participate with the UN delegation, easing many concerns.

More broadly, the situation is not ripe for multilateralism. The current pattern of polylateral diplomacy is productive, with various parties dealing bilaterally or trilaterally, coordinating quietly without the complications of an international conference. Still we need to be attentive to Chinese and -- especially -- Russian sensitivities over inadequate involvement. If left unaddressed, their perceived exclusion will allow Moscow and Beijing to duck responsibility for implementing any agreements.

If we fail?

Those advocating preemptive military action against North Korea's nuclear facilities are right: sanctions won't work -- at least in the short run.

But they misread the dynamics of the situation. True, the DPRK is unlikely to initiate all-out hostilities unless its sovereignty or its existence is challenged. But a preemptive strike would do just that. Moreover, rather than enhancing U.S. credibility and long-term security, even winning a war would badly damage both. Our alliances with Japan and the ROK might be sustained through the fighting, but anti-Americanism would rend those partnerships once hostilities ended. Future strategic cooperation with China would be unthinkable.

The NPT, rather than being extended indefinitely, would lapse, as the majority of nations rejected American aggression "justified" in the name of enforcing NPT obligations.

Rather, continued isolation would be North Korea's harshest punishment for intransigence, and far less costly to us than any such drastic

steps. In the context of political succession, Kim Jong Il might gain temporarily from standing up to the United States. But the deterioration in North Korea's condition would outpace -- and outrank -- any purported gains through the nuclear program. With effective deterrence in place, internal dynamics in North Korea would quickly take over, and the likelihood of a more accommodating regime would grow.



MEMORANDUM

June 21, 1994

TO: Tony Lake
FROM: Alan Romberg
SUBJECT: North Korea (What else?)

First, thank you for including me in yesterday's session. I don't know how all of you viewed it -- perhaps as a cacophony of voices that only confused things. But my sense was that you got a rich menu of opinions to help inform your deliberations. And I was impressed with the seriousness of purpose conveyed by not only the questions from "your side of the table" but the turnout itself.

Second, I wanted to follow up on one point regarding Kim Il Sung's detailed references to the light-water reactor in the Carter conversation and his apparent non-reference to normalization of relations. It is out of the question, in my view, that in national interest terms they actually assign higher priority to the reactor issue than to relations with the U.S. But it is striking that this is at least the third time Kim Il Sung has referred to the reactor, making clear on each occasion that he is willing to give up the reprocessing facility -- sorry, the radiochemical laboratory -- for it.

One gets the impression that someone convinced the Great Leader that LWR was a nifty idea, and that Kim has glommed onto it ever since. So, he mentioned it in his Washington Times interview, in his session with Sig Harrison, and to Jimmy Carter. One ought not be too surprised that it has thus acquired a certain salience in the North Korean position. I mean, after all, if you were the Vice Foreign Minister -- or let's say *anyone* else in North Korea, and the Great Leader had an idea he thought was nifty, you might come to think so too! (And, by the way, if he thinks it's nifty, we should not be backing away from our July 1993 pledge to assist them get it -- in the context of resolving the entire issue -- even if it is not the best option on technical or economic grounds.)

What I find most disturbing about this is that it may constitute further evidence that Kim does not have a full grasp of the issues. Rather, he is fixed on certain questions, and perhaps not the central ones. Still, while that may complicate things, it does not, in my mind, vitiate the need to connect Kim personally to the negotiation or to get him to cut his half of the Gordian knot. (Can one cut half a Gordian knot?) I remain concerned that the clock is ticking, both in terms of his health and in

~~Romberg Verdict~~

terms of political dynamics in Pyongyang. His imprimatur could be crucial to get the deal done, and -- in addition to the point I made about not piddling away the negotiations -- that argues to move sooner and more boldly rather than later and by increments.


One final comment (for now). When the question came up of stopping movement toward sanctions during a third round, you jumped in with: "suspend." Let me suggest to you that "suspend" is exactly the wrong way to go. Pyongyang understands that if things go wrong we'll head back down the sanctions route (though, in my view, with no positive outcome in prospect). To shove in their face the fact that the decision is reversible is consistent with the kind of game they like to play, but in this circumstance not constructive. As Don Gregg advocated with regard to the Administration and its critics, I say with regard to North Korea and the United States: cut them a little slack. We're the big guys; we can afford to take some "chances" so long as we aren't risking anything vital.

Finally, you still only get one preference point, at the outside one and a half, for being follicly challenged.

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Department of State

B

S/S #



'94 JUN 27 P6 17

006285

Message No. _____ Classification ~~SECRET~~ No. Pages 3

From: Max Robinson S/S 647-8448 7224
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

Message Description IMMEDIATE CABLE TO SEOUL: THE LIGHT WATER REACTOR
QUESTION IN THE THIRD ROUND

To (Agency):	Deliver To:	Extension	Room No.
NSCS	XXXXXXXXXX	456-6534	WHSITRM
	XXXXXXXXXX		
	Kristie Kenney		
	Executive Secretariat		
	PONEMAN ROTH		
	SUETTINGER		

For: Clearance ☒ Information ☐ Per Request ☐ Comment ☐

Remarks: PLEASE CLEAR BY: MONDAY, JUNE 27 ***** MUST GO *****

THIS CABLE NEEDS TO GO OVERNIGHT MONDAY, JUNE 27 SO THAT THE DEMARCHE CAN
NSC POC: D PONEMAN BE MADE IN SEOUL ON TUESDAY, JUNE 28.

S/S Officer: Max Robinson
Max Robinson

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: MD Date: 11/25/14
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009. cable	re Light Water Reactor Question [dupe of 001] (3 pages)	06/25/1994	P1/b(1)

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Korea, January-June, 1994 [1]

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010a. memo	information, Anthony Lake to POTUS re North Korea: Meeting with Senior Advisors (3 pages)	06/15/1994	P1/b(1)

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010b. paper	re Possible Military Options (4 pages)	c 06/1994	P1/b(1)

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- Wanted to bring you up to date on developments today on North Korea
- President Carter went to Pyongyang at the invitation of the North Koreans. He is there in a private capacity, which is the basis on which he had several hours of talks with Kim Il-Song today.
might or might not
- The North Koreans have made some statements to President Carter that ~~could either represent the basis for some progress or be further delaying tactics. We need to explore that.~~
- The North Koreans indicated that if we reopened negotiations with them they would keep the IAEA inspectors in place, and deal with returning fully to the NPT and special inspections in the context of such negotiations. They also raised the possibility of replacing their current graphite reactors with more proliferation resistant, light water reactors.
- That could be a constructive step if *if mean on the* they also commit to freezing the major elements of their nuclear program while new talks ~~take~~ place, i.e. not refueling the reactor or reprocessing the spent fuel they've just removed.
- If we can clarify that they will make these significant undertakings, we would be prepared to resume negotiations. We will see if they are prepared to do this, ~~either thru President Carter or otherwise.~~
- In the meantime, ~~we are not holding up the sanctions process in the UN.~~ We are continuing to consult on our sanctions resolution.
- I hope you will be cautious in your comments until we have a clearer understanding of whether, in fact, there is a useful opening here or not.

June 16, 1994

The U.S. welcomes indications that North Korea desires to find a constructive outcome to this very serious crisis. The U.S. has always been ready to engage these issues in the course of a third round of talks, as proposed by North Korea. In this connection we note North Korea's assurances that IAEA inspectors and IAEA monitoring equipment would be kept in place. It is also essential that North Korea take steps that will assure the international community that it is not moving closer to a nuclear weapons capability: specifically, that it would not refuel its reactor or reprocess spent fuel and that it accept safeguards inspections to insure non-diversion. Those assurances which clearly follow from their proposal would enable us to defer action on sanctions. Meanwhile, we are continuing to consult on our sanctions resolution.

We await former President Carter's report of his second round of discussions. If they are positive, the next step would be to move discussions to diplomatic channels so as to assure accuracy and complete understanding. In the event of a new round the U.S., as always, would be prepared to participate on behalf of the international community.

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May 31, 1994

Please respond to:
Daun De Vore
Ph # (619) 320-6342
24Hr (619) 773-2257
Fax# (619) 320-5947

Dear President Clinton,

During my several year tenure in Asia, in general, and in South Korea, in particular, I spoke frequently on International Security Interests for the Peninsula, taught Strategic Nuclear Doctrine for the University of Maryland at Seoul and served a significant period of time with U.S. Armed Forces and Korean military from generals on down through the ranks. I have spent a good deal of time at the DMZ.

As a long-standing Democratic woman with a graduate degree from Harvard's Kennedy School of Government with a specialization in International Affairs and Security, coupled with the fact that I am an attorney - Chairperson of the International Law Committee of the American Bar Association's (ABA) General Practice Section, currently putting together a program on North Korea to be delivered at the A.B.A. Annual Meeting in New Orleans this August - I believe that I am uniquely qualified to be of service to you right now.

While in Korea, I mastered the Korean perspective to such a degree that I was honored by the Koreans to be the first woman ever to teach Law at Seoul National University, the Harvard of Korea. I am familiar with Asia in general and most fluent with the Korean mind. I even possess Korean language capability. I can consistently predict Korean behavioral patterns and understand bargaining tactics unique to their culture. While living in Korea as an employee of a Korean law firm during the 80's, I represented the Republic of Korea along with Western multinationals and served as liaison, a capacity in which I still function for the A.B.A. General Practice Section Standing Committee Liaison to

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Law School
1201 Muldrow
Little Rock, AR 72202
(501)324-9966

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Cynthia Valley

(312)988-5659

Carol Simmons

(312)988-5640

Candy McNeal

(312)988-5648

Cont'd. (p.2)

Foreign and International Bars.

I have a lot to contribute to help resolve this most serious and dangerous situation. I include biographical materials and in the interest of time refer to Secretary Bob Reich as a personal reference who can vouch for my credentials, credibility and capability. Please let me help you. I have absolutely no doubt if you gave me a 5-minute audience I could shed great clarity upon what might seem now to be a very confusing situation. Ready, willing and able to serve you I remain,

Sincerely,

Daun Aline De Vore
Daun Aline De Vore,
Chair,
International Law Committee,
Liaison to Foreign and
International Bars.

Enclosures

I will fly to WASH. D.C. at my own expense.

DAUN ALINE DE VORE
Attorney at Law
International Consultant

2825 E. Tahquitz Canyon Way, Suite 109
 P.O. Box 8987
 Palm Springs, CA 92263-8987
 Tel (619) 773-2257 FAX (619) 320-5947

Admitted to California Bar (1981); U.S. Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit (1988); U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit (1988); U.S. Court of International Trade (1988); U.S. Court of Veterans Appeals (1990)

EDUCATION:

1. M.P.A. - HARVARD UNIVERSITY, JFK School of Government (International Affairs and Security) (1981-83) Regional Finalist, White House Fellowship - 1983)
2. J.D. - UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO, School of Law (1978-81) (Outstanding Legal Scholar in State of California, Golden Gate Business and Civic Women's Association (1981)
3. Troisième Année License - UNIVERSITY OF PARIS IV (SORBONNE) (Philosophy in French Language) (1976-77)
4. B.A. MAGNA CUM LAUDE - UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, Irvine (Philosophy) (1974-77) (Aldrich Senior Merit Scholarship Outstanding Student of University - 1976)
5. Graduate - HASTINGS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED ADVOCACY - (1991)

EXPERIENCE:

1. Attorney/International Consultant - OFFICES OF DAUN DE VORE, (1993-)
2. Attorney/Manager - L.A. Regional Office - EUROPEAN/INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LAW FIRM, Palm Springs CA - Practice limited to International Transactions/Litigation (1989-93)
3. Attorney/Consultant - OTHNIEL H.K. LTD, HONG KONG (Korean, Hong Kong, Massachusetts, California) (International Transactions/Negotiations) (1986 - 1989)
4. Attorney - CENTRAL INTERNATIONAL LAW FIRM, Seoul, KOREA, (International Transactions, Intellectual Property Law) (1984-85)
5. Research Attorney - SAN FRANCISCO PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE (Felony Criminal Law) (1982)
6. Law Clerk - MELVIN M. BELLI, ESQ., San Francisco CA (Research Writing re Tort Litigation; Revisions on Belli Book "Modern Trials") (Fall 1980)

7. Law Clerk - U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT, Washington, D.C. (Constitutional/Administrative Law - Complaints, EEOC cases, Civil Rights Violation Matters, Investigation, etc.) (Summer Honors Program, 1980)
8. Law Clerk - U.S. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, Constitution Subcommittee, Washington D.C. (Authored/Research re Status of Equal Rights Amendment for the White House, FBI Charter, NCIC, Budget, Juvenile Justice Act, Right to Privacy) (Spring 1980)
9. Law Clerk - U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, Region IX, San Francisco CA (enforcement re oil and chemical spill violations) (Fall 1979)
10. Law Clerk/Collective Bargaining Negotiator - UNITED FARM WORKERS OF AMERICA (AFL-CIO), Salinas CA (Summer 1979)

TEACHING EXPERIENCE:

1. First Woman Teacher - SEOUL NATIONAL UNIVERSITY LAW COLLEGE (Anglo-American Law) (1985 Academic Year)
2. Lecturer - UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND (Strategic Nuclear Doctrine/Government) Seoul, KOREA (1985)
3. Teaching Fellow - HARVARD UNIVERSITY (Congressional and Legislative Behavior, State Owned Enterprises) (1982, 1983)

POLITICAL EXPERIENCE:

1. California State Democratic Convention, Delegate (1992)
2. Riverside County Democratic Central Committee, Alternate Member (1989-1991)
3. Michael Dukakis for President, National Issues Staff, Kathy Malony, contact, (1988)
4. Americans with (Gary) Hart (for President), Press Advance (National), Field Office (state), (1984)
5. Teddy Kennedy for President, Special Assistant to the Vice-Chair of the California Kennedy Delegation, Democratic National Convention, (1980)
6. San Francisco Commission on the Status of Women, Legislative Committee Member (1978 - 1981)
7. District Office of Assemblyman Willie Brown, (Speaker of the Ca. State Assembly) Intern, San Francisco, CA (Summer 1976)
8. University of California Student Lobby (then ranked the 12th most effective lobby in California, Bank of America ranked 11th) Annex Director (1975 - 1977)
9. United Nations International Women's Year Convention, N.G.O. Representative, Mexico City, Mexico (July 1975)

PUBLICATIONS/PAPERS PRESENTED: (Authored by Daun A. De Vore)

1. "The Legal Aspects of Doing Business in Mexico", ABA N.Y. Annual Meeting Program, (1993)
2. "National Security Issues to be Considered by Foreign Investors", 12 Whitt.L.R. No.2 (1991)
3. "The Reunification of Germany and the Security of Europe", University of CA at Santa Barbara (July 1990)
4. "European Trade: The European Community and Eastern Europe - 1992 and Beyond" - The American Society of International Law, International Law Section, CA Bar (1990)
5. "Nuclear Proliferation and the Governance of Nuclear Power"- American Nuclear Society, Seoul, Korea (1986)
6. United States Information Service (U.S.I.S.) Speaker, Various topics re: U.S. Foreign Policy Position, South Korea (1986)
7. "Current Issues in Asian Intellectual Property Law", American Chamber of Commerce (APCAC), Singapore (1985)
8. Author/Publisher Agreements signed with the American Bar Association for two books on Korea and Monaco.

PUBLIC SPEAKING:

1. "U.S. Security Interests on the Korean Peninsula", Korea (1984)
2. "The Taiwan Question", Hong Kong (1986)
3. "Soviet Retrenchment and Eastern Europe" Palm Springs CA (1980)
4. "The Inherent Unity of All Religions", Kyungbuk University, Center for the Reconstruction of Society, Korea (1985)
5. "The Role of Law in Business Ventures", Conference on Soviet American Trade and Economic Cooperation, Kremlin Palace, Moscow (1991)
6. Judge, Rotary Club Contests, Local, Regional Levels (1990 - 1991)
7. Toastmaster (1989)

BIOGRAPHICAL PROFILES:

1. WHO'S WHO IN CALIFORNIA
2. WHO'S WHO OF EMERGING LEADERS OF AMERICA
3. WHO'S WHO IN AMERICAN LAW

MEMBERSHIPS:

1. CHAIR, INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMITTEE, LIAISON TO FOREIGN AND INTERNATIONAL BARS, General Practice Section, American Bar Association (1992-) CHAIR, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA-PACIFIC; INTERNATIONAL SERVICES COMMITTEE (1989-90); Section of International Law

2. CALIFORNIA BAR ASSOCIATION - Section of International Law, California Bar Association
3. UNION INTERNATIONALE DES AVOCATS
4. ASIA-PACIFIC LAWYERS ASSOCIATION
5. ARMED FORCES COMMUNICATIONS AND ELECTRONICS ASSOCIATION
6. HARVARD CLUB (Board of Directors, Korea 1986)

HONORS: (Other honors See EDUCATION above)

1. Commendation from the Palm Springs City Council for dedicated and continuing service to the City (1990)
2. Distinguished Leadership Award, American Biographical Institute, Raleigh NC (1988)

JOURNAL EXPERIENCE:

1. Journal for Policy Analysis and Management, Consultant/Assistant to the Editor in Chief, Prof. Raymond Vernon, Harvard University (1982-84)
2. ABA General Practice Section, International Law Update (1992-1993)

CIVIC/HOBBIES AND INTERESTS:

1. JUDGE FULBRIGHT FELLOWSHIP (Korea - 1985)
2. SAN GORGONIO GIRL SCOUTS COUNCIL (1988-90)
3. Opera Singer - locally currently in title role "Tosca" (Italian), "La Traviata", "Madame Butterfly"
4. Commissioner - CITY OF PALM SPRINGS, CA (1989-90)
5. Foreign Languages - French, Korean (some Spanish, negligible Chinese, Russian, Hebrew)

[Vol. 12]

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NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED BY FOREIGN INVESTORS*

DAUN A. DE VORE**

Essentially, three types of power exist in the international arena—economic, military and political. With the advent of nuclear weapons and the rise of economic power internationally, the Clausewitzian¹ notion that war is an extension of politics by other means has become antiquated. Many of the actions that Gorbachev has taken recently, and perhaps his very rise to power itself, demonstrate the acknowledgment by the Soviet Union that economic power is preeminent. These events are evidence that the longstanding Soviet military focus espoused by Stalin has finally come to an end.

Several factors set the stage for this. For example, Japan arose as a superpower without expending vast amounts of money on its military. The People's Republic of China, an ideological comrade, began to open up economically under Deng Xiao Ping, even though there have been setbacks in light of the Tiananmen Square incident. Furthermore, economic power holds the preeminent position for the first time since the seventeenth century when the Dutch, through their

* This is the edited text of a speech presented at the 1990 International Law Symposium at Whittier College School of Law on April 21, 1990.

** Daun Aline De Vore is managing partner of the Los Angeles Regional office of The International Business Law Firm, headquartered in Washington, D.C.

Ms. De Vore was educated at the University of California, the University of Paris IV (Sorbonne), the University of San Francisco and Harvard University, graduating from the latter with an additional advanced degree in International Affairs and Security. A former lecturer in Strategic Nuclear Doctrine at the University of Maryland, Ms. De Vore is a member of the California Bar and appears currently in *Who's Who in California*, *Who's Who in American Law*, and *Who's Who of Emerging Leaders of America*.

1. Clausewitz was a nineteenth century militarist who believed that war was but another method of waging peace.





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MARCH 1986

MONTHLY ECONOMIC JOURNAL

Foreign Banks: Snowballing Profits



FOREIGN LAWYERS IN KOREA

by Christopher Smith

FOREIGN LAWYERS IN KOREA: A HELP OR A HINDRANCE?

The handful of Korean law firms doing international business employ foreign attorneys to both attract international clients and assist in communication. The presence of these foreign lawyers is occasionally questioned by the local legal community. As pressure mounts for Korea to open up its legal market to foreign firms, local attorneys fear they will be eliminated by the competition and that the Korean legal profession will end up too heavily influenced by foreigners.

When Korea found itself a major player in the world economy around the mid-1970's, local businessmen became painfully aware that foreigners did not always share the Korean view on how things ought to be done... either in spirit or practice. Foreign companies or clients who came to do business here were dismayed by the delays, miscommunication and foul-ups that seemed to continually put awry their well-conceived plans. Inevitably, the foreigners began to seek legal help.

A few Korean lawyers saw their chance early-on and, in a scramble to draw international clients, took steps to create firms attractive to the newcomers. Men like H.H. Kim, of Kim, Chang & Lee, and Kim Young-Mu of Kim & Chang went to the United States to train. Upon their return to Korea in the early 1970's they set up their respective firms in anticipation of the new market. Others soon set up their own firms, but the lion's share of business went to the first pioneers.

As part of this drive, the new firms hired American attorneys as foreign legal consultants. Around the late 1970's, the Korean legal community began to question whether foreign lawyers should be allowed to work in such a capacity. Since only a handful of firms dominated the lucrative international business, the presence of foreign attorneys at these offices became a touchy issue. The question was finally taken to the Ministry of Justice and eventually reached the National Assembly. It was finally decided that the foreign attorneys could stay if they did not practice as Korean lawyers. Yet, the question remains, and is likely to resurface in a different form as Korea is

asked to open up its market to foreign law firms in the next few years.

Currently, about seven firms in Korea handle the vast bulk of international business legal work. All use, or have used, foreigners as legal consultants. By far, the largest is Kim & Chang, which employs about 11 Ameri-

Korea, and how they themselves view the overall situation. *BusinessWorld* interviewed five American and two Korean lawyers working in Seoul.

The most obvious role of a foreign attorney in any Korean law firm is to bridge the communication gap. This must be done by an expert in legal language. An American lawyer in Seoul stresses that he often serves as an intermediary by making Korean legal actions and their justifications understandable to American clients. Foreign attorneys must explain to foreign clients what is "between the lines" on all transactions. Contracts are also often made under foreign law, which requires that an attorney who knows where to look for and how to interpret the relevant material participate.

The foreign attorney must also be involved in transactions from the beginning of a project to the end. All work is done with Korean attorneys, so the foreigner's role is always as a consultant, not a lawyer. Another American attorney says his work is that of a lawyer in the sense that he helps in drafting, negotiations of contracts, etc. He does



Daun Aline De Vore

can attorneys. Next is Lee & Ko, followed by Kim, Chang & Lee, Shin & Kim, Shin, Kim & Yu, Central International Law Firm, and a few others.

The activities of these firms vary greatly. Clients include Kellogg, Hyundai, Daewoo, General Motors, and many others. Kim & Chang even handled some business for Steven Spielberg, famous for "E.T." and "Gremlins".

To get a better perspective on just what role the foreign attorneys play in

not, of course, sign opinion letters or engage in any other activity which would be considered the practice of law as an attorney in Korea. Donald Spafford, a U.S. attorney at Shin & Kim, says his work saves a great deal of time for the firm. Most agree that the frequency of telexes and other communications would increase significantly without the help of foreigners.

One Korean lawyer says the quality of the American attorneys in Korea is very poor. He maintains that the tight

FOREIGN LAWYERS IN KOREA

job market for lawyers in the U.S. has prompted people who could not find good jobs at home to come here. He also says that the difficulty in passing Korea's bar examination is a cause for resentment among local lawyers. Roughly one-third of U.S. law school graduates pass their bar exams.

Ken Jennings of Kim & Chang disagrees: "The quality of American attorneys here is uniformly high... Any of our people could have a very good job at home." Most of the other foreign attorneys agree with Jennings. They also add that coming to Korea is sometimes a sacrifice and that most came here out of a personal interest in the country. One lawyer's interest in Korea began as a result of his sense of injustice over the lopsided distribution of wealth among countries in the world. He was interested in the legal means by which Third World countries could protect themselves from being drained of resources and left behind as the rich countries advanced.

Daun De Vore, formerly of Central International, is an American attorney employed by a Hong Kong company affiliated with Kim & Kim. She has a different view. She believes that when Japan opens up its market to foreign law firms, Korea will have to follow. When that happens, very powerful Wall Street firms with much more talented attorneys might liquidate a few of the local law offices now handling foreign business transactions in Korea. Most of the talent that now exists in Korea, she adds, might not stand a chance against this extremely tough competition. Although this will spell disaster for some firms, she says, it will ultimately benefit Korea by increasing competition and elevating the quality of legal services as well as giving the nation access to powerful economic and political channels in the U.S. which are closely tied to the Wall Street firms. Korea's proper use of political channels not yet dominated by Japan could ameliorate its political position in the U.S. by counterbalancing the present ineffectiveness of Korean lobbies there.

Another Korean attorney, although he agrees with De Vore's assessment of the international law firms that now exist in Korea, does not think the presence of foreign firms will be of much help to his country. He maintains that Korean companies could hire the foreign firms now if they were interested in getting access to the powerful U.S. lobbies. Some say the Koreans might already be trying to do this. He also says Korean lawyers are very nervous about the prospect of Korea's legal market opening up to the outside.

Nevertheless, the competition will ultimately benefit the legal community, and he believes the quality of lawyers, both foreign and Korean, will improve.

Traditionally, lawyers in Korea have enjoyed a status quite different from lawyers in the U.S. A Korean attorney's job was always limited to litigation. His place was in the courtroom. "The use of lawyers in international business transactions in Korea is a very recent phenomena... It has only blossomed with the growth of international

among Koreans rather than a binding document. "Fundamentally, a contract is only as good as the relationship between the parties," she asserts, adding that the presence of American attorneys in a Korean firm does not change this underlying Confucian standard. De Vore says that although Korea has some well-defined laws, an American can not always count on exactly the same type of service from a lawyer as in the U.S. Loyalty to the welfare of Korea, however it may be perceived, underlies



Kenneth W. Jennings, Jr.

trade," says Spafford of Shin & Kim.

Korean companies also depend heavily on in-house paralegals rather than an outside firm when doing business. Since the number of people who pass the Korean bar examination is kept extremely low, many law school graduates become in-house paralegals for the major firms. Ken Jennings comments that the tendency to depend excessively on these people is slowly changing, although Korean companies have often been a little late in seeking outside legal help, as in the recent dumping cases. It is a good idea, says Jennings, to get outside counsel if the other side is using it, since outside counsel usually has more sophisticated knowledge.

Confucianism also deeply affects the attitude toward lawyers and the law. De Vore points out that social relationships tend to supercede the law in the ordering of society, and adds that the law in the East is traditionally for the incorrigible man of lowest moral character in contrast to the West, where the man of highest character, even a king or president, must be subject to it. A contract is regarded more as a symbol of good faith



Donald L. Spafford, Jr.

everything a Korean lawyer does.

Another Korean attorney says that the Confucian way of thinking is also behind Korean companies' reluctance to use U.S. law firms as an avenue to influence American lobbies. The Koreans seem to believe their personal relationship with the Americans makes such efforts unnecessary. De Vore observes that Japan is much more advanced in this respect than Korea. Japan has been actively pursuing its interests in the U.S. for years.

The bottom line, as most observe, is that the Koreans want to retain control of the legal profession. Foreign attorneys in Korea all work as employees of their Korean firms. The presence of foreigners as legal advisors under the control of a local firm serves the dual purpose of attracting foreign clients and keeping the legal profession in line with Korean standards. If the legal market opens up to foreign law firms, the situation will change dramatically. The effects may be mixed. Though many have good reasons to fear the newcomers, perhaps it is time Korea seriously considers the benefits they can bring. 

is an open-door effort to survive the international trade climate and its exports.

It-business forums, to t. 20, was organized by tion of Banks, which is Deputy Prime Minister also attending the meet- of the nation's major the top 30 business ar financial dealings.

forums are held behind whole picture of the dia- economy-related minis- leaders is not available. e discussion forums are if summaries of the dia- government has been re- texts of the ministers' to the press.

ne first of a series of the day at Hotel Lotte, De- ter Shin said the meet- pooling the wisdom of search of ways to perk gging economy.

ow a package of pump- taken by the govern- ar as a result of persis- n business circles. The signed mainly to spur ts, which suffered a 3.5 during the first seven ar earlier.

ump-priming measures id July, the private sec- nore powerful remedies slumping business. nomic growth rate dur- of this year stood at 3.2 with 10.5 percent dur- d a year ago.

it and business circles niple: They must take the slowing economy. on the measures to that ment says it cannot take that could adversely ty and the nation's ba- while the private sec- re active measures are up the economy.

is view the government- s arenas for argument. s are resolved to depart old, growth-at-any-cost orm a firmer base for economic growth. The ps, meanwhile, want to usiness practices favor- nsion of their business. during the past three ne Minister Shin said, e are now experiencing unavoidable process for my in the course of re- y inefficient factors as of the advanced coun-

ins to be seen whether "dialogue between the the private sector will to a variety of problems economy, not the least rrent business slump.

of 44 percent from the like period of last year.

Korean business advised to counter protectionism with flexibility

By Suh Myong-goo
Staff reporter

Korean businessmen should try to understand the thinking of their trade counterparts and adapt accordingly as they seek to cope with ever-growing trade protectionism, a U.S. lawyer said.

Dr. Daun Aline De Vore, a partner in the Korean law firm Central International, said that most trade friction stems from cultural misunderstandings and a lack of communication.

"In terms of bargaining techniques, Americans push to the last possible points, and then there is little room for compromise. But I think Koreans and many other Asians tend to compromise when someone says no more pushing," she said yesterday in an interview with The Korea Herald.

This is indicative of the differences between Oriental and Western ways of thinking, she noted.

But in terms of trade, Korean businessmen should understand that Americans feel that they have been patient enough, and are increasingly upset as the U.S. foreign trade deficit mounts, she said.

De Vore continued, saying U.S. government officials and legislators think that a lot of things have gone too far, that they have been too accommodating in the past.

"Now what they want to see is a substantive change in trade partner practices. They want action rather than continued talk," she said.

The 31-year-old U.S. lawyer came to Seoul last August to study international affairs and security involving the Asian region, while at the same time working at her present law firm.

Before coming to Korea, she had considerable experience in political and legal affairs in the United States. De Vore worked for the Civil Rights Division of U.S. Department of Justice as a law clerk and San Francisco Commission on the Status of Women as a legislative committee member. She received a doctorate from the University of San Francisco School of Law, in 1983.

De Vore said that sentiment in favor of protectionism is at a high level in the United States because the country is slipping into a difficult era, adding that American people want the government to stop patronizing foreign countries financially at the expense of domestic employment and social welfare.

"Protectionist legislation is pending in

In other words, the ITC attempted to freeze U.S. imports at 1983 levels.

Congress, largely aimed at Japan. But when the law is passed, it will be detrimental to Korea as well. Most U.S. congressmen regard Korea as following in Japan's footsteps," she said.

Noting the desirability of business incorporation in the U.S. as part of strategies to bypass trade barriers, she said that Korean businessmen would be wise to seek expert legal council in the state where they wish to locate. A qualified lawyer can provide particulars about rules and statutes governing local business operations.

Advance contact with the U.S. Embassy in Korea is another effective way by which Korean investors can gain access to various information concerning business investments in a specific area.

In De Vore's view, Korean employees don't seem to feel free in making suggestions to people in higher positions out of fear that the superior might think it criticism. This in turn could hamper improvements in a company's performance.

She pointed out that Koreans are quite different from Americans in weighing moral virtue. "In Korea, loyalty is much more important than fairness. In America, to the contrary, fairness takes precedence over loyalty. These differences can lead to some embarrassment on the part of Korean lobbyists in the United States," she said.

De Vore expects that the 1986 Asian Games and 1988 Olympics — both to be held in Seoul — will provide greater opportunities to acquaint foreigners with Korean thinking and ways of doing business.

And she is optimistic about Korea. "The economy may be slowing down, but the potential is tremendous in all economic sectors in view of the country's excellent technical manpower."



De Vore

Foreign exchange

	(Y/M) (in won)	
	Selling	Buying
Aug. 29		
U.S. Dollar	886.9	882.3
Japanese Yen (per ¥100)	374.35	372.47
British Pound	1,244.21	1,237.89
Deutsche Mark	319.95	318.35
Canadian Dollar	651.43	648.17
French Franc	104.84	104.30
Italian Lira (per 100 Lira)	47.66	47.42
Swiss Franc	390.68	388.72
Hong Kong Dollar	113.65	113.07
Swedish Krone	107.30	106.76
Australian Dollar	623.44	620.32
Danish Krone	87.91	87.47
Belgian Franc	15.80	15.72
Austrian Schilling	45.57	45.33
Norwegian Krone	108.25	107.71
Dutch Guilder	283.97	282.55
Saudi Riyal	242.82	241.50
Kuwait Dinar	2,833.07	2,818.43
Bahraini Dinar	2,352.61	2,340.87
UAE Dirham	241.49	240.27
Singapore Dollar	394.15	392.17

(Quoted by Korea Exchange Bank)
For more information, call 7722-711

World Gold Prices

Wednesday

New York 340.90, London 340.00, Zurich 340.00, in late gold prices (in U.S. dollars per troy ounce). (AP)

[x quote] (price: won)

over : 8,613 million won
anged : 57

restraints on shoe adopt tough measures overall.

The decision foreign footwear U.S. shoe manufacturer for legislative

The U.S. Congress nearly 300 bills tariffs, import of One of the more impose sweeping to the United Korea, Taiwan and

The most salient U.S. congressional one-percent limit from major textile ducts subject to

The U.S. Congress most part call for a global basis consideration of each global quota system reduced import proposal, if adopted textile exporters existing U.S. market textile goods (a billion worth) of last year.

Korea's textile country's largest earner since the 1970s vis total exports

Analysts expect proposal would charge on import barriers to U.S. pluses in trade with four countries Taiwan and Korea

Any one of the ly approved by the be a "disaster" Korean exporters, not

"U.S. President fusal to go along tion to impose shows that he is principle of free said.

Congressional trigger retaliatory partners, which war, the observer

The increasing measures in re most severely to

Thai airline here for

Janya Sukontak International, the Thailand, flew in group of members Thai Airport Authority

This is his first Korea after appointed to the post Oct. 1, 1984 accompanied by Subharp Sukontak

While here and he will meet with of Transportation of promoting commercial air traffic between

Business

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
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MONTHLY ECONOMIC JOURNAL

IBRD/IMF Annual Meetings



Korea '85

A Short Guide to Modern Korea

Do's and Don't's in Marketing

What You Should Know

About Marketing in ROK

Korea-A Ask: Growing Tes

SEOUL 1985



A large variety of goods, ranging from antique to clothes, are sold in Itaewon.

That Jazz. If you like discos, you can enjoy dancing at the Sportsman's Club. Around 100 bars and clubs are available for people who are seeking amusement.

To make the shopping for foreigners

easier, price tags are attached to all the goods. You will hardly experience a breakdown communication in Itaewon. Most shopkeepers are able to command basic English. Also, recently the city's top class hotels—Hyatt,

Shilla, Sheraton Walker Hill, Hilton and Plaza—started shuttle bus service to Itaewon.

Payment can be made in U.S. dollars or Korean Won at all stores. Some shops accept major credit cards including Amex, Master Card and Diners Club and traveler's checks. The current exchange rate here is around 870 Won. The official exchange rate of the Korea Exchange Bank is about 890 Won. According to Kim Hong-Kyu, assistant manager of the Cho Hung Bank—one of five commercial banks which have branch offices in Itaewon—about \$20,000 is deposited by shop owners per day. "Approximately \$100 million is collected from the Itaewon shopping area a year," said Kim. "Some of the U.S. dollars are flowing into the black market. It is not out of control, however," he added. The black market rate is about 920 Won to the dollar with daily fluctuations.

— by Kim Hae-Won

WOMEN ON THE GO

DE VORE NOMINATED

Women, who have long played an important role in the American Chamber of Commerce in Korea (AmCham), have now entered a new era of participation with the nomination of a woman, Daun Aline De Vore, for a position on the Board of Governors of AmCham. A lawyer currently employed at the Central International Law Firm, a Korean firm located in downtown Seoul, De Vore has had a wide range of educational and work experiences.

Educated at the University of California, the University of Paris IV (sorbonne), the University of San Francisco and Harvard University, De Vore has worked in legal and political spheres directly relevant to the activities of AmCham. While in Washington, D.C., she was employed by the U.S. Department of Justice and prepared memoranda for the White House during her tenure with the United States Senate Judiciary Committee. She also worked for the United States Environmental Agency and attorney Melvin M. Belli while she was in San Francisco.

She chose Korea in order to learn more about the Asian business world because she sees it as the place where many things are happening.

"There is a special relationship between the U.S. and Korea, both in the military and the business realm. Korea

is an exciting, newly industrialized nation and I felt that I had my best opportunity to contribute and to learn here," she said at a recent interview with *BusinessWorld*. She has been extremely active in AmCham from the first, taking part in many committees and speaking on behalf of AmCham on many occasions. As chairman of the Membership Committee, she was responsible for publishing a pictorial directory for AmCham which came out in September.

De Vore has participated in the Asian Pacific Council of American Chambers of Commerce (APCAC), recently delivering a very well received paper on intellectual property rights at their Singapore meeting. As a result, De Vore was asked to attend the annual Doorknock Campaign for APCAC in Washington, D.C. She met with Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige, as well as members of the National Security Council and the U.S. Senate.

De Vore sees her nomination as the next step in the natural progression of her participation with AmCham. "AmCham's role is to help foster a good relationship with the host country and other foreign businessmen and to protect the United States and American business interests here in Korea," she said.

She has very definite ideas about the



Ms. De Vore is a candidate for the governorship of the American Chamber of Commerce in Korea.

role of a governor. "I would focus on improving the conditions that American businesses operate in. AmCham must work with Korea and Korean businessmen to improve the situation between the U.S. and Korea and make it more equitable. This would promote a better business climate for both parties."

De Vore's enthusiasm and energy seem to have no limit. Along with her other activities, she teaches Strategic Nuclear Doctrine for the University of Maryland as well as Anglo-American Law at Seoul National University Law College. She finds the atmosphere of the Korean business community stimulating and educational.

— by C.B. Paiza

“韓·美·日·英·法·蘇·中”

國內의 醫眼의 技術 發展을 위한 노력

【서울 10일 특파원 특보】 국내의 醫眼의 技術은 最近 著히 發展하고 있다. 醫眼의 技術은 醫術의 重要한 部分이며, 人의 健康을 保衛하고 疾病을 治癒하는 데 至關重要한 役割을 擔當하고 있다. 國內의 醫眼의 技術은 最近 著히 發展하고 있다. 醫眼의 技術은 醫術의 重要한 部分이며, 人의 健康을 保衛하고 疾病을 治癒하는 데 至關重要한 役割을 擔當하고 있다.

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나지나쳐 가끔 損害 잘알아야 마찰 안 빚어 매로...오래 머물고 싶어요.

【서울 10일 특파원 특보】 韓·美·日·英·法·蘇·中의 關係는 最近 著히 發展하고 있다. 韓·美·日·英·法·蘇·中의 關係는 最近 著히 發展하고 있다. 韓·美·日·英·法·蘇·中의 關係는 最近 著히 發展하고 있다. 韓·美·日·英·法·蘇·中의 關係는 最近 著히 發展하고 있다. 韓·美·日·英·法·蘇·中의 關係는 最近 著히 發展하고 있다.

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