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Defense Budget
8/15McCurry Press Talking Points
August 15, 1996

- In 1992, then-Governor Clinton promised to reduce the Defense budget by \$60 billion over the FY 1994 to FY 1997 period.
 - This reduction was based on programmatic changes in defense purchases allowed by the ending of the Cold War.
- In preparation for the Clinton Administration's FY 1994 budget, another \$28 billion was removed to more accurately reflect changes in defense requirements for the post Cold War era.
 - The reductions were based on savings in pay, benefits, and other defense programs, bringing the total to \$88 billion.
- But, since the FY 1994 budget, the President increased the defense budget several times to accommodate emerging defense requirements to:
 - sustain a high-state of readiness,
 - improve quality of life, and
 - purchase new military hardware.
- As a result, by the FY 1997 budget, the Administration's defense savings between FY 1994 and FY 1997 were \$75 billion, down from \$88 billion.
- We don't know where the \$127 billion figure comes from.
 - The figure does not reflect the Clinton Administration's defense plan.

Background Paper: BRAC

Added for Wed Brief Book

We need another BRAC

- We have more bases than we need to support our forces. Since 1989, DoD has cut troops by 33%. The QDR will recommend additional endstrength reductions of 60,000-70,000 active duty, bringing the total reduction to 36%.
- We have only eliminated 21% of our U.S. base structure, 26% worldwide.
- Spending money on bases we don't need takes money from modernization and readiness.

We expect significant savings from BRAC

- Each round of BRAC will generate \$1.4 billion in annual recurring savings.
- A round of BRAC requires some upfront investment – about \$4.4 billion for a BRAC 99.
- We begin saving money in the fourth year of a BRAC round – '03 for a BRAC 99.
- These estimates are based on experience with four BRAC rounds which closed 97 major bases. These rounds will cost a total of \$23 billion. By 2001, we will have saved about \$14 billion. After 2001, we will save about \$5.6 billion a year.

How would a new BRAC work?

- The Administration must propose enabling legislation to Congress. Our proposal would be modeled on legislation that worked well for the previous BRAC rounds. For a BRAC 99:
- Services analyze and recommend closures/realignments to SecDef, who reviews and makes recommendations to an independent commission. Members of the Commission are nominated by the President, the Speaker of the House, and the Majority Leader of the Senate.
- The Commission reviews DoD's analysis and issues its own closure list (summer '99).
- The President may either accept or reject the Commission's list in total – he cannot modify it.
- Congress then has 45 days in which it may reject the list.
- For a BRAC 99, legislation must be passed this year.

Progress on Past BRAC Rounds: Administration Policies Speed Economic Development

- In 1993, President announced a 5 Point Program to assisted communities with closing bases:
 - Job creation/development became main focus of property disposal process
 - Fast track environmental cleanup removed needless delays
 - On-site ombudsmen assigned to every major base closure community
 - More retraining assistance for workers and development aid for communities
 - Larger planning grants to base closure communities -- on average, \$1 million over 5-years
- DoD established policies/procedures to respond to community needs and has been continuously improving them to speed implementation.

Results: Rapid Job Creation

- Nearly 31,000 jobs have been created thus far at closed bases. Eighty percent of these new jobs were created last year. 77,000 civilian jobs at these bases had been lost – that's a replacement rate of over 40%. At bases closed over a year, the job replacement rate is 47%, and growing.
- Economic Development Conveyances (new conveyance method to promote economic development) signed thus far are projected to create 96,000 new jobs.

Results: Better and Faster Implementation

- Military Departments closing bases faster – from 66 months (BRAC 88) to 42 months now
- Communities developing reuse plans faster – from 57 months (BRAC 88) to 21 months now
- Services executed more than 700 leases to bring commercial tenants to closing bases and DoD approved 20 EDCs this year.

May 12, 1997

QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW COMMUNICATION PROGRAM

The Department must have a comprehensive, unified message to convey to Congress and to the public, portraying the QDR as an innovative, analytical, far-reaching assessment of the national defense needs of the U.S., a blueprint which will enable the United States to respond to any threat we will face into the 21st Century. It is important that all Department components speak with one voice in its interaction with Congress and interested parties.

Key messages include:

- The QDR outlines a three-part strategy. First, we must shape the security environment to protect our national interests, promote regional stability, and deter aggression around the world. Second, we must be able to respond quickly to the full spectrum of threats through forces which are flexible, strong and ready to dominate any aggressor early in any conflict. Lastly, we have to prepare now for any threats that might arise in the future. By executing the robust modernization program we have planned, the United States will maintain its global leadership well into the next century.
- The QDR strategy must be executed within realistic budget restraints. The QDR positions the Department to exploit the revolutions in military affairs and business affairs that will yield the efficiencies necessary to modernize for the next century, while preserving today's readiness and capability. The Force is not broken. Because our military is strong, well-trained and ready, there is no need to radically restructure it. The QDR charts a prudent course to maintain its current strengths, achieve greater efficiencies, and reallocate resources to modernize for the future.
- The QDR is comprehensive. All elements of our defense program -- strategy, force structure, infrastructure, readiness, modernization, people and information and intelligence programs -- were thoroughly reviewed. Everything was on the table. All major components within the Department of Defense participated in the review. The service chiefs and CINCs were actively engaged. The QDR's recommendations resulted from tough decisions and difficult tradeoffs, but successfully balance the need to maintain readiness today, modernize for tomorrow and harness revolutionary technologies which will emerge in the coming decades.
- The QDR is not an end in itself, but a continuing process. The Department will work closely with the rest of the Administration, the Congress, and National Defense Panel in the months ahead. Many issues within the QDR require further analysis. However, this represents a critical foundation which will guide our defense programs well into the next century.

The QDR Roll-out will be accomplished in two phases. Phase 1 involves Congressional consultations and general public discussion regarding the QDR process, strategy and difficult choices facing the Department of Defense. Most of the media and political interest will revolve

DEFENSE -- MCKINNEY INDICTMENT

Background: Statements by high-level military, OSD and Administration officials have complicated court-martial proceedings on more than one occasion in the past when cited by defense attorneys as improper influence. The President, as Commander-in-Chief, should not make any statements on specific cases such as this.

- Due to the pending legal proceedings, it would be inappropriate for the White House to comment on the charges against Sgt Major McKinney.
- I refer your questions concerning this case to the Department of Defense.

Q: **What is the President's view on women in the military?**

A: The President supports the expanded roles for women in the Armed Services that have been implemented over the past four years.

Q: **What is the President's view on sexual harassment in the military?**

A: He views with concern all allegations of sexual harassment or sexual misconduct in the military. He expects the Department of Defense and the Services to investigate all such allegations and take appropriate disciplinary action against those found guilty, and to take appropriate corrective action to prevent further incidents.


Press Guidance

April 7, 1997

NEW YORK TIMES ARTICLE ON CONCEALED WEAPON DETECTION

Q: Is the NYT story accurate?

A: Yes, it appears to be primarily accurate and I would refer you to DOJ for any more technical details of on the on-going projects at NIJ.



FYI Background:

In response to the President's request in April of 1995, the Department of Justice through the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) initiated a program to develop better ways to detect concealed weapons. The current program consists of seven distinctly different technological approaches (to increase the likelihood of rapid success) -- Three are funded under a joint NIJ/Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) partnership -- The other four are funded under a partnership between DOJ and DOD. All seven are managed by NIJ, but the initial funding is now exhausted. DOJ is expected to seek additional funding to continue this program through the next four years in the range of \$4.5 million.

JS/Verman
Conversation Gregory Link/DOJ



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FAX COVER SHEET

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SUBJECT McVeigh Card

Number of pages including cover sheet: 4

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Per Col. Bridges

*NSC -
Are we
in
right
place?*

COPY

TAB____

MCVEIGH DISCHARGE - JAN. 13, 1998**CURRENT NEWS**

Washington Post (Jan. 12, 1998) - When Navy sailor Timothy R. McVeigh created a "user profile" on America Online, he didn't think his use of the word "gay" to describe his marital status would violate the Clinton administration's "don't ask, don't tell" policy on homosexuals in the military. He said he was careful not to include his full name or his occupation, referring to himself only as "Tim" in "Honolulu, Hawaii."

But last week, in an unusual case that has outraged gay-rights groups and electronic-privacy advocates, the Navy's deputy personnel chief ordered that McVeigh who is not related to the convicted bomber of the Oklahoma City federal building be dismissed from the service for violating the policy, after a naval investigator testified that he obtained McVeigh's identity with a telephone call to American Online Inc.

MESSAGE

- Under the Department of Defense homosexual conduct policy, a statement made by a member that he is "gay," provides a rebuttable presumption that the Servicemember has a propensity to engage in homosexual conduct. This presumption may warrant the initiation of administrative discharge proceedings against the member.
- Once the presumption is established, the member has an absolute right to an administrative hearing where he or she has the right to legal representation and to present evidence to rebut the presumption.
- In Senior Chief McVeigh's case, he was afforded the above rights. The board recommended that he be discharged with an honorable discharge which is to be effectuated on January 15, 1998.
- The Navy is prohibited under the Privacy Act from releasing any information at this time.

FACTS AND POLICY

HOMOSEXUAL POLICY REVIEW

- The review of implementation of homosexual conduct policy is nearing completion and should go to the Secretary of Defense within the next few weeks.
- It would be inappropriate to discuss the finds until the Secretary has been briefed.

ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING

- McVeigh went to his administrative hearing but chose not to provide evidence to rebut the presumption that he has a propensity to engage in homosexual conduct.
- He did provide an unsworn statement admitting that the profile was his and explaining his rational for creating the profile. As the statement was unsworn, the board could not ask follow-up questions. McVeigh's statement did not address specifically his sexual orientation.

DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL POLICY

- The "don't ask, don't tell" policy, which went into effect February 28, 1994, was grounded in months of extensive congressional research, hearings and debate before its final passage into law. This policy supports the maintenance of unit cohesion and morale as well as preserving the privacy of the individual. For these reasons, and because it works to maintain readiness, the Department supports and defends the policy.
- Reasons for "don't ask, don't tell" policy are spelled out in DoD directives:
 - DoD policy dictates that service in the U. S. military is based on conduct, not sexual orientation. The three bases for separation are homosexual acts, same sex marriages, and statements by an individual that he or she is a homosexual or bisexual.

- Congress likewise found in the National Defense Authorization Act of 1994 that: The presence in the Armed Forces of persons who demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts would create an unacceptable risk to the high standards of morale, good order and discipline and unit cohesion that are the essence of military compatibility.
- Allegations that commanders are abusing the new policy are thoroughly investigated. We are committed to ensuring fair application of the new policy across the board. In our view the policy is working well.

Source: CHINFO; General Counsel; Standing policy
A/O: Turner, 697-5135