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The President's Trip to Paris, The Hague, Rotterdam and London



PRESS KIT

PRESIDENT CLINTON'S TRIP TO FRANCE, THE NETHERLANDS, AND ENGLAND

MAY 27-29, 1997

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Every stop on President Clinton's trip to France, the Netherlands and England will highlight the progress that the transatlantic community has made toward the President's vision of an undivided, democratic and peaceful European continent for the first time in history. And it will reinforce the President's commitment to keeping the United States engaged in Europe to promote security and prosperity on both sides of the Atlantic.

This trip comes at a unique moment in European history. Within the same week that we commemorate the 50th anniversary of the Marshall Plan, NATO and Russia will be cementing their new security relationship for the next century. And just as American leadership was crucial in bringing stability to Europe 50 years ago, and to securing a new relationship with Russia today, so too, America will continue its leadership to ensure that this stability and prosperity extend to Europe's East.

Finally, the President's first official visit with newly elected British Prime Minister Tony Blair in London will underscore the breadth of our enduring Anglo-American relationship.

France: Tuesday, May 27, 1997

President Clinton's visit to Paris will include bilateral meetings with President Yeltsin and President Chirac as well as the signing of the historic NATO-Russia Founding Act which will extend the hand of enduring friendship and partnership to President Yeltsin and the people of Russia.

Paris, France

Paris is one of the most written about and raved about cities in the entire world. Drove of people have visited Paris for hundreds of years looking to inject their lives with beauty, glamour, culture and romance. The City of Light is the most magical city in France, and, for many people -- the world.

Despite a background of revolution and enemy occupation, the city and its monuments have largely been preserved. The French empire manifested the grandeur of state in the architecture of its capital city. And no other European city has such a lengthy history of urban planning: the city's wide and elegant boulevards, lined with centuries-old chestnut trees; the broad plazas with fountains and art; the many parks and gardens and all reflect a purposefulness and pride that is uniquely French.

Paris is also a very modern city. Nearly 10 million people live in the metropolitan area, one-fifth the total French population.

Tuesday, May 27, 1997
Paris, France

Bilateral Meeting with President Chirac at Elysee Palace

Upon arrival in Paris, the President will proceed directly to his bilateral meeting with President Chirac. This meeting provides President Clinton with an opportunity to thank President Chirac for hosting the NATO-Russia summit as well as for his efforts to help bring closure to this historic agreement and to thank, on behalf of the American people, the people of France for their hospitality and cooperation.

Additionally, this meeting serves as an opportunity to renew the friendship our two nations share in helping to define the new Euro-Atlantic community. France and the United States have worked together for many years to respond to crises the world over, and at present time, French and U.S. troops stand side by side in Bosnia and Saudi Arabia.

Palace De L'Elysee

The Palais de L'Elysée stands on the Rue du Faubourg Saint-Honoré, with extensive gardens in the back. It was built in 1718 by the architect Molet for the Comte d'Evreux on the edge of the grassy parade grounds known as the Elysian Fields, then on the outskirts of the city. The Palais was acquired for a short time by the Marquise de Pompadour, and enlarged by its next owner, the financier Beaujon. During the Revolution, it became a dance hall. Napoléon's sister, Caroline Murat, and the Empress Josephine lived at the Elysée. It was also in the Elysée that Napoléon III lived and planned his December 1851 coup d'état.

Following the overthrow of Napoléon III, the Elysée became the official residence of the President of the French Republic. Thirteen presidents of the Third Republic lived there. Since World War II, the Elysée has served as residence for the two presidents of the Fourth Republic, Vincent Auriol and René Coty, as well as the presidents of the Fifth Republic: Charles de Gaulle (1958-1969), Georges Pompidou (1969-1974), Valéry Giscard d'Estaing (1974-1981), Francois Mitterrand (1981-1995), and Jacques Chirac since 1995.

Signing Ceremony for NATO-Russia Founding Act Salon Des Festes, Palace De L'Elysee

Following remarks by Presidents Chirac and Yeltsin, as well as NATO Secretary General Solana, the assembled leaders will sign the NATO-Russia Founding Act. After the leaders sign the document, President Clinton will offer remarks, followed by the remaining NATO leaders in attendance.

The NATO/Russia security partnership established in the Founding Act opens a new era of cooperation in Europe and further bridges the continent's historic divide. This agreement demonstrates that it is possible and productive to enlarge NATO and strengthen the Atlantic Alliance while building a partnership between NATO and Russia. Further, this Act is evidence that democracies can overcome historic feuds and animosities as well as legacies of mistrust. The Founding Act is a historic change in the way that the Euro-Atlantic region approaches the challenge of building an undivided, democratic Europe.

In July at Madrid, the NATO leaders will meet again to extend invitations for the first group of new members to begin accession talks to join NATO. Bringing in new nations to NATO's ranks will strengthen security and stability for NATO's current members, future members and non-members alike, helping end Europe's Cold War division. The process of NATO enlargement, proceeding in parallel with the development of the NATO-Russia relationship, will make an important contribution to stability and security in Europe.

The signing ceremony will be followed by a group photo in the Park D'Elysee and a luncheon hosted by President Chirac in the State Dining Room of Elysee Palace.

Participants at NATO-Russia Signing Event

President Bill Clinton	United States
Secretary General Javier Solana	NATO
President Jacques Chirac	France
President Boris Yeltsin	Russia
Prime Minister Jean-Luc Dehaene	Belgium
Prime Minister Jean Chretien	Canada
Prime Minister Paul Nyrup Rasmussen	Denmark
Chancellor Helmut Kohl	Germany
Prime Minister Konstandinos Simitis	Greece
Prime Minister David Oddsson	Iceland
Prime Minister Romano Prodi	Italy
Prime Minister Jean Claude Juncker	Luxembourg
Prime Minister Wim Kok	Netherlands
Prime Minister Thorbjorn Jagland	Norway
Prime Minister Antonio Guterres	Portugal
President Jose Maria Aznar	Spain
Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan	Turkey
Prime Minister Tony Blair	United Kingdom

Bilateral Meeting with President Yeltsin American Ambassador's Residence

While this meeting provides President Clinton with an opportunity to reaffirm the commitment we have to deepening cooperation between our two nations on a broad range of bilateral issues, it is most significantly an opportunity to underscore the President's commitment to making NATO and Russia full partners in the security of Europe as we enter the 21st century.

President Clinton is likely to restate his determination to see that an enlarged NATO neither marginalizes nor isolates Russia, and that it more fully integrates Russia into the mainstream of an undivided Europe.

President Clinton is next expected to see President Yeltsin in June when Russia takes part in the Denver Summit of the Eight.

Following his meeting with President Yeltsin, President Clinton will depart Paris for the Hague.

American Ambassador's Residence

Located among the shops and mansions on the Rue du Faubourg Saint-Honoré, the Ambassador's Residence is a property which was first owned by the Chancellor d'Aguesseau, a key figure in the 18th Century court of Louis XV. By 1836 the house had fallen into disrepair and was bought by the Baroness de Pontalba, an American daughter of a former Spanish governor of Louisiana.

In 1842, the Baroness demolished the old house, leaving only the gateway entrance (similar to that of its neighbors, the Japanese and British Embassies and Elysée Palace). She then had the current house built by architect Ludovico Visconti, best known for his tomb of Napoléon at the Hotel des Invalides. The exterior today retains much of Visconti's design, but the interior has seen much revision. In 1875 Baron Edmond de Rothschild bought the mansion, which became a center for arts and letters. During the occupation, it was a club for the Luftwaffe and later for the British Air Force. It was sold to the United States Government after the war and in 1971 became the American Ambassador's residence.

France, NATO, Russia Fact Sheets:

U.S.-France Relations Fact Sheet

U.S.-Russia Relations Fact Sheet

NATO Fact Sheet

NATO Adaptation/Enlargement Fact Sheet

NATO Partnership for Peace Fact Sheet

North Atlantic Cooperation Council Fact Sheet

NATO-Russia Founding Act Fact Sheet

Report to the Congress On the Enlargement of NATO: Executive Summary



Fact Sheet: U.S.-French Relations

Prepared by the Office of Western European Affairs, Bureau for European and Canadian Affairs,
Washington, DC, 5/21/97

France is the United States' oldest ally. The two countries have been linked for more than two centuries by diplomatic and military alliances and a rich complex of cultural, intellectual, and economic ties. The seminal ideas of 18th-century "philosophes" profoundly influenced America's Founding Fathers, and the American victory in the Revolutionary War would have been inconceivable without the crucial support provided by the French. Conversely, European democracies would not have been possible without the commitment of the American people and the many lives lost on the beaches of Normandy in 1944.

At present, our relationship with France enjoys growing commercial, political, and cultural interchanges, which were strengthened by last year's G-7 conference in Lyon. With roughly 92 billion francs invested, the United States is France's second most important source of investment. The United States also is the largest destination for French investment, with \$24 billion invested.

Each year, about 2 million Americans tour France, and this country still tops the polls of countries visited by the French, with more than 1 million visitors annually.

The United States continues to work closely with France on key global and regional issues. Security, democracy, human rights, and economic prosperity are addressed bilaterally and through several multilateral forums.

Currently, U.S.-French cooperation is helping to:

- Maintain peace in Bosnia;
- Define a new European security structure;
- Move the Middle East peace process forward; and
- Combat organized crime and international terrorism.

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Fact Sheet: U.S.-Russian Relations

Fact sheet prepared by Office of Russian Affairs, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, U.S. Department of State, May 14, 1997

Since the end of the Cold War and the emergence of Russia as an independent state in 1991, the United States has developed a broad-based relationship with Russia. In eleven personal meetings since 1993, President Clinton and President Yeltsin have laid the foundation for a bilateral relationship based on cooperation. The United States remains committed to maintaining a constructive relationship with Russia in which we seek to expand areas of cooperation and frankly air our differences without confrontation.

Great strides have been made in reducing both sides' nuclear arsenals and enhancing controls over weapons of mass destruction, including to avoid their proliferation. We are working with Russia to improve accountability standards for nuclear material and to dismantle hundreds of Russian nuclear weapons. Such cooperation takes place under the umbrella of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program and numerous Defense and Energy Department activities. We continue to urge ratification of START II, which would reduce overall deployments of strategic nuclear weapons on each side by more than two-thirds from current levels and would eliminate the most destabilizing strategic weapons--heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and all other deployed multiple-warhead ICBMs.

The United States supports Russia's accession to global economic organizations such as the WTO, OECD, the Paris Club, and the Asian Development Bank. The U.S. is the largest foreign investor in Russia, with portfolio and direct investments of approximately \$3 billion. Though in its embryonic stages, bilateral trade is increasing and a growing number of non-defense jobs in both countries now rely on this commerce. We continue to encourage the Russians to make progress on legislation and administrative changes necessary to create a more favorable investment climate for foreign and domestic investors in Russia.

Our governments support hundreds of joint programs, many of them conducted through the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission (GCC). The establishment of the GCC has helped to advance significantly shared objectives in our bilateral relations. The eighth GCC meeting in February 1997 showcased several examples: a new regional investment initiative to attract more foreign and domestic capital to the regions of Russia; joint work to protect the marine ecosystem near Sakhalin Island; an initiative to support cooperation among small businesses; and a program to raise public awareness in Russia of women's reproductive health issues. The eight working committees of the Commission deal with business development, defense conversion, agricultural, space, energy, health, and environmental issues. In addition, the Commission provides a forum for high-level discussions of priority, security, nonproliferation, and economic issues.

At the grass-roots level, contacts between our countries are growing. We now issue about 100,000 visitor visas annually to Russians, compared to around 20,000 during the Soviet era.

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Fact Sheet: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Prepared by the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, February 12, 1997

NATO Background

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was formed against the backdrop of emerging post-war tensions engendered by the threat of Soviet expansionism and concern over political and economic instability in Western Europe. On April 4, 1949, in Washington, DC, the Foreign Ministers of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, United Kingdom, and United States signed the North Atlantic Treaty, the political framework for an international alliance designed to prevent aggression, or, if necessary, to resist attack against any alliance member. In 1952, Greece and Turkey acceded to the treaty, followed by the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955 and by Spain in 1982.

This alliance of sovereign states pledges, through a combination of political solidarity and military force, to preserve its mutual security. Reaffirming faith in the principles of individual and collective self-defense embodied in the UN Charter, the parties to the treaty pledge to defend the common heritage and civilization of their peoples and to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area. While recognizing the need to maintain adequate military strength to safeguard the security of its members, the alliance also resolves to work toward the establishment of a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe.

NATO Structure

North Atlantic Council

The NAC is the principal forum for consultation and cooperation between NATO member governments on all issues affecting their common security. Its decisions are based on consensus, with each member having an equal right to express its views. The NATO Secretary General is chair. The NAC meets at least twice a year in ministerial session. It also meets weekly at the level of Permanent Representatives, who hold ambassadorial rank.

North Atlantic Council/Defense Ministers (NAC/D)

The NAC/D deals with overall issues of defense and meets twice yearly when member countries are represented by their Defense Ministers.

Defense Planning Committee (DPC)

The DPC deals with defense planning and other issues related to NATO's integrated military structure. It is composed of all countries except France (which withdrew from NATO's integrated military structure in 1966). Like the NAC, it meets regularly at ambassadorial level and twice yearly with Defense Ministers, normally in conjunction with the NAC/D.

Nuclear Planning Group

This group has authority for nuclear matters. All countries except France participate. Iceland

participates as an observer.

Military Committee

The highest military authority in the alliance; is composed of the chiefs of staff of each country. Iceland, which has no military forces, is represented by a civilian member. The Military Committee advises the NAC and the DPC on military measures necessary for the common defense and provides guidance to the NATO commanders.

Regional Commands

The strategic area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty is divided into two regional commands: Allied Command Europe and Allied Command Atlantic, with a regional planning group for North America. With the exception of France and Iceland, all countries assign forces to the integrated military command structure. The NATO Defense area covers the territories of member nations in North America, in the Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer, and in Europe, including Turkey. However, events occurring outside the area which affect the preservation of peace and security in the treaty area also may be considered by the NAC.

North Atlantic Cooperation Council

The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was established in November 1991 to conduct NATO's outreach program to the former Warsaw Pact states. Current members include the 16 NATO allies, eight Central European states (Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia), the 12 former Soviet republics, and the three Baltic states. It meets in ministerial session at least once a year. Finland, Slovenia, and Sweden attend as observers.

NATO Today

NATO remains the core of American engagement in Europe and at the heart of European security. It is the member nations' most effective instrument for coordinating defense and arms control and maintaining stability throughout Europe. The collapse of the Soviet Union, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and the progress of European integration have not ended the need for NATO's essential commitment to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means in accordance with UN principles. The London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, issued after the summit meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) in July 1990, signaled the vitality of the alliance in adapting to security needs in a post-Cold War world. At that meeting, NATO allies announced a fundamental review of strategy and invited the Soviet Union and the countries of Central Europe to establish regular diplomatic liaison and to develop a new partnership.

The November 1991 Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation further underlined NATO's intention to redefine its objectives in light of changed circumstances. The declaration took into account the broader challenges to alliance security interests, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional instability, and terrorism. It outlined its future tasks in the context of a framework of interlocking and mutually reinforcing institutions, including the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)--now the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)--the Western European Union (WEU), the European Community (now the European Union), and the Council of Europe, working together to build a new European security system. The "New Strategic Concept" announced at the meeting stressed the alliance's mission in crisis management and mandated a more flexible force structure and reduced reliance on nuclear weapons. The Rome meeting also created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) to develop an institutional relationship of consultation and cooperation on political and security issues between NATO and its former adversaries. This initiative culminated in the participation of Foreign Ministers

and representatives from the 16 NATO countries, six Central European countries, and the three Baltic states at the inaugural meeting of the NACC in December 1991. At the second NACC meeting in March 1992, the new independent states of the former Soviet Union became members, except Georgia, which was admitted the following month. Albania joined the NACC in June 1992.

NATO Foreign Ministers affirmed their readiness to support peacekeeping activities under the auspices of the CSCE on a case-by-case basis in June 1992. The following month, the North Atlantic Council agreed on a NATO maritime operation in the Adriatic, in coordination with the WEU, to monitor compliance with the UN embargo against Serbia and Montenegro (upgraded to enforcement in November 1992 following UN Security Council resolutions to tighten economic sanctions). On June 8, 1993, agreement was reached to place the NATO/WEU Adriatic task force under the operational command of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

NATO began enforcing UN economic sanctions against Serbia-Montenegro and the arms embargo against former Yugoslav states (Operation Sharp Guard) on November 18, 1992. Similarly, NATO enforced a UN Security Council resolution banning military flights (the "No-Fly Zone") over Bosnia-Herzegovina since April 12, 1993.

Following its August 1, 1995 declaration that direct threats or attacks on UN-designated "safe areas" would prompt a decisive response, NATO initiated an extensive two-week-long air and artillery campaign in the wake of an August 28 mortar attack on Sarajevo's central market which killed dozens of civilians. Subsequent to September and October agreements on a Bosnian cease-fire and other measures, NATO completed preparations to implement the military aspects of a peace agreement. The Implementation Force (IFOR) successfully carried out military aspects of implementing the Dayton Agreements, and was replaced in 1996 by the Stabilization Force (SFOR).

In June 1993, the U.S. proposed a NATO summit to discuss the Clinton initiative, which set an agenda for NATO's future work. The initiative included strengthening cooperation among the allies, developing relations with the former Warsaw Pact states, improving NATO's links with other institutions, and addressing threats to security that arise from outside the North Atlantic Treaty area. The January 1994 NATO summit endorsed several of the President's proposals that advance NATO's adaptation to the post-Cold War European security environment.

The summit launched the Partnership for Peace (PFP), which expands and intensifies practical political and military cooperation between NATO and countries of central Europe and former Soviet republics, as well as some of Europe's traditionally neutral countries, and allows them to consult with NATO in the event of a direct threat to their security. PFP does not extend NATO security guarantees.

As of December 1996, 27 countries have joined PFP: Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.

PFP has become a permanent and central feature of the transatlantic security system. PFP military exercises began in fall 1994: Poland hosted the first PFP field exercise in a former communist state, and a PFP maritime exercise took place in the North Sea. NATO held 10 major PFP exercises in 1995, 14 major exercises in 1996, and numerous seminars, workshops, and "in the spirit of PFP" bilateral exercises. More than 25 major PFP and "in the spirit of PFP" exercises are planned for 1997.

The central organs of the Partnership have been the Steering Committee at NATO Headquarters and a planning organ, the Partnership Coordination Cell, at Mons, Belgium (at the same location as Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe).

At the January 1994 summit, NATO leaders welcomed an evolutionary expansion of NATO

membership to include new democracies in the region. Participation in PFP does not guarantee entry into NATO, but it is the best preparation for states interested in becoming NATO members. For those countries that do not aspire to NATO membership, PFP and the Atlantic Partnership Council will remain primary links to the alliance.

The January 1994 summit also endorsed a concept of "Combined Joint Task Forces" designed to make NATO military structures more flexible and to encourage the development of "separable but not separate" European military capabilities that could undertake operations under the auspices of the WEU when an alliance response was not required. NATO and the WEU have made excellent progress in developing this concept.

Finally, the summit directed immediate work to intensify and expand NATO's political and defense efforts against the spread of weapons of mass destruction. This led to agreement on a political framework for NATO actions which was approved at the North Atlantic Council ministerial meeting in June 1994. In December 1996, while reaffirming the essential role of nuclear weapons in the Alliances' strategy, the Ministers declared that "NATO countries have no intention, no plan, and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members."

In December 1996, the Ministers called for a summit in July 1997 at which one or more countries would be invited to begin accession negotiations with the Alliance, with a view to welcoming the first new members into NATO by the 50th anniversary of NATO, in 1999. NATO's role as a forum for political consultation and an association of nations committed to collective defense remains unchanged, even as its new responsibilities in the areas of peacekeeping and crisis management continue to evolve.

In September 1996, then-Secretary of State Christopher called for the establishment of an Atlantic Partnership Council which would integrate PFP and the NACC to give Partners a stronger voice with the Alliance and would provide a deeper cooperative and consultative relationship between NATO and Partners. At the December 1996 NAC meetings, the Ministers approved a comprehensive package of PFP enhancements, including greater Partner participation in decision making and expanding the scope of PFP operations to include peace enforcement.

U.S.-NATO Relations: The Transatlantic Partnership

The decision of the United States after World War II to participate in a regional peacetime, defensive alliance represented a fundamental change in American foreign policy. The United States recognized that its interests no longer could be confined to the limits of the Western Hemisphere: U.S. security was linked inextricably to the future of the West European democracies. Concepts of individual liberty and the rule of law, coupled with those of a common heritage and shared values, provided the foundation for the NATO alliance. These ideals, as well as the ongoing goal of each member country to achieve a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe, continue to link the fate of America to that of its NATO allies.

The history of U.S. engagement in NATO has been one of commitment by America and its allies to reduce tensions in Europe and to improve East-West relations. They have pursued a series of initiatives designed to lower levels of personnel and equipment and increase mutual confidence, while adhering to a policy of political cohesion and military strength. Arms control measures aimed at enhancing stability have included the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 1987 and the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) in 1990.

The CFE Treaty between the allies and the nations and successor states of the former Warsaw Pact provides for an unprecedented level of transparency in the security field through an information exchange and obligatory inspections. Most importantly, it mandates a sharp reduction in conventional weapons throughout Europe. The NATO allies coordinate closely to meet their own obligations under the treaty and to ensure full compliance in its information, verification, and

reduction provisions.

NATO also has played a leading role in developing far-reaching proposals for OSCE's Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC).

The United States supports the development of a European security and defense identity (ESDI) within NATO, as agreed at the Berlin Ministerials in June 1996, as a means of strengthening the effectiveness of the Alliance. This would include the development of "separable but not separate" European capabilities that could be made available to undertake independent European missions and measures for making NATO collective assets available to support a European-led, non-NATO mission.

The North Atlantic alliance and the American presence in Europe have helped keep peace for more than 40 years. Having helped to forge successful policies toward the former Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact since the foundation of NATO, the U.S. with its European allies must play a central role in building the framework of the new Euro-Atlantic architecture.

NATO Strategy

NATO collective security strategy was mainly based on the principle of deterrence. Defense capabilities were created to deter military aggression or other forms of pressure. Parties to the treaty agreed to consult whenever the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of any party was threatened. They further pledged to maintain their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and, should such deterrence fail, to defend the territory of the alliance. As a purely defensive alliance, NATO maintained only a level of military strength sufficient to be credible. Given the marked inferiority of allied conventional strength in Europe, the NATO guarantee rested primarily on the nuclear superiority of the United States.

At the conclusion of a 1967 comprehensive review of NATO strategy, the alliance adopted a revised approach to the common defense, based on a balanced range of responses, conventional and nuclear, to all levels of aggression or threats of aggression. This reassessment of the nature of the potential threat to member countries prompted the realization that the alliance must increasingly look to the dangers of more limited forms of aggression beyond the possibility of a massive Soviet attack. The basis of the new concept of "flexible response" was the belief that NATO should be able to deter and counter military force with a range of responses designed to defend directly against attack at an appropriate level, or, if necessary, to escalate the attack to the level necessary to persuade an aggressor to desist.

At the same time, the alliance accepted the recommendations of the report written by former Belgium Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel and titled "Future Tasks of the Alliance," which outlined the need to work toward the achievement of disarmament and balanced force reductions. The maintenance of adequate military forces would be coupled with efforts at improving East-West relations.

Soviet deployment of new mobile theater nuclear missiles (SS-20s) called into question the accepted NATO strategy of deterrence based on the concepts of forward defense and flexible response and lead to a decision in 1979 to modernize its defensive capability. The resulting "dual-track" decision by the alliance combined pursuing arms control negotiations with responding appropriately to the increased imbalance created by the new Soviet systems. Alliance governments agreed to deploy U.S. ground-launched cruise missiles in Western Europe.

The successful conclusion of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 1987, while eliminating all Soviet and U.S. land-based, intermediate-range missiles, required a new appraisal of NATO policy. In response, the alliance developed its "Comprehensive Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament," which provided a framework for alliance policy in nuclear, conventional, and

chemical fields of arms control and tied defense policies to progress in arms control.

NATO Adaptation

In July 1990, the NAC issued the "London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance" to adapt to the new realities in Europe. The Ministers pledged to intensify political and military contacts with Moscow and with Central and East European capitals and to work not only for the common defense but to build new partnerships with all the nations of Europe. They underlined the need to undertake broader arms control and confidence-building agreements to limit conventional armed forces in Europe. In recognition of the radical political changes in Europe and the improved security environment, the Ministers mandated a fundamental review of the alliance's political and military strategy.

The "New Strategic Concept" was outlined at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in November 1991. The threat of a massive full-scale Soviet attack, which had provided the focus of NATO's strategy during the Cold War, had disappeared after the end of the political division of Europe. The alliance acknowledged that the risks to its security, such as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and acts of terrorism and sabotage, were now less predictable and beyond the focus of traditional concerns. The new strategy adopts a broader approach to security, centered more on crisis management and conflict prevention. It assumes completion of the planned withdrawal of military forces from Central Europe and the Baltics and the full implementation of arms control agreements limiting conventional forces in Europe.

In the context of changed circumstances, the alliance will maintain a mix of nuclear and conventional forces based in Europe, although at significantly lower levels. To ensure effectiveness, alliance forces will be increasingly mobile to respond to a range of contingencies. Forces will be organized for flexible buildup to react to regional instability and crises. Collective defense arrangements will rely increasingly on multinational forces within the integrated military structure. Nuclear forces will continue to play an essential role in allied strategy but will be maintained at the minimum level sufficient to preserve stability.

The new strategy reaffirms the principle of common commitment and mutual cooperation in support of the indivisibility of security for all alliance members and underscores the essential political and military link between European and North American members provided by the presence of nuclear forces in Europe.

At the June 1996 NAC, the Ministers announced agreement on measures designed to carry on the process of adaptation. This agreement included three distinct, though interrelated components: restructuring NATO's military commands, building a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within the Alliance, and implementing the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept. Together, these measures will make the Alliance better able to respond to the full range of missions in support of European and Transatlantic security.

In December 1996, the Ministers noted progress in all areas of internal adaptation and directed the relevant Alliance committees to pursue their work vigorously to implement the decisions of June 1996.

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Fact Sheet: NATO Adaptation/Enlargement

Prepared by the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, February 12, 1997

The NATO Alliance, reformed and enlarged to meet the security challenges of the 21st century, is a key element in the New Atlantic Community that Secretary Christopher described on September 6 in Stuttgart. The U.S. has led the way in building a new NATO by giving the Alliance capabilities for new missions; opening NATO's doors to Europe's emerging democracies; and forging a strong, cooperative relationship between NATO and Russia.

At the January 1994 Brussels summit, President Clinton initiated a process of NATO external and internal adaptation. This process will reach new milestones at the July 1997 summit. The U.S. expects the summit to agree on NATO's internal reforms, launch enlargement negotiations with one or more countries, and deepen NATO's partnership with Russia and other European states.

New Roles and Missions: Bosnia

The new NATO emerging from this process of internal and external adaptation is capable of meeting the security challenges of the 21st century. European and Atlantic systems will be intertwined to create a true security partnership. NATO will continue to enlarge both the scope and depth of its cooperation with all European nations.

Circumstances have already forced NATO to demonstrate its new capability, and the Alliance has proved its mettle. Bosnia encapsulates the new kind of challenge. IFOR has been a brilliant response, and the new NATO-led Stabilization Force--SFOR--is continuing to secure the peace. Under the NATO umbrella, Allies and former adversaries have joined together to conduct the most important and successful peacekeeping operation since World War II.

Internal Adaptation

In 1990, NATO began its adaptation from a Cold War institution to a modern instrument of North Atlantic and European security, revising strategy and restructuring force posture to reflect the changed European security environment and the disappearance of the Soviet threat. One major development has been NATO's decision to adapt its standards to the growing European capabilities in the security field. The June 1996 North Atlantic Council--NAC--Ministerial in Berlin took major steps to give Europeans a larger role within a single, flexible Alliance structure. NATO Foreign Ministers agreed that the European role--known as the European Security and Defense Identity--ESDI--would be developed within the Alliance. ESDI will permit creation of coherent military forces capable of cooperating under the political control and strategic direction of the exclusively European security organization, the Western European Union--WEU.

NATO experts are working on detailed terms through which NATO assets, such as logistics or headquarters units, could be made available to the WEU on a case-by-case basis, as well as the appropriate command arrangements to support and conduct operations under WEU leadership. When ready, these arrangements will allow Europeans and the WEU to conduct security operations by drawing upon some of the Alliance's unique military assets.

The Berlin Ministerial also agreed on the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces--CJTF--which is being developed in more detail by NATO's Military Committee. When implemented, this concept

will provide the Alliance with more flexible and mobile forces and headquarters elements to be used, for example, in WEU-led operations or in missions including non-NATO countries.

External Adaptation: Partnership for Peace

President Clinton's initiative in January 1994 led the Alliance to reach out to non-member states and extend the zone of security and stability eastward in Europe. At his suggestion, NATO established the highly successful Partnership for Peace, a framework for practical cooperation with, currently, 27 Partners. PFP has become an integral part of the European security scene, helping young democracies restructure and establish democratic control of their military forces, develop transparency in defense planning and budgetary processes, operate effectively with Alliance forces, better understand collective defense planning, and learn new forms of military doctrine. The December NAC further strengthened the Partnership for Peace.

In September 1996, then-Secretary Christopher called for creation of an Atlantic Partnership Council--APC--to serve as a forum for consultations and cooperation between Allies and Partners on such issues as peacekeeping, peace enforcement, humanitarian and search and rescue missions, and PFP exercises. The APC will become a vital organ of Allied-Partner relations, giving Partners a greater voice in political consultation and planning of joint military activities. While PFP assists prospective members, it has become an institution in its own right which builds permanent cooperation among a large number of Partner states.

Enlargement

President Clinton's January 1994 initiative also launched a process of steady, transparent enlargement of the Alliance. In September 1995, NATO completed a study on the "how" and "why" of enlargement. During 1996, NATO and prospective new members engaged in intensified dialogue on potential accession to the Alliance.

At the December 1996 NAC, the Ministers called for a NATO summit to be held in July in Madrid. At that summit, one or more countries that want to join NATO will be invited to begin accession negotiations, with actual membership targeted for 1999--NATO's 50th anniversary. The U.S. has consistently stated that the first accession will not be the last and that the door to membership will remain open.

NATO enlargement is not directed against anyone, and it will not create new dividing lines. It will advance the security of everyone--NATO's old members, new members, and non-members alike. Enlargement will not be free of cost for the U.S. and current Allies or for new members, who must demonstrate that they are willing and able to shoulder the burdens and responsibilities of membership.

Special Relationships with NATO

A major U.S. goal is to integrate Russia into a stable European security system. The U.S., therefore, seeks a cooperative NATO-Russia relationship, which will strengthen the cooperative and consultative mechanisms between NATO and Russia. President Clinton has proposed concluding arrangements that permit NATO and Russia to consult broadly and act jointly when possible to meet new security challenges. NATO Secretary-General Solana is leading the efforts to develop this relationship.

Also, an independent, democratic, and stable Ukraine is another essential element of the New Atlantic Community. The U.S. is developing its own strategic partnership with Ukraine and supports the Alliance's efforts to enhance the NATO-Ukraine relationship.

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Fact Sheet: NATO Partnership for Peace

Prepared by the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, February 12, 1997

What Is PFP?

- A U.S. initiative, Partnership for Peace (PFP) was launched by the January 1994 NATO summit to establish strong links between NATO, its new democratic partners in the former Soviet bloc, and some of Europe's traditionally neutral countries to enhance European security.
- It provides a framework for enhanced political and military cooperation for joint multilateral activities, such as humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, and crisis management and enables Partners to improve their interoperability with NATO.
- It enables PFP members to consult with NATO when faced with a direct threat to its security but does not extend NATO security guarantees. Participation in PFP does not guarantee entry into NATO, but it is the best preparation for states interested in becoming NATO members.
- PFP's utility has been demonstrated by the success of the NATO peacekeeping operations in Bosnia (IFOR and SFOR), in which 13 PFP Partners have worked side by side with NATO Allies.

Who Has Joined

- 27 countries: Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.

How It Works

- Once a country has joined the PFP, it submits a Presentation Document to NATO explaining what resources it will contribute to PFP activities and the steps that it will take to meet PFP political goals, such as democratic control of the military. To date, all PFP countries except Switzerland have submitted Presentation Documents.
- A unique Individual Partnership Program (IPP), is then agreed to with the alliance. IPPs set forth shared objectives, (for instance, establishing democratic control over military forces; developing transparency in defense planning and budgetary processes; developing interoperability with NATO forces) and list activities planned to meet those objectives.
- NATO has reached agreement on IPPs with all PFP Partners except Switzerland and Uzbekistan. Many Partners have submitted revised IPPs.
- Partners can assign personnel on a full-time basis to NATO Headquarters in Brussels and to the Partnership Coordination Cell (PCC) at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium. Legislation which would enable Partners to accredit ambassadors to NATO is pending in Brussels.
- Partners may participate in an optional Defense Planning and Review Process (PARP) designed to evaluate and enhance a partner nation's interoperability with NATO. Participating states work with NATO to develop interoperability objectives, which can be used to help refine IPPs. As of February 1997, 15 partners--Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic,

Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, and Ukraine--are participating in PARP.

PFP Joint Military Exercises

- **1994.** Three joint military exercises were held, including "Cooperative Bridge" in Poland marking the first time NATO forces had joined with former adversaries on the territory of a former Warsaw Pact state.
- **1995.** Ten major field, maritime, search and rescue, and command post exercises were held.
- **1996.** More than 14 major PFP exercises in the areas of search and rescue, humanitarian assistance, and peacekeeping were held. Numerous seminars, workshops, and bilateral "in the spirit of PFP" exercises also were held.
- **1997.** More than 25 major and "in the spirit of PFP" exercises are planned. NATO is considering expanding the scope of PFP activities to include peace enforcement and Partner participation in the new Combined Joint Task Force concept.

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Fact Sheet: The North Atlantic Cooperation Council

Prepared by the Department of State; Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs; August 28, 1996

NACC Today

The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) joins the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies and the newly free and independent states of Central and Eastern Europe, the Baltics, and the former Soviet Union in a program of political security dialogue, partnership, and cooperation. Subjects discussed in regular meetings between allies and partner states include defense planning and budgeting, democratic concepts of civil-military relations, defense conversion, and scientific and environmental topics. Members also discuss current political issues of common concern. In this way, the NACC complements the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), NATO, the European Union, and the Council of Europe in building a Euro-Atlantic community of stable, democratic, and market-oriented societies from Vancouver to Vladivostok.

NACC's Origins

As the advent of glasnost and perestroika in the Soviet Union and the crumbling of communist control in Eastern Europe changed the nature of the European security challenge, NATO turned from a posture of confrontation with the East to one of dialogue and cooperation. The June 1990 Turnberry North Atlantic Council ministerial and July 1990 London NATO summit extended the hand of friendship to NATO's former adversaries and called for the alliance to institute a liaison program with the Warsaw Pact states. The June 1991 Copenhagen North Atlantic Council ministerial developed this theme in its statement on "Partnership with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe."

In their October 3, 1991, joint statement, Secretary of State Baker and German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher proposed the institutionalization of the NATO liaison program in a North Atlantic Cooperation Council. The following month, the Rome NATO summit formally established the NACC as a forum in which allies could offer their experience and expertise to partner countries on security and related issues.

Ongoing Projects

In its first year, NACC developed a solid basis of cooperation and dialogue. The first NACC ministerial, held on December 20, 1991, in Brussels, brought together representatives of the 16 NATO allies, the Baltic states, the U.S.S.R., Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania. Participants pledged to uphold CSCE principles, support arms control efforts, and work together in building a Europe whole and free.

The second NACC ministerial held on March 10, 1992, in Brussels, admitted all the states of the former Soviet Union except Georgia (which joined the following month). Ministers adopted the first NACC work plan, which spelled out a program of intensified consultations and cooperative activities focused on security and related issues, including political, military, economic, scientific, and environmental subjects. Specific topics for cooperation included defense planning, conceptual approaches to arms control, democratic concepts of civilian-military relations, civil-military coordination of air traffic management, defense conversion, and enhanced participation in NATO's "Third Dimension" scientific and environmental programs. Ministers also pledged to cooperate in

disseminating information about NATO in the partner countries and gave their support to the NACC's ad hoc High Level Group charged with facilitating entry-into-force of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty .

With the admission of Albania in June 1992 and the Czech-Slovak split in January 1993, membership in the NACC now stands at 38. Finland, Slovenia, and Sweden have attended recent ministerial meetings as observers.

A major step forward in NACC cooperation came at the December 1992 ministerial in Brussels. Ministers adopted a work plan for 1993 that included for the first time a provision for joint planning and training for peace-keeping. Subsequently, the NACC established an Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peace-keeping to coordinate activities in this area. The NACC has welcomed the participation in Ad Hoc Group deliberations of three non-NACC states with extensive peace-keeping experience--Finland, Sweden, and Austria. A representative from the OSCE also attends.

Building on the momentum of cooperation created by the NACC, NATO established in January 1994 a program within the framework of NACC called the Partnership for Peace (PFP). PFP activities complement other activities undertaken in the framework of the NACC and are designed to intensify political and military cooperation between the Alliance and members of the Partnership. The PFP is open to states participating in NACC and other OSCE states able and willing to contribute to the Partnership.

At their meeting in Brussels in December 1994, ministers reviewed progress on implementing PFP and held extensive consultations on regional issues. At the Noordwijk NAC in May 1995, the Secretary of State presented U.S. initiatives to "intensify the relationship between NATO and its partners," including on ensuring democratic and civilian control of the military, widening the Partnership's focus, and working more closely together on exercise planning.

The 1996 work plan, adopted by ministers at the December 6, 1995, NACC Ministerial in Brussels, continues and expands NACC/PFP work on peace-keeping and other topics.

In its fifth year, NACC already has established itself as an important element in post-Cold War Europe's security architecture. It will continue to develop as a complement to other European and trans-Atlantic organizations forging the links of a peaceful, democratic, and prosperous Euro-Atlantic community of nations.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

May 15, 1997

FACT SHEET

NATO-Russia Founding Act

On May 14, NATO Secretary General Solana and Russian Foreign Minister Primakov announced agreement on the text of the "Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation," creating a new relationship between the Alliance and Russia. The Act has been referred to NATO countries and President Yeltsin for approval.

The Clinton Administration has made building a more stable, secure and undivided Europe one of its key foreign policy priorities. At the Helsinki summit in March, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed on the importance of crafting a cooperative relationship between NATO and Russia. The Act provides the basis for an enduring and robust partnership between the Alliance and Russia, one that can make an important contribution to Europe's security architecture in the 21st century.

Under the terms of the Act, NATO and Russia will consult and coordinate regularly and, where possible and appropriate, act jointly -- as they are doing in Bosnia now. The Act has five principal sections:

The preamble notes that NATO and Russia do not consider one another adversaries and cites the sweeping transformations in NATO and Russia that make possible this new relationship.

Section I lays out the principles governing the relationship, e.g., restatement of the norms of international conduct in the UN Charter and OSCE Helsinki Final Act and explicit commitments, such as respecting the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of states and settling disputes peacefully.

Section II creates a new forum called the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council for NATO-Russia meetings and describes how this Council will function.

Section III describes a range of issues that NATO and Russia will discuss, including conflict prevention, peacekeeping, prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and exchange of information on security policies and defense forces.

Section IV describes the military dimensions of the relationship. Among the key provisions:

- Reiteration by NATO of aspects of its current defense policy and strategy, including the December 1996 statement that it has “no intention, no plan and no reason” to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members including nuclear weapons storage sites.
- Reference to NATO’s March 14, 1997 statement that in the current and foreseeable security environment, NATO will carry out its collective defense and other missions through interoperability, integration and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces on the territory of new members.
- Recognition that NATO will require adequate infrastructure on new members’ territories commensurate with NATO’s collective defense and other missions.
- Commitment by NATO and Russia to work for prompt adaptation of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty to reflect the changed security environment since CFE was completed in 1990.

Section IV also provides mechanisms to foster closer military-to-military cooperation between NATO and Russian militaries, including by creating military liaison missions in respective NATO and Russian military headquarters.

NATO retains its full prerogatives. While Russia will work closely with NATO, it will not work within NATO. The Act makes clear that Russia has no veto over alliance decisions and NATO retains the right to act independently when it so chooses.

The Act has no impact on NATO enlargement. That process is proceeding on schedule; NATO leaders at the Madrid summit in July will extend invitations to the first countries to begin accession talks. Those countries admitted will have the full rights and responsibilities of Alliance membership, and the door to membership will remain open to all emerging European democracies.

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Report to the Congress On the Enlargement of NATO: Rationale, Benefits, Costs and Implications February, 1997

Executive Summary

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has declared its intent again to admit new members. At a summit in Madrid this coming July, NATO's 16 heads of state and government plan to invite specific states from among the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe to start accession talks to join the Alliance. President Clinton and NATO have stressed their support for admitting the first new members by 1999 as part of a broad strategy to foster a peaceful, undivided and democratic Europe. This report, submitted to Congress pursuant to Section 1048 of the Fiscal Year 1997 Defense Authorization Act, describes the rationale, benefits, costs and other considerations related to NATO's enlargement.

This report also reflects the administration's commitment to work closely and in a bipartisan manner with Congress as it pursues this policy. Adding new members to NATO requires ratification by the United States Senate and requires both chambers of Congress to approve the resources needed to implement this initiative. If the security guarantees that will be extended to the new members are to be meaningful, they must represent an expression of informed national will. It is therefore essential that NATO enlargement proceed with the active participation and support of the American people and their representatives of both parties in Congress.

The major conclusions of this report include:

NATO enlargement contributes to the broader goal of a peaceful, undivided and democratic Europe. NATO enlargement is one part of a much broader, post-Cold War strategy to help create a peaceful, undivided and democratic Europe. That strategy has included many other elements: support for German unification; assistance to foster reforms in Russia, Ukraine and other new independent states; negotiation and adaptation of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty; and the evolution and strengthening of European security and economic institutions, including the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Council of Europe and the Western European Union. NATO enlargement is also part of a much broader series of steps to adapt NATO to the post-Cold War security environment, including adaptation of NATO strategy, strategic concept, command arrangements and force posture, and its willingness to carry out new missions beyond NATO's territory, as it has in Bosnia. As part of this broad series of steps, NATO enlargement aims to help the United States and Europe erase outdated Cold War lines and strengthen shared security into the next century.

Enlargement will yield benefits for the United States, NATO and Europe. Adding Central and East European states to the Alliance will: foster democratic reforms and stability throughout Europe; give NATO a stronger collective defense capability; improve relations among the region's states; improve burden-sharing within NATO; improve general security that will benefit Russian security and the security of other former Soviet states by improving general European stability; create a better environment for trade, investment and economic growth in Central and Eastern Europe; and help all of Europe become a stronger partner for the United States in political, economic and security affairs. As President Clinton has said, in this way, "NATO can do for Europe's East what it did for Europe's West: prevent a return to local rivalries, strengthen democracy against future threats and create the conditions for prosperity to flourish."

NATO enlargement carries costs. Security is not free. The United States and its allies will, by enlargement, extend solemn security guarantees to additional nations, and NATO members must provide the capability to back them up. Enlargement will not, however, require a change in NATO's military doctrine, which has already shifted from positional defense against an identified enemy to a capacity for flexible deployment to areas of need. Because the United States already has the world's pre-eminent deployment capability, and substantial forces forward deployed in Europe, there will be no need for additional U.S. forces. Current European NATO members are already investing in improved capabilities to operate beyond their border, and Central European states, including likely new members, are likewise investing in modernizing and restructuring their forces. These efforts have already begun and would continue whether or not NATO adds members.

Costs to the United States will be modest. The Department of Defense has estimated both the direct enlargement costs (e.g., for interoperability between the forces of current and new members and for extending NATO's integrated command, communications and air defense surveillance systems) and the costs of force improvements already being pursued by existing and new members which will also contribute to carrying out NATO's missions in an enlarged alliance. The direct enlargement costs are estimated to average \$700-900 million annually, for a total of around \$9-12 billion between 1997 and 2009, the date by which new NATO members are anticipated to have reached a "mature capability" as discussed later in this report. The U.S. share of these costs, chiefly for our share of the NATO budgets for direct enlargement costs, would largely be incurred in the ten years following formal accession in 1999, and would average about \$150-200 million annually during that period. The estimated costs for new members associated with restructuring their forces are estimated to be about \$800 million-\$1 billion annually, while those for improvements of our NATO Allies' regional reinforcement capabilities are estimated at \$600-800 million annually -- respectively \$10-13 billion and \$8-10 billion over 1997-2009. These costs, in accordance with long-standing NATO financial principles, would be borne by those nations. The United States would share in these costs only to the extent the U.S., with Congressional approval, may chose to continue or expand the current modest assistance being provided to the military modernization of the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe.

There are greater costs and risks to *not* enlarging NATO on the current schedule. The security of Europe has been a vital interest of the United States throughout this century, and it remains so, including for the new democracies to the east. If we fail to seize this historical opportunity to help integrate, consolidate and stabilize Central and Eastern Europe, we would risk a much higher price later. The most efficient and cost-effective way to guarantee stability in Europe is to do so collectively with our European partners, old and new, through NATO. Alliances save money. Collective defense is both cheaper and stronger than national defense. A decision to defer enlargement, much less to withhold it altogether, would send the message to Central and Eastern Europe that their future does not lie with NATO and the West. It would falsely validate the old divisions of the Cold War. The resulting sense of isolation and vulnerability would be destabilizing in the region and would encourage nationalist and disruptive forces throughout Europe. NATO would remain stuck in the past, in danger of irrelevance, while the U.S. would be seen as inconstant and unreliable in its leadership and withdrawing from its responsibilities in Europe and the world.

The United States and NATO are committed to constructive relations with Russia. The United States and its NATO Allies are committed to building a strategic partnership with a democratic Russia; indeed, that effort and NATO enlargement are both part of the same enterprise of building a peaceful, undivided and democratic Europe. While many Russian leaders have expressed opposition to NATO enlargement, this initiative can serve Russia's own long-term security interests by fostering stability to its west. The United States and NATO already have worked with Russia on specific tasks, including the peace process and military operation in Bosnia. Parallel to NATO enlargement, the United States and NATO have proposed a series of initiatives, including a NATO-Russia Charter and a permanent consultative mechanism, in order to ensure that Russia plays an active part in efforts to build a new Europe even as NATO enlargement proceeds.

In summary, the addition of new members to NATO will strengthen the Alliance, contribute to a stronger and more peaceful Europe and benefit American security interests. It is one of the President's highest priorities for American foreign policy.

The Netherlands: Tuesday, May 27 - Thursday, May 29, 1997

The United States and the Netherlands share a long and close relationship which reaches back to the origins of our country. It is a relationship which has grown and matured into a mutually beneficial partnership which will serve both nations well into the next century.

Our partnership with the Netherlands has focused on support for democracy worldwide, respect for human rights and free markets in Europe, and cooperation for peace and stability in the former Yugoslavia. As a result of our close national ties, the American private sector has invested significantly in the Netherlands and there are extensive business links between our two nations. Dutch free market policies have made the Netherlands' economic and job growth the envy of Europe and have sustained their position as a gateway to Europe.

The Hague, Netherlands

The Hague (Den Haag or Gravenhage in Dutch) is a worthwhile destination if you're interested in a glimpse of the royal history and political structure of the Netherlands.

The Hague originated as a hunting seat of the counts of Holland. It became the center of court life after William of Holland built a castle here in 1248, and in the late 16th century the city emerged as the Dutch capital during the revolt of the Netherlands against Spanish rule. It was under French control from 1795 to 1813 and again became the center of court life in 1815 with the establishment of the kingdom of the United Netherlands, which included present-day Belgium until 1830. The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 increased the city's long-standing importance as an international diplomatic and judicial center and led to the establishment of The Hague Tribunal, or Permanent Court of Arbitration.

Although Amsterdam is the constitutional capital, The Hague is the center of Dutch government and the site of the International Court of Justice (World Court), housed within the Peace Palace. The Hague also enjoys a certain prominence as the home of the Dutch royal family, headed by Queen Beatrix. The city is a sprawling mix of middle-class dwellings and retail stores, along with the exclusive homes of the royal family and international diplomats on the northern edge of the city center.

The Hague is an important transport center with major railways, trunk roads, and canals providing access to Rotterdam, Amsterdam, and beyond. Diversified manufactured goods, produced at scattered locations throughout the metropolitan area, include the following: electronic equipment, metal products, chemicals, glass, printed materials, and chocolate and other processed food.

Right in the center of the Hague is located the Binnenhof, the home of the Dutch parliament. Count William II built a castle here in the thirteenth century, and the settlement that grew up around it became known as the "Count's Domain" or Gravenhage, which is still the city's official name.

Tuesday, May 27, 1997, The Hague, Netherlands

Arrival at Schipol Airport, Amsterdam

President Clinton will be greeted by Prime Minister Kok and Mrs. Kok at Schipol Airport, Amsterdam, before departing for the Hague and an arrival ceremony at Noordeinde Palace.

Schipol Airport, Amsterdam

Amsterdam-Schipol Airport has established itself as one of the world's most user-friendly international airports. It is in the midst of a major expansion program to prepare for the next century. Schipol has a new and modern terminal and services more than 200 destinations in more than 90 countries. Among major European airports, Schipol ranks 4th in terms of passengers and freight. Schipol currently handles 25 million passengers a year, and forecasts 44 million by 2015. A direct rail link connects the airport to downtown Amsterdam, to The Hague and to a number of other cities. A new high-speed rail service will soon offer rapid transit to other European destinations. The airport is also accessible by an excellent network of highways.

Arrival Ceremony, Noordeinde Palace Courtyard

The President will be greeted by the Queen upon arrival at Noordeinde Palace, followed by the playing of the Dutch and American national anthems and a review of Dutch troops. Following the arrival ceremony, the President will retire for the night at Noordeinde Palace.

Noordeinde Palace, The Hague

Noordeinde Palace became Queen Beatrix's working palace (as opposed to a residential palace) in 1984 following a 50 million dollar restoration. The Queen uses Noordeinde to host formal receptions, audiences, luncheons and dinners. The offices of the royal household are located in the palace. Noordeinde is also where foreign ambassadors present their credentials to the Queen.

In 1591, the widow of Prince William I of Orange ("William the Silent") moved into a large house on the Noordeinde; the house dated from the second half of the 14th century. In 1609, the house was presented to the Dutch state. Since then, successive royal residents have expanded and added to Noordeinde Palace. It took on its current shape under King William I after the end of the French occupation in 1813. HRH Princess Juliana, the Queen Mother, was born in the palace and lived there until her marriage in 1937. After World War II, the royal family did not return to live at Noordeinde. In 1948, a fire destroyed large parts of the palace. In the early 1970s, renovation work started on the palace. Contemporary Dutch artists were commissioned to create works of art for Noordeinde, resulting in a mix of the modern and the antique, especially in the guest wing.

Wednesday, May 28, 1997
the Hague, the Netherlands

**U.S./EU Summit Meeting at Binnenhof
Treveszaal Room**

President Clinton will meet with Dutch Prime Minister Kok and EU Commission President Santer for the first semiannual U.S.-EU Summit of 1997. These summits are a part of the link the U.S. shares with Europe, particularly since the establishment of the New Transatlantic Agenda with the European Union in 1995 in Madrid. This U.S.-EU Summit is about demonstrating the practical cooperation we share with the EU to address issues that concern all our people as we enter the 21st century.

An important purpose of the summit is to affirm the U.S. commitment to work with the European Union in the building of a New Atlantic Community of democratic nations and our willingness to engage the EU as a full partner in promoting global peace and prosperity. It is also an opportunity to review our cooperative efforts on a variety of global issues including integrating Central and Eastern Europe into the rest of the continent to promote a stable and prosperous Europe, reconciliation and reconstruction in Bosnia, EU participation on the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization's (KEDO) board, international law enforcement and international narcotics interdiction

Treveszaal Room, Binnenhof

The Treves Hall, part of the Binnenhof Complex, is where the Dutch cabinet meets; the Dutch Prime Minister's office is nearby. It was the room in which the States-General assembled and held audience. In 1609, the Treves Hall was the site of the signing of the brief 12-year truce in the Eighty Years' War. The room was built in an ornate Louis XIV style by French refugee Daniel Marot. The ceiling and walls are exquisitely painted. The domed ceiling, painted by Theodoor van der Schuer, depicts unity. All portraits are by J. H. Brandon. The 1989 U.S.-EU Summit was also held in the Treves Hall.

Luncheon Hosted by Queen Beatrix Noordeinde Palace, Ballroom

President Clinton and Queen Beatrix will exchange toasts before a luncheon which will be attended by many leaders from the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

The toast is an opportunity for the President to thank Queen Beatrix and Prime Minister Wim Kok for their hospitality and their active support for a stronger, more stable, and more democratic future for Europe.

American ties to the Netherlands are strong and enduring. The United States is highly appreciative of the contribution the Dutch have made during their Presidency of the EU in deepening our transatlantic ties and furthering our partnership with the EU on a number of shared global concerns.

Marshall Plan 50th Anniversary Commemorative Event Binnenhof Courtyard

The Dutch government invited the leaders from all OSCE countries to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the Marshall Plan. Additionally, the OSCE countries, including the United States, will each be sending two youth leaders to the ceremony.

Following an introduction by Dutch Prime Minister Kok, President Clinton will offer remarks to commemorate George Marshall and the Marshall Plan.

The Marshall Plan was a historic declaration of U.S. commitment to European security fifty years ago, a commitment which we still maintain and will continue into the future. American engagement in Europe brought the continent together through military alliances for enhanced security, open markets for increased prosperity, and democratic institutions for increased stability. By extending security, democracy and market economics to Central and Eastern Europe, we have the opportunity to complete the vision of the post-World War II generation -- and to set a strong, secure foundation for the 21st century.

The U.S. and the EU are inaugurating a "Spirit of the Marshall Plan" award to be given to communities in Central and Eastern Europe and the Newly Independent States for their outstanding achievements in the field of democracy and civil society.

After his remarks at the Marshall Commemoration, President Clinton will travel to Rotterdam, Netherlands.

Courtyard, the Binnenhof

The courtyard is flanked by the upper and lower houses of Parliament and the Hall of Knights (Ridderzaal). Except during special events, it is an open public thoroughfare, and citizens and tourists stroll through it.

"Thank You America" Celebration
Wilhelmina Pier, Rotterdam

Following an introduction by Rotterdam Mayor Peper, President Clinton will make remarks before a crowd of Dutch citizens and Americans living in the Netherlands on what they have declared to be "Thank You America" day. The Dutch government has extended invitations to the celebration to all Americans living in the Netherlands.

President Clinton will celebrate American-Dutch friendship and highlight the benefits the Marshall Plan had on the lives of the ordinary citizens of Europe.

Upon the conclusion of his remarks, the President will unveil a bust of George Marshall.

Wilhelmina Pier, Rotterdam

Wilhelmina Pier is the home port of the Holland America Lines terminal, and is the site from which approximately one million European emigrants -- Dutch and non-Dutch alike -- have embarked for the United States.

Rotterdam lies at the heart of a maze of rivers and artificial waterways that forms the seaward outlet of the rivers Rhine and Maas. An important port as far back as the fourteenth century, it was one of the major cities of the Dutch Republic, and today, with the adjoining dockland area of Europoort, is the largest port in the world. The Germans bombed the town center in 1940 and destroyed the harbor in 1944.

Rotterdam was rebuilt almost entirely with Marshall Plan funds and it was through Rotterdam that most Marshall Plan aid flowed to other European destinations.

Thursday, May 29, 1997
The Hague, the Netherlands

**U.S. Embassy Staff Meet and Greet, American Ambassador's Residence
Courtyard, Noordeinde Palace**

President Clinton will meet with U.S. Embassy staff and families in The Hague at the Noordeinde Palace Courtyard. Following an introduction by Ambassador Terry Dornbush the President will deliver brief remarks.

Following his visit with U.S. Embassy staff and families the President will depart for London.

The Netherlands, European Union, Marshall Plan Fact Sheets:

Netherlands Background Notes

U.S.-Netherlands Relations Fact Sheet

European Union Fact Sheet

U.S.-European Union Relations Fact Sheet

New Transatlantic Agenda Fact Sheet

Marshall Plan Fact Sheet

George C. Marshall: His Life and Legacy



U.S. Department of State

Background Notes: The Netherlands, April 1996

Released by the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs

Official Name: Kingdom of the Netherlands

PROFILE

Geography

Area: 41,473 sq. km. (16,464 sq. mi.).

Cities: Capital--Amsterdam (pop. 1.1 million). Others--The Hague, seat of government, (pop. 695,000); Rotterdam, the world's busiest port (1 million); Utrecht (545,000).

Terrain: Coastal lowland.

Climate: Northern maritime.

People

Population: 15.4 million.

Nationality: Noun--Dutchmen and Dutchwomen. Adjective--Dutch.

Ethnic groups: Predominantly Dutch; largest minority communities are Moroccans, Turks, Surinamese, and Indonesians.

Religions: Roman Catholic, Protestant, other, and non-affiliated.

Language: Dutch.

Education: Years compulsory--10. Attendance--nearly 100%. Literacy--99%.

Health: Infant mortality rate--6/1,000. Life expectancy--78 yrs.

Work force: 6.5 million. Services--50%. Industry--28%. Government--16%. Agriculture--6%.

Government

Type: Parliamentary democracy under a constitutional monarch.

Constitution: 1814 and 1848.

Branches: Executive--monarch (chief of state), prime minister (head of government), cabinet.

Legislative--bicameral parliament (First and Second Chambers). Judicial--Supreme Court.

Subdivisions: 12 provinces.

Political parties: Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA), Labor Party

(PvdA), Liberal Party (VVD), Democrats '66 (D'66), other minor parties.

Suffrage: Universal at 18.

Economy

GDP (1995): \$350 billion.

GDP growth rate (1995): 3%.

GDP per capita (1995): \$23,000.

Natural resources: Natural gas, petroleum, fertile soil.

Agriculture (4% of GDP): Products--dairy, poultry, meat, flower bulbs, cut flowers, vegetables and fruits, sugar beets, potatoes, wheat, barley.

Industry (25% of GDP): Types--steel, metal products, electronics, bulk chemicals, natural gas, petroleum products, transport equipment.

Trade (1995): Exports--\$146 billion: mineral fuels, chemical products, machinery and transport equipment, foodstuffs. Imports--\$134 billion: mineral fuels and crude petroleum, machinery, chemical products, foodstuffs. Major trading partners--EU, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, U.K., U.S.

U.S.-DUTCH RELATIONS

The United States' partnership with the Netherlands is its oldest continuous relationship and dates back to the American revolution. The excellent bilateral relations are based on close historical and cultural ties and a common dedication to individual freedom and human rights. An outward-looking nation, the Netherlands shares with the U.S. a commitment to an open market and free trade. It is the United States' eighth-largest export market.

President Clinton invited Prime Minister Kok to Washington for an official working visit on February 27 and 28, 1995. Issues such as NATO, the UN, narcotics policy, trade relations, and international crises were discussed, and the meeting demonstrated the characteristic friendly atmosphere and good trade and political relations between the U.S. and the Netherlands.

The United States and the Netherlands often have similar positions on issues and work together bilaterally and through the UN and other multilateral organizations on matters concerning NATO, trade and economic cooperation, and regional and global problems.

International Drug-Trafficking Control

Narcotics trafficking is one such global problem. The Netherlands is considered an important transit point for narcotics; it has a major international airport hub, and Rotterdam is the world's largest container port. The Dutch Government has been working to tighten controls on its airports and harbors.

The Dutch work closely with other countries, including the U.S., on international programs against drug trafficking and organized crime. The Netherlands is a signatory to international counter-narcotics agreements, a member of the UN International Drug Control Program and UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs, and a leading contributor to international counter-narcotics projects.

Environmental Cooperation

The Netherlands plays a major role in international environmental forums and often cooperates closely with the United States. The Dutch were among the first to join the GLOBE Project, initiated by Vice President Gore, under which schools around the world cooperate in collecting environmental data and entering it into a computer network for use by scientists and other researchers. The Clinton administration works closely with the Dutch on climate change, biodiversity issues, global deforestation, the sustainable development of rainforests, ozone layer depletion, and the environmental aspects of the Middle East Peace Process.

Principal U.S. Embassy Officials

Ambassador--Kirk Terry Dornbush
Deputy Chief of Mission--William P. Pope
Political Counselor--Bronson Percival
Economic Counselor--Jack Croddy
Commercial Counselor--Rafael Fermoselle
Administrative Counselor--Wajat Iqbal
Regional Security Officer--George Gaines
Agriculture Counselor--Steven Yoder
Public Affairs Counselor (USIS)--Karl Olssen

The U.S. embassy is located at Lange Voorhout 102, 2514 EJ The Hague; tel: 31-70-310-9209; fax: 31-70-361-4688. The consulate general is at Museumplein 13, 1071 DJ Amsterdam; tel: 31-20-5755-309; fax: 31-20-5755-310.

HISTORICAL HIGHLIGHTS

The Dutch are primarily of Germanic stock with some Gallo-Celtic mixture. Their small homeland frequently has been threatened with destruction by the North Sea and often has been invaded by the great European powers.

Julius Caesar found the region which is now the Netherlands inhabited by Germanic tribes in the first century BC. The western portion was inhabited by the Batavians and became part of a Roman province; the eastern portion was inhabited by the Frisians. Between the fourth and eighth centuries AD, most of both portions were conquered by the Franks. The area later passed into the hands of the House of Burgundy and the Austrian Hapsburgs. Falling under harsh Spanish rule in the 16th century, the Dutch revolted in 1558 under the leadership of Willem of Orange. By virtue of the Union of Utrecht in 1579, the seven northern Dutch provinces became the Republic of the United Netherlands.

During the 17th century, considered its "golden era," the Netherlands became a great sea and colonial power. Among other achievements, this period saw the emergence of some of painting's "Old Masters," including Rembrandt and Hals, whose works--along with those of later artists such as Mondriaan and Van Gogh--are today on display in museums throughout the Netherlands.

The country's importance declined, however, with the gradual loss of Dutch technological superiority and after wars with Spain, France, and England in the 18th century. The Dutch United Provinces supported the Americans in the Revolutionary War. In 1795, French troops ousted Willem V of Orange, the Stadhouder under the Dutch Republic and head of the House of Orange.

Following Napoleon's defeat in 1813, the Netherlands and Belgium became the "Kingdom of the United Netherlands" under King Willem I, son of Willem V of Orange. The Belgians withdrew from the union in 1830 to form their own kingdom. King Willem II was largely responsible for the liberalizing revision of the constitution in 1848.

The Netherlands prospered during the long reign of Willem III (1849-90). At the time of his death, his daughter Wilhelmina was 10 years old. Her mother, Queen Emma, reigned as regent until 1898, when Wilhelmina reached the age of 18 and became the monarch.

The Netherlands proclaimed neutrality at the start of both world wars. Although it escaped occupation in World War I, German troops overran the country in May 1940. Queen Wilhelmina fled to London and established a government-in-exile. Shortly after the Netherlands was liberated in May 1945, the Queen returned. Crown Princess Juliana acceded to the throne in 1948 upon her mother's abdication. In April 1980, Queen Juliana abdicated in favor of her daughter, now Queen Beatrix. Crown Prince Willem Alexander was born in 1967.

Elements of the Netherlands' once far-flung empire were granted either full independence or nearly complete autonomy after World War II. Indonesia formally gained its independence in 1949, and Suriname became independent in 1975. The five islands of the Netherlands Antilles (Curacao, Bonaire, Saba, St. Eustatius, and a part of St. Maarten) are an integral part of the Netherlands realm but enjoy a large degree of autonomy. Aruba, which had been a part of the Netherlands Antilles, was granted in January 1986 a separate status within the kingdom on par with, but apart from, the Netherlands Antilles.

ECONOMY

The Dutch economy is based on private enterprise. It has been adjusting to recent recessions and changes in the global economic community and has flourished. The annual growth rate in 1995 was 3%, while inflation was 2%. Corporate investment has been high, and the Netherlands' balance-of-payments current account shows a strong surplus.

Government Role

Although the government has little direct ownership or participation, it heavily influences the economy. It plays a significant role through the many government permit requirements and regulations pertaining to almost every aspect of economic activity. Further, more than 45% of the gross national product is involved in government operations and social programs ranging from transfer payments through subsidizing the arts.

Overall, the scope and role of the Dutch welfare state have been modified lately, with spending cuts and efforts at privatization of certain government programs. Prime Minister Willem Kok's administration presented its economic policy for FY 1994-95 in September 1994. The policy aimed to emphasize stability and reduce public spending.

Trade

Foreign trade also heavily influences the Dutch economy, with exports accounting for 51% of gross national product. The 1995 trade surplus was roughly \$13 billion, equal to about 4% of gross product. The Netherlands finds a liberal commercial policy advantageous and participates in the European Union (EU), the Benelux Economic Union, the European Monetary System, and the World Trade Organization (WTO). It is a firm supporter of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, on which WTO is based, and it supports multilateral trade negotiations to establish freer and expanded world trade.

Sectors

Services account for more than half of the national income and are primarily in transport and financial areas, such as banking and insurance. Industrial activity provides about 25% of the national income and is dominated by the metalworking, oil refining, chemical, and food-processing industries. Construction amounts to about 10% of the national income. Agriculture and fishing, although visible and traditional Dutch activities, account for only slightly more than 4%.

The vast Slochteren gasfield in Groningen Province, first exploited in 1959, is now one of the world's largest producing natural gasfields. At present, total proven natural gas reserves--mainland and North Sea continental shelf--amount to 1.2 trillion cubic meters, of which about 80% is at Slochteren. Current gas production is running annually at about 84 billion cubic meters, roughly half of which is exported to EU member countries. General government revenues from natural gas totaled about \$4.1 billion in 1994.

Environmental Policy

Awareness of the environment plays a major role in Dutch life. Because so much of the Netherlands consists of reclaimed land, the Dutch have a fragile landscape and must be concerned about environmental degradation, especially given their density of population and intense agriculture.

The Netherlands introduced its first national environmental plan in 1989; it focused on eight environmental themes and grouped environmental problems according to sectors of economic activities. Targets and timetables were set with the goal of achieving sustainability by 2010.

A second such environmental plan was approved by the parliament in March 1994. This four-year plan is built on experience with the first one, but it strengthens the implementation framework, provides for greater cooperation between all those concerned, and focuses on sustainable production

and consumption in order to meet national targets and to implement global agreements, such as on climate change.

One interesting feature of Dutch environmental policy is the use of "covenants," which are voluntary agreements between industry and government--and sometimes other organizations--to work together to achieve certain environmental goals, such as the reduction of waste. The Dutch Government also uses financial instruments, including tax incentives, to meet environment goals. Progress has been made in reducing certain greenhouse gases, phasing out chlorofluorocarbons, lowering acidification and eutrophication levels, and moving toward waste prevention and recycling targets. The Rhine River cleanup, in which the Dutch participate, is improving water quality in that river and its branches.

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS

The present constitution--which dates from 1848 and has been amended several times--protects individual and political freedoms, including freedom of religion. Although church and state are separate, a few historical ties remain; the royal family belongs to the Dutch Reformed Church (Protestant). Freedom of speech also is protected.

Government Structure

The country's government is based on the principles of ministerial responsibility and parliamentary government. The national government comprises three main institutions: the crown, the States General, and the courts. There also are local governments.

The Crown. The monarch is the titular head of state. The Queen's function is largely ceremonial, but she does have some influence deriving from the traditional veneration of the House of Orange--from which Dutch monarchs for more than three centuries have been chosen; the personal qualities of the Queen; and her power to appoint the formateur, who forms the Council of Ministers following elections.

The Council of Ministers plans and implements government policy. Most ministers also head government ministries, although ministers without portfolio exist. The ministers, collectively and individually, are responsible to the States General (parliament). Unlike the British system, Dutch ministers cannot simultaneously be members of parliament.

The Council of State is a constitutionally established advisory body to the government which consists of members of the royal family and crown-appointed members generally having political, commercial, diplomatic, or military experience. The Council of State must be consulted by the cabinet on proposed legislation before a law is submitted to the parliament. The Council of State also serves as a channel of appeal for citizens against executive branch decisions.

States General (Parliament). The Dutch parliament consists of two houses, the First Chamber and the Second Chamber. Historically, Dutch governments have been based on the support of a majority in both houses of parliament. The Second Chamber is by far the more important of the two houses. It alone has the right to initiate legislation and amend bills submitted by the Council of Ministers. It shares with the First Chamber the right to question ministers and state secretaries.

The Second Chamber consists of 150 members, directly elected for a four-year term--unless the government falls prematurely--on the basis of a nationwide system of proportional representation. This system means that members represent the whole country--rather than individual districts as in the United States--and are normally elected on a party slate, not on a personal basis. There is no threshold for small-party representation. Campaigns usually last six weeks, and each party is limited to a budget of about \$600,000. The electoral system makes a coalition government almost inevitable. The most recent elections for the Second Chamber were held in May 1994.

The First Chamber is composed of 75 members elected for four-year terms by the 12 provincial legislatures. It cannot initiate or amend legislation, but its approval of bills passed by the Second Chamber is required before bills become law. The First Chamber generally meets only once a week, and its members usually have other full-time jobs. The current First Chamber was elected following provincial elections in March 1995.

Courts. The judiciary comprises 62 cantonal courts, 19 district courts, five courts of appeal, and a Supreme Court which has 24 justices. All judicial appointments are made by the crown. Judges nominally are appointed for life but actually are retired at age 70.

Local Government. The first-level administrative divisions are the 12 provinces, each governed by a locally elected provincial council and a provincial executive appointed by members of the provincial council. The province is formally headed by a queen's commissioner appointed by the crown.

Defense Forces. The defense structure of the Netherlands comprises the Ministry of Defense and the various branches of the armed forces. Political responsibility for the defense of the Netherlands lies with the minister of defense and the state secretary for defense.

The Royal Netherlands Armed Forces has a peacetime strength of about 85,500 military and civilians. The Royal Netherlands Army takes part in the new German-Netherlands Corps and in numerous international peacekeeping efforts. The Army features an elite Air Mobile Brigade supported by a range of transport and attack helicopters. The Royal Netherlands Navy is composed of escort ships, submarines, maritime patrol aircraft, helicopters, a mine countermeasure force, and a Marine Corps, as well as the necessary supporting elements. Priority has been given to anti-submarine warfare, with emphasis on air defense and surface warfare. The weapons systems of the Royal Netherlands Air Force are primarily fighter aircraft and surface-to-air guided weapons.

Political Parties

From the end of World War II until December 1958, the Netherlands was governed by a series of coalitions built on a Labor-Catholic base. From 1958 to 1994, governments were formed primarily from a center-right coalition of the Christian Democrats and the Liberals, with the social democratic-oriented Labor Party generally in opposition.

The current government, formed in August 1994, is a three-way "Purple Coalition" of the Labor (PvdA), Liberal (VVD), and Democrats '66 (D'66) parties headed by Prime Minister Kok of the PvdA. The coalition parties hold 92 of the 150 seats in the Second Chamber. The Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) is in opposition with 34 seats. Eight minor parties hold the remaining 24 seats. Descriptions of the four main parties follow.

— The Labor Party, a European social democratic party, is left of center. Labor has 37 seats in the current Second Chamber, which makes it the largest party. The party joined the VVD and D'66 in the "Purple Coalition" to form the present government, after having spent the past five years in an alliance with the CDA. Labor's program is based on greater social, political, and economic equality for all citizens, although in recent years the party has begun to debate the role of central government in that process. Although called the Labor Party, it has no formal links to the trade unions.

— The Christian Democratic Appeal was formed from a merger of the Catholic People's Party and two Protestant parties, the Anti-Revolutionary Party and the Christian-Historical Union. The merger process, begun in the early 1970s to try to stem the tide of losses suffered by religiously based parties, was completed in 1980. It supports free enterprise and holds to the principle that government activity should supplement but not supplant communal action by citizens. On the political spectrum, the CDA sees its philosophy as standing between the "individualism" of the Liberals and the "statism" of the Labor Party. The CDA won 34 seats in the 1994 parliamentary elections, which was a significant drop from its previous 54. For the first time in 76 years, the CDA is not a governing party.

-- The Liberal Party is "liberal" in the European, rather than American, sense of the word. It thus attaches great importance to private enterprise and the freedom of the individual in political, social, and economic affairs. The VVD is generally seen as the most conservative of the major parties. The VVD was the junior partner in two governing coalitions with the CDA from 1982-89, and is now in the three-way coalition with 31 seats in the Second Chamber.

-- Democrats '66, once the largest of the "small" parties in the Dutch parliament, has grown in size and influence. The electoral fortunes of D'66 have fluctuated widely since the party's founding in 1966. The 24 seats it currently holds are double the average of the party's showing over the last 20 years. D'66 is a center-left party, generally portrayed as between the CDA and PvdA, with its strongest support among young, urban, professional voters. It professes a pro-European platform of ethnic and religious toleration. D'66 is currently a governing party.

Domestic Drug Policy

Although prosecuting international drug traffickers is a top national priority, the operation in the Netherlands of "coffeehouses" selling cannabis products--of under 30 grams--is tolerated, albeit under strict criteria and increasing government scrutiny. And while drugs are not legal in the Netherlands, Dutch policy treats domestic drug use as a health issue, stressing prevention and treatment.

The legal basis of Dutch domestic drug policy is the Opium Act of 1919 (amended in 1928 and 1976). In addition to permitting authorities to treat drug use as a health problem, Dutch law also permits them to divide responsibility for implementing and enforcing the Opium Act between the Health and Justice Ministries.

The Opium Act distinguishes between "drugs presenting unacceptable risks"--i.e. "hard drugs" such as heroin and cocaine--"and traditional hemp products"--called "soft drugs." The law imposes penalties for the possession, sale, transport, trafficking, and manufacture of all drugs listed in the Opium Act, except for medical or scientific purposes. Drug consumption, per se, is not prohibited.

The Netherlands spends about \$200 million on health care for people with various types of addictions; about 40% of this funding goes to drug addicts. To combat the spread of the HIV among drug users, the Netherlands has extensive needle exchange programs.

Principal Government Officials

Head of State--Queen Beatrix

Prime Minister--Willem Kok

Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs--Hans van Mierlo

Ambassador to the U.S.--Adriaan Jacobovits de Szeged

Ambassador to the UN--Niek H. Biegan

The Netherlands' embassy in the U.S. is at 4200 Wisconsin Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20016; tel: 202-244-5300; fax: 202-362-3430.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

The Netherlands abandoned its traditional policy of neutrality after World War II. The Dutch have since become engaged participants in international affairs. Dutch foreign policy is geared to promoting a variety of goals: transatlanticism; European integration; Third World development; and respect for international law, human rights, and democracy.

As a relatively small country, the Netherlands generally pursues its foreign policy interests within the framework of multilateral organizations. The Netherlands is an active and responsible participant in the United Nations system as well as other multilateral organizations such as the Organization for

Security and Cooperation in Europe, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), WTO, and International Monetary Fund. A centuries-old tradition of legal scholarship has made the Netherlands the home of the International Court of Justice; the Iran Claims Tribunal; the Yugoslavia and Rwanda War Crime Tribunals; and the European police organization, Europol.

Dutch security policy is based primarily on membership in NATO, which the Netherlands joined in 1949. The Dutch also pursue defense cooperation within Europe, both multilaterally--in the context of the Western European Union--and bilaterally--as in the German-Netherlands Corps. In recent years, the Dutch have become significant contributors to United Nations peacekeeping efforts around the world.

The Dutch have been strong advocates of European integration, and most aspects of their foreign, economic, and trade policies are coordinated through the EU. The Netherlands' postwar customs union with Belgium and Luxembourg (the Benelux group) paved the way for the formation of the European Community (precursor to the EU), of which the Netherlands was a founding member. Likewise, the Benelux abolition of internal border controls was a model for the wider Schengen accord, which today has 10 European signatories--including the Netherlands--pledged to common visa policies and free movement of people across common borders.

Foreign Aid

The Netherlands is the fourth-largest foreign aid donor, giving about 1% of its gross national product in development assistance. The country consistently contributes large amounts of aid through multilateral channels, especially the UN Development Program, International Development Association, and EU programs. A large portion of Dutch aid funds also are channeled through private ("co-financing") organizations that have almost total autonomy in choice of projects.

In 1995, Dutch development assistance--as defined by the OECD--was about \$4 billion. The policy priorities of Dutch aid for 1995 were the environment, women in development, urban poverty alleviation, and research. Dutch aid is also targeted on emergency aid, programs for the private sector, and international education.

The Netherlands is a member of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which recently initiated economic reforms in Central Europe. The Dutch strongly support the Middle East Peace Process and contributed \$22 million in 1994 to international donor-coordinated activities for the occupied territories and also for projects in which they worked directly with Palestinian authorities. These projects included improving environmental conditions and support for multilateral programs in cooperation with local non-governmental organizations. In 1995, the Dutch provided significant amounts of aid to Bosnia and Rwanda, among others.

TRAVEL AND BUSINESS INFORMATION

The U.S. Department of State's Consular Information Program provides Travel Warnings and Consular Information Sheets. Travel Warnings are issued when the State Department recommends that Americans avoid travel to a certain country. Consular Information Sheets exist for all countries and include information on immigration practices, currency regulations, health conditions, areas of instability, crime and security, political disturbances, and the addresses of the U.S. posts in the subject country. They can be obtained by telephone at (202) 647-5225 or by fax at (202) 647-3000. To access the Consular Affairs Bulletin Board by computer, dial (202) 647-9225, via a modem with standard settings. Bureau of Consular Affairs' publications on obtaining passports and planning a safe trip abroad are available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402, tel. (202) 512-1800.

Emergency information concerning Americans traveling abroad may be obtained from the Office of Overseas Citizens Services at (202) 647-5225.

Travelers can check the latest health information with the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta, Georgia. A hotline at (404) 332-4559 gives the most recent health advisories, immunization recommendations or requirements, and advice on food and drinking water safety for regions and countries. A booklet entitled Health Information for International Travel (HHS publication number CDC-95-8280, price \$14.00) is available from the U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402, tel. (202) 512-1800.

Information on travel conditions, visa requirements, currency and customs regulations, legal holidays, and other items of interest to travelers also may be obtained before your departure from a country's embassy and/or consulates in the U.S. (for this country, see "Principal Government Officials" listing in this publication).

Upon their arrival in a country, U.S. citizens are encouraged to register at the U.S. embassy (see "Principal U.S. Embassy Officials" listing in this publication). This may help family members contact you in case of an emergency.

Further Electronic Information:

Consular Affairs Bulletin Board (CABB). Available by modem, the CABB provides Consular Information Sheets, Travel Warnings, and helpful information for travelers. Access at (202) 647-9225 is free of charge to anyone with a personal computer, modem, telecommunications software, and a telephone line.

Department of State Foreign Affairs Network. Available on the Internet, DOSFAN provides timely, global access to official U.S. foreign policy information. Updated daily, DOSFAN includes Background Notes; Dispatch, the official weekly magazine of U.S. foreign policy; daily press briefings; directories of key officers of foreign service posts; etc. DOSFAN is accessible on the Internet at: <http://www.state.gov>

Federal Bulletin Board (BBS). A broad range of foreign policy information also is carried on the BBS, operated by the U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO). By modem, dial (202) 512-1387. For general BBS information, call (202) 512-1530.

National Trade Data Bank (NTDB). Operated by the U.S. Department of Commerce, the NTDB contains a wealth of trade-related information, including Country Commercial Guides. It is available on the Internet (www.stat-usa.gov) and on CD-ROM. Call the NTDB Help-Line at (202) 482-1986 for more information.

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U.S.-Netherlands Relations

Fact sheet prepared by the Office of U.K., Benelux, and Ireland Affairs, Bureau for European and Canadian Affairs, May 9, 1997

The Netherlands is one of our oldest friends and closest allies, and today we are working more closely than ever. The Dutch are committed Atlanticists and have worked to enhance Europe's partnership with the United States.

During its Presidency of the European Union (EU), the Netherlands has continued to implement the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA). As a NATO member and active participant in efforts to develop European security architecture, the Dutch are acutely aware of the importance of maintaining the transatlantic connection. Similarly, in the foreign policy realm, the Dutch have encouraged their European partners to see the benefits of strong transatlantic cooperation.

The Netherlands has promoted streamlined procedures for decision-making in crafting the EU's common foreign and security policy. Dutch officials believe that a common European strategy on foreign policy issues will make the EU an even more effective partner for the United States. The fruits of this enhanced cooperation already are evident, particularly in the Aegean, where the U.S. and EU are coordinating more closely than ever. The Dutch remain central to achieving full implementation of the Dayton Agreement and making progress toward reconstruction. Dutch soldiers have taken part in IFOR/SFOR, and Dutch police officers are the mainstay of the International Police Task Force.

Our bilateral cooperation extends far beyond Europe, to reinforcing the Middle East peace process, assisting in Africa, and reforming the United Nations. In April, the Dutch governing political parties hosted a conference on human rights in Cuba. We wage a common war against drug traffickers and international criminals in the Caribbean and elsewhere. The Netherlands has been a major supporter of the U.S.-led effort to freeze and terminate North Korea's nuclear weapons program. The Dutch have contributed to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). In addition, the Dutch have provided the political leadership to bring to conclusion negotiations for EU accession to KEDO.

The Netherlands is the United States' eighth-largest trading partner. We run our largest bilateral trade surplus-more than \$10 billion annually-with the Netherlands. The country is the "gateway to Europe;" more than 40% of U.S. exports to Europe pass through the Netherlands. Two-way investment also is important. The Dutch are the third-largest direct investors in the United States, with more than \$70 billion invested. The U.S. is the largest source of foreign direct investment in the Netherlands, with some \$37 billion invested. We have cooperated closely to liberalize global trade and investment in the Uruguay Round, at the World Trade Organization, and at the OECD.

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Fact Sheet: European Union

Prepared by the Bureau for European and Canadian Affairs, U.S. Department of State, May 12, 1997.

The European Union (EU; formerly the European Community) is comprised of three separate communities: the European Coal and Steel Community (established in 1951); and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the European Economic Community (EEC), both established in 1957. The EU currently has 15 members: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

The Maastricht Treaty went into effect November 1, 1993. On that date, the European Community formally became the European Union, and the Commission of the European Communities became the European Commission. Under Maastricht, member states began intergovernmental coordination on Common Foreign and Security Policy (the "Second Pillar") and Justice and Home Affairs (the "Third Pillar.") The treaty set a timetable for the introduction of a single currency and a European Central Bank as well as the development of common economic and monetary policies.

The question of how fast to proceed with enlargement of the Union while strengthening EU institutions (the "widening" versus "deepening" issue) continues to be a major topic for discussion among member states. In the most recent enlargement, Austria, Finland, and Sweden joined the EU on January 1, 1995. Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Turkey have applied for membership. Initial Commission opinions (*avis*) on most of the candidate's readiness to join are expected in July.

An intergovernmental conference, initiated in March 1996 and scheduled for completion in 1997, is reviewing the Treaty on European Union and discussing adapting the institutional architecture and procedures of the EU, particularly in light of further enlargement.

EU Institutions and Presidency

Major EU institutions are the Commission, the Council of Ministers, the European Parliament, and the Court of Justice. Member states agree to relinquish a degree of national sovereignty to EU institutions and to cooperate in the joint administration of these powers.

The 20-member Commission, appointed by common agreement of the 15 governments and approved by the European Parliament, has primary responsibility for initiating and implementing EU policy in areas that fall under EU treaties (for example, the internal market, external trade, and agricultural policy). The Council of Ministers, representing the member states, occupies the preeminent position in the current institutional power balance and decides on the Commission's proposals. The Parliament, the only EU institution that directly represents European citizens, has significant power over budgetary matters and can amend or reject certain legislation approved by the Council. The Court, which has a role similar to that of the U.S. Supreme Court, is the final authority on the interpretation of EU treaties and laws.

Each member state serves as President of the Council for six months in rotation. The presidency country presides at all meetings of the member states and serves as spokesman in dealing with countries on intergovernmental matters, including efforts to coordinate the foreign policies of the member states. This foreign policy coordination process, known as Common Foreign and Security Policy, is one of seeking consensus for joint action by the 15 members on international political

issues. Since ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, the presidency country now also presides over intergovernmental cooperation and consultation on justice and home affairs.

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Fact Sheet: U.S.-European Union Relations

Prepared by the Bureau for European and Canadian Affairs, U.S. Department of State, May 12, 1997.

With the end of the Cold War, the U.S. has sought to strengthen its partnership with the European Union (EU) as part of a broader effort to build a New Atlantic Community and a New Transatlantic Marketplace.

The U.S. and the EU share the goal of promoting a healthy, open commercial relationship and strong multilateral economic institutions. The U.S. supports greater European political and economic integration and ongoing EU efforts to enlarge to include central and eastern European and Baltic states. This process of integration and enlargement contributes to a more stable and prosperous Europe, an objective that is also an important U.S. national interest. It should proceed, however, without creating new trade barriers.

The EU is the United States' largest economic partner, our largest investment partner, and second-largest trading partner. Total U.S.-EU trade was \$270 billion in 1996, up from \$256 billion in 1995. This two-way trade supports six million jobs directly on both sides of the Atlantic and accounts for 44% of U.S. foreign direct investment. By the end of 1995, the EU had more than \$315 billion invested in the United States, and the United States had more than \$320 billion invested in the EU. Investment in Europe supports 12% of U.S. manufacturing jobs. European companies are the number one investor in 41 of 50 U.S. States and number two in the remaining nine.

The EU also has taken on an increasingly important role in foreign affairs, especially in the area of humanitarian and development assistance. The EU's foreign aid budget for 1995-98 exceeds \$36 billion. This assistance reinforces many important U.S. interests. For example, the EU is the largest donor of grant assistance to the countries of central and eastern Europe--billion during the period 1990-94--to help promote democracy and free market reforms. EU aid also is supporting U.S. efforts to bring stability and prosperity to troubled areas, including the Middle East, former Yugoslavia, Albania, and Central Africa.

Evidencing our special partnership and our many shared interests with the EU, the President meets biannually with the head of state or government of the EU presidency country and the President of the European Commission. The Secretary of State also meets twice annually with the EU foreign ministers and with the foreign ministers of the "troika" countries (the EU presidency country, its predecessor, and its successor).

With the goal of coordinating and strengthening the cooperation between the U.S. and the EU, President Clinton and EU leaders announced the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) in December 1995. The NTA lays out an ambitious agenda for expanding U.S.-EU cooperation in political, diplomatic, economic, and people-to-people areas.(###)



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Fact Sheet: New Transatlantic Agenda

Prepared by the Bureau for European and Canadian Affairs, U.S. Department of State, May 8, 1997.

The New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA), established by President Clinton and European Union (EU) leaders in 1995, provides a framework for managing and enlarging our cooperation with the EU. It reinforces our bilateral relations with the EU member states and offers a flexible vehicle for engaging the EU as a whole through a regular consultative process involving the EU Presidency and the European Commission.

The NTA lays out an ambitious agenda for expanding U.S.-EU cooperation on promoting peace and stability, democracy and development around the world; responding to global challenges; contributing to the expansion of world trade and closer economic relations; and "building bridges" between Americans and Europeans of the post-Cold War generation.

A key element of the U.S.-EU worldwide partnership is our intensified diplomatic cooperation. The U.S. and EU are jointly promoting reconstruction and reconciliation in Bosnia and coordinating on the delivery of humanitarian aid and assistance in reestablishing democratic institutions in Albania. The U.S. is working with the EU to reinforce our political and economic cooperation with Turkey to keep it firmly anchored to the West. The U.S. and EU have encouraged dialogue among the parties in the Middle East Peace Process. In an effort to counter weapons of mass destruction, the EU is in the final stages of negotiations to join the U.S. in the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO).

The U.S. and EU cooperate extensively on law enforcement, counternarcotics, environmental degradation, and health issues. Our consultations have spurred joint counternarcotics actions in the Caribbean, where the EU is supporting a regional marine interdiction program, and initiation of cooperation against trafficking in women.

The U.S. and EU are reducing and eliminating transatlantic economic barriers and supporting the multilateral trading system. Both sides are hoping to finalize agreements for the mutual recognition of product testing, inspections, and other procedures, covering \$40 billion in two-way trade. The U.S. and the EU led the way in reaching the landmark Information Technology Agreement to eliminate tariffs on information products and an agreement to liberalize global trade in basic telecommunications services. Our governments are cooperating closely with the Transatlantic Business Dialogue, a unique U.S.-European business partnership, in addressing barriers to trade.

A key part of the agenda is a fourth chapter dealing with building bridges between the different constituencies in the transatlantic community. In May 1997 the U.S. and EU convened a Transatlantic Conference in Washington that gathered over 300 prominent Americans and Europeans in an effort to nurture the next generation of Transatlantic leaders and enhance the ties that strengthen the Transatlantic relationship.

The NTA is managed by a Senior Level Group (SLG) of U.S. and EU officials, lead on the U.S. side by the Undersecretaries of State for Political and Economic Affairs, who convene quarterly. In mid-May 1997 the SLG met to review our accomplishments under the Dutch EU Presidency. Secretary Albright also met with her Dutch counterpart in January 1997 to review key areas for cooperative action.

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The Marshall Plan

Fact sheet prepared by the Office of Policy and Public Affairs, Bureau for European and Canadian Affairs, May 12, 1997

The Marshall Plan responded to a crisis in postwar Europe resulting from a decline in production, a shortage of capital, a serious balance-of-payments deficit, and food shortages. The harsh winter of 1946-47 intensified these problems, and the economic crisis brought new hardships to a region just recovering from the horrors of war. The situation threatened to cripple U.S.-European trade and to benefit the large communist parties active in several key European countries. European stability seemed at risk.

Secretary of State George C. Marshall unveiled the U.S. remedy in a Harvard University commencement speech on June 5, 1947. Describing the gravity of the situation in Europe, Marshall said the U.S. was prepared to "assist in the return to normal economic health to the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace." He stressed that the initiative had to come from the European nations themselves, which would be expected to join in a cooperative effort.

The Europeans reacted immediately and enthusiastically. Representatives of 16 nations met as the Committee for European Economic Cooperation in Paris on July 12, 1947, to begin developing a recovery plan. This committee evolved into the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), forerunner of today's Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

President Truman presented the European Recovery Program (the Marshall Plan's official title) to Congress on December 19, 1947, requesting \$17 billion over four years. The Republican Party held a majority in both Houses, but good-faith negotiations and a bipartisan spirit, exemplified by Senator Vandenberg (R- Mich.), Chairman of the Senator Foreign Relations Committee, led to Senate approval on March 13, 1948, and House passage on March 31. President Truman signed the Economic Cooperation Act on April 3, 1948.

The U.S. administered the Marshall Plan through the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) under Paul G. Hoffman, President of Studebaker. W. Averell Harriman served as ECA Special Representative in Paris, with ECA mission chiefs in the recipient countries. Leading academics, businessmen, farm groups, and labor unions lent their support and staffed the program, making the ECA a remarkable network of government-private cooperation.

Sixteen countries--Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and West Germany--received Marshall Plan assistance. The USSR and countries under its influence declined participation; clearly positive responses from the Polish and Czechoslovak Governments were vetoed by Moscow. The Plan, reduced somewhat by Congress, totaled \$13.3 billion throughout the life of the program from 1948 to 1951. This would be more than \$88 billion in today's dollars.

Grants made up more than 90% of the total, providing essential commodities and services, mostly from the United States. Goods included food, animal feed, fertilizer, fuel, raw materials, and production equipment. Grant project financing upgraded manufacturing, mining, transportation, and communications industries. This aid was multiplied through "counterpart funds." Grant recipients set aside equivalent funds in local currency, which were dispensed with approval of the ECA. This

system vastly increased the resources available for reconstruction, while demanding partnership between the ECA and European governments.

The Marshall Plan also provided technical assistance, financing visits by American experts to Europe and European delegations to the United States. Delegations of managers, technicians, and labor leaders visited U.S. farms and factories covering almost every type of manufacturing, as U.S. firms opened their doors even to potential competitors. Europeans thus learned about U.S. production methods.

The Marshall Plan provided a critical margin to the Europeans' own economic efforts, as per capita GNP grew 33.5% in Western Europe from 1948 through 1951. This recovery set the stage for Europe's remarkable economic growth in the following years.

The architects of the Marshall Plan consciously promoted European integration. The Plan stimulated new forms of European cooperation via the OEEC, intra-European trade, and the European Payments Union, forerunner of the European Monetary System. These measures helped launch the process of integration leading to the European Community--now the European Union. The enhanced European cooperation, coupled with U.S. engagement, also facilitated the establishment of NATO in 1949.

The U.S. economy also benefitted from the Marshall Plan as the U.S. preserved and improved its trading relationship with Europe. By stimulating European productivity and accepting a greater volume of imports, the U.S. saw its own exports increase several-fold in the decades that followed.

The Marshall Plan left a legacy of U.S.-European friendship, transatlantic cooperation, U.S. engagement in Europe, and bipartisan U.S. support for that engagement. That legacy has guided U.S.-European relations ever since, and it serves as a beacon for the Euro-Atlantic Community today.

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GEORGE C. MARSHALL

His Life and Legacy



George C. Marshall, one of the great American statesmen of this century, played a crucial role in international affairs from 1939 to 1951 -- the years that shaped the second half of the century. Until 1945, he was in the military service of the United States. As Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army from 1939 to 1945 he was, in the words of Winston Churchill, the "true architect of victory" in the West European arena of World War II.

In a succession of positions of great responsibility between 1945 and 1951, Marshall devoted his efforts to the cause of international peace and security. He spent a year in China in 1945-46 as President Truman's representative, attempting -- without success -- to bring about a peaceful resolution to the conflict between the nationalists and the communists. As Secretary of State from 1947 to 1949, he had the vision to make the Marshall Plan the vehicle for the economic reconstruction of Europe.

As Europeans endured unemployment, dislocation, and starvation in the wake of World War II's devastation, the Marshall Plan embodied Marshall's conviction that economic recovery and stability were vital underpinnings to the successful rebuilding of a democratic Europe. Marshall's belief that America's security and continued economic growth were inextricably linked to Europe's well-being, which formed the cornerstone of his Plan.

With the assistance of the Marshall Plan, Western Europe began to recover from the ravages of war. Marshall's effort to include the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in this grand design was rejected by Moscow. As Western Europe rebuilt, Europe was divided both economically and ideologically, and conflicting politics soon laid the ground for another war -- The Cold War.

When it became evident that the gap between Eastern and Western Europe would not be bridged, and that the Western European states feared for their safety, Marshall was one of the leaders who created the North Atlantic Treaty Organization which would ensure the security of the West. The establishment of NATO in 1949 achieved a balance of power in Europe that endured until the end of the Cold War.

In his last official position as Secretary of Defense during 1950-51, Marshall oversaw the formation of an international force, under the United Nations, that turned back the North Korean invasion of South Korea.

Although he spent most of his life in the U.S. military, Marshall is best remembered as a true internationalist who sought peace for the world through cooperation and understanding among nations. It was a fitting tribute to a splendid career spent pursuing this ideal that Marshall received the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1953.

The principles of Marshall's vision for post -World War II Europe, as revealed in The Marshall Plan, are the same as those which lead to the creation of the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. The Marshall Center is an initiative which was launched just as new democracies were emerging from the nations of the former Warsaw Pact. It seeks to provide these emerging democratic nations with the intellectual capital they require to make and sustain the transition to democracy, while increasing their knowledge and understanding of each other and the West.

England: Thursday, May 29, 1997

President Clinton is visiting newly elected Prime Minister Tony Blair in London to renew the long-standing special relationship between the United States and Britain. Fifty years ago, our alliance won World War II and then stood fast through the Cold War. Together, our two nations are rising to the challenge of peace by building a partnership for the security and prosperity of both nations into the 21st century.

London, England

London's history is a rich one, evident in the jumbled layers of its buildings. Low 12th-century fortifications are juxtaposed with soaring 20th-century office blocks, and Victorian churches contrast with Roman city walls. Everywhere you look you'll see a confusion of ages, as well as countless images and symbols of the city that have become ingrained in the global subconscious, whether by Defoe, Fielding, and Dickens, or by the Beatles, the Stones, and Elvis Costello. Even people who have never set foot in London have vivid images of Big Ben, Tower Bridge, red double-decker buses, and people wearing raincoats and brandishing umbrellas.

London is a living, thriving entity. As empire changed into commonwealth, former subjects relocated to the capital, bringing with them their traditions and beliefs. The presence of so many international influences is changing the very essence of what it is to be British. With a population of almost seven million, London is both quintessentially English and thoroughly international. For every traditional pub serving bangers and mash, there's a Bengali, Vietnamese, or Caribbean restaurant vying for tourist dollars.

Spreading over more than 618 square miles from its core on the River Thames, London is the largest city in Europe and it boasts as many as 20 million visitors a year. London is well known for its outstanding museums and galleries, imposing palaces and monuments, quaint squares and peaceful green parks, excellent stores, brilliant theater, and exciting nightlife.

London has known the best of times and the worst of times since the Romans first erected a fort in the city of Londinium in the year AD 43. Its strategic setting on the banks of the Thames made it the Normans' first capital of England, and it later became the capital of the greatest empire in the world.

London's nearly disastrous catastrophe was the Blitz of WWII: night after night the Germans mercilessly bombed London for more than a year until much of the city—including the Houses of Parliament—was destroyed, and 30,000 Londoners were dead. That London thrives today is a testimony to the city's indomitable spirit.

Bilateral Meeting and Lunch with Prime Minister Blair

10 Downing Street, London

President Clinton's visit to 10 Downing Street will be his first official visit with the new Prime Minister since his election. During his visit to 10 Downing Street the President is expected to visit with members of Prime Minister Blair's new cabinet.

The President and Prime Minister, who met last April in Washington, D.C., are expected to discuss the upcoming Denver Summit of the Eight, and July's Madrid NATO summit, along with the Northern Ireland Peace Process, conditions in the former Yugoslavia and other matters of shared interest.

The meeting will be followed by a lunch and joint press statement.

10 Downing Street

The residence and offices at No. 10 are made up of several buildings. The famous front door on Downing Street enters into a house built in 1682 by Sir George Downing. Passing through the corridor you come to the main part of the building, originally a separate mansion built for the Countess of Lichfield, one of the children of Charles II by the Duchess Cleveland.

In 1732, King George II presented the house to his chief minister, Sir Robert Walpole. He declined the house as a personal gift but accepted it on behalf of the government as a residence for the First Lord of the Treasury. In fact, it is as the First Lord and not as Prime Minister that the British Prime Minister resides at No. 10. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, several First Lords preferred to remain in their own London homes. During this period, the house was often the residence of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Since 1877 when Benjamin Disraeli moved in, every Prime Minister but one has lived at No. 10 Downing Street.

The Cabinet Room

The Cabinet Room is the most famous room in No. 10. A long narrow apartment, it was extended to its present length in 1781, when the Corinthian columns were added. Down the center runs the Cabinet table, with a seat for each Cabinet member. The Cabinet Room and the other offices on this floor form the real working hub of No. 10.

Embassy Staff Meet and Greet

American Embassy, London

President Clinton will meet with U.S. Embassy staff and families in London. Following an introduction by Ambassador William Crowe the President will deliver brief remarks, including a salute to Ambassador Crowe.

England Fact Sheets:

U.S.-United Kingdom Relations Fact Sheet

Statement by the President: British Prime Minister Blair in Northern Ireland



United States-United Kingdom Relations

Fact sheet prepared by the Office of U.K., Benelux, and Ireland Affairs, Bureau for European and Canadian Affairs, 5/9/97

The United Kingdom is one of the United States' closest allies. The U.S. and U.K. consult regularly on an extremely wide range of foreign policy issues and share major foreign and security policy objectives. This close bilateral cooperation reflects the common language, ideals, and democratic practices of the two nations.

As permanent members of the UN Security Council, the U.S. and the U.K. have pursued similar objectives on maintaining international peace and security, including cooperation in peacekeeping and disaster-relief operations. The two countries have been solid allies in combating terrorism, organized crime, and drug trafficking.

The United Kingdom is a strong ally in NATO, and its views on internal adaptation, expansion, and NATO-Russian relations are not significantly different than those of the United States.

Since the latter half of 1995, the United States and the United Kingdom have worked closely together in Bosnia. British, American, and French troops made up the bulk of the IFOR force in Bosnia-as they do in its successor force, SFOR.

The United States is a strong supporter of continued political and economic freedoms in Hong Kong after its reversion to China on June 30, 1997. This support is appreciated by the British, who hold the same view for the Crown Colony about to revert to China.

The U.K., a former colonial power in the Middle East, is very supportive of U.S. initiatives for peace. The British also share similar views with the U.S. on Iran and Iraq.

The Administration remains in regular contact with senior figures in the British Government on the peace process in Northern Ireland. Like the British, the U.S. wants Sinn Fein to be represented at peace negotiations but only on the basis of a genuine IRA cease-fire.

The U.S. and the U.K. are negotiating an "open skies" agreement aimed at liberalizing our bilateral civil aviation regime. The "open skies" agreement would remove current limitations on U.S. carrier operations to the United Kingdom and countries beyond, relying on free markets rather than governments to determine airline capacity between our countries.

The U.S. and U.K., both committed to free trade and open markets, are the largest investors in each other's economies. Current U.S. investments in the U.K. economy total about \$111 billion. The U.K. is our second-largest trading partner in the EU (after Germany) and our sixth-largest globally. Two-way trade is about \$60 billion per year, with a slight U.S. surplus.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

May 16, 1997

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

British Prime Minister Blair in Northern Ireland

I welcome Prime Minister Blair's statement today in Northern Ireland as a balanced and constructive step toward restoring momentum to the peace process. His words offer hope and reassurance to the people of both of Northern Ireland's traditions.

The Prime Minister has made clear that this British Government, like its predecessor, wants to see inclusive talks, but it will invite Sinn Fein to the negotiating table only on the basis of an unequivocal cease-fire. And he has taken the initiative in offering to meet with Sinn Fein, at the official level, to assess whether inclusive talks are possible on that basis. I urge Sinn Fein to take up this offer and I pray it will bring about an end to the violence for good. Now is the time to open a new chapter in the history of this tragic conflict and achieve through dialogue and negotiation the lasting settlement the people of Northern Ireland want and deserve.

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Selected Transcripts and Speech Texts

- 5/21/97 Press Briefing
National Security Advisor Samuel R. Berger
and Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott
- 5/14/97 Statement by the President on NATO Expansion
President William Jefferson Clinton
- 5/14/97 Background Briefing on NATO-Russia Agreement
Senior Administration Officials
- 5/6/97 "The U.S., the EU, and Our Common Challenges"
Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott
- 3/17/97 "Europe, Russia and the Fulcrum of Power," *The Washington Post*
National Security Advisor Samuel R. Berger
- 2/18/97 Prepared Statement before the North Atlantic Council
Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright
- 2/15/97 "Why Bigger is Better," *The Economist*
Secretary of State Madeline Albright

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

May 21, 1997

PRESS BRIEFING BY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR SAMUEL BERGER AND DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE STROBE TALBOTT

The Briefing Room

2:00 P.M. EDT

MR. JOHNSON: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen, and welcome to the White House Briefing Room. The briefing today will be about the President's forthcoming trip to Europe. Your briefers will be Samuel Berger, the President's National Security Advisor; and Strobe Talbott, the Deputy Secretary of State.

MR. BERGER: Thank you, David. Let us go on a brief preview of the journey of next week. With the signing of the partnership between NATO and Russia coming exactly 50 years to the week the Marshall Plan was announced, the President's trip next week comes at a unique moment in history. The trip enables the President to pursue his vision for the future of the transatlantic alliance against the backdrop of the legacy of a previous generation of Americans.

There are three distinct and complementary parts of the trip: the historic signing of the NATO-Russia act in Paris, the commemoration of the Marshall Plan in The Hague, and the first meeting the President and the -- the first official meeting the President will have with Tony Blair in London. Together they highlight the importance of America's leadership and give the President the opportunity both to advance and to address the goal that he set back in Brussels in 1994 of a peaceful, undivided, democratic Europe for the first time in history.

The week really begins on Monday here in Washington, or at least in Arlington, with the Memorial Day traditional wreath-laying ceremony at Arlington. The site of the wreath-laying ceremony is steps away from the grave of George Marshall, and this will enable the President to both honor the Americans whose past sacrifice has led to our freedom, but also to build the bridge from the vision that George Marshall laid out 50 years ago to the vision that we seek to pursue over the decades ahead.

We will leave Monday evening, about 5:00 p.m., and arrive bright and fresh at 6:00 a.m. in Paris on Tuesday morning. The President will have a bilateral with President Chirac at the Elysees, and then will be participating in the signing ceremony of the NATO-Russia Founding Act, which I believe is a truly historic event, clearly demonstrating that it is possible to proceed with enlargement of NATO, strengthen our alliance, and build a partnership between NATO and Russia.

Following that event, the President will attend a lunch hosted by President Chirac at the palace, and then will have a bilateral meeting with President Yeltsin.

That evening, he will fly to The Hague, where he will have the evening -- he will meet with the Queen. And then on Wednesday morning, we begin in the Netherlands the semiannual U.S.-EU Summit, with Dutch Prime Minister Kok, EU President Santer and others.

The cooperation that the United States has built with the EU on political, economic and law enforcement issues is an integral part of the transatlantic fabric that the President is seeking to build for the period ahead, and there will be a number of issues that will be discussed at the summit, at the EU-U.S. Summit. We hope and expect that the leaders will sign an agreement that will provide for greater cooperation in stemming the flow of precursor chemicals that can be used in chemical weapons and really -- and used also as part of drug trafficking.

You heard the President this morning talking about, with the mayors, the overall effort on the drug front, and this is a very important part -- that is, the international dimension of that effort.

The President then will attend a lunch that will be hosted by Queen Beatrix that will be attended by approximately 40 heads of state, leaders from nations of Europe, OSCE, nations of Europe, where he will deliver an address commemorating the 50th anniversary of the Marshall Plan. This will be a major opportunity for the President to celebrate the vision of a remarkable generation of Americans who laid the foundation for 50 years of peace, from 1947 until now; and then to lay out his vision of the future of U.S.-European relations and the future of a peaceful, free, prosperous Europe whose stability is very much tied to our own.

Later that day, I believe that evening, the President will travel to Rotterdam, which has designated Wednesday, May 28th, as a day to thank Americans and the American people for the contribution that we made to the recovery of the Netherlands with the Marshall Plan. They call their celebration "Thank You, America." As many of you know, Rotterdam was destroyed almost completely during World War II and was rebuilt almost entirely with Marshall Plan funds. And the President will participate in those events on Wednesday evening.

The triumvirate events that day -- the U.S.-EU Summit, the Marshall Plan commemoration and the Rotterdam speech -- provide the President the opportunity, as I said, to set out a vision for the future of the transatlantic alliance and the future partnership between the United States and Europe for the next 50 years.

On Thursday, the President will travel to London, and he will meet with the new Prime Minister Tony Blair. They have met a few times in the past, but this will be -- and they will presumably be together in Paris, but this will be the first official one-on-one meeting between the two and will provide an opportunity for the President to reaffirm the special relationship that we have, longstanding relationship that we have with Britain, and discuss and deal with a wide range of issues of mutual interest, including Northern Ireland, the Persian Gulf, Hong Kong, Bosnia, NATO and others.

He will return here Friday night, but I think the week really ends on Saturday, from our perspective, and that is with his speech to the West Point commencement where the President will talk directly to the American people about America's leadership responsibilities in Europe and in the world, and explain why engagement in Europe and elsewhere remains vital to America's security and prosperity, and why NATO, including enlargement, is the foundation for that engagement.

We will return on Saturday night and there are no international events that I know of planned for Sunday.

Let me ask Secretary Talbott to speak more specifically about the NATO-Russia element of this.

DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT: Thank you, Sandy, and good afternoon to all of you. I know quite a number of you have had some briefings on the subject of the NATO-Russia Founding Act, including from this podium, so I won't go on at any length on that so that you can get quickly to your questions.

But just to recap very briefly, the NATO-Russia Founding Act is in five parts. The preamble and part one constitute a review of both the rationale for greater cooperation between the Alliance and the Russian Federation, and also the principal guidelines and understandings for international relations. Some of these are reiterations of principles from the United Nations Charter, the OSCE, the Lisbon OSCE document from last December, and those of you who were in Helsinki will also I think recognize some of the principles from that document, as well.

The document also sets forth the concept of and the mechanism of the so-called NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, which is a new body, a new entity that will institutionalize the cooperative relationship that already exists between NATO and Russia. And the document sets forth a number of areas for consultation, coordination, and, where possible as it emerges over time, joint decision-making and joint action between NATO and Russia.

And then the final section of the document is on the issue of the military dimension of the relationship. A great deal of that will depend on agreements still to be reached in the CFE talks in Vienna, but there is also considerable reliance on positions that NATO has already taken with regard to the deployment of nuclear weapons and of permanent-stationed forces, and there are some guidelines with respect to the CFE negotiations.

And Sandy and I would be happy to take any specific questions you have on that, but let me just say a word or two more about the NATO-Russia dimension and the U.S.-Russian dimension of the President's travel next week.

There will be a meeting, of course, between the two Presidents, President Clinton and President Yeltsin. The agenda will be partly on the subject of NATO-Russia, which has tended to dominate their last couple of meetings, but they will also look ahead to the Denver summit and to areas where the United States hopes to use its influence within the Summit of the 8 and the international financial institutions in order to support Russian economic reform. And I'm sure that the two Presidents will also talk about the remaining issues on the arms control and security agenda, particularly the importance of Duma ratification of START II and the desire that both Presidents have to move ahead with the related issue of ABM-TMD demarcation.

The last thing I would say is that in the weeks and months ahead we hope to see building on the progress that has been achieved both in the Helsinki meeting between the two Presidents and also in the NATO-Russia Joint Document further progress on CFE. The locus of that will be in Vienna, and we also hope to see in coming months the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council get up and running. I think you can expect to see that happen between now and perhaps the beginning of the fall.

So we can go to questions, and Sandy is available as well.

Q Especially at a time when parallels will be drawn to the Marshall Plan era, could you be a little more specific about the type of assistance -- do you mean more money, do you mean multilateral -- insofar as helping Russia promote reform? And could somebody speak a little bit more about the meeting with Blair, particularly the Irish issue?

DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT: Yes, I'm sure Sandy will take the latter question.

There are several dimensions, of course, to our willingness to cooperate with Russia on economic reform. There is a bilateral dimension under the aegis of the -- of our assistance program for the New Independent States. We are hoping to have more money in fiscal '98 than was available in fiscal '97. We're hoping to have \$240 million for Russia as part of that package.

As for the multilateral dimension, the United States is prepared to support the Russian aspiration for membership in the Paris Club and the World Trade Organization and the OECD, assuming, of course, that Russia is able to meet the conditions for membership in those organizations. And the Denver Summit of the 8 will talk, as it always does, of course, about ways in which the international financial institutions, particularly the World Bank and the IMF, can help.

Q Strobe, continuing on this issue, will the meeting between the President and President Yeltsin clarify this current dispute over the meaning of the Charter, with the Russians saying that it gives them a veto effectively over NATO decisions, and the U.S. saying, well, they have a voice, but not a veto?

DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT: Well, I honestly do not think that there is a misunderstanding on that score. The issue here is two different entities, two different bodies. There is an existing body called the North Atlantic Council, which you might see as the governing board of NATO. That is made up exclusively of the 16 members of the Alliance. That is a sovereign body representing the sovereign interests of the allies. That has not been, and will not be, subordinated to any other body.

Now, there is going to be a new body, which is the Joint Council, the Permanent Joint Council. The membership of that is made up of the currently 16 members of the Alliance and the Russian Federation. That body will operate by consensus. If it chooses by consensus to do something, then it can do something jointly. If there is not a consensus, then it won't do something. But the absence of a consensus in the NATO-Russia Joint Council does not in any way affect the freedom of action, the freedom of decision either of NATO and the NAC, or of Russia.

Q Well, how do you keep it from spilling over, though?

DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT: Well, I don't think there's any danger or way that it will spill over. The NAC is perfectly capable, and has demonstrated this many times, I might add, particularly in the way that it has overseen and guided the negotiations that have gone on between the Secretary General Mr. Solana, and the Foreign Minister Mr. Primakov -- has guided those negotiations, is capable of acting very much on its own.

You know, one way to look at this is at a institutionalization -- that is, the Permanent Council as an institutionalization of something that already exists. There is already in Brussels a device or an arrangement known as 16 plus 1. This means that any member of the Partnership for Peace can hold consultations at any time with the Alliance and with the NAC. And the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council is an institutionalization or a formalization of that. It's existed before, it hasn't in any way eroded or diluted the Alliance and it will not do so now.

Q So the NAC is not a constituent member of the Joint Council through its representatives?

DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT: That is correct. The NAC stands on its own, will continue to stand on its own. And the Alliance, as such, will take its guidance from the NAC.

Q Strobe, given the fact that President Yeltsin has explained it that way, does the administration look upon this as something that's necessary that Yeltsin had to do in order to sell it; or is there a danger inherent in him selling it that way in that the first time NATO acts against Russia's wishes, the Russian people and some Russian leaders can say, see, they're violating what we told you the deal was -- even though you say that's not what the deal is?

DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT: I understand the question. I think it's extremely -- I take the thrust of the question and I think that we have taken the thrust of that question ever

since this issue first arose, which, of course -- and it isn't new. It's very important that everybody understand this agreement in exactly the same way, what it does and it doesn't do.

The document, itself, is absolutely explicit on this point. It makes quite clear that the existence and the operation of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council will not in any way undermine or prejudice or overrule the NAC, any more than it will have those effects on the freedom of action of Russia itself. This document was extremely carefully negotiated. It's quite explicit in its terms. And that is the document that will be signed on Tuesday.

I don't want to get into the inner workings of Russian domestic politics on this, but as the Russian position has been explained back to us, it refers to precisely the workings of the Joint Council and does not have a bearing on the NAC itself.

Q Strobe, as you know, most -- a lot of think-tankers you have been too kind to Russia. One of the things -- you haven't been kind enough to Russia. One of the things you've been too kind --

DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT: Who have you been talking to? (Laughter.)

Q Well, one who you know quite well who thinks you've been too kind to Russia raises the point that if Russia is the cause of the problem -- we don't know what that problem would be at this point -- is the cause of a problem where NATO may try to take -- they consider military action, and you discuss it with Russia in your own council, and obviously, they disagree with the way you in the West are looking at it, it's going to be harder for a consensus to form within the main NATO body. Do you follow me and do you buy that?

DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT: I follow you; I do not buy it. I just don't think --

Q You understand the thinking.

DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT: I do, indeed, but I don't think there is any reason for that concern. There has been, since the end of the Cold War, since the formation of the Partnership for Peace, an opportunity for Russia and all of the other partner countries to consult with NATO about anything that they consider to be in their interest. We have nothing to fear from the continuation, the deepening, and the broadening of that kind of consultative relationship -- not just with Russia, but Ukraine and a number of other states -- as long as there is no ambiguity, no misunderstanding whatsoever that NATO remains NATO, NAC remains the NAC, and it hasn't been in any way subordinated.

And by the way, the member states of NATO and of the NAC have their own bilateral relationships, quite properly, with the Russian Federation. Those bilateral relationships came in -- played quite an important role in bringing us to the promising point where we now are. I'm thinking particularly about the good and workmanlike relations that exist between Chancellor Kohl and President Yeltsin, between President Chirac and President Yeltsin. So simply institutionalizing a way for Russia to talk about its concerns is nothing to be concerned about.

MR. BERGER: If I can just add one other point, Barry, to Strobe's answer, which I agree with fully. By extension of that logic, we would not be heading to Madrid to begin the process of NATO enlargement. I think NATO has demonstrated, from 1994 to today, that notwithstanding the misgivings that the Russians, misgivings probably is an understatement, that it felt that enlargement of NATO was in the overall security interests of NATO and of Europe, and it's proceeded without being deterred by the disagreement with that policy that Russia may have. And I think that -- in a sense, the proof is in the pudding here in terms of NATO's willingness to act in its interest even where there may be a disagreement.

DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT: There was a question about Northern Ireland.

MR. BERGER: You asked about the Blair meeting. I think the Blair meeting will be fairly far-ranging; there's a lot to talk about. I expect that they will talk about Northern Ireland. As you know, Prime Minister Blair has taken some steps in the last week; there are meetings that are taking place, actually, today between representatives of the British government and Sinn Fein. And he has indicated that were there to be an unequivocal cease-fire there would be an early resumption of inclusive talks. That is a view that we support, and I'm sure the President will want to hear from Prime Minister Blair where he believes that stands and how we can continue to be helpful in the process.

We will also -- they will also talk about Bosnia as we enter a very important 16 or 18 months when there is an enormous amount to accomplish on the ground. I think there's been good progress, but there clearly needs to be more progress in terms of particularly on the civil implementation side. There are issues in the Persian Gulf that they will be discussing -- Iraq, Iran. So I think it will be a pretty far-ranging discussion.

Q Mr. Berger, to what extent will the President be using his various speeches in this trip to start selling the American public and the Senate on this idea of NATO expansion, the idea - potential for American troops being called upon to join a force that might defend Prague or some other capital --

MR. BERGER: Well, I think the whole trip. And I think as I've described it. If you begin it, in a sense, at Arlington Cemetery and end it at West Point, and all of the events in between I think will be very much an exercise in talking about how America's relationship with Europe in the past has been inextricably intertwined in war and in peace; how it continues to be intertwined; and therefore, why America's engagement in Europe through NATO enlargement and other mechanisms will lay the basis for perhaps another 50 years of peace. And I think there are opportunities in Arlington, there are opportunities in The Hague speech, there are opportunities in Rotterdam and then back in West Point, all of which I am sure will address the issue of NATO enlargement.

And I think this is the beginning of a long dialogue that will take place in this country about NATO enlargement. The President has spoken about it frequently -- he spoke about it in Detroit during the campaign, he spoke about it in the State of the Union. But it now begins to

take on some real substance as you move from Helsinki, which was, I think, the pivotal event -- Solana, very important meetings -- then to Paris and then to Madrid. These things have a kind of vitality and reality that they don't have when they're simply abstractions.

Q You're a political advisor to the President in addition to being a National Security Advisor. How much -- well, you go to those Wednesday meetings and whatnot.

MR. BERGER: I go to meetings every day. Go ahead.

Q How much of a factor was domestic politics in the original decision to make NATO enlargement one of the principal foreign policy goals?

MR. BERGER: I don't think it was an important factor at all. And I think the notion somehow that NATO enlargement sprung up during the '96 campaign is ahistorical. The President set this course back in 1994, when he first articulated it in Brussels, when he talked about a peaceful, undivided democratic Europe for the first time in history -- a sweeping, broad, historic, strategic objective. And it has been something that he has worked for since.

This is not -- this has a rationale that really goes to how you define the future and how you define America's security. Our view is that by embracing the emerging democracies of Central Europe in an enlarging NATO, we can begin to help build the stability in the East that NATO has in the West and that the Marshall Plan did in the West 50 years ago. And in Paris I think we'll demonstrate that we can do that without undermining the U.S.-Russia relationship.

This has sort of been the Scylla and Charybdis of NATO enlargement. You do this in a way that both enlarges NATO and does not undermine the security or create second-class members on the one hand, and on the other hand, does not undermine Russian democracy. And I think what's been proven over the last year of very painstaking work -- the last two years or three years -- is that that's possible.

Q Let me just follow that, Sandy. Can you address the criticism of people who say that what the Eastern European new democracies need is economic integration into Europe, not military integration? And, while we're talking about Marshall, that was what the Marshall Plan was about, was economic assistance, not military.

MR. BERGER: It's not one or the other; I think it's both. Clearly, EU expansion is important and the integration of these economies into the European economy is important. Through the EU, through the institutions that Strobe discussed, all of that helps to bolster them economically and pull them into an increasingly integrated international economy.

But the EU does not include the United States. NATO is the institution that ties the United States to Europe and ties the United States to a Europe that ought to be expanding to embrace, help stabilize the new democracies of Central Europe. So I don't think it's a choice between the two, I think it's both.

DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT: Let me just add a word. By the way, on your first point, I go to a lot of meetings on Wednesdays, too, but never been accused of going to the one that you referred to.

Let me just give you a perspective on this issue of domestic politics versus long-term strategy. I think this notion that persists, that this was somehow driven by domestic politics is not only ahistorical but even counter-intuitive. And the earlier question about the coming effort to convince the United States Senate to ratify enlargement by a two-thirds majority really proves the point. This is not a slam dunk. This is not going to be easy. And it shouldn't be easy, precisely because of the stakes involved. And the notion that this idea would be an instant, widespread political winner for a politician I think misses the point of what's involved here and also misses, as Sandy says, the history of the thing.

Let me just say a word about Central Europe and its economy. Central Europe is not going to succeed in making the progress that it wants to and deserves to make unless it can do so in a secure security environment, and that's what a large part of what NATO enlargement is all about. If those countries were to be consigned to a limbo or a gray zone between the old Soviet Union and the old NATO, and the old NATO were to be frozen in amber, a number of things that would be bad economically as well as politically would be likely to happen. Among other things, those countries would be very likely to kind of scramble around in a very ad hoc fashion to develop their own security arrangements in a way that would pit them against each other and also end up with much higher levels of military spending, which would, of course, tie up money that ought to go to the economy.

Q Strobe, I don't know which one of you wants to tackle this question, but one of the issues that seems to be bubbling up on the agenda is that the EU Competitive Commissioner, Competition Commissioner, is publicly criticizing the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas deal. Do you expect that to come up in any way, shape, or form at the summit?

MR. BERGER: I don't know whether it will come up at the summit. It is a matter before the FTC here and before the EU Competition Commission, and therefore, I am told by people with practicing law degrees, as opposed to non-practicing law degrees, that it's inappropriate for me to comment on it.

Q As a follow, it's being criticized as antitrust, so who is going to be talking about it besides the FTC once you get over there?

MR. BERGER: Not me.

Q But who will?

MR. BERGER: I don't know whether this will be on the agenda. We'll have to find out how -- what is the appropriate way, obviously, if the Europeans raise it, for the President to address it in a way that is consistent with U.S. antitrust laws. I don't know the answer. I'm not

trying to be cute, but I have been told that this is not something, because it's pending before the FTC, that I really should get into.

Q To return to Russia for a second, the Duma once again is saying that it is not going to ratify START II, so then what is your answer to critics of NATO expansion who say that for U.S. security it is more important to get these limits on nuclear forces than it is to stabilize a situation in Europe that so far is not leading to any problems, and then what we have done is, in fact, once again, created a confrontation with Russia?

MR. BERGER: Well, let me try -- let me answer and then Strobe can comment.

We still expect the Duma to ratify START II. President Yeltsin, as late as Helsinki and again yesterday, reaffirmed that this was his commitment and this was his intention. And so I think it is premature to conclude that START II ratification is not going to take place. START II is not only in our interests, which is why President Bush signed it, it is also in Russia's interest both on its own terms, in terms of the world they live in if it's not ratified -- i.e. START I -- and in terms of the door that it unlocks to get to START III, which has been outlined at Helsinki for cuts to the 2000, 2,500 level. So for all of those reasons it's in Russia's interest, as well as ours. And I continue to expect and hope that the Duma will act on it and that this is not a trade-off here.

DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT: The only thing that I would add to that is that there is a false premise, not necessarily one that you share, but sometimes when this is put forward, that START II didn't run into difficulties in the Duma until the NATO enlargement, NATO-Russia issue came into sharp focus. That's not true. And, as Sandy says, President Yeltsin is committed himself several times to vigorously pursue a ratification. He has now started to do so when he met with the faction leaders and the committee chairman yesterday. So let's see how it plays out.

Q Strobe, you said that the United States will support Russia's membership in organizations like the WTO, the OECD and the Paris Club, provided Russia meets the routine requirements. Now, if Russia can meet the routine requirements, does it need that U.S. support, or is it token, or are there other forces besides Russia's own performance that would militate against its being admitted to those organizations?

DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT: I think the United States has a very important role to play in all of those institutions. And American support is substantively valuable to Russia. Certainly, the Russians take that position.

MR. BERGER: Also, John, I'd just say, for example, WTO, our support can be quite active -- that is to say, at a technical level. We will work -- we will be working with the Russians, who don't have a lot of experience, obviously, with the international trade rules, with the WTO, to help them deal with and fashion proposals that can help them meet the WTO basic criteria. So it is not just support in a sense of we will stand up at the meeting and give a seconding speech, the support here is also technical assistance.

So that you know what's in store for you, I've been asked to indicate that when we are liberated, Lincoln Gordon and Vernon Walters will be here to talk, who are both original participants in the Marshall Plan, 50 years ago, to talk a bit about the history of the Marshall Plan and give you some of the kind of flavor of what things are like as the Marshall Plan was launched 50 years ago.

Q In that list of organizations that you mentioned and the requirements that Russia needs to meet, could you just refresh my memory -- how many of those conditions is Russia able to meet at this point, for any of those organizations?

DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT: No, I cannot refresh your memory on that. We can perhaps get you a fact sheet on the WTO, what the requirements --

MR. BERGER: I don't think -- any country that comes into WTO has to accept the basic principles and construct of the WTO -- national treatment, most favored nation status. There are whole set of principles that come with that in addition to a set of tariff proposals that are acceptable to other members. I mean, it's a fairly elaborate negotiation. We are having this negotiation with the Chinese; there is this negotiation with the Taiwanese. These are very -- it's not like seven boxes to check. Basically there is a fairly elaborate set of negotiations that take place, like any trade negotiation.

Q But who, to the best of your knowledge -- it sounds as though you're saying that there is none of those that you can recall --

MR. BERGER: No, that's not true. This discussion has been going on with Russia and the WTO. At Helsinki, the two Presidents committed to try to accelerate that discussion. President Clinton said, let's try to get it done by next year. President Yeltsin said, let's try to get it done by next year. Our President said we will try to help you in ways that we can. So it's really -- there is now a political impetus or a political will behind something that will be done largely by trade negotiations.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

2:42 P.M. EDT

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

May 14, 1997

**STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT
ON NATO EXPANSION**

The Rose Garden

2:29 P.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Good afternoon. Today in Moscow we have taken an historic step closer to a peaceful, undivided, democratic Europe for the first time in history. The agreement that NATO, Secretary General Solana and Russian Foreign Minister Primakov have reached, and which we expect to be approved by NATO's governing council this week, forms a practical partnership between NATO and Russia that will make America, Europe and Russia stronger and more secure.

The agreement builds on the understandings that I reached with President Yeltsin in Helsinki. It helps to pave the way for NATO as it enlarges to take in new members to build a new relationship with Russia that benefits all of us.

In this century, Europe has suffered through two cold wars -- through two world wars and a cold war. And America has also paid a heavy price. Three years ago at the NATO Summit in Brussels, I laid out a vision for a new, different Europe in the 21st century -- an undivided continent where our values of democracy and human rights, free markets and peace know no boundaries; where nations know that their borders are secure and their independence respected; where nations defined their greatness by the promise of their people, not their power to dominate or destabilize.

For 50 years, NATO has been at the core of Europe and America's security. From the start of my first administration, the United States has worked to adapt NATO to new missions in a new century, to open its doors to Europe's new democracies, to strengthen its ties to non members through the Partnership for Peace, and to forge a strong, productive relationship between NATO and a free, democratic Russia.

These are goals Republicans and Democrats alike share, building on the legacy of bipartisan leadership in Europe, begun after the war between President Truman, Secretary of

State Marshall, and Senator Arthur Vandenberg. Today's agreement sets out a sustained cooperative relationship between NATO and Russia. NATO and Russia will consult and coordinate regularly. Where they all agree, they will act jointly as they are doing today in Bosnia. Russia will work closely with NATO, but not within NATO, giving Russia a voice in, but not a veto over NATO's business.

I congratulate NATO Secretary General Solana and Russian Foreign Minister Primakov. I look forward to personally thanking Secretary General Solana for his remarkable work when he visits here next week.

This agreement opens a way for a truly historic signing in Paris next month -- or excuse me, it will be later this month now. Let me say that NATO's relationship with Russia is a part of a larger process, to adapt NATO to new circumstances and new challenges in the 21st century. Just eight weeks from now in Madrid, NATO will invite the first new members to join our Alliance. Its doors will remain open to all those ready to shoulder the burdens of membership. The first new members will not be the last.

NATO, working with Russia and other friends of freedom, will see that we work to prevent a return to national rivalries, to defeat new threats to peace and prosperity, like the ethnic rivalries that have torn Bosnia asunder -- terrorism and weapons proliferation.

This March in Helsinki, President Yeltsin and I agreed that despite our differences over NATO enlargement, the relationship between the United States and Russia and the benefits to all of cooperation between NATO and Russia were too important to be jeopardized. And we set out the principles for how NATO and Russia could cooperate. Those form the basis for today's agreement, an agreement that proves that the relationship between NATO and Russia is not a zero sum game, and that the 21st century does not have to be trapped in the same assessments of advantage and loss that brought death and destruction and heartbreak to so many for so long in the 20th century.

It is possible to enlarge NATO, to maintain its effectiveness as the most successful defense alliance in history, to strengthen our partnership with Russia, and to do all this in a way that advances our common objectives of freedom and human rights and peace and prosperity. We can build a better Europe without lines or gray zones, but with real security, real peace, and real hope for all its citizens. A more secure, peaceful, and hopeful Europe clearly means a better world for Americans in the 21st century.

Thank you.

Q Mr. President, what do you think finally brought the Russians around, if there was one deciding factor? And how much of a problem is it going to be, now that you've got the Russians sort of on board, to convince Congress that NATO should, in fact, be expanded?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, let me answer the -- the first question, I think what brought the Russians to this agreement was a sustained effort at dialogue between Russia and NATO and

between Russia and the United States and other friends of democratic and between Russia and the United States and other friends of democratic Russia, making it clear that NATO has a new mission, that there was no attempt to be more threatening to Russia, but instead to build a common partnership for democratic values and democratic interests.

Yesterday, President Havel, of the Czech Republic, had a very compelling article in one of our major newspapers, laying out that case. We are not going to define NATO in the 21st century in the same way we did in the 20th century. And we are trying to change the realities that caused so much grief in the last century. I think he understood that -- that, in other words, that a democratic, free, non aggressive -- that is, in a destructive sense -- non aggressive Russia -- is not threatened by an expanded NATO, particularly now that there's going to be a partnership to work in areas which are in our common interests to work. So that's the first thing.

The second thing I would say is, in terms of the Congress, now that the partnership has been solidified between NATO and Russia, which I think is an important thing on its own merits, it would seem to me to be a great mistake to deny countries that are clearly able and willing and anxious to take on the responsibilities of NATO membership the opportunity to do that. The understandings that we have reached among ourselves about the process of expansion mean that the members themselves are ready to expand. And I believe that in the end the Congress will support that, particularly since all of our NATO allies will be voting on to whom new membership will be offered.

Q How tough a sell does President Yeltsin have at home with this?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I would hope that the clarifications that were hammered out, first at Helsinki, but then the excellent work that Secretary General Solana did, will help President Yeltsin to demonstrate that he has secured an agreement which shows that, while they don't have a veto over NATO actions, that NATO has no plans, no intentions, and has made clear that its mission is not to threaten, confine, or in any way undermine Russia; that we're looking for a partnership here between a democratic Russia and the democracies that are in NATO; and that this, in fact, will strengthen Russia's security and reduce the sense of anxiety that it might have otherwise felt, I believe. And I believe he'll be in a position to argue that to the Russia people now in a forceful way.

But keep in mind, all of us are trying to change the --not only the facts on the ground, if you will, but the whole pattern of thought which has dominated the international politics of Europe for 50 years. And even though the Cold War is over, a lot of people want to go back to the kind of -- kind of an analysis that was more typical even before World War II, in the late 19th and early 20th century.

And we're trying to change all that. We're trying to prove that democracies can reach across territorial lines to form partnerships that commit themselves not only to preserve freedom within each other's borders and the integrity of those borders, but to face these new transnational threats like terrorism, ethnic convulsions and weapons proliferation.

Q Mr. President, President Yeltsin said that you have made a precise commitment in this document to guarantee that there will be no military installations in the new member states. Have you given those guarantees?

THE PRESIDENT: I would urge you, first of all, to look at the language that Secretary General Solana has agreed to and that our representatives have provisionally agreed to just in the last couple of hours. What the language does is to make it clear that there are no plans and there are no reasons to, in effect, activate old Warsaw Pact military installations for what you might call traditional NATO aggressive forward posturing, but that we will have to use -- there is an explicit understanding in the agreement that we will have to use some infrastructure for the agreed upon operations that are an integral part of being a NATO member.

So all we're doing in the understanding is to recognize, yes, there will be some use of military infrastructure so that the requirements of membership can be met by any new members, but, no, we are not moving the dividing line of Europe from its old dividing line between NATO and the Warsaw Pact further east. So I think we got just exactly the right kind of understanding. And, again, I think Secretary General Solana did it right.

Thank you.

END

2:41 P.M. EDT

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

May 14, 1997

**BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS**

The Briefing Room

3:00 P.M. EDT

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me try to put today's relevance in a slightly broader context and then ask my distinguished colleague to go through the elements of the Founding Act that was agreed to today in Moscow between Foreign Minister Primakov and Secretary General Solana.

As the President has said, this document is strongly in the national interest of the United States and the American people. By bolstering Europe's stability, it will enhance our own security and prosperity in the 21st century. The document moves an historic step toward a partnership between Russia and NATO while preserving NATO's integrity, flexibility and core identity as a defensive, collective alliance. In other words, this is a win win win -- it's good for America, it's good for Europe, and it's good for Russia.

The document realizes an important element of President Clinton's vision of Europe, which he first articulated in Brussels in 1994 -- that is building a peaceful, democratic, undivided continent for the first time in history. And when the President talks about building a peaceful, democratic, undivided continent, let me try to describe what he means, what's the strategy behind those words.

It involves a set of complementary security, political and economic arrangements which bring Europe together; enlarging the NATO Alliance; building a new security cooperation between NATO and Russia, which we've acted on today; building partnerships with Ukraine, the Baltics and other countries in Central and Eastern Europe through the Partnership for Peace and the Euro Atlantic Partnership Council that will be created; moving the transatlantic agenda of trade and economic relationships forward. All of these are elements of a tapestry of a more integrated, more united, more peaceful Europe the President is referring to.

Now, today's actions is a very important step, in a sense a midpoint, on the road from Helsinki to Madrid in eight weeks, where NATO will act definitively to invite new members to join the NATO Alliance. But in a larger sense, this really is a process that began in January of 1994, when the President traveled through Europe and Western Europe and Central Europe and Eastern Europe and in Moscow, and outlined this vision really for the first time of an integrated Europe, and sent the message to all three that a new NATO would work with a new Russia to build a new Europe.

In Warsaw in 1994, the President called on NATO to begin concrete steps towards the process of bringing in new members. In May of 1995, in the summit between President Yeltsin and President Clinton, there was a detailed exchange on NATO enlargement and NATO Russia relations. As a result of that, in May of that year, Russia joined the Partnership for Peace and a process was begun parallel to that in which the NATO enlargement study was undertaken and completed in September of '95.

In October of '96, the President called specifically for a NATO summit in 1997 to name the first new NATO members, and called for a NATO Russia partnership, including mechanisms for consultation and, where possible, joint action; then in Helsinki, where President Yeltsin and President Clinton really laid the basis for the work that has been done so effectively by Secretary Solana, and in parallel with efforts that Chancellor Kohl and President Chirac and others have been engaged in, to result in this step.

Before I turn to my colleague to walk through the specific elements of this Founding Act, let me simply conclude by saying that for 50 years America's overriding security concern flowed from a hostile relationship with Moscow. With this Founding Act we reinforce the basis for a constructive, stable and peaceful relationship with Russia that is working with a stronger NATO that preserves its flexibility and integrity.

Now, let me turn this over to my colleague to talk more specifically about the elements of this founding act.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thank you, and good afternoon to all of you. For openers here, I will basically address two subjects: one, the content and the structure of this document, and then give you a little bit on the background of it and the process whereby it came about.

As you know, this is a document that went without a formal name for quite some time, and that really was one of the issues that was finally decided in the discussions between Secretary General Solana and Minister Primakov just in the last day or so, and the name of it is a Founding Act -- the full name is Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation, and Security and NATO and the Russian Federation.

Now, this document has five sections or parts. The first is a preamble that essentially sets the context of the relationship and makes the case for broader, more intense cooperation between NATO and Russia. Section two sets out the basic principles that will guide the NATO Russia

relationship and these are in a very positive sense quite familiar, because they are essentially reiterations or reaffirmations of international documents that have set the rules of the road for international relations over the last half century, particularly over the last couple of decades. That is, the United Nations Charter and the Helsinki Final Act. It's not entirely coincidental that that word, "act," would have come back into play in the context of these discussions.

These principles include commitments on the part of all countries involved to respect the sovereignty and the independence and the territorial integrity of all states, peaceful settlements of disputes and also -- this is, as I'm sure you will understand, very important -- the inherent right of every country to choose its own means for ensuring its own security. And, again, you will hear echoes of the document that emerged from the Helsinki meeting between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin.

Section three establishes a new forum, a new entity, to be called the NATO Russia Permanent Joint Council. This is a consultative mechanism that builds upon a feature that has existed in Brussels for the last number of years -- namely, the so called 16 plus 1 mechanism or structure. I can come back to that, but it institutionalizes 16 plus 1 with respect to NATO's relations with Russia.

Now, initially, this will be a body that will engage purely in consultations or discussion. However, the Founding Act allows for the possibility that over time, out of the consultations among the member states of NATO and Russia will come agreement on certain areas or tasks where there can be joint decision making and joint action. Example, of course, being what NATO and Russia, NATO and Ukraine, NATO and many of the Central European and former republics of the Soviet Union are doing today in Bosnia.

The Founding Act allows each side to raise any issues that it might have and to pursue those in the NATO Russia Joint Council. But it also quite explicitly provides for freedom of action of both sides. What that means is that if there's a consensus among the member states of NATO and Russia to do something under the auspices of the NATO Russia Joint Council then they can pursue that. If there's not a consensus then NATO is free to act as NATO and Russia is free to act as the Russian Federation.

Section four of the Founding Act sets out possible areas for consultation. Both the President and my colleague have touched on a couple of those: the prevention and settlement of conflicts; peacekeeping operations; preventing and curbing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and transparency, which is jargon meaning increasingly open exchange of information on what in the Cold War were areas, of course, of mutual secrecy, such as force posture and doctrine and that kind of thing.

Section five, which has been the focus of the most intense discussion in the last couple of months, covers the military dimension of the NATO Russia relationship. And here I would like to call your attention to a key feature of this document, and that is, it builds upon two unilateral positions that NATO has already taken. One of those is a December 10th NATO statement with

regard to nuclear weapons deployments, the so called "three nos." And the second is a reiteration of a March 14th North Atlantic Council NATO statement with regard to conventional forces.

Now, much as the Helsinki document did, the Founding Act takes those existing NATO positions, reiterates them and clarifies them in ways that the Russians, in being prepared to proceed with the signing of this document, clearly acknowledge as addressing some of their legitimate security concerns.

Q Could you just summarize those two?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. The three nos, Rita, says that -- and this is a key phrase -- under current, foreseeable circumstances, or in the current and foreseeable security environment, NATO has no reason, no plan and no intention to change current deployments of nuclear weapons; that is, it doesn't need to put nuclear weapons somewhere where they are not now in place.

The March 14th statement says that in current and foreseeable circumstances, or the environment, NATO will pursue its tasks and missions relying upon integration, inter operability - which means making sure that the new member states are able to integrate or operate as part of the unified command and -- this is very important -- reenforcement.

Now, in the case of both the December 10th and the March 14th statement, NATO reserves to itself the right to assess the security environment, and if it were ever, in and of itself, to conclude that the security environment had changed, then it would obviously want to look again at the question of deployments.

Q That is what the President was referring to out there?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. Yes. This has been a theme in the discussions between Secretary General Solana and Minister Primakov, going back sometime now, and indeed, it's been the subject -- I'll come to this in a minute -- of the discussions that have been going on through various country to country or bilateral channels as well.

Now, section five -- and I can come back to any of this in more detail if you want -- section five also provides for mechanisms that will, we hope, foster closer military to military cooperation including liaison missions in the headquarters of NATO and Russia.

I might say I think it's a telling coincidence that the Russian Defense Minister has been here over the last day and a half. He had meetings, of course, with Secretary Cohen; he met with Sandy and with Secretary Albright this morning. And one of the things, one of the many things on the agenda was opportunities for greater military to military cooperation.

Let me, if I could -- and we can come back to any parts of the document that you want to talk about -- let me just give you a little bit of the flavor of how this came about. It was a very

complicated, but I would say also quite orderly and disciplined process. And it was complicated, in part, because there were so many countries involved.

My colleague went through a number of key parts about the chronology here; let me mention one other important item on the calendar of the last year, and that was a speech that Secretary Christopher gave in Strasbourg last fall at which he broached publicly the idea of there being a NATO Russia document of the kind that now seems to be at hand.

We also I think look back on the OSCE -- Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe -- meeting in Lisbon in early December as an important point as well. The Vice President met with Prime Minister Chernomyrdin and gave a new political impetus, I would say, because each of them was under instructions from his President to try to move these negotiations forward. And I might add that during the last round of the Gore Chernomyrdin Commission here in Washington in early February there was also quite a bit of work done on all this.

But this was by no means just a U.S. Russia discussion. There have been intense bilateral contacts, including at the highest level involving all of our key allies -- Chancellor Kohl, President Chirac have been intensively engaged, as well. And, of course, Secretary Albright has had a number of meetings with Mr. Primakov.

But throughout this the nexus, the key channel was the Solana Primakov channel, and that was exactly as it should be, because this is, after all, a document that brings NATO, as such, into a set of understandings and undertakings with the Russian Federation.

I might just add one other, as it were, relevant but somewhat complicating factor to which we had to make sure we did justice, and that is that NATO is 16 countries now, Russia is one, that's 17 countries, but there are in all 30 countries that are signatories to the CFE process. In fact, there are a couple of countries that are not part of the CFE, but have an intense interest in the CFE, whose interests and rights were also involved here. So yet another part of the dialogue has been to urge the Russians to address as many of their military concerns as possible in Vienna through the CFE process so that all countries whose interests are involved will be respected there. And that is very much part of this document.

I guess the last thing I would say just on the status of it, Secretary General Solana flew out of Moscow after concluding his talks successfully with Minister Primakov. He went almost literally right into a meeting of the North Atlantic Council. It's our understanding that that meeting went quite well and that the Permanent representatives, the 16 Perm reps to the NAC are now forwarding the text back to their governments, but we have every reason to expect approval.

Why don't I go to your questions.

Q A technical question. The agreement -- this is not legally binding, correct?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is correct.

Q Why did you get away from the word "charter"? Did it sound too legalistic? Will it be submitted anyhow because there are gray area documents where a President may want the support or get the endorsement of Congress? You don't send this to Congress, but you send the CFE changes and the additions of new NATO members to Congress because they change treaties. Is that all correct?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's all correct. Let me add just a little bit to it, though.

It's very important to understand why it isn't and shouldn't be seen as legally binding. And I think I've already touched on the main points in the way I've addressed a couple of issues so far.

With respect to nuclear weapons and station forces -- infrastructure, that kind of thing -- this is not a document which says that NATO and Russia agree that X, Y, and Z will be the case forever or that A, B and C will never happen. That would be a treaty, a legally binding treaty that, of course, would go to the Senate. And, incidentally, that's the kind of document that the CFE treaty or START II is, and that's why they are subject to ratification. This document says that NATO takes the position that, explains its position, clarifies its position as meaning thus and such, but NATO reserves the rights that I've mentioned.

Barry, as to why the charter didn't fly at the end of the day, all I can tell you is that to Russian ears, it sounded like a word or a genre of document that was a little undervalued -- too many charters I think was it in part.

We, of course, are going to want to consult very closely with the Congress on the substance and the background and every other aspect of this, and we've already been doing so. I think that Secretary Albright is within 15 minutes going to be meeting with the Senate observer group and I will be going up to meet with that same group tomorrow. Several of us, not just from the State Department, but from DOD as well, have been up to brief Senator Gordon Smith and his colleagues on the European Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. So we're going to be working very closely with them, but it doesn't require ratification.

Q What does the President and the 16 others including Yeltsin sign? If they don't sign the agreed document, they don't sign a contract -- I mean, they say words, reassuring words like we just heard on the lawn -- what is the signature besides theater? What's the point?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's a political -- an enduring commitment at the highest political levels. Have you got the text of Helsinki there? And there is quite a bit of precedent for this. The Helsinki Final Act of 1974 -- and don't make too much of the -- '75 -- there are a lot of differences, obviously, but the Shanghai Communique is another example.

Q Once this is signed, can the Russians be pretty confident, even though they don't have a veto, that any future applicants that they have pretty strong objections to, like the Baltics, are not going to get in?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, they cannot be that confident of that. Throughout this process, we have had certain core principles which guided us at every step of the way, and those principles have emerged intact in the final document here. One of those was that no country was going to have a veto; there was going to be no slowdown or delay in the process of enlargement; there was going to be no second class membership in the Alliance, including, notably, as it takes in new allies. NATO was not in any way going to be subordinated to any other organization.

And then, another key principle is that there was going to be no exclusion. This is a process that is going to go on, it's going to be open to all eligible democratic states.

Q The Baltics and all these other countries have the expectation that they can get in?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is correct.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They're not excluded. And if I could just add one thing to what my colleague has said. The President was very explicit on this point with President Yeltsin when they met in Helsinki, so there can be no misunderstanding about what the intention is here -- that is, no nation is excluded and no non member has any kind of veto right over.

Q -- raising countries' expectations for something that will in all likelihood never happen?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, this is an ongoing process, as the President said, and this is -- in Madrid, NATO will take in its first new members since the end of the Cold War, but we have been very clear from the beginning that this would be an ongoing process and the first will not be the last. And I would simply go back over the last two or three years, at each stage there has been a question about whether, in fact, certain things would happen: Would we actually come out for enlargement? Yes, we did. Would there actually be enlargement? Yes, it looks like there will be -- most certainly will be. So each step of the way the skeptics have been proven here to be overly cautious.

Q When I asked President Clinton about congressional objection he responded by saying these countries feel that they're ready. But the issue in Congress, as you know, is not whether these countries feel that they're ready, but whether the U.S. is going to be willing to take on a common defense of that. And I guess the question is -- and as Barry says, the expense of it -- the question is, tell us, if you can tell us a little bit about what you're going to try to do to explain to Congress that this is in the interest of the U.S. and it's not going to be too expensive.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, first of all, there has been very broad support in both Houses of Congress over the past several years, past few years, for NATO enlargement. It has been bipartisan. It has been expressed in congressional resolutions and other forms of congressional action on several occasions overwhelmingly. So I think we begin here with a general presumption that enlargement of NATO is good for the United States.

But understand that what happens in Madrid in eight weeks, essentially, is the invitation to certain countries to begin accession talks. Those talks will then go on for undoubtedly several months, with a view towards ultimately their coming into NATO in 1999. So this period between now and that will be a time of, I think, very vigorous discussion on the Hill, debate in the country, and I think we have every intention of making our case very strongly to the Congress and to the American people that a NATO which is modernizing, a NATO which is adapting, a NATO which is enlarging to embrace new democracies is in America's national interests. And I believe that that will be supported on a bipartisan basis at the end of the day.

We certainly don't take that for granted. I think there will be a very vigorous effort on our part over this period, and I'm quite pleased that Majority Leader Lott has established the group that my colleague referred to, where Secretary Albright is speaking to at this moment. It's a bipartisan group in the Senate that will be actively engaged in this process.

Q Could you put a dollar figure on how much it will cost?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think there have been some preliminary estimates from the Defense Department in the neighborhood of about \$200 million a year, but I think that Secretary Cohen would be the first to say that those need to be refined, obviously, as we know, obviously, who, for starters.

Q Could you clear up one particular area? Tonight, apparently President Yeltsin went on the air and indicated that in fact he did have some kind of veto power or some way of blocking an admittance that he objected to. You guys says he doesn't. Can you explain --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me take the first whack, and then you take the second. There are no secret understandings. There is nothing here that does not appear in this document. And it is very clear and explicit that there is no veto that any country has. How he chooses to characterize this in Moscow, obviously, is --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'd like to add just one thing. No, it is very, very important that there be no misunderstanding about what this says and what it doesn't say, what it commits us to and what it leaves us free to do.

One of the principles that President Clinton established, going back to 1994 -- and my colleague mentioned kind of the genesis of being the trip that he made to Brussels, Prague, Kiev and Moscow -- was to say the same thing to every audience. We have been totally transparent and open about this and tried to be as clear as possible.

Now, on the issue at hand here, there are two bodies at issue here. One is called the North Atlantic Council, and that's kind of the board of directors of NATO. And that is sovereign. It doesn't take orders from anybody but itself; it doesn't report to anybody but the member governments. There's a new body called the NATO Russia Permanent Joint Council. That will operate by consensus. If Russia doesn't want something to happen under the auspices of the

NATO Russia Joint Council, it won't happen. But that does not mean that NATO can't do what it feels is in the interests of its members.

Q Two questions. Number one, doesn't the fact that Yeltsin feels compelled to say that, even if you say it's not the case, isn't that very telling? And number two, a more technical question, when you said that this document reiterates and clarifies existing NATO positions, what's clarified?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can answer -- the second part of that I can answer more easily than the first, and I'm at a little bit of a disadvantage. I have nothing but a ticker on what President Yeltsin is quoted as having said. And we have been in the most intense, specific negotiations with President Yeltsin himself and his Foreign Minister for months and months and months, and I assure you that there is no misunderstanding between NATO and Russia or the United States and Russia over what this document does and doesn't say.

It is a fact, and all of you know it, that President Yeltsin, Minister Primakov, Minister Rodionov and the rest of their team have an extremely tough job ahead of them on a whole variety of fronts, and Secretary Albright got a pretty vivid taste of that a week ago last Friday when she met with some otherwise reformist, very -- what should I say -- some of our favorite Russian politicians who were adamant in their opposition to NATO enlargement. But I don't want to enter into the Russian domestic debate.

But let me answer your question about where the clarification is. With respect to the December 10th statement on nuclear weapons deployment, the final version of this act will make explicit something that was implicit in the original December 10th statement, and that is that if we don't have any plan, intention or reason to deploy nuclear weapons, we don't have any plan, intention or reason to have storage sites for nuclear weapons where there are not storage sites now.

With respect to the March 14th statement on conventional forces, the final version asserts affirmatively that NATO will have infrastructure adequate to meet the tasks and missions identified and the parameters identified in the March 14th statement, and those missions, of course, include reenforcement.

Q Can I follow up just for a second on the second part of that question, which was the notion of why Yeltsin feels compelled to do this? I mean, in a sense, the only reason why an agreement like this -- forgive me for hyperbole -- matters is if it further cements the relationship between Russia and the West. I mean, that's why you're heralding this, because it's a good thing. But if, in Russia, it's seen largely as a bad thing, NATO expansion -- not this agreement but NATO expansion -- then for all the good talk, don't you risk undermining what you say you're holding up?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I sense my colleague may want a crack at this one, too. It's a very good question. I don't think you are hyperbolizing, by the way. I think you've put it pretty well.

Many, many Russians, including a lot of reformers, democrats, people who believe in Russia's integration with the outside world, don't like NATO, and they don't like NATO enlargement. They associate NATO with the bad old days of the Cold War, and they need to be persuaded by their own leaders, in the first instance, that this is indeed a new NATO, just as we're prepared to look at them as a new Russia.

Now, this is not an abstract question, it's also a military question. And you'll remember what was said publicly between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin in Helsinki. They chose their words very carefully. They said that the purpose of what we're talking to you about today is to limit or diminish -- or minimize, I guess -- the negative consequences of Russia's opposition to NATO enlargement. And we think that the principal way to do that is to make clear to the Russians what NATO does and doesn't plan to do. And that's why the December 10th statement matters with regards to nukes -- matters in military terms, not just cosmetic or symbolic or political terms -- and March 14th with respect to conventional weapons.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me just try -- come at that in a related way. I think that President Yeltsin has made a clear judgment about where Russia's future lies, and it does not lie in isolation from the United States, and it does not lie in isolation from Europe -- so that, notwithstanding the fact that they disagree with NATO enlargement, I think he made the judgment in and around the time of Helsinki that NATO enlargement was going forward, and that Russia's future lies by integrating itself with Europe, with the West, with the United States both through a NATO Russia relationship and through the bilateral relationships that are very important to him, including the U.S. Russian relationship, so that in Helsinki we not only made a breakthrough in terms of moving this ball down the court, but we also made important strides in terms of arms control, looking towards START III, and in terms of integrating Russia into other institutions.

The summit in Denver will be the Summit of the Eight. That, I think, is an important step. So I think here one should not substitute your judgment -- or one's judgment for President Yeltsin's in terms of what is in the best interest of Russia. I think he has the capacity to see a different future, and I think that the future that he sees is a Russia whose prosperity and peace and security lie in greater integration.

Q Does the Duma have to ratify this?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know whether the Duma has to ratify it. I think at some points President Yeltsin has said that he will --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They have different constitutional procedures and their government has made clear they are going, in some sense, to submit it to the Duma for approval, but it's not clear whether that constitutes formal ratification.

Q Now that the vision of this relationship between NATO and Russia is developing -- because it seems to me, as the President said today, we're looking at a new NATO for the 21st

century, whereas many of the countries, including Russia and many of those who want to join are looking at in terms of what it has been in the 20th century. And if we resolve the problem in terms of the Russian acceptance of the expansion of NATO, when the next step comes and the same presuppositions lie at the basis of decisions and the Baltic states or Ukraine or the Central Asian states want to join NATO and there is no change in those presuppositions of views of various parties, they're going to have another problem somewhere down the road --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think this moves us down a course towards a greater degree on integration. If you looked in 1985, you could not have predicted what happened in 1989. If you looked in 1990, you could not predict where you might have been in 1994. Three years ago, I doubt seriously whether one could have predicted where we have been -- where we are today -- on the verge of both having a NATO Russia agreement and enlarging NATO simultaneously.

So I think what we've done here is move an important step forward towards a more peaceful, constructive relationship with Russia and a more integrated Europe. And we'll have to see how that unfolds as the years unfold. But it will -- in our judgment, it will unfold in the direction of additional expansion of NATO.

Q What's the current state of play on troop levels in the new member countries? Is that addressed in this document? And what has changed since the Secretary's visit two weeks ago?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Nothing has changed, and nothing will change with regard to NATO's intentions and the flexibility that it insists on having. The March 14th statement -- which I imperfectly quoted earlier, but I think I got it more or less right -- basically says that NATO will concentrate on certain kinds of activities and deployments. And those will not include -- those that it concentrate -- will not include the need for the permanent stationing of large combat forces under current foreseeable circumstances. But it will certainly want to do a lot of exercises. It will want to move sometimes fairly large units in and out, in support of peacekeeping operations such as the fairly significant facility that NATO now has in Hungary. But it reserves the right to change that at any time.

Yes, my colleague says that there's another piece to this very complicated mosaic, which is CFE. CFE -- which was, as you all know, signed in 1991 in kind of the last days of the Cold War -- at least the existence of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact -- was based on a block to block structure. There were ceilings for NATO and there were ceilings for the Warsaw Pact.

NATO has made a proposal in Vienna for a whole new structure that would include ceilings on individual countries -- no more blocks -- but also that would include what are called stabilizing measures, still to be worked out, that would cap deployments in that part of Europe which has been the source of so much trouble throughout the last century. And that would affect Central European countries, Eastern European countries and former parts of the Soviet Union.

And an awful lot of what this document does is provide a, kind of a guideline or an impetus to CFE where many of the specifics that will come to all of your minds as you study it in weeks to come, but can't properly be answered by NATO because NATO doesn't represent all the countries that are affected by CFE.

Q In order to study it, we ought to really have it in front of us. So I wonder if you could make it available then?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We can make it available, I would think, very soon. As I mentioned earlier, the perm reps in Brussels only got it within the last couple of hours and they are sending it back to governments for approval. I think that -- I would have hoped by the end of the week -- but very soon, it would be publicly available.

Q -- statement.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's correct.

Q Are there any issues that you identified in the text, or that you can come up with, would not go to the new forum and which would be dealt with exclusively by NATO under the new arrangement?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q Can you sort of give us an example?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, my colleague's answer is in the negative -- anything that Russia doesn't want to do, but NATO does do is by definition. But --

Q But where you wouldn't go to Russia first and say, can we reach consensus on this; or is that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, assuming it wasn't a truly secret development that the Russians didn't know about -- if it was a hot issue -- the Russians would have every right, as would all the members of NATO -- and that could be 16, 19, 20, 21 as times goes on -- can bring it up in the consultative, in the joint council.

But NATO reserves the right indefinitely, as part of what my colleague called the preservation of its core identity as a collective defense pact, to decide that some development constitutes a threat to any one member or to the collective membership and to take action accordingly.

And if Russia agrees that that is a threat to Russia's interest as well, then you could have an operation of some kind under the aegis of the NATO Russia joint council. But if Russia had a different view of it, NATO's free to act alone -- absolutely essential point.

Q You keep referring to the March 14th statement. By doing that, are you trying to say that there were no additional assurances given by Secretary General Solana on the issue of positioning of troops in former Warsaw Pact countries during this most recent round of talks, or were there some additional assurances given?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Very close to that, is what I want to say. But let me put it in my own words. The Secretary General, who I think we're, from the President on down, are indebted to in the way that he has carried out this negotiation, always operated within the parameters of decisions taken by the North Atlantic Council. And one of the guiding principles was that we were not going to negotiate with Russia over what NATO is, who can belong to it, or what NATO can do. What we were prepared to do is to clarify, to explain and clarify, what NATO policy means.

And that principle guided the Secretary General right up until he shook hands with Primakov earlier today, and the Russians did understand that. That doesn't mean that that's the way they would have preferred it, but this was, after all, a negotiation that had to bring the two together.

Q So your answer is that you're not aware of any additional specific assurances that were given, above and beyond March 14th?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm aware of, I think, absolutely everything that transpired here, as is my colleague and the rest of us. And as I said earlier, with respect to nuclear weapons, there was a clarification with regard to the implications of the three nos on the subject of nuclear storage sites. And with respect to the March 14th unilateral statement, there was an additional clarification of what this means on the subject of infrastructure.

But when Roy gets his copy, and shares it with all of you, of this thing, and you look at the actual language, you will see that the statement about infrastructure, which has been kind of a word the Russians have particularly cared about, that it's an affirmative statement. It says basically, there will be the infrastructure necessary or adequate to carry out these tasks as defined in the March 14 statement.

Q There has been some criticism on the Hill that there was almost too much consultation built into this with the Russians. How do you answer that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I look forward to hearing exactly what our colleagues and partners in Congress mean by that. I'll be up there tomorrow. I think the important thing, which they will, I hope, understand, as this is laid out and explained to them, is that no aspect of the consultative mechanism infringes on, dilutes, undermines in any way what Sandy stressed to you in his first statement; and that is the integrity, the flexibility, and the identity of NATO as a collective defense pact.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me just add one thing, and that is, today we have a number of different mechanisms that surround NATO. The governing institution of

NATO, in a sense, is the NAC. There is also something called the NAC C, as you know, which includes Eastern European countries, which now will transmogrify into a Euro Atlantic partnership council. There is the 16 plus 1 today. There is a mechanism whereby NATO and Russia meet today, at 16 plus 1. In a sense, this is a codification or an institutionalization of that which exists.

So I think the core institution that makes the decisions for NATO remains the North Atlantic Council. It was yesterday, it will be today, it will be tomorrow.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think when my colleague starts using words like "transmogrification," we're coming to the end.

Q On another subject, the meeting between Mobutu and Kabila that was to take place today or tomorrow has been cancelled. Do you have any comment on that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, we actually have spent the last few hours on this, and I don't have any further information as to why it was cancelled. As of earlier this morning, I think, there was an expectation that the meeting would take place. But when I got back to my office --

Q It was cancelled just before your briefing -- I mean, when the briefing started. So you don't have to worry. (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thank you very much. (Laughter.) Just call me any time with information.

Thank you.

END

3:50 P.M. EDT



Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott
Remarks to the U.S.-EU Conference
"Bridging the Atlantic: People-to-People Links"
Washington, D.C., May 6, 1997
U.S. Department of State

Text As Delivered

The U.S., the EU, and Our Common Challenges

Thank you, Ambassador Ruperez, for that kind introduction. As President of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Spanish Parliament, as Spain's first Ambassador to NATO, as a negotiator who helped to craft the Helsinki Final Act, you are the personification of the European side of the transatlantic relationship that is the subject of my remarks to this distinguished audience.

The theme of this conference is building bridges across the Atlantic. I work for a President who is building one to the 21st century, so I applaud the metaphor. But it really is the right one. Many of you here are dealing with the nuts-and-bolts issues of strengthening the structures of transatlantic cooperation--student and employee exchange programs, sister-city relationships, economic partnerships, Internet link-ups, and the constant back-and-forth, give-and-take transactions across the Atlantic.

I would like to give special mention to one exchange program in particular because it has served as a model for several others represented here. Five decades ago, a statesman from Arkansas named William Fulbright had an inspired idea: a scholarship that would give Americans and others the opportunity to live and to study in a different country. Since then, thousands have used their Fulbright experience to tie tighter the bonds between the United States and Europe.

I am particularly pleased to see Harriet Fulbright here today. I want to tell you, Harriet, that your late husband's friend, admirer, and one-time Senate aide, President Clinton, will do everything he can to strengthen and extend this remarkable program and others like it, such as the Ron Brown and Edmund Muskie Fellowships, which give students from Europe's young democracies a chance to study in America.

The U.S.-EU Agreement on Higher Education and Vocational Training has already helped launch dozens of educational consortiums. The Fellowship of Hope--proposed by former Secretary Christopher last September--is up and running, giving officials from the U.S., the EU, and its member states a chance to work in the foreign affairs agencies of our governments. I am also pleased to see that a Transatlantic Labor Dialogue has joined the Transatlantic Business Dialogue, and I know you are already working on a flurry of creative proposals--from a transatlantic AIDSNET to a "telecity" and a digital library projects, from new sister-city arrangements with communities in central and eastern Europe to corporate and workplace exchange programs.

All of us--governments, the private sector, universities, and NGO's--are working together in joint enterprise. Its purpose is not just to strengthen existing structures across the body of water that separates us, but also to build new structures embracing the values that bring us together in a single, transatlantic community.

I'd like to speak to you this morning about several ways in which our community is changing. It is changing basically for the better, but, nonetheless, in ways that present challenges to all of us.

Both here, on this side of the pond in the Western Hemisphere, and on the far side in Europe, the watchword of our era is integration. Secretary of State Albright--who sends her greetings to all of you--is in Mexico. She is with President Clinton and several other members of his Cabinet, working to advance our Administration's vision of hemispheric integration. But the quest for integration is a transatlantic phenomenon as well, and it has been since the birth of our country.

In 1785, before Thomas Jefferson became Secretary of State, he was our Minister in France. That was a time of intense, often literally cut-throat competition in Europe. From his post in Paris, Mr. Jefferson drafted a proposal for freedom of trade between the Old and the New Worlds--and for a covenant on the universal rights for the citizens of all nations.

That same year, when Barbary pirates were menacing the sea lanes of the Mediterranean and Atlantic, Mr. Jefferson proposed that the United States organize a multinational naval force to combat the threat. If you will grant me a little license of creative hindsight, you could say one of our Founding Fathers was proposing a proto-NATO. However, he was shot down by his home office on the grounds, among other things, that we couldn't afford such a thing--a reminder that the occasional difficulty of persuading Congress to provide the resources for America's engagement abroad is nothing new.

One hundred and thirty years later, Americans went "over there"--to Europe--to fight the war that Woodrow Wilson said would end all wars and make the world safe for democracy. But, of course, all that carnage did nothing of the kind--in some measure because its aftermath included a sustained episode of American isolationism. It took another World War before America and Europe would finally build a lasting structure across the Atlantic.

This year, we are celebrating the 50th anniversary of the Marshall Plan, which, appropriately, came into being at about the same time as the Fulbright Exchange Program--and in furtherance of the same commitment to transatlantic bridge-building.

The enduring legacy of the Marshall Plan is visible today not only in the steel mills and railways and farmlands of Western Europe, it is visible in the institutions that have brought the two continents politically and economically closer together. The OECD and the Bretton Woods institutions--the World Bank and IMF--were catalysts not just for reconstruction of shattered economies, but for reconciliation and integration among former European adversaries. They helped ultimately to solidify the foundation of the European Union itself. Together, 50 years ago, we embarked on a period of unprecedented peace and prosperity, and together, we built the most dynamic trade and investment relationship in the world.

But there is another point that is crucial, both as an aspect of history and as a guide for the future: We--the U.S. and Europe--did not confine our cooperative efforts, or the benefits of those efforts, to ourselves alone. Rather, we reached out--we opened up--to other regions, to other markets. We saw the pattern in the tiles we were assembling as part of a larger mosaic. This was not an abstraction; it could not have been more practical, which is to say it could not have been more economical and commercial. The U.S. and the EU worked together to liberalize world trade. The Uruguay Round of the GATT was the culmination of that effort. In a word, to our credit, while acting regionally, we grew used to thinking, acting, and trading globally.

But being limited in our prophetic powers, we also grew used to the Cold War; we came to think of it as a permanent part of the human condition and the Iron Curtain as a

permanent fixture on the Continent of Europe. Our shortsightedness in this respect calls to mind a remark by an American baseball player, Dan Quisenberry, who used to be a relief pitcher for the Kansas City Royals: "I have seen the future," he once said, "and it is very much like the present--only longer."

Then, suddenly, eight years ago in 1989, the future arrived, and it looked very different. The walls came down, revealing a new landscape in which old thinking and old borders were no longer relevant. Today, the fastest-growing economies in Europe lie east of the Elbe. Soldiers from Russia and Ukraine, Estonia and Poland, Britain and France, America and Canada, and many other countries that were, only a decade ago, members of opposing blocs are today serving together in Bosnia. I spent last week in Moscow with Secretary Albright negotiating a cooperative relationship between Russia and NATO. All of which vindicates the wisdom of another famous philosopher-baseball player--the incomparable Yogi Berra: "The future," he said, "ain't what it used to be."

With the end of the Cold War, the energies that used to go into common defense have increasingly been able to go instead into the strengthening of our core institutions. One of those is the EU itself, about which I would like to say a few words.

But first let me put forward a general principle: Let me establish a context for American support of, and occasional concern about, the EU. We believe that regional integration in Europe and everywhere else should help those countries directly involved transcend traditional boundaries of habit and history, geography and culture. As a corollary, integration should look outward, rather than inward.

That is our best insurance policy against the possibility that the wrong kind of regional cohesion will spawn the worst kind of interregional conflict. That worry has been on the minds of some of our best, most farsighted thinkers for a long time. In the immediate aftermath of World War II, George Orwell wrote his futuristic nightmare *1984*. In the story that the novel tells, the globe is divided into three warring super-regions--Eurasia, Eastasia, and Oceania. Well, we are now 13 years past *1984* and, let's hope, safely past the danger of which Orwell warned.

But we can't be complacent. We must continue to make sure that cooperation within regions reinforces cooperation among regions. That principle guides our own government in its approach to NAFTA, as President Clinton, Secretaries Albright, Rubin, and Daley are telling their hosts in Mexico today. It guides us in our approach to South America and the Far East--and the opportunities for bridge-building between the two. Who would have thought a decade ago that Chile would be one of the most vibrant members of an organization called APEC? The A and the P stand for Asia-Pacific. And this same emphasis on openness, on outwardness--on bridge-building--will guide us in our reaction to, and interaction with, the EU.

Let me borrow the terminology especially familiar to the Europeans here today: When our Administration says we support European integration, we mean both deepening and broadening; we mean both the consolidation of international institutions and the expansion, or enlargement, of those institutions. That means we encourage our friends and allies in Europe to embrace the broadest, most expansive, most outward-looking, most inclusive possible version of integration.

This is not a criticism of past or current EU policy. Quite the contrary, we credit the EU for the farsighted decisions it has already made, such as its assistance programs in central and eastern Europe, its commitment to expand, and its part in the New Transatlantic Agenda.

That said, we also understand that Europe today is embroiled in a debate over an issue

that seems, at least to its participants, to be largely internal to Europe. I'm referring to the issue of EMU. A few words--carefully chosen, I might add--about our view on this important and sensitive subject. The record shows that over the past 50 years, the United States has supported every previous initiative to achieve greater political and economic unity among European nations. We have done so for reasons of our own self-interest. A politically united Europe will be a stronger partner to advance common goals. An economically united Europe creates a much more attractive environment for American investment.

As for the EMU, we have been careful not to plunge into the middle of a debate that already has plenty of just the right participants. It is not for us to say how this initiative should evolve or who should join. But we have no doubt--and no hesitancy in saying--that an EMU that cements an open single market and that sparks economic growth in Europe will be good for the American economy. If the EU emerges from this bold initiative able to play an even more active and constructive role on the world stage, that will be good for America, too.

Let me now turn to another subject that has also generated vigorous debate: the relationship between the EU and the lands to its east. Central and eastern Europe is the region where our century's two hot wars as well as the Cold War began. New dangers still lurk there, as is apparent from a sobering fact: From Bosnia, Croatia, and Albania in the Balkans, to Chechnya and Nagorno-Karabakh in the Caucasus, more Europeans have died violently in the last five years than in the previous 45. Instability there threatens the peace of Europe as a whole.

Vaclav Havel has reminded us that--and I quote--"Just as it is impossible for one-half of a room to be forever warm and the other half cold, it is equally unthinkable that two different Europe's could forever exist next to each other without detriment to both--and it is the stabler and more prosperous one that would pay the higher price." Havel is one of a number of brave leaders of brave peoples, who have, since 1989, broken the locks, thrown open the gates, torn down the walls. States that were, only a decade ago, captive nations, fortress societies, and command economies are now holding elections, instituting the rule of law, opening their economies, nurturing a free press, and knocking at the doors of the various international associations and institutions that make up our community.

We must respond by opening those doors. In debating whether--and how quickly and on what terms--to do so, we should remember that when George Marshall unveiled the plan that came to bear his name, Germany and France were ruined lands, worse off in many ways than the countries of central and eastern Europe today. Today, they and the rest of the EU represent the triumph of integration over what Marshall depicted in 1947 as the "hunger, poverty, despotism, and chaos" of Western Europe. That is why the enlargement of the structures that undergird the transatlantic community is not some risky new venture, but a logical extension of the strategy of Marshall, Adenauer, and Monnet.

It was with that idea in mind that the leaders of NATO three years ago decided to expand to central and eastern Europe. NATO had another choice. It could have confined itself to its Cold War membership, but that would have implied that Checkpoint Charlie marks the spot where our interests and aspirations end--or, as was once suggested not too long ago--where history itself ends. That would have been a strategic mistake of the most profound proportions and the most lasting consequences.

Let me speak for my own government's motives here. We, the United States, have a variety of mutually reinforcing reasons for enlarging NATO. We believe it is the best

way to ensure stability and consolidate democracy in central Europe.

But I will be quite frank: We have an ulterior motive as well. We hope that the enlargement of NATO, of which we are a member, will contribute to the conditions for the enlargement of the EU, of which we are not a member, but in which we have such a profound--I'd even say vital--interest.

This is not just a matter of NATO's setting an example. Rather, it's a matter of NATO's creating an environment which, because it is more stable and peaceful, will be conducive to the EU's expansion eastward. Many of Europe's new democracies are well on their way to meeting the economic conditions for EU membership. But EU governments and Western investors must also be confident about the long-term, deep-seated security of the region, and that's what NATO is all about.

Some have suggested that the opposite is true--that NATO enlargement gives the EU an excuse not to embrace new members. The facts argue otherwise. The clearer we have been about NATO's determination to take in new members, the clearer the EU has been about its own plans to expand. What's more, in all fairness to the EU, it is hard to imagine its process of expansion moving much faster. The EU rightly asks potential members to make many complex changes in their economic and regulatory policies. But as Secretary Albright has said, the security NATO provides should not have to wait until, as she put it, "tomato farmers in central Europe start using the right kinds of pesticides." From our vantage point, NATO enlargement and EU expansion are separate but parallel processes in support of the same overall cause, which is a broader, deeper transatlantic community.

Let me turn now to a third tough, important issue that the EU faces as it looks east and south. I'm referring to the challenge to Europe's sense of itself and its future posed by Turkey's aspiration to join the EU. Here, too, the U.S. doesn't have a vote, but it certainly has interests.

Turkey is undergoing the strains of modernization, including in the crucial area of democracy and human rights. These areas, along with Turkey's relationship with Greece, are all legitimate issues of concern to the EU. But these difficulties do not make Turkey any less European. In fact, many current EU members have overcome far greater traumas in this century, and that's putting it mildly. And let us not forget that at the beginning of this century, in the wake of World War I and the collapse of the Ottoman empire, Turkey--under the leadership of Kemal Ataturk--made a strategic choice about its nature and its orientation--the right choice, from our point of view and, we believe, from Turkey's own.

Then, in the wake of World War II, Turkey joined NATO. That was, of course, largely because Turkey shared a border with the Soviet Union and was thus literally on the front line of the Cold War. But it is today just as much on the front line of the multiple challenges that face us in the post-Cold War era. Turkey's continuing strategic importance derives from its frontiers with Iraq, Syria, and Iran, and from its proximity--as well as its linguistic affinity--to the Caucasus and central Asia.

Therefore, we have as much an interest as ever in Turkey's development as a strong, prosperous, secular, and democratic state, fully integrated with our community. Only with that kind of Turkey can we prevail together in the struggle that has replaced the Cold War: the struggle between security and insecurity; between prosperity and poverty; in short, between the forces of integration and disintegration.

We recognize how difficult and multi-dimensional the issue of Turkey is, not least for Turkey itself, but also for others. We realize that Turkey's relationship to the EU is not

just a foreign policy issue for several major EU states, but one of domestic politics as well, given the connection between EU membership and freedom of movement.

We in the U.S. have some familiarity with such connections, as anyone knows who has followed the debate over NAFTA, or who heard this morning's news reports on the demonstrations that greeted President Clinton upon his arrival in Mexico City. I'd even say that, among the many things that the U.S. and the EU have in common is a dilemma: how to reconcile, on the one hand, the imperatives and benefits of regional integration and open borders with our neighbors and, on the other, the imperatives of a sound and humane policy on migration. In their current visit to Mexico, President Clinton and his Cabinet are stressing that we want to encourage legal migration, which has enriched our culture and our economy and made the United States the fifth-largest Hispanic nation on earth. We want to encourage legal immigrants to become citizens, while at the same time, we want to discourage illegal migration, which only erodes the consensus for deeper ties.

We recognize that the EU and Turkey are working hard to strike their own balances on these complex issues and to stake out as much common ground as possible. The EU has had a Customs Union Agreement with Turkey for over a year, and last week, the EU stated that its door is open to Turkish membership according the same criteria applied to any other applicant. We also applaud the establishment last week of a group of "Wise Men" to look at the issues that have generated so much tension between Greece and Turkey.

Still, there are those who resist vehemently the idea that any nations to the east of what might be called "traditional Europe" can ever truly be part of a larger, 21st century Europe. We believe that view is quite wrong--and potentially quite dangerous. Over the centuries, Europe at its best--and its most peaceful and most prosperous--has defined itself not in terms of artificial barriers--a river here, a mountain range there, a concrete-and-barbed-wire wall somewhere else. Rather, Europe has become Europe by reaching over such boundaries; by assembling itself into a community of nations that share values, aspirations, and ways of life.

Turkey has been a part of the European system since the 16th century. Of course, it has cultural ties to Central Asia and the Middle East. But so does Russia, which must also be part of the building of an integrated post-Cold War Europe if there is to be such a thing. True, most of Turkey is separated from the rest of Europe by a bit of water, but then so is all of the United Kingdom.

Let me also say a word more about Islam. The current debate over Turkey resonates with references to "culture," or sometimes as "civilization." These words are often euphemisms for religion. There is a theory currently in vogue that the Cold War rivalry between communism and capitalism has been replaced by a global "clash of civilizations," including one between Western and Muslim countries.

That idea gives short shrift both to the great diversity within these supposed civilizations and to what they have in common. It underestimates the ethnic and religious diversity of the United States and, increasingly, of Western Europe as well. And it underestimates the dangers we may face in the future if we today raise artificial barriers against the aspirations of any European nation that is willing to accept the standards and responsibilities of our democratic community, or if we define the "European-ness" of a village on the basis of whether its landmarks are church spires or minarets.

As Warren Christopher put it early last year, our strategy of integration must, and I

quote, "not recognize any fundamental divide among the Catholic, Orthodox, and Islamic parts of Europe. That kind of thinking fueled the war in the former Yugoslavia and it must have no place in the Europe we are building." Secretary Albright strongly agrees, and she will use her own tenure here to urge that Europe define itself as inclusively, expansively, and comprehensively as possible.

So, to conclude, with respect to all three issues I have touched on this morning--the EMU, the relationship between the EU and the former communist lands to its east, and the EU's relationship with Turkey--the United States will continue to recommend as guiding principles for statesmanship and public policy precisely those goals and values that motivate all of you in the work that has brought you together for this conference. We will encourage the EU to do in the future what the individuals gathered and the organizations represented here are doing right now--and that is building bridges; deepening and broadening the network of connections and associations; and promoting exchanges within and among the local, national, and regional communities that make up the global community of which we are all a part. Thank you very much.

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Samuel R. Berger

Europe, Russia and the Fulcrum of Power

As we and our partners proceed with NATO enlargement, concerns have been raised about dangers that stand on either side of the straits we must navigate—the Scylla and Charybdis of NATO enlargement. On one side is the concern that NATO enlargement will shut Russia out from its rightful and essential place in Europe, thereby undercutting Russia's nascent democracy and its security cooperation with the West. On the other side is the anxiety that a misguided attempt to mollify Russia will weaken the alliance, giving Moscow a veto over NATO's decisions.

We must chart a course that carefully avoids both hazards. Thus, while we move forward irreversibly to enlarge the alliance, we have sought to build a strong partnership between the NATO and Russia—but one that sacrifices neither the interests of Central and Eastern Europeans nor NATO's ability to shape its own destiny.

Now, after three years of planning and consultation with our allies and Congress, the process of enlargement is about to begin. At the Madrid summit, some nations will be invited to begin accession talks. These first new members, as President Clinton has said, will not be the last. Because NATO aims to close rifts in Europe and not open new ones, all of Europe's emerging democracies are eligible to join NATO and will remain so. The alliance also will deepen its ties to those that are not in the first group of new members so that no nation feels it is being consigned to a zone of insecurity, cut off from the community of democracies. In the years ahead, we will work to increase security throughout the

region—not just among NATO's new members—because doing anything less would undermine our overall goals.

As NATO's adaptation progresses, we will seek to strengthen our relationship with Russia. We will strengthen our support for democratic reform and the economic transformation of Russia. And we will seek to make Russia a partner of the alliance in dealing with the new challenges to

“We will work to increase security throughout the region ... [A]nything less will undermine our overall goals.”

security in Europe that threaten us both. Deepening this partnership is clearly in America's long-term security interest, as we have already seen in our cooperation with Russia in peacekeeping in Bosnia. That makes sense for us and for the transatlantic community.

This partnership is not something we do to compensate Russia for NATO's enlargement. The success of Russia's democracy, which is of the utmost importance to the United States, depends on how Russia, with our help, advances its economic transition and strengthens its politi-

cal institutions. There will be no bargain of alliance concessions for Russia's assent to NATO enlargement. The alliance will grow as scheduled, and no outside country will have a veto over NATO decision-making. There will be no compromise of NATO's prerogatives and no second-class status for its new members. A member is a member.

NATO's enlargement will benefit Russia above all by increasing stability in Central and Eastern Europe, where Russia twice has been pulled into world war in this century. While Russians may find it difficult to see beyond the Cold War stereotypes of NATO, we hope that Russia will recognize the profound transformation of the alliance over the past six years—just as we recognize the dramatic transformation of Russia. As NATO and Russia work together, we believe the advantages of cooperation for both sides will be apparent.

Building a NATO-Russia relationship will not happen overnight. We will move forward at a pace that reflects our interests. In constructing this relationship, neither Helsinki nor Madrid is a deadline. Each is an important meeting in its right along the road to creating an inclusive security structure for the decades to come. Like the broad range of our cooperation with Russia—from our economic ties to our progress on arms control to our cooperation in science and culture—the relationship between NATO and Moscow will move ahead one step at a time.

The writer is assistant to the president for national security affairs.



Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright
Prepared statement before the North Atlantic Council
NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium, February 18, 1997
As released by the Office of the Spokesman
U.S. Department of State

Mr. Secretary-General, distinguished colleagues: Thank you for welcoming me today and for coming to Brussels for this occasion. I know this is an extraordinary session of the North Atlantic Council. But it is also an extraordinary time in the history of our alliance. I look forward to our consultations and to sharing your thoughts with President Clinton upon my return home. For me, there could be no more appropriate place than here, on this continent, before this gathering of allies and friends, to make my first formal remarks overseas as America's Secretary of State.

Nor could there be a more appropriate year. For it was in 1947, a half century ago, that America made its fateful decision, in the aftermath of war, to remain a European power. Instead of settling for the illusion of security as it had following World War I, America joined its European partners and built real security.

In March of that year, President Truman asked the American people, despite their weariness with sacrifice, and their wariness of new commitments, to re-join the battle for the future of this continent. He said that "the free people of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms. If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of our world--and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our own nation." Out of that insight and the resolve of a Europe determined to remain free, there evolved first the Truman Doctrine, then the Marshall Plan and soon this great Alliance. I am pleased, at the very outset of my service in this new position, to re-affirm America's steadfast commitment to the sentiments expressed by President Truman fifty years ago.

America stands with Europe because Americans understand, without regard to political party, that it is in our national interests as well as our collective interest that we do so. Atlantic unity and European unity remain our common vision. And, as we look ahead to the next fifty years; we are determined that NATO will endure, and adapt, and become the essential foundation for an ever-widening Atlantic community.

To judge NATO's future potential, we must understand fully its past accomplishments. For NATO has always been more than a defensive shield. It was the roof over our heads when we rebuilt post-war Europe. It was the floor upon which the first structures of European unity were laid. It was the door through which one time adversaries were welcomed into our family of democracies. And because of its strength, and the courage of its members, it has been a mighty deterrent to aggression.

Today, we are privileged to live at a time of relative stability and peace. But we know from history that we cannot take the extension of these blessings for granted. Peace is not a gift. It must be earned and re-earned. And if it is to last, it must be constantly reinforced.

That is why, through our joint efforts, NATO--a great instrument of peace--has been transformed to meet the demands of a new era. Our military forces and strategy have changed. No longer is NATO arrayed in opposition to any one enemy. Its mission is peace and cooperation with all who wish to walk with it.

To this end, the Alliance has sparked unprecedented collaboration on European security through the Partnership for Peace. It has adapted to new roles, including the historic

mission in Bosnia, which has halted the terrible carnage there and mobilized a remarkable coalition to help implement the Dayton Accords. It has undertaken a program of internal adaptation which offers greater visibility and responsibility to European members. And the prospect of its enlargement has contributed to the resolution of historic differences involving borders and minority rights in central and eastern Europe. In so doing, NATO has helped bring within our grasp the most elusive dream of this century: an undivided Europe, at peace, in which every nation is free and every free nation is a partner.

This vision of Europe is not the property of any one nation or group. It is an aspiration shared across the continent and on both sides of the Atlantic. And it is being realized through the efforts not only of NATO, but of the European Union, the OSCE, the Western European Union, the Council of Europe and democratic reformers in every affected nation.

This is critical, for increasingly in this new era, security will not rest on a single pillar. It must be supported by democratic institutions and values; bolstered by the wealth of free peoples freely engaged in production, agriculture and commerce; and glued together by habits of cooperation and consultation on matters of mutual interest.

So, as we contemplate the next phase in the evolution of NATO, we understand that its development is part of, and complementary to, a larger process. But we also understand that if we are to achieve for Europe the kind of future we all want, we have to manage the evolution of this alliance correctly--we have to get it right.

That is why we have charted our course carefully, moved ahead deliberately, and acted together.

It is why we have chosen as our common purpose to do for Europe's east what NATO did fifty years ago for Europe's west: to integrate new democracies, eliminate old hatreds, provide confidence in economic recovery, and deter conflict.

And it is why the road ahead is clear.

Let there be no doubt.

NATO *will* complete its internal adaptation.

It *will* begin accession talks.

It *will* accept new members.

It *will* create an Atlantic Partnership Council and keep the door to membership open.

It *will* have an enhanced relationship with Ukraine and it will do all it can to forge a long-term strategic partnership with Russia.

Our adherence to this course will keep NATO evolving and modernizing through the remaining years of this century and into the next. We must stay that course. We must stand by our commitments. And I am confident we will do so.

In twenty weeks, NATO leaders will gather at a summit in Madrid. That summit will not change our direction, but rather reaffirm it. Our job, during these next five months, will be to move ahead, step by step, on all fronts.

NATO's internal adaptation is already well advanced. The coalition assembled in Bosnia is evidence that a new NATO has already come into being; a NATO capable of

undertaking new missions; a NATO capable of mobilizing members and non-members alike in support of European security; a NATO capable of performing tasks that must be done in a manner only NATO could achieve.

But the adaptation of NATO is also evident in other ways. We have agreed to the Combined Joint Task Force concept. We are building the European Security and Defense Identity within the alliance. We have agreed to share NATO assets with the WEU for European-led operations. We are streamlining our command structures and we are providing more senior positions for European commanders.

Our goal, in all these efforts, goes right to the bottom line. We want an Alliance that is stronger, broader, more cohesive and more effective.

That is also our goal in expanding the alliance.

The start of accession negotiations with a number of our central European partners will be a milestone in the history of the alliance. But it is no sudden event.

The process of enlargement began three years ago at the NATO summit here in Brussels. It will not end in Madrid. Nor will it end with a division between winners and losers, for ultimately all who are interested in a peaceful and democratic Europe--whether they are in NATO or partners of it--will win.

Our goal should be to complete the membership negotiations by the end of this year, so that we can sign accession instruments at our meeting in December.

This will allow us time to complete what may be the most important part of the process: working with our parliaments and our publics to ratify the changes we will propose. That process of public information and education has already begun, and should be pursued with energy in every member state.

I note, in this connection, that President Clinton will be submitting to our Congress later this week a report on NATO enlargement, including an estimate of the costs. Ambassador Hunter will brief you on that report in the coming days.

At its December meeting, this Council agreed on the goal that the first new members should join the alliance by 1999. At the Madrid summit, we should make that a firm commitment.

Those we invite should be confident that for them, this process is entering its final stage. And they should prepare to fulfill as many obligations of membership as possible on the day they join.

For those not invited to join this year, but who wish to join, NATO's door must remain open. NATO has always been a dynamic alliance and has always been willing to take in qualified new members. Today, that open door has become a force for stability and an incentive for continued democratic reform throughout the region. This promise of enlargement is helping to bring Europe together. And it is a promise that must be kept.

The intensified dialogues we have conducted previously with potential NATO members have been vital. We need to conduct another round at 16-plus-1 this spring to give every ally a chance for direct discussion with potential members, and to give every aspirant a fair hearing.

These dialogues must continue in some form beyond Madrid. We cannot make specific commitments, but we can and should offer a program to bring our partners up to NATO

standards.

We should inform aspirants clearly what they must do to meet the political and military conditions for membership and we should be candid about shortcomings. In this way, NATO can continue to encourage the broadening of democratic institutions and values across the continent.

Two months ago, at the Ministerial here, this Council also agreed to strengthen the Partnership for Peace. We must go forward to implement the elements we have approved, and look to other possibilities for deepening our ties to Partner countries, especially those in the New Independent States.

We should also launch the Atlantic Partnership Council, so that it can be agreed at or before the Madrid summit. The Council will be the collective voice of the Partnership for Peace. It will deepen consultation and practical cooperation between the alliance and partner states and further strengthen their links to NATO.

Moreover, all of our partners should be invited to the summit in Madrid. Because the summit will help shape the future of Europe, all of Europe should be represented.

Our goal is an undivided Europe. We must ensure that every European democracy, whether it joins NATO sooner, later or not at all, has a role.

This includes Russia.

A critical task in the weeks ahead will be to build the partnership with Russia from which both Moscow and Europe will clearly benefit.

This is not a zero-sum game. On the contrary, NATO has recognized that we cannot build a Europe that is whole and free until a democratic Russia is wholly part of Europe. And I believe that most Russians understand, or will come to understand, that their great nation can best build a secure future for itself in a Europe without walls, with a transformed NATO as a partner.

The process of defining this new partnership is well underway.

We envision a NATO-Russia Joint Council that would promote a regular dialogue on major security issues, reach concerted decisions wherever possible, and seize opportunities for joint action.

Russian and NATO planners would work together at our major military commands. And we could begin immediately to develop a joint NATO-Russia brigade.

We have made progress on these issues and we have every chance through the efforts of Secretary General Solana, NATO's negotiator, to make more progress prior to Madrid.

We recognize that Russian leaders oppose the enlargement of our alliance and that this is not likely to change. But neither will we change. Russia has legitimate concerns that are being met: We have no plan, no need, and no intention to station nuclear weapons on the territory of new members. NATO's conventional and nuclear forces have been dramatically reduced.

In any event, our alliance is a positive alliance; it is not directed against any nation; and it need not be feared by any nation that does not seek first to instill fear in others.

To underline this point, last December, we agreed that the alliance should put forward a comprehensive proposal to adapt the CFE Treaty. I am pleased to learn that we are near

agreement on the details of that proposal. Early tabling of Alliance ideas in Vienna will make an important contribution to our preparations for Madrid.

The alliance must be united, and I believe we are united in our policy towards Russia. We cannot realize our shared vision of a united, secure and democratic Europe without Russia. We will not delay or abandon our own plans. But we will be steadfast in offering to Russia our respect, our friendship and an appropriate partnership in providing for the future security of Europe.

Our relationship with Ukraine is also critical. Ukraine has made great strides against tremendous odds toward freedom and stability. It is clearly ready to play its part in building a secure and undivided transatlantic community. We should strive to have a NATO-Ukraine agreement ready for signature in Madrid.

Before I conclude, I also want to say a few words about Bosnia. Bosnia is a daily, practical challenge for NATO -- perhaps the most complex we have ever undertaken. But it is also deeply connected to our larger challenge of building a New Atlantic Community. For four murderous years in Bosnia, we came face to face with the future we wish to avoid for Europe. For the last year, we have seen a glimpse of the future we are trying to build.

NATO-led troops have been on the ground in Bosnia for fourteen months. All 16 allies have been deeply involved, standing shoulder to shoulder with 14 Partnership countries and nations from around the world. They have not achieved perfection, but compared to what they found when they arrived, they have achieved a miracle.

Our troops no longer face the task of patrolling fixed fronts and former battlefields, but rather local threats to peace, such as the recent violence in Mostar, and the larger challenges of reconstruction, democracy and justice.

Working with the local parties and others in the international community, we must continue to diminish the need for an external military presence. We must establish a stable military situation, improve judicial and legal institutions, help more people return safely to their homes, and see that those indicted as war criminals are arrested and prosecuted.

On Friday, arbitrator Roberts Owen announced his decision on the status of Brcko, the one dispute that was not resolved by the Dayton Accords. His decision is a fair one. The goal is to further reduce the tensions that still stand in the way of a final determination of arrangements for this sensitive area.

Alliance members should work closely with the High Representative to implement the decision, including contributing additional police needed to help ensure freedom of movement in the area. And we must insist that the parties accept and cooperate with it.

I have said that the vision of a united and democratic Europe has been elusive, and that it extends back decades in history.

That reality could not better be illustrated than in a speech delivered fifty years ago by Mr. Winston Churchill. The aims he spoke of then bear a striking resemblance to the aims we speak of now:

"It is not our task or wish to draw frontier lines," he said, "but rather to smooth them away. Our aim is to bring about the unity of all the nations of all Europe. We seek to exclude no state whose territory lies in Europe and which assures to its people those fundamental...liberties on which our democratic civilization has been created."

He went on to say that:

"Some countries will feel able to come into our circle sooner and others later according to the circumstances in which they are placed. They can all be sure that, whenever they are to join, a place and a welcome will be waiting for them at the European council table."

Twice before in this century, we have faced the challenge, in the aftermath of war, of building together a free, secure and united Europe.

We had the opportunity after World War I, but too many, in the United States and elsewhere, lacked the vision.

After World War II, as Churchill's remarks illustrate, and the memory of Marshall, Monnet, Bevin, Adenauer and their counterparts bears witness there was no shortage of vision. But across half of Europe, the opportunity was denied.

Today, we have both the vision and the opportunity, and together we are building that Europe.

It will be my great privilege to work with you, on behalf of President Clinton and the American people, as we continue with this historic task. And by our success, we will ensure that the next century begins with a solid foundation for lasting liberty and enduring peace.

Thank you very much.

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ENLARGING NATO



Why bigger is better

In this article, Madeleine Albright defends NATO's enlargement

IT IS an old diplomatic tradition that American secretaries of state begin their terms by visiting our closest allies and partners. That is why this week I will be meeting with officials in Europe, and later in Asia, to forge a common agenda. The dominant questions of the day in virtually all these countries, as in my own, involve matters close to home—educating children, building businesses, cutting deficits, fighting unemployment. At a time when much of the world enjoys relative peace, we run the risk of forgetting the decades-long work of diplomacy and institution-building that has made it possible for the great majority of people to worry about domestic improvements rather than national survival.

My message on this trip is that we have our own work to do—and quickly—if this space of tranquillity is to endure and spread, rather than be written off by history as a pleasant time of tragically wasted opportunities. That message applies with special force to Europe. Today, the continent is no longer sliced in two, but dangers remain: from Bosnia to Chechnya, more Europeans died violently in the last five years than in the previous 45. From Serbia to Belarus, reminders are appearing that Europe's democratic revolution is not complete.

BY INVITATION



Madeleine Albright is America's secretary of state

Even so, a goal that would have seemed like Utopian delusion just years ago lies within our grasp: a peaceful and undivided Europe working in partnership with the United States, that welcomes every one of the continent's new democracies into our transatlantic community.

An ambitious goal, to be sure. Yet pro-

gress towards its realisation has been remarkable. Western Europe is moving towards economic and monetary union. Most of Europe's fastest-growing economies lie east of the Elbe. Russia has made a choice for democracy and markets and defied the most dire predictions about its evolution. An independent and robustly democratic Ukraine is casting its lot with Europe. American and European resolve has stopped the fighting in Bosnia. The military coalition there contains so many former adversaries that no sober student of history would have predicted it: France and Germany, Poland and Lithuania, Turkey and Greece, Russia and America.

Many institutions are playing their part in this effort, and all face critical tests this year. The European Union has promised to expand again and will soon make decisions. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has taken in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic; it is now looking to other market democracies, including Russia. The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is promoting the democratic standards that will enable Europe to come together; it is still treading a rough road in Bosnia.

But it is NATO, the linchpin of European security and the principal mechanism for American involvement in Europe, that is playing the leading role in bringing Europe together. It is changing its internal structure to create a stronger role for Europe. Its Partnership for Peace, under which other countries can train, plan, exercise and co-operate with NATO, has brought together old adversaries and long-time neutrals. In the wake of such changes, France and Spain are

ENLARGING NATO

participating more fully in the alliance. NATO is now more attractive to more nations because it is addressing new challenges in Europe and beyond. The next six months will be among the most ambitious and demanding in its history.

NATO's opportunity

At the NATO summit this July in Madrid, allied leaders will reform NATO's internal structures and invite several nations to become members by 1999. President Clinton and I have no higher priority than to work with our allies, and with our people and Congress, to build this new NATO. The debate in America will be spirited, as it should be. But I am confident the American people and their representatives will affirm that a new and broader NATO serves our security as well as Europe's.

Too often, the debate about NATO's future reduces the alliance's past to a one-dimensional caricature that discounts its relevance to today's European challenges. Certainly, NATO's cold-war task was to contain the Soviet threat. But that is not all it did. It provided the confidence and security shattered economies needed to rebuild themselves. It helped France and Germany become reconciled, making European integration possible. With other institutions, it brought Italy, then Germany and eventually Spain back into the family of European democracies. It de-nationalised allied defence policies. It has stabilised relations between Greece and Turkey. All without firing a shot.

Now the new NATO can do for Europe's east what the old NATO did for Europe's west: vanquish old hatreds, promote integration, create a secure environment for prosperity, and deter violence in the region where two world wars and the cold war began.

Just the prospect of NATO enlargement has given Central and Eastern Europe greater stability than it has seen in this century. Hungary has settled its border and minority questions with Slovakia and Romania. Poland has reached across an old divide to create joint peacekeeping battalions with Ukraine and Lithuania. Throughout the region, support for NATO membership has rallied political parties of every ideology in favour of joining the West. Country after country has made sure that soldiers take orders from civilians, not the other way around.

To align themselves with NATO, these states are resolving problems that could have led to future Bosnias. This is the productive paradox at NATO's heart: by extending solemn security guarantees, we actually

reduce the chance that our troops will again be called to fight in Europe. At the same time, we will gain new allies who are eager and increasingly able to contribute to our common agenda for security, from fighting terrorism and weapons proliferation to ensuring stability in trouble spots like the former Yugoslavia.

NATO enlargement will involve real costs, to the United States, its allies and its partners. But the costs are reasonable and many would arise whether NATO expands or not. Countries aspiring to membership will have to modernise their armed forces whether they are in or out of NATO—if anything, military spending would be higher in an insecure, unattached central Europe. A decision not to enlarge would also carry costs: it would constitute a declaration that



But not Russia

NATO will neither address the challenges nor accept the geography of a new Europe. NATO would be stuck in the past, risking irrelevance and even dissolution. Those are costs we cannot afford.

Addressing the critics

NATO and its members have laid out the reasons for enlargement. It is high time that critics came forward with a rationale that might possibly support a policy of fossilised immobility in the face of Europe's sweeping changes. Now that democracy's frontier has moved to Europe's farthest reaches, what logic would dictate that we freeze NATO's eastern edges where they presently lie, along the line where the Red Army stopped in the spring of 1945? President Clinton said it in Prague two years ago: "Freedoms boundaries now should be defined by new behaviour, not old history." Or for that matter by old thinking. To define them otherwise would not only create a permanent injustice, mocking the sacrifices made in this century on both sides of the Iron Curtain. It would create a permanent source of tension and insecurity in the heart of Europe.

Some critics point out that none of

NATO's prospective members faces an immediate military threat. True enough. But then, neither does Italy. Or Denmark. Or Britain. Or Iceland. Or the United States. If NATO were open only to countries menaced by aggressive neighbours, virtually no current ally would qualify.

Those who ask "where is the threat?" mistake NATO's real value. The alliance is not a wild-west posse that we trot out only when danger appears. It is a permanent presence, designed to promote common endeavours and to prevent a threat from ever arising. That is why current allies still need it and why others wish to join. NATO does not need an enemy. It has enduring purposes.

Other critics say that if we want to reunite Europe, the EU can do the job. Besides, they argue, what central Europe needs is stocks and bonds, not stockpiles and bombs. They are certainly right that EU expansion is vital. Though the United States has no vote in the process, we do have an interest in seeing it happen as rapidly and expansively as possible.

But the security NATO provides has always been essential to the prosperity the EU promises. What is more, EU enlargement requires current and new members to make vast and complex adjustments in subsidy schemes and regulatory regimes. If NATO enlargement can proceed more quickly, why wait until, say, tomato farmers in Central Europe start using the right kinds of pesticides? And because NATO, unlike the EU, is a transatlantic institution, it can ensure that a united Europe maintains its strongest link to North America. The question is not which institution strong democracies should join, but when and how they are prepared to join each.

Critics also say that NATO enlargement will somehow redivide post-cold war Europe. On the contrary. NATO has taken a range of steps to ensure that the erasure of old lines of division does not leave new ones on the map. NATO is strengthening its Partnership for Peace, reaching out to Ukraine and Russia, and giving every new democracy—whether it joins the alliance sooner, later or not at all—a say in its future through the Atlantic Partnership Council we will launch this spring.

Of course, the enlargement of NATO must begin with the strongest candidates; otherwise, it would not begin at all. But when we say that the first new members will not be the last, we mean it. And we expect the new members to export stability eastward, rather than viewing enlargement as a race to escape westward at the expense

of their neighbours.

The core of that challenge—and one of the most important tasks for NATO—is to build a close and constructive partnership with Russia. This will take vision and political will. It requires abandoning cold-war stereotypes and no longer looking at European security as a zero-sum game.

NATO enlargement is not taking place in response to a new Russian threat. It is motivated by the imperative of creating an integrated Europe—one that includes, not excludes, Russia. The purpose of enlargement is to give Central and Eastern Europe, a region whose future stability is key to the future of Europe as a whole, the same kind of security that has become commonplace in Western Europe. Russia, no less than the rest of us, needs stability and prosperity in the centre of Europe.

I recognise that many Russian leaders express opposition to NATO enlargement. Yet the NATO Russia claims to oppose bears little resemblance to the alliance we are actually building. NATO's conventional and nuclear forces have been dramatically reduced. We have no plan, no need and no intention to station nuclear weapons on the territory of new members. NATO's actions over the past six years reveal an alliance focused on building co-operation, not confrontation: an alliance working shoulder-to-shoulder with Russia—as it is in Bosnia—not trying to isolate it.

We recognise that Europe cannot finally be whole and free until a democratic Russia is fully part of Europe. Now we hope that Russians will recognise that their suspicions about NATO and its enlargement are misplaced. After all, if Russia wishes to be part of an undivided Europe, then it cannot look at countries like Poland or Estonia or Ukraine as a buffer zone that separates Russia from Europe.

It is a mistake to think that the fate of Russian democracy is somehow at stake in the enlargement debate. Russia's future as a free and prosperous nation will depend upon the ability of its leaders and citizens to build an open society, to defeat crime and corruption, to spark economic growth and spread its benefits. The Russian people know that their future will be written in Moscow, in Perm, in Irkutsk—and certainly not in Brussels. Poll after poll has shown that few ordinary Russians express concern about an alliance that many of their leaders concede poses no actual military threat to the country.

It would not be in our interest to delay or derail enlargement in response to the claims of some Russians that this constitutes an offensive act. Doing so would only encourage the worst political tendencies in Moscow. It would send a message that confrontation with the West pays off. Waiting to integrate Central and Eastern Europe's new democracies would do nothing to

help Russian democracy. It would make it harder, not easier, to create the kind of NATO-Russia relationship we are striving for today.

How to engage Russia

NATO has proposed defining that partnership in a charter with Russia. The charter would establish clear principles and arrangements for consultation, co-operation and joint action in peacekeeping, defence and arms control, nuclear safety, non-proliferation and emergency relief. It would establish a permanent NATO-Russia joint council. We want Russia and our other partners to participate in NATO's Combined Joint Task Forces, which will allow us to respond to crises together. We want Russian officers to help plan the missions we jointly undertake. As a nation not bound by NATO decisions, Russia would have no veto. But its voice would be sought and heard.

We are also negotiating to update the treaty governing Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), which limits military deployments throughout the continent. We invite the Russians to join us in an agreement that will lower levels of forces and promote stability and transparency on the continent. This can assure Russia that NATO enlargement will not result in any major build-up of NATO forces along its borders. Indeed, it can ensure there is no destabilising concentration of military equipment anywhere in Europe.

We have every chance to make progress on these issues before the July NATO summit. I will be seeing Russian leaders in Moscow on February 20th. President Clinton will meet President Yeltsin in Helsinki in March. He will be in Europe again in May for the US-EU summit. The G7 leaders will meet President Yeltsin in Denver in June. Russia has a strategic opportunity to secure its interests in an integrated Europe. It


should seize it now.

I approach this challenge, and all the challenges we face in Europe over the next few years, with confidence. And why not? For half a century now, Europeans and Americans have worked together to shape events, instead of being shaped by them.

Today's Europe stands in such stark contrast to the Europe I knew as a child after the second world war. For those who were not there, it must be hard to imagine the days of Franco, Tito and Stalin, the refugees, the hunger, the constant fear that peace was just an interlude, the Europe Winston Churchill described as "a rubble heap, a charnel house, a breeding ground for pestilence and hate". Thank heaven leaders like Marshall, Monnet, Bevin and Adenauer had the fortitude to make the hard and controversial decisions needed to build the institutions that gave us 50 years of peace and prosperity. Now it's our turn.

President Clinton observed in his state-of-the-union address that a child born today will have almost no memory of the 20th century. Just the same, the children of the transatlantic community who are born today have the chance to grow up knowing a very different Europe. In that new Europe, they will know Checkpoint Charlie only as a museum, Yalta as just a provincial city in a sovereign Ukraine, Sarajevo as a peaceful mountain resort in the heart of Europe. The children of the next century will come of age knowing a very different NATO—one that masses its energies on behalf of integration, rather than massing its forces on the borders of division.

All this is possible if—and it is not a big if—we act now to strengthen the arrangements that have served half of Europe so well for so long and to extend them to new partners and allies. Then, having come together, we will be able to concentrate on what we must do together. That is a goal worth every measure of our common effort.



The Russian-American relationship moves to a higher plane

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

May 14, 1997

PRESS BRIEFING BY
MIKE MCCURRY

The Briefing Room

1:17 P.M. EDT

MR. MCCURRY: The news of the day will be made by the President of the United States one hour from now when he steps out to the Rose Garden and hail the agreement reached today by NATO Secretary General Solana and the Russian Federation, represented by its Foreign Minister, Foreign Minister Primakov.

Q At 2:15 p.m.?

MR. MCCURRY: At 2:15 p.m.

Q Which means there's a signing in Paris, huh?

MR. MCCURRY: We would, in diplomatic parlance, gladly accept an invitation from the government of France to attend a signing ceremony, should we be invited, in Paris on May 27th.

Q Does that mean that you will be going?

MR. MCCURRY: Probably. That's what the discussion have been to the effect that there would be a signing ceremony in Paris the day before the U.S. EU summit, scheduled to begin in The Hague, Netherlands, on the 28th of May.

Q What is your understanding on what's actually in the agreement?

MR. MCCURRY: Our understanding is that it is a good, strong document that reflects the hard work that this administration has put into deliberations with the Russian Federation, the work the President did in Helsinki with President Yeltsin, the very exceptional work that the Secretary General of NATO, Secretary General Solana, has done on behalf of the Alliance. The document

is now being briefed to the North Atlantic Council in Brussels. There will be a procedure under which governments can take back to their capitals the document and review it between now and Friday, but we understand that the document is being well received in Brussels.

It really codifies the relationship that we expect Russia and the North Atlantic Alliance to have, looking forward into the next century. It defines the nature of the military relationship that they will have, it sets up the mechanisms for structuring that relationship, and all aspects what we sought and wanted in this document we believe we've gotten. We have not had to make any concessions on any of those things that we consider to be sort of fundamental principles of how the future of the Alliance would be structured.

Q Mike, does the document have any language relating to stationing forces on the territory of new members or nuclear weapons?

MR. MCCURRY: It's got all of the -- it has language that reflects our three nos -- principles -- and the issues laid out by the President with respect to infrastructure and stationing that we talked about in Helsinki. The language will match those principles. And I think we will have, right after the President speaks, someone here to brief you on background who can tell you a little more about the substantive detail of the document.

Q What do the Russians get out of this?

MR. MCCURRY: The Russians get an opportunity to participate in the most successful military alliance in human history as an equal participant in a structure that will set parameters for relationships between the emerging independent states that used to be part of the Warsaw Pact and the Alliance itself. They will participate in areas of common purpose and they'll have a formal structure to that relationship that will assure the people of Russia the security that comes with living in an undivided democratic continent.

Q So that means that when the next round of people apply, after the first round -- like, let's say the Baltics want to get in -- that we would take Russia's considerations -- we would take their concerns into consideration before --

MR. MCCURRY: Well, one of our so called red lines in these discussions were no exclusions from future membership.

Q That's not what I'm asking. I'm asking does it mean that before we go ahead and accept anybody beyond the three that

we're going to take in in July, that we would take Russia's concerns into consideration?

MR. MCCURRY: Well, we always take Russia's concerns into account as we make diplomacy. The decisions on membership will be made by members of the Alliance.

Q So the Russian involvement is not formalized?

MR. MCCURRY: There's no veto that Russia would have over new future members.

Q But they would participate in discussions about future members?

MR. MCCURRY: Well, we would -- we have all manner of discussions with them on matters related to European security, of which this has been an issue. This is already an issue in our dialogue.

Q Does this treaty formalize those discussions -- veto or not?

MR. MCCURRY: It provides a mechanism for consultation on a number of issues. But there's already a structure to our bilateral dialogue and there will be a structure now. There's already a structure for their discussions with the Alliance through Partnership for Peace and that will continue under the new mechanism established by the document.

Q Mike, you often speak of an undivided Europe and security. Just kind of bring it home for the average person who doesn't follow national security issues -- what does this really mean to them?

MR. MCCURRY: Well, most Americans remember the great war that we fought in this century for the future of Europe and to liberate Europe from the authoritarian forces of fascism. We fought a long, cold struggle, called the Cold War, to prevail over totalitarianism. And now, as we look ahead to the next century we have this prospect of working together with a Europe that is united all the way from the Urals to the United Kingdom, it presents an extraordinary opportunity to the American people to engage with a peaceful continent in which we can enjoy commerce and relations and travel and tourism and all the things that go with amicable relations between nations. It's a stunning and extraordinary achievement if you think that just 50 years ago this was a continent divided by world war.

Q So there are no guarantees about -- against stationing troops on new member states or military installations?

MR. MCCURRY: Well, there is language that reflects the concerns that we raised and talked about in Helsinki, and we'll have someone who will brief you after the President speaks further to the question.

Q Is there required Duma ratification, and do you expect that this is a document, that if it does, Yeltsin will have an easy sell, or is it going to be an uphill battle?

MR. MCCURRY: Well, President Yeltsin has already spoken to the document. How this document is treated within the polity of the Russian Federation will be for the leadership of the Russian Federation to determine. And President Yeltsin's comments, as they are emerging already on this, I think speak for themselves.

Q What does this do to the trip to see Blair?

MR. MCCURRY: Probably puts -- the tentative planning that we had made was that if there was an event in Paris we would see Prime Minister Blair at the end of the trip rather than the beginning of the trip. So I imagine we stop coming home from the Netherlands.

Q Thursday.

MR. MCCURRY: Yes. I don't think that's formally announced yet, and we'll have to discuss that with the U.K. But I imagine we will see Prime Minister Blair in Paris, too. Correct? He has to get the same invitation from the government of France that we're expecting to receive.

Q Do you expect the budget documentation to be ready today or tonight?

MR. MCCURRY: I don't expect; I wouldn't rule it out. But they're working on it and they'll get it done in due course.

Q What is the President's involvement today in terms of talking to Lott and Gingrich or Archer?

MR. MCCURRY: I'm not aware of any up to this point. He has been briefed on some of the back and forth. I don't believe that his engagement has been called for up to this point, but I wouldn't rule that out as we go through the afternoon.

Q Mike, you said you don't expect, but Senator Daschle seemed a little more optimistic, even though he wanted to see it on paper. Do you part company with the Minority Leader on --

MR. MCCURRY: No, we share his optimism.

Q Daschle also said that the President was supportive of his -- was in agreement with his alternative partial birth -- are you going to put out a --

MR. MCCURRY: He is. We are not putting out a written statement on that. Let me just tell you a little bit about it. The President did review the analysis of both Senator Daschle's amendment and Senator Feinstein's amendment. The President has -- a little history -- has long been an opponent of late term abortions. When he was governor of Arkansas, in fact, he signed legislation that barred third trimester abortions, with the appropriate exception for life or health of the mother. He's made it clear to the Congress that in those exceptional circumstances where there needs to be protection for a woman's life and health, that he would support banning this procedure or banning late term abortions. And the amendments offered by either Senator Daschle or Senator Feinstein would meet that specification according to the analysis that's been presented to the President. So he indicated to Senator Daschle this morning that he would be supportive of Senator Daschle's amendment.

Q What's the difference between Daschle and Senator Feinstein? I know what Daschle's says.

MR. MCCURRY: Well, Feinstein's amendment exempts an abortion if in the medical judgment of the attending physician the abortion is necessary to avert serious adverse health consequences to the woman. It reflects more precisely that language that we presented to Congress in the President's veto message last year. Senator Daschle's amendment is more restrictive, talking about the grievous injury to the woman's physical health and then describing grievous injury in more detail.

Q Why not a statement of administration policy?

MR. MCCURRY: We'll probably send up some type of administration policy SAP that is similar to what we did in the House bill, that sends up the President's specifications in language reflecting the veto message, but it would be similar to what we did in the case of the House debate.

Q You don't mean you'll say you support Daschle, you'll just say you don't care which one of these two --

MR. MCCURRY: I don't know that we will address specific amendments, but we will just say here's the language -- here's the President's concerns and here's the language that we're looking for.

Q Also, does the report by the American Medical Association on this issue have any impact on the President's view?

MR. MCCURRY: I think -- I mean, we were aware that they examined the issue. I think the President was impressed with the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, which today indicated that they endorsed the Daschle amendment. I think that was brought to his attention. The AMA has not taken a position on the legislative proposals, but they have made a study of the circumstances in which late term abortions are indicated, and the judgment of the AMA is that they are rarely indicated, and that's consistent with the President's view that abortions in general ought to be rare and ought to be done under safe and legal and appropriate circumstances.

Q Mike, if I could follow up, the AMA report specifically finds that there is no identified situation where this procedure is the only appropriate procedure, which would seem to contradict the President's claim last year that there are circumstances when it is. Would he rethink that conclusion?

MR. MCCURRY: No. The President has found compelling those cases presented to him by the women involved, and those were exceptional cases where the procedure was indicated. I believe the AMA statement says it's not the only procedure; that may be true, but it is one that is indicated by doctors under certain rare circumstances.

Q Mike, does the President still believe that an exception should be made to protect the mother's mental health?

MR. MCCURRY: The President has not, to my knowledge, ever indicated that as -- he's talked about serious adverse health consequences to the mother, and I don't think we've ever specified that ought to be mental health.

Q So health consequences could include mental health, and that's different from what Daschle is proposing?

MR. MCCURRY: Well, what Senator Daschle, himself, has indicated is that severe mental stress can sometimes manifest itself physically. I mean, he has said that in context to the

debate about his amendment. But his amendment is restricted to grievous physical injury to the woman's health.

Q But isn't that one of the bones of contention that some of the critics who think that --

MR. MCCURRY: I'm not aware that that's a bone of contention.

Q -- exception, when you include mental health as an exception, is that sort of loophole, Mike?

MR. MCCURRY: I think that that's true, but that's why the President has, to my knowledge, has always had stricter conditions that he attaches to the exception.

Q Do you consider the Daschle bill to -- the restrictions in the Daschle bill to be broader than the restrictions in --

MR. MCCURRY: Well, in some respects because they would ban all procedures, all abortions in the third trimester, they are more restrictive in a way. But we're talking about what is a rare procedure in any event.

Q So you're basically saying that mental stress is not a reason?

MR. MCCURRY: I'm not taking a position on that. I'm saying that the President has indicated to Senator Daschle he supports Senator Daschle's amendment and Senator Daschle's amendment does not speak to that issue.

Q On trade, do you see any prospects for moving on the fast track issue with Republicans in the near term? And separately, is the administration concerned about the prospect of the Europe Union blocking the merger of Boeing and McDonald Douglas and have we communicated this to the Europe Commission?

MR. MCCURRY: On the second point, with respect to Boeing, I don't know if we've taken any position on that transaction in front of the Europe Union. On the first question, we have been in consultations with Congress about the timetable for fast track. The President has indicated publicly he will seek fast track authority this year and we are determining when best to do that in our discussions.

Q Does "this year" mean realistically that he wants it done before he goes back to South America?

MR. MCCURRY: I think he would like it done before he goes to Santiago for the second Summit of the Americas so that you can then present to them the launch.

Q -- that '98?

MR. MCCURRY: Well, it's early enough in '98.

Q It's March, right?

MR. MCCURRY: Yes.

Q So October, a trip to Brazil and Venezuela is not in his mind?

MR. MCCURRY: Well, it would be preferable to the President to have fast track authority by October, when he goes. But realistically we'll have to take into account what the congressional calendar is and see whether that's possible. It would be good in any event to have the process well underway at that point.

Q Mike, why aren't we doing it now?

MR. MCCURRY: Because we are frying a lot of fish right now and the kettle is only so big.

Q I want to take another run at a question you probably feel you just answered. But is not the Daschle proposal quite broadly restrictive if it bans all procedures in cases of a viable fetuses. Is that not --

MR. MCCURRY: I think it is restrictive, yes. And it is intended to be and it is consistent with the President's view that abortion after post viability should be very restricted.

Q But why wouldn't he prefer Feinstein since it's more closely --

MR. MCCURRY: He has indicated his support for either version of the language would be acceptable to him.

Q Are you lobbying for --

MR. MCCURRY: I'm not aware that we're lobbying, because Senator Daschle's been doing a pretty good job rounding up support.

Q Is there any response to the letter by the President of the Southern Baptist Convention that criticized the President as a member of his delegation?

MR. MCCURRY: I'm not even aware that -- I'm not aware of the letter. I'm not aware of the letter.

Q Mike, Chairman Burton has postponed the hearing of Mr. Ruff. Can you tell us anything about the reasons for that?

MR. MCCURRY: I can't. I mean, I think he sent a letter that's pretty straightforward. Mr. Ruff is more than willing to sit and work through these issues with Chairman Burton and his staff. We have now sent, I think, 15,000 pages worth of documentation to Chairman Burton's committee. There are only several dozen issues that arise on specific documents because of attorney client privilege and I think our views on attorney client privilege are well known at this point. But there's nothing that can't be amicably resolved, as we did in the case of the Senate.

Q He said that Ruff had asked for additional time to structure --

MR. MCCURRY: I don't think he said that. I think he said that they were awaiting a privileged log from the Counsel's Office and that's what's being produced.

Q Well, Ruff said he needed more time, more time to prepare the privilege log, did he not?

MR. MCCURRY: I don't know that he said that. It just hadn't been produced by the somewhat arbitrary deadline that had been established by the committee.

Q So he didn't say he needed more time, he just needed more time?

MR. MCCURRY: He just took more time.

Q Separate from the log, he said in his letter he needed more time to prepare documents and look through documents. Does that mean he's going to deliver more documents in addition to the log?

MR. MCCURRY: Well, we have delivered -- I'm not aware that -- we've delivered a lot of paper to him already.

Q He's referring to an additional collection of documents he's planning to give to Burton --

MR. MCCURRY: No, there are a set of documents that we think are properly restricted because they're either covered by attorney client privilege and or they are sensitive documents related to personnel that ought to be protected for privacy reasons. Those are the only documents that are in dispute. And I believe that we have resolved any questions on those kinds of documents in dealing with the Senate and we think we can resolve any questions with the House committee, too. It shouldn't be too hard to do.

Q The President is doing the law enforcement memorial tomorrow. Does he have anything in particular by way of announcements or anything he wants to do, or is --

MR. MCCURRY: Well, this is an annual occasion to pay tribute to law enforcement officers who have fallen in the line of duty. There will be some good news tomorrow, which is that the number of law enforcement active duty officers who fell in the line of duty in 1996 is down, probably the lowest it's been in over three decades, I think, which will be good news for everyone who supports our folks in uniform who take care of our communities. But the President will also have some things to say about protecting law enforcement officers from gun violence and from violent crime generally.

Q One of the doctors who does perform late term abortions is quoted today -- as saying that he would use the Daschle bill basically as a loophole, and certify anyone who -- under that procedure. Is that of any concern to the White House, that one of the few doctors who does these procedures says the bill is a loophole you can drive a truck through?

MR. MCCURRY: There is very specific language in Senator Daschle's amendment on grievous injury, and it's well defined in the statute. I'm not aware of what this doctor has said, but it's pretty specific language. We're hearing from the other side of this debate that it is too restrictive.

Q Mike, I want to come back to law enforcement. You said the President is going to have some things to say about gun violence and law enforcement officers. A little while back, I asked you -- when the police officers who are involved in a very high profile bank robbery, they were advocating for legislation to make Kevlar vests illegal to get through the mail. Would the President be addressing anything of that nature, any specific legislative initiatives?

MR. MCCURRY: I'm not sure whether that's on his agenda for tomorrow or not.

Q Mike, on the budget, the House members that were at this meeting didn't talk to us. Do you guys have a sense yet of where the House leadership is on the budget?

MR. MCCURRY: They had a vote. They had to leave because they were called up for a vote, so it was not because they didn't want to have a chat. There is probably a more vibrant and wider range of views within the House caucus than within the Senate. There problem us somewhat more concern about the nature of the emerging balanced budget agreement in the House caucus as opposed to the Senate caucus. But that's not surprising given that it's larger, reflects a broader cross section of the American pollution spectrum.

Q And has the leadership -- has Gephardt given you any indication yet what he's doing?

MR. MCCURRY: He's given us the same indications he's given to you.

Q Mike, does the President still want Eric Holder to be Deputy Attorney General, and is there any concern about the delay in the hearings or the issue involving the Washington police?

MR. MCCURRY: He believes that is a very warranted and strong nominee for that vital position at the Justice Department, and hopes that the Judiciary Committee will very quickly resolve any concerns they have in favor of a nominee that needs to get to work.

Q He has no concerns about this issue that seems to have --

MR. MCCURRY: I haven't spoken to him about whether he has concerns about it or not. He expects the Senate to be able to resolve any concerns they have expeditiously.

Q Mike, can I go back to the mental health issue? It's still a little muddy to me. The President doesn't seek this as an exception, and Daschle's bill does not specify mental health as an exception. But you said earlier that Daschle feels that mental anxiety or whatever can manifest itself into a medical problem.

MR. MCCURRY: That's my -- I've heard the Senator say that or seen the Senator say that.

Q Does the President agree with that thinking?

MR. MCCURRY: The President understands that there are circumstances in which that can become physical. He's not a doctor, it's not his to make a diagnosis on it. But, in any event, the terminology in Senator Daschle's amendment is pretty restrictive and does not include a mental health exception, as you know.

Q Do you have a reaction to the loss of Richardson's seat in New Mexico?

MR. MCCURRY: It was disappointing to lose the seat, but it also reflects what happens when you've got a three way contest and the third party candidate takes, we believe, mostly from the Democratic side of the ledger. But we've got a lot of other targets of opportunity coming up as we look ahead to House seats and we'll be fighting contests across the country.

Q Do you have a position on the alternative aid package to the District of Columbia?

MR. MCCURRY: I don't have anything prepared on that. We were continuing to try to work through with the D.C. elected officials support for our plan, and continue to press the case for the plan that we presented.

Q Is there a timeline that the President's giving for the dispute in Zaire to be resolved before he might --

MR. MCCURRY: No, we're just hopeful that they actually go ahead and meet as they were scheduled to do. I don't believe that meeting has occurred yet, but we hope that President Mobutu and the alliance leader, Kabila, as they meet and think about the future of Zaire and the people of Zaire, can find a way to accommodate the international community's desire to see a cease fire and to see an orderly transition to a new government.

Q On budget, we've heard since Monday that the deal's going to come through.

MR. MCCURRY: Well, the deal has already happened. We're just waiting to see the fine print.

Q On seven or eight issues you guys are looking at right now, are they the same seven or eight that were on Monday? Or are we seeing new niggling issues coming into the process?

MR. MCCURRY: It's sort of a combination of a little or all of that.

Q Could you give us an example of one?

MR. MCCURRY: No. It will be done soon enough.

Q Do you have any more detail on the Sunday commencement speech?

MR. MCCURRY: Not yet. Ask tomorrow.

Q I just wanted to clarify what your sending up to the Hill on the Daschle and Feinstein amendments? Are you sending up something separate saying --

MR. MCCURRY: I don't think we're going to send anything specific on that. We're going to reiterate the kind of language that the President would prefer and then I've just indicated to you that the language in the Feinstein and Daschle amendments he would find acceptable and would sign into law.

Q Getting back to the Sunday's commencement speech, is it possible that new policy issues could be announced Sunday?

MR. MCCURRY: Yes.

Q And on the budget, you're still waiting for the Lott and Gingrich letter?

MR. MCCURRY: Yes. There will be a letter related to the tax bill that we expect to receive from the Speaker and the Majority Leader, and then my understanding is there will also be an addendum that will cover in greater detail the nature of the agreement.

Q You just said there is going to be some policy going on. It's supposed to be science and technology, anything specific -- money?

MR. MCCURRY: Look, I'm not going to -- if we can manage to squeeze some shred of news out of it, it will be when he gives the speech and not four days ahead of time.

Q On the agreement with Solana, the NATO agreement, will that be released? Are we going to see what --

MR. MCCURRY: I'm sorry, will it be what?

Q The agreement with Primakov and Solana, is there going to be a release of what they agreed to?

MR. MCCURRY: Well, at some proper point the document will be made public in Brussels, no doubt, by the North Atlantic

Council. My guess is that they may have done that already -- do you know? Not until Friday, until after they've gone through the silence procedure.

Q -- prepared to talk at this briefing after the President about some of the --

MR. MCCURRY: Yes, we can give you more specifics on it.

Okay. Thank you.

END

1:42 P.m. EDT

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

May 14, 1997

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS

The Briefing Room

3:00 P.M. EDT

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me try to put today's relevance in a slightly broader context and then ask my distinguished colleague to go through the elements of the Founding Act that was agreed to today in Moscow between Foreign Minister Primakov and Secretary General Solana.

As the President has said, this document is strongly in the national interest of the United States and the American people. By bolstering Europe's stability, it will enhance our own security and prosperity in the 21st century. The document moves an historic step toward a partnership between Russia and NATO while preserving NATO's integrity, flexibility and core identity as a defensive, collective alliance. In other words, this is a win win win -- it's good for America, it's good for Europe, and it's good for Russia.

The document realizes an important element of President Clinton's vision of Europe, which he first articulated in Brussels in 1994 -- that is building a peaceful, democratic, undivided continent for the first time in history. And when the President talks about building a peaceful, democratic, undivided continent, let me try to describe what he means, what's the strategy behind those words.

It involves a set of complementary security, political and economic arrangements which bring Europe together; enlarging the NATO Alliance; building a new security cooperation between NATO and Russia, which we've acted on today; building partnerships with Ukraine, the Baltics and other countries in Central and Eastern Europe through the Partnership for Peace and the Euro Atlantic Partnership Council that will be created; moving the

transatlantic agenda of trade and economic relationships forward. All of these are elements of a tapestry of a more integrated, more united, more peaceful Europe the President is referring to.

Now, today's actions is a very important step, in a sense a midpoint, on the road from Helsinki to Madrid in eight weeks, where NATO will act definitively to invite new members to join the NATO Alliance. But in a larger sense, this really is a process that began in January of 1994, when the President traveled through Europe and Western Europe and Central Europe and Eastern Europe and in Moscow, and outlined this vision really for the first time of an integrated Europe, and sent the message to all three that a new NATO would work with a new Russia to build a new Europe.

In Warsaw in 1994, the President called on NATO to begin concrete steps towards the process of bringing in new members. In May of 1995, in the summit between President Yeltsin and President Clinton, there was a detailed exchange on NATO enlargement and NATO Russia relations. As a result of that, in May of that year, Russia joined the Partnership for Peace and a process was begun parallel to that in which the NATO enlargement study was undertaken and completed in September of '95.

In October of '96, the President called specifically for a NATO summit in 1997 to name the first new NATO members, and called for a NATO Russia partnership, including mechanisms for consultation and, where possible, joint action; then in Helsinki, where President Yeltsin and President Clinton really laid the basis for the work that has been done so effectively by Secretary Solana, and in parallel with efforts that Chancellor Kohl and President Chirac and others have been engaged in, to result in this step.

Before I turn to my colleague to walk through the specific elements of this Founding Act, let me simply conclude by saying that for 50 years America's overriding security concern flowed from a hostile relationship with Moscow. With this Founding Act we reinforce the basis for a constructive, stable and peaceful relationship with Russia that is working with a stronger NATO that preserves its flexibility and integrity.

Now, let me turn this over to my colleague to talk more specifically about the elements of this founding act.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thank you, and good afternoon to all of you. For openers here, I will basically address two subjects: one, the content and the structure of this document, and then give you a little bit on the background of it and the process whereby it came about.

As you know, this is a document that went without a formal name for quite some time, and that really was one of the issues that was finally decided in the discussions between Secretary General Solana and Minister Primakov just in the last day or so, and the name of it is a Founding Act -- the full name is Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation, and Security and NATO and the Russian Federation.

Now, this document has five sections or parts. The first is a preamble that essentially sets the context of the relationship and makes the case for broader, more intense cooperation between NATO and Russia. Section two sets out the basic principles that will guide the NATO Russia relationship and these are in a very positive sense quite familiar, because they are essentially reiterations or reaffirmations of international documents that have set the rules of the road for international relations over the last half century, particularly over the last couple of decades. That is, the United Nations Charter and the Helsinki Final Act. It's not entirely coincidental that that word, "act," would have come back into play in the context of these discussions.

These principles include commitments on the part of all countries involved to respect the sovereignty and the independence and the territorial integrity of all states, peaceful settlements of disputes and also -- this is, as I'm sure you will understand, very important -- the inherent right of every country to choose its own means for ensuring its own security. And, again, you will hear echoes of the document that emerged from the Helsinki meeting between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin.

Section three establishes a new forum, a new entity, to be called the NATO Russia Permanent Joint Council. This is a consultative mechanism that builds upon a feature that has existed in Brussels for the last number of years -- namely, the so called 16 plus 1 mechanism or structure. I can come back to that, but it institutionalizes 16 plus 1 with respect to NATO's relations with Russia.

Now, initially, this will be a body that will engage purely in consultations or discussion. However, the Founding Act allows for the possibility that over time, out of the consultations among the member states of NATO and Russia will come agreement on certain areas or tasks where there can be joint decision making and joint action. Example, of course, being what NATO and Russia, NATO and Ukraine, NATO and many of the Central European and former republics of the Soviet Union are doing today in Bosnia.

The Founding Act allows each side to raise any issues that it might have and to pursue those in the NATO Russia Joint Council. But it also quite explicitly provides for freedom of action of both sides. What that means is that if there's a consensus among the member states of NATO and Russia to do something under the auspices of the NATO Russia Joint Council then they can pursue that. If there's not a consensus then NATO is free to act as NATO and Russia is free to act as the Russian Federation.

Section four of the Founding Act sets out possible areas for consultation. Both the President and my colleague have touched on a couple of those: the prevention and settlement of conflicts; peacekeeping operations; preventing and curbing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and transparency, which is jargon meaning increasingly open exchange of information on what in the Cold War were areas, of course, of mutual secrecy, such as force posture and doctrine and that kind of thing.

Section five, which has been the focus of the most intense discussion in the last couple of months, covers the military dimension of the NATO Russia relationship. And here I would like to call your attention to a key feature of this document, and that is, it builds upon two unilateral positions that NATO has already taken. One of those is a December 10th NATO statement with regard to nuclear weapons deployments, the so called "three nos." And the second is a reiteration of a March 14th North Atlantic Council NATO statement with regard to conventional forces.

Now, much as the Helsinki document did, the Founding Act takes those existing NATO positions, reiterates them and clarifies them in ways that the Russians, in being prepared to proceed with the signing of this document, clearly acknowledge as addressing some of their legitimate security concerns.

Q Could you just summarize those two?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. The three nos, Rita, says that -- and this is a key phrase -- under current, foreseeable circumstances, or in the current and foreseeable security environment, NATO has no reason, no plan and no intention to change current deployments of nuclear weapons; that is, it doesn't need to put nuclear weapons somewhere where they are not now in place.

The March 14th statement says that in current and foreseeable circumstances, or the environment, NATO will pursue its tasks and missions relying upon integration, inter

operability -- which means making sure that the new member states are able to integrate or operate as part of the unified command and -- this is very important -- reenforcement.

Now, in the case of both the December 10th and the March 14th statement, NATO reserves to itself the right to assess the security environment, and if it were ever, in and of itself, to conclude that the security environment had changed, then it would obviously want to look again at the question of deployments.

Q That is what the President was referring to out there?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. Yes. This has been a theme in the discussions between Secretary General Solana and Minister Primakov, going back sometime now, and indeed, it's been the subject -- I'll come to this in a minute -- of the discussions that have been going on through various country to country or bilateral channels as well.

Now, section five -- and I can come back to any of this in more detail if you want -- section five also provides for mechanisms that will, we hope, foster closer military to military cooperation including liaison missions in the headquarters of NATO and Russia.

I might say I think it's a telling coincidence that the Russian Defense Minister has been here over the last day and a half. He had meetings, of course, with Secretary Cohen; he met with Sandy and with Secretary Albright this morning. And one of the things, one of the many things on the agenda was opportunities for greater military to military cooperation.

Let me, if I could -- and we can come back to any parts of the document that you want to talk about -- let me just give you a little bit of the flavor of how this came about. It was a very complicated, but I would say also quite orderly and disciplined process. And it was complicated, in part, because there were so many countries involved.

My colleague went through a number of key parts about the chronology here; let me mention one other important item on the calendar of the last year, and that was a speech that Secretary Christopher gave in Strasbourg last fall at which he broached publicly the idea of there being a NATO Russia document of the kind that now seems to be at hand.

We also I think look back on the OSCE -- Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe -- meeting in Lisbon in early December as an important point as well. The Vice President met with Prime Minister Chernomyrdin and gave a new political

impetus, I would say, because each of them was under instructions from his President to try to move these negotiations forward. And I might add that during the last round of the Gore Chernomyrdin Commission here in Washington in early February there was also quite a bit of work done on all this.

But this was by no means just a U.S. Russia discussion. There have been intense bilateral contacts, including at the highest level involving all of our key allies -- Chancellor Kohl, President Chirac have been intensively engaged, as well. And, of course, Secretary Albright has had a number of meetings with Mr. Primakov.

But throughout this the nexus, the key channel was the Solana Primakov channel, and that was exactly as it should be, because this is, after all, a document that brings NATO, as such, into a set of understandings and undertakings with the Russian Federation.

I might just add one other, as it were, relevant but somewhat complicating factor to which we had to make sure we did justice, and that is that NATO is 16 countries now, Russia is one, that's 17 countries, but there are in all 30 countries that are signatories to the CFE process. In fact, there are a couple of countries that are not part of the CFE, but have an intense interest in the CFE, whose interests and rights were also involved here. So yet another part of the dialogue has been to urge the Russians to address as many of their military concerns as possible in Vienna through the CFE process so that all countries whose interests are involved will be respected there. And that is very much part of this document.

I guess the last thing I would say just on the status of it, Secretary General Solana flew out of Moscow after concluding his talks successfully with Minister Primakov. He went almost literally right into a meeting of the North Atlantic Council. It's our understanding that that meeting went quite well and that the Permanent representatives, the 16 Perm reps to the NAC are now forwarding the text back to their governments, but we have every reason to expect approval.

Why don't I go to your questions.

Q A technical question. The agreement -- this is not legally binding, correct?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is correct.

Q Why did you get away from the word "charter"? Did it sound too legalistic? Will it be submitted anyhow because there

are gray area documents where a President may want the support or get the endorsement of Congress? You don't send this to Congress, but you send the CFE changes and the additions of new NATO members to Congress because they change treaties. Is that all correct?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's all correct. Let me add just a little bit to it, though.

It's very important to understand why it isn't and shouldn't be seen as legally binding. And I think I've already touched on the main points in the way I've addressed a couple of issues so far.

With respect to nuclear weapons and station forces -- infrastructure, that kind of thing -- this is not a document which says that NATO and Russia agree that X, Y, and Z will be the case forever or that A, B and C will never happen. That would be a treaty, a legally binding treaty that, of course, would go to the Senate. And, incidentally, that's the kind of document that the CFE treaty or START II is, and that's why they are subject to ratification. This document says that NATO takes the position that, explains its position, clarifies its position as meaning thus and such, but NATO reserves the rights that I've mentioned.

Barry, as to why the charter didn't fly at the end of the day, all I can tell you is that to Russian ears, it sounded like a word or a genre of document that was a little undervalued -- too many charters I think was it in part.

We, of course, are going to want to consult very closely with the Congress on the substance and the background and every other aspect of this, and we've already been doing so. I think that Secretary Albright is within 15 minutes going to be meeting with the Senate observer group and I will be going up to meet with that same group tomorrow. Several of us, not just from the State Department, but from DOD as well, have been up to brief Senator Gordon Smith and his colleagues on the European Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. So we're going to be working very closely with them, but it doesn't require ratification.

Q What does the President and the 16 others including Yeltsin sign? If they don't sign the agreed document, they don't sign a contract -- I mean, they say words, reassuring words like we just heard on the lawn -- what is the signature besides theater? What's the point?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's a political -- an enduring commitment at the highest political levels. Have you got the text of Helsinki there? And there is quite a bit of precedent for this. The Helsinki Final Act of 1974 -- and don't make too much of the -- '75 -- there are a lot of differences, obviously, but the Shanghai Communique is another example.

Q Once this is signed, can the Russians be pretty confident, even though they don't have a veto, that any future applicants that they have pretty strong objections to, like the Baltics, are not going to get in?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, they cannot be that confident of that. Throughout this process, we have had certain core principles which guided us at every step of the way, and those principles have emerged intact in the final document here. One of those was that no country was going to have a veto; there was going to be no slowdown or delay in the process of enlargement; there was going to be no second class membership in the Alliance, including, notably, as it takes in new allies. NATO was not in any way going to be subordinated to any other organization.

And then, another key principle is that there was going to be no exclusion. This is a process that is going to go on, it's going to be open to all eligible democratic states.

Q The Baltics and all these other countries have the expectation that they can get in?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is correct.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They're not excluded. And if I could just add one thing to what my colleague has said. The President was very explicit on this point with President Yeltsin when they met in Helsinki, so there can be no misunderstanding about what the intention is here -- that is, no nation is excluded and no non member has any kind of veto right over.

Q -- raising countries' expectations for something that will in all likelihood never happen?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, this is an ongoing process, as the President said, and this is -- in Madrid, NATO will take in its first new members since the end of the Cold War, but we have been very clear from the beginning that this would be an ongoing process and the first will not be the last. And I would simply go back over the last two or three years, at each stage there has been a question about whether, in fact, certain things would happen: Would we actually come out for enlargement?

Yes, we did. Would there actually be enlargement? Yes, it looks like there will be -- most certainly will be. So each step of the way the skeptics have been proven here to be overly cautious.

Q When I asked President Clinton about congressional objection he responded by saying these countries feel that they're ready. But the issue in Congress, as you know, is not whether these countries feel that they're ready, but whether the U.S. is going to be willing to take on a common defense of that. And I guess the question is -- and as Barry says, the expense of it -- the question is, tell us, if you can tell us a little bit about what you're going to try to do to explain to Congress that this is in the interest of the U.S. and it's not going to be too expensive.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, first of all, there has been very broad support in both Houses of Congress over the past several years, past few years, for NATO enlargement. It has been bipartisan. It has been expressed in congressional resolutions and other forms of congressional action on several occasions overwhelmingly. So I think we begin here with a general presumption that enlargement of NATO is good for the United States.

But understand that what happens in Madrid in eight weeks, essentially, is the invitation to certain countries to begin accession talks. Those talks will then go on for undoubtedly several months, with a view towards ultimately their coming into NATO in 1999. So this period between now and that will be a time of, I think, very vigorous discussion on the Hill, debate in the country, and I think we have every intention of making our case very strongly to the Congress and to the American people that a NATO which is modernizing, a NATO which is adapting, a NATO which is enlarging to embrace new democracies is in America's national interests. And I believe that that will be supported on a bipartisan basis at the end of the day.

We certainly don't take that for granted. I think there will be a very vigorous effort on our part over this period, and I'm quite pleased that Majority Leader Lott has established the group that my colleague referred to, where Secretary Albright is speaking to at this moment. It's a bipartisan group in the Senate that will be actively engaged in this process.

Q Could you put a dollar figure on how much it will cost?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think there have been some preliminary estimates from the Defense Department in the neighborhood of about \$200 million a year, but I think that

Secretary Cohen would be the first to say that those need to be refined, obviously, as we know, obviously, who, for starters.

Q Could you clear up one particular area? Tonight, apparently President Yeltsin went on the air and indicated that in fact he did have some kind of veto power or some way of blocking an admittance that he objected to. You guys says he doesn't. Can you explain --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me take the first whack, and then you take the second. There are no secret understandings. There is nothing here that does not appear in this document. And it is very clear and explicit that there is no veto that any country has. How he chooses to characterize this in Moscow, obviously, is --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'd like to add just one thing. No, it is very, very important that there be no misunderstanding about what this says and what it doesn't say, what it commits us to and what it leaves us free to do.

One of the principles that President Clinton established, going back to 1994 -- and my colleague mentioned kind of the genesis of being the trip that he made to Brussels, Prague, Kiev and Moscow -- was to say the same thing to every audience. We have been totally transparent and open about this and tried to be as clear as possible.

Now, on the issue at hand here, there are two bodies at issue here. One is called the North Atlantic Council, and that's kind of the board of directors of NATO. And that is sovereign. It doesn't take orders from anybody but itself; it doesn't report to anybody but the member governments. There's a new body called the NATO Russia Permanent Joint Council. That will operate by consensus. If Russia doesn't want something to happen under the auspices of the NATO Russia Joint Council, it won't happen. But that does not mean that NATO can't do what it feels is in the interests of its members.

Q Two questions. Number one, doesn't the fact that Yeltsin feels compelled to say that, even if you say it's not the case, isn't that very telling? And number two, a more technical question, when you said that this document reiterates and clarifies existing NATO positions, what's clarified?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can answer -- the second part of that I can answer more easily than the first, and I'm at a little bit of a disadvantage. I have nothing but a ticker on what President Yeltsin is quoted as having said. And we have been in the most intense, specific negotiations with President

Yeltsin himself and his Foreign Minister for months and months and months, and I assure you that there is no misunderstanding between NATO and Russia or the United States and Russia over what this document does and doesn't say.

It is a fact, and all of you know it, that President Yeltsin, Minister Primakov, Minister Rodionov and the rest of their team have an extremely tough job ahead of them on a whole variety of fronts, and Secretary Albright got a pretty vivid taste of that a week ago last Friday when she met with some otherwise reformist, very -- what should I say -- some of our favorite Russian politicians who were adamant in their opposition to NATO enlargement. But I don't want to enter into the Russian domestic debate.

But let me answer your question about where the clarification is. With respect to the December 10th statement on nuclear weapons deployment, the final version of this act will make explicit something that was implicit in the original December 10th statement, and that is that if we don't have any plan, intention or reason to deploy nuclear weapons, we don't have any plan, intention or reason to have storage sites for nuclear weapons where there are not storage sites now.

With respect to the March 14th statement on conventional forces, the final version asserts affirmatively that NATO will have infrastructure adequate to meet the tasks and missions identified and the parameters identified in the March 14th statement, and those missions, of course, include reenforcement.

Q Can I follow up just for a second on the second part of that question, which was the notion of why Yeltsin feels compelled to do this? I mean, in a sense, the only reason why an agreement like this -- forgive me for hyperbole -- matters is if it further cements the relationship between Russia and the West. I mean, that's why you're heralding this, because it's a good thing. But if, in Russia, it's seen largely as a bad thing, NATO expansion -- not this agreement but NATO expansion -- then for all the good talk, don't you risk undermining what you say you're holding up?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I sense my colleague may want a crack at this one, too. It's a very good question. I don't think you are hyperbolizing, by the way. I think you've put it pretty well.

Many, many Russians, including a lot of reformers, democrats, people who believe in Russia's integration with the outside world, don't like NATO, and they don't like NATO enlargement. They associate NATO with the bad old days of the

Cold War, and they need to be persuaded by their own leaders, in the first instance, that this is indeed a new NATO, just as we're prepared to look at them as a new Russia.

Now, this is not an abstract question, it's also a military question. And you'll remember what was said publicly between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin in Helsinki. They chose their words very carefully. They said that the purpose of what we're talking to you about today is to limit or diminish -- or minimize, I guess -- the negative consequences of Russia's opposition to NATO enlargement. And we think that the principal way to do that is to make clear to the Russians what NATO does and doesn't plan to do. And that's why the December 10th statement matters with regards to nukes -- matters in military terms, not just cosmetic or symbolic or political terms -- and March 14th with respect to conventional weapons.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me just try -- come at that in a related way. I think that President Yeltsin has made a clear judgment about where Russia's future lies, and it does not lie in isolation from the United States, and it does not lie in isolation from Europe -- so that, notwithstanding the fact that they disagree with NATO enlargement, I think he made the judgment in and around the time of Helsinki that NATO enlargement was going forward, and that Russia's future lies by integrating itself with Europe, with the West, with the United States both through a NATO Russia relationship and through the bilateral relationships that are very important to him, including the U.S. Russian relationship, so that in Helsinki we not only made a breakthrough in terms of moving this ball down the court, but we also made important strides in terms of arms control, looking towards START III, and in terms of integrating Russia into other institutions.

The summit in Denver will be the Summit of the Eight. That, I think, is an important step. So I think here one should not substitute your judgment -- or one's judgment for President Yeltsin's in terms of what is in the best interest of Russia. I think he has the capacity to see a different future, and I think that the future that he sees is a Russia whose prosperity and peace and security lie in greater integration.

Q Does the Duma have to ratify this?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know whether the Duma has to ratify it. I think at some points President Yeltsin has said that he will --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They have different constitutional procedures and their government has made clear

they are going, in some sense, to submit it to the Duma for approval, but it's not clear whether that constitutes formal ratification.

Q Now that the vision of this relationship between NATO and Russia is developing -- because it seems to me, as the President said today, we're looking at a new NATO for the 21st century, whereas many of the countries, including Russia and many of those who want to join are looking at in terms of what it has been in the 20th century. And if we resolve the problem in terms of the Russian acceptance of the expansion of NATO, when the next step comes and the same presuppositions lie at the basis of decisions and the Baltic states or Ukraine or the Central Asian states want to join NATO and there is no change in those presuppositions of views of various parties, they're going to have another problem somewhere down the road --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think this moves us down a course towards a greater degree on integration. If you looked in 1985, you could not have predicted what happened in 1989. If you looked in 1990, you could not predict where you might have been in 1994. Three years ago, I doubt seriously whether one could have predicted where we have been -- where we are today -- on the verge of both having a NATO Russia agreement and enlarging NATO simultaneously.

So I think what we've done here is move an important step forward towards a more peaceful, constructive relationship with Russia and a more integrated Europe. And we'll have to see how that unfolds as the years unfold. But it will -- in our judgment, it will unfold in the direction of additional expansion of NATO.

Q What's the current state of play on troop levels in the new member countries? Is that addressed in this document? And what has changed since the Secretary's visit two weeks ago?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Nothing has changed, and nothing will change with regard to NATO's intentions and the flexibility that it insists on having. The March 14th statement -- which I imperfectly quoted earlier, but I think I got it more or less right -- basically says that NATO will concentrate on certain kinds of activities and deployments. And those will not include -- those that it concentrate -- will not include the need for the permanent stationing of large combat forces under current foreseeable circumstances. But it will certainly want to do a lot of exercises. It will want to move sometimes fairly large units in and out, in support of peacekeeping operations such as the fairly significant facility that NATO now has in Hungary. But it reserves the right to change that at any time.

Yes, my colleague says that there's another piece to this very complicated mosaic, which is CFE. CFE -- which was, as you all know, signed in 1991 in kind of the last days of the Cold War -- at least the existence of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact -- was based on a block to block structure. There were ceilings for NATO and there were ceilings for the Warsaw Pact.

NATO has made a proposal in Vienna for a whole new structure that would include ceilings on individual countries -- no more blocks -- but also that would include what are called stabilizing measures, still to be worked out, that would cap deployments in that part of Europe which has been the source of so much trouble throughout the last century. And that would affect Central European countries, Eastern European countries and former parts of the Soviet Union.

And an awful lot of what this document does is provide a, kind of a guideline or an impetus to CFE where many of the specifics that will come to all of your minds as you study it in weeks to come, but can't properly be answered by NATO because NATO doesn't represent all the countries that are affected by CFE.

Q In order to study it, we ought to really have it in front of us. So I wonder if you could make it available then?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We can make it available, I would think, very soon. As I mentioned earlier, the perm reps in Brussels only got it within the last couple of hours and they are sending it back to governments for approval. I think that -- I would have hoped by the end of the week -- but very soon, it would be publicly available.

Q -- statement.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's correct.

Q Are there any issues that you identified in the text, or that you can come up with, would not go to the new forum and which would be dealt with exclusively by NATO under the new arrangement?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q Can you sort of give us an example?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, my colleague's answer is in the negative -- anything that Russia doesn't want to do, but NATO does do is by definition. But --

Q But where you wouldn't go to Russia first and say, can we reach consensus on this; or is that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, assuming it wasn't a truly secret development that the Russians didn't know about -- if it was a hot issue -- the Russians would have every right, as would all the members of NATO -- and that could be 16, 19, 20, 21 as times goes on -- can bring it up in the consultative, in the joint council.

But NATO reserves the right indefinitely, as part of what my colleague called the preservation of its core identity as a collective defense pact, to decide that some development constitutes a threat to any one member or to the collective membership and to take action accordingly.

And if Russia agrees that that is a threat to Russia's interest as well, then you could have an operation of some kind under the aegis of the NATO Russia joint council. But if Russia had a different view of it, NATO's free to act alone -- absolutely essential point.

Q You keep referring to the March 14th statement. By doing that, are you trying to say that there were no additional assurances given by Secretary General Solana on the issue of positioning of troops in former Warsaw Pact countries during this most recent round of talks, or were there some additional assurances given?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Very close to that, is what I want to say. But let me put it in my own words. The Secretary General, who I think we're, from the President on down, are indebted to in the way that he has carried out this negotiation, always operated within the parameters of decisions taken by the North Atlantic Council. And one of the guiding principles was that we were not going to negotiate with Russia over what NATO is, who can belong to it, or what NATO can do. What we were prepared to do is to clarify, to explain and clarify, what NATO policy means.

And that principle guided the Secretary General right up until he shook hands with Primakov earlier today, and the Russians did understand that. That doesn't mean that that's the way they would have preferred it, but this was, after all, a negotiation that had to bring the two together.

Q So your answer is that you're not aware of any additional specific assurances that were given, above and beyond March 14th?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm aware of, I think, absolutely everything that transpired here, as is my colleague and the rest of us. And as I said earlier, with respect to nuclear weapons, there was a clarification with regard to the implications of the three nos on the subject of nuclear storage sites. And with respect to the March 14th unilateral statement, there was an additional clarification of what this means on the subject of infrastructure.

But when Roy gets his copy, and shares it with all of you, of this thing, and you look at the actual language, you will see that the statement about infrastructure, which has been kind of a word the Russians have particularly cared about, that it's an affirmative statement. It says basically, there will be the infrastructure necessary or adequate to carry out these tasks as defined in the March 14 statement.

Q There has been some criticism on the Hill that there was almost too much consultation built into this with the Russians. How do you answer that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I look forward to hearing exactly what our colleagues and partners in Congress mean by that. I'll be up there tomorrow. I think the important thing, which they will, I hope, understand, as this is laid out and explained to them, is that no aspect of the consultative mechanism infringes on, dilutes, undermines in any way what Sandy stressed to you in his first statement; and that is the integrity, the flexibility, and the identity of NATO as a collective defense pact.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me just add one thing, and that is, today we have a number of different mechanisms that surround NATO. The governing institution of NATO, in a sense, is the NAC. There is also something called the NAC C, as you know, which includes Eastern European countries, which now will transmogrify into a Euro Atlantic partnership council. There is the 16 plus 1 today. There is a mechanism whereby NATO and Russia meet today, at 16 plus 1. In a sense, this is a codification or an institutionalization of that which exists.

So I think the core institution that makes the decisions for NATO remains the North Atlantic Council. It was yesterday, it will be today, it will be tomorrow.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think when my colleague starts using words like "transmogrification," we're coming to the end.

Q On another subject, the meeting between Mobutu and Kabila that was to take place today or tomorrow has been cancelled. Do you have any comment on that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, we actually have spent the last few hours on this, and I don't have any further information as to why it was cancelled. As of earlier this morning, I think, there was an expectation that the meeting would take place. But when I got back to my office --

Q It was cancelled just before your briefing -- I mean, when the briefing started. So you don't have to worry.
(Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thank you very much.
(Laughter.) Just call me any time with information.

Thank you.

END

3:50 P.M. EDT

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

May 14, 1997

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT
ON NATO EXPANSION

The Rose Garden

2:29 P.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Good afternoon. Today in Moscow we have taken an historic step closer to a peaceful, undivided, democratic Europe for the first time in history. The agreement that NATO, Secretary General Solana and Russian Foreign Minister Primakov have reached, and which we expect to be approved by NATO's governing council this week, forms a practical partnership between NATO and Russia that will make America, Europe and Russia stronger and more secure.

The agreement builds on the understandings that I reached with President Yeltsin in Helsinki. It helps to pave the way for NATO as it enlarges to take in new members to build a new relationship with Russia that benefits all of us.

In this century, Europe has suffered through two cold wars -- through two world wars and a cold war. And America has also paid a heavy price. Three years ago at the NATO Summit in Brussels, I laid out a vision for a new, different Europe in the 21st century -- an undivided continent where our values of democracy and human rights, free markets and peace know no boundaries; where nations know that their borders are secure and their independence respected; where nations defined their greatness by the promise of their people, not their power to dominate or destabilize.

For 50 years, NATO has been at the core of Europe and America's security. From the start of my first administration, the United States has worked to adapt NATO to new missions in a new century, to open its doors to Europe's new democracies, to strengthen its ties to non members through the Partnership for Peace, and to forge a strong, productive relationship between NATO and a free, democratic Russia.

These are goals Republicans and Democrats alike share, building on the legacy of bipartisan leadership in Europe, begun after the war between President Truman, Secretary of State Marshall, and Senator Arthur Vandenberg. Today's agreement sets out a sustained cooperative relationship between NATO and Russia. NATO and Russia will consult and coordinate regularly. Where they all agree, they will act jointly as they are doing today in Bosnia. Russia will work closely with NATO, but not within NATO, giving Russia a voice in, but not a veto over NATO's business.

I congratulate NATO Secretary General Solana and Russian Foreign Minister Primakov. I look forward to personally thanking Secretary General Solana for his remarkable work when he visits here next week.

This agreement opens a way for a truly historic signing in Paris next month -- or excuse me, it will be later this month now. Let me say that NATO's relationship with Russia is a part of a larger process, to adapt NATO to new circumstances and new challenges in the 21st century. Just eight weeks from now in Madrid, NATO will invite the first new members to join our Alliance. Its doors will remain open to all those ready to shoulder the burdens of membership. The first new members will not be the last.

NATO, working with Russia and other friends of freedom, will see that we work to prevent a return to national rivalries, to defeat new threats to peace and prosperity, like the ethnic rivalries that have torn Bosnia asunder -- terrorism and weapons proliferation.

This March in Helsinki, President Yeltsin and I agreed that despite our differences over NATO enlargement, the relationship between the United States and Russia and the benefits to all of cooperation between NATO and Russia were too important to be jeopardized. And we set out the principles for how NATO and Russia could cooperate. Those form the basis for today's agreement, an agreement that proves that the relationship between NATO and Russia is not a zero-sum game, and that the 21st century does not have to be trapped in the same assessments of advantage and loss that brought death and destruction and heartbreak to so many for so long in the 20th century.

It is possible to enlarge NATO, to maintain its effectiveness as the most successful defense alliance in history, to strengthen our partnership with Russia, and to do all this in a way that advances our common objectives of freedom and human rights and peace and prosperity. We can build a better Europe without lines or gray zones, but with real security, real peace,

and real hope for all its citizens. A more secure, peaceful, and hopeful Europe clearly means a better world for Americans in the 21st century.

Thank you.

Q Mr. President, what do you think finally brought the Russians around, if there was one deciding factor? And how much of a problem is it going to be, now that you've got the Russians sort of on board, to convince Congress that NATO should, in fact, be expanded?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, let me answer the -- the first question, I think what brought the Russians to this agreement was a sustained effort at dialogue between Russia and NATO and between Russia and the United States and other friends of democratic and between Russia and the United States and other friends of democratic Russia, making it clear that NATO has a new mission, that there was no attempt to be more threatening to Russia, but instead to build a common partnership for democratic values and democratic interests.

Yesterday, President Havel, of the Czech Republic, had a very compelling article in one of our major newspapers, laying out that case. We are not going to define NATO in the 21st century in the same way we did in the 20th century. And we are trying to change the realities that caused so much grief in the last century. I think he understood that -- that, in other words, that a democratic, free, non aggressive -- that is, in a destructive sense -- non aggressive Russia -- is not threatened by an expanded NATO, particularly now that there's going to be a partnership to work in areas which are in our common interests to work. So that's the first thing.

The second thing I would say is, in terms of the Congress, now that the partnership has been solidified between NATO and Russia, which I think is an important thing on its own merits, it would seem to me to be a great mistake to deny countries that are clearly able and willing and anxious to take on the responsibilities of NATO membership the opportunity to do that. The understandings that we have reached among ourselves about the process of expansion mean that the members themselves are ready to expand. And I believe that in the end the Congress will support that, particularly since all of our NATO allies will be voting on to whom new membership will be offered.

Q How tough a sell does President Yeltsin have at home with this?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I would hope that the clarifications that were hammered out, first at Helsinki, but then the excellent work that Secretary General Solana did, will help President Yeltsin to demonstrate that he has secured an agreement which shows that, while they don't have a veto over NATO actions, that NATO has no plans, no intentions, and has made clear that its mission is not to threaten, confine, or in any way undermine Russia; that we're looking for a partnership here between a democratic Russia and the democracies that are in NATO; and that this, in fact, will strengthen Russia's security and reduce the sense of anxiety that it might have otherwise felt, I believe. And I believe he'll be in a position to argue that to the Russia people now in a forceful way.

But keep in mind, all of us are trying to change the --not only the facts on the ground, if you will, but the whole pattern of thought which has dominated the international politics of Europe for 50 years. And even though the Cold War is over, a lot of people want to go back to the kind of -- kind of an analysis that was more typical even before World War II, in the late 19th and early 20th century.

And we're trying to change all that. We're trying to prove that democracies can reach across territorial lines to form partnerships that commit themselves not only to preserve freedom within each other's borders and the integrity of those borders, but to face these new transnational threats like terrorism, ethnic convulsions and weapons proliferation.

Q Mr. President, President Yeltsin said that you have made a precise commitment in this document to guarantee that there will be no military installations in the new member states. Have you given those guarantees?

THE PRESIDENT: I would urge you, first of all, to look at the language that Secretary General Solana has agreed to and that our representatives have provisionally agreed to just in the last couple of hours. What the language does is to make it clear that there are no plans and there are no reasons to, in effect, activate old Warsaw Pact military installations for what you might call traditional NATO aggressive forward posturing, but that we will have to use -- there is an explicit understanding in the agreement that we will have to use some infrastructure for the agreed upon operations that are an integral part of being a NATO member.

So all we're doing in the understanding is to recognize, yes, there will be some use of military infrastructure so that the requirements of membership can be met by any new members, but, no, we are not moving the dividing line of Europe from its

old dividing line between NATO and the Warsaw Pact further east. So I think we got just exactly the right kind of understanding. And, again, I think Secretary General Solana did it right.

Thank you.

END

2:41 P.M. EDT