

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the William J. Clinton
Presidential Library Staff.**

Collection/Record Group: Clinton Presidential Records

Subgroup/Office of Origin: Domestic Policy Council

Series/Staff Member: Jose Cerda

Subseries:

OA/ID Number: 5873

FolderID:

Folder Title:

Crime Bill II '95 [1995] - House Votes [5]

Stack:

S

Row:

98

Section:

2

Shelf:

9

Position:

3

*Statement of Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
on the Republican 1995 Crime Proposals
February 9, 1995*

LAST YEAR, THE CONGRESS COMPLETED A SIX-YEAR EFFORT AND ENACTED A MAJOR ANTI-CRIME LAW, IN WHICH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT LAUNCHED A BOLD, MULTI-FACETED ATTACK ON VIOLENT CRIME AND ITS ROOTS IN THE COMMUNITY. FOR THE FIRST TIME, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT MADE A MAJOR COMMITMENT TO HELP STATES AND LOCALITIES -- WHERE 95 PERCENT OF CRIME OCCURS AND IS PROSECUTED -- REDRESS THE GREATEST SHORTCOMINGS OF OUR SYSTEM:

- * THE SHORTAGE OF POLICE OUT ON THE STREETS OF OUR COMMUNITIES;**
- * THE SHORTAGE OF PRISON SPACES AND THE NEED FOR SENTENCING REFORM;**
- * THE SHORTAGE OF EFFECTIVE RESPONSES TO DRUG OFFENDERS;**
- * THE LACK OF A SERIOUS RESPONSE TO RAPE AND FAMILY VIOLENCE; AND**
- * THE LACK OF SAFE PLACES AND POSITIVE ACTIVITIES FOR THOSE CHILDREN GROWING UP SURROUNDED BY ILLEGAL DRUGS, CRIME, AND VIOLENCE.**

IN ITS BREADTH, THE LAW REFLECTS THE LESSONS LEARNED OVER THE LAST DECADE AS WE STUDIED CRIME AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AND WORKED ON PASSING THIS LAW -- NAMELY, THAT ALL OF THESE SHORTCOMINGS MUST BE ADDRESSED TOGETHER, THAT CORRECTING ONE WITHOUT THE OTHERS IS FUTILE -- BECAUSE CRIME KNOWS NO EASY, SINGLE ANSWER. THE ANTI-CRIME LAW ADDRESSES EACH OF THESE SHORTCOMINGS, AS I WILL DETAIL IN A MOMENT. AND IN ITS APPROACH,

AS WELL AS IN MANY SPECIFICS, THE LAW WAS THE RESULT OF BI-PARTISAN EFFORTS.

THE LAW IS ALREADY AT WORK. \$1 BILLION HAS BEEN AWARDED TO STATES AND LOCALITIES TO PUT OVER 14,000 NEW POLICE OFFICERS ON THE STREETS IN COMMUNITY POLICING PROGRAMS. DOLLARS UNDER THE DRUG COURT PROGRAM AND THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT WILL BE AWARDED IN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS.

I HAD HOPED THAT I COULD SPEND THE NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS WATCHING OVER THE SMOOTH AND SPEEDY IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LAW, AS WELL AS TURNING MY FOCUS TO THOSE SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES STILL BEFORE US: JUST TO NAME TWO PRIORITIES -- WE MUST TURN ALL THE TALK ABOUT OUR WAR ON DRUGS INTO A REAL BATTLE; AND WE MUST REFORM OUR JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM AS IT STRUGGLES TO DEAL WITH VIOLENT YOUNG CRIMINALS UNLIKE ANY THE CURRENT SYSTEMS WERE DESIGNED TO HANDLE.

BUT INSTEAD OF MOVING FORWARD TO TAKE ON NEW, PRESSING CHALLENGES, THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES WILL BE IN FULL RETREAT. VERY SOON, THE SENATE WILL EMBARK ON A DEBATE NOT OF NEW CHALLENGES, BUT OF THE ANTI-CRIME LAW WE JUST ENACTED LAST FALL. THE HOUSE IS ALREADY TAKING APART THE LAW PIECEMEAL. WHAT IS MOTIVATING A RETREAT ON A BILL THAT CONTAINS SO MANY PROVISIONS DRAFTED AND ONCE SUPPORTED BY REPUBLICANS AS WELL AS DEMOCRATS?

I WILL LET YOU DRAW YOUR OWN CONCLUSIONS, BUT I ASK THAT YOU WALK WITH ME THROUGH THE CHANGES THE REPUBLICAN LEADERSHIP SEEKS TO MAKE IN THE ANTI-CRIME LAW -- AND I SUSPECT THE MERITS

WILL SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES. AT THE SAME TIME, I WANT TO MAKE CLEAR WHAT I WILL FIGHT FOR AND WHAT I WILL FIGHT AGAINST, AS WE REVISIT THE ISSUES WE DEBATED SO THOROUGHLY LAST YEAR.

THE 100,000 POLICE PROGRAM

LET ME TURN FIRST TO A CENTRAL PROVISION OF THE NEW LAW, A PROGRAM DESIGNED TO ADDRESS THE FIRST MAJOR LAW ENFORCEMENT SHORTCOMING I MENTIONED -- A PROGRAM THAT DESERVES TO BE PRESERVED AND ONE I WILL FIGHT TO SAVE FROM THE REPUBLICAN CHOPPING BLOCK. I AM SPEAKING, OF COURSE, ABOUT THE 100,000 POLICE PROGRAM.

I DON'T KNOW A RESPONSIBLE POLICE LEADER, ACADEMIC EXPERT, OR PUBLIC OFFICIAL WHO DOES NOT AGREE THAT PUTTING MORE POLICE OFFICERS ON OUR STREETS AND IN OUR NEIGHBORHOODS IS A GOOD IDEA -- A GOOD IDEA THAT GOES BY THE NAME OF "COMMUNITY POLICING."

THE TRUE INNOVATION OF COMMUNITY POLICING IS THAT IT ENABLES POLICE TO PURSUE DUAL GOALS -- THEY ARE BETTER POSITIONED TO RESPOND AND APPREHEND SUSPECTS WHEN CRIME OCCURS, BUT THEY ARE ALSO BETTER POSITIONED TO KEEP CRIME FROM OCCURRING IN THE FIRST PLACE. TODAY, TOO MANY POLICE OFFICERS ARE STRANGERS IN THEIR OWN COMMUNITIES; FROM HEADQUARTERS OR CRUISERS THEY RESPOND TO RADIO CALLS ONLY AFTER A CRIME HAS OCCURRED, FOREVER BEHIND THE CURVE. COMMUNITY POLICE ARE A PART OF THEIR COMMUNITY, THEY KNOW THEIR COMMUNITY -- THE HOT SPOTS, THE TROUBLE MAKERS, THE GANG MEMBERS -- AND THEY CAN WORK TO PREVENT A CRIME FROM EVER GETTING STARTED.

IN MY OWN HOME STATE, COMMUNITY POLICING TOOK THE FORM OF FOOT PATROLS WITH A PARTICULAR FOCUS ON BREAKING-UP STREET LEVEL DRUG DEALING THAT HAD TURNED ONE WILMINGTON NEIGHBORHOOD INTO A CRIME ZONE. THESE EFFORTS SUCCESSFULLY SUPPRESSED DRUG ACTIVITY, WITHOUT DISPLACING IT TO OTHER PARTS OF THE CITY. THE WILMINGTON EXAMPLE FITS THE SHORTHAND DESCRIPTION OFTEN USED FOR COMMUNITY POLICING -- PUTTING COPS ON THE STREETS TO "WALK THE BEAT."

BUT IN PRACTICE, COMMUNITY POLICING TAKES MANY FORMS, DEPENDING ON THE NEEDS OF EACH PARTICULAR COMMUNITY. WHILE THE FORM COMMUNITY POLICING TAKES MAY VARY DEPENDING ON THE NEED OF A PARTICULAR COMMUNITY, THE RESULTS COMING IN FROM THE FIELD ARE THE SAME -- COMMUNITY POLICING WORKS:

- * IN NEW YORK CITY -- A PLACE WHERE CRIME CAN SEEM INSURMOUNTABLE -- THE POLICE COMMISSIONER BEGAN AN AGGRESSIVE COMMUNITY POLICING PROGRAM THAT CONTRIBUTED TO SIGNIFICANT DECREASES IN SERIOUS OFFENSES LAST YEAR.**
 - ** MURDERS DROPPED 19 PERCENT.**
 - ** ROBBERIES FELL BY 16 PERCENT.**
 - ** BURGLARIES WENT DOWN 11 PERCENT.**
 - ** AND AUTO THEFTS WERE REDUCED BY 15 PERCENT.**

- * IN TAMPA, FLORIDA, POLICE COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO MOVING CRACK DEALERS OFF OF STREET CORNERS AND FORGED AN UNPRECEDENTED ALLIANCE WITH CITIZENS IN THE COMMUNITY TO ACHIEVE IT. THROUGH A COMBINATION OF STANDARD "BUY-BUST" OPERATIONS, NEW OUTREACH TO THE COMMUNITY, AND INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER CITY AGENCIES AND THE LOCAL MEDIA, THE**

DEALERS HAD BEEN DRIVEN OFF WITHIN A YEAR AND THE STREETS IN THE TARGETED AREA RETURNED TO NORMAL.

- * IN NEW HAVEN, CONNECTICUT, POLICE CHIEF NICK PASTORE'S AGGRESSIVE COMMUNITY POLICING EFFORT LEAD TO A 10% DROP IN SERIOUS CRIME IN 1992.**
- * COMMUNITY POLICING TECHNIQUES WERE INTRODUCED IN THE NEW YORK CITY SUBWAY SYSTEM FOUR YEARS AGO AND THE RESULTS HAVE BEEN PHENOMENAL: ROBBERIES HAVE FALLEN BY 52%.**
- * IN THE ENGLEWOOD SECTION OF CHICAGO, COMMUNITY POLICING WAS CREDITED WITH A 6% DECREASE IN VIOLENT CRIME LAST YEAR.**

THE ANTI-CRIME LAW ENACTED LAST YEAR TARGETS \$8.8 BILLION IN FEDERAL FUNDS TO STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT TO BE USED SPECIFICALLY TO TRAIN AND HIRE 100,000 NEW COMMUNITY POLICE OFFICERS ACROSS THE NATION. LIKE COMMUNITY POLICING ITSELF, THIS PROGRAM WORKS. ALREADY, THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT HAS AWARDED \$680 MILLION TO STATES AND LOCALITIES FOR 9,500 NEW OFFICERS. APPLICATIONS FOR ANOTHER \$450 MILLION IN FEDERAL FUNDS -- FOR MORE THAN 6,000 ADDITIONAL NEW OFFICERS -- ARE ALREADY PENDING AT THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT; THESE FUNDS WILL BE AWARDED THIS MONTH.

IN SHORT, IN ONLY THE FIRST SIX MONTHS FOLLOWING PASSAGE OF THE CRIME LAW, 15,000 NEW LOCAL POLICE OFFICERS WILL BE ON THE STREETS OF AMERICA. SO MUCH FOR THE CRITICS WHO CLAIMED THE NEW CRIME LAW WOULD FUND ONLY 22,000 POLICE OFFICERS IN SIX YEARS. IN FACT, THE LAW WILL FUND 15,000 IN THE FIRST SIX MONTHS ALONE. THESE

RESULTS SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES, AND THEY ARE THE BEST EVIDENCE THAT THE PROMISE OF 100,000 COPS IS REAL.

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE COPS PROGRAM DERIVES FROM ITS DESIGN -- THE COPS PROGRAM IS THE RESULT OF SETTING A PRECISE GOAL AND ENACTING A RESPONSIBLE PROGRAM TO ACHIEVE THAT PRECISE GOAL: WHEN HE TOOK OFFICE, PRESIDENT CLINTON CALLED ON US TO PUT 100,000 MORE POLICE ON THE STREETS OVER THE NEXT FIVE YEARS; WE THEN DESIGNED A PROGRAM THAT FUNDS THAT EFFORT AND THAT EFFORT ALONE -- THE FEDERAL DOLLARS WERE AWARDED FOR THE SOLE PURPOSE OF HIRING NEW POLICE OFFICERS, SO THAT IN FIVE YEARS TIME, AMERICA WILL HAVE 100,000 MORE POLICE ON THE STREET.

THE PRECISION OF THIS PROGRAM STANDS IN STARK CONTRAST TO THE REPUBLICANS' NEW "LAW ENFORCEMENT BLOCK GRANT" -- WHICH WOULD SPEND ROUGHLY THE SAME AMOUNT OF FEDERAL FUNDS -- TO BE SPECIFIC, \$8.5 BILLION -- WITHOUT GUARANTEEING A SINGLE NEW POLICE OFFICER ON ANY STREET IN AMERICA. READ THEIR PROPOSAL -- MONEY IS SENT NOT TO LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, BUT TO GOVERNORS, AND THE MONEY MAY BE USED TO HIRE OR PAY OVERTIME TO UNDEFINED "LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS," OR TO "PROCURE EQUIPMENT, TECHNOLOGY AND OTHER MATERIAL" THAT IS "DIRECTLY RELATED TO BASIC LAW ENFORCEMENT FUNCTIONS, SUCH AS THE DETECTION OR INVESTIGATION OF CRIME, OR THE PROSECUTION OF CRIMINALS."

NOW, THAT MAY SOUND FINE ON THE SURFACE, BUT A CLOSER LOOK REVEALS CRITICAL WEAKNESSES. LET'S CALL THE FIRST WEAKNESS THE "OFFICER LOOPHOLE" -- BECAUSE THE REPUBLICANS DO NOT DEFINE "LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS" AS CAREER OFFICERS DEDICATED TO ENFORCING THE CRIMINAL LAWS -- AS THEY ARE DEFINED IN THE NEW

CRIME LAW; INDEED, THE REPUBLICANS DO NOT DEFINE LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS AT ALL. LET'S CALL THE SECOND WEAKNESS THE "EQUIPMENT LOOPHOLE." THE REPUBLICAN PROPOSAL WOULD FUND ANY EQUIPMENT OR TECHNOLOGY RELATED TO "LAW ENFORCEMENT FUNCTIONS," AND THOSE FUNCTIONS ARE SPECIFICALLY DEFINED TO INCLUDE PROSECUTION.

THESE TWO LOOPHOLES MEAN STATES COULD SPEND ALL THE MONEY TO HIRE PROSECUTORS, TO IMPROVE COURT SYSTEMS, OR ANYTHING ELSE RELATED TO "LAW ENFORCEMENT." ARGUABLY, THE MONEY COULD EVEN BE USED TO HIRE ANY OFFICERS WHO ENFORCE THE LAWS, CIVIL AS WELL AS CRIMINAL -- FOR EXAMPLE, PUBLIC HEALTH OFFICERS WHO INSPECT RESTAURANTS. EQUIPMENT, AS DEFINED BY THE REPUBLICANS, COULD INCLUDE NOT MERELY POLICE EQUIPMENT -- WHICH THE NEW ANTI-CRIME LAW PERMITS A PORTION OF THE GRANT FUNDS TO PURCHASE -- BUT COMPUTERS FOR PROSECUTORS OR COURTS, OR TELEPHONE BOOTHS OR LIGHTING OR WHATEVER A GOVERNOR DECIDED WOULD "RELATE TO LAW ENFORCEMENT FUNCTIONS." AND ONE HUNDRED PERCENT OF THE FEDERAL FUNDS COULD BE USED FOR THIS EQUIPMENT, OR TO FUND PROSECUTORS. NOT ONE DOLLAR NEED BE USED TO HIRE A SINGLE NEW POLICE OFFICER.

NOW, I SUPPORT MANY OF THESE OTHER FUNCTIONS. IMPROVED PUBLIC LIGHTING AND EMERGENCY TELEPHONES ARE USEFUL. PROSECUTION OF CRIMINALS IS A CRITICAL FUNCTION -- IN FACT, THE ANTI-CRIME LAW PROVIDES \$150 MILLION FOR STATE AND LOCAL COURTS, PROSECUTORS, AND OTHER CRIMINAL JUSTICE PARTICIPANTS. BUT I CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THE SINGLE MOST CRITICAL NEED OUR COMMUNITIES FACE WHEN IT COMES TO FIGHTING CRIME IS THE LACK OF POLICE. I REMAIN COMMITTED TO USING THE SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT OF FEDERAL FUNDING WE

HAVE SET ASIDE -- OVER \$8 BILLION -- TO SERVE OUR HIGHEST PRIORITY -- GETTING MORE COPS OUT ON THE STREETS. I AM OPPOSED TO REPLACING A PROGRAM THAT GUARANTEES 100,000 NEW COPS ON OUR STREETS WITH A PROPOSAL THAT COULD SPEND OVER \$8 BILLION IN FEDERAL FUNDS WITHOUT PUTTING ANY COPS ANYWHERE.

THE REPUBLICAN PROPOSAL SUFFERS FROM AN ADDITIONAL FATAL FLAW -- IT REQUIRES NO FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY OR RESPONSIBILITY; IT IS SIMPLY A FEDERAL GIVE-AWAY. THE BILL USES A FORMULA TO SIMPLY HAND OUT FEDERAL FUNDS TO MAYORS AND STATE OFFICIALS WITH NO STRINGS ATTACHED -- NO STRINGS AND NO ACCOUNTABILITY. THE ANTI-CRIME LAW REQUIRES THAT STATES AND LOCALITIES "MATCH" THE FEDERAL GRANTS WITH FUNDS OF THEIR OWN. THE MATCH REQUIREMENT IS NOT BORNE OF A LACK OF GENEROSITY -- THE OFFER OF \$8.8 BILLION IN FEDERAL FUNDS TO ASSIST WITH A PURELY STATE AND LOCAL FUNCTION CAN HARDLY BE CHARACTERIZED AS STRINGY.

NO, THE MATCH REQUIREMENT IS BORNE OF EXPERIENCE -- EXPERIENCE I GAINED FIRST IN MY OWN DAYS AS A CITY COUNCILMAN -- THAT LOCAL OFFICIALS CARE A WHOLE LOT MORE ABOUT MAKING SURE THAT FEDERAL TAX DOLLARS ARE USED WISELY WHEN SOME LOCAL TAX DOLLARS ARE ALSO ON THE LINE. I LEARNED MORE ABOUT THIS PHENOMENON WHEN THIS CONGRESS TRIED -- AND THEN ABANDONED -- LEAA (LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION), OVER A DECADE AGO.

REMEMBER THE ALLEGATIONS OF LAVISH AND WASTEFUL SPENDING THAT OCCURRED UNDER THE PROGRAM? -- EVERYTHING FROM "DICK TRACY" WRIST RADIOS TO PURCHASING RIOT CONTROL GEAR FOR SMALL TOWNS THAT HAD NEVER HAD (AND PROBABLY NEVER HAVE SINCE) A MAJOR RIOT?

IN DISBANDING LEAA, WE CONCLUDED THAT THE PROGRAM'S DESIGN ACTUALLY ENCOURAGED THESE ABUSES. JUST LIKE THE REPUBLICAN BILL, THE LEAA PROGRAM PERMITTED SPENDING FEDERAL DOLLARS ON A ILL-FOCUSED RANGE OF GOODIES, INCLUDING EQUIPMENT, WITH NO MATCHING REQUIREMENT. THE RESULT WAS TESTAMENT TO THE LAW OF UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES -- LEAA ENDED UP FUNDING TOO MUCH EXTRANEOUS EQUIPMENT BY ENCOURAGING UNDISCIPLINED SPENDING.

I WAS ONE OF THE LEADING CRITICS OF THE LEAA PROGRAM IN THE LATE 1970'S, WHEN THE PROGRAM WAS RUN BY A DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATION. IN PARTICULAR, I CRITICIZED THE INABILITY OF THE PROGRAM TO IDENTIFY GOALS AND PRIORITIES AND TO ENCOURAGE CAREFUL PLANNING, AS LEADING TO A SCATTERSHOT APPROACH TO FREE SPENDING. IN 1980, 1984 AND AGAIN IN 1988, WITH THE SUPPORT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS AND BI-PARTISAN COOPERATION (SENATOR SPECTER AND I INTRODUCED ONE KEY BILL IN 1982, FOR EXAMPLE), THE CONGRESS EVENTUALLY STRENGTHENED THE STATE AND LOCAL CRIME-FIGHTING EFFORTS.

WE BUILT IN THREE KEY CONCEPTS -- WE TARGETED LAW ENFORCEMENT AID TO SPECIFIC PROGRAMS, WE REQUIRED A MATCH OF ONE STATE OR LOCAL DOLLAR FOR EVERY THREE FEDERAL DOLLARS, AND WE REQUIRED EXTENSIVE STATE PLANS TO EXPLAIN WHAT THE DOLLARS WOULD FUND. THE RESULTING LAW WAS WHAT WE CALL THE BYRNE GRANT PROGRAM -- A FISCALLY RESPONSIBLE, WELL RUN PROGRAM THAT CONTINUES TODAY. THESE SAME CONCEPTS MARK THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE ANTI-CRIME LAW'S 100,000 POLICE PROGRAM. IN FACT, WE EVEN IMPROVED ON BYRNE IN ONE RESPECT -- WE PERMIT LOCALITIES -- NOT JUST GOVERNORS -- TO APPLY DIRECTLY FOR FUNDS, TO ENSURE THAT MONEY GETS TO WHERE IT IS MOST NEEDED.

THE REPUBLICANS IGNORE THE LESSONS OF THE LEAA -- THEIR PROPOSAL IS AN \$8.5 BILLION GIVE-AWAY OF FEDERAL DOLLARS WITH NO SPECIFIC GOALS, NO SET LIMITS, AND NO EVALUATION OR MATCHING REQUIREMENTS. THE LOOPHOLES AND LOOSE LANGUAGE WOULD PERMIT EVERY CENT TO BE SPENT WITHOUT ANY INCREASE OF POLICE ON THE STREETS TO SHOW FOR OUR INVESTMENT AT THE END OF FIVE YEARS.

IN CONTRAST, THE CRIME LAW BUILDS ON THE LEAA LESSONS. IT SETS SPECIFIC GOALS, PROVIDES A SIMPLIFIED APPLICATION PROCESS, AND REQUIRES ACCOUNTABILITY THROUGH EVALUATIONS AND MATCHING REQUIREMENTS. IN ADDITION, THE MATCHING REQUIREMENT IS SET UP SO THAT THE LOCAL SHARE INCREASES FROM YEAR TO YEAR. THIS IS THE WAY TO ENSURE THAT LOCAL DOLLARS WILL BE USED RESPONSIBLY. IT IS ALSO THE KEY TO ENSURING A LASTING COMMITMENT ON THE PART OF LOCAL OFFICIALS.

POLICING IS A STATE AND LOCAL -- NOT A FEDERAL -- RESPONSIBILITY. THE ANTI-CRIME LAW OFFERS HELP TO THOSE WHO WANT TO STRENGTHEN THEIR POLICING EFFORTS AND WHO ARE WILLING TO STEP UP AND ACKNOWLEDGE THEIR OWN RESPONSIBILITY. THE ANTI-CRIME LAW ENCOURAGES STATES AND LOCALITIES TO INVEST IN THEIR OWN FUTURE. THE REPUBLICANS BLOCK GRANT DOES NOT. MOST IMPORTANTLY, THE ANTI-CRIME LAW TARGETS FUNDS TO HELP STATES AND LOCALITIES MAKE THE SHIFT TO COMMUNITY POLICING.

THE CHOICE WILL SOON BE BEFORE THIS BODY: WILL WE MAINTAIN THE ANTI-CRIME LAW'S GUARANTEE OF 100,000 COPS WORKING IN EFFECTIVE AND RESPONSIBLE COMMUNITY POLICING EFFORTS SUCH AS THOSE DESCRIBED ABOVE? OR WILL WE REPLACE A WORKING PROGRAM WITH AN IRRESPONSIBLE FEDERAL GIVE-AWAY?

I WILL SAY IT AGAIN BECAUSE IT IS WORTH REPEATING, THE REPUBLICAN BILL DOES NOT GUARANTEE A SINGLE NEW POLICE OFFICER ON ANY STREET IN AMERICA. IT DOES NOT EVEN GUARANTEE THAT A SINGLE DOLLAR WILL REACH ANY POLICE DEPARTMENT. LET US NOT WASTE ANOTHER \$8.5 BILLION TO LEARN THE SAME LESSONS WE LEARNED UNDER LEAA. LET US CHOOSE TO KEEP THE 100,000 COPS PROGRAM IN PLACE.

PRISON GRANTS

LET ME TURN NEXT TO THE SECOND MAJOR SHORTCOMING I MENTIONED. THE SECOND PRIMARY FOCUS OF THE ANTI-CRIME LAW WAS TO HELP STATES MEET THE SERIOUS PRISON CRISIS CONFRONTING MANY STATE PRISON SYSTEMS. AND AGAIN, THE PROGRAM WAS DESIGNED TO MEET TWO GOALS: FIRST, TO HELP STATES INCREASE -- AND THEN USE TO MAXIMUM ADVANTAGE -- THEIR SUPPLY OF PRISON SPACE, SECOND, TO ENCOURAGE STATES TO ADOPT THE KIND OF "TRUTH-IN-SENTENCING" SYSTEM THAT HAS WORKED SO WELL AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL.

TODAY, PRISON SYSTEMS IN 34 STATES ARE UNDER COURT ORDER DUE TO OVERCROWDING. BECAUSE THERE ARE NOT ENOUGH PRISON CELLS, STATES CAN KEEP THOSE VIOLENT CRIMINALS WHO ARE BEHIND BARS FOR ONLY ABOUT HALF THEIR SENTENCE; WORSE YET, 30,000 OFFENDERS EACH YEAR ARE CONVICTED OF A VIOLENT CRIME ARE NOT EVEN SENTENCED TO PRISON. THE BOTTOM LINE -- CONVICTED VIOLENT CRIMINALS WHO SHOULD BE BEHIND BARS ARE NOT, BECAUSE THERE ARE TOO FEW PRISON CELLS.

THE ANTI-CRIME LAW HELPS STATES RESPOND TO THIS PROBLEM WITH \$7.9 BILLION GRANT PROGRAM, UNDER WHICH STATES CAN BUILD AND OPERATE EITHER ADDITIONAL SECURE PRISON CELLS FOR VIOLENT

CRIMINALS OR BOOT CAMP PRISONS FOR NONVIOLENT OFFENDERS, THEREBY FREEING UP SECURE PRISON SPACES FOR VIOLENT CRIMINALS. IN THIS WAY, THE LAW ENCOURAGES STATES TO MAKE THE MOST EFFICIENT USE OF EXISTING PRISON CELLS BY PUTTING VIOLENT OFFENDERS IN THE MOST EXPENSIVE SPACE AND HOUSING NON-VIOLENT, MINOR OFFENDERS AT ONE-THIRD THE COST OF TRADITIONAL PRISON SPACE.

BOOT CAMP PRISONS WERE INCLUDED AMONG THE OPTIONS A STATE COULD CHOOSE UNDER THE PROGRAM FOR ONE REASON AND ONE REASON ONLY -- THEY ARE A CHEAPER MEANS OF INCARCERATING NONVIOLENT OFFENDERS. A BOOT CAMP SPACE COSTS ABOUT ONE-THIRD WHAT A PRISON SPACE COSTS PER INMATE. TODAY 160,000 YOUNG, NON-VIOLENT, MINOR OFFENDERS ARE BEHIND BARS IN COSTLY PRISON CELLS THAT WOULD BE BETTER USED TO HOUSE TRULY VIOLENT, DANGEROUS CRIMINALS. SO MOVING NONVIOLENT OFFENDERS INTO BOOT CAMPS, THEREBY FREEING UP SPACE IN TRADITIONAL PRISONS FOR VIOLENT OFFENDERS, IS A COST-EFFECTIVE RESPONSE TO THE PRISON SPACE SHORTAGE.

IN A PROVISION OF THE PROGRAM THAT REFLECTS A COMPROMISE I STRUCK WITH CONGRESSMAN MCCULLOM, THE LAW RESERVES HALF THE \$7.9 BILLION IN PRISON GRANT MONEY FOR STATES THAT MOVE TOWARDS A "TRUTH IN SENTENCING" MODEL FOR SENTENCING CONVICTED FELONS. NATIONWIDE TODAY, PRISONERS SERVE ON AVERAGE ONLY 40 PERCENT OF THEIR SENTENCES. ENCOURAGING STATES TO REFORM THEIR SYSTEMS IS A WORTHY GOAL. BUT IN ISSUING A CHALLENGE TO THE STATES, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE STANDARD SET BE ONE STATES CAN REALISTICALLY WORK TO MEET.

THE CRIME LAW'S PRISON PROGRAM DOES THAT: THE GRANTS ARE CONDITIONED ON A STATE KEEPING REPEAT VIOLENT OFFENDERS BEHIND BARS FOR AT LEAST 85 PERCENT OF THEIR SENTENCE. SO, LIKE THE 100,000 COPS PROGRAM, THE PRISON PROVISION WAS CAREFULLY DRAFTED TO INCLUDE REASONABLE, BUT SPECIFIC, REQUIREMENTS THAT SERVED SPECIFIC GOALS.

WHEN YOU LOOK AT THE REPUBLICAN'S NEW PRISON PROPOSAL, YOU SEE A MUCH DIFFERENT PICTURE. THIS TIME, THEY HAVE IDENTIFIED A SPECIFIC GOAL; THE PROBLEM IS THEIR PROGRAM ISN'T DESIGNED TO ATTAIN THAT GOAL. THE REPUBLICAN PROPOSAL GIVES STATES MONEY FOR ONE PURPOSE AND ONE PURPOSE ONLY -- TO BUILD AND OPERATE TRADITIONAL PRISONS.

BUT INSTEAD OF ENCOURAGING STATES TO MAXIMIZE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FUNDS, THEY HAVE SEVERELY LIMITED THE WAYS IN WHICH STATES CAN USE THE MONEY. FOR EXAMPLE, CONSIDER A STATE THAT HAS A LARGE STORE OF TRADITIONAL PRISON SPACE, BUT IS CURRENTLY USING 30 PERCENT OF THAT SPACE TO HOUSE NONVIOLENT OFFENDERS. THE MOST EFFECTIVE STRATEGY FOR THAT STATE WOULD BE TO BUILD A BOOT CAMP PRISON TO HOUSE THE NONVIOLENT OFFENDERS NOW IN CONVENTIONAL PRISONS, BECAUSE BOOT CAMP BEDS COST ABOUT ONE-FIFTH THE PRICE TO BUILD, AND ONLY ONE-THIRD THE PRICE TO OPERATE AS CONVENTIONAL PRISON BEDS. THE END RESULT WOULD BE THAT THE STATE COULD KEEP VIOLENT OFFENDERS BEHIND BARS 30 PERCENT LONGER, OR PUT 30 PERCENT MORE VIOLENT OFFENDERS BEHIND BARS, AND COULD DO SO AT ONE-THIRD THE COST OF BUILDING MORE CONVENTIONAL PRISON SPACE.

BUT UNDER THE REPUBLICAN PROPOSAL, THE STATE WOULD BE FORCED TO BUILD MORE EXPENSIVE, CONVENTIONAL PRISON CELLS IF IT WANTED TO RECEIVE THE FEDERAL FUNDS -- EVEN THOUGH IT COULD GET THE SAME RESULTS FOR ONE-THIRD THE PRICE IF IT COULD BUILD A BOOT CAMP PRISON. GOVERNOR ENGLER OF MICHIGAN, GOVERNOR THOMPSON OF WISCONSIN, GOVERNOR WILSON OF CALIFORNIA, GOVERNOR WELD OF MASSACHUSETTS, GOVERNOR EDGAR OF ILLINOIS -- ALL REPUBLICANS -- HAVE JOINED A NUMBER OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNORS WHO ARE OPERATING BOOT CAMPS FOR NONVIOLENT OFFENDERS, SO THAT EXPENSIVE, TRADITIONAL PRISONS CAN BE RESERVED FOR VIOLENT OFFENDERS.

RIGHT NOW, THERE ARE APPROXIMATELY 160,000 FIRST-TIME, NON-VIOLENT PRISONERS ACROSS THE COUNTRY WHO ARE ELIGIBLE FOR BOOT CAMP PRISONS, BUT ONLY ABOUT 10,000 ARE ENROLLED. MOVING MORE OF THESE INMATES INTO BOOT CAMPS WOULD FREE UP TRADITIONAL PRISON CELLS FOR VIOLENT INMATES AND WOULD MAKE THE MOST OF BOTH THE STATE AND THE FEDERAL RESOURCES AVAILABLE FOR PRISONS. AND THAT IS WHAT GOVERNORS FROM BOTH PARTIES ARE TRYING TO DO IN MANY STATES.

I OUTLINED BEFORE THE MISTAKE MADE WITH THE LAW ENFORCEMENT BLOCK GRANTS -- WHERE THE REPUBLICANS FAILED TO DEFINE GOALS AND THEN DEVISED AN AMORPHOUS PROGRAM WITH NO REQUIREMENTS AND NO GUIDELINES. WITH PRISONS, THE REPUBLICANS HAVE MADE THE OPPOSITE MISTAKE -- THEY FAIL TO GIVE THE STATES THE NECESSARY FLEXIBILITY TO MEET THE GOAL THEY IDENTIFY AND INSTEAD HAVE PUT THE STATES IN A STRAIGHTJACKET. THIS MISTAKE IS PARTICULARLY IRONIC GIVEN THAT FLEXIBILITY AND "DEVOLUTION TO THE STATES" IS THE REPUBLICAN WATCHWORD OF THE MONTH.

IN THE HOUSE, THE REPUBLICANS HAVE GONE EVEN FURTHER. TO GET ANY OF THE PRISON MONEY UNDER THE HOUSE REPUBLICAN'S PROVISION, EVEN FIRST-TIME VIOLENT OFFENDER MUST SERVE 85 PERCENT OF HIS SENTENCE. NOW, THIS IS THE ULTIMATE GOAL MANY OF US HAVE IN SIGHT. I WANT TO SEE ALL VIOLENT CRIMINALS SERVING AT LEAST 85 PERCENT OF THEIR SENTENCES. IF YOU DO THE CRIME, YOU SHOULD DO THE TIME. BUT IF WE WANT TO HELP STATES MEET THAT GOAL, WE HAVE TO BE REALISTIC. TO MEET THE HOUSE REPUBLICAN'S STANDARD, MOST STATES WOULD HAVE TO DOUBLE THE TIME THEY KEEP VIOLENT OFFENDERS BEHIND BARS FROM APPROXIMATELY 42 PERCENT TO THE REQUIRED 85 PERCENT.

IT WOULD COST THE STATES AT LEAST \$60 BILLION TO DO THIS -- \$60 BILLION DOLLARS, WHEN THE ENTIRE AMOUNT OF FEDERAL FUNDS AVAILABLE IS \$? BILLION. NOW, I COME FROM A STATE THAT ACTUALLY MEETS THIS REQUIREMENT -- DELAWARE HAS TRUTH-IN-SENTENCING LAWS -- BUT IT IS ONE OF ONLY THREE OR FOUR STATES THAT DOES. I RESPECTFULLY SUGGEST THAT NONE OF THE REMAINING 47 STATES WOULD BE WILLING TO SPEND TRIPLE THE AMOUNT OF ANY FEDERAL FUNDING THEY COULD RECEIVE, EVEN IF THEY DESPERATELY NEEDED MORE PRISON SPACE.

SO, AS INCREDIBLE AS IT SEEMS, THE HOUSE REPUBLICANS HAVE SUCCEEDED IN WRITING A PROGRAM THAT WILL ACTUALLY PRODUCE FEWER PRISON CELLS -- FEWER PRISONS -- THAN WHAT IS IN CURRENT LAW. RECOGNITION OF THIS PROBLEM WAS THE POINT, AS I UNDERSTOOD IT, OF WHAT THE NATIONAL GOVERNORS' ASSOCIATION WROTE TO ME JUST A FEW MONTHS AGO -- A LETTER, SIGNED BY GOVERNOR WILSON, AMONG OTHERS. IT SAID: "WE URGE YOU TO RESIST ANY EFFORT TO IMPOSE A STRINGENT SET OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURES AND SENTENCING

REQUIREMENTS ON THE STATES AS A CONDITION OF FEDERAL ASSISTANCE TO INCARCERATE VIOLENT CRIMINALS." I ALSO TRUST THAT THIS PROBLEM IS THE REASON THE SENATE REPUBLICANS HAVE STAYED WITH THE REPEAT VIOLENT OFFENDER STANDARD IN THEIR VERSION OF THE PRISON GRANT PROGRAM.

NOW IT IS NICE TO SEE THAT, DESPITE WHAT MY REPUBLICAN COLLEAGUES IN THE SENATE SAID DURING THE DEBATE LAST SUMMER, ABOUT HOW THE 85 PERCENT STANDARD MUST HOLD FOR FIRST-TIME OFFENDERS, THEY HAVE CHANGED THEIR VIEW. IN THEIR NEW BILL, THE SENATE REPUBLICANS APPLY THE 85 PERCENT STANDARD TO REPEAT VIOLENT OFFENDERS, WHICH IS WHAT IS IN THE CURRENT LAW. WHAT'S INTERESTING IS THAT THE CURRENT LAW WAS THE RESULT OF A COMPROMISE THAT I WORKED OUT WITH CONGRESSMAN MCCOLLUM OVER IN THE HOUSE. BUT NOW CONGRESSMAN MCCOLLUM IS BACK OVER THERE REWRITING THE VERY COMPROMISE WE AGREED ON, MAKING THE 85 PERCENT STANDARD APPLY TO EVERYBODY.

SO WE HAVE THE SENATE REPUBLICANS SWITCHING FROM FIRST-TIME TO REPEAT OFFENDERS, AND THE HOUSE REPUBLICANS FLIP-FLOPPING IN THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION, FROM REPEAT OFFENDERS TO FIRST-TIMERS. THESE POLITICAL GAMES MAY BE FASCINATING TO A LOT OF PEOPLE IN WASHINGTON. BUT WHILE WE'RE UP HERE PLOWING BACK OVER OLD GROUND, SWAPPING POSITIONS, CLAIMING WE'RE TOUGHER THAN THE NEXT GUY AND HAVING A GRAND OLD TIME, WE AREN'T HELPING ANYBODY BUILD ANY MORE PRISONS.

UNDER THE NEW REPUBLICAN PLAN, IT IS LIKELY THAT FEWER THAN 10,000 PRISON CELLS WILL BE BUILT. THE MONEY WILL BE SITTING HERE IN WASHINGTON, IN THE TRUST FUND, WAITING TO BE SENT OUT TO THE

STATES, BUT NO ONE WILL BE ABLE TO QUALIFY FOR IT. THE END RESULT WILL BE NO JAILS, NO PRISONS, NO MORE VIOLENT OFFENDERS BEHIND BARS.

FINALLY, THE REPUBLICAN PROPOSAL ACTUALLY WEAKENS THE RIGHTS OF CRIME VICTIMS. UNDER THE PROGRAM WE HAVE NOW, THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT IS IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES THAT ENSURE VICTIMS' INTERESTS ARE CONSIDERED AT EVERY STEP OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS: THAT VICTIMS ARE NOTIFIED OF THE STATUS OF THEIR CASES AND THE OFFENDERS; THAT THEY ARE PROVIDED THE CHANCE TO GO TO ALL PUBLIC HEARINGS AND PROCEEDINGS; THAT THEY HAVE THE RIGHT TO TESTIFY AT SENTENCING AND PAROLE HEARINGS; AND THAT THEY GET RESTITUTION FROM THEIR ASSAILANTS. THE REPUBLICAN PROPOSAL REFERS ONLY TO VICTIMS' RIGHT TO BE HEARD AT SENTENCING AND RELEASE HEARINGS, AND IT LIMITS THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT'S ABILITY TO ENCOURAGE THE BROADEST POSSIBLE RANGE OF VICTIM INPUT INTO THE SYSTEM.

THE REPUBLICAN PRISON PROPOSAL WILL BUILD FEWER PRISONS, IT WILL KEEP FEWER VIOLENT FELONS BEHIND BARS, AND IT WILL SHORTCHANGE THE RIGHTS OF CRIME VICTIMS. IT SHOULD BE REJECTED.

PREVENTION PROGRAMS

I TURN NOW TO AN ISSUE THAT HAS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF MORE MISINFORMATION AND OUTRIGHT MISCHARACTERIZATION THAN PERHAPS ANY OTHER IN THE CRIME DEBATE -- AND THAT'S SAYING QUITE A LOT! I REFER, OF COURSE TO THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE NATION OUGHT TO PREVENT CRIME BEFORE IT HAPPENS, INSTEAD OF CONTINUING TO DO NOTHING UNTIL AFTER THE SHOTS ARE FIRED, UNTIL AFTER OUR CHILDREN

BECOME ADDICTED TO DRUGS, UNTIL AFTER MORE AMERICANS' LIVES ARE RUINED, BEFORE WE TAKE ACTION.

THE ANTI-CRIME LAW ENACTED LAST YEAR ANSWERED THAT QUESTION BY JOINING THE COMMITMENT MADE TO LAW ENFORCEMENT -- TO 100,000 MORE POLICE OFFICERS, TO 100,000 TO 125,000 MORE PRISON CELLS -- WITH A COMMITMENT TO CRIME PREVENTION. IT SAID LOUD AND CLEAR THAT WE CANNOT KEEP EXPANDING THE SINK WITHOUT ALSO TRYING TO SHUT OFF THE FAUCET.

THE STRAIGHTFORWARD LOGIC OF THIS PROPOSITION IS SUPPORTED BY THE CONCLUSION OF VIRTUALLY EVERY CRIMINOLOGIST, EVERY LEGAL SCHOLAR, EVERY SOCIOLOGIST, EVERY PSYCHOLOGIST, EVERY MEDICAL AUTHORITY. THOSE WHO STUDY THIS ISSUE AGREE THAT BREAKING THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE AND CRIME REQUIRES AN INVESTMENT IN THE LIVES OF OUR CHILDREN, IN THE FORM OF SUPPORT AND GUIDANCE THAT HELPS THEM REJECT THE VIOLENCE AND ANARCHY OF THE STREETS IN FAVOR OF TAKING POSITIVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR OWN LIVES.

MOST IMPORTANTLY, PREVENTION IS WHAT COPS WANT -- WHAT VIRTUALLY EVERYONE IN LAW ENFORCEMENT WANTS. EVERY COP I HAVE TALKED TO, EVERY PROSECUTOR, EVERY PRISON WARDEN, EVERY PROBATION OFFICER LITERALLY SAYS THE SAME THING -- WE CAN'T DO IT ALONE.

LISTEN TO THE COPS:

"LAW ENFORCEMENT IS MORE THAN JUST ARRESTING PEOPLE AND PUTTING PEOPLE IN PRISON," SAID BUD MEEKS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL SHERIFFS' ASSOCIATION. "IT'S ALSO TRYING TO KEEP PEOPLE FROM GOING TO PRISON." [WASHINGTON TIMES, AUG. 2, 1994]

BOB SCULLY OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF POLICE ORGANIZATIONS SAYS: "IF YOU DON'T HAVE THE PREVENTION PORTION, YOU BETTER GO OUT AND MORTGAGE THIS COUNTRY TO BUILD PRISONS..." [LAW ENFORCEMENT NEWS, DEC. 31, 1994]

THE FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE SAID THE 1994 CRIME ACT "HAS A BALANCE OF ENFORCEMENT, PROSECUTION/COURTS, PRISONS, PREVENTION, WHICH WILL MAKE A REAL DIFFERENCE IN THE INCIDENCE OF CRIME OVER THE NEXT FIVE YEARS."

AND THE INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF POLICE OFFICERS SAYS "THE CRIME BILL IS AN APPROPRIATE BALANCE OF POLICE, PUNISHMENT AND PREVENTION, A HOLISTIC APPROACH CRITICAL TO A LONG TERM CURE."

LISTEN TO PROSECUTORS AS WELL:

THE NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION SAID, "WHILE MANY MAY CRITICIZE SPECIFIC COMPONENTS ... WE BELIEVE THAT THE FINAL EFFORT PROVIDES A BALANCE OF PROGRAMS THAT HOLD THE POTENTIAL FOR MAKING A VAST DIFFERENCE FOR OUR NATION IN REDUCING THE CRIME RATE."

LISTEN TO PRISON WARDENS:

IN A RECENTLY RELEASED SURVEY OF WARDENS ACROSS THE COUNTRY, PRISON OFFICIALS SAID IF THEY HAD AN EXTRA \$10 MILLION TO SPEND FIGHTING CRIME, THEY WOULD SPEND MORE THAN HALF -- 57 PERCENT OF IT -- ON PREVENTION PROGRAMS.

AND LISTEN TO LOCAL OFFICIALS, THOSE IN GOVERNMENT WHO ARE CLOSEST, FACE-TO-FACE WITH THE SCOURGE OF DRUGS AND VIOLENCE

EVERY DAY, THE VERY PEOPLE WHOM THE REPUBLICANS -- AND I BELIEVE RIGHTLY SO -- WANT TO GIVE GREATER VOICE:

LISTEN TO REPUBLICAN MAYORS GIULIANI OF NEW YORK AND RIORDAN OF LOS ANGELES -- QUOTE: "BY FUNDING PROVEN PREVENTION PROGRAMS FOR YOUNG PEOPLE, THE CRIME BILL OFFERS HOPE -- HOPE THAT IN THE FUTURE WE CAN REDUCE THE NEED FOR SO MANY POLICE OFFICERS AND JAILS." [USA TODAY, AUG. 17, 1994, OP-ED]

LISTEN TO PAUL HELMKE, THE REPUBLICAN MAYOR OF FORT WAYNE, INDIANA: "IT'S A LOT LESS EXPENSIVE TO DO THINGS ON THE PREVENTION SIDE THAN ON THE POLICE SIDE."

AND MAYOR HELMKE GETS ANOTHER CRUCIAL POINT AS WELL: "THERE HASN'T BEEN A CHANCE FOR THE CRIME BILL TO HAVE AN EFFECT. IT DOESN'T MAKE SENSE TO CHANGE THE RULES BEFORE WE CAN SEE IF THIS BILL REALLY WORKS." [USA TODAY, JAN. 19, 1995]

THIS UNITY AMONG LAW ENFORCEMENT WAS THE FORCE THAT DROVE THE PREVENTION PROGRAMS INTO THE CRIME LAW. WE NEED TO GIVE THESE PROGRAMS A CHANCE. IF AFTER A FEW YEARS THE PREVENTION PROGRAMS IN THE ANTI-CRIME LAW DO NOT WORK, I WILL BE FIRST IN LINE TO CHANGE IT.

NOW MY REPUBLICAN COLLEAGUES ARE CLEVER, AND THEY KNOW THAT EXPERT, POLICE, AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC STRONGLY SUPPORT UNDERTAKING PREVENTION EFFORTS HAND IN HAND WITH INCREASING ENFORCEMENT -- JUST AS THE CRIME LAW PROVIDES. SO LAST YEAR, MY REPUBLICAN COLLEAGUES EMBARKED ON A CAMPAIGN OF CHARACTER

ASSASSINATION, IF YOU WILL -- THEY SET OUT TO DESTROY THE REPUTATION OF THE PREVENTION PROGRAMS IN THE CRIME LAW. AND THEY DID IT WITH ONE WORD -- THE DREAD LABEL OF "PORK." FOR MONTHS, THEY INDISCRIMINATELY AND CONSISTENTLY APPLIED THE LABEL "PORK" TO ANYTHING AND EVERYTHING CALLED PREVENTION. I GUESS THEY WERE PURSUING THE APPROACH THAT IF YOU SAY SOMETHING OFTEN ENOUGH, PEOPLE WILL START TO BELIEVE IT, WHETHER IT IS TRUE OR NOT.

THE TRUTH OF COURSE IS THAT THERE IS NO PORK IN THIS BILL; THERE IS NO MONEY SPECIFICALLY MARKED FOR A SINGLE DISTRICT OR STATE; NO MONEY TO FUND A PET PROJECT BACK HOME FOR ANY MEMBER OF CONGRESS. THERE IS NOT ONE SINGLE POUND, THERE IS NOT EVEN AN OUNCE OF PORK IN THIS BILL -- THERE IS NO PORK IN HERE WHATSOEVER. NONE.

LET'S TAKE A LOOK AT WHAT THE BILL DOES FUND. THE BILL CONTAINS A \$30.2 BILLION TRUST FUND, FILLED WITH THE SAVINGS FROM REDUCING THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE. MORE THAN 80 PERCENT OF THE MONEY -- ABOUT \$25 BILLION -- PAYS FOR 100,000 MORE STATE AND LOCAL POLICE OFFICERS AND 100,000 MORE STATE PRISON CELLS. ANOTHER \$1.6 BILLION PAYS FOR MORE AGGRESSIVE PROSECUTION OF VIOLENT CRIMES AGAINST WOMEN. \$2.6 BILLION PAYS FOR MORE FBI AGENTS, MORE DEA AGENTS, MORE BORDER PATROL AGENTS, MORE TREASURY AGENTS, MORE PROSECUTORS, MORE U.S. ATTORNEYS, AND MORE AGGRESSIVE PROSECUTION OF VIOLENT CRIMES AGAINST WOMEN.

SO, OUT OF THE ENTIRE \$30.2 BILLION, \$5.4 BILLION -- JUST UNDER 18 PERCENT -- IS FOR PROGRAMS TO PREVENT CRIME BEFORE IT HAPPENS. THE REPUBLICANS HAVE TARGETED EVERY SINGLE PREVENTION GRANT TO

STATES OR LOCALITIES -- FOR COMPLETE ELIMINATION. LET'S GET PAST THE LABELS AND SEE WHAT THIS MONEY PAYS FOR. THE FIRST MYSTERY WE MUST UNRAVEL IS WHY THE REPUBLICANS OPPOSE THE DRUG COURT PROGRAM, A \$1 BILLION GRANT PROGRAM TO ENABLE STATES TO TOUGHEN ENFORCEMENT AGAINST FIRST-TIME AND MINOR NONVIOLENT DRUG OFFENDERS.

DRUG COURT PROGRAMS TARGET LOW-LEVEL DRUG OFFENDERS, WHO ARE OUT ON THE STREETS BREAKING INTO CARS AND STEALING TO SUPPORT THEIR HABITS. IN MOST COMMUNITIES, THESE OFFENDERS ARE NOW LARGELY IGNORED BY OUR SYSTEM. THEY DO NOT GO TO PRISON AND THEY ARE NOT REQUIRED TO COMPLY WITH DRUG TESTING OR TO GET TREATMENT. MOST ARE SIMPLY SENT RIGHT BACK OUT ON THE STREETS ON LARGELY UNSUPERVISED PROBATION. BACK OUT ON THE STREET, THESE OFFENDERS GO RIGHT BACK TO THE CYCLE OF DRUG USE -- AND THEN TO CRIME IN SUPPORT OF THEIR HABITS. ALL TOO OFTEN, THEIR CRIMINAL ACTIVITY SPIRALS UP TO MORE SERIOUS, VIOLENT OFFENDERS AS THEIR ADDICTIONS GET DEEPER.

THE HEART OF THE PROBLEM, HERE, IS THAT THE PROBATION AND PAROLE POPULATIONS HAVE BOOMED, JUST LIKE THE PRISON POPULATIONS. MORE THAN 3.5 MILLION OFFENDERS -- HALF OF THEM DRUG ADDICTS -- ARE NOW LIVING IN THEIR COMMUNITIES UNDER THE NOMINAL SUPERVISION OF COURT OR CORRECTIONS OFFICERS. ACCORDING TO THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT, SOME 135,000 DRUG-ADDICTED THIEVES AND OTHER OFFENDERS ARE RELEASED ON PROBATION EVERY YEAR. WITH AN AVERAGE PROBATION SENTENCE OF FOUR YEARS, THIS MEANS THAT ABOUT 600,000 DRUG-ADDICTED OFFENDERS ARE ON OUR NATION'S STREETS EACH DAY.

MANY OF THESE PROBATIONERS ARE HIGH-RATE OFFENDERS; HARD-CORE ADDICTS ARE ESTIMATED TO COMMIT UP TO 200 CRIMES A YEAR TO SUPPORT THEIR HABITS. AND WE KNOW WHO THESE PEOPLE ARE. JUDGES AND PROBATION OFFICERS HAVE THEIR NAMES. SO WHY DO WE IGNORE THEM? BECAUSE THE NUMBER OF PROBATION OFFICERS HAS NOT KEPT PACE WITH THE GROWTH IN THE PROBATION POPULATION, PROBATION CASELOADS NOW AVERAGE 118 OFFENDERS. IN SOME AREAS, CASELOADS CAN EXCEED 200! WITH SO MANY OFFENDERS, OFFICERS ARE ABLE TO CONDUCT ONLY MINIMAL SUPERVISION AT BEST -- PERHAPS 15 MINUTES A WEEK.

DRUG COURTS ARE DESIGNED TO TAKE THESE OFFENDERS AND THEIR CRIMES SERIOUSLY. DRUG COURTS GIVE THESE OFFENDERS A CHANCE TO STAY OUT OF JAIL -- BUT IT IS A CHANCE NOT A FREE PASS.

DRUG COURTS REQUIRE OFFENDERS TO SUBMIT TO MANDATORY DRUG TESTING AND TREATMENT, STRICT SUPERVISION BY A COURT OFFICER, BACKED UP BY SANCTIONS IF THEY FAIL. HOW CAN ANYONE CALL THIS "PORK" OR EVEN A "SOCIAL PROGRAM?" WHAT CONCEIVABLE DEFINITION OF PORK WOULD INCLUDE AN ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM THAT SUBJECTS DRUG OFFENDERS TO A TOUGHER RESPONSE FROM OUR COURT AND CORRECTIONS SYSTEM?

PROSECUTORS, JUDGES AND CORRECTIONS OFFICIALS ACROSS THE COUNTRY WANT TO ADOPT DRUG COURT PROGRAMS. FRANKLY, THE MONEY IN THE CRIME LAW IS MODEST IN FACE OF THE NEED AND THE DESIRE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT FOR THIS TOOL. SO \$1 BILLION OF THE \$5.4 BILLION THE REPUBLICANS HAVE TARGETED AS "WASTEFUL PREVENTION SPENDING" IS ACTUALLY FOR DRUG COURTS. WHAT DOES THE REMAINING \$4.4 BILLION DO?

THE NEXT \$2 BILLION IS ALREADY IN THE FORM OF BLOCK GRANTS -- THE PRECISE, FLEXIBLE FUNDING MECHANISM THE REPUBLICANS FAVOR. UNDER CURRENT LAW, CITIES, TOWNS AND COUNTIES GET \$2 BILLION TO SPEND ON PROGRAMS THEY DEVELOP TO PREVENT CRIME. IN FACT, NEARLY \$400 MILLION OF THE MONEY IS IN A BLOCK GRANT PROGRAM AUTHORED BY HOUSE REPUBLICANS, THAT LETS A COMMUNITY CHOOSE WHETHER IT WANTS A BOYS OR GIRLS CLUB, AN ATHLETIC LEAGUE, AMONG OTHER PROGRAMS.

WITH \$2 BILLION ALREADY IN BLOCK GRANTS, THAT LEAVES \$2.4 BILLION IN PREVENTION FUNDING. OF THAT \$2.4 BILLION, MORE THAN \$800 MILLION IS IN THE COMMUNITY SCHOOLS PROGRAM, WHICH KEEPS SCHOOLS OPEN IN THE AFTERNOONS AND EVENINGS AND ON WEEKENDS, SO KIDS LIVING IN DRUG AND CRIME-INFESTED NEIGHBORHOODS CAN HAVE A SAFE PLACE TO GO, AND WORK OR PLAY SPORTS WITH POSITIVE MENTORS INSTEAD OF GANG MEMBERS. EIGHTEEN MONTHS AGO, THIS PROGRAM HAD STRONG BIPARTISAN SUPPORT -- IT WAS ORIGINALLY SPONSORED BY SENATORS DOMENICI AND DANFORTH AS WELL AS SENATORS DODD AND BRADLEY -- AND WAS ENDORSED BY MAYORS OF ALL POLITICAL STRIPES -- INCLUDING MAYORS GIULIANI AND RIORDAN.

ANOTHER \$625 MILLION IS IN THE MODEL INTENSIVE GRANTS PROGRAM -- WHICH TARGETS THE CITIES AND TOWNS HARDEST HIT BY VIOLENCE FOR COORDINATED PREVENTION AND LAW ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS. THIS PROGRAM IS SUBSTANTIALLY SIMILAR TO THE WEED AND SEED PROGRAM CHAMPIONED BY THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION AND TO THE DRUG EMERGENCY AREAS PROGRAM, WHICH RECEIVED BI-PARTISAN SPONSORSHIP FROM SENATORS GORTON AND D'AMATO WHEN IT PASSED THE SENATE IN 1990.

NOW WE'RE DOWN TO AN EVEN \$1 BILLION. OF THAT BILLION, \$200 MILLION IS FOR MORE EFFECTIVE PROSECUTION AND PUNISHMENT OF YOUNG OFFENDERS. WITH THE RISE IN SERIOUS JUVENILE VIOLENCE THAT WE'VE SEEN OVER THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS, \$200 MILLION COMMITMENT IN A \$30 BILLION BILL SEEMS TO BE TO BE A MODEST AMOUNT TO FOCUS ON HELPING STATES REFORM THEIR JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM TO DEAL WITH THESE DELINQUENTS.

THAT LEAVES \$800 MILLION. \$400 MILLION OF THAT IS TARGETED AT DRUG TREATMENT IN PRISONS. NOW, LOGIC TELLS US THAT IF ALOT OF CRIME IS COMMITTED BY PEOPLE WHO ARE ADDICTED TO DRUGS, HELPING A CRIMINAL ADDICT KICK HIS HABIT BEFORE RELEASING HIM FROM PRISON MAKES SENSE. PRESIDENT BUSH'S DRUG CZAR, WILLIAM BENNETT, ISSUED A REPORT BACK IN 1990 THAT FOUND TREATMENT CUTS OFFENDERS' CRIME RATES IN HALF. AND SENATOR GRAMM OF TEXAS ENDORSED PRISON DRUG TREATMENT ON THE SENATE FLOOR DURING THE CRIME BILL DEBATE LAST NOVEMBER. YET TODAY, THE REPUBLICAN PROPOSAL WIPES OUT FUNDING FOR TREATING DRUG-ADDICTED STATE PRISONERS. INEXPLICABLY, THEY KEEP THE \$100 MILLION FOR TREATING FEDERAL PRISONERS, BUT GONE IS THE EFFORT TO HELP STATES -- WHERE THE VAST MAJORITY OF THESE OFFENDERS ARE.

NOW, WE'RE DOWN NOW TO \$500 MILLION. NEARLY \$100 MILLION OF THAT IS FOR COORDINATION OF PREVENTION EFFORTS AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL -- TO REDUCE ANY DUPLICATION, TO TARGET APPROPRIATE AREAS AND POPULATIONS WITH THE MOST EFFECTIVE PROGRAMS. \$270 MILLION IS FOR COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATIONS TO CREATE JOBS THAT PROVIDE OPPORTUNITIES FOR INNER-CITY YOUTHS IN THE LEGITIMATE ECONOMY.

ALMOST \$40 MILLION IN THE LAW IS FOR, DARE I SAY IT, ORPHANAGE-LIKE, RESIDENTIAL FACILITIES FOR TROUBLED YOUTHS. \$45 MILLION IS FOR THE "G.R.E.A.T." PROGRAM, WHICH SEEKS TO KEEPS KIDS OUT OF GANGS THE WAY THE "DARE" PROGRAM SEEKS TO KEEP KIDS OFF OF DRUGS. AND FINALLY, THERE IS \$1 MILLION DEVOTED TO A NATIONAL COMMISSION TO STUDY THE CAUSES OF VIOLENCE AND COME UP WITH EVER MORE EFFECTIVE SOLUTIONS DOWN THE ROAD.

SO I THINK IT IS CLEAR, MR. PRESIDENT, THAT ONCE YOU GET PAST ALL OF THE POLITICAL POSTURING AND GAMESMANSHIP, THE 1994 ANTI-CRIME LAW IS A SOUND AND MEASURED CRIME-FIGHTING STRATEGY. IT DOESN'T WASTE TAXPAYERS' DOLLARS. ON THE CONTRARY, IT WILL SAVE TAXPAYERS' LIVES. UNFORTUNATELY, FOR THE MILLIONS OF VIOLENCE-WEARY AMERICANS, INSTEAD OF MOVING FORWARD, WE ARE SCHEDULED TO RETURN TO YESTERDAY'S DEBATE. ALL I CAN SAY IS THAT REPUBLICANS SEEM MORE INTERESTED IN FIGHTING DEMOCRATS, THAN IN FIGHTING CRIME.

CONCLUSION

I HAVE TRIED TODAY TO OUTLINE MY OBJECTIONS TO THE REPUBLICANS RETREAT ON THE KEY PROVISIONS OF THE ANTI-CRIME LAW ENACTED LAST YEAR. I WILL RETURN TO ADDRESS OTHER PROVISIONS OF EQUAL SIGNIFICANCE THAT THE REPUBLICANS WILL RAISE, BUT THAT WERE NOT A PART OF LAST YEAR'S ANTI-CRIME LAW. MOST SIGNIFICANT AMONG THESE, PERHAPS, IS REFORM OF HABEAS CORPUS -- AN AREA WHERE REFORM IS LONG OVERDUE, BUT WHERE THE REPUBLICAN PROPOSAL, WHILE LABELED REFORM, ACTUALLY AMOUNTS TO ELIMINATION OF THE HISTORIC WRIT. I WILL ALSO ADDRESS THE SO-CALLED REFORM OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE, WHICH AGAIN THE REPUBLICANS EFFECTIVELY SEEK TO ELIMINATE.

WORKING PAPER SERIES

USING ELECTORAL CYCLES IN
POLICE HIRING TO ESTIMATE THE
EFFECT OF POLICE ON CRIME

Steven D. Levitt

Working Paper No. 4991

NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, INC.



USING ELECTORAL CYCLES IN
POLICE HIRING TO ESTIMATE THE
EFFECT OF POLICE ON CRIME

ABSTRACT

Previous empirical studies have typically uncovered little evidence that police reduce crime. One problem with those studies is a failure to adequately deal with the simultaneity between police and crime: while police may or may not reduce crime, there is little doubt that expenditures on police forces are an increasing function of the crime rate. In this study, the timing of mayoral and gubernatorial elections is used to identify the effect of police on crime. This paper first demonstrates that increases in the size of police forces disproportionately occur in mayoral and gubernatorial election years, a relationship that had previously gone undocumented. After controlling for changes in government spending on other social programs, there is little reason to think that elections will be otherwise correlated with crime, making elections ideal instruments. Using a panel of large U.S. cities from 1970-1992, police are shown to reduce crime for six of the seven crime categories examined. Each additional police officer is estimated to eliminate eight to ten serious crimes. Existing estimates of the costs of crime suggest that the social benefit of reduced crime is approximately \$100,000 per officer per year, implying that the current number of police is below the optimal level.

Steven D. Levitt
Harvard Society of Fellows
78 Mount Auburn Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
and NBER

Crime is a major social and economic issue in the United States. The cost of crime to victims is estimated at approximately \$200 billion per year (Miller, Cohen, and Rossman 1993). The indirect costs of crime are also substantial. Government outlays on the criminal justice system totaled \$74 billion in 1990, including \$32 billion on police protection. Private expenditures on self-protection are on the same order of magnitude.

Following the seminal contribution of Becker (1968), a large literature has addressed issues of criminal behavior and sanctions (e.g., Stigler 1970, Ehrlich 1973, Witte 1980, Myers 1983, McCormick and Tollison 1984, Andreoni 1991). One of the most surprising empirical results in this literature is the repeated failure to uncover evidence that an increase in the number of police reduces the crime rate. Of the twenty-two studies surveyed by Cameron (1988) that attempt to estimate a direct relationship between police and crime using variation across cities, eighteen find either no relationship or a positive (i.e. incorrectly signed) relationship between the two.¹

There are many reasons to suspect that existing estimates of the relationship between police and crime are biased against finding that police reduce crime. The primary source of bias is the clear simultaneity between police and crime rates (Fisher and Nagin 1978).² If more

¹ In addition to cross-sectional studies, there are two other sources of evidence. Quasi-experimental evidence from a study performed in Kansas City in the early 1970's found no statistically significant difference in crime when the number of police assigned to fifteen different patrol beats were varied (Kelling et al. 1974). Analysis of police on the New York subway system in the 1960's suggests that an increased police presence reduces the number of robberies slightly, but at an extremely high taxpayer cost per crime eliminated (Wilson 1983). Also, Tauchen et al. (1993) find a deterrent effect of police resources in an analysis that combines individual-level information on arrests with aggregate information on police.

² In fact, in a recent survey of the effect of police on crime, Sherman (1992) dismisses studies of the level of police resources based on cross-sectional variation in a footnote due to this

police are hired when crime is increasing, a positive correlation between police and crime can emerge, even if police reduce crime. The 1994 Crime Bill provides a good case study. In response to opinion polls ranking crime as the number one problem facing the country, a crime bill authorizing funding for an additional 100,000 police officers was passed into law.

Similarly, the presence of unobserved heterogeneity across cities will impart an upward bias on cross-sectional estimates of police effectiveness. Cities that have a high level of underlying criminality are likely to have both high crime rates and large police forces. Detroit, for instance, has twice as many police officers per capita as Omaha, and a violent crime rate over four times as high, but it would be a mistake to attribute the differences in crime rates to the presence of the police.

A final source of bias against finding that police reduce crime is the use of *reported* crimes rather than *actual* crimes in empirical studies, due to the lack of availability of the true measure. Victimization surveys find that only thirty-eight percent of all crimes are reported to the police. Even for a serious crime such as robbery, reporting rates are only 54.5 percent.³ As the police presence increases, reporting rates may rise if the perceived likelihood of a crime being solved increases. Furthermore, police officers have a great deal of discretion in choosing whether or not to make arrests in many cases such as domestic disputes. It is possible that the likelihood of arrest for a given incident decreases with the officer's workload, which may in turn be a function of the level of police staffing.

criticism, instead focusing on policing strategies.

³ Definitions of the crime categories used in this study, the same as those employed by the FBI in gathering Uniform Crime Reports, are presented in the appendix.

This paper develops a methodology that goes well beyond the existing literature on the topic in dealing with the first two sources of bias: simultaneity and unobserved heterogeneity.⁴ The primary innovation of the paper is the way in which it deals with the simultaneity between police and crime. In order to identify the effect of police on crime, a variable is required that is correlated with changes in the police force, but does not belong directly in the crime "production function." The instruments employed in this paper are the timing of mayoral and gubernatorial elections.

Section II of this paper documents an electoral cycle in police force staffing that was previously unrecognized in the literature. Increases in the size of police forces in large cities are disproportionately concentrated in mayoral and gubernatorial election years. For instance, the mean percentage change in sworn police officers for the cities in my sample is 2.6% in gubernatorial election years, 2.2% in mayoral election years, and only 0.4% in non-election years. That relationship persists after controlling for a variety of demographic, socio-economic and economic factors.

If elections are to serve as valid instruments, then they must be uncorrelated with crime, except through variables that are included in the equation explaining crime. The most obvious ways in which elections might systematically affect the crime rate (other than through changes in the police force) are through electoral cycles in other types of social spending, or through politically induced fluctuations in economic performance. Consequently, spending on education and public welfare programs are included in the equations, as are state unemployment rates.

⁴ Unfortunately, data restrictions make it impossible to adequately address the bias from changes in reporting behavior in the current analysis. To the extent that reporting bias is present, the results of this paper understate the effectiveness of police.

Having controlled for those factors, it seems plausible to argue that election timing will be otherwise unrelated to crime. Tests of overidentifying restrictions support that claim.

The second source of bias in estimates of police effectiveness, unobserved heterogeneity in underlying criminality across cities and over time, is dealt with in three ways. First, concerns over differences across cities are eliminated by including city-fixed effects in all specifications so that the parameters are identified only using within-city variation over time. Secondly, city-level trends are also included to account for the fact that some cities have become more dangerous over time, while others have not. These city-level trends explain a substantial portion of the variance in crime rates. Furthermore, their inclusion has a large effect (in the predicted direction) on estimates of police effectiveness, lending support to the claim that the number of police responds to rising and falling crime rates in a city. Third, socio-economic and demographic controls are included in the analysis to capture variation in a city's population over time. These controls included the percent of the population that is black, the percent of female headed households, and the percent of the population between the ages of 15 and 24 (the age group most likely to engage in criminal activities).

The results of the paper, based on a panel of 59 large cities over the period 1970-1992,⁵ suggest that sworn police officers reduce crime, and the magnitude of that reduction is both substantively important and statistically significant. Point estimates are negative for six of the seven crime categories examined (murder and non-negligible manslaughter, forcible rape, assault, robbery, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft). Larceny is the only crime that has

⁵ These cities represent all U.S. cities with directly elected mayors and a population of over 250,000 at some point in the time period analyzed.

an unexpected (but statistically insignificant) positive sign. The elasticities of crime with respect to the number of sworn officers range from 0.06 to -1.23 across the various crimes. Civilian employees of police forces, in contrast, appear to have a negligible effect on reported crime.

Estimated at the means of the data, each additional sworn police officer reduces the number of crimes across the various categories by eight to ten per year. Using estimates of the costs of crime to victims developed by Cohen (1988) and Miller, Cohen, and Rossman (1993), the value to society of eliminating those crimes is approximately \$90,000-\$130,000 per officer per year, suggesting that the current number of police officers in large cities is below the socially optimal level.

While the particular focus of this paper is on the issue of police and crime, the methodology employed here, namely the use of political variation to identify the effects of public policies, may prove to be of much broader applicability. Because public policies emerge from a political process, electoral cycles and differences in political institutions are logical instruments for public policy changes. To the extent that the timing of elections and political institutions are relatively fixed, such instruments may provide a more plausibly exogenous source of variation than either cross-sectional or time-series analyses.

The outline of the paper is as follows. Section I summarizes the data set used in the analysis. The second section demonstrates a positive correlation between changes in the size of the police force and both city mayoral races and gubernatorial elections. Section III presents the estimates of the effect of police on crime using the variation in police staffing due to electoral cycles to identify the parameters. Section IV attempts to place a social value on the reduction in crime, and considers the public policy implications of the results. Section V offers

a brief conclusion.

Section I: The Data

The data used are a panel of 59 U.S. cities, with observations running from 1970-1992. These cities represent all U.S. cities satisfying two criteria: (i) the city population exceeds 250,000 at some point in the time period analyzed, and (ii) the mayor is directly elected. Because mayoral elections are critical to identifying the model, six cities (Cincinnati, Virginia Beach, Norfolk, Wichita, Santa Ana, and Colorado Springs) that satisfy the population cut-off, but do not have direct election of mayors, are excluded from the sample.

Data on crime are taken from the Uniform Crime Reports published by the FBI, and are available annually on a city-level basis for seven types of crime: murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, forcible rape, assault, robbery, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft. Precise definitions of the crimes are presented in the appendix. Data on the number of police, both sworn officers and civilians employees, are also taken from the FBI Uniform Crime Reports. Sworn officers carry a gun and have the power of arrest; civilian employees do not.

Summary statistics on police and crime for the cities in the sample, expressed in values per 100,000 population, are presented in Table 1. Overall, there is slightly less than one reported crime per ten individuals, the majority of which are relatively minor property crimes.⁶ Violent crime rates for the cities in the sample are more than twice as high as for the nation as

⁶ In fact, this number greatly understates the true crime rate for two reasons. First, less than half of all crimes are reported to the police. Secondly, when multiple offenses occur in the commission of a single crime, the FBI only records the most serious of these offenses. Thus, if a robber kills someone in the process of a hold-up, and then steals a car to flee the scene, only the murder would be included in the FBI statistics.

a whole; property crimes per capita are almost twice as frequent in these cities. One notable feature of the data on reported crime is the wide variation across cities. The crime rates for an individual crime category often vary by orders of magnitude across cities. While some of this variation is probably attributable to differences in crime definitions and reporting, the variation is nonetheless striking.⁷ There are almost 300 police per 100,000 population, approximately 80% of whom are sworn officers.

Figure 1 shows the time series (in per capita terms) of violent crime, property crime, and sworn officers for the cities in the sample. In each case, the 1970 value of the category is indexed as 100. Violent crime has seen the greatest increase, more than doubling in these cities between 1970 and 1992. Until the mid 1980's, violent crime and property crime tracked each other fairly closely. Since that time, violent crime has steadily increased, while property crime has flattened.⁸ The number of sworn officers has grown less rapidly than crime rates.

In addition to the data on police and crime, a number of demographic, government spending, and economic variables are included in the regressions. Ideally, those variables would be available at the city-level on an annual basis. Unfortunately, the data limitations with respect to city-level data necessitate a number of compromises. While city populations are available annually, the only convenient data source for the percent of a city's population that is black and the percent

⁷ Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (1994) undertake an in-depth analysis of this issue.

⁸ Victimization surveys, unlike the reported crime statistics used in this analysis, show a declining trend in crime rates per capita (for the nation as a whole). Unfortunately, more disaggregated data on victimization is not available. For an extensive discussion of crime data in the United States, see O'Brien (1985).

living in female headed households is the decennial census. Consequently, a linear interpolation of those variables is made for non-census years. Since demographic variables tend to evolve slowly, this may serve as a reasonable approximation. The data on the percentage of the population between the ages of 15 and 24 used in this paper is also linearly interpolated from the decennial census, and suffers from the further defect that it is defined at the SMSA rather than city level.

Data on government spending for education and public welfare programs has a different complication. While annual city government outlays on such programs are available, less than ten percent of total state and local expenditures on both of those categories originate at the city level.⁹ State outlays, however, are not broken down according to the city that receives the money. Therefore, the spending variables that are employed in this paper are combined state and local outlays per capita (in 1992 dollars) on a particular category in a given state and year. While this variable misses some of the city-level variation, it is assumed that any mayoral election cycles in such spending will be small since city budgets for such activities are also small. Finally, annual state unemployment rates are used to control for economic fluctuations. Summary statistics for the various control variables described above are presented in Table 2.

Section II: Mayoral and Gubernatorial Election Cycles in Police Staffing

There are many reasons to suspect a link between elections and the timing of changes in the size of city police forces, particularly in big cities. First, crime is a critical political issue

⁹ In 1992, only eight of the fifty-nine cities in the sample spent an appreciable amount on education. Local school boards are typically financed independently from city governments.

in these cities, and has been since the crime rate began to rise in the early 1960s. Crime consistently ranks among the most important issues facing the nation in opinion surveys, and is frequently *the* most critical issue when the economy is performing well. Given the importance of crime as a political issue, incumbents will have incentives to increase the police force in advance of elections, either in hopes of actually reducing crime, or simply to demonstrate that they are "tough on crime."¹⁰

For mayors, especially, police are an ideal target for political manipulation since police departments are organized at the city level with only a few exceptions.¹¹ That both gives ultimate decision-making authority on police issues to the mayor, and also means that credit or blame concerning police performance are easily traced to the mayor by voters. Furthermore, the high rate of turnover among police officers (who can typically retire after 20 years with a full pension) and the ease of altering the size of an incoming class of cadets makes both upward and downward shifts in the size of the police force easy to accomplish. In contrast, a city's economic performance is largely outside the control of the mayor. For that reason, it is not clear that voters hold mayors responsible for a city's economic situation; Chubb (1988) finds that even governors bear little responsibility for the state economy in the eyes of voters.

While the motives of incumbent governors are likely to be similar to those of incumbent mayors, the mechanism by which governors might affect levels of city police staffing are less straightforward since the state government does not typically directly hire local police. State

¹⁰ Monkkenon (1992) details various other political uses of urban police forces over the last century, although no mention is made of election cycles in police staffing.

¹¹ In recent years, a few cities have formed a joint force with surrounding communities. Nashville, for instance, shares its police force with Davidson County.

governments do, however, provide substantial local aid to city governments (representing more than 20 percent of general revenues for large cities), as well as a more limited amount of intergovernmental grants tied specifically to local law enforcement. Besley and Case (1994) document gubernatorial election cycles for a range of fiscal variables. Although intergovernmental grants is not among the categories Besley and Case (1994) examine, the existence of cycles in intergovernmental grants would not be implausible in light of their other results.

Empirically, changes in the size of police forces do indeed tend to mirror the political cycle in large cities. A simple comparison of the mean percentage change in the number of police officers in the sample across election and non-election years reflects this pattern (standard deviations in parentheses):

	<u>%Δ Overall Police</u>	<u>%Δ Sworn Officers</u>	<u>%Δ Civilian Employees</u>
Gubernatorial Election Year (N=349)	2.8 (0.3)	2.6 (0.3)	4.5 (1.1)
Mayoral Election Year (N=402)	2.8 (0.3)	2.2 (0.3)	5.1 (1.0)
No Election (N=629)	0.7 (0.2)	0.4 (0.2)	2.2 (0.9)

Overall, police forces grow by 2.8 percent on average (with a standard error of 0.3) in

either gubernatorial or mayoral election years, but only 0.7 percent (with a standard error of 0.2) in non-election years.¹² Dividing police forces between sworn officers and civilians reveals similar patterns for both categories, although the standard errors on civilian employees are much larger.

Figure 2 provides a year-by-year comparison of increases in sworn officers for cities with elections in a given year (either mayoral or gubernatorial) and cities without elections.¹³ While there is substantial year-to-year variability in the average change in the number of sworn officers, cities with elections in the current year exhibit higher rates of increase (or smaller decreases) in 20 of the 23 years. If changes in sworn officers are independent across cities and are unrelated to the timing of elections, the likelihood that cities holding elections would have higher rates of increase in 20 of 23 cases is less than one in 4,000.¹⁴

Another way of examining the robustness of the relationship between sworn officers and elections is to analyze the data on a city-by-city basis. A full list of cities, along with information on mean changes in sworn officers in gubernatorial, mayoral, and non-election years is provided in the Appendix. Excluding Washington D.C., which does not have gubernatorial elections, 43 of the 58 cities in the sample have higher mean rates of increase in gubernatorial

¹² Approximately 3% of the observations in the sample have both mayoral elections and gubernatorial elections in the same year. Consequently, there is a small amount of double-counting in these simple averages. The patterns are unaltered if such observations are discarded.

¹³ Throughout the paper the analysis will tend to focus on sworn officers rather than civilian police employees. This is partly because of an a priori expectation that sworn officers will have a greater impact on crime, and partly because empirically the link between elections and sworn officers is stronger.

¹⁴ Of course, changes in police forces across cities are not truly independent since grants from state to local governments will tend to covary for cities in the same state.

election years compared to years in which there are neither gubernatorial or mayoral elections. If cities represent independent observations, the odds of this pattern are less than one in 5,000 if elections do not affect police hiring. 39 of the 59 cities have greater mean increases in sworn officers in mayoral election years versus non-election years (with one tie). Again assuming independence across cities, the likelihood of this pattern is less than one in 150 if mayoral elections have no affect on police staffing.

Those simple averages, of course, do not take into account possible correlation between the timing of elections and other factors that might influence growth of the police force, such as the state of the economy. It is also possible that election cycles in police staffing exhibit a more complicated structure than simply being high in election years and low in non-election years. Different patterns may also emerge in cities that have two year mayoral terms rather than four year terms.

To incorporate those possibilities, the relationship between police and elections is modeled more formally as follows:

$$P_{it} = E_{it}\theta + X_{it}\delta + \gamma_i + \lambda_t + v_{it} \quad (1)$$

where P_{it} is the percent change in the relevant police staffing category for city i in year t , E is a matrix of indicator variables corresponding to the years of the mayoral and gubernatorial election cycle, and X is a matrix of covariates.

Table 3 presents three sets of regression estimates of equation (1) corresponding to

overall police, sworn officers, and civilian police employees. The regressions in Table 3 allow a different intercept for each year of the election cycle for both mayoral and gubernatorial elections. The effect of mayoral election years is also allowed to vary according to whether the mayor's term is two or four years. All election coefficients are relative to the relevant omitted category, which in each case is the year directly following an election. Year indicators are included in the regressions, removing any national-level shocks to police hiring. City-fixed effects are also included; therefore the parameters are identified using only within-city variation over time.

A strong relationship between election years and police hiring continues to hold for overall police and sworn officers after controlling for the other factors. For instance, sworn officers are estimated to increase by an additional 1.3% in mayoral election years (relative to the year after the election) in cities with two year mayoral terms. For cities with four year mayoral terms, sworn officers increase by an extra 1.0 percent in election years, and also exhibit some tendency towards greater than average growth in the year prior to an election year. The individual mayoral election year coefficients are only marginally statistically significant, but are jointly significant at the .05 level in both columns (1) and (2). The largest electoral effects are for gubernatorial election years, in which sworn officers increase by an additional 3.0 percent. There is some evidence that sworn officers also increase disproportionately two years before gubernatorial elections, although there is not a strong election cycle rationalization for such a result.¹⁵

¹⁵ Following Besley and Case (1994), who find differential tax and fiscal behavior by incumbent governors conditional on the presence of binding term limits, I divided governors between those constrained from seeking re-election and those who are not constrained. While

While the election coefficients are positive for civilian police employees, the estimates are both individually and jointly statistically insignificant due in part to imprecise estimates. That result is not surprising. To the extent that only sworn officers have a direct impact on crime, one would expect that political manipulation of police departments would be concentrated on sworn officers.

The other variables in the regression are generally statistically insignificant and carry coefficients that are substantively small. The exception to that pattern is the state unemployment rate, which has a statistically significant negative coefficient in columns (1) and (2). For each percentage point increase in unemployment, the predicted growth rate in the police force declines by over three-tenths of a percentage point.

Section IV: Estimating the Effect of Police on Crime

The preceding section demonstrates a correlation between elections and changes in the police force. In order for election timing to serve as an instrument to identify the effect of police on crime, it must also be the case that elections are validly excluded from the crime "production function." The primary reason that such an exclusion might be invalid would be a failure to control for other variables that are both correlated with crime and also affected by electoral cycles. In particular, spending on public welfare or education might fall into that category since such spending may have effects on criminal activities by changing the opportunity sets of potential criminals. It is also possible that state and local elections induce economic

there was some evidence in the raw data that unconstrained governors induce more extreme cycles in police hiring, the restriction of identical behavior could not be rejected in the specifications shown in Table 3.

fluctuations akin to the political business cycle observed at the national level (Alesina and Sachs 1988). In estimating a relationship between police and crime, therefore, controls are included for state and local spending on both public welfare and education, as well as state unemployment rates. Having controlled for such factors, election cycles would appear to be plausible instruments.

Another potential source of upward bias in estimating a relationship between police and crime is unobserved heterogeneity across cities and over time. Three steps are taken to deal with such heterogeneity. First, city-level fixed effects are included in all specifications. Thus, the coefficients are identified using only within-city variation over time, lessening concern over the possible omission of explanatory variables that systematically vary across cities, and also avoiding the problem of non-comparability of reported crime statistics across cities (O'Brien 1985). Second, city-level trends are included to account for the fact that large changes in the underlying criminality of a given city can occur over time. Per capita crime in Jersey City increased by over 250% between 1970 and 1992. In contrast, San Jose saw a 30% decrease in per capita crime over the same period. For all of the crime categories examined, the city trends are jointly statistically significant at the .01 level, as are the city-fixed effects. Finally, year dummies and demographic controls are included in the analysis to further capture variation in a city's situation over time.

The effect of police on crime is allowed to enter both contemporaneously and with a one-year lag.¹⁰ From a theoretical perspective, increases in the police force may affect crime with a lag. Police reduce crime either via deterrence (preventing the commission of the initial crime

¹⁰ Inclusion of longer lags did not substantially alter the findings.

due to an increased likelihood of being caught), or through incapacitation (catching repeat offenders so they cannot commit future crimes). If there are lags in the response of criminal behavior to the probability of being caught, the deterrence effect will not be immediate. Similarly, the benefits of incapacitation are realized for as long as the offender is in jail. On a purely practical level, another reason for including lagged changes in the police force is the staggered nature of the available data. Data on reported crimes are collected on a calendar year basis, whereas the size of the police force is a snapshot as of October 31st.¹⁷ As a consequence, if changes in the police force occur shortly before October 31st, there is little opportunity for those changes to affect crime in the current year.

The impact of police on crime is estimated using two-stage least squares, treating the police variables as endogenous and the other right-hand side variables as exogenous. The particular form of the equations to be estimated are as follows:

$$C_{it} = P_{it}\beta + X_{it}\eta + \tau\theta_i + \gamma_t + \lambda_i + \epsilon_{it} \quad (2)$$

$$P_{it} = E_{it}\phi_i + X_{it}\delta + \gamma'_t + \lambda'_i + \tau\omega_i + \epsilon'_{it} \quad (3)$$

where C_{it} is the (logged) number of crimes in a given category in city i in year t , P is a matrix of (logged) contemporaneous and lagged sworn and civilian police staffing variables, X is a

¹⁷ The fact that the size of the police force is reported as of October 31st is quite fortuitous for this analysis since most mayoral elections and all gubernatorial elections occur in early November.

matrix of covariates, and E is a matrix of election year indicators. Equations 2 and 3 also include year dummies, city-fixed effects, and city-level trends. The effect of police on crime is identified via the election year indicator variables that are included in the first stage equation (equation 3), but excluded from the second stage (equation 2).

In the empirical estimation, the effect of mayoral elections on police staffing is allowed to vary across cities and the effect of gubernatorial elections is allowed to vary across states. In other words, mayoral elections in Miami are allowed to have a different effect on changes in the police force than mayoral elections in Chicago, but every mayoral election in Miami is assumed to have the same effect on the police force. Gubernatorial elections are constrained to have the same effect on police in San Jose and San Francisco, but can have different effects across states. A priori, there is no reason to believe that different mayors or governors have either equal incentives or equal capability to manipulate the police force for political purposes. Further justification for allowing the effects of elections to vary across cities is that the restriction of equal ϕ 's across all cities in equation 3 is rejected at the .01 level for sworn officers.

There are both advantages and disadvantages to using such a large set of instruments. Allowing election cycles to vary by city exploits the available information more efficiently, leading to smaller standard errors than would be obtained with a more limited set of instruments. A second benefit of allowing electoral effects to vary by city is that it generates a large number of testable overidentifying restrictions. One cost of having so many instruments is that it may lead to estimates that are biased in the same direction as those obtained using OLS. If the *true* relationship between elections and the police force is identical across all cities, then allowing that

relationship to vary by city will tend to pick up "bad" variation: cities that exhibit strong electoral fluctuations in police under that scenario will tend to be the cities that (by chance) had increases in criminality in election years.¹⁸ In the limit, where there is a separate instrument for each observation in the data set, two stage least squares is identical to OLS. A second drawback of having so many instruments is that convergence to asymptotic properties occurs slowly when the correlation between the instruments and the variables that are instrumented for is low (Staiger and Stock 1993). While that critique is unlikely to apply to the estimated coefficients on sworn police officers, where elections are good predictors of staffing changes, it may be quite relevant to the estimates on civilian employees where the explanatory power of electoral cycles is much lower.

Table 4 presents the results of two stage least squares estimation of equation (2) for each of the seven individual crime categories. In all specifications, feasible generalized least squares is used to take into account heteroskedasticity across cities. For simplicity, only the sum of the coefficients on current and lagged changes in police (as well as the appropriate standard errors) are reported. Since the dependent variable and the police variables are both in logs, those sums represent the estimated elasticity of crime for each category with respect to sworn and civilian police employees respectively.

The first row of Table 4 presents the estimated elasticity of various types of crime to sworn police officers. The point estimates range from 0.06 to -1.23. The estimated elasticities

are negative for six of the seven crime categories.¹⁹ Only larceny carries a positive (but statistically insignificant) coefficient. For three crime categories (murder, robbery, and motor vehicle theft), the estimates are statistically significant at the .05 level. The coefficient for rape is statistically significant at the .10 level.

In contrast to sworn officers, civilian employees appear to have little systematic effect on crime, although this result must be interpreted with caution given the poor performance of the instruments in the first stage. The estimated elasticities are evenly distributed between positive and negative signs. Interestingly, the two crime categories where civilian police have the largest negative impact are burglary and larceny, the least serious of the offenses included in the analysis, and precisely the crimes where increases in sworn officers had little impact.

Because the election cycle variables that serve as instruments are allowed to vary by city, the specifications in Table 4 are overidentified, allowing for a test of the exogeneity of the extra instruments. To test those restrictions, the residuals from the second stage regression of TSLS are regressed on all of the exogenous variables included in the specification, as well as the full set of election-cycle instruments. The test statistic for the validity of the overidentifying restrictions is computed as $N \cdot R^2$ where N is the number of observations and R^2 is the unadjusted R-squared from the regression of the residuals on the exogenous variables and the instruments. That test statistic is distributed χ^2 with degrees of freedom equal to the number of

¹⁸ Experimentation with reduced sets of instruments did not reveal any systematic tendency for the 2SLS estimates to move further away from the OLS estimates.

¹⁹ A similar pattern holds when looking at the contemporaneous and once-lagged effects of sworn officers individually, rather than at the sum of those values. For all of the crime categories except murder and larceny, the contemporaneous and once-lagged coefficients are both negative and of similar magnitudes. For murder, the contemporaneous effect of sworn officers is .03 (with a standard error of .25), whereas the lagged effect is -.66 (with a standard error of .24). For larceny, the contemporaneous effect is slightly positive, while the lagged effect is slightly negative. Both estimates are statistically insignificant.

overidentifying restrictions, in this case 208. For all seven categories, the test statistic is well within conventional bounds. The highest value of the test statistic, obtained for murder, is significant at only the .25 level. The inability to reject the overidentifying restrictions reinforces the intuition that election cycles are a reasonable choice of instrument.

The other coefficients in Table 4 are also of interest, although the results are mixed. In six of the seven specifications, the estimated elasticity of crime with respect to population is positive, although generally less than one. The restriction implied by estimating the relationship between police and crime in per capita terms is easily rejected for all of the crime categories.²⁰

The percentage of the population that is black is generally negatively correlated with crime, while the percentage of female headed households has a generally positive effect on crime. Because of the extremely high positive correlation between those variables ($\rho = .86$), however, it is somewhat difficult to interpret those coefficients separately. The percentage of the population between the ages of 15 and 24 has the expected positive sign for all crimes except rape and murder. A one standard deviation change in that variable (1.5 percentage points) translates into an increase of more than 10% in the number of robberies and motor vehicle thefts, and an increase in excess of 5% for burglaries and larcenies.

Spending on public welfare programs carries a small negative coefficient across all of the specifications, implying that increased public welfare spending reduces crime. In contrast, education spending per capita has a positive effect in crime. One explanation for this result is

²⁰ Estimating equation (2) in per capita terms is equivalent to imposing the restriction that $\beta_5 = 1 - \beta_1 - \beta_2 - \beta_3 - \beta_4$. (To see this, impose that restriction on equation (2), subtract $\ln(\text{population})$ from both sides, and rearrange terms to obtain a per capita regression.)

that educational spending is serving as a proxy for the age distribution of the population.

Changes in the unemployment rate appear to have a substantial effect on crimes where monetary gain is the primary motivation (robbery, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft), but have little effect on "crimes of passion." A one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate leads to a jump of more than one percent in the larceny, and burglary rates. Those elasticities are generally larger than those obtained using national-level time-series data (Cantor and Land 1985, Devine et al. 1988). Evaluated at the 1992 sample means, a one percentage point increase in unemployment leads to an additional 106 reported crimes per year per 100,000 population.

In order to understand how the estimates of police impact are affected by the inclusion of city-level trends and instrumenting, Table 5 presents crime-by-crime estimates of the police coefficients from three different specifications. The first specification, presented in rows 1 and 4, includes all of the variables in Table 4 except for city-level trends, and does not instrument with the election cycle. The second specification, in rows 2 and 5, is identical to the first specification except that city-level trends are added. The final specification also instruments using the election variables, and is thus identical to that presented in Table 4. If unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneity are present, the coefficients should become more negative moving down the columns.

Focusing first on the top three rows corresponding to sworn officers, the effects of controlling for city-level trends and instrumenting are dramatic. In the simplest specification, all seven of the point estimates on sworn officers carry an unexpected positive sign, and the estimates are statistically significant at the .05 level in six of the seven cases. Adding city trends

to control for unobserved variation in cities over time has a large effect on the estimates. Comparing rows 1 and 2, the point estimates are more negative for every crime category in the latter. Five of the seven estimates now have the predicted negative sign. The point estimates are statistically significant at the .05 level for three crimes (robbery, burglary, and motor vehicle theft), and are statistically significant at the .10 level for both murder and rape. Instrumenting in row 3 leads to further declines in the coefficients in five of the seven categories (but also results in standard errors approximately three times larger than those of the other specifications). It therefore appears that both unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity of police increases have contributed to the failure of previous studies to uncover negative effects of sworn officers on crime. The effects on civilian police employees in Table 5 are much less dramatic. Adding city-level trends has no systematic effect on the coefficients. Instrumenting does tend to make the estimates more negative.

One possible criticism of the estimates presented thus far is the relatively poor data quality for many of the covariates included in Table 4. A logical question to consider, therefore, is whether the negative relationship between sworn officers and crime is an artifact of the data problems or the particular specification employed. Table 6 re-estimates equation (2) omitting all of the covariates except for city population. It is reassuring that the estimates are virtually identical for all of the crime categories except murder and rape, where the effect of sworn officers remains negative, but is reduced. As before, tests of the overidentifying restrictions are well-within accepted limits, supporting the validity of the instruments, even when no factors are controlled for in the crime equation except for year dummies, city-fixed effects, and city trends.

The negative relationship between sworn officers and crime is robust to two further

alterations to the specification (tabular results are not provided, but full estimates are available from the author on request). First, instrumenting using only gubernatorial elections or only mayoral elections, rather than both, does not systematically affect the estimates, but does increase the standard errors. Second, inclusion of changes in *other* crimes as an explanatory variable in the regressions has little effect on the estimated effect of police. One might expect that changes in other crimes will better reflect changes in the underlying criminality of a city than will the crude demographic controls included in this analysis. While the coefficients on other crimes are generally positive as expected, the relationship between sworn officers and crime is unaltered.

Section V: Implications of the Estimated Effects of Police on Crime for Public Policy

While the estimates of the previous section suggest a negative relationship between sworn police officers and crime, those elasticities alone are not sufficient to determine the appropriate policy prescription. A thorough analysis of the public policy question requires careful consideration of at least four further issues. First, one must make an assumption concerning the ability of the police to affect unreported crimes. As long as criminals do not "specialize" in either reported or unreported crime, then the effect of police is likely to be similar across the two classes of crimes. In favor of that argument, a criminal does not know in advance whether a crime will be reported. It may be, however, that unreported crimes systematically differ from reported crimes (e.g., spousal assault tends to be reported less frequently than assaults at bars). If that is the case, an increased police presence may not have a large effect on unreported crimes. Secondly, a valuation must be placed on the social cost of crime. Ideally, that social

cost would include not only the value of stolen property, but also the substantial psychic costs of crime, as well as the marginal costs of precautionary actions taken to avoid being a victim of crime (e.g., home security systems, car alarms, or avoiding Central Park after dark).²¹ Third, some consideration must be given to the social value of police activities that are not related to reductions in the subset of crimes considered in this paper. Less than a quarter of all arrests are for crimes included in this analysis. Among the criminal activities not included in this paper that impose substantial social costs are driving under the influence, drug-related activities, arson, fraud, and vandalism. Moreover, police spend only half of their time on crime related activities (Greene and Klockars 1991). Finally, one must assess the degree to which the estimates of this paper continue to be biased against finding effects of police due to changes in reporting behavior.²²

While an exhaustive analysis of those four issues goes beyond the scope of this paper, it is nonetheless possible to derive rough estimates of a lower bound on the social benefits associated with increasing police staffing. The estimates that follow do not take into account any reporting bias, nor do they include any benefits of police activities except those related to the

²¹ One might also consider what social weight is given to the monetary gain and/or utility of the criminal from committing the crime.

²² Empirical studies of the importance of the reporting bias range widely. Craig (1987) finds the elasticity of crime reporting with respect to the clearance rate (arrests/reported crimes) to be 0.60, with a standard error of 0.31, using data on Baltimore neighborhoods that combines information from the National Crime Survey and data from the Baltimore police department. Levitt (1994), in contrast, finds little or no evidence that reporting rates are a function of the number of police using victimization survey data from 26 cities. Levitt (1994) also examines changes in the ratio of murders to other crimes as the number of police changes. Under the assumption that murders are always reported, but the reporting rate of other crimes varies with the number of police, that ratio might be expected to be a declining function of the number of police. No evidence of such a decline is uncovered.

seven crimes analyzed in this paper. Efforts are made, however, to deal with the other issues. Estimates of the number of crimes reduced by an additional police officer are presented under two alternative scenarios. In the first scenario, police are assumed to have no impact on the rate of unreported crimes. The second set of estimates assumes that the effect of police on unreported crime is identical to the effect on reported crime. The truth is likely to fall somewhere in between those two alternatives. In measuring the costs of crime, estimates provided by Cohen (1988) and Miller, Cohen, and Rossman (1993) are utilized. Those papers attempt to capture monetary costs of crime (medical bills, property loss, lost productivity) and quality of life reductions due to pain and suffering. To gauge the quality of life reductions, jury awards in civil suits, excluding punitive damages, are estimated for a wide range of injuries. Those awards are then mapped to the distribution of injuries associated with the various crime categories. These cost estimates do not include the costs of additional preventative measures taken by victims, lifestyle changes associated with the marginal crime, costs to employers, or legal costs, and therefore may understate the true costs of crime.

Table 7 presents estimates of the impact of adding one additional sworn officer. The values in Table 7 are based on the estimated elasticities from Table 4, and are computed at the sample means. Column (1) is the impact of an additional officer on reported crime. Column (2) reflects the combined decrease in reported and unreported crimes, assuming that the effect of police is identical across reported and unreported crimes. Estimates of the reporting rate for each crime are based on the National Crime Survey (U.S. Department of Justice 1992).

As column (1) demonstrates, an additional sworn police officer is estimated to reduce the number of reported crimes by approximately eight per year. While the bulk of this reduction

is due to fewer auto thefts, each officer also reduces the number of reported robberies by 1.6 per year, eliminates 0.6 assaults, and prevents a rape every eight years and a murder every twenty years. The number of reported larcenies, based on the estimates in Table 4, are actually projected to increase. When the potential effects of police on *unreported* crime is also included (column 2), the number of crimes eliminated per officer per year increases only slightly, to approximately ten. Adding unreported crimes has a relatively minor effect on crimes eliminated since most of the crimes for which sworn officers are found to be effective have high reporting rates.

Columns (3) and (4) are the Cohen (1988) and Miller, Cohen, and Rossman (1993) estimates of the monetary and quality of life losses due to crime.²³ For violent crimes, the bulk of the costs are associated with quality of life reductions. For property crimes, the costs are almost exclusively monetary. Column (5) combines the information in the first four columns to provide an estimate of the social value of the reduction in crime. The first value in column (5) is based only on the decrease in reported crimes in column (1); the second value is derived from the sum of columns (1) and (2). The reduction in robberies provides the greatest social

²³ The Miller, Cohen, and Rossman (1993) estimates, which update Cohen (1988), are available for rape, robbery, and assault only. The Cohen (1988) estimates are therefore used for burglary, larceny, and auto theft. I diverge from Miller, Cohen, and Rossman (1993) in the determination of the cost of a murder. According to their estimates, the cost per murder (adjusted to 1992 dollars) is over \$2.7 million. Over \$700,000 of that value is for lost productivity. Following Schelling (1989), however, I do not include that value since the victim would have been the primary consumer of that lost productivity, and therefore it is not clear that society loses on net. The value Miller, Cohen, and Rossman (1993) assign to lost quality of life from per murder, almost \$2 million in 1992 dollars, similarly seems too high. Therefore, I (somewhat arbitrarily) assign a quality of life reduction of \$400,000 for each murder. It is, of course, straightforward to calculate social benefits to crime reductions under alternative valuations that the reader deems more appropriate.

benefit. Each robbery eliminated has a social benefit of \$17,800. Including only the change in reported robberies (1.6) yields a social benefit of \$28,700 per officer; when the possible effect on unreported robberies is also included the social value roughly doubles. Reductions in the number of auto thefts also make a substantial contribution to social welfare -- on the order of \$22,500 to \$30,100 for an additional officer per year. Reduced murders represent a substantial social benefit of roughly \$20,000 per officer per year. The other violent crime categories (rape and assault) also make substantial contributions. The impact of burglary and larceny, however, is minor.

Summing across all seven categories, the estimated social benefit of each additional officer is approximately \$90,000 to \$130,000.²⁴ Given that an additional police officer will receive a salary of approximately \$40,000, and impose non-salary overhead costs of a roughly equal magnitude,²⁵ the number of sworn officers in large cities appears to be slightly below the optimal levels. In all likelihood, the estimates above understate the true social value of police due to changes in reporting behavior, the focus on a limited subset of crimes, and the omission of important components of the overall costs of crime, further reinforcing the conclusion that

²⁴ To get a rough estimate of the precision of the social cost estimates, standard errors were computed assuming that the costs per crime were exact and that the estimates of the effect of police on the different crime categories were uncorrelated. Both of those assumptions will lead the computed standard errors to understate the true values. The estimated standard error on the social benefits to an additional police officer are \$17,900 when only reported crimes are included, and \$29,200 when both reported and unreported crimes are included.

²⁵ Donohue and Siegelman (1994) report that there were 812,000 state and local police employees in 1990, and total salary expenditure for this group was \$33.4 billion in 1990, for an average salary of \$41,000. The shadow cost of raising public funds should also be included in the calculation of the overall cost of an additional police officer.

there are too few police in large cities.²⁶

Given that public welfare spending also appeared to reduce crime in Table 4, it is worth examining the cost-effectiveness of increasing public welfare spending in reducing crime. The mean level of public welfare spending per capita in the sample is \$255. A one percent increase in public welfare spending for a city with a population of 100,000 would cost \$255,000. Using the estimated elasticities from Table 4 and the estimates of the cost of crime to victims, the total social value of reduced crime is approximately \$39,000. Thus, while public welfare spending does not appear cost-beneficial in terms of crime reduction alone, this channel should not be ignored in a broader consideration of the benefits of public welfare spending.²⁷

Section VI: Conclusions

Previous studies have found little systematic evidence that increasing the size of a city's police force lowers the crime rate. By controlling more effectively for unobserved differences across cities and eliminating the simultaneity between police and crime through the use of the timing of mayoral and gubernatorial elections, this paper does uncover evidence that police reduce crime. Estimates of the social costs of crime suggest that current levels of police staffing

²⁶ Another consideration that is ignored in this cost-benefit analysis is the possible change in prison costs associated with the increase in the number of police. As McCormick and Tollison (1984) demonstrate, however, the effect of increasing the number of police on the number of arrests is ambiguous. When the likelihood of detection increases, a greater fraction of the crimes committed result in arrests, but some crimes that would previously have been committed are now successfully deterred and therefore do not lead to arrests. In McCormick and Tollison's data on fouls in the ACC basketball tournament, the number of fouls (arrests) drops substantially when the number of officials (police) is increased.

²⁷ For a thorough analysis of the possible cost-benefit tradeoff implied by a variety of educational and labor market interventions, see Donohue and Siegelman (1994).

in large cities are below the optimal level. Caution is warranted, however, in extrapolating the findings of this paper to a broader sample of cities. The cities analyzed here have far higher levels of criminal victimization than the nation as a whole; it is likely that the benefits of additional officers will be more limited in a broader sample of cities. The analysis of this paper suggests a number of avenues for future research. The most obvious shortcoming of the current work is the reliance on reported crime statistics. While individual-level victimization data is available, the absence of geographic indicators precludes a straightforward analysis of the relationship between police staffing and victimization. The lack of consensus in existing estimates of the magnitude of the reporting bias (Craig 1987, Levitt 1994) suggests that further work in this area is warranted. A second issue deserving more attention is the extent to which crime spills over between central cities and surrounding suburbs. The analysis presented here focuses exclusively on central cities. It is possible, however, that at least some of the decrease in crime in central cities associated with increased police staffing represents a geographical spillover of crime rather than a true reduction.

The finding that city police hiring is affected by the timing of elections adds to the short, but growing, literature documenting the effects of politics on economic decision-making (e.g., Rogoff 1990, Besley and Case 1994, Poterba 1994). This paper goes beyond those previous works, however, by using the political budget cycle as a source of exogenous variation to identify the value of public expenditures. The approach taken in this paper could in theory be applied to a wide range of public policies at all levels of government, and is likely to lead to more reliable estimates than studies based on either cross-sectional or time-series variation.

Table 1: Summary Statistics
(All Values per 100,000 residents except population)

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Mean</u>	<u>Standard Deviation</u>	<u>Minimum</u>	<u>Maximum</u>
Population	716,692	1,030,250	85,000	7,896,000
Total Crimes	8,902	2,586	3,105	20,690
Violent Crimes	1,162	684	103	4,353
Murder	19	12	0.7	81
Rape	68	31	4	199
Assault	521	353	42	2,386
Robbery	554	377	26	2,338
Property Crimes	7,740	2,584	3,105	20,690
Burglary	2,307	732	600	4,994
Larceny	4,364	1,403	550	10,003
Motor Vehicle Theft	1,069	693	165	5,369
Overall Police	294	110	79	910
Sworn	237	99	70	781
Civilian	57	27	5	176

Notes: All variables except population are per 100,000 residents. The sample used is a set of 59 large U.S. cities with directly elected mayors. Data on crimes and police from *Uniform Crime Reports* published by the FBI. For a breakdown of the data by city, see the appendix.

Table 2: Summary Statistics for Demographic, Economic, and Spending Controls

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Mean</u>	<u>Standard Deviation</u>		<u>Minimum</u>	<u>Maximum</u>
		<u>Within-City</u>	<u>Across Cities</u>		
% Black	23.0	2.3	18.1	0.1	78.2
% Female Headed Households	14.9	1.0	4.3	5.6	31.9
% Age 15-24	17.2	1.5	17.2	11.5	25.4
Public Welfare Spending Per Capita (1992 dollars)	255.2	56.8	126.0	33.5	847.7
Education Spending Per Capita (1992 Dollars)	765.2	79.7	122.9	445.9	1193.4
State Unemployment Rate	6.5	1.8	2.0	2.0	15.5

Notes: Summary statistics are for the 59 large U.S. cities included in the sample for the years 1970-1992. Data on % Black and % Female Headed Household are city-level data interpolated from the decennial census. % Age 15-24 is defined at the SMSA level, and is also based on decennial census. Spending data is combined state and local government spending on an annual basis, and is defined at the state level. See text for further description of data sources.

Table 3. The Election Cycle as a Predictor of Changes in the Police Force

Variable	(1) % Δ Total Police	(2) % Δ Sworn Officers	(3) % Δ Civilian Employees
Mayoral Election Timing			
Election Year (2-year Term)	.014 (.007)	.013 (.007)	.018 (.020)
Election Year (4-year Term)	.008 (.005)	.010 (.004)	.000 (.018)
Year Before Election (4-year terms only)	.005 (.005)	.007 (.004)	-.006 (.018)
Two Years Before Election (4-year terms only)	-.002 (.005)	-.001 (.004)	-.003 (.018)
Gubernatorial Election Timing			
Election Year	.026 (.008)	.030 (.008)	.015 (.037)
Year Before Election (4-year terms only)	.002 (.005)	-.001 (.005)	-.009 (.021)
Two Years Before Election (4-year terms only)	.004 (.008)	.015 (.008)	-.004 (.033)
% Δ City Population	.030 (.057)	.005 (.053)	.119 (.214)
% Δ Black	-.013 (.009)	-.014 (.009)	-.014 (.022)
% Δ Female Headed	-.014 (.018)	.018 (.016)	-.088 (.080)
State Unemployment Rate	-.331 (.136)	-.347 (.131)	-.413 (.503)
% Age 15-24 in SMSA	3.131 (2.392)	2.92 (2.16)	9.638 (10.351)
Year Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes
City Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes
Significance of Mayoral Election Year?	.05	.02	.67
Significance of All Election Years?	< .01	< .01	.82
R-Squared	.22	.21	.07

Notes: Sample includes 59 large U.S. cities with directly elected mayors, 1970-1992. Number of observations is 1,275. The omitted election year category in all cases is the year following an election. The effects of elections on police staffing are constrained to be equal across all cities. White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses.

Table 4. The Effect of Increased Police on Crime
Instrumenting with Election Cycles and Including Covariates

	Murder	Rape	Assault	Robbery	Burglary	Larceny	Vehicle Theft
In Sworn Officers	.63 (.30)	.46 (.25)	.28 (.26)	-.67 (.26)	-.11 (.20)	.06 (.17)	-1.23 (.29)
In Civilian Police	.05 (.08)	.03 (.06)	.03 (.07)	.06 (.07)	-.07 (.06)	-.13 (.06)	.00 (.07)
In City Population	.69 (.19)	.56 (.14)	-.04 (.16)	.44 (.15)	.19 (.10)	.30 (.09)	1.09 (.16)
% Black	-.025 (.008)	-.027 (.007)	.001 (.008)	-.011 (.008)	-.014 (.006)	.007 (.005)	-.051 (.008)
% Female Headed Households	.042 (.020)	.049 (.016)	-.021 (.017)	-.000 (.017)	-.009 (.013)	.017 (.011)	.070 (.018)
% Age 15-24 in SMSA	-2.73 (3.10)	-10.05 (2.24)	2.34 (2.67)	6.75 (2.57)	4.19 (1.78)	5.23 (1.40)	7.40 (2.62)
In Public Welfare Spending Per Capita	-.08 (.05)	-.11 (.04)	-.14 (.04)	-.11 (.04)	-.07 (.03)	-.07 (.03)	-.15 (.05)
In Education Spending Per Capita	.41 (.12)	.25 (.09)	.08 (.10)	.38 (.11)	.33 (.08)	.03 (.06)	.60 (.11)
State Unemployment Rate	-2.65 (0.54)	-1.84 (0.44)	-1.22 (0.49)	.11 (.47)	2.34 (0.34)	1.30 (0.29)	.52 (.51)
City-Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
City Trends?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Dummies?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: Dependent variable is the natural log of the named crime category. Police variables, city population, and spending variables are also in natural logs; therefore coefficients on those variables are interpreted as elasticities. The police coefficients are the sum of the coefficients on contemporaneous and once-lagged police. The sample covers the period 1970-1992 for 59 large U.S. cities with directly elected mayors. City-fixed effects, city trends, and year dummies included in all regressions. Number of observations is 1,314. Standard errors in parentheses. All specifications were estimated using FGLS to allow for heteroskedasticity across cities. All regressions are instrumented using interactions between city dummies and indicator variables for the year of the mayoral and gubernatorial election cycle.

Table 5. Progression of the Estimated Impact of Police on Crime as Controls for Unobserved City Characteristics and Endogeneity are Introduced.

	Murder	Rape	Assault	Robbery	Burglary	Larceny	Vehicle Theft
<u>Sworn Officers</u>							
City-Fixed Effects, Year Dummies, and Demographic Controls Only	.03 (.07)	.30 (.07)	.51 (.08)	.32 (.07)	.33 (.05)	.27 (.04)	.27 (.08)
All of the Above and City Trends	-.18 (.10)	-.13 (.08)	.05 (.07)	-.29 (.08)	-.18 (.06)	.04 (.05)	-.37 (.09)
All of the Above and Instrument with Elections	-.63 (.30)	-.46 (.25)	-.28 (.26)	-.67 (.26)	-.11 (.20)	.06 (.17)	-1.23 (.29)
<u>Civilian Police Employees</u>							
City-Fixed Effects, Year Dummies & Demographic Controls Only	.07 (.03)	.10 (.03)	.16 (.03)	.09 (.03)	.02 (.02)	.02 (.02)	.00 (.03)
All of the Above and City Trends	.12 (.03)	.05 (.03)	.05 (.03)	.16 (.03)	-.02 (.02)	-.01 (.03)	.05 (.03)
All of the Above and Instrument with Elections	.05 (.08)	.03 (.06)	-.03 (.07)	.06 (.07)	-.07 (.06)	-.13 (.06)	.00 (.07)

Notes: All coefficients in table are elasticities. The sample is 59 large U.S. cities with directly elected mayors, for the period 1970-1992. Number of observations is 1,314. Within each police staffing category (i.e. sworn and civilian), each row represents coefficients from a different regression with varying levels of controls. Standard errors in parentheses. All specifications were estimated using FGLS, allowing for heteroskedasticity across cities. Elasticities in the bottom row of each category are the coefficients reported in Table 4.

Table 6. The Effect of Increased Police on Crime
Instrumenting with Election Cycles; No Socio-Economic Controls

	Murder	Rape	Assault	Robbery	Burglary	Larceny	Vehicle Theft
Sworn Officers	-.34 (.29)	-.29 (.24)	-.38 (.25)	-.62 (.25)	-.11 (.20)	.05 (.16)	-1.28 (.29)
Civilian Police	.03 (.09)	.02 (.07)	-.02 (.06)	.09 (.07)	-.07 (.06)	-.13 (.05)	.00 (.07)
City Population	.75 (.19)	.61 (.15)	.03 (.16)	.47 (.15)	.21 (.11)	.31 (.09)	1.15 (.17)
City-Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
City Trends?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Dummies?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: Dependent variable is the natural log of the named crime category. Police variables, city population, and spending variables are also in natural logs; therefore coefficients on those variables are interpreted as elasticities. The police coefficients are the sum of the coefficients on contemporaneous and once-lagged police. The sample covers the period 1970-1992 for the 59 largest U.S. cities with directly elected mayors. City-fixed effects, city trends, and year dummies included in all regressions. Number of observations is 1,314. Standard errors in parentheses. All specifications were estimated using FGLS, allowing for heteroskedasticity across cities. All regressions are instrumented using interactions between city dummies and indicator variables for the year of the mayoral and gubernatorial election cycle.

Table 7: Estimated Impact On Crime From Adding One Sworn Police Officer
(Evaluated At Sample Means)

	Change in Reported Crimes	Change in Total Crime (Assumes Same Elasticity for Unreported Crimes)	Cost Per Crime		Social Benefit of Reduced Crime
			Monetary	Quality of Life	
Murder	-0.05	-0.05	\$17,000	\$400,000	\$20,800
Rape	-0.13	-0.19	9,800	40,800	6,600 - 9,600
Assault	-0.6	-1.3	1,800	10,200	7,400 - 16,000
Robbery	-1.6	-2.9	2,900	14,900	28,700 - 51,900
Burglary	-1.1	-2.3	1,200	400	1,700 - 3,600
Larceny	1.1	4.0	200	0	(-200) - (-800)
Auto Theft	-5.6	-7.5	4,000	0	22,500 - 30,100
Total	-7.98	-10.24	---	---	87,500 - 131,200

Notes: Based on estimates of elasticity of crime with respect to sworn police officers from Table 4 (full controls and election year instruments). Values in table are computed using sample means in 1992. Estimates of reporting rates for each type of crime are based on Criminal Victimization in the United States, 1991 (Wash, DC: U.S. Dept. of Justice, 1992), p. 102. With the exception of the quality of life reduction per murder, estimates of the social costs of crime are from Cohen (1988) and Miller, Cohen, and Rossman (1993), adjusted to 1992 dollars. The first value in the final column applies the cost of crime to the reduction in reported crimes only; the second value in the final column applies the cost of crime to the estimated change in both reported and unreported crimes.





Fig. 2: Yearly Changes in Sworn Police
Election Years vs Non-Election Years



Appendix: Data for Cities in Sample.

City	Mayor's Term	Violent Crimes Per 100,000	Property Crimes Per 100,000	Annual %Δ Crime	Police Per 100,000	%ΔSworn Gov. Elec.	%ΔSworn Mayor Elec.	%ΔSworn No Elec.
Akron	4yrs	704	6,544	3.6	204	1.2	0.6	-0.3
Albuquerque	4yrs	971	8,151	0.7	255	2.6	6.3	3.3
Anaheim	2yrs	535	6,953	-0.1	186	3.2	2.1	3.0
Arlington	2yrs	424	6,389	0.5	153	8.1	7.2	5.6
Atlanta	4yrs	2,417	10,634	3.5	369	2.3	4.8	2.2
Austin	3yrs	498	8,067	2.7	219	7.4	3.5	1.9
Baltimore	4yrs	2,031	6,974	1.3	460	-1.1	-1.7	0.0
Birmingham	4yrs	1,209	8,235	3.2	286	3.1	0.2	2.3
Boston	4yrs	1,839	9,208	1.7	436	9.4	-9.8	-1.8
Buffalo	4yrs	1,033	6,222	3.4	333	-1.5	-5.1	-2.3
Charlotte	2yrs	1,264	8,199	2.6	246	2.1	3.4	4.3
Chicago	4yrs	1,165	6,316	2.5	475	-0.5	2.7	-1.6
Cleveland	4yrs	1,468	6,880	0.4	362	-1.5	3.5	-3.8
Columbus	4yrs	781	7,516	1.5	250	1.7	3.5	2.8
Corpus Christi	2yrs	662	7,751	2.2	176	3.1	3.0	0.9
Dallas	2yrs	1,437	10,401	1.6	293	4.1	3.0	0.8
Denver	4yrs	906	8,780	-0.7	319	4.0	1.1	-0.0
Detroit	4yrs	2,139	9,071	0.3	437	0.7	10.6	-6.5
El Paso	2yrs	680	6,715	2.1	188	2.7	6.2	-0.4
Fort Worth	2yrs	1,118	10,311	3.1	242	2.4	5.0	-1.6
Fresno	4yrs	918	10,126	1.4	210	0.9	6.8	1.9
Honolulu	4yrs	250	5,865	1.2	252	2.3	4.5	3.7
Houston	2yrs	940	7,529	1.3	265	6.2	5.3	2.5
Indianapolis	4yrs	887	5,647	1.6	258	1.1	1.4	-0.6
Jacksonville	4yrs	1,079	7,079	2.8	275	5.8	4.3	2.3
Jersey City	4yrs	1,271	6,102	4.4	416	4.5	4.5	-1.4
Kansas City	4yrs	1,602	8,341	2.3	360	0.3	4.3	0.5
Los Angeles	4yrs	1,632	7,250	0.7	320	1.9	2.6	-0.1
Louisville	4yrs	766	5,488	0.5	284	2.3	-1.6	0.0
Memphis	4yrs	1,058	6,861	3.8	243	2.5	-0.9	2.0
Mesa	2yrs	420	6,510	2.0	181	9.4	11.7	7.9
Miami	4yrs	2,577	10,567	2.3	329	2.5	4.3	0.4

Appendix: Data for Cities in Sample

City	Mayor's Term	Violent Crimes Per 100,000	Property Crimes Per 100,000	Annual Crime	%Δ Per 100,000	Police Per 100,000	%ΔSworn Gov. Elec.	%ΔSworn Mayor Elec.	%ΔSworn No Elec.
Milwaukee	4yrs	580	6,051	3.4		360	-0.4	1.2	0.7
Minneapolis	4yrs	1,102	8,417	2.3		225	-0.1	1.8	0.3
Nashville	4yrs	857	6,044	3.1		245	3.6	2.1	4.2
Newark	4yrs	2,709	8,736	1.8		431	11.4	-2.6	-6.0
New Orleans	4yrs	1,419	7,140	1.4		321	4.5	-2.0	-1.0
New York	4yrs	1,902	6,594	0.7		441	2.8	1.0	1.0
Oakland	4yrs	1,753	10,318	0.2		267	-2.6	-2.6	2.1
Oklahoma City	4yrs	845	8,160	3.3		217	6.3	6.3	2.6
Omaha	4yrs	655	5,743	1.4		201	2.0	1.2	0.5
Phoenix	4yrs	797	8,889	0.3		264	3.5	5.6	3.4
Philadelphia	4yrs	942	4,162	2.8		469	1.9	-2.9	-0.8
Pittsburgh	4yrs	1,100	5,939	1.2		319	-2.4	-0.8	-2.1
Portland	4yrs	1,521	10,557	1.3		240	3.2	1.5	-0.9
Sacramento	4yrs	1,018	9,147	1.1		247	2.9	0.4	2.6
Saint Louis	4yrs	2,181	10,235	1.2		507	-0.9	-0.7	-1.1
Saint Paul	4yrs	756	6,883	0.9		233	-2.8	1.2	3.3
Saint Petersburg	2yrs	1,209	7,254	1.9		257	5.2	2.4	-0.6
San Antonio	2yrs	582	8,213	2.5		181	7.6	0.5	1.5
San Diego	4yrs	676	6,927	1.6		199	7.1	4.3	1.7
San Francisco	4yrs	1,454	7,959	-0.0		333	-1.2	0.9	1.8
San Jose	4yrs	497	6,083	-1.6		167	7.1	7.1	3.5
Seattle	4yrs	1,026	9,488	1.6		285	1.7	0.0	1.6
Tampa	4yrs	1,868	10,444	4.0		300	7.1	0.3	0.0
Toledo	2yrs	728	7,408	1.4		211	-2.6	2.8	-5.2
Tucson	4yrs	695	8,938	2.7		218	3.9	4.3	4.5
Tulsa	2yrs	741	7,076	2.1		214	2.2	2.1	1.7
Washington DC	4yrs	1,890	7,101	0.2		739	--	-2.2	-1.8

Definitions of the Uniform Crime Reports Crime Categories

Murder and Nonnegligent Manslaughter

The willful killing of one human being by another. Deaths caused by negligence, attempts to kill, assaults to kill, suicides, accidental deaths, and justifiable homicides are excluded. Justifiable homicides are limited to the killing of a felon. Traffic fatalities are excluded.

Forcible Rape

The carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and against her will. Included are rapes by force and attempts or assaults to rape. Statutory offenses (no force used -- victim under age of consent) are excluded.

Robbery

The taking or attempting to take anything of value from the care, custody, or control of a person or persons by force, or threat of force, or violence, and/or by putting the victim in fear.

Aggravated Assault

An unlawful attack by one person upon another for the purpose of inflicting severe or aggravated bodily injury. This type of assault usually is accompanied by the use of a weapon or by means likely to produce death or great bodily harm. Simple assaults are excluded.

Burglary

The unlawful entry of a structure to commit a felony or a theft. Attempted forcible entry is included.

Larceny

The unlawful taking of property from the possession of another. Examples are thefts of bicycles or automobile accessories, shoplifting, pocket-picking, or the stealing of any property or article which is not taken by force and violence or by fraud. Attempted larcenies are included. Embezzlement, "con" games, forgery, and worthless checks are excluded.

Motor Vehicle Theft

The theft or attempted theft of a motor vehicle.

Bibliography

- Alesina, Alberto, and Jeffrey Sachs. 1988. "Political Parties and the Business Cycle in the United States," *Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking* 20:63-82.
- Andreoni, James. 1991. "Reasonable Doubt and the Optimal Magnitude of Fines: Should the Penalty Fit the Crime?" *RAND Journal of Economics* 22:385-395.
- Becker, Gary. 1968. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," *Journal of Political Economy* 76:169-217.
- Besley, Timothy, and Anne Case. 1994. "Does Electoral Accountability Affect Economic Policy Choices? Evidence from Gubernatorial Term Limits." Mimeo, Department of Economics, Princeton University.
- Cameron, Samuel. 1988. "The Economics of Crime Deterrence: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," *Kyklos* 41:301-323.
- Cantor, David, and Kenneth C. Land. 1985. "Unemployment and Crime Rates in the Post-World War II United States: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis," *American Sociological Review* 50:317-332.
- Chubb, John. 1988. "Institutions, the Economy, and the Dynamics of State Elections," *American Political Science Review* 82:135-154.
- Cohen, Mark. 1988. "Pain, Suffering, and Jury Awards: A Study of the Cost of Crime to Victims," *Law and Society Review* 22:537-555.
- Craig, S. 1987. "The Deterrent Impact of Police: An Examination of a Locally Provided Public Service," *Journal of Urban Economics* 21:298-311.
- Devine, Joel A., Joseph F. Sheley, and M. Dwayne Smith. "Macroeconomic and Social-Control Policy Influences on Crime Rate Changes, 1948-1985," *American Sociological Review* 53:407-420.
- Donohue, John J., and Peter Siegelman. 1994. "Is the United States at the Optimal Rate of Crime?" Mimeo, American Bar Foundation.
- Ehrlich, Isaac. 1973. "Participation in Illegitimate Activities: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation," *Journal of Political Economy* 81:531-567.
- Fisher, Franklin, and D. Nagin. 1978. "On the Feasibility of Identifying the Crime Function in a Simultaneous Equations Model of Crime and Sanctions," in Blumstein, A., Nagin, D., and Cohen, J. (eds.), Deterrence and Incapacitation: Estimating the Effects of Criminal Sanctions on Crime Rates, Wash D.C.: National Academy of Sciences.
- Glaeser, Edward, Bruce Sacerdote, and Jose Scheinkman. 1994. "Crime and Social Interactions," Mimeo, Harvard University.
- Greene, Jack, and Carl Klockars. 1991. "What Police Do," in Klockars, C., and Mastrofski, S. (eds.), Thinking About Police, New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Kelling, George, Tony Pate, Duane Dieckman, and Charles Brown. 1974, The Kansas City Preventative Patrol Experiment: A Summary Report, Wash DC: Police Foundation.
- Levitt, Steven. 1994. "The Response of Crime Reporting Behavior to Changes in the Size of the Police Force: Implications for Studies of Police Effectiveness using Reported Crime Data," Mimeo, M.I.T. Department of Economics.
- McCormick, Robert, and Robert Tollison. 1984. "Crime on the Court," *Journal of Political Economy* 92:223-235.
- Miller, Ted, Mark Cohen, and Shelli Rossman. 1993. "Victim Costs of Violent Crime and Resulting Injuries," *Health Affairs* XX:186-197.
- Monkkonen, Eric. 1992. "History of Urban Police," in Tonry, M., and Morris, N. (eds.), Modern Policing, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Myers, S., 1983. "Estimating the Economic Model of Crime: Punishment vs. Deterrent Effects," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 98:157-166.
- O'Brien, Robert. 1985, Crime and Victimization Data, Beverly Hills: Sage.
- Poterba, James. 1994. "State Responses to Fiscal Crises: The Effects of Budgetary Institutions and Politics," *Journal of Political Economy* 102:799-821.
- Rogoff, Kenneth. 1990. "Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles," *American Economic Review* 80:21-36.
- Schelling, Thomas. 1989. "Value of Life," in Eatwell, J., Milgate, M., and Newman, P. (eds), The New Palgrave, New York: Norton.
- Sherman, Lawrence. 1992. "Attacking Crime: Police and Crime Control," in Tonry, M., and Morris, N. (eds), Modern Policing, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Staiger, Douglas, and James Stock. 1993. "Asymptotics for Instrumental Variables Regressions with Weakly Correlated Instruments," Mimeo, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.
- Sugler, George. 1970. "The Optimum Enforcement of Laws," *Journal of Political Economy* 78:526-536.

Tauchen, Helen, Anne Witte, and Harriet Griesinger, 1993, "Criminal Deterrence: Revisiting the Issue with a Birth Cohort," Mimeo, Department of Economics, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Wilson, James Q., 1983, *Thinking About Crime*, New York: Random House.

Witte, Ann, 1980, "Estimating the Economic Model of Crime with Individual Data," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 94:57-84

To order any of these papers, see instructions at the end of the list. To subscribe to all NBER Working Papers or the papers in a single area, see instructions inside the back cover. A complete list of NBER Working Papers and Reprints can be accessed on the Internet by using our gopher at nber.harvard.edu.

Number	Author(s)	Title	Date
4949	William N. Evans Edward Montgomery	Education and Health: Where There's Smoke There's an Instrument	12/94
4950	Joseph G. Altonji Thomas A. Dunn	An Intergenerational Model of Wages Hours and Earnings	12/94
4951	Karen E. Lewis	Puzzles in International Financial Markets	12/94
4952	Kenneth A. Froot Kenneth Rogoff	Perspectives on PPP and Long-Run Real Exchange Rates	12/94
4953	Tasneem Chispi Ann Dryden Witte	Economic Effects of Quality Regulations in the Daycare Industry	12/94
4954	Edward L. Glaeser José A. Scheinkman	Neither a Borrower nor a Lender Be: An Economic Analysis of Interest Restrictions and Usury Laws	12/94
4955	George J. Borjas	The Economic Benefits from Immigration	12/94
4956	Timothy Besley Anne Case	Unnatural Experiments? Estimating the Incidence of Endogenous Policies	12/94
4957	Robert Flood Nancy Marion	The Size and Timing of Devaluations in Capital-Controlled Developing Economies	12/94
4958	Robert F. Engle Joshua Rosenberg	Hedging Options in a GARCH Environment: Testing the Term Structure of Stochastic Volatility Models	12/94
4959	Garey Ramey Valerie A. Ramey	Cross-Country Evidence on the Link Between Volatility and Growth	12/94
4960	Patricia M. Anderson Bruce D. Meyer	The Effects of Unemployment Insurance Taxes and Benefits on Layoffs Using Firm and Individual Data	12/94
4961	Louis Kaplow	A Fundamental Objection to Tax Equity Norms: A Call for Utilitarianism	12/94
4962	Robert W. Stinger	International Rules and Institutions for Trade Policy	12/94
4963	Michael P. Dooley	A Retrospective on the Debt Crisis	12/94
4964	Dani Rodrik	Getting Interventions Right: How South Korea and Taiwan Grew Rich	12/94



**GRAND LODGE
FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE®**

NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS • 1410 DONELSON PKWY. #17 • NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE 37217
1-800-481-2711 • 615-259-0700 • FAX 615-259-0400

DEWEY R. STOKES
NATIONAL PRESIDENT

February 6, 1995

The Honorable William J. Clinton
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

As an organization comprised of more than 254,000 law enforcement professionals, the Fraternal Order of Police takes positions based on experience and fact, not conjecture and politics.

No position taken by the POP is more strongly rooted in conviction than that taken on semi-automatic assault weapons. While it is true that these weapons do not differ in terms of function and capability from other semi-automatic weapons, it is equally true that semi-automatic assault weapons are eight times more likely to be used in crime than conventional weapons. Therefore, in the interest of public safety and officer safety, we strongly supported the assault weapons ban contained in the Crime Bill which you signed on September 13, 1994.

In that same law, funds were authorized to hire 100,000 state and local police officers. In a time when law enforcement is close to being overwhelmed by violent crime, additional police, as well as thoughtful and effective prevention programs, are vital to turning the tide against those who would terrorize law abiding citizens. Therefore, we worked with you and Congress to obtain the funds necessary to hire those officers and underwrite those programs. These positions were adopted at our National Biennial Conference in August 1993, and continue to be our positions today.

We strongly support you in your resolve to fight any repeal of the assault weapons ban or any diversion of funding earmarked for the hiring of 100,000 police officers. We are prepared to work with you to the fullest extent of our ability to prevent this cynical reversal of vital public safety legislation.

Sincerely,


Dewey R. Stokes
National President



NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF POLICE ORGANIZATIONS, INC.

Representing America's Finest

750 First Street, N.E., Suite 1020 • Washington, D.C. 20002-4241

(202) 842-4420 • (800) 322-NAPO • (202) 842-6398 FAX

February 7, 1995

President
THOMAS J. SCOTTO
President, Detective
Enforcement Association
of New York City
New York, NY

Executive Vice President
TONY LOZZO
Senior Vice President
Dade County PBA
Miami, FL

Recording Secretary
D. J. HOLT
President, Central
Coast Chapter, PORAC
San Jose, CA

Treasurer
ROBERT SHEEHAN
President
Florida PBA
Tallahassee, FL

Sergeant-at-Arms
MARTIN MCKEAN
Executive Secretary
Ohio PBA
Burea, OH

Executive Secretary
B.D. "BUD" STONE
Past President PORAC
Berkeley, CA

The Honorable William Jefferson Clinton
President
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Executive Director
ROBERT T. SCULLY
General Counsel
WILLIAM J. JOHNSON
Legislative Counsel
JULES BERKSTEN
LINDA LIPSETT

Dear Mr. President:

On behalf of the National Association of Police Organizations (NAPO), representing over 3,500 police unions and associations and 175,000 sworn law enforcement officers throughout the country, I would like to state our unequivocal commitment to the 100,000 police officers provision funded by the Violence Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.

I would also like to thank you for your tremendous leadership and support on this most important program that is placing more officers on the nation's streets with a premium placed on community policing.

NAPO feels strongly that unless the monies are given directly to the law enforcement agencies to hire more police officers, the funds will be diverted by local bureaucrats with their own agendas. Our members have seen only too often that if local politicians have open-ended flexibility with federal funds, the odds are better than even that the funds will disappear into the city budget. Law enforcement's only agenda is to fight crime and protect the peace of American society and we need all the help we can get—putting more cops on the streets will help.

Last year, NAPO joined with all the major national law enforcement organizations in unanimous support of your proposal to fund an additional 100,000 police officers because cops know what works on the front lines against crime. NAPO members fought hard for this and we think it is ludicrous to dismantle this important program after 10,000 police officers have been funded.

Again, NAPO strongly supports the continuation of the discretionary grants to law enforcement agencies for hiring additional officers and opposes the block grant legislation as passed by the House Judiciary Committee last week.


Please do not hesitate to contact me about this or any other concern.

Sincerely,


Robert T. Scully

Sheriff James G. (Jim) Murphy
President
Newport, Vermont

Charles B. Meeks
Executive Director
Alexandria, Virginia



NATIONAL SHERIFFS' ASSOCIATION

1450 DUKE STREET · ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22314-3490
Telephone 703-836-7827
FAX 703-683-6541

February 10, 1995

Sheriff John T. Pierpont
1st Vice President
Springfield, Missouri

Sheriff Don Hathaway
2nd Vice President
Shreveport, Louisiana

Sheriff Fred Scoralick
3rd Vice President
Poughkeepsie, New York

Sheriff Dan Smith
4th Vice President
Bellon, Texas

Sheriff Philip M. McKelvey
5th Vice President
Cambridge, Maryland

Sheriff Jerry "Peanuts" Gaines
6th Vice President
Bowling Green, Kentucky

Sheriff John Cary Bittick
7th Vice President
Forsyth, Georgia

Sheriff Tommy Ferrell
Sergeant-At-Arms
Natchez, Mississippi

Sheriff Lyle W. Swenson
Secretary
Mitchell, South Dakota

Sheriff Bob E. Rice
Treasurer
Des Moines, Iowa

Sheriff Johnny Mack Brown
Immediate Past President
Greenville, South Carolina

Sheriff Frank Policare, Jr.
Immediate Past President
Beaver, Pennsylvania

Richard M. Weintraub
NSA General Counsel
Washington, D.C.

Mary T. Ross
NSA Corporate Representative
Columbus, Ohio

The Honorable Bill McCollum
Chairman
House Subcommittee on Crime
2266 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Congressman McCollum:

On behalf of the 22,000 members of the National Sheriffs' Association (NSA), I am writing in support of the continuation of the COPS program enacted in the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.

The sheriffs of the United States, with the assistance of President Clinton and the Department of Justice, have hired over 1,200 deputy sheriffs. These deputies have been hired in over 200 sheriffs' offices, moving toward increased law enforcement presence in our counties. This program of police hiring, in conjunction with community policing, will go a long way in helping to reduce crime in our counties.

Congressman, in the next few days, you will be casting critical votes that could favorably affect law enforcement and the citizens we were elected to represent. I urge you and your colleagues to preserve discretionary funding to maintain the 100,000 COPS program.

Thank you for your endeavors.

Sincerely,

Charles B. Meeks
Charles B. Meeks
Executive Director

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

Sheriff G.C. "Buck" Buchanan
Prescott, Arizona

Sheriff Larry V. Erickson
Spokane, Washington

Sheriff Bill Hutson
Macon, Georgia

Sheriff James Plousis
Cape May Court House, New Jersey

Sheriff Vince Swinney
Reno, Nevada

Sheriff Randall D. Yohn
Goshon, Indiana

Sheriff John M. Butterworth
Marion, Ohio

Sheriff Charles A. Fuseller
St. Martinville, Louisiana

Sheriff Mearl J. Justus
Belleville, Illinois

Sheriff Charles S. Robinson
Hartsville, Tennessee

Sheriff Lee Vasquez
McMinnville, Oregon

Ex-Officio Members
All Past Presidents

Sheriff Charles Dean
Inverness, Florida

Sheriff Wayne V. Gay
Wilson, North Carolina

Sheriff Ted. G. Kamatchue
Marshalltown, Iowa

Sheriff C. David Stone
Pickens, South Carolina

Sheriff Carl Wells
Bedford, Virginia

Member of the
Executive Committee

Sheriff Larry Emlen

Sheriff Stanley
Edmond, Oklahoma

Sheriff Aaron D. Kennard
Hartsville, Tennessee

Sheriff Patrick J. Sullivan, Jr.
Lincoln, Nebraska

Sheriff Kenneth G. Waldman
Ancker, Minnesota

national black police association



(202) 986-2070

3251 MT. PLEASANT ST., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20010

February 7, 1995

1994-1996

OFFICERS

LESLIE J. BETMORE
Chairman
LUTHER J. MUNTER, JR.
Vice-Chair
EUMEC D. NELSON
Secretary
WENDELL M. FRANCE
Treasurer
LEONARD WILLIAMS, SR.
Financial Secretary
HENRY L. WEATHERSPOON
Sergeant-at-Arms
GREGORY L. RILEY
Information Officer

**REGIONAL
PRESIDENTS**

Northeast
Oswald L. Thompson
East
Luther J. Munter, Jr.
South
Diana J. Ramsey-Brown
Midwest
Carl L. Safford
West
Rocky Watkins

**BOARD OF
DIRECTORS**

Eric Adams
Hans C. Anderson
Doris M. Byrd
John T. Coy
Kenneth Hancock
Andre F. Haynesworth
Thomas A. Jackson
Clarence A. Lewis
James W. Martin
Malvin Maxwell
Anthony G. Murphy
Donald W. Pears
Louis Ray, Jr.
Lewis R. Roberson
Bulford Smith, Jr.
Charles T. Taylor
Wanda L. Ward-Francis
Curtis L. Watson
Rodney L. Williams

DIRECTOR

Ronald E. Hampton

LEGAL COUNSEL

Ted J. Williams


The Honorable Janet Reno
United States Department of Justice
Office of the Attorney General
Constitution Avenue & 10th Streets, N.W.
Washington, DC 20530

Dear Madam Attorney General:

The National Black Police Association would like to go on record in support of the COPS Program (Community Oriented Policing Services) that will provide competitive grants to local police departments to add 100,000 new community police officers on the streets of America. Our members, many of whom work on the streets of this country, believe that the present procedure is the most effective and efficient way to reach President Clinton's goal.

Equally, we believe the precedent setting crime prevention funding provision should remain a part of the finished law as well. It is our belief, that if we are truly going to succeed at making communities safer, we must stop crime before it happens. Thank you for your continued efforts.

Sincerely,


Ronald E. Hampton
Executive Director

REH/fll

1150 CONNECTICUT AVENUE, N.W. SUITE 910
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036
PHONE: (202) 466-7820
FAX: (202) 466-7576
TTY: (202) 466-2670



CHUCK WEXLER
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

February 8, 1995

Hon. Charles E. Schumer
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington DC

Dear Representative Schumer:

On behalf of the members of the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), an organization of progressive police leaders whose agencies serve more than 40 percent of the nation's population, the PERF board urges you to consider the following law enforcement concerns with H.R. 728 before you vote. PERF members strongly supported the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (the "1994 crime bill"). Many PERF members have already benefited from its programs, and many others have applications pending for police resources and personnel. Furthermore, the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 has a reasonable balance between law enforcement, prevention and punishment. As police professionals, we do not want to see these critical police and prevention resources undermined.


We believe the following concerns raised by H.R. 728 should be addressed before any attempt to revise the 1994 program is made:

- Funds for H.R. 728 do not go directly to police agencies.
H.R. 728 would allow block grant funds to be used to *reduce crime and improve public safety*. While a laudable goal, there are no guarantees that the funds would go directly to police. The 1994 crime bill ensures that police agencies are getting the resources they need for more police, overtime, new technology, and other efforts related to community policing. Under H.R. 728, police will be competing with every other community group or service agency that has some relation to "public safety," even agencies involved in improved street lighting, tree removal, or disaster preparedness.

- **H.R. 728 does not focus on community policing.**
There is no *requirement* that funds be tied to community policing. PERF has been a pioneer in implementing a community-based, problem-solving approach to policing. The 1994 crime bill gave agencies sufficient flexibility to use the funds responsibly to meet their unique needs, but still served as the national catalyst for the community policing movement. To date, more than 8,000 applications have been made for the grants to put more cops on the streets. Even more applications are pending.
- **H.R. 728 eliminates nearly all of the 1994 crime bill's prevention programs.**
While some crime prevention activities can be funded under the block grant, to do so would draw money away from the pool of money that police can draw on for law enforcement efforts. Accordingly, fewer prevention programs will receive the level of funding appropriated under the 1994 bill. PERF members know that an investment in prevention can mean tremendous savings to the criminal justice system and can save countless lives of at-risk youth. PERF members would gladly work to help identify prevention programs with a demonstrated record of success.
- **H.R. 728 is vulnerable to budget cuts.**
With budget cuts being considered for every domestic spending program, PERF is concerned that it will be easier for Members to make across-the-board budget cuts to a block grant program than to a program that directly funds police agencies to work with their communities to address crime across the nation. Frankly, *appropriated* funds under the 1994 crime bill would appear to be more secure than the funds that would be *authorized* under H.R. 728.

Before we move to revise a crime bill that has not yet been fully implemented, PERF suggests that Congress work with police to better evaluate law enforcement's needs and concerns. PERF stands ready to work with you and your colleagues to find ways to help law enforcement and our communities deal with crime and violence. We urge you to consider law enforcement's concerns before you vote on H.R. 728. If you have any questions about PERF or the organization's positions, please feel free to contact me or Martha Plotkin at 202/466-7820.

Sincerely,


Chuck Wexler
Executive Director



California POLICE CHIEFS Association Inc.

1455 Response Rd., Suite 190 Sacramento, California 95815 Telephone (916) 923-2375 (916) 923-1825 FAX (916) 263-6090

OFFICERS

President
LARRY TODD
Los Gatos
1st Vice President
JIM ANTHONY
Glendale
2nd Vice President
RON LOWENDERC
Huntington Beach
3rd Vice President
RICHARD PROFFER
Covina
Secretary/Treasurer
PETER MCLELLY
Troy
Immediate Past President
FLOYD SANDERSON
Manteca

DIRECTORS

BOB BLANKENSHIP
Folsom
RICK BREZA
Santa Barbara
LOUIS CODARUVAZ
San Jose
B. WANNEN COCKE
San Bernardino (Pittsburg)
JAMES GARDNER
San Luis Obispo
ROGER MILL
Tulare
BOB McDONELL
Huntington Beach
TED MERTENS
Huntington Beach
SAL ROSANO
Santa Rosa
JOE SAMUELS
Oakland
RICH TEFANK
Bunton Park
RICK TENDORCH
Arcata
LLOYD WOOD
Pamona

COMMITTEE CHAIRS

TRAINING
JAMES MUNES
Placentia Hill
STANDARDS & ETHICS
CARL STECKLER
Fremont
LAW & LEGISLATION
TOM SIMMS
Rockville
WAYS & MEANS
ROY HARMON
Yuba City
PUBLICATIONS
BROOK McMAHON
Pismo Beach
NOMINATIONS
FLOYD SANDERSON
Manteca
RETIRED MEMBERS
JIM SIMMONS
Alhambra (Retired)

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
Dwight H. Pluritt

February 9, 1995

Honorable Janet Reno
United States Attorney General
Department of Justice
10th and Constitution Avenue, N.W.
Washington D.C. 20530

Dear Attorney General Reno:

The California Police Chiefs' Association which represents municipal chief executive officers in our state strongly encourages the continuation of the COPS Program through your Office. We support the continuation of discretionary grants administered by the Program and the retention of a funding mechanism which provides federal revenues directly to local law enforcement agencies in California.

Our experience with your COPS Program has been extremely beneficial to California law enforcement and we urge congressional support for continuance. Should you or your representatives wish to discuss the California Police Chiefs' Association's position on this matter further please call me directly at (818)548-3140.

Sincerely,

James E. Anthony
President



THE UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF MAYORS

1620 EYE STREET, NORTHWEST
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006
TELEPHONE (202) 293-7330
FAX (202) 293-2352
TDD (202) 293-9445

President:

VICTOR ASHE
Mayor of Knoxville

Vice Presidents:

NORMAN RICE
Mayor of Seattle

Past Presidents:

JERRY ABRAMSON
Mayor of Louisville

ROBERT M. ISAAC
Mayor of Colorado Springs

JOSEPH P. KELLY, JR.
Mayor of Charleston, SC

Treasurers:

RUSTON LUIS ALVAREZ
Mayor of San Juan

CHARLES BOX
Mayor of Hartford

DEBBIE CORBADO
Mayor of Salt Lake City

PAUL HELMES
Mayor of Port Wayne

SHARPE JAMES
Mayor of Newark, NJ

JAMES FELTON
Mayor of Elkhart

ELIZABETH D. RITA
Mayor of Rock Hill

PETE SPERAZZA
Mayor of Boca

DAVID SMITH
Mayor of Newark, CA

ERIC SPARROW
Mayor of Duluth

MICHAEL WHITE
Mayor of Cleveland

Advisory Board:

RICHARD M. DALEY, Chair
Mayor of Chicago

DENNIS ARCHER
Mayor of Detroit

RICHARD ARBINGTON
Mayor of Birmingham

ROBERT COMLE
Mayor of Columbia, SC

BRIAN COLES
Mayor of Boise

CARROLL COOPER
Mayor of East Orange

LOUISE GARDNER
Mayor of Jefferson City

ELISAN GOLDING
Mayor of San Diego

KAY GRANGER
Mayor of Fort Worth

MIKE JOHANNIS
Mayor of Lincoln

JAN LAVERTY JONES
Mayor of Las Vegas

FRANK JORDAN
Mayor of San Francisco

JOHN MCCARTHY
Mayor of Everett

PATRICK MURPHY
Mayor of Lynn

RITA MULLINS
Mayor of Palm Beach

JOHN O. NORQUIST
Mayor of Milwaukee

REYNA E. OBENDORF
Mayor of Virginia Beach

DONALD PLUSQUELLIC
Mayor of Akron

SAUL RAMIREZ, JR.
Mayor of Laredo

SHARON SAYLES BELTON
Mayor of Minneapolis

ELLY SCHMOKE
Mayor of Baltimore

PAUL SOGLIN
Mayor of Madison

BRUCE TODD
Mayor of Alton

February 1, 1995

The Honorable Janet Reno
Attorney General of the United States
U.S. Department of Justice
10th and Constitution Avenues, NW -- Room 5111
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear General Reno:

On behalf of The U.S. Conference of Mayors, I would like to congratulate you on the outstanding job which the Department of Justice has done in implementing the 1994 crime act. Mayors and police chiefs worked with you, the President and the Congress to get it enacted. Since then we have worked with you to see it implemented. We are confident that our strong partnership will continue.

As you are aware, we strongly support the COPS Program. In addition during our Winter Meeting, mayors reaffirmed their commitment to a strong prevention component and to working to see the bill's prevention programs funded next year.

We were pleased that both Associate Attorney General John Schmidt and COPS Program Director Joe Brann were able to meet with our Criminal and Social Justice Committee last week during the Winter Meeting. We look forward to continued sessions with them as we work to resolve implementation issues.

Sincerely yours,

Victor Ashe
Mayor of Knoxville
President

**The Law Enforcement Steering Committee
1001 22nd St. N.W., Suite 200
Washington, D.C. 20037**

February 10, 1995

Dear Representative:

The Law Enforcement Steering Committee (LESC) is a nonpartisan coalition of national law enforcement associations which represents over 450,000 sworn law enforcement officers across the country. The LESC is an unprecedented coalition of labor, management, and research organizations dedicated to improving policing and securing public safety. The Law Enforcement Steering Committee is comprised of the Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association, the Fraternal Order of Police, the International Brotherhood of Police Officers, the Major Cities Chiefs, the National Association of Police Organizations, the National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives, the National Troopers Coalition, the Police Executive Research Forum, and the Police Foundation. The LESC is firmly committed to the broad goal of protecting the nation's citizens by pursuing a wide range of public safety issues before Congress.

The Law Enforcement Steering Committee worked for over six years to secure tough anti-crime legislation on behalf of all Americans. The LESC was united in its support for last year's crime conference report, which was signed into law by President Clinton on September 13, 1994 (P.L. 103-322). The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 provided a tough, balanced approach to fighting crime, with critical resources dedicated to putting more police on the streets, building prisons to keep convicted criminals off the streets, and securing and improving prevention programs to reduce crime. The Law Enforcement Steering Committee is united in its belief that the 104th Congress must not retreat from the key tenets of P.L. 103-322.

Specifically, the LESC steadfastly believes that the current COPS program, which directs \$8.8 billion directly to localities to hire 100,000 police officers, must be retained intact. The LESC opposes the use of block grants, which would dilute the impact and decrease the accountability of the current program. Unless the funds are allocated directly to the law enforcement agencies, funds will be diverted by local authorities for non-police purposes. Additional police personnel dedicated to community policing is essential in our efforts to taking back the streets.


For years, many in Washington have fueled the "prevention vs. punishment" debate. The LESC rejects this reasoning and continues to support an anti-crime strategy that includes punishment and prevention. While we must pursue the resources to arrest criminals, prosecute and convict them, and put them in prison, we

must simultaneously pursue resources to prevent lives of crime and destruction.

Crime control legislation has been continually undermined by partisan politics and pressure from special interest groups. In the meantime, violence has exploded in our communities, making peace officers' jobs increasingly dangerous and frustrating. The LESC once again urges that Congress prevent partisan politics from destroying the legislative progress that occurred in 1994.

If you have any questions regarding the LESC's position, please do not hesitate to contact me as the current Chair of the Law Enforcement Steering Committee at (703) 979-0290.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Kenneth T. Lyons". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "Kenneth" and last name "Lyons" clearly distinguishable.

Kenneth T. Lyons
National President, IBPO
Chair, LESC

Law Enforcement Support for 100,000 Cops Initiative

FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS ASSOCIATION (FLEOA)

FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE (FOP)

INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF POLICE OFFICERS (IBPO)

MAJOR CITIES CHIEFS (MCC)

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF POLICE ORGANIZATIONS (NAPO)

NATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF BLACK LAW ENFORCEMENT EXECUTIVES (NOBLE)

NATIONAL SHERIFF'S ASSOCIATION (NSA)

NATIONAL TROOPERS COALITION (NTC)

POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH FORUM (PERF)

POLICE FOUNDATION

INTERNATIONAL UNION OF POLICE ASSOCIATIONS (IUPA)

NATIONAL BLACK POLICE ASSOCIATION

NB: The only major national group not in full support is the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP). Their organization supports the program generally -- and many of their members support the program strongly -- but they have ducked the issue of supporting cops over block grants.

→ see attache letter from
their CA chapter.