

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Shawn McCormick to Susan Rice, re: Update Contribution (5 pages)	12/13/1995	P1/b(1)
002. email	Susan Rice to Pat Battenfield, et al., re: Update (6 pages)	12/14/1995	P1/b(1)
003. email	Susan Rice to Pat Battenfield, et al., re: Update Contribution (6 pages)	12/14/1995	P1/b(1)
004. email	Shawn McCormick to Susan Rice, re: Updated Update (7 pages)	12/15/1995	P1/b(1)
005. email	Macarthur Deshazer to Pat Battenfield, et al., re: Update Dec 15 (8 pages)	12/15/1995	P1/b(1)
006. email	Shawn McCormick to Susan Rice, re: Updated Updated Update (8 pages)	12/15/1995	P1/b(1)
007. email	Susan Rice to Jane Baker, et al., re: Africa Update (13 pages)	12/18/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Email
 MSMail - Record (Sept 94 - Sept 97) ([AIDS and Global...])
 OA/Box Number: 590000

FOLDER TITLE:

[12/13/1995 - 12/29/1995]

2007-1550-F

ke2060

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]

P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]

P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]

P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]

P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 20 December 95 14:29

FROM Peters, Mary A.

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Froman, Michael B.

CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

TEXT_BODY

As long as you are still here... This idea of sending a letter to key members on this was suggested by Sandy Vershbow . State provided a much longer draft. Will Davis agreed that shorter would be better, (yes, this is the "short" version.) It would go to Pell, Helms Gilman, Hamilton, Chris Smith and D'Amato, possibly others as well. Your comments?[[NTALTR.DOC : 3627 in NTALTR.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 20 December 95 14:22

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** NTALTR.DOC

Dear

This past month has marked a series of extraordinary events that have demonstrated the effectiveness of American leadership in the search for a peaceful, undivided and democratic Europe. The Bosnian peace agreement was a major step in that direction, which would not have been possible without U.S. engagement and leadership. The unprecedented decision by Russia to participate in IFOR and place its soldiers under U.S. command is the boldest indication yet of the progress we have made toward a new and broadened Euro-Atlantic community. And, as my visit to Northern Ireland on November 30 demonstrated, American values and leadership can still inspire and galvanize people of other countries in their search for reconciliation and lasting peace.

Among these dramatic achievements, one of equal importance may have gotten less attention than it deserves. That is the New Transatlantic Agenda that French President Chirac, European Union Commission President Santer and I launched at the U.S.-EU Summit in Madrid on December 3. The Agenda takes our relationship with the

European Union from one of cooperation to one of joint action to advance the common interests of our citizens. For instance, it provides for:

- ù active, practical links between U.S. and European law enforcement agencies, including in training of crime-fighting officials in Central Europe, Russia and the NIS, and other areas;

- ù development of an effective global early warning system and response network for communicable diseases such as AIDS and the Ebola virus;

- ù increased exchange of information on major global environmental issues, such as climate change and ozone layer depletion, and initiatives to disseminate environmental technologies and reduce public health risks from hazardous substances; and

- ù coordination on development and humanitarian assistance activities, to help us rationalize our efforts and get the most mileage out of every taxpayer dollar.

On the economic side, the U.S. and Europe enjoy the largest trade and investment relationship in the world, amounting to over \$300 billion annually. American exports to EU countries and EU investment in the U.S. already support over seven million American jobs. Growth in this relationship of even a few percent means billions of dollars of economic activity and tens of thousands of jobs.

Our eventual goal is realization of a new Transatlantic Marketplace, where doing business will be as efficient and attractive as possible. Since American and European businessmen are in the best position to know what needs to be done, we based our first steps toward the "Marketplace" on the recommendations of the Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD), which met in Seville in November. We and the EU will initiate a joint study on facilitating trade and reducing or eliminating tariff and non-tariff barriers; a high-priority push for agreement on mutual recognition of product testing and certification; a new agreement on customs cooperation; and a program to collaborate on regulatory issues to promote the development of a Transatlantic Information Society.

Together with the EU, we are also taking steps to strengthen the

international trading system in advance of the Singapore World Trade Organization ministerial. We have decided to negotiate a new technology agreement which would open further European markets to U.S. high-tech exports; we will seek mutually agreed tariff reductions and consider acceleration of others. We will also establish a working group on employment and labor-related problems

that will look at such issues as increased investment in human resources, smoothing the transition from school-to-work and job-to-job and the relationship between work and welfare.

I have agreed with my EU counterparts to review progress on the Transatlantic Agenda at each semiannual U.S.-EU Summit. For the next Summit in June, I expect to have made concrete progress on the Agenda's key initiatives. We are already beginning follow-up action and preparing for discussions with Italy, which assumes the EU presidency on January 1, 1996.

I know you share my concerns about maximizing the effectiveness of our resources and commitments. The Transatlantic Agenda will do that by ensuring that the resources we and our European partners devote to common goals are used to the best effect. I hope you will join me in supporting the Agenda and in working to help ensure its fullest implementation.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 20 December 95 14:33

FROM Peters, Mary A.

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT Letter on Transatlantic Initiative [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Davis, William K.

CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

TEXT_BODY

You may recall I consulted you last week about this. You agreed that it would be better to focus on the US-EU initiative rather than trumpet all the achievements of our foreign policy toward Europe. And you suggested that it should go to Gilman, Hamilton, Pell, Helms, Chris Smith and D'Amato. Please take a look the draft and let me know if there are any members with interests in some of the areas mentioned , especially business/exports, global disease control and crime/drugs, who should also receive it. Thanks[[NTALTR.DOC : 3628 in NTALTR.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 20 December 95 14:31

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** NTALTR.DOC

Dear

This past month has marked a series of extraordinary events that have demonstrated the effectiveness of American leadership in the search for a peaceful, undivided and democratic Europe. The Bosnian peace agreement was a major step in that direction, which would not have been possible without U.S. engagement and leadership. The unprecedented decision by Russia to participate in IFOR and place its soldiers under U.S. command is the boldest indication yet of the progress we have made toward a new and broadened Euro-Atlantic community. And, as my visit to Northern Ireland on November 30 demonstrated, American values and leadership can still inspire and galvanize people of other countries in their search for reconciliation and lasting peace.

Among these dramatic achievements, one of equal importance may have gotten less attention than it deserves. That is the New Transatlantic Agenda that French President Chirac, European Union Commission President Santer and I launched at the U.S.-EU Summit in

Madrid on December 3. The Agenda takes our relationship with the European Union from one of cooperation to one of joint action to advance the common interests of our citizens. For instance, it provides for:

- ù active, practical links between U.S. and European law enforcement agencies, including in training of crime-fighting officials in Central Europe, Russia and the NIS, and other areas;

- ù development of an effective global early warning system and response network for communicable diseases such as AIDS and the Ebola virus;

- ù increased exchange of information on major global environmental issues, such as climate change and ozone layer depletion, and initiatives to disseminate environmental technologies and reduce public health risks from hazardous substances; and

- ù coordination on development and humanitarian assistance activities, to help us rationalize our efforts and get the most mileage out of every taxpayer dollar.

On the economic side, the U.S. and Europe enjoy the largest trade and investment relationship in the world, amounting to over \$300 billion annually. American exports to EU countries and EU investment in the U.S. already support over seven million American jobs. Growth in this relationship of even a few percent means billions of dollars of economic activity and tens of thousands of jobs.

Our eventual goal is realization of a new Transatlantic Marketplace, where doing business will be as efficient and attractive as possible. Since American and European businessmen are in the best position to know what needs to be done, we based our first steps toward the "Marketplace" on the recommendations of the Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD), which met in Seville in November. We and the EU will initiate a joint study on facilitating trade and reducing or eliminating tariff and non-tariff barriers; a high-priority push for agreement on mutual recognition of product testing and certification; a new agreement on customs cooperation; and a program to collaborate on regulatory issues to promote the development of a Transatlantic Information Society.

Together with the EU, we are also taking steps to strengthen the

international trading system in advance of the Singapore World Trade Organization ministerial. We have decided to negotiate a new technology agreement which would open further European markets to U.S. high-tech exports; we will seek mutually agreed tariff reductions and consider acceleration of others. We will also

establish a working group on employment and labor-related problems that will look at such issues as increased investment in human resources, smoothing the transition from school-to-work and job-to-job and the relationship between work and welfare.

I have agreed with my EU counterparts to review progress on the Transatlantic Agenda at each semiannual U.S.-EU Summit. For the next Summit in June, I expect to have made concrete progress on the Agenda's key initiatives. We are already beginning follow-up action and preparing for discussions with Italy, which assumes the EU presidency on January 1, 1996.

I know you share my concerns about maximizing the effectiveness of our resources and commitments. The Transatlantic Agenda will do that by ensuring that the resources we and our European partners devote to common goals are used to the best effect. I hope you will join me in supporting the Agenda and in working to help ensure its fullest implementation.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 27 December 95 11:06
FROM Peters, Mary A.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Letter to Key Members on NTA [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Daniel, Patty A.
Froman, Michael B.
Kyle, Robert D.
Mitsler, Elaine M.
Tarullo, Daniel K.
Walsh, Helen C.
Wilson, Marilyn E.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY Need clearance on this letter asap. thanks[[NTALTR.DOC : 2878 in
NTALTR.DOC]]
**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 27 December 95 11:5
**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** NTALTR.DOC

Dear(To be sent to Helms, Gilman, Pell, Hamilton, D'Amato and Chris Smith)

This past month has marked a series of extraordinary events that have demonstrated the effectiveness of American leadership in the search for a peaceful, undivided and democratic Europe. The Bosnian peace agreement was a major step in that direction, which would not have been possible without U.S. engagement and leadership. The unprecedented decision by Russia to participate in IFOR and place its soldiers under U.S. command is the boldest indication yet of the progress we have made toward a new and broadened Euro-Atlantic community. And, as my visit to Northern Ireland on November 30 demonstrated, American values and leadership can still inspire and galvanize people of other countries in their search for reconciliation and lasting peace.

Among these dramatic achievements, one of striking importance may not have received the attention it deserves. That is the New Transatlantic Agenda that Spanish President Gonzalez, European Union

Commission President Santer and I launched at the U.S.-European Union Summit in Madrid on December 3. The Agenda includes a number of new and innovative proposals for joint action with the European Union to advance the common interests of our citizens. For example, the Agenda provides for U.S.-EU cooperation to:

- ù nurture active, practical links between U.S. and European law enforcement agencies, including in training of crime-fighting officials in Central Europe, Russia and the NIS, and other areas;

- ù develop an effective global early warning system and response network for communicable diseases such as AIDS and the Ebola virus;

- ù increase exchange of information on major global environmental issues, such as climate change and ozone layer depletion, and initiatives to disseminate environmental technologies and reduce public health risks from hazardous substances;

- ù coordinate development and humanitarian assistance activities, to help us rationalize our efforts and get the most mileage out of every taxpayer dollar; and

- ù advance peace in Bosnia and the Middle East and the democratic transformation of Central Europe and Russia.

Strengthening our economic ties is another key priority for the Agenda. The U.S. and Europe enjoy the largest trade and investment relationship in the world, amounting to over \$300 billion annually. American exports to EU countries and EU investment in the U.S. already support over seven million American jobs. Growth in this relationship of even a few percent means billions of dollars of economic activity and tens of thousands of jobs.

Our eventual goal is realization of a new Transatlantic Marketplace, where doing business will be as efficient and attractive as possible. Since American and European businessmen are in the best position to know what needs to be done, we based our first steps toward the "Marketplace" on the recommendations of the Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD), which met in Seville in November. We and the EU will initiate a joint study on facilitating trade and reducing or eliminating tariff and non-tariff barriers; a high-priority push for agreement on mutual recognition of product testing and certification; a new agreement on customs cooperation;

and a program to collaborate on regulatory issues to promote the development of a Transatlantic Information Society.

Together with the EU, we are also taking steps to strengthen the international trading system in advance of the Singapore World Trade

Organization ministerial. We have decided to launch exercises to conclude an Information Technology Agreement which will expand opportunities for U.S. high-tech exports to Europe and to seek other market-opening measures, including acceleration of tariff cuts already agreed in the Uruguay Round. We will also establish a working group on employment and labor-related problems that will compare experiences and look at such issues as increased investment in human resources, smoothing the transition from school-to-work and job-to-job and the relationship between work and welfare.

I have agreed with my EU counterparts to review progress on the Transatlantic Agenda at each semiannual U.S.-EU Summit. For the next Summit, I expect to have made concrete progress on the Agenda's key initiatives. We are already beginning follow-up action and preparing for discussions with Italy, which assumes the EU presidency on January 1.

I know you share my concerns about maximizing the effectiveness of our resources and commitments. The Transatlantic Agenda will do that by ensuring that the resources we and our European partners devote to common goals are used to the best effect. I hope you will join me in supporting the Agenda and in working to help ensure its fullest implementation.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 28 December 95 16:32

FROM Peters, Mary A.

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT FW: Package [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Maxfield, Nancy H.

CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

TEXT_BODY

This is the letter I was referring to. Please let me know when the package is set up, before you print. Thanks

From: Peters, Mary A.
To: Maxfield, Nancy H.
CC: /R, Record at A1
Subject: Package [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Wednesday, December 27, 1995 12:48 PM

[[NTALTR.DOC : 4166 in NTALTR.DOC]]

Please do as a package. NOte there will be six separate letters. Please put down Will Davis and Bob Kyle as concurring. Thanks

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 27 December 95 12:48

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** NTALTR.DOC

Dear(To be sent to Helms, Gilman, Pell, Hamilton, D'Amato and Chris Smith)

This past month has marked a series of extraordinary events that have demonstrated the effectiveness of American leadership in the search for a peaceful, undivided and democratic Europe. The Bosnian peace agreement was a major step in that direction, which would not have been possible without U.S. engagement and leadership. The unprecedented decision by Russia to participate in IFOR and place its soldiers under U.S. command is the boldest indication yet of the progress we have made toward a new and broadened Euro-Atlantic community. And, as my visit to Northern Ireland on November 30 demonstrated, American values and leadership can still inspire and galvanize people of other countries in their search for

reconciliation and lasting peace.

Among these dramatic achievements, one of striking importance may not have received the attention it deserves. That is the New Transatlantic Agenda that Spanish President Gonzalez, European Union Commission President Santer and I launched at the U.S.-European Union Summit in Madrid on December 3. The Agenda includes a number of new and innovative proposals for joint action with the European Union to advance the common interests of our citizens. For example, the Agenda provides for U.S.-EU cooperation to:

- ù nurture active, practical links between U.S. and European law enforcement agencies, including in training of crime-fighting officials in Central Europe, Russia and the NIS, and other areas;

- ù develop an effective global early warning system and response network for communicable diseases such as AIDS and the Ebola virus;

- ù increase exchange of information on major global environmental issues, such as climate change and ozone layer depletion, and initiatives to disseminate environmental technologies and reduce public health risks from hazardous substances;

- ù coordinate development and humanitarian assistance activities, to help us rationalize our efforts and get the most mileage out of every taxpayer dollar; and

- ù advance peace in Bosnia and the Middle East and the democratic transformation of Central Europe and Russia.

Strengthening our economic ties is another key priority for the Agenda. The U.S. and Europe enjoy the largest trade and investment relationship in the world, amounting to over \$300 billion annually. American exports to EU countries and EU investment in the U.S. already support over seven million American jobs. Growth in this relationship of even a few percent means billions of dollars of economic activity and tens of thousands of jobs.

Our goal is realization of a new Transatlantic Marketplace, where doing business will be as efficient and attractive as possible. Since American and European businessmen are in the best position to know what needs to be done, we based our first steps toward the "Marketplace" on the recommendations of the Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD), which met in Seville in November. We and the EU will initiate a joint study on facilitating trade and reducing or eliminating tariff and non-tariff barriers; a high-priority push for agreement on mutual recognition of product testing and certification; a new agreement on customs cooperation; and a program

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M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 29 December 95 10:01
FROM Witkowsky, Anne A.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: Guidance Updates [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Cullin, Brian P.
Fetig, James L.
Johnson, David T.
Naplan, Steven J.
Schuker, Jill A.
Wozniak, Natalie S.

CARBON_COPY Andreasen, Steven P.
Bell, Robert G.
Kelly, Sandra L.
Moody, Angelyn D.
Seaton, James B.
Sestak, Joseph A.
Witkowsky, Anne A.

TEXT_BODY

[[DEFPRESS.DOC : 2644 in DEFPRESS.DOC]] Brian: Here's on defense authorization. I'll need to speak with our man Sestak on the W Times piece. Will get back to you asap.

From: Cullin, Brian P.
To: @NSC - NSC Staff
CC: /R, Record at A1
Subject: Guidance Updates [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Friday, December 29, 1995 06:42 AM

[[28DECGUI.DOC : 2643 in 28DECGUI.DOC]]

Please provide updates by 10:00 this AM. For Defense: please provide update on DoD Appropriations veto and response to Wash Times/Scarborough gay policy piece. Thanks, Brian

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 28 December 95 12:28

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** 28DECGUI.DOC

NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

December 28, 1995

EUROPE

Bosnia/Croatia

Russia

Turkish Elections -- Contingency

French Nuclear Testing

MIDDLE EAST

Israel

Libya -- Kennedy Amendment to D'Amato Bill

Iran -- USG Covert Program

ASIA

India

North Korea

China

AMERICAS

Guatemala-- Devine (contingency guidance for Prime Time Live)

Colombia -- AA CRASH

MISCELLANEOUS

Defense Authorization Bill

Immigration

BOSNIA/CROATIA

If asked about the drive-by shooting

ù All indications are that the shooting was was an isolated incident, non-directed
f
ire and not aimed at the U.S.
troops. The shooting was directed into the air and U.S. commanders have
contacted t
he parties telling them
to control their soldiers.

If asked about deployment of counter-battery radars to Sarajevo

ù The theater commander has the authority to move his assets wherever needed
to acc
omplish the mission,
depending on the situation.

ù Sector northeast is a command and control measure. The mission in Bosnia is not a
rea-dependent. We are
not defending ground, we are implementing a peace. All IFOR units are subject to re
positioning within the
country by the major commanders if the situation dictates. Militarily prudent.

If asked about the extension of time for Sarajevo withdrawal

ù As agreed in the Dayton accords, the IFOR commander has the authority to adjust ("determine") the time limits depending on the situation on the ground.

ù Admiral Smith and his commanders have determined to extend the time to more fully assess compliance.

ù Admiral Smith does not have the authority to alter the agreed dates of transfer. However, in those areas being transferred to a different entity, in order to provide an orderly period of transition, the entity to which an area is transferred shall not put forces in this area for 90 days after the transfer of authority, or as determined by the IFOR commander.

If asked about delays in troops deployments

ù Trust the judgement of our military commanders; safety of our troops is paramount.

ù This is not a wartime deployment--no reason to take unnecessary risks. Movement into area being done in deliberate, planned, and logical manner.

If pressed on whether delays will affect deadlines in peace agreement

ù Expect parties to meet all deadlines contained in Dayton agreement.

ù Encouraged by signs that parties already are beginning to implement some provisions.

ù IFOR commander is final authority in theatre regarding interpretation of military

aspects of peace settlement.

Transfer of Authority to IFOR

ù Last Wednesday IFOR officially assumed authority from UNPROFOR in a ceremony at 11 00 local time in Sarajevo. Transfer of authority "starts the clock" on a number of important obligations contained in annex 1 of the Dayton agreement, including the separation and withdrawal of forces.

ù Want to commend the brave soldiers from around the world who served in UNPROFOR in Bosnia under difficult circumstances since 1992. Through their efforts they helped contain the level of violence in the country and eased the suffering of tens of thousands of people.

ù Many of these same soldiers will now trade their blue berets for NATO headgear and continue serving in Bosnia under IFOR.

Bonn Conference/Regional Stabilization

ù Believe that establishing a stable military balance in Bosnia by time IFOR leaves is important to preventing resumption of war and facilitating IFOR departure.

ù Peace agreement includes strong arms control provisions which provide for "build-down" of forces. Intend to pursue this vigorously.

ù The peace agreement obligates the parties to start negotiations within seven days, under the auspices of OSCE, to agree on a series of confidence-building measures to be applied within 45 days in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

ù Conference to begin discussion of Dayton agreement's regional stabilization provisions (Annex 1b) held last Friday in Bonn.

ù These measures may include, for example, restrictions on military deployments and exercises, notification of military activities, and exchange of data.

ù The agreement establishes an arms control mechanism for setting numerical limits within 180 days on holdings of tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles, combat aircraft and attack helicopters. The parties are obligated to begin negotiations on such limits, under the auspices of OSCE, within 30 days.

ù If the parties fail to establish negotiated limits on the above categories of weapons within 180 days, individual limits on these categories automatically come into force for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Republic of Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

ù The OSCE will assist the parties with their negotiations, and with implementation and verification of resulting agreements.

ù The agreement includes a provision that the OSCE will help organize and conduct negotiations, facilitate inspections, and help resolve any disputes.

Sequence of events following Paris signing

ù The UN Security Council on December 15 passed the resolution authorizing the peace implementation force and endorsing key aspects of the civilian implementation of Dayton agreement, including the High Representative.

ù The NAC subsequently gave final approval for IFOR Main force deployment.

U.S. Plans to Equip and Train Federation Forces

-- Believe that establishing a stable military balance in Bosnia by time IFOR leaves is important to preventing resumption of war and facilitating IFOR departure.

-- Peace agreement includes strong arms control provisions which provide for "build-down" of forces. Intend to pursue this vigorously.

-- Even with arms control, Federation forces will still be at disadvantage. Accordingly, we have made a commitment to Bosnians that we will coordinate an international effort to ensure they have what is needed for self-defense when IFOR leaves.

-- We want to assure impartiality of IFOR, so providing arms and training to Federation forces will not be done by IFOR. Moreover, President's military advisors believe it is essential to minimize involvement of U.S. military personnel in this effort.

-- Approach we intend to pursue is for the U.S. to take a leadership role in coordinating efforts of third countries.

-- Efforts in this connection already underway. Assessment team evaluating needs of the Federation has returned from Bosnia.

-- We will proceed in manner consistent with UN resolution lifting arms embargo, which allows planning and training to proceed now, and permits transfer of small arms after three months and heavy weapons after six months.

If Pressed on U.S. military role in Equip and Train

-- Assuring the impartiality of IFOR requires minimizing the involvement of U.S. military personnel. First priority is the safety of U.S. forces on the ground in Bosnia.

-- The U.S. will take a leadership role in coordinating an international effort to ensure the Federation receives necessary assistance.

-- We expect some individual military officers, e.g. working in OSD, DSAA or other agencies, will be involved in planning this effort.

-- We will also offer the Bosnians participation in U.S. programs such as IMET.

-- Training programs and provisions of non-lethal assistance can begin immediately after the peace agreement enters into force. We intend to move expeditiously.

If asked about Assessment team activities

-- Team chartered by USG to assess Federation forces' strengths, weaknesses, and needs to enable Federation to field a credible defense.

-- Team assembled by Institute for Defense Analyses. Comprised 15 professional military analysts, including ten retired military. No active duty military involved.

-- After extensive briefings, team members travelled to Bosnia, met military leaders of Federation forces, and visited and observed units throughout Federation territory.

-- Team returned to U.S. on December 2 and is evaluating information they collected.

-- Findings expected to be classified, no public release envisioned.

-- Results of team's work will be one of central elements used in defining scope and nature of international effort to equip and train Federation forces.

-- Goal remains ensuring a stable regional military balance and a sustainable peace in Bosnia.

If asked about Serb No vote on Dayton referendum or threats to destroy utilities in Sarajevo

-- We do not intend to renegotiate the Dayton agreement.

-- At Dayton, Serbian President Milosevic was authorized to negotiate on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs and undertook to secure the acceptance of the peace agreement by the leadership.

-- Since Dayton, Bosnian Serb political leaders have come out in support of the agreement. Bosnian Serb leaders signed all the annexes to the agreement at Paris, indicating their intention to comply.

-- We expect President Milosevic to ensure compliance by the Bosnian Serbs with the terms of the peace agreement, as he committed to do in Dayton.

-- The NATO-led implementation force will deploy when the parties sign the agreement in Paris, indicating their intention to comply with its provisions.

-- Izetbegovic provided our delegation assurances that the Federation will protect the rights of all citizens, particularly those in the Sarajevo area, as spelled out in the Dayton agreement.

Why Bosnia

-- U.S. leadership, so critical to achieving peace, is critical to implementation as well.

-- Parties all recognize the need for an international implementation force to stabilize the situation and build confidence so that peace can take hold.

-- Remain firmly convinced that only NATO can effectively enforce military aspects of settlement. NATO presence is essential to creating secure environment in which political and economic rebuilding can begin.

-- As leader of NATO, U.S. has to be involved. Our interests are very much at stake : Our

engagement essential to prevent spread of conflict, achieve lasting peace. The danger of spillover are real.

-- If NATO takes on the implementation mission but we do not participate, it will be the end of NATO and of U.S. leadership on transatlantic security issues.

-- The United States was drawn into two world wars and a 50-year Cold War because of threats to security and stability in Europe.

IFOR Responsibilities

-- IFOR has specific tasks outlined in Dayton agreement (Annex 1): supervise marking boundaries and zone of separation; monitor and enforce withdrawal of forces; establish and maintain zone of separation, ensure adherence to cease-fire.

-- IFOR will create a stable and secure environment throughout the country so that rebuilding and other civilian tasks may occur.

-- The agreement gives IFOR the authority to use military force to prevent interference with the free movement of civilians, refugees, and displaced persons and to respond appropriately to violence against civilians.

-- IFOR not to act as police force, deliver aid, provide election security, control weapons.

Exit Strategy

-- Accomplishment of above military tasks will provide secure environment to implement non-military aspects of agreement--reconstruction, elections, etc.

-- U.S. and NATO military commanders believe military mission can be

accomplished in
about a
year.

-- Basic military tasks --separating forces, supervising withdrawal--should be
accom
plished in six
months.

-- 12 months will allow IFOR to complete tasks, while giving parties opportunity
and
incentive to
assume responsibilities assumed in Dayton agreement.

-- During this time, military situation should have stabilized, free elections held
under international
supervision, and economic reconstruction launched.

-- Want to create conditions that give parties opportunity to build a lasting peace,
not to have
NATO stay for extended period.

Risk of IFOR casualties

-- Any mission of this sort contains risks, but NATO plan minimizes risks to
IFOR.

-- IFOR will be heavily armed and thoroughly trained. Unlike U.N. forces, will
have
authority to
respond immediately, and training and equipment to respond with overwhelming
force t
o any threat to
their safety or violations of the military provisions of the agreement.

-- Impossible to make meaningful casualty predictions; no casualty models for
peace
operations.

-- Terms of agreement are enforceable and parties themselves accept the mission
and
robust ROE
that NATO implementation force (IFOR) must have.

Reserve Callup

-- President ordered the callup of the selected reserve to active duty.

-- In planning for peace implementation mission in Bosnia, always planned to
rely on

the special
skills of the members of the Guard and Reserves.

-- DoD has identified 37 units that may be asked to send members to Europe to
support

t
deployment of active duty troops to Bosnia, Croatia and nearby countries.

-- Estimated 3800 members of the Guard and Reserves will serve with active duty
force
es. Initial

callup will be for 270 days.

Some may go to Bosnia, others will be deployed to backfill units going to Bosnia,
C
roatia, Italy
or Hungary.

RUSSIA/NIS

Current Items

Yeltsin's Health

-- Understand Yeltsin was released from sanatorium December 26 and returned to
his d
acha near
Moscow. Expect Yeltsin will continue pattern set over last month of taking on
incre
asingly active
workload.

December 17 Russian Election

-- Hard-fought, open election; good news for advance of democracy in Russia.

-- 65% of electorate took part -- impressive demonstration of legitimacy of
process.

Observers report process met international standards as free and fair election.

-- Electorate revealed divided views on Russia's future. Vote reflects some frustra
tion with
dislocations, social costs accompanying collapse of Communism and reform. Not

unusu
al
phenomenon; have seen it in most countries moving from command to market economy.

-- Russia still has some way to go in defining its future. But clear that majority of Russians do not want return to past.

-- President Yeltsin and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin have stated Russian government will pursue same policies as before.

-- U.S. will remain steady in support for democratization, economic reform and Russia's integration into West. Will continue to work with Russian government and those favorably disposed toward these principles.

-- Believe most Russians see engagement, cooperative relations in Russia's interest

Chechnya

-- Russian forces reportedly retook Gudermes over weekend, following intensified Chechen rebel actions launched there during run-up to December 17 election.

-- Regret recent upsurge in fighting; will only make reconciliation more difficult. Painful year since conflict began. Dispute can only be resolved by negotiated settlement that takes into account legitimate interests of all parties. Urge parties to resume negotiations.

General Items

U.S. Stake in Relationship

-- U.S. has vital stake in engaging Russia and supporting reform there. Matters greatly to us if Russia dictatorship or democracy, centrally planned or market-oriented economy.

-- Long-term strategy. Transformation underway will be complex, protracted. Struggle going on between those who support reform and those who oppose or fear change.

-- Engagement producing important successes: reducing nuclear threat, some 60% of Russian GDP now from private sector, no Russian troops in Central Europe or Baltics.

Russian Concerns about NATO Enlargement

-- Intend to manage enlargement process in deliberate, transparent manner that strengthens security, stability of Europe as a whole. Russia a key player in building stable, undivided Europe. Our goal is to develop NATO-Russia relationship in parallel with NATO's process of taking in new members.

Iran Reactor Sale

-- Vice President and Chernomyrdin continuing serious dialogue. We continue to make clear our opposition to any nuclear cooperation with Iran, given Tehran's ambitions to acquire nuclear weapons capability.

Contingency Guidance -- Turkish Elections

Any comment on the December 24 Turkish elections?

-- As in recent Turkish elections, no single party won a majority of seats in parliament. We expect that discussions will begin soon aimed at forming a coalition government.

-- Given the election results, a number of different combinations are possible. We do not intend to speculate on the outcome.

-- Turkey is a good friend and ally of the United States and we look forward to working closely with the new government.

(If Refah wins a plurality of the vote.) Are you concerned that the Islamist Refah Party received the most votes and will be the largest party in the new parliament?

-- Refah clearly enjoys the support of a sizeable minority of the Turkish electorate. Even so, it only won X percent of the vote.

-- Despite its first place finish in the voting, it is not clear what the composition of the new government will be.

-- However, Turkey is a good friend and ally of the United States and we fully expect it to remain so whomever participates in the new governing coalition.

FRENCH NUCLEAR TEST

Q: What is the U.S. reaction to the December 27 French nuclear test?

A:

ù The United States regrets this action.

ù We continue to urge all of the nuclear powers, including France, to refrain from further nuclear tests and to join in a global moratorium as we work to complete and sign a CTB Treaty in 1996.

ù In this regard, we take note of President Chirac's strong commitment to sign a CTB Treaty no later than the fall of 1996, and we will continue to work with France and all other states participating in the CTB negotiations to ensure that a CTB Treaty is ready for signature next year.

Q: Is the French decision to resume testing a set-back for the CTB negotiations?

A:

ù Although we regret continued testing, we continue to believe we can conclude and sign a CTB Treaty next year.

Q: Has President Clinton discussed this issue with President Chirac? Has Chirac responded?

A:

ù Yes, the President has made clear to President Chirac U.S. support for a global moratorium on testing as we work to complete the CTB.

ù President Chirac himself has described his decision to conduct a final series of tests as "irrevocable."

Q: Has the United States offered to assist France in simulating nuclear tests so that France might forgo further testing?

A:

ù We have had a cooperation program with France in the nuclear area and we will continue to work with France to ensure the safety and reliability of existing nuclear weapons under a true zero yield CTB Treaty.

Q: Why isn't the White House releasing a written statement? Are you softening your position on French testing?

A:

ù The French well understand our position on nuclear testing and their test program.

Q: Won't French nuclear testing encourage other states, like India, to conduct its

own nuclear tests?

ù Refuse to speculate on how French testing will impact on the thinking of other states.

ù (Again), our policy with respect to nuclear testing is clear: the U.S. urges all countries to refrain from nuclear testing and to abide by a global moratorium as we work to complete and sign a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996.

ISRAEL: PEACE PROCESS

Q: Have there been any developments on the Syria track as a result of Prime Minister Peres' meeting with the President?

A: Following the President's meeting with Prime Minister Peres and call to President Asad, we believe that a genuine opportunity now exists to make progress on the Israel-Syrian negotiating track. Both Prime Minister Peres and President Asad have reaffirmed their commitment to move forward with their negotiations with the goal of reaching a comprehensive agreement as rapidly as possible, and the President has made clear his determination to do everything possible to help make this happen.

The President sent Secretary Christopher to the region in order to build upon the encouraging exchanges we have already had with Israel and Syria and to work for resumption of negotiations under our auspices at the earliest possible date.

Q: Did Prime Minister Peres request clemency for Jonathan Pollard from the President?
?

A: Prime Minister Peres raised the Pollard case to the President in their discussion.

The President has stated publicly that "If (Mr. Pollard) requests executive clemency, I will, of course, review that request, as I would anyone who requested it. But he has to make a request and it has to come through the ordinary channels before I can do that."

(If pressed) I would refer you to the Department of Justice regarding specific questions on Pollard's status and possible clemency requests.

Q: Did Former Prime Minister Rabin commit to lines of withdrawal from the Golan? Did Prime Minister Peres reaffirm these lines?

A: I would refer you to the comments of Prime Minister Peres during his press conference with the President, in which he said, "You cannot pin (peace negotiations) on a single issue. We are talking about the Syrian-Israeli peace process in its totality."

(If pressed)

I am not going to comment on the specifics of the talks.

Q: Did Prime Minister Peres broach the idea of a U.S.-Israeli Defense Treaty? Will the U.S. agree to such a treaty?

A: Our commitment to the security and well-being of Israel is ironclad. The President has made clear that he is dedicated to sustaining and enhancing Israel's qualitative advantage, and that the security of Israel is one of the main pillars of America's defense commitments. This will remain fundamental as Israel and the United

States p
roceed toward our
shared goal of a lasting and comprehensive peace.

(If pressed)

I am not going to comment further on
specifics of the talks.

LIBYA -- KENNEDY AMENDMENTS TO D'AMATO BILL

Q. What is the Administration's position on the Kennedy amendment to the
D'Amato bi
ll?

A. This Administration intends to work with Members of Congress and our allies
to o
btain additional multilateral
sanctions.

Q. But what about the Kennedy amendment itself? Does the Administration have
a pos
ition?

A. Sen. Kennedy sent a strong signal of the determination of the American people
to
fight state sponsors of
terrorism. We will work with him and other members of Congress on ways to
toughen m
ultilateral sanctions
on Libya.

Iran

Background: The Washington Post picked up the Reuters story regarding the
President
's interview with Middle
East Insight Magazine (somehow obtained and printed by the Arabic newspaper
Ash-Shar
q al-Awsat). The story
in the Post mistakenly reported that the President said that the US would not/not
be

willing to talk to the Iranians
until after they had stopped their nefarious activities--although both the Middle
East Insight and Ash-Sharq
al-Awsat versions of the interview have the correct response from the President,
that we are willing to engage in
authoritative dialogue at any time, but normalization of relations will not be possible until Iran has ceased its
objectionable activities.

Q. Is it true that the US will not begin a dialogue with Tehran until after Iran has stopped its objectionable activities?

A. Our position is well known, and has been clearly stated in the President's interview with Middle East Insight magazine.

But let me reiterate: we are prepared for dialogue with authoritative representatives of the government of Iran at any time, but normal relations such as we would have with any other country cannot occur until Iran has ceased its objectionable activities, including support for terrorism and attempted acquisition of weapons of mass destruction.

Q. Is there any truth to reports that the US has begun a covert action campaign against Iran?

A. It is US government policy that we do not comment on alleged intelligence activities.

INDIA - Possible Nuclear Test

Q: How are you responding to intelligence reports that India is preparing to conduct a nuclear test?

-- As a matter of policy, we do not comment on specific intelligence matters.

-- We have long been concerned about the dangers of nuclear proliferation in South Asia. We have worked hard to combat those dangers.

-- Our policy with respect to nuclear testing is clear. The US urges all countries, including India, to refrain from nuclear testing and to abide by a global moratorium as we work to complete and sign a CTBT in 1996.

-- with a CTBT on the near horizon, a test would put India in opposition to prevailing world opinion, would be perceived by the world as a particularly bad decision in that light, and would invite universal condemnation..

Q. What is your reaction to Foreign Minister Mukherjee's statement denying that India has any plans to conduct a nuclear test?

A. We are encouraged by the foreign minister's statement that India does not plan to conduct a nuclear test. We also understand he reiterated his country's support for a comprehensive test ban treaty, although he noted there are some differences between India and the U.S. about what it could contain.

It is a major goal of this Administration to have a CTBT open for signature by September of next year.

In support of a CTBT, the U.S. has adopted a moratorium on testing, and called on all states to do the same.

Q: What will you do if India does conduct a nuclear test?

-- Not going to deal in hypotheticals.

-- (if pressed) There are U.S. statutes on the books that apply. Under the Glenn Amendment, any nonnuclear weapon state that detonates a nuclear explosion is subject to broad sanctions.

Discussions with the Indian Government: We are closely monitoring the situation. We have made our views

known to the Indian government.

NORTH KOREA

Background: Media continues to report North Korea is starving -- international aid efforts are falling woefully short. UN says donor countries are \$8.8 billion short.

It's difficult to get a handle on the food situation in North Korea. There have been conflicting reports, some suggesting that there's no real problem (i.e. that the North is trying to take advantage of recent floods to hustle some aid), some suggesting that there's intermittent malnutrition in the countryside, and a handful of unconfirmed rumors of actual starvation (i.e. fatalities). We also know that North Korea maintains stockpiles of food and fuel for the military, but we don't know the extent to which these stockpiles have been tapped to deal with shortages. Obviously we and our ROK/Japanese allies have no interest in giving North Korea food aid that enables it to maintain military stockpiles.

Contrary to media coverage, the international response has been somewhat significant. Japan has supplied 500,000 tons of rice and Korea has supplied 150,000 tons. Korea would have supplied more except that North Korea behaved badly (made one South Korean ship fly a North Korean flag, refused for weeks to release a South Korean fishing ship and to cease ad hominem attacks on Kim Young Sam). Although it recently released the ship, the South is still wary of making promises about renewing food deliveries. If it becomes clear that people are actually starving, public opinion in the South may change (it's now anti-food aid) and demand that their fellow Koreans be fed.

Points

-- We continue to monitor the situation closely, in conjunction with the World Food

Program and
a few NGOs that are operating in North Korea.

-- To date, there is no credible evidence of starvation in North Korea.

-- We note that the countries in the region have already provided considerable
amount
ts of rice to
the North, and might be prepared to provide additional amounts in the future.

-- Now that North Korea has released the crew of the captured fishing vessel, we
hope
that
discussions between North and South on food assistance can be resumed
whenever appro
priate and
without impediment.

China: Wei Jingsheng Conviction Upheld

Q: What is your response to the Beijing Higher People's Court upholding the
convicti
on and
sentencing of Wei Jingsheng?

A: We are disappointed but hardly surprised at the outcome of Wei's appeal. It is
c
onsistent with
the kind of political domination of the judiciary that held Mr. Wei
incommunicado an
d without legal
charge for nearly 20 months, then tried, convicted and sentenced him in a day,
when
it felt the
repercussions would be least severe. It is not consistent with international standa
rds of justice or the
right to a fair trial.

We will continue to urge the Chinese authorities to show clemency for a man
whose
courageous advocacy of democracy in Chinese terms will continue to inspire
decent-mi
nded people
throughout the world.

Q: Do you have any comment on China's publication of a Human Rights White
Paper?

A: It is a political document with a political purpose. At the same time, we welcome China's reiteration of its support for internationally-recognized standards and norms for human rights and its recognition that governments are obligated to improve human rights standards of the people it governs.

Contingency Press Guidance
GUATEMALA -- DEVINE CASE -- PRIME TIME LIVE

Background: "Prime Time LIVE" alleged in a December 27 segment that AmCit Michael DeVine's 1990 murder in Guatemala was linked to drug trafficking. DeVine's case is one of several under review by the Intelligence Oversight Board, which is conducting a government-wide review of all aspects of the DeVine and Bamaca cases, as well as any intelligence that may bear on the torture, disappearance or death of any U.S. citizen in Guatemala since 1984. The allegations raised by "Prime Time Live" have been covered by the IOB review, but we are not able to release findings until the entire review is complete and the President or his designee has determined what information from the review to make public.

Points to Make:

The 1990 murder of Michael DeVine in Guatemala is one of the key areas of attention of the IOB's government-wide review. That review is comprehensive and ongoing. We expect to share the results of that review with Mrs. DeVine once it is complete.

The President intends to provide to the American public as much information about the

e review as appropriate.

It would be premature to comment on the IOB's findings regarding the murder of Michael DeVine until its review is complete.

In the interests of conducting a thorough review the IOB has not set a deadline for its final report. The review is in an advanced stage and the IOB's goal is to have its report ready for the President by early next year.

COLOMBIA: AMERICAN AIRLINES

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

Hillary and I offer our profound condolences to the many families whose loved ones perished in the crash of American Airlines flight 965 near Buga, Colombia. Coming on the eve of the holiday season, this tragic event took on even greater poignancy. I have dispatched an interagency team to the site which, working along side Colombian authorities, will pursue the goals of searching for survivors, identifying victims and determining the cause of the crash. Our hopes and prayers, along with those of all Americans, are with those whose lives have been so affected by this tragedy.

Q&A

Q: What is the U.S. doing?

A: Approximately 20 USG employees -- including representatives from the Embassy in Bogota, the NTSB, FAA, FBI AND ATF -- are on the scene now. They are working in conjunction with GOC officials at the scene to rescue survivors, identify victims, and determine the cause of this tragic crash. Tactical satellite communications equipment has arrived facilitating communication with this remote,

mountainous area.

Amb. and Mrs. Frechette went to Cali and Buga on Sunday to visit the crash site and

to meet with American

citizen relatives of the victims. They also visited the American survivors in the hospital.

Both the State Dept. and Embassy Bogota are continuing to operate working groups to

assist families of victims.

Q: What is the status of U.S. citizens?

A: Preliminary figures indicate that approximately 162 passengers and crew were on

board the flight.

Thus far, we believe 65 are U.S. citizens. Many are dual nationals. Figure not firm and likely to change.

There are 4 confirmed survivors, 2 of whom are U.S. citizens.

The remains of 153 individuals have been identified and released to next of kin.

Three bodies have not yet been recovered from the crash site.

Q: What happened?

A: Again, I caution everyone against speculating on the cause of this tragedy. There is an active investigation

underway and I would prefer to await its results. We have no information to connect

any threats with this

tragedy outside Cali.

I can tell you that we receive hundreds of threats against U.S. targets every year.

We take all the threats

seriously and investigate them to determine their credibility and take action if appropriate.

Q: (If pressed about a mid-November threat):

A: In mid-November, the State Department received information that criminal elements

might target U.S. air

carriers and/or cargo operations in Colombia. There was no specific information to

substantiate this threat.

This information was passed to the FAA which, in turn, informed the appropriate U.S.

carriers.

Q: (If asked about the threat received in Caracas)

A: This is an example of the type of threat situation we deal with. Our investigation indicated that the source was

an individual who was angry at immigrants and threatened to blow up aircraft traveling

from Colombia and

Venezuela to the United States.

FISCAL YEAR 1996 DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BILL

Background: The House and Senate concluded the conference on H.R. 1530, the FY 1996 defense authorization act. The bill as reported to both houses authorizes \$264.7 billion in Budget Authority, an increase of \$7.1 billion from the President's request. The increase includes billions in unrequested funding for the B-2 bomber, National Missile Defense (NMD) systems, fighter aircraft, ships and other equipment not contained in the Defense Department's Future Year Defense Plan (FYDP). The bill arrived at the White House on Friday afternoon.

Despite numerous warnings that the President's advisors would recommend that he veto the bill unless a number of unacceptable policy restrictions and binding provisions were deleted or revised, H.R. 1530 as reported by the conference fails to correct these flaws. Objectionable provisions include:

- ABM/NMD: The bill would unnecessarily require deployment by 2003 of a costly missile defense system capable of defending the U.S. from a long-range missile threat which the Intelligence Community does not believe will materialize in this time period. By forcing an unwarranted NMD deployment decision now, the bill would needlessly incur tens of billions of dollars in missile defense costs and force DoD prematurely to lock into a specific technological option. In addition, by directing that the NMD be "operationally effective" in defending all 50 states (including Alaska and Hawaii), the bill would likely require a multiple-site NMD architecture that cannot be accommodated within the terms of the ABM Treaty as now written. By setting the U.S. on a collision course with the ABM Treaty, the bill puts at risk continued

Russian implementation of START I and Russian ratification of START II, two treaties which together will reduce the number of U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear warheads by two-thirds from Cold War levels.

ù Infringements on the President's Authorities: The bill imposes restrictions on the ability of the President to conduct contingency operations that are essential to the national interest. The restrictions on funding available to the Administration to commence a contingency operation and the necessity to submit supplemental requests to continue an operation are unwarranted restrictions on the authority of the President. Moreover, by requiring a Presidential certification to assign U.S. Armed Forces under United Nations (UN) operational or tactical control, the bill infringes on the President's constitutional authority. Finally, by prohibiting DoD funding to meet the U.S. share of the costs of UN peacekeeping activities, the bill would undermine the President's ability to carry out effectively U.S. foreign policy.

ù Shipbuilding: The bill seeks to abandon plans to scrap two battleships, authorize procurement of amphibious ships that are not needed at this time, directs procurement to specific shipyards absent competition, and unnecessarily expands "Buy American" provisions for ships and naval equipment, thereby risking foreign retaliation against U.S. foreign military sales.

Q: Will the President veto this bill?

A: If the Conference Report on H.R. 1530 were presented to the President in its current form, the President would veto the bill. In addition to the ABM/TMD and contingency operations provisions which raise serious constitutional issues by restricting the President's powers as Commander-in-Chief and foreign policy powers, the Administration has serious concerns about the

following:
 restrictions on the
 use of Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction funds; subcaps on activities
 and elim
 ination of funding
 for the Defense Enterprise Fund; restrictions on the Technology Reinvestment
 Program
 and the
 retirement of U.S. strategic delivery systems; DoD's ability to execute disaster relief, demining, and
 military-to-military contact programs; provisions requiring the discharge of
 military
 personnel who are
 HIV-positive; restrictions on the ability the Secretary of Defense to manage DoD
 effort
 actively; and the
 Administration continues to object to the restrictions on the ability of female servicemembers or
 dependents from obtaining privately funded abortions in U.S. military hospitals
 abroad.

Q: What will happen to the military pay raise if he does veto it?

A: Under current law, the military will automatically receive the same pay
 increase
 next year as
 their civilian government counterparts. This is expected to be 2.0%. The bill
 reported out of
 the conference would raise this to 2.4%. The Administration is committed to the full
 military pay raise of
 2.4% and will seek to attach the required authority to other legislation as soon as
 possible.

Q: Will a veto undercut the Bosnia operation?

A: No. Funds for the Bosnia operation are available through the FY 1996 defense
 appropriations
 act which the President approved on November 30th.

The only Bosnia-related authority we need that was contained in the authorization
 bill is

authority to obligate or expend funds for certain new NATO infrastructure
 activities.
 s. We will seek to

obtain this authority on another legislative vehicle. In the meantime, the NATO projects will be paid for by the Alliance's other 15 nations, and we will make up our share later.

Q: Why is the President opposed to defending America against missile attack?

A: The President is not opposed to defending America against real threats. The problem with this bill is that it assumes a long-range missile threat to our homeland that simply does not exist and which is not expected to emerge for at least another decade.

The Defense Department is, however, developing a contingency national missile defense deployment option that, once ready in two or three years, would allow us to respond with a defense in being within a short period (two to three years) from the time we decided a sooner-than-expected threat required such a response.

Washington Post Piece on Alien Smuggling

Background: The Post story is generally accurate. State/INL provided Post reporter Bill Branigan with a sanitized summary of a confidential report that was submitted by State not to the President (as the story states), but to the NSC via a Brill-Sens memo. The report is an outgrowth of an immigration enforcement memorandum signed by the President and issued to agencies (and initiated by the DPC) last February. The aliens smuggling section directed the agencies to set up an interagency group to deal with this issue. They did so, and the report is their latest effort.

The recommendations -- increased cooperation with foreign governments, providing them with model anti-smuggling legislation, revoking visas to officials known to be implicated in smuggling.

ugbling, increased intelligence coordination, etc. -- follow-up on PDD-9 (Alien Smuggling). Many of the recommendations are already being implemented. We need to consider others and will.

Points:

Did the President Receive a Report on Alien Smuggling?

ù A report on alien smuggling was submitted to the NSC staff by an interagency working group created at the direction of the President in February 1995.

What were the principal recommendations of the report?

ù Don't want to go into details of classified report whose recommendations are still being considered, but recommendations included pressing governments to criminalize alien smuggling, revoking or denying visas to officials known to be implicated in alien smuggling, increasing coordination of intelligence on alien smuggling and increasing overseas training and assistance.

What have you done already on this issue?

ù The Clinton Administration has taken a range of actions on this issue that have been very effective.

ù The first step was a Presidential directive issued in 1993, instructing all agencies -- including State, INS, Coast Guard -- to increase law enforcement efforts to deter trafficking in human cargo.

ù Our policy is working: the Justice Department is focusing attention and resources toward prosecution of alien smugglers, we have increased cooperation with foreign law enforcement agencies, and other governments have permitted us to land interdicted migrants on their territories, from which repatriations have taken place.

ù We have significantly reduced the incidents of smuggling of large numbers of migrants

nts by boat.

What about the report's claim that these kinds of initiatives are underfunded?

ù The fiscal situation is tough, but this is an important issue for the Administration -- we need to make resources available and we have.

ù Late last year, for example, the President authorized use of \$6 million from Justice's Immigration Emergency Fund for repatriation of smuggled migrants.

ù But we need the support of the Congress, which -- as the Post report indicated -- has not always agreed to fund our proposals for enhanced overseas deterrence.

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

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Despite numerous warnings that the President's advisors would recommend that he veto the bill unless a number of unacceptable policy restrictions and binding provisions were deleted or revised, H.R. 1530 as reported by the

conference failed to correct these flaws. Objectionable provisions include:

- ù ABM/NMD: The bill would unnecessarily require deployment by 2003 of a costly missile defense system capable of defending the U.S. from a long-range missile threat which the Intelligence Community does not believe will materialize in this time period. By forcing an unwarranted NMD deployment decision now, the bill would needlessly incur tens of billions of dollars in missile defense costs and force DoD prematurely to lock into a specific technological option. In addition, by directing that the NMD be "operationally effective" in defending all 50 states (including Alaska and Hawaii), the bill would likely require a multiple-site NMD architecture that cannot be accommodated within the terms of the ABM Treaty as now written. By setting the U.S. on a collision course with the ABM Treaty, the bill puts at risk continued

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 dependents from obtaining privately funded abortions in U.S. military hospitals
 abro
 ad.

Q: What will happen to the military pay raise, now that the President has vetoed
 the
 bill?

A: The bill reported out of conference would have raised military pay by 2.4%.
 The

Administration is committed to the full military pay raise of 2.4%. To ensure that
 service men and

women are not harmed as the Administration works to resolve differences on the bill,
 the President issued
 an Executive Order yesterday (December 28) that provides for a 2% military pay raise
 , the most the law
 allows him to do. The President also sent legislation to Congress to implement the
 full 2.4 % military pay
 raise. He said that he wanted it "to be effective on January 1" and that he would "sign it as soon as [he] got it."

Q: Does this veto undercut the Bosnia operation?

A: No. Funds for the Bosnia operation are available through the FY 1996 defense appropriations act which the President approved on November 30th.

The only Bosnia-related authority we need that was contained in the authorization bill is
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