

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Joseph Sestak to Robert Bell, re: Authorization Bill (1 page)	06/06/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
MSMail - Record (Sept 94 - Sept 97) ([AIDS and Global...])
OA/Box Number: 590000

FOLDER TITLE:

[06/06/1995 - 06/23/1995]

2007-1550-F

ke2082

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

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001. email	Joseph Sestak to Robert Bell, re: Authorization Bill (1 page)	06/06/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

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FOLDER TITLE:

[06/06/1995 - 06/23/1995]

2007-1550-F
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RESTRICTION CODES

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P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 06 June 95 12:14
FROM Tyler, John T.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: HR 1561 Fact Sheet [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Blinken, Antony J.
Danvers, William C.
Fetig, James L.
CARBON_COPY Boorstin, Robert O.
TEXT_BODY

Tony--Attached is the latest version of the "NEWBAD " document--it is taken from the edit that Bob did yesterday---the formatting anomallies come from your shop. See Bill's abortion point below. Suggest that Sandy make the call on whether to include it. Would you please give the document a final scrub and then forward it on to Jim Fetig for final clearance by SB/AL and release this afternoon. I will take a copy down to Gordon Adams. You are going to have to work through Bob's formatting--hope he feels better. [[NEWBAD.DOC : 3137 in NEWBAD.DOC]]

From: Danvers, William C.
To: Halperin, Morton H.; Tyler, John T.
CC: /R, Record at A1; Boorstin, Robert O.; Clarke, Richard A.; Fetig, James L.; @LEGISLAT-Legislative Affairs
Subject: RE: HR 1561 Fact Sheet [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Tuesday, June 06, 1995 11:52 AM

If this is an issue-- i.e. abortion-- then just leave it out. We need to get this moving and we have a lot in the fact sheet as is.

From: Tyler, John T.

To: Halperin, Morton H.
CC: /R, Record at A1; Boorstin, Robert O.; Clarke, Richard A.; Danvers, William C.; Fetig, James L.
Subject: RE: HR 1561 Fact Sheet [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Tuesday, June 06, 1995 10:16 AM

Mort...I think the changes are fine also; however, I would prefer to hear from Bob Boorstin before we add the abortion issue. In response to "where does the package stand?"---we are waiting for the final Boorstin input and then I would run it by Gordon Adams before getting a final ok from AL/SB and then forwarding to Jim Fetig.

From: Halperin, Morton H.
To: Tyler, John T.
CC: /R, Record at A1
Subject: FW: HR 1561 Fact Sheet [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Tuesday, June 06, 1995 10:09 AM

I agree with these changes. Where does this package stand? We need to move it quickly if we want it out today.

From: Danvers, William C.
To: Boorstin, Robert O.; Tyler, John T.
CC: /R, Record at A1; Clarke, Richard A.; Cooper, Kathleen H.; Fetig, James L.; Halperin, Morton H.; Mitchell, Calvin A.; @LEGISLAT-Legislative Affairs
Subject: RE: HR 1561 Fact Sheet [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Tuesday, June 06, 1995 09:43 AM

I would add a new bullet and change one bullet in the fact sheet on cutting funds for DFA. You indicate the cut is 21%, AID believes the cuts are at least 23%, perhaps a little more. Therefore, I recommend saying that the cuts are almost 25%.

ALso, we should consider adding the following bullet, reflecting floor action-- i.e. the adoption of the Smith amendment:

-- Returns the US to the Mexico City policy of denying funds to any

international organization-- private or public-- which receives funds from any source for abortion-related services. such as counseling. This provision in the bill would also deny funds for UNFPA so long as it continues to support family planning programs in China.

From: Tyler, John T.

To: Boorstin, Robert O.

CC: /R, Record at A1; Clarke, Richard A.; Cooper, Kathleen H.; Danvers, William C.; Fetig, James L.; Halperin, Morton H.; Mitchell, Calvin A.

Subject: RE: HR 1561 Fact Sheet [UNCLASSIFIED]

Date: Monday, June 05, 1995 07:42 PM

<<Attached File: NEWBAD.DOC>>

Bob--I hope that this is a document that you believe we can use. We may still need to modify it based on any intelligence from Bill Danvers. Your formatting is mysterious.

From: Boorstin, Robert O.

To: Clarke, Richard A.; Danvers, William C.; Fetig, James L.; Halperin, Morton H.; Mitchell, Calvin A.; Tyler, John T.

CC: /N, NonRecord at A1; /R, Record at A1; Cooper, Kathleen H.

Subject: RE: HR 1561 Fact Sheet [UNCLASSIFIED]

Date: Monday, June 05, 1995 12:59 PM

<<Attached File: BADBILL.DOC>>

I have made revisions as shown. I assume this is going to be annotated, indicating the section of the bill that contains the offending passage.

Four points: (1) Is this a press release or a fact sheet? Releasing a fact sheet into the ether will not do us any good. (2) To satisfy our colleagues, we should consider moving up the "reorganization" bullet to just after the China bullet. (3) The second to last bullet -- on "end use and

diversion prevention" is very weak, especially because the purpose ("to make sure your tax dollars are not wasted") is popular and the bill does indicate how the program should be implemented. We cannot use the phrase "unfunded mandate" in this context. I have removed the section # here, because it should be presented uniformly with the other bullets. (4) The last bullet should be killed. We gain nothing by saying that they're saying good things, and it looks strange to single out a couple of programs.

From: Tyler, John T.

To: Boorstin, Robert O.; Clarke, Richard A.; Danvers, William C.; Fetig, James L.; Halperin, Morton H.

CC: /R, Record at A1; Cooper, Kathleen H.

Subject: HR 1561 Fact Sheet [UNCLASSIFIED]

Date: Monday, June 05, 1995 10:47 AM

<<Attached File: JUN5FAK.DOC>>

Attached is a new fact sheet to support another Rose Garden (or other) statement about the problems with the House's foreign aid bill. This version builds on the earlier version and adds some detail in places. NB the new bullet about the Congress trying to impose an "unfunded mandate" on the President! Kelly Kammerer is working on a draft statement, which will be circulated later. Please e-mail me your comments.

**ATTACHMENT FILE
DATE**

6 June 95 12:10

**ATTACHMENT FILE
NAME**

NEWBAD.DOC

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release June 6, 1995

Administration Fights

American Overseas Interests Act of 1995 (H.R. 1561)

This week the House resumes debate on legislation that threatens America's ability to preserve our global leadership and to safeguard the security and prosperity of the American people. H.R. 1561, the "American Overseas Interests Act of 1995," would limit the President's ability to respond to foreign threats and carry out foreign policy. By slashing our budget for foreign affairs, it would deprive our nation of the resources necessary to meet the challenges and seize the opportunities of the post-Cold War world. The bill would undercut Administration efforts to streamline its foreign affairs agencies -- where staff has already been cut by 4700 -- and would create new, inefficient bureaucratic layers. (BOB: this paragraph now hits all three key points -- the attack on Pres.Prerogatives; the Money cuts; and, the Reorganization problem--which is really a Pres.Prerogative problem>)

The Clinton Administration stands ready to work with Congress to craft a bill that the President can sign. But the President -- in order to protect our nation and advance the interests of the American people and on the advice of his senior foreign policy advisors -- would veto the bill as it now stands.

H.R. 1561 includes provisions that would, among other things:

- ù Require the President to give Congress 15 days notice before responding to "unanticipated contingencies" and
- require that he determine that providing emergency assistance is in our "vital national

nal interests" (Section 3401-3403).

ù Threaten to block efforts to stop North Korea's nuclear program by blocking the release of funds. The bill requires that cumbersome, unnecessary Presidential Determinations and advance notification be provided to Congressional committees (Section 2641-2645).

ù Compel changes in our refugee and migration policy and restricts the President's ability to respond to boat migration, which could precipitate a mass migration to the United States and increase illegal alien smuggling (Sections 2104/ 2252).

ù Derail our support for democratic reform in Russia and the other New Independent States by undercutting Presidential flexibility in promoting free market and democratic reform (Section 3224).

ù Impair the President's ability to manage American relations with China by:

- Lifting current restraints on arms sales to Taiwan, which could destabilize U.S.-Chinese relations without enhancing Taiwan's long-term security (Section 2601) .

- Requiring the President to appoint a Special Envoy to Tibet -- an action that would harm relations with China without improving the status of the Dalai Lama or helping the Tibetan people (Section 2302).

ù Reduces funding for debt reduction by 75%. If it were to become law, H.R. 1561 would force the United States to renege on its pledge to join other developed countries and reduce by two thirds debts owed by the world's poorest, most indebted countries--many of them in Africa.

ù Stop, in any meaningful sense, American leadership in international organizations

by placing restrictions on assistance to international organizations and our ability to meet certain international treaty obligations.

ù Cut the Development Fund for Africa by almost 25% and reduces world-wide development assistance funding by 34% from the President's FY 1996 request.

ù Force the sacrifice of any aid that has been authorized but not spent, after three years. H.R. 1561 would cause \$2.1 billion in aid in the "pipeline" now being used by private, non-profit American organizations to provide direct services in developing countries to be returned to the Treasury. The cut off would include \$250 million in Africa that helps reduce infant mortality, improve basic education for girls and slow the spread of AIDS. (Section 3286)

ù Require the President to establish an elaborate program to monitor the end use of all military equipment and technology transferred to our friends and allies and prevent their diversion. It provides no mechanism to fund or implement this scheme -- except to use borrowed workers from Reduce funding for debt reduction by 75%. If it were to become law, H.R. 1561 would the Defense and Treasury Departments. (Section 3192)

ù

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 06 June 95 14:14
FROM Fetig, James L.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: For Release TODAY [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Baker, Jane E.
Darby, Melanie B.
Gray, Wendy
Hawkins, Ardenia R.
Hilliard, Brenda I.
Joshi, M. Kay
Millison, Cathy L.
CARBON_COPY Fetig, James L.
Mitchell, Calvin A.
Wozniak, Natalie S.

TEXT_BODY

Forwarded for your clearance.

From: Tyler, John T.
To: Fetig, James L.
CC: /R, Record at A1; Blinken, Antony J.; Clarke, Richard A.; Cooper, Kathleen H.; Danvers, William C.; Halperin, Morton H.
Subject: For Release TODAY [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Tuesday, June 06, 1995 01:10 PM

[[NEWBAD.DOC : 3628 in NEWBAD.DOC]]

Jim--the attached version of the statement/fact sheet on HR 1561 has been cleared by Bob Boorstin's office (Tony Blinken). It includes Bill Danver's tic point on abortion as the last item. I have given a copy to Gordon Adams

(x54657)--but have not heard back from him.

Would you please clear the piece with Tony/Sandy. Thanks, Tim Tyler.

ATTACHMENT FILE
DATE

6 June 95 13:5

ATTACHMENT FILE
NAME

NEWBAD.DOC

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release June 6, 1995

Administration Fights

American Overseas Interests Act of 1995 (H.R. 1561)

This week the House resumes debate on legislation that threatens America's ability to preserve our global leadership and to safeguard the security and prosperity of the American people. H.R. 1561, the "American Overseas Interests Act of 1995," would limit the President's ability to respond to foreign threats and carry out foreign policy. By slashing our budget for foreign affairs, it would deprive our nation of the resources necessary to meet the challenges and seize the opportunities of the post-Cold War world. The bill would undercut Administration efforts to streamline its foreign affairs agencies -- where staff has already been cut by 4700 -- and would create new, inefficient layers of bureaucracy.

The Clinton Administration stands ready to work with Congress to craft a bill that t

he President can sign. But the President -- in order to protect our nation and advance the interests of the American people and on the the advice of his senior foreign policy advisors -- will veto the bill as it now stands.

H.R. 1561 includes provisions that would, among other things:

- ù Require the President to give Congress 15 days notice before responding to "unanticipated contingencies" and require that he determine that providing emergency assistance is in our "vital national interests." This would hinder the President's ability to act rapidly and effectively in the face of a crisis (Section 3401-3403).

- ù Obstruct our efforts to stop North Korea's nuclear program by blocking the release of funds to implement the Framework Agreement we secured with Pyongyang. The bill requires that cumbersome, unnecessary Presidential Determinations and advance notification be provided to Congressional committees before the release of funds (Section 2641-2645).

- ù Compel changes in our refugee and migration policy and restrict the President's ability to respond to boat migration, which could precipitate a mass migration to the United States and increase illegal alien smuggling (Sections 2104/ 2252).

- ù Derail our support for democratic reform in Russia and the other New Independent States by undercutting Presidential flexibility in promoting free market and democratic reform (Section 3224).

- ù Impair the President's ability to manage American relations with China by:

- Lifting current restraints on arms sales to Taiwan, which could destabilize U.S.-Chinese relations without enhancing Taiwan's long-term security (Section 260

1) .

- Requiring the President to appoint a Special Envoy to Tibet -- an action that would harm relations with China without improving the status of the Dalai Lama or helping the Tibetan people (Section 2302).

ù Reduces funding for developing country debt reduction by 75%. If it were to become law, H.R. 1561 would force the United States to renege on its pledge to join other developed countries and reduce by two thirds debts owed by the world's poorest, most indebted countries--many of them in Africa.

ù Stop, in any meaningful sense, American leadership in international organizations by placing restrictions on assistance to international organizations and our ability to meet certain international treaty obligations.

ù Cut the Development Fund for Africa by almost 25% and reduce world-wide development assistance funding by 34% from the President's FY 1996 request.

ù Force the sacrifice of any aid that has been authorized but not spent, after three years. H.R. 1561 would return to the Treasury \$2.1 billion in aid now in the "pipeline" that is being used by private, non-profit American organizations to provide direct services in developing countries. This would include \$250 million in assistance to Africa targeted to reduce infant mortality, improve basic education for girls and slow the spread of AIDS. (Section 3286)

ù Require the President to establish an elaborate program to monitor the end use of all military equipment and technology transferred to our friends and allies and prevent their diversion to unauthorized recipients It

provides no mechanism to fund or implement this scheme -- except to use borrowed workers from the Defense and Treasury Departments. (Section 3192).

ù Returns the U.S. to the Mexico City policy of denying funds to any international organization -- private or public -- which receives funds from any source for abortion-related services, such as counselling. This provision in the bill would deny funds for UNFPA so long as it continues to support family planning programs in China.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 06 June 95 15:17
FROM Fetig, James L.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: Fact Sheet with OMB on board [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Baker, Jane E.
Darby, Melanie B.
Gray, Wendy
Hawkins, Ardenia R.
Hilliard, Brenda I.
Joshi, M. Kay
Millison, Cathy L.

CARBON_COPY Fetig, James L.
Mitchell, Calvin A.
Tyler, John T.
Wozniak, Natalie S.

TEXT_BODY

For clearance. Originator says this version supercedes the one I sent you about one hour ago which did not include OMB's changes. Also spell checked this version! We'll have to hurry to get this out today. Thank you.

From: Tyler, John T.
To: Fetig, James L.
CC: /R, Record at A1; Blinken, Antony J.; Boorstin, Robert O.; Clarke, Richard A.; Danvers, William C.; Halperin, Morton H.
Subject: Fact Sheet with OMB on board[UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Tuesday, June 06, 1995 02:35 PM

[[NEWBAD.DOC : 3862 in NEWBAD.DOC]]

This version has the fixes requested by OMB at 2:30pm.

ATTACHMENT FILE
DATE

6 June 95 12:31

ATTACHMENT FILE
NAME

NEWBAD.DOC

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release June 6, 1995

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The Clinton Administration stands ready to work with Congress to craft a bill that the President can sign. But the President -- in order to protect our nation and advance the interests of the American

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of his senior foreign policy advisors -- would veto the bill as it now stands.

H.R. 1561 includes provisions that would, among other things:

- ù Require the President to give Congress 15 days notice before responding to "unanticipated contingencies" and require that he determine that providing emergency assistance is in our "vital national interests" (Section 3401-3403).

- ù Threaten to block efforts to stop North Korea's nuclear program by blocking the release of funds. The bill requires that cumbersome, unnecessary Presidential Determinations and advance notification be provided to Congressional committees (Section 2641-2645).

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- ù Compel changes in our refugee and migration policy and restricts the President's ability to respond to boat migration, which could precipitate a mass migration to the United States and increase illegal alien smuggling (Sections 2104/ 2252).

- ù Derail our support for democratic reform in Russia and the other New Independent States by undercutting Presidential flexibility in promoting free market and democratic reform (Section 3224).

- ù Impair the President's ability to manage American relations with China by:

- Lifting current restraints on arms sales to Taiwan, which could destabilize U.S.

.-Chinese relations without enhancing Taiwan's long-term security (Section 2601).

- Requiring the President to appoint a Special Envoy to Tibet -- an action that would harm relations with China without improving the status of the Dalai Lama or helping the Tibetan people (Section 2302).

ù Reduces funding for debt reduction by 75%. If it were to become law, H.R. 1561 would force the United States to renege on its pledge to join other developed countries and reduce by two thirds debts owed by the world's poorest, most indebted countries--many of them in Africa.

ù Stop, in any meaningful sense, American leadership in international organizations by placing restrictions on assistance to international organizations and our ability to meet certain international treaty obligations

ù Cut the Development Fund for Africa by almost 25% and reduces world-wide development assistance funding by 34% from the President's FY 1996 request.

ù Force the sacrifice of any aid that has been authorized but not spent, after three years. H.R. 1561 would cause \$2.1 billion in aid in the "pipeline" now being used by private, non-profit American organizations to

provide direct services in developing countries to be returned to the Treasury. The cut off would include \$250 million in Africa that helps reduce infant mortality, improve basic education for girls and slow the spread of AIDS. (Section 3286)

ù Require the President to establish an elaborate program to monitor the end use of all military equipment and technology transferred to our friends and allies and prevent their diversion. It provides no mechanism to

fund or implement this scheme -- except to use borrowed workers from Reduce funding for debt reduction by 75%. If it were to become law, H.R. 1561 would the Defense and Treasury Departments. (Section 3192)

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 06 June 95 16:37
FROM Tyler, John T.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Blinken, Antony J.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY
[[NEWBAD.DOC : 4173 in NEWBAD.DOC]]
ATTACHMENT FILE
DATE 6 June 95 16:36
ATTACHMENT FILE
NAME NEWBAD.DOC

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release June 6, 1995

Administration Fights

American Overseas Interests Act of 1995 (H.R. 1561)

This week the House resumes debate on legislation that threatens America's ability to preserve our global

leadership and to safeguard the security and prosperity of the American people. H.R. 1561, the "American Overseas Interests Act of 1995," would limit the President's ability to respond to foreign threats and carry out foreign policy. By slashing our budget for foreign affairs, it would deprive our nation of the resources necessary to meet the challenges and seize the opportunities of the post-Cold War world. The bill would undercut Administration efforts to streamline its foreign affairs agencies -- where staff is already being cut by 4700 -- and would create new, inefficient layers of bureaucracy.

The Clinton Administration stands ready to work with Congress to craft a bill that the President can sign. But the President -- in order to protect our nation and advance the interests of the American people and on the advice of his senior foreign policy advisors -- will veto the bill as it now stands.

H.R. 1561 includes provisions that would, among other things:

- ù Compel changes in our refugee and migration policy and restrict the President's ability to respond to boat migration, which could precipitate a mass migration to the United States and increase illegal alien smuggling (Sections 2104/ 2252).

- ù Obstruct our efforts to stop North Korea's nuclear program by blocking the release of funds to implement the Framework Agreement we secured with Pyongyang. The bill requires that cumbersome, unnecessary Presidential Determinations and advance notification be provided to Congressional committees before the release of funds (Section 2641-2645).

- ù Derail our support for democratic reform in Russia and the other New Independent States by undercutting Presidential flexibility in promoting free market and democratic reform (Section 322

4).

ù Impair the President's ability to manage American relations with China by:

- Lifting current restraints on arms sales to Taiwan, which could destabilize U.S.-Chinese relations without enhancing Taiwan's long-term security (Section 2601).

- Requiring the President to appoint a Special Envoy to Tibet -- an action that would harm relations with China without improving the status of the Dalai Lama or helping the Tibetan people (Section 2302).

ù Reduces funding for developing country debt reduction by 75%. If it were to become law, H.R. 1561 would force the United States to renege on its pledge to join other developed countries and reduce by two thirds debts owed by the world's poorest, most indebted countries--many of them in Africa.

ù Stop, in any meaningful sense, American leadership in international organizations by placing restrictions on assistance to international organizations and our ability to meet certain international treaty obligations.

ù Numerous reductions in world-wide programs that would, for example: cut the Development Fund for Africa by almost 25%, cut aid to Central and Eastern Europe by 32%, and reduce world-wide development assistance funding by 34% from the President's FY 1996 request.

ù Force the sacrifice of any aid that has been authorized but not spent, after three years. H.R. 1561 would return to the Treasury \$2.1 billion in aid now in the "pipeline" that is being used by private, non-profit American organizations to provide direct services in developing countries. This would include \$250 million in assistance to Africa targeted to reduce infant mortality, improve basic education f

or girls and slow the spread of AIDS. (Section 3286)

ù Require the President to give Congress 15 days notice before responding to "unanticipated contingencies" and require that he determine that providing emergency assistance is in our "vital national interests." This would

hinder the President's ability to act rapidly and effectively in the face of a crisis (Section 3401-3403).

ù Require the President to establish an elaborate program to monitor the end use of all military equipment and technology transferred to our friends and allies and prevent their diversion to unauthorized recipients It provides no mechanism to fund or implement this scheme -- except to use borrowed workers from the Defense and Treasury Departments. (Section 3192).

ù Returns the U.S. to the Mexico City policy of denying funds to any international organization --private or public -- which receives funds from any source for abortion-related services, such as counseling. This provision in the bill would deny funds for UNFPA so long as it continues to support family planning programs in China.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 06 June 95 16:38
FROM Tyler, John T.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: Fact Sheet with OMB on board [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Fetig, James L.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY

[[NEWBAD.DOC : 4172 in NEWBAD.DOC]]Good. Caught a couple of typos.

From: Fetig, James L.
To: Tyler, John T.
CC: /R, Record at A1
Subject: RE: Fact Sheet with OMB on board [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Tuesday, June 06, 1995 04:35 PM

Ok. We'll hold the press release on HR 1561 until tomorrow.

From: Tyler, John T.
To: Danvers, William C.; Fetig, James L.
CC: /R, Record at A1; Halperin, Morton H.
Subject: RE: Fact Sheet with OMB on board [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Tuesday, June 06, 1995 03:42 PM

Great... I am also working, as promised, on a piece that takes on the Dole piece in the NYT today. I will circulate it shortly for comment and massive editorial attack.

From: Danvers, William C.
To: Fetig, James L.; Tyler, John T.

CC: /R, Record at A1; Halperin, Morton H.
Subject: RE: Fact Sheet with OMB on board [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Tuesday, June 06, 1995 03:36 PM

Tomorrow's fine, maybe better.

From: Tyler, John T.
To: Fetig, James L.
CC: /R, Record at A1; Danvers, William C.; Halperin, Morton H.
Subject: RE: Fact Sheet with OMB on board [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Tuesday, June 06, 1995 03:28 PM

I can argue both ways on release today or tomorrow--Bill Danvers would have a better feel. It seems to me that a piece out tomorrow morning would be just as useful as a piece out this evening.....

From: Fetig, James L.
To: Tyler, John T.
CC: /R, Record at A1
Subject: RE: Fact Sheet with OMB on board [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Tuesday, June 06, 1995 03:20 PM

Just wanted you to know that I'm not certain that we can make today's deadline. Depends on whether x hatch can clear this on time. Moreover, it would be better to put out something like this in the morning so that the reporters would have all day to pursue it. If it goes out late, many will be likely to ignore it having already written for the day.

From: Tyler, John T.
To: Fetig, James L.
CC: /R, Record at A1; Blinken, Antony J.; Boorstin, Robert O.; Clarke, Richard A.; Danvers, William C.; Halperin, Morton H.
Subject: Fact Sheet with OMB on board[UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Tuesday, June 06, 1995 02:35 PM

<<Attached File: NEWBAD.DOC>>

This version has the fixes requested by OMB at 2:30pm.

ATTACHMENT FILE
DATE

6 June 95 16:36

ATTACHMENT FILE
NAME

NEWBAD.DOC

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release June 6, 1995

Administration Fights

American Overseas Interests Act of 1995 (H.R. 1561)

This week the House resumes debate on legislation that threatens America's ability to preserve our global leadership and to safeguard the security and prosperity of the American people. H.R. 1561, the "American Overseas Interests Act of 1995," would limit the President's ability to respond to foreign threats and carry out foreign policy. By slashing our budget for foreign affairs, it would deprive our nation of the resources necessary to meet the challenges and seize the opportunities of the post-Cold War world. The bill would undercut Administration efforts to streamline its foreign affairs agencies -- where staff is already being cut by 4700 -- and would create new, inefficient layers of bureaucracy.

The Clinton Administration stands ready to work with Congress to craft a bill that the President can sign. But the President -- in order to protect our nation and advance the interests of the American

n people and on the advice of
his senior foreign policy advisors -- will veto the bill as it now stands.

H.R. 1561 includes provisions that would, among other things:

- ù Compel changes in our refugee and migration policy and restrict the President's ability to respond to boat migration, which could precipitate a mass migration to the United States and increase illegal alien smuggling (Sections 2104/ 2252).

- ù Obstruct our efforts to stop North Korea's nuclear program by blocking the release of funds to implement the Framework Agreement we secured with Pyongyang. The bill requires that cumbersome, unnecessary Presidential Determinations and advance notification be provided to Congressional committees before the release of funds (Section 2641-2645).

- ù Derail our support for democratic reform in Russia and the other New Independent States by undercutting Presidential flexibility in promoting free market and democratic reform (Section 3224).

- ù Impair the President's ability to manage American relations with China by:

- Lifting current restraints on arms sales to Taiwan, which could destabilize U.S.-Chinese relations without enhancing Taiwan's long-term security (Section 2601).

- Requiring the President to appoint a Special Envoy to Tibet -- an action that would harm relations with China without improving the status of the Dalai Lama or helping the Tibetan people (Section 2302).

- ù Reduces funding for developing country debt reduction by 75%. If it were to become law, H.R. 1561 would force the United States to renege on its pledge to join other developed countries and

d reduce by two thirds
debts owed by the world's poorest, most indebted countries--many of them in Africa.

ù Stop, in any meaningful sense, American leadership in international organizations
by placing restrictions on
assistance to international organizations and our ability to meet certain international treaty obligations.

ù Numerous reductions in world-wide programs that would, for example: cut the Development Fund for Africa
by almost 25%, cut aid to Central and Eastern Europe by 32%, and reduce world-wide development
assistance funding by 34% from the President's FY 1996 request.

ù Force the sacrifice of any aid that has been authorized but not spent, after three years. H.R. 1561 would
return to the Treasury \$2.1 billion in aid now in the "pipeline" that is being used
by private, non-profit
American organizations to provide direct services in developing countries. This would include \$250 million in
assistance to Africa targeted to reduce infant mortality, improve basic education for girls and slow the spread
of AIDS. (Section 3286)

ù Require the President to give Congress 15 days notice before responding to "unanticipated contingencies" and
require that he determine that providing emergency assistance is in our "vital national interests." This would

hinder the President's ability to act rapidly and effectively in the face of a crisis (Section 3401-3403).

ù Require the President to establish an elaborate program to monitor the end use of
all military equipment and
technology transferred to our friends and allies and prevent their diversion to unauthorized recipients It

provides no mechanism to fund or implement this scheme -- except to use borrowed workers from the Defense and Treasury Departments. (Section 3192).

ù Returns the U.S. to the Mexico City policy of denying funds to any international organization --private or public -- which receives funds from any source for abortion-related services, such as counseling. This provision in the bill would deny funds for UNFPA so long as it continues to support family planning programs in China.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 07 June 95 11:30
FROM Kreczko, Alan J.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Subject: FW: Legislative Update [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Sestak, Joseph A.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY

Joe,

Can you send me the provisions of the bill which relate to items 7, 9 and 10 of Bob's E-mail below?

From: Bell, Robert G.
To: Danvers, William C.; @NSC - NSC Staff; @VP - VP Natl Security Affairs
CC: /R, Record at A1; @LEGISLAT-Legislative Affairs
Subject: RE: Legislative Update [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Tuesday, June 06, 1995 08:52 PM

Re my read on the DoD auth bill as reported out by HCONS: It is not my prerogative to threaten the "v-word" (nor would I venture an opinion on it as a policy option in any discussions outside the White House) but I think that is where we should be postured vis-a-vis this terrible bill. In taking a "v-word" position on the bill I would recommend the Administration cite the following "top 10" deficiencies and misplaced priorities approved by the Republican majority on the committee:

1. authorizes \$9.5 billion more than Administration (and Senate) believe appropriate for defense in FY96 (money that comes at expense of other national priorities in foreign and domestic accounts);
2. wastes hundreds of millions on unnecessary, high-priced weapons systems, including "Star Wars" and the B-2;
3. foolishly slashes Nunn-Lugar funding by one-third;
4. unconstitutionally infringes on President's authority to deploy US forces in support of UN peacekeeping;
5. unconstitutionally infringes on President's authority to conduct international negotiations (i.e., to negotiate an appropriate ABM/TMD demarcation agreement, as opposed to the one (and only one) demarcation the House seeks to impose unilaterally through this legislation;
6. micromanages Pentagon organization (bill mandates 25% personnel cut and elimination of various senior positions);
7. discriminates against female servicemembers/dependents (bill prohibits performance of abortion services in overseas military hospitals);
8. unwisely terminates program (TRP) that is crucial to our ability to

remain competitive in defense technology and to encourage "dual-use" approach that will keep more companies in defense R&D and production business than otherwise would be the case;

9. discriminates against certain service personnel (bill requires discharge of all those diagnosed as HIV-positive);

10. needlessly micromanages foreign policy matters (bill prohibits funds for US military to have contact with PRC military).

Taking a "v-word" posture on this bill is not without risks (e.g., it is the defense authorization bill (and not a CR) that provides the military an annual pay raise and that authorizes new-starts in MILCON), but I believe if we are to get the House majority's attention and make them understand the fun and games must end and that they MUST negotiate with us in conference, then we should be prepared to step up to this decision on this bill.,

From: Danvers, William C.

To: @NSC - NSC Staff; @VP - VP Natl Security Affairs

CC: /R, Record at A1; @LEGISLAT-Legislative Affairs

Subject: FW: Legislative Update [UNCLASSIFIED]

Date: Tuesday, June 06, 1995 08:12 PM

From: Danvers, William C.

To: @up; @nsa

CC: Record; @legislat; fuerth; wise

Subject: Legislative Update [UNCLASSIFIED]

Date: Tuesday, June 06, 1995 08:07 PM

Note for Tony and Sandy:

On Bosnia, Tarnoff briefed the Senate Dem Caucus today. Understand it went well. SFRC (and Dole) staff briefed on op plan this afternoon. SASC and HCONS hearings tomorrow with Perry and Shali.

Hoyer still on track to offer his unilateral lift amendment.

Sandy Vershbow met with Rep. Armev today to give him an overview on Bosnia.

It went well.

Dole will introduce legislation soon that would authorize U.S. participation in the withdrawal of UNPROFOR but with strict conditions and unilateral lift on the other end.

HR 1561 comes up tomorrow. We will get a whip count at around one. We may need to ask you to make some calls to members to vote against the bill. I spoke to Rep. Neal and to Rep. McNulty's office about the bill. White House LA has been working it hard as well.

SFRC goes back to its mark up tomorrow. We have a copy of an en bloc

amendment that we will get to directorates tomorrow.

DoD auth bill moves to the floor next week. We will hold an interagency conference call on how to work the bill in the House tomorrow morning. Problems with N-L funds and peacekeeping, among other things. We hope a SAP will be circulated by OMB tomorrow. Understand that DoD does not particularly like the bill. Unclear just how much. Bob Bell's office has a copy and is looking it over.

Terrorism bill should be finished by tomorrow morning. Only vote left will be habeus tomorrow. They then move to telecom bill.

We had an interagency leg meeting on the approps process this afternoon. Agencies will be making calls. We have asked you to make calls in a separate E-Mail.

Meeting with Kennedy staff on Cuban Adjustment Act. Meeting went well. Looks like we have come to an understanding with Kennedy and he will try to help. We told him that we are opposed to repeal but gave him language in case they do repeal the overall act, we can protect our equities.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 07 June 95 15:13

FROM Tyler, John T.

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT HR 1561 Fact Sheet[UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Bass, Peter E.

CARBON_COPY Fetig, James L.

TEXT_BODY

[[NEWBAD.DOC : 3843 in NEWBAD.DOC]] I understand that you may have received a bum version of what we would like to release. The attached is the clean version with OMB's and other's edits. Please let me know where we stand. Cheers, Tim

ATTACHMENT FILE DATE 7 June 95 15:10

ATTACHMENT FILE NAME NEWBAD.DOC

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release June 6, 1995

Administration Fights

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ù Impair the President's ability to manage American relations with China by:

- Lifting current restraints on arms sales to Taiwan, which could destabilize U.S.-Chinese relations without enhancing Taiwan's long-term security (Section 2601).

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ù Reduces funding for developing country debt reduction by 75%. If it were to become law, H.R. 1561 would force the United States to renege on its pledge to join other developed countries and reduce by two thirds debts owed by the world's poorest, most indebted countries--many of them in Africa.

ù Stop, in any meaningful sense, American leadership in international organizations by placing restrictions on assistance to international organizations and our ability to meet certain international treaty obligations.

ù Numerous reductions in world-wide programs that would, for example: cut the Development Fund for Africa by almost 25%, cut aid to Central and Eastern Europe by 32%, and reduce world-wide development assistance funding by 34% from the President's FY 1996 request.

ù Force the sacrifice of any aid that has been authorized but not spent, after three years. H.R. 1561 would return to the Treasury \$2.1 billion in aid now in the "pipeline" that is being used by private, non-profit

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M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 07 June 95 15:30
FROM Danvers, William C.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Calls [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Schifter, Richard
CARBON_COPY Andricos, George M.
Danvers, William C.
Funches, Christina L.

TEXT_BODY

Dick--

Here is some info. Please let me know how the calls go. Many thanks.

[[NEWBAD.DOC : 3855 in NEWBAD.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT FILE
DATE**

7 June 95 15:28

**ATTACHMENT FILE
NAME**

NEWBAD.DOC

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release June 6, 1995

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M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 07 June 95 15:33
FROM Fetig, James L.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: Fact Sheet with OMB on board [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Tyler, John T.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY

Needs para MDBs.

From: Fetig, James L.
To: @NSA - Nat'l Security Advisor
CC: /R, Record at A1; @PRESS - Public Affairs
Subject: FW: Fact Sheet with OMB on board [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Wednesday, June 07, 1995 10:44 AM

[[NEWBAD.DOC : 3855 in NEWBAD.DOC]]

For clearance. This has been coordinated within the NSC staff. Would like to release this today following the veto of the rescissions bill.

From: Fetig, James L.
To: @CROSS - Cross Hatches
CC: /R, Record at A1; Tyler, John T.; @PRESS - Public Affairs
Subject: FW: Fact Sheet with OMB on board [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Tuesday, June 06, 1995 03:17 PM

For clearance by Sandy and Tony as possible. We would like to release this

just after the veto.

From: Tyler, John T.

To: Fetig, James L.

CC: /R, Record at A1; Blinken, Antony J.; Boorstin, Robert O.; Clarke, Richard A.; Danvers, William C.; Halperin, Morton H.

Subject: Fact Sheet with OMB on board[UNCLASSIFIED]

Date: Tuesday, June 06, 1995 02:35 PM

This version has the fixes requested by OMB at 2:30pm.

**ATTACHMENT FILE
DATE**

7 June 95 10:39

**ATTACHMENT FILE
NAME**

NEWBAD.DOC

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release June 7, 1995

Administration Fights

American Overseas Interests Act of 1995 (H.R. 1561)

This week the House resumes debate on legislation that threatens America's ability to preserve our global leadership and to safeguard the security and prosperity of the American people. H.R. 1561, the "American Overseas Interests Act of 1995," would limit the President's ability to respond to foreign threats and carry out

foreign policy. By slashing our budget for foreign affairs, it would deprive our nation of the resources necessary to meet the challenges and seize the opportunities of the post-Cold War world. The bill would undercut Administration efforts to streamline its foreign affairs agencies -- where staff has already been cut by 4700 -- and would create new, inefficient bureaucratic layers by merging USIA, USAID, and ACDA into the State Department.

The Clinton Administration stands ready to work with Congress to craft a bill that the President can sign. But the President -- in order to protect our nation and advance the interests of the American people and on the advice of his senior foreign policy advisors -- would veto the bill as it now stands.

H.R. 1561 includes provisions that would, among other things:

- ù Require the President to give Congress 15 days notice before responding to "unanticipated contingencies" and require that he determine that providing emergency assistance is in our "vital national interests" (Section 3401-3403).

- ù Threaten to block efforts to stop North Korea's nuclear program by blocking the release of funds. The bill requires that cumbersome, unnecessary Presidential Determinations and advance notification be provided to Congressional committees (Section 2641-2645).

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ù Derail our support for democratic reform in Russia and the other New Independent States by undercutting Presidential flexibility in promoting free market and democratic reform (Section 3224).

ù Impair the President's ability to manage American relations with China by:

- Lifting current restraints on arms sales to Taiwan, which could destabilize U.S.-Chinese relations without enhancing Taiwan's long-term security (Section 2601).

- Requiring the President to appoint a Special Envoy to Tibet -- an action that would harm relations with China without improving the status of the Dalai Lama or helping the Tibetan people (Section 2302).

ù Reduces funding for debt reduction by 75%. If it were to become law, H.R. 1561 would force the United States to renege on its pledge to join other developed countries and reduce by two thirds debts owed by the world's poorest, most indebted countries--many of them in Africa.

ù Stop, in any meaningful sense, American leadership in international organizations by placing restrictions on assistance to international organizations and our ability to meet certain international treaty obligations

ù Cut the Development Fund for Africa by almost 25% and reduces world-wide development assistance funding by 34% from the President's FY 1996 request.

ù Force the sacrifice of any aid that has been authorized but not spent, after three years. H.R. 1561 would

cause \$2.1 billion in aid in the "pipeline" now being used by private, non-profit American organizations to provide direct services in developing countries to be returned to the Treasury. The cut off would include \$250 million in Africa that helps reduce infant mortality, improve basic education for girls and slow the spread of AIDS. (Section 3286)

ù Require the President to establish an elaborate program to monitor the end use of all military equipment and technology transferred to our friends and allies and prevent their diversion to unauthorized recipients. It provides no mechanism to fund or implement this scheme -- except to use borrowed workers from the Defense and Treasury Departments. (Section 3192)

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 07 June 95 16:13
FROM Fetig, James L.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Bass, Peter E.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

TEXT_BODY

This is the final.

From: Tyler, John T.
To: Fetig, James L.
CC: /R, Record at A1
Subject: [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Wednesday, June 07, 1995 03:57 PM

[[NEWBADA.DOC : 4193 in NEWBADA.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT FILE
DATE**

7 June 95 15:56

**ATTACHMENT FILE
NAME**

NEWBADA.DOC

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release June 6, 1995

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- ù Obstruct our efforts to stop North Korea's nuclear program by blocking the release

of funds to implement the Framework Agreement we secured with Pyongyang. The bill requires that cumbersome, unnecessary Presidential Determinations and advance notification be provided to Congressional committees before the release of funds (Section 2641-2645).

ù Derail our support for democratic reform in Russia and the other New Independent States by undercutting Presidential flexibility in promoting free market and democratic reform (Section 3224).

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M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 07 June 95 17:08
FROM Fetig, James L.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Clearance [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Danvers, William C.
Halperin, Morton H.
CARBON_COPY Fetig, James L.
Mitchell, Calvin A.
Wozniak, Natalie S.

TEXT_BODY

[[NEWBAD.DOC : 4369 in NEWBAD.DOC]]

Have had some computer headspace problems that have delayed this. Would like to get it out ASAP. Tony approves if you two do. Please send response to @Press.

Thanks

**ATTACHMENT FILE
DATE**

7 June 95 17:6

**ATTACHMENT FILE
NAME**

NEWBAD.DOC

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release June 7, 1995

A Threat to American Leadership

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- ù Obstruct our efforts to stop North Korea's nuclear program by potentially blocking

the release of funds to implement the Framework Agreement we secured with Pyongyang. The bill requires that cumbersome, unnecessary Presidential Determinations and advance notification be provided to Congressional committees before the release of funds (Section 2641-2645).

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ù Potentially cripple world-wide development programs by cutting the Development Fund for Africa by almost 25%, cutting aid to Central and Eastern Europe by 32%, and reducing world-wide development assistance

funding by 34% below the President's FY 1996 request.

ù Force the sacrifice of any aid that has been authorized but not spent, after three years. H.R. 1561 would return to the Treasury \$2.1 billion in aid now in the "pipeline" that is being used by private, non-profit American organizations to provide direct services in developing countries. This would include \$250 million in assistance to Africa targeted to reduce infant mortality, improve basic education for girls and slow the spread of AIDS. (Section 3286)

ù Require the President to give Congress 15 days notice before responding to "unanticipated contingencies" and require that he determine that providing emergency assistance is in our "vital national interests." This would

hinder the President's ability to act rapidly and effectively in the face of a crisis (Section 3401-3403).

ù Require the President to establish an elaborate program to monitor the end use of all military equipment and technology transferred to our friends and allies and prevent their diversion to unauthorized recipients. It provides no mechanism to fund or implement this scheme -- except to use borrowed workers from the Defense and Treasury Departments. (Section 3192).

ù Cut almost a billion dollars from our support for the multilateral development banks and other international lending institutions, the activities of which created nearly \$5 billion in jobs and exports for U.S. firms in the past two years.

ù

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 07 June 95 19:09
FROM Wozniak, Natalie S.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT H.R. 1561 [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Wozniak, Natalie S.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY [[NEWBAD1.DOC : 4921 in NEWBAD1.DOC]]

ATTACHMENT FILE DATE 7 June 95 17:30
ATTACHMENT FILE NAME NEWBAD1.DOC

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release June 7, 1995

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

A Threat to American Leadership:
American Overseas Interests Act of 1995 (H.R. 1561)

The House today resumed debate on legislation that threatens America's ability to preserve our global leadership and to safeguard the security and prosperity of the American people. H.R. 1561, the

"American Overseas Interests Act of 1995," would limit the President's ability to respond to foreign threats and carry out foreign policy. By slashing our budget for foreign affairs, it would deprive our nation of the resources necessary to meet the challenges and seize the opportunities of the post-Cold War world. The bill would undercut Administration efforts to streamline its foreign affairs agencies --where staff is already being cut by 4700 -- and would create new, inefficient layers of bureaucracy.

The Clinton Administration stands ready to work with Congress to craft a bill that the President can sign. But the President -- in order to protect our nation and advance the interests of the American people and on the advice of his senior foreign policy advisors -- will veto the bill as it now stands.

H.R. 1561 includes provisions that would, among other things:

- ù Compel changes in our refugee and migration policy and restrict the President's ability to respond to boat migration, which could precipitate a mass migration to the United States and increase illegal alien smuggling (Sections 2104/ 2252).

- ù Obstruct our efforts to stop North Korea's nuclear program by potentially blocking the release of funds to implement the Framework Agreement we secured with Pyongyang. The bill requires that cumbersome, unnecessary Presidential Determinations and advance notification be provided to Congressional committees before the release of funds (Section 2641-2645).

- ù Derail our support for democratic reform in Russia and the other New Independent States by undercutting Presidential flexibility in promoting free market and democratic reform (Section 3224).

ù Impair the President's ability to manage American relations with China by:

- Lifting current restraints on arms sales to Taiwan, which could destabilize U.S.-Chinese relations without enhancing Taiwan's long-term security (Section 2601).

- Requiring the President to appoint a Special Envoy to Tibet -- an action that would harm relations with China without improving the status of the Dalai Lama or helping the Tibetan people (Section 2302).

- more -
ù

ù Reduce funding for developing country debt reduction by 75%. If it were to become law, H.R. 1561 would force the United States to renege on its pledge to join other developed countries and reduce by two thirds debts owed by the world's poorest, most indebted countries--many of them in Africa.

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#

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 08 June 95 07:04
FROM Fried, Daniel
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: H.R. 1561 [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Fetig, James L.
CARBON_COPY Danvers, William C.
TEXT_BODY

Not a bad piece of rhetoric. As work on HR 1561 continues, I might be able to contribute some language on CEE (SEED Act) assistance. (e.g., We are supporting countries that have already made radical free market reforms and are showing strong results. Our assistance will enable them to complete the transition and stand on their own as strong economic partners and markets for U.S. goods.)

From: Fetig, James L.
To: @NSC - NSC Staff; @VP - VP Natl Security Affairs
CC: /R, Record at A1
Subject: H.R. 1561 [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Wednesday, June 07, 1995 07:07 PM

[[NEWBAD.DOC : 1853 in NEWBAD.DOC]]

ATTACHMENT FILE
DATE

7 June 95 17:30

ATTACHMENT FILE
NAME

NEWBAD.DOC

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For Immediate Release June 7, 1995

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#

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 22 June 95 21:09
FROM Eddy, Randolph P.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Viruses!! [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Clarke, Richard A.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY

RAC, in reference to the Chyba e-mail

[[CLARK.DOC : 5431 in CLARK.DOC]]

From: Chyba, Christopher F.
To: Eddy, Randolph P.
CC: /R, Record at A1
Subject: RE: Section 3 [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Tuesday, June 20, 1995 06:18 PM

RP,

I think you are right to be concerned.

As you know, I am chairing the group that is supposed to be drafting an action plan. I will mail you a copy of the latest memo. That group's report WILL contain several recommendations related to quarantine issues. CDC is supposed to be working with Justice on these. However, I think it is accurate to say that not enough interaction is taking place, especially with the intel community--though they hardly volunteered at Wirth's meeting.

If NSC wants more on part 3, the most effective way to express this is for Dick Clarke to convey this directly to Wirth. My understanding is that Dick is going to the Monday meeting that Wirth is chairing on this topic, and bringing with him someone from the DOD with relevant background. I suggest that he bring this up right then and there, and feel sure that Wirth would be quite willing to create a CDC/Justice/CIA etc subgroup to give a rapid turnaround product that is more responsive to NSC's concerns--which Dick should spell out. (Were I he, I would give Wirth a heads up this is coming.)

The draft action plan from my group will not be completed until the weekend sometime. If you wish, I can deliver a copy to Dick first thing Monday morning.

Emergingly yours,

Chris

From: Eddy, Randolph P.
To: Chyba, Christopher F.
CC: /R, Record at A1; Clarke, Richard A.
Subject: Section 3 [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Tuesday, June 20, 1995 05:20 PM

Chris,

After speaking with Dick about the recent goings-on with Ciset, I am reassured in my belief that, though this is in many ways Wirth's baby, we are extremely interested in part 3 of the tasker, and concerned that it is not getting the attention it deserves.

I believe if they want to provide the best answer to question 3, Ciset should be vigorously consulting with the intelligence community, the PHS emergency response team, and perhaps the Armed Forces.

Questions 1 and 2 are important to us also, but if Wirth is of the attitude that they are under his aegis, so be it, we need to look out for #3.

Please let me know what you think of this, and how we could best get our message across.

Thanks very much, hope all is well.

R.P.

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

22 June 95 21:1

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

CLARK.DOC

Dick,

I know you have seen the attached from Chyba already, but I am still unsure of what tack we will take with this.
As neither you nor I will be here Monday, I wanted to get news to Chris he could pass on for you at the Monday meeting, or we could get info to Wirth some other way.

The more I think about this, the more I feel like Chicken Little. I believe that in the face of the increasing threats of infectious disease, Ciset is right on. We do need a complete overhaul, maybe construction, of an infrastructure able to predict, surveil, respond and contain viruses like Ebola.

- ù We have seen two nearly identical strains of Ebola, one that is 80% lethal to humans, and one that is as contagious as the flu. It mutates at an alarmingly fast pace, how long till it "gets it right" and the combination appears?
- ù Each of the last 4 outbreaks of Ebola was only contained before it burned out of control because ONE doctor in each locale was astute enough to call CDC.
- ù It is hypothesized that the world's pathetically slow (30 years) response to HIV would have been even longer if HIV had not clustered among active, self-identified, gay men, or did not cause an increase in easily recognized, unusual opportunistic infections (rare pneumoniae) or cancers (Kaposi's sarcoma).
- ù Ebola Reston showed us that in a week's time hundreds of people on four continents could be exposed to an apparently new microbe, well before authorities were aware of its existence.

We are dodging bullets.

The current fiscal climate insists that we ignore this reality. If an outbreak occurs, I do not believe we have much chance of keeping airborne viruses out of the U.S., but we need to fast track the section of the tasker that will offers us methods to try (3), especially if Ciset continues to pipe-dream about parts 1 and 2, thereby dooming the entire project.

At this juncture we need to at least be sure that Ciset is giving section 3 the creative, interagency, attention it deserves. It seems that due to Tim Wirth's assumption of ownership of this project you are the only one who can make this happen.

Have a virus-free weekend. I'll be back Thursday.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 23 June 95 00:37
FROM Chyba, Christopher F.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT [UNCLASSIFIED]DRAFT action plan
TO Eddy, Randolph P.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY

This lacks the intro and the budget description, which I will write tonight. Final clearance should come at my 1 pm meeting tomorrow.

Is there anyone from NSC/Global who can be at the meeting Monday? It would be very welcome. Jane Wales will be cochairing with Wirth.

[[CDCDFT.DOC : 77 in CDCDFT.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 23 June 95 0:34

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** CDCDFT.DOC

CISSET WORKING GROUP DRAFT ACTION PLAN

(C.F. Chyba, Chair; 6/23/95)

I. ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS

There are a number of steps, with minimal budget implications, that the Executive Branch can pursue quickly to improve the ability of the United States and the world to detect and respond to emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases (EREIDs). Some of these actions can be taken immediately, whereas others will require careful interagency collaboration for completion. Broadly, these steps divide into actions that are primarily international, and actions that are primarily domestic in scope. In addition, we recommend the creation of a policy-level task force under which a number of working groups should be created to iron out specific issues and language.

A. Recommended International Actions

1. Encourage other nations and international organizations to assign higher priority to EREIDs

a. Prepare a letter for the President's consideration calling for increased action by nations and international organizations against EREIDs; and specifically:

i. Calling for the development of a global surveillance and response network [can this be done in a way that is consistent with the possibility that no resources other than reprogrammed resources would be available? If so we need language to that effect];

ii. Endorsing the recent World Health Organization (WHO) resolution on EREIDs (WHA 48.13) to strengthen the WHO EREID collaborating centers and the existing networks for surveillance of specific diseases and drug resistance and to improve outbreak response capabilities [what if any commitments does the U.S. accept by endorsing this resolution?];

iii. In the context of WHA 48.13, establishing the responsibility of all nations to provide accurate and timely reporting of EREID outbreaks;

iv. Requesting donor country contributions to support epidemiological research and training. {In particular, nations should be encouraged to contribute to the NIAID Tropical Medicine Research Centers and International Collaborations in Infectious Disease Research, and the CDC Field Epidemiology Training Programs. These programs, located in regions where tropical diseases are prevalent, provide overseas sites for field-based research and training in issues relevant to EREIDs.} [Is it appropriate to request other nations to contribute to U.S.-funded and -originated grant-supported research programs? Would it be better to say:] {In particular, nations should be encouraged to contribute to WHO collaborating centers. {or to designate part of their U.N. contribution to go to combating EREIDs through the WHO.}}

{v. Offering U.S. expertise in epidemiology, communications, research and training.} [As written, this seems like a wide-open financial commitment. Unless there is some restrictive language, such as offering "technical assistance" that is understood not to commit new financial resources, I can't include this here.]

b. Send a two-part cable to all diplomatic embassies. [Would this go out under the Secretary of State's signature?] Part I would contain instructions to the Ambassadors to deliver the President's letter to the Head of State together with talking points detailing the U.S. Government (USG) recommendations on EREIDs. Part II would be a long information cable, based on the summary of the working group report, intended to develop an information base among Department of State and other personnel abroad.

c. Prepare a letter {from Under Secretary Wirth to his} {from the CISET cochairs to their} Japanese counterpart{s} recommending that the two countries include under the Common Agenda joint action in Third World countries on EREID surveillance and response as well as on research and training {. This might be {would best be} accomplished under the auspices of the U.S.-Japan cooperative sciences program, an established NIH-DOS bilateral initiative with Japan.}

{d. Establish a working group on EREID research in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Megascience Forum to be established in September 1995.}

2. Encourage and express U.S. support for the WHO in playing a stronger role on EREIDs

a. Cable our Ambassador in the U.S. Mission Geneva to express USG support for the WHO to play a stronger role on EREIDs (and in particular, to express support for WHA 48.13), and to provide our Ambassador with a copy of the President's letter to Heads of State. The demarche would offer U.S. encouragement for the WHO:

i. To strengthen the WHO EREID Collaborating Centres and the existing networks for surveillance of specific diseases (polio, AIDS, TB, influenza) and drug resistance, as well as to improve regional outbreak response capabilities;

ii. To coordinate the development of regional EREID centers, based on existing institutions; and

iii. To work with developing nations to establish regional and national EREID plans.

b. The Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), part of the WHO, accepted the recommendation from its June 15 meeting in Washington [will someone please tell me how to properly reference this meeting] to develop an inventory of the capabilities available for EREID surveillance and response in the Americas. (This inventory includes identifying national communicable disease control chiefs, national laboratory chiefs, and institutions in regional networks.) The CISET cochairs should write the WHO, urging it to work through its Division of Communicable Diseases to develop an analogous inventory for its other regions.

c. The WHO has prepared a resolution calling for revision of the International Health Regulations (IHRs). The United States, through the CDC, should participate in the revision of the IHRs to ensure improved U.S. screening and quarantine capabilities to account for the dramatic changes in contemporary international travel.

Additionally, revisions to the IHRs should provide for better information exchange and diagnostic capabilities for EREIDs.

d. Develop in coordination with U.S. industry and NGOs an offer of technical assistance to WHO and other nations in establishing a global EREID communications network, based on regional centers. The EREID network would serve as a system for disease surveillance and reporting, for coordination of international response activities,

and for the dissemination of diagnostic and treatment information. The network would make use of modern telecommunications technology, including internet and satellite communications. [State states that the budgetary implications of establishing this network would be modest, especially with U.S. industry engaged in the effort. I am skeptical. I suggest we move the exploration of this possibility to an activity of the Task Force in I(C) below.]

3. Expand the mission of DoD and its Continental U.S. (CONUS) and Outside the Continental U.S. (OCONUS) laboratories to include surveillance, training, research, and rapid response for EREIDs

To better protect and treat U.S. military personnel and their dependents assigned or deployed overseas, the DoD has an established program focused on identifying infectious disease threats to military operations and conducting research on prevention and control measures. This program includes three medical research laboratories in the Continental U.S. (CONUS) and six laboratories overseas (OCONUS) in Brazil, Peru, Egypt, Kenya, Thailand, and Indonesia.

The DoD is currently expanding its mission, including expansion of the mission of the OCONUS laboratories to include surveillance for EREIDs. For maximum effectiveness, the expansion will be part of a well-coordinated effort with the host countries where the OCONUS labs are located, and with various national and international organizations. DoD contributions to an international consortium are focusing on three general areas: improvement in the global surveillance system for new events; construction of an international rapid response capability, and research efforts aimed at identifying and testing diagnostic, preventive and control measures.

We recommend the following additional steps:

a. Raise the State Department ceilings on personnel assigned to the six OCONUS labs to allow DoD to expand its overseas mission to include EREID surveillance and training.

b. Ensure the availability of diagnostic and treatment capabilities in the three CONUS and six OCONUS labs, using DoD resources.

c. Develop training for foreign epidemiologists and technicians at the six OCONUS labs, using reprogrammed DoD resources.

Among other benefits, these steps will help ensure that foreign public health personnel will make use of these facilities and report new or unusual disease occurrences.

B. Recommended Domestic Actions

1. Encourage expanded formal training of health care providers

Encourage the expanded formal training of health care providers and laboratory health researchers in the recognition of EREIDs, particularly those that occur in developing countries. The Ciset cochaairs should write the appropriate health care provider organizations (including the American College of Physicians, American Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene, the Infectious Diseases Society of America, and the American Society of Microbiology), urging that questions on EREIDs be included on their certifying and re-certifying examinations. The letter should state that topics for emphasis are those given in the Report of the Ciset Working Group, which is enclosed.

The Ciset cochaairs should also write the Association of Medical

Colleges to urge them to include more training in EREIDs in their curricula for medical students, and in their examinations. Again, the Ciset Working Group Report should be enclosed.

2. Review and update regulations for screening and quarantine at ports of entry into the United States

Under the foreign quarantine regulations, CDC's Division of Quarantine is responsible for preventing the introduction of communicable diseases by controlling the entry of persons, animals, and transported materials suspected of harboring certain human pathogens. Current regulations should be reviewed and updated in light of recent experiences with disease outbreaks to ensure that there is sufficient flexibility to meet current and future public health needs in preventing and controlling the importation of disease. Issues considered should include such items as early warning systems abroad, providing stricter controls at ports of entry, and more control after persons, animals, or material have entered the United States. Specifically, 42 CFR Part 71, Subparts B, D, E and F should be reviewed. This review should be coordinated by the Task Force discussed in I(C) below.

3. Make information about ill passengers (and others exposed during international travel) more accessible to health authorities

Captains of aircraft and ships are required to report the presence of ill passengers before arrival at their intended port of entry so those passengers can be met and detained for further evaluation, if necessary. There is no formal agreement between the transportation industry and public health authorities for the industry to provide information (e.g., passenger name and destinations), when passenger follow-up is required. Cooperative arrangements need to be developed between the transportation industry and health authorities to provide this information. These arrangements should be reviewed by the Task Force discussed in I(C) below.

C. Establishment of a Standing Task Force

We recommend the establishment of a standing Task Force of the NSTC, evolving directly from the Ciset Working Group on EREIDs. The task force should be co-chaired by State, CDC, {and DoD}, with participation of all Ciset agencies, including the Intelligence Community and the Department of Justice. The Task Force will continue to provide strategic planning on EREID issues, and will also establish action groups as necessary to pursue particular topics. In particular, the Task Force should immediately address:

1. Facilitating coordination of the USG response to infectious disease outbreaks.
2. Updating and reviewing 42 CFR Part 71, as described in B(2) above.
3. Establishing cooperative agreements between the transportation industry and health authorities, as described in B(3) above.
4. Promoting public/private sector partnerships to ensure that industrial capabilities in areas such as biologics (drugs, vaccines, anti-sera), diagnostic tools, medical equipment, and communications are strengthened and applied effectively for response to EREIDs.
5. Finalizing recommendation II(B) below.

In addition, to facilitate interagency coordination, memoranda of understanding (MOUs) should be established as necessary. If

infectious disease subcommittees are required, the Federal Malaria Vaccine Coordinating Committee and consortium of collaborating agencies may serve as a model.

II. LEGISLATIVE ACTIONS

There are several steps, with minimal budget implications, that will require working with the Legislative Branch in order to

implement.

A. Extend CDC's legislative mandate

CDC is the lead U.S. agency in matters of domestic disease surveillance, control, and prevention. However, CDC does not have direct authority to support the development of international health programs. Because it lacks direct authority in this area, CDC cannot receive appropriations in support of international infectious disease surveillance, except for AIDS surveillance.

In view of the international nature of EREIDs, and of the increasing mobility of infectious microbes, CDC's mandate to protect the health of U.S. citizens should be extended by amending the Public Health Service Act to include outbreak investigations and responses to epidemics overseas, in consultation with appropriate U.S. agencies, including state and local health departments, DoD, USAID, and others.

B. Establish the authority of relevant U.S. Government agencies

Under the Task Force, establish an action group that is to finalize the following recommendation:

"Ensure that responsible agencies have the authority, emergency procurement powers, and resources to coordinate interagency responses to foreign disease outbreaks that have the potential to spread globally.

Using the current legislative language of the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance as a model, it is recommended that the following 'notwithstanding' language be incorporated into the legislation for the lead U.S. Government agency or agencies:

'Subject to the limitations in [funding authorization], and notwithstanding any other provision of this or any other Act, the President is authorized to furnish assistance to any foreign country, international organization, or private voluntary organization, on such terms and conditions as he may determine, for response to international epidemics and threats from newly emerging or previously controlled diseases, including assistance relating to epidemic preparedness and global disease surveillance, and to the prediction of, and contingency planning for, disease epidemics and emerging/resurging infectious diseases abroad.'

The Task Force must further define the circumstances under which the powers suggested by the "notwithstanding" language is granted to the President.

The budgetary implications of the phrase "authority, emergency

procurement powers, and resources" require further consideration.

III. BUDGET

As of this drafting, I have not yet received agency inputs on this point, apart from NOAA.

(Note: At this time, DoD is not requesting additional funds and will support its participation and expand its efforts using existing DoD funds.)

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 23 June 95 00:51
FROM Chyba, Christopher F.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT [UNCLASSIFIED]use this draft
TO Eddy, Randolph P.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY

RP,

replace the draft I just sent with this one. It still doesn't give budget info, but what it says about the budget is accurate, at least.

Chris

[[CDCDFT.DOC : 30 in CDCDFT.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 23 June 95 0:45

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** CDCDFT.DOC

CISSET WORKING GROUP DRAFT ACTION PLAN

(C.F. Chyba, Chair; 6/23/95)

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iii. In the context of WHA 48.13, establishing the responsibility of all nations to provide accurate and timely reporting of EREID outbreaks;

iv. Requesting donor country contributions to support epidemiological research and training. {In particular, nations should be encouraged to contribute to the NIAID Tropical Medicine Research Centers and International Collaborations in Infectious Disease Research, and the CDC Field Epidemiology Training Programs. These programs, located in regions where tropical diseases are prevalent, provide overseas sites for field-based research and training in issues relevant to EREIDs.} [Is it appropriate to request other nations to contribute to U.S.-funded and -originated grant-supported research programs? Would it be better to say:] {In particular, nations should be encouraged to contribute to WHO collaborating centers. {or to designate part of their U.N. contribution to go to combating EREIDs through the WHO.}}

{v. Offering U.S. expertise in epidemiology, communications, research and training.} [As written, this seems like a wide-open financial commitment. Unless there is some restrictive language, such as offering "technical assistance" that is understood not to commit new financial resources, I can't include this here.]

b. Send a two-part cable to all diplomatic embassies. [Would this go out under the Secretary of State's signature?] Part I would contain instructions to the Ambassadors to deliver the President's letter to the Head of State together with talking points detailing the U.S. Government (USG) recommendations on EREIDs. Part II would be a long information cable, based on the summary of the working group report, intended to develop an information base among

Department of State and other personnel abroad.

c. Prepare a letter {from Under Secretary Wirth to his} {from the CISET cochairs to their} Japanese counterpart{s} recommending that the two countries include under the Common Agenda joint action in Third World countries on EREID surveillance and response as well as on research and training {. This might be {would best be} accomplished under the auspices of the U.S.-Japan cooperative sciences program, an established NIH-DOS bilateral initiative with Japan.}

{d. Establish a working group on EREID research in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Megascience Forum to be established in September 1995.}

2. Encourage and express U.S. support for the WHO in playing a stronger role on EREIDs

a. Cable our Ambassador in the U.S. Mission Geneva to express USG support for the WHO to play a stronger role on EREIDs (and in particular, to express support for WHA 48.13), and to provide our Ambassador with a copy of the President's letter to Heads of State. The demarche would offer U.S. encouragement for the WHO:

i. To strengthen the WHO EREID Collaborating Centres and the existing networks for surveillance of specific diseases (polio, AIDS, TB, influenza) and drug resistance, as well as to improve regional outbreak response capabilities;

ii. To coordinate the development of regional EREID centers, based on existing institutions; and

iii. To work with developing nations to establish regional and national EREID plans.

b. The Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), part of the WHO, accepted the recommendation from its June 15 meeting in Washington [will someone please tell me how to properly reference this meeting] to develop an inventory of the capabilities available for EREID surveillance and response in the Americas. (This inventory includes identifying national communicable disease control chiefs, national laboratory chiefs, and institutions in regional networks.) The CISET cochairs should write the WHO, urging it to work through its Division of Communicable Diseases to develop an analogous inventory for its other regions.

c. The WHO has prepared a resolution calling for revision of the International Health Regulations (IHRs). The United States, through the CDC, should participate in the revision of the IHRs to ensure improved U.S. screening and quarantine capabilities to account for

the dramatic changes in contemporary international travel. Additionally, revisions to the IHRs should provide for better information exchange and diagnostic capabilities for EREIDs.

d. Develop in coordination with U.S. industry and NGOs an offer of technical assistance to WHO and other nations in establishing a global EREID communications network, based on regional centers. The EREID network would serve as a system for disease surveillance and reporting, for coordination of international response activities,

and for the dissemination of diagnostic and treatment information. The network would make use of modern telecommunications technology, including internet and satellite communications. [State states that the budgetary implications of establishing this network would be modest, especially with U.S. industry engaged in the effort. I am skeptical. I suggest we move the exploration of this possibility to an activity of the Task Force in I(C) below.]

3. Expand the mission of DoD and its Continental U.S. (CONUS) and Outside the Continental U.S. (OCONUS) laboratories to include surveillance, training, research, and rapid response for EREIDs

To better protect and treat U.S. military personnel and their dependents assigned or deployed overseas, the DoD has an established program focused on identifying infectious disease threats to military operations and conducting research on prevention and control measures. This program includes three medical research laboratories in the Continental U.S. (CONUS) and six laboratories overseas (OCONUS) in Brazil, Peru, Egypt, Kenya, Thailand, and Indonesia.

The DoD is currently expanding its mission, including expansion of the mission of the OCONUS laboratories to include surveillance for EREIDs. For maximum effectiveness, the expansion will be part of a well-coordinated effort with the host countries where the OCONUS labs are located, and with various national and international organizations. DoD contributions to an international consortium are focusing on three general areas: improvement in the global surveillance system for new events; construction of an international rapid response capability, and research efforts aimed at identifying and testing diagnostic, preventive and control measures.

We recommend the following additional steps:

a. Raise the State Department ceilings on personnel assigned to the six OCONUS labs to allow DoD to expand its overseas mission to include EREID surveillance and training.

b. Ensure the availability of diagnostic and treatment capabilities in the three CONUS and six OCONUS labs, using DoD resources.

c. Develop training for foreign epidemiologists and technicians at the six OCONUS labs, using DoD resources.

Among other benefits, these steps will help ensure that foreign public health personnel will make use of these facilities and report new or unusual disease occurrences.

B. Recommended Domestic Actions

1. Encourage expanded formal training of health care providers

Encourage the expanded formal training of health care providers and laboratory health researchers in the recognition of EREIDs, particularly those that occur in developing countries. The Ciset cochairs should write the appropriate health care provider organizations (including the American College of Physicians, American Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene, the Infectious Diseases Society of America, and the American Society of Microbiology), urging that questions on EREIDs be included on their certifying and re-certifying examinations. The letter should state that topics for emphasis are those given in the Report of the Ciset Working Group, which is enclosed.

The Ciset cochairs should also write the Association of Medical Colleges to urge them to include more training in EREIDs in their curricula for medical students, and in their examinations. Again, the Ciset Working Group Report should be enclosed.

2. Review and update regulations for screening and quarantine at ports of entry into the United States

Under the foreign quarantine regulations, CDC's Division of Quarantine is responsible for preventing the introduction of communicable diseases by controlling the entry of persons, animals, and transported materials suspected of harboring certain human pathogens. Current regulations should be reviewed and updated in light of recent experiences with disease outbreaks to ensure that there is sufficient flexibility to meet current and future public health needs in preventing and controlling the importation of disease. Issues considered should include such items as early warning systems abroad, providing stricter controls at ports of entry, and more control after persons, animals, or material have entered the United States. Specifically, 42 CFR Part 71, Subparts B, D, E and F should be reviewed. This review should be coordinated by the Task Force discussed in I(C) below.

3. Make information about ill passengers (and others exposed during international travel) more accessible to health authorities

Captains of aircraft and ships are required to report the presence of ill passengers before arrival at their intended port of entry so those passengers can be met and detained for further evaluation, if necessary. There is no formal agreement between the transportation industry and public health authorities for the industry to provide information (e.g., passenger name and destinations), when passenger follow-up is required. Cooperative arrangements need to be developed between the transportation industry and health authorities to provide this information. These arrangements should be reviewed by the Task Force discussed in I(C) below.

C. Establishment of a Standing Task Force

We recommend the establishment of a standing Task Force of the NSTC, evolving directly from the Ciset Working Group on EREIDs. The task force should be co-chaired by State, CDC, {and DoD}, with participation of all Ciset agencies, including the Intelligence Community and the Department of Justice. The Task Force will continue to provide strategic planning on EREID issues, and will also establish action groups as necessary to pursue particular topics. In particular, the Task Force should immediately address:

1. Coordination of the USG response to infectious disease outbreaks.
2. Updating and reviewing 42 CFR Part 71, as described in B(2) above.
3. Establishing cooperative agreements between the transportation industry and health authorities, as described in B(3) above.
4. Promoting public/private sector partnerships to ensure that industrial capabilities in areas such as biologics (drugs, vaccines, anti-sera), diagnostic tools, medical equipment, and communications are strengthened and applied effectively for response to EREIDs.
5. Finalizing recommendation II(B) below.

In addition, to facilitate interagency coordination, memoranda of understanding (MOUs) should be established as necessary. If

infectious disease subcommittees are required, the Federal Malaria Vaccine Coordinating Committee and consortium of collaborating agencies may serve as a model.

II. LEGISLATIVE ACTIONS

There are several steps, with minimal budget implications, that

will require working with the Legislative Branch in order to implement.

A. Extend CDC's legislative mandate

CDC is the lead U.S. agency in matters of domestic disease surveillance, control, and prevention. However, CDC does not have direct authority to support the development of international health programs. Because it lacks direct authority in this area, CDC cannot receive appropriations in support of international infectious disease surveillance, except for AIDS surveillance.

In view of the international nature of EREIDs, and of the increasing mobility of infectious microbes, CDC's mandate to protect the health of U.S. citizens should be extended by amending the Public Health Service Act to include outbreak investigations and responses to epidemics overseas, in consultation with appropriate U.S. agencies, including state and local health departments, DoD, USAID, and others.

B. Establish the authority of relevant U.S. Government agencies

Under the Task Force, establish an action group that is to finalize the following recommendation:

"Ensure that responsible agencies have the authority, emergency procurement powers, and resources to coordinate interagency responses to foreign disease outbreaks that have the potential to spread globally.

Using the current legislative language of the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance as a model, it is recommended that the following 'notwithstanding' language be incorporated into the legislation for the lead U.S. Government agency or agencies:

'Subject to the limitations in [funding authorization], and notwithstanding any other provision of this or any other Act, the President is authorized to furnish assistance to any foreign country, international organization, or private voluntary organization, on such terms and conditions as he may determine, for response to international epidemics and threats from newly emerging or previously controlled diseases, including assistance relating to epidemic preparedness and global disease surveillance, and to the prediction of, and contingency planning for, disease epidemics and emerging/resurging infectious diseases abroad.'"

The Task Force must further define the circumstances under which the powers suggested by the "notwithstanding" language is granted to the President.

The budgetary implications of the phrase "authority, emergency procurement powers, and resources" require further consideration.

III. BUDGET

I have received detailed coordinated agency budgets, prioritizing spending in the cases of 10, 25, 50, and 75 million dollars being available for EREID spending.

(Note: At this time, DoD is not requesting additional funds and will support its participation and expand its efforts using existing DoD funds.)

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 23 June 95 02:23
FROM Chyba, Christopher F.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT [UNCLASSIFIED]the latest
TO Eddy, Randolph P.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY [[CDCDFT.DOC : 609 in CDCDFT.DOC]]
**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 23 June 95 2:23
**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** CDCDFT.DOC

This Working Group was established June 12, 1995, and directed by the Committee on International Science, Engineering and Technology (CISET) of the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) to deliver an action plan on June 26, 1995, detailing the U.S.

Government response to the threat of emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases (herein dubbed "EREIDs"). The action plan was to build on the draft of the Report of the CISET Working Group on Emerging and Re-Emerging Infectious Diseases, as well as additional work that had been done by the agencies. Great effort on the part of the agencies has been required for the production of this report within the time required.

The Working Group quickly found itself between the hammer and anvil. It was emphasized by some members that in the current budget climate, requests for additional resources are very difficult to put forward. Other members responded that the problem posed by EREIDs was sufficiently grave that substantial additional resources were nevertheless required.

This action plan therefore breaks possible steps that may be taken to address the threat of EREIDs into three categories. Category I addresses administrative actions that can be taken with minimal budget implications and without the requirement of new legislation. Category II involves legislative actions that may be taken with minimal budget implications. Category III involves steps that carry with them clear resource requirements. These requirements have been rigorously specified and prioritized, as discussed in section III, and as detailed in the lengthy annexes to this report.

I. ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS

There are a number of steps, with minimal budget implications, that the Executive Branch can pursue quickly to improve the ability of the United States and the world to detect and respond to emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases (EREIDs). Some of these actions can be taken immediately, whereas others will require careful interagency collaboration for completion. Broadly, these steps divide into actions that are primarily international, and actions that are primarily domestic in scope. In addition, we recommend the creation of a policy-level task force under which a number of working groups should be created to iron out specific issues.

A. Recommended International Actions

1. Encourage other nations and international organizations to assign higher priority to EREIDs

a. Prepare a letter for the President's consideration calling for increased action by nations and international organizations against EREIDs; and specifically:

i. Calling for the development of a global surveillance and response network [can this be done in a way that is consistent with the possibility that no resources other than reprogrammed resources would be available? If so we need language to that effect];

ii. Endorsing the recent World Health Organization (WHO) resolution on EREIDs (WHA 48.13) to strengthen the WHO EREID collaborating centers and the existing networks for surveillance of specific diseases and drug resistance and to improve outbreak response capabilities [what if any commitments does the U.S. accept by endorsing this resolution?];

iii. In the context of WHA 48.13, establishing the responsibility of all nations to provide accurate and timely reporting of EREID outbreaks;

iv. Requesting donor country contributions to support epidemiological research and training. {In particular, nations should be encouraged to contribute to the NIAID Tropical Medicine Research Centers and International Collaborations in Infectious Disease Research, and the CDC Field Epidemiology Training Programs. These programs, located in regions where tropical diseases are prevalent, provide overseas sites for field-based research and training in issues relevant to EREIDs.} [Is it appropriate to request other nations to contribute to U.S.-funded and -originated grant-supported research programs? Would it be better to say:]{In particular,

nations should be encouraged to contribute to WHO collaborating centers. {or to designate part of their U.N. contribution to go to combating EREIDs through the WHO.}}

{v. Offering U.S. expertise in epidemiology, communications, research and training.} [As written, this seems like a wide-open financial commitment. Unless there is some restrictive language, such as offering "technical assistance" that is understood not to commit new financial resources, I can't include this here. Would it be appropriate and valuable to have the letter emphasize, e.g., the willingness and availability of the CDC to identify outbreak agents?]

b. Send a two-part cable to all diplomatic embassies. [Would this go out under the Secretary of State's signature?] Part I would contain instructions to the Ambassadors to deliver the President's letter to the Head of State together with talking points detailing the U.S. Government (USG) recommendations on EREIDs. Part II would be a long information cable, based on the summary of the Report of the CISET Working Group on Emerging and Re-Emerging Infectious Diseases, intended to develop an information base among Department of State and other personnel abroad.

c. Prepare a letter {from Under Secretary Wirth to his} {from the CISET cochairs to their} Japanese counterpart{s} recommending that the two countries include under the Common Agenda joint action in Third World countries on EREID surveillance and response as well as on research and training {. This might be {would best be} accomplished under the auspices of the U.S.-Japan cooperative sciences program, an established NIH-DOS bilateral initiative with Japan.}

{d. Establish a working group on EREID research in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Megascience Forum to be established in September 1995.}

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a. Cable our Ambassador in the U.S. Mission Geneva to express USG support for the WHO to play a stronger role on EREIDs (and in particular, to express support for WHA 48.13), and to provide our Ambassador with a copy of the President's letter to Heads of State. The demarche would offer U.S. encouragement for the WHO:

i. To strengthen the WHO EREID Collaborating Centres and the existing networks for surveillance of specific diseases (polio, AIDS, TB, influenza) and drug resistance, as well as to improve regional outbreak response capabilities;

ii. To coordinate the development of regional EREID centers, based on existing institutions; and

iii. To work with developing nations to establish regional and national EREID plans.

[iv. Are there specific steps the U.S. can offer to help improve the WHO? E.g., could we offer to work with the WHO to create containment strategies and guidelines for coordination during outbreaks? Or is the problem one of implementation, not strategy?]

b. The Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), part of the WHO, accepted the recommendation from its June 15 meeting in Washington [will someone please tell me how to properly reference this meeting] to develop an inventory of the capabilities available for EREID surveillance and response in the Americas. (This inventory includes identifying national communicable disease control chiefs, national laboratory chiefs, and institutions in regional networks.) The Ciset cochairs should write the WHO, urging it to work through its Division of Communicable Diseases to develop an analogous inventory for its other regions.

c. The WHO has prepared a resolution calling for revision of the International Health Regulations (IHRs). The United States, through the CDC, should participate in the revision of the IHRs to ensure improved U.S. screening and quarantine capabilities to account for the dramatic changes in contemporary international travel. Additionally, revisions to the IHRs should provide for better information exchange and diagnostic capabilities for EREIDs.

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To better protect and treat U.S. military personnel and their dependents assigned or deployed overseas, the DoD has an established

program focused on identifying infectious disease threats to military operations and conducting research on prevention and control measures. This program includes three medical research laboratories in the Continental U.S. and six laboratories overseas in Brazil, Peru, Egypt, Kenya, Thailand, and Indonesia.

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We recommend the following additional steps:

- a. Raise the State Department ceilings on personnel assigned to the six OCONUS labs to allow DoD to expand its overseas mission to include EREID surveillance and training.
- b. Ensure the availability of diagnostic and treatment capabilities in the three CONUS and six OCONUS labs, using DoD resources.
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Among other benefits, these steps will help ensure that foreign public health personnel will make use of these facilities and report new or unusual disease occurrences.

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outbreaks.

2. Updating and reviewing 42 CFR Part 71, as described in B(2) above.
3. Establishing cooperative agreements between the transportation industry and health authorities, as described in B(3) above.
4. Promoting public/private sector partnerships to ensure that industrial capabilities in areas such as biologics (drugs, vaccines, anti-sera), diagnostic tools, medical equipment, and communications are strengthened and applied effectively for response to EREIDs.
5. Finalizing recommendation II(B) below.

In addition, to facilitate interagency coordination, memoranda of understanding (MOUs) should be established as necessary. If infectious disease subcommittees are required, the Federal Malaria Vaccine Coordinating Committee and consortium of collaborating agencies may serve as a model.

II. LEGISLATIVE ACTIONS

There are several steps, with minimal budget implications, that will require working with the Legislative Branch in order to implement.

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In view of the international nature of EREIDs, and of the increasing mobility of infectious microbes, CDC's mandate to protect the health of U.S. citizens should be extended by amending the Public Health Service Act to include outbreak investigations and responses to epidemics overseas, in consultation with appropriate U.S. agencies, including state and local health departments, DoD, USAID, and others.

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Under the Task Force, establish an action group that is to finalize the following recommendation:

"Ensure that responsible agencies have the authority, emergency procurement powers, and resources to coordinate interagency responses to foreign disease outbreaks that have the potential to spread globally.

Using the current legislative language of the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance as a model, it is recommended that the following 'notwithstanding' language be incorporated into the legislation for the lead U.S. Government agency or agencies:

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The Task Force must further define the circumstances under which the powers suggested by the "notwithstanding" language is granted to the President.

The budgetary implications of the phrase "authority, emergency procurement powers, and resources" require further consideration.

III. BUDGET

The data attached to this report detail and prioritize resource requirements for improving the United States' ability to address the threat of EREIDs. Data have been provided by the Department of Health and Human Services [Centers for Disease Control (CDC) and Prevention and the Fogarty International Center (FIC) and National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) of the National Institutes of Health (NIH)], USAID, and NOAA.

The document at Tab A breaks "resource requirements" into three categories: (1) surveillance; (2) response; and (3) screening and quarantine. These were the initial resource data provided by the agencies. It was clear that these data, while a beginning, needed to be supplemented. In particular: (1) greater detail needed to be provided regarding proposed expenditures, so that it would be clear why a given level of resources was required for a particular task; (2) resource requirements needed to be prioritized; and (3) FY94 (actual), FY95 (enacted), and FY96 (President's budget) was required to put the figures in context.

The information required by (1), specific justifications for resource requirements, is provided at Tab B.

Priorization was achieved in the following way. The agencies were requested to consider scenarios in which \$10, \$25, \$50, and \$75 million were available for these additional resource requirements (in addition to the full request). They were then asked to provide, in matrix form, the way in which they would divide funding between initiatives at these funding levels. In the time available for this report, it was not possible to jointly prioritize DHHS and USAID initiatives. However, the three DHHS offices were able to jointly prioritize their requests. These matrices, and additional relevant information, are provided at Tab C. Because of the small size of NOAA's request, it has not been broken out in this way.

The Working Group has not yet fully assembled FY94, FY95, and FY96 data for each of the initiatives proposed. The collection of these data is ongoing.

Finally, at this time, DoD is not requesting additional resources and will support its participation and expand its efforts using existing DoD funds.

The goal of this Working Group in this report has been to ensure that CISET has the information it requires to decide how to respond to the EREID threat. The data given at Tabs A through C provide CISET with specific and prioritized objectives, should CISET choose to pursue additional resources in addressing this issue. These data demonstrate the seriousness with which the participating agencies have considered this problem.