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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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001. email	Ernest Wilson to Jeremy Rosner, re: TL ODC Speech (4 pages)	10/11/1993	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
A1 - Record (Jan 93 - Sept 94) ([AIDS and Global...])
OA/Box Number: 570000

FOLDER TITLE:

[05/14/1993 - 11/18/1993]

2007-1550-F
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

14-May-1993 13:48 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Natalie S. Wozniak
(WOZNIAK)

SUBJECT: May 14 Press Conference Qs and As

May 14, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NSC STAFF

FROM: DON STEINBERG/PAUL CLARKE

SUBJECT: MAY 14 PRESS CONFERENCE

Following are the final approved versions of the Qs and As prepared for the President's Press Conference today.

Please retain them for future reference.

Thanks for all your help in putting this package together.

□

FOREIGN POLICY Qs and As FOR MAY 14 PRESS CONFERENCE

AFRICA

SOMALIA
SUDAN

ASIA

CAMBODIA
CHINA: MFN
CHINA: MISSILE PROLIFERATION
NORTH KOREA
VIETNAM

CIS

ARMENIA AND AZERBAIJAN
RUSSIA: ASSISTANCE
RUSSIA: CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE
RUSSIA: MISSILE-RELATED EXPORTS
RUSSIA: SATELLITE LAUNCH
RUSSIA/UNITED STATES: PEACEKEEPING
RUSSIA/UNITED STATES: SPACE STATION
RUSSIA/UNITED STATES: URANIUM PURCHASE
UNITED STATES/UKRAINIAN RELATIONS

EUROPE

BOSNIA/MACEDONIA
NORTHERN IRELAND: SPECIAL ENVOY
NORTHERN IRELAND: VISA TO GERRY ADAMS

LATIN AMERICA

HAITI
HAITIANS AT GUANTANAMO BAY

MIDDLE EAST

IRAN
IRAQ
IRAQ: UN GUARDS
MIDDLE EAST: AMERICAN DRAFT OF ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN
JOINT STATEMENT
MIDDLE EAST PEACE TALKS

ARMS CONTROL ISSUES

ACDA STATUS
COCOM
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR TESTING PROGRAM

DEFENSE ISSUES

HOMOSEXUALS IN THE MILITARY
TAILHOOK
WOMEN IN COMBAT

ENVIRONMENT

BIODIVERSITY

INTELLIGENCE

BUDGET
ENCRYPTION

□

TRADE ISSUES: GENERAL

CHILE
EC PROCUREMENT DISPUTE
NAFTA
SUPER 301
URUGUAY ROUND

TRADE ISSUES: UNITED STATES/JAPAN

JAPAN ACCUSES UNITED STATES OF UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES
MULTI-PURPOSE VEHICLES/AUTOS AND AUTO PARTS
NEGOTIATING FRAMEWORK WITH JAPAN
TONE OF UNITED STATES-JAPAN RELATIONS
TRADE RESULTS VS. MANAGED TRADE

□

Somalia

Q: When will the last U.S. troops be out of Somalia?

A: The transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II was
successfully completed May 4.

The number of U.S. troops in Somalia was over 24,000 when I took office, and now we have less than 4,000.

I am proud that the remaining U.S. soldiers are playing an important support role in UNOSOM II.

Their withdrawal will be worked out with the UN and with other nations that are contributors to UNOSOM.

I cannot give you a precise date at this point, but I can assure you that I will not keep American soldiers there any longer than necessary.

Q: Are those 4,000 combat troops?

A: No, 2,700 are logistics support troops. The remainder are part of a Quick Reaction Force that will be stationed off-shore beginning in the summer.

Q: How would you characterize the U.S. role in Somalia?

A: The U.S.-led coalition was a great success. We eliminated the risk of mass starvation and greatly alleviated the humanitarian crisis we found when we arrived.

The transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II has taken place smoothly, and we are confident of the continued success of the UN in Somalia.

□

Sudan

Q: What is being done about the tragic situation in Sudan?

A: I am deeply concerned about the crisis in Sudan, where as many as a million people could be at risk of starvation.

We have taken a number of practical steps to relieve the suffering. We have provided two C-130s and several smaller aircraft to fly food into areas of critical need. We are also moving food by barge up the Nile.

The parties to the conflict must stop using food and the misery of their own people as weapons. Fighting, whether it is between the rebel factions or with the government, prevents relief efforts from taking place and the result is that many more people die.

The SPLA and the government must negotiate seriously at the talks now underway in Abuja under Nigerian auspices and reach a settlement that will allow the reconciliation and rehabilitation that Sudan so desperately needs.

We will continue to support strongly the Abuja talks.

Both Ambassador Petterson and Assistant Secretary Moose have recently visited the region to assess the needs of those affected.

We are currently looking at additional steps we can take to alleviate the suffering.

□

Cambodia

Q: Will the Cambodian elections proceed as planned in view of the attacks on UNTAC personnel? What are we doing to improve the security of the UNTAC troops?

A: We are committed to holding the elections as scheduled in late May. We condemn the attacks on UNTAC personnel, but the international community will not be intimidated. The Khmer Rouge will be held fully responsible for its actions.

The U.S., UN and the major troop-contributing countries in Cambodia are taking concrete steps to enhance the security of UN personnel. We have just sent three U.S. transport planes to Phnom Penh filled with urgently needed equipment, like body armor, helmets and medical supplies. In addition, Australia is sending six Black Hawk helicopters and 100 additional support troops, which the U.S. government will lift to Cambodia.

We expect UNTAC troops to take all measures necessary within the scope of their mandate to defend the election process. That mandate allows the UN soldiers to defend themselves and their mission with force when threatened.

□

China: MFN

Q: During the campaign, you spoke out on your concerns over humans rights abuses and criticized the previous administration for coddling China. China's MFN treatment comes up for renewal in a couple of weeks or so. Will you hold to your campaign position and place conditions on MFN?

A: We have no interest in isolating China. China is changing rapidly and growing quickly. I hope it will be a partner in building a more secure and prosperous world.

But continued progress in our relations must include progress in human rights, trade access and non-proliferation.

As we chart our China policy, I am consulting closely with key members of Congress, including on the issues of MFN.

Our approach to MFN renewal will depend on steps the Chinese government takes to address these important issues.

Q: What is your reaction to the news that the Chinese rebuffed Lord during his recent trip?

A: Ambassador Lord met with senior Chinese officials for two days of frank discussions in Beijing earlier this week.

He pressed for additional progress in the areas of human rights, trade and nonproliferation.

I do not intend to characterize the Chinese response until Ambassador Lord has provided me his full report.

Q: Do you support the China MFN bill introduced in Congress by Pelosi and Mitchell, including the provision on Tibet?

A: I share the concerns of Congress over China's record. I share with a majority in Congress the belief that progress in our relations must include progress in human rights, trade and non-proliferation.

As to the issue of Tibet, we continue to urge Beijing to revive discussions with the Dalai Lama and to address the full range of concerns and issues of the people of Tibet, including human rights abuses.

Q: Will you place conditions on MFN through an Executive Order?

A: I have not made any decisions yet. As I said, our approach to MFN renewal will depend on steps the Chinese government takes to address these important issues.

□

China and Missile Proliferation

Q: Are you going to impose sanctions on China for missile exports to Pakistan?

A: We've made very clear to China our concern about reports that they may have exported missile-related technology to Pakistan.

We expect China to live up to the commitment it has made to observe the guidelines and parameters of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) with respect to its exports.

U.S. law requires us to impose sanctions on countries or individual companies if we determine they have exported missile technology in contravention of the MTCR Guidelines. We will enforce that law.

[IF PRESSED]:

No determination has been made regarding whether new missile technology sanctions must be imposed against China.

□

North Korea Nuclear

Q: Now that the UN Security Council has passed a resolution, what's the next step in dealing with North Korea's nuclear program?

A: North Korea should heed Tuesday's UNSC resolution calling for it to honor its non-proliferation commitments.

The international community has again made clear that non-proliferation is vital to international peace and security and that countries who sign non-proliferation agreements must live up to them.

Q: Will the U.S. meet with North Korea to resolve this issue?

A: We've said that we would be willing to meet with North Korean officials if this would support international efforts to resolve the current situation. Nothing has been scheduled.

□

Vietnam

Q: Can you tell us if you have made any decision to change U.S. policy toward Vietnam? To lift the embargo?

A: Any decision on U.S.-Vietnam relations depends on my evaluation of the effort to achieve the fullest possible accounting of American POW/MIAs.

We are in the process of reviewing the results of General Vessey's visit to Hanoi last month in terms of its contribution to the fullest possible accounting.

I have made no decision at this point.

Q: Can you comment on Senator Kerry's upcoming trip to Vietnam? Is he conveying a message from you to the Vietnamese leaders?

A: Senator Kerry is making a personal trip to Vietnam to press for further progress on the issue of MIA/POW's. I hope his visit will contribute to resolving some of the unanswered questions, and I look forward to

receiving a report when he returns.

Senator Kerry knows well that this Administration places the highest priority on the fullest possible accounting of POW/MIAs, and he will convey that message to the Vietnamese.

(if pressed)

I have sent a letter to the Vietnam President Le Duc Anh.

The letter simply underscores my commitment to the American people to ensure the fullest possible accounting of our MIA/POWs.

It urges the Vietnamese government to accommodate Senator Kerry's request for progress in resolving outstanding questions on this important issue.

□

Armenia and Azerbaijan

Q: Have you given any thought to dealing with the possible consequences of a widened war in the Caucasus, particularly the involvement of regional powers such as Turkey, Russia or Iran in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict?

A: Our negotiator, Ambassador Jack Maresca, has been working tirelessly to bring the parties back to the CSCE-sponsored Minsk Group negotiations in the wake of the recent ethnic Armenian offensive.

We believe this is the best way to avoid a widening of the conflict. We are in almost constant contact with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkey and Russia on these matters.

Ambassador Strobe Talbott, the coordinator for our policy toward the former Soviet Union, visited Armenia and Azerbaijan this week. He stressed the importance of a peaceful resolution of these issues with both parties.

□

Russia: Assistance

Q: How will you fund the \$1.8 billion U.S. assistance program for Russia announced in April? Will you ask for a supplemental?

A: I am consulting with Congress on the best way to fund this program. I was in close touch with Congress before announcing this program. We are now exchanging views on how the money should be allocated and how to fund the program.

We have made no decision on whether that should be through a supplemental.

Q: Can you give us a breakdown of the \$1.8 billion program?

A: This program is designed to build on the \$1.6 billion Vancouver program by expanding our efforts to promote democracy and free markets in Russia.

We hope to direct \$1.3 billion to efforts to promote nuclear power safety, expanded energy production, a safer environment, technical assistance, and vastly increased exchanges.

We also are discussing \$500 million as a "challenge grant" to a multilateral Privatization Fund to be financed with our G-7 partners.

If the other G-7 nations make substantial contributions, then we will together reach our \$2 billion goal.

A matching contribution by EBRD and the World Bank would increase the capital available to \$4 billion.

This program would assist in privatizing the largest enterprises in Russia -- thereby contributing to our goal of helping to build a free market economy in Russia.

Q: How can you justify aid to Russia when your stimulus package has been defeated and times are tough here at home?

A: For America to be strong at home -- to revive opportunity and growth here -- we must be strong and active abroad.

Nowhere is our involvement more important than in our policies toward Russia.

Russia's struggle to build a free and democratic society is a political miracle, historic in its scope and drama.

□

We must act now and do what we can to support the reform process in Russia -- not out of charity, but because it is a wise investment in our own future.

Our efforts will entail some new costs, but we'll reap even larger dividends for our safety and prosperity if we act now.

America's taxpayers spent trillions of dollars to prosecute the Cold War; a democratizing Russia means we can reduce that pace of spending and move billions into creating new businesses, new jobs and a better future for our children.

But if Russia falls into anarchy or lurches back

to despotism, we would face a renewed nuclear threat, higher defense budgets and a huge setback for democracy for the world.

Thus, our ability to put people first at home requires that we put Russia first on our agenda abroad.

Russia: The Constitutional Debate

Q: Now that President Yeltsin has won the April 25 referendum, he seems to be provoking a new political crisis by calling for a June 5 Constitutional Convention. Does the U.S. support this move which many observers would characterize as extra-constitutional?

A: -- First, as I have noted previously, it would not be appropriate for the U.S. to comment on what is or is not constitutional within the Russian system. That is for the Russian people to decide.

The Russian people gave President Yeltsin and the reform process a great vote of confidence and support in the April 25 referendum. The successful conclusion of a free and fair referendum is in itself a major step in the development of Russian democracy.

Our position is clear: we support the strengthening of Russian democracy and economic reform. We support reformers throughout Russia, and specifically President Yeltsin, who is the leader of the reform movement.

The U.S. has offered significant bilateral economic support to help reform continue. And we are working closely with our allies to provide even greater multilateral support.

Russia: Missile-Related Exports

Q: Are Russian high-technology exports contributing to the proliferation of ballistic missiles?

A: The Russians have said that they believe that the transfer of hardware and technology for "peaceful" space-launch programs is permitted under the international Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

We have interpreted the MTCR differently and, in accordance with U.S. law, have imposed sanctions against entities in both Russia and India for their involvement in efforts to transfer MTCR-controlled items.

We will continue to press for universal observance of the MTCR guidelines and to discuss these matters with the Russians in order to resolve our differences.

We need to work with the Russians to find legitimate

avenues for their high-technology exports in this and other areas.

□

Russia Satellite Launch

Q: Why are we allowing Russia to enter the international commercial satellite launch market when U.S. firms already face stiff competition from Europe and China?

A: Last week in Moscow, the United States and Russia agreed on the main elements of an agreement that will both facilitate Russia's entry into the commercial satellite launch market and, at the same time, safeguard our commercial interests.

The agreement will allow Russia to enter the international launch market in a way that will avoid market disruption and government intervention that could distort competition. This is something our industry expressed strong concern about, and we believe that we have addressed these concerns in the agreement.

The agreement is also important because it will encourage market-oriented reforms in the Russian economy and space-launch sector and demonstrate that we are serious about cooperating with Russia over the long haul on important areas of interest to both sides.

Q: Won't it cost American jobs?

That is always a concern. However, we have taken steps to minimize any such risk. For example, the number of launches available to Russian bid has been limited so as to avoid the displacement of U.S. firms.

In addition, by removing a barrier to the development of the satellite industry as a whole, this agreement could expand market opportunities for existing U.S. firms and thus create jobs.

Q: Can you provide us with any details on the number of launches permitted, the pricing provision and other key elements?

A: Ambassador Kantor's staff at the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative can provide you with more information on the agreement.

□

Russia/United States: Peacekeeping

Q: You have just announced a series of new peacekeeping initiatives with Russia to help resolve international conflicts. Why are you doing this, especially in light of their veto of Cyprus peacekeeping?

A: We are actively examining ways to enhance the U.N.'s peacekeeping capability.

One of the great benefits of our new relationships with Russia is that our two military forces now have an opportunity to work together to help resolve conflicts. This is an historic change.

Peacekeeping and peace enforcement are relatively new roles for the U.S. military. By conducting joint training and exercises with the Russians, we will strengthen our ability to support peacekeeping missions approved by the U.N. Security Council. We plan to work with other countries in challenging, but largely non-combat situations, in the field.

We are also working with the Russians and our other friends on the Security Council to address the institutional, financial and operational challenges the U.N. faces as it tries to support more peacekeepers than ever before.

As for the Russian veto of the Cyprus funding, the Russians used their veto in the Security Council on the question of how to finance the peacekeeping force, not on whether that force should continue to operate. We are confident that they will continue their pattern of constructive consultation and cooperation.

Q: Does all of this mean that we are shifting our focus away from our traditional allies?

A: No, not at all. Peacekeeping is something that can and should be done by as broad a spectrum of countries as possible.

We see this as the beginning of what we hope will be fruitful cooperation with many friendly countries that share our commitment to U.N. peacekeeping.

□

Russia/United States: Participation in Space Station

Q: What is the status of Russia's involvement in the space station redesign?

A: Russian space officials have been in Washington to participate in the redesign effort.

No decisions have been made about the Russian contribution.

Nevertheless, we intend to give full consideration to the use of Russian assets, including hardware that can reduce the station's costs.

□

Uranium Purchase from Russia

Q: What's the status of your plans to buy highly-enriched uranium from Russia?

A: This continues to be a high priority. Buying enriched uranium from dismantled former Soviet weapons will reduce proliferation risks while helping the Russian economy.

Our negotiators are continuing to work out the complex commercial and technical issues needed to conclude this agreement.

We've told the Russians that before this deal goes forward, there will need to be arrangements for equitable sharing of the proceeds with Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus.

□

U.S./Ukrainian Relations

Q: How were Ambassador Talbott's meetings in Ukraine? Ukrainian officials have complained that we are giving Ukraine short shrift compared to Russia.

A: Ambassador Talbott met with President Kravchuk and other Ukrainian officials. His meetings were very positive.

-- We are seeking to develop our relations with Ukraine on We want a full and productive relationship, and Ambassador Talbott's trip there was a sign of that.

Q: Are we developing a more lenient approach toward Ukraine?

A: Our position that Ukraine should ratify the START I treaty and accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapon state remains firm. When Ambassador Talbott met with Ukrainian government officials, they stressed that Ukraine would fulfill these commitments.

Q: Are you proposing a new security initiative with Ukraine?

A: Our proposals for security assurances remain as before, but Ambassador Talbott did have a good discussion of security issues with Ukrainian officials.

Q: Why did you refuse to see Prime Minister Kuchma when he came to the United States?

A: Prime Minister Kuchma was invited here on a private visit, during a busy period for me. I will look forward to meeting him at a time more convenient for both of us.

□

Bosnia/Macedonia

Q: Are we sending forces to Macedonia as reported in the media?

A: As I said previously, we are considering this among a number of options we are studying in our efforts to deal with the conflict in Yugoslavia.

No final decisions have been made.

Q: Are we sending ground troops to monitor the border between Serbia and Bosnia?

A: I am not contemplating any such steps. As I have said, I do not intend to put ground troops into Bosnia except as part of an effort to implement a settlement.

Q: Why are you back-pedaling on military options for responding to the Bosnian crisis after such intensive rhetoric last week?

A: We remain committed to our approach to the Bosnian crisis. We have always said that all options for dealing with this crisis are on the table, including more forceful measures to help bring a stop to the killing. In fact, the current general cease-fire may have been reached in part because the Serbs know we are serious about more forceful measures.

Q: Why has the air come out of your Bosnian policy? How are you going to recover from the European rejection of your initiatives? Doesn't the current stall put the lie to the U.S. as leader for the post-Cold War world?

A: Not so. Together with our allies and friends, we have made clear that all options are open; we continue to assess the situation.

The conflict in Bosnia is among the most complex anyone has ever faced. Deeply rooted hatreds have been fertilized with the blood of thousands. Bringing peace to this region will require the full effort of the international community. The United States cannot solve this problem on its own.

With the cease-fire generally holding in Bosnia, and Mr. Milosevic on record as disassociating himself from the actions of the Bosnian Serbs, we are at an important phase in the search for peace. It is up to the Bosnians to maintain the cease-fire which has been agreed.

□

The international community is watching developments in the former Yugoslavia very closely. Mr. Milosevic has said that he will sever all but essential humanitarian

goods to the Bosnian Serbs. It is now up to him to deliver on this promise.

In short, in assessing the responsibilities of the international community -- including the United States -- for resolving this conflict, it is also important to keep in mind the responsibilities of the parties, the governments in Belgrade and Zagreb.

We, together with other concerned members of the international community are, as we have been, willing to help bring peace to the region. But others must do their share.

Q: Doesn't the continued warfare between the Croats and Muslims complicate efforts to bring peace to Bosnia?

A: We have condemned those who initiate violence, regardless of their affiliation. We have given strong messages to Zagreb that they must do what they can to prevent violence from breaking out. We have sent similar messages to the Izetbegovic government.

Q: A general cease-fire seems to be holding, but how will the U.S. react if the violence in Eastern Bosnia resumes?

A: I won't address that hypothetical situation, but will stress that we continue to follow events in Bosnia very closely and have not ruled out any options.

Q: What about the upcoming vote of the Bosnian Serb Assembly?

A: The U.S. places no legitimacy in this so-called referendum.

Q: If the U.S. were to take stronger action, do you need additional authorization by the UN?

A: We will ensure that any action we take will be consistent with UN resolutions. We will seek additional action in the UN if it is required.

Q: How about consultations with Congress?

A: My advisers and I have had extensive consultations with Congressional leadership and interested members on the Bosnian situation. Their observations and recommendations have been an important part of our deliberations.

□

Q: What about the Bosnian Foreign Minister's (Haris Siladzic) call for removing UNPROFOR from Bosnia?

A: We understand the frustration of the Bosnians as this conflict has dragged on.

The men and women of UNPROFOR, the UNHCR and ICRC have worked tirelessly under extremely difficult circumstances to relieve the suffering of tens of thousands of Bosnian citizens, as well as the suffering of others.

The United States does not believe that UNPROFOR presents a problem for the international community as it contemplates what further measures may be necessary to help bring peace.

Northern Ireland: Special Envoy

Q: Do you plan to appoint a "Special Envoy" on Northern Ireland?

A: As you know, I consulted earlier this year with both Prime Minister Major and Prime Minister Reynolds. My number one priority is to encourage the parties to resume the talks which were recessed last fall.

I told both leaders that our policy toward Northern Ireland would be based on three principles:

First, Northern Ireland will remain an important issue for discussion among the U.S., Great Britain and Ireland.

Second, any proposals we make will be judged against the standard of whether they can contribute to bringing about an end to the tragedy in Northern Ireland. The goal is to promote peace and reconciliation.

Third, we will consult fully with both Britain and Ireland.

If the parties believe that a U.S. representative could help, then I would be prepared to take such a step to advance the cause of peace.

Ultimately, it is up to the people in Northern Ireland themselves to bring about an end to this tragedy. I want them to know that we will stand with them to help in any way we can.

Visa to Gerry Adams

Q: During the campaign you called for granting a visa to Gerry Adams, yet your Administration just denied him one. How do you account for this contradiction?

A: Mr. Adams was denied a visa in accordance with U.S. law, specifically, the Immigration and Nationality Act which bars those individuals involved in terrorist

activity from entry into the United States.

The decision to deny Mr. Adams a visa was recommended by the State Department with the full support of the Justice Department, including the FBI. I stand by that decision.

During the campaign, I said I would consider granting a visa to Mr. Adams because he was a member of parliament and as such could be helpful to the process of bringing peace to the area.

However, Mr. Adams is no longer a member of Parliament.

Q: Will you be discussing Northern Ireland with President Robinson?

A: As you know, I will be seeing President Robinson -- who is Ireland's head of state -- later this afternoon, along with Ireland's Foreign Minister Dick Spring.

I anticipate we will touch on Northern Ireland and on other issues affecting Irish society and Ireland's role in the world. In that regard, let me add that all of us, not to mention the Somalis themselves, owe President Robinson a heartfelt thank you for her valiant efforts to highlight the plight of the Somali people.

I understand she will be accepting an award from Care today for her efforts. It is a well deserved honor.

Haiti

Q: What is the status of the Haiti negotiations?

A: I am committed to the restoration of constitutional government and the return of President Aristide to Haiti. We have made that view clear to the current military leaders in Haiti.

I believe that the negotiations will succeed. We will not back off from our commitment to the Haitian people, nor will we accept delaying tactics. All Haitian parties must come together to ensure the restoration of democracy quickly.

We believe UN and OAS Special Representative Dante Caputo is making progress, and we continue to support his efforts.

Secretary Christopher held productive meetings with UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali, Under-Secretary General Goulding and Mr. Caputo two days ago in New York.

Q: Will the UN Security Council consider the issue of Haiti,

especially the idea of international police monitors?

A: A number of UN members, including ourselves, are consulting on ways to strengthen the international presence in Haiti as part of the future political settlement.

One option under discussion is the deployment of international police monitors to professionalize the Haitian police and promote security and confidence.

I support this concept, but a number of details remain to be worked out, including the role of the U.S. in this operation.

□

Haitians at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

[Background: As a result of a court order mandating "adequate care" for Haitian AIDS victims whose immune systems had seriously deteriorated, some 50 Haitians were recently permitted U.S. entry from Guantanamo. In addition, we have permitted another 50 or so to come into the United States for specified medical and humanitarian reasons. Thus, the population of Haitians at Guantanamo has diminished from about 270 when you took office to about 170 today.]

Q: What do you plan to do with the Haitians at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba?

A: This is a complicated and compelling issue that is under review.

It must be resolved in a manner that meets the humanitarian needs of the Haitians and is sensitive to burdens faced by state and local health care facilities.

□

Iran

Q: What is your view of the current behavior of Iran?

A: Iran's behavior on a number of important issues shows that it has chosen to remain outside the family of nations.

It sponsors terrorism and assassination; it supports extremist violence in Egypt and elsewhere; it is engaged in an effort to subvert the Middle East peace process; and it is seeking nuclear weapons. We and our allies need to work together to contain the Iranian

threat.

Q: Are you prepared to allow the sale of civilian aircraft to Iran?

A: This is a difficult issue which combines a number of U.S. interests, including economic interests. It has been the subject of an intensive review in the Administration, and a decision has not yet been taken.

Q: How serious is the threat from Iran? What are you doing about it?

A: Iran is building up its conventional military forces, pursuing missile and chemical weapons programs and seeking nuclear weapons. Its sponsorship of terrorism and assassination, its support for extremist violence in Egypt and elsewhere and its violent opposition to the Middle East peace process put it outside the family of nations.

We have pressed our allies and others not to assist Iran's nuclear and other weapons programs. We've told potential exporters that arms sales to Iran would be highly destabilizing, given the Iranian regime's behavior and ambitions.

□

Iraq

Q: What is your reaction to the Kuwaiti claim that Iraq tried to assassinate former President Bush last month in Kuwait city?

A: This is a very serious matter.

We are working closely with the Government of Kuwait to investigate these charges thoroughly and expeditiously. An FBI/Secret Service team is in Kuwait at the moment interrogating the suspects and examining the physical evidence.

Until this investigation is completed, I am not going to speculate about its conclusions or the course of action I will decide upon.

Q: Are you softening the U.S. approach to Iraq?

A: No, we are toughening the U.S. approach, with enforcement of our no-fly zone, continuing pressure on nuclear issues and the growing effect of our embargo.

Senior members of my Administration recently expressed my support to the Iraqi democratic opposition here in Washington.

We are insisting that Iraq comply fully with all the UN resolutions. That applies to the Saddam Hussein regime and any successor regime.

We are also urging the UN to set up a commission to investigate Iraq's war crimes and crimes against humanity.

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Iraq: UN Guards

[Background: The UN has announced it is withdrawing 50 UN guards from northern Iraq this weekend because it has run out of money for its programs in Iraq, including those that provide relief for the Kurds in the north.]

Q: What is the U.S. reaction to reports the UN is withdrawing guards from northern Iraq which protect relief operations for the Kurds?

A: The UN guards play an important role in the humanitarian relief effort in Iraq. We are working with our allies and other donors to ensure that the UN has the finances needed to get the UN guard force to its full strength.

At the same time, U.S. and coalition aircraft will continue their mission of patrolling the no-fly zone in northern Iraq to protect the Kurds from Iraqi military pressure.

Saddam Hussein should have no doubt that the coalition remains determined to see all the UN resolutions are complied with, including Resolution 688 that demands an end to repression of the Iraqi people.

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American Draft

of an Israeli-Palestinian Joint Statement

[Background: The U.S. tabled the attached draft on Wednesday evening, May 12. It followed the earlier tabling of Israeli and Palestinian drafts and was designed to codify overlapping areas where they seemed to be close to agreement. The introduction of an American draft was designed to focus their energies, particularly in the closing days of the negotiations and ensure that there would be an ongoing focus of activity during the recess.]

Neither side has rejected the draft, contrary to the impression created in the media. The Palestinians see it as an "Israeli draft" and have serious problems with it. The Israelis like it. Both sides are engaged with us in ongoing discussions about it which we intend to continue in the next few weeks. Our objective is to prepare the ground for closure on this agreement when the negotiations resume in early June.]

The Document:

The document is an American draft of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement. It does not represent American positions but rather our version of the common ground between the parties. The elements of the statement include:

Objective: to end the conflict and create a peaceful future of coexistence

Goal of Negotiations: an agreement on self government arrangements for the Palestinians for five years; a second phase of final status negotiations to implement 242 and 338.

Description of Self-Government: the empowerment of the Palestinians through the transfer of the functions of the Israeli Civil Administration, which should give Palestinians greater control over decisions that affect their lives and fate.

Security: the agreement states the opposing views of the Israeli and Palestinian sides. Israel wants to be responsible for overall security and the security of Israelis in the territories during the interim period; the Palestinians object.

Establishment of Working Groups: codifies agreement already reached on the creation of three working groups: concept of interim self-government; land and water and humanitarian affairs and human rights.

Elections: elections for the authority will be free and fair and will include international observers.

Powers: the powers of the elected authority will include executive and judicial powers and legislative powers within the responsibilities transferred to it.

□

Q: Are you disappointed that the U.S. draft Israeli-Palestinian agreement has been rejected?

A: The draft agreement has not been rejected by either side. Both the Israelis and Palestinians have some problems with it.

But both sides have indicated their willingness to use the American draft as a basis for their negotiations.

We will be having ongoing discussions with the Israelis and Palestinians about this draft over the next few weeks before the formal negotiations reconvene.

□

Middle East Peace Talks

[Background: The Middle East peace negotiations adjourned yesterday without any substantive agreement. Nevertheless, all sides in all the tracks have tabled papers and are negotiating their differences. Progress is being made but it is slow and difficult. The U.S., for the first time since Madrid, has introduced an American draft of a joint Israeli-Palestinian agreement. We sought to do this at a trilateral meeting (U.S.-Israel-Palestinians), but the Palestinians did not show up. This was disappointing since they had been demanding trilateral meetings. Nevertheless, both sides are now giving serious consideration to the U.S. draft. We are treating this break in negotiations as a recess. We expect the negotiations to resume, after Jewish and Muslim holidays, in early June.]

Q: The Arab-Israeli negotiators have now left town. Why didn't you meet with them?

A: I was looking forward to meeting with them to hear them report that they had achieved agreement.

Unfortunately, that did not happen in this round. But I remain optimistic that we will be able to meet soon and announce real progress.

As I have often stated, I believe that 1993 can be a year of serious and substantive progress in the Middle East negotiations -- a year of breakthrough. Because of that assessment, I have instructed Secretary of State Christopher and our team to be actively engaged in the negotiations as a "full partner."

The U.S. was fully engaged in this round of the negotiations, working with all the parties. We even introduced an American draft of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement.

There is a lot of hard work to be done. We are ready to do our part. I expect the parties to live up to their responsibilities. We can only be a "full partner" if they are full participants too.

Frankly, I think some opportunities were missed this time. That makes it all the more important that all the parties come back after the recess, as early as June, in a problem-solving mode, ready to do real work.

□

ACDA

Q: There is continuing uncertainty over your plans for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Is it true that you plan to dissolve the agency and fold it into the State Department?

A: We are now engaged in a review of ACDA's future.

In deciding how best to organize the Government in the areas of arms control and non-proliferation, one of our key considerations will be the high priority that I

place on both these areas.

We expect the review to be completed soon.

Meanwhile, ACDA continues to play an important role in interagency deliberations as we review our policies in these areas.

COCOM

Q: You promised Mr. Yeltsin that you would review security-related export controls for Russia. What are the results of that review?

A: As I stated during the campaign and again to Mr. Yeltsin at Vancouver, we need a careful review of our East-West export controls.

We are in the midst of a study of this review, and we will closely coordinate our views with Congress and our allies.

U.S. Nuclear Testing Program

Q: Have you decided whether or not to resume U.S. nuclear testing when the moratorium expires on July 1, 1993?

A: I support a phased approach to the implementation of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty but have not made any decisions on actual tests.

Last year's Congressional compromise on this issue allows the U.S. to phase out nuclear testing between 1993 and 1996 as it simultaneously pursues a Comprehensive Test Ban, with the goal of attaining a CTB by 1996.

Our review of these issues is in its final stages and I expect to receive recommendations from the appropriate Departments in the next few weeks.

Homosexuals in the Military

Q: The Senate and House Armed Services Committees have recently completed their hearings on the issue of lifting the ban on homosexuals in the military. The testimony during the SASC hearing strongly suggests that the "don't ask/don't tell" formula is gaining momentum as an alternative to lifting the ban completely. Do you view this as a viable option?

A: I remain committed to ensuring that American citizens who want to serve their country should be able to so do unless their conduct disqualifies them from doing so.

I believe that behavior can and should be strictly

regulated. I do not think people should be disqualified merely on the basis of status.

I do not believe individuals should be excluded from military service solely on the basis of their status.

Q: Will you discuss this issue with Congress before acting on the recommendations of the Secretary of Defense?

A: I had extensive discussions in the Congress on this issue earlier in the year.

In the next two months, Secretary Aspin plans to discuss with concerned members of Congress the issues that have been raised both in his investigations and in the Armed Services Committees hearings.

Once I receive Secretary Aspin's recommendation on or before July 15, I will again consult with Congressional leaders.

□

Star Wars Program

Q: Do you agree with Secretary Aspin's decision to kill the Star Wars program?

A: Secretary Aspin has renamed, restructured and reoriented the former Strategic Defense Initiative Office (SDIO); he has not canceled research and development on missile defenses.

Under the new Ballistic Missile Defense Office (BMDO), which will now report to the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition instead of directly to the Secretary, the Defense Department will continue as a first priority to develop and deploy theater missile defenses. The second priority is to develop a limited defense for the Continental United States that would be consistent with the ABM Treaty and which we could consider deploying in about a decade or so.

We have requested \$3.8 billion for work on missile defenses in FY 1994, so it isn't accurate to say we have terminated our efforts in this area.

The decisions announced by Secretary Aspin yesterday are fully consistent with the position on SDI that I took during the campaign and enjoy my full support.

□

Tailhook

Q: The recently released Tailhook report described in vivid detail the sexual misconduct of many junior officers and the failure of several more senior officers to exercise appropriate leadership. What is being done to punish those

responsible?

A: The sexual misconduct that is reported to have occurred at the 1991 Tailhook conference is not in keeping with the high standards that we expect from our military officers. Furthermore, it is an affront to the fair and equal treatment of women that we expect throughout the military -- or anywhere.

I hope that this report will not be used to diminish our respect for the Navy and its extraordinarily devoted and competent personnel.

The Chief of Naval Operations and acting Secretary of the Navy, Admiral Frank Kelso, have established convening authorities that are ready to expedite the individual cases that have arisen from the Tailhook investigation.

We must ensure that the follow-up to the report, including any judicial proceedings, be implemented in a fair and objective manner. As Commander-in-Chief, I am determined that this process be fair both to those making the allegations and to the officers being charged.

I have recently nominated John Dalton to be the next Secretary of the Navy. Upon his confirmation, I expect him to focus on the fair and expeditious resolution of this unfortunate event.

□

Women in Combat

Q: Secretary Aspin recently announced that women will be allowed to serve in combat positions in the Armed Forces. Is this decision consistent with the recommendations of last year's Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces and subsequent Congressional proclamations?

A: In opening combat positions to women, Secretary Aspin was referring specifically to allowing women to serve aboard U.S. Navy combat ships with the exception of amphibious ships and submarines.

The decision to allow women to fly tactical aircraft during combat missions is contrary to the recommendation of the Commission but is consistent with the position taken by the Congressional decision to lift the ban against women serving in combat.

The military services are moving quickly to implement this decision and, as Commander-in-Chief, I am confident that women will be able to make significant contributions to our national security in combat positions.

□

Biodiversity

Q: Have the industry and environmental groups been consulted on your approach to signing the biodiversity treaty?

A: Yes. We have worked with leaders in the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries and in the environmental community. They have played a vital role in helping us to understand the key concerns of the industry and in helping us find a way to sign the treaty that also protects the patent and other economic rights of our industry.

Q: Can you release the draft interpretative statement?

A: No, we're not releasing it at this time, because it is the subject of discussion with other governments. We will release it as soon as we have completed those discussions.

Q: When will you submit the treaty to the Senate for ratification?

A: We will submit the treaty as soon as we complete the discussions with other governments, so that we have an approach to an interpretative statement that we feel will have broad support.

Q: How long is that going to take? Will it be done in 1993?

A: We have already begun these discussions. We want to complete them soon -- and certainly expect it well before the end of the year.

□

Intelligence Budget

Q: Do you plan to live up to your campaign pledge and cut intelligence spending by \$7.0 billion?

A: Our budget request will reduce the intelligence budget by \$7.0 billion between fiscal years 1993 and 1997 when compared to the Bush administration's proposal for the same period of time.

Jim Woolsey, Les Aspin and I are committed to this course of action. And I believe that we will be able to identify additional savings.

We plan to consolidate costly collection systems, streamline operations and eliminate costly and redundant activities that may exist in military and civilian intelligence programs. This consolidation

will incur some initial expenses.

We inherited the priorities of another era. We have begun a process to identify intelligence priorities that will help us meet the challenges of a new era.

This will not happen overnight. But we are committed to both real reductions and maintaining a well-grounded intelligence capability to help us meet the challenges we face.

Encryption

Q: Your Administration has announced a new initiative with regard to encryption products that it claims will improve the privacy of telephone communications while at the same time meeting the needs of law enforcement. Are the privacy rights of Americans going to be jeopardized by this initiative?

A: Absolutely not. First of all, our approach is voluntary. We will give our citizens and business community the opportunity to buy an encryption product that is more secure, more convenient and less expensive than others readily available today.

While encryption technology can help Americans protect business secrets and prevent the unauthorized release of personal information, it can also be used by terrorists, drug dealers, and other criminals.

Our approach is to use the best technology available to strike a good balance among competing needs.

We are providing law enforcement with no new authorities to access the private conversations of Americans.

I am committed to policies that protect the rights of all Americans to privacy while also protecting them from those who break the law.

Chile

Q: You have said that you support a free trade agreement with Chile. Ambassador Kantor has said that he wants to build on the NAFTA process with more agreements in Latin America. Why aren't you requesting fast-track authority for any bilateral agreements? Is Chile next in line for a trade agreement after the NAFTA?

A: Chile deserves a lot of credit for taking some extremely significant steps to liberalize its economy. In part because of these steps, U.S. exports to Chile were up 33 percent last year.

I continue to support the negotiation of a free trade

agreement with Chile at the appropriate time. Done properly, such an agreement could be in the interest of both of our nations. Chile is also a praiseworthy model of democratic efficiency and social justice.

While I hope to negotiate bilateral arrangements with other countries after the NAFTA, I want to focus my attention on completing that negotiation and those at the Uruguay Round at this time.

□

EC Procurement Dispute

Q: Last week you held your first U.S.-EC Summit. You settled part of a dispute with the EC over government procurement, yet Ambassador Kantor announced that the United States is still planning to retaliate. Is this half a trade war? Or are you trying to paper over U.S.-EC differences in order to focus on problems with the Japanese?

A: I am pleased with the outcome of U.S.-EC discussions on the procurement issue. Our U.S. manufacturers won access to the EC's \$20 billion market for heavy electrical equipment -- a market that had been closed. The affected U.S. companies believe this is a great opportunity.

At the same time, the U.S. and the EC will continue to work to resolve other outstanding issues. As Ambassador Kantor explained, the U.S. will move ahead with plans for measured retaliation over remaining barriers to U.S. access to the European telecommunications sector.

There is no link between this issue and our trade agenda with Japan. The U.S. will work to reduce trade barriers wherever we find them.

□

NAFTA

Q: The Cabinet met yesterday to discuss NAFTA strategy, reportedly considering whether to seek trade sanctions for violations of environmental and labor standards. Wouldn't this contradict Ambassador Kantor's testimony to Congress that the U.S. would not seek sanctions? Wouldn't trade sanctions require reopening the underlying NAFTA agreement? Are you seeking tougher measures because you agree with Director Panetta -- that the NAFTA would be dead in Congress if the vote were held today?

A: My position on NAFTA is unchanged. I firmly believe that a NAFTA agreement, coupled with strong and effective supplemental agreements, can be an important component of a stronger and more competitive U.S. economy. A good agreement must include tough enforcement provisions with real teeth.

I am committed to negotiating accords that provide

assurances that environmental and labor standards are upheld.

I believe Congress wants the same things from a NAFTA that I do. If we succeed in putting together a strong NAFTA package, I am confident it will win support in Congress.

You can see the potential of the NAFTA by looking at what we've already gained. Since Mexico began to liberalize its economy in 1986, we've gone from a \$6 billion trade deficit with Mexico to a \$5-plus billion trade surplus. That improvement in the U.S. trade balance has created over a quarter of a million new American jobs. The NAFTA can help lock in that change.

Many people may not know that Mexico already is a critical market for U.S. goods. In 1992, Mexico passed Japan as the second largest market for U.S. exports of manufactured goods. Moreover, Mexico has just begun to realize its economic potential.

□

Super 301

Q: During the campaign, you said that you supported legislation to renew Super 301. Why aren't you including it with your request for fast-track extension?

A: I support extension of Super 301, and I will work with the Congress to find the best opportunity to extend it. But given the importance of jump-starting the Uruguay Round, I want to avoid a protracted Congressional debate over other trade measures at this time.

Super 301 is only one tool in our trade arsenal. I won't wait for new legislation before I place a high priority on expanding export opportunities for U.S. businesses. I'm doing that now.

□

Uruguay Round

Q: When do you expect to start serious negotiations to complete the Uruguay Round? Hasn't the Round taken a back seat to NAFTA?

A: The completion of a good Uruguay Round agreement remains a high priority of this Administration. A successful conclusion of the Round is essential to strengthen the world trading system and promote global growth. One-third of the world's trade is not currently covered by GATT, including services. For example, U.S. industries lose up to \$60 billion each year due to inadequate intellectual property rights protection. A successful Uruguay Round would help remedy these problems.

That is why I announced on April 9 my intention to seek a short renewal of fast-track authority to complete these talks by December 15. I urge Congress to approve

a clean extension of fast-track authority as soon as possible so that none of our trading partners have any excuse to delay serious negotiations. We are consulting with Congress as to the best way to do this.

Today, in Toronto, Ambassador Kantor is negotiating on market access provisions with the EC, Canada, and Japan. We look forward to making significant progress with our major trading partners so that we can complete a successful Round by December.

□

Japan Accuses U.S. of Unfair Trade Practices

Q: Earlier this week, Japan issued a report accusing the U.S. of being the worst offender of free-trade principles among its major trading partners. In particular, it criticized the U.S. for the use of unilateral sanctions. What is the Administration's response?

A: By all reasonable standards, the U.S. maintains the most open market in the world.

Japan and we can liberalize world trade, by concentrating on the successful completion of the Uruguay Round and the development of the framework for economic negotiations announced last month.

□

Multi-Purpose Vehicles/Autos and Auto Parts

Q: Is the Administration going to increase the tariff on multi-purpose vehicles to 25 percent? When are you going to make a decision?

A: The Department of the Treasury is currently reviewing this matter, and we will wait for that review to be completed before any decision is taken.

Minivan reclassification raises broader questions about trade opportunities for autos and auto parts. Sixty percent of the U.S. trade deficit with Japan consists of autos and auto parts.

We take seriously the pledges that Japanese auto manufacturers made in 1992 to buy more auto parts, increase the local content of cars made in U.S. plants and import more cars into Japan. We will look to them to fulfill their commitments.

Beyond that, I am deeply concerned about the competitiveness of the U.S. auto industry and the openness of foreign markets to our autos and auto parts. It is the responsibility of our companies to produce competitive goods, and they have. It is now the obligation of other countries, including Japan, to open their markets to competitive U.S. goods.

□

Negotiating Framework with Japan

Q: How do you expect to get results from Japan, when previous Administrations have had such difficulty? Your new economic framework negotiations seem identical to the initiatives past Administrations have pursued (e.g. MOSS talks, SII). How is this one different?

A: We view the U.S.-Japan relationship as having three interconnected parts: economic issues, political/security partnership, and cooperation on global problems.

The exact content of our initiative is currently being worked out, but several aspects of our approach are fundamentally different. First, we have zeroed in on the need to advance the economic agenda in our relationship. Second, for the first time in 12 years, the U.S. is honestly addressing its budget deficit -- and that puts us in a stronger position to seek action from Japan. Third, I will remain personally committed to these talks and will stay actively involved.

Q: How and when will the framework discussions proceed?

A: The two sides will meet in the near future to discuss schedule and approach. They will then move quickly to talks over the specific framework.

□

Tone of U.S.-Japan Relations

Q: Increasingly, Japan seems to be standing up to the United States, both in its tone and its attitude towards U.S. policy. Is this the beginning of a trade war?

A: As I announced after my meeting with Prime Minister Miyazawa, the U.S.-Japan relationship is entering a new phase, one based on equal partnership and mutual respect.

In a bilateral relationship as complex as the U.S.-Japan relationship, it is not surprising that there are differences of opinion, but those differences need not lead to a trade war.

We are developing a new framework through which we can address our concerns about structural and sectoral barriers to trade with Japan. We look forward to resolving our differences and avoiding increased frictions through these negotiations.

□

Trade Results vs. Managed Trade

Q: You have said that, in our relationship with Japan, you will demand results. The Japanese equate results with managed

trade, which they reject. How can you be for results and for free trade at the same time?

A: I am concerned about Japan's substantial and persistent trade surplus with the U.S. As Prime Minister Miyazawa recognized when he was here last month, we have engaged in many negotiations, some of which have resulted in improved market access, some of which have not. Changes in procedures and superficial barriers are not sufficient if more intractable barriers remain that deny sales to U.S. firms.

It is important that the U.S. insist on measurable progress when it comes to trade agreements with Japan, but that does not mean managed trade. I support free trade. We will be looking for measurable progress to make sure that our agreements with Japan produce competitive opportunities for American business in Japan.

Q: Does this mean every future agreement will be like the semiconductor agreement?

A: Not necessarily. There are many ways to measure progress other than market share (e.g., increased design-in opportunities, number of foreign bids awarded, number of distribution outlets carrying foreign products). In still other cases, specific measurements might not be necessary in the agreement at all. Each case is different. It also is important that U.S. companies pursue the market aggressively. We should not be too simplistic about this, but results do matter.

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FOR: Michael Laybourne (LAYBOURNE@WHSR@CCGATE@VAXA)
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FOR: Russell L. Gorrell (GORRELL@WHSR@CCGATE@VAXA)
CC: Records (RECORDS)

Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 14-May-1993 13:40
Deletable Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 006614
VMS Filename: OA\$SHARE20:ZURIJKN6J.WPL
A1 Folder: MAY93
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 14-May-1993 13:40
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

09-Jun-1993 12:22 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR:

George M. Andricos

(ANDRICOS)

FROM:

Eric P. Schwartz
(SCHWARTZ)

SUBJECT:

additions to the CBC package

Haitian asylum-seekers

Guantanamo

- As you know, I decided not to seek a stay of the Federal District Court order involving the HIV-positive Haitians, and I expect the remaining 158 Haitians to be off the island and in the United States shortly.

Direct return of Haitians interdicted in international waters

- I maintained the practice of direct return to avoid a humanitarian tragedy that could have resulted in the loss of thousands of lives.
- This is a policy for extraordinary circumstances that is continually under review.
- As you know, we have taken an range of actions to make it easier and safer for Haitians in Haiti to apply asylum.
- For example, we have opened regional processing centers outside of Port-au-Prince in two provincial cities, we have increased staffing so that claims can be heard more quickly, and we have increased our ability to identify and assess applicants who may be fearful of coming into a refugee processing center for an interview but are nonetheless deserving of refugee status.

CC: Records

(RECORDS)

Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 09-Jun-1993 12:22

Deletable Flag: N

DOCNUM: 008134

VMS Filename: OA\$SHARE29:ZUSIHOEK5.WPL

A1 Folder: JUN93

Message Format:

Message Status: NOTED

Date Modified: 09-Jun-1993 12:22
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

15-Jun-1993 16:25 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Natalie S. Wozniak

(WOZNIAK)

FROM:

Paul Clarke
(CLARKE)

SUBJECT:

schwartz

fyi

CC: Records

(RECORDS)

Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 15-Jun-1993 16:25

Deletable Flag: N

DOCNUM: 009864

VMS Filename: OA\$SHARE31:ZUSONH8YG.WPL

A1 Folder: JUN93

Message Format:

Message Status: NOTED

Date Modified: 15-Jun-1993 16:25

Forward Flag: YES

Read-Receipt Requested: NO

Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO

Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

□

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

15-Jun-1993 12:26 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Paul Clarke

(CLARKE)

FROM:

Eric P. Schwartz
(SCHWARTZ)

SUBJECT:

Pres's 6/16 press conference: Qs&As: GTMO, alien sm

CC: Records

(RECORDS)

CC: Richard A. Clarke

(CLARKER)

CC: Randy R. Beers

(BEERS)

Haitians at Guantanamo: the Court decision

Q. Why didn't you seek a stay of the order to bring in the Haitians?

A. In accordance with the recommendation of the Attorney General, I chose not to seek a stay of the order. I did this because I believed that the interests of all affected parties were best served by the decision not to seek a stay, and that no useful purpose would have been served by seeking a stay.

Q. Why didn't you act sooner to end the detention of these Haitians?

A. Even before this latest court decision, we had reduced the population at Guantanamo from almost 300 on January 21 to 158, as Haitians were admitted to the U.S. for required medical care and other compelling humanitarian reasons.

Q. But why did you wait to act on the entire group until you were so ordered by a Court?

A. This has been a complicated and controversial issue and, under the circumstances that prevailed until the Court decision, I felt that the gradual provision of entry for humanitarian reasons was the reasonable approach. In view of yesterday's court decision, I determined that not seeking a stay was the appropriate action.

Q. Does this mean that this Court case is closed? Or will you appeal the ruling despite your not seeking a stay?

A. The Justice Department is studying the legal basis of the Court decision, which seems to suggest a wide range of constitutional rights for aliens outside the United States.

Q. Does this decision affect your position on the general HIV exclusion?

A. This decision was made in response to the Court's order and is not a statement of policy on the HIV-exclusion issue.

Q. But what is your position on the HIV exclusion?

A. As you know, this issue has already been the subject of debate and legislative action in the Congress, and the exclusion has been included in the NIH Authorization bill.

Q. Won't this impose a major burden on states and localities? Are you planning to compensate the states for the costs of health care for this population?

A. While we will be looking at this issue, I should note that the Department of Justice's Community Relations

Service has developed a resettlement plan designed to minimize the burden on localities. The plan, which has the cooperation of the Departments of State, Defense and other agencies, uses a wide range of voluntary agencies, community organizations, and family members to ease the transition for new arrivals. The plan has been used successfully for more than 100 HIV-Haitians who have entered since late January.

- Q. A Washington Post report suggests that, due to their mistrust of the military doctors on Guantanamo, some of the infected Haitians do not believe they are HIV-positive and will thus be more likely to infect others after arriving in the U.S. What are you doing about that?
- A. The voluntary agencies involved in resettlement arrange for counselling of the Haitians. And as the Post story suggests, when the Haitians are retested and counselled in a therapeutic environment they are much more likely to accept the diagnosis and the counselling.
- Q. When will the rest of the Haitians arrive?
- A. Over the course of the next week.

□

Alien Smuggling

- Q. Any comment on reports about a new Administration plan to deal with alien smuggling?

This is a problem that we have inherited, and which grew significantly during the last Administration.

The smuggling operations, coordinated by criminal syndicates, are a despicable trade in human misery.

The conditions under which these persons are brought to the United States run the gamut from deplorable to life threatening, and many of those who make it to the U.S. are consigned to years of indentured servitude.

The White House -- with both Domestic Policy Council and National Security Council involvement -- is coordinating a vigorous interagency effort to develop a range of effective responses to deal this shameful practice.

Within the next day or so, we will provide a more detailed description of our efforts on this issue. But for now, I can say that we are and will be:

increasing our surveillance of suspect vessels overseas and along our coasts;

working with foreign governments to monitor and discourage the refitting and use of freighters and fishing trawlers for these smuggling endeavors;

undertaking diplomatic efforts with flag states to

preclude vessels registered with them from
engaging in this trade in human misery;

encouraging flag states to assume responsibility
for the safety, well-being, and the processing
illegal migrants on flag vessels intercepted in
international waters.

And to communicate the message that a smuggling ship is
not the way to come to the U.S., we will detain aliens
who enter the U.S. pursuant to these smuggling
operations unless they have credible claims to
political asylum.

We will also be examining administrative and
legislative changes that would provide for more
effective and expeditious processing at ports of entry.

We will do so, however, without sacrificing the
principle of ensuring protection for bonafide political
refugees who enter the United States.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

16-Jun-1993 12:01 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Natalie S. Wozniak
(WOZNIAK)

SUBJECT: PRIME TIME PRESS CONFERENCE

June 16, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR NSC SENIOR DIRECTORS/DIRECTORS

FROM: PAUL CLARKE

SUBJECT: PRIME TIME PRESS CONFERENCE

Attached are the Qs and As prepared yesterday for the President's Press Conference this morning with President Nujoma. Please use this as a guide in preparing your Qs and As and include any additional topics you deem necessary.

Please E-Mail to o @PRESS by 3:00 p.m. today.

Thanks.

□

Somalia

[Background: Your words from Saturday's radio address: "(Our action) ...was essential to send a clear message to the armed gangs, to protect the vast majority of Somalis who long for peace, to enhance the security of our forces still in Somalia, to hasten the day when they can safely return home, and to strengthen the effectiveness and credibility of U.N. peacekeeping in Somalia and around the world."]

Q: What are the U.S. objectives in participating in this action in Somalia?

A: This enforcement action is in support of UN Security Council Resolution 837 calling for aggressive action against the perpetrators of the June 5 attack on UNOSOM coalition forces.

U.S. action in Somalia is in support of the UN and of UNOSOM II.

Q: Why is the U.S. undertaking this action by itself?

A: We are not. Twenty-two countries currently have nearly 20,000 troops in Somalia in support of UNOSOM II. The U.S. has about 3,000 noncombat logistics troops and 1,100 in the quick reaction force (QRF). Pakistan has the largest contingent in Somalia. Other major troop providers in the country are France, Italy, Morocco, and Belgium. Pakistan has primarily responsible for Mogadishu, where the QRF is also based. France, Italy, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey also have troops in Mogadishu.

Q: What is the Administration's reaction to the death of 20 Somali civilians at the hands of the U.N. contingent?

A: -- Let me emphasize that we deeply regret the loss of life in Somalia resulting from this and other recent incidents.

As you know, there is a tense situation on the ground in Somalia that comes in the aftermath of the cold-blooded ambush by General Aideed's forces of U.N. peacekeepers on June 5.

The United Nations is conducting an investigation to determine what actually took place during the demonstrations on Sunday.

In general, I am pleased with how the U.N. operation is proceeding.

□

Q: How long will the U.S. air attacks take place? In light of other events over the weekend, do you have second thoughts now about approving the air strikes over the weekend?

A: Our on-going efforts are designed to achieve the goals identified in last Sunday's U.N. Security Council Resolution.

Our actions over the weekend were highly successful. Our strikes on military targets were accurate and precise and minimized the risk of danger to civilians.

They have considerably reduced the stocks of weapons, ammunition and military vehicles. These attacks have greatly lessened the capacity of General Aideed to wreck havoc on the people of Somalia.

Q: Have the United States and the United Nations lost the moral high ground because of this attack?

A: We should not allow the events of the last 10 days obscure the real progress that has occurred in Somalia since the engagement of the U.S. forces late last year and the introduction of the UNOSOM forces thereafter.

I understand that relief organizations have criticisms of and concerns about the current UN operation in Somalia.

The relief organizations have legitimate concerns about violence. That is why UNOSOM has moved against Aideed's forces. If the relief organizations are to operate as they were before, order has to be reestablished. That is what UNOSOM is doing now.

As I noted on Saturday, by the time we arrived, more than 350,000 Somalis had died in a savage civil war that had caused the disintegration of Somali society. Today, crops are being planted and harvested, schools and hospitals are re-opening and refugees are returning home.

General Aideed and others are trying to divert attention from their own lawless actions by focusing on this latest incident.

Q: Is the United Nations still committed to going after Aideed?

A: The United Nations remains committed to following through on its Security Council resolution calling for the detention and ultimate trial of the faction leaders responsible for the killings on June 5.

□

[BACKGROUND: Unconfirmed press reports indicate that a U.S. Army Cobra helicopter fired into Aideed's compound today at a multiple rocket launcher that was aimed at the U.N. compound.

The reports indicate that the helicopter fired twice, and one of its rockets hit a civilian residence. They also note that the multiple rocket launcher was already inoperable.

We are unable to verify whether there were any civilian casualties.]

Q: Independent observers have described callous actions by the Pakistani peacekeepers, including killing of children and refusal to help the wounded. What action do you plan to take against the peacekeepers if these allegations are found to be true?

A: It is for the United Nations to determine if peacekeepers under their authority acted within the terms of engagement defined for their mission in Somalia.

Q: Is the UN planning to take over the administration of Somalia?

A: The United Nations has no desire to exercise sovereign power in Somalia. In the absence of a Somali-designated authority, however, it must carry out its humanitarian mission and protect its people from attack, as authorized in Security Council Resolutions 814 and 837.

Q: Does this mean that UNOSOM II is not a success in Somalia?

A: UNOSOM II has been operating successfully in Somalia since assuming responsibilities from U.S.-led UNITAF forces on May 4. It would be wrong to assume from the tragic results of one incident of treachery on June 5 that UNOSOM II cannot carry out its mission.

Furthermore, the U.S. did not leave Somalia - we remain in UNOSOM II and our actions today are in full support of UNOSOM II.

□

China MFN

Q: Why are you not linking trade and non-proliferation to extending MFN status for China?

A: We already have tough laws in these areas. I intend to use forcefully the instruments at my disposal to press these issues.

Q: What if the human rights situation improves, but China violates trade and non-proliferation agreements? Will the U.S. extend MFN?

A: As the Executive Order clearly states, MFN extension in 1994 will depend on human rights related actions by China.

Q: What about your campaign promises?

A: I said in the campaign and since -- progress in our relations with China will depend on progress in human rights, as well as in the areas of trade and non-proliferation.

The action I am taking keeps faith with those commitments and the convictions of the American people.

Q: What is the purpose of the Executive Order providing for conditional extension of MFN status for China for an additional 12 months?

A: I have determined that conditionally extending MFN is the best way to encourage Chinese progress in the areas of concern to us, particularly human rights.

Our relationship with China is important. Because of its huge population and fast-growing economy, China has a valuable role to play in the future of Asia and the world. Improving relations with China in a way consistent with U.S. values will prove essential to both our countries.

□

China: Missile Proliferation

Q: Senator Pell and other have sent a letter to Secretary Christopher criticizing our lack of action on M-11 sales from China to Pakistan. Are you going to impose sanctions on China for missile exports to Pakistan?

A: We've made very clear to China our concern about reports that they may have exported missile-related technology to Pakistan.

We expect China to live up to the commitment it has made to observe the guidelines and parameters of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) with respect to its exports.

U.S. law requires us to impose sanctions on countries or individual companies if we determine they have exported missile technology in contravention of the MTCR Guidelines. We will enforce that law.

[IF PRESSED]:

No determination has been made regarding whether new missile sanctions must be imposed against China.

□

North Korea

Q: What's the status of your negotiations with North Korea on the nuclear issue?

A: North Korea's decision on Friday to suspend its withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty is an important first step.

We will continue to work with other members of the international community to ensure a nuclear-free Korea and to bolster the international nonproliferation regime.

We expect to continue our discussions with North Korea but have not yet scheduled an additional meeting.

Q: Is it true that North Korea successfully tested a new long

range missile recently?

A: We have been concerned for some time about North Korea's missile development efforts.

These activities have made North Korea one of our primary missile proliferation concerns.

I can't really comment beyond that.

□

Russia: Status of Vancouver Assistance Package

Q: What is the status of implementation of the agreements on aid promised at the Vancouver Summit?

A: I consider implementation of the Vancouver Assistance Package for Russia to be one of my highest foreign policy objectives.

In the past 10 weeks since the Vancouver Summit, we have obligated 20% of the \$1.6 billion package.

We are continuing to work hard toward the goal of implementing aid as quickly as possible without sacrificing the effectiveness and efficiency of our programs.

We are working actively with the government of Russia to speed delivery of assistance and have made considerable progress in the ten weeks since Vancouver.

For example:

On June 4, Secretary of Agriculture Espy and Russian Deputy Prime Minister Zaveryukha signed the first two of four government-to-government agreements included in the \$700 million food for progress program.

Delivery of nutritional supplements for mothers and children will begin this month.

A DoD medical survey team is in Moscow to assess local medical facilities in preparation for donation of two hospitals. Installation will be completed by the end of September.

We are ready to begin negotiation of the grant for the Russian-American Enterprise Fund. I am now considering nominees for the Chairman and for other members of the Fund Board.

Contracts for \$31.9 million in privatization technical assistance are in place, and advisors are providing assistance to the Russian State Committee for Privatization (GKI).

On May 18, A.I.D. made a \$4 million grant to the Eurasia Foundation. The Foundation is currently

establishing offices in Moscow and Kiev, with two additional field sites under construction.

Our Democracy Corps Initiative is well underway. USIA has received \$36.25 million from A.I.D. through an interagency agreement to fund exchange programs throughout the former Soviet Union.

□

A.I.D. is currently reviewing proposals from builders for the Officer Resettlement Initiative. The target for contract award is August, with construction to begin in early September.

□

U.S.- Russia: Air Force Officer

[Background: A Russian officer recently graduated from the Air Force's Air War College at Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base in Montgomery, Alabama. Colonel Andrei Aleynikov, who arrived at Maxwell Air Force Base last summer, was the first Russian officer to attend the Air War College. He graduated on June 7 and has subsequently out-processed and is no longer assigned to Air University.]

Q: What do you know of the defection of a Russian officer who attended the Air War College? Doesn't this suggest that the situation in Russia remains as bleak as it was under Communism?

A: It would be inappropriate to comment on any actions Colonel Aleynikov does or does not plan to take as far as remaining in this country.

□

U.S.-Ukraine: Nuclear Weapons

Q: What can you say about reports that Ukraine is actively trying to gain control of the nuclear weapons on its territory? What are you doing about this?

A: We have had an ongoing concern about the evident wish of some Ukrainians to retain nuclear weapons in Ukraine. For that reason, we are working closely with the Ukrainian government at the highest level, both to make the leadership aware of our concern and to cooperate with them on developing initiatives to improve their overall security environment.

We remain confident Ukraine does not have independent control over nuclear weapons and does not have the capability to order the use of strategic weapons on its territories.

Secretary Aspin and Ambassador Talbot just visited the region and had good discussions with Ukrainian, as well as Russian, officials on this and a wide range of other issues.

We continue to consult on this issue and look forward to broadening our relations with Ukraine, including in the military and defense area.

Q: Is it true that Ukraine is going to fail to ratify START I and accede to the Nonproliferation Treaty?

A: In the last days, President Kravchuk and Foreign Minister Zlenko have again confirmed that Ukraine's policy is to see a positive vote for START I ratification and accession to the NPT.

They are working closely with the Ukrainian parliament to achieve that vote. We expect a positive outcome.

The parliament will begin debate on START this month. It is unclear when a vote will take place.

□

Bosnia

Q: Do you agree with the recommendation by UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali to send 7,500 additional troops to protect the safe havens? Where will the troops come from?

A: We obviously have not had the opportunity to examine the report at length. However, a proposal calling for deployment of 7,500 troops is a reasonable proposal.

Once the Security Council approves a deployment plan, the Secretary General will solicit troop contributions. Until that time, it is premature to speculate on possible troop contributions.

As you know, we have already indicated our willingness to provide airlift capacity so that these troops can be deployed quickly.

Q: A senior U.S. intelligence analyst has reported that the U.S. has given up on the Vance-Owen Plan and believes that the safe havens will lead to the creation of Muslim ghettos. Is this true?

A: Our policy laid out in the Joint Action Program is unchanged. We support the creation of safe havens as an important interim step to save lives. We are now in the process along with our allies to determine the best way to safeguard these safe havens.

As for the Vance-Owen Plan, we recognize that there is little movement toward a negotiated settlement right now, but we believe Vance-Owen can be the basis for further discussions.

We remain committed to try to bring pressure on all parties to reach a negotiated settlement.

□

Macedonia

[Background: On June 10, we announced that we have offered the UN a reinforced company team to augment the UN contingent already in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Secretary Christopher said, "These troops underscore the seriousness of our warning to Belgrade and the Bosnian Serbs. This offer of U.S. troops to the UN has both symbolic and tangible significance."]

Points

- We understand that U.S. Defense officials are discussing the modalities of the deployment with UN officials.
- We expect U.S. troops will arrive in Macedonia within the next week or two. The Advance Team is visiting UNPROFOR Headquarters in Zagreb Thursday.
- We have consulted closely with the Macedonian leadership on this issue.
- Our offer does not signify any change in our recognition policy with respect to Macedonia. Further steps on recognition await resolution of the issues, including the question of the name, now being addressed by Owen and Stoltenberg on behalf of the UN.

Q: Who will command the troops?

A: They will augment UNPROFOR Macedonia and will be under the operational control of the UNPROFOR commander there. U.S. forces will wear blue helmets and conduct missions as directed by the UN commander.

Q: Will this action require you to submit a report to Congress under the War Powers Act?

A: Whether a report under the War Powers Act is required will be determined prior to the time of deployment.

However, the deployment would not appear to enter U.S. troops into "imminent involvement in hostilities."
[FYI: If combat-equipped forces are introduced, a report would be required.]

□

Canada: Kim Campbell Elected Head of Conservative Party

Q: What is our reaction to the election of Kim Campbell as head of the Conservative Party and new Prime Minister?

A: I look forward to continuing with Ms. Campbell the excellent relations I've enjoyed with Prime Minister

Mulroney.

Brian Mulroney remains Prime Minister until he meets with the Governor General and officially hands in his resignation. At that time, Kim Campbell will become the new Prime Minister.

□

Cuba

[Background: Cuba's official news agency carried a story today (June 15) citing a Cuban official expressing willingness to discuss compensation as part of broader talks on improving relations.]

Q: Any reaction to Cuba's apparent offer to discuss payment for expropriated American property?

A: The Cuban government has not approached us through official channels to discuss this subject.

However, the longstanding position of the U.S. government is that Americans are entitled to compensation for their expropriated properties and that such compensation should be paid unconditionally.

If the Cubans have a serious proposal in this regard, we would be interested in hearing it.

Q: What is your reaction to reports that Cuba will reduce the size of its military?

A: A reduction in Cuban military expenditures would be consistent with the end of Soviet subsidies and the deteriorating economic situation in Cuba.

We do not have details at this point on precisely what military cuts the Cubans may be contemplating.

Q: What would the Cubans have to do to get better relations with the U.S.?

I don't want to talk about conditions for better relations, as that would imply we are engaged in some kind of negotiations with Cuba.

We are not.

Our problems with the current Cuban regime are well known. That regime has a history of repressing human rights and dissent, it has consistently refused to relinquish its tight control on Cuba's society, political system and economy.

Across the world, other nations have become more open in response to the kinds of problems Cuba faces, we

think Cuba should do the same.

□

Q: Is yesterday's announcement a serious effort to improve Cuba's relations with the U.S.?

A: We want to see peaceful democratic change in Cuba, as we have seen around the world.

If the Cuban government wants better relations with the U.S., it should make that kind of change.

□

Haiti

Q: What is the status of the UN sanctions on Haiti? Do we expect a sanctions resolution soon?

A: We are consulting in New York on a resolution to impose sanctions on oil and arms exports to Haiti and to freeze official Haitian assets overseas.

We anticipate enactment of sanctions as early as this week.

Q: How do we view the Parliament's approval to allow Aristide to return to Haiti with conditions?

A: Acceptance of President Aristide's legitimacy is a necessary step toward ending Haiti's political crisis.

We urge the de facto regime and President Aristide and his supporters to accept UN envoy Caputo's invitation to negotiate the prompt return of democracy and President Aristide.

□

Haitians at Guantanamo: The Court Decision

Q: Why didn't you seek a stay of the order to bring in the Haitians?

A: In accordance with the recommendation of the Attorney General, I chose not to seek a stay of the order. I did this because I believed that the interests of all affected parties were best served by the decision not to seek a stay.

Q: Why didn't you act sooner to end the detention of these Haitians?

A: Even before this latest court decision, we had reduced the population at Guantanamo from almost 300 on January 21 to 158, as Haitians were admitted to the U.S. for required medical care and other compelling humanitarian reasons.

Q: But why did you wait to act on the entire group until you

were so ordered by a Court?

A: This has been a complicated and controversial issue and, under the circumstances that prevailed until the Court decision, I felt that the gradual provision of entry for humanitarian reasons was the reasonable approach. In view of yesterday's court decision, I determined that not seeking a stay was the appropriate action.

Q: Does this mean that this Court case is closed? Or will you appeal the ruling despite your not seeking a stay?

A: The Justice Department is studying the legal basis of the Court decision, which seems to suggest a wide range of constitutional rights for aliens outside the United States.

Q: But what is your position on the HIV exclusion?

A: As you know, this issue has already been the subject of debate and legislative action in the Congress, and the exclusion has been included in the NIH Authorization bill.

□

Q: Won't this impose a major burden on states and localities? Are you planning to compensate the states for the costs of health care for this population?

A: While we will be looking at this issue, I should note that the Department of Justice's Community Relations Service has developed a resettlement plan designed to minimize the burden on localities.

The plan, which has the cooperation of the Departments of State, Defense and other agencies, uses a wide range of voluntary agencies, community organizations and family members to ease the transition for new arrivals. The plan has been used successfully for more than 100 HIV-Haitians who have entered since late January.

Q: A Washington Post report suggests that, due to their mistrust of the military doctors on Guantanamo, some of the infected Haitians do not believe they are HIV-positive and will thus be more likely to infect others after arriving in the U.S. What are you doing about that?

A: The voluntary agencies involved in resettlement arrange for counselling of the Haitians. And as the Post story suggests, when the Haitians are retested and counselled in a therapeutic environment they are much more likely to accept the diagnosis and the counselling.

Q: When will the rest of the Haitians arrive?

A: Over the course of the next week.

□

Iran

Q: What is your view of Iran?

A: Iran's behavior on a number of important issues shows that it has chosen to remain outside the family of nations. It sponsors terrorism and assassination, it supports extremist violence in Egypt and elsewhere, it is engaged in an effort to subvert the Middle East peace process and it is seeking nuclear weapons.

We and our allies need to work together to contain the Iranian threat.

As you know, Secretary Christopher briefed the EC last week on this issue and our European allies have agreed to review their policies toward Iran.

Q: Are you prepared to allow the sale of civilian aircraft to Iran?

A: This is a difficult issue which combines a number of U.S. interests, including economic interests. It has been the subject of an intensive review in the Administration, and a decision has not yet been taken.

□

Iraq

Q: What is your reaction to the Kuwaiti claim that Iraq tried to assassinate former President Bush last month in Kuwait city?

A: I view this as a very serious matter. Iraqi sponsorship of terrorist operations in Kuwait is a clear violation of UN Security Council resolution 687. [Background: UNSCR 687 calls on Iraq, among other things, to end its sponsorship of terrorism.]

We are working closely with the Government of Kuwait to investigate these charges thoroughly and expeditiously. An FBI/Secret Service Team is in Kuwait at the moment, interrogating the suspects.

Until our investigation is completed, I am not going to speculate about its conclusions or the course of action I will decide upon.

Q: Are you softening the U.S. approach to Iraq?

A: No, we are toughening the U.S. approach. We insist that Iraq comply fully with all the UN resolutions. That applies to the Saddam Hussein regime and any successor regime.

We are also urging the UN to set up a commission to investigate Iraq's war crimes and crimes against humanity.

We have also increased our support for Iraq's opposition body, the Iraq National Congress, which Vice President Gore met with last month and which just held high-level meetings with our Saudi allies as well.

□

Middle East Peace Talks

Q: What comment do you have on the resumption of the Middle East peace talks?

A: We are pleased that all parties have returned to the bilateral negotiating table. We have urged the sides to engage substantively to achieve tangible, serious progress.

The United States is committed to the role of full partner in the negotiations. We can only be of assistance, however, when the parties to the talks are themselves directly engaged in narrowing the gaps between them.

□

Nuclear Testing

Q: Have you decided to resume nuclear testing while the United States attempts to negotiate a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB)?

A: I have made no decisions on this important issue. My administration has been conducting a thorough review of our non-proliferation goals and our nuclear deterrence needs.

I expect to receive recommendations and options very soon.

As you know, President Yeltsin and I agreed at Vancouver to the early commencement of negotiations on a CTB, and I look forward to beginning consultations with our allies and key states on this undertaking at an early date.

□

1993 Base Closure Recommendations

Q: What is your reaction to the recommendations on base closures and realignments?

A: Between now and the end of June, the Commission dealing

with this issue will hold hearings around the country, visit bases, and make an independent and open review of recommendations now on the list. By July 1, the Commission must submit its list to me of bases recommended for closing or realignment.

There are a number of criteria governing this process, including military importance of a particular base, return on investment, and the impact that closures or realignments might have on a local economy, environment, and infrastructure.

In line with the timeframe set forth for this process, I will provide my comments on specific proposed closings by July 15.

□

Homosexuals in the Military

Q: The Senate and House Armed Services Committees have recently completed their hearings on the issue of lifting the ban on homosexuals in the military. Do you view the "don't ask/don't tell" formula or other formulations short of an outright lifting of the ban as viable options?

A: I remain committed to ensuring that Americans who want to serve their country should be able to do so unless their conduct disqualifies them from doing so. People should not be disqualified merely on the basis of status.

□

Alien Smuggling

Q: Any comment on reports about a new Administration plan to deal with alien smuggling?

A: This is a problem that we have inherited and which grew significantly during the last Administration.

The smuggling operations, coordinated by criminal syndicates, are a despicable trade in human misery.

The conditions under which these persons are brought to the United States run the gamut from deplorable to life threatening, and many of those who make it to the U.S. are consigned to years of indentured servitude.

The White House -- with both Domestic Policy Council and National Security Council involvement -- is coordinating a vigorous interagency effort to develop a range of effective responses to deal this shameful practice.

Within the next day or so, we will provide a more detailed description of our efforts on this issue. But for now, I can say that we are and will be:

increasing our surveillance of suspect vessels

overseas and along our coasts;

working with foreign governments to monitor and discourage the refitting and use of freighters and fishing trawlers for these smuggling endeavors;

undertaking diplomatic efforts with flag states to preclude vessels registered with them from engaging in this trade in human misery;

encouraging flag states to assume responsibility for the safety, well-being, and the processing illegal migrants on flag vessels intercepted in international waters.

And to communicate the message that a smuggling ship is not the way to come to the U.S., we will detain aliens who enter the U.S. pursuant to these smuggling operations unless they have credible claims to political asylum.

We will also be examining administrative and legislative changes that would provide for more effective and expeditious processing at ports of entry.

□

We will do so, however, without sacrificing the principle of ensuring protection for bonafide political refugees who enter the United States.

□

U.S.-Japan Economic Framework

Q: Doesn't your policy amount to managed trade?

A: No. We favor free trade and open markets governed by rules of fair play.

We would much prefer a regime of rules. But years of experience tell us that merely setting forth rules of fair play does not overcome Japan's more entrenched barriers to imports and foreign investment.

We do not intend to carve out special benefits for the U.S. alone.

Q: How is your policy different from past U.S.-Japan negotiations, like SII or the MOSS talks?

A: For the first time in 12 years, we are putting our economic house in order.

I have put an unprecedented emphasis on the economic part of this relationship.

This approach relates macroeconomic, structural and sectoral policies in a more sophisticated manner.

We intend to use multiple benchmarks to measure progress. We intend to press Japan to accept agreements containing benchmarks that will help us measure progress.

We are taking advantage of the strength of American companies.

Q: Does the commitment to keep your markets open mean you would forswear unilateral measures, like Section 301 or Super 301?

A: Let's remember that these approaches exist only because we have had such market access problems in the past.

The purpose of this Framework is to make sufficient progress towards opening Japan's market that unilateral trade actions would not be necessary.

□

NAFTA

Q: Isn't NAFTA in deep trouble on the Hill? Aren't the side agreements you are proposing too weak to satisfy Congress?

A: My position on NAFTA is unchanged. I firmly believe that a NAFTA agreement, coupled with strong and effective supplemental agreements, can be an important component of a stronger and more competitive U.S. economy. A good agreement must include tough enforcement provisions with real teeth.

I am committed to negotiating accords that provide assurances that environmental and labor standards are upheld.

I believe Congress wants the same things from a NAFTA that I do. If we succeed in putting together a strong NAFTA package, I am confident it will win support in Congress.

You can see the potential of the NAFTA by looking at what we've already gained. Since Mexico began to liberalize its economy in 1986, we've gone from a \$6 billion trade deficit with Mexico to a \$5-plus billion trade surplus. That improvement in the U.S. trade balance has created over a quarter of a million new American jobs. The NAFTA can help lock in that change.

Many people may not know that Mexico already is a critical market for U.S. goods. In 1992, Mexico passed Japan as the second largest market for U.S. exports of manufactured goods. Moreover, Mexico has just begun to realize its economic potential.

□

Uruguay Round

Q: When do expect to start serious negotiations to complete the Uruguay Round? Hasn't the Round taken a back seat to NAFTA?

A: The completion of a good Uruguay Round agreement remains a high priority of this Administration. A successful conclusion of the Round is essential to strengthen the world trading system and promote global growth. One-third of the world's trade is not currently covered by GATT, including services. For example, U.S. industries lose up to \$60 billion each year due to inadequate intellectual property rights protection. A successful Uruguay Round would help remedy these problems.

That is why I announced on April 9 my intention to seek a short renewal of fast-track authority to complete these talks by December 15. I urge Congress to approve a clean extension of fast-track authority as soon as possible so that none of our trading partners have any excuse to delay serious negotiations. We are consulting with Congress as to the best way to do this.

At the upcoming G-7 Summit in Tokyo, we look forward to making significant progress with our major trading partners so that we can complete a successful Round.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

19-Jul-1993 21:40 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Paul Clarke (CLARKEP)
Paul Clarke (CLARKE AT A1 AT WHSR)

FROM: Eric P. Schwartz
(SCHWARTZ)

SUBJECT: Talkers: immigration

Immigration

Background:

Immigration has been a long-term challenge, but several specific issues have brought it to the forefront: HIV-positive Haitians at Guantanamo, the World Trade Center bombing and the effort to deport Sheik Omar Abdel-Rahman, Chinese alien smuggling and the general issues of the economy and jobs.

Over the past week, there has been a great deal of media interest in the Chinese alien smuggling issue, as the Coast Guard interdicted three vessels with some 660 migrants off the west coast of Northern Mexico. After protracted and sometimes difficult discussions, the Mexicans agreed to permit the aliens to land in Mexico and to be transferred directly to waiting planes for repatriation to China.

The migrants were transferred to Mexican custody after we had interviewed them on board their ships to determine whether any might be eligible for protection as refugees. In an operation involving the cooperation of the UNHCR, we determined that one of the migrants was deserving of protection (and could come into the United States) and transferred all of the others to Mexican custody. They have now departed Mexico for China.

Talking Points: Immigration

- We are proud of the fact that we are a nation of immigrants and a haven for refugees and our policies need to be consistent with that fact.
- However, illegal immigrants take advantage of our generosity and their actions are unfair to other intending immigrants who play by the rules.
- My Administration is taking a number of actions to deal with this problem, such as 1) proposing legislation to expedite exclusion at airports and other ports of entry so that those who arrive without proper documentation and do not deserve our protection as genuine refugees can be promptly returned; 2) tightening up our visa issuance procedures overseas, in

part by upgrading technology so that our consulates can better share information on who should be denied visas; and 3) providing our law enforcement agencies, including the border patrol, with state of the art technology and equipment.

Talking Points: Chinese alien smuggling

- This is a shameful practice in which criminal syndicate smuggling operations have cynically exploited Chinese migrants.
 - The Alien Smuggling Plan of Action I announced last month attacks the problem in several ways, all designed to send a strong message of deterrence to smuggling syndicates wherever they might exist.
-
- First, we will be proposing legislation that would provide for enhanced penalties for alien smuggling.
 - In addition, our efforts include 1) urging governments in Asia to crack down on these smuggling operations, 2) encouraging more rigorous enforcement actions by states whose flags these smuggling ships fly; 3) augmenting our own efforts to identify and track these vessels in port and in transit; 4) interdicting these vessels and diverting them to flag states or other third countries for processing and repatriation; and 5) with respect to those vessels that enter U.S. waters, detaining the migrants who do not have credible claims to asylum pending disposition of their claims, and seeking prosecution of the organizers of these smuggling operations.
 - And while the large majority of those who are transported on these ships appear to be economic migrants who have little reason to fear return, we have nonetheless sought to provide procedures to ensure that any genuine refugees are not repatriated to their country of origin.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

18-Nov-1993 14:58 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Kristie A. Kenney

(KENNEY)

FROM:

Brenda I. Hilliard
(HILLIARD)

SUBJECT:

Central American Luncheon

Per our earlier conversation, attached is a note from Rossin/Fienberg regarding the possibility/preference for moving subject luncheon. As stated, they would like an answer today one way or the other -- to start inviting.

I just did a little ground work with Collier (Scheduling). December 1 is "World AIDS Day" and they are not sure yet what the President will be doing. However the Tree will be dedicated that day (either in the Old Family Dining Room, East Room, etc. December 2 is the regularly scheduled lunch with the VP and decorating begins as soon as the regularly scheduled tours end. From then on the State Floor is closed to events.

I asked Collier about the following week, but she said they didn't have things scheduled that far ahead.

WHAT ARE WE TO DO????? THANKS.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

18-Nov-1993 13:29 EDT

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Brenda I. Hilliard

(HILLIARD)

FROM: Lawrence G. Rossin
(ROSSIN)

SUBJECT: Central America event date

CC: Records (RECORDS)
CC: Richard E. Feinberg (FEINBERG)
CC: Nancy Soderberg (SODERBERG)

-- November 30 is a particularly unfortunate date for this event because it lands it smack dab in the middle of the annual Miami Conference on the Caribbean (which at least five of the seven leaders are attending) and will severely disrupt that event.

-- In particular, a number of southern state governors have arranged to host on November 30 the first of what they want to become an annual "summit lunch" with the Central American and Caribbean leaders on the Miami Conference margin. We would have to try to get that rescheduled to another day or else be seen as torpedoing this new regional initiative. Risks resentment of the White House and President among his until-recently gubernatorial colleagues.

-- December 1 would be an improvement because it avoids the conflict with the Southern governor's event and because that is the winding down day for the Conference in any case, so it would not disrupt the Conference significantly.

-- As we noted before, however, our ideal would be to have the event later in the second week of December, even if that means Blair House. There also is an issue of seemliness in the President inviting fellow heads of state/government with less than 2 weeks notice.

-- However, if neither of these alternatives is possible we much prefer November 30 to nothing.

-- Given the short lead time for invitations we need to know today. Thanks for your help.