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Committee for National Security Meeting, 06/29/98

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Agenda for the Meeting of the
NSTC COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

June 29, 1998
3:00 - 4:30 PM
Pentagon, Room 3D1019

I. INTRODUCTION

II. STATUS OF CURRENT EFFORTS

- Critical Infrastructure Protection R&D Interagency Working Group
- Nonproliferation and Arms Control Technical Working Group

III. OTHER BUSINESS

- Weapons of Mass Destruction R&D Update
- FY00 R&D Budget Priorities

IV. CLOSING REMARKS

NSTC COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

Minutes -- Meeting of March 31, 1998

The Committee on National Security (CNS) held its sixteenth meeting on March 31, 1998. The principals who attended are listed at Attachment 1. The primary purpose of the meeting was twofold: (1) to discuss the work plan for the new Critical Infrastructure Protection R&D Interagency Working Group and (2) to consider the approach taken by the International Technology Transfer Issues and Policy Interagency Working Group to perform the selected case studies. The meeting agenda is shown at Attachment 2.

I. INTRODUCTION

Dr. Kerri-Ann Jones opened the meeting.

II. CURRENT EFFORTS

A. Critical Infrastructure Protection

Dr. Jones introduced the subject and pointed out that although the Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) on critical infrastructure protection had not yet been signed, the Critical Infrastructure Protection R&D Interagency Working Group (CIP IWG) held its first meeting on 25 March 1998. She introduced Dr. Steve Rinaldi of the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), who presented the work plan for the group.

Dr. Rinaldi indicated that the group had four major actions to accomplish in the next 6 months, or more precisely, within 180 days after the PDD is signed, in order to complete an R&D agenda and forward it, as part of a national critical infrastructure protection program, to the President through the principals.

- *Identify current R&D programs.* The goal is to accomplish this task in one month. The IWG will build on an ongoing Department of Justice study on counterterrorism activities and an OMB survey, completed in January, of existing agency infrastructure protection R&D.

- *Identify R&D needs and gaps.* This task should be accomplished within two months. One of the CNS principals asked whether the IWG included system integration in R&D, or whether it limited itself to more traditional R&D. Dr. Rinaldi responded that the IWG is avoiding the traditional stovepipe look at R&D and is including system integration. He described infrastructure as a collection of manmade systems and processes that work on the creation and distribution of goods. A *critical infrastructure* was defined by the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP) as an infrastructure whose destruction or incapacitation would produce grave national and economic security consequences. The commission identified eight infrastructures that met this criterion, including electricity, oil and natural gas production and storage, transportation, banking and finance. The IWG will take a broad look at the infrastructures identified by the PCCIP, and its R&D agenda will consider private sector and academic R&D.

- *Develop an R&D agenda for submission to the President.* As called for in the PDD, the report to the President will include a critical infrastructure protection R&D agenda that will require interagency coordination. The draft report should be completed within four months.
- *Track budgets.* The IWG will work with OMB and the agencies to identify and track RDT&E funding levels for critical infrastructure protection. The IWG will act as a clearinghouse and build on similar efforts by DOJ, OMB and others.

Dr. Jones asked that each principal ensure that his or her representatives participate in the IWG .

B. International Technology Transfer

Dr. Jones reminded the committee that it tasked the International Technology Transfer Issues and Policy IWG to examine case studies with international technology transfer issues at the December CNS meeting. The IWG developed ten candidate cases, each with its own sensitivities, so the committee principals were asked to vote for their preferred cases. There were two clear winners: Federal Laboratory International Technology Transfer Policies and Civil Communications Satellites. The IWG will examine these two cases in its study.

Dr. Jones introduced Dr. Gerald Hane, who discussed the current activities of the group. He identified the ten candidate cases that the IWG considered and highlighted the two cases the principals selected. The IWG is focusing on the processes used to manage national security and economic security in international technology transfer in each case, and it will not revisit the decisions that have been made. In the Federal Laboratory International Technology Transfer Policies case, the IWG is focusing on practices that worked well and lessons learned (e.g., a best-practices approach). Currently, the IWG only has preliminary data. Next week agency experts will present briefings on the strengths and commonalities of technology transfer processes in the Federal Laboratory case.

In the Civil Communications Satellites case, the IWG will look at the process that led to the Presidential decision in March 1996. The National Security Council had the lead in negotiating the issues to transfer jurisdiction over civil satellite exports from the Department of State to the Department of Commerce. The process for implementing the policy was also instructive. The Department of Commerce is leading the effort to develop a draft outline of the case. The draft should be out next week for agency review.

Mr. Reinsch proposed that the IWG consider the remaining cases on the list when it finishes the two initial cases, pointing out that the purpose of the study is to examine how technology transfers have been accomplished in the past so that a better process can be established for future decisions. The principals agreed that the group would complete the two preferred cases before a decision is made on future case studies.

Dr. Jones briefed the principals on two ongoing congressional activities related to technology transfer:

- Senators Joseph Lieberman and Jay Rockefeller sent a letter to Vice President Gore, Dr. John Gibbons, and Mr. Gene Sperling (Attachment 3) expressing concern with management of international technology transfer, in particular the DOE lithography CRADA. The Senators asked OSTP to conduct a review of these issues with involved agencies. The draft reply, currently being coordinated, indicates that the CNS

International Technology Transfer Issues and Policy IWG is examining these issues. A copy of the final reply, expected by the end of the week, will be provided to each principal.

- On 26 March, in the hearings on the Technology Transfer Commercialization Act in the Technology Subcommittee of the House Committee on Science, Representative Tauscher indicated that she planned to add an amendment to the bill tasking the OSTP to conduct a review of the CRADA review process. The text of that amendment had not been released at the time of the CNS meeting.

III. OTHER BUSINESS

A. FY00 R&D Budget Priorities

Dr. Jones pointed out that each year the heads of OMB and OSTP release a joint memorandum discussing the science and technology (S&T) priorities for the upcoming budget cycle. This year's memorandum will provide specific guidance and OMB will likely check to ensure that agencies have followed the guidance during its agency budget reviews. This year, there will be two categories of guidance. The first category will be for formal budget crosscuts on specific topics. OMB has proposed criteria for the crosscut process (Attachment 4) that will require more work than in the past. Dr. Jones had considered including critical infrastructure protection in the joint memorandum for the crosscut, but in view of the OMB criteria, she felt that it would be premature to include it as a crosscut at this time. Since these criteria are not yet firm, she asked for the committee's comments on the criteria and whether the critical infrastructure working group was mature enough to handle the task. There was general agreement that the proposed criteria would impose a heavy burden on affected departments and agencies and that critical infrastructure should not be on the list of formal crosscuts.

The second category is for special emphasis programs. For topics in this category, departments and agencies would be asked how much is being spent in each area. Dr. Jones proposed placing critical infrastructure in this category. This would give the working group time to get some work done. There was general agreement with her proposal.

B. Humanitarian Demining R&D

Dr. Jones proposed that CNS establish an Ad Hoc Interagency Working Group on Research and Development for Humanitarian Demining to develop a strategic agenda or strategy document on humanitarian demining R&D. The draft terms of reference for the working group describe the steps necessary to develop a strategy document. There is an existing interagency working group chaired by the Department of State that focuses on demining operations and this working group has an R&D subgroup. In view of the increased national and international interest in demining R&D, it would be worthwhile having a group develop a simple document describing ongoing demining R&D activities. Dr. Gansler noted that essentially all of the R&D is being done by DoD. In his view, the problem lies in the business aspect of demining, not the R&D itself. Items are developed, but none are purchased for humanitarian demining. He had Dr. Foster chair a Defense Science Board Task Force to examine this issue. The Task Force concluded that the problem is not technology limited, but resource limited. He believes there are great ideas being developed, but they are not being funded as a business. Dr. Jones recognized that demining R&D is largely a single agency program, but that a short-term ad hoc group might provide useful visibility to the R&D program. Dr. Gansler noted that Ms. Sheri

Goodman has the responsibility in DoD of integrating concepts for mine clearing from the DOE laboratories and other agencies. It was agreed that Dr. Jones would call a meeting at OSTP with Ms. Goodman and other interested parties to examine strategy and agendas, discuss DoD activities, and explore needs.

IV. CLOSING REMARKS

Dr. Jones adjourned the meeting.

 JUN 11 1998

Dr. Jacques Gansler, Chair (date)

 6/8/98.

Dr. Kerri-Ann Jones, Co-Chair (date)

Attachments:

1. List of Principals attending
2. Meeting agenda
3. Letter from Senators Lieberman and Rockefeller
4. OMB Crosscuts

**Principals Attending Meeting of Committee for National Security
March 31, 1998**

Dr. Jacques Gansler, Chair	Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology
Dr. Kerri-Ann Jones, Co-Chair	Associate Director, National Security and International Affairs, Office of Science & Technology Policy
Mr. William Reinsch	Under Secretary of Commerce for Export Administration
Dr. Ruth David	Deputy Director, Science and Technology, CIA
Ambassador Ralph Earle II	Deputy Director, Arms Control & Disarmament Agency
Mr. James Devine	Senior Advisor for Science Applications, U.S. Geological Survey, Department of the Interior
Mr. John R. Dailey	Acting Deputy Administrator National Aeronautics and Space Administration

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United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

February 25, 1998

The Honorable Albert Gore, Jr.
Vice President of the United States
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500

The Honorable John H. Gibbons
Director
Office of Science and Technology Policy
Old Executive Office Building
Washington, DC 20500

The Honorable Gene Sperling
National Economic Council
Old Executive Office Building
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. Vice President, Mr. Gibbons, and Mr. Sperling:

We are writing to bring your attention to serious procedural problems we have observed in the development and implementation of Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADA's) involving foreign firms and strategic U.S. industries. The issues reviewed here would also apply to other forms of research contracts established between private corporations and governmental agencies, including the Commerce Department, the Defense Department, the Energy Department, NASA, and the National Institute of Health. We are asking you to consider reforms to that process. We are, as you know, very strong advocates of the advantages to both the government and commercial sector of technology partnerships and emphasize that reforms adopted should not unduly delay the partnership process or make it overly cumbersome.

In March 1997, the Department of Energy (DoE) agreed to a CRADA for development of advanced lithography technology used to etch semiconductor chips. There was no public announcement of the lithography CRADA until September 1997. Terms of the CRADA left open the possibility that commercially and potentially defense critical technologies could be transferred to one or more foreign companies. In many cases, this technology was developed at U.S. taxpayer expense under earlier government research programs. For these reasons, the DoE lithography CRADA has generated a significant amount of controversy. Leaving aside specific technology transfer issues presented by the DoE CRADA, this matter has brought forward a number of procedural problems we have summarized below:

1) Review by Defense and Export Control Agencies. There was no interagency review process followed or in place for consultation with affected defense, intelligence, and export control

agencies. In this case, there was no notice to or discussion with the Defense Department or affected intelligence agencies during the formulation and negotiation phase even though information concerning at least two apparently sensitive defense technologies could be transferred as a result of the CRADA to a foreign firm. Furthermore, there was no notice to or consultation with the Commerce Department's Export Administration even though advanced lithography machines and some of their component parts appear in international agreements regulating dissemination of defense technology.

2) Review by the White House, OSTP, and Other Key Agencies, Such as Commerce's Technology Administration and USTR. This case illustrates there is no process for notice or review by the above cited agencies concerning the overall merits, including competitive implications and appropriate quid pro quo's, of a significant technology transfer of taxpayer funded research to a foreign firm due to a CRADA's implementation, from an economic benefits or policy perspective. Furthermore, there was no process for analysis of possible adverse effects of this transfer to foreign firms on competing U.S. firms in the semiconductor industry as well as their suppliers. The latter argued that they could be seriously damaged if such a transfer were to occur, and that they were being excluded from benefiting from technology developed by the U.S. taxpayer that potentially could be provided to foreign competitors at little or no cost recovery to the U.S.

3) Reciprocal R&D Access. In the case of participation of any industrial organization or person subject to the control of a foreign company or government, CRADA law requires that the laboratory director "take into consideration whether or not such foreign government permits United States agencies, organizations, or other persons to enter into cooperative research and development agreements and licensing agreements." Despite this statutory requirement, there was no notice in this CRADA to, or discussion with, US trade or technology agencies concerning reciprocal R&D access issues.

4) Intellectual Property and Patent Rights. There is no review process in place for a review of proposed CRADA's by agencies with affected interests and use rights in affected intellectual property. For example, the Defense Department apparently holds a number of patents on the public's behalf on technologies that may be transferred to a foreign firm by the DoE CRADA. Yet no consultation apparently was held concerning either the effect of sharing these patents or compensation for the publically-held patent rights, or U.S. access to flow-back technology developed from intellectual property rights given to foreign firms.

We are informed that a number of other transfers of taxpayer-financed technology to foreign firms are now under consideration in the private sector and that the precedents being set by the DoE CRADA are being assumed to be Administration policy. In addition, some foreign governments apparently view this CRADA as the benchmark CRADA which could grant them access to U.S. National Labs and to other federally funded R&D programs, such as PNGV, ASCI, NSF ERC's, and DARPA.

Letter of February 25, 1998, Page Three

In previous Administrations, implementation of the 1986 and 1989 technology transfer legislation included an institutionalized interagency review process for policy coordination and oversight. Large scale "strategic" CRADA's (those affecting significant industrial infrastructure, multiple industrial sectors, or impeding or granting potential unfair competitive advantage), that included foreign firm access or participation, were subjected to interagency review. Such review was initiated by the sponsoring agency with fiduciary oversight. The Commerce Secretary's Interagency Committee on Federal Technology Transfer, the Vice President's Competitiveness Council, and the Economic Policy Council were the designated interagency policy review vehicles for addressing these matters.

While past Administrations have had a review process for CRADA's involving significant transfers to foreign firms of intellectual property paid for by the taxpayers, no such procedures are now in place. We strongly recommend that the Administration, acting either through your agencies or through another appropriate entity, develop such a process. We are concerned that unless you act to develop responsible procedures, there could be legislation that could seriously damage the CRADA process, which we continue to regard as a critical tool for government-industry technology advances.


We recommend that the Office of Science and Technology Policy, with the Commerce Department, play a leadership role whereby involved agencies with a policy role affected by a CRADA are informed and consulted about its terms. Such a review should assure the evaluation of defense technology transfers, of compliance with defense export requirements, of publicly-held patent rights, and of effects on U.S. firms, the U.S. technology base, and overall U.S. competitiveness. Obviously, the review requirements should not be limited to CRADA's but also include the other forms of research and development agreements between government and industry, where there are foreign transfers of significant or strategic technologies. We are very sympathetic, as noted above, to concerns that the CRADA or other technology transfer processes not be unduly delayed or made cumbersome. Accordingly, whatever procedures are adopted should be expeditious, straightforward, flexible, and appropriate to the overall interests at stake.

We look forward to a prompt reply on how you plan to address this important policy issue with its long term implications for our national competitiveness and defense interests. Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,



Senator Joseph Lieberman
Ranking Member
Acquisition and Technology Subcommittee
Senate Armed Services Committee



Senator Jay Rockefeller
Ranking Member
Science, Technology and Space
Subcommittee
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science
and Transportation

Crosscuts

While most of these programs are ongoing, in the preparation of the FY 2000 budget we are promoting more uniform management and accounting to enhance the benefits of interagency coordination. Specifically, each interagency program must include the following:

1. Concise, GPRA-compliant program goals and performance measures, finalized no later than September 1998.
2. A program implementation plan outlining specific agency activities and budgets, and the linkages between them. Agency activities should be tied clearly to overall program goals and performance measures. Implementation plans should be finalized no later than September 1998.
3. Interagency implementation plans should include a certification that all agencies involved in the crosscut have reviewed each other's projects, and that these projects directly contribute to the goals and objectives of the crosscut.
4. September 1998, budget hearing with OSTP and OMB staff.
5. Supplement to the President's budget, to be released to the public no later than mid-April.



Nonproliferation and Arms Control Technology Working Group

A 3 Year Perspective on R&D Coordination

Committee on National Security

29 June 1998



NPAC TWG - 3 Year Perspective


- Organizing principles
- Current state of NPAC R&D coordination
- Lessons learned
- Opportunities for improvement
- Current issues




Organizing Principles

- Promote information sharing and cooperation
- Enhance effectiveness of overall "program"
- Eschew proliferation of working groups
- Develop informal budget crosscuts
- Frame issues and differences for adjudication

3



Reporting Chain




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State of Play in NPAC R&D

- Funding flat or slightly up for most focus groups FY96-98
- Funding drops in 3 groups
 - Active Electro-Optics - 35%
 - Unattended Remote Sensors - 13%
 - Underground Facilities Detection - 61%
- Shortfalls in basic science across the board
- No new money, many new mandates

5



Defining the Federal Investment

- TWG coordinates ~\$616M (282 programs)
- Radius database indicates \$6.1 Billion
- "Solving" the Radius problem entails
 - Large analytical effort
 - Single year solutions => moving target
 - High cost for marginal gain
- High confidence in TWG's bottom-up reporting
- Trends more instructive than static numbers

6



Lessons Learned

- NPAC TWG approach is highly effective for
 - increasing communication, sharing knowledge
 - identifying and addressing gaps and overlaps
 - creating leveraging/synergy opportunities
 - providing organizing framework for tech issues
- Agency mandates and priorities do not always correlate across government
- Technical organizations ill-suited to identify priorities and adjudicate differences
- Can't fill gaps without separate authority or funding

7



Opportunities for Improvement

- Better engage operators/users, tech developers, and policy makers
- Reduce barriers to coordination:
 - minimize compartmentalization
 - electronic information sharing, databasing
 - go outside the National Security mainstream
- Incentivize long range planning and needs generation
- Clarify national policy directions and priorities
- Provide policy community with clear picture of the possible


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Current Issues: SIPRNET

- TWG collaboration would benefit from secure internetted information medium
- Database sharing, file transfers, document clearance/coordination, "chat rooms"
- SIPRNET secure up to SECRET, expandable, acceptable entry cost
\$7k + \$21k/year (128kb line)
- Only 3 focus group chairs have or use SIPRNET

9



Current Issues: Unattended Sensors

- National leadership, centralized functions:
 - Collect, document and respond to national requirements
 - Technology roadmap to focus resources
 - Standards/guidelines for hardware, software and communications compatibility
 - Delivery systems
- Designated executive function - CMO?
 - Fits CMO charter
 - Resource problems


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Current Issues: Hazard Prediction Models

- Plume models for NBC
 - Accident prediction/emergency response
 - Consequence analysis
 - Military mission planning
- Users - DoD, DOE, FBI, CIA, FEMA, NOAA
- DoD focus on O&M, V&V - spinoff to others
- R&D gaps
 - High confidence for civilian applications
 - Field portable
 - Critical decision (attrition vs. evacuation)

11



Current Issues: Technology Transition

- User/Developer gap:
 - Achieving sufficient maturity for user adoption
 - Tolerating enough risk for real innovation
 - Cross-cutting needs not in any one stovepipe
- Models: "Facilitator," CT TSWG, CPRC/CPSP
 - Short "product cycles"
 - Dedicated funding lines at modest levels
 - Rapid operationalizing - the 70% solution
- Technology Needs Subcommittee
 - Impacts on the margins
 - June URS users meeting

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1/
CNS Meeting - 29 June 95

- Pinfield's brief, 1 Del reports to CNS member

- Gerald's briefing

-- Paper we can proceed as RST suggested (BR.)

-- Can CNS be the forum to evaluate major CRADA's

-- Civil satellites

--- DOD, DDC, DCS get together + talk off line

--- May want to postpone the issue

--- R - agrees to hold this (postpone). Ideas idea of the 3 agencies talking. DDC volunteered to do initial drafting of several. I've talked out 5 other cases. Should be done in 2-3 weeks. Proposed sending the other 5 around. Hopes others

will put in time + effort on the others

* --- ^{will} go ^{back} out to the principals

SEMATECH, copied of M-109, rocket casing } other 5
high perf. computers, export licensing } topics
Off duty night vision, hot section (same issues as
satellites), ~~partnership~~ for PNOV.

- NPAC/TW6

-- Radar database - they're abandoning this because of difficulty of use + lower marginal data gain.

... KAT - how widely distributed in the agencies are the reports of the NPAC TUX? If info were probably not integrating

- PDD-62 (WMD preparedness + protection)

-- OSTP has had to coordinate R+D. Lot of work already, not recreate the wheel. Setting up 3 teams.

- R+D budget priorities memo. CTR is on the emphasis area list, not

Crossed



***CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION:
DEVELOPING THE
FEDERAL R&D AGENDA***

Dr. Steven M. Rinaldi
Office of Science and Technology Policy

June 29, 1998



THE PRESIDENT'S GUIDANCE

R&D TASKING:

“Research and Development: Federally-sponsored research and development in support of infrastructure protection shall be coordinated, be subject to multi-year planning, take into account private sector research, and be adequately funded to minimize our vulnerabilities on a rapid but achievable timetable.”

ORGANIZATIONAL GUIDANCE:

“OSTP shall be responsible for coordinating research and development agendas and programs for the government through the National Science and Technology Council.”



*Critical Infrastructure Protection R&D
Interagency Working Group*

IWG UP AND RUNNING

- **Interagency Working Group established in March**
- **Goals:**
 - **Develop and coordinate the federal government's critical infrastructure protection R&D agenda before end of year**
 - **Reach out to industry, academia, and international partners**
- **PDD-63 deadline - deliver plan to the President by mid-November**



*Critical Infrastructure Protection R&D
Interagency Working Group*

WORK PLAN

- | | |
|--------------|---|
| 6/11 | Submission of agency current activity summary papers |
| 7/15 | Vulnerabilities papers |
| 7/15 | Conceptual, comprehensive agenda |
| 7/23 | Plan for Critical Infrastructure Coordination Group
(Clarke) |
| 7/30 | Gaps and shortfalls paper |
| 7/30 | Criteria for evaluating proposed R&D programs |
| 8/15 | R&D focus areas and budgets |
| 8/15 | Outreach paper (private sector, academia, tech transfer) |
| 9/18 | First draft, R&D agenda and plan |
| 10/18 | Final version, R&D agenda and plan |
| 11/18 | Final R&D agenda and plan to President |



*Critical Infrastructure Protection R&D
Interagency Working Group*

ACTIVITIES ARE WELL UNDERWAY

- **Identifying ongoing agency programs and budgets**
 - **Agencies have completed the initial look**
 - **Working group is examining the agency inputs**
- **Summarizing infrastructure vulnerabilities, drawing upon analyses in other studies (e.g., PCCIP report, Argonne National Laboratory, Department of Transportation)**
- **Will develop near/long term budget recommendations and plan**
- **Draft Terms of Reference are undergoing final review**



*Critical Infrastructure Protection R&D
Interagency Working Group*

CIAO ROADMAPPING STUDY

- **Involved government, private sector, academia, and national labs; coordinated by Argonne National Laboratory**
- **Focused on perceived technology gaps between infrastructure protection needs and available technologies**
- **Recommended R&D programs to address the gaps**
- **Study is under final review**



*Critical Infrastructure Protection R&D
Interagency Working Group*

LINK TO USG ORGANIZATION

- **PDD-63 establishes Critical Infrastructure Coordination Group (CICG) to ensure interagency coordination**
 - **Chaired by National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-Terrorism**
 - **Agency representatives -- Assistant Secretary level or higher**
- **CICG met for the first time on June 11**
 - **Tasked CIP R&D IWG to develop its work plan by July 23**
 - **Draft plan has been completed and is undergoing internal review**



*Critical Infrastructure Protection R&D
Interagency Working Group*

OUTREACH - PARTNERSHIP

White Paper on PDD-63: "...the elimination of our potential vulnerability requires a closely coordinated effort of both the public and the private sector. To succeed, this partnership must be genuine, mutual and cooperative."

- **OSTP and other agencies recognized early on the importance of partnerships with industry and academia and are committed to fostering them**
- **IWG has established an outreach subgroup chaired by Commerce**
- **Initial contacts with industry:**
 - **Close contact with NSTAC and its member companies**
 - **Participation in symposia: Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association, National Defense Industrial Association**



*Critical Infrastructure Protection R&D
Interagency Working Group*

SUMMARY

- **IWG established to develop and coordinate federal government's critical infrastructure protection R&D agenda**
- **IWG activities well underway**
- **Partnership with the private sector, academia, and international partners is key to success**




*Critical Infrastructure Protection R&D
Interagency Working Group*

BACKUP MATERIAL



Critical Infrastructure Protection R&D Interagency Working Group

INTERAGENCY COORDINATION IS KEY





*Critical Infrastructure Protection R&D
Interagency Working Group*

SHARING THE LOAD

SUBGROUPS

- Banking and Finance
- Information and Comm
- Transportation
- Energy
- Vital Human Services
- Budget
- Outreach
- Interdependencies

AGENCIES

Treasury (lead), DOJ, DOS, DOC, FED

DOC (lead), DOD, DOJ, NSF

DOT (lead), NASA, DOE

DOE (lead), DOI

HHS (lead), EPA, FEMA, NIH, PHS,
DOI, DOE

OMB (lead), DOD

DOC (lead), NSF, DOS, ACDA, DOD
DOT, DOE

OSTP (lead), DOD, DOC, Treasury,
DOT, DOE, HHS, OMB



*Critical Infrastructure Protection R&D
Interagency Working Group*

20 PLAYERS

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Central Intelligence Agency
Department of Commerce
Department of Defense
Department of Energy
Department of Health and Human Services
Department of the Interior
Department of State
Department of Transportation
Department of the Treasury
Environmental Protection Agency
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Federal Emergency Management Agency
National Aeronautics and Space Agency
National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health
National Security Agency
National Security Council
National Science Foundation
Office of Management and Budget
Office of Science and Technology Policy

Full Daird - can send out Docs