

SALT, 1977

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
memo	HJ to JC (3 pp.)	4/20/77	C
corresp.	Melvin Price, Charles Bennett, Bob Wilson, Charles Wilson, C. William Whitehurst, Clement J. Zablocki, William Broomfield, Paul Findley, Jack Edwards to JC <i>Open 5/30/90</i>	11/2/77	A
memo	Rick Hutcheson to ZB (5 pp.)	9/23/77	A
memo	Paul Warnke to Cyrus Vance (4 pp.)	11/26/77	A
memo	HJ to JC (2 pp.) 2 copies	10/3/77	A
memo	HJ, Frank Moore to M (18 pp.) 4 copies <i>Open 3/29/90</i>	11/17/77	A
memo	HJ, Frank Moore to JB (21 pp.) 2 copies <i>Open 3/29/90</i>	11/17/77	A
memo	Rick Inderfurth to HJ, Landon Butler (9 pp.)	10/13/77	A
memo	Rick Inderfurth to HJ, Landon Butler (2 pp.)	9/12/77	A
memo	Mark Stiegel to HJ	9/30/77	A
memo	Rick Inderfurth to HJ (3 pp.)	9/1/77	A
memo	Rick Inderfurth to HJ (2 pp.)	9/2/77	A

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Wednesday, March 9, 1977

Daily Digest

HIGHLIGHTS

Senate confirmed Warnke nominations.

House cleared 17 committee resolutions.

House committee ordered reported NASA and NSF authorization bills, fiscal year 1978.

Senate

Chamber Action

Routine Proceedings, pages S3727-S3845

Bills Introduced: 18 bills and 2 resolutions were introduced, as follows: S. 946-963; S.J. Res. 36; and S. Res. 108.

Pages S3789, S3811

Bills Reported: Reports were made as follows:

H.J. Res. 269, making urgent supplemental appropriations for fiscal year 1977 in the amount of \$200,000,000 for the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration (S. Rept. 95-40);

H.R. 3839, to rescind certain budget authority recommended in the message of the President of January 17, 1977, transmitted pursuant to the Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (S. Rept. 95-41);

S. 213, to provide for a GAO audit of the Internal Revenue Service and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, with amendments (S. Rept. 95-42);

S. 489, authorizing \$34.5 million for fiscal year 1977 for military assistance to Portugal, with an amendment (S. Rept. 95-43);

S. Res. 106, waiving section 402(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 with respect to the consideration of S. 427, authorizing funds for public works employment programs, and for employment of teenaged youth in community improvement projects (S. Rept. 95-44);

S. Res. 98, to print as a Senate document a history of the Committee on Finance (S. Rept. 95-45);

S. Res. 99, requesting an additional \$30,000 for expenses of Committee on Finance for this session of the Congress, with amendments (S. Rept. 95-46);

S. Res. 100, to print as a Senate document Governmental Affairs Committee print entitled "Study on Federal Regulation, Volume II, Congressional Oversight of Regulatory Agencies" (S. Rept. 95-47);

S. Res. 101, to print as a Senate document Governmental Affairs Committee print entitled "Study on Federal

Regulation, Volume I, The Regulatory Appointments Process" (S. Rept. 95-48);

S. Res. 108, waiving section 402(a) of the Congressional Budget Act with respect to the consideration of S. 489, authorizing \$34.5 million for fiscal year 1977 for military assistance to Portugal (without written report) (referred to Committee on the Budget).

Pages S3788-S3789

Bill Referred: H.R. 3477, tax reduction, was referred to Committee on Finance.

Page S3789

Message From the House:

Page S3788

Amendments Submitted for Printing:

Pages S3811-S3812

Notices of Committee Hearings:

Page S3812

Executive Communications:

Page S3788

Resolution Agreed To:

Budget Act Waiver—Public Works Employment: Senate agreed to S. Res. 106, waiving section 402(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 with respect to the consideration of S. 427, authorizing funds for public works employment programs, and for employment of teenaged youth in community improvement projects.

Pages S3783-S3787

Presidential Messages: Senate received messages from the President, as follows:

PM-47, outlining new youth employment programs which he intends to initiate when the Congress makes available requested \$1.5 billion for such purposes—referred to Committee on Human Resources;

PM-48, withdrawing a previously proposed rescission in budget authority, and reporting revisions to three deferrals in budget authority previously transmitted to the Congress—referred jointly to Committees on Appropriations and the Budget.

Pages S3787-S3788

Confirmation: By 58 yeas to 40 nays, Senate confirmed the nomination of Paul C. Warnke, of the District of Columbia, for the rank of Ambassador (for SALT ne-

negotiations); and, by 70 yeas to 28 nays, Mr. Warnke's nomination to be Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Pages 53729-53783, 53845

Nominations: Senate received the following nominations:

John J. Gilligan, of Ohio, to be Administrator of the Agency for International Development;

Peter F. Flaherty, of Pennsylvania, to be Deputy Attorney General;

Charles Linn Haslam, of North Carolina, to be General Counsel of the Department of Commerce;

Carol Tucker Foreman, of the District of Columbia, to be a Member of the Board of Directors of the Commodity Credit Corporation; and

One Marine Corps in the rank of General. Page 53845

Quorum Call: One quorum call was taken today.

Page 53768

Record Votes: Two record votes were taken today (total 42). Pages 53781, 53782-53783

Recess: Senate met at 10:30 a.m. and recessed at 6:19 p.m. until 9:45 a.m. on Thursday, March 10. (For program for Thursday, see last page of today's Record.)

Page 53845

Committee Meetings

(Committees not listed did not meet)

GRAIN STANDARDS AND FARM AND FOOD LEGISLATION

Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry: Committee ordered favorably reported an original bill to amend the recordkeeping requirements and fee provisions of the Grain Standards Act, and to provide for a temporary advisory committee to advise the Administrator of the Federal Grain Inspection Service with respect to the implementation of such act.

Also, committee continued hearings on proposed legislation to amend and extend the Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973, receiving testimony from Jeff Kirsch, Food Research and Action Center, Washington, D.C.; Wilma Ferguson, Arkansas Nutrition Council, Little Rock, Ark.; Christine Van Lenten, National Child Nutrition Project, New Brunswick, N.J.; S. Rayburn Watkins, National Labor-Management Foundation, Louisville; Arnold Mayer, Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America, AFL-CIO, Washington, D.C.; Dr. Armand Thiebolt, National Association of Manufacturers, Washington, D.C.; Dorothy Forney, Harrisburg, Pa., representing the National Welfare Fraud Association; Jacob Clayman, Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO, Washington, D.C.; and Allen Sigafus, Mankato, Minn., accompanied by Tom Lindquist, Scott County, Minn., and Gilbert Dulaney, Atlanta, Georgia, all representing the National Association of Counties.

Hearings continue tomorrow.

DISASTER RELIEF/RESCISSION

Committee on Appropriations: Committee ordered favorably reported without amendment the following measures:

H.J. Res. 269, making urgent supplemental appropriations for fiscal year 1977 for disaster relief in the amount of \$200,000,000 for the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration; and

H.R. 3839, to rescind certain budget authority recommended in the message of the President of January 17, 1977, transmitted pursuant to the Impoundment Control Act of 1974, affecting defense military programs, foreign military credit sales, and the Department of State International Organizations and Conferences Contributions for International Peacekeeping.

APPROPRIATIONS—AGRICULTURE

Committee on Appropriations: Subcommittee resumed hearings on proposed budget estimates for fiscal year 1978 for the Department of Agriculture, receiving testimony from Denton E. Sprague, Assistant Administrator, Farmers Home Administration.

Subcommittee will meet again tomorrow.

APPROPRIATIONS—GENERAL GOVERNMENT

Committee on Appropriations: Subcommittee continued hearings on proposed budget estimates for fiscal year 1978 for the Department of the Treasury and General Government, receiving testimony on funds for their respective activities from Chief Judge Howard Dawson, United States Tax Court; Rear Admiral Robert R. Jortberg, (U.S. Navy), Director, Shore Facilities Program Division; Manus J. Fish, Regional Director, National Capital Parks, Dept. of the Interior; Dr. William Thaler, Acting Director, Office of Telecommunications Policy; Richard M. Harden, Special Assistant to the President for Budget and Organization; and Stuart E. Eizenstat, Executive Director, Domestic Council.

Subcommittee will meet again tomorrow.

APPROPRIATIONS—HEW

Committee on Appropriations: Subcommittee continued hearings on proposed budget estimates for fiscal year 1978 for the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, receiving testimony on funds for their respective activities from John Kelso, Deputy Administrator, Health Services Administration, and William Watson, Deputy Director, Center for Disease Control, both of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare.

Subcommittee will meet again tomorrow.

APPROPRIATIONS—LEGISLATIVE

Committee on Appropriations: Subcommittee continued hearings on proposed budget estimates for fiscal year 1978 for the legislative branch, receiving testimony on funds for the Joint Economic Committee from Senator Javits and Representative Bolling; and Subcommittee

of the United States to analyze and determine whether or not we feel.

regard Soviet efforts in the world. I don't think that we have our military guard. I have seen positions which were at various weapon systems as to whether they were the best weapon systems or not. I have never seen anything less than a strong military. And I have never been at all the proposition if we were just the Soviets would behave in a similar manner.

ed with a scenario in which the might claim to need a small just to compensate for how-ward their country on the part other than the United States. Mr. Warnke was asked what his reply was. It was as follows:

It would be completely negative. It seems to me that we cannot en- situation in which we allow the to have, first of all, more in the strategic capability than we have be- their explanation that they don't and to use it against us. In the of crisis, that intention could be.

Mr. Warnke was asked what action taken in the event of a Soviet of any arms limitation agree- Warnke said:

There is any agreement which was de- there would be the counterpart of standing consultative commis- exists in the SALT I agreement. U.S., Soviet commission which er specifically to determine not violations have existed, to about any sort of suspicion that had. I think that would be the that you would have. You are unable to receive any sort that there had been no viola- that any violation had been inad- had ceased, then obviously, you to consider whether or not it at that point to claim a breach and hence to repudiate it. That fundamental enforcement mechanism have.

over to a question as to our abil- monitor and exercise surveillance ourselves of compliance and e to any arms control agree- Mr. Warnke spoke as follows:

that the difficulty of verification having influence on the nature of control agreement that you have you could count on total verifica- you could go a lot further than I are going to be able to go at the because of the limitations that

I hope that there would be a gov- wide study of the various means of that exist or that can be devel- I don't know whether such a study has been done, but I think that one should ought to be one of the items with negotiator is armed in getting into negotiations.

tion is in fact the sine qua non of effective and enforceable arms com- ment.

Regarding onsite inspections, his reaction:

My feeling about on-site inspection is that it ought to be included in a treaty to the extent that it can be in fact effective. I am not sure that you could rely on on-site inspection as being the heart of any sort of verification system.

You would have to have, obviously, many other means of verification because other- wise, you would never be sure whether you had been shown just what the Soviets wanted to show you.

I close my excerpts from the testimony, Mr. President, with the three following questions and answers:

Mr. Warnke, would you today, in a negoti- ating context, advocate the kind of ap- proach of unilateral restraints that you ad- vocated in 1975?

Mr. WARNKE: I would not.

Would you today advocate a policy of uni- lateral restraints as an alternative method to negotiation?

Mr. WARNKE: I would not.

Do you today feel that a numerical imbal- ance is totally irrelevant to our security?

Mr. WARNKE: Not in view of the Soviet developments in MIRVs and in accuracy.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Tennessee:

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk pro- ceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without ob- jection, it is so ordered.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the nomi- nation.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there a sufficient second?

There is a sufficient second.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I only say that after the conclusion of the vote I intend to ask the majority leader for a modification of the time limitation agreement before the next vote.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The question is, will the Senate advise and consent to the nomination of Paul C. Warnke, of Washington, D.C., to be Ambassador dur- ing his tenure of service as Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. On this question, the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, may we have order?

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senate will be in order.

The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. MAGNUSON (when his name was called). Mr. President, on this vote I have a pair with the distinguished Sen- ator from Indiana (Mr. BAYH). If he were present and voting, he would vote "yea." If I were at liberty to vote, I would vote "nay." Therefore, I withhold my vote.

Mr. CRANSTON. I announce that the Senator from Indiana (Mr. BAYH) is necessarily absent.

The result was announced—yeas 58, nays 40, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 41 Ex.]

YEAS—58

Abourez	Gravel	Metzenbaum
Anderson	Hart	Morgan
Bentsen	Haskell	Muskie
Biden	Hatfield	Nelson
Brock	Hathaway	Pearson
Bumpers	Hollings	Pell
Burke	Humphrey	Percy
Byrd, Robert C.	Inouye	Proxmire
Case	Javits	Randolph
Chafee	Johnson	Ribicoff
Church	Kennedy	Riegle
Clark	Leahy	Schance
Cranston	Long	Schlesinger
Culver	Mathias	Sparkman
DeConcini	McGuire	Strom
Durkin	McIntyre	Stevens
Eagleton	McGovern	Williams
Eastland	McIntyre	Young
Ford	Meacham	
Gale	Metcalfe	

NAYS—40

Allen	Griffin	Roth
Baker	Hansen	Schmitt
Bartlett	Hatch	Schweiker
Belmont	Hayakawa	Scott
Byrd	Helms	Stennis
Canine	Holmes	Stevens
Cannon	Huddleston	Stone
Chiles	Jackson	Talmadge
Curtis	Laxalt	Thurmond
Danforth	Lugar	Tower
Dole	McClure	Wallace
Domenici	Moynihan	Weicker
Gandy	Nun	Zorinsky
Goldwater	Packwood	

PRESENT AND GIVING A LIVE PAIR AS PREVIOUSLY RECORDED—1

Magnuson, against.

NOT VOTING—1

Bayh

So the nomination was confirmed. Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the confirmation was confirmed.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, under the order the President is to be immediately notified of the confirmation.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator is correct.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, now that the Senate has confirmed Mr. Warnke as chairman of the U.S. SALT delegation, we turn to the question of whether Mr. Warnke should direct the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

My fellow Senators and I have spent very little time in the course of this discussion on the question of the future of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and Mr. Warnke's plans for that Agency.

From what I have seen of Mr. Warnke, I conclude that he is a man of character and principle and that he has considerable talent to bring to bear on the direction of that Agency. Many Senators are aware that this Agency has had difficult times over the past several years. I think Mr. Warnke is fully qualified and dedicated to reinvigorating the Agency and making it a major and effective part of the national security decisionmaking process.

I will let Mr. Warnke speak for himself on the key principles he would follow as

Director. He told the Committee on Foreign Relations:

Senator Humphrey has pointed out that the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is of course a creation of this Congress with Senator Humphrey being an architect of the Agency. The express purpose that the Congress had in mind, and stated, was to create a new agency of peace to deal with the problem of reduction and control of armaments. And at the same time Congress noted that arms control and disarmament policy, being an important aspect of foreign policy, must be consistent with national security policy as a whole. That's right in the act. And this I regard as the key principle I would follow as Director of the Agency.

I support, of course, and I always have supported, a strong national defense, and I regard the objective of arms control similarly as being to enhance the security of the United States, as well as advancing the chances of world peace. In securing these goals, the act establishing the Agency makes arms control and disarmament an integral part of the process of making national security decisions.

As the committee knows, the Director of the Agency is by statute the principle advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of State on arms control and disarmament matters. It is his responsibility to view national security problems from this perspective and to search for and advocate arms control solutions to these problems. In any particular situation the President, of course, may or may not decide to employ arms limitation measures in resolving the questions of national security. But I believe it to be of the utmost importance that this alternative be presented at the highest levels of the Government.

So if confirmed as Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, I will do my best in this capacity to argue persuasively for arms control initiatives where I believe them to be warranted. In some instances, sound measures of arms limitation may do more to protect this country than new armament programs.

Also as Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, I would seek ways to head off new explosions of arms technology which could ultimately damage the security of this Nation. I would seek ways to limit and reduce arms already in existence so as to make this country more secure. To accomplish this, any measures of arms limitations that are pursued must be soundly conceived and any agreements that are reached must be adequately verifiable. If the American public is to have confidence in an arms control regime that has been negotiated, then that public must know that their security cannot be undermined through undetected violations by another party to the agreement.

I think it should also be recognized that some new weapons system developments can help, rather than hinder, the objectives of sound arms control. By the time that long range nuclear armed ballistic missiles had appeared, the development of the submarine launched ballistic missile on nuclear submarines had a positive effect. It improves stability because of the invulnerability of this weapons system and has a consequent stabilizing effect on the strategic balance. The direction of arms control policy must be toward greater stability at lower levels of destructive potential in both conventional and nuclear arms. This will be the philosophy by which I would be guided if confirmed as ACDA Director.

It's been suggested that I have become a symbol of a certain philosophic position. I'm flattered at the attention but I have to reject the characterization. I don't believe that I represent a fixed philosophical posi-

tion on the issues of arms control. I'm a strong advocate of arms control. I'm also a strong advocate of a strong national defense. I believe the two to be totally consistent and indeed, complementary.

But I believe that if anybody does think that I represent a fixed philosophical position, then some of them will be surprised, and some others will be disappointed.

Mr. President, I have no doubt that Mr. Warnke intends to adhere to those principles. Accordingly, I do not hesitate in urging the Senate to confirm him for this position.

Mr. BAKER. May we have order, Mr. President?

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senate will be in order. The Senator from Tennessee.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, there is an order existent providing for 1 hour of debate before the next rollcall. I believe that is unnecessary. While most of my colleagues are here on our side, if there is no other point of view I am perfectly willing to agree with the majority leader that we modify that order to vote almost immediately.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. LEAHY). Would the leaders withhold until we have order in the Chamber?

May we have order in the Chamber?

Will Senators please restrain their conversations so their leaders can be heard?

The Senator from Tennessee.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, if there are no other—

Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, the Senate is still not in order.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arkansas is correct. The Senate will please be in order. The galleries will be in order. There will be order before the Senate proceeds.

The Senator from Tennessee.

Mr. BAKER. I thank the Chair.

Mr. President, I hear no objection on our side to such a modification. I would ask the majority leader if he might be agreeable to modifying the previous unanimous-consent order to provide for a vote, as far as I am concerned, at this time, on the second nomination.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I see no Senator who wishes to be recognized at this time.

NOMINATION OF PAUL C. WARNKE TO BE DIRECTOR OF THE U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the period of time of 1 hour for debate on the second nomination be vitiated, that the vote occur immediately, and that there be a time limitation on the vote of 10 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. First, the clerk will state the nomination. The legislative clerk read as follows:

Nomination of Paul C. Warnke, of the District of Columbia, to be Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Commission.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request of the Senator

from West Virginia? Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? There is a sufficient second.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that immediately upon the confirmation of the nomination, if it is confirmed, that the President be immediately notified of the nomination and that a motion to reconsider be laid on the table.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. And that the Senate resume legislative session.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The question is, Will the Senate advise and consent to the nomination of Paul C. Warnke, of the District of Columbia, to be Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency? On this question the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair will remind Senators that this vote is limited to 10 minutes and asks the assistance of Senators in maintaining order so we can complete the vote in the 10 minutes time. The Chair requests that there be order.

The Chair reminds those in the galleries that order applies also to those in the visitors' galleries.

The clerk may proceed.

The legislative clerk resumed and concluded the call of the roll.

Mr. CRANSTON. I announce that the Senator from Indiana (Mr. BAYH) is necessarily absent.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Indiana (Mr. BAYH) would vote "yea."

The result was announced—yeas 70, nays 29, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 42 Ex.]

YEAS—70

Abourezk	Haskell	Muskie
Anderson	Hatfield	Nelson
Bentsen	Hathaway	Nunn
Biden	Helms	Packwood
Brooke	Hollings	Pearson
Bumpers	Huddleston	Pell
Burdick	Humphrey	Percy
Byrd, Robert C.	Inouye	Proxmire
Cannon	Jackson	Randolph
Case	Javits	Ribicoff
Chafee	Johnston	Riegle
Chiles	Kennedy	Roth
Church	Leahy	Sarbanes
Clark	Long	Sasser
Cranston	Magnuson	Sparkman
Culver	Mathias	Stafford
DeConcini	Matsunaga	Stevens
Durkin	McGovern	Stevenson
Eagleton	McIntyre	Stone
Eastland	Melcher	Talmadge
Ford	Metcalfe	Williams
Glenn	Metzenbaum	Young
Gravel	Morgan	
Hart	Moynihan	

NAYS—29

Allen	Danforth	Hatch
Baker	Dole	Hayakawa
Bartlett	Domenici	Helms
Belmont	Garn	Laxalt
Byrd	Goldwater	Lugar
Harry P., Jr.	Griffin	McClellan
Curtis	Hansen	McClure

Senators
Schweiker
Scott

Stennis
Thurmond
Tower

Wallop
Weicker
Zorinsky

NOT VOTING—1

Bayh

So the nomination was confirmed.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, a motion to reconsider the vote is laid on the table.

Under the previous order, the President of the United States will be notified immediately of the confirmation of the nominations.

LEGISLATIVE SESSION

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate returns to the consideration of legislative business.

The Senator from West Virginia is recognized.

WAIVER OF SECTION 402(a) OF CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET ACT OF 1974 WITH RESPECT TO CONSIDERATION OF S. 427

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that it be in order to call up the waiver resolution at this time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will state the resolution by title.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

A resolution (S. Res. 106) waiving section 402(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 with respect to the consideration of S. 427.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Senate will proceed to its consideration.

The Senate proceeded to consider the resolution.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under Public Law 93-344, debate is limited to 1 hour.

Who yields time?

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I yield myself 5 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, this is the first waiver resolution of section 402, of the Budget Act in this session of Congress. So, I think it appropriate, in light of the fact that there are many new Members of this body, to explain what it is and what is in it in connection with the public works bill, which we shall take up tomorrow. It will not take very much time, perhaps 10 minutes, to present the matter and such time, in addition, as Members may want to take for questions, if any. Therefore, I shall proceed.

Mr. President, the Budget Committee today met and favorably reported Senate Resolution 106, a resolution pursuant to section 402 of the Budget Act, waiving the May 15 deadline for the reporting of authorizing legislation in the case of S. 427, the public works employment bill. S. 427 is the first major authorization bill to come before the Senate in this Congress. It is also the first major authorizing legislation reported in the Senate to implement the decisions taken in the third concurrent resolution on the budget which Congress adopted last

week. S. 427 is also an integral part of President Carter's economic stimulus program submitted to the Congress on January 31.

Senate Resolution 106, waiving section 402 of the Budget Act in the case of S. 427, is necessary because of S. 427 provides authorization for new budget authority for fiscal year 1977. Because the Congressional Budget Act prescribes a very tight timetable for completion of all authorization and appropriation legislation, it also provides that authorizations contemplating new budget authority for a fiscal year must be reported before the May 15 preceding the beginning of that fiscal year. Thus, legislation providing authorization for this fiscal year, which began on October 1, should have been reported by May 15 of last year.

This provision was included in the Budget Act to insure that all authorizing legislation is considered as far as possible in advance of the fiscal year in which it will take effect so that it could be considered in the formulation of the first concurrent resolution. In addition, this section was included to provide the Appropriations Committee with some reasonable notice of needed appropriations for the coming fiscal year so that the Appropriations Committee can meet the appropriations timetable spelled out in the Budget Act.

Legislation authorizing the enactment of new budget authority which is reported to the Senate after May 15 could delay the enactment of appropriations bills past the Budget Act deadline of 7 days after Labor Day for the completion of the entire appropriations process.

However, the Budget Act also recognizes that events outside the control of an authorizing committee may require the reporting of additional authorizations after the May 15 deadline. Significantly changed economic circumstances such as have occasioned the third budget resolution, President Carter's stimulus program, and S. 427 are among such factors.

To take the possibility of such changed circumstances into account, the Budget Act also provided that the May 15 deadline could be waived by the Budget Committee, upon the application of a committee reporting post-May 15 authorizing legislation. That application takes the form of a simple resolution reported by the committee in question when it reports the post-May 15 authorization bill. The legislative history of the Budget Act indicates that the May 15 reporting deadline is not to be lightly waived. Under these circumstances, the Budget Committee, in deciding whether to favorably report resolutions waiving section 402 of the Budget Act, will consider factors including: the reporting committee's effort to meet the May 15 deadline, the delay in the appropriations process engendered by the delayed reporting of the authorization, and whether the authorization was contemplated in the national priorities established in the congressional budget.

The Budget Committee has favorably reported Senate Resolution 106 in light

of the urgent need for the consideration of the important economic recovery legislation S. 427 represents. The effect of defeating the consideration of this bill would be to prevent implementation of a major part of the programs contemplated by President Carter and Congress in adopting the third budget resolution. In reporting Senate Resolution 106 to clear the way for Senate consideration of S. 427, the Budget Committee is not prejudging the merits of that bill. Individual Senators on the committee and in the Senate will form their own judgment about that bill and amendments to it. However, the committee did vote unanimously, under the special circumstances presented by this case, to favorably report Senate Resolution 106 waiving the May 15 reporting deadline.

Mr. President, in addition to the reasons I have already stated, special considerations affected title III of S. 427. Title III provides short-term interim funding of the ongoing waste treatment program. The Public Works Committee did report legislation to provide such funding before the May 15 deadline last year, reported the bill to the Senate, and the Senate approved it when it considered the legislation on the Senate floor. The legislation went to conference and died in conference when the Congress adjourned last year.

So title III of this legislation did, in fact, meet the May 15 requirement of the bill, but must be resurrected in S. 427 so that the Senate may again consider the matter and send it to conference with the House.

Therefore title III has a special case for the waiver under section 402 of the Budget Act.

This may appear to be and is, Mr. President, a technical matter, but it is a very important one. I thought in order to stress its importance I ought to take it up formally on the Senate floor.

Mr. President, I yield to my good friend the distinguished Senator from West Virginia, chairman of the Public Works Committee.

Mr. RANDOLPH. Mr. President, the able chairman of our Subcommittee on the Problems of Pollution in the Environment and Public Works Committee (Mr. MUSKIE) very properly calls attention to the need for the funding of the waste treatment program. This is a very important vital program.

I appreciate the Senator from Maine explaining the necessity for handling this matter in connection with the waivers that have been discussed.

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, in response to the comments of my good friend from West Virginia, I say that although title III represents additional funding for an ongoing program, it is very appropriate to the purposes of the bill itself. This waste treatment program provides tens of thousands of jobs at a time when jobs are not available to over 7 million Americans, and some 34 States are in danger of running out of funding in this calendar year if we do not enact title III of this bill.

That would mean that the programs would slow down or come to a halt. It

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM TO HAMILTON JORDAN

FROM: LONDON BUTLER 
DATE: MARCH 17, 1977
SUBJECT: PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR A SALT TREATY

In general, our problem will be to mobilize middle-of-the-road public support for a SALT Treaty, while avoiding a left-wing vs. right-wing fight reminiscent of the Sixties. If we fail to act promptly, well-established peace organizations will take the lead, and the anti-disarmament forces will have an opportunity to label us as "soft."

Here are some specific suggestions for mobilizing public support:

1. The President's Time.

By far and away the most effective way to mobilize support will be the use of the President's time. At an appropriate point, we should consider holding a telephone call-in show or a town-hall meeting outside of Washington in which the subject is foreign and defense policy. This would be consistent with the President's promise to trust the people on foreign policy subjects, and would provide variety and interest to the "People Program."

2. An Umbrella Organization.

The establishment of a new umbrella organization to support the President's disarmament efforts would have a number of distinct advantages:

- a. With the right leadership the new organization could give the effort a middle-of-the-road image.
- b. The organization could raise money for a direct mail campaign (see item 3 below).
- c. The organization could disseminate bumper stickers.

- d. The organization could advertise in local newspapers.
- e. The umbrella organization could also develop a grass-roots structure.
- f. Finally, the organization could spearhead a coalition of existing groups by holding conferences, preparing newsletters, etc. Rafshoon says he can have an organization name, a slogan, and sample materials ready in about two weeks.

3. Direct Mail.

A direct mail program is necessary, if only to counteract the very effective right-wing mail effort that was evident during the Warnke hearings. Given the effectiveness of the right-wing effort, I frankly doubt if we will be able to do much more than neutralize their campaign.

The direct mail capability needs to be set up in such a way that it can be used for a variety of purposes, not just the SALT Treaty. This means that it should not be located and controlled by an umbrella organization, although that organization could certainly raise money to carry out a direct mail campaign. The direct mail operation should remain under Jerry Rafshoon's thumb so that we will be able to control content and can apply what we learn to other situations.

4. Administration Speakers.

Speaking tours across the country by the Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and the Director of the CIA could be enormously effective. When the Secretary of State visits a medium-sized city and holds an "off-the-record" discussion with local community leaders to explain our foreign policy, the impact is dramatic. A well-planned series of speaking tours by key Administration leaders should be a key component of any public support program.

Rick Inderfurth at NSC told me yesterday that he would begin to develop a draft speech that could be used by Administration spokespersons.

5. Public Service Advertising.

It may not be out of the question to ask the Advertising Council to develop public service advertisements on the general question of the threat of nuclear proliferation. Such advertising would not be partisan, nor would it be in support of the President's efforts; it would simply help establish that nuclear proliferation is a serious threat to civilization, and create a favorable climate for the President's disarmament program.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM TO HAMILTON JORDAN

FROM: LONDON BUTLER
DATE: MAY 11, 1977
SUBJECT: SALT POLITICS

This Memorandum expands on the key points of our discussion last week with Zbig and David Aaron on "the politics of SALT."

Generally, both Zbig and David appear to agree that it's in the President's best interest to broaden the base of political support for SALT by reaching out to the public at large, to Senators and congressional staffers who have not previously been involved in SALT briefings, and to influential persons and groups across the country who have not previously participated in the arms control debate. By broadening the base of support, the President can help insure that he has the trust of the public and the Senate when he presents an agreement for ratification.

I would caution everyone, however, that we must avoid political steps which would add needlessly to the suspicion and mistrust which already exists between factions in the arms control community, and which were apparent during the Warnke hearings. A clumsy effort to broaden the political base could create more problems than it would solve.

With these general comments in mind, I would make the following suggestions:

1. The President should use a Town Hall Meeting or a telephone call-in show to discuss SALT. Brzezinski has suggested to the President that a Town Hall Meeting be held on the subject of foreign policy. If the President agrees, I suggest that the meeting be held in a Southern or Southwestern town, where the audience would be generally perceived as conservative.

Most of the Senators with swing votes on a SALT treaty come from southern and border states; if the President takes the lead in discussing SALT openly in a conservative setting, these Senators will undoubtedly be less worried about demagoguery from the right.

I suggest that such a Town Hall Meeting be held in the next two months. By holding the meeting in the near future, the President can discuss SALT in general; if we wait four to six months, he may be forced to avoid answering questions on specific items under negotiations in Geneva.

2. The State Department should consider producing a film presenting the President's viewpoint on arms control. As you know, there are at least two films being distributed nationwide which present the Jackson/Pentagon viewpoint; Rick Inderfurth has obtained copies, and is arranging for them to be shown here.

I think it would be valuable to have a film which presents the President's viewpoint: this film could stress about our national strength and our commitment to a policy of disarmament.

Copies of the film would be available for distribution to local civic groups, church organizations, political science classes, etc., and would be a valuable asset if we ever need to seek grassroots support for a SALT treaty.

3. We need carefully to broaden our base of support in the Senate. Everyone agrees that we should not allow Senator Jackson to monopolize Senate commentary on our SALT positions. As a result, the State Department has begun holding regular briefings for five Senators selected by Cranston: Bumpers, Hart, Chafee, Culver and Sarbanes. Frank is also putting together a separate meeting of Senators with the President at the White House. Finally, Warnke is considering inviting a number of Senators to Geneva to get a feel for the negotiating sessions.

These efforts need to be coordinated, and Frank Moore should be the person who does it. The potential for criticism, crossed signals, and confusion is enormous, and we could easily wind up simply annoying Senator Jackson and accomplishing little else. To correct this situation, Rick Inderfurth is now putting together a meeting with Frank, Doug Bennet, David Aaron and yourself. The meeting is set for 5:15pm Friday in your office.

4. The General Advisory Committee of ACDA can be broadened to play a very useful role.

I have given you a separate memo on this subject and have discussed it in some detail with Rick and John Markin of the NSC staff. If we appoint to the GAC such people as Paul Austin of Coca-Cola, Doug Frasier of the UAW, Owen Cooper of Mississippi, and Harry Huge,

We can begin to involve interest groups and regions of the country which have not previously been consulted in the SALT discussions. Opinions of persons and groups outside of the arms control establishment could ultimately weigh heavily on the vote in the Senate.

Last night, Warren Christopher in his evening report made a similar suggestion to the President; the President answered in the margin, "Need to abolish." I think GAC is a case in which an advisory group can play a genuinely important role - it would be worthwhile to ask the President to change his mind.

5. We should develop a special program to relate to interested private groups.

The "liberal" groups which have traditionally supported disarmament programs are now clamoring for attention, and at least one new group has been formed (by Harold Willens and Leo Wyler) to support the President. Beyond these groups, there is an endless list of potentially helpful organizations with an interest in SALT. Some of these groups (the Democratic Forum, the Policy Group, the DNC Finance Council, etc.) are politically influential; other groups (educators, scientists, religious leaders, etc.) have only a general interest but would be influential in fostering a favorable climate for the President's SALT position.

We should consider placing one person of some stature in charge of examining our SALT position to outside organizations. This person could coordinate speaking schedules, help develop support among organizations which have not previously taken positions on SALT, act as liaison with the liberal organizations, and, in general, help develop a favorable political climate for the President's position.

If you agree, we should discuss names as soon as possible.

6. We should develop a direct mail capability only as a last resort.

While I am fully aware of Senator Cranston's concern about the right wing's direct mail capability, I am equally as worried that a direct mail effort on behalf of the President's position would smack of Nixon-era tactics, and would do much more harm than good.

While you were in Europe, I spent a good deal of time with Joel McCleary and Greg on the general subject of mail lists and direct mail efforts. We have agreed on a general approach, and will put together a meeting on this subject sometime in the next week.

It is my opinion now that anything we do on SALT should be a part of an overall DNC effort. Nothing should be done until Bob Lipshutz and the President have given their prior approval.

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
CANCELED PER E.O. 12958, SEC. 1.3 AND
ARCHIVED MEMO OF MARCH 10, 1983

FILE
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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MONG.

you may want to consider
not passing the 2nd page

FRANK:

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 18, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR FRANK MOORE

FROM: DAN TATE

SUBJECT: SALT

The selling of the SALT agreement, any SALT agreement, is going to be the toughest foreign policy challenge to this Administration, tougher even than the Panama Canal Treaties.

When the SALT I treaty was ratified, everything was going in its favor: it was an historic breakthrough -- the first such agreement; it was negotiated by Nixon and Kissinger -- two hardliners whom no one suspected of being soft on the Soviets or in favor of weakening our national defense; the country was in the midst of a war and this was an initiative against future wars of the most horrible type.

The relative merits of the agreement being negotiated now are not of primary importance at this time. What is important is the fact that the agreement is being negotiated by Paul Warnke and Jimmy Carter -- neither of whom has a reputation of being especially tough on the Soviets or of building up our defense posture at any cost. Also, the American people perceive that the U.S. has given concession after concession to two-bit countries (Vietnam, Cuba, Panama, etc.). There is a strong feeling that those old hardliners, Nixon and Kissinger, sold us down the river in SALT I -- which they probably did -- and if Nixon could get outmaneuvered by the Russians, then Carter does not stand a chance, especially with a "unilateral disarmer" as his negotiator.

So before we even know what form the agreement will take, we are in trouble. We get into even deeper trouble when we look at who will be pushing the treaty for us -- State, ACDA, and other people never known for "standing up for America" -- and who will be working against us -- the military and others. Our advocates have great influence with a couple of dozen Senators, but those Senators are already with us. However, not only do State and ACDA not have influence with the 75 or so other Senators, they are despised by most of those Senators. We have to reach the Bentsens, the Morgans, the Cannons of the Senate, and right now we have no one who can devote full time to the task and come close.

The first thing we need to do is find a ramrod who can coordinate the diverse elements in the Administration itself and work the Hill. That person must be technically expert, must be a tough in-fighter in the bureaucratic sense, must have extensive experience with and knowledge of the Hill, and must have impeccable "conservative credentials". He should not be a big name, status type; otherwise Warnke, Vance and others would feel scorned and shunted aside. In short, we need our own Richard Perle.

November 17, 1977

~~SECRET~~

TO: PRESIDENT CARTER
FROM: HAMILTON JORDAN AND FRANK MOORE *HJ. FM.*
RE: POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE SALT TREATY

We have tried to outline in this memorandum some of the political considerations and scheduling problems which surround the SALT II negotiations.

We feel that you should have this material and review it prior to your meeting Thursday.

"DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
CANCELLED PER E.O. 12356, SEC. 1.3 AND
ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF MARCH 16, 1983"

SUPPORT FOR SALT II IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE

We should not underestimate the difficulty we will have getting a SALT II Treaty ratified by two-thirds of the United States Senate regardless of the merits of our new proposal. The philosophical differences which exist in the Senate on the question of arms control are real, deep, and should not be minimized.*

The confirmation vote on Paul Warnke as SALT negotiator is the best clue to the political and philosophical divisions that exist in the Senate on the basic question of arms control. An analysis of that Senate vote is instructive and necessary for appreciating the difficulty which we face on this issue.

*For that reason, another option for practical enactment of the new SALT agreement is presented in a later section.

The Warnke nomination received 58 votes for confirmation, nine short of the two-thirds vote we will need to ratify a SALT II Treaty in the Senate.

The persons and/or groups who opposed Warnke were:

Republicans. Out of 38 Republican Senators, 28 opposed Warnke. The support we received from the Republicans was in the first months of the new Administration on a nomination. As the vote on the SALT II proposal will come in the middle of an election year on a complex substantive issue, I believe that you would have to assume that the SALT II debate will be more partisan than the Warnke nomination.

Southern Democrats. Out of eleven Democratic votes against Warnke, seven were Southern Senators.

If you assumed that we could hold the same votes we received on the Warnke nomination, we will still be

nine votes short of the two-thirds we would need to ratify the treaty. And a close analysis of those who supported Warnke would suggest that it will be very difficult to hold all of these same Senators on a SALT II Treaty.

The following Senators supported the Warnke nomination but would have to be considered "marginal" on a SALT II vote:

- Bentsen, Texas
- Bumpers, Arkansas
- Ford, Kentucky
- Eastland, Mississippi
- Hollings, South Carolina
- Johnston, Louisiana
- Long, Louisiana
- McClelland, Arkansas

- Morgan, North Carolina
- Sasser, Tennessee
- Sparkman, Alabama

It is impossible to avoid the conclusion that a hotly debated SALT II Treaty will divide the Senate along traditional party and philosophical lines with the outcome determined by Democratic Senators from Southern and Border states.

To obtain a two-thirds vote, we will have to:

- 1) Hold the votes of the Republican Senators who supported the Warnke nomination in spite of the fact it is an election year;
- 2) Hold all of the Southern and Border state Democrats who supported Warnke; and
- 3) Pick up an additional nine votes.

RATIFICATION OPTIONS

Although we have all assumed that the SALT II agreement would be presented to the United States Senate for consideration as a "treaty", there are other options which should be explored.

Section 33 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act requires that a SALT II agreement be either:

- (a) a "treaty" requiring a two-thirds majority of the Senate, or
- (b) an Executive Agreement approved by Congressional legislation (majorities of both houses).

There are no precise rules for choosing between these two forms. A treaty is more formal and generally is used for commitments of particular political sensitivity or importance, or which in practice have been in treaty form.

The 1972 ABM Agreement - one of the SALT I proposals - is a major permanent arms control agreement and was concluded as a "treaty."

The duration or permanence of the agreement and/or treaty is another factor. A "treaty" implies a permanent agreement not limited in its duration. An "agreement" has come to mean a temporary device that is less than permanent.

All of the recent multilateral arms control agreements have also been treaties - Limited Test Ban Treaty, Nuclear Nonproliferation, and others. The 1974 Bi-lateral Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions agreements were submitted to the Senate as "treaties."

The Executive Agreement authorized by statute tends to be employed for agreement of comparatively short duration. The 1972 Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms was an Executive Agreement. Congressional approval was requested and given in a Joint Congressional Resolution.

This agreement, which had a five year term, was universally regarded as a means of establishing beneficial arms limitations pending negotiation of a more permanent agreement.

Advantages and Disadvantages of an "Agreement"

Advantages

- Does not require a two-thirds vote in the Senate.
- Has the same force legally as a "treaty," but is considered less permanent.
- Allows both Houses to vote on SALT. This can be presented as positive feature and counter to charge that we lack support in the Senate for full treaty ratification.

Disadvantages

- Requires passage by both Houses during an election year.
- SALT opponents will charge that we lacked the political support we need in the Senate for ratification.

We have said all along that SALT II is only an intermediate step on the way to SALT III and that SALT III negotiations will begin immediately after SALT II is signed. In that sense, the non-permanent nature of an "agreement" seems entirely appropriate for the implementation of the SALT II proposal. It is certainly an option available to us that should be considered.

If we seek to obtain a two-thirds vote in the Senate on SALT II and fail, it will severely undermine the credibility of this Administration in foreign policy for the balance of your first term. As we presently analyze it, it will be very difficult to get a two-thirds vote in the Senate. Frank Moore and his staff believe that we probably go into SALT II with 45-48 votes in the Senate we can count on. Through a careful analysis, they can see 55-58 eventually. They have great difficulty seeing 65 or 67 votes for a treaty that is already hotly debated. With Jackson and Nunn actively supporting the SALT II proposal, ratification

is probable. With Jackson opposing the treaty, it will be difficult. If Jackson and Nunn both oppose, it will be impossible to get the two-thirds vote.

The "agreement" option should certainly be considered. We are on sound legal ground and it has the same legal force as a "treaty."*

*Frank Moore has spoken to the Speaker about this and he responded favorably to the idea of House consideration of SALT II.

PROBABLE TIMETABLE FOR SENATE CONSIDERATION OF SALT II

Everyone agrees that it would be a mistake to send the SALT II proposal to the Senate until they have completed action on the Panama Canal Treaty. The Foreign Relations Committee has primary jurisdiction for both treaties. When the Panama Canal Treaty is being debated and filibustered, members of the Foreign Relations Committee will be the leading proponents of the Panama Canal Treaty and floor managers for the ratification resolution. It will be impossible to get the Foreign Relations Committee to begin its active consideration of SALT II until the Panama Canal Treaty is voted on.

Frank Moore's staff has reconciled the Senate calendar with its legislative schedule, the planned holidays, and Byrd's intention to take up the Panama Canal Treaty early in the year.

J A N U A R Y

SUNDAY	MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY	SATURDAY
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8	9	10	11	12	13	14
15	16	17	18	19	20	21
				Congress Reconvenes		
22	23	24	25	26	27	28
				Conference Reports in the Senate. President's State of the Union Address.		
29	30	31				
				Arms Service Committee likely to begin hearings on Panama Canal Treaty.		

F E B R U A R Y

SUNDAY MONDAY TUESDAY WEDNESDAY THURSDAY FRIDAY SATURDAY

1 2 3 4

Senate Armed Services Committee continues hearing on Panama Canal Treaty. Probably concludes this week.

5. 6 7 8 9 10 11

Armed Services completes Panama Canal Treaty work on Panama Canal Treaty. Panama Canal Treaty reported to Senate.

12 13 14 15 16 17 18

Lincoln Holidays scheduled for entire week. Congress will be out entire week.

19 20 21 22 23 24 25

Senate debate on Panama Canal Treaty begins with filibuster taking about ten days before cloture is attempted.

26 27 28

Filibuster will
continue.

M A R C H

SUNDAY MONDAY TUESDAY WEDNESDAY THURSDAY FRIDAY SATURDAY

1 2 3 4

Filibuster on Panama Canal
Treaty continues.

5 6 7 8 9 10 11

First effort to invoke cloture is likely. If invoked this week, two or three weeks of debate on reservations and amendments begins.

12 13 14 15 16 17 18

Floor debate on Panama Canal Treaty continues on amendments and reservations.

19 _____ 20 _____ 21 _____ 22 _____ 23 _____ 24 _____ 25 _____

Floor debate on Panama Canal Treaty continues.

Easter
Holiday
begins.

26 27 28 29 30 31

Easter Congressional recess continues.

A P R I L

SUNDAY	MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY	SATURDAY
						1
2	3	4	5	6	7	8
If previous <u>conservative</u> analysis is generally correct, final vote could come this week.						
9	10	11	12	13	14	15
Final vote on Panama Canal Treaty might come this week if it didn't take place earlier.						
16	17	18	19	20	21	22
23	24	25	26	27	28	29

This calendar is a very conservative estimate. It assumes that no other legislative matters will disrupt the Panama Treaty debates and that cloture will be invoked very early in the filibuster. But the inevitable filibuster, the large number of Congressional holidays, and the plans of the Senate Armed Services Committee to hold brief hearings on the Panama Canal Treaty when the Congress returns next year all indicate that it will be at least early or mid-April before a final vote on the Panama Canal Treaty is taken.

If you apply this same general schedule to the SALT II proposal given the fact that it is an election year and there will be a great desire to get home soon and avoid controversial issues, it leads to the conclusion that it will be late in the session - if then - before a final vote on SALT II takes place.

And while there may be compelling foreign policy arguments for consummating the SALT II treaties soon and having a Summit Conference with Brezhnev at an early date, there are few - if any - good reasons for us either to be in a hurry or appear to be in a hurry. The SALT II proposals will not be formally considered by the Congress until late Spring at the earliest. I would think that appearing to be anxious would weaken our bargaining position with the Soviets on the remaining items being negotiated. Also, appearing to be in a hurry on SALT II supports the arguments of the opponents of SALT who say that the Administration "will do anything to get a SALT II treaty" and is being "out-traded by the Russians".

As the controlling factor for formal implementation
of SALT II is Congressional approval in some form
and since serious consideration of the proposal is
at least six months away, I would think that we could
modify our schedule for consummating SALT II in a way
that will allow us to take a tough position on the
remaining issues and undermine the charges of those
who claim we are too anxious and in a hurry. The
result, I would hope, would be a better SALT II
package and an improved atmosphere in the Congress.

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11

SALT TREATY - TARGET STATES

State	Both Senators Probably Support	Both Senators Undecided	One Senator Probably Supports	One Senator Undecided	Some Chance Both Senators	Some Chance One Senator	No Chance Either Senator
ALABAMA			St. Roman			Allen	
ALASKA			Gravel			Stevens	
ARIZONA				DeLozini		Goldwater	
ARKANSAS			Bumpers	McClellan			
CALIFORNIA			Cranston			Honolulu	
COLORADO	Hart Haskell						
CONNECTICUT			Ribicoff	Weicker			
DELAWARE			Biden	Roth			
FLORIDA					Chiles Stone		
GEORGIA					Talmadge Nunn		
HAWAII			Matsunaga	Inouye			
IDAHO			Church			McClure	
ILLINOIS			Stevenson	Percy			
INDIANA			Bayh			Ingram	
IOWA	Clark Culver						
KANSAS			Pearson			Dole	

SALT TREATY - TARGET STATES

-2

State	Both Senators Probably Support	Both Senators Undecided	One Senator Probably Supports	One Senator Undecided	Some Chance Both Senators	Some Chance One Senator	No Chance Either Senator
KENTUCKY					Huddleston Ford		
LOUISIANA					Long Johnston		
MAINE	Muskie Bathaway						
MARYLAND	Carbone Mathias						
MASSACHUSETTS	Kennedy Crooke						
MICHIGAN			Riegle			Griffin	
MINNESOTA	Humphrey Anderson						
MISSISSIPPI					Eastland Stennis		
MISSOURI			Eagleton			Donforth	
* MONTANA		Metcalf Melcher					
* NEBRASKA					Zorinsky Curtis		
* NEVADA				Cannon		Laxalt	
NEW HAMPSHIRE	McIntyre Durkin						
NEW JERSEY	Williams Case						
NEW MEXICO					Domenici Schmitt		
NEW YORK	Javits			Moynihan			


SALT TREATY - TARGET STATES

State	Both Senators Probably Support	Both Senators Undecided	One Senator Probably Supports	One Senator Undecided	Some Chance Both Senators	Some Chance One Senator	No Chance Either Senator
NORTH CAROLINA			Morgan				Helm
NORTH DAKOTA			Burdick	Young			
OHIO			Metzenbaum	Glenn			
OKLAHOMA				Bellmon		Bartlett	
OREGON			Hatfield	Pickwood			
PENNSYLVANIA					Heinz Schweiker		
RHODE ISLAND			Pell	Chafee			
SOUTH CAROLINA				Hollings		Thurmond	
SOUTH DAKOTA	McGovern Abourezk						
TENNESSEE			Sasser	Baker			
TEXAS				Bentsen		Tower	
UTAH					Garn Hatch		
VERMONT			Leahy	Stafford			
* VIRGINIA					Byrd Scott		
WASHINGTON		Jackson Magneison					
WEST VIRGINIA		Byrd Randolph					


SALT TREATY - TARGET STATES

[illegible]

PAUL WARNEKE VOTE - DIRECTOR OF U.S. ARMS CONTROL
AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY



FAIR HUNTER STATE - DISTRICTS OF THE STATE



Vice President Mondale, Walter F. (Minn.)	42424	2203	Jackson, Henry M. (Wash.)	43141	137
Abood, James (S. Dak.)	45842	1105	Jacobs, Jacob K. (N.Y.)	45542	321
Allen, James B. (Ala.)	45744	6205	Johnston, J. Bennett, Jr. (La.)	45824	432
Anderson, Wendell R. (Minn.)	45641	443C	Kennedy, Edward M. (Mass.)	45542	431
Baker, Howard H., Jr. (Tenn.)	44944	4123	Larock, Paul (Nev.)	43542	326
Bartlett, Dewey F. (Okla.)	44721	140	Leahy, Patrick J. (Vt.)	44242	1203
Barr, Birch (Ind.)	45623	363	Lonz, Russell B. (La.)	44623	217
Bellman, Henry (Okla.)	45754	125	Lugar, Richard G. (Ind.)	44814	254
Bentzen, Lloyd (Tex.)	45922	240	McClellan, Joan L. (Ark.)	42353	3241
Biden, Joseph R., Jr. (Del.)	45042	440	McClure, James A. (Idaho)	42752	460
Brooke, Edward W. (Mass.)	42742	437	McGovern, George (S. Dak.)	42321	4241
Bumpers, Dale (Ark.)	44843	6313	McIntyre, Thomas J. (N.H.)	42341	105
Burdick, Quentin N. (N. Dak.)	42551	451	Magnuson, Warren G. (Wash.)	42521	127
Byrd, Harry F., Jr. (Va.)	44024	417	Mathias, Charles McC., Jr. (Md.)	44654	358
Byrd, Robert C. (W. Va.)	43954	133	Matsunaga, Spark M. (Hawaii)	46361	2121
Cannon, Howard W. (Nev.)	46244	259	Melcher, John (Mont.)	42644	313
Cas, Clifford P. (N.J.)	43224	315	Metcalf, Lee (Mont.)	42651	1121
Casper, John H. (R.I.)	42921	3215	Metzenbaure, Howard M. (Ohio)	42315	405
Chiles, Lawton (Fla.)	45274	2107	Morgan, Robert (N.C.)	43154	1251
Church, Frank (Idaho)	46142	245	Moynihan, Daniel Patrick (N.Y.)	44451	304
Clark, Dick (Iowa)	43254	404	Muskie, Edmund S. (Maine)	45344	145
Cranston, Alan (Calif.)	43553	452	Nelson, Gaylord (Wis.)	45323	221
Culver, John C. (Iowa)	43744	2327	Nunn, Sam (Ga.)	43521	110
Curtis, Carl T. (Nebr.)	44224	2213	Packwood, Bob (Oreg.)	45244	1317
Danforth, John G. (Mo.)	46154	229A	Pearson, James B. (Kans.)	44774	5313
DeConcini, Dennis (Ariz.)	44521	3121	Pell, Claiborne (R.I.)	44642	325
Dole, Robert (Kans.)	46521	4213	Percy, Charles H. (Ill.)	42152	4321
Domenech, Pete V. (N. Mex.)	46621	4107	Proxmire, William (Wis.)	45553	5241
Durkin, John A. (N.H.)	43324	3230	Randolph, Jennings (W. Va.)	46472	5121
Eagleton, Thomas F. (Mo.)	45721	1215	Ribicoff, Abraham (Conn.)	42823	337
Eastland, James O. (Miss.)	45054	2241	Riegle, Donald W. (Mich.)	44822	253
Ford, Wendell H. (Ky.)	44343	2104	Roth, William V., Jr. (Del.)	42441	4327
Garn, Jake (Utah)	45444	4203	Sarbanes, Paul S. (Md.)	44524	362
Glenn, John (Ohio)	43353	204	Sasser, James R. (Tenn.)	43344	229D
Goldwater, Barry (Ariz.)	42235	427	Schmitt, Harrison (Jack) (N. Mex.)	45521	5229
Gravel, Mike (Alaska)	46565	3317	Schweiker, Richard S. (Pa.)	44254	347
Gripen, Robert P. (Mich.)	46221	353	Scott, William Lloyd (Va.)	42023	3109
Hansen, Clifford P. (Wyo.)	43424	3229	Sparkman, John (Ala.)	44124	3203
Hart, Gary (Colo.)	45852	6327	Stafford, Robert T. (Vt.)	45141	5219
Haskell, Floyd K. (Colo.)	45941	4104	Stennis, John C. (Miss.)	46253	205
Hatch, Orrin G. (Utah)	45251	115A	Stevens, Ted (Alaska)	43004	411
Hatfield, Mark O. (Oreg.)	43753	463	Stevenson, Adlai E. (Ill.)	42854	456
Hatneway, William D. (Maine)	42523	248	Stone, Richard (Dick) (Fla.)	43041	1327
Hayakawa, S. I. (Sam) (Calif.)	43841	6221	Talmadge, Herman E. (Ga.)	43643	109
Holoz, H. John, III (Pa.)	46324	260	Thurmond, Strom (S.C.)	45972	209
Holms, Jesse A. (N.C.)	46342	5107	Tower, John (Tex.)	42934	142
Hollings, Ernest F. (S.C.)	46121	115	Wallop, Malcolm (Wyo.)	46141	344
Huddleston, Walter (Ky.)	42541	3327	Weicker, Lowell P., Jr. (Conn.)	44041	312
Humphrey, Hubert H. (Minn.)	43244	232	Williams, Harrison A., Jr. (N.J.)	44744	352
Inouye, Daniel K. (Hawaii)	43934	442	Young, Milton R. (N. Dak.)	42043	5205
			Zorinsky, Edward (Nebr.)	46551	1407

Independent

April 7, 1977

BACKGROUND REPORT

STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS

MEMORANDUM FOR: EDITORS, NEWS DIRECTORS

FROM: MEDIA LIAISON OFFICE
THE WHITE HOUSE

This is a background report on the U. S. proposals on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and a description of the U. S. position presented to the Soviet Union by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance.

We hope this information is useful to you in forming your evaluation and backgrounding your readers and audiences on the arms limitation talks.

If you have any questions or comments, or need further information, please contact the Media Liaison Office, 202/456-2947, 6623, or 2863.

QUESTION: What were the main features of the U. S. proposal?

ANSWER: The U. S. made two proposals to the Soviets. The features of the first proposal are:

- A reduction in the aggregate number of strategic systems from 2400 to somewhere between 1800-2000.
- A reduction in the Vladivostok level for MIRVed missiles from 1320 to somewhere between 1100-1200.
- A freeze on deployment of new ICBMs; a ban on modification of existing ICBMs; a limit on the number of annual flight tests allowed for ICBMs. This was meant to result in a common limit of 550 land-based MIRVed missiles.

-MORE-

(OVER)

- A reduction in the number of large ballistic missiles (particularly the SS-9 and SS-18), which only the Soviets possess, from the current level of 308 to a new level of 150.
- Assurance that the new Soviet Backfire bomber would not be used as a strategic weapon.
- And finally a ban on cruise missiles of ranges sufficient to provide independent strategic capability.

The second proposal was to accept the overall numerical limit and the MIRV sub-limits of the Vladivostok accord and to defer the Backfire and cruise missile issues for later negotiations.

We told the Soviet Union that we would accept certain forms of assurances that the Backfire would not be used as a strategic weapon. We are prepared to negotiate the exact form of these limitations in the framework of a proposal to ban all strategic cruise missiles.

The U. S. comprehensive approach is intended to produce real constraints on the strategic arms programs of both countries, and to make a first step towards reduced dependence on nuclear systems. We want to tailor reductions and other constraints to reduce the vulnerability of land-based ICBMs, as this is a major potential source of strategic instability between the sides.

QUESTION: Was the Soviet rejection a result of miscalculations on the part of the United States?

ANSWER: The Soviet rejection of the proposals made by Secretary Vance in Moscow was not a result of miscalculations on the part of the U. S. We knew that they might reject our proposals; but we also knew that initial rejection by the Soviets is not necessarily ultimate rejection. The Soviets initially have rejected proposals before only to accept them later on; the initial proposal to limit ABMs is a case in point.

QUESTION: Was the U. S. proposal unfair to the Soviet Union?

ANSWER: The U. S. proposal was fair because it provided for essential equivalence in U. S. - U.S.S.R. strategic forces. With MIRVed ICBMs, for instance, it proposed that both sides would be limited to the same level -- 550. The Soviets would end up with a reduced advantage in throw weight (total launching tonnage), but an advantage nonetheless. The U. S. would probably retain an advantage in the number of warheads -- but a reduced advantage. In fact, with 550 MIRVed land-based missiles, the Soviet Union would have about a 2 to 1 advantage in warheads on land-based ICBMs.

The point is that both sides would have fewer strategic weapons and the situation would be more stable. Furthermore, the question of qualitative improvement, which none of the previous agreements touched, is seriously addressed. We are also prepared to reach a compromise on the issue of how to treat the Backfire bomber, and proposed a reasonable solution to differentiate between tactical and strategic cruise missiles on the basis of their range.

QUESTION: What about the idea that we asked them to destroy a lot of missiles in return for our commitment to forego development of our missiles? Was that unfair?

ANSWER: Our first proposal involved the destruction of large numbers of strategic systems on both sides. In our case, the bulk of the systems that would be eliminated would be our older bombers; in their case, older missiles. It is true that the Soviets would have to get rid of more systems than we would, but that is inevitable, given the somewhat larger numbers of their forces and the fact that a fair agreement should allow equal numbers of forces for both sides.

-MORE-

We attempted very deliberately to forego those elements in our strategic posture which threaten the Soviets the most, and we made proposals to them that they forego those elements in their strategic posture which threaten us the most.

The alternative is for us to build an additional number of missiles so we can both destroy the same number. That's not a very logical approach if we're both serious about equity.

QUESTION: Did we surprise the Soviets with our deep-cut proposals?

ANSWER: No. Before his Inauguration, President Carter notified General Secretary Brezhnev that he intended to propose deep cuts in the overall numbers of missiles. He made the same comments publicly and to Ambassador Dobrynin well before Secretary Vance left for Moscow. Perhaps the Soviets were surprised that the President meant what he said, but they should not have been.

QUESTION: Are the Soviets upset by open diplomacy?

ANSWER: Perhaps, but it is important that the public understand the basic principles of what we are trying to accomplish on SALT. Only in that way can a final agreement have broad support and contribute to an improvement in relations between the two countries. We are not posturing or engaging in propaganda. We are serious in seeking a real change in the impending strategic relationship.

If we are prohibited from explaining our actions to Congress and the country, then we will always negotiate without assured support. We cannot allow ourselves to be put in such a position of negotiating from weakness. At the same time we do not plan to negotiate in public and recognize obviously that a measure of privacy is necessary for give and take in a negotiation.

-MORE-

QUESTION: Did President Ford and Secretary Kissinger, as the Soviets claim, agree to place limits on cruise missile production while allowing the Soviet Union to go into unrestricted production of the Intercontinental Backfire bomber?

ANSWER: It is our understanding that both of these issues -- cruise missiles and Backfire -- arose after the meeting at Vladivostok; in any case, they have been the subject of extensive negotiations since then. Our proposal, to defer them, is consistent with our understanding of the basic accord reached between President Ford and Brezhnev and takes into account the fact that no agreements were reached on these questions in the last 2½ years.

QUESTION: Besides the presentation of our SALT proposals, and the opening of discussions what else was accomplished?

ANSWER: Several important things. It was agreed to discuss eight arms control issues:

- Measures to prohibit interference with space satellites.
- A comprehensive ban on nuclear explosions.
- Mutual restraint in military activity in the Indian Ocean.
- Restraint and limitations on transfer of conventional weapons to third countries.
- Nonproliferation of nuclear weapons capability.
- Examination of a ban on radiological warfare and continuation of negotiations on limiting chemical weapons.
- The civil defense programs of both countries.

In addition, the President hopes that both sides will discuss in depth the establishment of a data base system whereby the United States and the Soviet Union would advise each other of their respective levels of strategic armaments, and have methods of verifying the accuracy of such reports.

SALT TREATY - TARGET STATES

State	Both Senators Probably Support	Both Senators Undecided	One Senator Probably Supports	One Senator Undecided	Some Chance Both Senators	Some Chance One Senator	No Chance Either Senator
ALABAMA			Sparkman			Allen	
ALASKA			Gravel			Stevens	
ARIZONA				DeConcini		Goldwater	
ARKANSAS			Bumpers	McClellan			
CALIFORNIA			Cranston			Hayakawa	
COLORADO	Hart Haskell						
CONNECTICUT			Ribicoff	Weicker			
DELAWARE			Biden	Roth			
FLORIDA					Chiles Stone		
GEORGIA					Talmadge Nunn		
HAWAII			Matsunaga	Inouye			
IDAHO			Church			McClure	
ILLINOIS			Stevenson	Percy			
INDIANA			Bayh			Lugar	
IOWA	Clark Culver						
KANSAS			Pearson			Dole	

SALT TREATY - TARGET STATES

-2

State	Both Senators Probably Support	Both Senators Undecided	One Senator Probably Supports	One Senator Undecided	Some Chance Both Senators	Some Chance One Senator	No Chance Either Senator
KENTUCKY					Huddleston Ford		
LOUISIANA					Long Johnston		
MAINE	Muskie Hathaway						
MARYLAND	Sarbanes Mathias						
MASSACHUSETTS	Kennedy Brooke						
MICHIGAN			Riegle			Griffin	
MINNESOTA	Humphrey Anderson						
MISSISSIPPI					Eastland Stennis		
MISSOURI			Eagleton			Danforth	
MONTANA		Metcalf Melcher					
NEBRASKA					Zorinsky Curtis		
NEVADA				Cannon		Laxalt	
NEW HAMPSHIRE	McIntyre Durkin						
NEW JERSEY	Williams Case						
NEW MEXICO					Domenici Schmitt		
NEW YORK	Javits			Moynihan			

SALT TREATY - TARGET STATES

-3

State	Both Senators Probably Support	Both Senators Undecided	One Senator Probably Supports	One Senator Undecided	Some Chance Both Senators	Some Chance One Senator	No Chance Either Senator Helms
NORTH CAROLINA			Morgan				
NORTH DAKOTA			Burdick	Young			
OHIO			Metzenbaum	Glenn			
OKLAHOMA				Bellmon		Bartlett	
OREGON			Hatfield	Packwood			
PENNSYLVANIA					Heinz Schweiker		
RHODE ISLAND			Pell	Chafee			
SOUTH CAROLINA				Hollings		Thurmond	
SOUTH DAKOTA	McGovern Abourezk						
TENNESSEE			Sasser	Baker			
TEXAS				Bentsen		Tower	
UTAH					Garn Hatch		
VERMONT			Leahy	Stafford			
VIRGINIA					Byrd Scott		
WASHINGTON		Jackson Magnuson					
WEST VIRGINIA		Byrd Randolph					

SALT TREATY - TARGET STATES

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM TO HAMILTON JORDAN

FROM : LONDON BUTLER

DATE: JUNE 3, 1977

SUBJECT: SALT

Here is a check list of items for your Memorandum (I can expand them if you wish):

CONSULTATION

1. President/Secretary Vance meetings with Senate leadership (on-going).
2. Special treatment for Sam Nunn.
3. State Department briefings for Bumpers, Hart, Chafee, Culver, and Sarbanes.
4. Invitations to Senators to attend Geneva negotiations.

I am tracking the above Senate consultations on a chart in my office. In addition, I would recommend the following further consultations:

5. Harold Brown should invite a number of "hard-line" leaders (Lane Kirkland, Paul Nitze, Eugene Rostow, Dean Rusk, etc.) for a general meeting with the President.
6. The National Security Council should brief a number of "progressive" leaders (Father Hesbergh, David Cohen, Russ Peterson, Carl Marcy, etc.).

PUBLIC EDUCATION

1. Reconstitute the General Advisory Committee of ACDA to reach out to geographic regions and groups which have not normally been a part of the arms control debate. I now have substantial agreement on the membership of this Committee.
2. Jody's out-of-town press briefings. I have already talked with Walt Wurfel about these, and we can target these briefings to stress states with Senate swing votes.
3. Speaking tours. Vance, Christopher, Brown, and Warnke should be encouraged to speak regularly in the states with Senate swing votes.

4. At an appropriate time, when over exposure is no longer a consideration, the President should consider a Town Hall Meeting on foreign policy in a "conservative" setting (Omaha, for example).
5. A film in support of arms control should be produced. Jerry Rafshoon is meeting with a group to begin work on this on Tuesday.
6. Direct Mail. Greg and Joel McCleary are putting together a proposal now. Direct mail will have to be used very carefully, if at all.

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INFO AMEMBASSY WASHINGTON
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AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
AMEMBASSY RAHAT
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDAH
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UNCLAS SECTION 1 OF 3

DEPARTMENT FOR EX
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GENEVA FOR EPA
E.O. 11552: 1/1
SUBJ: MEDIA REACTION ((C)) PRESS REVIEW AUGUST 16, 1977 ((193-77))

1. SUMMARY: MEDIA CAP TOGETHER DAYAN'S COMING MISSION TO THE U.S. AND ASHRAF IS REPORTED STAND ON THE PALESTINIAN, THE PLO AND THE FUTURE OF THE WEST BANK, SAY THAT THE LATTER DOES NOT LEAVE THE FOREIGN A GREAT DEAL OF CHANCE TO CONCLUDE HIS MISSION SUCCESSFULLY. MEDIA ARE ALMOST UNANIMOUSLY CRITICAL OF THE LATEST AMERICAN DECLARATIONS ON THE PALESTINIANS. END SUMMARY.

2. A CARTOON IN HAFARETZ BY ZEEV SHOWS A BUT-SKAPED, HUGE

*****-HSR COMMENT*****

WIACT, SPECTER

PSN:27226 PAGE 1 TOR:259/16145Z DTG:161452Z SEP 77

CLIPPING TIME. I AM WAITING FOR FOMMIA DAYAN AT THE WHITE HOUSE EXTRA DE. ANOTHER CARTOON, BY POST'S "DRY BONES," HAS PRESIDENT SADAT CALLING YASSER ARAFAT AND TELLING HIM, "LOOK...CARTER MADE HIS "MORE MODERATE" SPEECH AND YOU REJECTED 242. NOW CARTER IS CALLING FOR PALESTINIAN PARTICIPATION IN GENEVA. NOW YOU'VE GOT TO SAY SOMETHING MODERATE!" HE IS NOT GOING TO SEND AN INVITATION WITH A SILENT RIFLE ON IT!!" BUT AT THAT VERY MOMENT PRESIDENT CARTER IS ASKING "ZIGIE" TO "HOLD YOUR FINGER HERE WHILE I TIE THIS ONE."

3. BERTA ACCOMPANY FOMMIA DAYAN ON HIS WAY TO THE U.S. FROM BRUSSELS, THE ISRAELI RADIO REPORTED THIS MORNING THAT DAYAN SAID THAT "ISRAEL AND THE U.S. ARE IN BASIC CONFLICT OVER THE FUTURE OF THE WEST BANK..." PRESS REPORTS THAT DAYAN ALSO SAID "IT IS BETTER TO OPPOSE A PALESTINIAN STATE AND RISK A WAR NOW, THAN ACCEPT SUCH A STATE AND GO TO WAR TEN YEARS HENCE UNDER FAR WORSE SECURITY CONDITIONS." AMRI IS GOLAN SAYS THAT SPEAKING WITH JEWISH LEADERS FROM ESTER 1977, DAYAN SAID HE WOULD BE "MORE WORRIED ABOUT THE LACK OF SUPPORT FROM THE JEWISH PEOPLE THAN ABOUT AMERICAN PRESSURE."

4. HATARETZIS WFO SAYS HE LEARNED FROM "KNOWLEDGEABLE SOURCES" IN WASHINGTON THAT "HUSSEIN HAS REJECTED THE GUIDELINES OF DAYAN'S PLAN FOR THE WEST BANK." ON THE OTHER HAND, "THE ADMINISTRATION...SEES IT AS PRELIMINARY PROPOSAL WHICH COULD PROVIDE AN INITIAL BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS. THE PLAN'S MAJOR OUTLINES CALL FOR THE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY TO REMAIN OPEN UNTIL THE FINAL STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. ISRAEL WILL LIMIT ITS PRESENCE ON THE WEST BANK TO ONLY THE STRATEGIC SPOTS, WHILE THE ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY WILL BE HANDLED OVER TO JORDAN...BUT UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES, AT OVER IN THE CASE OF FULL PEACE, WILL THE WEST BANK BE MADE PART OF JORDAN." MARCUS QUOTES AN UNNAMED "SENIOR AMERICAN SOURCE" AS HAVING NOTED THAT "THIS PLAN TURNS KING HUSSEIN INTO A DOG ON A LEASH."

5. USING THE EDITORIAL PAGE, MARCUS PROVIDES A SITUATION REPORT ON THE EVE OF DAYAN'S U.S. TALKS. HE ARGUES THAT AS THINGS STAND NOW, "THE ARABS ARE STILL WILLING TO MAKE PEACE WITH ISRAEL OR RECOGNIZE ITS EXISTENCE. AT BEST, THEY ARE PREPARED TO PUT UP WITH IT." BY THE WAY, MARCUS ASKERS "HAS U.S. PUBLIC OPINION AND ADMINISTRATION TURNED AGAINST ISRAEL?" THE ANSWER, AS PROVIDED BY "A SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL" IS "THE ARABS ARE MAKING THEM RIGHT SO THERE ARE NOISES," WHILE ISRAEL HAS BEEN MAKING THE WRONG NOISES, ESPECIALLY ON THE SETTLEMENT ISSUE. MARCUS GOES AS FAR AS TO SAY THAT "IN VIEW OF THOSE WRONG NOISES AND SOUNDS WE HAVE BEEN MAKING, DAYAN'S MISSION HERE SEEMS AN IMPOSSIBLE ONE."

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UNCLAS SECTION 2 OF 3

6. KARPINIS DISSENCHIK STRESSES "THE DIFFICULT TALKS DAYAN IS FACING WITH PRESIDENT CARTER AND SECRETARY VANCE." ACCORDING TO THE WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT, "U.S.- ISRAEL CONFRONTATION HAS SHIFTED TO HIGH GEAR. THE GULF IS WIDE, THE VIEWS SO CONFLICTING THAT FINDING COULD SEEMINGLY BRIDGE THEM." DISSENCHIK SAYS THAT "ONLY A FEW PEOPLE IN THE U.S. STILL REMEMBER REGINIS VISIT, FOR HE IS THE PRESS WITH HIS WIT AND INTEGRITY. ISRAEL IS AGAIN BEING PROJECTED AS AN INTRANSIGENT COUNTRY STRIVING ONLY TO ANNEX JUDEA, SAMARIA AND THE GAZA STRIP. IT IS NOT THAT ISRAEL'S VOICE IS NOT BEING HEARD IN THE U.S. BUT ITS CHIEF SPOKESMAN SEEMS TO BE MINISTER SHARON, CONSIDERED TO BE THE HARGLINER OF THE LOT." FURTHERMORE DISSENCHIK NOTES THAT "DAYAN IS GOING TO HAVE TO DEAL WITH A U.S. PRESIDENT WHO IS SAID TO HAVE BEEN HIT IN THE FACE BY REGINIS REFUSAL TO STOP JEWISH SETTLEMENTS IN TERRITORIES ...A PRESIDENT WHOSE REQUESTS HAVE SO MANY TIMES BEEN TURNED DOWN THAT HE FEELS AS IF ISRAEL HAS BEEN DEFYING HIM..."

EVEN FORTY BY THEN. UNLESS BEGIN SHOULD CHANGE HIS GOVERNMENT'S POLICIES ON THE SETTLEMENT ISSUE, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT CARTER WOULD ROLL OUT A VERY RED CARPET FOR HIM THE NEXT TIME HE COMES TO WASHINGTON. IN FACT, SOME ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS SAY CARTER IS SO MAD AT BEGIN THAT HE WOULD RATHER NOT SEE HIM AT ALL IN THE NEAR FUTURE." (SOURCES NOT SPECIFIED.)

12. JERUSALEM SETTLEMENTS IN TERRITORIES.

A) ISRAEL RADIO REPORTED THIS MORNING THAT "SETTLEMENT PLAN ON WEST BANK HAS BEEN POSTPONED, FOLLOWING POUMIN DAYAN'S INSTRUCTION TO THE MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE ON SETTLEMENT NOT TO EXPROPRIATE LAND IN JUDEA AND SAMARIA UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE." RADIO ADDED THAT THIS HAS IMMEDIATE BEARING ON TWO URBAN SETTLEMENTS SCHEDULED TO GO UP IN THE NEAR FUTURE IN THE JERUSALEM REGION.

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USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY JORDAN
AMEMBASSY PARAT
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JERUSALEM
USIS/LOLON
USMISSION NEW YORK
USMISSION ROME
CIA HAS-DC

UNCLAS SECTION 2 OF 3

B) ISRAELI T.V. CHANNEL 10 SAY THAT RABBI ZVI COOK, "THE SPIRITUAL LEADER OF GUSH EMUNIM," CALLED IN A PUBLIC STATEMENT ISSUED ON NEW YEAR'S EVE OF GUSH EMUNIM TO "SETTLE ONLY AFTER ADVANCE COORDINATION WITH THE GOVERNMENT." A GUSH EMUNIM SPOKESMAN REPORTEDLY CONFIRMED RECEIPT OF THE MESSAGE, SAID HIS ORGANIZATION APPROVED OF IT, "AS SYMPATHETIC TO BOTH THE COUNTRY'S NEEDS AND THE POLITICAL SITUATION."

C) FOREIGN PRESS IS REPORTED TO HAVE TOLD JEWISH LEADERS IN BRUSSELS THAT "ISRAEL'S BOUNDARIES ARE GOING TO BE DETERMINED NOT BY JEWISH SETTLEMENTS BUT THROUGH THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS."

D) YERUSHALAYIM SAYING SAYS THAT "MINISTER SHARON'S STATEMENTS ON WEST BANK SETTLEMENTS HAVE GENERATED A LOT OF BAD BLOOD IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE. MR. BEGIN HIMSELF HAS MADE NO SECRET OF HIS AVERSION TO SHARON'S REMARKS. SOME MINISTERS GOT MAD TO THE POINT OF ASKING WHEN IS BEGIN GOING TO STOP THIS FRENZIED SHARON?"

E) NAJARETZIS LITVINSKY SAYS "IT IS WRONG TO LIKEN SHARON TO A BULL IN A CHINA SHOP. HE MAY BE A BULL, BUT RIGHT NOW HE IS ROAMING IN HIS NATURAL ENVIRONMENT - THE JUNGLE...MR. SHARON EXPRESSES THE LINE AND POLICY STATED PUBLICLY BY PREMIER REGIN, REGARDLESS OF HOW HARD DAYAN AND EITZMAN TRY TO WHITENASH IT."

13. TORTURE OF ARAB PRISONERS IN TERRITORIES: PRESS AND TV PLAY UP AS "ADVISE" TO ISRAEL TO ALLOW AN INTERNATIONAL DELEGATION TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF TORTURE.

A) NAJARETZ SAYS THAT "ISRAELI REPRESENTATIVES NOTED THAT THEY HAVE NEVER HEARD OF THE SWISS GROUP WHICH HAS MADE THOSE ALLEGATIONS, HAVE NEVER BEEN APPROACHED BY THE LEAGUE FOR INFORMATION, WHICH WAS GATHERED ONLY FROM ANTI-ISRAELI ELEMENTS."

B) PORTIS BLITZER SAYS THAT "THE STATE DEPARTMENT SAID PRESIDENT CARTER MIGHT POSSIBLY RAISE THE QUESTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS ON THE WEST BANK DURING HIS TALKS WITH DAYAN."

C) ZAVAK'S CLOCK STATES THAT "CIRCLES AROUND THE PRIME MINISTER LAST NIGHT DENIED A REPORT THAT MR. REGIN HAS ORDERED THAT THE TORTURE OF PRISONERS IN THE TERRITORIES BE STOPPED, THE CIRCLES STRESSED THAT SUCH AN ORDER HAS NEVER BEEN ISSUED...AS HE HAS BEEN ASSURED THAT THE CHARGES ARE WITHOUT FOUNDATION."

D) AL-HAKISHMARIS STORY REPORTS THAT "JERUSALEM HAS WELCOMED HODGING CARTER'S REJECTION OF THE CHARGES LEVIED AGAINST ISRAEL BY A SWISS LEAGUE ON THE TORTURE OF WEST BANK DETENUEES."

E) NAARIVIS ZAPHEL SAYS THAT "THE U.S. CONSULATE IN EAST JERUSALEM HAS BEEN LOOKING INTO" THE ISSUE, "HAS BEEN GATHERING DATA FROM VARIOUS SOURCES, INCLUDING THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND POLICE... ARAB LAWYERS AND OTHER OFFICIALS IN EAST JERUSALEM AND ON THE WEST BANK COPELAND THAT THEY HAVE REPORTED TO THE CONSULATE ALL THEY KNOW OF THE ISSUE - AS IT WAS TOLD THEM BY THE PRISONERS."

14. INFLUENCE COVERAGE:

A) NAARIVIS REL REPORTS FROM N.Y. OF "A SECRET UNDERSTANDING REACHED BETWEEN THE U.S. AND SAUDI ARABIA ON THE NEED TO PRESURE ISRAEL INTO MAKING MAJOR CONCESSIONS." BEN ADDS THAT "UNLESS DAYAN ARRIVES AT SOME MEETING OF THE MINDS WITH PRESIDENT CARTER, THE U.S. MIGHT JOIN AN ANTI-SETTLEMENTS RESOLUTION AT THE U.N." ("UNKNOWLEDGEABLE SOURCES AT THE U.N." ARE QUOTED.)

B) IN ANOTHER STORY BEN SAYS THAT "AMERICAN JEWS DO NOT UNDERSTAND WHY ISRAELI OBJECTS TO A UNIFIED ARAB DELEGATION IN GENEVA." QUOTING "AN ISRAELI JEWISH LEADER," BEN SAYS THAT "THE MAIN COMPLAINT THAT ISRAELI STAFF HAS NOT BEEN WELL EXPLAINED... REGIN HAS NEGLECTED TO INFORM U.S. JEWRY." WRITER ADDS IN A FOOTNOTE THAT "IN PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS, U.S. DIPLOMATS SAY OPENLY THAT ALTHOUGH THEY NEVER MENTION IN PUBLIC THE WORD 'PLO', USE THE TERM 'PALESTINIAN' INSTEAD, THEY FEEL THAT RIGHT NOW THE TWO ARE IDENTICAL." (SOURCE NOT SPECIFIED.)

C) QUOTING "SOURCES CLOSE TO THE ISRAELI MINISTER OF FINANCE," NAARIVIS DISSEMINATES SAYS THAT "THE U.S. HAS AGREED TO GRANT

*****U C L A S S I F I E D*****S COPY

ISRAEL \$100 MILLION IN CASH...THIS BRINGS TO \$320 MILLION THE TOTAL AMOUNT IN CASH ISRAEL HAS RECEIVED FROM THE U.S. MAN UN- PRECEDENTED AMOUNT AS FAR AS AMERICA'S FOREIGN ASSISTANCE IS CONCERNED." THE REPORT ADDS THAT "THE U.S. HAS BEEN PARTICULARLY GENEROUS IN VIEW OF THE UNEMPLOYMENT CRISIS IT IS GOING THROUGH IN THESE LAST YEARS."

D) IN AN ARTICLE PUBLISHED BY HAARIV, DEPUTY MINISTER OF DEFENSE, MORDECHAI ZIPORI, SAID THAT "FOR THE FIRST TIME ISRAEL IS WORKING ON THE DEFINITION OF OBJECTIVES OF WAR." THE DEPUTY MINISTER DID NOT ELABORATE.

HITCHCOCK

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Congress of the United States
House of Representatives

Washington, D.C. 20515

November 2, 1977

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CONGRESSIONAL
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NOV 8 1977

log ret'd by P. on 11/4

The Honorable Jimmy Carter
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

We have had the opportunity to review the central features of the emerging strategic arms agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union. On the basis of that review we write to you now, respectfully, privately, and with candor, to indicate our strong reservations and deep concern.

In particular we believe that:

1) The Soviets are permitted to retain sufficient strategic capability to pose a severe potential threat to the survival of the American Minuteman force in the 1980s. The newly negotiated sublimit on land-based, Mirved ICBMs, while a step in the right direction, is much too high a limit to mitigate the projected threat during this period. We believe that the protection of our land-based force is central to continuing strategic stability. Even the perception that our force is vulnerable could, particularly during moments of crisis, have extremely dangerous military and political consequences.

2) Key elements of the agreement present large and in several cases unresolvable problems of verification. This can be only harmful since, in our view, high quality verification is the cornerstone of meaningful arms control and the basis for long-term public and Congressional acceptance of the SALT process.

It is unclear to us, for example, how we can confidently verify the range of a cruise missile or, for that matter, determine whether an allegedly unarmed reconnaissance vehicle is indeed "unarmed." With respect to the Backfire bomber, we are dubious of the benefits of accepting Soviet pledges that the bomber will not be used in a strategic role. Such pledges would count for little in times of actual crisis or hostility. Equally tenuous are the constraints that have been suggested as means of enhancing this pledge. What matters is the existence of a potential capability that is rapidly exploitable in time of war, not constraints on peacetime operational practice.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

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Jay

5/30/80

The Honorable Jimmy Carter
November 2, 1977
Page 2

3) Limitations in the Protocol adversely affect our long-term defense posture in Europe and, potentially, our relationship with important NATO allies. The 600 kilometer range constraint, for example, greatly impedes our efforts to revitalize the NATO alliance. Without more adequate range, the cruise missile will be unable to circumvent heavily defended areas, to reach valuable Warsaw Pact targets, and to find greater protection through basing on more distant and therefore less vulnerable platforms. Moreover, we see little justice in an agreement that constrains our most promising theater-oriented system, while letting new, lethal, and longer ranged Soviet systems--the Backfire and the SS-20--go free. Should we actually accept Soviet proposals to prohibit the transfer of needed cruise technology to our allies, the asymmetry of this situation will become even more pronounced.

The fact that these restrictions are contained within the Protocol rather than the Treaty itself does little to reduce our concern. We believe that the limits agreed to will inevitably constitute an important precedent, that these limits will prejudice Congressional judgments on r&d and procurement during the period of the Protocol, and that a change in the U.S. position at the end of this period will, realistically, have to be purchased either at the price of new concessions in another area, or at the risk of some purportedly equivalent break-out by the Soviets themselves. Indeed we question whether the U.S. will have sufficient leverage at that point to revise the Protocol in an acceptable way; is it not more likely that the Soviets, with an entirely new generation of ICBMs already under way, will be able to dominate any negotiations over revision.

Many additional points could be made of course regarding the cruise missile. Clearly it promises to improve allied options, to minimize, through its superior accuracy, the net destructiveness of war, to divert Soviet resources from destabilizing, first strike weaponry, and, in accord with your larger aims, to raise the nuclear threshold.

We have the greatest respect for your determination to reduce the perils of the nuclear age. Many of us have ourselves labored long in the service of this same objective and have enthusiastically supported other aspects of your nuclear control policies. But the terms of the SALT agreement now under discussion seem to us to be fundamentally unequal and are likely to be so perceived by very many of our colleagues in the Congress. We feel it would be a disservice to you and to the best interest of U.S. foreign policy for us to remain silent while there is still time for us, cooperatively, to find solutions that will help to avert a protracted and damaging debate.

The Honorable Jimmy Carter
November 2, 1977
Page 3

We thank you in advance for giving attention to this matter.

Sincerely yours,

Walter P. Rife
Charles E. Blum
Bob Wilson
Bill Whitehurst
Jack Edwards

Clement Zablocki
Wm. Brownfield
Paul Freidley
Chas. Wilson

Signatures

Melvin Price
Chairman
House Armed Services
Committee

Charles E. Bennett
House Armed Services
Committee

Bob Wilson
Ranking Minority Member
House Armed Services
Committee

Charles H. Wilson
House Armed Services
Committee

G. William Whitehurst
House Armed Services
Committee

Clement J. Zablocki
Chairman
House International Relations
Committee

William Broomfield
Ranking Minority Member
House International Relations
Committee

Paul Findley
House International Relations
Committee

Jack Edwards
Ranking Minority Member
House Subcommittee on
Defense Appropriations

November 17, 1977

~~SECRET~~

TO: PRESIDENT CARTER
FROM: HAMILTON JORDAN AND FRANK MOORE *HJ. FM.*
RE: POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE SALT TREATY

We have tried to outline in this memorandum some of the political considerations and scheduling problems which surround the SALT II negotiations.

We feel that you should have this material and review it prior to your meeting Thursday.

"DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
CANCELLED PER E.O. 12956, SEC. 1.3 AND
ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF MARCH 14, 1993"

SUPPORT FOR SALT II IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE

We should not underestimate the difficulty we will have getting a SALT II Treaty ratified by two-thirds of the United States Senate regardless of the merits of our new proposal. The philosophical differences which exist in the Senate on the question of arms control are real, deep, and should not be minimized.*

The confirmation vote on Paul Warnke as SALT negotiator is the best clue to the political and philosophical divisions that exist in the Senate on the basic question of arms control. An analysis of that Senate vote is instructive and necessary for appreciating the difficulty which we face on this issue.

*For that reason, another option for practical enactment of the new SALT agreement is presented in a later section.

The Warnke nomination received 58 votes for confirmation, nine short of the two-thirds vote we will need to ratify a SALT II Treaty in the Senate.

The persons and/or groups who opposed Warnke were:

Republicans. Out of 38 Republican Senators, 28 opposed Warnke. The support we received from the Republicans was in the first months of the new Administration on a nomination. As the vote on the SALT II proposal will come in the middle of an election year on a complex substantive issue, I believe that you would have to assume that the SALT II debate will be more partisan than the Warnke nomination.

Southern Democrats. Out of eleven Democratic votes against Warnke, seven were Southern Senators.

If you assumed that we could hold the same votes we received on the Warnke nomination, we will still be

nine votes short of the two-thirds we would need to ratify the treaty. And a close analysis of those who supported Warnke would suggest that it will be very difficult to hold all of these same Senators on a SALT II Treaty.

The following Senators supported the Warnke nomination but would have to be considered "marginal" on a SALT II vote:

- Bentsen, Texas
- Bumpers, Arkansas
- Ford, Kentucky
- Eastland, Mississippi
- Hollings, South Carolina
- Johnston, Louisiana
- Long, Louisiana
- McClelland, Arkansas

- Morgan, North Carolina
- Sasser, Tennessee
- Sparkman, Alabama

It is impossible to avoid the conclusion that a hotly debated SALT II Treaty will divide the Senate along traditional party and philosophical lines with the outcome determined by Democratic Senators from Southern and Border states.

To obtain a two-thirds vote, we will have to:

- 1) Hold the votes of the Republican Senators who supported the Warnke nomination in spite of the fact it is an election year;
- 2) Hold all of the Southern and Border state Democrats who supported Warnke; and
- 3) Pick up an additional nine votes.

RATIFICATION OPTIONS

Although we have all assumed that the SALT II agreement would be presented to the United States Senate for consideration as a "treaty", there are other options which should be explored.

Section 33 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act requires that a SALT II agreement be either:

- (a) a "treaty" requiring a two-thirds majority of the Senate, or
- (b) an Executive Agreement approved by Congressional legislation (majorities of both houses).

There are no precise rules for choosing between these two forms. A treaty is more formal and generally is used for commitments of particular political sensitivity or importance, or which in practice have been in treaty form.

The 1972 ABM Agreement - one of the SALT I proposals - is a major permanent arms control agreement and was concluded as a "treaty."

The duration or permanence of the agreement and/or treaty is another factor. A "treaty" implies a permanent agreement not limited in its duration. An "agreement" has come to mean a temporary device that is less than permanent.

All of the recent multilateral arms control agreements have also been treaties - Limited Test Ban Treaty, Nuclear Nonproliferation, and others. The 1974 Bilateral Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions agreements were submitted to the Senate as "treaties."

The Executive Agreement authorized by statute tends to be employed for agreement of comparatively short duration. The 1972 Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms was an Executive Agreement. Congressional approval was requested and given in a Joint Congressional Resolution.

This agreement, which had a five year term, was universally regarded as a means of establishing beneficial arms limitations pending negotiation of a more permanent agreement.

Advantages and Disadvantages of an "Agreement"

Advantages

- Does not require a two-thirds vote in the Senate.
- Has the same force legally as a "treaty," but is considered less permanent.
- Allows both Houses to vote on SALT. This can be presented as positive feature and counter to charge that we lack support in the Senate for full treaty ratification.

Disadvantages

- Requires passage by both Houses during an election year.
- SALT opponents will charge that we lacked the political support we need in the Senate for ratification.

We have said all along that SALT II is only an intermediate step on the way to SALT III and that SALT III negotiations will begin immediately after SALT II is signed. In that sense, the non-permanent nature of an "agreement" seems entirely appropriate for the implementation of the SALT II proposal. It is certainly an option available to us that should be considered.

If we seek to obtain a two-thirds vote in the Senate on SALT II and fail, it will severely undermine the credibility of this Administration in foreign policy for the balance of your first term. As we presently analyze it, it will be very difficult to get a two-thirds vote in the Senate. Frank Moore and his staff believe that we probably go into SALT II with 45-48 votes in the Senate we can count on. Through a careful analysis, they can see 55-58 eventually. They have great difficulty seeing 65 or 67 votes for a treaty that is already hotly debated. With Jackson and Nunn actively supporting the SALT II proposal, ratification

is probable. With Jackson opposing the treaty, it will be difficult. If Jackson and Nunn both oppose, it will be impossible to get the two-thirds vote.

The "agreement" option should certainly be considered. We are on sound legal ground and it has the same legal force as a "treaty."*

*Frank Moore has spoken to the Speaker about this and he responded favorably to the idea of House consideration of SALT II.

PROBABLE TIMETABLE FOR SENATE CONSIDERATION OF SALT II

Everyone agrees that it would be a mistake to send the SALT II proposal to the Senate until they have completed action on the Panama Canal Treaty. The Foreign Relations Committee has primary jurisdiction for both treaties. When the Panama Canal Treaty is being debated and filibustered, members of the Foreign Relations Committee will be the leading proponents of the Panama Canal Treaty and floor managers for the ratification resolution. It will be impossible to get the Foreign Relations Committee to begin its active consideration of SALT II until the Panama Canal Treaty is voted on.

Frank Moore's staff has reconciled the Senate calendar with its legislative schedule, the planned holidays, and Byrd's intention to take up the Panama Canal Treaty early in the year.

J A N U A R Y						
SUNDAY	MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY	SATURDAY
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8	9	10	11	12	13	14
15	16	17	18	19	20	21
				Congress Reconvenes		
22	23	24	25	26	27	28
Conference Reports in the Senate. President's State of the Union Address.						
29	30	31				
Arms Service Committee likely to begin hearings on Panama Canal Treaty.						

Conference Reports in the Senate. President's
State of the Union Address.

Arms Service Committee likely to begin hearings on Panama Canal Treaty.

F E B R U A R Y

SUNDAY MONDAY TUESDAY WEDNESDAY THURSDAY FRIDAY SATURDAY

1 2 3 4

Senate Armed Services Committee continues hearing on Panama Canal Treaty. Probably concludes this week.

5 6 7 8 9 10 11

Armed Services completes work on Panama Canal Treaty. Panama Canal Treaty reported to Senate.

12 13 14 15 16 17 18

Lincoln Holidays scheduled for entire week. Congress will be out entire week.

19 20 21 22 23 24 25

Senate debate on Panama Canal Treaty begins with filibuster taking about ten days before cloture is attempted.

26 27 28

Filibuster will continue.

M A R C H

SUNDAY	MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY	SATURDAY
			1	2	3	4
			Filibuster on Panama Canal Treaty continues.			
5	6	7	8	9	10	11
	First effort to invoke cloture is likely. If invoked this week, two or three weeks of debate on reservations and amendments begins.					
12	13	14	15	16	17	18
	Floor debate on Panama Canal Treaty continues on amendments and reservations.					
19	20	21	22	23	24	25
	Floor debate on Panama Canal Treaty continues.				Easter Holiday begins.	
26	27	28	29	30	31	
	Easter Congressional recess continues.					

A P R I L

SUNDAY	MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY	SATURDAY
						1
2	3	4	5	6	7	8
If previous conservative analysis is generally correct, final vote could come this week.						
9	10	11	12	13	14	15
Final vote on Panama Canal Treaty might come this week if it didn't take place earlier.						
16	17	18	19	20	21	22
23	24	25	26	27	28	29

This calendar is a very conservative estimate. It assumes that no other legislative matters will disrupt the Panama Treaty debates and that cloture will be invoked very early in the filibuster. But the inevitable filibuster, the large number of Congressional holidays, and the plans of the Senate Armed Services Committee to hold brief hearings on the Panama Canal Treaty when the Congress returns next year all indicate that it will be at least early or mid-April before a final vote on the Panama Canal Treaty is taken.

If you apply this same general schedule to the SALT II proposal given the fact that it is an election year and there will be a great desire to get home soon and avoid controversial issues, it leads to the conclusion that it will be late in the session - if then - before a final vote on SALT II takes place.

And while there may be compelling foreign policy arguments for consummating the SALT II treaties soon and having a Summit Conference with Brezhnev at an early date, there are few - if any - good reasons for us either to be in a hurry or appear to be in a hurry. The SALT II proposals will not be formally considered by the Congress until late Spring at the earliest. I would think that appearing to be anxious would weaken our bargaining position with the Soviets on the remaining items being negotiated. Also, appearing to be in a hurry on SALT II supports the arguments of the opponents of SALT who say that the Administration "will do anything to get a SALT II treaty" and is being "out-traded by the Russians".

As the controlling factor for formal implementation
of SALT II is Congressional approval in some form
and since serious consideration of the proposal is
at least six months away, I would think that we could
modify our schedule for consummating SALT II in a way
that will allow us to take a tough position on the
remaining issues and undermine the charges of those
who claim we are too anxious and in a hurry. The
result, I would hope, would be a better SALT II
package and an improved atmosphere in the Congress.

TO WHITE HOUSE PRIORITY
USUAL PRIORITY

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WHITE HOUSE FOR KARL Inderfurth, JERROLD SCHECTER, JODY POWELL, TIM SMITH AND CLAUDIA TOWNSEND

NEWS FOR EDWIN PANCAST, IBS/P - ROOM 2069

IOP/FN - FOR WILLIAM STRICKER

IOP/FN - FOR WALTER KOHL

UN/N.Y. - FOR TOM OFFENBERGER, U.N. PLAZA

EARLY MORNING DIGEST OF FOREIGN MEDIA REACTION USIA,

OFFICE OF POLICY AND PLANS, 724-2057

///FYI EDITORS, THIS ITEM IS FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION AND BACKGROUND AND NOT FOR BROADCAST.///

FOREIGN MEDIA REACTION

MORNING DIGEST

8 A.M. EDT SEPTEMBER 16, 1977

DAYAN VISIT--IN ADVANCE OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER'S ARRIVAL HERE, MEDIA IN SEVERAL COUNTRIES FOCUSED ON DIFFICULTIES OF BRINGING MID-EAST NEGOTIATORS TOGETHER. A COMMENTATOR ON WEST GERMANY'S FIRST TELEVISION NETWORK STATED THAT DAYAN'S MISSION "IS CERTAINLY VERY DELICATE."

THE INDEPENDENT FINANCIAL TIMES OF LONDON SAID THAT DAYAN'S "SPECIFIC PEACE PROPOSALS...APPEAR LIKELY TO BRING ABOUT OPEN DISAGREEMENT WITH THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION AMID A CRESCENDO OF SYRIAN WARNINGS ABOUT THE INEVITABILITY OF WAR." THE PAPER REPORTED THE STATE DEPARTMENT "CONFIRMED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION IS EXPECTED TO PROPOSE PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF A COLLECTIVE ARAB DELEGATION WHICH WOULD INCLUDE DELEGATES PREPARED TO RECOGNIZE ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST. THIS WILL APPARENTLY BE THE MAIN APPROACH ADOPTED BY (CARTER AND VANCE) WHEN THEY MEET ISRAELI AND ARAB FOREIGN MINISTERS...."

THE CONSERVATIVE DAILY TELEGRAPH'S WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION "WILL INSIST (ON) ...PALESTINIAN PARTICIPATION IN ANY GENEVA PEACE CONFERENCE," AND THAT "THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION IS DISTURBED

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AT THE WAY IN WHICH MR. BEGIN'S GOVERNMENT...KEEPS AIRING ATTACHED TO HAND ON TO THE WEST BANK BY E.C.

WASHINGTON AS A CALCULATED GAMBIT... THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT APPEARS TO BE COUNTING ON THE POLITICALLY POTENT JEWISH VOTE IN THE U.S. TO FORCE MR. CARTER TO BACK DOWN."

FIGARO OF PARIS SAID "THE (DAYAN) VISIT... REPRESENTS THE ONLY HOPE FOR THE (GENEVA) CONFERENCE. THE TERRITORIAL WITHDRAWALS WHICH HE WILL PRESENT TO AMERICAN LEADERS ARE PERHAPS A FIRST STEP TOWARD A DISTANT, UNCERTAINLY, BUT AT LAST A POSSIBLE PEACE."

EUROPEAN SATELLITE FAILURE--COMMENT ON THE ABORTIVE LAUNCH OF THE OTS, HERETOFORE NOTED ONLY IN FRANCE, MADE ITS APPEARANCE IN TWO WEST GERMAN PAPERS AND ONE IN SWITZERLAND.

WEST GERMANY'S MUENCHNER MERKUR CITED SWITZERLAND'S BASLER NACHRICHTEN AS SAYING "THE AMERICANS HAVE MANAGED TO SPOIL EVERY FOURTH EUROPEAN SATELLITE THEY HAVE LAUNCHED," BUT ONLY ONE IN A HUNDRED U.S. TESTS HAD FAILED.

MUENCHNER MERKUR SAID INDICATIONS WERE THAT "SOME FAILURE" OF THE U.S.-MADE DELTA ROCKET CAUSED THE EXPLOSION. AUGSBURGER ALLGEMEINE SAID THE AFFAIR LEFT A "PECULIAR AFTERTASTE... WITH THE EUROPEAN COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE REMAINING ON THE GROUND, THE AMERICANS WILL CONTINUE TO BE ALONE IN DOING SATELLITE BUSINESS..."

BERT-LANDED -- LIMITED TREATMENT IN WEST GERMAN AND ITALIAN MEDIA TODAY NOTED HIS STATEMENT THAT HE WAS NOT PREPARED TO RESIGN. DIE WELT OF BONN AND BERLINER MORGENPOST CARRIED A CORRESPONDENT'S REPORT THAT "UNLIKE ZIEGLER, CARTER'S POWELL SOON REALIZED HE HAD MADE A MISTAKE" AND THAT HE THEN FORMALLY APOLOGIZED TO SENATOR PERCY. STILL, HE SAID, MR. POWELL'S ACTION RECALLED NIXON TIMES. WEST GERMAN TELEVISION SAID THAT "TO COMPARE THE LANCE AFFAIR WITH WATERGATE WOULD MEAN TO CONFUSE THE DIMENSIONS OF THE TWO EVENTS. BUT NOW WASHINGTON IS ALREADY HAUNTED BY A WORD WHICH BECAME NOTORIOUS DURING WATERGATE: COVER-UP."

IL GIORNALE OF MILAN SAID SUCH TELEVISED HEARINGS "HAVE CERTAINLY NOT BEEN UNUSUAL IN RECENT AMERICAN HISTORY, BUT THEY ARE A MENACING AND SAD NOVELTY FOR CARTER'S ADMINISTRATION, WHICH CAME INTO POWER UNDER THE BANNER OF PURITY."

FRENCH PRIME MINISTER IN WASHINGTON -- FRENCH MEDIA PRAISED THE ATTENTION GIVEN TO MR. BARRE BY THE ADMINISTRATION.

ROUVERDIEN DE PARIS SAID THAT "WHILE IT IS TRUE THAT THE PREMIER WAS WELCOMED AT DULLES... ONLY BY A DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE... HE HAS BEEN GIVEN PRESIDENTIAL

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STATEMENT. THE PAPER SAID, HOWEVER, THAT MR. BARRE MUST... RESULT... THIS "CAN ONLY BE A PROMISE FROM

AND THEN TO MOSCOW WITHIN 12 DAYS AIMS AT BREAKING THE
SAULIATRE POLICY OF NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE VIS-A-VIS THE
SUPERPOWERS." MODERATE-LEFT FRANCE-SOIR AGREED THAT THE
"FRANCO-AMERICAN TALKS GOT OFF TO A FAST START...RAYMOND
BARRE IS OBVIOUSLY TRYING TO DISPEL THE MISUNDERSTANDINGS
WHICH HAVE ARISEN BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES FOLLOWING
CRITICAL COMMENTS BY GISCARD OF CARTER'S POLICY IN AN
INTERVIEW...WITH NEWSWEEK MAGAZINE. BUT IT IS ALSO OBVIOUS
THAT THE U.S. PRESIDENT IS MANIFESTING A SINCERE DESIRE TO
UNDERSTAND THESE DECIDEDLY COMPLICATED FRENCH AND TO SMOOTH
OUT ALL KINDS OF DIFFICULTIES."

PARIS-BASED EUROPE ONE RADIO SAID MR. BARRE'S VISIT
"IS FAR FROM BEING A SIMPLE PROTOCOL VISIT...AND IS WITHOUT
PRECEDENT IN THE HISTORY OF THE FIFTH REPUBLIC" SINCE
FOREIGN AFFAIRS HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN RESERVED FOR THE CHIEF
OF STATE.

PRO-SOCIALIST LE MATIN, HOWEVER, SAID "THE AMERICAN
HAVE...PAID LITTLE ATTENTION TO THE BARRE VISIT...THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT...ALLOWED TO FILTER DOWN IN A WAY WHICH
APPEARS HARDLY FORTUITOUS A (TECHNICAL) REPORT, THE EFFECT
OF WHICH IS TO WEAKEN THE ARGUMENTS RAYMOND BARRE
INTENDED TO ADVANCE ON BEHALF OF FRANCE'S
(MORE COMING)

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NUCLEAR POLICY." A COMMENTATOR ON THE PAPER ADDED THAT "IT IS OBVIOUS THE AMERICAN ANNOUNCEMENT (REGARDING THE USE OF PARTIALLY REFINED PLUTONIUM FOR WEAPONS)...IS AIMED AT DISSUADING NATIONS SUCH AS FRANCE AND WEST GERMANY FROM EXPORTING NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY.

U.S.-JAPAN TRADE TALKS -- THREE TOKYO PAPERS TODAY CARRIED EDITORIALS ON THE RECENTLY CONCLUDED U.S.-JAPAN SUBCABINET CONSULTATIONS ON TRADE. MODERATE YOMIURI HELD THAT THE TALKS IN TOKYO "HAVE PAVED THE WAY TOWARD CONCRETE MEASURES TO CORRECT THE TRADE IMBALANCE BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES." IT ADDED: "JAPAN RIGHTLY CRITICIZED THE U.S., SAYING THAT ITS LARGE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DEFICIT RESULTED MAINLY FROM INCREASES IN U.S. IMPORTS OF OIL AND THAT IT IS NOT TRYING HARD ENOUGH TO ATTAIN THE COMMON OBJECTIVE OF THE ADVANCED COUNTRIES OF REDUCING DEPENDENCE ON OPEC BY CONSERVING ENERGY AND DEVELOPING ITS OWN NATURAL RESOURCES." NOTING THAT "THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IS STILL RESISTING PROTECTIONIST PRESSURES AT HOME," THE PAPER CAUTIONED THAT "IF JAPANESE IMPORTS OF U.S. PRODUCTS ARE NOT INCREASED...THIS SITUATION WILL CHANGE."

PANAMA CANAL -- LATIN AMERICAN MEDIA CARRIED WIRE SERVICE STORIES ON THE KISSINGER AND RUSK TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE. ACCOUNTS WERE FACTUAL WITH LITTLE COMMENT. AN EXCEPTION WAS THE MEXICAN PRESS WHICH CONTINUED ITS RUNNING FIRE OF CRITICISM OF THE TREATIES.

A BYLINER WROTE IN OFFICIAL EL NACIONAL OF MEXICO CITY THAT THE "NEW TREATIES ARE INCOMPLETE AND AN UNSATISFACTORY SOLUTION TO THE ISSUE OF PANAMA'S FULL SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE CANAL." MEXICO IS "DETERMINED TO STAND BY PANAMA IN ITS STRUGGLE TO EXERCISE FULL SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE WHOLE OF ITS TERRITORY." EXILED CHILEAN COLUMNIST FRIDA MODAK WROTE IN PRO-COMMUNIST EL DIA THAT THE U.S. HAD "AGREED

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TO THE PANAMA TREATIES WITH PANAMA BECAUSE THE TRANS-
FER OF CONTROL OF THE CANAL TO THE U.S. FOREIGN

SUPPLEMENT

SEPTEMBER 18, 1977

SOVIETS CONTINUE ATTACK ON U.S. RADIO STATIONS -- A TASS DISPATCH YESTERDAY CITED A WASHINGTON STAR INTERVIEW WITH SIG MICKELSON, PRESIDENT OF THE COMBINED RADIO LIBERTY AND RADIO FREE EUROPE, AND COMMENTED: "THE STATIONS HAVE BEEN AND REMAIN INSTRUMENTS OF THE MOST REACTIONARY CIRCLES IN THE U.S., WHICH ARE DIRECTED AT CARRYING OUT SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AGAINST THE COUNTRIES OF THE SOCIALIST CAMP... MICKELSON STATED IN LAID TERMS THAT "OUR ROLE IS TO FUNCTION AS IF WE WERE LOCAL STATIONS IN EVERY AREA TO WHICH WE BROADCAST. WE CONSIDER IT TO BE OUR AIM TO CARRY OUT OUR WORK AS IF WE WERE THE LOCAL RADIO STATION IN KIEV OR BUCHAREST, IN MOSCOW OR BUDAPEST." THE LEADER OF THE STATIONS IN ESSENCE HAD TO REPLY IN THE AFFIRMATIVE TO A QUESTION BY THE WASHINGTON STAR CORRESPONDENT ABOUT WHETHER IT IS THE TASK OF THESE STATIONS TO ENCOURAGE "INTERNAL DISORDER" IN THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. SUCH A STANCE IS FLAGRANT INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF OTHER STATES AND DIRECTLY CONTRADICTS THE PROVISIONS OF THE FINAL ACT OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN HELSINKI WHICH THE U.S. SIGNED."

THE REPORT ASSERTED THAT MICKELSON "ADMITTED" THAT THE "SUBVERSIVE" STATIONS ARE THE DIRECT INSTRUMENT OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND WERE FINANCED BY THE CIA UP TO 1971.

CRUISE MISSILE RANGE--TASS YESTERDAY CARRIED AN ARTICLE FROM PRAVDA OF SEPTEMBER 12 WHICH HELD THAT PROGRESS ON THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS IS DELAYED BY SQUABBLING BETWEEN THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND PENTAGON OVER THE RANGE OF THE U.S. CRUISE MISSILE. THE ARTICLE SAID THE NEW YORK TIMES STATED THE MAIN THROST OF THE DISPUTE LIES IN THE FACT THAT THE PENTAGON WISHES TO INCREASE THE RANGE WHILE THE STATE DEPARTMENT IS OBJECTING ON THE GROUNDS IT DOES NOT WISH TO ALTER PROPOSALS ALREADY MADE TO THE USSR.

BT

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JOHN C. CULVER
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SARCO

United States Senate
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

Nov. 21. 77

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CONGRESSIONAL
LIAISON

NOV 22 1977

Dear Mr. President,

I wanted to let you know
how strongly I am opposed
to any more books on SALT I
from whatever source.

I have compared my views
to Mr. Raven in view of
Dr. Braggins. I understand
you a copy of my book



NEWS FROM
JOHN C. CULVER
SENATOR FOR IOWA

344 Russell Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510

FOR RELEASE:
IMMEDIATELY
FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 10, 1977

For More Information Contact:
Don Brownlee 202-224-3744
703-527-6190

**CULVER ASKS HALT
TO ADMINISTRATION SALT LEAKS**

(WASHINGTON, D.C., Nov. 18) -- Senator John Culver (D-Iowa) today called on President Carter "to halt the selective disclosures by administration sources of sensitive details of the SALT negotiations and to lay before the American people as much about the emerging agreement as can properly be released at this time."

As an example of new SALT leakage, this time by the executive branch, Culver cited a front page article in today's New York Times under the headline, "Major Concession on Cruise Missiles by Soviets Reported." The article said the Soviet Union had altered its previous position on the testing, deployment and range of the cruise missile.

Culver said he had telephoned the White House to protest the Times story.

"These negotiations are too critical to our national and global security to be subjected to a guerrilla war of leaks," Culver commented. "One leak begets another. I cannot believe that the continuing negotiations are helped in any way by a running series of stories about who conceded what this week."

"Less than two weeks ago," Culver said, "a number of my Senate colleagues and I condemned and called for an investigation of apparent leaks regarding hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee." Culver noted that he had previously deplored the leaks of sensitive information, by advocates as well as opponents of the tentative agreements, as being harmful to the negotiations.

---MORE---

CULVER/SALT LEAKS RELEASE
first add

In the past, there have been other potentially damaging revelations attributed to executive branch sources. Now we have yet another anonymous account that appears to be part of an administration selling job. All of these apparently unauthorized disclosures should be thoroughly investigated."

"The public is entitled to know as much about the ongoing negotiations as can be told without hurting our national security interests in these crucial talks.

In order to clear the atmosphere, the administration should set ground rules regarding disclosure that are fair and understandable to all parties concerned.

"If some of the people now providing information to the press have the authority to declassify sensitive details, then they should speak openly, accurately and on the record.


"And decisions about what can be safely disclosed should not be made by individuals at will, but only after a careful review process by responsible authorities that balances the public's right to know with the precise requirements of diplomatic confidentiality."

315 ...
...
...

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

* goal is extract a SALT II
* ...
be ...

* get a SALT II more
...
* when we get it ...



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Do you think the
option of an "agreement"
instead of a "treaty"
is politically possible?

~~Jan~~

I don't know -

But it is

unfinitely hard
now.

I suggested it 6 months
ago: No Tabors

22

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

* perception is a good one
to


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- * Sade
 - * Retifcation Options
 - * Compression Twiddle



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dec. 12

Hamilton,

The attached items
just came across my
desk. Subject: Congressional
Concerns about SALT.

Rich Indefuria

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

- * trade-off between PC and SALT II
 - * Biden support PC, but a statesman oppose SALT II
 - * if SALT II drags beyond election, we will probably lose several votes on SALT II
-