

Panama Canal Treaty, 10, 11, 12/77 (1)

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
memo	Omar Torrijos to JC (4 pp.) <i>OPENED 8/9/03</i>	12/3/77	A
memo	HJ to JC,ZB (4 pp.) 3 copies	11/29/77	A
memo	HJ to JC (6 pp.) <i>Opened 1/31/91</i>	n.d.	A
memo	HJ, Bob Pastor to JC (4 pp.) <i>opened 1/31/91</i>	10/14/77	A
memo	Bob Pastor to HJ (4 pp.) <i>Opened 1/31/91</i>	11/17/77	A
memo	JC to Omar Torrijos (1 p.) <i>opened 4/22/91</i>	11/2/77	A
memo	Warren Christopher's evening report <i>OPENED 8/9/03</i>	10/1/77	A
memo	Bob Pastor to HJ, Rick Inderfurth (3 pp.) <i>sanitized 7/24/02</i>	11/29/77	A
report	Analysis of Treaty (2 pp.)	11/29/77	A

FILE LOCATION

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 14, 1977

Mr. President:

If this memo seems incoherent, it is because we wrote it at 2:00 a.m.

One of the objectives of the State Department was to have possible clarification language nailed down going into the meeting. Torrijos was completely uninterested in the details or the wording of the statement.

He and his key staff have had it for five days. They had it tonight before them in Spanish. I assumed from their reluctance to discuss it that while they were not excited about having to explain new language to the people of Panama, they were reconciled to doing it because they realize it is important to us politically. We talked about the clarification language in terms of the need for a joint statement.

Ham

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

PER 7/2/80 MS HYRE MR-444-9026

BY Jag NARS. DATE 1/30/91

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 14, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: HAMILTON JORDAN AND BOB PASTOR ^{HJ} *BP*
SUBJECT: Meeting with General Torrijos

We spent about six hours tonight with General Torrijos at the Panamanian Embassy talking mostly about the problems of gaining ratification for the treaties in our respective countries.

We did not dwell on the details of the statement which was drafted by Warren Christopher in conjunction with the Senators in an attempt to clarify certain points. Copies of our statement had been translated into Spanish by the Panamanians and circulated to their negotiators and key members of their staff. General Torrijos was not interested in discussing the contents of that document, but was more concerned about why we needed such a statement at this time. Our impression is that they are reconciled to having to do something to help us with "our" political problem, but Torrijos would like to think that the fact he is meeting with you will be sufficient. We told him that clarification was essential.

Torrijos is very concerned about the political problems which have emerged in Panama while he has been travelling through Europe during the past three weeks. He doesn't doubt that the treaties will be ratified in the plebiscite in 10 days, but he is bothered by the increasing criticism being directed at the treaties and himself. He is particularly worried about how his meeting with you to "clarify" treaties so recently signed will be interpreted in Panama. We believe that you will find him very reluctant to do anything until he has had a chance to return to Panama and evaluate the situation there. We believe getting a commitment from him as to language is possible, but believe that he will want to wait until he gets back to Panama to make any public statement.

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PER 76610 NCS HRE MR-462-90-26
BY Jay NARS, DATE 1/30/91

One obvious fact is that the Panamanians have a very limited and superficial understanding of the way our government functions and of the ratification process. They see the President as the most powerful person in the world and have difficulty comprehending why you are having problems getting the Senate to ratify this treaty.

In explaining the need for a clarifying statement of some kind, we noted that in the process of trying to sell a single product to two markets, both sides had made statements which antagonized the buyers in the other's market. In the U.S., several Senators who had supported the treaties, now tell us they won't vote for it unless several provisions are clarified. If we don't recapture these Senators and the momentum now, before the Panamanian plebiscite, we will lose the treaties.

We told them that key Senators had worked with us in developing some language which tried to deal with the political objections raised in both countries. To the extent that we used this same language to clarify these differences, we would be winning votes in the Senate for the treaties. If we changed or modified this language, we would risk losing their support.

Torrijos never explicitly said that he accepted the language. Panamanian negotiator Escobar made clear that he had problems with the third provision -- closure due to unprofitability -- primarily because he felt that it had been considered in the negotiations and subsequently dropped. Since it wasn't in the treaty, he argued that we couldn't very well have a clarifying statement on it. While noting that the neutrality treaty incorporated the concept of an "open" Canal, we said that we didn't want to engage in a "legalistic" argument over what is essentially a political issue. (Lewis had told us before that Torrijos had made this same argument a number of times.)

Both sides raised hypothetical questions about the meaning of the treaties, and agreed that if we answered such questions differently, we would just invite future problems which could make ratification of the treaties impossible.

Scenario

Torrijos would very much enjoy talking privately with you for about 10 or 15 minutes before the meeting, and this offers the opportunity for you to impress upon him the need for his complete agreement on the text of the "Joint Statement."

Talking Points:

- Torrijos is very proud of the trip he has just completed to ten countries. You should inquire about it, compliment him on the serious attention it received, and seek the reaction of the Heads of State to the treaty. We would suggest you ask him for a brief report at the outset of the group meeting -- believe that this will set a good tone for discussion.
- Treaty will not be ratified in this country unless these key points are clarified.
- If these clarifications do not take place before the Panamanian plebiscite, opponents of the treaties here will argue that the Panamanian people have voted for a treaty that they did not understand.
- It is possible to clarify the differences raised in both countries with language which is mutually beneficial.
- Because some key Senators were involved in developing the language which was presented as a working draft, we would be jeopardizing their support if we changed their draft significantly.
- For that same reason, we tried to draft that language in a way that was sensitive to the politics of Panama. This is the reason for the "non-intervention" clause.
- And while we are not very flexible on the language for clarification, we would defer to General Torrijos as to the best time and mechanism for making public this clarification.
- Lastly, there remains the problem of trying to ensure that no new discrepancies emerge. It's important for Torrijos to recognize the problems we will have if the Panamanians interpret the treaties differently than the way we do.

Hamm
J
Coord = State

CONFIDENTIAL

TO: PRESIDENT CARTER
FROM: HAMILTON JORDAN *HJ*
RE: MORNING MEETING WITH TORRIJOS

Along with Bob Pastor (NSC) and Terrence Todman, I had breakfast and a two hour meeting with Torrijos this morning. There were several things that were said that you should know about.

He is in this country in route to the Mideast and Western Europe. He is obviously trying to balance his trip earlier this year to Libya that was highly publicized.

He is obviously very interested in the political situation here as regards to ratification, and I tried to

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BY *Jay* NARS DATE *1/30/91*

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give him a pragmatic assessment of the political situation in the Senate. I told them that our hope was still for an early vote on the treaty although we were less optimistic about this because of Senator Byrd's recent statements.

I outlined for him the things we were doing to insure ratification and spent some time reviewing the process by which the Senate would review the treaty. I tried to distinguish for him the difference in a "reservation" and an "understanding" so that these terms would be familiar to him and so that they would not overreact politically to their mention by Senators in the process of debating ratification.

As you know, their referendum on the treaty is in late October. Once the referendum is over, they will have acted officially on the treaty initialed by the two governments. This will leave Torrijos in the position of having to go back to his people for their additional approval if a "reservation" is added or agreed to by

the Senate the first of the year. Torrijos said it will even be difficult to refrain from responding officially to an "understanding" if that "understanding" states in very explicit terms things that were only implied in the treaty already signed.

At any rate, we need to be continually mindful of the political pressures under which Torrijos governs. He obviously has a great deal more flexibility than we do, but we should also understand that there are limits to what he can do.

For the time being, I would strongly recommend the following in terms of our own strategy:

1. That we are opposed to all reservations. That we believe strongly in the treaty that has been negotiated and signed by the two countries. To suggest that we would even consider a "reservation" at this point suggests that we ^{ARE} ready and

willing to make early political concessions. It should also be explained that the talk of a "reservation" jeopardizes the possibility of a new treaty as the Panamanians would have to vote twice on the treaty. Put more simply, you might pose the question as to how the Senate would feel if, after passing the treaty, they were asked to vote a second time on a less satisfactory treaty. The fact that Torrijos has political problems like this underscores the fact that he is not a dictator with total control of his country and unresponsive to public opinion. At the same time, we must be respectful of the Senate right to add reservations, but you should make clear to them the process by which you would agree to such an act.

2. That we are opposed generally to the addition of numerous "understandings" and would only look favorably on those that were necessary to clarify the true meaning of the treaty and the

intentions of both countries. Again, to look favorably on "understandings" suggests a willingness on our part to compromise early and ignores the political realities that face Torrijos. We were only able to get a treaty because our defense rights after the year 2000 were implied and not explicit. If the opponents choose to state those rights explicitly, it will probably pick us up the votes in the Senate that we will need to win ratification. It obviously will create major political problems for Torrijos.

I posed the question as to whether General Torrijos might approve personally any "understanding" or even a "reservation" if it did not change substantively the meaning of the treaty and in that way avoid the need for a possible second referendum in Panama. He laughed and said that it was impossible for him to be a "democratic leader" for the first referendum and a "dictator" for the second.

In summary, I suspect the General has more political flexibility than he allows at this point, but we should not

█ ignore the political situation he faces in his own country █^{NOR} assume his willingness and/or ability to go along with any "understanding" or "reservation" the Senate might attach. Therefore, we should be very cautious in our public comments to discourage the idea of adding "reservations" or "understandings".

My own sense of the thing is that we will probably have to agree to some "understandings" in the final stages to secure enough votes for passage, and that at that point it can be explained to Torrijos in a manner that he will find satisfactory. The addition of any "reservations" will require him to go back to his people and could be a major obstacle to getting a treaty. We should just keep his political situation in mind as well as our own as we go into the final stretch.

More importantly, we should take - for the time being - a hard line in opposition to any "reservations" and discourage Byrd and others from talking about them.

P.S. Bob Thompson memo which follows explores these legalisms further.

Warren Christopher's Evening Report
October 1, 1977

Canal Treaties. During last week's Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings, two broad issues surfaced on which I want to make recommendations today.

(a) Releasing Documents. The first issue concerns Senator Baker's request that the Administration provide the Committee with all its records concerning the treaty negotiations. He asked specifically for minutes of the negotiations with the Panamanians, cables, internal position papers, and communications between you, Cy and our negotiators.

We have quickly reviewed the historical precedents and can find no case in which the Executive Branch has released to the Senate the full and confidential record of treaty negotiations or the record of its internal deliberations. There are cases, beginning with the Jay Treaty in 1796, in which the President has refused such requests. Over the years, Presidents have endeavored to resolve disputes with Congress over provision of documents by practical accommodations, including summaries and briefings, but have resorted to the exercise of executive privilege where necessary.

I agree
It is our recommendation that the Administration should not release the minutes of the negotiating sessions. We have a clear understanding with the Panamanians that the negotiations are to be kept confidential and, moreover, the precedent set by their release could cause massive future problems. We also recommend that a stern position be taken against the release of any Presidential documents (e.g., PRM 1).

~~SECRET~~
GDS

~~ATTN~~

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

PER 8/31/00 NSC RE NLL-00428
BY NARS DATE 6/26/03

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- 2 -

As a matter of constitutional practice and conduct of foreign affairs, it is very tempting to turn down Baker's request. But a flat refusal could lead him to oppose the treaties and might well lead to Senate rejection of them. Therefore, it is recommended that we respond to Senator Baker's request by the following: (i) offer a full briefing to Senator Baker, or any other Senator, on any aspect of the treaties in which they are interested, (ii) provide summaries, on a confidential basis, of the minutes of the negotiating sessions beginning with the Tack/Kissinger Principles of 1974 where specifically requested, and (iii) provide carefully controlled access to defined categories of negotiating documents such as position papers exchanged between the parties since 1974. On the latter two points, we would need to get the concurrence of the Panamanians, and also insist that the summaries and documents not be published.

(b) Interpretation of the Treaties. As a result of questions raised by Senators Baker, Stone and others, it is apparent that it will be important to try to resolve several questions of interpretation which have arisen. Some but not all of these questions arise from the August 19 and 22 statements of Panamanian negotiator Escobar. The principal questions appear to relate to neutrality, "intervention," and expeditious passage.

I recommend that we begin to explore the possibility of an interpretive exchange of notes, and I met with Ambassador Bunker this afternoon to ask that he and Sol start the process. There are several delicate issues involved. Torrijos may be reluctant to agree publicly to our interpretations prior to his October 23 plebiscite. Moreover, an early exchange would be subject to the risk that new questions of interpretation may arise as Senate consideration of the treaties proceeds, and it might not be possible to have a further exchange which addressed them. On the other hand, an exchange of notes after the plebiscite could be open to challenge as not being binding on the Panamanians. After we have given further consideration to these matters of timing and substance and tested the water with the Panamanians, we will make specific recommendations to you.

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ok, but
Be
Cautious &
Consequential

I need
to have
these
interpretations
classified
also

10 Moulton Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

Cambridge Survey Research

An Analysis of Public Attitudes

Toward

The Panama Canal Treaties

Prepared for

The Democratic National Committee

An Analysis of Public Attitudes
Toward
The Panama Canal Treaties

Prepared for
The Democratic National Committee

CSR #970
October 1977

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As with any survey, the release of selected figures from this report without the analysis that explains their meaning would be damaging to us. Therefore, we reserve the right to correct any erroneous or misleading release of this data in any medium through the release of correct data or analysis.

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This report presents and discusses the results of a poll taken of a sample of the American public on their feelings about the proposed Panama Canal Treaty. Results presented here are based on 1000 telephone interviews with people who voted in the 1976 Presidential election. The interviews were conducted between October 5th and October 9th prior to President Carter's meetings with General Torrijos.

Methodology

The methods used in conducting this survey were the same professional ones used in all Cambridge Survey Research work.

The most important points to remember are:

1. The sample was designed to reflect the actual voting behavior of Americans in the November general election. To this end, interviews were conducted at several different geographically selected locations around the country.
2. All the interviews were conducted by trained, professional interviewers under the supervision of the Cambridge Survey Research field staff. A number of interviews were validated to insure honest and accurate completion.
3. All the interviews were returned to Cambridge where they were coded and compiled using modern data processing methods.


4. This analysis represents our attempt to extract the most meaningful and interesting data from a great mass of facts. Obviously, various points covered in the analysis may be of greater or lesser interest to various readers. We are always prepared to furnish supplementary analysis on any points of particular interest.

Notes on analysis


It will be helpful to keep several points in mind:

1. An asterisk (*) by a row or column of figures indicates that the numbers are based on a sample size too small to be entirely reliable and, thus, conclusions based on them should be treated with caution. This does not mean that the figures are wrong, but that an insufficient number of interviews makes it impossible to show that they are definitely right for the area.


2. In demographic tables, the number in parentheses after a designation, [e.g., Democrats (55)], shows the percentage that the group represents in the overall population.
3. Maps showing the areas used in the analysis follows these notes on analysis.
4. An Appendix follows the body of this report.



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Rocky Mountains

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Overview and Summary of Findings

Overall, American voters tend to oppose the treaty by nearly a two-to-one majority. Fifty-five percent of the voters questioned said they were opposed to the treaty, compared with 30% who favor it. The remainder (15%) indicated they had not formed a decision. Strongest opposition to the treaty comes from Republicans, conservatives and those with an unfavorable opinion of President Carter. Support tends to be concentrated in the younger, better-educated, upper-income segments of the population.

The primary reason for opposing the treaty is the feeling that it is seen as a "give away" of American property. Supporters, on the other hand, tend to feel that the Canal rightfully belongs to the Panamanians.

While there is concern among those who oppose the treaty that giving up the Canal will impair U.S. security, the feeling does not appear to be overwhelmingly strong.

While opposition to the treaty is widespread, neither opposition nor support appear to be deeply rooted views. For example, 43% of those who favor the treaty and 49% of those who oppose it indicates that they really don't know enough about the issue to make an informed judgment.

Pressed for their reasons for opposing the treaty, 49% say that they feel that it represents a "give away" of American property. By contrast, only 5% name national security as a reason for not giving it up. The pattern overall is that those who oppose the treaty can see no good reason to give up the Canal and, since they feel it is rightfully ours, believe we should keep it. Those who favor the treaty feel that the Canal is rightfully the property of Panama and, because they see no real reasons for keeping it, we should give it up.

A substantial indication that voters' views on the issue do not tend to be adamant comes from the fact that, during the course of the interview, 15% of the respondent's changed their views on the issue. While most of those who changed were among those who were undecided at the beginning, 15% of those who initially favored and 8% of those who initially opposed the treaty reversed their positions.

To the extent that the survey contains good news it is twofold. First, the issue does not seem to be all that important to the average American voter, given his admitted lack of knowledge and the ease with which opinions seem to be changed. Secondly, it is possible to change the views of a fair number of voters who oppose the Canal treaty.

The bad news, however, is that the position of those who favor the treaty is even more weakly held than that of the opposition. For every voter who came to favor the treaty during the course of the interview, one also came to oppose it.

The Basic Question

To find out the level of support for the treaty today, we asked the American people, based on what they knew about the treaty, whether they favored or opposed it. Our findings reflect that a majority of Americans today oppose the treaty, with less than one-third reporting that they favor it.

From what you do know about the treaty, do you generally favor or oppose it?

Favor	30%
Don't know	15
Oppose	55

The following tables show the demographic breakdowns for this response, from which the following patterns emerge.

1. Strongest political support for the treaty come from Democrats, the liberally inclined, those favorable to Carter and those who think Carter is doing a good job.
2. Strongest opposition comes among Republicans, conservatives and Carter detractors.

3. Professionals, college graduates, those in high-income categories, and thirty-five years old and under are more inclined to favor the treaty than other groups. Conversely, anti-treaty sentiment is highest among older Americans, the poor, and less-educated segments of the population.

4. Regionally, strongest support for the treaty is evidenced by residents of the Northeast and Pacific regions, while the South and Central regions show stronger-than-average opposition.

From what you do know about the treaty do you generally favor or oppose it?

	<u>Favor</u>	<u>Don't know</u>	<u>Oppose</u>
<u>Overall</u>	30%	15	55
<u>Party preference</u>			
Democrat (54)	34	16	51
Independent (24)	31	14	55
Republican (21)	24	13	63
<u>Political ideology</u>			
Liberal (26)	43	11	46
Moderate (29)	37	14	49
Conservative (37)	22	15	63
<u>Carter rating</u>			
Favorable (74)	38	16	46
Unfavorable (17)	15	10	76
Can't rate (9)	12	15	73
<u>Carter performance rating</u>			
Excellent (7)	43	21	35
Good (49)	39	15	46
Only fair (34)	21	15	65
Poor (8)	8	5	87
Don't know) 2)*	22	70	8
<u>Sex</u>			
Female (51)	30	17	53
Male (49)	31	12	57
<u>Race</u>			
White (88)	29	14	57
Black (10)	38	18	44
<u>Occupation</u>			
Professional (5)	46	12	41
White collar (18)	30	13	57
Blue collar (25)	31	14	55
Government (6)	31	20	50
Teacher (4)*	52	16	31
Self-employed (7)	16	17	68
Retired (24)	23	15	63

From what you do know about the treaty (continued)

	<u>Favor</u>	<u>Don't know</u>	<u>Oppose</u>
<u>Education</u>			
Some grade school (13)	21	26	53
Some high school (16)	26	15	60
Graduated high school (32)	27	14	59
Technical/vocational (4)*	10	11	78
Some college (18)	29	16	54
Graduated college (10)	38	13	49
Graduate/professional (7)	51	8	41
<u>Religion</u>			
Protestant (57)	28	14	58
Catholic (30)	30	18	52
Jewish (3)*	30	16	54
Other (5)	38	5	57
None (4)*	44	13	43
<u>Total household income</u>			
\$0-3,999 (8)	16	27	57
\$4-6,999 (9)	18	12	71
\$7-9,999 (12)	37	14	50
\$10-12,999 (12)	28	17	55
\$13-14,999 (10)	33	9	58
\$15-19,999 (15)	32	12	56
\$20-24,999 (11)	33	12	55
Over \$25,000 (10)	41	12	47
<u>Union membership</u>			
Respondent (17)	40	9	51
Family member (12)	43	21	36
No member (71)	27	14	58
<u>Age group</u>			
18-25 (10)	43	15	42
26-35 (20)	38	17	45
36-45 (18)	31	14	55
46-55 (17)	32	17	51
56-65 (18)	17	13	71
Over 65 (19)	21	13	67

From what you do know about the treaty (continued)

	<u>Favor</u>	<u>Don't know</u>	<u>Oppose</u>
<u>Areas</u>			
Northeast (15)	39	10	51
Industrial (25)	31	17	52
Midlands (15)	21	27	52
South (19)	27	13	60
Central (14)	24	11	65
Pacific (13)	40	13	48
<u>Areas</u>			
California (10)	42	13	44
West (12)	27	11	62
New York (9)	40	12	49
South (14)	28	13	60
Industrial (27)	30	20	50
Border (8)	25	10	65
New England (6)	39	8	54
Midlands (13)	22	21	57

Reasons for support or opposition

The strongest argument for supporting the treaty among those that favor it, is that the Canal really belongs to Panama. Other reasons that had moderate margins of support include the position that returning the Canal to Panama is the only fair thing to do, and that it is not really that valuable or strategic to the United States anyway. Others see it as a way to prevent communism by showing the World and South America that the United States is a fair country.

Why do you take that position in regards to the Panama Canal?

It belongs to Panama	32%
The right, fair thing to do	12
Not valuable or strategic	6
Show U.S. is fair, prevent communism	5
Fair to both sides	4
President knows what he's doing, Carter's right	4
We stole it, should give it back	3
Not necessary	2
Both sides happy	1
Other	20
Don't know	11

The reason most often cited for opposing the Canal treaty among respondents who felt that way was the amount of money the United States had invested in the Canal -- the idea that because we paid for it, we have a right to it. Other responses by treaty antagonists had to do with the security issue: the fear of a Communist takeover and the need to protect the U.S.

Why do you take that position in regard to the Panama Canal?

U.S. spent too much in money/ lives to give it up	18%)	
U.S. should keep it	11)	
It's ours, belongs to us	9)-	49%
We built it, we should keep it	8)	
Why should U.S. give away everything?	3)	
Vital to our security	5	
The commies will take over	4	
You can't trust the Panamanians	4	
U.S. might need it again, need it, need it for trade	4	
Cost U.S. too much to use in future	3	
U.S. can take care of it better	3	
U.S. might lose access to it	2	
Unstable government in Panama	1	
Other	13	
Don't know	11	

Though most Americans had an opinion on the issue, we were also interested in finding out how informed people felt themselves to be about the Panama Canal treaty. Interestingly, the majority of Americans felt they were not in a position to make an informed judgment about it.

Do you feel that you are currently informed enough about the Panama Canal treaty to make an informed judgment about it?

Yes	43%
Not sure	6
No	51

Demographically, as the following table shows, Democrats, liberals, Carter supporters and the young feel less informed than their counterparts on the treaty. However, those in the upper-income groups, the better-educated and residents of the Pacific states -- some segments of the population that tended to report favorably toward the treaty -- feel they are sufficiently familiar with the issue to make such a judgment.

Among those who feel they are not informed enough, blacks, those in blue collar occupations, lower-income groups and residents of the Midlands are least informed of all.

Do you feel that you are currently informed enough about the Panama Canal treaty to make an informed judgement about it?

	<u>Yes</u>	<u>Not sure</u>	<u>No</u>
<u>Overall</u>	43%	6	51
<u>Party preference</u>			
Democrat (54)	38	7	56
Independent (24)	49	6	45
Republican (21)	49	4	48
<u>Political ideology</u>			
Liberal (26)	41	4	56
Moderate (29)	50	6	45
Conservative (37)	45	7	49
<u>Opinion of treaty</u>			
Favor (30)	49	8	43
Don't know (15)	15	12	73
Oppose (55)	48	3	49
<u>Carter rating</u>			
Favorable (74)	40	7	54
Unfavorable (17)	55	4	41
Can't rate (9)	36	5	59
<u>Carter performance rating</u>			
Excellent (7)	48	6	45
Good (49)	40	7	53
Only fair (34)	42	5	52
Poor (8)	64	3	34
Don't know (2)*	30	-	70
<u>Sex</u>			
Female (51)	38	8	54
Male (49)	50	3	47
<u>Race</u>			
White (88)	46	5	49
Black (10)	28	6	66

Do you feel...informed enough about the Panama Canal...(Continued)

	<u>Yes</u>	<u>Not sure</u>	<u>No</u>
<u>Occupation</u>			
Professional (5)	45	5	50
White collar (18)	48	6	47
Blue collar (25)	37	3	59
Government (6)	51	2	48
Teacher (4)*	41	13	46
Self-employed (7)	45	9	46
Retired (24)	41	8	52
<u>Education</u>			
Some grade school (13)	36	11	54
Some high school (16)	27	11	62
Graduated high school (32)	42	6	52
Technical/vocational (4)*	59	4	38
Some college (18)	45	3	52
Graduated college (10)	54	3	43
Graduate/professional (7)	53	3	44
<u>Religion</u>			
Protestant (57)	46	4	50
Catholic (30)	44	7	50
Jewish (3)*	29	13	58
Other (5)	38	6	57
None (4)*	37	11	52
<u>Total household income</u>			
\$0-3,999 (8)	42	21	37
\$4-6,999 (9)	39	11	51
\$7-9,999 (12)	35	5	60
\$10-12,999 (12)	34	--	66
\$13-14,999 (10)	52	3	45
\$15-19,999 (15)	51	3	46
\$20-24,999 (11)	45	2	53
Over \$25,000 (10)	54	2	44
<u>Union membership</u>			
Respondent (17)	47	4	50
Family member (12)	32	11	57
No member (71)	46	5	50

Do you feel...informed enough about the Panama Canal...(Continued)

	<u>Yes</u>	<u>Not sure</u>	<u>No</u>
<u>Age group</u>			
18-25 (10)	40	4	56
26-35 (20)	39	4	57
36-45 (18)	51	7	42
46-55 (17)	47	6	47
56-65 (18)	41	6	53
Over 65 (19)	46	6	48
<u>Areas</u>			
Northeast (15)	45	6	50
Industrial (25)	43	9	48
Midlands (15)	31	4	65
South (19)	42	4	54
Central (14)	45	4	50
Pacific (13)	56	5	39
<u>Areas</u>			
California (10)	60	7	33
West (12)	49	1	50
New York (9)	43	3	53
South (14)	42	4	54
Industrial (27)	39	10	52
Border (8)	46	4	50
New England (6)	47	9	45
Midlands (13)	36	6	59

We asked those Americans who were unsure or who felt they were not adequately informed with regard to the treaty, what additional information they would need to arrive at a conclusive decision. Most responded that they would simply like more details in general, and increased media coverage specifically. Smaller numbers were interested in learning the reactions of Panamanians to the treaty and its implications for the United States.

What additional information would you most like to have to help you make a decision?

General information	19%
More things published	12
Points of the treaty	9
More TV coverage	6
Rights, controls U.S. will have	5
How Panamanians feel, alternatives will accept	4
The truth	3
Neutrality issue, degree of U.S. intervention	2
Cost to U.S. of future use of Canal	2
Amount of U.S. investment in Panama lost by treaty	2
Other	12
Don't know	24

Further, we looked to see whether lack of information correlated in any way with anti-treaty sentiment. While over one-half of the respondents who feel they lack sufficient knowledge on the issue oppose the treaty, the remarkable finding here is that 61% of those who feel sufficiently informed also oppose it.

Opinion of treaty

	<u>Favor</u>	<u>Don't know</u>	<u>Oppose</u>
<u>Overall</u>	30%	15	55
<u>Informed enough:</u>			
Yes	34%	5	61
No	26%	21	53

Testing arguments

To elicit more specific reactions and fears about the Panama Canal treaty, we posed a set of statements to respondents and asked them to tell us to what degree they felt each of the statements to be true or false. In every instance, we found that the majority of respondents were more likely to claim as false those statements which suggested that the United States would lose face if the treaty was not ratified.

Americans tend to reject the idea, for instance, that other countries will no longer trust the President's ability to negotiate, or that internal unrest in Panama will ensue if the treaty is not ratified. Further, the majority was inclined to disbelieve that the U.S. would no longer be trusted by other Latin American countries, or that failure to ratify the treaty would result in communist charges of U.S. imperialism.

On the other hand, pluralities also reject the idea that ratification of the treaty will have a negative impact on the world's image of the United States. For though a majority of Americans may oppose the treaty, they do not believe, by a two-to-one margin, that the Canal treaty implies that the United States is growing weak and can no longer play a strong role in world affairs. Nor does a majority perceive the treaty as an indication that any little dictatorship can kick the U.S. around: nor would a majority be willing to send American troops into the Canal zone to fight guerrillas. (Though a surprising number would).

The pattern that seems to emerge is that while the majority of Americans see no major disadvantage to ratification of the treaty, they see no advantages either. In fact, a significant 58% of Americans believe that the Canal is a giveaway of American property, for which they see little in return.

Moreover, confidence in Carter's judgment on the issue as sufficient reason for ratification -- while at the 40% level -- is rejected by a larger margin. It would appear that no-one -- including the President -- has given a sizeable proportion of Americans a persuasive argument for giving up the Canal zone.

As to the charge that the Republican Party has seized on opposing the treaty because it is politically advantageous for them to do so, almost one-half of the population seem to feel that this is true, although a sizeable minority -- 19% -- were unsure about it.

I'm going to read you a number of statements that have been made about the Panama Canal issue and I'd like you to tell me whether each statement is very true, only somewhat true, somewhat false, or absolutely false.

	Very true	Only somewhat true	Somewhat false	Absolutely false	Don't know
If the Senate refuses to ratify the treaty, the country will be hurt because other countries won't trust the President's ability to negotiate.	17%	27	17	29	10
The Canal Treaty is basically a give away of American property.	40%	18	16	19	6
I have enough faith in Jimmy Carter that if he says the treaty is needed the Senate should back him up.	22%	18	19	34	7
The Panama Canal treaty indicates that any petty little dictatorship can kick the U.S. around.	25%	17	17	34	8
If we don't ratify the treaty, there will be violence and bloodshed in Panama.	16%	23	21	26	15
I would be willing to send American troops to fight against guerrillas in the Canal zone.	25%	11	12	40	12
If we don't help Panama by agreeing to the Canal treaty other Latin American countries won't trust the United States	17%	21	19	33	10
The communists will gain a great deal of advantage if we don't ratify the treaty because they will be able to show that the U.S. is only interested in itself and not in other countries.	17%	18	15	42	9
The Canal treaty is just one more symbol that the U.S. is growing weak and can no longer play a strong role in world affairs.	16%	14	14	50	6

Statements made about Panama Canal (continued)

	<u>Very true</u>	<u>Only somewhat true</u>	<u>Somewhat false</u>	<u>Absolutely false</u>	<u>Don't know</u>
The Republican Party has seized on opposing the Canal Treaty not so much because they believe in it but because they think it is too their political advantage.	23%	24	13	22	19

The "give away" issue

When we look at support for the treaty by validity of each statement, the sharpest polarity of viewpoints is evidenced by the statement that the treaty is a give away of American property. Treaty opposers see it as the most compelling argument against the treaty. At the same time, treaty supporters are overwhelmingly negative toward this suggestion, the implication being that they do not consider it American property in the first place. Those that are undecided are about evenly split on the issue.

The Canal Treaty is basically a give away of American property.

	<u>True</u>	<u>Don't know</u>	<u>False *</u>
Favor	23%	5	72
Don't know	40%	18	42
Oppose	82%	4	14

* For ease of presentation, we have collapsed the scale into a true-false dichotomy.

Looking at the demographic breakdowns which follow, "give away" sentiment is highest among lower-income groups, the poor, blue collar workers, and older citizens. Residents of the Central states moreover are much more likely to see giving up of the Canal Zone as a loss of U.S. property than other areas.

Those who reject the idea most fervently are liberals, the college-educated and professional people. Moreover, residents of the Northeast and Pacific regions -- while still more inclined than not see the Canal as belonging to the United States -- are more apt to reject this idea than all other geographic groups.

From a partisan point of view, there is some indication that feelings about the "give away" issue and feelings toward the Administration are inextricably linked. A very high proportion of Republicans (69%) and Conservatives (69%) see the treaty as An American give away. Further, over three-quarters of those unfavorable to Carter perceive the treaty as a hand-out. Conversely, higher-than-average proportions of Democrats, Independents, liberals, moderates, and those favorable to Carter agree with the notion that the United States is not giving anything away. In addition, there is a linear relationship between giving Carter a favorable performance rating and being less inclined to perceive the treaty as a give away.

The Canal treaty is basically a give away of American property.

	<u>True</u>	<u>Don't know</u>	<u>False</u>
<u>Overall</u>	58%	6	36
<u>Party preference</u>			
Democrat (54)	56	7	37
Independent (24)	55	5	40
Republican (21)	69	4	27
<u>Political ideology</u>			
Liberal (26)	44	8	48
Moderate (29)	53	7	40
Conservative (37)	69	3	29
<u>Opinion of treaty</u>			
Favor (30)	23	5	72
Don't know (15)	40	18	42
Oppose (55)	82	4	14
<u>Carter rating</u>			
Favorable (74)	50	6	44
Unfavorable (17)	76	5	19
Can't rate (9)	72	11	17
<u>Carter performance rating</u>			
Excellent (7)	46	7	47
Good (49)	49	6	45
Only fair (34)	67	6	27
Poor (8)	85	4	11
Don't know (2)*	--	41	59
<u>Sex</u>			
Female (51)	61	6	33
Male (49)	56	6	38
<u>Race</u>			
White (88)	59	6	35
Black (10)	52	11	38

Canal treaty is basically a give away (continued)

	<u>True</u>	<u>Don't know</u>	<u>False</u>
<u>Occupation</u>			
Professional (5)	47	2	51
White collar (18)	52	3	45
Blue collar (25)	63	9	28
Government (6)	56	2	42
Teacher (4)*	39	--	62
Self-employed (7)	70	4	26
Retired (24)	66	11	23
<u>Education</u>			
Some grade school (13)	67	17	16
Some high school (16)	64	10	25
Graduated high school (32)	63	7	30
Technical/vocational (4)*	73	--	27
Some college (18)	59	3	39
Graduated college (10)	47	2	51
Graduate/professional (7)	38	8	54
<u>Religion</u>			
Protestant (57)	59	6	35
Catholic (30)	62	6	33
Jewish (3)*	43	--	57
Other (5)	65	--	35
None (4)*	44	11	46
<u>Total household income</u>			
\$0-3,999 (8)	69	12	20
\$4-6,999 (9)	72	8	20
\$7-9,999 (12)	48	8	44
\$10-12,999 (12)	59	3	37
\$13-14,999 (10)	64	3	34
\$15-19,999 (15)	54	8	38
\$20-24,999 (11)	51	4	45
Over \$25,000 (10)	54	1	46
<u>Union membership</u>			
Respondent (17)	63	7	30
Family member (12)	54	5	42
No member (71)	58	6	36

Canal treaty is basically a give away (continued)

	<u>True</u>	<u>Don't know</u>	<u>False</u>
<u>Age group</u>			
18-25 (10)	56	4	40
26-35 (20)	50	2	48
36-45 (18)	58	5	36
46-55 (17)	47	6	47
56-65 (18)	70	9	21
Over 65 (19)	68	10	22
<u>Areas</u>			
Northeast (15)	53	2	45
Industrial (25)	62	7	31
Midlands (15)	61	6	34
South (19)	52	9	39
Central (14)	66	5	29
Pacific (13)	49	10	41
<u>Areas</u>			
California (10)	47	9	44
West (12)	62	4	34
New York (9)	51	1	47
South (14)	61	5	35
Industrial (27)	62	6	31
Border (8)	60	9	32
New England (6)	55	4	41
Midlands (13)	56	11	32

In a further attempt to measure respondents' sentiment about the rights of the United States to the Canal Zone, we suggest to respondents that seventy-five years after taking the Canal Zone from Panama, that it was only fair and an indication of U.S. magnanimity, that we now return it to Panama. The majority of respondents, however, didn't buy the belief that the U.S. had stolen the Canal Zone or that it was time to give it back.

Seventy-five years after taking the Canal Zone from Panama, it is only fair and just, and a sign that we are a great nation, that we return it to Panama.

Strongly agree	17%)	-	34%
Somewhat agree	17)		
Somewhat disagree	18)	-	58%
Strongly disagree	40)		
Don't know	8		

When we look at this response by reactions to the treaty, again we find that a vast majority of those opposed to the treaty -- and a significant plurality of the undecideds -- believe the United States should not return the Canal Zone to Panama. On the other hand, almost three-quarters of those who support the treaty agree that giving it back is the only fair thing to do.

Those who hold treaty position:

	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Don't know</u>	<u>Disagree</u>
Favor	74%	5	21
Don't know	30%	23	48
Oppose	14%	81	6

As the following demographic tables show, similar patterns emerge for this question as for the previous one, with staunchest support for keeping the Canal Zone coming from Republicans, conservatives, and those with anti-Carter sentiments. In addition, poorer Americans, older citizens, and residents of the South and Central regions hold stronger reservations than other groups about giving back the Canal Zone.

Again, those in the higher socio-economic groups, Democrats, liberals, Carter admirers, and residents of the Northeast and Pacific states are more inclined to feel that the Canal Zone belongs to the Panamanians

Seventy-five years after taking the Canal Zone from Panama, it is only fair and just, and a sign that we are a great Nation, that we return it to Panama.

	<u>Strongly agree</u>	<u>Somewhat agree</u>	<u>Somewhat disagree</u>	<u>Strongly disagree</u>	<u>Don't know</u>
<u>Overall</u>	17%	17	18	40	8
<u>Party preference</u>					
Democrat (54)	19	20	18	35	8
Independent (24)	16	16	17	42	9
Republican (21)	14	14	21	45	7
<u>Political ideology</u>					
Liberal (26)	27	24	18	25	6
Moderate (29)	14	20	16	39	12
Conservative (37)	13	15	18	49	6
<u>Opinion of treaty</u>					
Favor (30)	42	32	12	9	5
Don't know (15)	11	19	18	30	23
Oppose (55)	5	9	22	59	5
<u>Carter rating</u>					
Favorable (74)	21	21	18	32	9
Unfavorable (17)	8	9	18	59	6
Can't rate (9)	9	11	21	49	9
<u>Carter performance rating</u>					
Excellent (7)	22	26	8	36	8
Good (49)	24	20	23	26	8
Only fair (34)	10	15	17	49	9
Poor (8)	5	--	13	80	2
Don't know (2)*	51	--	8	--	41
<u>Sex</u>					
Female (51)	16	20	18	37	9
Male (49)	18	14	18	43	7
<u>Race</u>					
White (88)	15	17	19	42	8
Black (10)	23	22	19	26	10

...it is only fair and just...that we return (the canal) to Panama. (Continued)

	<u>Strongly agree</u>	<u>Somewhat agree</u>	<u>Somewhat disagree</u>	<u>Strongly disagree</u>	<u>Don't know</u>
<u>Occupation</u>					
Professional (5)	13	28	21	34	3
White collar (18)	20	16	19	37	8
Blue collar (25)	18	18	22	33	9
Government (6)	19	14	23	35	10
Teacher (4)*	19	37	2	37	6
Self-employed (7)	8	13	17	61	1
Retired (24)	13	14	9	53	11
<u>Education</u>					
Some grade school (13)	21	17	10	45	8
Some high school (16)	12	15	10	47	17
Graduated high school (32)	14	18	18	44	7
Technical/vocational (4)*	3	16	40	41	--
Some college (18)	21	17	23	35	5
Graduated college (10)	15	22	18	38	8
Graduate/professional (7)	28	16	17	30	9
<u>Religion</u>					
Protestant (57)	16	17	19	39	9
Catholic (30)	15	17	18	35	6
Jewish (3)*	10	13	15	48	14
Other (5)	29	8	30	27	5
None (4)*	23	28	10	32	7
<u>Total household income</u>					
\$0-3,999 (8)	17	16	10	55	2
\$4-6,999 (9)	13	12	15	48	13
\$7-9,999 (12)	20	13	35	26	6
\$10-12,999 (12)	18	17	13	43	9
\$13-14,999 (10)	19	14	22	40	6
\$15-19,999 (15)	14	21	21	38	6
\$20-24,999 (11)	15	22	17	40	6
Over \$25,000 (10)	21	20	16	36	8
<u>Union membership</u>					
Respondent (17)	21	15	19	40	6
Family member (12)	18	22	15	36	9
No member (71)	16	17	18	41	8

...if it is only fair and just...that we return (the canal) to
Panama (Continued)

	<u>Strongly agree</u>	<u>Somewhat agree</u>	<u>Somewhat disagree</u>	<u>Strongly disagree</u>	<u>Don't know</u>
<u>Age group</u>					
18-25 (10)	24	25	24	24	4
26-35 (20)	20	22	25	30	3
36-45 (18)	17	17	14	45	6
46-55 (17)	21	14	21	31	13
56-65 (18)	11	12	13	51	13
Over 65 (19)	11	13	11	57	10
<u>Areas</u>					
Northeast (15)	24	19	14	39	3
Industrial (25)	17	19	20	37	8
Midlands (15)	11	14	16	43	17
South (19)	14	17	17	45	8
Central (14)	22	8	22	42	6
Pacific (13)	16	27	20	29	9
<u>Areas</u>					
California (10)	16	28	15	33	8
West (12)	25	8	25	35	7
New York (9)	26	20	13	40	1
South (14)	14	17	16	44	9
Industrial (27)	17	17	20	37	9
Border (8)	13	19	18	45	5
New England (6)	22	19	16	38	6
Midlands (13)	10	14	20	43	13

Defense issue

A major reason for this sentiment would appear to be that many people feel that the Canal Zone is still vital to the defense of the United States. Even when given a choice of statements, one of which indicated that the Canal is now too small for many of U.S. vessels -- and consequently no longer important -- a majority of respondents still opted for retaining the Canal zone as necessary for the protection of the United States.

Vital to U.S. defense	58%
No longer important	34
Don't know	7

When we look at this response by support for the treaty, it is not surprising to find that almost three-quarters of treaty opposers feel the Canal zone is still strategically necessary. It is significant that a plurality of the undecided respondents feel this way also.

	<u>Vital</u>	<u>Don't know</u>	<u>No longer important</u>
<u>Treaty position:</u>			
Favor	34%	6	59
Don't know	48%	17	34
Oppose	74%	5	20

Demographic breakdowns of this response, as the following table shows, reinforces many of the patterns we have seen previously, with the same segment of the population invariably more inclined to opt for keeping the Canal.

Which of these two statements is closer to your opinion: retaining the Canal and Canal Zone is vital to the defence of the United States, or while it might once have been of vital importance, since our big submarines and aircraft carriers can't even fit through it, the Canal is no longer really important to the U.S. defense?

	<u>Vital to defense</u>	<u>Not really important to defense</u>	<u>Don't know</u>
<u>Overall</u>	58 %	34	7
<u>Party preference</u>			
Democrat (54)	57	36	6
Independent (24)	55	33	11
Republican (21)	63	31	5
<u>Political ideology</u>			
Liberal (26)	45	46	8
Moderate (29)	61	33	6
Conservative (37)	64	29	6
<u>Opinion of treaty</u>			
Favor (30)	34	59	6
Don't know (15)	48	34	17
Oppose (55)	74	20	5
<u>Carter rating</u>			
Favorable (74)	52	38	9
Unfavorable (17)	75	22	2
Can't rate (9)	62	32	6
<u>Carter performance rating</u>			
Excellent (7)	54	43	3
Good (49)	47	44	8
Only fair (34)	68	25	6
Poor (8)	83	14	4
Don't know (2)*	--	38	62
<u>Sex</u>			
Female (51)	56	34	9
Male (49)	60	34	6
<u>Race</u>			
White (88)	59	34	6
Black (10)	55	34	10

Which of these two statements is closer to your opinion: ...the Canal...is vital to the defense ...or...is no longer really important...(Continued)

	<u>Vital to defense</u>	<u>Not really import- ant to defense</u>	<u>Don't know</u>
<u>Occupation</u>			
Professional (5)	53	41	6
White collar (18)	55	40	4
Blue collar (25)	57	34	8
Government (6)	60	34	5
Teacher (4)*	42	50	8
Self-employed (7)	67	26	6
Retired (24)	67	26	7
<u>Education</u>			
Some grade school (13)	62	24	13
Some high school (16)	64	22	13
Graduated high school (32)	63	30	6
Technical/vocational (4)*	69	27	4
Some college (18)	57	38	4
Graduated college (10)	50	46	5
Graduate/professional (7)	45	46	8
<u>Religion</u>			
Protestant (57)	61	32	6
Catholic (30)	62	32	5
Jewish (3)*	55	36	9
Other (5)	43	41	15
None (4)*	38	57	6
<u>Total household income</u>			
\$0-3,999 (8)	56	33	10
\$4-6,999 (9)	63	21	15
\$7-9,999 (12)	57	32	10
\$10-12,999 (12)	59	39	2
\$13-14,999 (10)	58	40	1
\$15-19,999 (15)	63	32	4
\$20-24,999 (11)	56	38	5
Over \$25,000 (10)	54	37	9
<u>Union membership</u>			
Respondent (17)	63	31	6
Family member (12)	51	37	11
No member (71)	58	34	7

Which of these two statements is closer to your opinion: ...the Canal...is vital to...defense...or...is no longer really important...(Continued)

	<u>Vital to defense</u>	<u>Not really import- and to defense</u>	<u>Don't know</u>
<u>Age group</u>			
18-25 (10)	51	45	3
26-35 (20)	55	41	3
36-45 (18)	51	38	10
46-55 (17)	56	35	8
56-65 (18)	71	18	10
Over 65 (19)	65	27	7
<u>Areas</u>			
Northeast (15)	62	32	6
Industrial (25)	53	37	9
Midlands (15)	50	36	13
South (19)	65	31	3
Central (14)	59	29	11
Pacific (13)	56	41	4
<u>Areas</u>			
California (10)	53	44	3
West (12)	58	29	13
New York (9)	62	32	6
South (14)	66	29	4
Industrial (27)	49	40	10
Border (8)	70	29	1
New England (6)	62	31	6
Midlands (13)	55	33	11

The partisan relationship

As we have seen previously, a relationship exists between feelings toward the Administration and feelings toward the Panama Canal treaty issue. In this regard, segmentation on the statement that best equates confidence in Carter's judgment with the need to ratify the treaty, underscores the previous findings. The vast majority of those who favor the treaty agree with the statement that if Jimmy Carter says the treaty is needed, the Senate should back him up. On the other hand, the vast majority of those who oppose the treaty feel that the statement is false. Interestingly, the majority of those who are unsure about the treaty feel the statement to be true.

I have enough faith in Jimmy Carter that if he says the treaty is needed the Senate should back him up.

	<u>True</u>	<u>Don't know</u>	<u>False</u>
Favor	71%	7	22
Don't know	55%	18	27
Oppose	19%	5	77

In addition, the following, related patterns emerge:

1. A majority of those favorable to Carter (54%), Democrats (51%) and liberals (51%) believe the Senate should back the President up on the treaty issue.
2. Those that give Carter an excellent performance rating support the statement by a three-to-one margin, while support among those that give Carter a good rating is at the 55% level.
3. Doubts that Carter's integrity on the treaty issue is reflected by Republicans and conservatives by 66% and 64% respectively, and independents by 57%.
4. Not surprisingly, 71% of those that give Carter a fair rating, and 93% of those that rate him poorly, reject the idea that the Senate should back him up.

Further, a majority of those who favor the treaty are more likely to credit the Republican Party with political motivation for opposing the treaty rather than because the party believes in it. Treaty opposers, however, were about evenly divided on the issue.

The Republican Party has seized on opposing the Canal treaty not so much because they believe in it, but because they think it is to their political advantage.

	<u>True</u>	<u>Don't know</u>	<u>False</u>
<u>Overall</u>	46%	19	35
Favor	58%	14	28
Don't know	36%	33	31
Oppose	42%	18	40

Looking at responses to the statement along partisan-political lines, it is not surprising to find that those respondents who are most skeptical toward the Republican Party for their opposition are Democrats (58%), liberals (54%), moderates (50%), and those favorable to Carter (50%). In addition, those that give Carter excellent and good ratings feel this is true by 60% and 49% respectively. While the plurality of Republicans -- at the 49% level -- feel this statement to be false even a significant number of Republicans are critical or uncertain about their own Party's motives.

Positive and negative sentiment on implications of the treaty

In order to better understand voters' reasons for favoring or opposing the Panama Canal treaty, we examined how those who favored or opposed the treaty felt about those statements dealing with the long- and short-term implications of treaty ratification. The results of these analyses give a clearer picture of both the support and opposition to the signing of the treaty. In addition, we examined the beliefs of those voters who are still undecided on the treaty -- the pool from which additional public support for the President's position is most likely to come.

I. Attitudes of treaty supporters

The following table shows how treaty supporters feel about the pros and cons of treaty ratification. Several clear patterns emerge from the table. First the majority of those who support the treaty feel that failure to ratify will be detrimental to the image of the United States -- especially in the Third World countries.

1. Over one-half of those who support the treaty feel that if we don't help Panama by agreeing to the Canal treaty, other Latin American countries won't trust the United States.
2. A majority also feels that if the Senate refuses to ratify the treaty, the country will be hurt because other countries won't trust the President's ability to negotiate.
3. Finally, one-half of those who favor the treaty feel that the Communists will gain a great deal of advantage if we don't ratify the treaty because they will be able to show selfish motivations in U.S. foreign policy.

In line with their idea of negative consequences if the treaty is not ratified, treaty supporters reject wholeheartedly the idea that the treaty is a sign of U.S. weakness.

1. More than four-out-of-five reject the idea that the Panama Canal treaty indicates that any petty little dictatorship can kick the U.S. around.
2. Also rejected by 82% of those who support the treaty is the idea that it is just one more sign that the U.S. is growing weak and can no longer play a strong role in world affairs.

While accepted by a plurality of those who support the treaty -- 44% versus 40% -- the idea of violence in Panama if the treaty is not ratified does not appear to be a strong issue to supporters of the treaty.

On the other hand, while over one-half indicate that they would not be willing to send American troops to fight against guerrillas in the Canal Zone, over one-third of those who support the treaty indicate that they would be willing to send American troops to defend it against Panamanians.

Base = treaty supporters

	<u>True</u>	<u>Don't know</u>	<u>False</u>
If the Senate refuses to ratify the treaty, the country will be hurt because other countries won't trust the President's ability to negotiate.	52%	7	42
The Panama Canal treaty indicates that any petty little dictatorship can kick the U.S. around.	11%	7	83
If we don't ratify the treaty, there will be violence and bloodshed in Panama.	44%	16	40
I would be willing to send American troops to fight against guerrillas in the Canal zone.	34%	8	58
If we don't help Panama by agreeing to the Canal treaty other Latin American countries won't trust the United States.	55%	5	41
The communists will gain a great deal of advantage if we don't ratify the treaty because they will be able to show that the U.S. is only interested in itself and not in other countries.	50%	6	44
The Canal treaty is just one more symbol that the U.S. is growing weak and can no longer play a strong role in world affairs.	14%	4	82

II. Attitudes of treaty opposers

Besides feeling that the Canal treaty is basically a give away of American property, an other strong motivation for opposing the treaty expressed by those who oppose its ratification is that it indicates that any little dictatorship can kick the U.S. around. As the following table illustrates, this feeling is endorsed by 59% of those opposing the treaty. Nevertheless, less than one-half of the anti-treaty group would be willing to send U.S. troops to fight guerrillas in the Canal Zone, although a majority of opposers reject the idea that the treaty is just one more sign that the U.S. is no longer able to play a strong role in world affairs.

Within the opposition, however, there are signs of areas where opinions may be changed, at least among a sizeable minority.

1. Two-out-of-five feel that failure of the Senate to ratify the treaty will hurt the country because other countries won't trust the President's ability to negotiate.
2. Nearly one-third believe that if we don't help Panama by agreeing to the Canal treaty, other Latin American countries won't trust the United States.

2. Over one-fourth believe that the Communists will gain a great deal of advantage if we don't ratify the treaty because they will be able to show that the U.S. is only interested in itself and not in other countries.

Base = treaty opposers

	<u>True</u>	<u>Don't know</u>	<u>False</u>
If the Senate refuses to ratify the treaty, the country will be hurt because other countries won't trust the President's ability to negotiate.	41%	9	51
The Panama Canal treaty indicates that any petty little dictatorship can kick the U.S. around.	59%	7	34
If we don't ratify the treaty, there will be violence and bloodshed in Panama.	35%	13	52
I would be willing to send American troops to fight against guerrillas in the Canal zone.	43%	12	46
If we don't help Panama by agreeing to the Canal treaty other Latin American countries won't trust the United States.	31%	9	60
The communists will gain a great deal of advantage if we don't ratify the treaty because they will be able to show that the U.S. is only interested in itself and not in other countries.	28%	7	65
The Canal treaty is just one more symbol that the U.S. is growing weak and can no longer play a strong role in world affairs.	41%	5	54

III. Attitudes of the undecided

As might be expected, those who are undecided about the treaty are split on most of the issues surrounding the treaty. In terms of looking for possible support for the treaty among members of this group, there is both good and bad news as reflected in the table that follows.

On the "good news" side, we find the following:

1. Nearly two-out-of-every-three say they would be unwilling to send American troops to fight guerrillas in the Canal Zone;
2. A plurality feel that failure to ratify the treaty will weaken the President's ability to negotiate with other countries;
3. Nearly one-half reject the idea that the treaty indicates that the U.S. can be kicked around by petty dictatorships;
4. The idea that the treaty is a symbol that the U.S. can no longer play a strong role in world affairs is rejected by nearly a two-to-one margin.

On the negative side, however, the undecideds reject the idea that failure to ratify the treaty will hurt the United States' image in communist countries and Latin America.

1. Over one-half disagree that the communists will use the failure of the U.S. to ratify the treaty to show that we are only interested in ourselves and not in other countries.
2. A plurality reject the idea that other Latin American countries won't trust the United States if we fail to help Panama by ratifying the treaty.

Undecided respondents also tend to reject the idea that there will be violence and bloodshed in Panama if the treaty is not ratified.

Base = treaty undecideds

	<u>True</u>	<u>Don't know</u>	<u>False</u>
If the Senate refuses to ratify the treaty, the country will be hurt because other countries won't trust the President's ability to negotiate.	40%	23	37
The Panama Canal treaty, indicates that any petty little dictatorship can kick the U.S. around.	38%	16	46
If we don't ratify the treaty, there will be violence and bloodshed in Panama.	36%	23	41
I would be willing to send American troops to fight against guerrillas in the Canal zone.	17%	19	65
If we don't help Panama by agreeing to the Canal treaty other Latin American countries won't trust the United States.	34%	23	44
The communists will gain a great deal of advantage if we don't ratify the treaty because they will be able to show that the U.S. is only interested in itself and not in other countries.	29%	20	51
The Canal treaty is just one more symbol that the U.S. is growing weak and can no longer play a strong role in world affairs.	25%	13	42

Changing the Public's MindPotential impacts on voters' attitudes toward the treaty

To find out more about what might influence voters' attitudes toward the Canal treaty one way or the other, we asked what impact it would have on their views of the treaty if the statements we had made before were, in fact, true. Specifically, we looked to see what effect negative statements would have on those with positive attitudes about the treaty, and how the positive statements, if true, would change the views of those opposed to the treaty. Finally, we examined the impact of each of the statements on those who have yet to decide on the issue.

Generally, the findings indicate that those who are currently in support of the treaty would be somewhat more affected by finding negative statements true than would treaty opposers who find positive statements true. Among the undecideds, however, it was the positive or pro-treaty statements which appeared to be the more persuasive.

We further examined how certain "trade-offs" might affect voters' views toward the treaty, specifically with regard to foreign aid to Panama, the regime in Panama, and the right of the United States to build a larger canal in the future.

Potential impacts on treaty supporters

Among treaty supporters, we were interested in finding out what ramifications of the treaty might cause an erosion of support. As the following table demonstrates, a significant waning of support for the treaty would result if pro-treaty Americans believed them to be true.

1. Over one-half said that they would be less inclined to support the treaty if they felt it was true that it indicated that the United States could be pushed around by petty dictatorships.
2. Fifty-one percent of the supporters indicated that they would be less favorable toward the treaty if they felt it were true that the treaty was really a give away of American property.
3. Nearly one-half said they would be less likely to favor ratification if they felt that the treaty symbolized U.S. weakness in the area of world affairs.

4. Finally, 45% indicated that, if they had to send troops to fight guerrillas in the Canal Zone, they would be less inclined to support ratification of the treaty.

Potential impact of "true" statements on treaty supporters. If statement were true, would you be:

	<u>More inclined to support</u>	<u>No difference</u>	<u>Less inclined to support</u>	<u>Don't know</u>
The Canal treaty is basically a give away of American property.	37%	7	51	5
The Panama Canal treaty indicates that any petty little dictatorship can kick the U.S. around.	36%	5	55	4
I would be willing to send American troops to fight against guerrillas in the Canal zone.	42%	5	45	9
The Canal treaty is just one more symbol that the U.S. is growing weak and can no longer play a strong role in world affairs.	40%	5	47	9

Though the majority of treaty supporters believe the United States should give the Canal Zone back to the Panamanians, they do not believe that the U.S. should also give them foreign aid. This suggests that there is a limit to what treaty supporters will accept, and that any discussion of foreign aid to Panama might tend to reduce favorable sentiment among a majority of this group.

I wouldn't mind giving up the Canal, but we should not give the Panamanians any foreign aid to go along with it.

Agree	54%
Don't know	7
Disagree	39

Potential impacts on treaty opposers

In contrast with treaty supporters, it is notable at the outset that treaty opposers are even more adamant in their negative views of the treaty when asked to assume that certain positive statements about the treaty are true. In almost every instance, over one-half of those who oppose the treaty felt that such a fact would make them even less inclined to support the measure.

In fact, the only "fact" that would make less than a majority of treaty opposers even less favorable was the statement that the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the military have supported the treaty for some time on the grounds that the Canal is not defensible, and feel that the treaty would increase security. However, less than four-out-of-ten of those opposing the treaty said that such a fact might make them more inclined to support ratification.

There are some signs, nevertheless, that each of these statements would encourage some shift to the pro-treaty side. As the following table indicates, about one-in-three said they

would be more favorable toward the treaty if each statement were true.

Potential impact of "true" statements on treaty opposers. If statement were true would you be:

	<u>More inclined to support</u>	<u>No difference</u>	<u>Less inclined to support</u>	<u>Don't know</u>
If the Senate refuses to ratify the treaty, the country will be hurt because other countries won't trust the President's ability to negotiate.	32%	8	52	8
I have enough faith in Jimmy Carter that if he says the treaty is needed the Senate should back him up.	33%	6	58	4
If we don't ratify the treaty, there will be violence and bloodshed in Panama.	36%	6	51	6
If we don't help Panama by agreeing to the Canal treaty other Latin American countries won't trust the United States.	33%	7	55	5
The communists will gain a great deal of advantage if we don't ratify the treaty because they will be able to show that the U.S. is only interested in itself and not in other countries.	32%	9	54	5
If it was true that the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the military have supported the treaty for several years because they believe that the Canal in its present form is incapable of being defended and recognize the treaty as a means of improving security.	38%	5	45	12

However, a slightly wider margin of pro-treaty sentiment would be evidenced among opposers were the treaty to include a provision that gives the United States the right to build a new and larger Canal that could accommodate U.S. oil tankers and aircraft carriers.

If Panama agrees as part of the current treaty to give us the right to build a new canal, how inclined would you be to support the treaty?

More inclined	40%
Less inclined	46
No difference	7
Don't know	8

Moreover, it is evident, that the regime that presently exists in Panama is a major factor in opposing the treaty. A sizeable majority of treaty opposers report that they would be willing to give the Canal to Panama if it had a free, Democratic government instead of the dictatorship presently ruling.

I'd agree to give the Canal to Panama if it had a free, Democratic government but I don't think we should give it to the dictatorship that currently rules.

Agree	60%
Don't know	3
Disagree	36

Potential impacts on the undecideds

It is the opinions of the 15% who are still undecided on the issue which are of special interest as they are probably the most susceptible to change. To get a better picture of this group and how it might be brought over to the "supporter" side, we first looked at the impact which both positive and negative "facts" would have on their attitudes.

Looking at the impacts of the positive statements, we find the following:

1. Over one-half say they would be more favorable toward the Canal treaty if they found it was actually supported by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
2. Over one-half say they would be more favorable toward the Canal treaty if it were true that failure to ratify would hurt the President's ability to negotiate with other countries.
3. Forty-two percent would be more inclined to support the treaty if failure to ratify would give the communists the opportunity to say that the U.S. doesn't care about other countries.

4. Pluralities of the undecideds would be more favorable toward the treaty, if they felt that riots would result in Panama, or that Latin American countries would not trust the United States if the treaty were not ratified.
5. Only one-quarter, however, would be more inclined to support the treaty if they felt the Republican Party had ulterior motives in opposing the treaty.

The impact of negative "facts" appear to be considerably weaker than the impact of positive ones among the undecideds.

1. If they felt that the Canal treaty was simply another symbol of U.S. loss of world power, 40% would be less inclined to support the treaty.
2. If they were willing to send U.S. troops to the Canal Zone to fight guerrillas, nearly one-half would feel less inclined to support the treaty.

3. Pretending that the treaty was simply a give away of American property or that it showed petty dictators could push us around, resulted in only the slightest plurality shifting from undecided to less inclined

Potential impact of "true" statements of the undecideds. If statement were true would you be:

	<u>More inclined to support</u>	<u>No difference</u>	<u>Less inclined to support</u>	<u>Don't know</u>
If the Senate refuses to ratify the treaty, the country will be hurt because other countries won't trust the President's ability to negotiate.	51%	7	21	21
The Canal treaty is basically a give away of American property.	33%	2	38	27
I have enough faith in Jimmy Carter that if he says the treaty is needed the Senate should back him up.	50%	4	24	21
The Panama Canal treaty indicates that any petty little dictatorship can kick the U.S. around.	36%	3	37	24
If we don't ratify the treaty, there will be violence and bloodshed in Panama.	41%	6	29	24
I would be willing to send American troops to fight guerrillas in the Canal zone.	23%	3	48	25
If we don't help Panama by agreeing to the Canal treaty other Latin American countries won't trust the United States.	41%	4	30	25
The communists will gain a great deal of advantage if we don't ratify the treaty because they will be able to show that the U.S. is only interested in itself and not in other countries.	42%	5	33	21
The Canal treaty is just one more symbol that the U.S. is growing weak and can no longer play a strong role in world affairs.	28%	6	40	26
The Republican Party has seized on opposing the Canal treaty not so much because they believe in it but because they think it is to their political advantage.	25%	9	36	30

Impact of "true" statements on undecideds (continued)

	<u>More inclined to support</u>	<u>No difference</u>	<u>Less inclined to support</u>	<u>Don't know</u>
If it was true that the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the military have supported the treaty for several years because they believe that the Canal in its present form is incapable of being defended and recognize the treaty as a means of improving security.	52%	5	16	27

Among the "trade-off" issues, those that would shift the undecideds to a pro-treaty stance were the following:

1. Fifty-two percent of the undecideds would be more inclined to support the treaty were it to include a provision that gave the U.S. the right to build a new and larger Canal.
2. A plurality (48%) supported the argument that they wouldn't mind giving up the Canal Zone as long as foreign aid to Panama was not part of the deal.

In addition, a Democratic government in Panama would make a majority of the undecideds (56%) more favorable toward the treaty.

To find out whether discussion of the issue had, perhaps, changed respondents' views on the treaty, we asked them to give us their vote again. Overall, the responses were much the same as before, with 3% of the undecideds dividing two-to-one against the treaty.

However, when we look at the actual crossovers, 15% of treaty supporters now have doubts or have shifted to the anti-treaty column. 41% of the undecideds have reached a conclusion, with slightly more opposing the treaty than favoring it. Treaty opposers remain firmest in their initial decision, although some positive shift is evidenced.

	<u>For</u>	<u>Not sure</u>	<u>Against</u>
<u>Treaty position:</u>			
Favor	85%	7	8
Don't know	18%	59	24
Oppose	5%	3	92

When we asked respondents who had changed their positions on the treaty issue their reason for doing so, a surprisingly high percentage were not sure why they had. This suggests that some Americans are still fuzzy on the issues surrounding the treaty, and subject to change their minds again.

The primary reason cited by pro-treaty respondents for changing their minds was that discussion of the treaty had made them more aware of the issues.

[Not sure or favored the treaty] What if anything stands out as a reason for changing your mind?

Additional information	15%
Keep Communism out, U.S. more secure	7
Shouldn't give it away, U.S. built it	7
Sending troops	6
Opening to Communism	2
Other	27
Don't know	36

Additional information was also cited by those who had originally opposed the treaty as the main reason for changing their minds. The idea of sending troops into the Canal Zone had disturbed a small minority of switchers; others had been convinced by the idea that we shouldn't get involved in Panama, that it's too small and of no military value any more.

[Not sure or opposed the treaty] What is anything stands out as a reason for changing your mind?

Additional information	23%
Sending our troops	6
U.S. shouldn't get involved	4
Panama is too small, has no military value	4
[IF] Joint Chiefs of Staff are in favor of it	2
Other	27
Don't know	34

Demographic breakdowns for the second vote on the treaty show much the same overall patterns as for the initial response. However, the Midland region shows a net gain of 10% in the number who oppose the treaty, and is now second only to the Central region in lack of treaty support. The Border states moreover, reflect an 11% increase in the number of people supporting the treaty, while the Southern states reflect a 6% increase in support.

Professional people, teachers and the self-employed all showed stronger gains than other occupational groups, as did college graduates among educational groups. Those in the 18-25 year old age group made a marked shift into the anti-treaty column, although those in the 36-45 age group reflected a six-point gain in support.

Net change between first and second response

	<u>For</u>	<u>Not sure</u>	<u>Against</u>
<u>Overall</u>	+ 18	- 3	+ 2
<u>Party preference</u>			
Democrat (54)	—	- 2	+ 1
Independent (24)	+ 1	- 3	+ 2
Republican (21)	+ 2	- 2	+ 1
<u>Political ideology</u>			
Liberal (26)	+ 2	- 2	+ 1
Moderate (29)	- 4	+ 2	+ 2
Conservative (37)	+ 2	- 4	+ 2
<u>Carter rating</u>			
Favorable (74)	+ 2	- 3	+ 1
Unfavorable (17)	- 1	- 1	+ 1
Can't rate (9)	—	- 4	+ 4
<u>Carter performance rating</u>			
Excellent (7)	+ 3	+ 2	- 3
Good (49)	+ 2	- 4	+ 2
Only fair (34)	+ 1	- 3	+ 2
Poor (8)	- 2	- 1	+ 3
Don't know (2)*	—	—	—
<u>Sex</u>			
Female (51)	+ 1	- 1	—
Male (49)	+ 1	- 4	+ 3
<u>Race</u>			
White (88)	+ 1	- 3	+ 2
Black (10)	+ 3	+ 2	- 5
<u>Occupation</u>			
Professional (5)	+ 2	- 4	+ 6
White collar (18)	- 1	- 5	+ 3
Blue collar (25)	+ 2	+ 2	- 1
Government (6)	- 5	- 4	- 3
Teacher (4)*	- 1	- 7	+11
Self-employed (7)	+ 3	- 2	+ 8
Retired (24)	—	—	- 2

Net change (continued)

	<u>For</u>	<u>Not sure</u>	<u>Against</u>
<u>Education</u>			
Some grade school (13)	+ 7	- 5	- 2
Some high school (16)	- 2	+ 4	- 2
Graduated high school (32)	+ 2	- 1	--
Technical/vocational (4)*	+ 9	+ 1	- 9
Some college (18)	+ 2	- 8	+ 7
Graduated college (10)	- 1	- 4	+ 5
Graduate/professional (7)	- 3	+ 1	+ 2
<u>Religion</u>			
Protestant (57)	+ 2	- 3	+ 1
Catholic (30)	+ 1	- 2	+ 2
Jewish (3)*	--	+ 7	- 7
Other (5)	- 6	+ 3	+ 3
None (4)*	+ 3	- 7	+ 3
<u>Total household income</u>			
\$0-3,999 (8)	+ 5	+ 4	- 9
\$4-6,999 (9)	- 1	- 1	+ 1
\$7-9,999 (12)	+ 4	- 3	- 1
\$10-12,999 (12)	+ 2	- 9	+ 7
\$13-14,999 (10)	+ 3	--	- 3
\$15-19,999 (15)	- 2	- 3	+ 4
\$20-24,999 (11)	+ 4	- 4	+ 1
Over \$25,000 (10)	- 2	- 2	+ 5
<u>Union membership</u>			
Respondent (17)	- 2	+ 4	- 1
Family member (12)	- 6	- 1	+ 8
No member (71)	+ 3	- 3	+ 1
<u>Age group</u>			
18-25 (10)	- 5	- 4	+10
26-35 (20)	+ 5	- 4	- 2
36-45 (18)	+ 6	- 6	--
46-55 (17)	- 2	- 2	+ 4
56-65 (18)	+ 1	+ 3	- 5
Over 65 (19)	+ 1	- 3	+ 2

Net change (continued)

	<u>For</u>	<u>Not sure</u>	<u>Against</u>
<u>Areas</u>			
Northeast (15)	--	+ 2	- 2
Industrial (25)	--	- 1	+ 2
Midlands (15)	+ 2	-11	+10
South (19)	+ 6	- 6	--
Central (14)	- 2	- 1	+ 3
Pacific (13)	- 4	+ 4	--
<u>Areas</u>			
California (10)	- 7	+ 7	+ 1
West (12)	+ 2	- 1	- 1
New York (9)	+ 1	--	- 2
South (14)	+ 3	- 6	+ 2
Industrial (27)	--	- 3	+ 3
Border (8)	+11	- 5	- 6
New England (6)	- 3	+ 4	- 1
Midland (13)	- 2	- 8	+10

Sometimes as we discuss an issue and bring up arguments for and against something, people switch their minds about it. We've raised arguments for and against the treaty in this discussion. Given all you're heard do you think if you had to vote yourself right now for or against the treaty, how would you vote?

<u>Overall</u>	<u>For</u> 31%	<u>Not sure</u> 12	<u>Against</u> 57
<u>Party preference</u>			
Democrat (54)	34	14	52
Independent (24)	32	11	57
Republican (21)	26	11	64
<u>Political ideology</u>			
Liberal (26)	45	9	47
Moderate (29)	33	16	51
Conservative (37)	24	11	65
<u>Opinion of treaty</u>			
Favor (30)	85	7	8
Don't know (15)	18	59	24
Oppose (55)	5	3	92
<u>Carter rating</u>			
Favorable (74)	40	13	47
Unfavorable (17)	14	9	77
Can't rate (9)	12	11	77
<u>Carter performance rating</u>			
Excellent (7)	46	23	32
Good (49)	41	11	48
Only fair (34)	22	12	67
Poor (8)	6	4	90
Don't know (2)*	22	70	8
<u>Sex</u>			
Female (51)	31	16	53
Male (49)	32	8	60
<u>Race</u>			
White (88)	30	11	59
Black (10)	41	20	39

...for or against the treaty, how would you vote?

	<u>For</u>	<u>Not sure</u>	Against
<u>Occupation</u>			
Professional (5)	46	8	47
White collar (18)	32	8	60
Blue collar (25)	30	16	54
Government (6)	33	20	47
Teacher (4)*	47	11	42
Self-employed (7)	15	10	76
Retired (24)	26	13	61
<u>Education</u>			
Some grade school (13)	28	21	51
Some high school (16)	24	19	58
Graduated high school (32)	29	13	59
Technical/vocational (4)*	19	12	69
Some college (18)	31	8	61
Graduated college (10)	37	9	54
Graduate/professional (7)	48	9	43
<u>Religion</u>			
Protestant (57)	30	11	59
Catholic (30)	31	16	54
Jewish (3)*	30	23	47
Other (5)	32	8	60
None (4)*	47	6	47
<u>Total household income</u>			
\$0-3,999 (8)	21	31	48
\$4-6,999 (9)	17	11	72
\$7-9,999 (12)	41	11	49
\$10-12,999 (12)	30	8	62
\$13-14,999 (10)	36	9	55
\$15-19,999 (15)	30	9	60
\$20-24,999 (11)	37	8	54
Over \$25,000 (10)	39	10	52
<u>Union membership</u>			
Respondent (17)	38	12	50
Family member (12)	37	20	44
No member (71)	30	11	59

...for or against the treaty, how would you vote?

	<u>For</u>	<u>Not sure</u>	<u>Against</u>
<u>Age group</u>			
18-25 (10)	38	11	52
26-35 (20)	43	13	43
36-45 (18)	37	8	55
46-55 (17)	30	15	55
56-65 (18)	18	16	66
Over 65 (19)	22	10	69
<u>Areas</u>			
Northeast (15)	39	12	49
Industrial (25)	31	16	54
Midlands (15)	23	16	62
South (19)	33	7	60
Central (14)	22	10	68
Pacific (13)	36	17	48
<u>Areas</u>			
California (10)	35	20	45
West (12)	29	10	61
New York (9)	41	12	47
South (14)	31	7	62
Industrial (27)	30	17	53
Border (8)	36	5	59
New England (6)	36	12	52
Midlands (13)	20	13	67

APPENDIX

CSR #970

Regardless of whether you vote or not, do you generally consider yourself a Democrat, a Republican or what?

Democrat	46%
Independent	29
Republican	22
Don't know	3

Do you generally think of yourself as more of a liberal, or more of a conservative?

Liberal	28%
Moderate	16
Conservative	47
Don't know	8

The United States government has recently concluded a treaty with the government of Panama to return the Panama Canal, and the Canal zone to Panama over time finishing by the year 2000. The U.S. would retain rights to defend the Canal and Panama agrees to maintain its neutrality and keep it open.

Do you feel that you are currently informed enough about the Panama Canal treaty to make an informed judgment about it?

Yes	43%
Not sure	6
No	51

What additional information would you most like to have to help you make a decision?

More about it, what it involves, general information, a whole lot	19%
Read more about it, more things published on it	12
Points of the treaty, details in negotiations	9
More coverage on TV news	6
How much use will the U.S. have, what will our rights be, what control will the U.S. have	5
How do the Panamanians feel, more about different interpretations of the treaty, the alternatives the Panamanians will accept	4
The truth	3
Neutrality issue, would we fight if the Russians came in, how much can we intervene, how much will our military be involved	2
How much will it cost, how much will U.S. have to pay for future use of Canal	2
How much are we losing, how much is invested there	2
Other	12
Don't know	24

From what you do know about the treaty do you generally favor or oppose it?

Favor	30%
Don't know	15
Oppose	55

Why do you take that position in regards to the Panama Canal?

FAVOR

It belongs to Panama, it isn't ours, they own it, it's on their land, it's their country, it's in the middle of Panama	32%
It's the right thing to do, it's the just thing, it's fair to them	12
Not valuable or strategic, not worth that much	6
It will show the world and South America that we are fair and will help prevent communism from coming in	5
It's fair to both sides, terms are fair	4
President knows what he's doing, Carter is right	4
We stole it originally, we should give it back	3
Not necessary	2
If it made both sides happy	1
Other	21
Don't know	11

OPPOSE

We spent too much in money and lives to keep it or build it, we've invested too much in it to give it up, we paid for it	18%
We should keep it, don't think we should give it up	11
It's ours, it belongs to us	9
We built it, we built it and we should keep it	8
Vital to our security, might need it during time of war, we'd be jeopardizing our national security	5
The Commies will take over	4
You can't trust the Panamanians, they might not keep their promises	4
Never know when we might need it again, we need it for trade, we need it	4
Why should we give away everything	3
Will cost us too much to use it in the future, what future expenses might be	3
We can take care of it better	3
We might lose access to it	2
Other	16
Don't know	11

I'm going to read you a number of statements that have been made about the Panama Canal issue and I'd like you to tell me whether each statement is very true, only somewhat true, somewhat false or absolutely false.

	<u>Very true</u>	<u>Only somewhat true</u>	<u>Somewhat false</u>	<u>Absolutely false</u>	<u>Don't know</u>
If the Senate refuses to ratify the treaty, the country won't trust the President's ability to negotiate.	17%	27	17	29	10
The Canal Treaty is basically a give away of American property.	40%	18	16	19	6
I have enough faith in Jimmy Carter that if he says the treaty is needed the Senate should back him up.	22%	18	19	34	7
The Panama Canal treaty indicates that any petty little dictatorship can kick the U.S. around.	25%	17	17	34	8
If we don't ratify the treaty, there will be violence and bloodshed in Panama.	16%	23	21	26	15
I would be willing to send American troops to fight against guerrillas in the Canal zone.	25%	11	12	40	12
If we don't help Panama by agreeing to the Canal Treaty other Latin American countries won't trust the United States.	17%	21	19	33	10
The communists will gain a great deal of advantage if we don't ratify the treaty because they will be able to show that U.S. is only interested in itself and not in other countries.	17%	18	15	42	9
The canal treaty is just one more symbol that the U.S. is growing weak and can no longer play a strong role in world affairs.	16%	14	14	50	6
The Republican Party has seized on opposing the Canal Treaty not so much because they believe in it but because they think it is too their political advantage.	23%	24	13	22	19

Now, that we've established whether or not you feel each of these statements was true or not. I'd like you to assume that these statements are true and go through the list again and tell me if it was true would it make you much more inclined to support the treaty, somewhat more inclined, somewhat less inclined or much less inclined to support the treaty?

	Much more inclined	Somewhat more inclined	Somewhat less inclined	Much less inclined	Makes no difference	Don't know
If the Senate refuses to ratify the treaty, the country will be hurt because other countries won't trust the President's ability to negotiate.	20%	24	15	24	7	10
The Canal Treaty is basically a give away of American property.	15%	15	16	42	5	7
I have enough faith in Jimmy Carter that if he says the treaty is needed the Senate should back him up.	25%	23	14	27	5	6
The Panama Canal Treaty indicates that any petty little dictatorship can kick the U.S. around.	15%	15	14	43	5	8
If we don't ratify the treaty, there will be violence and bloodshed in Panama.	24%	20	14	27	6	9
I would be willing to send American troops to fight against guerillas in the Canal zone.	20%	15	14	36	6	10
If we din't help Panama by agreeing to the Canal Treaty other Latin American countries won't trust the United States.	20%	23	16	27	7	7
The communists will gain a great advantage if we don't ratify the treaty because they will be able to show that the U.S. is only interested in itself and not in other countries.	23%	19	15	28	8	8
The Canal Treaty is just one more symbol that the U.S. is growing weak and can no longer play a strong role in world affairs.	15%	18	17	35	6	9
The Republican Party has ceased on opposing the Canal Treaty, not so much because they believe in it but because they think it is too their political advantage.	13%	17	19	30	10	12

Much more inclined
 Somewhat more inclined
 Somewhat less inclined
 Much less inclined
 Makes no difference
 Don't know

If it was true than the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the military have supported the treaty for several years because they believe that the Canal in its present form is incapable of being defended and recognize the treaty as a means of improving security.

26% 24 13 19 6 13

Which of these two statements is closer to your opinion:

Retaining the Canal and Canal Zone is vital to the defense of the United States.

58%

While it might once have been of vital importance, since our big submarines and aircraft carriers can't even fit through it, the Canal is not longer really important to the U.S. defense.

34

Don't know

7

One fact about the Panama Canal is that it is currently too small for many of the largest ships -- oil tankers and aircraft carriers. A solution to that would be to build a new Canal. If Panama agrees as part of the current treaty to give us the right to build a new Canal would you be much more inclined, somewhat more inclined, somewhat less inclined or much less inclined to support the treaty?

Much more inclined	29%
Somewhat more inclined	21
Somewhat less inclined	12
Much less inclined	23
Makes no difference	6
Don't know	9

Would you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree with the following statements:

Seventy-five years after taking the Canal Zone from Panama, it is only fair and just, and a sign that we are a great Nation, that we return it to Panama.

Strongly agree	17%
Somewhat agree	17
Somewhat disagree	18
Strongly disagree	40
Don't know	8

I'd agree to give the Canal to Panama if it had a free, Democratic government but I don't think we should give it to the dictatorship that currently rules.

Strongly agree	36%
Somewhat agree	20
Somewhat disagree	20
Strongly disagree	17
Don't know	7

I wouldn't mind giving up the Canal, but we should not give the Panamanians any foreign aid to go along with it.

Strongly agree	31%
Somewhat agree	16
Somewhat disagree	24
Strongly disagree	22
Don't know	8

Sometimes as we discuss an issue and bring up arguments for and against something people switch their minds about it. We've raised arguments for and against the treaty in this discussion. Given all you've heard do you think if you had to vote yourself right now for or against the treaty, how would you vote?

For	31%
Not sure	12
Against	57

You said earlier you [FAVORED/OPPOSED] the treaty. What if any things stand out as a reason for changing your mind?

FOR

My lack of knowledge, need to think about it more, have raised some good questions, additional information has changed my mind	23%
About sending our troops	6
We shouldn't get involved	4
It's too small anyway, it has no military value	4
[IF] Joints Chiefs are in favor of the treaty	2
Other	27
Don't know	34

AGAINST

My lack of knowledge, need to think about it more, have raised some good questions, additional information has changed my mind	15%
Help keep Communism out, help make U.S. more secure	7
Shouldn't give it away, we should keep it, we built it	7
About sending our troops	6
Opening to Communism	2
Other	27
Don't know	36

Warren Christopher's Evening Report
October 1, 1977

Canal Treaties. During last week's Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings, two broad issues surfaced on which I want to make recommendations today.

(a) Releasing Documents. The first issue concerns Senator Baker's request that the Administration provide the Committee with all its records concerning the treaty negotiations. He asked specifically for minutes of the negotiations with the Panamanians, cables, internal position papers, and communications between you, Cy and our negotiators.

We have quickly reviewed the historical precedents and can find no case in which the Executive Branch has released to the Senate the full and confidential record of treaty negotiations or the record of its internal deliberations. There are cases, beginning with the Jay Treaty in 1796, in which the President has refused such requests. Over the years, Presidents have endeavored to resolve disputes with Congress over provision of documents by practical accommodations, including summaries and briefings, but have resorted to the exercise of executive privilege where necessary.

I agree
It is our recommendation that the Administration should not release the minutes of the negotiating sessions. We have a clear understanding with the Panamanians that the negotiations are to be kept confidential and, moreover, the precedent set by their release could cause massive future problems. We also recommend that a stern position be taken against the release of any Presidential documents (e.g., PRM 1).

~~SECRET~~
GDS

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

PER 8/31/00 NSC RE NLC-00428
BY NARS DATE 6/26/03

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

*ok, but
Be
Cautious &
Conservative*

As a matter of constitutional practice and conduct of foreign affairs, it is very tempting to turn down Baker's request. But a flat refusal could lead him to oppose the treaties and might well lead to Senate rejection of them. Therefore, it is recommended that we respond to Senator Baker's request by the following: (i) offer a full briefing to Senator Baker, or any other Senator, on any aspect of the treaties in which they are interested, (ii) provide summaries, on a confidential basis, of the minutes of the negotiating sessions beginning with the Tack/Kissinger Principles of 1974 where specifically requested, and (iii) provide carefully controlled access to defined categories of negotiating documents such as position papers exchanged between the parties since 1974. On the latter two points, we would need to get the concurrence of the Panamanians, and also insist that the summaries and documents not be published.

(b) Interpretation of the Treaties. As a result of questions raised by Senators Baker, Stone and others, it is apparent that it will be important to try to resolve several questions of interpretation which have arisen. Some but not all of these questions arise from the August 19 and 22 statements of Panamanian negotiator Escobar. The principal questions appear to relate to neutrality, "intervention," and expeditious passage.

*I need
to have
these
interpretations
classified
also*

I recommend that we begin to explore the possibility of an interpretive exchange of notes, and I met with Ambassador Bunker this afternoon to ask that he and Sol start the process. There are several delicate issues involved. Torrijos may be reluctant to agree publicly to our interpretations prior to his October 23 plebiscite. Moreover, an early exchange would be subject to the risk that new questions of interpretation may arise as Senate consideration of the treaties proceeds, and it might not be possible to have a further exchange which addressed them. On the other hand, an exchange of notes after the plebiscite could be open to challenge as not being binding on the Panamanians. After we have given further consideration to these matters of timing and substance and tested the water with the Panamanians, we will make specific recommendations to you.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

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Pastor

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 2, 1977

Dear General Torrijos

Let me again extend my congratulations to you and your government on the successful vote on the Panama Canal treaties. You can be proud of the free and open discussions in Panama on the Canal treaties. The debate and the vote demonstrated to the world that the Panamanian people support the treaties. In ratifying the treaties, Panama has set an example, which I pledge to you the United States will follow.


Upon his return from Panama, Bob Pastor reported to me about his enjoyable and useful conversation with you. I have read through the reports of your trip, which you gave him, and I found them fascinating, informative, and extremely valuable.

I especially appreciate your efforts at obtaining international support for the treaties. The statement by Prime Minister Begin that he will ask Senators who are friendly to Israel to vote favorably on the Canal treaties is an important one.

You have a keen ability to know people very quickly and your insights were very interesting. I especially appreciate the trust you have put in our friendship by sharing your thoughts and experiences with me.

My best wishes,

Sincerely,



His Excellency
General Omar Torrijos Herrera
Chief of Government of the
Republic of Panama
Panama City

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
PER 4/9/91 NLS Hx RE MP-NLC-91-1
BY *[Signature]* NARS DATE 4/22/91

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

November 17, 1977

TO: HAMILTON JORDAN
FROM: BOB PASTOR

Zbig condensed the original memo, but I am attaching it because it offers a couple of other reasons why we may want to move more slowly on the democracy in Panama issue.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

PER 7/24/00 NLC HVRE MR-NLC-90-26
BY Jag NARS, DATE 1/30/91

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7504

File Panama
C

CONFIDENTIAL

November 14, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI *B.*
SUBJECT: Senator Byrd's Trip -- An Assessment

By all accounts, the trip by Senator Byrd and six other Senators to Panama was a success. It was well planned to give the Senators a flavor of political dissent in Panama, to permit them to see the full commitment of the Panamanian people to the Canal Treaties, and to be briefed on Panama's plans for the future economic development of Panama and the Zone. It also gave the Senators an opportunity to see a good cross-section of well-educated and intelligent Panamanians. Torrijos spent a good deal of time with the Senators, and came to like and respect Senator Byrd.

There is one set of issues on which the Senators pressed Torrijos quite hard, and which may cause us some problems. It is the future of democratic government in Panama.

There is the danger that some Senators will seek concessions in the area as a way to divert attention from the Treaties. If Torrijos does not make the concessions regarding democracy that several believe he promised, they could use that as an excuse to vote against the Treaties. Therefore, I think it is in our interest not to couple the democracy-in-Panama issue with the Canal Treaties. I think we are more likely to lose votes if Torrijos does not make good on his supposed concessions than win them if he does.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

PER *Dudley* NSC H/RE MR-116-90-26
BY *Dudley* NARS. DATE 1/30/91

CONFIDENTIAL~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

SUBJECT: Senator Byrd's Trip -- An Assessment

By all accounts, the trip by Senator Byrd and six other Senators to Panama was a success. It was well planned to give the Senators a flavor of political dissent in Panama, to permit them to see the full commitment of the Panamanian people to the Canal Treaties, and to be briefed on Panama's plans for the future economic development of Panama and the Zone. It also gave the Senators an opportunity to see a good cross-section of well-educated and intelligent Panamanians. Torrijos spent a good deal of time with the Senators, and came to like and respect Senator Byrd.

There is one set of issues on which the Senators pressed Torrijos quite hard, and which may cause us some problems. It is the future of democratic government in Panama. While Torrijos was tolerant of the criticism and even somewhat accommodating of the recommendations, I think this is one area where it would be wise to suggest more cautiousness in the future.

For one, the future structure of the Panamanian government is not really relevant to the Senate's decision on the Canal Treaties. Any and all Panamanian governments will have a considerable stake in the smooth implementation of the Canal Treaties and the efficient operation of the Canal. One would be hard-pressed to argue that a more democratic Panamanian government would be a better guarantee of a well-run Canal.

There is no question that the Senators will seek concessions in the area as a way to divert attention from the Treaties. If Torrijos does not make the concessions that several believe he promised, they will use that as an excuse to vote against the Treaties. Therefore, I think it is in our interest to de-couple the democracy-in-Panama issue from the Canal Treaties. I think we are more likely to lose votes if Torrijos does not make good on his supposed concessions than win them if he does.

CONFIDENTIAL-GDS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
PER 7/24/00 NSC/HZ RE HR-112-92-26
BY [signature] NARS. DATE 1/30/01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

A second and in many ways equally important reason why we should tread lightly on the democracy issue is because it carries paternalistic connotations which could undermine the new approach you have outlined for U.S. relations with Latin America. All of us in the U.S. and most people in Latin America believe that all governments are justified in speaking out on human rights violations, wherever they occur. While many in the U.S. believe we are justified in telling other countries how they should organize their governments, this view is not shared by Latin Americans. Indeed, many believe the Alliance for Progress failed primarily because we placed such great emphasis on the importance of democratic government (as we know it) as a means to the pursuit of our lofty goals. Latin Americans saw this as a new form of imperialism or evangelism.

I believe the success of your new approach to Latin America has been that we have avoided telling the Latin Americans how to organize their governments, but rather have stated in very general terms that we have an obvious preference for those countries which share our democratic values. Rather than suggesting changes in governments, we have tried to create a climate where such changes can become more likely. One possible result of this approach is the stated intention of five Latin American military governments to begin the transition toward democratic and civilian rule. I think this process would be setback if our approach to this issue were to become any more explicit or direct.

In summary, I would recommend you suggest to Byrd the dangers to the Canal Treaties and to our overall relations with Latin America of linking the Treaties to progress towards a more democratic form of government in Panama.

PERSONAL AND ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO: PRESIDENT CARTER AND DR. BRZEZINSKI
FROM: HAMILTON JORDAN *H.J.*
RE: CALL FROM AMBASSADOR GABRIEL LEWIS

I received a call today from Panama from Ambassador Gabriel Lewis who asked if he could come and see me as soon as possible. I replied that he could and thought nothing of it as we stay in touch constantly on matters related to ratification of the Treaty.

I asked him how he was doing and he responded that, "things are going badly here - that is why I must talk to you as soon as possible".

This was a curious remark so I inquired of Bob Pastor as to any recent information on the internal situation in Panama. He provided me with the following information and the attached memorandum. From all that I

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
PER *7/26/90 NK/RE MR NCC 90-26*
BY *Dug* NARS, DATE *1/30/91*

can learn, Torrijos has become personally despondent for several reasons.

First, the Panamanian economy is in poor shape. Unemployment and inflation are high and foreign investment is off. Torrijos thinks that potential foreign investors are holding off because of uncertainty about treaty ratification and/or rejection and the implications of either action.

Secondly, for the first time, Torrijos has permitted criticism of his leadership and the treaty and the groups of people opposed to him and the treaties are exercising their new rights freely. He has been booed at several rallies and was shaken by it.

Thirdly, and probably most importantly, they do not understand our system of government and are confused about the repeated delays in final consideration of the treaties by the Senate. We told them initially that we would work for an October vote on the treaties

and have postponed the likely date for a vote several times. All we can say now is that after the energy bill is passed, we will focus on the Panama Canal Treaties.

At any rate, I believe that Gabriel and General Torrijos need to be reassured that the treaty will be taken up early in the year, that we are working hard for ratification and that prospects for passage are improving. We get criticized on the Hill for "not doing enough on the Panama Canal Treaties" so I am sure that it must be difficult to see any interest or momentum from Panama.

We need to keep Torrijos in a positive frame of mind so that he will continue to make positive statements and gestures in Panama in addition to courting the Senators who visit. For that reason, I plan to do the following with Bob Pastor when we meet with Gabriel Wednesday:

- Review likely timetable for Congressional action
- Point out that we are delaying SALT II for Panama Canal Treaties
- Point out recent good signs (mail, polls, etc.)
- Review what we have been doing, including White House briefings, support of Citizens' Committee, endorsements received, work with individual Senators, Speakers' Bureau that has been set up, etc.

Generally, without misleading Gabriel on underestimating the difficulty of ratification, I would like to reassure him of the prospects and our own commitment to its passage.

If you and Zbig think it is appropriate, I might like to bring Gabriel in to see you just briefly so he can report back to General Torrijos that he got to see you and has your personal reassurance. You might just pick up the telephone and get Senator Byrd to spend five minutes with Gabriel outlining the likely Senate schedule for consideration of the treaty.

Torrijos has been very helpful and it is in our own interests to reassure him and keep him positive.

~~SECRET~~

OP IMMED

NOVEMBER 29, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: HAMILTON JORDAN AND RICK INDERFURTH

FROM: BOB PASTOR

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

1. ATTACHED IS AN EXCERPT FROM AN INTERCEPT OF [REDACTED] WHICH I AM FORWARDING TO YOU FYI.

SANITIZED

E.O.12958, Sec.1.5

PER 6126/01 DOD RE NLC-00-129

BY BTZ NARS DATE 7/24/03

Entire page exempted.

CONFIDENTIAL

Letter from General Torrijos to Menachem Begin, Prime
Minister of Israel - For Delivery to President Carter

Panama City, December 3, 1977

Dear Friend:

Allow me to make, briefly, a series of comments reflecting the way I see things after having familiarized myself with the Middle East problem.

Your accession to the office of Prime Minister of your country does not represent the election of a new leader, but a change in the attitude of a people.

In times of very serious crises, people find themselves again, close ranks, and look for someone to direct them and lead them, not someone to manage them. The leader who says "Follow me" replaces those who say "Go," or "This must be done."

Prolonged periods of tension prevent people from thinking calmly and from seeking someone capable of remaining calm when everything is in disarray. This justifies taking dangerous risks, provided that they break the status quo.


The slogan of a boss is: "When in doubt, stop," that of a leader is: "When in doubt, attack."

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
PER 8/31/00 NSC RE NSC-00-127
BY alum NARS DATE 6/26/03

Your country is in a permanent state of alert. I have the impressions that in your region there are many who love hatred. Their hatred has claws and powerful destructive machinery. Your generation gave the Jewish State a Fatherland, a home, a sanctuary, a passport, and a place where, in respectful reverence, all can bow their heads at the sacred shrines of their faith.

Several decades have passed since these unquestionable conquests took place. Although they have been very serious, your subsequent generations have had to pay a very high price: that of being born to die, rather than being born to live. This is unnatural, and all unnatural things must come to an end.


I was impressed by the destructive capability of the "Centurion," but I was even more impressed by the age of the children who are handling these war machines. The ages of the five of them combined did not amount to 100. They are children prematurely aged by life. A sad child is a very sad thing to see. I was not completely shocked because their tanks were protecting the kibutzim. If they had been protecting large estates, I would have ended my trip that same day.



At the officers' mess luncheon, when the colonel who commanded the base was talking to me, I asked him to explain the enemy's battle plan. "Syria has so many tanks in this or that position," he said. Then I asked him to tell me about his counterpart in the Syrian forces. "We both have 10 years' combat experience," he said. "During the war of '67 he did not have much training, but he has been improving. He trains a lot and his men are well trained. I must admit that in the Yom Kippur war he acted like a true professional."

I found such honesty and professionalism in this Israeli colonel! He described his enemy counterpart as the man really is, not as a fanatic would describe him.

I, as an old soldier, wondered: Who can possibly sleep in peace before so many threatening tanks? Behind his prematurely aged features I saw the youngest old man that I have ever met. At 32, having spent 10 years in combat, this fellow does not laugh; he does not have the normal cares of people his age. He lives with the fixed idea that his country is not to be invaded through that front. I thought that the other one, the Syrian, was in exactly the same situation.



-4

If each one of them were to walk 10 kilometers some night, alone, unarmed, and if they were to meet somewhere where they could talk about their sadnesses, their hopes, their frustrations, it would not be fallacious to think that they might reach agreement and to join forces and aim their guns at everything they feel is preventing them from living the normal life of a man just turned 30.


These men in uniform who impressed me so highly expect a lot from you. Do everything in your power to make happiness return to their faces.

Please forgive me if I am meddling in what is not my business, but remember that one only talks to a friend in these terms.

You set the date for your trip to my country. I want to be able to take care of you as well as you took care of me. I ask only that you give me 10 days' notice.

Cordially,

Omar Torrijos H.



(for/dec)
77

PERSONAL AND ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO: PRESIDENT CARTER AND DR. BRZEZINSKI
FROM: HAMILTON JORDAN *H.J.*
RE: CALL FROM AMBASSADOR GABRIEL LEWIS

I received a call today from Panama from Ambassador Gabriel Lewis who asked if he could come and see me as soon as possible. I replied that he could and thought nothing of it as we stay in touch constantly on matters related to ratification of the Treaty.

I asked him how he was doing and he responded that, "things are going badly here - that is why I must talk to you as soon as possible".

This was a curious remark so I inquired of Bob Pastor as to any recent information on the internal situation in Panama. He provided me with the following information and the attached memorandum. From all that I

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
PER *1/24/80* *MLL* *HR* RE *MR NLC-90-24*
BY *Jay* NARS, DATE *11/30/91*

can learn, Torrijos has become personally despondent for several reasons.

First, the Panamanian economy is in poor shape.

Unemployment and inflation are high and foreign investment is off. Torrijos thinks that potential foreign investors are holding off because of uncertainty about treaty ratification and/or rejection and the implications of either action.

Secondly, for the first time, Torrijos has permitted criticism of his leadership and the treaty and the groups of people opposed to him and the treaties are exercising their new rights freely. He has been booed at several rallies and was shaken by it.

Thirdly, and probably most importantly, they do not understand our system of government and are confused about the repeated delays in final consideration of the treaties by the Senate. We told them initially that we would work for an October vote on the treaties

and have postponed the likely date for a vote several times. All we can say now is that after the energy bill is passed, we will focus on the Panama Canal Treaties.

At any rate, I believe that Gabriel and General Torrijos need to be reassured that the treaty will be taken up early in the year, that we are working hard for ratification and that prospects for passage are improving. We get criticized on the Hill for "not doing enough on the Panama Canal Treaties" so I am sure that it must be difficult to see any interest or momentum from Panama.

We need to keep Torrijos in a positive frame of mind so that he will continue to make positive statements and gestures in Panama in addition to courting the Senators who visit. For that reason, I plan to do the following with Bob Pastor when we meet with Gabriel Wednesday:

- Review likely timetable for Congressional action
- Point out that we are delaying SALT II for Panama Canal Treaties
- Point out recent good signs (mail, polls, etc.)
- Review what we have been doing, including White House briefings, support of Citizens' Committee, endorsements received, work with individual Senators, Speakers' Bureau that has been set up, etc.

Generally, without misleading Gabriel on underestimating the difficulty of ratification, I would like to reassure him of the prospects and our own commitment to its passage.

If you and Zbig think it is appropriate, I might like to bring Gabriel in to see you just briefly so he can report back to General Torrijos that he got to see you and has your personal reassurance. You might just pick up the telephone and get Senator Byrd to spend five minutes with Gabriel outlining the likely Senate schedule for consideration of the treaty.

Torrijos has been very helpful and it is in our own interests to reassure him and keep him positive.

11/29/77

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

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TO: PRESIDENT CARTER AND DR. BRZEZINSKI
FROM: HAMILTON JORDAN *H.J.*
RE: CALL FROM AMBASSADOR GABRIEL LEWIS

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

PER *7/20/80 NLS* RE *MR-NLC-90-26*
BY *[Signature]* NARS, DATE *1/30/91*

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