

Panama Canal Treaty, 8/77 (1)

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
memo	HJ to JC (4 pp.) 2 copies opened 8/17/90	8/24/77	A
memo	Dennis Chapman to Rick Inderfurth (5 pp.) opened 8/17/90	8/25/77	A
memo	Dennis Chapman to Rick Inderfurth (5 pp.) opened 8/17/90	8/24/77	A
memcon	JC to Omar Torrijos (3 pp.) opened 8/17/90	8/24/77	A
memo	HJ to JC (31 pp.) opened 10/3/90	8/21/77	A
memo	HJ to JC (30 pp.) opened 10/3/90	8/21/77	A
cable	American Embassy Bogota to Sec. of State	8/17/77	A
memo	Ellsworth Bunker, Sol Linowitz to JC opened 10/9/91	8/5/77	A
memo	HJ to JC (5 pp.) opened 8/17/90	n.d.	A
memo	HJ, William Hyland to JC open 6/27/03	8/6/77	A
memo	Walter Mondale to HJ open 6/27/03	8/2/77	A
memo	Manny Rubio to Rick Inderfurth (4 pp.) Sanitized 10-1-02	8/23/77	A
cable	HJ to Jody Powell (3 pp.) OPENED 4/18/00	8/5/77	A
cable	HJ to Tim Smith (7 pp.) 3 copies OPENED 4/18/00	8/5/77	A
memo	HJ to JC (3 pp.) 5 copies opened 3/27/90	8/5/77	A

FILE LOCATION

Chief of Staff (Jordan)/Confidential File/Panama Canal Treaty-August 1977

RESTRICTION CODES

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CONFIDENTIAL

THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

August 2, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR HAMILTON JORDAN

FROM: THE VICE PRESIDENT *WJ*

SUBJECT: Consultations with Senators Nelson, Williams, Stafford, DeConcini and Anderson on Foreign Policy Issues, August 2, 1977

The four principal issues touched on during my August 2 meeting were:

- the need to ensure the U.S. public understands the benefits the U.S. will derive from the Panama Canal Treaty;
- the need for better public understanding of the Administration's conventional arms sale policy;
- Soviet telecommunications intercepts; and
- the need for increased attention to the US-Mexican problem of illegal aliens/undocumented workers.

Panama. All Senators present agreed that the Administration will have to do a good job of telling the country why the new treaty with Panama is in U.S. interests. This, as you know, has been a recurring message during my consultations with members of the Senate. They believe the President and the Administration will have to go to the people not only via television from Washington, but also through "work in the hinterlands" to explain the importance of the new treaty and the reason it is in our national interest. Senator Nelson noted that while he has a flow of mail against the U.S.-Panama negotiations, he has not had a single letter in favor of the negotiations. Senator Stafford said that if

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

PER 9/7/00 NSC RE NLG-00-125
BY *CS* NARS DATE 6/27/07

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

people in America, including people on the right, had a better understanding of the specifics of the negotiations -- including the fact that American troops will be able to stay and the fact that the U.S. will be able to intervene to safeguard the canal's neutrality after 2000 -- that there would be increased support for the negotiations. The Senators want to be supportive, but they alone cannot be expected to argue a new treaty's merits. They believe the Administration will have to take a strong lead.

Arms Sales Policy. Warren Christopher, who was a very welcome participant in the August 2 meeting, discussed the Administration's approach to conventional arms sales. There was general agreement among the Senators present that, again, the American public needs a clearer understanding of what the Administration is trying to do. Many believe that if the U.S. alone reduces the sale of arms that we will do no more than lose business, inasmuch as Great Britain, France, Italy and other nations will move in to replace us. It was suggested that the Administration explain publicly and in detail what we are doing with other arms suppliers to reach an international understanding of the need to reduce the flow of conventional arms.

Soviet Telecommunications Intercepts. We touched only briefly on this problem. No one saw an easy solution. Senator Anderson felt that the Soviets would have far much more to lose than ourselves if both countries were to stop telecommunications intercepts. Each Senator present said he would vote for the Moynihan bill if it comes to a vote.

Illegal Aliens/Undocumented Workers. Senator DeConcini said he would like to know more about the direction Stu Eizenstat's program is taking on the question of undocumented Mexican workers in the U.S. He said he believes the U.S. tends to neglect Mexico, that we should work harder with the Mexicans, giving aid if necessary (he emphasized he would much rather send it to Mexico than to a number of other countries), to improve conditions in Mexico to a point where the people would not feel compelled to try to move to the U.S.

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Senator Nelson felt that a color photo ID card program would be essential if we are to come to grips with the problem. Each of the Senators present saw this issue as one that is becoming of growing concern to Americans throughout the country.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 5, 1977

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEX - PRIORITY

TO: TIM SMITH, PLAINS

FROM: HAMILTON SORDAN

SUBJECT: PANAMA CANAL

Please give the attached memorandum to the President for his action and approval. The telegram mentioned is also being sent to Jody for his sign off. You may wish to coordinate with Jody. If you have questions or need additional information, Joe Aragon and/or Landon Butler will be available. Please advise as soon as the President has acted.

Attachment

8 3/22/60

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM TO PRESIDENT CARTER

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

FROM: HAMILTON JORDAN *HJ.*

DATE: AUGUST 5, 1977

SUBJECT: PANAMA CANAL ANNOUNCEMENT CHECKLIST

Day 1 - (Possibly Monday or Tuesday). President receives conceptual agreement memorandum from negotiators. Probable news leaks from Panama on agreement terms.

- President and Vice-President call Congressional leadership to discuss terms of conceptual agreement, and to inform them of probable announcement that conceptual agreement has been received.

<u>Calls to:</u>	<u>By President</u>	<u>By V.P.</u>	<u>Other</u>
Byrd	_____	_____	_____
Baker	_____	_____	_____
O'Neill	_____	_____	_____
Rhodes	_____	_____	_____
Wright	_____	_____	_____
Cranston	_____	_____	_____
Goldwater	_____	_____	_____
Humphrey	_____	_____	_____
Stevenson	_____	_____	_____
Sparkman	_____	_____	_____
Gerald Ford	_____	_____	_____
Henry Kissinger	_____	_____	_____
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_____	_____	_____	_____

State Department Congressional Relations will prepare memo with positions of each member to be called.

Q 312/00

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~

- Powell, Pastor give background briefing to the members of press on status of negotiations, announcement schedule, basic terms. The briefing will be held to insure that news stories from Panama do not give unbalanced or incomplete versions of the treaty terms.

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

- President sends telegram to all members of Congress. Jordan will prepare text, State will send. (Draft telegram attached.)

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

- State Department mails to all members of Congress summary of conceptual document, JCS responses, questions and answers.

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

- Linowitz and Bunker call core members of Citizens Group to explain terms and invite them to meet with the President the following week.

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

Day 2. (Or when President returns from Plains).

- President meets with NSC to discuss agreement terms.

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

Day 3.

- Briefing of full Cabinet by Linowitz and Bunker, followed by public announcement by President in Briefing Room of the date and place of the signing ceremony.

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

- Comments by supporting Congressional Leaders and public figures.

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~Day 4 and Following.

- Appearances on morning talk shows and weekend news programs by Bunker and Linowitz.
- Meeting of President with Henry Kissinger, Henry Ford II, Maxwell Taylor, Jay Rockefeller, Dean Rusk and George Meany (names recommended by Linowitz and Bunker) to form Panama Canal Citizens Committee. Separate memo to be prepared by Joe Aragon.

APPROVED _____

DISAPPROVED _____

- Signing Ceremony. Option paper to be prepared by Bob Pastor.

Draft Telegram to All Senators and Congressmen:

Panama Canal Negotiations

Negotiations for a a new Panama Canal Treaty may conclude very soon. I believe we will achieve much more than has been expected. I expect to be able to announce an agreement in principle shortly, and then I will personally review the entire treaty before it is signed to assure that our legitimate national security interest are met. I hope you can support the treaty. In any case, I urge you to reserve judgment until you have had an opportunity to read the treaty, discuss it with our negotiators, and examine it in great detail. Once you have, I believe you will agree with me that the treaty will provide the best defense for the Canal and will lead to improved relations with Panama and all of Latin America and the Caribbean.

Jimmy Carter

DRAFT - STRICTLY ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3/24/80

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

August 5, 1977

DEX PRIORITY

TO JODY POWELL IN PLAINS

FROM: HAMILTON JORDAN *HJ*.

Attached is a proposed telegram to be sent to all Senators and Congressmen from the President either Saturday or Sunday. Your approval of the text is requested as soon as possible so that it can be sent out over the President's signature.

Attachment

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DRAFT - STRICTLY ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ET  3/2/72

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 5, 1977

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEX - PRIORITY

TO: TIM SMITH, PLAINS
FROM: HAMILTON ~~ADRIAN~~
SUBJECT: PANAMA CANAL

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Attachment

3/25/00

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM TO PRESIDENT CARTER

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DATE: AUGUST 5, 1977

SUBJECT: PANAMA CANAL ANNOUNCEMENT CHECKLIST

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Gerald Ford	_____	_____	_____
Henry Kissinger	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
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_____	_____	_____	_____

State Department Congressional Relations will prepare memo with positions of each member to be called.

J *362/00*

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

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APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

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APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

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STRICTLY ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Day 4 and Following.

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Jimmy Carter

DRAFT - STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Q

3/22/00

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 5, 1977

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEX PRIORITY

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FROM: HAMILTON JORDAN *HJ*.

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9/22/00

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DRAFT - STRICTLY ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3/24/00

IMMEDIATE
PRECEDENCE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CLASSIFICATION

FOR COMMCENTER USE ONLY

FROM: HAMILTON JORDON
TO: TIM SMITH
(PLAINS)

INFO:

DEX _____

~~MAC~~ 016

GPS _____

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PAGES 4

TTY _____

CITE _____

DTG: 060034Z

RELEASED BY:
DG

TOR: 060048Z

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

DELIVER IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT

1977 JUL 6 00 33

77 AUG 5 PM 9:00

Q

362/00

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 5, 1977

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Gerald Ford	_____	_____	_____
Henry Kissinger	_____	_____	_____
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_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

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FOR COMMCENTER USE ONLY

FROM: HAMILTON JORDON

TO: JODY POWELL

(PLAINS)

INFO:

DEX _____

DAC 015

GPS _____

LDX _____

PAGES 2

TTY _____

CITE _____

DTG: 0600 33 Z

TOR: 0600 42 Z

RELEASED BY:

DG

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

DELIVER IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT

1977 JUL 6 00 33

77 AUG 5 PM 9 : 00

HOUSE
COMMUNICATIONS

Q

3/22/00

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 5, 1977

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Jimmy Carter

DRAFT - STRICTLY ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE
BY 

3/2/60

8/5

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Hamilton,

FYI

Jimmy needs to know if
approved.
approved

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AMBASSADOR AT LARGE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

August 5, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Ellsworth Bunker *EB*
Sol M. Linowitz *SL*

SUBJECT: Panama Canal Treaty Negotiations

Based on a message this morning from General Torrijos, we believe it is entirely possible that agreement on a new treaty may be reached next week when we will be in Panama.

On the economic issue, the Panamanians have abandoned their excessive demands and are close to accepting our offer in the memorandum which you approved. Two elements of our economic arrangements offer were:

- an annuity of 30 cents per Panama Canal ton, to be paid from toll revenues.
- use of the U.S. interest payment (\$20 million per annum) as an additional payment to Panama either:
 - a) \$10 million per year fixed; or
 - b) \$20 million per year as Canal revenues permit, with shortfalls in payment to Panama to be made up in surplus years.

They have asked for modifications to our offer in order to reach agreement. We recommend that you approve two changes which in our opinion are justified and which we would be in a position to offer provided that the Panamanians indicate prior acceptance of our positions on all the other outstanding issues (expansion, lands and waters, etc.).

~~SECRET~~
GDS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
PER *90862* *Stak* *11* RE *MZ-NLC-90-24*
BY *Jay* NARS, DATE *11/30/91*

~~SECRET~~

-2-

We believe that with the following modifications in our proposal, we may be able to reach agreement:

- a) adjustment of the 30 cents per ton annuity to reflect inflation over the years, based upon a U.S. index or any other index which the U.S. selects, and
- b) with regard to the use of the interest payment:
 - (i) a commitment to Panama of \$10 million per annum, plus
 - (ii) an additional \$10 million only if Canal revenues permit (again, shortfalls in this payment would be made up in surplus years).

Example:

- 1980: Assuming after payment of the obligated \$10 million to Panama there is a surplus of \$5 million (revenues over expenses), Panama would receive a total of \$15 million.
- 1981: Assuming after payment to Panama of the obligated \$10 million there is a surplus (revenues over expenses) of \$30 million, Panama would receive no more than \$20 million for the year but we may choose to make up the shortfall for the previous year by paying an additional \$5 million this year.

ACTION REQUESTED:

That you approve the modifications as outlined above.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MARKING BY BB

DATE 2-14-83

TO: PRESIDENT CARTER
FORM: HAMILTON JORDAN *HJ*
RE: STATUS REPORT ON PANAMA CANAL TREATY

Please find attached a status report on our efforts to obtain ratification of the new treaty. This is preceded by some recent information on the signing ceremony and related activities.

SIGNING CEREMONY

As I mentioned to you on the telephone Friday, the Panamanian Ambassador ~~Enrique~~^{GABRIEL} Lewis came to see me Friday to convey General Torrijos' willingness to come to Washington for the signing ceremony. He expressed at the same time a hope that you would visit Panama after Senate ratification.

I expressed to Ambassador Lewis our appreciation for their sensitivity to the political situation that we faced in our country and told him that we would be honored to receive General Torrijos for the signing ceremony. I told him that I would talk with you over the weekend and give him an official response the first of the week.

Following his visit, we asked the State Department to

begin to inquire informally through our Latin American embassies to determine how successful we might be in having a good number of heads of state here in Washington for a signing ceremony. This survey will be completed by Monday. NSC and State suggest that the invitation to the ceremony be extended by you and General Torrijos to the "participating members of the OAS". This will relieve us from having to invite Castro.

Also, as suggested by you, Frank Moore has called Senator Byrd and asked his reaction to having the signing ceremony take place during the first week that Congress ^{is} ~~was~~ back. He was generally positive about the idea but asked to have the weekend to reflect on it. We assured him that it would be done in a way that did not interfere with the Senate's busy schedule.

I have tried to outline a schedule that would minimize the total amount of time that would have to be spent with Torrijos and the other heads of state. I believe

that it will be important that we have a separate event and/or function for Torrijos and also that you host some function for all of the heads of state. We should keep the schedule loose enough that some of the heads of state could visit key senators and express to them the importance of ratifying the new treaty.

The sample schedule that I have outlined on the following page envisions a welcoming ceremony for General Torrijos, a bilateral meeting with him and a luncheon in his honor at the White House followed by the signing ceremony at the OAS Building and a dinner that night hosted by you in honor of the heads of state from Latin America.

POSSIBLE SCHEDULE - TORRIJOS VISIT/TREATY CEREMONY

10:30	Arrival Ceremony for General Torrijos on South Lawn of White House
11:00	Bilateral Meeting with General Torrijos and President Carter
12:00	Break
12:30	Official Luncheon at White House
2:30	Opening Session of Organization of American States at OAS Building
3:15	Signing Ceremony of Panama Canal Treaty
4:00	President Carter Departs
8:00	President Carter Hosts Dinner for Heads of States at White House

After you have had some time to think about it and get an official reaction from Senator Byrd, we will need to officially inform General Torrijos of our plans. Ambassador Lewis has asked that we send someone from here to go to Panama with him to work out the details of the visit. This should be done by the middle of the week.

STATUS REPORT ON RATIFICATION EFFORTS

It might be worthwhile for us to review our progress and activities to date:

- We have completed highly publicized and successful treaty negotiations;
- We have maintained high and positive media visibility;
- We have maintained a bipartisan flavor to the treaty through the public endorsements of Ford and Kissinger;
- We have minimized criticism from defense-minded persons through the public endorsements of the Joint Chiefs;
- We have significant editorial support around the country; Buckley's support was significant and Kilpatrick has an "open mind";
- Perhaps most importantly, the fight to date has been President Carter vs. Helms and Thurmond; the longer we can keep responsible and articulate conservative spokesmen out of the fight, the less

inclined they will be to get involved;

-In summary, we have taken the initiative in the ratification effort, have dominated the media and the early discussion of the treaty and have developed public and political momentum.

The next two weeks are critical. Obviously, the intense coverage by the media will subside soon. If we can sustain our present momentum through the next few weeks, we will limit severely the damage ~~which~~ treaty opponents can do ~~against us~~.

Our plans for the next few weeks can be divided into two broad catagories: our public campaign to educate the American people and our political campaign to influence specific Senators.

Public Effort

Endorsements. We must continue to solicit public

endorsements from key individuals and groups.

Some of the individuals that remain to be recruited are:

William Rogers, former Secretary of State

James Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense

Donald Rumsfeld, former Secretary of Defense

Melvin Laird, former Secretary of Defense

William Westmoreland, Retired Army Chief of Staff

General Fleming, former Canal Commander

Dean Rusk, former Secretary of State

General D. Parker, former Canal Commander

Brent Scowcroft, Ford NSC Adviser

Nelson Rockefeller, former Vice-President

General Lucius Clay, former General

General Maxwell Taylor, former Chairman of Joint Chiefs

Others

The active recruitment of these people will create

a positive atmosphere among conservatives for ratification of the treaty and also will deny the opponents the use of these same well known names in opposing the treaty. Each of these persons will be asked for the use of their name in endorsing the treaty and will be encouraged to make a public statement of support.

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But to understand our efforts within key targeted states, it is important first to review our most recent vote count.

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The briefing format we will use is attached for your review.

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3:15	Treaty Review/Questions	<u>Bunker/Linowitz</u>
3:45	President Carter	
4:00	Meeting Concludes	

Special Briefings

The special Bunker-Linowitz-Joint Chiefs briefings that we have made available to key people and groups has been very effective.

I would recommend that you consider calling Senator Goldwater and Baker and offer them such a briefing. Just your offer of such a briefing will be an additional constraint to their possibly doing anything or making an adverse decision before they return to Washington.

They will probably be content to wait until they return to Washington, but we could certainly fly Bunker and Linowitz to Tennessee and Arizona if they desired a briefing right away. If they go to Tennessee, we will have to make some special arrangements for Jim Sasser so as to not alienate him.

Bunker and Linowitz are also supposed to see Reagan this week. Although I am sure that we will eventually lose Reagan, the longer that we can deny the opponents of the treaty an articulate spokesman, the more difficult it will be for Baker and other moderate Republicans to oppose the treaty.

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by your political use of television, and that it would have a positive effect on him if you simply mentioned the liklihood of a fireside chat on the treaty.

2. Meeting with key Democratic Senators. Senator Cranston has suggested - and Frank Moore and I agree - that you meet with Senators Byrd, Stennis, Jackson and Nunn when Congress returns. You should ask Senator Byrd's advice on such a meeting but not mention that it was Cranston's idea. The idea would be for a meeting with the negotiators, the Joint Chiefs and you to go over the details of the treaty and answer their questions. If you are able to obtain the public support of these four Senators who represent collectively conservative, defense-minded Democrats in the Senate, we will have helped to create a political atmosphere in the Senate that will make it easier for Sasser, Ford, Morgan, and others to support the treaty.

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4. Review of our campaign to win ratification. Frank thinks that it will have a good effect if you outline for Byrd the range of things that we will be doing to educate the public and win Senate approval - again, to reinforce the fact that you are going to make a major fight for ratification.

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1. Calls to Kissinger and Ford. I would recommend that you call both men and express your appreciation for their statements this week. Also, you should go over with them the list of undecided Senators and ask each man to try to help you with several Senators. They have both indicated a willingness to actively help and we should involve them in a way that makes it their fight as well as ours.
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you call him and ask him to personally assume responsibility for trying to win over Talmadge and Nunn. They both respect him, and if he would visit both men before they return to Washington, I believe that it could be decisive. Also, he might be willing to call others. You should ask him to issue public statement of support.

3. William Scranton. He was, as you know, the very popular Republican Governor of Pennsylvania. You should call him and ask him to help with both of his Republican Senators who are presently listed as leaning against the treaty. Also, he might be willing to tell us other ways to influence Heinz and Schweicker.

4. Baker and Goldwater. You might want to call them for the purpose of offering them the Linowitz-Bunker briefing as was discussed earlier. The longer we can keep them both out of the fight against the treaty, the more difficult it will be for them to get into it.

5. Senators you missed last week. You might see some senators that you called last week that you might want to try again today.

To Ham
J

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
WORKING BY BB DATE 2-14-83

TO: PRESIDENT CARTER
FORM: HAMILTON JORDAN *HJ.*
RE: STATUS REPORT ON PANAMA CANAL TREATY

Please find attached a status report on our efforts to obtain ratification of the new treaty. This is preceded by some recent information on the signing ceremony and related activities.

SIGNING CEREMONY

As I mentioned to you on the telephone Friday, the Panamanian Ambassador ~~Garriel~~^{GABRIEL} Lewis came to see me Friday to convey General Torrijos' willingness to come to Washington for the signing ceremony. He expressed at the same time a hope that you would visit Panama after Senate ratification.

I expressed to Ambassador Lewis our appreciation for their sensitivity to the political situation that we faced in our country and told him that we would be honored to receive General Torrijos for the signing ceremony. I told him that I would talk with you over the weekend and give him an official response the first of the week.

Following his visit, we asked the State Department to

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have results
ok
begin to inquire informally through our Latin American
embassies to determine how successful we might be in
having a good number of heads of state here in Washington
for a signing ceremony. This survey will be completed
by Monday. NSC and State suggest that the invitation
to the ceremony be extended by you and General Torrijos
to the "participating members of the OAS". This will
relieve us from having to invite Castro.

Also, as suggested by you, Frank Moore has called
Senator Byrd and asked his reaction to having the sign-
ing ceremony take place during the first week that
Congress ^{is} ~~was~~ back. He was generally positive about
the idea but asked to have the weekend to reflect on
it. We assured him that it would be done in a way
that did not interfere with the Senate's busy schedule.

I have tried to outline a schedule that would minimize
the total amount of time that would have to be spent
with Torrijos and the other heads of state. I believe

*Minimize singling out Torrijos -
Emphasize Pan-American
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that it will be important that we have a separate event and/or function for Torrijos and also that you host some function for all of the heads of state. We should keep the schedule loose enough that some of the heads of state could visit key senators ^{& business / later / House} and express to them the importance of ratifying the new treaty.

*Too much
Torrijos*

The sample schedule that I have outlined on the following page envisions a welcoming ceremony for General Torrijos, a bilateral meeting with him and a luncheon in his honor at the White House followed by the signing ceremony at the OAS Building and a dinner that night hosted by you in honor of the heads of state from Latin America.

POSSIBLE SCHEDULE - TORRIJOS VISIT/TREATY CEREMONY

10:30 Arrival Ceremony for General Torrijos
 on South Lawn of White House

11:00 Bilateral Meeting with General Torrijos
 and President Carter

12:00 Break

12:30 Official Luncheon at White House

2:30 Opening Session of Organization of
 American States at OAS Building

3:15 Signing Ceremony of Panama Canal Treaty

4:00 President Carter Departs

8:00 President Carter Hosts Dinner for Heads
 of States at White House

*More time for
bilateral meetings*

After you have had some time to think about it, and get an official reaction from Senator Byrd, we will need to officially inform General Torrijos of our plans. Ambassador Lewis has asked that we send someone from here to go to Panama with him to work out the details of the visit. This should be done by the middle of the week.

STATUS REPORT ON RATIFICATION EFFORTS

It might be worthwhile for us to review our progress and activities to date:

- We have completed highly publicized and successful treaty negotiations;
- We have maintained high and positive media visibility;
- We have maintained a bipartisan flavor to the treaty through the public endorsements of Ford and Kissinger;
- We have minimized criticism from defense-minded persons through the public endorsements of the Joint Chiefs;
- We have significant editorial support around the country; Buckley's support was significant and Kilpatrick has an "open mind";
- Perhaps most importantly, the fight to date has been President Carter vs. Helms and Thurmond; the longer we can keep responsible and articulate conservative spokesmen out of the fight, the less

*move to
get his
endorsement →*

inclined they will be to get involved;

-In summary, we have taken the initiative in the ratification effort, have dominated the media and the early discussion of the treaty and have developed public and political momentum.

The next two weeks are critical. Obviously, the intense coverage by the media will subside soon. If we can sustain our present momentum through the next few weeks, we will limit severely the damage treaty opponents can do,

Our plans for the next few weeks can be divided into two broad catagories: our public campaign to educate the American people and our political campaign to influence specific Senators.

Public Effort

Endorsements. We must continue to solicit public

endorsements from key individuals and groups.

Some of the individuals that remain to be recruited are:

do so ↓
William Rogers, former Secretary of State

James Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense

Donald Rumsfeld, former Secretary of Defense

Melvin Laird, former Secretary of Defense

William Westmoreland, Retired Army Chief of Staff

General Fleming, former Canal Commander

JC Dean Rusk, former Secretary of State

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Brent Scowcroft, Ford NSC Adviser

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Others

ALAN SCOTT

The active recruitment of these people will create

a positive atmosphere among conservatives for ratification of the treaty and also will deny the opponents the use of these same well known names in opposing the treaty. Each of these persons will be asked for the use of their name in endorsing the treaty and will be encouraged to make a public statement of support.

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*9/11 help
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*Labor
business
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5. Senators you missed last week. You might see some senators that you called last week that you might want to try again today.

8/21/77

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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FORM: HAMILTON JORDAN *HJ*
RE: STATUS REPORT ON PANAMA CANAL TREATY

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DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MARKING BY *[Signature]*

DATE

70/3/92

SIGNING CEREMONY

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begin to inquire informally through our Latin American embassies to determine how successful we might be in having a good number of heads of state here in Washington for a signing ceremony. This survey will be completed by Monday. NSC and State suggest that the invitation to the ceremony be extended by you and General Torrijos to the "participating members of the OAS". This will relieve us from having to invite Castro.

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POSSIBLE SCHEDULE - TORRIJOS VISIT/TREATY CEREMONY

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11:00	Bilateral Meeting with General Torrijos and President Carter
12:00	Break
12:30	Official Luncheon at White House
2:30	Opening Session of Organization of American States at OAS Building
3:15	Signing Ceremony of Panama Canal Treaty
4:00	President Carter Departs
8:00	President Carter Hosts Dinner for Heads of States at White House

After you have had some time to think about it and get an official reaction from Senator Byrd, we will need to officially inform General Torrijos of our plans.. Ambassador Lewis has asked that we send someone from here to go to Panama with him to work out the details of the visit. This should be done by the middle of the week.

STATUS REPORT ON RATIFICATION EFFORTS

It might be worthwhile for us to review our progress and activities to date:

- We have completed highly publicized and successful treaty negotiations;
- We have maintained high and positive media visibility;
- We have maintained a bipartisan flavor to the treaty through the public endorsements of Ford and Kissinger;
- We have minimized criticism from defense-minded persons through the public endorsements of the Joint Chiefs;
- We have significant editorial support around the country; Buckley's support was significant and Kilpatrick has an "open mind";
- Perhaps most importantly, the fight to date has been President Carter vs. Helms and Thurmond; the longer we can keep responsible and articulate conservative spokesmen out of the fight, the less

inclined they will be to get involved;

-In summary, we have taken the initiative in the ratification effort, have dominated the media and the early discussion of the treaty and have developed public and political momentum.

The next two weeks are critical. Obviously, the intense coverage by the media will subside soon. If we can sustain our present momentum through the next few weeks, we will limit severely the damage ~~which~~ treaty opponents can do ~~against us~~.

Our plans for the next few weeks can be divided into two broad catagories: our public campaign to educate the American people and our political campaign to influence specific Senators.

Public Effort

Endorsements. We must continue to solicit public

endorsements from key individuals and groups.

Some of the individuals that remain to be recruited are:

William Rogers, former Secretary of State

James Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense

Donald Rumsfeld, former Secretary of Defense

Melvin Laird, former Secretary of Defense

William Westmoreland, Retired Army Chief of Staff

General Fleming, former Canal Commander

Dean Rusk, former Secretary of State

General D. Parker, former Canal Commander

Brent Scowcroft, Ford NSC Adviser

Nelson Rockefeller, former Vice-President

General Lucius Clay, former General

General Maxwell Taylor, former Chairman of Joint Chiefs

Others

The active recruitment of these people will create

a positive atmosphere among conservatives for ratification of the treaty and also will deny the opponents the use of these same well known names in opposing the treaty. Each of these persons will be asked for the use of their name in endorsing the treaty and will be encouraged to make a public statement of support.

At the same time, an organized effort is underway to deal with groups and organizations that can be helpful. They include:

- U.S. Chamber of Commerce
- National Association of Manufacturers
- Business Roundtable
- Council of the Americas
- AFL-CIO/other labor organizations
- Governors, Mayors, Party Chairmen, etc.

Media. Through Jody's office, we will continue to provide national mailings to the news media as well as concentrated mailings to target states. We will

continue to work to see that pro-treaty spokesmen appear on the major talk shows and also insure that anti-treaty opponents are rebutted at every opportunity.

I still like the idea of a fireside chat on the treaty at the appropriate time. Most of the members of Congress have an inordinate fear of your use of the media. Possibly going on television the night before you sign the treaty outlining the history of the canal and the benefits of the new treaty to our country would create a positive political mood in the Congress as they return to town.

Special briefings for editors from our target states will be provided as is outlined elsewhere in this memorandum.

The Political Campaign

In the following pages, I have also attempted to

outline our plans for the ratification campaign.

But to understand our efforts within key targeted states, it is important first to review our most recent vote count.

LATEST VOTE COUNT

It is important that while we maintain a public posture of confidence that we also create a political atmosphere which will make each Senator feel that his vote is critical to the ratification of the Treaty. I believe that the treaty is already postured publicly in a way that no undecided senator wants to be "the Senator" that defeated the new treaty.

For that reason, it is very important that we keep our vote counts very confidential. Also, to the extent possible, we need to encourage supporters to publicly announce their support to preserve the political momentum that we have developed.

You will find on the attached sheet our most recent vote count. Most of the movement has been in our

direction, with Moynihan, Anderson, Hayakawa and Packwood moving into the "support likely" column since the announcement of the new treaty and Johnston moving into the "opposed" column. This count was done by Frank Moore's people and is generally conservative. It does put Senator Byrd in the support column.

Target States

Working closely with Frank Moore's office, we have identified ten target states which will receive special attention and effort in the weeks ahead. These are states where both of the Senators are "leaning against" and/or "undecided". For a variety of reasons, we have assessed that there is a good possibility of getting one or both of the Senators to support the treaty if we can demonstrate political support for the treaty in their state.

The ten "target states" are:

- Tennessee
- Georgia
- Kentucky
- Oklahoma

- Florida
- Pennsylvania
- Arizona
- Montana
- New Hampshire
- New Mexico

We have also identified a second group of "target states" which will be moved onto the main list as we win votes and commitments. These are states where it is judged that we have a good chance at winning the vote of only one Senator if we are able to demonstrate political support for the treaty.

Each of the target states will receive the following attention:

1. A White House Briefing. Outlined in the following section.
2. A major speaker. A major Administration figure will visit state, make speech explaining treaty, meet with state press, etc.

3. White House briefing of state press.

The major media outlets in each state will be invited to White House for special briefing on details of the treaty.

4. Special mailings. Information packets have been developed and within each target state we will do mailings to elected officials, business leaders, party leaders, etc.

Obviously, through Frank Moore's office we will be monitoring each Senator's statements and actions and will supply you a continuing list of persons to be called and will set up occasional meetings with individual Senators.

Treaty Briefing for Supporters from Target States

Beginning this week, we will bring delegations of persons from each of the target states to the White House for briefings on the treaty. We will bring two or three states at a time. These groups will include:

- Early Carter supporters
- Elected Officials
- Business Leaders
- Others Who Might Be Influential with Members of Congress

For example, Reuben Askew will bring a delegation of persons from Florida. It will include Mike Abrams and Alfredo Durand, Duby Ausley, ^{Bill} ~~Tom~~ Clark, Richard Swann and representatives from the Florida Ports Authority. We will brief these people on the political and economic importance of the new treaty and ask them to return to their home states and generate

public understanding of and political support for the treaty. The homestate Senators will be informed in advance of these briefings and invited to participate in them. Many Senators have requested - as I think you know - that you help them create a political atmosphere in their state that will allow them to vote for the treaty. Nevertheless, the opponents of the treaty will say that you are "going over the heads of the Congress". We simply have to be prepared for that criticism and accept it.

Conversely, to the extent that it is perceived that we are going to wage an all-out political battle to pass the treaty, it will create a political counter pressure to the very effective direct mail campaign which will be waged by the rightwingers and the Birchers. Wendell Ford's man told me that they have already received over 600 letters in opposition to the treaty and four or five in favor of it.

We begin with our first state briefing this week. If it is productive, we will have several a week until we have completed briefings for all of the target states.

The briefing format we will use is attached for your review.

STATE BRIEFING FORMAT

State Dining Room/White House

2:00	Introduction	<u>Jack Watson</u>
2:10	Importance of New Treaty to the U.S. and Latin America	<u>Z. Brzezinski</u>
2:30	National Security Implications	<u>Harold Brown</u>
2:45	Break/Coffee with Vice-President, Hamilton Jordan, Frank Moore and Jody Powell	
3:15	Treaty Review/Questions	<u>Bunker/Linowitz</u>
3:45	President Carter	
4:00	Meeting Concludes	

Special Briefings

The special Bunker-Linowitz-Joint Chiefs briefings that we have made available to key people and groups has been very effective.

I would recommend that you consider calling Senator Goldwater and Baker and offer them such a briefing. Just your offer of such a briefing will be an additional constraint to their possibly doing anything or making an adverse decision before they return to Washington.

They will probably be content to wait until they return to Washington, but we could certainly fly Bunker and Linowitz to Tennessee and Arizona if they desired a briefing right away. If they go to Tennessee, we will have to make some special arrangements for Jim Sasser so as to not alienate him.

Bunker and Linowitz are also supposed to see Reagan this week. Although I am sure that we will eventually lose Reagan, the longer that we can deny the opponents of the treaty an articulate spokesman, the more difficult it will be for Baker and other moderate Republicans to oppose the treaty.

Points for Discussion with Senator Byrd

As you know, you will have dinner Tuesday night with Senator Byrd. Frank Moore and I recommend that you mention the following points:

1. Timing of the treaty vote. I believe that we all agree that an early vote will be better than a later vote. It is difficult to see how our prospects for passage will increase once the Senators leave Washington after the recess. I think we have all found that our political resources can be used more effectively when the Congress is in town. To get Senator Byrd to agree to an early vote, you will probably have to convince him of the time, effort and political resources that you are personally willing to commit to this fight. Obviously, if the votes are not there in the Fall, we would do better to wait until January. Frank mentions that Byrd is intrigued

by your political use of television, and that it would have a positive effect on him if you simply mentioned the liklihood of a fireside chat on the treaty.

2. Meeting with key Democratic Senators. Senator Cranston has suggested - and Frank Moore and I agree - that you meet with Senators Byrd, Stennis, Jackson and Nunn when Congress returns. You should ask Senator Byrd's advice on such a meeting but not mention that it was Cranston's idea. The idea would be for a meeting with the negotiators, the Joint Chiefs and you to go over the details of the treaty and answer their questions. If you are able to obtain the public support of these four Senators who represent collectively conservative, defense-minded Democrats in the Senate, we will have helped to create a political atmosphere in the Senate that will make it easier for Sasser, Ford, Morgan, and others to support the treaty.

At the same time, it will make it more difficult for Baker to lead the opposition.

3. Possible Humphrey role. Depending entirely on what Senator Humphrey's condition is when he returns to Washington next week, you might want to ask him to lead the fight for ratification of the treaty. This would be a great honor for Humphrey and would give him something important to do that might allow him to think about something other than his health. You might want to mention this to Byrd and get his reaction. If it is favorable, you might ask the Vice-President to check with the Senator's family and staff to see if such a request is appropriate and feasible in view of his recent surgery. If Humphrey is willing and able to do this, it would best come in the form of an offer from him to lead the fight as we do not want to be playing on the sympathy of others. Humphrey is a great man, and my own guess is that he probably has one good fight left in him and would be honored to make it on something that is as important as this.

This potential utilization of Humphrey would only be inappropriate if Senator Byrd is willing to take an early leadership role himself. As that is highly unlikely, he would probably respond well to the possible use of Humphrey. Byrd will probably want to wait until he can see the strong possibility of success and then come in and help us put the final votes together.

4. Review of our campaign to win ratification. Frank thinks that it will have a good effect if you outline for Byrd the range of things that we will be doing to educate the public and win Senate approval - again, to reinforce the fact that you are going to make a major fight for ratification.

Things To Do

You indicated that you might have time Sunday night to make some telephone calls. The following are calls that I think would be most productive. I think that our immediate goal should be to involve and utilize others in helping us persuade undecided Senators.

1. Calls to Kissinger and Ford. I would recommend that you call both men and express your appreciation for their statements this week. Also, you should go over with them the list of undecided Senators and ask each man to try to help you with several Senators. They have both indicated a willingness to actively help and we should involve them in a way that makes it their fight as well as ours.
2. Call to Dean Rusk. Has sent us word that he is anxious to help on ratification. I would suggest that

you call him and ask him to personally assume responsibility for trying to win over Talmadge and Nunn. They both respect him, and if he would visit both men before they return to Washington, I believe that it could be decisive. Also, he might be willing to call others. You should ask him to issue public statement of support.

3. William Scranton. He was, as you know, the very popular Republican Governor of Pennsylvania. You should call him and ask him to help with both of his Republican Senators who are presently listed as leaning against the treaty. Also, he might be willing to tell us other ways to influence Heinz and Schweicker.

4. Baker and Goldwater. You might want to call them for the purpose of offering them the Linowitz-Bunker briefing as was discussed earlier. The longer we can keep them both out of the fight against the treaty, the more difficult it will be for them to get into it.

5. Senators you missed last week. You might see some senators that you called last week that you might want to try again today.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Idem: 1/2m.

Attended to the most
recent update on the
signing ceremony.

Rich

8/25/

August 24, 1977

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO: PRESIDENT CARTER
FROM: HAMILTON JORDAN *HJ*
RE: STATUS REPORT ON PANAMA CANAL ACTIVITIES

1. Follow-up on Torrijos call. After the telephone call, I met with the Panamanian Ambassador and talked with Warren Christopher and Zbig. The OAS will issue the invitation tomorrow (we hope) which invites the participating OAS members to participate in the signing ceremony on September 7th. Simultaneously, State will send out personal cables to the heads of state reinforcing the OAS invitation and saying that you would be honored to meet personally with the particular head of state if they do attend the signing ceremony. Warren says that they will personalize each personal message in terms of common interests, issues to be discussed, etc. At the same time, Torrijos will issue personal invitations and is willing to encourage important countries to attend.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

PER *7/10/90* *AKK* *HJ* *RE* *MR-NLC-90-23*
BY *[Signature]* NARS DATE *8/16/90*

2. Prospects of televised signing ceremony. Jody's initial reaction from the networks is very positive and highly encouraging. He says that the chances are better than 75% that all three will cover ceremony live. Once we get the go-ahead on this, we will be able to lock in the official schedule.

3. Getting text of treaty to Senators and others. After we have reviewed finally the text of treaty, we should get a copy of text to each Senator and House member and also to others who are helping us. Until the text is widely distributed and studied, many cautious Senators and those who are looking for an excuse to avoid making a decision will be able to say that they have not seen treaty.

4. Ford involvement. We should all be thinking of ways to stress the bipartisan nature of this treaty during the ceremonies. For example, we should have President Ford and Mrs. Johnson at the ceremony. We should keep Republicans and the military publicly involved.

5. Formation of a working group for signing ceremony.

We have a million things to do in a very short period of time. We have got to worry with everything from the format of the OAS meeting to the invitation list of Senators to the State dinner. For that reason, I have asked each of the affected agencies to designate someone to represent them in an informal working group which will meet regularly, exchange information and identify the major decisions which have to be made. Phil Wise will be the convenor of this group. The members will be persons designated by Jody, Frank, Zbig and Warren to work with us on a day-to-day basis to make the many detailed decisions which will have to be made in the next ten days. See the attached memo.

6. Bob Thompson's daily summary/update. Bob Thompson of Frank Moore's staff will be responsible on a day to day basis for accumulating and circulating political information and intelligence on votes in the Senate. This will start immediately.

7. California trip. I leave Thursday afternoon for California to participate in several events with Democratic contributors leading up to their big October fundraiser that you attend. If this had not been scheduled for several weeks, I would have tried to cancel and/or postpone it with all the Canal business pending here. I'll be back during the weekend - in my absence Landon Butler will be fully informed of our activities here. Phil Wise will begin to work on the details of the ceremony and Frank's office will continue to work on individual Senators and will keep you informed. I haven't had any time off since we arrived here so I am look forward to getting away for a couple of days.

8. Ambassador Lewis has gotten General Torrijos to invite me down to personally brief him on the agenda for the ceremony, his posture, etc. I have begged off on the basis that I can do more here and that you want me here. Just in case they contact you about it, I wanted you to know so you could back me up on this.

⑤ Goldwater - all have excuse
of not having a text

Percy 2 2 2 2

~~Stennis~~ is murder;
Stennis very reluctant;
has made statement
against it; have Brown
call him;

Zinnvult



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

August 4, 1977

MEMORANDUM

TO: Hamilton Jordan
The White House

FROM: Doug Bennet and Bob Beckel
Congressional Relations

SUBJECT: Panama Agreement: Congressional Relations
Objectives and Work Plan

Scenario. The US and Panama negotiators will reach "conceptual agreement." Our negotiating team will immediately prepare a memorandum outlining the conceptual agreement for the President and the NSC. The President will presumably need at least 48 hours to consider the conceptual agreement before any public announcement is made. Ideally, public announcement should be simultaneous here and in Panama. The negotiators will try to negotiate simultaneous announcements, but the Panamanians may jump the gun. In any case, leaks during the 48 hours are probably inevitable.

Treaty drafting will proceed for an indefinite period. Once final language is agreed upon, it will be initialed either by the negotiators or by the President and General Torillos. Timing of any initialling ceremony can be adjusted by agreement to suit the tactical requirements in both countries. We recommend that this occur as close to the end of the Congressional recess as possible (Congress returns September 6th) to allow the goodwill of the ceremony to spill over to the Hill.

Day 1.

The President receives memorandum on conceptual agreement.

Action: Negotiators to keep draft memo up to date for instant transmittal.

President calls Congressional leadership to review terms of agreement and solicit favorable reactions. Some Members will be reluctant to pledge all-out support until hearings are held, but can nevertheless state that the treaty is fair, a good deal, hard-fought, etc.

Senator Byrd
Senator Baker
Speaker O'Neill
Congressman Rhodes
Congressman Wright
Senator Cranston
Senator Goldwater
Others?

Action: Beckel prepares memo with note on position of each Senator and prepares suggested talking points. Should be in President's hands simultaneously with negotiators' memorandum.

President approves conceptual agreement.

Summaries of conceptual agreement, JCS responses plus treaty and Q&A's for each Member of Congress for immediate delivery in White House envelopes upon Presidential approval. Action: State Department/H.

Day 2.

Secretary Vance, Deputy Secretary, others call foreign relations committee members plus targeted uncommitteds seeking favorable reaction and stating that memorandum is on the way.

Action: H makes assignments, prepares memo for each caller.

Telegrams from President to all Members at home offices expressing satisfaction with agreement and outlining main points in terms which will produce positive responses to local press queries. Include announcement time. Action: White House.

White House mobilizes citizen leaders. See separate schedule of public statements. Action: Butler.

(Final press backgrounding. We assume backgrounders

for selected writers have been held previously. Embargoed copies of memorandum on conceptual agreement plus background on Canal circulated for release. Action: Powell.)

Day 3.

Announcement day. (This should not be a Monday if possible because we need a work day to make Day 2 contacts successfully.)

White House announces conceptual agreement in time for evening news. Simultaneous announcement in Panama. (Query: Has there been enough time to generate favorable editorial reaction? How much citizen support should be sprung this day? Does the President meet with leaders of citizen groups, or should this be a day or two later for more spontaneity?)

Press stories culled nationwide for reaction by Members of Congress. Action: H arranges in advance to get the material from PA, White House, other sources.

Day 4.

President holds open Cabinet meeting on treaty (?) followed by press conference. (?) Publicly thanks negotiators for their toughness and success, announces new day in USA relations with Latin America. Chairman of Joint Chiefs responds to questions on defense (?). Action: White House.

(Query: Is any of this likely to upset the treaty drafting?)

Day 5.

President meets with citizen leaders, coalition formed. (?) Action: White House.

#

Early September, President and Torrillos sign treaty. Action: White House and State.

September 7th ~ Secretary Vance and negotiators present treaty to Senate bipartisan group. Action: H selects bipartisan group and makes arrangements for presentation.

Late September, implementing legislation sent to House and Senate.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM TO HAMILTON JORDAN

FROM: LONDON BUTLER

DATE: AUGUST 5, 1977

SUBJECT: PANAMA CANAL ANNOUNCEMENT CHECKLIST

Day 1 - (Possibly Monday or Tuesday). President receives conceptual agreement memorandum from negotiators. Probable news leaks from Panama on agreement terms.

- President and Vice-President call Congressional leadership to discuss terms of conceptual agreement, and to inform them of probable announcement that conceptual agreement has been received.

<u>Calls To:</u>	<u>By President</u>	<u>By Vice President</u>
Byrd	_____	_____
Baker	_____	_____
O'Neill	_____	_____
Rhoades	_____	_____
Wright	_____	_____
Cranston	_____	_____
Goldwater	_____	_____
Gerald Ford	_____	_____
Henry Kissinger	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____

State Department Congressional Relations will prepare memo with positions of each member to be called.

- Powell, Pastor give background briefing to the members of press on status of negotiations, announcement schedule, basic terms. The briefing will be held to insure that news stories from Panama do not give unbalanced or incomplete versions of the treaty terms.

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

- President sends telegram to all members of Congress. Jordan will prepare text, State will send.

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

- State Department mails to all members of Congress summary of conceptual document, JCS responses, questions and answers.

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

- Linowitz and Bunker call core members of Citizens Group to explain terms and invite them to meet with the President the following week.

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

Day 2. (Or when President returns from Plains).

- President meets with NSC to discuss agreement terms.

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

Day 3.

- Briefing of full Cabinet by Linowitz and Bunker, followed by public announcement by President in Briefing Room of the date and place of the signing ceremony.

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

- Comments by supporting Congressional Leaders and public figures.

Day 4 and Following.

- Appearances on morning talk shows and weekend news programs by Bunker and Linowitz.
- Meeting of President with Henry Kissinger, Henry Ford II, Maxwell Taylor, Jay Rockefeller, Dean Rusk and George Meany (names recommended by Linowitz and Bunker) to form Panama Canal Citizens Committee. Separate memo to be prepared by Joe Aragon.

APPROVED _____ DISAPPROVED _____

- Signing Ceremony. Option paper to be prepared by Bob Pastor.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM TO HAMILTON JORDAN

FROM: LONDON BUTLER ^B(U)
DATE: AUGUST 4, 1977
SUBJECT: PANAMA CANAL ANNOUNCEMENT CHECKLIST

It is possible that the negotiations for a new canal treaty may be successfully concluded within the next week, perhaps while the President is in Plains. If the news breaks before the President returns, we will probably need to do the following things:

1. Background briefing of key journalists by Jody, Linowitz and Bunker, describing the status of the negotiations, basic terms, and informing the press that the President will hold a meeting of the National Security Council to discuss the negotiations when he returns.
2. Background briefing of congressional leadership, possibly providing them with advance text of the treaty.

Immediately upon the President's return on Thursday, we should schedule the following:

1. NSC meeting.
2. A briefing by Linowitz and Bunker of the full Cabinet, followed by a public announcement and press briefing.
3. Supportive statements by key Senate members.

Following these events we would:

1. Schedule Administration spokespersons on the morning talk shows and weekend news programs.
2. Schedule a select group (Kissinger, Rusk, Maxwell Taylor, et al) to meet with the President to discuss the formation of a citizens group.

3. Briefings in the White House of supportive constituent groups, such as the Chamber of Commerce, the Jaycees, and the Council of the Americas.

AUGUST 6, 1977

SENATE

> I called

ASSESSMENT OF POSITIONS ON PANAMA

* Slipping to "inclined
against"

** Possible supporters

SUPPORT LIKELY 39	INCLINED TO SUPPORT 16	UNCERTAIN UNDECIDED 9	INCLINED AGAINST 20	OPPOSED 16
<u>DEMOCRATS</u> Abourezk > Stevenson + Bayh + Williams + Biden > R. Byrd + Chiles Eagleton + > Church + Clark + Cranston Culver Glenn Gravel + > Humphrey + Hart ? Hathaway + Kennedy Matsunaga Metzenbaum McGovern > Morgan + > Muskie + Nelson + Pell + Ribicoff Riegle > Sarbanes + > Sparkman +	Anderson ? Bentsen Burdick Durkin + ? Haskell Inouye + > Jackson Leahy + Metcalf > Moynihan + Proxmire +	Bumpers ? DeConcini * + Hollings * - ? Magnuson - ? > Sasser +	> Cannon ? > Ford ? + ** > Huddleston ** ? > McIntyre - ? > Melcher ** ? > Nunn ? ** > Randolph + > Stennis ? Stone ** > Talmadge ? > Zorinsky ? ** Johnston +	> Allen - H. Byrd > Eastland ? Long ? McClellan
<u>REPUBLICANS</u> Brooke Javits Case Mathias Chafee + Packwood + Danforth + Pearson Hatfield + Percy	> Baker + Bellmon + > Goldwater + Griffin Weicker	Hayakawa * ? > Heinz * ? Stafford + Stevens	> Bartlett - > Young ? Domenici ? > Hansen - Roth - ** > Laxalt Tamm **	Curtis Scott - Dole Thurmond Garn Tower > Helms-Wallop McClure Hatch

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE

WORKING BY _____ DATE _____

~~SECRET~~

TO: PRESIDENT CARTER
FROM: HAMILTON JORDAN ^{7/17} AND FRANK MOORE *FM*
RE: POLITICAL SCENARIO FOR RELEASE OF STATEMENT
ON PANAMA CANAL TREATY

Assuming that Escobar and Linowitz are able to work out language that is agreeable to you and Torrijos, we should be careful to get Byrd involved on behalf of the Senate.

I would suggest that you do the following:

- 1) Call Byrd before you give final approval to statement of clarification to insure that you "lock him in to the process." A similar call possibly should go to Baker saying basically that "we got what he wanted."
- 2) Assuming that he will approve, ask Byrd if he can assemble group of Senators (Foreign Relations Committee members, key Senators from group that met with you last week, etc.) to be briefed today by Linowitz and Christopher. Linowitz, because he worked on clarifying statement and Christopher because he was responsible for negotiating desirable political language with members of the Senate. We need to do this to avoid Senators saying that this statement does not satisfy them. It is absolutely essential that we do this before or simultaneously with the release so that there can be positive reactions from the Senators.
- 3) As part of our release of the statement today, we need to take the position that this clarifies the true meaning of the treaties and that we are consequently opposed to any "understandings" or "reservations" being attached to the treaties. That such an action by the Senate now is unnecessary and reflects on the intentions of our negotiators and our Panamanian friends.

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES
~~STANDING~~ COMMITTEE ON WORLD ORDER UNDER LAW

RECOMMENDATION

The Standing Committee on World Order Under Law recommends adoption of the following resolutions:

BE IT RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association supports the prompt conclusion of a new Panama Canal Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of Panama based upon the Joint Statement of Principles signed in February 1974; and

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, That when this new Panama Canal Treaty is forwarded for the advice and consent of the United States Senate, the American Bar Association urges prompt Senate ratification of the treaty and Congressional enactment of any required implementing legislation.

REPORT

The United States and the Republic of Panama are currently negotiating a new Panama Canal Treaty based upon the Joint Statement of Principles signed in February 1974. In summary, the Joint Statement of Principles proposes:

- Replacement of the 1903 Treaty;
- Elimination of the concept of perpetuity;
- Termination of United States jurisdiction over the Canal Zone;
- Exercise of Panamanian jurisdiction over the Canal Zone, with permission to the United States for limited time to run, maintain, and protect the canal;
- Just compensation for Panama from the tolls;
- Panamanian participation in the administration of the canal and exclusive administration when the treaty expires; and
- Consideration of the expansion of the canal facilities.

The Carter Administration has listed a new Panama Canal Treaty as the highest priority for the Administration's policy in Latin America. The principal objectives of the United States are to secure essential rights to operate and defend the canal for a reasonably extended period of time and

to seek a guarantee that the canal will remain neutral and open on a nondiscriminatory basis after termination of the treaty.

President Carter's target date for a new treaty draft is June 1977. While certain issues have been resolved, major issues still remain. Even after a draft treaty is approved by the Administration, the treaty must be submitted to the Senate for advice and consent by two-thirds of its members and to both Houses of Congress for passage of any required implementing legislation. Opposition in Congress to a new treaty based upon the Joint Statement of Principles reflects, to a considerable degree, misconceptions that have developed over the years regarding the background and effect of the current treaty, the present United States interests in the Canal Zone, and the consensus of the international community.

The negotiation of this new treaty has become a test of United States intentions in the Western Hemisphere. Panama has convinced many nations that United States presence in the Canal Zone represents colonialism and prevents its national development. In recent years international organizations and other Latin American nations have strongly supported Panama's desire for a new treaty which will complete Panama's process of independence without impinging upon the right of the maritime interests to have access to the canal on the basis of nondiscrimination, reasonable tolls, and permanent neutrality.

The Standing Committee on World Order Under Law carefully examined and evaluated the Panama Canal issues with a representative of the Republic of Panama and with jurists from the United States and Mexico during the February 23 - 26, 1977, conference in Mexico City sponsored by the Standing Committee, Barra Mexicana, The World Peace Through Law Center, The American University and Howard University Law School. The Standing Committee believes that a new treaty based upon the Joint Statement of Principles will protect legitimate United States interests in the canal and will improve United States relations in the Western Hemisphere.

Accordingly, the Standing Committee "On World Order Under Law recommends approval of the foregoing resolutions expressing endorsement of the American Bar Association for the negotiation, ratification and implementation of a new Panama Canal Treaty. Prompt action on this Report with Recommendation is necessary in view of the efforts of the Administration to conclude a new treaty with the Republic of Panama.

BACKGROUND

Immediately after its formation as a nation in 1903, Panama signed a treaty with the United States which granted the United States--in perpetuity--the use of a 10 by 51 mile strip of Panamanian territory for the "construction, maintenance, operation and protection of an interoceanic canal as well as all rights, powers and authority which the United States would possess if it were sovereign." The canal opened in 1914, and since that time the United States has operated, maintained and defended it. The Panama Canal enterprise is divided into two agencies: the Canal Zone Government, responsible for all civilian Governmental functions in the Zone, and the Panama Canal Company, which operates the waterway and the supporting installations. These agencies are under the direction of the Governor, who is appointed by the President of the United States. He administers the Canal Zone Government and is ex officio director and President of the Panama Canal Company. Residence in the Zone is restricted by treaty to persons connected with the operation, maintenance or defense of the canal.

PANAMA'S TREATY CONCERNS

Panama has been dissatisfied with the existing treaty since its inception. Panamanians have blamed what they consider to be its highly unfavorable terms on the unusual circumstances under which the treaty was negotiated and ratified. They say that Panama's dependence upon the United States to protect its new independence from Colombia seriously limited its bargaining strength in the negotiations. Adding to these complaints, they note that the Panamanian

negotiator, Buneau Varilla, was a French stockholder in the bankrupt French canal company--a company which benefitted considerably when the United States purchased its assets.

Panamanians are disturbed by their lack of control over their own territory and concerned about their present inability to shape their own development. While the dependent and underdeveloped nations of the world may have their resources exploited, processed and marketed by other nations, such dependent nations usually maintain control in the form of production limits, tax structures and rates, police or military presence, or enforcement of national laws. The situation in Panama differs significantly, however, because the Panamanian Government exercises no control over its major resource, the canal. Panama's police cannot patrol it; Panama's laws do not extend to it; Panama can in no way regulate or tax the profits from its operations. A Panamanian may be arrested for breaking foreign law, tried in a foreign court and punished by foreign authorities all on his own soil.

Panama suffers from dependence readily apparent to the world. Panamanians hope to implement the resolution passed by the United Nations General Assembly in 1961 affirming the right of every nation to control its natural resources for the sake of the development of its people. To measure the degree to which Panama's underdevelopment is caused by the alienation of its resources is difficult. The Canal Zone cuts across the heartland of Panama's territory, dividing it in two. The existence of the Zone curbs the natural growth of Panama's urban areas. The Canal Zone holds, unused, large areas of land vital to Panama's development; it controls all the major deep-water-port facilities serving Panama; and it prevents Panamanians from competing with American commercial enterprises in the Zone. For the rights the United States enjoys on Panamanian territory, the United States currently pays Panama \$2.3 million a year.

STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES

Panamanian frustration over this situation increased steadily over the years. In January 1964, demonstrations and riots took place which cost the lives of twenty-one Panamanians and three Americans. Diplomatic relations were broken until April 1964. During 1964, the United Nations, the Organization of American States, and other international bodies debated the status of the canal. On December 18, 1964, President Johnson made a public commitment to negotiate a new, fixed-term treaty. In 1967, three draft agreements were prepared but neither government moved to ratify them. Later Panama rejected these drafts. On February 7, 1974, Secretary of State Kissinger and Panamanian Foreign Minister Juan Antonio Tack met in Panama City and signed a Joint Statement of Principles which has served as the framework for the present negotiations. The principles set forth therein are as follows:

- "1. The Treaty of 1903 and its amendments will be abrogated by the conclusion of an entirely new interoceanic canal treaty.
- "2. The concept of perpetuity will be eliminated. The new treaty concerning the lock canal shall have a fixed termination date.
- "3. Termination of United States jurisdiction over Panamanian territory shall take place promptly in accordance with terms specified in the treaty.
- "4. The Panamanian territory in which the canal is situated shall be returned to the jurisdiction of the Republic of Panama. The Republic of Panama, in its capacity as territorial sovereign, shall grant to the United States of America, for the duration of the new interoceanic canal treaty and in accordance with what that treaty states, the right to use the lands, waters and airspace which may be

necessary for the operation, maintenance, protection and defense of the canal and the transit of ships.

- "5. The Republic of Panama shall have a just and equitable share of the benefits derived from the operation of the canal in its territory. It is recognized that the geographic position of its territory constitutes the principal resource of the Republic of Panama.
- "6. The Republic of Panama shall participate in the administration of the canal, in accordance with a procedure to be agreed upon in the treaty. The treaty shall also provide that Panama will assume total responsibility for the operation of the canal upon the termination of the treaty. The Republic of Panama shall grant to the United States of America the rights necessary to regulate the transit of ships through the canal and operate, maintain, protect and defend the canal, and to undertake any other specific activity related to those ends, as may be agreed upon in the treaty.
- "7. The Republic of Panama shall participate with the United States of America in the protection and defense of the canal in accordance with what is agreed upon in the new treaty.
- "8. The United States of America and the Republic of Panama, recognizing the important services rendered by the inter-oceanic Panama Canal to international maritime traffic, and bearing in mind the possibility that the present canal could become inadequate for said traffic, shall agree bilaterally on provisions for new

projects which will enlarge canal capacity. Such provisions will be incorporated in the new treaty in accord with the concepts established in principle 2."

In June 1974, substantive talks began to define and resolve the issues involved in the new treaty arrangement.

STATUS OF CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS

Resumptions of Negotiations

On February 14, 1977, talks resumed between the United States and Panama after a nine-month suspension because of the United States Presidential campaign. Currently negotiating for the United States are Ellsworth Bunker and Sol Linowitz; and negotiating for Panama is Mr. Gonzales-Revilla.

Principal Treaty Objectives

The principal objective of the United States is to assure that the Panama Canal is operational, secure, efficient and open on a nondiscriminatory basis to world shipping. Under a treaty relationship based upon the concept of partnership, the United States would have the essential rights to operate and defend the canal for a reasonably extended period of time. In addition, the United States is seeking a guarantee that the canal will remain neutral and open on a nondiscriminatory basis after termination of the treaty.

Issues Agreed Upon

The guidelines elaborated by Henry Kissinger and Juan Tack in February 1974, provide the skeletal framework for the new treaty. It has been agreed that during the treaty's duration, the United States will have the primary responsibility for operating the canal. There will be growing participation of Panamanian nationals in day-to-day operations in preparation for Panama's assumption of responsibility for the operation of the canal at the treaty's termination. The United States will also be primarily

responsible for canal defense during the treaty. Panama will grant the United States "use rights" for defending the waterway, and Panama will participate in canal defense in accordance with its capabilities. There is agreement that jurisdiction in the area of the present Canal Zone will pass to Panama in transitional fashion, with the United States retaining the right to use those areas necessary for the operation, maintenance and defense of the canal.

Issues Remaining

Questions still to be decided in detail include:

- The portion of the 533 square mile Canal Zone needed by the United States to continue operating the waterway during the life of the new treaty;
- The number and size of military bases required by the United States for defense of the canal and Zone during this period;
- The legal status of the "Zonians"--the 40,000 United States citizens who live in the Zone and have, until now, been subject there only to United States taxes, laws and courts;
- Financial matters such as compensation for United States owned property transferred to Panama and the annuity to be paid Panama from canal receipts during the duration of the treaty; and
- The two major issues indicated recently by Secretary Vance: the termination date of the new treaty, meaning the date when control of the canal would pass to Panama; and the matters of access to, and defense of, the canal once the treaty expires.

The Position of the United States and Panama On These Two Major Issues

Actually the two sides are not far apart on the new treaty's duration. Panama has asked for control of the Zone in three years and for control of the canal and its defense in twenty-three years. The last United States offer reported was for transfer of the canal in twenty years but for retention of certain military bases for forty years.

With respect to the question of what rights, if any, the United States could exercise after the treaty's expiration to insure access to the canal and its defense, if necessary, the United States wants to be the sole guarantor and to reserve to itself the right to decide the existence of a threat against the security of the canal and any response thereto. Panama says that such a bilateral provision, once control of the canal has been transferred, would re-instate the perpetuity problem of the existing treaty. For the post-treaty period, Panama proposes to vest guarantees of access and the neutrality of the canal in the United Nations or the Organization of American States through a multilateral accord.

Newspaper accounts on March 31, 1977, report that Panama is now willing to sign a bilateral guarantee of neutrality with the United States as a means to end the fourteen years of long negotiations and to get approval of the United States Senate. In return for this, Panama insists that the United States must agree to give Panama a "substantial portion" of the land and water currently under United States control in the Canal Zone.

RATIFICATION OF A DRAFT TREATY

President Carter's target date for a new treaty draft is June of this year. If that deadline is met, the biggest battle of all may then have to be waged to gain public acceptance and official ratification of a document that will inevitably reflect compromises by both governments on highly emotional issues. Panama, according to its

constitution, must submit any new treaty to a plebiscite to insure its acceptability to the Panamanian people. The United States, upon approval by the executive branch, must submit the treaty draft to the Senate for advice and consent by two-thirds of its members. It is anticipated that both Houses of Congress will have to pass implementing legislation.

Opposition in Congress to a new treaty reflects to a considerable degree the myths that have developed over the years--about ownership and sovereignty; about the need for perpetuity and about Panama's intentions and capabilities.

Ownership and Sovereignty

Some Americans assert that the United States owns the canal; that the United States bought and paid for it, just like Alaska or Louisiana. During Governor Ronald Reagan's challenge to President Ford in the Republic primaries of 1976, Mr. Reagan pronounced: "We bought it, we paid for it, we built it, and we intend to keep it."

Others assert that the United States has sovereignty over the canal; that sovereignty is essential to the United States needs; and that loss of sovereignty would impair our control of the canal and our ability to defend it. However, it is necessary to distinguish between treaty rights which allow the use and control by one nation over foreign territory and actual sovereignty which is supreme and independent power and authority over that territory.

The Treaty of 1903 only conferred on the United States the use, occupation, and control of the Zone as "if it were sovereign." All negotiations between the United States and Panama have been based on the understanding that sovereignty did and does rest with Panama. A 1936 Treaty revision clarified the sovereignty question by referring to the Canal Zone as a territory of the Republic of Panama under the jurisdiction of the United States.

Need for Perpetuity

There is a view in the United States that the canal cannot be adequately secured unless United States rights are guaranteed in perpetuity--as stipulated in the 1903 Treaty. During President Carter's campaign last year, he stated that he would "never give up complete control or practical control over the Panama Canal Zone." He has never retracted that statement, although before he took office this January, both he and Secretary Vance listed a new Panama Canal Treaty as the highest priority for the administration's policy in Latin America.

To rely on the exercise of complete or practical control of the canal in perpetuity has been a source of unnecessary tension. A relationship which does not provide for the possibility of periodic mutual revision in today's rapidly evolving world is likely to create a hostile environment which will jeopardize the very interests that perpetuity was designed to protect. A new treaty based on partnership would give the United States the rights it needs, restore the crucial ingredient of Panamanian consent, and strengthen the mutual interest in a well-run and secure canal.

Panama's Intentions and Capabilities

There is also the suggestion by some that a new treaty will somehow lead to the closing of the canal. The fact is that Panama's interest in keeping the canal open is far greater than that of the United States. Currently more than 30% of Panama's foreign exchange earnings and nearly 13% of its gross national product are directly or indirectly attributed to the presence of the canal. With Panamanian participation in the operation of the canal during the transitional period, Panamanians should acquire the required technical competence and management skills to keep the canal operating efficiently and economically.

COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATION

During February 23 - 26, 1977, the Standing Committee on World Order Under Law co-sponsored a conference in Mexico City with the Barra Mexicana, The World Peace Through Law Center, The American University and Howard University Law School for the purpose of discussing problems of mutual concern to the United States, Mexico and the world community of nations. A problem of particular interest to the conference was the status of negotiations between the United States of America and the Republic of Panama for a new treaty which would return the Canal Zone to Panamanian jurisdiction.

The conference's consideration of the Panama Canal issues commenced with the presentation of the views of the Government of Panama by Ambassador Dr. Carlos Alfredo Lopez Guevara of the Republic of Panama. Following his remarks, a member of the Standing Committee outlined the viewpoint of the United States Government toward the transfer of the Canal Zone and the then current status of negotiations; and Dr. Gregory Wolfe, Dean, School of International Service, The American University, presented comments on the use of bilateral agreements to resolve international disputes. These formal presentations served as the nucleus for discussion among the panelists and other participants.

The conference participants expressed an earnest desire that the current United States/Panamanian negotiations culminate at the earliest possible time in a just and equitable solution permitting Panama to fully exercise its sovereign rights in the Canal Zone. The participants felt that opposition in the United States to a new treaty based upon the Joint Statement of Principles reflects, to a considerable degree, misconceptions that have developed over the years regarding the background and effect of the current treaty, the present United States interests in the Canal Zone, and the consensus of the international community.

After careful evaluation of the Panama Canal question, the Standing Committee on World Order Under Law recommends unconditional support for the negotiation, ratification and implementation of a new Panama Canal Treaty

based upon the Joint Statement of Principles of 1974. The Committee believes that the American public and Congress must have the facts regarding the background and effect of the current treaty, the present United States interests in the Canaly Zone and the consensus of the international community to be aware of protecting legitimate United States interest, while maintaining good relations with Panama and Latin America and credibility and reputation in the international community.

Respectfully submitted,

William S. Thompson, Chairman
Paul P. Bazelides, Jr.
Bruno V. Bitker
Thomas R. Brett
E. N. Carpenter, II
Donald T. Fox
Rita E. Hauser

August, 1977

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM TO PRESIDENT CARTER

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~

FROM: HAMILTON JORDAN

DATE: AUGUST 5, 1977

SUBJECT: PANAMA CANAL ANNOUNCEMENT CHECKLIST

Day 1 - (Possibly Monday or Tuesday). President receives conceptual agreement memorandum from negotiators. Probable news leaks from Panama on agreement terms.

-- President and Vice-President call Congressional leadership to discuss terms of conceptual agreement, and to inform them of probable announcement that conceptual agreement has been received.

<u>Calls to:</u>	<u>By President</u>	<u>By V.P.</u>	<u>Other</u>
Byrd	_____	_____	_____
Baker	_____	_____	_____
O'Neill	_____	_____	_____
Rhodes	_____	_____	_____
Wright	_____	_____	_____
Cranston	_____	_____	_____
Goldwater	_____	_____	_____
Humphrey	_____	_____	_____
Stevenson	_____	_____	_____
Sparkman	_____	_____	_____
Gerald Ford	_____	_____	_____
Henry Kissinger	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

State Department Congressional Relations will prepare memo with positions of each member to be called.

"DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
CANCELLED PER E.O. 12356, SEC. 1.3 AND
ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF MARCH 14, 1983"

Jay 11/25/90

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~

- Powell, Pastor give background briefing to the members of press on status of negotiations, announcement schedule, basic terms. The briefing will be held to insure that news stories from Panama do not give unbalanced or incomplete versions of the treaty terms.

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

- President sends telegram to all members of Congress. Jordan will prepare text, State will send.

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

- State Department mails to all members of Congress summary of conceptual document, JCS responses, questions and answers.

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

- Linowitz and Bunker call core members of Citizens Group to explain terms and invite them to meet with the President the following week.

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

Day 2. (Or when President returns from Plains).

- President meets with NSC to discuss agreement terms.

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

Day 3.

- Briefing of full Cabinet by Linowitz and Bunker, followed by public announcement by President in Briefing Room of the date and place of the signing ceremony.

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

- Comments by supporting Congressional Leaders and public figures.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~

Day 4 and Following.

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- Meeting of President with Henry Kissinger, Henry Ford II, Maxwell Taylor, Jay Rockefeller, Dean Rusk and George Meany (names recommended by Linowitz and Bunker) to form Panama Canal Citizens Committee. Separate memo to be prepared by Joe Aragon.

APPROVED _____ DISAPPROVED _____

- Signing Ceremony. Option paper to be prepared by Bob Pastor.

Henry Kissinger

State Department Congressional Relations will
prepare memo with positions of each member to
be called.

"PETER WENT TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
CANCELLED PER E.O. 12958, SEC. 1.3 AND
ANNOUNCE MEMO OF MARCH 16, 1988"

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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Sparkman	_____	_____	_____
Gerald Ford	_____	_____	_____
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_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

State Department Congressional Relations will prepare memo with positions of each member to be called.

"DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
CANCELLED PER E.O. 12356, SEC. 1.3 AND
ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF MARCH 16, 1981"

Aug 3/27/90

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~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~

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_____	_____	_____	_____

State Department Congressional Relations will prepare memo with positions of each member to be called.

DETERMINED TO BE / ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
CANCELLED FOR E.O. 12, SEC. 1.3 AND
REMOVED FROM FILE 1600 14, 1963

Jay 3/27/4

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Henry Kissinger	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

State Department Congressional Relations will prepare memo with positions of each member to be called.

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
CANCELLED PER E.O. 12958, SEC. 1.3 AND
"HIVIST'S MEMO OF MARCH 18, 1963"

Jay = 27/90

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~

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APPROVED _____ DISAPPROVED _____

- Signing Ceremony. Option paper to be prepared by Bob Pastor.

8/21/77

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO: PRESIDENT CARTER
FORM: HAMILTON JORDAN *HJ.*
RE: STATUS REPORT ON PANAMA CANAL TREATY

Please find attached a status report on our efforts to obtain ratification of the new treaty. This is preceded by some recent information on the signing ceremony and related activities.

OF: HANDED TO DEAN ADMINISTRATIVE
MA: 40 BY *Jay*

10/3/90

SIGNING CEREMONY

As I mentioned to you on the telephone Friday, the Panamanian Ambassador ~~Garriel~~^{GABRIEL} Lewis came to see me Friday to convey General Torrijos' willingness to come to Washington for the signing ceremony. He expressed at the same time a hope that you would visit Panama after Senate ratification.

I expressed to Ambassador Lewis our appreciation for their sensitivity to the political situation that we faced in our country and told him that we would be honored to receive General Torrijos for the signing ceremony. I told him that I would talk with you over the weekend and give him an official response the first of the week.

Following his visit, we asked the State Department to

begin to inquire informally through our Latin American embassies to determine how successful we might be in having a good number of heads of state here in Washington for a signing ceremony. This survey will be completed by Monday. NSC and State suggest that the invitation to the ceremony be extended by you and General Torrijos to the "participating members of the OAS". This will relieve us from having to invite Castro.

Also, as suggested by you, Frank Moore has called Senator Byrd and asked his reaction to having the signing ceremony take place during the first week that Congress ^{is} ~~was~~ back. He was generally positive about the idea but asked to have the weekend to reflect on it. We assured him that it would be done in a way that did not interfere with the Senate's busy schedule.

I have tried to outline a schedule that would minimize the total amount of time that would have to be spent with Torrijos and the other heads of state. I believe

that it will be important that we have a separate event and/or function for Torrijos and also that you host some function for all of the heads of state. We should keep the schedule loose enough that some of the heads of state could visit key senators and express to them the importance of ratifying the new treaty.

The sample schedule that I have outlined on the following page envisions a welcoming ceremony for General Torrijos, a bilateral meeting with him and a luncheon in his honor at the White House followed by the signing ceremony at the OAS Building and a dinner that night hosted by you in honor of the heads of state from Latin America.

POSSIBLE SCHEDULE - TORRIJOS VISIT/TREATY CEREMONY

10:30	Arrival Ceremony for General Torrijos on South Lawn of White House
11:00	Bilateral Meeting with General Torrijos and President Carter
12:00	Break
12:30	Official Luncheon at White House
2:30	Opening Session of Organization of American States at OAS Building
3:15	Signing Ceremony of Panama Canal Treaty
4:00	President Carter Departs
8:00	President Carter Hosts Dinner for Heads of States at White House

After you have had some time to think about it and get an official reaction from Senator Byrd, we will need to officially inform General Torrijos of our plans. Ambassador Lewis has asked that we send someone from here to go to Panama with him to work out the details of the visit. This should be done by the middle of the week.

STATUS REPORT ON RATIFICATION EFFORTS

It might be worthwhile for us to review our progress and activities to date:

- We have completed highly publicized and successful treaty negotiations;
- We have maintained high and positive media visibility;
- We have maintained a bipartisan flavor to the treaty through the public endorsements of Ford and Kissinger;
- We have minimized criticism from defense-minded persons through the public endorsements of the Joint Chiefs;
- We have significant editorial support around the country; Buckley's support was significant and Kilpatrick has an "open mind";
- Perhaps most importantly, the fight to date has been President Carter vs. Helms and Thurmond; the longer we can keep responsible and articulate conservative spokesmen out of the fight, the less

inclined they will be to get involved;

-In summary, we have taken the initiative in the ratification effort, have dominated the media and the early discussion of the treaty and have developed public and political momentum.

The next two weeks are critical. Obviously, the intense coverage by the media will subside soon. If we can sustain our present momentum through the next few weeks, we will limit severely the damage ~~which treaty opponents can do against us.~~

Our plans for the next few weeks can be divided into two broad categories: our public campaign to educate the American people and our political campaign to influence specific Senators.

Public Effort

Endorsements. We must continue to solicit public

endorsements from key individuals and groups.

Some of the individuals that remain to be recruited are:

William Rogers, former Secretary of State

James Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense

Donald Rumsfeld, former Secretary of Defense

Melvin Laird, former Secretary of Defense

William Westmoreland, Retired Army Chief of Staff

General Fleming, former Canal Commander

Dean Rusk, former Secretary of State

General D. Parker, former Canal Commander

Brent Scowcroft, Ford NSC Adviser

Nelson Rockefeller, former Vice-President

General Lucius Clay, former General

General Maxwell Taylor, former Chairman of Joint Chiefs

Others

The active recruitment of these people will create

a positive atmosphere among conservatives for ratification of the treaty and also will deny the opponents the use of these same well known names in opposing the treaty. Each of these persons will be asked for the use of their name in endorsing the treaty and will be encouraged to make a public statement of support.

At the same time, an organized effort is underway to deal with groups and organizations that can be helpful. They include:

- U.S. Chamber of Commerce
- National Association of Manufacturers
- Business Roundtable
- Council of the Americas
- AFL-CIO/other labor organizations
- Governors, Mayors, Party Chairmen, etc.

Media. Through Jody's office, we will continue to provide national mailings to the news media as well as concentrated mailings to target states. We will

continue to work to see that pro-treaty spokesmen appear on the major talk shows and also insure that anti-treaty opponents are rebutted at every opportunity.

I still like the idea of a fireside chat on the treaty at the appropriate time. Most of the members of Congress have an inordinate fear of your use of the media. Possibly going on television the night before you sign the treaty outlining the history of the canal and the benefits of the new treaty to our country would create a positive political mood in the Congress as they return to town.

Special briefings for editors from our target states will be provided as is outlined elsewhere in this memorandum.

The Political Campaign

In the following pages, I have also attempted to

outline our plans for the ratification campaign.

But to understand our efforts within key targeted states, it is important first to review our most recent vote count.

LATEST VOTE COUNT

It is important that while we maintain a public posture of confidence that we also create a political atmosphere which will make each Senator feel that his vote is critical to the ratification of the Treaty. I believe that the treaty is already postured publicly in a way that no undecided senator wants to be "the Senator" that defeated the new treaty.

For that reason, it is very important that we keep our vote counts very confidential. Also, to the extent possible, we need to encourage supporters to publicly announce their support to preserve the political momentum that we have developed.

You will find on the attached sheet our most recent vote count. Most of the movement has been in our

direction, with Moynihan, Anderson, Hayakawa and Packwood moving into the "support likely" column since the announcement of the new treaty and Johnston moving into the "opposed" column. This count was done by Frank Moore's people and is generally conservative. It does put Senator Byrd in the support column.

ASSESSMENT OF SENATE POSITIONS ON PANAMA

** Possible supporters

SUPPORT LIKELY 42	INCLINED TO SUPPORT 15	UNDECIDED UNCERTAIN 8	INCLINED AGAINST 17	OPPOSED 17
<u>DEMOCRATS</u>				
Abourezk	Anderson	Bentsen	Cannon	Allen
Bayh	R. Byrd	Burdick	Ford **	H. Byrd
Biden	Eagleton	Haskell	Huddleston **	Eastland
Chiles	Leahy	Inouye	McIntyre **	Long
Church	Metcalf	Jackson	Melcher **	McClellan
Clark	Moynihan	DeConcini	Nunn **	Johnston
Cranston	Hayakawa	Magnuson	Randolph	
Culver		Hathaway	Stennis	
Glenn		Matsunaga	Stone **	
Gravel			Talmadge	
Humphrey			Zorinsky **	
Hart				
Kennedy				
Metzenbaum				
McGovern				
Morgan				
Muskie				
Nelson				
Pell				
Ribicoff				
Riegle				
Sarbanes				
Sparkman				
Stevenson				
Williams				
<u>REPUBLICANS</u>				
Brooke	Javits	Baker	Stevens	Stafford
Case	Mathias	Bellmon		Domenici
Chafee	Packwood	Goldwater		Lugar
Conrad	Pearson	Griffin		
Hatfield	Percy	Weicker		
			Heinz	Schmitt
			Hansen	
			Roth **	
			Schweiker**	
			Young	
				Bartlett
				Laxalt
				Curtis
				McClure
				Dole
				Scott
				Garn
				Thurmond
				Holmes
				Tower
				Hatch
				Wallop

Target States

Working closely with Frank Moore's office, we have identified ten target states which will receive special attention and effort in the weeks ahead. These are states where both of the Senators are "leaning against" and/or "undecided". For a variety of reasons, we have assessed that there is a good possibility of getting one or both of the Senators to support the treaty if we can demonstrate political support for the treaty in their state.

The ten "target states" are:

- Tennessee
- Georgia
- Kentucky
- Oklahoma

- Florida
- Pennsylvania
- Arizona
- Montana
- New Hampshire
- New Mexico

We have also identified a second group of "target states" which will be moved onto the main list as we win votes and commitments. These are states where it is judged that we have a good chance at winning the vote of only one Senator if we are able to demonstrate political support for the treaty.

Each of the target states will receive the following attention:

1. A White House Briefing. Outlined in the following section.
2. A major speaker. A major Administration figure will visit state, make speech explaining treaty, meet with state press, etc.

3. White House briefing of state press.

The major media outlets in each state will be invited to White House for special briefing on details of the treaty.

4. Special mailings. Information packets have been developed and within each target state we will do mailings to elected officials, business leaders, party leaders, etc.

Obviously, through Frank Moore's office we will be monitoring each Senator's statements and actions and will supply you a continuing list of persons to be called and will set up occasional meetings with individual Senators.

Treaty Briefing for Supporters from Target States

Beginning this week, we will bring delegations of persons from each of the target states to the White House for briefings on the treaty. We will bring two or three states at a time. These groups will include:

- Early Carter supporters
- Elected Officials
- Business Leaders
- Others Who Might Be Influential with Members of Congress

For example, Reuben Askew will bring a delegation of persons from Florida. It will include Mike Abrams and Alfredo Durand, Duby Ausley, Tom Clark, Richard Swann and representatives from the Florida Ports Authority. We will brief these people on the political and economic importance of the new treaty and ask them to return to their home states and generate

public understanding of and political support for the treaty. The homestate Senators will be informed in advance of these briefings and invited to participate in them. Many Senators have requested - as I think you know - that you help them create a political atmosphere in their state that will allow them to vote for the treaty. Nevertheless, the opponents of the treaty will say that you are "going over the heads of the Congress". We simply have to be prepared for that criticism and accept it.

Conversely, to the extent that it is perceived that we are going to wage an all-out political battle to pass the treaty, it will create a political counter pressure to the very effective direct mail campaign which will be waged by the rightwingers and the Birchers. Wendell Ford's man told me that they have already received over 600 letters in opposition to the treaty and four or five in favor of it.

We begin with our first state briefing this week. If it is productive, we will have several a week until we have completed briefings for all of the target states.

The briefing format we will use is attached for your review.

STATE BRIEFING FORMAT

State Dining Room/White House

2:00	Introduction	<u>Jack Watson</u>
2:10	Importance of New Treaty to the U.S. and Latin America	<u>Z. Brzezinski</u>
2:30	National Security Implications	<u>Harold Brown</u>
2:45	Break/Coffee with Vice-President, Hamilton Jordan, Frank Moore and Jody Powell	
3:15	Treaty Review/Questions	<u>Bunker/Linowitz</u>
3:45	President Carter	
4:00	Meeting Concludes	

Special Briefings

The special Bunker-Linowitz-Joint Chiefs briefings that we have made available to key people and groups has been very effective.

I would recommend that you consider calling Senator Goldwater and Baker and offer them such a briefing. Just your offer of such a briefing will be an additional constraint to their possibly doing anything or making an adverse decision before they return to Washington.

They will probably be content to wait until they return to Washington, but we could certainly fly Bunker and Linowitz to Tennessee and Arizona if they desired a briefing right away. If they go to Tennessee, we will have to make some special arrangements for Jim Sasser so as to not alienate him.

Bunker and Linowitz are also supposed to see Reagan this week. Although I am sure that we will eventually lose Reagan, the longer that we can deny the opponents of the treaty an articulate spokesman, the more difficult it will be for Baker and other moderate Republicans to oppose the treaty.

Points for Discussion with Senator Byrd

As you know, you will have dinner Tuesday night with Senator Byrd. Frank Moore and I recommend that you mention the following points:

1. Timing of the treaty vote. I believe that we all agree that an early vote will be better than a later vote. It is difficult to see how our prospects for passage will increase once the Senators leave Washington after the recess. I think we have all found that our political resources can be used more effectively when the Congress is in town. To get Senator Byrd to agree to an early vote, you will probably have to convince him of the time, effort and political resources that you are personally willing to commit to this fight. Obviously, if the votes are not there in the Fall, we would do better to wait until January. Frank mentions that Byrd is intrigued

by your political use of television, and that it would have a positive effect on him if you simply mentioned the liklihood of a fireside chat on the treaty.

2. Meeting with key Democratic Senators. Senator Cranston has suggested - and Frank Moore and I agree - that you meet with Senators Byrd, Stennis, Jackson and Nunn when Congress returns. You should ask Senator Byrd's advice on such a meeting but not mention that it was Cranston's idea. The idea would be for a meeting with the negotiators, the Joint Chiefs and you to go over the details of the treaty and answer their questions. If you are able to obtain the public support of these four Senators who represent collectively conservative, defense-minded Democrats in the Senate, we will have helped to create a political atmosphere in the Senate that will make it easier for Sasser, Ford, Morgan, and others to support the treaty.

At the same time, it will make it more difficult for Baker to lead the opposition.

3. Possible Humphrey role. Depending entirely on what Senator Humphrey's condition is when he returns to Washington next week, you might want to ask him to lead the fight for ratification of the treaty. This would be a great honor for Humphrey and would give him something important to do that might allow him to think about something other than his health. You might want to mention this to Byrd and get his reaction. If it is favorable, you might ask the Vice-President to check with the Senator's family and staff to see if such a request is appropriate and feasible in view of his recent surgery. If Humphrey is willing and able to do this, it would best come in the form of an offer from him to lead the fight as we do not want to be playing on the sympathy of others. Humphrey is a great man, and my own guess is that he probably has one good fight left in him and would be honored to make it on something that is as important as this.

This potential utilization of Humphrey would only be inappropriate if Senator Byrd is willing to take an early leadership role himself. As that is highly unlikely, he would probably respond well to the possible use of Humphrey. Byrd will probably want to wait until he can see the strong possibility of success and then come in and help us put the final votes together.

4. Review of our campaign to win ratification. Frank thinks that it will have a good effect if you outline for Byrd the range of things that we will be doing to educate the public and win Senate approval - again, to reinforce the fact that you are going to make a major fight for ratification.

Things To Do

You indicated that you might have time Sunday night to make some telephone calls. The following are calls that I think would be most productive. I think that our immediate goal should be to involve and utilize others in helping us persuade undecided Senators.

1. Calls to Kissinger and Ford. I would recommend that you call both men and express your appreciation for their statements this week. Also, you should go over with them the list of undecided Senators and ask each man to try to help you with several Senators. They have both indicated a willingness to actively help and we should involve them in a way that makes it their fight as well as ours.
2. Call to Dean Rusk. Has sent us word that he is anxious to help on ratification. I would suggest that

you call him and ask him to personally assume responsibility for trying to win over Talmadge and Nunn. They both respect him, and if he would visit both men before they return to Washington, I believe that it could be decisive. Also, he might be willing to call others. You should ask him to issue public statement of support.

3. William Scranton. He was, as you know, the very popular Republican Governor of Pennsylvania. You should call him and ask him to help with both of his Republican Senators who are presently listed as leaning against the treaty. Also, he might be willing to tell us other ways to influence Heinz and Schweicker.

4. Baker and Goldwater. You might want to call them for the purpose of offering them the Linowitz-Bunker briefing as was discussed earlier. The longer we can keep them both out of the fight against the treaty, the more difficult it will be for them to get into it.

5. Senators you missed last week. You might see some senators that you called last week that you might want to try again today.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

August 6, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HAMILTON JORDAN
WILLIAM G. HYLAND

SUBJECT: Status of Canal Negotiations

Ambassadors Linowitz and Bunker have drafted a status report on the negotiations for you, and it is attached at Tab A.

The provision on the sea-level canal, which Linowitz and Bunker recommend, was in fact drafted in Bogota last night by Torrijos and the Presidents of Venezuela, Mexico, Costa Rica, Columbia, and Jamaica. It may conceivably cause some problems with the Senate since it gives Panama the option of excluding the United States, and inviting other countries -- e. g., the USSR -- to join with Panama in building the canal. Our negotiators tried to get the Panamanians to give us a veto over third-country canal construction in Panama, along the lines of the following sentence:

"No new interoceanic canal will be constructed on the territory of the Republic of Panama during the lifetime of this Treaty except as herein provided or as the two governments may otherwise agree."

Panama's negotiators said that the principle of reciprocity required that we, in turn, accept a prohibition from building a sea-level canal through any other country. Their suggested sentence, made with the strong support of the Presidents of Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Costa Rica, is as follows:

"During the lifetime of the canal treaty the United States will not negotiate with third countries any interoceanic canal through any other route in the territory of the Western Hemisphere."

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

9/7/00 NSC RE NLC-00-125
BY 62 NARS DATE 6/27/03

~~SECRET~~

2.

The 1970 Canal Studies Commission explored more than a dozen routes through Nicaragua, Colombia, and Mexico as well as Panama, and recommended the #10 route through Panama. There is little likelihood that if we chose to build a sea-level canal it would be anywhere else but Panama. Although it might be agreed that the option to build a canal in a third country gives us added leverage over Panama, any hint of using such leverage would provoke such an adverse reaction in Latin America that, in effect, we couldn't use it.

We suggest you might want to speak directly with Ambassadors Bunker and Linowitz on this. Essentially, the question at issue is whether to adopt the provision in the status report or the proposed two additions (U.S. and Panamanian). We should add that the Panamanian Ambassador just told us that the four Latin American Presidents (of Venezuela, Costa Rica, Mexico and Colombia) "personally request" you to accept the latter sentence (if we insist on ours), and that our refusal would lead to a break in the negotiations.

I am also attaching a copy of the latest vote count in the Senate, which the State Department did.

Hyland spoke with Brzezinski who believes that on-balance we can accept the original Panamanian position without adding any further sentences on veto rights or prohibition against a canal in other countries (i. e., the language as presented in the attached status report).

In any case, Ambassadors Linowitz and Bunker will need your guidance before they depart for Panama tomorrow (Sunday) at noon.

~~SECRET~~

August 6, 1977

Status of Negotiations

Last night Ambassadors Bunker and Linowitz, at the residence of Panamanian Ambassador Lewis, talked by telephone with Panamanian Negotiators in Bogota and in Panama City. These conversations lasted from about 6:30 to 11:30 p.m., involved discussion of all outstanding issues, and brought us even closer to agreement on a new treaty.

As the U.S. Negotiators leave for Panama, the status of negotiations is as follows:

1. Economic Arrangements: Panama will accept our proposal (including use of an appropriate U.S. inflation index applied to the 30¢ per ton annuity, and including the fixed payment of \$10 million per annum plus another \$10 million if available from Canal earnings, subject to making up deficits from surplus in future years).
2. Lands and Waters: Most issues have now been settled on the basis of our recent negotiating position. We have agreed to explore under the treaty, settlement of remaining issues which have been in our discussions, and expect no major difficulty in their resolution.
3. Sea-level canal: The Panamanians this morning proposed the following sea-level canal provision instead of the one we had put forward earlier. Bunker and Linowitz believe it to be acceptable.

"The Republic of Panama and the United States of America, foreseeing the possibility that in the future a sea-level canal in Panama may have importance for international navigation, commit themselves, after the Panama Canal treaty enters into force and during its lifetime to study jointly the feasibility of a new interoceanic waterway on Panamanian territory. Therefore, if the parties agree that such waterway is necessary in the interest of the Republic of Panama, the USA and world commerce, both countries will undertake to negotiate mutually agreeable terms pertaining to the construction of the new waterway."

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O.12958, Sec.3.6
ER 9/7/00 N/SC RE NLL-00-125
NARS DATE 6/27/03

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2

4. Miscellaneous: A few minor issues remain such as the display of flags, coordination of port management, etc. No major difficulties are expected.

The outlook is that, barring quite unforeseen problems, we will be able to reach conceptual agreement early next week and that an announcement to that effect will be made in Panama. The negotiation of treaty texts is also proceeding quickly, and final texts will be ready before long.

~~SECRET~~

AUGUST 6, 1977

SENATE

ASSESSMENT OF POSITIONS ON PANAMA

* Slipping to "inclined
against"
** Possible supporters

SUPPORT LIKELY 39	INCLINED TO SUPPORT 16	UNCERTAIN UNDECIDED 9	INCLINED AGAINST 20	OPPOSED 16
<u>DEMOCRATS</u>				
Abourezk Stevenson	Anderson	Bumpers	Cannon	Allen
Bayh Williams	Bentsen	DeConcini *	Ford **	H. Byrd
Biden R. Byrd	Burdick	Hollings *	Huddleston **	Eastland
Chiles Eagleton	Durkin	Magnuson	McIntyre	Long
Church	Haskell	Sasser	Melcher **	McClellan
Clark	Inouye		Nunn **	
Cranston	Jackson		Randolph	
Culver	Leahy		Stennis	
Glenn	Metcalf		Stone **	
Gravel	Moynihan		Talmadge	
Humphrey	Proxmire		Zorinsky **	
Hart			Johnston	
Hathaway				
Kennedy				
Matsunaga				
Metzenbaum				
McGovern				
Morgan				
Muskie				
Nelson				
Pell				
Ribicoff				
Riegle				
Sarbanes				
Sparkman				
<u>REPUBLICANS</u>				
Brooke Javits	Baker	Hayakawa *	Bartlett Young	Curtis Scott
Case Mathias	Bellmon	Heinz *	Domenici	Dole Thurmond
Chafee Packwood	Goldwater	Stafford	Hansen	Garn Tower
Danforth Pearson	Griffin	Stevens	Roth **	Helms Wallop
Hatfield Percy	Weicker		Laxalt	McClure Hatch

AUGUST 6, 1977

SENATE

> I called

TERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE ASSESSMENT OF POSITIONS ON PANAMA
MARKING BY BB DATE 2-14-83 55 64* Slipping to "incline
against"
** Possible supporters

SUPPORT LIKELY 39	INCLINED TO SUPPORT 16	UNCERTAIN UNDECIDED 9	INCLINED AGAINST 20	OPPOSED 16
<u>DEMOCRATS</u>				
Abourezk > Stevenson + Bayh + Williams + Biden > R. Byrd + Chiles Eagleton + > Church + Clark + Cranston Culver Glenn Gravel + > Humphrey + Hart ? Hathaway + Kennedy Matsunaga Metzenbaum McGovern > Morgan + > Muskie + Nelson + Pell + Ribicoff Riegle > Sarbanes + > Sparkman +	Anderson ? Bentsen Burdick Durkin + ? Haskell Inouye + > Jackson Leahy + Metcalf > Moynihan + Proxmire +	Bumpers ? DeConcini * + Hollings * - ? Magnuson - ? > Sasser +	> Cannon ? > Ford ? + ** > Huddleston ** ? > McIntyre - ? > Melcher ** ? > Nunn ? ** > Randolph + > Stennis ? Stone ** > Talmadge ? > Zorinsky ? ** Johnston +	> Allen - H. Byrd > Eastland ? Long ? McClellan
<u>REPUBLICANS</u>				
Brooke Javits Case Mathias Chafee + Packwood + Danforth + Pearson Hatfield + Percy	> Baker + Bellmon + > Goldwater + Griffin Weicker	Hayakawa * ? > Heinz * ? Stafford + Stevens	> Bartlett - > Young ? Domenici ? > Hansen - Roth - ** > Laxalt **	Curtis Scott - Dole Thurmond Garn Tower > Helms-Wallop McClure Hatch

~~SECRET~~

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~~Film -~~
~~I don't like~~
~~this - See me~~
~~J~~

FILE

CONFIDENTIAL

TO: PRESIDENT CARTER
FROM: HAMILTON JORDAN *HJ*
RE: STATUS REPORT ON PANAMA CANAL TREATY CEREMONY

1. Torrijos arrival. Working with the Panamanian Ambassador, we have arranged for General Torrijos to arrive in Washington at 7:00 p.m. Monday. This will allow him overnight to rest before his bilateral with you. Also, it puts him in late enough that his arrival will miss the evening news. We explained to the Panamanians that due to Labor Day traffic a late arrival would logistically be best. He is staying at Jackson Place which has been described to him as the "place where former Presidents stay when in Washington". He is happy with these accommodations. *ok*

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

PER *Theresa NLC Hyre* NLC-90-23
BY *Jrp* NARS, DATE *8/6/92*

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2. Draft texts of treaties. Jody has completed his final review of the treaties. We have made a decision that it would be better now to wait and release them early next week as the activities commence as opposed to releasing them over the weekend. If we release them now, Jody says that Helms and Thurmond will be on the attack over the weekend. If we wait until next week, their objections will be lost in the coverage of the arrivals and the ceremony.

ok
—

3. Kissinger and Ford breakfast. I met with Kissinger today and Hugh Carter is in Vail with Ford. I asked Dr. Kissinger if he would host a breakfast meeting on the Panama Canal with President Ford. He and Ford talked and agreed to co-host such a function and invite all the Republican Senators. They said that inviting everyone was much easier for them than having to pick and choose. We all agreed that it would be best to do it at either the Capitol or at a hotel to emphasize the independent nature of the function. Kissinger feels strongly that he can be much more effective if he is perceived as

ok
—

a concerned former Secretary of State as opposed to being the agent of the new President.

4. Ford and Kissinger presence at functions. We have invited both men to be present at both the OAS ceremony and at the State Dinner. They have both accepted. *ok*

5. Signing ceremony schedule. The tentative schedule for the ceremony is as follows:

7:25	All heads of state seated.
7:31	Secretary-General of OAS, President Carter and General Torrijos enter.
7:33	Welcoming statement by Secretary-General.
7:37	Statement by President Carter (7 mins).
7:47	Statement by General Torrijos (7 mins).
7:55	Signing of treaties by principles.
7:58	Conclusion/benediction.

With the seats made available to the United States, we will invite every member of the Senate, the House leaders-

What I want is to emphasize presence of other heads of state - Not me & Torrijos. Cut my statement to one minute - let other leaders come forward to sign or initial something - I want TV viewers to see each of them, identified by a nameplate, white, Chancellor - J.C.

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For Preservation Purposes

hip, and members of two key committees. Also, we will invite recognizable private citizens (business and labor leaders) and members of the Joint Chiefs. Ford and Kissinger as well as other prominent persons from former administrations will be included.

Tip? 6. State dinner. The State Dinner will be held immediately after the signing ceremony. To avoid people having to change clothes and having the participants at the ceremony in black tie, the dress for the ceremony and the State Dinner will be a business suit. This may give the people in the East Wing apoplexy, but it is the only reasonable way to do it. To make maximum use of the State Dinner, we will restrict participation there to heads of state and Senators. We have asked Secretary Vance to host a collateral function at the State Department for Foreign Ministers and members of their traveling parties. In this way, we can insure a large number of Senators at the State Dinner. ok

7. Collateral events. We are arranging a large number

**Electrostatic Copy Made
for Preservation Purposes**

of private briefings, luncheons, receptions, etc.,
between heads of state, business leaders and members
of the Congress and their staffs. I will keep you
generally informed of this. You may be sure that there
will be a lot going on that is beneficial to us polit-
ically.

ok

8. Bilateral schedule. Tim Kraft and Evan Dobelle
have worked out the schedule for your bilaterals that
will, I think, give you maximum flexibility in dealing
with each head of state.

ok

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

August 23, 1977

7 POSITIVE
1 NEGATIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR RICK INDERFURTH

FROM: MANNY RUBIO *me*

SUBJECT: Signing Ceremony for Panama Canal Treaty

*Have set
mtg today
for me. Warr
J.C.*

The following responses have been received as of 1600 EDT regarding the U.S. invitation to Latin American heads of state to attend the signing of the Panama Canal Treaty in Washington.

BRAZIL

? Foreign Minister Silviera hopes to be able to respond in principle this afternoon, but Ambassador Crimmins comments that the dates currently contemplated, except for the outside one, are impossible for Geisel -- his presence is mandatory for Brazilian National Day September 7. Earlier Crimmins seemed to be very positive about a refusal by President Geisel.

- CHILE

President Pinochet appreciates the invitation and has accepted in principle, but he will not be able to attend if the ceremony is on September 9 because he must be in Chile on the 10th for anniversary celebrations. He also would like to know which other chiefs of state have tentatively accepted.

? ECUADOR

Ambassador Blomfield is not hopeful of getting any response before tomorrow. According to Embassy Santiago the Ecuadorean foreign minister now meeting in Santiago with the Peruvian and Chilean foreign ministers reportedly rejected a Chilean draft congratulatory message to Panama and the U.S. from Peru, Chile, and Ecuador. The foreign ministers reportedly believe the new treaty will mean higher tolls.

~~TOP SECRET~~

12/11/01 NSC NLC-00-126
BAE 8/15/02

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2-

? MEXICO

Foreign Minister Roel claimed that he would have to check with President Lopez Portillo, but added that he did not find it a very attractive idea.

? PERU

A definitive response is not expected before tomorrow morning, but Ambassador Shlaudeman sees little possibility of President Morales Bermudez' acceptance in view of his public commitment to defer foreign travel.

+ COLOMBIA

President Lopez agrees in principle.

+ URUGUAY

President Mendez is favorably inclined to accept; however, approval must be obtained from the Council of Ministers.

+ NICARAGUA

President Somoza will be "delighted" to attend, but Charge Rubenstein comments that the unknown factor on whether he will be able to attend is his health.

? GUATEMALA

President Laugerud would like very much to attend, but because of his schedule he will not be able to attend during the contemplated dates. He will not be able to leave the country until September 15 and must also obtain permission from Congress to leave the country.

+ COSTA RICA

President Oduber has responded positively and enthusiastically and thinks it is a "superb idea."

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-3-

+ BOLIVIA

There is no definitive response from President Banzer yet, but the deputy foreign minister believes he will wish to attend.

? TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

Ambassador Fox has not been able to see the foreign minister to extend the invitation.

? BARBADOS

There is no reply from the prime minister as yet and Ambassador Ortiz doubts whether we shall get any definite word until we are much closer to the date of the ceremony.

+ GRENADA

Prime Minister Gairy in principle remains very interested in attending. Definite confirmation depends on the exact date.

+ GUYANA

Foreign Minister Wills said that while he personally believed Guyanas would accept an invitation, he would have to check into it further. Embassy Georgetown feels that Prime Minister Burnham's health would prohibit his attendance.

? SURINAM

A government official stated yesterday that Surinam's Minister President would not be able to respond until he had some idea of the timing of the ceremony. Ambassador Zurhellen was not able to see the prime minister today for a more definitive response, and was informed that the reply would have to await the availability of the prime minister.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-4-

? JAMAICA

No definitive response has been received but Embassy Kingston was reminded of the demands on the prime minister's time during the contemplated dates.

? ARGENTINA

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: PANAMA CANAL TREATY: TELEPHONE CALL FROM PRESIDENT CARTER TO GENERAL OMAR TORRIJOS

DATE : August 24, 1977

TIME : 4:05 pm

PLACE : The Oval Office, The White House

PARTICIPANTS: The United States

Panama

The President

General Omar Torrijos,
Head of State

THE PRESIDENT: We are very eager to have the treaty ratified by the Senate. It would help very much, if you and I, under the auspices of the OAS, invited the Heads of State of the continent to witness the treaty signing ceremonies.

TORRIJOS: I agree. I am ready to cooperate in any manner that is necessary to insure that the treaty is ratified as soon as possible. There is a problem however. It is my feeling that if the OAS were to issue the invitations, fewer Presidents would be likely to attend the signing ceremonies than if it were the White House that would extend the invitations.

THE PRESIDENT: General, I am interested in having as many Presidents as possible from Central and South America. If you and I jointly extend an invitation and follow it up with personal messages to the Heads of State I think we would achieve the greatest participation. I am planning to meet first with you regarding the treaty and how it effects us and also how it effects you in Panama. Then I also want to meet with the leaders of the other countries. It would consist of two steps: first, a formal invitation extended together by you and me, and, second, personal invitations to the Heads of State that we would individually extend. For example, we would be needing your help in encouraging Lopez Portillo of Mexico to attend.

TORRIJOS: Now it is clear to me what you propose to do. I think it is an excellent idea. I know that between both of us we will get the largest number of Presidents of Latin America to attend. It is important though that while the rest of them decide on coming, that the first statements to the press be made in the sense that a number of Presidents have already been contacted and they have assured us they will attend. Then we would see what the other Presidents would do because it would be in their own interests to communicate their decisions.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

PER 7/16/90 NARS RE MP-NLC-90-23
BY gry NARS, DATE 9/16/90

Page Two of
Memcon: Carter/Torrijos Telcon 8/24/77

THE PRESIDENT: Very good. I think it would be advantageous if we were to keep expectations low regarding the number that would attend so that the public would be more surprised at the number in attendance. I am sure that if we stated that twenty Presidents were to come, and only 14 showed up in Washington, D.C., the next day the headlines would read: SIX PRESIDENTS REFUSE TO GO TO WASHINGTON, D.C. On the other hand, if the expectations are kept low, and 14 Presidents and 6 Foreign Ministers attend the ceremonies, the press and media would focus on that in a positive manner. Therefore, I feel that public statements should be of such a nature as to maintain expectations low, so that with the large number in attendance, public opinion would be favorably impressed.

TORRIJOS: I completely agree with you. I believe that there is a political feeling in Latin America, and it might be the case with you also, whereby the number of Presidents attending might be thought of in terms of the goals scored in a soccer match. It will be good to keep expectations low in statements to the press. I do have a question though. That is, how many have already confirmed their acceptances?

THE PRESIDENT: First, let me say that I do not know yet. I believe about six have already made definite plans. However, they have been somewhat hesitant because the formal invitations have not been extended yet, and no official date has been set yet. However, now that you and I have agreed, I will undertake to make a maximum effort to contact directly the Presidents inviting them to witness the ceremony of the signing of the treaty, as well as to come to Washington to conduct other business. We are also preparing a banquet at the White House on the 7th of September, after the signing of the treaty, which I believe will provide a delightful end to that day. During the two days thereafter, we will have a chance to follow up in our talks with the various Heads of State present. At this point, I think we have good indications that eight Heads of State will be coming. We will keep your Ambassador informed of the responses we get, and you could do the same with our Ambassador regarding those leaders that you talk to who indicate that they will be attending the treaty signature.

TORRIJOS: Fine. I think it is important that you make a statement in the sense that certain leaders, without specifying their numbers, have been invited and will attend, and that you announce the date. I have a suggestion to make also. That we invite Canada. Prime Minister Trudeau enjoys great popularity in Latin America.

Page Three of

Memcon: Carter/Torrijos Telcon 8/24/77

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, it would be a great pleasure to do so. He also enjoys great popularity in the United States, and I believe he should be included. We feel that this is so important that it be publicized throughout the country to the people that we are planning to have the ceremony covered on live television in our country. We have not approached the networks yet, but the possibility exists. I would like to know whether you would have any objection to this?

TORRIJOS: Absolutely no objection. The moment is of great significance for the Americas, and I think it would be very advantageous to provide for TV coverage throughout the Continent.

THE PRESIDENT: I would like to suggest that some key White House staffers go to Panama with your Ambassador to arrange the details with you.

TORRIJOS: That would be fine.

THE PRESIDENT: To conclude, I want to tell you that I greatly appreciate the spirit of cooperation that has been shown by your Negotiators and by you. My wife and I are looking forward to your visit to the White House. Rosalyn was delighted with the complimentary remarks that you made while she was on her trip of Central and South America.

TORRIJOS: Thank you, President Carter. I want to tell you that you have shown great moral courage by the way you have faced the problems at hand. It was only with great moral courage that our ends could be achieved.

THE PRESIDENT: I am proud of the progress we have made. There are a number of things that you and the leaders of Latin America can do to help us, and we are also eager to help you get your people to approve the treaty. I hope your visit will allow us to establish ties of personal friendship and understanding that will assure the approval in the Senate and by the people of Panama. It is very important that our citizens know that you and I have consulted and are ready to cooperate in the future.

TORRIJOS: I agree. Thank you very much, Mr. President.

Conversation ended at 4:30 pm.

Drafted by: Anthony J. Hervas, Interpreter;cl

August 24, 1977

CONFIDENTIAL

TO: PRESIDENT CARTER
FROM: HAMILTON JORDAN *H.J.*
RE: STATUS REPORT ON PANAMA CANAL ACTIVITIES

1. Follow-up on Torrijos call. After the telephone call, I met with the Panamanian Ambassador and talked with Warren Christopher and Zbig. The OAS will issue the invitation tomorrow (we hope) which invites the participating OAS members to participate in the signing ceremony on September 7th. Simultaneously, State will send out personal cables to the heads of state reinforcing the OAS invitation and saying that you would be honored to meet personally with the particular head of state if they do attend the signing ceremony. Warren says that they will personalize each personal message in terms of common interests, issues to be discussed, etc. At the same time, Torrijos will issue personal invitation and is willing to encourage important countries to attend.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
PER *7/10/90 NLC HZ RE* *ML-NLC-90-23*
BY *[Signature]* NARS, DATE *8/14/90*

2. Prospects of televised signing ceremony. Jody's initial reaction from the networks is very positive and highly encouraging. He says that the chances are better than 75% that all three will cover ceremony live. Once we get the go-ahead on this, we will be able to lock in the official schedule.

3. Getting text of treaty to Senators and others. After we have reviewed finally the text of treaty, we should get a copy of text to each Senator and House member and also to others who are helping us. Until the text is widely distributed and studied, many cautious Senators and those who are looking for an excuse to avoid making a decision will be able to say that they have not seen treaty.

4. Ford involvement. We should all be thinking of ways to stress the bipartisan nature of this treaty during the ceremonies. For example, we should have President Ford and Mrs. Johnson at the ceremony. We should keep Republicans and the military publicly involved.

5. Formation of a working group for signing ceremony.

We have a million things to do in a very short period of time. We have got to worry with everything from the format of the OAS meeting to the invitation list of Senators to the State dinner. For that reason, I have asked each of the affected agencies to designate someone to represent them in an informal working group which will meet regularly, exchange information and identify the major decisions which have to be made. Phil Wise will be the convenor of this group. The members will be persons designated by Jody, Frank, Zbig and Warren to work with us on a day-to-day basis to make the many detailed decisions which will have to be made in the next ten days. See the attached memo.

6. Bob Thompson's daily summary/update. Bob Thompson of Frank Moore's staff will be responsible on a day to day basis for accumulating and circulating political information and intelligence on votes in the Senate. This will start immediately.

7. California trip. I leave Thursday afternoon for California to participate in several events with Democratic contributors leading up to their big October fundraiser that you attend. If this had not been scheduled for several weeks, I would have tried to cancel and/or postpone it with all the Canal business pending here. I'll be back during the weekend - in my absence Landon Butler will be fully informed of our activities here. Phil Wise will begin to work on the details of the ceremony and Frank's office will continue to work on individual Senators and will keep you informed. I haven't had any time off since we arrived here so I am look forward to getting away for a couple of days.

8. Ambassador Lewis has gotten General Torrijos to invite me down to personally brief him on the agenda for the ceremony, his posture, etc. I have begged off on the basis that I can do more here and that you want me here. Just in case they contact you about it, I wanted you to know so you could back me up on this.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

August 25, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR RICK INDERFURTH

FROM: DENNIS CHAPMAN

SUBJECT: Update on Signing Ceremony for Panama Canal Treaty

The following responses have been received as of 0630 today regarding the U.S. invitation to Latin American heads of state to attend the signing of the Panama Canal Treaty in Washington.

BARBADOS

There is no reply from the prime minister as yet and it is unlikely that we shall get any definite word until it is closer to the actual date of the ceremony.

BRAZIL

Ambassador Crimmins reports that President Geisel will not be able to attend due to Brazil's National Day on September 7. He is willing, however, to send a qualified representative if that is acceptable.

BOLIVIA

President Banzer would be prepared to accept the invitation.

CHILE

President Pinochet appreciates the invitation and has accepted in principle, but he will not be able to attend if the ceremony is on September 9 because he must be in Chile

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

PER 7/10/80 NLC HX RE MR-NLC-90-23
BY [Signature] NARS, DATE 8/10/90

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-2-

on the 10th for anniversary celebrations. He also would like to know which other chiefs of state have tentatively accepted.

COLOMBIA

President Lopez agrees, and will attend.

COSTA RICA

President Oduber has responded positively and enthusiastically.

ECUADOR

Admiral Poveda will accept an invitation if it were extended.

GRENADA

Prime Minister Gairy, in principle, remains very interested in attending. Definite confirmation depends on the exact date.

GUATEMALA

Although President Laugerud would like to attend, his schedule prohibits his presence on the planned dates.

GUYANA

Foreign Minister Wills said that while he personally believed Guyana would accept an invitation, he would have to check into it further. Embassy Georgetown feels that Prime Minister Burnham's health would prohibit his attendance.

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-3-

HAITI

President Duvalier cannot attend an early September ceremony because of pressing business, but has offered to send a high level delegation instead.

JAMAICA

No definitive response has been received, but Embassy Kingston was reminded of the demands on the prime minister's time during the contemplated dates.

MEXICO

Foreign Secretary Roel said he did not yet have a reaction from President Lopez Portillo, although he noted the dates were not convenient. He requested names of other heads of state willing to attend.

NICARAGUA

President Somoza will be "delighted" to attend, but Charge Rubenstein comments that the unknown factor is whether he will be able to attend because of his health.

PERU

No definitive response has been received, but Ambassador Shlaudeman sees little possibility of President's acceptance in view of his public commitment to defer foreign travel.

SURINAM

The Prime Minister will not be able to accept the invitation because of the internal political situation in Surinam and a prospective state visit scheduled for mid-September.

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-4-

TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

Foreign Minister Donaldson has expressed little hope that Prime Minister Williams could accept the invitation because of present commitments. However, Donaldson is checking with President Clarke to see if the Washington visit could be fitted into his schedule.

URUGUAY

President Mendez is favorably inclined to accept; however, approval must be obtained from the Council of Ministers. He wants to confer with other Latin American colleagues before making a commitment.

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CONFIDENTIAL

August 25, 1977

As of 0630, August 25

ACCEPT

1. Bolivia
2. Chile
3. Colombia
4. Costa Rica
5. Ecuador
6. Venezuela

TENATIVE ACCEPTANCE OR LEANING TOWARDS ACCEPTANCE

1. Grenada
2. Guyana
3. Nicaragua
4. Uruguay

LEANING TOWARDS REJECTION

1. Brazil
2. Guatamala
3. Haiti
4. Jamaica
5. Mexico
6. Peru

NO DEFINITE RESPONSE

1. Barbados
2. Trinidad and Tobago

REJECTION

1. Surinam

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BOLIVIA

There is no definitive response from President Banzer yet, but the deputy foreign minister believes he will wish to attend.

CHILE

President Pinochet appreciates the invitation and has accepted in principle, but he will not be able to attend if

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-2-

the ceremony is on September 9 because he must be in Chile on the 10th for anniversary celebrations. He also would like to know which other chiefs of state have tentatively accepted:

COLOMBIA

President Lopez agrees and will attend.

COSTA RICA

President Oduber has responded positively and enthusiastically.

ECUADOR

Admiral Poveda will accept an invitation if it were extended.

GRENADA

Prime Minister Gairy, in principle, remains very interested in attending. Definite confirmation depends on the exact date.

GUATEMALA

Although President Laugerud would like to attend, his schedule prohibits his presence on the planned dates.

GUYANA

Foreign Minister Wills said that while he personally believed Guyana would accept an invitation, he would have to check into it further. Embassy Georgetown feels that Prime Minister Burnham's health would prohibit his attendance.

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-3-

HAITI

President Duvalier advises that the press of business would deprive him of attending should the invitation actually be extended, but he does offer to send a high ranking delegation should we so desire.

JAMAICA

No definitive response has been received, but Embassy Kingston was reminded of the demands on the prime minister's time during the contemplated dates.

MEXICO

Foreign Minister Roel claimed that he would have to check with President Lopez Portillo, but added that he does not find it a very attractive idea.

NICARAGUA

President Somoza will be "delighted" to attend, but Charge Rubenstein comments that the unknown factor is whether he will be able to attend because of his health.

PERU

A definitive response is expected sometime today, but Ambassador Shlaudeman sees little possibility of President's acceptance in view of his public commitment to defer foreign travel.

SURINAM

A government official stated yesterday that Surinam's Minister President would not be able to respond until he had some idea of the timing of the ceremony. Ambassador Zurhellen was not able to see the prime minister today for a more definitive response, and was informed that the reply would have to await the availability of the prime minister.

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-4-

TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

Foreign Minister Donaldson has expressed little hope that Prime Minister Williams could accept the invitation because of present commitments. However, Donaldson is checking with President Clarke to see if the Washington visit could be fitted into his schedule.

URUGUAY

President Mendez is favorably inclined to accept; however, approval must be obtained from the Council of Ministers.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

August 24, 1977

As of 0630, August 24

ACCEPT

1. Chile
2. Colombia
3. Costa Rica
4. Ecuador

TENATIVE ACCEPTANCE OR LEANING TOWARDS ACCEPTANCE

1. Bolivia
2. Grenada
3. Guyana
4. Haiti
5. Nicaragua
6. Uruguay

LEANING TOWARDS REJECTION

1. Brazil
2. Guatamala
3. Jamaica
4. Mexico
5. Peru

NO DEFINITE RESPONSE

1. Barbados
2. Trinidad and Tobago
3. Surinam

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~