

Iran Scenario

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
draft	Possible scenario (5 pp.) 3 copies <i>OPENED 11/19/93</i>	n.d.	A
draft	Revised scenario (8 pp.) <i>OPENED 11/19/93</i>	n.d.	A
draft	final scenario (1 p.) <i>OPENED 11/19/93</i>	n.d.	A
draft	Contingency Press Guidance 2 copies <i>OPENED 3/27/95</i>	3/1/80	A
memo	Phil Wise to MJ (4 pp.) <i>OPENED 3/27/95</i>	3/1/80	A
draft	Press Guidance (4 pp.) <i>OPENED 3/27/95</i>	n.d.	A
draft	Updated scenario (1 p.) <i>OPENED 11/19/93</i>	n.d.	A
cable	to White House	5/6/80	A

FILE LOCATION

Chief of Staff (Jordan)/Confidential File/~~Box 6 of 8 (org.)~~/ Iran --Scenario

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A POSSIBLE SCENARIO

Two important steps have already been taken:

- 1) Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh has responded to the Jordan/Saunders trip to London by authorizing Messrs. Villalon and Bourguet to travel to Washington carrying tangible evidence of Iran's serious intentions and good will to discuss practical stages to end the crisis.
- 2) The United States has conveyed through private channels to the President-elect, Mr. Bani Sadr, and to the Foreign Minister, Mr. Ghotbzadeh, a message confirming to them the importance which the United States attaches to our conversations.

I. Principles and Procedures

The United States and Iran agree:

- 1) to accept the principle of the establishment of a scenario, the first stages of which would be defined precisely, and the subsequent stages ^{in detail} would be defined _{as} events evolve;
- 2) to manage this scenario with the help of persons agreed to by both sides;
- 3) to proceed, within the framework of this scenario, by stages each involving reciprocal actions to be defined in advance;

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BY CR NARS, DATE 11/4/93

- 4) that these agreed points are intended to allow the earliest possible resolution of the present crisis by peaceful means.

II. Establishment of a Commission of Inquiry

1) Request by Iran that the Secretary-General of the United Nations establish a Commission of Inquiry "to hear Iran's grievances and to allow an early solution to the crisis between Iran and the United States." This request will state Iran's desire to have the Commission speak to each of the hostages.

2) Removal by the United States of its objections to the establishment of this Commission.

3) Mr. Waldheim's role:

- a) appointment of a chairman and members of this Commission;
- b) preparation of the terms of reference, which will state that the Commission will not be a tribunal but rather a fact-finding mission, and establishment of deadlines for the Commission's work;
- c) official announcement by Mr. Waldheim of the Commission's establishment and simultaneous publication by him of the Iranian request.

4) Public statement by the United States recalling that the Commission is going on a fact-finding mission to Tehran, to hear Iranian grievances, to meet with each of the hostages, and to report to the Secretary-General. The United States would

object publicly to having the Commission subject the hostages to interrogations in connection with its inquiry during any of its meetings with them. The United States would recall that it is important for it to ascertain the condition of each of the hostages. *B-5*

5) The Imam would present the establishment of the Commission of Inquiry as a success, would interpret the visit to the hostages as being one of the elements in the investigation into Iranian grievances, and would state his desire to see the Commission conclude its work rapidly.

(would ask government administrations to place their documents at the disposal of the Commission)

III. Work of the Commission

1) The Commission will not leave New York for Tehran until the announcement provided for in paragraph III 5) above has been made.

2) The Commission will hold its meetings in private and will receive evidence and documents to be submitted to it by Iranian authorities.

3) The Commission will visit the embassy as soon as possible to meet with the hostages.

4) As soon as the Commission has concluded its work and drafted its report, it:

- a) will announce that it is ready to return to New York to submit its report to the Secretary-General;

- b) will present to the Revolutionary Council (or to the new Government if it has come into being) the part of this report which concerns the conditions of confinement of the hostages; and if these conditions appear inadmissible, the Commission will state that its full report will not be submitted to the Secretary-General until the conditions of confinement have been changed and the hostages transferred elsewhere.

IV. Final Stages

- 1) The Revolutionary Council (or the Government) will submit to the Imam the section of the report referred to in part III 4) b) above.
- 2) The Imam, having taken cognizance of this report, will make a public statement on the hostages' actual conditions of confinement thus revealed to him and will order the transfer of the hostages to a hospital under the shared custody of the Iranian authority and the Commission.
- 3) The report of the Commission will be submitted to the Secretary-General on the occasion of the religious holidays celebrating the 1500th anniversary of the Hegira in Iran (planned for February 11).
- 4) The freeing of the hostages will take place on the same occasion.

5) The other elements in dispute between Iran and the United States will be studied and discussed by a joint commission formed by the two governments.

OPR/LS-I:SvanReigersberg
1/30/80 x28916

A handwritten signature, possibly reading 'SR', is written over the typed name 'SvanReigersberg'.

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Revised Scenario

I. Principles and Procedures (no change from earlier draft)

The United States and Iran agree:

1. to accept the principle of the establishment of a scenario, the first stages of which would be defined precisely, and the subsequent stages would be defined in detail as events evolve;
2. to manage this scenario with the help of persons agreed to by both sides:

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3. to proceed, within the framework of this scenario, by stages each involving reciprocal actions to be defined in advance;
4. that these points are intended to allow the earliest possible resolution of the present crisis by peaceful means.

- II. Establishment of a Commission of Inquiry (changes show detailed sequence of events--all times below are New York time)
1. It is agreed in the approval of this scenario that the Secretary-General of the United Nations should establish a Commission of Inquiry "to hear Iran's grievances and to allow an early solution of the crisis between Iran and the U.S." and that Iran desires to have the Commission speak to each of the hostages.
 2. Monday night: Secretary-General Waldheim sends a message to Ghotbzadeh confirming his readiness to send to Iran within a week the Commission of 5-7 members which he discussed in Tehran early in January "to hear Iran's grievances and to allow an early solution of the crisis between Iran and the U.S."
 3. Tuesday: Ghotbzadeh would respond by agreeing that the Commission should come to Tehran within a week and stating Iran's desire to have the

Commission speak to each of the hostages.

4. Tuesday night: The U.S. would ^{conditionally} remove its objections to the establishment of this Commission by a direct private communication to the Secretary-General. In that communication, the U.S. would state importance that Commission look into the grievances of both sides and work for early release of the hostages. At this time, the U.S. would take the following position publicly: The U.S. will discuss with the Secretary-General the concept of a Commission. The U.S. will reserve its comments until it knows what the terms of reference of the Commission will be. The U.S. has stated its position many times before and need not repeat it. While we have opposed the formation of a Commission under past conditions, ^{we} would support [any] steps by the UN that might lead to the release of the hostages while protecting essential international principles.
5. Tuesday night: Secretary-General Waldheim sends a second message to Ghotbzadeh which would (a) state briefly the purpose of the Commission as a fact-finding mission (not a tribunal) to help end the crisis and (b) recommend the membership of 5-7 for the Commission. In proposing

the membership, the Secretary-General would propose Aguillan as Chairman plus 4-6 members, including (1) M'Bow (UNESCO Director), (2) Bedjaoui (Algerian PermRep at UN), (3) Petitti (former head of Paris Bar Association and Association of Catholic Jurists), (4) Martin Ennals (Amnesty International Secretary-General), (5) Abu Sayeed Chowdhury (former President of Bangladesh), (6) Daoudi (Advisor to President Assad of Syria) or Sabah el Rikabi (Head of Union of Syrian Bar Associations). If any of the proposed members is not acceptable to Iran, Iran could suggest that one or two be dropped.

6. Between Tuesday and Friday: Either Bani-Sadr himself would confirm by ^{TELEGRAM} ~~phone~~ to the Secretary-General or the Imam would issue a statement that he has authorized the Revolutionary Council to resolve the crisis. The Secretary-General would not proceed until he has received confirmation in one of these forms from Iran.

PUBLIC
STATEMENT
BY SYG

7. Friday at 1600 hours: The Secretary-General would announce establishment of the Commission and its purposes, including Iran's desire to have the Commission speak to each of the hostages.
8. After SYG Waldheim's announcement: The President

of Iran would publicly present the establishment of the Commission of Inquiry as a success of Iranian diplomacy, would interpret the visit to the hostages as one of the elements in the investigation into Iranian grievances, and would state the desire of the Imam to see the Commission conclude its work rapidly. The Iranian President would instruct government administrations to place their documents at the disposal of the Commission.

9. After the Iranian statement: The U.S. would state that the Commission is going on a fact-finding mission to Tehran, to hear the grievances of both sides, to meet with each of the hostages, and to report to the Secretary-General. The U.S. would object publicly to having the Commission subject the hostages to interrogation in connection with its inquiry during any of its meetings with them.

- purpose
- terms of reference

III. Work of the Commission

1. The Commission would not leave New York for Tehran until the U.S. announcement above has been made. It would aim to begin work in Tehran early next week.
2. The Commission would hold its meetings in private and will receive evidence and documents

to be submitted to it by Iranian authorities]

3. The Commission would visit the embassy as soon as possible to meet with the hostages.
4. As soon as the Commission has concluded its work and drafted its report, it: (a) would tell the Revolutionary Council that the credibility of its report would be seriously limited unless the hostages are released immediately or at least moved from the compound to a hospital; (b) would inform the Revolutionary Council that it is ready to return to New York to submit its report to the Secretary-General.

IV. Final Stages:

1. Transfer of the hostages to the protection of the Government of Iran either in a hospital or in the Embassy compound after the "students" have left the premises. (Day Number 1.)
2. Return of the Commission to New York. (Day 1 + 1)
3. Submission to the Secretary-General of the Commission's report which will contain findings and recommendations. Publication of the report as a UN document. The report would express inter alia the following principle as a recommendation to all governments:

-- Governments should respect and facilitate
their
within the framework of/internal laws the
right of Iran:

(a) to file suits against the Shah, his family
or associates on the basis of the grave
presumption of any serious crimes set forth
in the report;

(b) to file suits to recover assets which in
the report are presumed to have been illegally
taken from Iran by the Shah, his family or
associates.

(Day 1 + 2)

4. Release of the hostages and their departure from
Iran. (Day 1 + 3)

5. One hour after their departure, ~~the SYG will~~
~~release~~ statements by President Bani-Sadr and
President Carter ~~both previously agreed by Iran~~
~~and the U.S. and, before the Commission left~~
~~Iran, deposited privately with the SYG. WILL BE~~
~~PUBLICLY RELEASED~~
(a) The Iranian statement will admit the moral
wrong of holding hostages, express regret,
promise to respect international law and affirm
to
a desire/establish normal relations based on
mutual respect, ~~and~~ equality and international law.

(b) The U.S. statement will:

- (1) Accept the principle stated in 3 above;
- (2) Express understanding and regret for the grievances of the Iranian people, including the widespread perception of U.S. intervention in Iran's internal affairs;
- (3) Affirm the right of the Iranian people to make decisions governing their political future and the policy of the U.S. to respect that right;
- (4) Affirm a desire for normal relations based on mutual respect, equality and the principles of international law.

6. Establishment of a Joint Commission to resolve all unresolved bilateral problems. (On a date to be determined by Iran and the U.S. within one month after Day 1.)

Joc

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

PRESS GUIDANCE

Steps Toward Release of the Hostages

*I need the
port worked.*

Present situation: Iranians State Decision to Form a Commission

Iran: Revolutionary Council has decided that a commission on inquiry should be formed ~~to hear grievances of both sides / to allow the inquiry into hostages.~~

NOTE: The scenario is not triggered until Iran sends pre-arranged request to SYG Waldheim. The SYG therefore has control over launching the scenario.

U.S.: -- No Iranian decision has been communicated to us nor, as far as we know, to the UN.

-- If a proposal is made, we will state our position.

U.N.: Provides no substantive response until a formal Iranian request along agreed lines is received.

Probably several days in between.

Step II - 1 and 2: Iranian Request that a Commission be formed.

Iran Requests SYG Waldheim establish a Commission of Inquiry "to hear Iran's grievances and to allow an early solution to the crisis between Iran and the United States" and states Iran's desire to have the Commission speak to each of the hostages ~~to hear grievances of both sides.~~

Alternatively: "... to investigate the grievances of both sides."

NOTE: This would trigger the scenario.

U.S.: -- The U.S. will discuss the Iranian request with the Secretary General. We will reserve our comments until we know what the terms of reference of the Commission will be.

-- You have heard our position many times before. I need not repeat it.

-- We support any steps by the UN that might lead to the release of the hostages while protecting essential international principles.

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E.O. 12333, Sec. 3.4

PER 12/22/84 NLC HRE MR NLC-94-94

BY *Jas* NARS, DATE 3/16/95

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*May want to clear with chmn. before he
publicly accepts.*

Step II - 3: SYG Waldheim Announces Commission

UN: SYG Waldheim -- using good offices authority, recalling his talks in Tehran, and citing the Iranian request -- would announce formation of the Commission to hear (Iran's) grievances (of both sides) and to allow an early solution to the crisis between Iran and the U.S. (We will press strongly that the Commission be described as a "fact-finding" commission in all UN statements.)

Iran: The Commission will come to investigate the crimes of the Shah's regime. (Will see the hostages as part of its investigation into Iran's grievances.) Commission should conclude its work rapidly.

U.S.: Will have to answer why it has changed its position that the hostages should be released simultaneous with appointment of a Commission.

-- This is a fact-finding mission, not a tribunal with any judicial role. Its mission is to investigate the concerns of both sides in Tehran, including our concern that the hostages continue to be held and that they are held in inhumane conditions.

-- The United States is not on trial in this process and our diplomats are not on trial.

-- The U.S. continues to oppose any interrogation of people being held hostage and believes the world will reject the findings of any inquiry based on the statements of people held under duress.

-- When asked why we had not been willing to agree to this arrangement in the past, we would say there was no one in Iran with authority with whom we could deal.

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*May want the Chairman of the Commission
to meet with the Sec. of State before he goes.
Public or private?*

Step III - 2: Commission Receives Evidence from Iranians

There is a high probability that there will be television coverage in Iran of Commission interviews with victims of the Shah's regime, etc. We will have to answer the question why this airing of Iranian grievances is permitted when the hostages have not been released.

- We've heard this in suits that it happened.*
- U.S.:
- We would reiterate that the purpose of the Commission is to look into the concerns of both sides.
 - The Iranians should recognize that the world will pay little attention to their claims as long as the hostages are held.
 - The public spectacle in Iran is nothing more than what Iran has been staging over the past three months for the world's press and every international visitor, including the Secretary General.
 - (We would probably have to de-emphasize our interest in having the Commission see the hostages because delicate negotiations might be required in Tehran to get the Commission into the Embassy compound.)

Step III - 3: Commission Meets the Hostages

Iran: The Commission is investigating the activities of the Embassy.

U.S.: The Commission, in accordance with its mandate, is investigating the condition of the hostages. An inquiry into their duties or alleged spy charges would be a violation of the Commission's mandate.

They have to see we have to make sure that a clear understanding of no negotiation.

Step IV: The Hostages are Transferred to a Hospital Under the Custody of the Iranian Government and the Commission and the Commission Departs for New York

For whatever reason they want to give.

U.S.: We will have to answer the question why the hostages have not been allowed to return to the United States.

- The safety and well-being of the hostages is assured by the Iranian government and the UN. We are confident that they will be released in the very near future.

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Step V: The Commission Makes Its Report to SYG Waldheim
and the Hostages are Allowed to Leave

U.S.: We will face the questions of what kind of
relation we want with Iran and whether we can
confirm that the release scenario was a pre-
arranged game plan.

- U.S. and Iranian representatives will meet
in an attempt to work out the many difficulties
between us. It will be premature to describe
the relationship that may develop.
- We would withhold comment on how the release
was arranged.

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11 February 1980

The Secretary-General sent a cable to Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh confirming his readiness to send a commission of inquiry to Iran to hear Iran's grievances and to allow an early solution of the crisis between Iran and the United States.

13 February 1980

Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh sent a message to the Secretary-General confirming Iran's acceptance of the establishment of the commission and repeating the understanding of the two-fold mandate of the commission. He also confirmed Iran's desire to have the commission speak to each of the hostages.

The Secretary-General, with reference to the above exchange of messages, confirmed his intention to establish the commission with the agreed mandate and also took note of Iran's desire.

17 February 1980

The Secretary-General sent a message to President Banisadr in which he requested concurrence to a proposed text for a public announcement.

18 February 1980

Mr. Shemirani confirmed that the announcement should not make reference to consultations with the Governments of Iran and the United States and added that, if there were any other changes, he would inform as soon as he received instructions from his Government.

Mr. Shemirani also informed the Secretary-General that the visit of the commission should be postponed for a few days.

20 February 1980

The Secretary-General received a message from President Banisadr in which he said that the commission could proceed to Iran.

At 12.30 pm, the Secretary-General made the announcement, after deleting the reference to consultations with the Governments of Iran and the United States.

22 February 1980

Mr. Shemirani sent a letter informing that the commission could depart for Teheran any time on 23 February 1980.

23 February 1980

The Secretary-General sent a message to President Banisadr in which he stated that the commission was proceeding to Teheran on the basis of the agreed mandate, including Iran's desire for it to speak to each of the hostages.

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.4
PER 3/2/93 NLS HZ RE MR-ALLC-42-160
BY [Signature] NARS, DATE 11/4/93

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CONTINGENCY PRESS GUIDANCE

It looks increasingly likely that within the next two to four days the Commission of Inquiry will actually visit the hostages on the compound. As the weekend proceeds, we need to be extremely careful about how we react publicly so as not to complicate Bani Sadr's efforts to make the visit happen. If it happens, a visit could occur in a variety of circumstances.

1. Initial Iranian Announcement

-- Iran: The Commission will visit the hostages (time and circumstances unspecified).

-- U.S.: We have seen the reports from Tehran. We have nothing on them. We'll have to wait and see.

2. Prior Announcement--with a Twist

-- Iran: The visit is part of the Commission's inquiry into the crimes of the Shah; the Commission will receive documents from the students and interrogate the hostages.

-- U.S.: We have made plain our opposition to the interrogation of hostages. Such interrogation would not be consistent with principles of international law.

We welcome steps which can lead to a solution to the crisis, but we will withhold further

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PER 12/22/94 USC HRP MR-NLC-94-94
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comment until the proposed visit has actually taken place.

3. A visit occurs on Saturday, only half the hostages are seen, and the second visit is promised for Sunday

-- U.S.: We are withholding comment. The Commission has not yet had a chance to see all of the hostages.

4. Visit to the hostages is completed but not all 50 are seen by the Commission

-- U.S.: The Commission went to Tehran after Iran expressed its desire that the Commission speak with each of the hostages. This is a serious breach of faith with the Commission. We hold the Iranian Government responsible for the well-being of all 50 hostages. There are serious implications in the failure of the Commission to see all 50 persons who were taken prisoner on November 4. It is imperative that the Commission be allowed to see all the hostages.

-- (We would insist with Waldheim that the Commission suspend all activity but remain in Tehran until all 50 hostages had been seen. We would ask our allies to organize a strong diplomatic demarche to the Iranian Government demanding access to all 50. We would mount a campaign in the world press.)

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5. Announcement that Hostage is Missing--all others seen

-- Iran: Missing hostage escaped and has not been found.

-- U.S.: We hold the Iranian Government responsible for an intensive effort to determine his fate. (We have to allow for the possibility that there has been a successful escape and not hold up the release of the rest at the outset.)

6. Hostage was killed escaping

-- U.S.: We hold the Iranian Government responsible for investigating the exact circumstances and meeting its responsibilities under international law.

7. Visit to the hostages completed and all 50 hostages are seen

-- Iran: Might describe the visit as a part of the collection of evidence against the former regime and the USG.

-- U.S.: We would express pleasure that for the first time all hostages have been seen by neutral outsiders and describe this as a significant step forward in efforts to improve the condition of the hostages.

We are confident that the Commission members

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adhered to principles of international law during their visit to the compound.

(As a reciprocal gesture we could:

-- Suspend the deportation of Iranians from the U.S. except those persons convicted of crimes.

-- Authorize Italy to supply helicopters and spare parts useful for flood relief work in Khuzestan.

-- Authorize the U.S. Red Cross and pharmaceutical suppliers to make donations of medicine and other supplies for flood relief purposes.)

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FM HAMILTON JORDAN

TO PHIL WISE FOR THE PRESIDENT

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CONTINGENCY PRESS GUIDANCE

IT LOOKS INCREASINGLY LIKELY THAT WITHIN THE NEXT TWO TO FOUR DAYS THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY WILL ACTUALLY VISIT THE HOSTAGES ON THE COMPOUND. AS THE WEEKEND PROCEEDS, WE NEED TO BE EXTREMELY CAREFUL ABOUT HOW WE REACT PUBLICLY SO AS NOT TO COMPLICATE BANI SADRI'S EFFORTS TO MAKE THE VISIT HAPPEN. IF IT HAPPENS, A VISIT COULD OCCUR IN A VARIETY OF CIRCUMSTANCES.

1. INITIAL IRANIAN ANNOUNCEMENT

-- IRANI: THE COMMISSION WILL VISIT THE HOSTAGES (TIME AND CIRCUMSTANCES UNSPECIFIED).

-- U.S.: WE HAVE SEEN THE REPORTS FROM TEHRAN. WE HAVE NOTHING ON THEM. WE'LL HAVE TO WAIT AND SEE.

2. PRIOR ANNOUNCEMENT--WITH A TWIST

-- IRANI: THE VISIT IS PART OF THE COMMISSION'S INQUIRY INTO THE CRIMES OF THE SHAH; THE COMMISSION WILL RECEIVE DOCUMENTS FROM THE STUDENTS AND INTERROGATE THE HOSTAGES.

-- U.S.: WE HAVE MADE PLAIN OUR OPPOSITION TO THE INTERROGATION OF HOSTAGES. SUCH INTERROGATION WOULD NOT BE CONSISTENT WITH PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

WE WELCOME STEPS WHICH CAN LEAD TO A SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS, BUT WE WILL WITHHOLD FURTHER COMMENT UNTIL THE PROPOSED VISIT HAS ACTUALLY TAKEN PLACE.

*****WHSR COMMENT*****

JORDAN

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DATE 3/16/95

3. A VISIT OCCURS ON SATURDAY, ONLY HALF THE HOSTAGES ARE SEEN, AND THE SECOND VISIT IS PROMISED FOR SUNDAY

-- U.S.: WE ARE WITHHOLDING COMMENT. THE COMMISSION HAS NOT YET HAD A CHANCE TO SEE ALL OF THE HOSTAGES.

4. VISIT TO THE HOSTAGES IS COMPLETED BUT NOT ALL 50 ARE SEEN BY THE COMMISSION

-- U.S.: THE COMMISSION WENT TO TEHRAN AFTER IRAN EXPRESSED ITS DESIRE THAT THE COMMISSION SPEAK WITH EACH OF THE HOSTAGES. THIS IS A SERIOUS BREACH OF FAITH WITH THE COMMISSION. WE HOLD THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE WELL-BEING OF ALL 50 HOSTAGES. THERE ARE SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS IN THE FAILURE OF THE COMMISSION TO SEE ALL 50 PERSONS WHO WERE TAKEN PRISONER ON NOVEMBER 4. IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT THE COMMISSION BE ALLOWED TO SEE ALL THE HOSTAGES.

-- (WE WOULD INSIST WITH WALDHEIM THAT THE COMMISSION SUSPEND ALL ACTIVITY BUT REMAIN IN TEHRAN UNTIL ALL 50 HOSTAGES HAD BEEN SEEN. WE WOULD ASK OUR ALLIES TO ORGANIZE A STRONG DIPLOMATIC DEMARCHE TO THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT DEMANDING ACCESS TO ALL

50. WE WOULD MOUNT A CAMPAIGN IN THE WORLD PRESS.)

5. ANNOUNCEMENT THAT HOSTAGE IS MISSING--ALL OTHERS SEEN

-- IRAN: MISSING HOSTAGE ESCAPED AND HAS NOT BEEN FOUND.

--U.S.: WE HOLD THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBLE

FOR AN INTENSIVE EFFORT TO DETERMINE HIS FATE. (WE HAVE TO ALLOW FOR THE POSSIBILITY THAT THERE HAS BEEN A SUCCESSFUL ESCAPE AND NOT HOLD UP THE RELEASE OF THE REST AT THE OUTSET.)

6. HOSTAGE WAS KILLED ESCAPING

-- U.S.: WE HOLD THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBLE FOR INVESTIGATING THE EXACT CIRCUMSTANCES AND MEETING ITS RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW.

7. VISIT TO THE HOSTAGES COMPLETED AND ALL 50

~~SECRET~~

*****8 COPY

HOSTAGES ARE SEEN

-- IRAN: MIGHT DESCRIBE THE VISIT AS A PART OF THE COLLECTION OF EVIDENCE AGAINST THE FORMER REGIME AND THE USG.

-- U.S.: WE WOULD EXPRESS PLEASURE THAT FOR THE FIRST TIME ALL HOSTAGES HAVE BEEN SEEN BY NEUTRAL OUTSIDERS AND DESCRIBE THIS AS A SIGNIFICANT STEP FORWARD IN EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THE CONDITION OF THE HOSTAGES.

WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT THE COMMISSION MEMBERS ADHERED TO PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW DURING THEIR VISIT TO THE COMPOUND.

(AS A RECIPROCAL GESTURE WE COULD:

-- SUSPEND THE DEPORTATION OF IRANIANS FROM THE U.S. EXCEPT THOSE PERSONS CONVICTED OF CRIMES.

-- AUTHORIZE ITALY TO SUPPLY HELICOPTERS AND SPARE PARTS USEFUL FOR FLOOD RELIEF WORK IN KHUZESTAN.

-- AUTHORIZE THE U.S. RED CROSS AND PHARMACEUTICAL SUPPLIERS TO MAKE DONATIONS OF MEDICINE AND OTHER SUPPLIES FOR FLOOD RELIEF PURPOSES.)

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FM HAMILTON JORDAN

TO PHIL WISE FOR THE PRESIDENT

ZEM

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~~SECRET~~

Phil -
Call Ham -
give him my
notes

J

*Phil
not ham -
give him my
notes*

CONTINGENCY PRESS GUIDANCE

IT LOOKS INCREASINGLY LIKELY THAT WITHIN THE NEXT TWO TO FOUR DAYS THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY WILL ACTUALLY VISIT THE HOSTAGES ON THE COMPOUND. AS THE WEEKEND PROCEEDS, WE NEED TO BE EXTREMELY CAREFUL ABOUT HOW WE REACT PUBLICLY SO AS NOT TO COMPLICATE BANI SADR'S EFFORTS TO MAKE THE VISIT HAPPEN. IF IT HAPPENS, A VISIT COULD OCCUR IN A VARIETY OF CIRCUMSTANCES.

1. INITIAL IRANIAN ANNOUNCEMENT

-- IRAN: THE COMMISSION WILL VISIT THE HOSTAGES (TIME AND CIRCUMSTANCES UNSPECIFIED).

-- U.S.: WE HAVE SEEN THE REPORTS FROM TEHRAN. WE HAVE NOTHING ON THEM. WE'LL HAVE TO WAIT AND SEE.

2. PRIOR ANNOUNCEMENT--WITH A TWIST

-- IRAN: THE VISIT IS PART OF THE COMMISSION'S INQUIRY INTO THE CRIMES OF THE SHAH; THE COMMISSION WILL RECEIVE DOCUMENTS FROM THE STUDENTS AND INTERROGATE THE HOSTAGES.

-- U.S.: WE HAVE MADE PLAIN OUR OPPOSITION TO THE INTERROGATION OF HOSTAGES. SUCH INTERROGATION WOULD NOT BE CONSISTENT WITH PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

WE WELCOME STEPS WHICH CAN LEAD TO A SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS, BUT WE WILL WITHHOLD FURTHER COMMENT UNTIL THE PROPOSED VISIT HAS ACTUALLY TAKEN PLACE.

3. A VISIT OCCURS ON SATURDAY, ONLY HALF THE HOSTAGES ARE SEEN, AND THE SECOND VISIT IS PROMISED FOR SUNDAY

-- U.S.: WE ARE WITHHOLDING COMMENT. THE COMMISSION HAS NOT YET HAD A CHANCE TO SEE ALL OF THE HOSTAGES.

*The Commission
+ 3-5 days
agree that
there will be
no interrogation
of the hostages*

Also
"The Commission &
SYG have agreed that
there will be no
interrogation of
the hostages"

END OF PAGE 01

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20100201 SPS 30
BY 12/20/94 NSC HYDE MR-NLC-94-94
DATE 3/16/95

~~SECRET~~

Also: "The Iranian gov't officials have specifically promised that all hostages would be visited to determine their condition"

4. VISIT TO THE HOSTAGES IS COMPLETED BUT NOT ALL 50 ARE SEEN BY THE COMMISSION

-- U.S.: THE COMMISSION WENT TO TEHRAN AFTER IRAN EXPRESSED ITS DESIRE THAT THE COMMISSION SPEAK WITH EACH OF THE HOSTAGES. THIS IS A SERIOUS BREACH OF FAITH WITH THE COMMISSION. WE HOLD THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE WELL-BEING OF ALL 50 HOSTAGES. THERE ARE SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS IN THE FAILURE OF THE COMMISSION TO SEE ALL 50 PERSONS WHO WERE TAKEN PRISONER ON NOVEMBER 4. IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT THE COMMISSION BE ALLOWED TO SEE ALL THE HOSTAGES.

Iranian gov't have specifically promised to see all hostages to determine their condition

-- (WE WOULD INSIST WITH WALDHEIM THAT THE COMMISSION SUSPEND ALL ACTIVITY BUT REMAIN IN TEHRAN UNTIL ALL 50 HOSTAGES HAD BEEN SEEN. WE WOULD ASK OUR ALLIES TO ORGANIZE A STRONG DIPLOMATIC DEMARCHE TO THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT DEMANDING ACCESS TO ALL 50. WE WOULD MOUNT A CAMPAIGN IN THE WORLD PRESS.)

ok

This is not strong enough in the face of probable murder

5. ANNOUNCEMENT THAT HOSTAGE IS MISSING--ALL OTHERS SEEN

-- IRAN: MISSING HOSTAGE ESCAPED AND HAS NOT BEEN FOUND.

This is not strong enough in the face of probable murder

--U.S.: WE HOLD THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBLE FOR AN INTENSIVE EFFORT TO DETERMINE HIS FATE. (WE HAVE TO ALLOW FOR THE POSSIBILITY THAT THERE HAS BEEN A SUCCESSFUL ESCAPE AND NOT HOLD UP THE RELEASE OF THE REST AT THE OUTSET.)

6. HOSTAGE WAS KILLED ESCAPING

-- U.S.: WE HOLD THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBLE FOR INVESTIGATING THE EXACT CIRCUMSTANCES AND MEETING ITS RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW.

Too effusive - The bastards haven't done us a big favor - Do not say anything good about the Iranians.

7. VISIT TO THE HOSTAGES COMPLETED AND ALL 50 HOSTAGES ARE SEEN

-- IRAN: MIGHT DESCRIBE THE VISIT AS A PART OF THE COLLECTION OF EVIDENCE AGAINST THE FORMER REGIME AND THE USG.

-- U.S. : WE WOULD EXPRESS PLEASURE THAT FOR THE FIRST TIME ALL HOSTAGES HAVE BEEN SEEN BY NEUTRAL OUTSIDERS AND DESCRIBE THIS AS A SIGNIFICANT STEP FORWARD IN EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THE CONDITION OF THE HOSTAGES.

WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT THE COMMISSION MEMBERS ADHERED TO PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW DURING THEIR VISIT TO

Too effusive - The bastards haven't done us a big favor - do not say anything good about the Iranians

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

THE COMPOUND.

(AS A RECIPROCAL GESTURE WE COULD:

-- SUSPEND THE DEPORTATION OF IRANIANS FROM THE U.S. EXCEPT THOSE PERSONS CONVICTED OF CRIMES. NO *no*

-- AUTHORIZE ITALY TO SUPPLY HELICOPTERS AND SPARE PARTS USEFUL FOR FLOOD RELIEF WORK IN KHUZESTAN. NO *no*

-- AUTHORIZE THE U.S. RED CROSS AND PHARMACEUTICAL SUPPLIERS TO MAKE DONATIONS OF MEDICINE AND OTHER SUPPLIES FOR FLOOD RELIEF PURPOSES.) NO *no*

DRAFTED: NEA/IWG:HPRECHT/NEA:HHSAUNDERS
2/28/80 X26610/29588

0739
#1748

*They must
send hostages home.
We are not reward
gov't or student
kidnappers...*

✓
They must send hostages
home
We will not reward gov't
or student Kidnappers -

J

~~SECRET~~

U. S. Position

"The United States understands and sympathizes with the grievances felt by many Iranian citizens concerning the practices of the former regime".

Updated Scenario - Berne

"(b) The U.S. statement will:

- (1) Accept the principle stated in 3 above; (assets, right to seek Shah's money in courts, etc.)
- (2) Express understanding and regret for ^{their} the grievances *felt by* of the Iranian people, including ~~the~~ widespread perception of U.S. intervention in Iran's internal affairs;
- (3) Affirm the right of the Iranian people to make decisions governing their political future and the policy of the U.S. to respect that right;
- (4) Affirm a desire for normal relations based on mutual respect, equality and the principles of international law.

recognize and express regret

*"apologizing"
is humiliation*

*new realities created by
Recognize a revolution ^{there} in Iran
No intervention in internal affairs
Desire friendship with people of Iran
Desire strong, independent, secure Iran*

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

PER 33013 NK HY RE MR-NLC-92-160
BY *[Signature]* NARS, DATE 11/4/93