

International Labor Organization

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
Corresp.	Charles W. Maynes to MJ (2p.)	10-26-77	A
Memo.	Cyrus Vance to JS (7 pp.)	10-17-77	A
Memo.	Zbigniew Brzezinski to JS (11 pp.)	8-5-77	A

FILE LOCATION

Chief of Staff (Jordan) / ~~Box 2 of 8~~ / International Labor Organization
Confidential File

RESTRICTION CODES

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
Memo	HJ to Pres. Carter, 5 pp. Re: Withdrawal from the ILO	10/25/77	A

FILE LOCATION

Carter Presidential Papers, Staff Offices, Chief of Staff (Jordan), Confidential File
International Labor Organization

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Curtis termed on way out as Democrats' chairman

By CARL P. LEUBSDORF
Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—Kenneth M. Curtis is on his way out as chairman of the Democratic National Committee, and the White House is actively looking for a successor, several highly placed sources said yesterday.

Mr. Curtis, who some contended would be asked to leave because he is too nice a guy to hold the party post, is expected to be offered another job in the Carter administration.

The party chieftain, reached by telephone in New Jersey, confirmed the impression held by some close to him that he would not be too unhappy to leave the chairmanship.

But he denounced "power-hungry little people who have been planting rumors" about his departure.

"I'm there to help the President," said the former Maine governor.

"I have a very good relationship with him. And at any time he feels that a change is warranted, I'd be the first one to agree."

"If these people persist in spreading these rumors," he added, "there might be a vacancy. It's not the kind of job you fight to keep."

Although Mr. Curtis said the President, with whom he met yesterday morning, has never said anything to him indicating dissatisfaction, a labor official said the White House has been asking for candidates as

possible successors for several months.

He said Mr. Curtis, the only prominent Maine Democrat who was an early supporter of Mr. Carter for the presidency, was "a nice, friendly, very popular guy who didn't attempt to lay down the law."

Another labor official, who called Mr. Curtis a "very decent guy," said after checking with some people well attuned to Democratic party affairs, "there seems to be general agreement that Curtis is going to go, that either he will resign or that he will be asked to leave."


And a high-ranking administration official said he thought it highly unlikely that Mr. Curtis would stay on, as had originally been planned, through the November, 1978, congressional elections and the December, 1978, Democratic mini-convention.

But the official agreed that Mr. Carter would doubtless offer another job to Mr. Curtis, who recently sold his house in Maine and moved his wife and 16-year-old daughter, who has cystic fibrosis, into a rented town house in Washington's Virginia suburbs.

There have been repeated reports in recent weeks that Mr. Curtis has been upset at alleged White House interference in party affairs.

However, the chairman insisted yesterday he has "an excellent relationship"

See CURTIS, A8, Col. 6



KENNETH M. CURTIS
... Democratic National Committee chief

Curtis held on way out of party post

CURTIS, from A1

with both the President and with Hamilton Jordan, Mr. Carter's chief political operative.

Nevertheless, a source familiar with both the White House and the national committee side of things said Mr. Curtis had been particularly upset at efforts to influence party activities by Mark A. Siegel and Richard M. Hutcheson Jr.

Mr. Siegel is Mr. Jordan's deputy and former executive director of the national committee, and Mr. Hutcheson is another top White House aide who once worked for the party.

But the main consideration, several sources said, was the desire by some in the White House to install a chairman who would take a firmer hand in dealing with current and potential party problems, including the possibility of internal dissatisfaction with Mr. Carter that could surface at the 1978 mini-convention.


There was little agreement, however, on a possible successor. Two persons suggested Anne Wexler, the former Connecticut party activist who now is deputy under secretary of commerce.

But labor officials called that idea "a disaster," and Mrs. Wexler said she was not interested.

A labor official suggested Mr. Siegel, but others familiar with party activities said the 30-year-old presidential aide was too controversial.

Among the other names mentioned were Gov. Julian M. Carroll of Kentucky, Morely Winograd, the Michigan party chairman, Paul Tapps, the Ohio party chairman, and Alex Smith, a Chicago lawyer.

MEMORANDUM TO ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM: LONDON BUTLER 

DATE: SEPTEMBER 20, 1977

SUBJECT: LABOR AND THE ILO

This Memorandum follows up on the conversation we had two weeks ago in which I suggested ways for us to find common ground with the AFL-CIO on the ILO issue.

Background

The AFL-CIO's position on the ILO is the result of their long-standing belief that, without freedom and democracy, trade unions cannot flourish. Since the turn of the century, Gompers, David Dubinsky, George Meany, and even Walter Ruether have consistently held that state-controlled labor movements will inevitably sacrifice the true interests of workers to the state's political policies. American labor leaders have consistently called for "unions pure and simple," and have been suspicious of intellectuals who sought to use the labor movement for their own political purposes.

Samuel Gompers played a central role in the formation of the ILO in 1919, and the tripartite structure of the ILO mirrors Gompers' belief in free labor unions. But American labor leaders have been disenchanted with the ILO since 1954, when the Soviet Union and its bloc nations became ILO members. The admission to the ILO in the Sixties of Third World nations has further eroded American influence in the ILO.

American labor leaders have three basic criticisms of the ILO:

- The Communists delegations have weakened tripartism and restricted the autonomy of worker and employee groups in the organization.
- The ILO is used as a forum for ideological assaults on America, Israel, and other "imperialist" countries.
- The Communists delegations have successfully prevented the ILO from investigating violations of basic worker and human rights in the Soviet Union and other "progressive" countries.

These criticisms are compounded by the fact that the United States government has consistently given ILO matters a low priority. Congress has ratified only a few of the ILO conventions, and until recently, most ILO decisions were made at sub-cabinet levels

or lower. In contrast to the US attitude, the Soviet Union has over 40 full-time persons assigned to the ILO.

The Administration's Interest

There is a tendency these days to dismiss American labor leaders as right-wing jingoists who are out of step with the new politics. I don't think we should make that mistake; instead, I think the Carter Administration, in its foreign policy, should look for common ground with the labor movement. There are two reasons why we should make this effort:

--The Carter Administration is going to need all the support it can find if we are to carry out our ambitious foreign policy objectives. The AFL-CIO has a long history of interest in foreign policy, and communicates its views to some 15 million members. A new generation of leaders (Fraser of the UAW, Winpisinger of the Machinists, Wurf of AFSCME, and McBride of the Steelworkers, etc.) will insure that the AFL-CIO will remain a major factor in American politics.

The AFL-CIO won't stop our foreign policy in its tracks; but if American labor leaders have confidence in our foreign policies, then their confidence will favorably influence the opinions of the political community and the public at large.

--In the longer run, the best response to the competition of cheap labor in foreign countries may well be to organize the workers in those countries. It seems logical that U.S. economic policy should include support and encouragement of free trade unions abroad.

Conclusions and Recommendations

I personally believe the United States should remain in the ILO. I think it would be a mistake to pull out of a major multi-national organization just as the President's human rights policies have gained us the moral high ground, and when we are beginning to prove more adept at multi-national politics than the Soviets. Under these circumstances, I think the ILO can be an important forum in which to further U.S. foreign policy objectives.

But I think we should remain in the ILO only if we can identify ourselves with the historic concerns of American organized labor. We must speak out forcefully in favor of the rights of workers in foreign countries to organize freely and bargain collectively, and we must oppose the use of the ILO as a forum for political and ideological assaults.

More specifically, I suggest the following steps:

--The President should choose a major forum to identify himself with the concerns of American labor. He could, for example, include a paragraph on this subject in his upcoming UN speech.

→ | --A person of unquestioned stature in American politics -- someone like Arthur Goldberg -- should be selected to lead the U. S. delegation at the ILO.

--The Congress should be asked to cooperate by passing ILO conventions.

--Steps should be taken which insure adequate staff support and cabinet-level participation in ILO policies.

If we take these steps, I believe we can stay in the ILO for the right reasons, gain the trust of the AFL-CIO for our overall foreign policy, and further the Administration's human rights and economic goals.

If you agree with these conclusions, I suggest that you meet with Lane Kirkland in the near future to explore this approach further.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 24, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: STU EIZENSTAT
SUBJECT: Membership in the ILO

In May of this year you issued a statement personally reaffirming this Administration's intention to leave the ILO "if (it) should prove impossible ... to promote the conditions which will facilitate our continued participation." (Statement attached) The original U.S. letter announcing our intention to leave the organization by November 5, 1977 cited four concerns:

- 1) Many members of the organization were failing to provide tripartite representation (business, labor and government) but were in fact represented only by their governments.
- 2) The organization was selectively applying its basic rules concerning employment discrimination, forced labor, and rights to form labor organizations. Staff reports concerning violations in Soviet bloc and some developing countries were not being adopted by the full membership, while reports critical of Western countries were being adopted.
- 3) The organization was violating due process. For example, in 1974 it condemned Israeli labor practices in the occupied territories without any investigation of the charges.
- 4) In general the organization had become a forum for politically motivated criticism of some countries, especially the United States and Israel.

Few observers familiar with the ILO would argue that significant progress has been made on any of these problems in the last two years.

This year prior to the annual Conference in June, we pointedly repeated our threat to leave. The June conference however, was an unequivocal failure. A report on violations of labor conventions was not adopted. An amendment that would have provided a mechanism for screening out overtly political resolutions was never brought to the floor. Those nations on whom we had been counting failed to support us on crucial votes.

The prospects for reform next year are clouded. The Department of State cites a number of recent offers of help from our European allies, from some third world countries, and from the ILO leadership as evidence that there may be a climate for progress. The Department of Labor points out, however, that most of these offers come from countries that have been with us all along.

Individuals from the Department of Labor, the AFL-CIO and the Chamber of Commerce who have been attending ILO meetings are very pessimistic that any new attempt to reform the organization is likely to be successful. They point out that over the past two years we have made strenuous efforts to encourage changes. In their view the basic make-up of the organization (of 134 members only 24 are industrial democracies, 10 are Socialist bloc, and 100 are developing nations) makes significant reform unlikely. It is worth noting that on all the key votes in the June meeting we could muster the support of only 35-40 countries.

At this point I would summarize the debate over our future in the ILO as follows:

For Leaving: Department of Labor, Department of Commerce, the AFL-CIO, the Chamber of Commerce, Jewish groups, opponents of the U.N. They argue:

1. Our credibility is at stake. We have been threatening to leave and demanding reforms for two years. During that time we have been repeatedly and unmistakably rebuffed.
2. Despite the promised efforts of the ILO's leadership and of our allies, we cannot expect much improvement next year in the organization's performance. On the other hand our departure might be a sufficient shock to encourage members of the ILO to undertake serious reforms.

3. If we don't leave, the AFL-CIO and the Chamber of Commerce will leave anyway. This will undermine one of our key arguments: that the organization needs to return to the tripartite representation called for in its charter.
4. We can soften our departure by citing the organization's potential, by pledging continued commitment to its goals and by promising a sincere effort to continue to seek changes that will enable us to return.
5. Withdrawal will not necessarily harm our other multilateral and U.N. efforts.
6. If we don't leave, Congress may mount a potentially embarrassing effort to withhold U.S. financial support for the organization.

For Staying: The Department of State, Dr. Brzezinski, liberal union leaders (Doug Frazier of the UAW and William Winpisinger of the IAM) our European allies, liberals in the Congress, in the press and among the "establishment". They argue:

1. Much of the ILO's good work in the area of human rights and international labor standards could be destroyed if we leave. We support 1/4 of the ILO budget, and without us the organization could be gravely damaged.
2. The sincerity and strength of our commitments to human rights, North-South dialogue, and the U.N. will be eroded if we leave this third-world dominated body. Our position in the U.N. could be especially impacted.
3. Relations with our European allies who have urged us to stay could be damaged and our leadership position weakened.
4. We can legally postpone our departure according to ILO lawyers. Our allies and the ILO leadership have promised us help to try to reform the organization in the interim.
5. If we leave we cannot credibly return for several years. If we desire to return, we will have to convince the AFL-CIO and the Chamber of Commerce to join us.

A relatively small number of people in this country know or care about this issue, but considerable fervor seems to surround the debate. The labor movement is sharply divided. Jewish organizations do not rank the issue among their top priorities, but they are unequivocally opposed to staying. Most editorial comment I have seen as urged us to remain.

RECOMMENDATION

I have reluctantly concluded that the best choice is to leave the ILO now.

If we could turn the clock back two years I would oppose sending a letter threatening to leave the ILO. But we and the previous Administration have painted ourselves into a corner in our attempt to encourage reform.

The problem now is simply that we issued a specific time-limited challenge which, by all objective standards, has not been met. Either we admit that we have changed our position and that we now intend to stay and work within the ILO no matter how political it becomes, or we must leave.

If we stay we will have to return to the next conference without the business and labor members of our delegation. We will be in a challengable legal position. And we may have to fight a Congressional battle just to retain funds for continued participation. If, as is likely, there is no improvement in the ILO's performance we will face the same stay-or-leave decision next year. To depart then would give us the worst of both worlds- first antagonizing one side and then the other.

By leaving now we can gain some political credit with the AFL-CIO and others who favor a tough international stance. I believe that by handling our departure skillfully we can minimize harm to our leadership position in the U.N. or to our efforts in the area of human rights. And our departure may conceivably strengthen our negotiating credibility on other international issues.

If you choose to stay I believe that there are two choices. Either we can take a hard line by conditioning our stay on further specific reforms within one year, or we can soften our position by emphasizing that our commitment to the organization and its goals transcends specific differences

we may have with the majority. In my view, the first course is preferable to protect against criticism in Congress. The danger, of course, in a hard line conditional extension of our membership is that we may be forced to leave next year simply to preserve our credibility.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 25, 1977

Mr. President:

Ray Marshall will be in Norway, Sweden and Denmark for the balance of this week until Sunday, October 30. While the ILO matter is not specifically on his discussion agenda, he indicates that his hosts have raised the matter. His office here has indicated he would prefer that you postpone announcement of your decision until he returns in order to prevent any embarrassment.

Stu

P.S. It turns out that Secretary Marshall will not be in Canada.

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

The question of U.S. relations with the ILO remains a matter of high priority and will remain under continuing review by a Cabinet Level Committee where, we hope, the AFL-CIO and the Chamber of Commerce will continue to play active roles.

Because of dissatisfaction in the U.S. Government and among labor and industry leaders with a number of unfortunate trends in the ILO, the U.S. submitted a letter on November 5, 1975 giving the required two-year notice of intent to withdraw from the Organization. In that letter, it was stated:

"The U.S. does not desire to leave the ILO. The U.S. does not expect to do so. But we do intend to make every possible effort to promote the conditions which will facilitate our continued participation. If this should prove impossible, we are in fact prepared to depart."

Those views are no less valid today. They will guide our actions and our ultimate decision in the critical months ahead.

#

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ok
JC
Issued May 27, 1977

[1977]

"DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
CANCELLED PER E.O. 12336, SEC. 1.3 AND
ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF MARCH 16, 1983"

Date: October 18, 1977

MEMORANDUM

FOR ACTION:

Stu Eizenstat
Jack Watson
Zbig Brzezinski
Landon Butler
Frank Moore
Jim McIntyre

FOR INFORMATION:

The Vice President

571
X C. C. C. C.
Schmidt

FROM: Rick Hutcheson, Staff Secretary

SUBJECT: Marshall and Vance memo re U.S. Membership in the ILO

~~CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT~~

YOUR RESPONSE MUST BE DELIVERED
TO THE STAFF SECRETARY BY:

TIME: 12:00 NOON

DAY: Thursday

DATE: October 20, 1977

ACTION REQUESTED:

☒ Your comments

Other:

STAFF RESPONSE:

☐ I concur.

☐ No comment.

Please note other comments below:

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, SEC. 3.4(b)
WHITE HOUSE GUIDELINES, FEB. 24, 1983
BY MTD NARS, DATE 6/30/87

PLEASE ATTACH THIS COPY TO MATERIAL SUBMITTED.

If you have any questions or if you anticipate a delay in submitting the required material, please telephone the Staff Secretary immediately. (Telephone, 7052)

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

October 17, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SECRETARY OF LABOR, RAY MARSHALL

SUBJECT: U.S. Membership in the International Labor Organization (ILO)

The Cabinet Level Committee on the ILO, which I chair, was unable to reach agreement on a joint recommendation to you at its October 12 meeting. As a result, I am attaching two separate recommendations.

I favor withdrawal from the ILO with the door left open for return if reform is achieved. The AFL-CIO and the Chamber of Commerce share this position. The alternative recommendation is that we extend our letter of withdrawal for one more year in the hope that reforms may be achieved during this period. This is the position taken by Cy Vance and Zbig Brzezinski.

Juanita Kreps is sending a separate memorandum to you directly.

The Cabinet Level Committee did make one unanimous recommendation, however. We believe that the Cabinet Level Committee on the ILO should continue to operate, regardless of your decision since it would be useful in either case.

The 1975 letter of withdrawal will automatically take effect on November 6, 1977, unless modified or rescinded. For this reason, it is important to reach an early decision.

When you make your decision, I recommend that you inform me and Cy Vance, to permit us to inform the industrial democratic countries before your decision is made public and to make suggestions concerning the public announcement.

Attachments

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

October 17, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SECRETARY OF LABOR, RAY MARSHALL *Ray Marshall*

SUBJECT: Reasons for Withdrawing from the ILO

RECOMMENDATION

For the reasons summarized below, withdrawal from the ILO now constitutes the best--and in my view the only--way to achieve U.S. objectives in the ILO. Any other course of action will weaken--rather than strengthen--our ability to achieve needed reforms in the ILO. As a result, I strongly urge you to permit our letter of withdrawal to take effect on November 6, 1977.

At the same time, I feel it is also important for you to publicly stress, at the time of withdrawal, our continuing commitment to effective international labor programs. The emphasis should be on our willingness to rejoin the ILO if reforms are enacted.

These views are supported by the AFL-CIO and the Chamber of Commerce.

BACKGROUND

As you know, the United States on November 5, 1975, gave the two years' notice of our intent to withdraw which is required by the ILO Constitution. This letter had the full support of the AFL-CIO and the Chamber of Commerce. Their role is important because the ILO is a tripartite organization with each country represented by labor and management, as well as its government.

The 1975 letter cited four reasons for our intent to withdraw from the ILO: (1). erosion of the principle of tripartite representation; 2). selective application of human rights Conventions; 3). violation of due process; and 4). the increased politicization of the Organization.

The letter emphasized that we would prefer not to leave the Organization and would participate fully in the ILO for two years in hope of achieving needed reforms. Our efforts following this letter for the first time created a pattern of collaboration and cooperation among the industrialized democracies within the ILO. For a time, it appeared that progress was being made to modify the ILO's violations of basic principles and procedures.

*- moral commitment/statement of intention
- if they (ILO) / agree to respect our 46 part
2 years to on threats to quit is the only way
to think the will now?*

These hopes evaporated at the June 1977 ILO Conference. The Conference proceedings were dominated by a majority representing the developing nations and East European countries under the leadership of the Soviet Union and the Arab states. In its most important action, the ILO Conference refused to adopt a report which treated violations of labor human rights Conventions in an even-handed manner. This rejection made very clear that the majority of the ILO regarded human rights as just another subject for political maneuver. The Conference also bottled up in committee an amendment which would have provided a mechanism for screening out political resolutions not germane to the purposes of the ILO.

In short, the June 1977 Conference of the ILO was a failure for our efforts to reform the Organization.

(For more detailed background, see my October 6 memorandum to you on the ILO.)

ONE-YEAR EXTENSION OF NOTICE TO WITHDRAW

The language of the ILO Constitution is straight-forward and unequivocal with respect to the timing of notices of withdrawal. However, as a result of the imminent U.S. decision on withdrawal, the ILO Legal Advisor has now come up with a questionable interpretation of the Constitution which would allow us to extend our letter for an additional year. The AFL-CIO and the Chamber of Commerce have made it very clear that they would not participate in the ILO if we asked for a one-year extension.

A consistent theme in our complaints about the ILO has been the way that the Organization's rules have been bent in response to political pressure. For us to extend our withdrawal notice on the basis of such a questionable interpretation of the ILO Constitution would deprive our reform efforts of their basic credibility. In addition, any member of the ILO could, at any time, challenge our right to participate in the Organization for this one-year period. It is also difficult to understand how we would be more successful in reforming the ILO in the next year, particularly under these conditions, than we have been in the two years since the original letter of intent to withdraw.

TRIPARTITE PARTICIPATION

If we were to extend our letter of withdrawal for another year, it would represent an abandonment of the principle of tripartite representation which has been the cornerstone of our efforts to reform the Organization. We have often complained of the absence of independent labor and management representation in the ILO delegations of other nations. If we were to participate in the ILO without the AFL-CIO and the Chamber of Commerce, we would be guilty of one of the violations

~~of ILO principles that we have deplored.~~ In their view, which I share, U.S. Government participation alone would be a repudiation of the ILO's basic tripartite principle. We would be viewed as entirely opportunistic and could not plausibly urge others to adhere to ILO principles.

APPEALS FROM OTHER GOVERNMENTS

It is clear that most industrialized democracies would prefer for us to stay in the ILO. Yet these appeals do not represent any greater possibility of reform of the ILO since these countries have been supporting us in the past. They have also made clear that they would continue their own reform efforts even if we withdrew from the Organization.

Only a small proportion of the developing countries have appealed to us to stay in the Organization. These appeals have largely been general in nature and do not reflect any shift in basic positions. It should be remembered that before the June 1977 meeting of the ILO Conference a number of developing countries made specific commitments to support our positions. However, at the Conference these commitments were not fulfilled.

In a few cases developing countries have said that some reform might be possible, but have made this conditional on concessions which have been consistently rejected by U.S. Government, Workers and Employers. These concessions would involve changing the composition of the Governing Body by weighting in more heavily against the possibility of upholding established principles and procedures.

One cannot fail to be impressed by the large number of countries which have not asked us to remain in the ILO. Nothing has happened since the June 1977 Conference that would lead to the belief that we could assemble a majority to support our reform efforts.

We understand that the ILO Director General plans to declare his willingness to withhold Conference resolutions not germane to ILO. Even if he were to do so, however, and this would address only one of many basic issues, his initiative would still be at the mercy of the membership which could overrule him at the ILO Conference.

WITHDRAWAL

we need to show we are serious

Withdrawal would immediately achieve what a massive, two-year diplomatic effort so far has failed to achieve--it would demonstrate that we are serious. At the June 1977 ILO Conference, all ILO members knew of our withdrawal letter, and a large number had privately said that they agreed with us on the need to respect ILO principles and procedures. Yet, when issues came to a vote, most felt that the risk of actual U.S. withdrawal was small.

By withdrawing now from the ILO we can end all speculation about our intentions. Our withdrawal will confront ILO members with a clear

choice. They could either continue to politicize the Organization or they could take steps to make the ILO an effective Organization capable of helping them achieve their own development goals.

We will demonstrate by withdrawing that there are limits to our tolerance for the distortion of basic principles and procedures of international organizations. Our withdrawal may help other industrialized democracies obtain sufficient support to make the changes in the ILO that would permit our return.

CREDIBILITY

Unless we carry through with our withdrawal letter, our credibility in the ILO--and elsewhere--will be seriously jeopardized. For the last two years, our public position on the ILO has been clear and unequivocal. For example, you stated on May 27, 1977, that unless reform were achieved, we would leave the ILO in November. Our reform efforts failed at the June 1977 ILO Conference. For us to continue to remain in the ILO would seriously undermine the international credibility of the United States.

Some of the extremists within the ILO have been saying that we were using our letter of withdrawal only as a threat for political advantage and that we had no intention of actually leaving the Organization. If we are to maintain any degree of credibility, we must live up to our word. If we do not live up to our word and stay in the ILO, it is unlikely that our reform efforts would be taken seriously.

IMPACT BEYOND ILO

The ILO is a unique, tripartite organization. Because of its dissimilarity to other international organizations, withdrawal should not have any adverse spillover effects. In fact, the opposite may be true. By demonstrating that there are limits to our tolerance, we may well find ourselves in a stronger position to deal generally with the problems of politicization of United Nations agencies.

Our statement of withdrawal from the ILO could be phrased to alleviate fears that this action represents a decreased commitment to international agencies.

It has been urged that the ILO should be a forum for cooperation between the U.S. and developing countries. Unfortunately, the reality is the opposite; it has become an arena for confrontation with the developing countries, doing harm to our relationships with them.

STATEMENT OF WITHDRAWAL

There are several points that I believe should be contained in any statement announcing our withdrawal from the ILO:

1). Our withdrawal does not diminish our continued commitment to international organizations. Rather, it illustrates the importance that we attach to the effective functioning of these organizations.

2). We continue to believe in the potential of the ILO as a forum to make human rights and decent working conditions tangible to workers throughout the world.

3). We leave the ILO with regret. We have sincerely tried to bring about reform in the last two years. We look forward to the day when the ILO returns to its traditional principles and procedures and we can rejoin the Organization.

4). The Cabinet Level Committee on the ILO will continue to meet and to monitor closely developments within the ILO.

when I reflect on the political consequences of
how many of our f.p. initiatives SACU, M.E.,
South Africa & conference all liberal;
don't if you listed your 25 top priorities
- f.p. I don't think ILO would be one of them;
for that reason. I ~~think~~ that a decision
to stay in the ILO would represent a
significant political imbalance & a
willingness to continue participation
in an international body of questionable
purpose or utilization at the cost domesticity
of clearing the labor movement;

37

I do not think we can expect to turn
to the AFL-CIO for help on controversial f.p.
issues if we take a position on ~~the~~
- f.p. issues which directly affects them

we will continue to meet and need
the support of organized labor on issues
important to us: the AFL-CIO responded
positively to your requests that they assist
us on P.C. changes.

It is not unreasonable for the American
labor movement - which has as much a
to

- ① right/moral
- ② ILO
- ③ politically correct
- ④ hypocrisy of our

- ⑤ continuing in an organization ~~which~~ ^{on a conditional}
best because of an ~~abstract~~ ^{concern}
- ⑥ previous statement

* if the Keweenaw letter represents a
commitment or pledge of our growth
to within values & the 4 principles,
as met, I do not see how we can
change that position - Ligo q:

- ① last 2 years
- ② June convention
- ③ public statements by you and Secretary V. & Nelson

Submitted by

American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees

(to IV) Consent

International Labor Organization

WHEREAS:

By formal action of its International Executive Board AFSCME supports without reservation the position adopted by President Meany, Secretary-Treasurer Kirkland and the Executive Council dealing with the politicalization and distortion of mission of the ILO;

WHEREAS:

The AFL-CIO proposed eminently responsible actions for dealing with this situation, including withdrawal of the United States in order to underline the concern of the American labor movement with the rights of free workers and the survival of democratic procedure;

WHEREAS:

AFSCME and the AFSCME delegation has formally reaffirmed and supported the AFL-CIO program at the recent World Congress of the public employee international trade secretariat, Public Services International, winning substantial agreement from most of our counterpart organizations with the patience and responsibility of the AFL-CIO's position regarding the ILO.

NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED:

That this Twelfth Constitutional Convention of the Industrial Union Department affirm its support of the AFL-CIO Executive Council's position on the International Labor Organization, including withdrawal of the United States.