

Hungary-Crown of St. Stephen

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
memo	ZB to JC (2pp.) 2 copies	8/3/77	A
memo	Cyrus Vance to JC (4 pp.) 2 copies opened 4/17/07	7/28/77	A
memo	Rick Hutchinson to JC (1 p.) 2 copies OPENED 10/4/61	n.d.	A
memo	ZB to JC (2 pp.) 2 copies	6/14/77	A
memo	HI to JB (6 pp.) <i>opened 9/16/95</i>	ca. 11/77	A

FILE LOCATION

Chief of Staff (Jordan)/Box 6 of 8/ Hungary-Crown of St. Stephen
Confidential File

RESTRICTION CODES

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS

July 28, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From: Cyrus Vance *CV*

Subject: The Return of the Crown of St. Stephen

I believe the following scenario for the return of the Crown of St. Stephen would be appropriate.

Timing and Means of Return

It would be quite helpful if we could return the Crown by September 15 before the opening of the CSCE Conference around September 25. This act could strengthen our position at the conference and highlight the fact that Hungary's record in implementing Helsinki is the best of all the European countries.

The Crown should be returned by an American delegation headed by a distinguished government or public figure. The Vice President or Governor Harriman would be suitable for such a role. Members of Congress should be included in the delegation as well as the Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution to emphasize the cultural nature of the Crown.

Consultations with the Hungarian Government

When Ambassador Kaiser presents his credentials in early August I suggest that he inform the Hungarian President that we are prepared to return the Crown provided that both countries agree upon certain basic conditions. These are:

--Various segments of the Hungarian public, including the Roman Catholic Primate, would participate in the ceremonies marking the return of the Crown.

--The Crown would be displayed publicly and appropriately in a historical location not associated with the Communist Party.

--The Crown would be treated with respect.

SECRET/NODIS

GDS

per 3-5-02 State ltr
NLJC 02-002
BY BAA NARA DATE 4-17-07

The Hungarians have told us privately that they are prepared to meet these conditions. In addition, we will seek to arrange a ceremony which will emphasize the national, religious and cultural nature of the Crown. We would hope to secure an official statement to the effect that Hungarians from all over the world will be free to visit Hungary and view the Crown.

Congressional Consultations and Participation

We will want to inform Congressional leaders before you announce your decision. I think we should do so only after Ambassador Kaiser has arranged an appropriate scenario with the Hungarians. This should enable us to deal more effectively with any possible criticism.

I have attached a list of Members of Congress who could be included in the delegation to Budapest.

Hungarian-American Community

We are reasonably confident that once your decision is taken most of the members of the Hungarian-American community who oppose the Crown's return will support the decision. Participation by key members of Congress in the delegation returning the Crown would contribute to that end. I would suggest that we not inform representatives of the Hungarian-American community before you announce your decision.

The Vatican

I believe that we also should inform the Vatican prior to the return of the Crown. The Vatican Foreign Minister Casaroli has told us that the Crown should be returned but the Pope does not consider the present to be an opportune time. I believe that our proposed scenario, especially participation by the Cardinal Primate, would allay the Vatican's concerns.

Preparation and Shipment

The Crown and its accompanying regalia will be prepared for shipment by the Smithsonian Institution. I would

~~SECRET~~/NODIS

-3-

suggest that we transport the Crown and delegation by a US Air Force plane.

If you agree, we will move forward with this scenario.

~~SECRET~~/NODIS

Proposed Congressional Delegation

4A

The Senate

Humphrey - He has been actively in favor of returning the Crown. His leadership position in the Senate as well as his international prominence make him an excellent candidate for the delegation.

Pell - As a member of the SFRC, Pell (who served in Czechoslovakia as an FSO), has been actively interested in Eastern European affairs over the years.

Griffin - Griffin supported return of the Crown during the confirmation hearing of Phil Kaiser.

The House

Vanik - As Chairman of the Ways & Means Subcommittee on Trade, he has been the principal mover on the House side behind returning the Crown.

Frenzel - Ranking Minority member on the Trade Subcommittee, Frenzel has also supported this step.

Zablocki - Long a supporter of steps to improve our relations with the individual countries within Eastern Europe.

Findley - Although a loner in the House, he has been a firm supporter on any steps toward improved relations with Eastern Europe.

Fascell - As Chairman of the CSCE Commission, Fascell has become increasingly active in Eastern European affairs. Hungary's good record (by East European standards) on human rights might make this the most appropriate country to visit in view of the CSCE Chairmanship.

Derwinski - He is the most influential Republican on Eastern European affairs and within the ethnic community, but he is on record as opposing return of the Crown. He has told us that this is a pro forma position and he would not have his heart in any effort to block the move. We recommend that he be offered a place on the delegation.

→ FILE
Hungary

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

RH
↑

Mr. President:

Hamilton favors the third option: do nothing now. From a domestic political point of view, it is not worth the trouble it would cause at this point in time.

Rick

Keep this
as per N
file

→ FILE
Hungary

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~RH~~
↑ 1

Mr. President:

Hamilton favors the third option: do nothing now. From a domestic political point of view, it is not worth the trouble it would cause at this point in time.

Rick

Keep this
as per N
file

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 8, 1977

The Vice President
Hamilton Jordan
Jody Powell

The attached is forwarded to
you for your information.

Rick Hutcheson

SECRET ATTACHMENT HUNGARY: CROWN
ON ST. STEPHEN

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 4, 1977

Z. Brzezinski -

The attached was returned in
the President's outbox. It is
forwarded to you for appropriate
handling.

Rick Hutcheson

cc: Hamilton Jordan

Re: Hungary: Crown of St. Stephen

SECRET attachment

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 4, 1977

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C

PERSONAL AND ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO: PRESIDENT CARTER
FROM: HAMILTON JORDAN *H.J.*
RE: RETURN OF THE CROWN TO HUNGARY

I hope that you will review the attached memorandum from Pat Caddell.

I ~~have~~ ^{HAVE} checked around on the support for the return of the Crown as well as the opposition to it. There is no way to discern scientifically ^{HOW} Hungarian Americans feel about this issue. But basically, my feeling is that those who have feelings about it oppose the return of the Crown overwhelmingly. Former government officials and educated Hungarians may have a more enlightened view of this matter, but the average Hungarian American is opposed to this action because the alleged benefit to the people of Hungary has not been explained and is difficult to explain. Their reaction to our return of the Crown is emotional and not

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an enlightened view. I wish you could have stayed at the meeting to hear the former Mayor of Budapest describe what the Crown means to him. It was emotional and very touching.

We mislead ourselves to think that the Hungarian-American community is closely divided on this issue. It is not. If it were, you would not have had members of Congress and the leaders of all of the Captive Nation organizations protesting this decision.

It is one thing for us to suffer domestically with a group of people in pursuit of a major policy that is important to ~~the~~^{us} and the world (the Mideast, for example). It is quite another for us to suffer politically for an action that has very little - if any - redeeming features. We are alienating the Hungarian community in this country in hopes of gaining some intangible benefit from the Communist regime in Hungary. The political trade-offs do not seem acceptable to me.

Our policy in the Middle East has cost us the support of American Jews in states like New York, California and Florida. The Panama Canal treaty has hurt us in the South with conservatives. I would argue that these issues are worth the political costs.

But now, we have hurt ourselves in the industrial states of the Midwest through an action that has very little benefit. We have taken a position on an emotional issue that will cost us dearly in the future with Hungarian-Americans and other Eastern European groups. These people who are immigrants and the families of immigrants will not forget easily or quickly what we have done.

With the Panama Canal treaty upcoming and the prospects for a SALT II treaty good, it seems ridiculous to sacrifice the moral and political authority of your Presidency for such an issue. We should husband our political capital and spend it sparingly and wisely. At a time when we are low in the polls and involved in many important controversial issues, we have expended our political capital

unwisely on this issue.

You have so many things to do and many pressure on you. I hate to present this problem to you in such a way, but if the people responsible for your foreign policy decisions don't develop some political sensitivity, we are going to be in trouble on the big issues that matter.

PRE 1 DEVI
F4I
110

Re: The importance of East European voters in the various states

From John Gorman

To: Hamilton Jordan

Memorandum

Date: 9 November 1977

Pat has requested that I forward you the following information about the importance of East European voters in crucial states. Obviously it is difficult to characterize any particular group as vital; however, it is clear that without the significant support of East European voters in the 1976 election Jimmy Carter would not have been elected President.

Proportion of East Europeans in the electorate

We have defined East Europeans as non-British respondents who report their ancestry as: East European, Slavic, Polish, Czech, Slovak, Hungarian or any other minor East European nationality. The following table shows the proportion of these people in each of the 12 largest states as well as an estimate of their proportion in the general election population. Since they tend to be registered Democrats, the primary contribution is larger than the general election contribution in every state.

in general in primary
electorate electorate

Pennsylvania	13%	13%
New Jersey	11%	14%
Indiana	4%	8%
Missouri	4%	7%
Florida	5%	8%
Michigan	9%	13%
New York	11%	16%
California	5%	7%
Ohio	8%	14%
Illinois	11%	16%
Texas	3%	5%
Wisconsin	9%	16%

Obviously the east european vote is most critical in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Michigan, New York, Illinois and Wisconsin. Significant proportions of east europeans also exist in some of the smaller states.

The next table shows the proportion of east europeans who supported Carter in the 1976 election by state. As the table indicates Carter tended to do somewhat better among east europeans than among the general electorate.

% supporting Carter

California	59
Florida	NA
Illinois	53
Indiana	54
Michigan	49
New Jersey	57
New York	65
Ohio	57
Pennsylvania	60
Texas	NA
Wisconsin	61

One can consider the impact of a 20 point shift in east european support by estimating the impact of both such a gain by Carter and such a loss in the 1976 election.

If Carter had done 20 points better among east europeans he would have won:

California
Illinois
New Jersey

If Carter had done 20 points worse among east europeans he would have lost:


New York
Ohio
Pennsylvania
Wisconsin

and the election.

Indeed, many observers have argued that Ford's "free Poland" gaff was one of the crucial factors in slowing his recovery and preventing his possible victory. Given the number of voter groups who have been alienated by some aspect of policy this year, it would be tragic if yet another group was lost.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Ham Jordan wants ZB
to see this ASAP.



Reception

To: Hamilton Jordan

From: John Gorman

Re: The importance of East European voters in the various states

Date: 9 November 1977

SEE PAGE 2

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Protection of East Europeans in the electorate

We have defined East Europeans as non-Jewish respondents who report their ancestry as: east european, slave, polish, czech, serb, hungarian or any other minor east european nationality. The following table shows the proportions of these people in each of the 12 largest states as well as an estimate of their proportion in the general election population. Since they tend to be registered Democrats, the primary contribution is larger than the general election contribution in every state.

2 in general
2 in primary
electorate
electorate

Pennsylvania
New Jersey
Indiana
Missouri
Florida
Michigan
New York
California
Ohio
Illinois
Texas
Wisconsin

129
11
4
4
5
8
11
5
8
11
3
9

153
14
8
7
6
13
16
7
14
16
5
16

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