

Withdrawn/Redacted Material

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DOCUMENT NO.	FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
001	Telcon	Telcon - S94 [2 PAGES RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/08/2025 JLS]	2	10/06/1973	
002	Telcon	Telcon - S94 [2 PAGES RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/08/2025 JLS]	2	10/06/1973	
003	Telcon	Telcon - S96	2	10/06/1973	b1;
004	Telcon	Telcon - S96	2	10/06/1973	b1;
005	Telcon	Telcon - S97 [3 PAGES RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/08/2025 JLS]	3	10/06/1973	
006	Telcon	Telcon - S97 [3 PAGES RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/08/2025 JLS]	3	10/06/1973	

COLLECTION TITLE:

Counsel's Office, White House

SERIES:

Kavanaugh, Brett - Subject Files

FOLDER TITLE:

State Department, Henry Kissinger Transcripts [2]

FRC ID:

9674

RESTRICTION CODES

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- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

Deed of Gift Restrictions

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007	Telcon	Telcon - S103 [1 PAGE RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/08/2025 JLS]	1	10/06/1973	
008	Telcon	Telcon - S103 [1 PAGE RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/08/2025 JLS]	1	10/06/1973	
009	Telcon	Telcon - S104 [2 PAGES RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/08/2025 JLS]	2	10/06/1973	
010	Telcon	Telcon - S104 [2 PAGES RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/08/2025 JLS]	2	10/06/1973	
011	Telcon	Telcon - S107 [1 PAGE RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/08/2025 JLS]	1	10/06/1973	

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012	Telcon	Telcon - S107 [1 PAGE RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/08/2025 JLS]	1	10/06/1973	
013	Telcon	Telcon - S110 [3 PAGES RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/08/2025 JLS]	3	10/06/1973	
014	Telcon	Telcon - S110 [3 PAGES RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/08/2025 JLS]	3	10/06/1973	
015	Telcon	Telcon - S111 [1 PAGE RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/08/2025 JLS]	1	10/06/1973	
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017	Telcon	Telcon - S113 [5 PAGES RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/08/2025 JLS]	5	10/06/1973	
018	Telcon	Telcon - S113 [5 PAGES RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/08/2025 JLS]	5	10/06/1973	
019	Telcon	Telcon - S115	2	10/06/1973	b1;
020	Telcon	Telcon - S115	2	10/06/1973	b1;
021	Telcon	Telcon - S117 [2 PAGES RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/08/2025 JLS]	2	10/06/1973	
022	Telcon	Telcon - S117 [2 PAGES RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/08/2025 JLS]	2	10/06/1973	

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023	Telcon	Telcon - S118 [2 PAGES RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/08/2025 JLS]	2	10/06/1973	
024	Telcon	Telcon - S118 [2 PAGES RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/08/2025 JLS]	2	10/06/1973	
025	Telcon	Telcon - S121 [1 PAGE RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/08/2025 JLS]	1	10/06/1973	
026	Telcon	Telcon - S121 [1 PAGE RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/08/2025 JLS]	1	10/06/1973	
027	Telcon	Telcon - S122 [1 PAGE RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/08/2025 JLS]	1	10/06/1973	

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028	Telcon	Telcon - S122 [1 PAGE RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/08/2025 JLS]	1	10/06/1973	
029	Telcon	Telcon - S123	3	10/07/1973	b1;
030	Telcon	Telcon - S123	3	10/07/1973	b1;
031	Telcon	Telcon - S125 [1 PAGE RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/08/2025 JLS]	1	10/07/1973	
032	Telcon	Telcon - S125 [1 PAGE RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/08/2025 JLS]	1	10/07/1973	
033	Telcon	Telcon - S126 [2 PAGES RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/08/2025 JLS]	2	10/07/1973	

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034	Telcon	Telcon - S126 [2 PAGES RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/08/2025 JLS]	2	10/07/1973	
035	Telcon	Telcon - S127 [1 PAGE RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/08/2025 JLS]	1	10/07/1973	
036	Telcon	Telcon - S127 [1 PAGE RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/08/2025 JLS]	1	10/07/1973	
037	Telcon	Telcon - S130 [1 PAGE RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/08/2025 JLS]	1	10/07/1973	
038	Telcon	Telcon - S130 [1 PAGE RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/08/2025 JLS]	1	10/07/1973	
039	Telcon	Telcon - S131	2	10/07/1973	b1;

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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Withdrawn/Redacted Material

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DOCUMENT NO.	FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
057	Telcon	Telcon - S141 [2 PAGES RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/08/2025 JLS]	2	10/07/1973	
058	Telcon	Telcon - S141 [2 PAGES RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/08/2025 JLS]	2	10/07/1973	
059	Telcon	Telcon - S145 [1 PAGE RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/08/2025 JLS]	1	10/07/1973	
060	Telcon	Telcon - S145 [1 PAGE RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/08/2025 JLS]	1	10/07/1973	
061	Telcon	Telcon - S148	1	10/07/1973	b1;
062	Telcon	Telcon - S148	1	10/07/1973	b1;

COLLECTION TITLE:

Counsel's Office, White House

SERIES:

Kavanaugh, Brett - Subject Files

FOLDER TITLE:

State Department, Henry Kissinger Transcripts [2]

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DOCUMENT NO.	FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
001	Telcon	Telcon - S94	2	10/06/1973	P5;
002	Telcon	Telcon - S94	2	10/06/1973	P5;
003	Telcon	Telcon - S96	2	10/06/1973	P1/b1; P5;
004	Telcon	Telcon - S96	2	10/06/1973	P1/b1; P5;
005	Telcon	Telcon - S97	3	10/06/1973	P5;
006	Telcon	Telcon - S97	3	10/06/1973	P5;
007	Telcon	Telcon - S103	1	10/06/1973	P5;
008	Telcon	Telcon - S103	1	10/06/1973	P5;

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DOCUMENT NO.	FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
009	Telcon	Telcon - S104	2	10/06/1973	P5;
010	Telcon	Telcon - S104	2	10/06/1973	P5;
011	Telcon	Telcon - S107	1	10/06/1973	P5;
012	Telcon	Telcon - S107	1	10/06/1973	P5;
013	Telcon	Telcon - S110	3	10/06/1973	P5;
014	Telcon	Telcon - S110	3	10/06/1973	P5;
015	Telcon	Telcon - S111	1	10/06/1973	P5;
016	Telcon	Telcon - S111	1	10/06/1973	P5;

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DOCUMENT NO.	FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
017	Telcon	Telcon - S113	5	10/06/1973	P5;
018	Telcon	Telcon - S113	5	10/06/1973	P5;
019	Telcon	Telcon - S115	2	10/06/1973	P1/b1; P5;
020	Telcon	Telcon - S115	2	10/06/1973	P1/b1; P5;
021	Telcon	Telcon - S117	2	10/06/1973	P5;
022	Telcon	Telcon - S117	2	10/06/1973	P5;
023	Telcon	Telcon - S118	2	10/06/1973	P5;
024	Telcon	Telcon - S118	2	10/06/1973	P5;

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DOCUMENT NO.	FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
025	Telcon	Telcon - S121	1	10/06/1973	P5;
026	Telcon	Telcon - S121	1	10/06/1973	P5;
027	Telcon	Telcon - S122	1	10/06/1973	P5;
028	Telcon	Telcon - S122	1	10/06/1973	P5;
029	Telcon	Telcon - S123	3	10/07/1973	P1/b1; P5;
030	Telcon	Telcon - S123	3	10/07/1973	P1/b1; P5;
031	Telcon	Telcon - S125	1	10/07/1973	P5;
032	Telcon	Telcon - S125	1	10/07/1973	P5;

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033	Telcon	Telcon - S126	2	10/07/1973	P5;
034	Telcon	Telcon - S126	2	10/07/1973	P5;
035	Telcon	Telcon - S127	1	10/07/1973	P5;
036	Telcon	Telcon - S127	1	10/07/1973	P5;
037	Telcon	Telcon - S130	1	10/07/1973	P5;
038	Telcon	Telcon - S130	1	10/07/1973	P5;
039	Telcon	Telcon - S131	2	10/07/1973	P1/b1; P5;
040	Telcon	Telcon - S131	2	10/07/1973	P1/b1; P5;

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DOCUMENT NO.	FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
041	Telcon	Telcon - S132	3	10/07/1973	P5;
042	Telcon	Telcon - S132	3	10/07/1973	P5;
043	Telcon	Telcon - S133	1	10/07/1973	P1/b1; P5;
044	Telcon	Telcon - S133	1	10/07/1973	P1/b1; P5;
045	Telcon	Telcon - S134	3	10/07/1973	P5;
046	Telcon	Telcon - S134	3	10/07/1973	P5;
047	Telcon	Telcon - S135	2	10/07/1973	P5;
048	Telcon	Telcon - S135	2	10/07/1973	P5;

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050	Telcon	Telcon - S136	2	10/07/1973	P1/b1; P5;
051	Telcon	Telcon - S137	1	10/07/1973	P5;
052	Telcon	Telcon - S137	1	10/07/1973	P5;
053	Telcon	Telcon - S139	2	10/07/1973	P5;
054	Telcon	Telcon - S139	2	10/07/1973	P5;
055	Telcon	Telcon - S140	1	10/07/1973	P5;
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058	Telcon	Telcon - S141	2	10/07/1973	P5;
059	Telcon	Telcon - S145	1	10/07/1973	P5;
060	Telcon	Telcon - S145	1	10/07/1973	P5;
061	Telcon	Telcon - S148	1	10/07/1973	P1/b1; P5;
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TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

TELCON

Dobrynin/sSec. Kissinger

Oct. 6 - 3:50 p.m. 1973 I

K: Anatol I have your message. I can't say it is a model of solidity. It either means you are confused or you are cooperating with them.

D: With whom?

K: The Arabs.

D: Why.

K: What do you think it means. Will you explain it.

D: It was very clear that they do not know exactly what is going on but from their side they will compare it -- we both will compare together as for their definite planning ~~work~~ we will do that later.

K: How much later? We feel very strongly and let me have your reaction. The Egyptians want to put in the GAs and we consider this a frivolous act. We must say if it turns into a GA debate, then we will let it take its course. We are certain it will turn out to be a military victory for the Israelis. Then everyone one will come to us. If it turns nasty we will shut off communications for a while. We feel we should put it into the SC.

D: Yes.

K: But we have turned it off until we have heard from you. How much longer should we wait until we heard from you?

D: One hour. They are having a meeting there.

K: I will wait until 5:00 to make a decision. Let me assure you we want to cooperate with you.

D: That is our answer.

K: That is my impression from your ~~ask~~ answer. What I said to you is for the benefit of your friends. No one should think they can diddle us along.

D: No. No.

2

Dobrynin

Oct. 6

K: And have a great propaganda debate on Tuesday, What we are thinking is we'll call the SC. We will oppose without condemnation of either side a ceasefire and a return to the ceasefire line.

D: That is it.

K: I will send over to you a draft resolution.

D: It is changed?

K: No. Essentially what I told you.

D: Ceasefire and return to the ceasefire line.

K: Yes. I wanted to tell you I like the tone of your reply but I wanted to tell you if this thing drags on to Monday...

D: No. No. No. And if the Israelis win...

K: I have explained to Gen. Scowcroft today means it is only a matter of a few hours. It means a matter of hours.

D: Did I understand you to say a matter of hours.

K: Scowcroft says no more than necessary. If I have not heard from you by 5:00 you will hear from me. Now go back and watch the baseball game.

D: O.K.

K: Fine.

ENC

TELCON

Dobrynin/sSec. Kissinger

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D: O.K.

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ENC

Withdrawal Marker

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FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
Telcon	Telcon - S96	2	10/06/1973	P1/b1; P5; MAC 9/8/2005

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COLLECTION:

Counsel's Office, White House

SERIES:

Kavanaugh, Brett - Subject Files

FOLDER TITLE:

State Department, Henry Kissinger Transcripts [2]

FRC ID:

9674

OA Num.:

1911

NARA Num.:

1829

FOIA IDs and Segments:

2018-0016-P

2017-0345-F

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advise between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

*

TELCON

Lord Cromer - Secretary Kissinger

October 6, 1973

4:25. p.m.

✓ (S97)

K: Our worst mistake was to throw you out of the Canal zone.

C: And a little late, it was a mistake.

K: Our first mistake was to push you into the Canal zone.

C: What did they do now?

K: I wanted to give you -- and this is for the Prime Minister only -- the general strategy. We hope to work as closely as we did in September 1970.

C: I'm sure we would wish to do that too.

K: Whatever the situation in Copenhagen, it doesn't apply with regard to the Eastern Mediterranean. Let me give you our reading of the situation. We are quite confident that the Arabs started this and we in fact were given assurances, when we transmitted to the Egyptians and Soviets our request not to launch pre-emptive attack. We told them that if Israel launched an attack, we would oppose them publicly.

C: Was this recently?

K: That was during the night, but it was too late to be ...to affect decisions. Once we had the information. Now the ... our assessment of the situation is this: We have approached the Soviets and proposed calling a Security Council meeting and that there be a simple resolution calling for a return to the cease fire lines and a cease fire. We are doing this because that is a neutral type of resolution which requires no condemnation and we suspect within a couple of days, unless our judgment is really off, the Arabs will be on their knees begging us to do this. We want to have a platform of having moved in this direction before that.

C: Before that, yes.

K: If the Soviets support us in this we are home free. If they do not, we will have to move quite drastically to make it clear that the Arabs were the aggressors in this particular instance, and more or less side with the Israelis. The reasons for this -- We are beginning, as you could see from the newspapers, and as I have told you, a series of diplomatic moves in an attempt to make at least some progress and this action depends on being able to convince the Israelis, to make other security guarantees.

Cromer/kissinger

C: I discussed with....

K: If they are not even prepared to see what we can do, then no guarantees by us will have the slightest significance. If the Soviets don't join us in quieting things down, you have to assume collusion before _____. We are not prepared to take them on. It is in the interest of everybody, including Western Europe, not to run across us in this particular instance.

C: When would the Security Council meet?

K: I have called Dobrynin. We have had already a reply from the Soviets. -- and I will not give anybody else the full flavor of this -- If the General Assembly turns into a propaganda battle, we will be unreachable for the rest of the week. No matter what beautiful speeches are given in New York. We will not then be as easy to deal with as we are now. On the other hand, we are willing to cooperate now to proceed on a neutral line.

C: Sure.

K: We will wait...-- I have given him until 5:00 and we will wait an extra hour until 6:00 this evening, to produce a reply from Moscow. If not, I have been asked by the President to ask Ambassador Scali to call for a Security Council meeting. We will not be condemnatory at the meeting unless the Soviets turn towards the Arabs. We will be very grateful. If your representative could be instructed to coordinate support.

C: I will get on this right away.

K: Let me know what your representative is instructed to do?

C: Was this completely out of the blue, as it is to me?

K: Oh, yes, the first time -- and this is for your Prime Minister -- we were requesting intelligence reports, even called in the Israeli Ambassador to check our intelligence, they predicted fully defensive preparations. I got a report this morning. They were still maintaining that last night. We received the first confirmation this morning. Then I got on the telephone, gave assurances to everybody...but three hours later it started.

C: You have got friends, like in North VietNam and other parts of the world, they are a little unreliable.

K: In Moscow, you mean?

C: No, I mean among the Arabs. Don't you think they have been clever.

K: Oh, yes, very clever. Whether they have committed suicide depends....depends on how the military operation goes. Our information is, though we don't have the complete picture, is that they have crossed at 5 points, only 2 are left.

C: 2 left?

K: 2 are under attack now.

C: OK, I'll get on it right away.

K: And 20 Egyptian and 12 Syrian airplanes.

TELCON
Lord Cromer - Secretary Kissinger
October 6, 1973
4:25. p.m.

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TELECON
Haig/Kissinger
October 6, 1973
6:05 p.m.

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

K: we are considering possible steps we are taking. Dobrynin says we'll hear again in another hour. In New York the Egyptians are against the Security Council meeting. The Soviets are without instructions. The British are getting cold feet. I'll wait til 6 for the Soviets. If we don't get it we call the Security Council. By tomorrow if we haven't got them to stop it we ~~are~~ will be accused of collusion. ...a wild propoganda battle in the GA we will shut off our phones. They had better comt to us now.Defense wnat's to turn ataingst the Israelis. At this stafe a Israeli-Pakistan situation.

H: Sounds like Clemenets

K: It's manageable here. Aroud 6:00 I'll call the Security Council meeting. In New York as I was leaving a microphone was pushed in front of me. I told them the President has instructed me to return to Wasington.. As a former Deputy of mine...do you agree with ths approach?

H: I think tha's fine. The only assessments we need to worry is how the Soviets read us.

K: We cannot be soft guys. in this case. It will help us on MFN and,,

H: No we can't be soft .

K: You will be kept informed.

H: We'll be here.

*
S103

TELECON

Haig/Kissinger

October 6, 1973

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H: We;ll be here.

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

S104

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TELECON

Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger

October 6, 1973

6:20 PM.

K: I haven't seen the text of your message yet. . give me your interpretation. What do you think . . . really saying. It will be polemical.

D: My impressions that we don't have information from the Arabs. Tomorrow will be alright. They find it will be polemical session. . a small unit and on first line you and we will be. They don't like this idea.

K: What are you saying?

D: None of the participants are asking for the Security Council so what's really for us to do. . . then this forced you to say old story about our position. . .

K: What we have is a case of a military attack. A difficult position. . a question of negotiation. . . It is one thing for the Soviet Union to take a stand in preliminary negotiation. . . it is another to take a stand after hostilities have started. . . in 3 days you'll be begging us for it.

D: I understand. . our position. . In Moscow don't want to become involved immediately. They will try to get territory back. . .

K: What are you telling them privately?

D: We don't like this idea.

K: Yet -- if you knew of it why didn't you consult with us.

D: Not a question of that --

K: We told Gromyko what ;ur intentions to do. . . we Told. . . .

D: The question is how far do we go or not go. The situation could be some discussion on our. . .

K: If there was evacuation on your part.

D: I don't have that information. . .

K; two conclusions. .

D: Just saying we don't like this idea.

K: I would have though in light of questions. . . you might have given us your view. . . and we did not inform. . . ahead of time. If we had you would have every right to complain. We assume there was an evacuation. . . everything moot on Monday. Then we have to argue in front of 100 people. . . three points: first, public opinion, secondly Congress, and then the special relationship we thought existed between us. If you tell us in debate on Monday. . . we understand. . . you tell us to wait we will have a real donnybrook. . . do you know what that means? We will have a brawl in the General Assembly. and will then make it insoluble. We've been holding up the Israelis on bombing. I don't know if we can keep this up.

D: That's clear to me.

K: Zayyat has asked for the floor on Monday.

D: All I can tell you is that I will talk to Moscow.

K: I'll talk to Key Biscayne and tell you what we are going to do. I'll call you back so don't go to Maryland.

END

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TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

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S 107

TELCON

Gen. Haig - Secretary Kissinger

October 6, 1973

7-10-

H: Just talked to the President. He feels that we possibly should not wait too much longer for the Soviet answer before moving with the resolution.

K: Exactly right. First, though, a Soviet answer is coming in now. Second, my recommendation is to move tonight, whatever is in the answer we move into the Security Council as soon.... We will put forward a call for a cease fire and return to the status quo ante before the fighting started. The reason is we have to do that is we will be rewarding the attacker....once the Israelis start beating up on the Arabsisraelis grab Arab territory. I feel we must recommend cease fire and return to status quo ante if it gets voted down...best position with the Chinese. ' Can't have precedents set in which ... can grab territory and then call for a cease fire.

H: Henry, what do you think about our announcing here, first on that thing.

K: That's fine. Just say that the President has instructed Dr. Kissinger to move immediatelyWait for the Soviet answer. Its coming in now but I will let you make the announcement down there. I'll call you as soon as I have got the answer

*
(S 107)

TELCON

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October 6, 1973

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S 110

12
no drink

TELCON
Genl Haig/Sec. Kissinger
Sat., Oct. 6, 1973
7:10 p.m.

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

K: and claimed that the Russians alluded to the Israelis. I told them in three days they would ~~through~~ ^{throw} them out and be coming to us.

H: Sure.

K: I told them the Gen. Assembly debate on Monday which will start if we don't start on the Security Council. -- ~~my~~ recommendation unless you feel strongly to the contrary. I have told him unless he hears from me to the contrary, I will give him until tomorrow to avoid this dilemma.

H: Yes.

K: If not, we will have to go to the Council. If we don't do that we will get creamed in the GA on Monday.

H: I think they have understood the position they are talking; tonight is fine.

K: I told Dobrynin if it goes to the GA and if the US is taken over the coals I want them to know we are taking the position that words are words and deeds are deeds and people who can commit deeds will be let run loose for a couple of days. You make sure the President is fully informed.

H: I will. I know he is anxious to do something in the morning.

K: By 10:00 you will be able to announce he has asked that it be moved to the Security Council.

H: I don't understand what the Soviets think they are going to gain.

K: Actually, they seem to have gotten across in larger force than they thought possible.

H: Really.

K: The Israelis say there is a real bridgehead across the Canal. Sixty dead and 110 wounded. You have to multiply that by a hundred to get the equivalent American casualties. If we suffered 6,000 dead and 15,000 wounded in one day. No joke. The Israelis say they have shot down six helicopters with troops.

H: There are generally 10 to 15 in a helicopter.

2.
Haig.
Oct. 6, 1973

K: O.K. We will proceed on that basis.

H: If you feel you need to change.

K: I am comfortable with this.

H: I take it you had rather do it tomorrow.

K: Yes.

H: You will get much better news play tomorrow. From a political point of view, it is better to have given ~~the~~ Russians a few more hours and lean over backwards.

K: We had better keep book on that. If they play it the hard way we know what we are up against. There are two things: No. 1) is I think as long as we know that the Soviets have been capricious and that way it proves to be there will be no limits on what we can do. If they play soft and spongy it would be very hard to be tough.

H: With the President.

K: That's right.

H: He will be making a mistake.

K: You have to figure as you go ~~down~~ this thing if the Soviets are using us we have to call a spade a spade and not play with them whatever the price.

H: That is my view.

K: We are in good shape.

H: That is totally my view. I don't think we can play it spongy.

K: As long as you play it that way.

H: They will be playing ~~is~~ spongy and we will still have to call a spade a spade.

K: That is alright too. That has a time limit on it. I have given them until 9:00 tomorrow morning. I think it would be ~~again~~ a mistake because we have no one else lined up.

3.

Haig.

Oct. 6, 1973

H: Precisely. I told him that.

K: Would he rather go tonight.

H: Instinctively, he would. I told him the British fell off the status quo anti aspect and you felt we ought to be very careful not to go against the others until they had thought about it. If you go back to Dobrynin and tell them this is what we are going to do.

K: I have already told them that.

H: As much as you can.

K: I told them I would try to sell this in Key Biscayne.

H: Alright, Henry.

END

S 110
14
no dial

TELCON
Genl Haig/Sec. Kissinger
Sat., Oct. 6, 1973
7:10 p.m.

K: and claimed that the Russians alluded to the Israelis. I told them in three days they would ~~through~~ ^{throw} them out and be coming to us.

H: Sure.

K: I told them the Gen. Assembly debate on Monday which will start if we don't start on the Security Council-- ~~my~~ recommendation unless you feel strongly to the contrary. I have told him unless he hears from me to the contrary, I will give him until tomorrow to avoid this dilemma.

H: Yes.

K: If not, we will have to go to the Council. If we don't do that we will get creamed in the GA on Monday.

H: I think they have understood the position they are talking; tonight is fine.

K: I told Dobrynin if it goes to the GA and if the US is taken over the coals I want them to know we are taking the position that words are words and deeds are deeds and people who can commit deeds will be let run loose for a couple of days. You make sure the President is fully informed.

H: I will. I know he is anxious to do something in the morning.

K: By 10:00 you will be able to announce he has asked that it be moved to the Security Council.

H: I don't understand what the Soviets think they are going to gain.

K: Actually, they seem to have gotten across in larger force than they thought possible.

H: Really.

K: The Israelis say there is a real bridgehead across the Canal. Sixty dead and 110 wounded. You have to multiply that by a hundred to get the equivalent American casualties. If we suffered 6,000 dead and 15,000 wounded in one day. No joke. The Israelis say they have shot down six helicopters with troops.

H: There are generally 10 to 15 in a helicopter.

*

2.
Haig.
Oct. 6, 1973

K: O.K. We will proceed on that basis.

H: If you feel you need to change.

K: I am comfortable with this.

H: I take it you had rather do it tomorrow.

K: Yes.

H: You will get much better news play tomorrow. From a political point of view, it is better to have given ~~the~~ Russians a few more hours and lean over backwards.

K: We had better keep book on that. If they play it the hard way we know what we are up against. There are two things: No. 1) is I think as long as we know that the Soviets have been capricious and that way it proves to be there will be no limits on what we can do. If they play soft and spongy it would be very hard to be tough.

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K: I have already told them that.

H: As much as you can.

K: I told them I would try to sell this in Key Biscayne.

H: Alright, Henry.

END

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

*
S111

TELECON

General Haig/Secretary Kissinger

October 6, 1973

8:00

K: You don't mean we have to do it. . . British will support resolution for simple cease-fire but not cease-fire ante. This faces us with a problem. Next move -- sanction against Israel for refusing a cease-fire. By Tuesday or Wednesday Israel may be in Arab territory and then they will accept it. Third point -- anyone who can grab territory and then submit to a cease-fire. . . Number one do we go to Security Council tonight, Number 2, with what sort of Resolution. My

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K: We can give the Soviets til tomorrow morning at 9:00. If they are surprised they are confused -- if not surprised then stalling for time.

H: I don't know how the battle is going.

K: They are aggressive. The Israelis are being excessively timid.

H: They are not surrounded. . . Syria

K: Do. . . but not any missile attacks on other line.

H: Don't want a missile attack. I think the Egyptian want them to come in there against their missiles. . and the Israelis didn't nibble. We could probably wait til morning -- not overly hungry as long as we aren't snookered.

K: By 9:00 in the morning we should go.

H: That's what I think.

END

S 111*

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General Haig/Secretary Kissinger

October 6, 1973

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H: That's what I think.

END

TELCON

Foreign Minister Zayyat
October 6, 1973/8:48 p.m.

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

K: Hello.

Z: Hello

K: Mr. Foreign Minister. How are you?

Z: Fine thank you.

K: I just wanted to touch base with you at the end of a rather hectic and I'm sure rather trying day for you and for all of us. Let me tell you candidly what our evaluation is and I'll speak to you in the candor that we always have. First, I thought we had done rather well in our discussions yesterday, in establishing a basis of some mutual confidence and I look forward to seeing you down here and resuming our discussions in November. Now we are in the difficult situation that if the fighting doesn't get stopped in a reasonable time events may again get out of control. Now, our evaluation is that if the fighting goes on the Israelis will probably gain the upper hand. You know, you can disagree with this but this is our estimate and therefore when we suggest that we would prefer a ceasefire plus a restoration of the status quo anti.l...

Z: Anti what Mr. Kissinger.

K: No anti, before this last round started.

Z: Very strange.

K: I understand your point and we talked about that on Friday but then that will in time work to the advantage of the Arab side if the evolution is the way it may be. I just wanted you to know on a personal basis that if the fortunes of war should go the other way we would not look with favor on any further Israeli territorial claims. And we would like to have this thing wound up in a way that does not make it more difficult to resume what I thought was a beginning of a better possibility for discussion. I don't have a very concrete proposal and we have tried to be restrained today in the hope that perhaps something could be developed.

Z: Of course the question of you know when you think about 5,000 Egyptians killed and then going back to where we were is something out of the question, in Cairo. If I were in Cairo I would think madness.

K: How many Egyptians killed?

- Z: I don't know how many people but I don't know how many killed but could be thousands killed.
- K: Of course, our impression is that the action was initiated probably by your side this time but we may be wrong.
- Z: Even so, but how can you advise anyone after doing this to go back where he was. I mean this is completely unreasonable. And just remember that you were speaking what can we give them since they ceasefire. Everything was so good that they started the cease^{fire} the fact of their occupation for 7 years 6 years was quite alright because of the ceasefire. I think it better for them and the evolution to find there is a war really and therefore find a solution for it.
- K: That I agree with you on completely.
- Z: They were so pleased and didn't want to do something because there was a ceasefire. And the ceasefire which was costing us every day that which I spoke to you about. I don't know who began this or how it began but we should move with the best _____ which we have now.
- K: Which is what?
- Z: I don't know but a position of going back to where we were of course nobody can suggest this to the government but me anyhow but I don't know what other positions are up. I didn't go to the Council because really I _____ to a rough frame. I didn't know what to do in the Council, the Council can have votes with me but with one veto. ~~XXXXXX~~
- K: What is your view?
- Z: I don't know. Do you have any suggestions. You have been studying this for some time and you know the other people we don't have relation with them.
- K: You see our theory is that the other side is going to launch a very strong attack within the next day or two and then we will have another major problem to contend with and we would like to keep the fighting contained as much as possible to give diplomacy an opportunity. I mean you have certainly made your point which you had already made to me eloquently about the intolerable nature of the situation.
- Z: The situation is really impossible for us. It has been repeatedly said this is American land. Nobody can _____. Security was assured for Israel by the water canal and therefore how can they leave the security.

- K: No, I think it was a very effective operation in many ways.
- Z: There is no security there. Security is possible only at the acceptance of coexistence.
- K: I unfortunately don't have a concrete plan Mr. Foreign Minister but I do believe you have made a very, the events of today, have made a very strong point and now the question is how to go from here to some positive result rather than to an expansion of the war which then could reverse many of the things that have happened.
- Z: I would like Cairo.. I would do anything. I don't care very much for war or for all this kind of thing.
- K: Look, I really, you convinced me yesterday very much of your serious intent and good will.
- Z: In any world how to get peace is the most important thing.
- K: I couldn't agree more.
- Z: The question now, what can I suggest to go back to establish the _____ of yesterday. I don't think I can even whisper it.
- K: Supposing it happens in a day or two anyway.
- Z: You know _____ of their occupying Cairo because then we have the German _____ or the British _____. I hope that you are not going to help them do that.
- K: Certainly not. I told you ~~never~~ we will oppose it.
- Z: Yes. So I think if there is no extra help from anywhere we can defend what we have to the best of our abilities but there is a point now that this question of security was over-rated and perhaps no protection. We can tell that now and begin asking something, doing something perhaps.
- K: That I understnad and from that point of view we now show statesmanship. Something positive could emerge out of all of this. If it's done in some concrete and practical way. That's ~~why~~ I called you know, I don't really know. I just wanted you to know that I'm open for discussion and that we are not lined up in order to create difficulty.
- Z: Well I should hope not because it is not good for anyone.

K: But you see this now goes to the General Assembly.

Z: I'm not going to the General Assembly. There is a mistake about that. What I wanted to do is to give the General Assembly the note I gave them today. On Monday I am going to give the _____ again and that's all. We don't want a debate in General Assembly.

K: You do not want a debate.

Z: No.

K: Well, that is a misunderstanding. I thought that you wanted it.

Z: No. I don't want it until November to give you a chance. What I am expected to do is to read the letter which I gave to the President today to read it as a statement of what had happened and sit down and hear other speakers of _____ as they wish. Because there was no meeting today I _____ any demand or request for a debate. I know the radio says difference but I hope you look _____. But I didn't ask for a debate and did not even raise the question. If this would help. But this is something _____. Ask them what is going to happen in the spot, this is more important.

K: Now supposing you know we said we were going to give this opportunity. How can we get the fighting stopped now.

Z: I don't really know. You are far away. You can have more cool head, you can tell me what to think and I plan to take a plane tomorrow morning to see the President and then come back. I will do anything because I sincerely believe until the end all wars are going to end by some sort of peace and the peace that we want. For this I think there is understanding, you have said it repeatedly.

K: You explained that to me on Friday.

Z: Yes, and it has been said before you can say clearly, perhaps you cannot say it but this a fact. So if we can have any encouragement of any endorsement of this by America for example you can _____ think clearly that the _____ of all states to preserve rewards for rewards. Something like this. I'm not speaking for myself. I don't know, can you think about it until tomorrow and we will call you again and see what can be done.

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K: Yeah. I understand.

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K: Good. Alright.

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FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
Telcon	Telcon - S115	2	10/06/1973	P1/b1; P5; <i>mtc 9/18/2025</i>

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COLLECTION:

Counsel's Office, White House

SERIES:

Kavanaugh, Brett - Subject Files

FOLDER TITLE:

State Department, Henry Kissinger Transcripts [2]

FRC ID:

9674

OA Num.:

1911

NARA Num.:

1829

FOIA IDs and Segments:

2018-0016-P

2017-0345-F

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advise between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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(S117)*

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

Telcon NYC
Ron Ziegler/HAK

October 6, 1973; 10:10 a.m.

- Z: I will check with you and set up the thing with McCloskey. He is with you?
- K: He is with me now. What you should say is that I was awakened this morning with a message from Jerusalem that there was an attack made on them and asking for our telling all interested parties they had no intention to launch an attack. I think the best thing is not to go into the details of what happened this morning.
- Z: I agree.
- K: You should say we received reports on a total situation this morning in the Middle East at 6 this morning. From then on I was in touch with the President, with the Foreign Ministers of Egypt and Israel, and the President as well as with the Secretary General of the UN, and the President was kept fully informed of developments. That's what you should say.
- Z: The picture is still unclear and therefore we can't expand.
- K: Yes, but you have to be careful. You must not take any position that will prevent us from siding with anybody. Just say it is not yet clear what the extent of the fighting is and therefore it would be wrong, but don't make any comment on who started it.
- Z: The picture is still unclear. But we will keep you informed.
- K: You can also say there has been a WSAG meeting in Washington.



- Z: I have told the President he should not return to Washington.
- K: There is not a goddam thing he can do. But I want to be in a...
- Z: Your returning to Washington can hypo this.
- K: And it makes it an American... We would have to do something.
- Z: That's what I say. You have to pay your way back. You can't just come back to Washington. What if they ask if you have been in touch with the Soviets?
- K: You will say yes.
- Z: And what action will you take?
- K: No statement whatever.
- Z: What about US citizens in the area?
- K: We will take care of that.

Telcon NYC
Ron Ziegler/HAK
October 6, 1973; 10:10 a.m.

- Z: I will check with you and set up the thing with McCloskey. He is with you?
- K: He is with me now. What you should say is that I was awakened this morning with a message from Jerusalem that there was an attack made on them and asking for our telling all interested parties they had no intention to launch an attack. I think the best thing is not to go into the details of what happened this morning.
- Z: I agree.
- K: You should say we received reports on a total situation this morning in the Middle East at 6 this morning. From then on I was in touch with the President, with the Foreign Ministers of Egypt and Israel, and the President as well as with the Secretary General of the UN, and the President was kept fully informed of developments. That's what you should say.
- Z: The picture is still unclear and therefore we can't expand.
- K: Yes, but you have to be careful. You must not take any position that will prevent us from siding with anybody. Just say it is not yet clear what the extent of the fighting is and therefore it would be wrong, but don't make any comment on who started it.
- Z: The picture is still unclear. But we will keep you informed.
- K: You can also say there has been a WSAG meeting in Washington.



Z: I have told the President he should not return to Washington.

K: There is not a goddam thing he can do. But I want to be in a...

Z: Your returning to Washington can hypo this.

K: And it makes it an American... We would have to do something.

Z: That's what I say. You have to pay your way back. You can't just come back to Washington. What if they ask if you have been in touch with the Soviets?

K: You will say yes.

Z: And what action will you take?

K: No statement whatever.

Z: What about US citizens in the area?

K: We will take care of that.

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

Telcon NYC
Minister Shalev/HAK
October 6, 1973; 11:55 a.m.

- K: I have talked to the President again and to the Soviets. I want you to know what we are doing. We are getting our fleet together in the Mediterranean and start moving it toward the Eastern Mediterranean. This will take us about 12 hours and we will start ~~going~~ moving it toward the Eastern Mediterranean. We will almost certainly approve tomorrow the military equipment within reason that you may need, especially if the Soviets line up with the Arabs, then we will certainly do it.
- S: You will do it.
- K: If the Soviets line up in the UN with the Arabs we will sure do it and if not we will probably do it, but we just want to see. But we would appreciate from you as much of the true military situation as you feel you can give us so we can make our evaluations, and also any plans you may have. We are going to propose when there is a Security Council meeting, whether or not the Soviets agree, that there should be a restoration of the ceasefire and a restoration of the ceasefire lines.
- S: And you are doing that irrespective of their agreement or not.
- K: We will wait a few hours to get their agreement. If not, we have concerted with the British and they will call a meeting and we will then propose this.
- S: All right.
- K: Do you have any views on the subject?
- S: Well, I know there isn't and wasn't any decisions yet on whether to ask for a Security Council.
- K: I think it is better if you don't.
- S: I think ~~that~~ at one stage we wanted you to wait before calling one.
- K: We are waiting still.
- S: Good.
- K: We are not going to do it until about 2 or 3 this afternoon for a meeting 5 or 6 this afternoon. And all we will do is ask for a ceasefire and ~~we~~ ask for a return to the ceasefire lines. The British are prepared to say they think the Arabs started this.

- S: I think it is quite clear. The UN observers have also reported that from ~~behind~~ both fronts.
- K: To all practical purposes there is no question.
- S: The information I have on the military situation is that in the Syrian front the attempt by the Syrians to advance have been halted. On the Egyptian front I know about 16 Egyptian planes down, some of the Egyptian troops crossed the Canal and our people are dealing with that now. I wouldn't like to be in the shoes of those that are being dealt with.
- K: (laughs) Well, that is what we are counting on.
- S: You shouldn't worry.
- K: We are operating on the assumption that you will win.
- S: There isn't the slightest doubt.
- K: But it would be helpful to us if you kept me informed.
- S: Yes, all right.
- K: Thank you.
- S: Thank you, sir. Goodbye.

Telcon NYC
Minister Shalev/HAK
October 6, 1973; 11:55 a.m.

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- K: But it would be helpful to us if you kept me informed.
- S: Yes, all right.
- K: Thank you.
- S: Thank you, sir. Goodbye.

S 124 *

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

Saturday, October 6, 1973
11:00 p. m.

TELEPHONE CALL TO COMMANDER HOWE

Sec. thought at first it was Gen. Scowcroft. Sec. asked if we got off the cable about ICCS to Le Duc Tho. Howe said it had not left. Sec. said this is the fourth week of crapping ~~around~~ around & with that. Howe said it is with the Secretary's things. Sec. said it must be brought to his attention - we cannot keep playing around and letting the ICCS compromise. Howe understood.

jmr

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TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

TELECON
Dobrynin/Kissinger
October 6, 1973
8:20

K. Just talked to the President again. He just wanted me to reaffirm to you personally that he supports everything I have said to you and that.....said that we will wait another 12 hours. I explained your problem. He has no complete idea at the moment. Wait until 9:00 to decide on some position he will take.. May not be public.

D. Public position?

K. That is not decided yet. Whatever he will have to do he will have to do without cooperation with you.

D. Understandable, don't want understand that... isn't to Moscow decided to do at a

K. Not yet decided to do it. Originally decided to do something tonight. Now want to wait to see whether something else can emerge.

D. There are no specific....

K. He just asked me to call you to reaffirm.

D. Thank you, if you have any suggestion I will appreciate, especially in Moscow. They will appreciate. This is really the point.

K. O'k I will call you.

TELECON

Dobrynin/ Kissinger

October 6, 1973

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K. O'k I will call you.

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FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
Telcon	Telcon - S123	3	10/07/1973	P1/b1; P5; WAC 9/8/2025

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COLLECTION:

Counsel's Office, White House

SERIES:

Kavanaugh, Brett - Subject Files

FOLDER TITLE:

State Department, Henry Kissinger Transcripts [2]

FRC ID:

9674

OA Num.:

1911

NARA Num.:

1829

FOIA IDs and Segments:

2018-0016-P

2017-0345-F

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

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TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

S425*

TELECON 10:20¹⁵ a. m. October 7, 1973

Secretary Kissinger/Amb. Dobrynin

D. Good morning, Henry. I hope you slept well.

K. I slept very well, thank you.

D. I have just received a telegram stating that in about two hours I will be getting a message for the President. I don't know what is in it. I will transmit it to you. This is for your information.

K. Thank you very much.

mj

(S425)*

15
TELECON 10:20 a. m. October 7, 1973

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K. I slept very well, thank you.

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TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

*
S126

TELECON 10:40 a. m. Oct. 7, 1973

Secretary/Senator Percy

P. I spoke to Gen. Gowon in New York. I have had a very friendly / relationship with him stemming from the trip you sent me on a couple of years ago. I wanted to determine his attitude. He has a very constructive attitude. He thinks we should think of our major goals. He likes the President's statement on Africa. It only needs implementation. He would respond favorably to a future visit -- a State visit or whatever. He is distressed by the newspaper comments that did not take into account the President's heavy schedule. He has a good feeling toward you and General Haig. I think a phone call by you or the President . . he's in his room now.

K. Would he take a call from me?

P. He spoke very favorably and friendly when I asked if he had seen you. He is an absolutely stupendous person and a future force in Africa. I think a phone call . . . he will certainly take a call from you. He took my call.

K. I see.

P. I recommend a phone call from the President. Then if he accepts a chance to come back . . . The demagogues will call this thing anti-Black.

K. We offered to have him at Key Biscayne.

P. I told him my original appointment was the same day as his and I know it was cancelled also. The time offered for Key Biscayne was Friday afternoon between the Secretary General's lunch and the Foreign Policy Association in the evening. There was no possibility in two hours and forty minutes . . to fly down and get back. The others I can't explain. I'm not trying to excuse him at all. He won't try to make anything out of this. His number is 212-355-3000, it's the Waldorf, extension 2647 or 2645. He will pick up the phone himself.

K. Nice to talk to you. Somebody will call him.

mj

*

TELECON, 11:20 a.m. Oct. 7, 1973

Secretary/Senator Griffin

G. I have to go on Meet the Press at 12:00. Do you have any guidance you can give me on the Middle East?

K. For your guidance--but don't use it--the Israelis aren't doing so well. Nobody is being active at the UN--the Arabs because they think they are winning and the Israelis because they think they're losing.

G. There's been some talk of a Security Council meeting tonight.

K. We might do that but I wouldn't nail myself to that at all because we haven't heard from the Soviets. You can say we're very active. We have been talking to the Russians, the Israelis, the British, the Egyptians . . . There is a good chance we'll go to the Security Council either tonight or early tomorrow.

G. The military situation . . .

K. Well, the Israelis have not fully mobilized yet. You can say your impression is that ~~the~~ it is clear the Arabs attacked.

G. OK. There's a UN report that says that. I think it will be helpful and I will be very careful. I might say I talked with you this morning.

K. You can say that and you can say you favor some kind of UN action.

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K. You can say that and you can say you favor some kind of UN action.

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*

S 127

TELECON

General Haig/Secretary Kissinger

October 7, 1973

12:35 pm

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

K: Let me tell you where matters now stand. The Egyptians have told the British -- he didn't want a Security Council meeting but if one were held...and that suggests...we will be totally alone in our.. My suggestion is we hold our announcement til 4:00 this afternoon. No since forcing a vote and getting all stirred up. No since rushing in and getting nothing out of it. By Wednesday or Thursday, it is my thinking it will be over...so UN can contribute to situation as it exists. With the Israelis and the Arabs not yet wanting a meeting, I think we should hold off til about 4:00 this afternoon.

H: Yeah, I think that's fine.

K: We'll say we're prepared...tomorrow morning or tonight. Might be better to have informal consultations tonight. We haven't heard from the Soviets yet but will soon.

H: I agree with you. He is comfortable. Knows it will be short and he doesn't want to go up there and get licked.

K: Right. Now all we will get is a cease-fire but should..get a position to handle the after period. The Arabs want to get me into this.

H: Good, Henry. I think this is alright. We'll hold til around 4:00 I'll get back to you on the Soviet thing.

K: You're reachable within the next hour.

H: Oh yes, I'm right here.

*

S 127

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October 7, 1973
12:35 pm

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K: You're reachable within the next hour.

H: Oh yes, I'm right here.

TELECON
Eban/ Kissinger
October 7, 1973
1:15 pm

*
S 130

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

E: The best way to proceed is the way you suggested yesterday.

K: We will probably proceed later this afternoon.

E: I had a report that Heath and Brandt will convene...

K: I just talked to Waldheim who gave me the same report.
We are thinking we should table the resolution today and ask for a meeting in the morning. I have to wait a few hours til I can get to the President. We ... proceeding on discussion we had earlier today.

E: I think the urgent thing is a public decision by the US to convene the Council. Trouble about tabling the resolution is you don't get in you won't have priority.

K: But if we call a meeting we will have priority.

E: Yes. I get the impression that in the last few hours the military situation has improved. Attacks on bridgeheads have succeeded.

K: Yes

END

TELECON
Eban/Kissinger
October 7, 1973
1:15 pm

*
S 130

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E: Yes. I get the impression that in the last few hours the military situation has improved. Attacks on bridgeheads have succeeded.

K: Yes

END

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FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
Telcon	Telcon - S131	2	10/07/1973	P1/b1; P5; <i>MAC</i> <i>9/8/2025</i>

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COLLECTION:

Counsel's Office, White House

SERIES:

Kavanaugh, Brett - Subject Files

FOLDER TITLE:

State Department, Henry Kissinger Transcripts [2]

FRC ID:

9674

OA Num.:

1911

NARA Num.:

1829

FOIA IDs and Segments:

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2017-0345-F

RESTRICTION CODES

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Kavanaugh, Brett - Subject Files

FOLDER TITLE:

State Department, Henry Kissinger Transcripts [2]

FRC ID:

9674

OA Num.:

1911

NARA Num.:

1829

FOIA IDs and Segments:

2018-0016-P

2017-0345-F

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

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TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

*
S 132

TELCON

The President - Secretary Kissinger

October 7, 1973

2:07 p.m.

K: I talked to Dobrynin this morning. He hasn't gotten a message yet. I think if we don't hear by 4:00 we should go ahead anyway and call for a Council meeting for tomorrow. I have talked to Waldheim, Eban, oh I have talked to everybody and its a sort of a kaleidoscope. Nobody knows what's...

N: At least calling for a Council meeting shows some action and we still might decide to do nothing tomorrow.

K:

N: We don't have to hear from Brezhnev. If we want to change our views, we can change our views.

K: That's right. But its almost inexplicable how ^{a war} ~~the~~ can go on for two days without the UN even meeting. I think Ziegler should say something like that, that war has been going on for two days, we think there ought to be a Council meeting.

N: Absolutely right.

K: And the US will....

N: Whatever you work out with Ron is fine with me. The war's going on about as it was?

K: Actually the Arabs are fighting much better than expected....

N: Which, the Egyptians or Syrians, or both?

K: Both, actually the Syrians are advancing, the Egyptians are across the Canal.... you know yesterday was a Jewish holiday. The Egyptians caught the Israelis unprepared...

N: Like Pearl Harbor isn't it?

K: Right.until tomorrow and then introduce the idea of return to pre-case fire line. By tomorrow the Israelis will be reversing the tide.

N: Do you think they will?

K: By tomorrow they could turn the tide.....work against Israel. If we introduce the idea today the Arabs will claim we are trying to push them back. By Wednesday morning at the latest Israel will be in Arab territory.

N: Do you think they have the stuff to do it. Israel is convinced they can do it despite...

K: I am seeing the Israeli Ambassador who has just returned from Israel, promised to come in about 6:30 to give me the latest....

N: Boy, don't you wish Rabin were there now?

K: Oh, gosh.....

N: He won't know what's Can't you get a message from somebody out there, Moshe Dayan or

K: We are in contact with Dyan

.....

K: more tractable.....and that's why we have a difficult tightrope not dissoiating in a crisis...

N: I understand, right.

K: That issue hasn't actually come up.

N: Better not to have a situation where you have got a double headed...

K: That would be unmanageable.

N: No, we just couldn't manage it, could we.

K:

N: Are you working well together over there?

K: Working well.you have noticednewspapers that as a team, rather than playing ~~the~~ State against the White House.

N: Right. You go ahead and tell Ziegler whatever you want.

K: If there is any message I will get it to you. immediately.

N: You think you will get one from Breshnev?

K: Yes. I'll let you know if there is anything

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FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
Telcon	Telcon - S133	1	10/07/1973	P1/b1; P5; MTC 9/8/05

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S 134

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

TELCON

Ambassador Dobrynin - Secretary Kissinger

October 7, 1973

3:25 p. m.

D: Received the text. I could read it to you but then I could give to you oral, however you like.

K: What's the essence&

D: This say -- it is a letter from boss to boss -- it is saying about that recollection how question was discussed between them, Minister to minister, saying we are always in favor here to do something but nothing done. We regret very much it bothers you. And then after.... these things, then it goes like this. It would be possible to say a lot more to this but the main thing now we are warning... is to take urgent effective measures to get rid of the cause of the conflict. With the situation in the Middle East will continue to remain a source of constant danger. It would be very important if there came on the part of the Israelis a statement of its readiness to negotiate. Keeping in mind at the same time the security of the Israelis countries so that area would be guaranteed what is acceptable for Israel to the interest of the Israeli people themselves. And if at all possible to seek security of states in a seizure of foreign territories as you know Mr. President, we have always exercised restraint.... political settlement by the lack of

In effect the effectiveness of such a... for the Israelis... claim of the Arabs lands which insures turning point in the dangerous situation in the Middle East, could be the beginning of the process of settlement on the basis of UN decisions. We would like to hope that now when the situation is especially urgent, demands this will use its possibilities for a necessary. of Israel in this direction. It goes without saying that we are ready to continue American confidential consultations on the whole Middle East problem. along the lines as we have talked about during meeting with you Mr. President. I would like to underline specifically, we firmly proceed from the premise that the current activities in the Middle East should not all the things that have developed in American relations. We do not allow even thought to the contrary.

zx Then there is an oral thing that in our recommendation to the Arabs to the Arab leadership I wish to say that I do not have that will come in further communication.

K: You recognize as non practical possibility in the present situation.

K: You know as well as I do it doesn't say anything.

D: Explain to you that we ...from Israel not only Egyptian and Syrians take into consideration, UN and Chile where you do the same thing. Decided to make this move without preliminary consultation with Egypt and Syrian government. Without asking their agreement.

K: Well, Anatoly, we will have a critical period this week, it is obvious to me.

D: I hope it will not be crisis.

K: You know yourself we are perfectly prepared to ask Israel after it is over to make accelerated diplomatic moves.

D: Have you seen the statement made by Eb-Zayyat.

.....

K: That doesn't mean anything either.

D: Saw it on the ticker...

K: OK Anatoly. Could you get it typed up and sent to Gen. Scowcroft

D: Translate it too.

K: Yes and translated, send it to Gen. Scowcroft.

D: Maybe we could manage something direct - you know through your house to another house. There are many things I prefer not to say by telephone, you know.

K: Oh, yes. We can do it easily. Listen, Anatoly, I wanted to ask you. I am making a speech tomorrow night in which I was going to advocate MFN among other things. Frankly may not, have to drop that section from the speech, depending on developments tomorrow. But let me read what I have written. There's a long defense of it which I won't bother you with, just one point which follows:

Quiet diplomacy has produced results. The tax on immigration is not being collected. We have received assurances it is not being applied, hardship cases submitted to the Soviet governmentthe rate of immigration is in the tens of thousands, where it was in 1960

D: OK, why not.

K: Do they want to jeopardize this. I'm not asking you to approve only the part on MFN.

D: In the context....the part on quiet diplomacy will sound quite good. x

K: Well, if tomorrow we are in a debate in the UN, ifattacks Israel this doesn't help

D: Not about the US. Nothing new in attacks on Israel...same old thingI understand....

K; You know what we decided. We are prepared immediately after the Israeli election to start diplomatic effort. In order to have any chance of success means the present conflict has to be brought to a reasonable conclusion

D: Are the British going to have the Security Council....

K: Well, they haven't asked.

D: I heard Heath and Brandt....

K: They denied it to us.

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S135

TELCON

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October 7, 1973

4:15 p.m.

K: Sure you want to talk to me?⁷ ... you insist on dealing with McCloskey now.

Z: Don't want to bother you

K: He's right here, he want to give you some instructions.

Z: Thanks alot.

K: Are you going at 5:00

Z: Yah. Not right on the nose, but around that time. 5 is about right, or 5 mintues on either side, all right?

K: Don't go before 5 because we have ...

Z: Okay, 5 or shortly after.

K: Let me read to you, it's very simple: At the President's direction, the Secretary of State has been in extensive consultation yesterday and today, with the fighting in the Middle East still continuing. The President has now instructed the Secretary to take the matter to the UN and to request a meeting of the Security Council. Now, if you get a question ~~q~~ when will that meeting of the Security Council take place, we are now consulting other members as to the best time. If you on guidance want to say tomorrow, ok, but don't want to look like we are delaying it overnight. Not going to get in a lot of trouble...no one else wants it.

Z: Say Amb. Scali now consulting, effort would be to get a cease fire.

K: No, shouldn't go into that becuase its a big issue - the cease fire and return to the previous lines before fighting started. Don't mention cease fire without returning to preiouv's lines. Don't want to tie the President to...

Z: What I would like to do ~~for~~ is have Jerry, say the White House down here say you have been in constant contact with the President as you were yesterday.

K: Two or three times a day.

Z: Then give to the press what you just gave me and say Bob McCloskey at State can give further details.

2.

*

K: Perfect. Then

Z: Then Bob, who is there with you can

K: Bob will brief after the WSAG, or at least after you have

Z: Is McCloskey there now?

K: I will put him on, just a second

Z: defers any question to you

M: That will be fine. You can't handle the cease fire return to previous lines you will have to start from the origin... with the press in Miami Beach

Z: Okay, is Henry still there. You know we are coming back at 7:30

K: Leaving at 7:30&

Z: Right home by about 10. You know, the departure, combined with this announcement will hyper this quite a bit.

KX

K: Not so eager to have that. Don't make any impression. Will come down now and drive for solution, only I will explain when you get back. Don't want to discuss it on the phone.

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S 137

TELCON:

Ron Zeigler - Secretary Kissinger

October 7, 1973

4:20

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

K: Very much want to avoid coupling the Presiden't departure from this announcement. Whatever headline you get, you will pay the price for Tuesday or Wednesday.

Z: Don't want to....

K: Separate it...disconnect it

Z: Just want you to know its absolutely impossible to convince them

K: If you hyper it, you will pay the price. The strategy here is to slow things down.

Z: I only raised it because I wanted to point out that its going to very difficult to keep the press from interlocking.

K: Why don't you just step back on the plane, and give an account during the day, that I talked to the President several times... What time did you announce the President's departure?

Z: Announced two hours ago.

K: Oh, well, that's pretty good. You can say at 4:00 he decided after first reviewing the situation with me, to move to the Council

Z: Right, we'll say this decision for a meeting was made at 4:00 and what I would like to do is to say that Mr. McCloskey at the St. Department can give details.

K: If you follow the announcement of his departure with announcement of the Council meeting, we will really be in trouble.

Z: The reason I raised it before, but they will combine them even so, the meeting and his returning

K: Well, just keep it slow and keep it calm.

*
S 137

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Ron Zeigler - Secretary Kissinger
October 7, 1973
4:20

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K: Well, just keep it slow and keep it calm.

TELECON
Dobrynin/Kissinger
October 7, 1973
4:40 pm

*
(S139)

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

.....
K: Where is your granddaughter?

D:...

K: You're going all the way down there tonight? Are you planning an attack tonight.

D: You watch from 5-11.

K: Anatoyl, I wanted you to know what the President has decided to do. We'll announce at 5:00 we are asking for a S. C. meeting.

D: When are you announcing?

K: In about 45 minutes, it shouldn't be on the TASS tickers before that. We haven't yet decided whether we will propose a resolution or what it will be. It may be just a discussion. But we don't see how we can avoid asking for a session. I think its useful ... keep the principle we discussed yesterday and we keep calm with each other. If your Ambassador conducts himself the same way we will get through the day. I'll let you know in the morning... we're not going to table a resolution tonight even if we table one tomorrow -- we can discuss. I will let you know a couple of hours before we do it.

D: alright.

K: The President comes back tonight and I will have a change to talke with him. I understand your view....a certain lapse in events that may overtake our discussion.

D: Alright.

K: That's why we're not tabling anything. That gives us several hours to decide what to do.

D: We can ask for instructions from the government.

K: We are not going to push you and if you don't push us.

D: no, no.

K: Right now we must get the Security Council to ... All the best the best to your granddaughter and tell ____ that next time he won't be treated so nicely.

D: OK. goodbye.

TELECON
Dobrynin/Kissinger
October 7, 1973
4:40 pm

*
(S139)

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D:...

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K: We are not going to push you and if you don't push us.

D: no, no.

K: Right now we must get the Security Council to ... All the best the best to your granddaughter and tell ____ that next time he won't be treated so nicely.

D: OK. goodbye.

TELECON
Scali/Kissinger
October 7, 1973
4:45 pm

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(S140)

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

K: John, how are you.? Where are you?

S: I'm fine. I'm in my office.

K: Where we now stand is the President is going to announce that we are asking for a meeting of the Security Council. We are going to ask for it tomorrow morning. I have explained the strategy to Popper and he will call you. . but the main thing is to delay as long as possible to obfuscate the situation. I have told the British what are general line is and they have sworn they will cooperate without question and keep it open. If the situation is restored the second part of our thinking .. become moot. You are not to indicate that we're to table a resolution. Just ask for the meeting.

S: alright.

K: Let them guess. Our primary purpose is to beat the Assembly. David will call you and give you the details.

S: alright.

K: Major thing is to not do too much too fast.

S: Very good, Henry.

END

TELECON
Scali/Kissinger
October 7, 1973
4:45 pm

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S140

K: John, how are you.? Where are you?

S: I'm fine. I'm in my office.

K: Where we now stand is the President is going to announce that we are asking for a meeting of the Security Council. We are going to ask for it tomorrow morning. I have explained the strategy to Popper and he will call you. . but the main thing is to delay as long as possible to obfuscate the situation. I have told the British what are general line is and they have sworn they will cooperate without question and keep it open. If the situation is restored the second part of our thinking .. become moot. You are not to indicate that we're to table a resolution. Just ask for the meeting.

S: alright.

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S: alright.

K: Major thing is to not do too much too fast.

S: Very good, Henry.

END

TELECON
Waldheim/Kissinger
4:50 pm

*

[7 Oct 73?]

(S 141)

K: Mr. Secretary General

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

W: Good afternoon.

K: I have just completed several conversations with the President. We're going to announce that we will ask for a meeting of the Security Council probably for tomorrow. We've not yet decided to put forth a resolution or just a general discussion. We will be prepared to have informal consultations tonight. .. major reason is the argument you made to me earlier with respect to the impact of a war going on for 48 hours without anyone doing anything .

W: Thank you very much. This is the right approach. Whatever the outcome of the meeting should be, I think it will show the UN that at least we are trying.

K: Our ... will be non-inflammatory and low-key.

S: good.

K: It will not turn into a propaganda battle.

W: We can continue consultations even with debate going on.

K: Of course, dangerous to substitute bilateral consultation for Security Council consultations.

W: I agree completely. As far as the General Assembly, neither Egypt or Syria wants debate in the General Assembly. What is agreed is that before the beginning of the debate : - Egypt and Syria and if Israel wants -- the three delegations. . make informal statements. Agreed that nobody else should speak so then after these 3 or 4 statements, general debate would continue.

K: Very constructive approach. That means the Security Council meeting will be in the afternoon.

W: I assume the President would have to contact Egypt and Syria again.

K:the information statement would not block it. quite acceptable to us.

W: After your announcement I would discuss procedures with the President and 3 delegated.

K: If you call me I would appreciate some information.

W: ...yet to be clarified. I assume the President will have to contact... of course I wish to keep close contact. ... when do you expect to make the formal request.

K: in the nest 45 minutes to an hour.

W: OK . I will wait til the formal request comes. will then contact the President as to whether they want to speak in the General Assembly or address the Security Council.

K: Or they can do both.

W: Exactly.

K: Thank you

W: Thank you.

END

TELECON
Waldheim/Kissinger
4:50 pm

*

[7 Oct 73?]

(S 141)

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W: Good afternoon.

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W: Exactly.

K: Thank you

W: Thank you.

END

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

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S145

TELCON

Foreign Minister Abba Eban - Secretary Kissinger

October 7, 1973

5:08 p. m.

K: Good afternoon. We have now decided to go ahead long the lines we discussed earlier. Therefore, you mustn't do anything The President., not the President himself but Key Biscayne, is going to announce that we will ask for a meeting of the Security Council. We will then, around 5:30, ask the President of the Security Council for a meeting tomorrow. We will let it go at that for tonight. We will not indicate today whether we will table a resolution or what it will be. Don't want to get too muchgenerated. We will table a resolution along , this is for your private information, lines we discussed. I understand you will have to speak before the Council.

E: I will have to speak very early.

K: At the Council...we will count on your elequence... and in this case wouldn't mind if you sacrificed eloquence to length.

E: Oh, yes, I agree it often happens in inverse relation. I'll just say we want..... cease fire in full.

K: Not necessary for you to make any proposal as long as you discuss the situation in great detail.

E: saying Egypt and Syria encroached on us and not us on them. I assure you we are keeping an eye on other Western Europeans, presume you are doing so as well.

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FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
Telcon	Telcon - S148	1	10/07/1973	P1/b1; P5; <i>MAC</i> <i>7/9/2005</i>

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COLLECTION:

Counsel's Office, White House

SERIES:

Kavanaugh, Brett - Subject Files

FOLDER TITLE:

State Department, Henry Kissinger Transcripts [2]

FRC ID:

9674

OA Num.:

1911

NARA Num.:

1829

FOIA IDs and Segments:

2018-0016-P

2017-0345-F

RESTRICTION CODES

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