002
NARA GENERAL COUNSEL
04/16/2003 16:15 FAX 3018370293

Notification Status Summary

Pending at the White House/Cleared by the Representative(s)

NLMS Case Number	Date Notice Sent to Reps and White House	Description	End of 45 Day Review Period
NLMS 2002-023	06/27/02	74 pages and 15:38 minutes of videotape segments of Reagan Presidential records (NOTE: Reagan reps and White House approved the release of 1580 pages.) (All P5)	11/07/02
* NLMS 2002-024	01/28/03	1,898 pages of Reagan Presidential records declassified in full or in part (73 pages of P5)	04/21/03
* NLMS 2002-046	11/18/02	14,690 pages of Reagan Presidential records in full and 22 pages in part (220 pages of P5)	04/13/03 → cleared 4/18
NLMS 2003-012	03/25/03	44,767 pages of Bush Presidential records	05/17/03 cleared 4/18
NLMS 2003-024	04/02/03	93 pages of Bush Presidential records	05/18/03 cleared 4/18
NLMS 2003-025	04/07/03	49 pages of Bush Presidential records	05/22/03 cleared 4/18
* NLMS 2003-026	04/10/03	14 pages of Bush Vice Presidential records (no P5)	05/26/03 cleared 4/18

* - orginal notice letter attached

National Archives and Records Administration

700 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20408-0001

VIA FACSIMILE
(NLMS 2002-024)

January 28, 2003

The Honorable Alberto R. Gonzales
Counsel to the President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20502

Dear Judge Gonzales:

In accordance with the requirements of the Presidential Records Act (PRA), 44 U.S.C. §§2201-2207 and Executive Order 13233, this letter constitutes a formal notice from the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) to the incumbent President of our intent to open Reagan Presidential records in response to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, mandatory review requests and systematic processing projects listed in Attachment A.

This material, consisting of 1,898 pages, was previously restricted from release under 44 U.S.C. §2204(a)(1) and/or 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(1). In accordance with sections 3.6 and 3.7 of Executive Order 12958, archivists at the Ronald Reagan Library returned copies of these documents to the originating and equity agencies for a classification review. These documents have subsequently been declassified in whole or in part by those agencies.

Please note that NARA has previously notified the White House of our intent to release all 1,898 pages in this notification in accordance with E.O. 12667. In letters dated April 6, 2001, May 9, 2001, and July 11, 2001, NARA notified the incumbent President of our intent to release a total of 36,191 pages and 43 minutes of tape recordings, of which these records are a part. The incumbent President made no decision with respect to these three notifications as issued under E.O. 12667. Therefore, in accordance with E.O. 13233, NARA is now providing notification of our intent to open this material.

Additionally, NARA also informed former President Reagan's representative, Joanne Drake, of our intent to release these records under E.O. 12667, as part of the 36,191 pages. Even though Ms. Drake informed us then that former President Reagan had no objection to the release of these records at that time, we are now providing notice to her under E.O. 13233.

In order to fulfill the White House Counsel's Office request that NARA provide the incumbent President with document-level information about formerly classified material proposed for release as well as the agencies authorizing their declassification, copies of these Reagan Presidential records can be found at Attachment B. These copies are annotated to include a list of all reviewing agencies for each document. Further, it should be noted that 73 pages of the 1,898 pages proposed for opening in this notification contain confidential communications requesting or submitting advice that would normally have been withheld prior to January 20, 2001, under the PRA restrictions in 44

U.S.C. §2204(a)(5), as they were asserted and narrowed by President Reagan. Copies of these documents have been segregated from the other documents and can be found at Attachment C.

Please inform us at your earliest convenience of your decision with respect to any privilege claims. Pursuant to E.O. 13233, NARA will not release the documents unless and until former President Reagan and the incumbent President agree to authorize access to the records.

If you have any questions relating to this request, please contact me at (202) 501-5700 or NARA General Counsel Gary M. Stern at (301) 837-3026.

Sincerely,

Nancy Kegan Smith

NANCY KEGAN SMITH
DIRECTOR
Presidential Materials Staff

Enclosure

cc: Brett Kavanaugh
Associate Counsel to the President
Paul Colborn
Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice
Gary M. Stern
General Counsel, National Archives and Records Administration
R. Duke Blackwood
Director, Ronald Reagan Library

National Archives and Records Administration
700 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20408-0001

VIA FACSIMILE
(NLMS 2002-046)

November 18, 2002

The Honorable Alberto R. Gonzales
Counsel to the President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Judge Gonzales:

In accordance with the requirements of the Presidential Records Act (PRA), 44 U.S.C. §§2201-2207 and Executive Order 13233, this letter constitutes a formal notice from the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) to the incumbent President of our intent to open Reagan Presidential records in response to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request listed in Attachment A.

This material, consisting of 14,958 pages, has been reviewed for all applicable FOIA exemptions, resulting in a total of 268 pages restricted in whole and 22 pages restricted in part. NARA is proposing to open 14,690 pages in full and 22 pages in part. Reagan Presidential records are no longer subject to closure under the Presidential restrictive categories of the PRA. However, it should be noted that the material proposed for opening in this notice includes 220 pages of documents containing confidential communications requesting or submitting advice or other information that would normally have been withheld prior to January 20, 2001, under the PRA restrictions in 44 U.S.C. §2204(a), as they were asserted and narrowed by President Reagan. A copy of these documents is included at Attachment B. Additionally, nine pages of the records proposed for opening were declassified by Reagan Library staff using Department of State declassification guidelines. A copy of these declassified documents is included at Attachment C.

Copies of all other documents proposed for release under this notice will be provided to you upon request. We are also concurrently informing former President Reagan's representative, Joanne Drake, of our intent to release these records. Please inform us at your earliest convenience of your decision with respect to any privilege claims. Pursuant to E.O. 13233, NARA will not release the documents unless and until former President Reagan and the incumbent President agree to authorize access to the records.

If you have any questions relating to this request, please contact me at (202) 501-5700 or NARA General Counsel Gary M. Stern at (301) 837-3026.

Sincerely,

Nancy Kegan Smith

NANCY KEGAN SMITH
DIRECTOR
Presidential Materials Staff

National Archives and Records Administration

700 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20408-0001

VIA FACSIMILE
(NLMS 2003-026)

April 10, 2003

The Honorable Alberto R. Gonzales
Counsel to the President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20502

Dear Judge Gonzales:

In accordance with the requirements of the Presidential Records Act (PRA), 44 U.S.C. §§2201-2207 and Executive Order 13233, this letter constitutes a formal notice from the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) to the incumbent President of our intent to open Bush Vice Presidential records in response to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request listed in Attachment A.

This material, consisting of 14 pages, has been reviewed for all applicable FOIA exemptions, resulting in no pages restricted in whole or in part. Therefore, NARA is proposing to open all 14 pages in full. Bush Vice Presidential records are no longer subject to closure under the Presidential restrictive categories of the PRA. However, it should be noted that the material proposed for opening in this notice contains no confidential communications requesting or submitting advice or information relating to appointment to Federal office that would formally have been withheld prior to January 20, 2001, under the PRA restrictions in 44 U.S.C. §2204(a), as they were asserted and narrowed by President Bush.

A copy of all records proposed for release under this notice will be provided to you upon your request. Please inform us at your earliest convenience of your decision with respect to any privilege claims. Pursuant to E.O. 13233, we are also concurrently informing former President Bush's representative, James W. Cicconi, and former President Reagan's representative, John Mintz, of our intent to release these records. NARA will not release the documents unless and until former Presidents Bush and Reagan and the incumbent President agree to authorize access to the records.

If you have any questions relating to this request, please contact me at (202) 501-5700 or NARA General Counsel Gary M. Stern at (301) 837-3026.

Sincerely,

Nancy Kegan Smith

NANCY KEGAN SMITH
DIRECTOR
Presidential Materials Staff

Enclosure

National Archives & Records Administration

[redacted]

to: Brett Kavanaugh

fax #: 202-456-5104

re: Notice Letters

date: 04/16/2003

pages: 6 Pages (including cover sheet).

494
7372

From the desk of...

Gary M. Stern
General Counsel
NARA
8601 Adelphi Road
College Park, MD 20740-6001
Telephone: 301-837-3026
Fax: 301-837-0293
Email: garym.stern@nara.gov

1786
REAGAN LIBRARY

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

ADD ON SYSTEM II

90054

SECRET/SENSITIVE

INFORMATION

February 13, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: RONALD C. ST. MARTIN
ELAINE L. MORTON

SUBJECT: CPPG on Libya, Thursday, February 13, 1986

The CPPG met today to review the effect of measures already undertaken against Libya and to consider preparations for further steps.

REDACTED

CTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

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REDACTED

State and Treasury reported on their efforts to establish a baseline of European economic activity in Libya so that we can (1) identify instances of undercutting with respect to our sanctions and (2) identify areas in which it would be productive to request that they cease activity otherwise helpful to the Libyans. Once the baseline is established (on a country-by-country basis) we will be able to use diplomatic demarches to contrast, if necessary, what was promised John Whitehead and what is happening, in fact. We will also be positioned to exert bilateral pressure in order to force cancellation of undesired activities.

NSC, DoS, AAA, Treasury

SECRET/SENSITIVE
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLS F95-023/3 #25
BY: QS NARA DATE 4/23/01

04/21/03 08:35 FAX 202 501 5709 NLMS ROOM 104 002

Two key proposals advanced by Treasury were (1) to expand the regulations implementing the January 7, 1986 Executive Order to prohibit countries from receiving parts imports from the U.S. which in turn would be used to service Libyan airliners (principally France), and (2) to devise a ban on the importation of oil to the U.S. from refineries (principally in Europe) that process Libyan crude. The burden of proof would be on the importer; Customs would enforce; and the regulations would be so burdensome that alternative source of supply likely would be sought. The partial dependence of the U.S. military on such refineries was also flagged as an issue.

Treasury is beginning to move from the "interpretative" to the "enforcement" phase of the E.O. and is considering selective referrals to Justice (in instances of non-compliance) so that the word will get out that we mean business. Those who deliberately defy the travel ban would be allowed to come back into the U.S. in a way that denies them a media opportunity (e.g., arrest at entry) but does subject them to investigation and prosecution afterward.

Except for a brief update on the current exercises in the Central Mediterranean, discussion of military measures was deferred until a second CPPG to be scheduled next week. At that time, the Freedom of Navigation exercise scheduled for late March will be discussed, along with the necessary supplementary measures with the public, the Congress, and states in the region.

Outstanding actions:

(1) Treasury is preparing a paper due a week from today on expanding the E.O. to capture sales of spare parts to Libyan airlines.

(2) Don Fortier will call General Odom to make certain that NSA is brought into the Libya Task Force efforts.

(3) The Libya Task Force will produce a country-by-country weekly list of the extent of undercutting.

ICTED

REDACTED

R

REDACTED

04/21/03 08:36 FAX 202 501 5709 NLMS ROOM 104 003

~~SECRET~~ Kemp

SYSTEM II
90784

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 18, 1984

Excellent memo to VP

Sit'n Rm 7/21

FYI

File

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: DONALD FORTIER
GEOFFREY KEMP
SHIRIN TAHIR-KHELI

SUBJECT: South Asian Security and U.S. Policy After the Vice President's Visit

We have already sent a National Security Study Directive proposal on India and Pakistan to you. This memorandum lays out the background and provides our assessment of the agenda before us. We need to consolidate the gains made during the Vice President's visit and seek ways of capitalizing on the unique opportunity currently available for enhanced South Asian security.

U.S. Goals and Objectives

Our highest priority goals in South Asia are (a) security and stability; and (b) reduction of Soviet influence. Indo-Pakistani normalization offers us the best hope of achieving both goals. It also frees us from the perennial problem of playing a zero sum game in the subcontinent.

Our objectives in South Asia are several: to keep Pakistan firm on Afghanistan by resisting Soviet pressure; to seek Indian assistance, where possible, toward Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan; to prevent two-front threats to Pakistani security; to seek enhanced political and military cooperation pursuant to NSDD-99 and, finally, to try to curb the nuclear arms competition on the subcontinent which has the possibility not only of destroying our ability to work with both parties, but also holds the potential for deepening instability and perhaps even nuclear conflict itself.

Naturally, we do not expect to replace the Soviets in India because of their extensive military supply relationship and Mrs. Gandhi's predelictions against our presence in Southwest Asia. But we can reduce the ability of the Soviets to make gains by exploiting the situation in South Asia.

~~SECRET~~
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

DOS, NSC
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLS F96-112/2 #140
By LOJ, NARA, Date 4/17/01

~~SECRET~~

04/21/03 08:36 FAX 202 501 5709 NLMS ROOM 104 004

Background

In recognition of the importance of South Asia, the Administration has tried to improve U.S. relations with both India and Pakistan. We have done so despite Indian unhappiness with our security assistance to Pakistan and Pakistani doubts regarding our staying power.

Despite local moves to foster regional cooperation, either bilaterally in the case of India and Pakistan, or multilaterally, as in the formation of the South Asia forum for Regional Cooperation (SARC), India's neighbors remain suspicious of Mrs. Gandhi's intentions. [redacted] complained bitterly about Indian meddling in [redacted] disturbances [redacted] and a coup attempt in December. [redacted] held India responsible for the level of Tamil terrorist violence since it was supported by Tamils in India's Tamil Nadu state. Indeed, we have found in our dialogue with South Asian leaders over the past three years a constant refrain of real or potential Indian interference leading toward national disintegration in their countries. India on the other hand, has complained of the dangers inherent in our becoming involved.

Our continuing dialogue with Mrs. Gandhi through Presidential letters and visits of senior U.S. and Indian officials has helped to mitigate these concerns by emphasizing our interest in Indian stability and territorial integrity, along with that of its neighbors. The Vice President's efforts in May were particularly helpful and, no doubt, instrumental in toning down official Indian reaction to charges of outside interference during the Punjab disturbances last month. Thus, we have developed some assets with India: a willingness to discuss issues and be sensitive to Indian concerns; a commitment to stability; a recognition in New Delhi that Soviet occupation of Afghanistan necessitates a U.S. security relationship with Pakistan. We have also tried to walk a fine line by implying that there are responsible limits to U.S.-Pakistani security cooperation, but that these limits can be pushed backward as a result of a worsening of the situation in Afghanistan. The implicit message is: it is in Indian interest to become more active in pushing for a settlement; the U.S.-Pakistani relationship is not without limits.

Our assets with Pakistan are, of course, more concrete: a six year $3.2 billion program; our willingness to sell advanced weapons; a commitment to keeping the Afghanistan issue internationally visible and to support Pakistan's strong position vis-a-vis Soviet occupation and its hosting the 2.8 million Afghan refugees. As the Vice President's trip indicated, we have devoted attention and resources toward the relationship and Pakistanis have felt strengthened by the support. We have also raised the Pakistani stake in their relationship with us and thus slowed, although not eliminated, their pursuit of a nuclear option.

04/21/03 08:36 FAX 202 501 5709 NLMS ROOM 104 005

Assessing the Current Situation

A fundamental change in India's relationship with its neighbors is underway. Thus far, India has had the luxury of interfering in regional affairs without undue concern about its own internal security. In the last year, however, India has had to cope with dissension in the north in Kashmir, in the northeast in Assam, in the south in Tamil Nadu and in the west in Punjab. Major communal riots in Bombay killed over 300 people. While the number of assassinations by Sikh extremist groups was already on the rise in May, what followed in June was different by an order of magnitude. This situation is made more urgent by the fact that the Punjab, where 80 percent of the Indian population of 14 million Sikhs live, is economically very important to India and that it is a province bordering on Pakistan. Hence, Mrs. Gandhi has subsequently become careful in mending her fences with her neighbors. She has promised not to interfere in Sri Lankan affairs and its handling of the communal situation. [redacted] (No doubt, the decision was influenced by her recent experience with a well-armed Sikh population rising against the Central government).

Absent other problems, Mrs. Gandhi can cope with the Tamil issue in Sri Lanka and its domestic impact in Tamil Nadu. Her capacity to manage a series of simultaneous crises, including Sikh agitation in the Punjab and its effect on the army, is more limited. Therefore, Indian moves toward normalization with Pakistan are likely to continue, albeit haltingly. For example: (1) discussions of a "Treaty of Peace and Good Neighborliness" should move forward; (2) government-controlled propaganda should diminish and; (3) [redacted]

A pause in India's quarrels with Bangladesh is also evident. Border skirmishes have diminished and the readiness of forces in the area has declined. India and Bangladesh signed an agreement on June 10 to withdraw troops from their border by the end of this month. This move is necessitated by the use of Indian army units from the region around Bangladesh in the Punjab.

U.S. Policy Issues

1. Indo-Pakistani Normalization. Ironically, the potential for progress and the danger of losing gains are both greater today than when the Vice President visited India and Pakistan. In both countries he mentioned a U.S. desire for improved Indo-Pakistani relations, stating U.S. willingness to do whatever was "reasonably possible" to help. Improved communication, which started early in the Administration, with Gandhi and Zia is helpful. We need to focus on concrete and imaginative ways of facilitating the rapprochement, proposing confidence building measures while cautioning restraint on the Pakistanis in the Punjab. Our strategy is to use this normalization

04/21/03 08:37 FAX 202 501 5709 NLMS ROOM 104 006

process to limit Soviet opportunities to use the "Indian card" to pressure Pakistan on Afghanistan.

2. Afghanistan. Pakistani support for the Mujahadeen is critical for our present Afghan policy. Thus our goals here today are to maintain that support and to find ways of diffusing Soviet pressure on Pakistan to change policy. Pressure within Pakistan for a shift in its refugee policy must also be resisted. Our policy must focus on a variety of components: (a) military, i.e., support of the Mujahadeen which creates an incentive for the Soviets to negotiate by raising the costs; (b) political, i.e., enhancing the chances for a political settlement via the U.N. process currently in train or through alternative means while raising the political costs for the Soviets in the third world via the Afghan issue; (c) economic, i.e., reducing the costs of the 2.8 million Afghans within Pakistan. We also need to maintain better worldwide visibility of the Afghan issue and increase Allied contribution to the resistance. This helps Pakistan in two ways: it helps to legitimize support for the resistance and reduce their exposure, while creating an environment in which Soviet pressure against Pakistan would be much more obvious. To buffer Pakistan, we need to consider economic opportunities of refugee relief which local Pakistanis also see as beneficial. Setting up small industries, ecological programs, tube wells, etc. which enhance local assets might help defuse cries of refugee burden in areas where they are concentrated. We also hope to engage Mrs. Gandhi through a "non paper" on Afghanistan now in her hands. The idea here would be to convince the Soviets that a political solution leading to a withdrawal of Soviet forces is the most desirable option.

3. Economic Issues. Of the issues raised in Delhi (IDA VII, the textile quota and ADB), only the ADB carries some hope for progress. The U.S. has agreed "in principle" to Indian borrowing. The problem remains how much and when. State and Treasury positions continue to differ. Movement on ADB may help offset lack of progress elsewhere in our bilateral relations with India.

4. Arms Sales/Technology Transfer. We have agreed in principle to the sale of AIM 9-L to Pakistan. The Pakistanis have not yet been informed of this decision.

There is little chance that the MOU with India, on which all technology transfers are predicated, will make much headway. [redacted] A SIG just prior to the Vice President's trip failed to resolve the inter-agency differences. In order to prevent the MOU issue from affecting our relations, we must: (a) see if we could use India's deep interest in technology as a wedge to cure diversion problems; (b) make some progress on other issues with India to offset lack of movement here; (c) set up acceptable benchmarks for

04/21/03 08:37 FAX 202 501 5709 NLMS ROOM 104 007

India (on Afghanistan, in NAM) which we see as suitable returns of technology transfer, however limited in nature.

5. Nuclear Matters. There is a fundamental conflict between U.S. nonproliferation policy and law and India's view that we have a "contractual obligation" to provide material support for Tarapur through our 1963 agreement for nuclear cooperation. While Tarapur was not raised in the Delhi talks, it could surface again as an irritant.

You have received a separate memorandum on the Pakistani program and future U.S. policy.

6. Narcotics. Drug traffic from the Pak-Afghan border increasingly moves through India to the West. Zia said he welcomed U.S. help and needed more. It may be worthwhile to make some trilateral effort involving the U.S., India and Pakistan in coping with the problem.

Our interests in South Asia are important. Expansion of Soviet influence there and/or a disintegration of the present order would have a substantial strategic impact. Our capacity to manage crises in the Persian Gulf region would be diminished. Pressures against the PRC and ASEAN countries would also increase. While there are limits to our cooperation bilaterally with India and Pakistan and their cooperation with each other, we have important interests and some assets with which to work. We will have to try to use them more effectively. The payoff can be a more stable South Asia region.

04/21/03 08:37 FAX 202 501 5709 NLMS ROOM 104 008

MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~ Kemp

SYSTEM II
90784

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 18, 1984

~~SECRET~~

Excellent memo to VP

Shirin 7/21

FYI

File

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: DONALD FORTIER
GEOFFREY KEMP
SHIRIN TAHIR-KHELI

SUBJECT: South Asian Security and U.S. Policy After the Vice President's Visit

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Naturally, we do not expect to replace the Soviets in India because of their extensive military supply relationship and Mrs. Gandhi's predelictions against our presence in Southwest Asia. But we can reduce the ability of the Soviets to make gains by exploiting the situation in South Asia.

~~SECRET~~
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLS F96-112/2 #157
By LOS, NARA, Date 4/17/01
DOS, NSC

04/21/03 08:38 FAX 202 501 5709 NLMS ROOM 104 009

Background

In recognition of the importance of South Asia, the Administration has tried to improve U.S. relations with both India and Pakistan. We have done so despite Indian unhappiness with our security assistance to Pakistan and Pakistani doubts regarding our staying power.

Despite local moves to foster regional cooperation, either bilaterally in the case of India and Pakistan, or multilaterally, as in the formation of the South Asia forum for Regional Cooperation (SARC), India's neighbors remain suspicious of Mrs. Gandhi's intentions. [redacted] complained bitterly about Indian meddling in [redacted] disturbances, [redacted] and a coup attempt in December. [redacted] held India responsible for the level of Tamil terrorist violence since it was supported by Tamils in India's Tamil Nadu state. Indeed, we have found in our dialogue with South Asian leaders over the past three years a constant refrain of real or potential Indian interference leading toward national disintegration in their countries. India on the other hand, has complained of the dangers inherent in our becoming involved.

Our continuing dialogue with Mrs. Gandhi through Presidential letters and visits of senior U.S. and Indian officials has helped to mitigate these concerns by emphasizing our interest in Indian stability and territorial integrity, along with that of its neighbors. The Vice President's efforts in May were particularly helpful and, no doubt, instrumental in toning down official Indian reaction to charges of outside interference during the Punjab disturbances last month. Thus, we have developed some assets with India: a willingness to discuss issues and be sensitive to Indian concerns; a commitment to stability; a recognition in New Delhi that Soviet occupation of Afghanistan necessitates a U.S. security relationship with Pakistan. We have also tried to walk a fine line by implying that there are responsible limits to U.S.-Pakistani security cooperation, but that these limits can be pushed backward as a result of a worsening of the situation in Afghanistan. The implicit message is: it is in Indian interest to become more active in pushing for a settlement; the U.S.-Pakistani relationship is not without limits.

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04/21/03 08:38 FAX 202 501 5709 NLMS ROOM 104 010

Assessing the Current Situation

A fundamental change in India's relationship with its neighbors is underway. Thus far, India has had the luxury of interfering in regional affairs without undue concern about its own internal security. In the last year, however, India has had to cope with dissension in the north in Kashmir, in the northeast in Assam, in the south in Tamil Nadu and in the west in Punjab. Major communal riots in Bombay killed over 300 people. While the number of assassinations by Sikh extremist groups was already on the rise in May, what followed in June was different by an order of magnitude. This situation is made more urgent by the fact that the Punjab, where 80 percent of the Indian population of 14 million Sikhs live, is economically very important to India and that it is a province bordering on Pakistan. Hence, Mrs. Gandhi has subsequently become careful in mending her fences with her neighbors. She has promised not to interfere in Sri Lankan affairs and its handling of the communal situation. [redacted] (No doubt, the decision was influenced by her recent experience with a well-armed Sikh population rising against the Central government).

Absent other problems, Mrs. Gandhi can cope with the Tamil issue in Sri Lanka and its domestic impact in Tamil Nadu. Her capacity to manage a series of simultaneous crises, including Sikh agitation in the Punjab and its effect on the army, is more limited. Therefore, Indian moves toward normalization with Pakistan are likely to continue, albeit haltingly. For example: (1) discussions of a "Treaty of Peace and Good Neighborliness" should move forward; (2) government-controlled propaganda should diminish and; (3) [redacted]

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04/21/03 08:38 FAX 202 501 5709 NLMS ROOM 104 011

process to limit Soviet opportunities to use the "Indian card" to pressure Pakistan on Afghanistan.

2. Afghanistan. Pakistani support for the Mujahadeen is critical for our present Afghan policy. Thus our goals here today are to maintain that support and to find ways of diffusing Soviet pressure on Pakistan to change policy. Pressure within Pakistan for a shift in its refugee policy must also be resisted. Our policy must focus on a variety of components: (a) military, i.e., support of the Mujahadeen which creates an incentive for the Soviets to negotiate by raising the costs; (b) political, i.e., enhancing the chances for a political settlement via the U.N. process currently in train or through alternative means while raising the political costs for the Soviets in the third world via the Afghan issue; (c) economic, i.e., reducing the costs of the 2.8 million Afghans within Pakistan. We also need to maintain better worldwide visibility of the Afghan issue and increase Allied contribution to the resistance. This helps Pakistan in two ways: it helps to legitimize support for the resistance and reduce their exposure, while creating an environment in which Soviet pressure against Pakistan would be much more obvious. To buffer Pakistan, we need to consider economic opportunities of refugee relief which local Pakistanis also see as beneficial. Setting up small industries, ecological programs, tube wells, etc. which enhance local assets might help defuse cries of refugee burden in areas where they are concentrated. We also hope to engage Mrs. Gandhi through a "non paper" on Afghanistan now in her hands. The idea here would be to convince the Soviets that a political solution leading to a withdrawal of Soviet forces is the most desirable option.

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There is little chance that the MOU with India, on which all technology transfers are predicated, will make much headway. [redacted] A SIG just prior to the Vice President's trip failed to resolve the inter-agency differences. In order to prevent the MOU issue from affecting our relations, we must: (a) see if we could use India's deep interest in technology as a wedge to cure diversion problems; (b) make some progress on other issues with India to offset lack of movement here; (c) set up acceptable benchmarks for

04/21/03 08:39 FAX 202 501 5709 NLMS ROOM 104 012

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India (on Afghanistan, in NAM) which we see as suitable returns of technology transfer, however limited in nature.

5. Nuclear Matters. There is a fundamental conflict between U.S. nonproliferation policy and law and India's view that we have a "contractual obligation" to provide material support for Tarapur through our 1963 agreement for nuclear cooperation. While Tarapur was not raised in the Delhi talks, it could surface again as an irritant.

   You have received a separate memorandum on the Pakistani program and future U.S. policy.

6. Narcotics. Drug traffic from the Pak-Afghan border increasingly moves through India to the West. Zia said he welcomed U.S. help and needed more. It may be worthwhile to make some trilateral effort involving the U.S., India and Pakistan in coping with the problem.

Our interests in South Asia are important. Expansion of Soviet influence there and/or a disintegration of the present order would have a substantial strategic impact. Our capacity to manage crises in the Persian Gulf region would be diminished. Pressures against the PRC and ASEAN countries would also increase. While there are limits to our cooperation bilaterally with India and Pakistan and their cooperation with each other, we have important interests and some assets with which to work. We will have to try to use them more effectively. The payoff can be a more stable South Asia region.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 19, 1985

MEETING WITH BRITISH PRIME MINISTER MARGARET THATCHER

DATE: February 20, 1985
LOCATION: Oval Office, Blue Room, Family Dining Room
TIME: 11:30 a.m. - 2:40 p.m.

FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE

I. PURPOSE: To continue close consultations with Mrs. Thatcher.

II. BACKGROUND: In a broader sense, Wednesday's session will be a continuation of the pre-Christmas Camp David meeting. For this round, Mrs. Thatcher will be accompanied by both Foreign Secretary Howe and Defense Minister Heseltine, as she has expressed special interest in discussing strategic topics. Since Mrs. Thatcher will be addressing a joint session of Congress, the White House meetings will commence a little later than usual with a 15 to 20 minute tête-à-tête session, followed by a working lunch in the Blue Room and a meeting in the Family Dining Room. The Family Dining Room session is being billed as a seminar on "Strategic Stability." It will focus on East-West relations and arms control questions.

This month marks her 10th year as leader of the Conservative Party, and she has been Prime Minister for nearly 6 years. While Mrs. Thatcher's Parliamentary majority remains large, her political popularity is on the wane because of her uncompromising style and unresolved economic problems, reflected by the weak pound and high unemployment. By refusing to bend on the year-old miners strike, she has forcefully demonstrated that no union can bring Britain to a halt. Yet many claim the strike could have ended long ago on terms favorable to the government, with far less economic disruption.

Our bilateral relations remain close and special. She is among your strongest and most vocal supporters, and we and the British pursue similar foreign policy goals. This visit offers an opportunity to build on the Camp David discussions and to continue our extensive consultations on a wide range of international topics. George's comprehensive briefing paper addresses the primary subjects: Arms control and East-West relations; the Middle East; Central America; economic issues; terrorism; and Northern Ireland.

cc Vice President
Ed Meese
Don Regan
Mike Deaver

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F97-013/2 #1
6/6/01

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Your talking points spell out our position on these questions. Earlier this month she met with Nicaraguan Vice President Ramirez and we expect that Central America will be on her mind. She was very firm and critical of the Sandanistas in this meeting. You have sent her a cable of thanks.

For some time, the British have been dissatisfied with the mandatory on-site inspection provision in Article 10 of our draft Chemical Weapons (CW) Ban Treaty. While supportive of our overall approach, Mrs. Thatcher may urge more flexible Article 10 language that permits on-site inspection, but allows for graduated access over seven days to some suspect sites, as opposed to our proposal for mandatory access within two days to all suspect sites. Considering the risks of Soviet cheating, we recommend that you hold firm on our approach, but express the willingness to have your arms control specialists consider whether any alternatives might be developed that would be as effective a deterrent as our Article 10.

Unlike recent meetings, there is no major bilateral irritant at this time. There has been no change in the civil aviation situation, but Mrs. Thatcher reportedly now realizes the limitations on Executive Branch actions with regard to private treble damage claims. You may want to stress that liberalization of the aviation regime is in both our interests. You may also wish to underline the need to intensify the Anglo-Irish dialogue on Northern Ireland. Mrs. Thatcher shares our concerns about international terrorism but naturally focuses on the IRA. You might seek to enlist her continuing cooperation in combatting terrorism and may want to express concern that the British have reduced the security force around our GLCM base at Greenham Common.

On Thursday, Secretaries Shultz, Baker, Baldrige, and Block are having a separate economic roundtable with Mrs. Thatcher. You will want to emphasize the need to build on the success of the London Summit, and urge her to join us in seeking agreement at the Bonn Summit to begin a new round of trade negotiations by early next year. The British reportedly are also seeking ways to induce New Zealand to resume its full defense responsibilities. Prime Minster Lange may participate in a debate at Oxford in early March. If he does, Mrs. Thatcher will see him and will undoubtedly hold Lange's feet to the fire.

This year also marks the 200th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and the United Kingdom. You and Mrs. Reagan have agreed to join the Thatchers at a February 20 dinner at the British Embassy, hosted by Ambassador and Mrs. Wright, commemorating this historic event. Your dinner toast is being forwarded directly by the Speechwriters.

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George's comprehensive memo is at Tab A. Your suggested talking points and Mrs. Thatcher's bio are at Tab B. Your departure statement is at Tab C.

III. PARTICIPANTS

11:30 a.m. - Pre-brief - Oval Office

The President
The Vice President
Secretary Shultz
Secretary Weinberger
Donald P. Regan
Robert C. McFarlane
Ambassador Price
Jack F. Matlock, Jr.
Assistant Secretary Burt

12:00 noon - 12:15 P.M. - Private Meeting - Oval Office

The President
Jack F. Matlock, Jr. (notetaker)

Prime Minister Thatcher
Charles Powell (notetaker)

12:15 p.m. - 1:15 p.m. - Working Lunch - Family Dining Room

The President
The Vice President
Secretary Shultz
Secretary Weinberger
Donald P. Regan
Robert C. McFarlane
Ambassador Price
Jack F. Matlock, Jr.
Ronald F. Lehman
Assistant Secretary Burt
Assistant Secretary Perle

Prime Minister Thatcher
Foreign Secretary Howe
Defense Minister Heseltine
Ambassador Wright
Robin Butler, Principal Private Secretary to Mrs. Thatcher
Charles Powell, Private Secretary to Mrs. Thatcher

04/21/03 08:40 FAX 202 501 5709 NLMS ROOM 104 016

1:15 p.m. - 2:30 p.m. - Seminar - Blue Room
The President
The Vice President
Secretary Shultz
Secretary Weinberger
Donald P. Regan
Robert C. McFarlane
Ambassador Price
Ronald F. Lehman
Jack F. Matlock, Jr.
Kenneth L. Adelman
Assistant Secretary Burt
Assistant Secretary Perle
Lt. Gen. John T. Chain, Jr.

Prime Minister Thatcher
Foreign Secretary Howe
Defense Minister Heseltine
Ambassador Wright
Robin Butler, Principal Private Secretary
to Mrs. Thatcher
Charles Powell, Private Secretary to
Mrs. Thatcher

IV. PRESS PLAN: Photo Opportunity at beginning of Oval Office meeting. Full press coverage of departure statements.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS:

11:30 a.m. - 12:00 noon	Pre-brief in Oval Office
12:00 noon - 12:15 p.m.	Private meeting (plus notetakers) in Oval Office
12:15 - 1:15 p.m.	Working Lunch in Blue Room
1:15 - 2:30 p.m.	Seminar in Family Dining Room

Attachments
Tab A Shultz Memo
Tab B Talking Points and Bio

Prepared by:
Peter R. Sommer

04/21/03 08:40 FAX 202 501 5709 NLMS ROOM 104 017

MEMORANDUM

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Sommers

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON 9212

F97-013/2 #25
BY NJ NARA DATE 6/6/01
NSC/DOS

December 21, 1984

Thatcher Visit

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ACTION

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE

SUBJECT: Ambassador Price's Message on The Thatcher Visit

Ambassador Price has sent you a thoughtful and interesting message outlining the topics he expects Mrs. Thatcher to focus on during your December 22nd meeting (Tab A). My briefing package for the Thatcher visit and my separate paper on SDI cover the various topics that Charlie cites. Charlie does, however, put additional emphasis on two points that you may wish to address in Saturday's meeting.

On SDI, Charlie suggests, and I agree, that you urge Mrs. Thatcher to set the record straight on her support for SDI at the press conference she will hold at Andrews AFB just prior to her departure. You will wish to underline to her that perceptions that SDI lacks Allied support will hurt us at the upcoming Geneva talks.

On terrorism, you should express our appreciation for Britain's excellent cooperation in our antiterrorist efforts and praise British efforts to obtain more awareness and activity by other Europeans, especially the French and the Germans, in countering the terrorist threat.

Recommendation

OK ___ NO ___

That you make these additional points on SDI and terrorism in your December 22nd meeting with Mrs Thatcher. (I will provide you a separate card on these points during the prebrief)

Attachment:

Tab A Ambassador Price's Message

Prepared by:
Peter R. Sommer

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04/21/03 08:40 FAX 202 501 5709 NLMS ROOM 104 018

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SECRET ATTACHMENT

TAKE TO CAMP DAVID

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON 8128

49*

MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER MARGARET THATCHER

DATE: November 15, 1986
LOCATION: Camp David
TIME: 10:45 a.m. - 1:40 p.m.

FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER

I. PURPOSE: To continue your close, personal consultations with Mrs. Thatcher, with a focus on arms control.

II. BACKGROUND: You last met with Mrs. Thatcher at the Tokyo Summit. She is nearing her 12th year as leader of the Conservative Party -- the last 7½ years of which she has been Prime Minister. While her Parliamentary majority remains secure, her uncompromising personal style, long tenure in office, and continuing economic problems -- especially high unemployment (over 11 percent) -- have led to much criticism.

Nonetheless, after trailing Labor for more than a year by 4 to 6 percentage points in the polls, Mrs. Thatcher and the Tories are all of a sudden riding high -- neck and neck, or even slightly ahead of Labor. There is thus much speculation that she will call elections next Spring, though her mandate runs to June 1988.

While she remains one of your most ardent supporters, Mrs. Thatcher is concerned about the strategic implications of your Reykjavik proposals. She requested this meeting well before your meeting with Gorbachev. But Mrs. Thatcher is clearly coming to seek reassurances about Reykjavik: in particular, that strategic reductions (especially the elimination of ballistic missiles) will not undercut deterrence and will not overlook the conventional imbalance in Europe; and reassurances that our negotiating proposals will not put in question the UK Trident program and undermine her reelection chances.

You will recall she spoke to you on the phone about her concerns, the day after Reykjavik. Specifically, she questions whether we can have effective deterrence without ballistic missiles. She does not believe it prudent to make major reductions without redressing conventional and chemical weapons imbalances. Mrs. Thatcher also fears that elimination of ballistic missiles will undercut her domestic political position. Her main rival, Labor -- under Neil Kinnock -- advocates that Britain give up its independent nuclear force and remove all U.S. nuclear weapons from British soil. This would deal a severe blow to NATO. We,

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and our Allies, need to speak out with one voice and one theme on the adverse consequences of Labor's security policies. How we do it, however, is a delicate matter.

Earlier in the week, I sent you a background paper that addressed Mrs. Thatcher's special concerns in some detail. I have also enclosed (at Tab C) full talking points that explain your Reykjavik proposals and respond directly to her concerns. We also have incorporated their central thrust in your talking point cards (at Tab B).

Some of Mrs. Thatcher's concerns are shared by other European Allies. You will recall that Kohl raised similar points. Indeed, there are reports that the British, French, Germans, and Italians have launched a new effort to better coordinate their arms control positions. Therefore, it would be useful for you to stress to Mrs. Thatcher that you have no intention of abandoning nuclear deterrence, which will not be altered by the elimination of ballistic missiles. Our remaining strategic nuclear retaliatory forces -- although smaller and of a different composition -- would be facing a much smaller Soviet threat without fast flying ballistic missiles and, therefore, would be a stronger deterrent. As long as the Soviets lead in ballistic missiles, and we retain our technological lead in bombers and cruise missiles, eliminating ballistic missiles -- while maintaining the nuclear deterrent -- is to our advantage.

You will, as well, want to emphasize that prospects for cuts in nuclear arms make it all the more important to pursue conventional force reductions on a sound basis. You will recall there is a disagreement over the best forum for any new "Atlantic-to-the-Urals" negotiations. We and our European partners want to include the French -- they are not involved in the current, more limited MBFR talks. But while we believe the negotiations must be Alliance-to-Alliance, with instructions decided by NATO, the French -- with some European support -- desire negotiations under the far less structured CSCE framework. We are working with Allies, like Mrs. Thatcher, to move the French to an acceptable compromise.

On other arms control matters, Mrs. Thatcher has been critical of the so-called broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty and of our plans to exceed the SALT II numerical sublimits. The press prematurely reported that we would break out of SALT numerical constraints this week. We do not, however, expect her to spend much time on ABM and SALT, given Soviet violations.

Earlier this week, I sent you a background paper addressing the complexities and competing interests in our trilateral US-UK-Argentine relationship. Our relations with Britain --

04/21/03 08:41 FAX 202 501 5709 NLMS ROOM 104 020

and your close personal relationship with Mrs. Thatcher -- in a broad sense stand in the way of our efforts to strengthen Argentina's burgeoning democracy. While Mrs. Thatcher recognizes the benefits of a democratic Argentina, she has been unyielding on entering any negotiations that conceivably could address sovereignty over the Falklands/Malvinas. She also has steadfastly refused to approve the transfer of major arms to Argentina.

Britain's recent unilateral declaration of a fisheries protection zone around the Falklands -- and Argentina's strong reaction -- offer an opportunity for you to stress the importance we attach to democracy in Argentina. While we clearly do not want to make things more difficult for her domestically, you will want to tell Mrs. Thatcher that we cannot continually put off how best to nurture Argentina's democracy. And that sooner rather than later, we will want to return to the question of military aircraft for Argentina. You should expect a typical Thatcher barrage.

Terrorism will likely also be high on her agenda. This is an area in which our "special relationship" takes on a true meaning -- there is real cooperation and commonality of views. On Monday, the EC -- except for Greece -- announced, at British urging, joint measures against Syria. We are announcing our measures against Syria November 14. You will want to applaud her strong stance against terrorism and stress the need for similar cooperation from other Europeans.

There are indications that she may wish to discuss briefly the Middle East and South Africa. In both areas, the thrust will be on the need to continue to work closely together as we look for ways to promote peaceful progress. George's scope paper (at Tab A) addresses these issues and provides additional insights on other aspects of the agenda.

Unlike some of your earlier meetings, there is no burning bilateral matter (e.g., civil aviation). She did, however, just write you to express concern over increased protectionist pressures in the U.S. Specifically, she objected to the provision in the Superfund legislation which introduces differential tax treatment between domestic and imported oil. Britain, of course, is an oil exporter. You will want to acknowledge her letter.

Visits like Mrs. Thatcher's form the essence of consultations to which we and our partners attach such significance. In this regard, you will recall that on her last visit to Camp David (December 1984) she obtained our agreement to make four points -- in her press conference -- characterizing common views about the purpose of SDI. They were: 1) we do not seek superiority; 2) SDI deployment is a matter for negotiation; 3) our objective is to enhance deterrence; and 4) negotiations with the Soviets (which were about to resume)

04/21/03 08:41 FAX 202 501 5709 NLMS ROOM 104 021

are aimed at achieving security at reduced levels of offensive systems. Given her concerns today, and the changed climate since December 1984, the last point, in particular, sounds somewhat hollow.

Nonetheless, she may make a similar effort this year. We have queried the British, and her top aides insist she has no plans to propose a joint statement. However, they leave the door slightly ajar, by saying that should discussions lead to the development of common points for public use, they would not object. We, however, have found that in most cases -- even with friends like Mrs. Thatcher -- that joint statements, which are usually a compromise, do not serve our policy interests. Hence, we are watching this carefully and will give you an update at the prebrief. Just in case, State and my staff are preparing contingency points.

III. PARTICIPANTS: Informal Cocktails and Working Lunch

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Secretary Shultz
Donald T. Regan
John M. Poindexter
Ambassador Charles Price
Asst. Secretary Rozanne L. Ridgway
Peter R. Sommer, NSC

U.K.
Mrs. Thatcher
Ambassador Antony Acland
Private Secretary Powell

IV. PRESS PLAN: White House photographers at appropriate points during Camp David schedule. Pool press coverage of Mrs. Thatcher's arrival.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

10:45	Camp David	Mrs. Thatcher arrives
10:50-11:50	Aspen Cabin	Private meeting with Mrs. Thatcher
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1:40		Mrs. Thatcher departs

Attachments
Tab A Shultz' scope paper and Thatcher's Bio
Tab B Talking Points
Tab C Detailed Arms Control Talking Points

Prepared by:
Peter R. Sommer

04/21/03 08:42 FAX 202 501 5709 NLMS ROOM 104 022

CONFIDENTIAL W/
SECRET ATTACHMENT

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER MARGARET THATCHER

DATE: November 15, 1986
LOCATION: Camp David
TIME: 10:45 a.m. - 1:40 p.m.

FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER

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NSC, DoS F97-013/2 #85

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SECRET ATTACHMENT

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04/21/03 08:42 FAX 202 501 5709 NLMS ROOM 104 023

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04/21/03 08:42 FAX 202 501 5709 NLMS ROOM 104 024

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04/21/03 08:43 FAX 202 501 5709 NLMS ROOM 104 025

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U.K.
Mrs. Thatcher
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Private Secretary Powell

IV. PRESS PLAN: White House photographers at appropriate points during Camp David schedule. Pool press coverage of Mrs. Thatcher's arrival.

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1:40		Mrs. Thatcher departs

Attachments
Tab A Shultz' scope paper and Thatcher's Bio
Tab B Talking Points
Tab C Detailed Arms Control Talking Points

Prepared by:
Peter R. Sommer

04/21/03 08:43 FAX 202 501 5709 NLMS ROOM 104 026

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PAGE 01 OF 02 BONN 4257 DTG: 091252Z DEC 81 PSN: 043240
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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 05 BONN 24257
EXDIS - MILITARY ADDRESSEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEC
GENEVA ALSO FOR USINF
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 12-09-1991 (WOESSNER, WILLIAM M.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, PINT, PARM, EGEN, US, GE
SUBJECT: SCHMIDT JANUARY 5 VISIT TO WASHINGTON:
- GENERAL OBJECTIVES AND OBSERVATIONS
-
-

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: ALTHOUGH CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT HAS RECENTLY REGAINED POLITICAL STANDING AT HOME IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE PRESIDENT'S ARMS CONTROL SPEECH AND THE BREZHNEV VISIT, POLITICAL PROBLEMS WITHIN THE SPD AND WITH HIS COALITION PARTNER PERSIST. THE U.S. AND THE FRG HAVE

DoS
DECLASSIFIED
F97-030/2 #4
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CTS NARA DATE 4/20/01

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DRAWN MUCH CLOSER ON INF ISSUES AND SCHMIDT REMAINS FULLY COMMITTED TO IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NATO "DOUBLE DECISION." WE NEED, NEVERTHELESS, TO EMPHASIZE TO HIM THE IMPORTANCE OF HIS STANDING BY THAT DECISION IN THE FACE OF CONTINUING PRESSURES FROM HIS PARTY AND THE FDP LEFT. AN ADDITIONAL IMPORTANT U.S. OBJECTIVE DURING THE SCHMIDT VISIT SHOULD BE TO IMPRESS ON HIM THE CONTINUING NEED FOR THE FRG TO IMPLEMENT GERMAN NATIONAL AND NATO CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS, IN SPITE OF STRONG ADVERSE DOMESTIC POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FACTORS. IN THIS CONNECTION WE SHOULD EXPLAIN CURRENT CONGRESSIONAL AND OTHER U.S. PUBLIC PRESSURES FOR GREATER ALLIED CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE BURDEN. WE SHOULD ALSO ENLIST CONTINUED GERMAN UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT FOR SUCH EAST-WEST ISSUES AS AFGHANISTAN AND POLAND, AND ATTEMPT ALSO TO INCREASE GERMAN COOPERATION IN EAST-WEST ECONOMIC ISSUES. END SUMMARY

3. SCHMIDT RIDING HIGH POLITICALLY...

FOLLOWING PRESIDENT REAGAN'S SPEECH, AND BONN'S SUCCESSFUL HANDLING OF THE BREZHNEV VISIT, SCHMIDT SEEMS TO HAVE REGAINED THE POLITICAL STATURE DOMESTICALLY THAT HE HAD LOST LAST FALL BECAUSE OF PROBLEMS WITH HIS PARTY AND HIS HEALTH. CASTING HIMSELF IN THE ROLE OF "INTERPRETER" BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS,

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

HE HAS WON CREDIT FOR CONTRIBUTING IN LARGE PART TO THE RESUMPTION OF CONTACTS BETWEEN THEM AND THE LAUNCHING OF INF TALKS ON THE BASIS OF POSITIONS PARTLY SUGGESTED BY THE FRG. THIS HAS ALLOWED HIM TO PRE-EMPT FOR NOW THE MOMENTARILY QUIESCENT PEACE MOVEMENT HERE TO THE POINT THAT PRESS SPOKESMAN BECKER COULD ASSERT THAT SCHMIDT IS THE LEADER OF THE MOVEMENT.

4. ...BUT BESET BY PROBLEMS

THESE MAY BE ONLY TRANSITORY GAINS, HOWEVER. THE DIFFICULTIES OF SCHMIDT AND THE SPD AND THE COALITION PERSIST. HEADLINES THIS WEEKEND HERALD THE "HIGHEST UNEMPLOYMENT IN 28 YEARS." BUDGET-CUTTING EFFORTS ARE REVEALING STRAINS WITHIN THE BUREAUCRACY AND THE COALITION. THE PEACE MOVEMENT, THOUGH QUIET FOR THE MOMENT, HAS NOT ABATED. PRESSURE FROM THE SPD AND FDP LEFT AGAINST THE NATO DOUBLE DECISION CONTINUES, WITH CONGRESSES IN BREMEN (THE SPD) AND IN BERLIN (FDP) LAST WEEKEND VOTING AGAINST DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. LRTNF. WITHIN HIS OWN PARTY SCHMIDT MUST CONTEND WITH THE LIKES

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SIT989 DATE 12/Ø9/81 TOR: 343/1642Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /ØØ1

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: RVA NAN COL JP VP SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHOLA #4257 3431305
O Ø91252Z DEC 81
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2391

INFO SECDEF WASHDC
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AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 32ØØ
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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION Ø2 OF Ø5 BONN 24257
EXDIS - MILITARY ADDRESSEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEC
GENEVA ALSO FOR USINF
OF PARTY CHAIRMAN BRANDT SUGGESTING PUBLICLY THAT THE SPD CONGRESS DECISION ON DEPLOYMENT COULD BE POSTPONED FROM THE PLANNED APRIL CONGRESS IN 1982 UNTIL LATE 1983 OR LATER TO GIVE THE ARMS CONTROL EFFORT A CHANCE TO WORK. (SEE SEPARATE MESSAGE ON SCHMIDT'S DOMESTIC POLITICAL SITUATION.)

5. SCHMIDT WILL THUS COME TO WASHINGTON SEEKING CONTINUED MOMENTUM TO SUPPORT HIS RECENT FOREIGN POLICY TRIUMPHS AND TO DEMONSTRATE THAT HE RETAINS A VOICE IN U.S. POLICY ON IMPORTANT QUESTIONS LIKE THE INF TALKS. HE WILL SEEK THE SUPPORT OF WASHINGTON

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IN A DEMONSTRABLE WAY TO SHOW HE IS MAKING A CONTRIBUTION TO PEACE AND TO CONCERTED ALLIED EFFORTS TO RESOLVE CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS.

6. THE GERMAN DEFENSE EFFORT--MORE IS NEEDED, NOT ONLY SUPPORT FOR INF

ALTHOUGH THE FRG CONTRIBUTION TO THE ALLIANCE DEFENSE EFFORT IS SUBSTANTIAL, THE SCHMIDT GOVERNMENT HAS PLACED A HIGHER PRIORITY ON RESOLVING ITS ECONOMIC PROBLEMS THAN ON MEETING ITS COMMITMENT TO INCREASE NATIONAL AND NATO CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS. FORCED TO USE MUCH OF HIS POLITICAL CAPITAL TO CONTAIN THE INF PROBLEM, SCHMIDT HAS BEEN UNWILLING -- AND PERHAPS UNABLE -- TO TAKE ON SIMULTANEOUSLY A SECOND MAJOR TASK IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY AREA. HE ALSO HAS REAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS TO CONTEND WITH. PERHAPS UNDERSTANDABLY HE HAS NOT TRIED TO BUILD SUPPORT FOR MAKING ADDITIONAL SACRIFICES FOR DEFENSE. INSTEAD, HE HAS ADOPTED THE APPROACH THAT, ON BALANCE, THE GERMAN DEFENSE CONTRIBUTION IS ADEQUATE AND EQUITABLE, AND THAT MAJOR ADDITIONAL EFFORTS MUST BE SUBORDINATED TO ECONOMIC POLICY REQUIREMENTS. WHILE SUCH AN APPROACH MAY BE JUSTIFIABLE IN TERMS OF GERMAN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REALITIES, SCHMIDT OUGHT TO BE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

CONFRONTED WITH THE BROAD NEGATIVE EFFECT THIS POLICY WILL HAVE ON THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE AND ON THE ALLIANCE ITSELF.

7. GERMAN CURTAILMENT OF DEFENSE PROGRAMS NOT ONLY REDUCES THE CAPABILITY OF THE GERMAN ARMED FORCES, IT ALSO REDUCES THE ABILITY OF THE ALLIANCE TO IMPLEMENT SEVERAL CRITICAL PROGRAMS, E.G. INFRASTRUCTURE FOR THE RAPID REINFORCEMENT PROGRAM. MOREOVER, IT PLACES AN UNFAIR BURDEN ON OTHER ALLIANCE GOVERNMENTS WHICH, DESPITE MUCH MORE SERIOUS ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES, ARE TRYING TO MAKE THE EXTRA EFFORTS NEEDED FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE ALLIANCE. INDEED, IT MAY BECOME EVEN MORE DIFFICULT FOR THESE GOVERNMENTS TO MAKE THESE EFFORTS IF THEIR PEOPLE BECOME AWARE THAT THE RELATIVELY "RICH" GERMANS ARE NOT MAKING SIMILAR EFFORTS.

8. THIS SITUATION IS ALSO IMPORTANT DOMESTICALLY IN THE U.S. AND WE SHOULD ENSURE THAT SCHMIDT FULLY APPRECIATES THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE CRITICAL ATTITUDES IN THE CONGRESS AND ELSEWHERE IN THE U.S. TOWARDS THE

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SIT988 DATE 12/09/81 TOR: 343/1844Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: RVA NAN COL JP VP SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHOLA #4257 3491308
O 091252Z DEC 81
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2392

INFO SECDEF WASHDC
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AMCONSUL FRANKFURT 3479
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USMISSION USBERLIN 5818
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 05 BONN 24257
EXDIS - MILITARY ADDRESSEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEC
GENEVA ALSO FOR USINF
LEVEL OF THE GERMAN DEFENSE EFFORT. IT IS POINTLESS TO ARGUE WHETHER OR NOT THE FRG IS CARRYING ITS FAIR SHARE OF THE DEFENSE BURDEN; THE FACT IS THAT THERE IS A SIGNIFICANT BODY OF U.S. OPINION WHICH PERCEIVES THE BURDEN-SHARING TO BE UNFAIR. SCHMIDT NEEDS TO UNDERSTAND THAT UNLESS BONN TAKES STEPS TO CORRECT THIS IMPRESSION, SHIFTS WILL OCCUR IN U.S. DEFENSE PROGRAMS WHICH WILL WEAKEN THE U.S. ABILITY TO REINFORCE AND SUPPORT THE NATO CENTRAL FRONT. SCHMIDT ALSO NEEDS TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE SUCCESS IN NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WE ALL DESIRE, WILL REQUIRE ADDITIONAL EFFORTS IN CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE. HE, AND HIS GOVERNMENT, NEED TO TAKE STEPS TO BEGIN TO EDUCATE HIS PEOPLE ON THIS FACT.

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8. INF

WE NEED TO KEEP THE FRG FIRMLY BEHIND US ON THE NATO DOUBLE DECISION AND TO STAVE OFF KIBITZING ON THE INF TALKS. SCHMIDT HAS PUBLICLY ITERATED AND REITERATED HIS COMMITMENT TO THE NATO DECISION AND TO INF DEPLOYMENT BY THE FALL OF 1983 IF THE INF TALKS DO NOT WORK, BUT HE IS HAVING TROUBLE KEEPING HIS PARTY IN LINE. IT BEHOOVES US, AT LEAST FOR NOW, TO DO WHAT WE CAN TO HELP SCHMIDT MAINTAIN GERMAN BACKING FOR US THROUGH AN EFFECTIVE PUBLIC RELATIONS EFFORT TO ACCOMPANY THE TALKS IN GENEVA.

10. WHILE STRIVING THUS TO BOLSTER SCHMIDT, HOWEVER, WE SHOULD ALSO IMPRESS ON HIM AND THROUGH HIM THE GERMAN PUBLIC THE REALITIES OF THE SITUATION REGARDING THE ACHIEVEMENT OF SUCCESS AT GENEVA. WE SHOULD CONSULT CLOSELY ON THE TALKS, WHILE ALSO POINTING OUT THE DANGERS OF UNHELPFUL KIBITZING THAT COULD UNDERMINE OUR ABILITY TO EXACT THE CONCESSIONS WE ALL DESIRE FROM THE SOVIETS.

11. EAST-WEST RELATIONS: MANAGING THE SOVIETS

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SIMILARLY, WE SHOULD IMPRESS ON SCHMIDT THE NEED FOR CONTINUED FIRMNESS--DESPITE THE RESUMPTION OF DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIETS--ON IMPORTANT ISSUES. SUCH FIRMNESS IS NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE OUR COMMON GOALS OF SUCCESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND GENERALLY ENCOURAGING RESTRAINT AND RECIPROCITY IN OUR DEALINGS WITH THE SOVIETS--OR AS SCHMIDT HIMSELF PUT IT IN HIS DINNER TOAST TO BREZHNEV, REFERRING TO FRG-SOVIET RELATIONS: "CONSIDERATION FOR THE OTHER'S INTERESTS AND RESTRAINT IN...WORDS AND DEEDS."

12. AFGHANISTAN

PUBLIC INTEREST ON THIS ISSUE REMAINS HIGH IN THE FRG, AND WE SHOULD CAPITALIZE ON THAT TO DISCUSS WITH THE CHANCELLOR COMMON EFFORTS TO FOCUS WORLD ATTENTION ON THIS ISSUE.

13. POLAND

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SIT987 DATE 12/Ø9/81 TOR: 343/1646Z

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WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: RVA NAN COL JP VP SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHOLA #4257 3431309
O Ø91252Z DEC 81
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2393

INFO SECDEF WASHDC
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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION Ø4 OF Ø5 BONN 24257
EXDIS - MILITARY ADDRESSEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEC
GENEVA ALSO FOR USINF
WE SHOULD DISCUSS WAYS TO HELP POLAND THROUGH ITS IMMEDIATE CRISIS AND TO ENCOURAGE A FOCUS ON LONGER-TERM ECONOMIC SOLUTIONS. WE SHOULD ALSO DISCUSS POSSIBLE GENERAL EFFECTS ON EASTERN EUROPE AND EAST-WEST RELATIONS OF A PROTRACTED CRISIS, OF CONSOLIDATION OF THE LIBERALIZATION GAINED SO FAR, AND OF SUDDEN REPRESSION BY THE POLES AND/OR SOVIETS.

14. STRENGTHENING US-FRG COOPERATION ON EAST-WEST ECONOMIC ISSUES

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(A) SOVIET-FRG NATURAL GAS DEAL. WE SHOULD ACKNOWLEDGE THE SIGNATURE OF THE SOVIET-FRG GAS DEAL, NOTING THAT WE RESPECT THE CHANCELLOR'S ANALYSIS OF THE ENERGY VULNERABILITY IMPLICATIONS OF INCREASED IMPORTS OF SOVIET GAS, AND TELLING THE CHANCELLOR OF OUR DETERMINATION NOT TO BLOCK THE EXPORT OF PIPELAYERS AND COMPRESSOR TECHNOLOGY TO BE USED IN CONSTRUCTING THE PIPELINE. WE SHOULD INDICATE OUR CONTINUING INTEREST IN THE QUESTION OF ENERGY VULNERABILITY, RELATING INTERRUPTIONS OF EITHER MIDDLE EAST OR SOVIET SUPPLIES. WE ENDORSE AND SEEK FRG SUPPORT FOR THE EFFORTS CONTEMPLATED IN THE INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY TO ASSESS ENERGY VULNERABILITY, PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO NATURAL GAS.

(B) EAST-WEST TECHNOLOGY CONTROLS. WE SHOULD UNDERSCORE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FORTHCOMING HIGH LEVEL MEETING TO STRENGTHEN THE COORDINATING COMMITTEE STRUCTURE. THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT THIS MECHANISM MUST BE IMPROVED TO BETTER CONTROL THE EXPORT OF SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGIES. WE LOOK FORWARD TO CLOSE AND FRUITFUL COOPERATION WITH THE FRG IN THIS ENDEAVOR, WHICH WE VIEW AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF OUR COMMON DEFENSE EFFORT.

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

15. STEEL

WE SHOULD INDICATE OUR CONTINUING OPPOSITION TO STEEL SUBSIDIES. WE ARE UNDER HEAVY PRESSURE FROM THE U.S. STEEL INDUSTRY TO STEM THE FLOW OF STEEL IMPORTS INTO THE U.S. WE UNDERSTAND THE FRG IS ALSO UNDER PRESSURE FROM ITS INDUSTRY TO HAVE OTHER EC MEMBERS LOWER THE SUBSIDIES THEY PROVIDE THEIR STEEL FIRMS. WE CONSIDER THIS ANOTHER ISSUE IN WHICH THE INTERESTS OF OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS ARE PARALLEL AND LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING TOGETHER TO REDUCE SUBSIDIES TO STEEL PRODUCERS.

16. AGRICULTURE

THE U.S. IS GREATLY CONCERNED ABOUT INITIATIVES WITHIN THE EC WHICH COULD FURTHER SERIOUSLY DAMAGE OUR AGRICULTURAL TRADE. SOME WOULD ADD NEW RESTRICTIONS TO THE EC'S IMPORT REGIME IN AN EFFORT TO RAISE REVENUE OR AS PART OF A COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY REFORM

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SIT986 DATE 12/09/81 TOR: 343/1647Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: RVA NAN COL JP VP SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHOLA #4257 3431310
O 091252Z DEC 81
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2394

INFO SECDEF WASHDC
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EXDIS - MILITARY ADDRESSEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEC
GENEVA ALSO FOR USINF
PACKAGE; HERE TWO OF OUR LARGEST EXPORTS TO THE EC ARE THREATENED--SOYBEANS BY THE PROPOSED VEGETABLE OILS TAX, AND CORN GLUTEN BY PROPOSED BARRIERS TO NON-GRAIN FEEDS. BUT PROPOSALS FOR AN AGGRESSIVE EC EXPORT POLICY ARE ALSO THREATENING OUR EXPORTS TO THIRD COUNTRIES. THIS IS PARTICULARLY WORRISOME BECAUSE SUBSIDIZED EC EXPORTS ARE NOW COMPETING UNFAIRLY WHERE WE HAVE INVESTED TIME AND MONEY TO DEVELOP NEW MARKETS. THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC IS THE LARGEST NET CONTRIBUTOR TO THE EC BUDGET AND IS INTERESTED IN CONTAINING SPENDING. WE BELIEVE THERE IS A COMMON US-GERMAN INTEREST IN CURBING EXPENSIVE EC SUPPORT AND SUBSIDY PROGRAMS, AND AVOIDING MEASURES WHICH WOULD WORSEN TRADE RELATIONS BY THEIR EFFECTS ON PRIMARY TRADING INTERESTS OF EITHER

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RONALD W. REAGAN 1755

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SIT726 DATE 01/29/82 TOR: 027/0249Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: SIT MR
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WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #0579 0262221
O 262214Z JAN 82 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 5578

INFO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 6785
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~~S E C R E T~~ STATE 020579 TOSEC 020062
NODIS
FOR AS CROCKER FROM S/P-PWOLFOWITZ
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 - 1/26/02 (WOLFOWITZ, PAUL D.)

TAGS: PEPR, XS, US
SUBJECT: NAMIBIA: FLS RESPONSE TO CG PHASE I PROPOSALS

1. ~~(S)~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. IN THEIR REPLY TO THE CG'S REVISED PHASE ONE PROPOSALS THE FLS HAVE NOT COMPROMISED MUCH ON THEIR RESPONSE TO THE INITIAL CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS. HAVING WITH GREAT EFFORT BROUGHT THE SAG ALONG, WE NOW FACE FLS INTRANSIGENCE PROBABLY PRODUCED BY SWAPO WITH SOVIET ENCOURAGEMENT. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, IF WE GO BACK TO THE SAG SEEKING REVISIONS, WE COULD DAMAGE OUR CREDIBILITY NOW, AND CREATE SERIOUS PROBLEMS DOWN THE ROAD IN PERSUADING THE SOUTH AFRICANS THAT WE ARE RELIABLE. THE ISSUE GOES BEYOND TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND INVOLVES OUR ABILITY TO SUSTAIN OUR OVERALL STRATEGY, THROUGH PHASES II AND III, TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

3. IN THE CG REPLY TO THE FLS I THINK WE SHOULD BE FIRM ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING THE INTEGRITY OF THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS, WHICH REQUIRES THAT ALL SIDES BE WILLING TO COMPROMISE. WE SHOULD EMPHASIZE, AS YOU DID WITH JORGE IN PARIS, THAT WE HAVE BROUGHT SAG A LONG WAY FROM INITIALLY TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE POSITIONS (E.G., ON ETHNIC CONSTITUENCIES, ON THE NEED FOR A DETAILED CONSTITUTION, ON THE FUND FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT) AND THAT GOING BACK TO THEM NOW COULD REOPEN EXTREMELY CONTENTIOUS ISSUES THAT WILL DELAY AND POSSIBLY DERAIL THE ENTIRE NEGOTIATING PROCESS.

4. THE FLS APPEAR TO HAVE LARGELY IGNORED THE SUBSTANTIVE

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ARGUMENTS IN THE EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM WHICH ACCOMPANIED THE REVISED CG PROPOSALS. THE FLS OBJECTION THAT THE DUAL VOTE SYSTEM IS TOO SOPHISTICATED FOR THE "ILLITERATE" NAMIBIAN POPULATION BELITTLES THE SUBSTANTIAL INTELLIGENCE REQUIRED TO OPERATE WITHIN MOST IF NOT ALL OF AFRICA'S COMPLEX SOCIAL SYSTEMS. THE OTHER FLS OBJECTIONS ARE HIGHLY LEGALISTIC, SINCE THE ISSUES OF PRINCIPLE THAT APPEAR TO BE RAISED (E.G., DISCRIMINATION BY PRIVATE GROUPS), ARE ALREADY HANDLED ELSEWHERE (E.G., PARA 85). MORE IMPORTANTLY, THE FLS RESPONSE IGNORES THE MOST PRACTICAL NECESSITY -- MAINTAINING THE MOMENTUM OF THE ONLY PROCESS THAT CAN LEAD TO NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE. WE SHOULD PUT THE BURDEN ON THE FLS TO PROVE THAT THE OBJECTIONS THEY RAISE INVOLVE SUCH WEIGHTY ISSUES OF PRINCIPLE THAT IT IS WORTH DELAYING AND PERHAPS DERAILING THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS IN ORDER TO DEAL WITH THEM.

5. THE WAY WE HANDLE THIS CRITICAL JUNCTURE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL PROBABLY ATTRACT PUBLIC ATTENTION. WE MAY HAVE TO TAKE SOME HEAT IF WE TAKE A FIRM LINE WITH THE FLS. IT WILL BE WORTH IT IN ORDER TO SUSTAIN THE CREDIBILITY WE WILL NEED WITH THE SAG FOR THE MORE DIFFICULT PHASE II ISSUES. IT WILL ALSO CARRY A MESSAGE TO LUANDA, HAVANA AND MOSCOW THAT WE ARE NOT AFRAID TO LET THEIR INTRANSIGENCE THWART AFRICAN AMBITIONS. MOREOVER, IT WILL ALSO ENHANCE OUR CREDIBILITY IN ANOTHER ARENA WHERE OUR REPUTATION AS A TOUGH AND HONEST BROKER WILL BE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

IMPORTANT. BOTH THE ISRAELIS AND THE ARABS WILL BENEFIT FROM A DISPLAY OF OUR ABILITY TO RESIST UNCOMPROMISING INTRANSIGENCE BY REFUSING TO BACK AWAY FROM REASONABLE AND FAIR POSITIONS, FORGED AFTER CONSIDERABLE EFFORT AND EXTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS. STOESSEL

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SIT612 DATE Ø1/29/82 TOR: Ø22/1901Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /ØØ1

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC NAN MCF COL JP VP SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: CHEKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHOL #1485 Ø221342
O 221342Z JAN 82 ZFF-4
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~~S E C R E T~~ BONN Ø1485
NODIS
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE AMBASSADOR
E.O. 12065: GDS Ø1/22/88 (BURNS, ARTHUR F.) OR-M
TAGS: ENRG, EEWT, GE, US, SU
SUBJECT: ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

1. ~~S~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. IN BONN 1188 I GAVE MY VIEWS ON THE NECESSITY OF NOT INTERFERING WITH EXISTING CONTRACTS FOR THE EXPORT OR FOREIGN PRODUCTION OF GOODS IN SITUATIONS SHORT OF WAR OR THE GRAVEST OF NATIONAL EMERGENCIES. I AM CONCERNED THAT ACTIONS MAY BE UNDERWAY WHICH WOULD RESTRICT EXISTING CONTRACTS EVEN FURTHER, AND WISH THEREFORE TO EXPRESS MORE FULLY MY VIEW OF THE PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF OUR ABROGATION OF SUCH CONTRACTS.

3. IN EARLY 1981, WE AGREED IN NATO ON A CONTINGENCY PLAN TO BE IMPLEMENTED IN THE EVENT OF A SOVIET INVASION OF POLAND (SEE Ø1 STATE 77429 NODIS). THIS DOCUMENT MAKES THREE PRINCIPAL POINTS IN THE ECONOMIC AREA: A) EXISTING CONTRACTS SHOULD NOT BE BROKEN; B) TRADE SANCTIONS SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED SO AS TO HAVE AN EFFECT ON THE SOVIET UNION WHILE NOT DISCRIMINATING

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AMONG THE TRADE OF NATO MEMBERS; AND C) OUR ACTIONS WILL SUCCEED ONLY IF NATO MEMBERS ACT TOGETHER.

4. IT WAS CLEARLY RECOGNIZED AT THE TIME THAT INTERFERENCE WITH EXISTING CONTRACTS UNDERMINED INTERNATIONAL LAW AND EXPECTATIONS, BUT WOULD ALSO PROVIDE THE SOVIETS WITH A POWERFUL PRECEDENT AND EXCUSE FOR SIMILAR CONDUCT IN THE FUTURE. INDEED, PRECISELY ONE OF THE POINTS THAT WE HAVE MADE TO THE EUROPEANS IN OPPOSITION TO THE GAS PIPELINE IS TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE REPEATEDLY CUT OFF ENERGY EXPORTS, DESPITE EXISTING CONTRACTS, FOR POLITICAL REASONS.

5. IT APPEARS THAT THE FRG GOVERNMENT BELIEVES A VALID

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PAGE Ø2 OF Ø2 BONN 1485 DTG: 221342Z JAN 82 PSN: Ø41973

NATO AGREEMENT EXISTS NOT TO INVALIDATE EXISTING CONTRACTS, EVEN IN THE EVENT OF A FULL SOVIET INVASION OF POLAND. (JUDGING FROM THE REPORTING OF EMBASSY LONDON AND THE PRESS, SIMILAR VIEWS EXIST IN OTHER NATO CAPITALS.)

6. IN THE NATO CONTINGENCY PLAN WE AGREED ALSO THAT QUOTE DUE ATTENTION SHOULD BE PAID TO SHARING THE BURDEN FAIRLY AND TO BALANCING THE LONG-TERM AND SHORT-TERM LOSSES OF THE ALLIES. END QUOTE.

7. YET, TO DATE, WE HAVE NOT IMPOSED A GRAIN EMBARGO DESPITE THE PLAN'S CONCLUSION THAT SUCH AN EMBARGO QUOTE WOULD AFFECT THE SOVIET UNION SIGNIFICANTLY AND RELATIVELY QUICKLY. END QUOTE. (MY PURPOSE HERE IS NOT TO ARGUE FOR OR AGAINST A GRAIN EMBARGO, BUT TO INDICATE THAT OUR ACTIONS TO DATE APPEAR TO MANY EUROPEANS TO SEEK MORE SACRIFICES FROM THEIR COUNTRIES THAN WE ARE PREPARED TO MAKE OURSELVES.)

8. HOWEVER MUCH WE MAY DISLIKE THE SOVIET GAS PIPELINE, INTERFERING WITH SIGNED CONTRACTS BETWEEN EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN FIRMS TO SUPPLY PARTS FOR THIS PROJECT WILL, IN MY JUDGEMENT, DO US MORE HARM THAN GOOD. WE RUN A RISK OF SPLITTING THE ALLIANCE. WE INVALIDATE A PRIOR CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR A MORE EXTREME SITUATION AND CALL

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THE PROCESS OF ALLIED CONSULTATION INTO DOUBT. WE PROVIDE THE SOVIETS WITH A PROPAGANDA LEVER TO USE THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, AND A PRECEDENT SO CLEAR AS TO ALTER THE NATURE OF CONTRACT LAW AND INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE, PERHAPS FOR YEARS INTO THE FUTURE. OUR EFFORT TO DEPRIVE THE EUROPEANS OF THE POSSIBILITY OF COMPLETING A PROJECT WHICH THEY BELIEVE TO BE IN THEIR INTEREST ADDS CREDENCE TO THE CHARGE, WHICH THE SOVIETS AND OTHERS WILL SURELY MAKE, THAT THE U.S. FAILS TO RECOGNIZE THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE EUROPEAN STATES.

9. FOR THESE REASONS, I URGE THAT WE STRUCTURE OUR SANCTIONS REGULATIONS SO AS NOT TO RESTRICT EXISTING CONTRACTS FOR GOODS WHICH COULD HAVE BEEN LEGALLY EXPORTED PRIOR TO DECMEBER 29. BURNS

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 19, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR DENNIS W. THOMAS

FROM: COLIN L. POWELL

SUBJECT: Policy Coordination on Canada

Subsequent to our meeting yesterday, I received a copy of a memorandum from Don Regan to Ed Meese dated February 12, initiating the acid rain review process. While we are pleased that the review process has begun, the memo, frankly, does not convey the sense of urgency associated with the President's commitment to Prime Minister Mulroney.

Craig Fuller sent me a memorandum (Tab A) expressing concern regarding this question. He also suggests that we need to examine how important it is for us to have PM Mulroney in office and what, if anything, can be done about it. Craig recommends the formation of a special Policy Coordinating Group to prepare for the President's trip to Canada. We have no objection to Craig's suggestion, but it strikes me that such a group might be superfluous -- we already have an NSC-chaired interagency steering group on Canada that has worked fairly well in managing our complex relationship.

However, I believe it would be useful if our Powell-Thomas Group that has been established to coordinate preparations for the President's trip to Europe and the Venice Economic Summit were also designated as the focal point for coordinating preparations for the President's trip to Canada, April 5th and 6th. Indeed, the meeting we had yesterday might be a first step in that direction. I believe we could thereby treat the Canadian trip as an integral step on the road to Venice.

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum from Craig Fuller

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BY CAS NARA, DATE 5/30/01

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MEMORANDUM

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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August 28, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR NORMAN A. BAILEY

FROM: DOUGLAS J. FEITH

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy Toward PLO (U)

In light of (1) the current halt in hostilities across the Lebanese border, (2) Sadat's recent call for direct USG-PLO negotiations, (3) press reports of a "softening" of our Administration's line on the PLO, and (4) Begin's imminent visit to Washington, you requested me to review how we arrived at our official position on the PLO, why we retain it, and where we should go from here. (U)

I contend that this Administration's policy of open hostility toward the Qadafi regime in Libya requires us, for the sake of consistency, to adopt an aggressively disapproving attitude toward the PLO. Consider what irritates us about the Qadafi regime: Its Soviet connection; its interference in other countries' affairs; its practice and support for terrorism; its denunciations of the United States; its calls for the destruction of Israel. Which of these items does not taint the PLO as well? When our F-14s recently shot down two Libyan jets that had attacked them over the Gulf of Sidra, at least one American newspaper commentator commented critically that the F-14s' action will force Qadafi into an anti-American stand. It is no less bizarre to argue that the USG, by wielding a stick against the PLO, will force the PLO toward extremism, or that the USG, by dangling carrots before the PLO, can entice the organization away from terrorism, away from its Soviet connection, and toward authentic diplomatic moderation. It makes much more sense for the USG to combat the PLO than to court it. It is noteworthy that the PLO publicly supported Libya and condemned the United States in connection with the Libyan attack on the F-14s.

Were the Reagan Administration to undertake the diplomatic campaign outlined on page9 below, it would demonstrate the coherence of three of our chief foreign policy promises and themes: (1) to combat international terrorism; (2) to counter the Soviet Union's use of subversive proxies; and (3) to bolster our friends and stand down our enemies. In addition, it would improve prospects for a broader Arab-Israeli peace by helping free the truly moderate Arabs from violent Arab intimidation and by increasing Israel's sense of security.

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It would also facilitate the ultimate peaceable resolution of Lebanon's internal crisis by increasing the relative power of the Lebanese central authorities vis-a-vis the PLO.

Such a campaign would, at least in its early stages, provoke public denunciations by many Arab governments, but we can expect the outcry to diminish once we have demonstrated our seriousness of purpose (and, in turn, the vanity of the outcry). For those Arab governments that recognize the usefulness of friendly and cooperative relations with the USG, a bold U.S. stand against the radical, terrorist, Soviet-backed PLO would not negate their interest in such good relations. Their complaints and demarches will not outweigh the campaign's many types of value.

A number of factors account for the distrust and antagonism that have characterized official U.S. attitudes toward the PLO: (1) the PLO's terrorist operations, which have frequently disrupted international commerce and diplomacy and have aimed, almost exclusively, at civilian targets; (2) its "national covenant," which dedicates the PLO to the liquidation of Israel by military means; (3) the PLO's political and military ties to the Soviet Union; (4) its challenge to Hashemite rule in Jordan, which culminated in the Jordanian civil war of September 1970; (5) its anti-United States and generally anti-Western declarations; and (6) its support (material, technical, and political) for radical (often Soviet-sponsored) organizations and "movements" in the Middle East, Europe, Africa, and Latin America.

These factors help explain the USG's willingness, in 1975, to sign an agreement with Israel (in connection with the second Egyptian-Israeli "disengagement" accord) containing the following commitment:

> The United States will continue to adhere to its present policy with respect to the Palestine Liberation Organization, whereby it will not recognize or negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Organization so long as the Palestine Liberation Organization does not recognize Israel's right to exist and does not accept Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.
>
> Memorandum of Agreement of September 1, 1975 between the Governments of Israel and the United States.

That commitment, it bears noting, does not preclude "communications" or "dealings" with the PLO; it does not bar the flow of thoughts, ideas, suggestions and the like between the USG and PLO. What it does is to bind the USG not to "recognize or negotiate with" the PLO. In other words, it bars only those types of communication that would enhance the diplomatic standing or the general prestige of the PLO.

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Even if the USG had given no such commitment to Israel, it would be wise, I submit, to refrain from action and words that increase the PLO's stature and power.

Advocates of immediate direct USG-PLO negotiations build their brief on two premises: (1) While some of the groups functioning under the PLO umbrella retain terrorist and politically extremist views, Fatah, the largest PLO constituent organization, is no longer a terrorist group and has moderated its ambitions regarding Israel. (2) The PLO is a permanent factor in the Arab-Israeli conflict; it must be dealt with sooner or later if that conflict is to be resolved peaceably. These premises, however, are contradicted by the public statements of leading Reagan Administration officials, as well as by reports from our intelligence agencies.

On September 3, 1980, President (then-candidate) Ronald Reagan stated:

> President Carter refuses to brand the PLO as a terrorist organization. I have no hesitation in doing so.
>
> We live in a world which any band of thugs clever enough to get the word "liberation" into its name can thereupon murder school children and have its deeds considered glamorous and glorious. Terrorists are not guerrillas or commandos, or freedom-fighters or anything else. They are terrorists and they should be identified as such. If others wish to deal with them, establish diplomatic relations with them, let it be on their heads. And let them be willing to pay the price of appeasement.

Address to the B'nai B'rith Forum, Washington, D.C.

President Reagan reiterated on November 6, 1980 (in his first press conference following the election), that "the PLO has proven that it is a terrorist organization."

Secretary of State Alexander Haig, when questioned about the PLO, has made two points: First, the PLO is not a unitary organization (an observation that casts doubt on the PLO leadership's authority to speak for "the Palestinian people" -- that is, the PLO's willingness and ability to bind its putative constituency to any truly moderate agreement regarding peace with Israel); and second, the largest and most "moderate" section of the PLO, Fatah, is a terrorist group:

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> If you're talking about the PLO, I think that encompasses a number of forces, influences, and attitudes. If you're talking about the Fatah wing of the PLO, for example, then you're talking about a pretty tough hardcore group of terrorists.

Confirmation hearings before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, January 1981.

Likewise has Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Richard Allen characterized the PLO as an organization "dealing in terror and supporting terror." (The Washington Post, January 3, 1981, p. A-14.) In an interview with ABC-News aired March 20, 1981, Mr. Allen was asked: "Is it fair to call the PLO a terrorist organization?" He responded:

> We have said, the President of the United States has said repeatedly, that there are two main conditions that are obstacles to discussing anything with the PLO. One is its practice of terrorism and its condoning of international terrorism. And the second, of course, is the refusal to recognize the right of Israel to exist. Absent those two conditions and we'd be dealing with a fundamentally different situation, so the President has said.
>
> I think yes, on balance. There's no question that we must identify the PLO as a terrorist organization.

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In a report dated March 27, 1981, the Defense Intelligence Agency sets forth the details of PLO support to leftist revolutionaries in Central America -- Nicaragua and El Salvador in particular.

[redacted] "the PLO claimed credit for six separate bombing incidents/attempts in Israel on August 23 and 24 [1981]," Observing that the claims may be exaggerated, the Embassy points out that the claims are intended to demonstrate the continuation of the PLO's "military confrontation with Israel, the ceasefire in South Lebanon notwithstanding." ~~(C)~~ Beirut cable 6513, August 25, 1981 (emphasis added).

It flouts the evidence to assert that Fatah or the PLO is not still a terrorist organization.

As for whether the PLO has moderated its attitude regarding the United States and Israel, it is worthwhile reviewing the

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interview Farouk Kadoumi, the head of the PLO's Political Department, gave the West German newsmagazine Stern on July 30, 1981. Kadoumi works closely with Arafat within Fatah and generally is characterized as a relative "moderate" in Fatah.

Kadoumi: One cannot expect the Palestinians to talk with their enemy. Israel has occupied our country for 32 years [note: "occupied territories" refers not just to areas lost to Israel in 1967, but to areas Israel has controlled since 1949], and the primary precondition is that it retreat from the occupied territories. ....

Stern: When you say "occupied territories," what do you mean?

Kadoumi: For the present, the West Bank, the Golan Heights and the Gaza Strip.

* * * *

Stern: ... Provided you were now to get this state on the West Bank and Gaza - and there are not a few who would wish you to have it with all their heart - what would then happen to the remainder, to Israel in the 1948 boundaries?

Kadoumi: I shall make it perfectly clear to you. We shall never recognize Israel, never accept the usurper, the colonialist, the imperialist.

Stern: Your attitude means the destruction of the State of Israel.

Kadoumi: Yes, I want to destroy the enemy who keeps my homeland occupied, who has murdered my parents, my brothers and sisters ....

* * * *

Stern: Your Arab friends in the region are somewhat more reserved towards the Soviet Union.

Kadoumi: That might apply to Saudi Arabia. But King Hussein of Jordan has quite recently visited Moscow, and, to conclude from the joint communique, understanding between him and his hosts has been excellent. You see that there has been some change.

Stern: But it does not seem likely at present that, in an emergency, he would side with the Soviet Union.

Kadoumi: In case all-out war actually broke out, we would be the allies of the Soviet Union -- for we prefer to be the friends of Communists, rather than to be the victims of the Zionist and imperialist occupation forces.

Stern: As we know, Communists, too, can be occupation forces.

Kadoumi: In the Arab world they are not.

(Emphasis added.)

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The fundamental antagonism between U.S. interests and PLO power cannot be overcome by a change in the PLO's rhetoric regarding UNSC Resolution 242 and Israel's right to exist. Given the history and the current views and activities of the PLO's leaders (even the relatively "moderate" ones), U.S. officials should attempt to undermine, not enhance, the PLO's ability to conduct terrorist operations and its influence over international political developments.

Rather than paving the way toward U.S. recognition of the PLO by encouraging such a rhetorical change, the USG should impose additional conditions for such recognition designed to convince the Palestinian Arabs that their only hope of winning active U.S. support lies in developing a non-PLO political leadership for themselves. The USG requires a plan designed to foster the emergence of a Palestinian Arab leadership unburdened by the PLO's association with (1) terrorism, (2) international, Soviet-sponsored subversion, and (3) the belligerent "Palestine National Covenant."

In devising such a plan, the USG should exploit the conflict of interests existing between the West Bank/Gaza Strip Arab residents and the PLO leaders in Beirut. The former group stands to benefit directly if living conditions improve in the West Bank/Gaza Strip regions (e.g., if the Israeli military administration is withdrawn pursuant to the Camp David "Framework" Accord). The latter group stands to lose if that Camp David Accord is fulfilled; hence the PLO's (thus far successful) campaign of intimidation and assassination to ensure that no West Bank/Gaza Strip Arabs participate in forming the "Self-Governing Authority (Administrative Council)" necessary to advance the Camp David peace process.

In an effort to reduce the PLO's influence in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (and thereby improve prospects for local Arab endorsements of whatever autonomy accord is negotiated by Egypt and Israel), Israeli authorities recently curtailed the flow of PLO monies into those regions. Certain U.S. officials, predicting financial hardships for the former recipients of the PLO monies, have advocated that the USG deliver a protest to Israel about the curtailment. The USG's interests, however, would be better served through encouragement of such Israeli actions.

So long as the world's diplomatic community accommodates the PLO, there is little chance of the West Bank/Gaza Strip Arabs' challenging the Beirut-based leadership outright. A USG-led effort to reduce the PLO's diplomatic standing and to encourage the cutting of political and financial ties between the PLO and the West Bank/Gaza Strip residents could, however, deprive the PLO of its veto on progress toward Arab-Israel peace, while undermining the Soviet Union's ability to use the PLO as an effective proxy around the world. Such an effort could include the following:

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a. Persistent condemnation of the PLO as a terrorist group. Emphasis on PLO's Soviet connection.

b. Declaration that USG is convinced that no progress toward resolution of the Palestine problem can occur until a non-terrorist (i.e., non-PLO) Palestinian Arab leadership emerges.

c. Closure of PLO information offices in Washington and New York.

d. Campaign among U.S. allies to ostracize the PLO. (This should go hand-in-hand with education of allies regarding the "oil weapon.")

e. Campaign to convince Arab states supporting the PLO that the USG will not ease up its opposition to the PLO no matter how much they protest. (We can tell the Saudis that, while we realize they cannot very well endorse our attacks on the PLO, it will ultimately serve Saudi interests if the PLO is undermined.)

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By SNL NARA, Date 4/30/01

A Summary of Doug Feith's Paper on the PLO

U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE PLO

In light of our plan of action for Lebanon and our role in the upcoming Egyptian-Israeli autonomy talks, it is timely to review our thinking about the PLO. ~~(S)~~

A number of factors account for the distrust and antagonism that have characterized official U.S. attitudes toward the PLO: (1) the PLO's terrorist operations, which have frequently disrupted international commerce and diplomacy and have aimed, almost exclusively, at civilian targets; (2) its "national covenant," which dedicates the PLO to the liquidation of Israel by military means; (3) the PLO's political and military ties to the Soviet Union; (4) its challenge to Hashemite rule in Jordan, which culminated in the Jordanian civil war of September 1970; (5) its anti-United States and generally anti-Western declarations; and (6) its support (material, technical, and political) for radical (often Soviet-sponsored) organizations and "movements" in the Middle East, Europe, Africa, and Latin America. ~~(S)~~

The Administration's policy of open hostility toward Libya's Qadafi can be seen as requiring us, for the sake of consistency, to adopt an aggressively disapproving attitude toward the PLO. What taints the Qadafi regime -- its Soviet connection, interference in other countries' affairs, practice and support for terrorism, denunciations of the United States, calls for the destruction of Israel -- taints the PLO as well. ~~(S)~~

An active, hardline policy toward the PLO may well be the wisest response, should the PLO deny the USG cooperation regarding our plan of action for Lebanon. Such a policy would demonstrate the coherence of three of our chief foreign policy promises and themes: (1) to combat international terrorism; (2) to counter the Soviet Union's use of subversive proxies; and (3) to bolster our friends and stand down our enemies. In addition, it might improve prospects for a broader Arab-Israeli peace by helping free the truly moderate Arabs from violent Arab intimidation and by increasing Israel's sense of security. ~~(S)~~

It might also facilitate the ultimate resolution of Lebanon's internal crisis by increasing the relative power of the Lebanese central authorities vis-a-vis the PLO. ~~(S)~~

Such a policy would, at least in its early stages, provoke public denunciations by many Arab governments, but we can expect the outcry to diminish once we have demonstrated our seriousness of purpose (and, in turn, the vanity of the outcry). For those Arab

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governments that recognize the usefulness of friendly and cooperative relations with the USG, a bold U.S. stand against the radical, terrorist, Soviet-backed PLO would not negate their interest in such good relations. Their complaints and demarches may be outweighed by the campaign's many types of value. ~~(S)~~

Advocates of immediate direct USG-PLO negotiations build their brief on two premises: (1) While some of the groups functioning under the PLO umbrella retain terrorist and politically extremist views, Fatah, the largest PLO constituent organization, is no longer a terrorist group and has moderated its ambitions regarding Israel. (2) The PLO is a permanent factor in the Arab-Israeli conflict; it must be dealt with sooner or later if that conflict is to be resolved peaceably. These premises, however, are contradicted by the public statements of leading Reagan Administration officials, as well as by reports from our intelligence agencies. ~~(S)~~

President Reagan and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Allen are both on record several times characterizing the PLO as a terrorist organization. Secretary of State Alexander Haig, when questioned about the PLO, has made two points: First, the PLO is not a unitary organization (an observation that casts doubt on the PLO leadership's authority to speak for "the Palestinian people" -- that is, the PLO's willingness and ability to bind its putative constituency to any truly moderate agreement regarding peace with Israel); and second, the largest and most "moderate" section of the PLO, Fatah, is a terrorist group:

> "If you're talking about the PLO, I think that encompasses a number of forces, influences, and attitudes. If you're talking about the Fatah wing of the PLO, for example, then you're talking about a pretty tough hardcore group of terrorists."
>
> Confirmation hearings before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, January 1981. ~~(S)~~

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As for the PLO's current attitude toward Israel, one of Fatah's leading "moderates" told a West German interviewer a few weeks ago that (1) the PLO defines "occupied territories" as including all of Israel, and (2) the PLO will under no circumstances recognize Israel because the PLO aims for Israel's destruction. The Fatah

spokesman added: "In case all-out war actually broke out, we would be the allies of the Soviet Union...." (S)

The antagonism between U.S. interests and PLO power cannot be overcome by a change in the PLO's rhetoric regarding Israel's right to exist. Rather than pave the way toward U.S. recognition of the PLO by encouraging such a rhetorical change, it may be best to impose additional conditions for such recognition designed to convince the Palestinian Arabs that their only hope of U.S. support lies in developing a non-PLO leadership for themselves. What kind of plan would foster the emergence of a Palestinian Arab leadership unburdened by the PLO's association with (1) terrorism, (2) international, Soviet-sponsored subversion, and (3) the militaristic "Palestine National Covenant"? (S)

In devising such a plan, the USG could exploit the conflict of interests existing between the West Bank/Gaza Strip Arab residents and the PLO leaders in Beirut. The former group stands to benefit directly if living conditions improve in the West Bank/Gaza Strip regions (e.g., if the Israeli military administration is withdrawn pursuant to the Camp David "Framework" Accord). The latter group stands to lose if that Camp David Accord is fulfilled; hence the PLO's (thus far successful) campaign of intimidation and assassination to ensure that no West Bank/Gaza Strip Arabs participate in forming the "Self-Governing Authority (Administrative Council)" necessary to advance the Camp David peace process. (S)

In an effort to reduce the PLO's influence in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (and thereby improve prospects for local Arab endorsements of whatever autonomy accord is negotiated by Egypt and Israel), Israeli authorities recently curtailed the flow of PLO monies into those regions. Certain U.S. officials predicting financial hardships for the former recipients of the PLO monies, have advocated that the USG deliver a protest to Israel about the curtailment. The USG's interests, however, might be better served through encouragement of such Israeli actions. (S)

who?

So long as the world's diplomatic community accommodates the PLO, there is little chance of the West Bank/Gaza Strip Arabs' challenging the Beirut-based leadership outright. A USG-led effort to reduce the PLO's diplomatic standing and to encourage the cutting of political and financial ties between the PLO and the West Bank/Gaza Strip residents might, however, deprive the PLO of its veto on progress toward Arab-Israel peace, while undermining the Soviet Union's ability to use the PLO as an effective proxy around the world. (S)

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MEMORANDUM

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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August 28, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR NORMAN A. BAILEY

FROM: DOUGLAS J. FEITH

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy Toward PLO (U)

In light of (1) the current halt in hostilities across the Lebanese border, (2) Sadat's recent call for direct USG-PLO negotiations, (3) press reports of a "softening" of our Administration's line on the PLO, and (4) Begin's imminent visit to Washington, you requested me to review how we arrived at our official position on the PLO, why we retain it, and where we should go from here. (U)

I contend that this Administration's policy of open hostility toward the Qadafi regime in Libya requires us, for the sake of consistency, to adopt an aggressively disapproving attitude toward the PLO. Consider what irritates us about the Qadafi regime: Its Soviet connection; its interference in other countries' affairs; its practice and support for terrorism; its denunciations of the United States; its calls for the destruction of Israel. Which of these items does not taint the PLO as well? When our F-14s recently shot down two Libyan jets that had attacked them over the Gulf of Sidra, at least one American newspaper commentator commented critically that the F-14s' action will force Qadafi into an anti-American stand. It is no less bizarre to argue that the USG, by wielding a stick against the PLO, will force the PLO toward extremism, or that the USG, by dangling carrots before the PLO, can entice the organization away from terrorism, away from its Soviet connection, and toward authentic diplomatic moderation. It makes much more sense for the USG to combat the PLO than to court it. It is noteworthy that the PLO publicly supported Libya and condemned the United States in connection with the Libyan attack on the F-14s.

Were the Reagan Administration to undertake the diplomatic campaign outlined on page9 below, it would demonstrate the coherence of three of our chief foreign policy promises and themes: (1) to combat international terrorism; (2) to counter the Soviet Union's use of subversive proxies; and (3) to bolster our friends and stand down our enemies. In addition, it would improve prospects for a broader Arab-Israeli peace by helping free the truly moderate Arabs from violent Arab intimidation and by increasing Israel's sense of security.

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NLS F97-106 #27

BY NARA DATE 11/17/97

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It would also facilitate the ultimate peaceable resolution of Lebanon's internal crisis by increasing the relative power of the Lebanese central authorities vis-a-vis the PLO.

Such a campaign would, at least in its early stages, provoke public denunciations by many Arab governments, but we can expect the outcry to diminish once we have demonstrated our seriousness of purpose (and, in turn, the vanity of the outcry). For those Arab governments that recognize the usefulness of friendly and cooperative relations with the USG, a bold U.S. stand against the radical, terrorist, Soviet-backed PLO would not negate their interest in such good relations. Their complaints and demarches will not outweigh the campaign's many types of value.

A number of factors account for the distrust and antagonism that have characterized official U.S. attitudes toward the PLO: (1) the PLO's terrorist operations, which have frequently disrupted international commerce and diplomacy and have aimed, almost exclusively, at civilian targets; (2) its "national covenant," which dedicates the PLO to the liquidation of Israel by military means; (3) the PLO's political and military ties to the Soviet Union; (4) its challenge to Hashemite rule in Jordan, which culminated in the Jordanian civil war of September 1970; (5) its anti-United States and generally anti-Western declarations; and (6) its support (material, technical, and political) for radical (often Soviet-sponsored) organizations and "movements" in the Middle East, Europe, Africa, and Latin America.

These factors help explain the USG's willingness, in 1975, to sign an agreement with Israel (in connection with the second Egyptian-Israeli "disengagement" accord) containing the following commitment:

> The United States will continue to adhere to its present policy with respect to the Palestine Liberation Organization, whereby it will not recognize or negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Organization so long as the Palestine Liberation Organization does not recognize Israel's right to exist and does not accept Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.
>
> Memorandum of Agreement of September 1, 1975 between the Governments of Israel and the United States.

That commitment, it bears noting, does not preclude "communications" or "dealings" with the PLO; it does not bar the flow of thoughts, ideas, suggestions and the like between the USG and PLO. What it does is to bind the USG not to "recognize or negotiate with" the PLO. In other words, it bars only those types of communication that would enhance the diplomatic standing or the general prestige of the PLO.

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Even if the USG had given no such commitment to Israel, it would be wise, I submit, to refrain from action and words that increase the PLO's stature and power.

Advocates of immediate direct USG-PLO negotiations build their brief on two premises: (1) While some of the groups functioning under the PLO umbrella retain terrorist and politically extremist views, Fatah, the largest PLO constituent organization, is no longer a terrorist group and has moderated its ambitions regarding Israel. (2) The PLO is a permanent factor in the Arab-Israeli conflict; it must be dealt with sooner or later if that conflict is to be resolved peaceably. These premises, however, are contradicted by the public statements of leading Reagan Administration officials, as well as by reports from our intelligence agencies.

On September 3, 1980, President (then-candidate) Ronald Reagan stated:

> President Carter refuses to brand the PLO as a terrorist organization. I have no hesitation in doing so.
>
> We live in a world which any band of thugs clever enough to get the word "liberation" into its name can thereupon murder school children and have its deeds considered glamorous and glorious. Terrorists are not guerrillas or commandos, or freedom-fighters or anything else. They are terrorists and they should be identified as such. If others wish to deal with them, establish diplomatic relations with them, let it be on their heads. And let them be willing to pay the price of appeasement.

Address to the B'nai B'rith Forum, Washington, D.C.

President Reagan reiterated on November 6, 1980 (in his first press conference following the election), that "the PLO has proven that it is a terrorist organization."

Secretary of State Alexander Haig, when questioned about the PLO, has made two points: First, the PLO is not a unitary organization (an observation that casts doubt on the PLO leadership's authority to speak for "the Palestinian people" -- that is, the PLO's willingness and ability to bind its putative constituency to any truly moderate agreement regarding peace with Israel); and second, the largest and most "moderate" section of the PLO, Fatah, is a terrorist group:

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> If you're talking about the PLO, I think that encompasses a number of forces, influences, and attitudes. If you're talking about the Fatah wing of the PLO, for example, then you're talking about a pretty tough hardcore group of terrorists.

Confirmation hearings before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, January 1981.

Likewise has Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Richard Allen characterized the PLO as an organization "dealing in terror and supporting terror." (The Washington Post, January 3, 1981, p. A-14.) In an interview with ABC-News aired March 20, 1981, Mr. Allen was asked: "Is it fair to call the PLO a terrorist organization?" He responded:

> We have said, the President of the United States has said repeatedly, that there are two main conditions that are obstacles to discussing anything with the PLO. One is its practice of terrorism and its condoning of international terrorism. And the second, of course, is the refusal to recognize the right of Israel to exist. Absent those two conditions and we'd be dealing with a fundamentally different situation, so the President has said.
>
> I think yes, on balance. There's no question that we must identify the PLO as a terrorist organization.

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In a report dated March 27, 1981, the Defense Intelligence Agency sets forth the details of PLO support to leftist revolutionaries in Central America -- Nicaragua and El Salvador in particular.

[redacted] "the PLO claimed credit for six separate bombing incidents/attempts in Israel on August 23 and 24 [1981]," Observing that the claims may be exaggerated, the Embassy points out that the claims are intended to demonstrate the continuation of the PLO's "military confrontation with Israel, the ceasefire in South Lebanon notwithstanding." ~~(C)~~ Beirut cable 6513, August 25, 1981 (emphasis added).

It flouts the evidence to assert that Fatah or the PLO is not still a terrorist organization.

As for whether the PLO has moderated its attitude regarding the United States and Israel, it is worthwhile reviewing the

(Footnote continued from previous page)

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interview Farouk Kadoumi, the head of the PLO's Political Department, gave the West German newsmagazine Stern on July 30, 1981. Kadoumi works closely with Arafat within Fatah and generally is characterized as a relative "moderate" in Fatah.

Kadoumi: One cannot expect the Palestinians to talk with their enemy. Israel has occupied our country for 32 years [note: "occupied territories" refers not just to areas lost to Israel in 1967, but to areas Israel has controlled since 1949], and the primary precondition is that it retreat from the occupied territories. ....

Stern: When you say "occupied territories," what do you mean?

Kadoumi: For the present, the West Bank, the Golan Heights and the Gaza Strip.

* * * *

Stern: ... Provided you were now to get this state on the West Bank and Gaza - and there are not a few who would wish you to have it with all their heart - what would then happen to the remainder, to Israel in the 1948 boundaries?

Kadoumi: I shall make it perfectly clear to you. We shall never recognize Israel, never accept the usurper, the colonialist, the imperialist.

Stern: Your attitude means the destruction of the State of Israel.

Kadoumi: Yes, I want to destroy the enemy who keeps my homeland occupied, who has murdered my parents, my brothers and sisters ....

* * * *

Stern: Your Arab friends in the region are somewhat more reserved towards the Soviet Union.

Kadoumi: That might apply to Saudi Arabia. But King Hussein of Jordan has quite recently visited Moscow, and, to conclude from the joint communique, understanding between him and his hosts has been excellent. You see that there has been some change.

Stern: But it does not seem likely at present that, in an emergency, he would side with the Soviet Union.

Kadoumi: In case all-out war actually broke out, we would be the allies of the Soviet Union -- for we prefer to be the friends of Communists, rather than to be the victims of the Zionist and imperialist occupation forces.

Stern: As we know, Communists, too, can be occupation forces.

Kadoumi: In the Arab world they are not.

(Emphasis added.)

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The fundamental antagonism between U.S. interests and PLO power cannot be overcome by a change in the PLO's rhetoric regarding UNSC Resolution 242 and Israel's right to exist. Given the history and the current views and activities of the PLO's leaders (even the relatively "moderate" ones), U.S. officials should attempt to undermine, not enhance, the PLO's ability to conduct terrorist operations and its influence over international political developments.

Rather than paving the way toward U.S. recognition of the PLO by encouraging such a rhetorical change, the USG should impose additional conditions for such recognition designed to convince the Palestinian Arabs that their only hope of winning active U.S. support lies in developing a non-PLO political leadership for themselves. The USG requires a plan designed to foster the emergence of a Palestinian Arab leadership unburdened by the PLO's association with (1) terrorism, (2) international, Soviet-sponsored subversion, and (3) the belligerent "Palestine National Covenant."

In devising such a plan, the USG should exploit the conflict of interests existing between the West Bank/Gaza Strip Arab residents and the PLO leaders in Beirut. The former group stands to benefit directly if living conditions improve in the West Bank/Gaza Strip regions (e.g., if the Israeli military administration is withdrawn pursuant to the Camp David "Framework" Accord). The latter group stands to lose if that Camp David Accord is fulfilled; hence the PLO's (thus far successful) campaign of intimidation and assassination to ensure that no West Bank/Gaza Strip Arabs participate in forming the "Self-Governing Authority (Administrative Council)" necessary to advance the Camp David peace process.

In an effort to reduce the PLO's influence in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (and thereby improve prospects for local Arab endorsements of whatever autonomy accord is negotiated by Egypt and Israel), Israeli authorities recently curtailed the flow of PLO monies into those regions. Certain U.S. officials, predicting financial hardships for the former recipients of the PLO monies, have advocated that the USG deliver a protest to Israel about the curtailment. The USG's interests, however, would be better served through encouragement of such Israeli actions.

So long as the world's diplomatic community accommodates the PLO, there is little chance of the West Bank/Gaza Strip Arabs' challenging the Beirut-based leadership outright. A USG-led effort to reduce the PLO's diplomatic standing and to encourage the cutting of political and financial ties between the PLO and the West Bank/Gaza Strip residents could, however, deprive the PLO of its veto on progress toward Arab-Israel peace, while undermining the Soviet Union's ability to use the PLO as an effective proxy around the world. Such an effort could include the following:

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a. Persistent condemnation of the PLO as a terrorist group. Emphasis on PLO's Soviet connection.

b. Declaration that USG is convinced that no progress toward resolution of the Palestine problem can occur until a non-terrorist (i.e., non-PLO) Palestinian Arab leadership emerges.

c. Closure of PLO information offices in Washington and New York.

d. Campaign among U.S. allies to ostracize the PLO. (This should go hand-in-hand with education of allies regarding the "oil weapon.")

e. Campaign to convince Arab states supporting the PLO that the USG will not ease up its opposition to the PLO no matter how much they protest. (We can tell the Saudis that, while we realize they cannot very well endorse our attacks on the PLO, it will ultimately serve Saudi interests if the PLO is undermined.)

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6174

AUG 3 1 1983

UNITED STATES DELEGATION
TO THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT
Geneva, Switzerland

OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR

August 26, 1983

~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL~~

The Honorable
William P. Clark
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Judge Clark:

I am writing to give you, from my vantage point on the front lines of our arms control and disarmament efforts, a personal assessment of our current efforts in the multilateral arena. It is not a totally optimistic picture. Moreover, there are political storm clouds gathering on the horizon which portend serious international problems for the United States next year. Some of these problems can be averted -- or at least moderated -- by taking steps which would not prejudice any of our national security interests.

1984 will be important for the establishment of a dynamic record in the arms control field. It is doubtful, to my mind at least, that the Soviets will have an interest in giving the President any election advantages. If this is true, they will try to ensure that arms control issues become disruptive of the political process in our country and divisive internationally. The remarkable increase in my mail from peace groups across the United States offers substantial evidence of our own national mood. Here in Europe, arms control is clearly the number one issue. In a year when the domestic and international debate on arms control, in particular on nuclear issues, will be of increasing significance, we need to consider ways to improve our participation in the Committee on Disarmament (and other related international bodies) to help meet this situation, which has obvious implications for the President's policies and our national security.

First, let me describe the Committee on Disarmament (CD). It is a little-known, generally neglected forum which has in the past been a respectable negotiating body. But it has

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BY 045 NARA, DATE 4/16/01

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degenerated badly to the point where it now often serves as little more than a platform to continue UN General Assembly debates. While it has the capacity to undertake serious negotiations, most of the time is spent in posturing and sterile argument. When the Administration took office, the CD had been virtually ceded to the Soviet Union as a propaganda instrument. I have been fighting for the past two years to deny the Soviets that advantage and to gain international acceptance for U.S. arms control policies. We have made some progress, but not enough.

As a consensus body, the Committee is patently not a threat to any state's vital interests. Any proposal can be blocked, and even discussion of a proposal can be stopped if one member so desires. Of course, this cuts both ways, and a combination of unrealistic proposals and blocking tactics have contributed to the Committee's problems. An illustration of this is the fate of our own proposal to negotiate a treaty prohibiting radiological weapons. The proposal has largely been accepted by 35 of the 40 members of the Committee, but has been blocked by hard-line non-parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). A second example is our inability to make rapid progress toward a chemical weapons ban. Here there is apparent political will to achieve a convention on the part of all members except the Soviets. With these examples in mind, it is fair to question the CD's utility as a negotiating forum, but one can hardly make a convincing case -- as some within the Government attempt to do -- that the Committee is a "slippery slope" on which we dare not place issues of great importance to our national security. I would argue the contrary. From my perspective, the Committee affords the Reagan Administration a unique, virtually risk-free opportunity to demonstrate its commitment to the vital arms control component of our national security. But we must understand the CD and use it to better advantage.

Let me first point to some successes and suggest how we might do even better. Our stance in the Committee on the negotiation of a chemical weapons ban is solid, positive, and respected. This spring the Vice President delivered our openins statement, which was largely devoted to this issue, and underscored our interest in making rapid progress. Both this year and last we have introduced constructive and detailed proposals, and have clearly and firmly taken the lead in the Committee, leaving the Soviets trailing in the dust. Yet, we have failed to receive domestic or international credit publicly for our efforts on this critical issue. Indeed, judging from press clippings, it is apparent that the American press focuses almost exclusively on the Administration's request for modernization of our chemical weapons capability and virtually ignores the fact that the United States is undertaking a

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concurrent negotiating effort to achieve a chemical weapons ban. Opponents and supporters alike of the binary program strongly advocate such a ban. In my opinion, we should make a major, high-level effort to focus attention on these negotiations, both to explain our position on the modernization issue and to educate the public in general about our serious and constructive initiative here in the CD.

With respect to the treaty prohibiting radiological weapons, this U.S. initiative (first made by Fred Ikle in 1976) has become bogged down over extraneous issues. While modest, the treaty would nevertheless be useful: it would ban the weapons use of the rapidly accumulating stocks of highly radioactive nuclear reactor wastes, and obligate states to protect these materials against diversion to such use. In my judgment, the treaty is negotiable in 1984 if we expend a minimal amount of political capital to urge the recalcitrant states to withdraw unrelated dealing with nuclear disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. I believe we should expend the capital. The treaty constitutes one of the few arms control issues with propsects for near-term success on which we and the Soviets see eye-to-eye and enjoy a good working relationship (we introduced draft treaty elements into the CD jointly with them in 1979). Agreement would almost certainly provide political benefits both bilaterally with the Soviets and more broadly.

In the nuclear area, the picture is bleak. The fundamental debate in the CD results from the position of the non-nuclear weapon states -- both parties and non-parties to the NPT -- that because the use of nuclear weapons would affect not just the combatants but all of mankind, all nations have a role to play in achieving nuclear disarmament measures. They translate their position into specific proposals for negotiations in the Committee. There are three issues at play: nuclear arms control, where the non-nuclear weapon states realize (but do not accept) that there will be no meaningful role for them; nuclear weapons testing, where there is extreme frustration regarding our current refusal to negotiate a comprehensive test ban and where we are most vulnerable to criticism; and the prevention of nuclear war, which is a new issue for the Committee.

I believe the time is right for an initiative in the nuclear area. We are obviously not going to negotiate nuclear disarmament or a nuclear test ban in the CD. But we should give some thought to a modest initiative related to the prevention of nuclear war which would go a long way toward improving our position here. The President has recently proposed some nuclear confidence-building measures to be undertaken with the Soviet

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Union on a bilateral basis. I understand that a nuclear incidents proposal which would be appropriate for the CD is now awaiting NSC approval. Such an initiative would greatly assist us in defusing a difficult problem here and would have, I believe, useful spill-over implications both domestically and internationally.

There are other ways in which the Committee can be used to positive advantage without putting at risk vital national security positions. I have not, for example, mentioned outer space arms control, which is receiving great attention here, particularly in light of Mr. Andropov's recent pronouncements. But rather than extending this already lengthy letter, might I seek an appointment to discuss the matters I have raised with you on my return to Washington? If this meets with your approval, would there be some time during the week of either September 19 or September 26 convenient to your schedule? Pending your response, I shall keep both weeks open on my calendar.

With warmest personal regards -- and apologies for the length of this letter, I am

Respectfully yours,

Louis G. Fields, Jr.
Ambassador
United States Representative
to the Committee on Disarmament

04/21/03 08:56 FAX 202 501 5709 NLMS ROOM 104 014

~~SECRET~~

3971

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

June 8, 1982

~~SECRET~~

6M

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: ROGER W. ROBINSON

SUBJECT: President's Talking Points to Prime Minister Thatcher on John Brown Ltd.

I was asked by John Poindexter to comment on the attached note (Tab I) from Secretary Haig to the President concerning Mrs. Thatcher's anticipated request to release G.E. rotors to John Brown Engineering (turbine manufacturing subsidiary). Consistent with my memo to you of June 3, I continue to respectfully disagree with the way in which Secretary Haig has framed his comments on this matter. Secretary Haig makes the comment that the language we received on East-West credits . . . "does not justify such a decision /to release rotors/ at this time." You will recall that in the May 24 NSC meeting, the President strongly indicated he did not wish to link the release of any equipment covered by the December 30 sanctions to the credit restraint initiative -- only to consider whether or not to impose extraterritorial controls. Regrettably there have been a number of press reports speculating on our willingness to lift the sanctions on oil and gas equipment for progress on credits, which may have in turn misled our allies, including the UK, that we are contemplating such a trade off. As for progress on restraining East-West credits, I fully concur with Secretary Haig's view that the language received is "ambiguous and weak." For your information, I have attached three recent articles touching on the credit initiative (Tab II) which I believe are reflective of the media's view.

I would, therefore, recommend that the President indicate that we do not contemplate any loosening of the December 30 sanctions in the near future and perhaps review the stated preconditions in order to prudently temper Mrs. Thatcher's expectations in this connection.

In lieu of our inability to secure a meaningful allied agreement on credits, I seek your guidance concerning the preparation of a brief options paper for interagency comment as a prelude to an NSC meeting on the December 30 sanctions in the near future.

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NLS F99-051/1 #226 NSC DOS

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Review June 8, 1988

~~SECRET~~ BY CAS NARA, DATE 5/2/01

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RECOMMENDATION:

That I prepare a brief options paper for interagency comment as a prelude to an NSC meeting on the December 30 sanctions.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

cc: Richard Pipes
Paula Dobriansky
Norman Bailey

04/21/03 08:57 FAX 202 501 5709 NLMS ROOM 104 016

2

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 6, 1986

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: DAVID G. WIGG

SUBJECT: Suggested Organizational Change

The proper blending of our national security interests and economic policies is a vital function that the NSC should provide the President. This can best be accomplished by a proper balancing of competing forces that characteristically line up on both sides of East-West, debt, counterterrorism and other politically charged policy debates to forge Cabinet decisions consistent with the President's goals. In the past two years here, I have developed what I believe is a successful approach consistent with this mandate to matching proactive economic policies against specific U.S. problems around the globe. I recently sent you a short paper at your request concerning possible actions per the debt crisis. Those are only potential actions. To make my point, I would like to list some "actual" accomplishments over the past year for the purpose of arguing for breaking off my operation into something called the Economic Security Issues Directorate

The following are examples of how economics can be used proactively to solve U.S.problems, improve relationships with other countries, increase leverage, protect our national interests, etc. These are the kinds of issues I would take on in the new directorate. I ask that you not share this paper with anyone.

o

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BY CAS NARA, DATE 3/27/01

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- Iraq-Aqaba Pipeline Insurance. When Bud asked me to take on this deal it was a shambles. Roger had succeeded in getting OPIC involved, but they were dead-set against going ahead and leaks were becoming a distinct possibility. It only took one meeting with OPIC to convince me that their involvement was not a viable option. I took the concept I explained to you on the phone a couple of Saturdays ago to DOD and we now have a package that I believe will fly with the President's imprimateur. Of course Bill Clark may obviate our need for the insurance, but at least the deal that had been given up as hopeless was salvaged in a secure manner. If it serves to set in motion the rest of the process, it will be an important contribution to our regional goals.

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[redacted]

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John, I see 1986 as a tumultuous year in economic security matters. If you feel that I can serve you in the way that I suggest, please give my offer some consideration. As I mentioned earlier, I would appreciate your keeping this paper close-hold. Thanks.

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2468

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET

ACTION

March 26, 1985

BURGHARDT

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: OLIVER L. NORTH
RAYMOND F. BURGHARDT

SUBJECT: S-W-M Breakfast March 27, 1985 Item:
Nicaragua Policy Overview: Where Are We Going?

Attached at Tab I are talking points for your use during tomorrow's breakfast. This responds to the PROFs note at Tab II.

This item was submitted by DOD (Ikle) who wants to have a "frank and useful exchange" among Bud, Ken Dam, Wil Taft, et al. In conversations with Dr. Ikle earlier in the day, both Don and I have tried to dissuade him of the necessity for such colloquy. Although we did not succeed, it may be a good opportunity to at least try to direct and reinforce the points we have been making with State, Defense, and CIA regarding our planning.

We have told the other participants that our goal is to prepare a report, in accord with Section 8066 of the FY-85 CR, for submission on or about April 15. Further, that the report should have three separate versions of the Presidential Determination: lethal, non-lethal, and non-specific. Defense has suggested and we have agreed that there should be less emphasis on omnibus regional negotiations and more on the matter of the internal dialogue based on the March 1 San Jose Declaration.

Finally, Defense wants to emphasize the matter of economic sanctions and "derecognition." We have advised that these are not matters that need to be determined at this point; rather, we should be pressing for an effective public education effort exposing the threat and the resistance as an alternative.

RECOMMENDATION

That you use the talking points attached at Tab I during your breakfast tomorrow morning.

Approve ✓ Disapprove ____

Fine. I think they are all Calmed down

Attachments
Tab I - Talking Points
Tab II - PROFs Note 3/26/85 09:39:54

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Declassify: OADR

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED NSC, DOD
NLS N2010-109 #3
BY GAS NARA, DATE 3/16/01

04/21/03 08:58 FAX 202 501 5709 NLMS ROOM 104 022

ATTACHMENT B

National Archives and Records Administration

700 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20408-0001

VIA FACSIMILE
(NLMS 2002-046)

November 18, 2002

The Honorable Alberto R. Gonzales
Counsel to the President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Judge Gonzales:

In accordance with the requirements of the Presidential Records Act (PRA), 44 U.S.C. §§2201-2207 and Executive Order 13233, this letter constitutes a formal notice from the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) to the incumbent President of our intent to open Reagan Presidential records in response to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request listed in Attachment A.

This material, consisting of 14,958 pages, has been reviewed for all applicable FOIA exemptions, resulting in a total of 268 pages restricted in whole and 22 pages restricted in part. NARA is proposing to open 14,690 pages in full and 22 pages in part. Reagan Presidential records are no longer subject to closure under the Presidential restrictive categories of the PRA. However, it should be noted that the material proposed for opening in this notice includes 220 pages of documents containing confidential communications requesting or submitting advice or other information that would normally have been withheld prior to January 20, 2001, under the PRA restrictions in 44 U.S.C. §2204(a), as they were asserted and narrowed by President Reagan. A copy of these documents is included at Attachment B. Additionally, nine pages of the records proposed for opening were declassified by Reagan Library staff using Department of State declassification guidelines. A copy of these declassified documents is included at Attachment C.

Copies of all other documents proposed for release under this notice will be provided to you upon request. We are also concurrently informing former President Reagan's representative, Joanne Drake, of our intent to release these records. Please inform us at your earliest convenience of your decision with respect to any privilege claims. Pursuant to E.O. 13233, NARA will not release the documents unless and until former President Reagan and the incumbent President agree to authorize access to the records.

If you have any questions relating to this request, please contact me at (202) 501-5700 or NARA General Counsel Gary M. Stern at (301) 837-3026.

Sincerely,

Nancy Kegan Smith

NANCY KEGAN SMITH
DIRECTOR
Presidential Materials Staff

Enclosures

cc: Brett Kavanaugh
Associate Counsel to the President
Paul Colborn
Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice
Gary M. Stern
General Counsel, National Archives and Records Administration
R. Duke Blackwood
Director, Ronald Reagan Library

ATTACHMENT A

Case Number	Requester	Topic	Pages Processed	Pages Restricted	Pages Proposed for Opening
F97-054/5	David Welborn	Selected files from the Office of Legislative Affairs	14,958	268 in whole; 22 in part	14,690 in full; 22 in part

This request pertains to selected folders from the files of Kenneth Duberstein, Robert Kabel, and M.B. Oglesby, Jr., that pertain to their duties in the White House Office of Legislative Affairs. The records to be opened consist of material relating to a large array of issues involving the Reagan Administration's interactions with Congress between 1981 and 1986. This includes routine correspondence with members of Congress on various topics, routine information regarding proposed or pending legislation, requests for appointments, and requests for Presidential and Vice Presidential telephone calls to support various pieces of pending legislation. Also included are copies of legislation that were under consideration by Congress, reports on Congressional hearings and the testimony of various administration officials at those hearings, and memoranda regarding approaches taken by the Reagan Administration with executive agency officials and members of Congress in support of or opposition to legislation. Other records consist of memoranda that relate to appointment nominations by the President, legislative strategies employed by the Reagan Administration, and discussions concerning advice given by the Republican leadership in Congress. Finally, the chronological memoranda files maintained by these staff members in the Office of Legislative Affairs and processed for this FOIA request are generally routine in nature and document changes in various bills or relate to scheduling issues. This material contains 220 pages that would have been closed under restriction P-5 of the PRA prior to January 20, 2001. Copies of these pages can be found at Attachment B. It also includes nine pages declassified using Department of State guidelines. Copies of these pages can be found at Attachment C.

###

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

#1

August 18, 1982

TO: KEN

FROM: SHERRIE

RE: Ohio judgeships - Jim Baker instructions

Jim Baker called me to inform us that the Ohio judgeship should not be "given" to the Ohio delegation unless it translates into votes for the tax bill tomorrow.

I informed him that you had directed that no one from Ohio be informed of the decision to go with the man (Bell) who they have recommended until you had time to assess the situation tonight. It was Baker's concern that we should continue to search for a woman for the Ohio vacancy, if proceeding with Bell does not get us any votes.

(The Baker conversation was conducted by Cicconi since I was not available when Baker called and had to call him back.)

Please advise what your decision is so I can inform Fielding and Department of Justice as to the appropriate follow-up action.

~~KWD~~ #2

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Ken Duberstein –

Sen. Kasten is hopping mad because the Army is about to award an engine contract to a minority-owned business in the Bronx (at a heavy federal subsidy) instead of by competitive bid which his Chrysler constituent owned unit (outboard marine).

He says he will call for a GAO/Armed Servies Comte investigation.

D'Amato is ecstatic.

Because I helped the minority business qualify with a UDAG loan, an SBA loan, and a N.Y. State loan, he is mostly upset at me. He says it was none of my business. It is Fred Fielding's business (sic?).

Jim Jukins

#3

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

PRIVATE

August 5, 1982

Jim Baker

Subject: Rostow Personnel Problems

As you know Helms has a hold on Terrell and Grey. In a letter to Rostow last Friday, Helms reaffirmed his opposition with considerable firmness.

Gene, who is creating problems for us in a number of areas and has implied that if his guys are not confirmed he will leave. In a letter to Bill last week, he said "...if they lapse, so do I."

But it seems to me that if that happens--at least in that way--it hurts the President, for in leaving Rostow would air his persistent complaints of having his original mandate from the White House withdrawn and even though that is not true, it would produce an unneeded public argument.

I believe there is the basis for a compromise. As a separate but related matter, Percy is holding up the nominations of the General Advisory Commission on Arms Control (GAC) because they are all hard liners (and in our judgment very good people).

I believe we might get Howard Baker to broker a compromise by urging Percy to let the GAC nominations go and Helms let the ACDA nominations go--both could claim victory. (As an aside, I have just had a call from Howard Baker's guy who noted in passing that Baker is meeting with Rostow this

afternoon at 2:30.

Please let me know if you wish to explore this course. Better still, perhaps you would rather have Ken Duberstein handle it.

Bud McFarlane (Bill Clark concurs)

cc: Ken Duberstein

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE #4

WASHINGTON

November 2, 1982

TO: Ken Duberstein

FROM: Dave Swanson DS.

THRU: Pam Turner

SUBJECT: New Department of Energy Appointments

I called Senator McClure on Tuesday to tell him of the current thinking regarding replacement of Secretary Edwards, Deputy Secretary Ken Davis and Assistant Secretary for Administration Bill Heffelfinger. I told him that Don Hodel would be named to replace Edwards and that he would be recess appointed. I told McClure that we were also going to ask for the resignation of Ken Davis and Bill Heffelfinger. At this point, I told him we were thinking very seriously about appointing Irene Wischer of Texas to replace Davis and that the only obstacle was a few very minor conflict of interest problems which were going to get worked out. I also told him that it was our intention to replace Heffelfinger with Martha Hesse but that we would make no announcemnt on this action until Heffelfinger had been summoned to the White House to talk with the Personnel people probably on Monday. Because of the critical nature of that position, I told him we felt it necessary to recess appoint Martha Hesse.

He had no problem with the Hodel recess appointment. However, he was very concerned and resistant to the other two changes until he had been told why it was necessary to make these changes. He is very close to both Davis and Heffelfinger. And he is also convinced that our past actions and these appointments combine to lead to a conclusion in his mind that we are trying again to kill the nuclear option. He is convinced that this is underlying agenda for the OMB (Stockman and Khedouri) and OPD (Boggs).

Pam feels strongly (and I strongly concur) that in all aspects relating to confirmation, we will willingly handle the situation. However,in those matters relating to judgments on personnel changes, Helene, and Joe Ryan if necessary, should explain their reasons for this decision. Ryan has prepared a four page memo for Helene detailing these reasons. I am told it is very sensitive material and we don't think we should be bringing that news to McClure.

Recommendation

Our recommendation is that if McClure insists on knowing our justifications, we might offer to set up a meeting with Helene. One of us could attend that meeting if you think appropriate.

MEMORANDUM

#5

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 9, 1981

TO: Max Friedersdorf

FROM: Sherrie M. Cooksey SMC

SUBJECT: Congressional Relations Positions in Departments and Agencies

Listed below is a status report on any decision by the Secretaries on their top Congressional Relations positions. Where appropriate, I have recommended areas of inquiry for your use in discussing these positions with the Secretaries.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

--Block is considering the following individuals for the top appointment:

John Schrote
Richard Ashworth
Paul Theis

--You had recommended Bernie Windon.
-- Block is sending a resume to you today on his choice for this position. (per Nancy Kennedy)
QUESTION: Has Block or anyone on his staff interviewed Windon?

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

--Paul VanderMyde has been selected as Assistant Secretary.
--You had requested that VanderMyde interview Mrs. Elise DuPont for a deputy position.

QUESTION: Has VanderMyde been interviewing those individuals we had recommended for the operating staff?

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

--You had recommended three individuals:

Lee Verstandig at DOT
Chris Lehman, Senator Warner's staff
Jack McKenzie

--We've had no communications regarding Casey's decisions on this position.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

--Russ Rourke will be named Assistant Secretary. Rourke has made contact with the offices of Baker and Michel to set up his courtesy calls for next week.

--I sent Russ a consolidated list of all our Congressional Relations recommendations for DOD.

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

--You had strongly recommended Carl Anderson, who is supported by Michel and works for Senator Helms. (Bill Gribbin says Anderson covers all education issues for the Senate conservatives.)

--Also recommended:

George Archibald
Edgar Morgan (Transition & Phil Buchen)
Jack Caulkins

--No indication as to any decisions by Bell.

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

--You had recommended Rob Odle with Jay Morris a close second.

--Apparently, Rob Odle has been offered the job.

--No indication as to whether or not Odle has set up courtesy calls with Baker and Michel.

You may wish to touch base with Secretary Edwards on this.

HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

--Warren Richardson has been chosen and received Congressional clearance.

HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT

--Steve May is Secretary Pierce's candidate.

--I spoke with Dan Hughes, Secretary Pierce's Executive Assistant, regarding May's courtesy calls on Baker and Michel. Hughes said he wouldn't request that of May until he cleared it with the Secretary. Hughes had not seen your memo to the Secretary on that subject.

--In doing Congressional clearances on May, I understood Jim Cannon to say that May was an "outstanding" choice.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

--You had recommended:

Frank Polk
Eric Hultman

--Charlie Leppert may be in consideration.

--Bob McConnell was also being considered at one time.

--John Bolton being pushed by Senators East and Helms.

QUESTION: Has Smith made any decisions yet? (You had been discussing these with Ed Schmultz.)

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

--Don Shasteen is Donovan's choice; however, Senator Hatch had voiced objections to Shasteen's appointment. Hatch was supporting Ron Clements.

QUESTIONS: Was Clements ever interviewed for the position? (Clements says he was not. It would ease the situation with Hatch if someone considered Clements.)

--Shasteen has apparently hired Chris Hankin (campaign staff & lobbyist) as one of aides for CG Relations.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

--Dick Fairbanks is in place.

--Topic to discuss: need more communication with State Department Congressional Relations as they set up meetings with Members so that our people are not embarrassed. This happened on the hostage hearings.

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

--Watt has chosen Stan Hewlitt.

--Bill Gribbin has been negotiating with Watt's office in requesting that Hewlitt pay courtesy calls on Baker and Michel.

--Topic to discuss: Recommend to Secretary that Hewlitt pay his courtesy calls on Baker and Michel.

OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET

--Jonna Lynn Cullen is on board.

--For the other position, you had recommended:

Tom Cantrell, Mike Hudson and George Pritts

-- Harper seems to be favoring Tom Cantrell.

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

--Lee Verstandig in place.

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

--Dennis Thomas in place.

SPECIAL TRADE REPRESENTATIVE

--Brock has chosen Steve Saunders for top position, but has not decided on the deputy position.

--It is unclear whether or not Saunders has made courtesy calls on Baker and Michel.

--Topics to discuss: Courtesy calls.
Possible choices for deputy.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DRAFT

February 16, 1982

#6

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Issue: What decision should be taken on the issue of decontrol of natural gas?

Background: In August 1981, the Cabinet Council on Natural Resources and Environment recommended that the Administration propose legislation to change the current law regulating natural gas to provide for smooth and complete decontrol by 1985, rather than the sudden and partial decontrol now in the law. That recommendation has not ben acted on, and key congressmen agree that a bill must be submitted this month if it is to have any chance of passing in 1982.

The passage of time without a decision has undoubtedly reduced the chances for a successful Administration effort in support of a bill. "Consumer" groups who support all price control efforts have become increasingly vocal and successful in arousing opposition. On the other hand, supporters of decontrol, who include a wide variety of groups, have been fairly silent, waiting for an Administration lead. If a proposal is made, a surprising amount of support may be generated from producers of competing energy sources, such as coal, oil and renewables, supporters of conservation, environmental protection, and energy security. Most academic and editorial opinion will also be favorable, though many may support some type of tax on additional revenues.

Discussion: During the 1980 campaign, President Reagan pledged to "rapidly phase out price controls on oil and natural gas." This promise was intended to improve America's energy situation by preventing serious imbalances in supply and demand which are the usual results of price controls. To the average observer, there is no "natural gas problem" at this very moment. Congressmen and interest groups who respond best to "crises" have taken this as a license to urge that there is no need to worry about natural gas right now.

Indeed, it is just barely possible that we will struggle through to 1985, and see about half of natural gas deregulated as scheduled, which should lead to market-clearing prices for consumers and market prices for producers. However, for this happy state of events to occur, oil prices will have to drop substantially and stay low. If prices just hold steady,

or rise, then we will see a number of serious problems, if the current law is not changed.

(1) Market distortion-- Already, different pipelines are paying very different prices for gas. Pipelines in the producing states are generally paying more than those in consuming states, because they formerly had a free market. This may well lead to increasing shortages in the producing areas, as those pipelines are unable to compete for deregulated supplies becuase of their higher average cost.

(2) Inadequate drilling and exploration--The current drilling boom has been fueled almost entirely by oil. Since phased decontrol of oil began, new oil wells have grown 40% annually; new gas wells only about 10%. In 1980, as much oil was found as was produced. Gas found without any connection to oil fell fas short of replacing our production of that gas. With true decontrol in 1985 increasingly uncertain, drilling and exploration will be constrained by low prices under the current law, and fear of a repetition of the betrayal by a previous President of his pledges to work for decontrol.

(3) Unless oil prices fall markedly, the current law sets the stage for a sharp and instant price rise on January 1, 1985. If the rise takes place, it will undoubtedly cause a far more severe shock than if the price increase were phased in. The threat of that increase is certain to lead to demands for continued or "stretched-out" controls. This will be a very difficult issue to deal with in the middle of the 1984 campaign.

Options: I. DO NOTHING

If the Administration does not make a proposal for decontrol in the next two weeks, it is virtually certain that the current law will not be changed in 1982, and very unlikely that it will be changed before 1985.

ADVANTAGES:

--Avoids a major Congressional fight, freeing energies for other matter
--Allows the possibility that the current law will solve problems.
--Avoids question of a tax, since there is no "windfall" to tax.

DISADVANTAGES:

--Forfeits opportunity to improve America's energy position, put additional pressure on OPEC, encourage production and discourage wasteful consumption.
--Violates a campaign pledge
--May lead to continued controls beyond 1985
--Disheartens and dissolves the strong coalition of allies ready to work for decontrol

[NOTE: If this option is chosen, we could issue a statement ascribing our decision to the impossibility of success, and attempting to put some distance between the current ("Carter") law and its possible disasters, and this Administration. We could also direct DOE to take a more active role in encouraging the FERC in doing what it can to try to improve matters, though FERC will be subject to severe challenge in court for any action it takes.]

Option: II. SUBMIT ADMINISTRATION BILL SIMILAR TO CABINET COUNCIL PROPOSAL

This would involve a smooth phase out of controls on all gas by 1985, and removal of all restrictions on use of gas. Would probably contain some negotiated provisions to reduce or prevent inordinate price increases upon decontrol due to outdated contract clauses.

ADVANTAGES:

--Fulfills campaign pledge.
--Offers best hope of a smooth transition to decontrol
--Will increase exploration and production of gas, as well as conservation.
--Will put additional pressure on OPEC to reduce oil prices, also aiding our allies.
--Will encourage alternatives to gas, especially coal, solar and nuclea
--Stability of supply will encourage oil-to-gas switches.

DISADVANTAGES:

--Will cause great outcry in some quarters, adding to charge that Administration is hurting "the poor."
--Proposal could well fail, thus incurring political cost needlessly.
--By non-monetarist reasoning, would lead to higher inflation, thus also reducing real GNP.
--Would lead to almost irresistable demands for a "windfall" tax.

[NOTE: So long as a tax is confined to the "windfall" of additional revenue provided under a new law as opposed to the revenue possible under current law, decontrol with a tax is preferable to no decontrol, as our experience with oil has shown.]

Option: III. SUBMIT SOME PARTIAL DECONTROL PROPOSAL

This would convey the appearance of "moderation", trying to do something with regard to decontrol without raising as much opposition. The two variants most often suggested are to decontrol "new" gas only (gas from wells drilled after 1981 or 1982), and to ask only for changes in demand restrictions such as the Fuel Use Act or incremental pricing [special high prices for large boilers].

ADVANTAGES:

--Would appear to move toward fulfilling campaign pledge
--New gas decontrol could increase new exploration as opposed to current law.
--Increasing demand for gas could increase producers incentive to produce and raise the price that currently deregulated gas could receive.
--Would not appear to affect consumers as much as a full program of phased decontrol.

DISADVANTAGES:

--Would appear to be a "gimmick" adopted in the face of rising opposition.
--New gas decontrol almost certainly could not pass. Producing state interests fear that such a plan would insure that all new supplies would go out of state.
--If it could pass, a strong argument would be made to continue pre-1981 gas under controls forever.
--Fuel Use Act has already been effectively repealed. Consumer groups would bitterly oppose doing away with incremental pricing, as adding more costs to consumers.
--"Patchwork" solutions do not attack the basic problem of the necessity of allowing supply and demand to come into balance on a uniform basis.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

#7

October 23, 1981

TO: Max Friedersdorf

FROM: Sherrie Cooksey SMC

THRU: Powell Moore PM

SUBJECT: 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals/Weicker Objections

The nomination of Ralph Winter to the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals is pending for Presidential signature. Senator Weicker has informed us that he intends to fight the nomination in committee and on the Senate floor. His objection is based on the fact that the President is not nominating someone for the "Conn." seat on the 2nd circuit who was recommended by Weicker. However, Weicker has made no recommendations for the position and has known all along of the administration's policy regarding Senatorial input on Courts of Appeals judgeships.

In an effort to seek Weicker's endorsement Ralph Winter is to visit Senator Weicker as soon as possible. It is doubtful that Weicker will change his position.

If Weicker "blue slips" Winter, Senator Thurmond will encounter his first instance of having to "roll a blue slip". I have discussed this possibility with Duke Short who suggested that we not put Thurmond in that position until after he is faced with a similar blue slip problem from a Democrat. However I am not sure when, if at all, a Democratic blue slip problem will occur.

RECOMMENDATION:

1. Delay sending up Winter's nomination until he visits with Weicker.

2. After receiving the report on Winter's visit go to the Chairman and present the problem to him, and either
   (a) seek his guidance on how to proceed with the nomination Yes ✓
   No _____

   (b) inform him that we intend to proceed with the nomination and would appreciate his support in moving it forward in committee and on the floor Yes _____
   No _____

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

#8

May 8, 1981

TO: Max

FROM: Bill Gribbin

RE: Judicial selection process - Senate role

There was long discussion at yesterday's meeting about the way the Senate will figure in the President's judicial nominations. The senior staff at the meeting all understand the traditional blue slip system. They all agree, however, that the President will simply not abide by it.

Currently, we are asking senators for at least three names for each vacancy to which they want to propose someone. Baker and Thurmond have toyed with the names being proposed seriatim. But this has not placated Senators who insist upon their traditional habit of sending up only one name.

(Senators who "named" a candidate before the Attorney General issued his guidelines in March are being grandfathered into this system and handled on a separate basis.)

The President definitely considers these his appointments under the Constitution. Meese, Baker, et al. are ready to encounter senatorial resistance and, in effect, to call upon public opinion if any of the President's choices are stalled in Judiciary.

To avoid as much trouble as we can, it was agreed to continue to accept lists of three names from everyone who will comply. In almost all cases, the President's choices will come from those lists. As Senators see judges and others being appointed from the lists of their colleagues, it is hoped they will be more likely to go along with this system.

In recalcitrant cases, a Senator may be permitted to submit three names seriatim. He takes his chances of being embarassed. He sends in a single name. We tell him it's not what we want. He sends in another. Same response. He sends down a third. We then take all three and see if the President wants any of them.

The catch to this entire system, however, is something which Senators do not yet understand, thank heaven. There will be hell to pay when they find out that, if the White House does not like anyone on their list, the President feels free to select anybody at all from their state. Someone recommended by party leaders, friends, interest groups, etc. The example Meese, Baker and others keep returning to is Illinois. (I suspect that Connecticut and Rhode Island may figure in this too, although so far there has been no problem with the Washington selections!)

c: Parnell, Sherrie