

Withdrawn/Redacted Material

The George W. Bush Library

DOCUMENT NO.	FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
001	Telcon	Telcon - SB223	4	04/12/1974	b1;
002	Telcon	Telcon - SB224	1	04/12/1974	b1;
003	Telcon	Telcon - SB231 [2 PAGES RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/12/2025 JLS]	2	04/12/1974	
004	Telcon	Telcon - SB232 [2 PAGES RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/12/2025 JLS]	2	04/12/1974	
005	Telcon	Telcon - SB233 [1 PAGE RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/12/2025 JLS]	1	04/12/1974	
006	Telcon	Telcon - SB237 [2 PAGES RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/12/2025 JLS]	2	04/12/1974	

COLLECTION TITLE:

Counsel's Office, White House

SERIES:

Kavanaugh, Brett - Subject Files

FOLDER TITLE:

Kissinger, Henry FOIA (Freedom of Information Act) Request [4]

FRC ID:

9700

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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DOCUMENT NO.	FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
007	Telcon	Telcon - SB242 [1 PAGE RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/12/2025 JLS]	1	04/14/1974	
008	Telcon	Telcon - SB248 [2 PAGES RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/12/2025 JLS]	2	04/15/1974	
009	Telcon	Telcon - SB249 [1 PAGE RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/12/2025 JLS]	1	04/16/1974	
010	Telcon	Telcon - SB251 [1 PAGE RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/12/2025 JLS]	1	04/16/1974	
011	Telcon	Telcon - SB255 [1 PAGE RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/12/2025 JLS]	1	04/16/1974	

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012	Telcon	Telcon - SB257 [2 PAGES RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/12/2025 JLS]	2	04/17/1974	
013	Telcon	Telcon - SB258 [1 PAGE RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/12/2025 JLS]	1	04/17/1974	
014	Telcon	Telcon - SB259 [1 PAGE RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/12/2025 JLS]	1	04/17/1974	
015	Telcon	Telcon - SB260 [3 PAGES RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/12/2025 JLS]	3	04/17/1974	
016	Telcon	Telcon - SB261 [2 PAGES RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/12/2025 JLS]	2	04/17/1974	

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017	Telcon	Telcon - SB262 [1 PAGE RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/12/2025 JLS]	1	04/17/1974	
018	Telcon	Telcon - SB264 [1 PAGE RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/12/2025 JLS]	1	04/17/1974	
019	Telcon	Telcon - SB265 [1 PAGE RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/12/2025 JLS]	1	04/17/1974	
020	Telcon	Telcon - SB271 [2 PAGES RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/12/2025 JLS]	2	04/18/1974	
021	Telcon	Telcon - SB280 [3 PAGES RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/12/2025 JLS]	3	04/19/1974	

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022	Telcon	Telcon - SB281 [2 PAGES RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/12/2025 JLS]	2	04/19/1974	
023	Telcon	Telcon - SB292 [1 PAGE RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/12/2025 JLS]	1	04/22/1974	
024	Telcon	Telcon - SB295 [1 PAGE RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/12/2025 JLS]	1	04/23/1974	
025	Telcon	Telcon - SB297 [2 PAGES RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/12/2025 JLS]	2	04/23/1974	
026	Telcon	Telcon - SB298	2	04/23/1974	b1;
027	Telcon	Telcon - SB299 [1 PAGE RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/12/2025 JLS]	1	04/23/1974	

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2017-0345-F

2018-0016-P

2018-0325-F

2018-0016-P

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DOCUMENT NO.	FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
028	Telcon	Telcon - SB301 [1 PAGE RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/12/2025 JLS]	1	04/23/1974	
029	Telcon	Telcon - SB304 [4 PAGES RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/12/2025 JLS]	4	04/24/1974	
030	Telcon	Telcon - SB312 [1 PAGE RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/12/2025 JLS]	1	04/25/1974	
031	Telcon	Telcon - SB314 [1 PAGE RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/12/2025 JLS]	1	04/25/1974	
032	Telcon	Telcon - SB319	4	04/26/1974	b1;
033	Telcon	Telcon - SB321 [1 PAGE RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/12/2025 JLS]	1	04/26/1974	

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034	Telcon	Telcon - SB325 [1 PAGE RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/12/2025 JLS]	1	04/26/1974	
035	Telcon	Telcon - SB327 [1 PAGE RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/12/2025 JLS]	1	04/26/1974	
036	Telcon	Telcon - SB330 [3 PAGES RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/12/2025 JLS]	3	04/26/1974	
037	Telcon	Telcon - SB331 [2 PAGES RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/12/2025 JLS]	2	04/27/1974	
038	Telcon	Telcon - SB332 [4 PAGES RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/12/2025 JLS]	4	04/27/1974	

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039	Telcon	Telcon - SB337 [5 PAGES RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/12/2025 JLS]	5	05/31/1974	
040	Telcon	Telcon - SB5 [3 PAGES RELEASED IN PART FOR (b)(6) ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/12/2025 JLS]	3	02/17/1974	b6;
041	Telcon	Telcon - SB27 [2 PAGES RELEASED IN PART FOR (b)(6) ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/12/2025 JLS]	2	02/20/1974	b6;
042	Telcon	Telcon - SB54 [3 PAGES RELEASED IN PART FOR (b)(6) ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/12/2025 JLS]	3	03/07/1974	b6;
043	Telcon	Telcon - SB57 [1 PAGE RELEASED IN PART FOR (b)(6) ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/12/2025 JLS]	1	03/08/1974	b6;

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046	Telcon	Telcon - SB101 [2 PAGES RELEASED IN PART FOR (b)(6) ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/12/2025 JLS]	2	03/14/1974	b6;

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006	Telcon	Telcon - SB237	2	04/12/1974	P5;
007	Telcon	Telcon - SB242	1	04/14/1974	P5;
008	Telcon	Telcon - SB248	2	04/15/1974	P5;

COLLECTION TITLE:

Counsel's Office, White House

SERIES:

Kavanaugh, Brett - Subject Files

FOLDER TITLE:

Kissinger, Henry FOIA (Freedom of Information Act) Request [4]

FRC ID:

9700

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Records Not Subject to FOIA

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DOCUMENT NO.	FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
009	Telcon	Telcon - SB249	1	04/16/1974	P5;
010	Telcon	Telcon - SB251	1	04/16/1974	P5;
011	Telcon	Telcon - SB255	1	04/16/1974	P5;
012	Telcon	Telcon - SB257	2	04/17/1974	P5;
013	Telcon	Telcon - SB258	1	04/17/1974	P5;
014	Telcon	Telcon - SB259	1	04/17/1974	P5;
015	Telcon	Telcon - SB260	3	04/17/1974	P5;
016	Telcon	Telcon - SB261	2	04/17/1974	P5;

COLLECTION TITLE:

Counsel's Office, White House

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DOCUMENT NO.	FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
017	Telcon	Telcon - SB262	1	04/17/1974	P5;
018	Telcon	Telcon - SB264	1	04/17/1974	P5;
019	Telcon	Telcon - SB265	1	04/17/1974	P5;
020	Telcon	Telcon - SB271	2	04/18/1974	P5;
021	Telcon	Telcon - SB280	3	04/19/1974	P5;
022	Telcon	Telcon - SB281	2	04/19/1974	P5;
023	Telcon	Telcon - SB292	1	04/22/1974	P5;
024	Telcon	Telcon - SB295	1	04/23/1974	P5;

COLLECTION TITLE:

Counsel's Office, White House

SERIES:

Kavanaugh, Brett - Subject Files

FOLDER TITLE:

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FRC ID:

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DOCUMENT NO.	FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
025	Telcon	Telcon - SB297	2	04/23/1974	P5;
026	Telcon	Telcon - SB298	2	04/23/1974	P1/b1; P5;
027	Telcon	Telcon - SB299	1	04/23/1974	P5;
028	Telcon	Telcon - SB301	1	04/23/1974	P5;
029	Telcon	Telcon - SB304	4	04/24/1974	P5;
030	Telcon	Telcon - SB312	1	04/25/1974	P5;
031	Telcon	Telcon - SB314	1	04/25/1974	P5;
032	Telcon	Telcon - SB319	4	04/26/1974	P1/b1; P5;

COLLECTION TITLE:

Counsel's Office, White House

SERIES:

Kavanaugh, Brett - Subject Files

FOLDER TITLE:

Kissinger, Henry FOIA (Freedom of Information Act) Request [4]

FRC ID:

9700

RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT NO.	FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
033	Telcon	Telcon - SB321	1	04/26/1974	P5;
034	Telcon	Telcon - SB325	1	04/26/1974	P5;
035	Telcon	Telcon - SB327	1	04/26/1974	P5;
036	Telcon	Telcon - SB330	3	04/26/1974	P5;
037	Telcon	Telcon - SB331	2	04/27/1974	P5;
038	Telcon	Telcon - SB332	4	04/27/1974	P5;
039	Telcon	Telcon - SB337	5	05/31/1974	P5;
040	Telcon	Telcon - SB5	3	02/17/1974	P5; P6/b6;

COLLECTION TITLE:

Counsel's Office, White House

SERIES:

Kavanaugh, Brett - Subject Files

FOLDER TITLE:

Kissinger, Henry FOIA (Freedom of Information Act) Request [4]

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9700

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DOCUMENT NO.	FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
041	Telcon	Telcon - SB27	2	02/20/1974	P5; P6/b6;
042	Telcon	Telcon - SB54	3	03/07/1974	P5; P6/b6;
043	Telcon	Telcon - SB57	1	03/08/1974	P5; P6/b6;
044	Telcon	Telcon - SB73	1	03/12/1974	P5; P6/b6;
045	Telcon	Telcon - SB88	2	03/13/1974	P5; P6/b6;
046	Telcon	Telcon - SB101	2	03/14/1974	P5; P6/b6;

COLLECTION TITLE:

Counsel's Office, White House

SERIES:

Kavanaugh, Brett - Subject Files

FOLDER TITLE:

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FRC ID:

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Withdrawal Marker

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FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
Telcon	Telcon - SB223	4	04/12/1974	P1/b1; P5; <i>MAC 7/12/2025</i>

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For a complete list of items withdrawn from this folder, see the
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COLLECTION:

Counsel's Office, White House

SERIES:

Kavanaugh, Brett - Subject Files

FOLDER TITLE:

Kissinger, Henry FOIA (Freedom of Information Act) Request [4]

FRC ID:

9700

OA Num.:

2170

NARA Num.:

2081

FOIA IDs and Segments:

2018-0016-P

2017-0345-F

RESTRICTION CODES

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FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
Telcon	Telcon - SB224	1	04/12/1974	P1/b1; P5; MAC 9/18/2005

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FOLDER TITLE:

Kissinger, Henry FOIA (Freedom of Information Act) Request [4]

FRC ID:

9700

OA Num.:

2170

NARA Num.:

2081

FOIA IDs and Segments:

2018-0016-P

2017-0345-F

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TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
April 12, 1974
4:35 PM

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

(Missed first part)

to have

S: /two tickers now by Mike Mansfield saying the President told him he plans to visit Helsinki next month.

K: Impossible.

S: I know, but we've got to answer it now.

K: I've already said it isn't possible.

S: How are we going to respond to these particular ones?

K: I've already said it publicly. They asked me, is the President going to Helsinki next month and I said no.

S: Oh, you said today.

K: Yes.

S: Oh, great.

K: When I saw Gromyko off.

S: Oh, OK. Good. Then we can just refer to that.

K: Say look. Are you looking at my schedule? Have you seen what this maniac is doing to me day after day?

S: Well, this week it's just been terrible.

K: I know but I have that United Nations speech. I haven't even had a chance to look at it yet.

S: Yes, that's right. I must say things get on - no, I don't know anything about it. I presume you order them, like Fahmy this morning; van der Stoel tomorrow morning.



Scowcroft - page 2

K: That I ordered, but I don't order Moynihan and

S: Where that came from, I don't have a clue. But it's a disaster, there's no question about it. It really is. I'll try to get next week's under some control.

K: OK, fine. Thank you.

END

SB 232*

TELCON

Sen. Mansfield/Sec. Kissinger

April 12, 1974,

4:45 p.m.

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

M: Afternoon, Henry.

K: How are you.

M: Not so good. I was asked by Reuters and UPI about the President's going to Moscow. I said he was going and I said he was also going to the security meeting at Helsinki in May. That is what he told me and I thought he wanted me to get out the information -- that he in effect authorized me without saying it. I don't say much when I come out of these meetings. I said he was going to Helsinki in May and would go to Moscow sometime he thought the middle of June.

K: Frankly, he had that a little bit screwed up. I have done something unintentional to embarrass you. When I saw Gromyko off someone asked me if he was going to Helsinki in May and I said absolutely not.

M: The Manchester Guardian called up and said there is no meeting in Helsinki in May, that there is a meeting in Geneva to wind it up. There is no Helsinki meeting.

K: What do you want me to do to counteract the bad reporting coming out of the press of your meeting and his going to Moscow. I need an explanation.

M: I will say he was considering going to it when concluded and I assumed he meant Helsinki but I was mistaken.

K: The fact is if it is concluded it will be at Helsinki.

M: When concluded it will be in Helsinki.

K: Right. If you say he is considering going to it whenever it is concluded then you will be on safe ground. It is not yet definitely decided.

M: I said he was going. He was pretty positive. I don't want to embarrass him. He has enough troubles as it is.

K: That would be a little embarrassing with our European Allies because we have not told them yet. ^{PM}As I recall it now he was considering going to Helsinki for the final meeting of the security conference which would be held in Helsinki. It was my mistake when I said he was going next month. I misunderstood him. That will clear it up.

K: Exactly.

M: Fine. Thanks.
END



TELCON

Gen. Scowcroft, Sec. Kissinger

4:50 p.m., April 12, 1974

Gen. Scowcroft's secretary took the following message:

"Just pass a note in to him and tell him that Mansfield will issue a clarifying statement."

SB 233 *

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
April 12, 1974
5:07 PM

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

S: Yes sir.

K: Have we heard from the President about his Atlanta trip?

S: No, we haven't heard. I thought the thing was all settled, apparently now it's all up in the air again about which one he's going to do.

K: Yes. Well, will you tell him we really have to answer. I would prefer him giving a dinner. It would be easier from me if he didn't.

S: You would have to do the speech then, wouldn't you.

K: Yes. I have to know. Can you find out from Haig?

S: Sure. They ought to be down there about now. I'll see if I can get it. You prefer the dinner?

K: Right. And I've got Mansfield to retract it.

S: Good. I'll just tell Jerry Warren then to just do nothing.

K: Right.

S: OK.

END

SB 237*

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
April 12, 1974
8:46 PM

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

K: Brent, have we heard from Key Biscayne?

S: Yes. On the dinner, Al said it looks good. That he'll will agree to the dinner.

K: On Wednesday.

S: Yes, he said he prefers Thursday and I said Wednesday is much better because they'll be wanting...

K: No, we can't keep them here on Thursday.

S: So he said he'd be working on Wednesday, but he said it looks good for that.

K: How about -- and he's not giving the speech.

S: And he's not giving the speech.

K: I guess he's in retirement again.

S: I don't know what turned all that around.

K: He doesn't want to have a press conference.

S: Oh, is that what was going to be -- oh, that's right. And he signed the real treaty paper.

K: OK.

S: The revision of it.

K: Otherwise is everything sane?

S: Otherwise everything is sane and quiet. I don't know how long he's going to stay down there but they canceled the Monday staff meeting. At least through Monday I guess.

K: Oh, Thursday would be better probably because he doesn't want to come back on Wednesday.

S: Oh, maybe. You think he would stay that long.



Scowcroft - page 2

K: Well, I think we ought to lock one of the dates.

S: He said he would get back to me tomorrow on it.

K: We can hold them another night.

S: But Wednesday would be preferable.

K: Oh, yes, because they couldn't be quite as obnoxious as they are or which they're planning to be.

S: Are you going to try to talk to him about -- well I don't know if you'll have a chance -- about the Canadian locomotive thing?

K: We've got to get it settled by this week.

S: We really do. And I think you're talking to him is the only way to do it.

K: Yes, but I didn't want to do it before he went to Key Biscayne and into the clutches of Rebozo.

S: No, that's a good point.

K: OK.

END

SB 242 *

TELCON
Scowcroft/Sec. Kissinger
April 14, 1974
20:20 p.m.

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

S: Yes, sir.

K: Where are you?

S: In the office.

K: Oh, if I had known that I would have called you. Have we heard about the Goddamned party.

S: We haven't heard anything further. I think it is -- you know, it is a matter of the day. And I guess it is a little hard to get to him down there now. But I don't think there is any question about it taking place, I just think it is -- and I don't know what the difference between Wednesday and Thursday is as far as he is concerned -- why he seems to prefer Thursday. I know you need to know.

K: O.K. I hope you have seen that cable from Algiers that these guys used the fact that we said -- that the White House said he was there as the leader of the Third World all over the Third World-- Boumediene.

S: No, I've not seen that.

K: Who had that bright idea to put that out.

S: I okayed it. I didn't put it in but I okayed it.

K: That is the sort of thing that really should be checked.

S: I guess so. The argument was that that was the principal reason that he was coming to the United States. But you are absolutely right. It should not have been there.

K: It is not so crucial. O.K.

S: I'm going to hit him again in the morning on that.

K: O.K. Good, thank you.

END

SB 248*

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

TELCON

The President/Kissinger

9:20 a.m. - 4/15/74

- K: Mr. President. I missed you last night.
- P: I only called to wish you a Happy Easter.
- K: Thank you. I am in New York today to speak to the UN. It is not going to shake the world.
- P: We seem to have a little problem on the Lebanon border but that was inevitable.
- K: Both sides are guilty there. I had a good talk with the Chinese last night. You know the highest ranking official ever was here. They fully reaffirmed our policy and he went on and on about your visit. And he strongly reaffirmed the course that was outlined.
- P: Did they give you any indication of the problems?
- K: I have the feeling Chou is on the way out. They didn't mention him once during the evening. And everytime I brought him up they changed the conversation to Mao. Now as I think back, I had over three hours with Mao and Chou didn't say a word.
- P: Mao (?) has killed off his people like Stalin.
- K: That's right. That's the second man he's killed off. To be number 2 man is suicide. That conversation with me was his way of putting his own stamp on the thing so that they could get rid of Chou without hurting the relationship with the US.
- P: Why do you think they want to get rid of him?
- K: Domestic politics. I think it's a tragedy. I think it's a clash between Chou and Madame Mao. This guy yesterday talked as if he were in charge. He didn't say he was in charge but talked with great assurance.
- P: We didn't meet him?
- K: No, he was purged in the Cultural Revolution and just rehabilitated after you were there.



P: Anything else of interest except your UN speech?

K: Ten o'clock.

P. Ten. Well, I wish you all the best.

SB 249*

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

TELCON
Gen. Scowcroft/Sec. Kissinger
April 16, 1974,
10:35 a.m.

K: How about the dinner for tomorrow.

S: The dinner is all set for tomorrow.

K: Business suit.

S: Business suit, at 7:30.

K: I'm surprised he doesn't do it at 6:00. Including wives.

S: Including wives.

K: That includes my wife.

S: That includes your wife. It will be a big dinner. Over 100 of them are Latin Americans.

K: How can it be that many Latin Americans?

S: By the time you get the delegations, the OAS ambassadors, plus whatever wives there are it comes out to something like 100.

K: But why did we have to have the OAS ambassadors.

S: Gee, I don't know. I just followed the instructions of the Dept. of State.

K: The Dept. of State is a bunch of horses asses. Wouldn't it have been better to get another guest list?

S: I assumed this was with your blessing.

K: You know that they wouldn't check with me, those bastards.

S: We can still cut out the OAS ambassadors. I don't think any of the invitations have actually gone.

K: O.K. Well, let me talk to them.

S: O.K.

END

TELECON

Congressman Otto Passman/Secretary Kissinger

April 16, 1974

5:00 PM

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

P. Mr. Secretary.

K: Mr. Chairman, you called me last when when I was in the middle of some frenzy and I never had a chance to return you call.

P: The only purpose in calling, I realize that unless we can find some money for Vietnam, those people could get in trouble. Let Parker to go ahead and take 60 million dollars out of the development loan fund and leave it to me to fight it out for him. You're familiar with it, aren't you?

K: Yes, I'm familiar with it.

P: And course those people on the other side here are going to cut your throat anyway and last year they cut it to 3 and I moved it back to 450. If they need that extra money the 49 million I put in my supplemental I pulled that through. He says he must have 60 million dollars more and I said go ahead and take it out of the developmental loan account. But the way I was reading the record he was just a little bit afraid to do that. What's your views?

K: I'm sympathetic to it. But let me ~~XX~~ check it with my associates and call you back.

P: I'll tell you this. He's out of the country anyway but I want to back this President up and I know that he requested, recently had intended request, I think 119, he cut it to 114 and I asked him to find 60 elsewhere so I feel the responsibility to help you get the money.

K: I'm very sympathetic to it.

P: I'll be back in Washington Monday.

K: Why don't we talk on the phone then.

P. That's fine, if you don't mind.

K: Terrific. Thank you, have a good rest.

P: Thank you. Bye.

END

SB 255 *

TELECON

General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger

April 16, 1974

8:28 PM

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

K: Brent, he's got to see Fahmy on Thursday afternoon, you know.

S: Oh yes. I think we can make that ~~all~~ alright.

K: Can I find out soon.

S: Sure. Probably not before morning.

K: Good.

S: But we'll make that one alright.

K: Good.

S: Right.

END

SB 257*

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

TELCON
Gen. Scowcroft/Sec. Kissinger
April 17, 1974
10:10 a.m.

K: Can't I have five minutes with the President.

S: Al is with him to ask him now.

K: All I need is five minutes.

S: I know, and I think the answer is yes. But you know the mood over here is not very good this morning. I think the answer is going to be yes but I don't have ...

K: What did they think was going to happen. Did you have any question.

S: No. I don't even know whether it is that but he is not in the cheerest mood. I'm sorry but he just would not answer last night and he is in with him now.

K: Ok. I will be over in 10 minutes. We are dealing with a nut house here. Do you want to come to that lunch, or do you want to come to any part of the Latin American ministers conference.

S: Not unless you think I should.

K: No, I would just like to have you get a little exposure to some of these guys.

S: Well, I will come to the dinner.

K: Oh, are you invited to that? That's a little more above your level.

S: I understand that.

K: O.K. I will see you shortly. How many dozens of people going to sit in on that meeting with Schuetz.

~~Sx~~

S: How many do you want with you.

K: Who is scheduled now.

S: Just you.

K: Well, that's insane of course.

S: Well, you need a notetaker and with your meeting I think it is Sonnenfeldt and a State Dept. notetaker.



Scowcroft, p.2

K: O.K. fine. That's what I meant, in my meeting.

END

SB 258*

TELCON
Fahmy/Sec. Kissinger
April 17, 1974
10: 15 a.m.

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

K: Hello.

F: Good morning, Henry.

K: Ismail, how are you.

F: How are you.

K: O.K.

F: Humm.

K: I wanted to check with you about your appointment with the President.

F: Yes.

K: Would it be convenient for you to do it also, I'll say Monday next week.

F: Monday, next week?

K: Yes.

F: I can't stay. I'm leaving on Friday.

K: Oh, you are. All right, then we will do it tomorrow.

F: I'm coming tonight and if it is possible...

K: We have the Latin American Foreign Ministers here and it is hard for me to leave them. That's my problem.

F: I'll see him for 15 minutes, you know.

K: You and he cannot talk for 15 minutes. You will be fighting with each other as always.

K: Oh, no.

K: No, no. We will arrange it for tomorrow afternoon.

F: If you please, thank you very much.

K: Good.

F: O.K. Bye, bye. END

SB 259 i*

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

TELCON
Gen. Scowcroft/Sec. Kissinger
April 17, 1974
10:20 a.m.

S: Yes, sir.

K: We must get that appointment with Fahmy.

S: I understand that.

K: Can we do that -- I don't know when to do it. I'd like to do it at a time that our bloody Foreign Ministers are out of town. 4:30 in the afternoon -- that's probably too late to make the evening news.

S: Yes, it really has to be about ...

K: How about 2:30.

S: 2:30, let me try that.

K: Can you?

S: I will see...

K: We don't need a long time. Tell him half an hour is all we need. In fact that is all that is required.

S: Alright. I will shoot for 30 minutes at 2:30.

K: This toast is alright.

S: No barn burner.

K: Actually -- Latin America it will be -- not bad. These guys are the biggest gasers you've ever seen.

S: O.K. Good.

K. O.K.

END

SB 2601*

TELCON

Len Garment/Secy Kissinger
4/17/74 - 11:23 a.m.

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

- G: Hi, Henry, how are you?
- K: Okay.
- G: They may already be resolved, but I have a fairly strong feeling that it will be helpful to go for the bundle on the aid to --
- K: Oh, come on. Look, tell the Israelis to lay off. They know -- they're again going through one of their suicidal periods.
- G: Well, that may be, but these have happened only occasionally that I've gotten a very strong sense of their being in that kind of a state.
- K: There's no chance of our giving them the whole thing now before Syrian disengagement. I mean, we also have the Arabs to consider. What should we give them \$1.5 billion for? I have worked something out with Dinitz which we're going to do this week, and then we'll do the rest afterwards. We've got our Arab position, too, to worry about.
- G: Um-humm. You say, why do it? I think it's --
- K: I'm telling you, if you want to do something, you tell the Israelis to be helpful on Syria because I'm going to withdraw from the negotiations if they're not going to do it. And then let them see how they can stand the whole world in international forums.
- G: Well, can they -- I understand that, Henry, and I've only partially cause to make this presentation --
- K: Yeah, but look at our position. Here we are with a war going on on the Golan Heights with no progress whatever on disengagement, you want the President to announce he's giving a \$1.5 billion credit to Israel? Do you think the President will approve this? He hasn't even approved \$500 million yet.
- G: Well, I think he should.
- K: Why?
- G: Because I think it would be a message of consistency in strength.
- K: Well, he will do it --

- G: . . . some people that are not persuaded by anything because of their own fanaticism and there are others who will get the message that there is some consistency no matter what's going on on the homefront. And I think that the Israelis do have some intuition of a tragic destiny that may be multiplied by their congenital hysteria and I think at this time that kind of resolution of this particular problem would have a great meaning.
- K: Well, he will get what I worked out with Dinitz.
- G: And that is agreeable . . .
- K: This is agreeable with Dinitz.
- G: All right. But I wanted you to know the feeling I had based upon some of the discussions against a backdrop of 5 years of intimate requests. This one just seemed very real. And I think that they do need that help and that it would be important . . .
- K: But we need a little help too.
- G: . . . know that. But I think that they --
- K: They need help on MFN and we need help on the negotiations.
- G: All right. But I don't think you want to have echoes of 1969 and early 70 when there was a great feeling of distrust there about what was happening here. I think that would be very extremely dangerous.
- K: No.
- G: [Because they have] disarray at this point over in Israel.
- K: Well, look, they have gotten everything from us all along and that isn't going to change. It's simply a question of timing. But even that isn't a major problem because he will get the major part.
- G: Um-humm.
- K: What you should tell him is that it is important that we make some progress on the Syrian disengagement or there's going to be --
- G: . . . I think they'd be much stronger in their ability to do that if they had a very clear cut and very symbolic vote of support and there's nothing that would be more concrete than this particular decision at this time. . . .



Len Garment/Secy Kissinger

3

K: Well, they're getting something very significant this week.

G: Okay, Henry.

K: Good.

G: Thank you.

K: Bye.

SB 261 *

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

TELCON
Gen. Scowcroft/Sec. Kissinger
April 17, 1974
3:25 p.m.

K: Where do ~~you~~ we stand with -- what was I going to say. -- Where do we stand with the Israeli money.

S: With the Israeli money?

K: Yea, the one billion bucks -- make sure it happens this week.

S: O.K. The paper right now is in your Department. I'll get it over here.

K: Look, it's got to happen this week. I do not give a Goddamn what those sons of bitches are doing.

S: No problem. I'll have it over here on your desk tomorrow.

K: O.K. What's happening to that Argentine case. I can get -- the Argentians have agreed to make this deal with me. That if we let them announce this thing from here tomorrow they will then not press for an end to sanctions for an end of sanctions against Cuba at the OAS for which they developed a very cute formula. You see they were going to introduce a resolution resolved that the sanctions continue. That would require a 2/3s vote which isn't available. You see rather than say resolved that they be ended which also required a 2/3s vote, they were going to say ~~that~~ resolved that they continue.

S: I see it and then they would not be able to get the 2/3s vote on it.

K: That's it. Can you talk to Haig. All we are doing is implementing something he has already approved.

S: We can implement the Argentine one; it is the Canadian one that is the problem.

K: But talk to Haig. Have I got a chance to see him.

S: Are you prepared to see him this evening.

K: About 6:00

S: Let me try that.

K: Or at least talk to him on the phone.

S: O.K.



Scowcroft, p.2

K: What's the mood.

S: Not real good, I gather.

K: Were you there with the German.

S: Yes. Oh, he was fine there. Just a little nonsense for about 10 minutes. He was fine with that.

K: O.K. Listen, you know we are getting more request from people he told to come and call on him.

S: I know we are. You know what it was. It was this doggone reception and it was just diplomatic chatter was what it was. But they all took it seriously.

K: What is what you tend to do when you deal with the President of the U.S. O.K.

S: O.K. I will see about 6:00.

K: Tell him I may be at a meeting. And how about Fahmy.

S: Fahmy, I think we are going to be o.k. It may have to be 3:30 rather than 2:30. ~~Th~~

K: Then I would prefer 4:30 because I will be in the middle of a meeting.

S: O.K. Either 2:30 or 4:30.

K: Let him know then that it is all set. Can we do that.

S: I can't yet.

K: You tell him it is essential. That considering that Sadat has always ~~xxxx~~ seen me.

S: I understand. I just don't think there is a problem, but I don't have a firm commitment yet.

K: O.K. Thank you.

END

SB 262-1*

TELECON

General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger

April 17, 1974

5:25 PM

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

K: How are we doing on Fahmy?

S: I can't find out. He has just left talking with the President and he must be with ~~with~~ Fred Bissart (phonetic) but he was going to raise....

K: Look ^{he} is has got to be there's no choice.

S: I don't think there's any question.

K: Yes, but I've got to tell him to come down. I'll just tell him to come down.

S: I just don't think there's any question about it.

K: I'll just have him and say, OK down how are we doing on this Argentine business.

S: I sent you over....

K: Yes, but I haven't got the time now.

S: OK.

K: I haven't got the time to sign it. I thought you were going to send it in.

S: I thought you were going to call ~~ex~~ him or talk with him. I'm sorry.

K: Well, I've got an appointment with him, haven't I?

S: No, but he's alone now in the EOB.

K: OK, fine. Let me call him.

S: OK.

END

SB 264 i*

TELECON

Roy Atherton/Secretary Kissinger

April 17, 1974

7:10 PM

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

K: Roy, will you make sure Fahmy is called and told we don't have an exact time for his meeting with the President tomorrow afternoon, but he should come on down anyway.

A: Yes sir, he's coming. He's coming by train.

K: OK.

A: In fact, I thought I'd go out to the railroad station.

K: Excellent, very nice.

A: I'll tell him that when I see him.

K: Have we found out who talked to Gwertzman?

A: No sir. I told Joe I haven't since he came back from the Middle East trip.

K: But it has to be someone who was at the meeting.

A: Some ~~xx~~ of it, it sounds to me, could have come from the parties themselves. Except the part that Fahmy's upset about. No, I'm ~~puzzled~~ puzzled. I notice he wrote the story out of New York. I've checked with my people and I'm persuaded that none of them have talked -- they don't normally work with this.

K: OK. Well, we'll talk later.

A: Alright, ~~xxxx~~ sir.

K: Thank you.

END

SB 265 :*

TELECON
President Nixon/Secretary Kissinger
April 17, 1974
8:28 PM

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

K: Mr. President.

N: Yes, hi.

K: I'm sorry to disturb you. We have one matter with this Latin American meeting and the one that's happening at the OAS. As you know, there are a number of American subsidiaries in Argentina and the Argentines have passed a law according to which if they don't sell to Cuba they're going to be nationalized.

N: I see.

K: And you had already approved in February that under those conditions we can make a special exception and we can't really take the position that American companies in Argentina cannot obey Argentine law. If you had approved that and I held up the implementation of it because the Brazilian government at that time was changing and they had some doubts about it, now the Brazilian Government has come to us and have indicated that they favor our going ahead and if we could go ahead within the next day on this then Argentina would not introduce a resolution in Atlanta which would have the effect of lifting the sanctions altogether throughout the Western Hemisphere.

N: It's a dead loser as far as anything here is concerned to indicate any backing down in regard to ____ it will raise a hell of a storm.

K: Well, we're not backing down with Cuba. The position we're taking -- we're not lifting any.....

N: Well just don't make any announcement on it, just do it.

K: OK.

N: Just do it very very very quietly. Don't make a big thing out of it.

K: No, we wouldn't announce at it, we'd just let the Argentines do it in a low key way.

N: Alright, fine. OK, Henry.

K: Right, Mr. President.

END

Telcon
HAK/Joseph Sisco
April 18, 1974; 12:41 p.m.

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

- K: Joe, can you send the other resolution over here.
- S: Sure.
- K: So that the President can see it?
- S: The one that we didn't like?
- K: Yes.
- S: Yes, I'll get it right over to you.
- K: So then we know what the basis...
- S: It's not to be shown to Fahmy, however, because he hasn't seen that. That was what the British came out of the European.
- K: Oh, no. What is the nonaligned one?
- S: Well, the nonaligned one came in about 48 hours ago. Why don't I get that one over to you right away.
- K: That's the one - let's not get these two confused by getting the European resolution in.
- S: That's right. No, no, I'll get that one for you because I know it's utterly impossible and will demonstrate the point that you made. I can LDX that to you right away if you like.
- K: Good. And we are not going to have any - there's to be no discussion that this was even discussed with Fahmy.
- S: Well we can do that too.
- K: Absolutely. That's essential.
- S: Yeah.
- K: So at the press briefing just say that the President and Fahmy had a general review of the situation and the Lebanese issue didn't come up.



- S: In our press briefing here.
- K: Well, if it comes up.
- S: Well, I don't think anybody in our press even knows that I've seen you on this matter. Certainly I haven't mentioned it to anybody so how would, you know. The question could come up, however, and I'd better just tell them right away that you just had a general discussion about the Lebanese thing.
- K: Fahmy is to be kept out of the Security Council discussion altogether.
- S: Altogether.
- K: Right.
- S: All right.
- K: One idea which I think is a very good one. You should send a message to Franjia urging him to instruct his Foreign Minister to cooperate closely with us. And what we should do is to send a message saying, look, please keep in mind we must get maximum pressure from Jewish groups and so forth on the Israelis - I mean, put it more elegantly so that it doesn't leak. With respect to Syrian disengagement.
- S: Do you mind, if I can sell Bill Buffam on this as to whether that gambit of going to Franji at this moment while we have talked to the Foreign Minister is apt to explode in our face or not. He knows this Foreign Minister very well and he knows the relationship between them.
- K: OK, but draft something to me to look at.
- S: All right. I'll get this resolution to you right away.
- K: Good. Over at the White House.

SB 280*

TELCON
JOE SISCO/HAK
4/19/74 - 9:12

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

- K: Joe, why does it take 5 days to get a memo over here on assistance to Israel?
- S: Well, I don't really know other than the whole bureaucratic thing that you've got so damned many people involved in.
- K: Well, but, that's what I want to end.
- S: Alright. I don't...
- K: Now, it was important to me to get this determination made before the Congress came back and all hell broke loose. And that was worth more to me than whether every G. D. SFO7 could sign off on something on which the decision was never going to be made at any level other than the President.
- S: It got there, I think, yesterday, if I recall or.....
- K: Well it got there last night and I had asked for it Monday morning and all we needed was a two page memorandum on which I told them what I wanted.
- S: Well Brent called me late last night and he tells me there is a problem with this which.....
- K: That's the second issue.
- S: And the problem is in the Defense Department, I am told, that they feel that first of all, the instructions that I understood were given, they weren't given to me directly, was that you wanted for 1 billion dollars and then you leave the rest untouched. The problem is that apparently the bills have gone around that amount and therefore there is need to make a determination in terms of the overall amount so if you make the rest of the amount foreign military sales, that will mean that the Israelis I am told have to begin to pay on that because its a matter of credit. Now is that what you and Dinitz worked out. I'm not very clear what you and Dinitz worked out in this regard Mr. Secretary.
- K: What we worked out was what I ordered which was 1 billion now and 1.2 later. Now this I did in part so that I could sell it to the Arabs.



- S: Well when you say 1.2 later you mean.....
- K: That then we would give them the other 500 million in grant in the effect after the Syrian disengagement when the Arabs could understand it.
- S: But the 1.2 in the meantime you would just call as ~~XXXXXX~~ credit.
- K: Well but....
- S: Once its credit you can always shift it back to...
- K: We would call it credit and then shift it back.
- S: Well see this was what didn't come through and I don't think the memo quite says this and thats just the point and thats what Brent and I talked about late, late last night.
- K: But we are now in the situation Joe, due to the G.D. bureaucracy of the State Department. These memos always get written in some three hour period. Its a very brief memo. Had that memo been done Tuesday when I requested it we would have flushed out this problem on Tuesday. I want this done before the Congress comes back and all hell ~~XXXXXX~~ breaks loose in Congress. So that we are reacting to the Congress.
- S: Well, this I understand and I think as I say, part of it is some confusion in the instruction and part of it is what I would agreeable and it is not defensible is.....
- K: Yes, but if there is confusion in the instruction all they have to do ask me what I mean.
- S: I understand Mr. Secretary. I'm not justifying, I'm trying to explain.
- K: Joe, you are the number 3 guy in the Department now. Why must it take five days to get a simple G.D. memo which is not controversial since orders had been issued what we wanted.
- S: Not controversial here Mr. Secretary but you've got other agencies that are involved in this.
- K: And why can it not be done in one day, that's what I want to know.
- S: There is no excuse.
- K: If I had done it in the W.H. I guarantee it would have been done in 2 hours.



- S: I have no excuse.
- K: OK. Well you know it wasn't. I would like to get the people who did this called on the carpet and told to straighten out.
- S: In any event I've already called George Newman this morning after Brent talked to this has got to be revised somewhat to reflect what you've just said here.
- K: But by that time it will happen just before I go to the Middle East. It will look like blackmail. It will happen just when the Congress is coming back and screaming its head off. In other words, the Department has again brought about the exactly the opposite of what I wantd.
- S: Why don't we get this altered in the next hour which can be done in the next hour Mr. Secretary and then go from here.
- K: If I then can get to the President who is raving around here on his own reasons.
- S: I will try to give you a better answer as to why it got delayed. I don't honestly know.
- K: Good. Thank you.

UNCLASSIFIED

SB 281*

TELECON

FM Fahmy/Secretary Kissinger

April 19, 1974

10:45 AM

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

K: Ismail, how are you? I'm just talking to the Lebanese.

F: You called me yesterday night?

K: Yes. I wanted to tell you that your resolution, really we can't go along with. I think that is too unbalanced and it will get us into...

F: This is too unbalanced?

K: Yes.

F: _____ resolution much stronger than this, on the Lebanese issue too, before and 3/4 of this from the European and from the American talks.

K: Well, there's now a European draft which we...'

F: A new one?

K: A new one which has 4 or 5 of (it has Australia), France agrees with it too which we would like to go along with.

F: Yes. But I mean there are some parts of that thing which I mean the non-aligned will not be able to support and then (Moscow) really will be forced to propose another version which will get the necessary votes. The point is, you see, if the Lebanese accept the European than you have no problem. If they accept anything, you see.

K: Yes.

F: It's up to them. The minute they tell the non-aligned or the Europeans or anybody that they are ready to accept any version, then this is the key for the whole thing. OK?

K: Well, let me see what I can do. I have the Egyptian Foreign Minister here now -- the Lebanese Foreign Minister. The Egyptian Foreign Minister is a pain in the neck, he's in N.Y.

F: You see, the main thing for them is, in my opinion, they will get a draft which you can support. This is in their interest.

K: I agree completely. Incidentally, I wanted to tell you something yesterday but that I wouldn't....

F: I'm here in the hotel, you know.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED



Fahmy - page 2

K: In New York?

F: Yes.

K: I'll send it by cable.

F: OK.

K: Because there are too many switchboards.

F: OK. Send it by cable to Cairo.

K: Yes, to Cairo. You're leaving today, aren't you?

F: I'm arriving tomorrow.

K: I'll have it for you by tomorrow.

F: OK, thank you very much.

K: It's just a point for you and for your President. Just a point of information about some Soviet activity here.

F: OK. Thank you very much.

K: The President was very pleased with his meeting with you.

F: Well, I was very pleased and honored and the President, I got a cable from him, he's very satisfied.

K: And you know we are receiving Ghorbal today.

F: Yes, thank you very much. You are going to meet Schlesinger?

K: Sunday, when he comes back.

F: And we're looking for you and Nancy, OK.

K: Terrific. Thank you.

F: Thank you for everything, Henry.

K: Ismail, you're a good friend in addition to everything else.

END

UNCLASSIFIED

SB 292 1*

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
April 22, 1974
10:00 PM

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

(Missed first part)

K: _____ over a folder for Schlesinger.

S: Right.

K: And you'll pick me up at a quarter to 8.

S: Right.

K: Good. ~~YEA~~ Thank you.

S: OK.

END

UNCLASSIFIED

SB 295 1*

TELECON

Mr. Hummel/Secretary Kissinger

April 23, 1974

5:50 PM

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

(Missed the first part)

K: Not while I was there.

H: Oh, I'm sorry. This was told to Dick Soloman as he was escorting him down. That was the way it happened.

K: OK, but that's not something we can tell the press yet.

H: No sir, no. Dick Soloman and the White House are working that end of it and very quietly.

K: Good. OK. Thank you.

END

UNCLASSIFIED

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

SB 297 *

TELECON

Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger

April 23, 1974

D: I received a telegram from Gromyko. He asked me to clear with you a sub-communique about his and your meeting in Geneva. He proposed to publish this short announcement. A meeting between Gromyko and Kissinger. An agreement has been ~~reached~~ reached that Gromyko, a member of the Politburo and USSR Minister for Foreign Relations and Dr. Kissinger, U.S. Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs will meet in Geneva on April 28 and 29. During the meeting an exchange of opinions will be continued on a number of issues in connection with the forthcoming visit of President Nixon to the Soviet Union.

K: Right.

D: That's all.

K: You don't want to mention the Middle East?

D: If you like.

K: No, it's up to you.

D: No, he proposes _____ because it implies ~~that~~ it's included in the Middle East after you may make, just put in general.

K: No, I accept this.

D: ~~OK~~ OK?

we

K: Good. What time should ~~be~~ we/publish it?

D: 25th or 26th, which is more convenience for you. 10:00 AM Washington time. 25th is Thursday, 26th, Friday.

K: Let's do it on Thursday.

D: Thursday, 10:00 AM Washington time.

K: For us noon is a little better.

D: Noon better. Then it will be 12:00. Our time it will be 7:00.

K: Yes.

D: OK, I think it could be done, really. At noon, Washington time on the 25th.

K: I will try to send something over to you this evening.



Dobrynin - page 2

D: OK.

K: Right. Today or tomorrow ~~xxxx~~ morning, but I'll call you within the hour.

D: OK.

K: Thank you.

D: Thank you, Henry.

END

Withdrawal Marker

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FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
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Telcon	Telcon - SB298	2	04/23/1974	P1/b1; P5; <i>MAC</i> <i>9/12/2025</i>
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COLLECTION:

Counsel's Office, White House

SERIES:

Kavanaugh, Brett - Subject Files

FOLDER TITLE:

Kissinger, Henry FOIA (Freedom of Information Act) Request [4]

FRC ID:

9700

OA Num.:

2170

NARA Num.:

2081

FOIA IDs and Segments:

2018-0016-P

2017-0345-F

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advise between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

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- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TELECON

Mr. Sisco/Secretary Kissinger

April 23, 1974

8:30

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

K: On this trip of Agnew's to Saudi Arabia, we are staying the hell/^{out} of that.
Just tell Aikins ~~xxxx~~ not to worry.

S: Alright, just stay out of it.

K: Yes.

S: And leave it up to....

K: He's going as a private person.

S: Alright I'll tell him that.

K: Don't you think?

S: Well, actually I think we're going to have to put together a circular tomorrow because ~~there~~ there are so many posts where we say basically that he's a private citizen and we want to stay out of it and let them decide and to render at least the...

K: No, I don't object to that, but I don't see how it effects my visit in the slightest.

S: Well, I don't either. I would hate like hell to have him there while you're there, however.

K: Yes. I mean that should be discreetly handled.

S: Alright, I'll put something together on that.

K: Also you have to get that Joe Kraft matter worked out.

S: Well, the way we're going -- what we're putting up to you is as follows; and we'll let Aikins know, we're just going to get him on the plane.

K: No, he should check it with Saqqaf.

S: Saqqaf, I think, would rather not hear ~~it~~ it, but I think we better tell Aikins and give him an opportunity to get back at Saqqaf once more.

K: I think so.

S: Because you wouldn't want a (donnybrook) right there.

K: Exactly.

S: Let's do that in the morning as well. K: Thank you. END

SB 301 1*

TELECON

General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger

April 23, 1974

10:10 PM

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

K: Brent, I'd like you to do a back channel for Eilts to Fahmy and tell him to destroy the -- tell him if Fahmy now wanted to say that he ~~x~~ would not negotiate with the ~~x~~ Israelis prior to Syrian disengagement. If he would say that publicly now this would be a good time.

S: OK.

K: If he would now say publicly what he told me he wanted to say in NY. I would not object.

S: OK.

K: You see what I mean.

S: Right.

K: OK.

S: I'll get it right off to him.

K: Right. Bye.

END

SB 304 *

TELECON
Senator Cranston/Secretary Kissinger
April 24, 1974
11:30 AM

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

(Missed first part)

C: As you know, the tax bill seemingly is hung up for different reasons. The Energy Bill is in ahead of that and there's some feeling that it's a controverisal...

K: Which bill - the Trade Bill.

C: ~~XXX~~ The trade bill. That may not be moving anywhere and ~~h~~ we may have no particular chance to do anything. A halfway measure is possible in terms of the export-import legislation which has to get through by June 30, so that will be coming to _____ to extend the export-import matter. Jackson added credits to his amendment so that we can quite appropriate ~~xxxx~~ put in whatever modification of the Jackson amendment we might like to or seek to do that on that bill.

K: That would then take....

C: Not cover most favæ red nations.

K: No, but it would take care of the credits.

C: It would take care of the credit and would ~~xxxx~~ show the Senate position.

K: That would be helpful.

C: That would be one step. Now there's one other alternative. The Finance Committee is going to report ~~4~~ 3 tax bills out in the next week or so. If we wanted we could try to amend one of them with our version of the Jackson thing and just do it rather _____ if we have the capacity, which I think we have and _____ the matter right then by adding on the Jackson language~~x~~ modified which would cover most favor nations and cover the export-import credit matter. That would go to the proper committee in the House so that we wouldn't have jurisdictional problems over there. The question is whether it's worth trying to move that swiftly or whether we should test the waters on export-import legislation.

K: My instinct is the latter but I'm not expert on legislative.

C: If we showed the Senate will on that, we, of course, will have not have vehicle to grant the most favored nation status to Soviet Union and the question is how long....

K: My impresion is, that if we could get a quick show of preserving the credits that this would help us a hell of a lot.



Cranston - page 2

C: That may be the rightest and most orderly way to go then.

K: But I would be prepared to consider the other alternative. I'm having breakfast with Jackson, Ribicoff and Javits on Friday and maybe we should talk after that.

C: Fine. In connection with that business, the general feeling among people I've talked to here is that Jackson and Ribicoff are in _____ and even if we confront them with it, the likelihood of beating them -- they're going to ~~fight~~ fight like hell and try to beat us. Whereas ~~Jack~~ Javits might be detached from them and I've had a preliminary meeting with Bill ~~Hildebrand~~ Hildebrand who's Scott's key man up there. Scott is generally sympathetic to our view point and what I'm trying to put together next week, is early in the week, a meeting with Scott Mansfield and myself and Javits to bring him into our plans and ~~we~~ see if...

K: I think Javits can be detached. Ribicoff talks to me as if he could be detached but that may be tactical.

C: I ~~think~~ think it's conceivable if he -- I'm sure he's aware of the re-thinking going on in the Jewish community...

K: Jackson I agree is in _____.

C: I presume the meeting you'll have wouldn't come to any conclusions. Wouldn't leave us free to move these people, or try to move them.

K: I'm certain -- I ~~do not~~ do not expect we reach any conclusion. But I thought if I could have a sense of _____ I could make a better judgment after that.

C: That would be very useful. I will not be able to have this meeting until next week so ~~if~~ if I could talk to you before you take off again, after you've talked to those 3.

K: Absolutely. I'll talk to you Friday morning, right afterwards.

C: Let me ask you two more questions. One on Sparkman, do you happen to know his feelings. If we're going to do this in the banking committee, he's one I haven't talked to you.

K: No, my instinct is, he would be in strong support of ^{your} ~~his~~ position.

C: I think that he would be also. Now one other thing. The amendment - this is the final thing I've got -- on the amendment that we're working on, I've worked with Nelson and ~~Hix~~ Himes a w revision and it comes down in clear essentials to this, first, we propose that if most favored nation is granted our credits by the President there would be under the ~~reorganization~~ reorganization act a 90 day period in



Cranston - page 3

which one House of Congress could object to ___ and thereafter the most favored nation thing would be subject to approval or disapproval each two years so that Congress would have that right to take a look every two years and the ___ governing what we should take into account would include the following section D and this is really the meat of the ___. When considering such a resolution of disapproval, the Congress shall take into account whether such country is evidencing reasonable progress and or is not retreating from the observance of principles of human rights set forth in Section 402 which is ___ including the principle of ___.

K: Was the problem you have in addition with this, which we haven't raised this China.

C: Yes, I know. That's another little problem.

K: We don't want to get ourselves into discriminatory box with China, but maybe we can get ~~Mansfield~~ Mansfield to introduce a special legislation for them.

C: He is going to. So that would cover that. Is that language I read to you sound reasonable?

K: That ~~xx~~ sounds possible. Now let me ask you, when you say, does it mean every two years the thing continues unless the Senate disapproves this.

C: That's right, yes.

K: It doesn't have a permanent ___ for it.

C: It should be renewable for additional periods in the language we've got in now. Each not to exceed to 2 years subject to the provisions...

K: So, there has to be a positive vote or it lapses.

C: The Congress would just have to reject ~~it~~ if it wanted. It would have the opportunity to object every 2 years.

K: That I would prefer.

C: That's the way it is.

K: The other ~~thing~~ thing on credits. Are you requiring that every credit no matter what the size be put before the....

C: That would be a different matter that is not in this portion of the bill.

K: That is not in there.



Cranston - page 4

C: No, I believe that the banking committee will have some...

K: You know, I have no ~~obj~~ objection to saying any credit above a certain amount should lay over for 90 days.

C: That's what we will do.

K: ~~Good~~ Good. Well, I appreciated very much what you're doing.

C: Well, ~~thank~~ thank you very much.

K: I'll call you Friday.

C: Very good.

K: Thank you.

END

SB 312 *

TELECON

Mr. Sisco/Secretary Kissinger

April 25, 1974

12:01 PM

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND

RELEASE

CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

K: Joe, have you seen a cable here from Aikins that he asked the Saudis to extend an invitation to the President for a visit.

S: No, I haven't.

K: Look, we've just got to get more discipline into this.

S: Is there such a cable?

K: Yes, there is such a cable.

S: Well, let me see what it is.

K: Well, there's nothing to see what it is, Joe. You've got to get these guys in line.

S: He would have done this totally on his own responsibility.

K: Yes, but there is too much flapping around. These guys have to learn that they are serving the God-damn United States and not themselves. No one has asked him to discuss this.

S: He certainly hasn't.

K: What are we going to do with an invitation if the President isn't coming?

S: That's a good question.

K: There was never any question that the President would be welcome there.

S: I'm sorry to hear this, Mr. Secretary and I have no answer and no explanation.

K: Well, take a look at it.

S: Alright, I will.

END

SB 314 *

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

TELECON

General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger

April 25, 1974

4:30 PM

K: Do I have to talk . to Fulbright or is it enough to talk with Sparkman.

S: I think it would be enough to talk to Sparkman since he's acting now.
Unless he feels he can't do it, then maybe if he feels he has to, he could
talk to Fulbright.

K: I would prefer to do it that way.

S: I would think that would be better.

K: Good.

END

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FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
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Telcon	Telcon - SB319	4	04/26/1974	P1/b1; P5; MAC 7/12/2005
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COLLECTION:

Counsel's Office, White House

SERIES:

Kavanaugh, Brett - Subject Files

FOLDER TITLE:

Kissinger, Henry FOIA (Freedom of Information Act) Request [4]

FRC ID:

9700

OA Num.:

2170

NARA Num.:

2081

FOIA IDs and Segments:

2018-0016-P

2017-0345-F

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

SB 321 *

TEELCON
General Scowcroft/Sec. Kissinger
April 26, 1974
10:45

K: Brent, could you ask Peter to type up what I said as my opening statement to the Jewish leaders by noon, so that I can have it for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee this afternoon.

S: Sure, I'll get right on it.

K: Do you have any ideas on what I should raise in my press conference. Also, did you send over here what I said to the Senate, or at the briefing the other morning.

S: Yes, yes I did.

K: Who's got it?

S: Larry has it.

K: Good, I'll get it.

ⓧ END

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

SB 325 *

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
April 26, 1974
12:40 PM

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

K: ____ to Sparkman and Morgan and they both approve our drawing down 50 million.

S: Great. That's very good.

K: Probably makes an irreversible enemy out of Fulbright. I just think the ~~danger~~ danger of calling him in Arkansas and turning me down, is too great.

S: No, I agree.

K: I called his office, he wasn't in town.

S: I think you've done the right thing then. Did Sparkman say anything about....

K: Now, let's get a little money into Arkansas for ____, because I can't afford having a ____ Fulbright again. OK, Brent.

S: Good. Thanks.

END

SB 327 *

TELCON
General Scowcroft/Sec. Kissinger
April 26, 1974
3:25 PM

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

K: Brent, there is a group of Russian parliamentarians over here. They are handled by a fellow called Pomorani of (sp) who is Secretary of the Central Committee, which is a position that Brezhnev had at one point and Dobrynin just called me and said they would appreciate it if the President received them.

S: o.k.

it

K: I think ~~is~~ essential either the 8th or 9th of May and I told them to work with you on this.

S: Sure. I don't see any problem. He is usually very good about meeting with the Russians.

K: I know his heavy schedule doesn't permit planning the summit.

S: I think we can work that out.

K: O.K. Good.

S: I will get in touch with them.

K: Good, thank you.

S: O.K.

END

SB 330 1*

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE

TELCON

Peter Flanigan/Sec. Kissinger

April 26, 1974

CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

F: I heard of your meeting with the Jewish leaders.

K: With the Jewish leaders, oh..

F: And their feeling that it would take some time -- before you tell me that, could you tell me how you did with Jackson.

K: Very inconclusively, and above all they all implored me not to go running around because it would kill everything. I wouldn't have enough to run around with.

F: What did they mean -- run around to other senators.

K: That's right.

F: The question is.....

K: I mean to run around quoting them about their attitudes.

F: Oh, I see. Well, tell me this, then, what do you think we ought to do?

K: My impression is that after a lot of tough talk at the meeting Javits didn't give much. I had the impression that Jackson was a little bit more receptive. He didn't insist on a ~~hundred~~ hundred thousands any more.

F: Would he go towards a formula as you suggested?

K: Well, he said I should take a run at the Soviets about ending harrassment, which is what I'm going to do with Gromyko.

F: You got the feeling that there's enough give so that it's better to stay on this track then to try another track.

K: No, I think if you try another track, that's fine with me. Like What?

F: Well, I have a feeling there's -- that they made a real plea not to have this put on the Ex-im ~~bank~~ bank. bill. If it were put on the Exim Bank Bill it came off this bill we could have a bill that wouldn't do us any good but it wouldn't get us MFM but it would stop credit. I think they're afraid they'll lose their support on the other -- from the other Senators on Exim because the other senators constituents want loans. Another approach is to come up with a position that is significantly different then our original ~~a~~ position but

Flanigan - page 2

not what Jackson wants and then see how many senators who are very unhappy at being on his amendment. How many of them will say, well that' meets my requirement, I'd not have to stick with you Scoop.

K: Well, I have the impression that we might work out something on the Exim Bill. He wasn't so strong on the Exim Bill.

F: Well, but did that assume that there was nothing in the bill. Or assuming there was a Jackson ___ in this bill.

K: I had the impression he'd keep the Jackson ___ also in the bill.

F: Well then we haven't gotten anywhere.

K: Exactly.

F: I wonder if he isn't afraid -- he must be knowing that his senatorial support is eroding and a lot of these guys didn't mean to kill the Trade Bill and they're beginning to ~~think~~ see that that's what he's doing and they're beginning to suspect he's doing it really at that behest of Labor and a deal to keep Labor support for his candidacy. So, there aren't ~~87~~ 78 guys up there who want him to be President. Most of them want to be ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ President themselves.

K: I think what he really wants is to kill the Trade Bill for this year.

F: That's right, for the Labor people. Because know full well that once you get a veto through Congress, we're never going to get that thing out of the Ways and Means Committee again. It's '77 for you get another swing at a Trade Bill and that ~~means~~ means no trade negotiations. The argument that we shouldn't go running around is probably a good one, surely a good one if we can make head way with him on the other hand are we being had for his purposes and he's just giving us a little in ~~order~~ order to kill the bill. I presume you are as anxious for foreign policy reasons as I am for international economic reasons to get a bill.

K: Oh, I'm very anxious.

F: I would guess that we have about 15-20 days in which to get some movement here or we're going to lose the bill just because of the ~~the~~ Finance Committee's timing because I have to admit there's ~~not~~ not what you'd call a great deal of enthusiasm in the Senate or in that Committee for this piece of legislation so ~~that~~ they'd happily go on to other things. Do you think we can bring it to a ~~an~~ head in that period of time?

K: I think what we should do is to move very _____. The first thing, I think is impossible. I think we can try to bring it to a head as soon as I return.

Flanigan - page 3

Because then either we will have had a success in which case I'll proceed _____
might help alot. Well, if we've had a failure then it would effect everything
anyway. I think we can gamble on success.

F: When do you hope to see Gomyko?

K: Monday.

F: Good. Is this something he can deal with?

K: Well, if -- look if he would give me anything at all, it would help. OK.

F: Then we will just think ~~xxx~~ of alternative courses, put it in our back
pocket until you come back and whenever it is, that's beginning the week after
next, and make a real reappraisal right then.

K: Exactly.

F: Good luck, Henry.

END

SB 331 *
TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

TELECON

William Casey/Secretary Kissinger

2:40 PM

Saturday, April 27, 1974

K: Hello

C: Hello, Henry.

K: Bill.

C: How are you?

K: OK

C: Good. I had a talk ~~with~~ last week with Stevenson and Jackson.

K: Yea.

C: I had to go up and testify Tuesday on the EX-IM authorization and I just thought I would touch base with you to see if you had any guidance for me. They've been talking together about getting the EX-IM Bill out quite clean. With respect to Soviets and European transactions except for requirement that to be a Presidential finding with respect to any loan over some amount yet to be determined. Maybe a \$100 million maybe a quarter of a million dollars. And also a requirement that specifies loans perhaps energy related and those of a large magnitude to gain a 100 million or whatever. The ... on the table up there is 30 to 60 days with an opportunity on the part of Congress to veto. Now ~~is~~ it is my view that we could live with the Presidential finding requirement although I don't think that should be placed on the President but the requirement that you lay burden the whole ~~the~~ transaction out so that the sponsorer could be jilted at the altar and his competitors would know all about it and ~~get~~ zero in on him I think would just ~~be~~ put us out of business.

K: Yep.

C: Now I'm going to say that, lay it out in my testimony.

K: Well I wouldn't have an objection to the veto by Congress if the sum were high enough, if we could lick that problem, that technical problem of the ~~competitive~~ competition.

C: Well it is not only the problem of competition it also puts the Congress in a position of perhaps administering a specific review slap in face to one of our trading parties and one of the countries we are trying to do business with and they really shouldn't put themselves in that position. It is a stupid thing for them to do.

Casey/Kissinger

K: Look, I don't want it. I like it better than the Jackson amendment to the Trade Bill.

C: Yea. I think that is right. I'm not sure however that the fact that they let EXIM Bank.

K: Well, why don't you stick to this position. If we want to compromise we can always do it later.

C: Yea. Do you have anything else that would help me deal with this.

K: No, no, we have to get the credits for the Soviets. I mean if that ability is lost we are just in horrible shape.

C: When are you leaving? You leaving tomorrow?

K: First thing yea.

C: Have a good trip.

C

K: Thank you.

C: Would you like to, uh me to send over the personal points of my testimony? In case you have any reactions.

K: Oh, I would appreciate that. Yes.

C: What is the latest ~~late~~ time I can get it to you today?

K: Any time. Six o'clock, as late as five or six ~~o'clock~~ o'clock.

C: OK, ~~and~~ I'll ship it over.

K: Thank you. Are you enjoying your job?

C: Yea. It is fun.

K: Good.

C: I'll see you.

K: Bye, Bill.

C: Bye.

SB 3321*

TELECON

David Rockefeller/Secretary Kissinger

3:02

Saturday, April 27, 1974 TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

K: Hello.

R: Henry.

K: David, how are you?

R: How nice of you to call back and I apologize...
I just wanted to point out to you a couple of things.

K: Yes.

R: As you heard from Nelson about Bilderberg. ~~xxx~~

K: Yes I have.

R: You probably also heard from Hal.

K: Right.

R: So I don't think I need to fill you in on that.

K: I think I have a pretty good feel.

R: He and Nelson made a great impression.

K: Wonderful.

R: It was very useful having him along and he defended the President very well against George Ball.

K: You know, we have a report today from Dabenyour(sp?) saying a lot of Americans at Bilderberg and also Americans from Bilderberg traveling through Europe were saying that this Administration is determine to destroy our Atlantic relations. You know, I don't understand what good it does to an American to do this.

R: Well, I can't imagine why they would.

K: It is not true but even if it were true.

R: I'd say that Hal did present a hard line.

K: Yea, but that's our line.

R: Well, OK. But I mean this is part of the problem ~~for Hal~~ we have

Rockefeller/Kissinger

K: Yes, but his hard line as I understood it was we will support European unity if Europe supports our Atlantic relationships, but not in the abstract.

R: Well, you know, it is unfortunately just a bad climate. It really is at the moment, and I think a new administration in France could certainly help.

K: Yea, but I doubt that they will.

R: I think might

K: Shiscar might, yea.

R: And Nelson said he had given you the statement by this young French fellow Pierre de Montebanc. (sp?)

K: Yes.

R: And I thought it was a little encouraging that he had said something quite different from what Jobert has been saying and the fact that Jobert said it. They are feelers. I don't feel totally discouraged but I do think it is not in a good shape at the moment.

K: Yea. But largely the result European actions.

R: I think that is probably true but its just not a good atmosphere I'm shocked about thought if what you say about the other Americans going around saying.

K: Yea.

R: And I don't the explanation.

K: What actions of ours have contributed to it?

R: You know, they are sorta snide remarks and retaliation ~~xxx~~ and so on.

K: Well, what snide remarks?

R: Well I suppose one the sorta example was the sad fact of the report on your talking to the ladies.

K: Oh, but God, that happened at the end of a year's process.

R: I agree, but I am just saying this is



K: But that couldn't have caused anything, because the damage by that time had been done.

R: Right, it is an example of the sorta thing they ~~think~~ pick on .

K: Yea. But that is a symptom that is not a cause.

R: No, no, it isn't a cause. I don't know. I think they are having trouble among themselves and therefore they are looking for outside excuses.

K: I mean that talk to the ladies was a disaster, because I didn't know the press was there and it wasn't a well consider statement.

R: That's right. Well, you know, I can understand, but I think

K: At any rate that couldn't have been the cause because that was the end of a year of trying to get them to agree to something rational.

R: Yea, well, they are very difficult. I have no question about that. But I think it is clear that they need a lot of sorta tender loving care just to give them when they behave the way they do.

K: Yea.

R: And I fully agree on that. I did want to say a word on the Soviets. I think the Darmouth meeting went much the best than any we have had. And I have been sick in the sense that it was much less recrimination and much less polemic than there has been at the others. and much more willingness to discuss in a rational fashion the nature of our problems and a willingness to discuss how we can deal with them. And in a way, strangely enough: almost more than in Bilderberg.

K: Oh, really.

R: It was surprising. Of course I would write it up in three groups. One on political side which I think is a little more fireworks and I wasn't involved in that. Then there was one on science and environment and that went very well. And ours was on trade and economic relations And we brought up a whole series of rather concrete suggestions that would make possible a more effective cooperation. Excepting the fact that the wouldn't accept ownership in the Soviet Union by anyone, that was the most difficult. We said well how about leasing and we described what this country could do with equipment and also with plants and this be a possibility. And then we discussed the possibility of joint ventures in third countries and instead of just saying this is the end, they said, well, we would like to study it and it was agreed in the end that new US/USSR Council would be asked to set up a task force to see what might be done in this area.

R: And I think that is encouraging because if we could do something along those lines, it would be very positive and their whole approach is this, they sense a good delegation. Richard Lee who is Administrator of Food sat in with us for one whole day & the Deputy Minister of Agriculture and the Vice Chairman of the state Bank so that it was really a good discussion. And then that was followed up by ... I did go to see Kosygin in Moscow and had an hour and a half with him. I think he would have gone on a lot longer, but we were half hour late for lunch as it was. And he brought up an interesting idea and that is and he really wanted me to take this up with you and he said how about US and Soviets ~~xxxx~~ participating in the construction of nuclear power plants in third countries. In other words this is a variation of the idea we had advanced only doing it in a different way and then we saw Devisonne(sp?) and he is pretty clearly I think and put the idea in his head but he would really like to do this and I think it is an interesting idea.

K: It is certainly one we would be prepared to look at.

R: You see the idea would be that they would provide certain elements of the plant and we in others.

K: Yea.

R: But I would think this has interesting possibilities. So far as the joint ventures are concerned it seemed ~~xxx~~ to me that the ideal place to do it would be in India. Where they are already strong, where the Indians need enormous amounts of capital and I'm not sure it might not be an interesting idea. Not now speaking of necessary power plants but something else. And they were at least willing to discuss it.

K: Now are they going to approach us on this? Or how is it going?

R: Well, I mean, what he is going to do is to send me through Dobrynin a memorandum but I thought maybe it was useful to you to have it in the back of your mind when you are over there seeing them. It seemed to me a positive approach and the whole meeting with Kosygin was much more ~~positive~~ friendly, much less barring and much less jives than I have ever had it before.

K: Well I think they are still eager to continue the detente, but what's going in this country with Congress isn't very encouraging.

R: No, although Hugh Scott was there you know. He gave them a moderately optimistic view on MFN.

K: Good. I hope he knows what he is talking about.

SB 337*

TELECON
Joseph Kraft/Secretary Kissinger
May 31, 1974
7:45 PM

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

K: Hello.

JK: Henry, congratulations.

K: Thank you, Joe.

JK: You must be very gratified.

K: It's the most nerve-racking negotiation I've ever been involved in.

JK: Yes, I can imagine. Thank you very much for calling. I'm wrapping up a New Yorker letter from Damascus and I wondered if there was something you could tell me about the way Asad handled the negotiation. What he (inaudible) at, what his basic conception seemed to me, what he was worried about.

K: Well, you're not going to attribute it to me.

JK: No. I will not attribute...

K: The difference ~~was~~ between him and -- first of all, I think he's a man of superb intelligence, great sense of humor and really quite ~~attractive~~ attractive, and I found him to be a man of his word. His problem in contrast to Sadat was that Sadat had made up his mind where he was going to go before he entered negotiations, while Asad seemed to be feeling his way during the negotiations. And to him it was a really traumatic experience to go through the process of recognizing and to call Israel for even -- if only for purposes of negotiations. And at every stage of the process he had to bring along his domestic consensus sometimes by bringing people in for me to repeat to them the same arguments I'd ~~was~~ already made to him. Sometimes by simply having them sit in. He had two problems, one of course was the line where the disengagement would ~~a~~ take place, the second was how to reconcile thinning out UN and so forth _____ conception of sovereignty.

JK: I see. What was the fight about Qunitra at the beginning about whether civilians could come into Qunitra.

K: There was no fight ever about ~~was~~ whether civilians could come into Qunitra. At first the Israelis drew the lines ~~themselves~~ around Qunitra and in such a way that Israeli ~~x~~ military forces would in fact -- well, at first, Israelis wanted to keep half of Qunitra for themselves.

JK: I see, they wanted to keep the western half.



Kraft - page 2

K: And then the major problem was whether he could put ~~xxx~~ civilians into a town that in effect had Israeli military outposts at every corner except one road. That's really what the issue was.

JK: I see.

K: Never any prohibition against ____.

JK: I see and you solved it by putting the Israelis out of the town but in the joining area.

K: By putting the Israelis out of town into a joining area, your creating a ~~demilitarized~~ demilitarized Israeli zone for a kilometer and a half beyond Quenitra.
what

JK: Any indication ~~xxx~~ the Palestinians are going -- how they're going to react? think

K: Well, that was another problem he had very much on his mind. I ~~xxx~~ there's a chance that they will not react too violently.

JK: Yes. So far they haven't at any rate. OK, well, look, thank you very much.

K: One point you had in one of your ~~xxxxxxx~~ columns to which I took exception is, you know, was we didn't get the war started, the war go itself started in the Golan Heights.

JK: It was ~~xxxxxxx~~ crudly written on my part.
not

K: It was anything we had any control over and it wasn't something we deliberately used. The problem was that without these negotiations it would have escalated into a much ^{more} extensive war.

JK: Well look, it was rather crud but I also feel that without that fighting he couldn't have brought it off.

K: That may be true but it wasn't a plan -- you know, it wasn't that -- there was no way of moving this thing to a negotiation faster given the Israeli domestic crisis and given the fact that we had to get these people to put something on paper to which they were committed before we started so it isn't we ~~deliberately~~ deliberately let this thing build up. We couldn't start much before we did.

JK: OK, I have written Bob McCloskey a note trying to explain that. I was a little surprised at his letter about that kind of relationship with me, but basically I just don't think you could have done it or that the Syrians could have....

K: Joe I did not agree -- I didn't disagree with your analysis ~~xxx~~ of the dynamics of the negotiations. I objected to the phrase that I unleashed the dogs of war.

*

Kraft - page 3

And also I objected to the idea that all of this was being done to arrange a Presidential trip to the Middle East. That may be the result but that was not the intention.

JK: I didn't say that. I mean I don't remember what I ~~said~~ said, but.....

K: But basically I thought 4/5 of the analysis ~~was~~ was extremely acute. I mean the analysis of the dynamics was extremely acute.

JK: OK.

K: Yes, you had been in Damascus.

JK: Yes, I spent a lot of time in Damascus. I sort of know a lot of about -- I think the _____.

K: Then you know that this was a traumatic experience for ~~me~~ ____.

JK: Absolutely. She was coming down from a romantic linguistic _____ or he was bringing his people down from that romantic linguistic _____ heaven to the pragmatic dirt of a national state.

K: Exactly. And so it was a tremendously emotional negotiation because you could see what he was going through.

JK: And he had to ~~haggle~~ haggle at every step of ^{the} ~~that~~/way. You know, what strikes me about this that the last part of the agreement where he establishes almost no connection between this step and the end step. That really surprised me.

K: That's right. No, it was a -- in his way he had a much tougher role than Sadat and he showed again in the wierd Syrian way, equal of not even greater wisdom. I mean to get it this far, now what he'll do in the next stage, God only knows.

JK: Yes, but his capacity for making mischief is much smaller.

K: Much smaller. He's lost his extreme radical creditial.

JK: Yes. Alright, I think it's a very, you know, really extremely good outcome.

K: Good, Joe, nice to talk to you.

JK: Nice to chat, my best to Nancy.

K: Thank you and we'll see you when -- you're going off on a trip?



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JK: I'm going to the Governors conference now and I don't think I'll go to the Mid East trip. I expect to go to Moscow. Will you be going to Moscow before the President.

K: No, there won't be time.

JK: God. I'll be going on that. Is it clear where he's going to be going? Apart from Moscow itself.

K: No. I have to talk to Dobrynin soon.

JK: I take it you've seen the Shultz article.

K: What Shultz article.

JK: (inaudible)

K: No.

JK: Nobody called it to your attention?

K: No.

JK: It's in the current issue of Foreign Policy. I don't want to load you down with something but you at least ought to get somebody to look at it, it's going to break on your head and

K: What's he saying?

JK: I think it makes -- I'm not sure I can give a good characterization. It purports to be ~~ix~~ an account of peace making in Indochina and may be its surrounding by more ___ than the fact, but the ___ suggested there was a good deal of double dealing.

K: Double dealing with whom?

JK: With both -- well, let me be very very. If you wanted a worse ___ you would say that you duped everybody, you duped the ~~Cambodians~~ Cambodians, the South Vietnamese, the North Vietnamese, and President Nixon.

K: I duped -- no ~~that~~ let's start with the last one. How did I dupe President Nixon.

JK: Look, I can't argue this case ~~idow~~ at all and I don't know enough about it even to make -- but two colleagues of mine had called me if I had seen it



Kraft - page 5

and they are writing ~~xxx~~ articles about it. You certainly ought to get somebody to brief you on it.

K: I'll get it. It's quite an achievement.

JK: It's not anything to worry about. I really don't -- but I think you ought.....

K: To do such a _____ is an amazing achievement.

JK: That's right.

K: OK, Joe, I'll get it.

JK: One other question has come up. It came up to me in connection with something I saw Rockefeller about. Do you -- did you notice in the transcripts something that had -- that you told the ~~Rxxxx~~ President which Rockefeller told you which Coin told him.

K: I saw that and I don't what the hell they're talking about. Did Rockefeller know.

JK: He didn't know what they were talking about and that you had a pretty good memory and would know.

K: I have no idea what they were talking about. I've seen that transcript.

JK: Well, it's -- there are two possibility that came to my mind but none of them very clear. One that -- the most likely it seems to ~~xxxx~~ me is that Hoover told Coin who told Rockefeller who told you that there had been bugging of the 1968 campaign by the Democrats. That strikes me as the most likely. The other possibility has to do with how the story of the bugging of -- how the story of the 1969 -70 bugging got out.

K: No. That certainly not. That could not be the case. The first, conceivably. You know, in analysing, leaving aside anything that may be said about me, in analysing these transcripts you have to understand that they are necessarily the truth. They are the impression the various actors wanted to create about various events. They weren't necessarily.....

JK: It's very clear to me in the two I mentioned that they are totally _____. That they are in fact ~~k~~ coaching for various specific purposes and to regard these as an ~~xxxxxx~~ expression of the truth is -- well, it's even an act of irony I would say.

K: Exactly. OK.

JK: Take care have a nice weekend.

✓ END

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SB5

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND PARTIAL RELEASE

B6

CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

TELCON

Minister Fahmi - Secretary Kissinger

February 17, 1974

3:50 p.m.

K: Should you and Sqaaf come in formally, the two of you, tomorrow?

F: Yes.

K: How should we do that, just the three of us or with advisors?

F: Only the three of us.

K: Only the three of us, okay.

F: For the same reasons, we were talking about.

K: Okay. Now, should I give just a social lunch afterwards?

F: No, its not necessary.

K: But what if I want to give just a social lunch? Then I can have Bunker and his wife, Sisco and myself and you and Sqaaf.

F: I see, you mean you can indulge a little bit, in a social thing. At your place or what?

K: no, no, we could do it at the State Department or we could do it at some restaurant. Its a holiday tomorrow so it may be difficult.

F: OK.

B6

(b)(6)

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Page two

B6

(b)(6)

K: Ismail, you really....There's one subject we didn't discuss today which we really should discuss tomorrow, you and I alone at some point, that's your March 1 visitor, you know that whole complex of questions.

F: Yah, shouldn't worry about that.

K: I'm not worried, I just want to coordinate.

F: Good, just give me instructions what I'm supposed to do, and I'll do it.

K: Listen, you devel. I said coordinate. The first day I give you instructions I'm going to go the same way as your March 1 visitor. Unfortunately you are very proud.

F: I understand and you are really very considerate.

K: No, I think....you are so sarcastic, and you know how you can upset me this way. All right, so why don't you and Saqaaf come at 11:30 and right from there we have lunch.

F: Okay. It will be done.

K: And, we will see.

F: Good.

K: And we will arrange a meeting with the President for Tuesday morning.

F: At the State Department?

K: Tomorrow you come to the State Department and Tuesday you go and see the President.

F: Okay. Will you be present when I see the President, or....

K: Look, if you think I trust you with the President alone, you're mad. I'm going to be there.

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F: But Sakaaf doesn't want you to be present when we talk to the President .

K: I don't believe it. It doesn't make any difference because Sakaaf
, I haven't told you yet, can't be present when you talk to the President.

F: 11:30.

K: 11:30. Right, bye.

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SB27

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND PARTIAL RELEASE
B6
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

TELCON

Secretary Kissinger - Senator Javits
February 20, 1974

J: Mr. Secretary, how are you?

K: Just fine, and you?

J: Fine. Henry you are having fabulous successes. You're a man who's going to find it very hard to better his own batting average.

K: Know it. The next trick is to get the Syrians and Israelis together.

J: That's a trick worth doing. I'm calling about Charlotte Curtis.

K: She never called me.

J: Well she called your office but I think they were a little confused about what she wanted and I think she was a little confused too. I understood that you were willing to have it published.

K: Yes. Let me take a look at it again, to see how I edited it, but.... I'm distressed I wasn't told she called.

J: I want you to make her acquaintance.

K: I met her at your house, not knowing who she was.

J: That's right. She's going to take the page from Harrison Salsbury. I wanted to mention (b)(6) (?) to you. He's been over to the White House and they're going to send him to the State Department in order to look him over with an eye to doing something in State. Now, whom shall he see.

B6

K: Well, he should see Ken Rush but I'll pass the word on to have a hard look at him.

J: Remember our talk about Europe, Japan, etc. etc. A very interesting idea has come in from the field, from the Dutch Government. They are going to make it an item on the parliamentary agenda which consists of a report to the Council of 9, and do a Foreign Office White Paper commenting on it. The idea is to move into doing it in every parliamentary meeting of the 15.

K: We would support it.

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Pae two

J: I'm going to talk to the guy who's the President of the organization and he's going to push it with the Chairman of each national delegation. It's a hell of a way to publicize the discussion of this set of ideas of what you ultimately will be following directly.

K: Yes. I must run to catch my plane to Mexico.



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TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND PARTIAL RELEASE

B6

CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

SB54

TELCON

Rollie Evans/Sec. Kissinger

March 7, 1974

5:00 p.m.

E: Mr. Super Secretary.

K: What is it Rollie?

E: I want to congratulate you.

K: What did I do?

E: You got them talking. What have you done? What have you not done?

K: Actually for anyone knows the Arabs that was probably more of an achievement that did not get as much publicity.

E: I have been to Damascus and I know the players. They are the most difficult people to deal with in mankind.

K: I agree.

E: Much worse than the Iraqis.

K: I don't know about that but they are the most unbelievable ^{bunch} ~~bunch~~ I have seen.

E: How are you?

K: What the hell do you want? I am fine.

E: Just don't be so impatient. Will you have breakfast next week. You cancelled the last one. You don't see the columnists anymore. I figure you have all of these regular reporters lined up and they are all afraid to write the truth because they are afraid of you.

K: And they will get bumped off the plane, and I know which car to put them in that is going to be blown up. How about Saturday?

E: I will be in Florida, going down with the President to Key Biscayne.

K: Are you kidding?

E: I will be going to Palm Beach and will be with the family.

K: Since I don't have access to upper class resorts. . .

E: Do you want to come down.



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2.
Rollie Evans

K: No.

E: They probably wouldn't like it, Henry. How about Wednesday.

K: O.K.

E: Seriously.

K: O.K. That looks good. The White House 7:45.

E: You are not going to have someone call me on Tuesday at a dinner party and say Mr. Kissinger cannot make it.

K: No.

E: How is your sense of humor.

K: Great.

E: You sound so serious.

K: I have an appointment with the Vice President in five minutes and I am trying to figure how to get there without offending one of the senior columnists so he will not mention me unfavorably in his column.

E: You want to be sure he will reemploy you.

K: There will not be an impeachment.

E: I think there will be.

K: It won't succeed.

E: You mean he won't be convicted.

K: No.

E: I think that is right. I think the thing last night was a disaster. I will tell you about it Wednesday. You sound ominously grave.

UNCLASSIFIED



3.
Rollie Evans

K: When you are dealing with the Sec. of State there is a gap in status.

E: You are getting pompous.

K: ~~For~~ One who goes three rounds with Assad can afford to admit it.

E: Your're right. I just got a message from Stu.
(Assad)

K: He/kissed me on the cheek.

E: Stu is in Arizona and

(b)(6)

B6

(b)(6)

He is having a good time. Getting a lot of sun and trying to put back some weight.

K: Terrific.

E: Wed. morning. He is coming back a week from Sunday and we are going to try to have a few people in for dinner with Stu and we want you present.

K: I would be honored. I have to go and see the Vice President now.

E: O.K.

END

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SB 57 *

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND PARTIAL RELEASE

TELCON
George Vest
Secretary Kissinger
12:34 3/8/74

B6

CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

- V: I have only one question which is a question that comes out of your remark that you have been meeting regularly with members of the Jewish community and the report from the National Conference on Soviet Jewry that they have not seen you for several months --you said regularly but
- K: No, no just a minute--the National Conference on Soviet Jewry--
- V: Is not the Jewish leaders--
- K: Just say I have been maintaining my position
- V: With members of the Jewish community
- K: I have been meeting with the President's conference and other key leaders of the Jewish community--I didn't include every last member of them
- V: Right, that is what I wanted to pin down--I've got nothing else
- K: What are you going to do on the European thing if anything comes up
- V: I would take exactly sir the line that had gone out in the telegram which we sent out yesterday--Ed Hartman and I had spoken of this yesterday--just a simple--rehearses the background and says we are now carefully studying the text and a meeting date will be fixed upon completion on the study
- K: And you better make clear we received it officially only on Wednesday
- V: Yes, that is the preceding part, sir--received it on Monday originally but then explanations on Tuesday March 5--which reached us on Wednesday and this is too serious a matter to be handled that quickly.
- K: Don't say it is too serious--just say we won't be ready and if you have B6 and opportunity--Reston has been briefed--(b)(6)--by French (?) we have never asked to be present at the ForMin's meeting--that was not an issue at all--if it comes up--don't volunteer it
- V: Right, I understand
- K: Good, thank you.

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SB73*

TELCON

March 12, 1974/11:35 a.m.

Secretary Morton/HAK

M: I've gotten a call from Annenberg and Annenberg said he wanted to stay on until June the 30th and all that, which Huston has no problem with but (b)(6) but has got coming over to the Derby which he runs as a head of the American purse, Princess Margaret and that'll be early in May. He feels with Annenberg knowing this and everybody knowing this, that the information is going to get out and he suggests that for everybody's sake maybe some announcement be made fairly soon so that the worry about a leak is not so evident and that we -- he begins to sort of get his house in order as far as getting ...

B6

K: That's fine. What we would like to do though is wait a few weeks because (b)(6) wanted that job and we've got to get him announced for something else.

B6

M: I don't think he knew that.

K: Because if he -- and we put him off with the argument that the job wasn't available.

M: Well, the only thing you've got. You've got a problem that when (b)(6) is going to be with the Princess and all that.

B6

K: But that isn't until May.

M: That's right. So I guess we've got the rest of March and a piece of April. ~~Another~~ words, in 4 or 5 weeks.

K: That's right.

K: Let me tell him that.

K: Good. Fine

K: OK.

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND PARTIAL RELEASE

B6

CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

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SB88*

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND PARTIAL
RELEASE

TELCON

Secretary Kissinger

B6

(b)(6)

3/13/74 9:08 a.m.

CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

B6

B:to answer this question, but once you told me to wait until you had to chance to see about the State^{Dept}ment. But I really have to negotiate on Thursday--I don't need a definite answer but I assume you have decided that for whatever reason that you just--

K: Well I talked to (b)(6) about it too to see what his view was and he looked over the situation with me and ~~he said~~ we just couldn't come up with anything that wouldn't create massive problems.

B6

B: He told me that I should do something about it, because he thought you needed me you know

K: No, I give you my word

B: Listen, don't be silly--

K: He had told me that--

B: The last thing he told me before you left was call Henry--I

K: I need you--there is no question about that--I asked him, we both agreed that (b)(6) would be a tremendous asset

B6

B: Let me just ask you one question--I'm not sure -- for one thing-- I'm not sure I even want it. There is no point in getting me into the ~~bureaucracy~~ bureaucracy

K: Well that is the problem

B: I could get a job more probably--

K: No, no I could get a job for you in this bureaucracy but you are no good to me there

B: But the point was--or even I might be able to get a job there--the point is there is no way that you could get me as an assistant to you where I could be helpful in dealing with people so that the things happening to you

B6

K: Look (b)(6) give me 3 or 4 more days because I have had one disaster after another this week
I have had a series of press disasters this week which would never have happened if a thoughtful person--



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B: If you put me some place as your assistant, I don't think you should worry about publicity--I will tell you what it is going to be--it will be a short article by (b)(6) --believe me I have a very, very good B6 work record and nobody can say that you are hiring (b)(6) who is a B6 friend of your.

K: No, my problem will be over here at the WH

B: But whether you can hire me as an assistant to you where you don't have to bother--I have a very small ego--if I could help you ab id some of the things that I hear coming up, I would love to do it. If I can't, then I might as well go on--at the time I am willing to wait indefinitely just--yo u know I would go ahead and negotiate and if you need me fine

K: No, no give me until the middle of next week.

B: I will give you indefinitely

K: No, no the middle of the next week

B: Thanks for calling me.

K: Right, Bye.

SB101 *

TELECON
General Haig/Secretary Kissinger
March 14, 1974
6:10 PM

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND PARTIAL
RELEASE

B6

CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

K: Al.

H: Yes, Henry.

K: I just wanted to check, he has signed off on that letter?

H: Oh, Yes. I gave it to Brent when I called you.

K: OK, well, then we'll get it off by telegram.

H: Good.

K: That's right. He assumed you were sending it tonight.

K: Right. Now, I talked to Ford because I made too many statements disavowing him today.

H: Yes.

K: And he says it's ridiculous, he never even said this.

H: No, the questions said it.

K: He said we never even discussed it yesterday.

H: Right. I listen to the thing. It was, you've been close to Dr. Kissinger lately, something to that effect. What has happened on the embargo and he said well I understand, he informs me or something like that, that it's done.

K: Yes.

H: It was a very brief exchange. He sort of got led into it.

K: Yes.

H: His guy came over here, I said, look just don't worry about it. It's a minor problem Henry.

K: That's what I think.

H: Nobody's paying any god-damned attention to it.

K: I think it's not right to keep the Vice President from hosting that sort of a dinner. He changed all his travel plans. He didn't do any damage.

Haig - page 2



H: Oh, no. There was a bad statement on the society page from (b)(6)
Hartman which he said they were suddenly ordered to do this then to change
everything you know as though nobody knew what they were doing.

B6

K: No .

H: That's what that was all about.

K: Oh, oh, I see. OK.

H: Everything is alright here, Henry. Status quo.

K: Good. OK, then we'll send the letter.

H: Yes, OK.

END