

Withdrawn/Redacted Material

The George W. Bush Library

DOCUMENT NO.	FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
001	Telcon	Telcon - S08 [2 PAGES RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/12/2025 JLS]	2	10/08/1973	
002	Telcon	Telcon - S09 [3 PAGES RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/12/2025 JLS]	3	10/09/1973	
003	Telcon	Telcon - S013 [4 PAGES RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/12/2025 JLS]	4	10/10/1973	
004	Telcon	Telcon - S020 [2 PAGES RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/12/2025 JLS]	2	10/13/1973	
005	Telcon	Telcon - S021 [6 PAGES RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/12/2025 JLS]	6	10/13/1973	

COLLECTION TITLE:

Counsel's Office, White House

SERIES:

Kavanaugh, Brett - Subject Files

FOLDER TITLE:

Kissinger, Henry FOIA (Freedom of Information Act) Request [1]

FRC ID:

9700

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

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007	Telcon	Telcon - S023 [3 PAGES RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/12/2025 JLS]	3	10/17/1973	
008	Telcon	Telcon - S024 [3 PAGES RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/12/2025 JLS]	3	10/18/1973	
009	Telcon	Telcon - S025 [2 PAGES RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/12/2025 JLS]	2	10/19/1973	
010	Telcon	Telcon - S026 [1 PAGE RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/12/2025 JLS]	1	10/19/1973	

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012	Telcon	Telcon - S028 [4 PAGES RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/12/2025 JLS]	4	10/23/1973	
013	Telcon	Telcon - S032 [2 PAGES RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/12/2025 JLS]	2	10/23/1973	
014	Telcon	Telcon - S033 [4 PAGES RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/12/2025 JLS]	4	10/23/1973	
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017	Telcon	Telcon - S044 [4 PAGES RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/12/2025 JLS]	4	10/27/1973	
018	Telcon	Telcon - S045 [2 PAGES RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/12/2025 JLS]	2	10/29/1973	
019	Telcon	Telcon - S046	1	10/29/1973	b1;
020	Telcon	Telcon - S047 [3 PAGES RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/12/2025 JLS]	3	10/30/1973	
021	Telcon	Telcon - S048 [4 PAGES RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/12/2025 JLS]	4	11/01/1973	

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022	Telcon	Telcon - S055 [4 PAGES RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/12/2025 JLS]	4	11/27/1973	
023	Telcon	Telcon - S064 [5 PAGES RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/12/2025 JLS]	5	12/24/1973	
024	Telcon	Telcon - S069 [2 PAGES RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/12/2025 JLS]	2	01/21/1974	
025	Telcon	Telcon - S071 [2 PAGES RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/12/2025 JLS]	2	01/29/1974	
026	Telcon	Telcon - S074 [2 PAGES RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/12/2025 JLS]	2	04/23/1974	

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027	Telcon	Telcon - S078 [2 PAGES RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/12/2025 JLS]	2	06/06/1974	
028	Telcon	Telcon - S079 [4 PAGES RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/12/2025 JLS]	4	06/08/1974	
029	Telcon	Telcon - S080 [2 PAGES RELEASED IN WHOLE ON PRA RE-REVIEW 09/12/2025 JLS]	2	06/21/1974	
030	Telcon	Telcon - S082	5	06/08/1974	b1;
031	Telcon	Telcon - S087	1	07/18/1974	b1;
032	Telcon	Telcon - S088	2	07/16/1974	b1;

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006	Telcon	Telcon - S022	3	10/14/1973	P5;
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- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

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- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Records Not Subject to FOIA

Court Sealed - The document is withheld under a court seal and is not subject to the Freedom of Information Act.

Withdrawn/Redacted Material

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SUPERSEDED

DOCUMENT NO.	FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
029	Telcon	Telcon - S080	2	06/21/1974	P5;
030	Telcon	Telcon - S082	5	06/08/1974	P1/b1; P5;
031	Telcon	Telcon - S087	1	07/18/1974	P1/b1; P5;
032	Telcon	Telcon - S088	2	07/16/1974	P1/b1; P5;

COLLECTION TITLE:

Counsel's Office, White House

SERIES:

Kavanaugh, Brett - Subject Files

FOLDER TITLE:

Kissinger, Henry FOIA (Freedom of Information Act) Request [1]

FRC ID:

9700

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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2081

Document Originally
Attached to
Following Page



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

Case No. 200102979 2

Requester: Burr, William

3-6-03

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED MEMORANDUM
Deliberative Process/Attorney-Client Privilege

TO: → Office of The Counsel To The President
Brett Kavanaugh
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., OEOB - 156
Washington, DC 20500

Department of Justice
Paul Colborn
Office of Legal Counsel
ROOM 3230, Main Justice Building
Washington, D.C. 20530

FROM: Department of State
L/LM - Jamison S. Borek *by PMiller*

SUBJECT: Kissinger Telephone Transcripts

In response to your request, the Department (A/RPS/IPS) has identified those Kissinger telephone transcripts containing any mention of the White House or the National Security Council (NSC), including discussions with or about persons who were either at the White House or the NSC at the time the transcripts were made or with or about persons who are now senior officials of the current Administration. These transcripts are provided for your concurrence in release. A number of them are also being referred to other agencies for concurrence as indicated on the documents. Documents will not be referred to the United Kingdom for concurrence until we have received the White House concurrence. Your copies are marked with the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) determinations (glossary of markings attached) and appropriate FOIA exemptions. We note that we are still awaiting guidance from the Department of Justice on application of the privacy exemption and certain other questions that we referred to them in the spring.

The Kissinger collection contains 15 segments, totaling approximately 10,000 pages. As you requested, classified material has been separated from each segment and will be stored at SA-2, awaiting pick up by DOJ and White House personnel. To

arrange for pick up or for additional information, please
contact Kay Muse at 202-261-8510.

A list of transcripts from segment two of 15 is attached.

Attachments:

As stated

Drafted: A/RPS/IPS: K.Muse

Cleared: A/RPS/IPS: MPGrafeld

A/RPS: FMachak

Attachment 1 List of Transcripts Segment Two

1. 59 documents sent to the White House and Department of Justice: SO8, SO9, SO11, SO13, SO20, SO21, SO22, SO23, SO24, SO25, SO26, SO27, SO28, SO32, SO33, SO38, SO43, SO44, SO45, SO46, SO47, SO48, SO55, SO64, SO69, SO71, SO74, SO78, SO79, SO80, SO82, SO87, SO88, SO89, SO93, SO95, SO96, SO97, SO99, SO100, SO102, SO104, SO105, SO107, SO110, SO111, SO112, SO114, SO115, SO116, SO117, SO120, SO121, SO123, SO124, SO125, SO129, SO130 and SO134.

2. Five documents sent to the National Security Council: SO46, SO82, SO87, SO88 and SO89.

3. One document sent to the Department of Defense: SO46.

4. Three documents sent to the Department of Agriculture: S100, S101 and 102.

Attachment 2

Freedom of Information (FOIA) Determinations

R = Release

P = Partial Release

D = Denied in Full

Exemptions and Citations:

- 5 USC 522 (b) (1) national security
- (b) (2) personnel rules and practices of agency
- (b) (3) specific statutes: visas, CIA, Export Control, etc.
- (b) (4) commercial and financial privileged information
- (b) (5) formulation of policy process, attorney work product
- (b) (6) personal privacy
- (b) (7) law enforcement records or information

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10 August 2001

Ms. Margaret P. Grafeld
Director, Office of IRM Programs and Services, SA-2
5th Floor
U.S. Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20522-6001

Re: Request under the FOIA, in reply refer to Archive # 20011016DOS246

Dear Ms. Grafeld:

Pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), I hereby request disclosure of the following documents:

Copies of transcripts of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's telephone conversations as recently transferred by Mr. Kissinger to the Department (see State Department press release, 9 August 2001).

I ask that that the Department provide an expedited review of this material in light of 1) the enormous public interest in it, and 2) the likely relevance of some of the material to the recent special Chile declassification review as well as the current special review of documents relating to U.S.-Argentina relations. In addition, if these documents had been in the Department's possession they would have already been declassified and released under the twenty-five year provisions of E.O. 12958.

If you regard any of these documents as potentially exempt from the FOIA's disclosure requirements, I request that you nonetheless exercise your discretion to disclose them. As the FOIA requires, please release all reasonably segregable nonexempt portions of documents. To permit me to reach an intelligent and informed decision whether or not to file an administrative appeal of any denied material, please describe any withheld records (or portions thereof) and explain the basis for your exemption claims.

As you know, the National Security Archive qualifies for waiver of search and review fees as a representative of the news media. This request is made as part of a scholarly and news research project and not for commercial use. For details on the Archive's research and publication activities, please see our Web site at the address above. Please notify me before incurring photocopying costs over \$100. —

To expedite the release of the requested documents, please disclose them on an interim basis as they become available to you, without waiting until all the documents have been processed. If you have any questions regarding the identity of the records, their location, the scope of the request or any other matters, please call me at (202) 994-7000. I look forward to receiving your response within the twenty-day statutory time period.

Sincerely Yours,
William Burr
William Burr

UNCLASSIFIED

S08 *

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Ambassador Dobrynin
10/8/73; 9:54 a.m.

D: Hello.

K: Anatol!

D: Hello, Henry. I just received an oral message -- a very short one, but I think it is fairly urgent. An oral message from Brezhnev to the President and he asked me to tell you personally about it. The message is very short and I will just read it. "We have contacted the leaders of the Arab states on the question of of ceasefire. We hope to get a reply shortly. We feel that we should act in cooperation with you, being guided by the broad interests of maintaining peace and developing the Soviet-American relations. We hope that President Nixon will act likewise."

K: I can answer that for you right away because I have just come from the President. This reflects our spirit and we will also -- we are eager to cooperate in bringing peace. I was going to call you. Just for your guidance -- with reference to the discussions we have had, we were not going to put in a resolution at the Security Council this afternoon.

D: Not going to?

K: No, we are just going to have a general discussion. But we would appreciate it since we are doing that, that you don't confront us with one without discussion.

D: I don't know -- I have a telegram from -- which will sent to our Ambassador to the delegation to the United Nations -- with instructions -- I don't know yet.

K: Will you let me know what you are going to do.

D: But I will right now mention to them that you are not going to put any -- you are not going to today, yes?

K: We have no intention to put one in today unless there is a drastic change.

D: Of the situation.

K: We thought that since you wouldn't agree with us on our proposal and since we wouldn't agree with you, it would be best to have a general discussion.

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Telecon
Secretary Kissinger
Ambassador Dobrynin
10/8/73; 9:54 a.m.

-2-

D: I think so. Maybe there will be some reply and then we will be in touch with you, of course. But as of now my personal feeling is that the best thing to do is a general discussion without . . .

K: Why don't you inform Moscow of this?

D: I will do that right away.

K: Also, we will take a conciliatory -- you know not a conciliatory but . . .

D: I understand -- under the circumstances.

K: We will follow your line of not attacking you.

D: I understand.

K: And I will include finally some reference of the discussion of MFN in my speech tonight.

D: I think, under the circumstances, it would be a good idea -- from our side, too.

K: I will do that. Good.

D: What about the telephone? Couldn't you extend this particular telephone. Your own people probably know.

K: I will get it done within the next few days.

D: Yeah. It's just an extension of your telephone in your office to the department. There is nothing to be done on my side, really.

K: No, no, it will be done. You can be sure.

D: Because otherwise to call by . . .

K: No, no, I understand. You can count on it.

D: Okay.

K: Bye.

D: Bye. Bye.

UNCLASSIFIED

S09

*

TELCON

Amb. Dobrynin/Secy Kissinger
11:29 a.m., October 9, 1973

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

K: Anatol.

D: Oh, hello, Henry.

K: How are you?

D: Thank you very much. Are you in White House now or you already have connections with State Department?

K: No, no, I'm in the White House. Anatol, I just got a message from Amman.

D: Yes, saying what? What's happening there?

K: Well, saying that your Charge -- Let me read it to you.

D: Okay.

K: "The Soviet Charge asked to see King and was received this morning. Charge said Soviets fully support Arabs in conflict with Israel. He said Soviet Union thought all Arab States should enter battle now."

D: Soviet, what?

K: "Soviet Union thought all Arab . . ."

D: Soviet Union?

K: Yes.

D: Thought or fought?

K: Recommending to the King.

D: Un-huh.

K: "King considers this a Soviet request for him to send his army into action."

D: We asked King to go into action?

K: Yeah.

D: Unbelievable story. Was it ours . . ? I don't have any information at all. I could quite [readily accept] that we discuss with them and saying

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Amb. Dobrynin/Secy Kissinger

2

- D: (cont'd) that we _____ our support of Arab countries is nothing new. But as you said we asked King to send..... yes?
- K: That's right.
- D: I will check with Moscow right now. It was our initiative or it was --
- K: No, it was your initiative.
- D: It's an unbelievable story, I should say.
- K: You know, I'm not drawing any conclusions but we really urge you to keep people calm.
- D: No, no. May I have a second try once again? Soviet Union thought . . .
- K: "Soviet Union thought all Arab States should enter the battle now."
- D: Enter the battle?
- K: Yes.
- D: He actually mentioned to the King?
- K: Yes.
- D: Okay, I will check this with Moscow right away. It's an unbelievable story.
- K: Okay.
- D: I'm sure on this country I should know. (laughs) I think this is really unbelievable, that he asked him to do this. He may just say in general. Well, I will check with Moscow, then I will be back with you, all right?
- K: Okay, good.
- D: There is for the time being nothing new I understand.
- K: No. On my promise, we will make no move.
- D: No.
- K: Now, let me tell you something -- We're assuming when you say this and we're having this arrangement that we will not be confronted with an Egyptian move which you support.



Amb. Dobrynin/Secy Kissinger

3

- D: Well, you see the situation, I don't want really to do this in any way because I don't know what Egyptians will do and quite frankly [as a matter of fact] sometimes even Moscow doesn't know. I don't want you to [later on] tell me I am sorry you give me a solemn promise which I couldn't keep. In a sense I couldn't keep, not deliberately; we have an agreement but simply Zayat is uncontrollable. Today he refused -- Yesterday he refused to come which you mentioned when he spoke with _____. He was not intending to make a speech in Security Council but then he consented to make it. On the General Assembly again he refused to have it in the morning or to make his speech when we asked him to find out what he's going to say he was unavailable. ^{on} So this is like you say he may come with a resolution or situation/which overall the principal of support against the aggression and Malack will be forced to support. I'm speaking from this end. But Malack in a specific agreement to do something to put you in an embarrassing situation I.....
- K: You have to help us study the problem you know.
- D: I know because with the telegram going to Moscow I tell you very frankly that we will prepare to keep our part of the bargain but sometimes it could happen that U.N. will allow something that I couldn't control in Moscow.
- K: Anatol, we will keep our side of the promise.
- D: We will do the same.
- K: Move up the Israelis restraint in so far as we can.
- D: Henry, this is the impression I get that they are beginning to bomb civilialns. That's not a very good idea. I have instructions. My remarks are off. Damascus and somewhere in Cairo. It was an article that was published for the Republic of Science.
- K: We'll wait until we hear from you. OK. Bye.

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50 11 *

TELCON

Dobrynin/HAK

October 10, 1973/8:13 a.m.

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

- D: When I called you about an hour ago you were still home.
- K: An hour ago?
- D: No, half an hour. Henry, I received a message for the President and to you from the Secretary General. I have not translated it yet but I will translate from the telegram as I read it.
- K: But you'll send over the substance a little later?
- D: OK. "Acting in the spirit of mutual understanding reached with the President on this score, we during the last days were having consultations with the leaders of Egypt and Syria on the correction of ceasefire. Frankly speaking these conversations with the Arabs were difficult and prolonged but we have now the opportunity to say to the President that the Soviet Union is ready not to oppose the resolution of the Security Council in favor of ceasefire. The President of course understands that in the present situation to work in the Security Council for the resolution of ceasefire the Soviet Union could not do it but the main thing is that we will not oppose. We will not vote against. Our representative will abstain during their voting. To come to this decision was not really easy. A decisive factor was that we, took into consideration this particular case, the pro-interest of supporting this and other developments, preserving and developing all those positives which have taken place during the last years of the Soviet/American relations and in the international situation in general. We would like to draw attention President, to one more circumstance. It is necessary to limit for the first time being the decision to ceasefire and either we will broaden the resolutions with more additional conditions on this matter for instance about their creating certain kinds of conditions or withdrawing troops on a condition. This very clearly will lead to the failure(?) that would really matter. This would have the ability to act combined. We are mentioning about this only because there were some hints on this kind of decision which were heard in a speech made by the representative of the U.S. during the last Security Council meeting. If that kind of position were put forward it would put us in a very difficult situation and the Soviet representative would be sure in this circumstance to object and vote again. We hope that this will refrain from happening and the combined action of the Soviet Union and the United States will facilitate or help to establish

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this line on the Middle East and the resumption of actual efforts to reach a political settlement. This business about a revelation or perhaps allegation of your sending supplies to Israel. This was really a very important step and of course could ruin the whole national situation and we got rather hot on this matter. We are giving the whole Security Council, and we hope that they will try, a chance to act in conjunction with us.

- K: We need a few hours to consider this and we will let you know later today.
- D: D: I will wait to hear from you
- K: Wait till you hear from me but you can say it's a constructive message.
- D: OK.
- K: You will hear from me. I have to meet with the President. If you could get me the text of this sent over.
- D: Alright. It will take an hour or so.

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50 13 *

TELCON

Amb. Dobrynin/Secy Kissinger
11:45 a.m., October 10, 1973

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

K: Anatol, I just wanted to tell you the following. We are having a major domestic problem, which as you will see, even you will recognize it's major, which is coming to a head early this afternoon.

D: Yeah.

K: And so there will be decisional delay until I can get you -- But you will get your formal answer.

D: You mean it happens today or tomorrow?

K: By the end of the day I will give you an answer.

D: By the end of the day.

K: I just want you to know. You will see that this is not a delaying tactic.

D: Yeah. But what is the crisis? Could you tell me that?

K: Well, it concerns the Vice President.

D: Oh, I see.

K: So I wanted you to know that and I'll be in touch with you around 4:00 or 5:00 o'clock this afternoon.

D: 400 or 5:00.

K: Right.

D: Okay.

K: We are thinking very seriously about what you said.

D: No, I think this is really a chance for both of us.

K: No, no, I recognize it. Now, may I urge you, however, really both you and your friends, not to force us into anything prematurely.

D: But what really our friends could force you, really? I don't -- Could you really mention what our friends could force you, for example?

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TELCON

Amb. Dobrynin/Secy Kissinger

2

- K: Well, for example, give us a chance to have a meeting on the subject here.
- D: But what they could do up till 5 o'clock, nothing?
- K: I don't know what they could --
- D: Neither do I.
- K: They crossed the Suez Canal, maybe they'll cross the Hudson River.
- D: Oh, this is another story. This is another story. (laughs) Well, as for us, there will be no trouble. But as for them, well, I couldn't give a guarantee. They have a Minister here sitting so he knows better than I do. But, speaking theoretically, I do not see any way in which they could force you to do something.
- K: No, no. Well, they can't force us but we would like not to be forced into verbal battles.
- D: No, no, I understand.
- K: No, we can't be forced. You've experienced that often enough.
- D: No, no, I know. But as of now, what we are doing there will be no statement from our representative. We will not be eager at all to have another Security Council. So on this side, it's safe. On our side, you're not going to say anything which could --
- K: Well, then we will not say anything and I'll be in touch with you around 5'clock.
- D: Yeah. And we didn't tell anyone about what [we] mentioned to you
- K: And just for your information, we have not told anyone. And I repeat anyone.
- D: I understand. And Malik has the same instruction. Except he might be in contact with -- He has instruction, I am telling you off-the-record, that if this thing will come, it's settled okay. And it will come Security Council. Then he has instruction to come to Scali before the meeting and tell him how he will vote.
- K: Good. But let him not go to Scali either now. Make sure he doesn't go to Scali.



Amb. Dobrynin/Secy Kissinger

3

- D: Okay. I will mention to him specifically.
- K: Okay. Good.
- D: Because his instruction now is before he has to notify because he will make a statement against -- on a principle position about, not touching you at all, but about Israel, that kind of thing, but at the same time he will not tell him that it doesn't matter [obscure thing].
- K: Right.
- D: Okay?
- K: Right.
- D: So I will just warn him not to tell anything to Scali, as I understand you want it. Or is it better not to tell them they'll be sitting there -- I don't know, what do you think?
- K: Tell them not to go to Scali because Scali doesn't know anything about it and he's very excitable.
- D: (laughs) I understand.
- K: And we have told -- The only' people who know up to now are the President.
- D: I understand.
- K: And, as you will see very soon, the President cannot possibly address this question for a couple of hours.
- D: I understand.
- K: But what I've told you about this domestic situation, Anatol, is a sign of my great confidence in you.
- D: No, no, no. I understand. But does this coming affect in any way --
- K: It affects nothing.
- D: Nothing. I mean, from the point of view of foreign policy.
- K: In terms of foreign policy, it, if anything, strengthens our abilities.
- D: I speak in a sense of ability not a public relations because sometimes
.....

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K: In terms of our foreign policy, it either affects it not at all or strengthens it.

D: Okay.

K: But in terms of making a decision and in terms of getting time with the President, that is now very difficult until into the afternoon.

D: I understand. Okay. Well, until the end of the day.

K: And, therefore, we don't want to get anything started with a lot of other countries.

D: Yeah, I understand.

K: Good.

D: Thank you very much. I will await your call.

K: And we have emphatically not yet discussed it with the Israelis.

D: I understand.

K: Because we do not want their lobby to start working here.

D: Yeah, I think this is the wise thing.

K: Before we have a chance to

D: To make your own decision.

K: To make our own decisions on how to handle it.

D: I understand.

K: Good.

D: All right.

wgh

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TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

SO 20*

TELCON

Amb. Dobrynin - Secretary Kissinger

October 13, 1973

5:00 p.m.

K: I have just heard from the British who don't want to proceed. They were told by Sadat, one, that he did not want the resolution and two, such a resolution were put in, they would ask the Chinese to veto it. They would consider it an unfriendly act if it were put in. Leaves two possibilities. Either the Russians tricked us or.

D: It was very easy to check with us.

K: What do you mean.

D: It was clear this particular resolution. our answer again. It was very easy to be both, even two days ago. Move to the General Assembly, both abstain. d

K: Got to get somebody to put it in.

D: As it

K: Don't doubt that you would abstain. What's the sense of such maneuver if the Egyptians wouldn't accept it. At any rate, British won't introduce it and you don't want the Australians to introduce it.

D: In this connection, please wait until I receive instructions.

K: We're not going to do anything. We are now going to wash our hands of it and let nature take its course.

D: Second possibility was nature.

K: Until about an hour ago, we operated on the assumption you wanted to settle it and the airlift to the Arabs was to show your good will. we can't let war go on three days getting Israel lined up and the British.

D: Before ... Henry, how could we make that ... I have no knowledge at all.

K: You might have known what Sadat would do.

D: In this case it was easy.

K: No sense debating it.

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TELCON

Amb. Dobrynin - Secretary Kissinger

October 13, 1973

7:40 p. m.

K: I am going to see the President, wanted to check with you to see if you had an explanation yet.

D: In five or ten minutes I will get it. Could you wait.

K: Sadat informed the British that he informed your Ambassador under no circumstances would he accept such a proposal.

D: I will call you in ten minutes. Right?

K: OK.

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TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

SO 21 *

TELCON

Amb. Dobrynin - Secretary Kissinger

October 13, 1973

7:55 p. m.

D: Oral message --- First Brezhnev refers to rx discussion I had yesterday with your boss during reception

K: Told me about that.

D: Expresses great satisfaction ...about things what said the President to the Ambassador. Suro... shared his view and he would like me to tell to Dr. Kissinger he adheres exactly to the same points of view, Hope , no matter what difficulties, ...many good things done and will...to keep it.

K: Good, Hope ...going to prove that.

D: Situation in Middle East and Security Council ...for days, US and some countries with which they consulted don't come to the conclusion of immediately convocation of Security Council. We don't know exactly reason of that. Question, reply.... military situation in Middle East how it develops, it develops different, can only through last days. In one day don't have the . Don't think try to follow us ...our part. We concerned on position about cease-fire. Same time tells ...use bombardment of civilian targets in territories by Israel. Make it more difficult. Indication argued ...Arab capitals and peoples. That's why difficult to discuss on this, questions specifically... now Arabs are objecting...to accept Security Council resolution which deals only with cease fire. They insist should be accompanied simultaneous cease fire and should be another additional part of solution which had to say about, be stages withdrawals of Israeli troops from Arab territories, which was occupied in 1967. Isn't finished yet, finally consultation with Arab countries about, insist on positiondon't have text yet.

K: We have worked for three days on assumption you are now cancelling.

D: For two days might ...have been quite prepared to do, now Arabs are objecting to this. Like to decide situation on bit scale...which means will remove cause of all conflict. This will be really major decision which will have to decide thing ...

K: Well, where does this leave us? Nowhere.

D: ...now with Security Council.

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K: Now we are right back to where we were last Monday.

D: Looks so...

K:took 48 hours to make possible

D: For two days, the day before yesterday and yesterday and in the morning yesterday, I give you reply... even I was shaken up with you... you know I was shaken up... telegram from everyone don't received any for some days. Two days our position very clear, we were prepared to abstain... no other interpretation. Very firmly, don't want to have complication. For two days, then Arabs changed position. Telegram from Chomsky say check with Khrushchev, reply or not. We are complaining you don't... Really waiting until you get the British or something. For two days we are on record not not to vote at all... abstain with you. ...Arabs categorically objected.

K: In the meantime, you sent in 140 airplanes. May be why the Arabs are so tough now.

D: Not really. Security Council resolution two days ago... no connection with airlift. Holding from your side. Maybe you relied too much on British. Maybe Australiansprepared yesterday.

K: Yesterday the British talked to Sadat.... what caused delay. Sadat never would have accepted....

D: Yesterday morning ... sent telegram yesterday... I was shaken last time I talked to you. Now we really have known if it wasn't mentioned to you yesterday. Very clear Security Council yesterday morning. I know up until today Malik had instructions very clear -- abstain. Sent very strong telegram to Malik, when you have complained. Immediately called to Scall, going to abstain.

K: Point is, now objective military despite very friendly words of Khrushchev, trying to avoid collision, you have 140 airplanes. still much ... we cannot not supply our friends while you are supplying yours.

D: Well, you had made decision.

K: You waited for 5 days. Tonight Egypt launching attack in the Sinai. tomorrow when some American airplanes reach Israel

going
 Arabs are going to start yelling. We will not under any circumstances let detente be used for unilateral advantage. No illusions about that. I haveairlift for four days.way of getting political settlement. Friends have refused to participate in something took you two days to get Arabs...they change their minds. I think once we were in it with you, Arabs, if President had given the word to Brezhnev...believe at last moment on day it was supposed to be implemented say they wouldn't do it. We made agreement this summer, Arabs objected to, we went ahead with it. ...important to me you can tell Brezhnev to save itself the effort we are not going to accept the Egyptian position. Only exacerbate the situation by proposing it to us.

D: All right, fair enough.

K: ...want to accept Egyptian position, deal directly with it. I have had Egyptian position since Wednesday.

D: Did they propose this to you before or on Wednesday.

K: On Wednesday Egyptians sent us a proposal, of which they said they gave you a copy. and which is totally inconsistent with your proposal. Israel return to '67 borders, peace conference of great Powers, Palestine and Arabs, discuss only internationaland security and future of Palestine.

D: Wednesday, quite prepared to support...

K: I told the President, despite this message from Israel, I relied on your word. Quite inconsistent to what Arabs told us. I assure Arabs.....you know Egypt would agree in no sense, how you support, if Egypt wouldn't agree.

D: I understand this point of view. Change ...few days ago.

K: Fine with us and we just have to see what happens now.

D: Is completely unacceptable, two part resolution.

K: Well, what's the second part?

D: Stages, back to borders.

K: ...secure and recognized borders.

D: '67.

K: No, unacceptable, may be inin Moscow not toadd obligation not to exacerbate situation. Until this afternoon I believedthat

possibility of pressing for settlement. pressing for a cease fire. Now hasn't happened, you are pulling in unable or unwilling to produce ceasefire...are obviously on collision course no matter how many what do you think we can say to the people on Monday, had them quieted down of the weekend ... so utility of detente to both of us. You don't think we will accept a military set back in the Middle East, can't believe it.

D: Wouldn't believe it.

K: I recognize you have problems. have to... No law that says you have to send in 140 airplanes.

D: I understand, is a problem.

K: Until this minute not one American airplane has landed in Israel. Not one. My whole strategy based on reliance on you. I can tell you, in addition to whatever else is achieved, my own credibility with respect to what not exactly high at this moment. ... but not from you personally, put in ... to me yesterday afternoon, getting contrary report from Sadat than I was from you. I said I had absolute confidence never liked to us before.

D: Could you imagine the situation? You are taking position proposed to other countries. Circumstances to be changed. This is situation... exactly I should put it on really stake much while people involved have two days making new suggestions. Now we're in a situation to do it.

K: Why do we have to deal with you, that depends on Sadat, why not deal with Sadat directly.

D: Up to you and the President to decide. disastrous results. As you now changed situation we will not

K: work out this when finished able to demonstrate that special relationship. Developed would have concrete results, if you read the press conference, this was line I took.

D: I did.

K: On Monday this will be done to

D: public relations.



K: Monday you will have sent in 50-100 airplanes.

D: You are now free.....

K: Only inflame Arab leaders... victory for you. Only strategy is to make Arabs don't feel they can so three or four days from now we'll see what the situation is. many proposals like 67 borders, make the situation worse.

D: All right, send back telegram.

K: President is extremely agitated. I know you to make favorable according...

D: In my telegram, I will quote, unquote you. I can assure you... otherwise, is dangerous.

K: We had understanding to work on with basic issue in January. This has been completely disregarded now. Will not let ourselves be pressured into it. It would not be not be unhelpful. Hear something today, tomorrow, NEC meeting.... Don't have to get it today, meeting isn't till Monday

D: All right.



1. A call to the sides to immediately cease fire and all military action on the positions where the troops actually are.
2. A demand to start immediately after the ceasefire phased withdrawal of the Israeli troops from the occupied Arab territories to the line in accordance with Res. 242 of the Security Council, with completion of this withdrawal in the shortest period of time
3. A decision to start immediately and concurrently with the ceasefire appropriate consultations aimed at establishing a just and honorable peace in the Middle East.

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SO 22 [✱]

Telcon
Amb. Dobrynin/Kissinger
10/14/73 - 12:36 p.m.

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

K: Hello, Anatol.

D: Hello Henry. How are you?

K: How are you?

D: Yes.

K: I just talked to the President.

D: Yes.

K: And he wanted me for the benefit of your leadership to know two things -- to tell you two things. One, we are now engaged in an airlift as you know of equipment to Israel.

D: Is it heavy equipment or consumables?

K: It is mostly at this point consumables and we are keeping some restraints at the moment on heavy equipment. Considerable restraints on heavy equipment, and a little but very little. We are prepared to stop the airlift immediately after a cease-fire if you are prepared to stop your airlift. But if not we can first of all increase it considerably and include heavy equipment. I mean we are not going at our maximum capacity or anywhere near.

D: No, I understand. It is not that you will continue intermittently.

K: Well, if it goes on we will be forced into it sooner or later. As you know, we are already as you know under massive pressure on the phantoms. We are sending a few but not like anything what we are asked to do.

D: Yes, I understand. Yes.

K: You know those were the major items he wanted me to.....

D: At the beginning you said you begin an airlift, yes?

K: Beginning - it is in process. It is beginning now. Yes.

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- D: Well, that is a matter of information.
- K: Well, it is a matter of information _____ proposal. If you are prepared to stop your airlift after a cease-fire, we are prepared to stop ours immediately.
- D: Alright, but it is connected with the cease-fire you mentioned, yes.
- K: In connection with the cease-fire, yes.
- D: O.K. I'll pass it on right away.
- K: You know, Anatol, we all know now what is at stake because if this goes on much longer, ...
- D: Well, _____ if you had a chance to read my telegram what I sent yesterday it was exactly what I am told.
- K: No, no I....
- D: I make my own reservations of course, but it was a direct quotation everything you said. It is not only fair, but it is important for them to know the mood. At a certain point of our usual thing, I don't do direct quotations, but a summary, I make it. But yesterday I was rather in a detail of what you said because this is what I feel and...
- K: But also I give you advice. I have kept press guidance for today to an absolute minimum and we will say nothing but
- D: For press, you mean.
- K: Well, we will just say we are doing something but starting tomorrow as I have already explained to you we'll be forced to say something.
- D: Yes, I understand. I am already make it clear for tomorrow after this you might say something unless maybe there are some other things.
- K: Well, unless we know where we are going.
- D: Yes, I understand. I will telephone tomorrow.
- K: O.K., good.
- D: O.K. Tell me, do you expect _____ 4:00, for 4 hours?

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- K: I don't expect we will do anything between 4 and 8.
- D: Nothing. Yes, because I just wanted to see you -- to go and then come back.
- K: No, no.
- D: O.K.
- K: Good.
- D: Bye, bye.

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5023 [X]

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

TELCON
Secretary Kissinger
Ambassador Dobrynin

10/17/73 9:42 a.m.

K: Hello

D: How are you?

K: Okay.

D: Three things, first this is a--Mr. Brezhnev and Mr. Gromyko asked me to congratulate you heartily with the Nobel Prize.

K: Thank you, I appreciate that.

D: And they would really like to congratulate you. Second, I have instructions to tell you on a very strictly confidential basis for you and for President Nixon, I am to mention to him and you that we are now having consultations with Arab Leaders.

K: Yes, and Kosygin is in Cairo.

D: Yeh, this is exactly what they asked me to tell you. But you already know.

K: No, no we know a Soviet VIP is in Cairo, we've told the Israelis to stay away from Cairo and the Cairo airport.

D: This is Kosygin.

K: We didn't have it confirmed.

D: But they specifically asked to tell you and to the President --

K: I hope you have noticed that we have tried to keep things very quiet here.

D: No, I know. I noticed that it is on low key under the circumstances. But this is really for your information.

K: You know we cannot help if there is speculation because

D: No, no, I understand

K: Frankly, we know a Soviet VIP plane is there. And therefore a lot of people know something.

D: No, I understnad.

K: But you can be sure that we will not confirm it in any official way or leak it.

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- D: Yeh, I understand.
This is just they asked me specifically to tell --he is there in connection with this consultation and including a consult with the about formula issue proposal--
- K: Anatol, you should understand because I don't want to mislead you, the ceasefire formula--the one on Saturday, we had discussed with the Israelis--this formula, we have not yet discussed with the Israelis.
- D: About the 242?
- K: Yes.
- D: 242.
- K: Yes. But we think they will accept it, but we didn't want frankly our press to be agitated against us.
- D: Yeh, no, no.
- K: So there may be 24 hours after if you come back with something.
- D: Yes, I understand.
- K: I just -- don't want you people to be misled.
- D: Yes,
- K: You can be sure that what we said to you we will stand by.
- D: Hm huh. And the last one, Henry, here is some oral considerations by Mr. Brezhnev to the President. It is not immediate in the sense of proposals, but so to speak of our relations in really good terms, I should say in a quiet way, it is on four pages--probably--it's oral however, maybe I will send it to you--nothing really
- K: Can you send it over within the next hour.
- D: I could send it right away.
- K: Send it over, just for our records.
- D: Just for your own. And if you have some comments or other, please let me know.
- K: Okay.
- D: I could come to you anytime--or by telephone.



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- K: You know our policy as I have told you, is to try to really to the utmost to not only keep the detente going, but to strengthen it.
- D: Yeh, this is really what--this too--this oral consideration--by Brezhnev. I think it is rather helpful, just for the whole background--there is nothing immediate or specifically new, but in general how it is presented, I think you will find it interesting.
- K: Good.
- D: Okay. Nothing else for the time being, no?
- K: No, we are waiting for you.
- D: I understand. This foreign minister not yet--in your office. The foreign ministers of _____
- K: No, they are coming in at 11:30, but we don't think we should give them this formula do you?
- D: No--well it's up to you, but I don't know I doubt very much if their reaction will _____ but you may have better indications that we have, but this is my impression, because they are under the pressure from _____
- K: No, no we will wait for you before we make an open initiative.
- D: Okay. Be in touch.
- K: Bye.

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5024 *

TELECON
Dobrynin/Kissinger
October 18, 1973
8:45 p.m.

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

D. Mr. Brezhnev asked you to convince the President of the following: This is not exactly the text of the message but I'm reading... "We continue to carry on very extensive consultations with the Arab leaders. For its consideration we need a little bit more time. At the same time we - the Soviet Union, the Soviet leaders - want to think of what kind of formulation should be included in the text of the draft resolution of the Security Council. In our opinion this resolution should include the following main provisions:

1. A call to the sides to immediately cease fire and all military action on the positions where the troops actually are.
2. A demand to start immediately after the ceasefire phased withdrawal of the Israeli troops from the occupied Arab territories to the line in accordance with Res. 242 of the Security Council, with completion of this withdrawal in the shortest period of time.
3. A decision to start immediately and concurrently with the ceasefire appropriate consultations aimed at establishing a just and honorable peace in the Middle East.

This is the main point. I will repeat it. (Repeated the above three provisions).

K. Appropriate consultations with whom?

D. Our commentary involves the following conclusions. We feel that the best thing would be to have limited number of participants in these consultations. We, the Soviet Union, are prepared, if it suits you and the immediately involved participants and Israelis, for this kind of consultation on the part of the Soviet Union and the U.S.

K. Why are you so hard on your allies?

D. On what allies. We have many allies. I would like a clarification.

K. The one ally you have as a permanent member of the Security Council.

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D. For the sake of conversation, why not drop them.

K. Actually we are no more eager to have your allies there than you are. We are not much more eager to have our own allies there.

D. Let's have these conclusions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The question arises about a guarantee. If the resolution is to be adopted. I agreed together with you, if it is acceptable to both of our clients, that the U. S. and the Soviet Union in a recent forum guarantee the fulfillment of this resolution. We also are prepared to guarantee the territorial integrity, security and inviolability of the borders and the frontiers of all, including Israel, taking into consideration at the same time its right to sovereignty and independent existence. With these kind of guarantees from the U.S. and the Soviet Union we feel that hardly anybody will have a doubt about the viability of the guarantee. So Mr. Brezhnev would like to share his thoughts along those lines with the President and he would like to receive the reaction of the White House. On my own there are two basic things: the Middle East and our relationship to cement with you.

K. I understand. You will see in the message that the President will send to you at about 10:00 or 10:30 (this he has and wants to work on it personally) --which is not an answer to this--that he makes exactly the same point without going into details. Should I still send the message of the President's to you?

D. Yes, I will mention that it was received before this.

K. Because we won't have an answer in two hours. Thinking out loud without having talked to the President, the most difficult point here is point number two about immediately after ceasefire that the Israelis should withdraw to a line under Res. 242 which really isn't established yet. First let me say I realize you're making a very constructive effort....

D. Yes, I'm being very constructive.

K. Why don't we consider it later rather than debate it out now and if we have a counter-proposal we will get back to you.

D. Did you get it all down.

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K. Yes, the FBI, CIA and we all have taken it down and your KGB man too.

D. Send the President's message to me between 10 and 11, all right?

K. Yes, and on the other you will get our response before the end of tomorrow.

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5025 1*

TELCON HAK -- DOBRYNIN

October 19, 1973 11:04 a.m.

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

K: Hello Anatol.

D: Hello. I received a short message from Brezhnev to the President.
The text I will read you. OK?

K: Yes.

D: "Dear Mr. President:

The events in the Middle East become more and more dangerous. Our two powers, as we both have agreed, must do the utmost in order to keep the events from going beyond the limits, when they could take even more dangerous turn.

K: Right.

D: If they develop along this way there is a danger that harm could be done even to the immediate relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. We believe that neither you, nor we want to see it. If it is so then prompt and effective political decisions are needed. We have conviction that with due willingness our two powers can facilitate the finding of such decisions.

K: Right.

D: Since time is essential and now not only every day but every hour counts,

K: Right.

D: my colleagues and I suggest that the US Secretary of State and your closest associate Dr. Kissinger comes in an urgent manner to Moscow to conduct appropriate negotiations with him as with your authorized personal representative. It would be good if he could come tomorrow, October 20. I will appreciate your speedy reply.

Sincerely, L. Brezhnev, October 19, 1973 "

K: You are freindly, aren't you?

D: Hum?

K: That's a friendly suggestion.

D: Of course it is.

K: Well, I will have to get to the President and call you back.

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HAK Dobrynin

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D: Okay.

K: Okay, bye.

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TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Ambassador Dobrynin
10/19/73; 11:10 a.m.

D: Hello.

K: Anatol, could you send us over -- just so that I have something to show to the President.

D: Okay.

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Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Ambassador Dobrynin
10/19/73; 11:38 a.m.

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

D: Yes.

K: Anatol, I have had a preliminary talk with the President and we agree in principle to a high level contact.

D: Yes.

K: And you give me your quick reaction, why should Gromyko not come over here?

D: Because I think my reaction is because Kosygin is back from there so they would like to discuss, I guess, the three of them. Brezhnev, Kosygin and Gromyko.

K: I see.

D: This is really the idea -- not to send a telegram telling what was said by Sadat or what was said back and forth. They would like you for one day to come there and then I am sure Kosygin will everybody. This is my real impression why they are asking this one because he is fresh so to speak in what he was thinking and they could discuss with you.

K: Will you come back there with me?

D: Yes, if you don't mind I would like to go both ways.

K: With me?

D: Yes.

K: Well, as long as you sit in the front compartment.

D: (Laughter) All right. I would rather be in the tail but nevertheless.

K: Now what are we going to do about navigators and so forth?

D: There is no problem. We will give you a navigator and we will take care about this.

K: Well all right. I will call you back -- oh, what is it now, a quarter to 12:00?

D: ~~XXXXXX~~ Yeah.

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Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Ambassador Dobrynin
10/19/73; 11:38 a.m.

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K: No later than two.

D: No later than two. Okay.

K: We are very sympathetic to the proposal.

D: I think this is really important, Henry.

K: Anatol, when the Soviet Government makes such a proposal on the basis of urgency it is not a matter we take lightly.
leave

D: Yes. And tomorrow because they really feel it is urgent.

K: Well they want me to arrive -- well I can't leave now until about midnight tonight.

D: No, I understand. So you will arrive tomorrow but . . .

K: I will arrive tomorrow but -- I will arrive tomorrow night and we could talk Sunday.

D: Sunday, yes.

K: You know I would like to get a few hours sleep before your three men starting working me over.

D: (Laughter) Oh you are a beautiful fellow. Yuri saw it in Moscow.

K: One night please I think I am entitled to.

D: No, because . . .

K: My present thinking is that I leave around midnight tonight.

D: As it was last time.

K: As it was when we went on the secret trip.

D: I think it is right. So you will arrive approximately around in the evening.

K: Around 8:00 or 9:00.



Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Ambassador Dobrynin
10/19/73; 11:38 a.m.

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D: Yes and then you go to bed and fresh in the morning on Sunday -- you will be as fresh as you usually are.

K: That's right. Just tell Antanov not to offer me his diversions because I need a night's sleep.

D: Okay. He will do it afterwards.

K: Okay.

D: Then we will wait a call . . .

K: It is not yet approved.

D: No, no, I will not say anything until you finally say to me okay.

K: Okay, fine.

D: Bye

TELECON
Dobrynin/Kissinger
October 23, 1973
7:10 p.m.

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

D. What are you doing here with Voronsov?

K. The moment he is alone here there is a crisis.

D. When I left Moscow...all the members of the Politburo...
Now it looks really rather negative after your trip to Israel all
these developments.

K. We had another joint resolution this afternoon.... You agree
with the Egyptians on something.

D. The only point which I was surprised you refused to accept was
paragraph 2 about the ceasefire line.

K. What paragraph 2?

D. Of the resolution calling for them to return to the position
previously agreed upon.

K. First of all that isn't true. The extraordinary difficulty is
deciding where the line started. We didn't want to get into a hassle
about where the line had been. Finally we joined you. I had to talk
to the President.

D. It looks fine again. Were you surprised?

K. I had absolutely no knowledge of this.

D. I think nothing really.

K. Voronsov called me at 10:00 this morning. By 1:00 we had
agreed to it. That is not an undue delay.

D. What is the situation in the field?.....

K. The Israelis swear that the Egyptians attacked them first. We
have no separate information.

D. What is the situation? The fighting continues or stops?



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K. I think it stops. We have urged the Israelis in the strongest terms to stop it.

D. Did they begin to...the position as they issued on Sunday.

K. They say they would agree to it. But who knows what that position was. They will never agree.

D. Don't you know through your reconnaissance.

K. We haven't done any air reconnaissance. Lets say we do not know what the actual situation is frankly.

D. You don't know yet.

K. We have sent two urgent messages today to stop and I have had the Israeli Ambassador in here to stop.

D. Brezhnev, when I left....

K. It isn't right for Voronsev to say he had to complain to the Politburo. You can't give us a resolution and expect an answer in ten minutes. It is amazing. We....

D. It was agreed upon by you and Brezhnev that there would be a ceasefire in 12 hours.

K. Your resolution said they should return to the position at the time the ceasefire was agreed upon.... We made another not to determine whether we could agree to something that nobody could enforce. The Egyptians say one thing, the Israelis another, you don't know and we don't know.

D. He had to call again to Moscow. He agreed on the second line. Then in a few moments Sisco called.

K. He had no right to do that. I straightened that out. It wasn't easy to get a winning side to accept a ceasefire. From that point on Israel was winning and we nevertheless agreed to it.

D. We didn't make any definition in Moscow as to who was winning.

K. We made a great effort to make the agreement.

D. I am more worried about our understanding than the Arabs....



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K. We have spent all day today to get the Israelis to stop and I think they have now stopped.

D. I would like to see you tomorrow. If you don't mind.

K. I think we have the...in principal of the Israelis in our joint auspices.

D. They agreed to this one.

K. Not yet 100 percent. If we can get the prisoner thing settled they will agree to it. I had along talk with the Prime Minister. I have already sent a message to Brezhnev to that effect.

D. Do you think we should talk tomorrow. You are having a press conference tomorrow?

K. No, on Thursday. I also wanted to talk to you. There will be a few ups and downs within the next few weeks. We have settled this in a very diplomatic way....

D. This is exactly the point. All right, Henry. The most important thing is the agreement between you and Brezhnev and the whole situation in the Middle East. If we hold that firm it doesn't matter what happens, we will survive. If we drag this anchor through the winds---

K. You have known me long enough. I will not trick Brezhnev. That is the stupidist thing I could do. Even if we win this one we could never have a trusting relationship again. We cannot control everything the Israelis do. They swear that Egyptians started it.

D. The question is to stop and continue discussions politically with the Secretary General.

K. That we are prepared to do. I had a meeting with the Jewish community on the MFN issue. We are making progress now. We are going to drop Title 4 from the House bill.

D. It all?

K. Altogether. It is too complex to change overnight. They are going to work with me to work with Jackson to change his Senate bill and when it comes to the House we will change it once more and get an acceptable bill. It was by far the best meeting we have had.



D. Were my friends there.

K. Fisher, Stein and Moss were there....I am telling it to you not to ask anything of the Soviet Union but to give you a sense of the mood. I think we had a marvelous meeting this week.

D. When Brezhnev spoke to you I was next to him by telephone. But he asked me once again to come. He was pleased with the meeting.

K. Tell me one thing....I give you my word of honor I knew nothing about what happened today except....

D. Tomorrow you will call. We can go through what happened in these few days.

K. I have postponed my trip to China.

D. When are you going there?

K. At least a month. At the end of November.

D. What was the reaction of the Chinese? I think they will have more time to prepare.

K. Not very well. They know we introduced two joint resolutions. I will call you tomorrow.

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TELCON

Minister Vorontsov/Secy Kissinger

11:25 a.m., October 23, 1973

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

V: Hello.

K: Yuri.

V: Yes, Henry.

K: I just talked to the President. Two things, (1) we would really like a delay if at all possible.

V: Oh, oh, that doesn't mean that the Israelis will take some more 50 miles of territory during the delay.

K: No, no; I don't believe -- I don't know how fast they are moving --

V: I don't know either but --

K: At least an hour.

V: Well, the Security Council never meets on the dot but still maybe just to have it started at 12:00 but then the time for agreement on the Resolution and everything like that and you will have your time. But to postpone the meeting is not very good in the eyes of the Arab countries.

K: Can you see whether Malik and Scali can't get some delay?

V: Malik said he has already engaged himself on the 12 o'clock with the Arabs and with the First Chairman or President of the Security Council.

K: You can then get a delay in the vote or something?

V: But later on they can do it. Yes, I know it for sure.

K: Okay. Well, do that then. Secondly, we definitely cannot accept your phrase "withdrawn to the position where they were at the moment of the adoption of the decision on the ceasefire."

V: How are you suggesting to change it?

K: Well, we have not yet decided. I have just talked to the President. What we could consider is "where they were at the moment the ceasefire went into effect."

UNCLASSIFIED



Minister Vorontsov

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V: Went into effect. Well, okay, I just warn Moscow about this, that you'll have these changes and warn Malik. But, again, let Scali and Malik talk on this.

K: Sure.

V: Okay?

K: Good. But this is not yet definite.

V: I would rather not see definite. I would rather see it as it is in the text.

K: No, that is out of the question.

V: Out of the question.

K: That we will not accept.

V: Okay, let's work on that.

K: Good.

V: Good.

UNCLASSIFIED

SO 331*

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Minister Vorontsov
10/23/73; 9:47 a.m.

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

V: (missed first part) message from Brezhnev and reads like that and they haven't received your message yet. They crossed each other.

K: Right.

V: So it reads like that: First, President Sadat has informed us that in the morning on the 23 of October Israeli forces in violation of the decision of the Security Council renewed firing on the West Coast of the Suez Canal and are moving into the southern direction. We would like to underline that Moscow has its own reliable information which proves that this is the fact and that the Israelis apparently decided to widen their bridgehead on the West coast of the Canal. Thus Israel once again challenges the decision of the Security Council. This is absolutely unacceptable. All this looks like as a flagrant deceit on the part of the Israelis. We will express the confidence that the United States will use all the possibilities they have and its authority to bring the Israelis to order.

K: Well, you have our answer before we got your message.

V: That's right.

K: And you can be sure we are in the most urgent contact -- of course, we get the opposite claim from the Israelis.

V: Well, but . . .

K: I just want you to know we do not have independent means of checking it. I think frankly today's order of business should be to stop it whoever started it.

V: Exactly. Henry, and that's the way it goes later on in the statement. I will continue reading, okay?

K: Oh, I am sorry. I thought you were finished.

V: No, no. No, no.

K: How the hell can I win an argument if I let you finish.

V: You won this argument already but I think you will like what I will say further on. So, it goes without saying that Israeli forces in this case should be withdrawn to the positions where they stayed during the acceptance of the ceasefire decision.

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Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Minister Vorontsov
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Second, President Sadat suggests that the Soviet Union and the United States agree among themselves about measures which would insure physical parting of Egyptian and Israeli forces with the help of the observers of the United Nations.

Three, Sadat suggests in particular immediate use of the United Nations observers and first of all the personnel of the United Nations which was placed previously along side the Suez Canal and which is now in Cairo. That is our point of view, Brezhnev says, that it would be really wise to do so since the personnel of the United Nations, which is in Cairo now, need only appropriate orders and they could be immediately dispatched to the place of conflict.

K: All right.

V: Quickly we suggest that the Soviet Union and the United States urgently submit to the Security Council a draft of appropriate resolution to this effect. If the United States side agrees to that, the draft could look like that and follows the text of the draft:

K: What is it?

V: I am getting to it: The Security Council referring to its resolution 338 of October 22, 1973, (1) Confirms its decision about immediate cessation of all fire and all military activity and demands that the forces of the sides should be withdrawn to the position where they were at the moment of the adoption of the decision on ceasefire. (2) Suggest to the Secretary General of the United Nations to immediately take steps for immediate dispatch of the UN observers to supervise the observation of ceasefire between the forces of Israel and Egypt, using for that purpose first of all the personnel of the United Nations which is at present in Cairo.

K: All right.

V: Period. And the last line says that Mr. Brezhnev would like to underline to Secretary Kissinger the urgency of these matters. . .

K: Yuly, I don't have to check this with the President because I know he agrees. The only suggestion I have -- I have two suggestions.

V: Okay.

K: One, could we delay the start of the Security Council meeting until 2:00?

V: Easy.

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Minister Vorontsov
10/23/73; 9:47 a.m.

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K: So that we could get our delegates together.

V: Okay.

K: Second, I would recommend deleting from the instructions "withdraw to the line they occupied" because it will lead to endless debate. I don't think anybody gained a hell of a lot. What could they have gained in a few hours?

V: Well, obviously they have gained something. Otherwise our side wouldn't raise this question.

K: I don't know the situation and I have no basic objection to it.

V: It would be better, of course, to keep this. There will be arguments, exactly of a half a mile or something like that but politically that will be expedient of course to urge that everybody would return where they were last night.

K: Of course they will never agree on where they were last night so it doesn't make any difference.

V: Well, let them argue -- not fight at least.

K: Look, I agree and I will instruct Scali immediately. You can inform Moscow.

V: Good.

K: That we agree -- that I urge that the meeting be put off at least until 2:00. We will inform the Israelis if you will inform the Arabs.

V: Okay.

K: I will instruct Scali in this sense and we will agree to this resolution.

V: You will agree to this resolution.

K: We may have a word about "withdraw to the Line" but as long as we both understand this that is not going to be easy to enforce. I am not going to quarrel about it.

V: I think in Moscow they gave some attention to this phrase so we better keep it here.



Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
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10/23/73; 9:47 a.m.

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K: Okay. Now we are sending over to you an oral message for the General Secretary about the appropriate auspices issue.

V: Fine.

K: I think he will like. Let me get my people immediately so that we get the word.

V: Fine, Henry.

K: Send over that message.

V: I'll send the message.

K: Good.

UNCLASSIFIED

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TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

TELECOM

Amb. Dobrynin - Secretary Kissinger

October 25, 1973

2:40 p.m.

K: Anatoly?

D: Hello Henry. I would like to read to you a letter from Brezhnev to the President and then I will send you. Have it now in writing, I mean handwriting.

K: Is it going to calm me down or make me go into orbit again?

D: No, not orbit. Prefer to stay in orbit quietly. "I have received your letter in which you alleged once again the Israelis have cease firing...contradictory to the facts we have received in Moscow.Israel was bombing the city of Ismail, and fighting was continuing in the straits of _____, which has until this moment not been a scene of military action. President of Egypt, Mr. Sadat in which addressed.... We have already dispatched on October 25, Sovietwhich counted 70 persons at the Egyptian/Israeli front, of observers ofSecurity Council decision. Since you are ready now, as we understand it, now to send to Egypt a group of American observers, we agree to it jointly in this question. Soviet group of observers instructed to get into contact immediately in a businesslike operation with the US group of observers, with the American group as soon as they arrive in Egypt, and without delay and discharging their tasksIn the situation without delay. We are ready to cooperate with the American side in taking other measures which will be dictated by the situation, to insure immediateimplementation of the Security Council resolution of the 22 and 23 of October.following dispatch of observers, we in an urgent memo, will continue also other political measures and corresponding to decision of the Security Council andto the understanding in Moscow with Kissinger who conducted negotiations on your behalf, on part of US really effective steps will be taken to guarantee implementation by Israel of decisions of the Security Council about what you, Mr. President write in your letter. Respectfully, Brezhnev. That's all.

K: OK, Anatoly. Did you hear my press conference?

D: Of course, I hear Henry. I couldn't miss you. I see on television.

K: I tried to be gentle with you, so....

D: Yes, so I noticed, from yesterday 4:00 in the morning.

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K: Oh, no. At 4:00 in the morning I didn't try to be gentle. I thought you were threatening us. Don't ...I take threats very badly. We will talk about it some time.

D: No, isn't anything to discuss now...

K: Will you get it over to me at the White House, to Scowcroft?

D: To Scowcroft. OK. We will type it up and send to him. Good. In the usual way.

EYES ONLY

K: Good.

PCB:

13-2-80 return to Justice Hill
by Office of Business today.

TELECON
Dobrynin-Elsasser
October 27, 1976
12:20 p.m.

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

D. The Security Council meeting, not official but closed, ... This is substance of version... they talked but Malik considered your reply of let's have 20 or 25. Malik said why should we. We want to send 70. ... 70 is quite all right with us. On the whole the figure on the observers--he wanted 113 observers including your side--is not very much. Altogether the U.S. and Canada have more than 100-120... what he asked. Scali did not answer this and Malik is waiting for a reply.

K. Let me tell you what our problem is. If you read the President's letter, he said to the General Secretary if you accept this idea we should get together and discuss numbers. The next thing you have sent 70 people in there.

D. We mentioned that to you.

K. The point is we never had a chance to express our view that 70 was the right number. If you agreed to the idea, then our representatives would get together immediately to work out modality. We think 70 is too large.

D. Out of 2000 people there?

K. Wait a moment.

D. ...after 2000 observers. I found that, I don't recall exactly. More than 100 of yours and we haven't a single Russian there. We went 70 to make a voice. You already have more than us. Just to make a point that you are tough. What are you trying to do with that point?

K. Let's not go in one week from cooperation to proving how tough we are.

D. What is your point? What are you asking now? To scale down 70 to 20 or you do not accept? We don't see any harm because you have a lot of people. You could match it. What is the difference, but that it should be the figures you gave us? What is the logic?

K. How about having 51, you have 23 and we have 25. You are stronger.

D. If you like, we can have 70 and you can send Scali and Somebody else. We don't mind.



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K. Let me...

D. Now, I think it is rather... argument about 70.

K. The problem now is the number.

D. ...then Scall proposed 20 instead of 70.

K. I will call you back in an hour.

UNCLASSIFIED

50 44 *

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

TELECON
Debrynin/Elsinger
October 27, 1973
11:24 a.m.

D. Thank you. Scowcroft sent me a copy of what you sent. I received what we sent to you just after your talk with me. By the way, in your letter which you sent to Brezhnev in answer you quoted sentences in his letter of....you remember.

K. Yes.

D. Perhaps when I dictated to you it was my sound but a little bit different. I don't think it makes that big of difference. It was not adhere. I said act here without delay.

K. That makes a big difference.

D. I don't think so.

K. Adhere means we have to agree with what you said. While to act here leaves it open to joint action.

D. You will say that you acted pro _____. This adhere speaks about a Security Council resolution. So, in any case---

K. We had the impression that you were planning a military move. We did not invent this. Someday soon we have to discuss this. We had no reason to meet until 4:00 in the morning.

D. This is the point. On this, I think, one thing was really a big blunder on your side, maybe it was deliberate. For six hours you are just telling us every hour to wait, there will be a reply. I am sure if you had just mentioned to me that the President feels it was necessary to make an alert...blow up our relations. We don't want to do it, please send an urgent message to the Chairman. We will be forced to do it if we must. I am sure it would have received a reply that nothing....

K. That was a blunder.

D. Seven hours you were telling us and then we receive a letter that didn't say a word about the alert. It was widely publicized.

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K. Whether you ever believe it or not it is not important now. I am telling you it was not...we were convinced you were planning something unilateral. We were as outrated. We thought the tone in that letter....

D. You were pretty sure we would do it. If you were so sure, you could have waited one hour to get some additional information from Brezhnev. But you didn't want to have it.

K. That isn't true. I was very tough. Don't pressure us. I sent you two or three messages to please don't do anything unilateral.

D. Exactly.

K. You could have said what makes you think we will do anything unilateral. We have no intention of taking action.

D. What you said was to wait for a reply. I sent four telegrams to Moscow--this was a unique situation--to wait for a reply from the President. What did they receive? This is not....Someday in Moscow...much more easy to discuss.

K. We very truly thought you were threatening us out of the....

D. Exactly, you have it with us. Wait for the reply. By the way nothing was said. Then you are trying to make it look like it was a Cuban or Hanoi crisis.

K. Don't remind me of that. It was not well done.

D. It was done badly. It was unbelievable. He won't believe he compared it....More things are involved for both sides. There is no need to discuss this. What was done was done. We will now have to look forward. This message is oral to the President and to you in connection with Soviet/American observers. I was instructed to tell you in a written message...that the Secretary General would like to say that we...substance of yesterday's message from...about Soviet/American observers.

K. I know of one. You sent me on discussions.

D. We also...from the promise that the Soviet and American observers...will ask as a contingent of the observer force of the UN. We want to stress that we consider it very important that the American observers will start the dispatch of their forces, having in mind that it should give the USSR and US the possibility of getting authentic information.



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We expect that the US on its part will also take necessary steps before the UN...The American said that...to Egypt front about of... and the President Nixon in his letter...that a number of the American officers should be there to oversee the ceasefire. On the same day we informed the President of the dispatch of 70 Soviet observers to...and sent them immediately to the line. It would mean that this understanding reached with us would be broken. We would hope that....

K. Don't you think the President answered it yesterday. We are prepared to send observers as soon as the Secretary General requests them and we have told him he should request them.

D. You should mention it to him again. He said that Scali...

K. I will get in touch with Scali immediately.

D. Waldheim is under the impression...

K. I thought they were talking about some number yesterday. Let me call Scali.

D. Send out U.S. observers and I will....

K. I will call you back within an hour. Why don't we get together on Monday and review just what went wrong.

D. What time would you like?

K. How about lunch.

D. I will try. Fulbright would like to have me for lunch. Maybe I could switch it on Tuesday.

K. I also have a lunch. It was either a deliberate...of thinking by you and of thinking by us or it was a horrible misunderstanding. I can assure you from our side it was not deliberate....

D. I will ask Fulbright to postpone Monday.

K. Too much is at stake for us to be angry with each other. Let's not have it later. As a friend---

D. For two days I was mad. I know that anger in Moscow is still very high.



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K. As a friend, one thing about yesterday evening that can only be explained in terms of emotional stress over a domestic situation.

D. I understand.

K. This was not well chosen and not deliberate. General Haig called you immediately.

D. I know.

K. We are in a difficult period between the two of us now. If you had no intention of acting unilaterally our letter was a mistake. I should have warned you but I was outraged.

D. ...I simply asked you if you could tell me 15 hours. That is all right with me. You really think that I was pressing you to get an answer. I simply asked you the usual question--when I could expect an answer, sometime today, sometime tomorrow. You immediately qualified that as a pressure. That I usually do, did before, and will again.

K. O'k. Lunch at Monday at 1:00.

D. At State?

K. Yes, better food here.

UNCLASSIFIED

50 45 *

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

TELCON
October 29, 1973/9:20 a.m.
Dobrynin/HAK

K: Hello.

D: Hello Henry.

K: Anatol, I'm on the way to the House Foreign Affairs Committee..

D: Congratulations. What are they going to do with you?

K: They're going to confirm me again.

D: They have not given it up? Henry, about 1:00 today so it's settled.

K: Fine.

D: The second thing I would like to ask you the following question.

K: But I frankly don't think that Fulbright knows about it yet because he asked me yesterday for advise on what he should say to you.

D: He knows.

K: OK fine.

D: He knows because we mentioned to him that we are going to switch it. Yesterday I spoke with him. His wife called my wife so that was a confirmation again so he knows that there is really no problem. The question now what is really Henry. I received a message and I would like your assistance in this. Message from Brezhnev to President and Brezhnev asked me to deliver it personally to the President. I feel its rather important in general in the sense it was my impression yesterday there was a meeting rather important in Moscow and they would like so to speak to know his opinion right away about our relations which they feel are rather _____ now. And a rather a crisis of confidence which is more or less on the level of the Brezhnev and President. So as you know its very unpleasant talk for me because I spent so much time and energy to on the contrary to keep it up not down so I think it may be useful really for me to deliver the message. There are some contrary _____ but they are not important enough.

K: Can I see that message first. I think it will be helpful to both of us.

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D: OK. When I come I could talk to you.

K: You leave the message and I will then arrange a meeting late today or first thing in the morning.

D: Could you make it today Henry.

K: I will make it today.

D: This will be better.

K: I will make it today.

D: This is the point you see. When you mention to me then I will tell you. OK.

K: What do you mean when I mention to you.

D: When you are expecting to try to arrange it today. Yes.

K: Right. We'll discuss it at lunch. I'll do it late today.

D: Let's aim it on the second part or I will bring it to the lunch.

K: Bring it to the lunch and we'll have it about 4 or 5 oclock today.

D: OK.

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5047 *

TELCON
Dobrynin/HAK
October 30, 1973/10:27 a.m.

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

D: Hello.

K: Hello Anatol.

D: Henry.

K: How are you?

D: Fine.

K: I understand you are agitating against us at the Concert.

D: I left in the second act.

K: Was that in protest. Well, listen, I'm having Zeigler ~~xxxx~~ say something at 11:00 about that fleet movement.

D: 11:00. I think that is fine because otherwise it goes on more and more.

K: No, he's saying it. He will say that it is a routine thing that is unrelated to any of this. On the MFN, what you have to understand, I can't explain all these maneuvers. Our basic intention is to get it taken out of the House bill.

D: Yes.

K: We have the biggest gap between the House and the Senate bill but it has nothing to do with the Middle East. I just want you to understand that.

D: I understand. But it is my understanding that the President said to the leaders of the Congress on last week that he is going to veto the whole bill, is that correct?

K: That is correct. Now if they include restrictions on credit to the Soviet Union, we'll veto the whole bill. Now just a minute. The President suggests if you don't mind, if you and I would go up to Camp David about 5:30.

D: From here yes.

K: Yes and then we will have a talk with him there. He has a meeting tonight but you and I can have dinner up there and then come back later tonight.

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D: OK but when will he be there.

K: From 6:00 to 7:00 - 7:30. You'll have a good talk with him then.

D: He'll be there too.

K: Yes.

D: I didn't understand.

K: He will be there but he has something to do afterwards.

D: That's alright with me.

K: So the three of us have a relaxed hour together and then you and I have dinner or if you want to come back right away it's up to you.

D: No, I would like to have dinner but come back. Alright.

K: Yes. Do you want to see a movie up there or....

D: No Henry. I will just have dinner and afterwards it will be 9 or 10 is alright with me.

K: We'll come back around 10.

D: OK.

K: You and I just have another talk up there. And we will announce that you are going up to Camp David just to calm the atmosphere a little bit.

D: OK.

K: Do you object.

D: No, what are you going to say?

K: We are going to say you are coming up there to receive an ultimatum and you will be kept as a hostage.

D: If you like.

K: No, what we'll say is the 3 of us will have a general review of the situation.

D: Ok. No problem. 5:30 where should I be?

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K: We'll call you or maybe I'll come by and pick you up.

D: OK. Thank you very much.

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50 48 *

TELCON
Amb. Dobrynin
Secretary Kissinger
1:35 p.m. 11/1/73

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

D: Hello?

K: Anatol.

D: Oh hell, Henry. Good afternoon. This is I received a telegram from-- in connection with we discussed with the President and _____--you remember the message of Brezhnev about this same thing--those people who represent our two and them--

K: Yeh, but we haven't really agreed to it yet.

D: No, no, no. I know. They are answering me to tell you on your remark. And you have to report back to the President and then you ask this final answer.

K: Right.

D: So the question really is to tell you they are positively looking to ideas which you expressed aloud that those people who could be appointed by both of our governments--Soviet Union and the United States to look about it--the ceasefire agreement on Israeli-Egypt front were at the same time represented their _____ of both governments during the negotiations on Middle East settlement in accordance with agreement which

K: One minute, Anatol. There must be a misunderstanding--we have never agreed to foreign special representatives to supervise the ceasefire--it is a UN responsibility.

D: You say that they may come there.

K: I said that we are prepared to appoint the people who would provide the auspices and who perhaps in the performance of their duties could do some traveling, but not for the ceasefire--but for the auspices.

D: No for the auspices we appoint a force which is nothing new--

UNCLASSIFIED



Page 2

- K: But the people who are providing the auspices can also do some traveling.
- D: Yeh, I understand, but you remember--
- K: We have not agreed to a ceasefire--to separate US-USSR ceasefire supervision Anatol.
- D: But it was proposed you were saying that those people could come there --it was this way. We proposed--I'm just trying to recall how it was happened. This proposal would the people be sent there--and you said okay then they go there for a very brief time but then better to have the people then--or maybe it was a good idea you could have then to be represented on the auspices--under the auspices for that settlement. So it was in this way it presented in a proposal and so on.
- K: Right.
- D: So it is not exactly that you proposed to have auspices--it was to make a proposal on this to send them there and you said it could be developed in a different place. So I could make a reservation from what you said that you want not--
- K: So far--Israel--I doubt whether Israel will agree to it, but I have presented it to them.
- D: Yeh. That was in connection with your thinking--and as for our possible you remember ----American representative to Tel Aviv--this question could be considered originally when it will be the response of ----- So what will it now be for you really for you to report to the President and when he okays, will be ready immediately or not immediately--we will be ready to discuss in more concrete terms the practical sides of all this--
- K: Okay.
- D: I don't know how you--I am sure you will discuss problems with Israelis--but for my own information--could you tell something to us tomorrow let us say?
- K: Yes. I hope to get you an answer tomorrow. Assuming we can get the Israelis to agree--one of the maddening things of this situation is that everyday we are being asked five more things we have to get them to agree to.



Page 3

- D: No, is this--for the last days we haven't said anything.
- K: No, no you've been more restrained than your Egyptian allies.
- D: Egyptians are you know--but on this it really matters that discuss with the President, so we would really like to have a reply.
- K: We will reply tomorrow.
- D: Okay, but take into consideration this particular answer which you give me right now.
- K: Exactly. We'll take it very seriously.
- D: And then second, this is from Gromyko saying once again about the composition of this United Nations Force on the Middle East. He is just asking me to tell you--to emphasize once again the importance adopted by the Security Council Resolution principle where fair geographic distribution. Because this described in the telegram saying he really could not give any good---for Waldheim. Waldheim is doing everything what he is told by Scali and of course we are going to press on Scali from now on but they hope that really he will understand the Security Council.
- K: Well, I understand we now settled the two-observer question.
- D: That is my impression, yes. But now it is about the troops and we are feeling that about Poland, Czechs and Bulgaria.
- K: You want all three of them?
- D: That was proposed, I don't know all of them or one of them. It's not my business, because I have my own things, but I know Waldheim said
- K: But the principle we have tried to follow is that it should be composed of countries that are--have diplomatic relations with both sides.
- D: And this is--that you couldn't give up any man from Africa because nobody else is left except South Africa and we couldn't go along those lines really, to be strictly observers, after all its Security Council decision. So I understand your point because they told you so.



Page 4

- K: It's not just what Israelis have told us, but there is a certain elemental fairness to have an emergency force which is supposed to operate between the two sides. But--which is composed to a considerable extent of countries that have broken relations with one of the sides and therefore cannot be--cannot presume to be impartial.
- D: Yeh. It is clear, but at the same time it could be done if just accepting what they are telling really--
- K: If you had had my talks with the Prime Minister of Israel, you wouldn't suffer from the illusion that we are doing everything they are telling us.
- D: No, no.
- K: They are accusing of betraying them--
- D: I don't know what you are telling but -----the pressure ^{on} you is very clear. I am sure she could do it along those lines. Public pressure. Really Henry Gromyko asked me to have you look into this matter and --
- K: I will look into it.
- D: What kind of answer I have to give Gromkyo because now he is pressing me on this
- K: I'll have to talk to Scali--I'll call you later this afternoon.
- D: Today.
- K: Before the end of the day-
- D: You report to me huh?
- K: Yes.
- D: Good, thank you very much.

UNCLASSIFIED
TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

5055

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TELCON

Amb. Dobrynin - Secretary Kissinger

November 27, 1973

4:55 p.m.

D: How are you, after having briefed all the people in Congress?

K: Anatoly, I'm going to get a bipartisan foreign policy. If it kills me.

D: My impression is you have already got one, after your press conference, your meetings with Fulbright, etc.

K: I think we're getting them under control.

D: I think so. How are things going? I have telegram in connection with yesterday's complaint. I have full text of conversation between your Ambassador and our Ambassador.

K: Oh, good. I understand that they submitted the letter to Fawzi today.

D: Good idea.

K: Fawzi made a few objections.

D: I have not yet the telegram.

K: The Egyptians don't want us to be co-chairmen, just participate. But let's wait until you get instructions and then we'll settle it, OK?

D: OK.

K: They want the auspices to be under the Secretary General.

D: They want the Secretary General, I never heard this kind of ideas. We discussed auspices, not participants.

K: I think we should insist on the auspices, but not on the co-chairmen.

D: The auspices, never objected to this one to my knowledge.

K: I think our European friends may be in on this one.

D: I'll say I discussed with you along those lines, auspices in Moscow, then the co-chairmen doesn't really matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

2.
Lebrynki/Moskinger
November 27
4:55 p.m.

K: I don't care about the co-chairmen, really. I don't know if Waldheim is bright enough to be chairman of anything.

D: I don't know if he is really going to be chairman, otherwise we're in trouble.

K: We would like to nominate Stoessel as Ambassador. We haven't asked for a formal agreement. Could you get approval?

D: Am I to check in an official way, or....?

K: Officially, yes. We are asking for an agreement for him.

D: Agreement for him. Fine. I will do it right away.

K: If its not a problem.

D: No, no, no problem. When I get a reply we will follow regular procedures as usual.

K: Secondly, Anatoly, you remember we have an understanding about release of prisoners.

D: What prisoners?

K: Israelis that the Arabs hold.

D: In moscow when you were there.

K: The Syrians haven't even given a list and I'm afraid this is going to cause complications if they haven't at least given a list of prisoners

D: I understand the problem.

K: If you could do something we would appreciate it.

D: I will check with Moscow and then let you know. I have no information on that subject from Moscow. I will check with them on what is valid information. I'll say I understand it would be helpful to do something along those lines.

K: Thank you.

D: I want to talk with you a little bit about our Ambassadors. I have full text of our ambassador...., impression simple ... that they are ...

3.
 LeMayn/Altsinger
 November 27
 4:55 p.m.

sent on to me what he said without correcting it or anything, according to this he said, it was his impression the Egyptian side is not satisfied at all by fulfillment of Israelis of agreement, by point 2, he said his impression was that the Egyptian side is not satisfied.

K: Well, that's all right.

D: He mentioned in the telegram the Egyptians complained to him several times to the Ambassador, and his own impression was they are complaining. This would create obstacles....

K: One other thing, lately. The Israelis keep telling us that there is extremely high readiness of Egyptian forces.

D: This could be. They make public.

K: No, no. We are telling the Israelis if there is any attack by Israel we will have to oppose them. We hope you will use your influence with The Egyptians to calm them down. We have told our Ambassador to tell the Egyptians.

K: No chance to discuss it yet.

D: No, because ~~XXXXX~~ Fahmi isn't back.

K: They mentioned to us too in the sense they are afraid of some tricks by the Israelis and telling they should be prepared, publically said this. not just to us, from time to time tell us about things, but nothing in addition to my knowledge to what was said publicly. I will notify Moscow so they know Is there any change in the elections. Are the Israelis going to change the elections?

K: If the Israelis change the elections it will not affect our determination to proceed. If the election is not until the 31 then we should not put in substantive matters before then, but if they delay by three months then we will go into substance right away.

D: If we must wait so to speak 3 months, it will take a lot of....

K: We will not take that much time. Only delay which is acceptable is the 31st.

D: This is understandable. We do understand that in Moscow.

4.

Dobrynin/Missinger

November 27, 1973

4:55 p.m.

K: Exactly, I think you and we are on a good course.

D: That is my impression too.

K: Both the President and I said so very strongly to the leaders this morning. We talked about Soviet-American detente and how it has proved itself in a crisis.

D: I think it is true and second it is a good thing to do. The summitry, the more open atmosphere will open broad horizons before us.

K: Right.

UNCLASSIFIED

5064 *

TELCON

Amb. Dobrynin/Secy Kissinger

1:14 p.m., December 24, 1973

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

K: Hello, Anatol.

D: Oh, hello, Henry, how are you?

K: Okay.

D: How's about your cold? I was told that you are, I mean, in very bad shape. It was very bad cold. Is it so?

K: Yeah, I was really in bad shape. I'm getting better though.

D: Now it's better. I really would like just to say "Merry Christmas and a very guzuntite" (?) so to speak. The very best, I should say. Henry, do you intend to go -- to the place, you remember . .

K: Acapulco?

D: Yeah.

K: I haven't decided yet.

D: Because, I speak very privately, on this basis, I received a telegram from Brezhnev. He asked me or just to notify to come in the first [decade] of January. There will be a meeting in Moscow of top people around to look at of 1974 so he asked me to be in the first [decade]. I refuse it yesterday. At the same time in this connection, I didn't know whether you will be here. If you will be here, I will definitely stay here and no questions. If you go, then maybe I will drop in for couple of days there if I will have a chance to speak with you in a very general, informal way.

K: Absolutely. Now I'm not sure -- How long will you be in Acapulco?

D: If I should be there for a couple of days, I ^{should} be back on the 2nd.

K: Oh, I wouldn't go before the 29th if I went.

D: Oh, not before 29th?

K: No.

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Amb. Dobrynin/Secy Kissinger

2

- D: Oh, I see.
- K: I will probably be here next week and go a week later.
- D: So you will spend New Year here?
- K: Probably.
- D: Uh-huh. And so you will go there only in the beginning of next year, yeah?
- K: Probably, yes.
- D: Because if you are not going there, I will not go too. I mean, now. So you decided not to go, I mean, this part of it's clear, yeah?
- K: It's more or less clear, yes.
- D: When it will be clearer for you, more than less?
- K: Well, it's practically clear.
- D: It's practically clear?
- K: Yes.
- D: Because if you will ^{be here,} / then I will definitely stay here. If you will go, you will go in the very beginning, yeah?
- K: Right.
- D: About this varies, depends on when you will be, but because after the New Year, I don't know exactly the time, but he said in the first ten days he will send me telegram precise date about the meeting so I will be there. But I think for this timing, 2 or 3 days before New Year, I will drop this idea and stay here just to be in touch with you in case, okay?
- K: Okay. I've just talked to the President. He can see you Wednesday morning around 10 o'clock.
- D: That's quite all right.
- K: If that's convenient.



Amb. Dobrynin/Secy Kissinger

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- D: If it's convenient to him, it's quite all right.
- K: Now if he goes to Key Biscayne, which he may do, in that case, he may want to see you tomorrow.
- D: It's fine with me. Any time he -- because this is just 15 minutes, no more really.
- K: Yeah. And it will be just the three of us, you, he and I.
- D: Okay.
- K: Unless you have a message that's critical of me.
- D: Huh?
- K: Unless you have something you want to deliver that's critical of me.
- D: (laughter) No, nothing. Only high esteem, Henry.
- K: Well, I worked together very happily with Gromyko. It was really very good.
- D: Yeah. I received from him a message and he was in the same mood. I am receive a copy of what he send to Brezhnev.
- K: No, he was really very good. And he tried to be cooperative. You know, it was harder for him, given your relations with Israel, than for me.
- D: Yes. I haven't received yet a report of how his talks with ...
- K: It went quite well.
- D: Quite well, huh?
- K: From what I hear from both sides.
- D: Yeah. So I hope it will be -- it's rather good move, to begin really talking and then a little bit more.
- K: Exactly.
- D: It will help in many ways.
- K: Exactly.

Amb. Dobrynin/Secy Kissinger

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D:

K: No, I think we've made a good start.

D: Yeah, I think it's good. And, of course, you played a major role.
(laughter)

K: Well, I think the spirit was set on my trip to Moscow and despite a temporary interruption we are back on course.

D: Well, I think this is true. There was no question, he has not yet send me about date. Was it fixed or not?

K: Yes, he mentioned it. We set around February 10th, between the 5th and 10th.

D: Because he said somewhere in February but he didn't mention any date.

K: I didn't give the exact date. I said I would let you know but it will be between the 5th and 10th of February.

D: That's fine. I think this is very convenient date.

K: I had proposed that you and I might have lunch on Wednesday, is that possible?

D: Of course. I am looking forward, Henry.

K: Good.

D: So on Wednesday, we will have 1 o'clock in State Department.

K: Right.

D: As to the President's, either tomorrow or day after tomorrow?

K: That's right.

D: You will let me know when, today or ?

K: Well, if you don't hear from me, it's 10 o'clock on Wednesday.

D: So it will be 10 o'clock - -

K: Or I might call you tomorrow morning or were you going away?



Amb. Dobrynin/Secy Kissinger

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D: No, I am staying here. I prefer to have a quiet Christmas at home.
(laughter)

K: Right.

D: With Nina (?) and Kritrina (sp?). I have the girls to stay quietly.

K: Good.

D: Okay?

K: Bye.

D: Thank you very much, Henry. Bye, bye.

UNCLASSIFIED

5069 *

TELCON
Ambassador Dobrynin/HAK
January 21, 1974/12:11 p.m.

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

K: Anatol

D: How are you? Welcome back. Well, well...

K: The Middle East. We'll gladly let you handle everything from now on.

D: (laughter) Well, You arrived today in the morning but because I have a telegram from Minister, today, that's why I decided to bother you.

K: Not at all.

D: The question is about he asked me to ask you about his proposal (Brezhnev) about meeting with him, Mr. Gromyko and you in Geneva 7th - 8th of February. This could wait until tomorrow but I haven't.....

K: I haven't had a chance to talk to the President about it in detail. I think it is going to be technically very tough for me because we have that energy conference and I wanted to take a vacation that week.

D: Is that already an answer or...

K: Give me until tonight. It's almost certainly going to be that it's not a good idea.

D: I understand. I don't want to specifically press you this evening but if you could give me more...an answer really.

K: It looks as if this will be the answer.

D: But should I pass that on now or...

K: Can you wait until tonight?

D: But today yes.

K: Today. I just want to talk to the President once more about it.

D: OK Henry.

K: And then you and I. I have a meeting with Congressional leaders all morning. But I want you to know that the President said to these leaders and I said to these leaders that we maintain the position of joint work with the Soviet Union in that area. That the Soviet Union has vital interests and this is our position and we said that to all of these leaders.

UNCLASSIFIED



- 2 -

D: I understand. Tell me, maybe we will have a chance to meet with you tomorrow.

K: Yes, lets aim for that.

D: Which ever is more suitable for you.

K: When is the swearing in of?

D: It's 4:00.

K: Why don't we get together at 4:30.

D: After the swearing in. I think it will be the most proper time. But today please give me this final confirmation by the end of the day.

K: I will do it Anatol.

D: Best wishes once again. Bye.

TELCON

Secretary Kissinger - Amb. Dobrynin

January 29, 1974

3:50 p.m.

FB: _____

K: Its a new wiretap devise that translates immediately into English.

D: That's why you are in trouble. You can voluntarily.....

K: What do you want?

D: Did you call me just now.

K: Why should I call the Russian Ambassador?


D: Well anyway I will take the opportunity to make two points. First, you remember I mentioned to you about Congress. I received from Moscow today an invitation from our government to discuss in the future (at least in the next year or two), to be in communication with Congress, to send a delegation in general for discussions, a committee with Albert, Carl Albert, for instance, in this connection.

K: Very good. I will strongly support it.

D: I am going to visit them tomorrow but I heard from Moscow that I have to advise you about doing this. Second. Gromyko will be here on Sunday evening. He will leave on Tuesday. In any case all negotiations, discussions will go on on Monday.

K: That's right. You want to have dinner on Monday night?

D: I think that is a good idea, Henry. If you will organize it.



B6

D: You're probably right. Monday night.

K: And I'll give you the time for the President.



1210 _____

2.

D: Good.

K: I'll see you Friday at the State Department.

D: 8:00 o'clock?

K: 8:00 o'clock. Good.

EYES ONLY

FOR: *Mr. Starnes*

Please return to Tachar 101
by Close of Business to Mr.

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

S074 *

TELECON

Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger
April 23, 1974

D: I received a telegram from Gromyko. He asked me to clear with you a sub-communicue about his and your meeting in Geneva. He proposed to publish this short announcement. A meeting between Gromyko and Kissinger. An agreement has been ~~reached~~ reached that Gromyko, a member of the Politburo and USSR Minister for Foreign Relations and Dr. Kissinger, U.S. Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs will meet in Geneva on April 28 and 29. During the meeting an exchange of opinions will be continued on a number of issues in connection with the forthcoming visit of President Nixon to the Soviet Union.

K: Right.

D: That's all.

K: You don't want to mention the Middle East?

D: If you like.

K: No, it's up to you.

D: No, he proposes _____ because it implies ~~that~~ it's included in the Middle East after you may make, just put in general.

K: No, I accept this.

D: ~~OK~~ OK?

K: Good. What time should ^{we} ~~be~~ publish it?

D: 25th or 26th, which is more convenience for you. 10:00 AM Washington time. 25th is Thursday, 26th, Friday.

K: Let's do it on Thursday.

D: Thursday, 10:00 AM Washington time.

K: For us noon is a little better.

D: Noon better. Then it will be 12:00. Our time it will be 7:00.

K: Yes.

D: OK, I think it could be done, really. At noon, Washington time on the 25th.

K: I will try to send something over to you this evening.

Dobrynin - page 2

D: OK. .

K: Right. Today or tomorrow ~~morning~~ morning, but I'll call you within the hour.

D: OK.

K: Thank you.

D: Thank you, Henry.

END

*Original page
is skewed.*

UNCLASSIFIED

5078 *

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

TELECON

Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger

June 6, 1974

6:18 PM

D: Hello?

K: Anatol.

D: Hello, Henry. I just wanted -- it's not very urgent, but maybe you will get an answer tomorrow. This is about the schedule for the President's trip to Moscow. You remember we discussed?

K: Yes.

This is the schedule that that ___ after negotiations in Moscow on the 27th and 28th. It will be Thursday and Friday. The President will spend Saturday and Sunday, it will be 29th and 30th in the Crimea. After that on July 1, it will be Monday, on his ~~way~~ way back from Crimea to Moscow, he could stay for a few hours in Volgograd. There is only one small problem, in this case the President's plane, which would accompany him as usual would fly directly from Crimea to Moscow. The airport in Volgograd is not fit for the planes of Boeing 707 type. If for the above mentioned reason, this suggestion would prove for the President's ___ unacceptable because of this Boeing 707, then it would be possible on the way back ___ from Crimea to Moscow to stop for a few hours in Minsk, it is a very good and interesting city. He wasn't there.

K: Yes, that's an ~~interesting~~ interesting idea.

D: ~~WACK~~ So, we propose this way, or we could do it this way: he will fly to Minsk not from Crimea to Moscow but at the end of the day of July 2, after the completion of negotiations in Moscow and with the final departure from Minsk on July 3, there are two ~~possibility~~ possibilities. If he chooses Minsk, then we could do it, either he will go when he will go on July 1 from.....

K: I think he will probably prefer to conclude the trip in Moscow.

D: And to go directly from Moscow to home, yes?

K: Right.

D: In this case it will be these two choices, either he will go to Volgograd but in this case Boeing 707 will stop ~~because~~ because he will use our smaller ~~planes~~ planes there.

K: Alright.

UNCLASSIFIED



Dobrynin - page 2

D: Or ~~he is not back~~ if he prefers to go to Minsk than its alright with us with Boeing he could go from Crimea to Minsk then from Minsk to Moscow and then he will depart from Moscow.

K: Let me discuss it with him and I'll let you know tomorrow.

D: This way I'm just giving you the forecast and you can tell me tomorrow what he prefers.

K: Good.

D: I read in a ticker he might fly to ___ or just speculation?

K: Nonsense. Totally out of the question.

D: In this case, we have to look about the flight over the territory there.
OK. ___ Star City, there is no problem for us, one of his days in Moscow definitely, ~~if~~ if he wishes so, we will organize this one.

K: Right.

D: No problem.

K: ~~It~~ Good, wonderful.

D: OK.

K: Thank you Anatol.

D: That's all.

K: Bye.

END

UNCLASSIFIED

5079 *

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

TELECON

A. Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger

June 8, 1974; Saturday

2:55 p.m.

D: Hello?

K: Yes, Ana...

ticker that

D: Yes, one question. I noticed on a ~~(transmit)~~ General Scowcroft goes with you too.

K: Yes.

D: Who am I supposed to contact? In the White House everything should go through Sonnenfeldt.

K: You better do it through Sonnenfeldt or through Col. Kennedy at the White House if it's very sensitive.

D: Col. Kennedy, I know him, yes. He was before? Yes?

K: Yes.

D: So we are supposed to check with him now?

K: Yes. Now Anatoli, I have two other things which I had forgotten to mention. One is, well the second I better keep for a personal conversation. It's not that time urgent. The other one is the Kiev versus Odessa. It seems to have it if we trade NY for Odessa, it really looks again as if we get the worst of the arrangement.

D: I could rather have you work then for your consideration there are some of your people there who but really, in our case, we do have people working in... this is pure organizational thing because our mission at the United Nations doesn't want to be engaged (inaudible) himself. ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ We will think of all the things we can get other (inaudible) here in the course of whether ~~they~~ calling for Department 24 hours. Because you already have people in this city. So it would be excellent if you could arrange it, but until you do it completely avoid, in this case Odessa, where you know, you could have a big wood area.

UNCLASSIFIED



-2-

K: The only other countries that I can tell that have consulates there are Bulgaria and India.

D: I think there are some others too.

K: No. Cuba and India-Cuba and Bulgaria, that's it.

D: That's good company.

K: That's a little boring than for our man.

D: Yes, well, I understand. Would you like something else? Something Else?

K: Well, would you look into it?

D: Well, let's look at one mutually. Ok?

K: Ok.

D: Have you had a chance to look at this communique yet?

K: I haven't got an answer but I will get it.

D: Then we will get back, yes?

K: I hope so.

D: Ok. Soon. We will wait it. If the other thing comes--if some urgency comes up, I will go through Kennedy to you, right?

K: Right.

D: Through him.

K: Yes.

D: Ok. Good. Thank you.

K: Good~~xxx~~ bye.

D: Bye-bye (inaudible) and good luck.

K: Thank you. Don't overdo it.

D: I hope you won't surprise us with some big agreement in the Middle East.



-3-

A: No, believe me, believe me. There's no agreement planned.

D: Because we kept telling ~~information~~ information in Egypt your plans claim the second stage of ...

K: Absolute nonsense. Believe me.

D: No?

K: Look, we are not playing games like that. There will be no agreement announced, you know. Maybe some technical cooperation or something like that. I mean nothing of any fundamental significance.

D: I mean on a technical (inadmissible)

K: Well, ~~if there is~~ even that we are not planning; but, you know, if they're looking around for something maybe some agreement on some minor technical issue. But there will be no second stage agreement; there will be nothing of that kind.

D: The reason is we heard there is something cooking.

K: There's nothing you can cook here. If there is, they're not doing it with us.

D: That's the Russian view. If you affirm me. Because we heard something that a

K: Anatoli, really, why should I lie to you on something you'll know in a week?
fair enough,

D: No, no, no. We'll wait/because I didn't ask you if the issue were you.

K: I give you the absolute assurance that ~~total~~ assurance that there will be no second stage agreement or no announcement having anything to do with the Middle East peace negotiations.

D: Would you make a communique or would the announcement, what kind of public documents, I mean.

K: Probably a communique, but no treaty, no. It will not be a, you know it may be viable, but it's not a big event.

D: I understand. It's rather difficult to expect you to do something in 2 days.



-4-

K: Impossible.

D: What you have already accomplished, so if, I prefer you not disappoint but this way I'm talking to you.

K: Look.

D: (Inaudible)

K: Anatol, you can give the absolute assurance to Gromyko that nothing of any significance of that kind will be announced.

D: I understand. I thank you.

K: Bye.

D: Ok. Bye-bye.

RND

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TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE
CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - WH

5080

*

TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger
June 21, 1974
12:05 PM

(Missed first part)

D: If you don't mind.

K: Except I have the Spanish Foreign Minister waiting. You wouldn't want to undermine my relations.

D: Very quick matter. Exactly one minute.

K: Yes.

D: It's OK ~~about~~ with us about signing new things you proposed yesterday. You remember? About fulfillment about the _____. Maybe it will be signed in Moscow. Second, Mr. Gromyko asked me urgently to come to ~~see~~ you and check. Your first party which arrived to Moscow, they say that they do not nothing about Crimea.

K: They are fools. Of course we're going to the Crimea.

D: No, they say they have only Moscow and Minsk and they say they are going to ____.

K: Oh, they are.....

D: ____ social practice is please check with

K: No.

D: And ask him to give...

K: No, they don't want to go to Yalta.

D: Well Yalta -- this is the Crimea.

K: Yes but they'd go anywhere else in the Crimea.

D: Where. Who goes to -- we discussed about Crimea about -- in Yalta there is a place where Brezhnev lived personally.

K: I see.

D: So, this is the Crimea, really.

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Dobryain - page 2

K: I take care of it.

D: He asked you to give instructions to solve this.

K: Oh, they're crazy. OK.

D: OK, because they say they no nothing....

K: Anatol, I ve got to run.

D: OK. So you will give me a call when you -- tomorrow or day after, OK.

K: You want to come over here tomorrow morning.

D: Tomorrow or day after ~~xxx~~ tomorrow, what is better for you?

K: Why don't you come here about 9:00 tomorrow morning.

D: I think this is a good idea.

K: Good.

D: 9:00 ~~at~~ⁱⁿ the morning.

K: Good. See you then.

END

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RESTRICTION CODES**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

Deed of Gift Restrictions

- A. Closed by Executive Order 13526 governing access to national security information.
- B. Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal Marker

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FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
Telcon	Telcon - S087	1	07/18/1974	P1/b1; P5; <i>MAC</i> <i>9/12/2005</i>

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For a complete list of items withdrawn from this folder, see the
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COLLECTION:

Counsel's Office, White House

SERIES:

Kavanaugh, Brett - Subject Files

FOLDER TITLE:

Kissinger, Henry FOIA (Freedom of Information Act) Request [1]

FRC ID:

9700

OA Num.:

2170

NARA Num.:

2081

FOIA IDs and Segments:

2018-0016-P

2017-0345-F

2014-0544-F

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FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
Telcon	Telcon - S088	2	07/16/1974	P1/b1; P5; MAC 7/18/2005

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