

Withdrawn/Redacted Material

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DOCUMENT NO.	FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
011	Email	RE: Rice Speech on Sept. 10 - To: John D. Gibson & Robert G. Joseph - From: Daniel Fried	2	08/16/2001	P5;
012	Draft	Remarks by Dr. Rice	10	09/11/2001	P5;
013	Email	Rostov Lecture - To: John D. Gibson - From: Matthew C. Waxman	1	08/06/2001	P5;
014	Speech	MAD About the Cold War	2	N.D.	P5;
016a	Handwritten Note	[Note] - To: John Rood - From: [Steve Hadley]	2	07/24/2001	P5;
018	Email	RE: New Draft - To: John C. Rood & Robert G. Joseph - From: John D. Gibson	1	09/07/2001	P5;

COLLECTION TITLE:

National Security Council - Media Communications and Speechwriting

SERIES:

Gibson, John - Chron Files

FOLDER TITLE:

09/11/2001, Rice - Nitze School (Cancelled) [2]

FRC ID:

34849

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Misconceptions about Missile Defense

1. States like North Korea and Iran would not dare to attack the United States, knowing that they would pay a terrible price in response. Nuclear deterrence prevented the Soviet Union from attacking the United States and our allies in the Cold War. We can continue to rely on offensive deterrence instead of missile defenses.

- The world has changed greatly since the Cold War. We no longer have the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union, but, as the President said, this is still a dangerous world, a less certain, and a less predictable one.
- We need to update our concept of deterrence to reflect the realities of the current security environment, which includes weapons of mass destruction in the hands of some of the world's least responsible states. These leaders place great value in possessing even a small number of long-range missiles.
- The leaders of these states have demonstrated a willingness to take large gambles and are acquiring weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles as their means to deter us from coming to the assistance of our friends and allies in vital regions of interest.
- These leaders may well believe that they can blackmail us -- prevent us from helping the victims of their aggression -- if they can hold even a small number of our cities or those of our friends and allies hostage to attack.
- This is not Cold War deterrence. States like North Korea and Iran are not seeking massive arsenals for a first strike. We are seeking the ability to defeat a small number of missiles to deny these countries an instrument of coercion and aggression.
- Missile defense also provides an alternative to the grim prospect of being forced to order a retaliatory strike that might kill many innocent civilians for the reckless act of an irresponsible dictator.



2. The technology for missile defense simply does not work.

- The United States has formidable engineering and scientific capabilities that are up to the task.
- In fact, we have already had several notable successes in our development programs.
- The PAC-3 system has successfully intercepted target missiles in all seven intercept tests conducted thus far.
- The last two intercept tests of the THAAD system were successful.
- Israel's Arrow missile defense system, which was developed jointly with the U.S., has had successful tests and is now being deployed.
- The first intercept test of the ground-based system for defense of the U.S. against long-range missiles was also successful.
- In this test, a warhead on a target missile launched from California was successfully destroyed by a kill vehicle launched from an atoll in the South Pacific.
- This was not a "lucky shot," or an event that occurred "by accident" as some have described it. When a target warhead and a kill vehicle that are each about the size of a chair, collide in the vastness of space about 140 miles above the earth, at closing speeds of 15,000 miles per hour after being launched over 4,300 miles apart, that is not an accident.
- Although we have had many successful tests of our missile defense systems, we have also had some failures.
- This is not unusual for development programs. Test programs are designed to uncover engineering flaws and we expect that some future tests will inevitably not succeed. But we will learn from each event.
- There were several notable failures in early tests of rockets for the U.S. space program. Yet we persevered, and

eventually landed a man on the moon. In fact, manned space flight is almost routine today.

- As the President has said, we will evaluate what works and what does not in our missile defense programs. We know that there will be failures and that some approaches won't work. But we will build on our successes.

3. Even if it could work, missile defense costs too much money.

- Bearing the cost of missile defense is a national security imperative given the growing threats we face from rogue states armed with weapons of mass destruction and seeking long-range missiles.
- The cost to inaction cannot be measured in dollars, namely vulnerability to blackmail or attack from rogue states armed with WMD and missiles.
- Like other major defense programs, such as those to develop new fighter aircraft or ships, missile defense will require significant funding. Even so, it will only represent a small fraction of the defense budget.

4. Diplomacy and arms control are more effective ways to stop proliferation.

- Diplomacy is an essential tool in countering WMD and missile proliferation. Prevention is the first line of defense.
- We will work with friends and allies on nonproliferation and counter-proliferation efforts to prevent and protect against the spread of weapons of mass destruction and missiles.
- The United States will continue to support arms control treaties like the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), but we understand that such agreements have limits. Some rogue states cheat on such agreements, as Iraq did with its crash program to develop a nuclear weapon prior to the Gulf War. Other rogue nations simply do not join such international agreements.

- We know that despite our best efforts, WMD and missile proliferation has occurred on a wide scale and that determined nations will acquire greater and more dangerous capabilities in the future.

5. The 1972 ABM Treaty is the "cornerstone of strategic stability." There would be profound problems if the United States were to withdraw from the Treaty.

- The world has changed greatly since 1972.
- Unlike the Cold War, today's most urgent threat stems not from thousands of ballistic missiles in Soviet hands, but from a small number of missiles in the hands of rogues.
- The President has said we must move beyond the constraints of the ABM Treaty to deter and defend against the threats of today's world.
- The ABM Treaty codified the adversarial relationship between the superpowers that existed during the Cold War. It was premised on a relationship of distrust and mutually assured destruction. We need a new foundation for our strategic relationship with Russia. Russia is not the Soviet Union. Russia is not an enemy.
- We have begun real consultations with friends, allies, and, importantly, with Russia about a new cooperative framework that addresses the realities of the post-Cold War world.
- This new framework will allow for defenses, substantial reductions in strategic offensive forces, as well as counter- and non-proliferation efforts.

6. Deployment of missile defenses will lead to a new arms race.

- We have said all along that we seek missile defenses to deal with the threat of blackmail and terror by rogue states.
- The limited missile defenses we intend to deploy would only be capable of defending against handfuls of incoming missiles, not hundreds or thousands.

- The limited missile defense that we will deploy would not in any way undercut the Russian nuclear deterrent, even at levels below those reportedly being contemplated by Russia.
- Furthermore, Russia has maintained a missile defense system around Moscow for decades and understands that missile defenses are not provocative or destabilizing.
- China is already engaged in a substantial effort to modernize its strategic nuclear forces which are currently capable of striking the United States. We do not believe our deployment of limited missile defenses should lead Beijing to further accelerate or expand its buildup of strategic nuclear forces.
- Defense procurement is a very transparent process in the United States. The limited scale of long-range missile defenses we seek will be clear to all and be the subject of public discussion and debate.
- Furthermore, one of the factors that makes ballistic missiles so attractive to many states is that effective defenses have not been fielded to counter them. Missile defenses devalue these weapons, thereby reducing incentives for proliferation.

7. Deployment of missile defenses will harm relations with Russia and China.

- We believe it is important for Russia and the United States to work together to develop a new foundation for our relationship in the 21st Century.
- This relationship should no longer be based on the 1972 ABM Treaty, which was premised on an adversarial relationship of distrust and mutually assured destruction.
- The ABM Treaty was created at the height of the Cold War, and prohibits us from defending our nation's territory and that of our friends and allies against the growing threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles.
- The new framework of our relationship with Russia should reflect a clean and clear break from the Cold War, and

should be premised on openness, mutual confidence, and real opportunities for cooperation.

- Over the coming months, we hope to complete the work of changing the U.S.-Russia relationship from one based on a mutual balance of terror to one based on common responsibilities and common interests.
- With regard to China, we do not view China as an enemy, and our limited missile defenses are not directed at it. Our defenses are designed to protect against those states that would threaten or blackmail us.
- We do not believe the deployment of limited missile defenses should compel China to increase the pace and scale of its already ambitious effort to both modernize its strategic nuclear forces and deploy hundreds of shorter-range missiles opposite Taiwan.
- Furthermore, missile defenses are not provocative. These purely defensive weapons can only be used to defeat an incoming missile launched by an aggressor or a missile launched by accident.

8. Deployment of missile defenses will split the U.S. from our allies who are opposed to this idea.

- There is a growing recognition among allies that the threat from WMD and missiles is growing and represents a major security challenge for the future. This is reflected in statements by many national leaders in Europe and Asia.
- There is also a growing recognition that missile defenses are an essential element of the response to today's threats. This is clearly seen in the remarks by a number of allied leaders.
- The list of countries with weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs includes some of the world's least responsible states. This poses a growing threat to the United States, as well as to our friends and allies.
- These rogue states seek weapons of mass destruction to intimidate their neighbors and to keep the U.S. and other

nations from helping allies and friends who may be victims of aggression.

- When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990, the world joined forces to turn him back. But the international community would have faced a very different situation had Hussein possessed the means to blackmail us and our allies with even a few nuclear-tipped missiles.
- Far from splitting the United States from our allies, missile defenses help us to meet our international commitments to come to their aid in a crisis.
- The President recently sent several high-level U.S. delegations around the world to consult with friends and allies on this important topic.
- We intend to continue working with friends and allies to create a new framework for security and stability that reflects the new strategic environment.

9. Missile defense does not defend against other means of delivering a WMD payload to the U.S., such as a terrorist using a suitcase or car bomb.

- The United States must also defend against these other threats.
- The United States spent about \$11 billion last year on counter-terrorism efforts, about twice as much as we did on missile defense. We also work closely with friends, allies, and the broader international community on counter-terrorism initiatives.
- The President recognizes the need to do more to protect America's homeland and citizens against the possibility that a terrorist group could use weapons of mass destruction against targets in the United States.
- In May, the President launched a major initiative, appointing Vice President Cheney to oversee the development of a coordinated national effort that will expand and integrate the myriad federal, state, and local government efforts in the WMD preparedness area.

- The President has asked the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency to create an Office of National Preparedness. This Office will be responsible for implementing the results of those parts of the national effort overseen by Vice President Cheney that deal with consequence management. Specifically, it will coordinate all Federal programs dealing with weapons of mass destruction consequence management within the Departments of Defense, Health and Human Services, Justice, and Energy, the Environmental Protection Agency, and other federal agencies.
- But, in addition to defending against the potential terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction in the United States, we also need missile defense because countries like Iran and North Korea are making enormous efforts to acquire and develop long-range ballistic missiles -- suggesting that ballistic missiles are the "weapons of choice" for these nations for coercion and blackmail.

10. The United States has exaggerated the WMD and missile threat. We should wait until we see whether the long-range missile threat actually materializes before we deploy defenses.

- The threat from ballistic missiles is already present and will continue to grow.
- For example, in 1998 North Korea launched a three-stage Taepo Dong 1 missile that overflew Japan. The Intelligence Community assesses that this launch demonstrated the ability of North Korea to deliver a small payload to the United States. The Taepo Dong 2 missile currently under development in North Korea will have an even greater range and payload capability.
- A number of rogue states also possess large numbers of short- and medium-range missiles that pose a significant threat to deployed U.S. forces, and friends and allies abroad.
- Ballistic missiles, first used over 50 years ago when Germany launched hundreds of V-2 rockets against Great Britain, have become an increasingly common feature of modern conflict. For example, hundreds of ballistic missiles were used during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s.

- In the Persian Gulf War in 1991, 28 American soldiers were killed and 99 were wounded by a single Iraqi Scud missile that hit a barracks in Saudi Arabia. This is a high percentage of the total casualties the United States suffered in that conflict, in which 148 troops were killed and 470 were wounded in combat.
- Only now, more than 10 years after that attack, are we about to field an effective capability designed to counter the short-range threat. We do not wish to ever be put in such a position again.
- Because of the time it takes to field defenses, we cannot wait until an even greater long-range missile threat is upon us to begin development and testing of systems to counter this threat.
- The number of ballistic missiles on the face of the earth, and the number of countries possessing them is growing. The technology for ballistic missiles is ubiquitous. The existence of this threat is not debatable -- it is real.
- Sweeping political changes have occurred over the last 15 years and many more will occur over the next 15 years. The world of 2015 will almost certainly be little like today, and will without a doubt be notably different from what today's experts are confidently forecasting.
- While it is difficult to know precisely who will threaten us, or where, or when, we know that the technology for ballistic missiles will not disappear. This is why we need to develop the means to defend against these weapons.

11. The United States can do all the missile defense research and testing it needs in the next couple of years without breaking the ABM Treaty.

- The ABM Treaty prevents us from acquiring the capabilities we need to deter and defend against the new threats we face.
- Under Article I of the Treaty, the United States is not permitted to defend all 50 states against missile attack, nor are we permitted to defend even a single city under the

Treaty's 1974 Protocol. We are only permitted to defend a missile field in North Dakota.

- Article V of the Treaty prohibits the development, testing, and deployment of ABM systems and components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based;
- Article VI bans the development, testing, and deployment of "theater defenses" that have the capability to counter longer-range strategic missiles; and
- Article IX prevents us from sharing and working on defenses against longer-range missiles with our allies and even with Russia.
- The Clinton Administration designed its missile defense development and test programs to be as consistent with the ABM Treaty as possible. Once so designed, that Administration could and did claim that the ABM Treaty was not inhibiting missile defense development and testing. However, contrary to the claims of many, even the Clinton Administration's NMD system, which involved the placement of ground-based interceptors and construction of an ABM radar in Alaska, could not be deployed under the Treaty, as President Clinton himself acknowledged.
- As the President has said, we will examine all available technologies and basing modes for missile defense. As we have informed our allies and Russia, we expect our RDT&E efforts will conflict with ABM Treaty limitations in a matter of months, not years.

12. Extensive debate is needed on the President's missile defense initiative, since polls show most American's don't know much about missile defense and generally do not support it.

- Missile defense has been one of the most widely discussed and debated security issues in recent years. Major newspapers routinely report on it and the op-ed pages around the country are filled with articles on the subject. Congress has held numerous hearings in recent years, and legislation on the subject has been hotly debated.
- We welcome this debate, because the facts and arguments in favor of missile defense are compelling.

- Furthermore, recent polls show the American public supports the President's missile defense initiative. For example, a poll conducted by the Pew Research Center in collaboration with the Council on Foreign Relations in May shows that the Administration's missile defense initiative is supported by the public by a 51 to 38 percent margin.
- This poll also showed that the public has a substantially greater awareness of the arguments against missile defense than those favoring it. Despite this "awareness gap," the arguments in favor of defenses were accepted by a clear majority of respondents as important reasons to support the program. None of the counter-arguments was considered an important reason to oppose the program.

13. In a return to "Star Wars," the Bush Administration intends to pursue a "massive" missile defense program. Although the President has spoken of a limited defense, in order to provide protection to friends and allies and to defend against an accidental launch of a Russian ICBM that would employ sophisticated countermeasures, a very large missile defense system will be needed.

- The Administration has said all along that we seek missile defenses to deal with the threat posed by a small number of missiles in the hands of rogue states.
- The limited defenses we intend to deploy will only be capable of defending against handfuls of incoming missiles, not hundreds or thousands. Such defenses will not undercut the Russian nuclear deterrent, even at levels below those reportedly contemplated by Russia.
- There is a growing recognition among friends and allies that the threat from WMD and missiles is increasing and that missile defenses are an essential element of the response to this threat. This is clearly seen in the remarks by a number of allied leaders. The President is committed to working together with friends and allies to address this common threat.
- However, the assertion that the President intends to pursue a "world-wide" missile defense system on a "massive" scale is unfounded.

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FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
Email	RE: Rice Speech on Sept. 10 - To: John D. Gibson & Robert G. Joseph - From: Daniel Fried	2	08/16/2001	P5;

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National Security Council - Media Communications and Speechwriting

SERIES:

Gibson, John - Chron Files

FOLDER TITLE:

09/11/2001, Rice - Nitze School (Cancelled) [2]

FRC ID:

34849

OA Num.:

NSC 0612

NARA Num.:**FOIA IDs and Segments:**

2014-0508-F

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- These leaders may well believe that they can blackmail us -- prevent us from helping the victims of their aggression -- if they can hold even a small number of our cities or those of our friends and allies hostage to attack.
- This is not Cold War deterrence. States like North Korea and Iran are not seeking massive arsenals for a first strike. We are seeking the ability to defeat a small number of missiles to deny these countries an instrument of coercion and aggression.
- Missile defense also provides an alternative to the grim prospect of being forced to order a retaliatory strike that might kill many innocent civilians for the reckless act of an irresponsible dictator.

2. The technology for missile defense simply does not work.

- The United States has formidable engineering and scientific capabilities that are up to the task.
- In fact, we have already had several notable successes in our development programs.
- The PAC-3 system has successfully intercepted target missiles in all seven intercept tests conducted thus far.
- The last two intercept tests of the THAAD system were successful.
- Israel's Arrow missile defense system, which was developed jointly with the U.S., has had successful tests and is now being deployed.
- The first intercept test of the ground-based system for defense of the U.S. against long-range missiles was also successful.
- In this test, a warhead on a target missile launched from California was successfully destroyed by a kill vehicle launched from an atoll in the South Pacific.
- This was not a "lucky shot," or an event that occurred "by accident" as some have described it. When a target warhead and a kill vehicle that are each about the size of a chair, collide in the vastness of space about 140 miles above the earth, at closing speeds of 15,000 miles per hour after being launched over 4,300 miles apart, that is not an accident.
- Although we have had many successful tests of our missile defense systems, we have also had some failures.
- This is not unusual for development programs. Test programs are designed to uncover engineering flaws and we expect that some future tests will inevitably not succeed. But we will learn from each event.
- There were several notable failures in early tests of rockets for the U.S. space program. Yet we persevered, and

eventually landed a man on the moon. In fact, manned space flight is almost routine today.

- As the President has said, we will evaluate what works and what does not in our missile defense programs. We know that there will be failures and that some approaches won't work. But we will build on our successes.

3. Even if it could work, missile defense costs too much money.

- Bearing the cost of missile defense is a national security imperative given the growing threats we face from rogue states armed with weapons of mass destruction and seeking long-range missiles.
- The cost to inaction cannot be measured in dollars, namely vulnerability to blackmail or attack from rogue states armed with WMD and missiles.
- Like other major defense programs, such as those to develop new fighter aircraft or ships, missile defense will require significant funding. Even so, it will only represent a small fraction of the defense budget.

4. Diplomacy and arms control are more effective ways to stop proliferation.

- Diplomacy is an essential tool in countering WMD and missile proliferation. Prevention is the first line of defense.
- We will work with friends and allies on nonproliferation and counter-proliferation efforts to prevent and protect against the spread of weapons of mass destruction and missiles.
- The United States will continue to support arms control treaties like the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), but we understand that such agreements have limits. Some rogue states cheat on such agreements, as Iraq did with its crash program to develop a nuclear weapon prior to the Gulf War. Other rogue nations simply do not join such international agreements.

- We know that despite our best efforts, WMD and missile proliferation has occurred on a wide scale and that determined nations will acquire greater and more dangerous capabilities in the future.

5. The 1972 ABM Treaty is the "cornerstone of strategic stability." There would be profound problems if the United States were to withdraw from the Treaty.

- The world has changed greatly since 1972.
- Unlike the Cold War, today's most urgent threat stems not from thousands of ballistic missiles in Soviet hands, but from a small number of missiles in the hands of rogues.
- The President has said we must move beyond the constraints of the ABM Treaty to deter and defend against the threats of today's world.
- The ABM Treaty codified the adversarial relationship between the superpowers that existed during the Cold War. It was premised on a relationship of distrust and mutually assured destruction. We need a new foundation for our strategic relationship with Russia. Russia is not the Soviet Union. Russia is not an enemy.
- We have begun real consultations with friends, allies, and, importantly, with Russia about a new cooperative framework that addresses the realities of the post-Cold War world.
- This new framework will allow for defenses, substantial reductions in strategic offensive forces, as well as counter- and non-proliferation efforts.

6. Deployment of missile defenses will lead to a new arms race.

- We have said all along that we seek missile defenses to deal with the threat of blackmail and terror by rogue states.
- The limited missile defenses we intend to deploy would only be capable of defending against handfuls of incoming missiles, not hundreds or thousands.

- The limited missile defense that we will deploy would not in any way undercut the Russian nuclear deterrent, even at levels below those reportedly being contemplated by Russia.
- Furthermore, Russia has maintained a missile defense system around Moscow for decades and understands that missile defenses are not provocative or destabilizing.
- China is already engaged in a substantial effort to modernize its strategic nuclear forces which are currently capable of striking the United States. We do not believe our deployment of limited missile defenses should lead Beijing to further accelerate or expand its buildup of strategic nuclear forces.
- Defense procurement is a very transparent process in the United States. The limited scale of long-range missile defenses we seek will be clear to all and be the subject of public discussion and debate.
- Furthermore, one of the factors that makes ballistic missiles so attractive to many states is that effective defenses have not been fielded to counter them. Missile defenses devalue these weapons, thereby reducing incentives for proliferation.

7. Deployment of missile defenses will harm relations with Russia and China.

- We believe it is important for Russia and the United States to work together to develop a new foundation for our relationship in the 21st Century.
- This relationship should no longer be based on the 1972 ABM Treaty, which was premised on an adversarial relationship of distrust and mutually assured destruction.
- The ABM Treaty was created at the height of the Cold War, and prohibits us from defending our nation's territory and that of our friends and allies against the growing threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles.
- The new framework of our relationship with Russia should reflect a clean and clear break from the Cold War, and

should be premised on openness, mutual confidence, and real opportunities for cooperation.

- Over the coming months, we hope to complete the work of changing the U.S.-Russia relationship from one based on a mutual balance of terror to one based on common responsibilities and common interests.
- With regard to China, we do not view China as an enemy, and our limited missile defenses are not directed at it. Our defenses are designed to protect against those states that would threaten or blackmail us.
- We do not believe the deployment of limited missile defenses should compel China to increase the pace and scale of its already ambitious effort to both modernize its strategic nuclear forces and deploy hundreds of shorter-range missiles opposite Taiwan.
- Furthermore, missile defenses are not provocative. These purely defensive weapons can only be used to defeat an incoming missile launched by an aggressor or a missile launched by accident.

8. Deployment of missile defenses will split the U.S. from our allies who are opposed to this idea.

- There is a growing recognition among allies that the threat from WMD and missiles is growing and represents a major security challenge for the future. This is reflected in statements by many national leaders in Europe and Asia.
- There is also a growing recognition that missile defenses are an essential element of the response to today's threats. This is clearly seen in the remarks by a number of allied leaders.
- The list of countries with weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs includes some of the world's least responsible states. This poses a growing threat to the United States, as well as to our friends and allies.
- These rogue states seek weapons of mass destruction to intimidate their neighbors and to keep the U.S. and other

nations from helping allies and friends who may be victims of aggression.

- When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990, the world joined forces to turn him back. But the international community would have faced a very different situation had Hussein possessed the means to blackmail us and our allies with even a few nuclear-tipped missiles.
- Far from splitting the United States from our allies, missile defenses help us to meet our international commitments to come to their aid in a crisis.
- The President recently sent several high-level U.S. delegations around the world to consult with friends and allies on this important topic.
- We intend to continue working with friends and allies to create a new framework for security and stability that reflects the new strategic environment.

9. Missile defense does not defend against other means of delivering a WMD payload to the U.S., such as a terrorist using a suitcase or car bomb.

- The United States must also defend against these other threats.
- The United States spent about \$11 billion last year on counter-terrorism efforts, about twice as much as we did on missile defense. We also work closely with friends, allies, and the broader international community on counter-terrorism initiatives.
- The President recognizes the need to do more to protect America's homeland and citizens against the possibility that a terrorist group could use weapons of mass destruction against targets in the United States.
- In May, the President launched a major initiative, appointing Vice President Cheney to oversee the development of a coordinated national effort that will expand and integrate the myriad federal, state, and local government efforts in the WMD preparedness area.

- The President has asked the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency to create an Office of National Preparedness. This Office will be responsible for implementing the results of those parts of the national effort overseen by Vice President Cheney that deal with consequence management. Specifically, it will coordinate all Federal programs dealing with weapons of mass destruction consequence management within the Departments of Defense, Health and Human Services, Justice, and Energy, the Environmental Protection Agency, and other federal agencies.
- But, in addition to defending against the potential terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction in the United States, we also need missile defense because countries like Iran and North Korea are making enormous efforts to acquire and develop long-range ballistic missiles -- suggesting that ballistic missiles are the "weapons of choice" for these nations for coercion and blackmail.

10. The United States has exaggerated the WMD and missile threat. We should wait until we see whether the long-range missile threat actually materializes before we deploy defenses.

- The threat from ballistic missiles is already present and will continue to grow.
- For example, in 1998 North Korea launched a three-stage Taepo Dong 1 missile that overflew Japan. The Intelligence Community assesses that this launch demonstrated the ability of North Korea to deliver a small payload to the United States. The Taepo Dong 2 missile currently under development in North Korea will have an even greater range and payload capability.
- A number of rogue states also possess large numbers of short- and medium-range missiles that pose a significant threat to deployed U.S. forces, and friends and allies abroad.
- Ballistic missiles, first used over 50 years ago when Germany launched hundreds of V-2 rockets against Great Britain, have become an increasingly common feature of modern conflict. For example, hundreds of ballistic missiles were used during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s.

- In the Persian Gulf War in 1991, 28 American soldiers were killed and 99 were wounded by a single Iraqi Scud missile that hit a barracks in Saudi Arabia. This is a high percentage of the total casualties the United States suffered in that conflict, in which 148 troops were killed and 470 were wounded in combat.
- Only now, more than 10 years after that attack, are we about to field an effective capability designed to counter the short-range threat. We do not wish to ever be put in such a position again.
- Because of the time it takes to field defenses, we cannot wait until an even greater long-range missile threat is upon us to begin development and testing of systems to counter this threat.
- The number of ballistic missiles on the face of the earth, and the number of countries possessing them is growing. The technology for ballistic missiles is ubiquitous. The existence of this threat is not debatable -- it is real.
- Sweeping political changes have occurred over the last 15 years and many more will occur over the next 15 years. The world of 2015 will almost certainly be little like today, and will without a doubt be notably different from what today's experts are confidently forecasting.
- While it is difficult to know precisely who will threaten us, or where, or when, we know that the technology for ballistic missiles will not disappear. This is why we need to develop the means to defend against these weapons.

11. The United States can do all the missile defense research and testing it needs in the next couple of years without breaking the ABM Treaty.

- The ABM Treaty prevents us from acquiring the capabilities we need to deter and defend against the new threats we face.
- Under Article I of the Treaty, the United States is not permitted to defend all 50 states against missile attack, nor are we permitted to defend even a single city under the

Treaty's 1974 Protocol. We are only permitted to defend a missile field in North Dakota.

- Article V of the Treaty prohibits the development, testing, and deployment of ABM systems and components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based;
- Article VI bans the development, testing, and deployment of "theater defenses" that have the capability to counter longer-range strategic missiles; and
- Article IX prevents us from sharing and working on defenses against longer-range missiles with our allies and even with Russia.
- The Clinton Administration designed its missile defense development and test programs to be as consistent with the ABM Treaty as possible. Once so designed, that Administration could and did claim that the ABM Treaty was not inhibiting missile defense development and testing. However, contrary to the claims of many, even the Clinton Administration's NMD system, which involved the placement of ground-based interceptors and construction of an ABM radar in Alaska, could not be deployed under the Treaty, as President Clinton himself acknowledged.
- As the President has said, we will examine all available technologies and basing modes for missile defense. As we have informed our allies and Russia, we expect our RDT&E efforts will conflict with ABM Treaty limitations in a matter of months, not years.

12. Extensive debate is needed on the President's missile defense initiative, since polls show most American's don't know much about missile defense and generally do not support it.

- Missile defense has been one of the most widely discussed and debated security issues in recent years. Major newspapers routinely report on it and the op-ed pages around the country are filled with articles on the subject. Congress has held numerous hearings in recent years, and legislation on the subject has been hotly debated.
- We welcome this debate, because the facts and arguments in favor of missile defense are compelling.

- Furthermore, recent polls show the American public supports the President's missile defense initiative. For example, a poll conducted by the Pew Research Center in collaboration with the Council on Foreign Relations in May shows that the Administration's missile defense initiative is supported by the public by a 51 to 38 percent margin.
- This poll also showed that the public has a substantially greater awareness of the arguments against missile defense than those favoring it. Despite this "awareness gap," the arguments in favor of defenses were accepted by a clear majority of respondents as important reasons to support the program. None of the counter-arguments was considered an important reason to oppose the program.

13. In a return to "Star Wars," the Bush Administration intends to pursue a "massive" missile defense program. Although the President has spoken of a limited defense, in order to provide protection to friends and allies and to defend against an accidental launch of a Russian ICBM that would employ sophisticated countermeasures, a very large missile defense system will be needed.

- The Administration has said all along that we seek missile defenses to deal with the threat posed by a small number of missiles in the hands of rogue states.
- The limited defenses we intend to deploy will only be capable of defending against handfuls of incoming missiles, not hundreds or thousands. Such defenses will not undercut the Russian nuclear deterrent, even at levels below those reportedly contemplated by Russia.
- There is a growing recognition among friends and allies that the threat from WMD and missiles is increasing and that missile defenses are an essential element of the response to this threat. This is clearly seen in the remarks by a number of allied leaders. The President is committed to working together with friends and allies to address this common threat.
- However, the assertion that the President intends to pursue a "world-wide" missile defense system on a "massive" scale is unfounded.

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helped veil the appalling human rights record of the almost half a million Indian soldiers in Kashmir.

India's more recent intransigence on Kashmir also owes something to the growing closeness of the globalizing Indian elite to the United States. Indian traditions of anticolonialism and nonaligned foreign policy have been transformed with the end of the cold war and the rise of Hindu nationalism. India's rise has been accompanied by Pakistan's fall, as Pakistani help in fighting the Soviet Union and balancing Indian nonalignment has become correspondingly less important to America. This situation has caused anger and frustration among Islamic fundamentalists in Pakistan, the tiny but well organized minority that enjoyed Western patronage during the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan. For these hard-liners, jihad, and not dialogue, is the way to deal with the arrogant and deceitful Hindus of India and their fair-weather American friends.

Liberal Pakistanis have tried to hold on to the optimistic view that India, weary of fighting the Kashmir insurgency, will eventually negotiate. Few have been willing to confront the harsher possibility: that the Hindu nationalists may not be much inclined to make concessions on Kashmir to what they perceive as a weak and isolated state. This is the bitter lesson Mr. Musharraf learned in India, where he was reduced to arguing that the Indian side settle for calling Kashmir an "issue" if it isn't happy with the word "dispute."

Some anxious American goading might bring the two governments together. Their ministries continue to arrange future meetings; the failure in Agra does not seem to have greatly surprised the participants or led to a sense that progress is impossible. India and Pakistan can at least talk about their (as yet undefined) nuclear arsenals. It might be easier to create some trust on this issue, since India and Pakistan have achieved a kind of parity with their weapons of mass destruction. Yet in all other ways the gap between the two countries grows, and this disparity — in status, resources and self-confidence — lay behind the failure of the India-Pakistan summit. It is likely to make the Kashmir problem even more intractable.

Pankaj Mishra is author of "The Romantics." He writes often on Kashmir.

NEW YORK TIMES OP/ED

JUL 24, 2001

MAD Isn't Crazy

By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN

I sure welcome the news that the Bush team will open missile talks with Russia, because it might bring some clarity to the Bushies' arguments on missile defense, which have been at best incoherent and at worst dishonest.

Look at the Republican arms expert Richard Perle's Senate testimony last week. He was trying to justify why we need missile defense against rogue leaders, who, he claimed, cannot be deterred by the classic doctrine of mutual assured destruction (MAD), which has kept the peace for 50 years. "[Some say] you can count on Saddam to be deterred by our deterrent," said Mr. Perle. "I frankly don't want to count on the rational judgment of a man who used poison gas against his own people."

Let's dissect that statement. Mr. Perle is comparing the Iraqi people to the American people, and suggesting that since Saddam used gas against his own people, you never know, he may do the same to us.

Well, there is one small difference between us and the Iraqi people: We have nuclear weapons to retaliate with and they did not. During the gulf war Saddam had poison gas warheads. He was warned by the elder President Bush that if he used that poison gas against U.S. troops, his regime would be wiped off the planet. And he didn't use it. Not only did he not use it against our troops in a war on his own border, with his whole regime and maybe his own life in the balance, he did not even put poison gas on the Scuds he fired at Israel, which would have been enormously popular in the Arab world. Why not? Classic deterrence. He knew the Israelis would destroy Baghdad.

In other words, the one thing we know about Saddam is that given the ideal opportunity to use weapons of mass destruction against us, before we had any missile shield, he chose not to for exactly the reasons that the Bushies insist are out of date — classic deterrence. Saddam understands something the Bushies refuse to admit: that there is a

difference between evil and crazy. Saddam is evil. But he has survived all these years precisely because he's not suicidal.

These require honest arguments, not theology, and the Bushies have not made them.

This gets to the core problem with the Bush approach to missile defense. It is based on flimsy or dishonest arguments, including: (1) We need a missile shield because the cold war deterrence doctrine of MAD, mutual assured destruction, is out of date. The truth: We will continue to rely on MAD for decades to come. Indeed, the U.S. is now so overpowering, the only thing that might be new about MAD is that it is no longer mutual. Any rogues firing a missile at us would end up with TAD — Their Assured Destruction. (2) Classic deterrence can't be relied upon to work against rogues because they are crazy. The truth: All evidence proves just the opposite.

The Bushies resort to these tall tales because they are theologically obsessed with missile defense. So to justify spending \$100 billion on a system to deter rogues who are already deterred by classic deterrence, and to justify ripping up the ABM treaty (the Bushies' real goal, because they hate arms control), they have to make wildly exaggerated claims that we are in a whole new era and the old ways won't work.

As I said before, I am not theologically against missile defense, but it has to be judged by what it really is — a defense system that will always be, at best, a supplement to mutual assured destruction, which is neither out of date nor going away. It is like wearing suspenders along with a belt.

Sure, it would be nice to have some extra protection against rogues. But if the Bush team wants us to pay huge money for such suspenders it must prove that missile defense works under battlefield conditions, which it hasn't; that it can be deployed without alienating Russia and China, which can overwhelm any system by simply selling missiles to rogues; and that the system will not cost so much that it will divert needed resources from weapons and army units, which already do work against real threats.

"Missile defense isn't like abortion, where the only issue is whether you're for or against it," says Michael Mandelbaum, the Johns Hopkins foreign policy expert. "Who wouldn't want both a belt and suspenders? The question is, what are the economic and strategic costs, and what are the alternatives?"

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LIFE AFTER THE COLD WAR

THE UNITED STATES has found it exceedingly difficult to define its "national interest" in the absence of Soviet power. That we do not know how to think about what follows the U.S.-Soviet confrontation is clear from the continued references to the "post -- Cold War period." Yet such periods of transition are important, because they offer strategic opportunities. During these fluid times, one can affect the shape of the world to come.

The enormity of the moment is obvious. The Soviet Union was more than just a traditional global competitor; it strove to lead a universal socialist alternative to markets and democracy. The Soviet Union quarantined itself and many often-unwitting captives and clients from the rigors of international capitalism. In the end, it sowed the seeds of its own destruction, becoming in isolation an economic and technological dinosaur.

But this is only part of the story. The Soviet Union's collapse coincided with another great revolution. Dramatic changes in information technology and the growth of "knowledge-based" industries altered the very basis of economic dynamism, accelerating already noticeable trends in economic interaction that often circumvented and ignored state boundaries. As competition for capital investment has intensified, states have faced difficult choices about their internal economic, political, and social structures. As the prototype of this "new economy," the United States has seen its economic influence grow -- and with it, its diplomatic influence. America has emerged as both the principal benefactor of these simultaneous revolutions and their beneficiary.

The process of outlining a new foreign policy must begin by recognizing that the United States is in a remarkable position. Powerful secular trends are moving the world toward economic openness and -- more unevenly -- democracy and individual liberty. Some states have one foot on the train and the other off. ~~Some states still hope to find a way to decouple democracy and economic progress. Some hold on to old hatreds as diversions from the modernizing task at hand.~~ But the United States and its allies are on the right side of history.

In such an environment, American policies must help further these favorable trends by maintaining a disciplined and consistent foreign policy that separates the important from the trivial. The Clinton administration has assiduously avoided implementing such an agenda. Instead, every issue has been taken on its own terms -- crisis by crisis, day by day. It takes courage to set priorities because doing so is an

admission that American foreign policy cannot be all things to all people -- or rather, to all interest groups. The Clinton administration's approach has its advantages: If priorities and intent are not clear, they cannot be criticized. But there is a high price to pay for this approach. In a democracy as pluralistic as ours, the absence of an articulated "national interest" either produces a fertile ground for those wishing to withdraw from the world or creates a vacuum to be filled by parochial groups and transitory pressures.

THE ALTERNATIVE

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY in a Republican administration should refocus the United States on the national interest and the pursuit of key priorities. These tasks are

- * to ensure that America's military can deter war, project power, and fight in defense of its interests if deterrence fails;
- * to promote economic growth and political openness by extending free trade and a stable international monetary system to all committed to these principles, including in the western hemisphere, which has too often been neglected as a vital area of U.S. national interest;
- * to renew strong and intimate relationships with allies who share American values and can thus share the burden of promoting peace, prosperity, and freedom;
- * to focus U.S. energies on comprehensive relationships with the big powers, particularly Russia and China, that can and will mold the character of the international political system; and
- * to deal decisively with the threat of rogue regimes and hostile powers, which is increasingly taking the forms of the potential for terrorism and the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

INTERESTS AND IDEALS

POWER MATTERS, both the exercise of power by the United States and the ability of others to exercise it. Yet many in the United States are (and have always been) uncomfortable with the notions of power politics, great powers, and power balances. In an extreme form, this discomfort leads to a reflexive appeal instead to notions of international law and norms, and the belief that the support of many states -- or even better, of institutions like the United Nations -- is essential to the legitimate exercise of power. The "national interest" is replaced with "humanitarian interests" or the interests of "the international community." The belief that the United States is exercising power legitimately only when it is doing so on behalf of someone or something else was deeply rooted in Wilsonian thought, and there are strong echoes of it in the Clinton administration. To be sure, there is nothing wrong with doing something that benefits all humanity, but that is, in a sense, a second-order effect. America's pursuit of the national interest will create conditions that promote freedom, markets, and peace. Its pursuit of national interests after World War II led to a more prosperous and democratic world. This can happen again.

So multilateral agreements and institutions should not be ends in themselves. U.S. interests are served by having strong alliances and can be promoted within the U.N. and other multilateral organizations, as well as through well-crafted international agreements. But the Clinton administration has often been so anxious to find multilateral solutions to problems that it has signed agreements that are not in America's interest. The Kyoto treaty is a case in point: whatever the facts on global warming, a treaty that does not include China and exempts "developing" countries from tough standards while penalizing American industry cannot possibly be in America's national interest.

Similarly, the arguments about U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty are instructive. Since 1992, the United States has refrained unilaterally from testing nuclear weapons. It is an example to the rest of the world yet does not tie its own hands "in perpetuity" if testing becomes necessary again. But in pursuit of a "norm" against the acquisition of nuclear weapons, the United States signed a treaty that was not verifiable, did not deal with the threat of the development of nuclear weapons by rogue states, and threatened the reliability of the nuclear stockpile. Legitimate congressional concerns about the substance of the treaty were ignored during negotiations. When faced with the defeat of a bad treaty, the administration attacked the motives of its opponents -- incredibly branding long-standing internationalists like Senators Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) and John Warner (R-Va.) as isolationists.

Certainly, Republican presidents have not been immune to the practice of pursuing symbolic agreements of questionable value. According to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, some 52 conventions, agreements, and treaties still await ratification; some even date back to 1949. But the Clinton administration's attachment to largely symbolic agreements and its pursuit of, at best, illusory "norms" of international behavior have become an epidemic. That is not leadership. Neither is it isolationist to suggest that the United States has a special role in the world and should not adhere to every international convention and agreement that someone thinks to propose.

Even those comfortable with notions of the "national interest" are still queasy with a focus on power relationships and great-power politics. The reality is that a few big powers can radically affect international peace, stability, and prosperity. These states are capable of disruption on a grand scale, and their fits of anger or acts of beneficence affect hundreds of millions of people. By reason of size, geographic position, economic potential, and military strength, they are capable of influencing American welfare for good or ill. Moreover, that kind of power is usually accompanied by a sense of entitlement to play a decisive role in international politics. Great powers do not just mind their own business.

Some worry that this view of the world ignores the role of values, particularly human rights and the promotion of democracy. In fact, there are those who would draw a sharp line between power politics and a principled foreign policy based on values. This polarized view -- you are either a realist or devoted to norms and values -- may be just fine in academic debate, but it is a disaster for American foreign policy. American values are universal. People want to say what they think, worship as they wish, and elect those who govern them; the triumph of these values is most assuredly easier when the international balance of power favors those who believe in them. But sometimes that favorable balance of power takes time to achieve, both internationally and within a society. And in the meantime, it is simply not possible to ignore and isolate other powerful states that do not share those values.

The Cold War is a good example. Few would deny that the collapse of the Soviet Union profoundly transformed the picture of democracy and human rights in eastern and central Europe and the former Soviet territories. Nothing improved human rights as much as the collapse of Soviet power. Throughout the Cold War, the United States pursued a policy that promoted political liberty, using every instrument from the Voice of America to direct presidential intervention on behalf of dissidents. But it lost sight neither of the importance of the geopolitical relationship with Moscow nor of the absolute necessity of retaining robust American military power to deter an all-out military confrontation.

In the 1970s, the Soviet Union was at the height of its power -- which it was more than willing to use. Given its weak economic and technological base, the victories of that period turned out to be Pyrrhic. President Reagan's challenge to Soviet power was both resolute and well timed. It included intense substantive engagements with Moscow across the entire range of issues captured in the "four-part agenda" (arms control, human rights, economic issues, and regional conflicts). The Bush administration then focused greater attention on rolling back Soviet power in central and eastern Europe. As the Soviet

Union's might waned, it could no longer defend its interests and gave up peacefully (thankfully) to the West -- a tremendous victory for Western power and also for human liberty.

SETTING PRIORITIES

THE UNITED STATES has many sources of power in the pursuit of its goals. The global economy demands economic liberalization, greater openness and transparency, and at the very least, access to information technology. International economic policies that leverage the advantages of the American economy and expand free trade are the decisive tools in shaping international politics. They permit us to reach out to states as varied as South Africa and India and to engage our neighbors in the western hemisphere in a shared interest in economic prosperity. The growth of entrepreneurial classes throughout the world is an asset in the promotion of human rights and individual liberty, and it should be understood and used as such. Yet peace is the first and most important condition for continued prosperity and freedom. America's military power must be secure because the United States is the only guarantor of global peace and stability. The current neglect of America's armed forces threatens its ability to maintain peace.

The Bush administration had been able to reduce defense spending somewhat at the end of the Cold War in 1991. But the Clinton administration witlessly accelerated and deepened these cuts. The results were devastating: military readiness declined, training suffered, military pay slipped 15 percent below civilian equivalents, morale plummeted, and the services cannibalized existing equipment to keep airplanes flying, ships afloat, and tanks moving. The increased difficulty in recruiting people to the armed forces or retaining them is hardly surprising.

Moreover, the administration began deploying American forces abroad at a furious pace -- an average of once every nine weeks. As it cut defense spending to its lowest point as a percentage of GDP since Pearl Harbor, the administration deployed the armed forces more often than at any time in the last 50 years. Some of the deployments themselves were questionable, such as in Haiti. But more than anything it was simply unwise to multiply missions in the face of a continuing budget reduction. Means and mission were not matched, and (predictably) the already thinly stretched armed forces came close to a breaking point. When all these trends became so obvious and embarrassing that they could no longer be ignored, the administration finally requested increased defense spending. But the "death spiral," as the administration's own under-secretary of defense called it -- robbing procurement and research and development simply to operate the armed forces -- was already well under way. That the administration did nothing, choosing instead to live off the fruits of Reagan's military buildup, constitutes an extraordinary neglect of the fiduciary responsibilities of the commander in chief.

Now the next president will be confronted with a prolonged job of repair. Military readiness will have to take center stage, particularly those aspects that affect the living conditions of the troops -- military pay, housing -- and also training. New weapons will have to be procured in order to give the military the capacity to carry out today's missions. But even in its current state, the American military still enjoys a commanding technological lead and therefore has a battlefield advantage over any competitor. Thus the next president should refocus the Pentagon's priorities on building the military of the 21st century rather than continuing to build on the structure of the Cold War. U.S. technological advantages should be leveraged to build forces that are lighter and more lethal, more mobile and agile, and capable of firing accurately from long distances. In order to do this, Washington must reallocate resources, perhaps in some cases skipping a generation of technology to make leaps rather than incremental improvements in its forces.

The other major concern is a loss of focus on the mission of the armed forces. What does it mean to deter, fight, and win wars and defend the national interest? First, the American military must be able to meet decisively the emergence of any hostile military power in the Asia-Pacific region, the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and Europe -- areas in which not only our interests but also those of our key allies are at stake. America's military is the only one capable of this deterrence function, and it must not be stretched or diverted into areas that weaken these broader responsibilities. It is the role that the United States played when Saddam Hussein threatened the Persian Gulf, and it is the power needed to deter trouble on the Korean Peninsula or across the Taiwan Strait. In the latter cases, the goal is to make it inconceivable for North Korea or China to use force because American military power is a compelling factor in their equations.

Some small-scale conflicts clearly have an impact on American strategic interests. Such was the case with Kosovo, which was in the backyard of America's most important strategic alliance: NATO. In fact, Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic's rejection of peaceful coexistence with the Kosovar Albanians threatened to rock the area's fragile ethnic balance. Eastern Europe is a patchwork of ethnic minorities. For the most part, Hungarians and Romanians, Bulgarians and Turks, and even Ukrainians and Russians have found a way since 1991 of preventing their differences from exploding. Milosevic has been the exception, and the United States had an overriding strategic interest in stopping him. There was, of course, a humanitarian disaster looming as well, but in the absence of concerns based on the interests of the alliance, the case for intervention would have been more tenuous.

The Kosovo war was conducted incompetently, in part because the administration's political goals kept shifting and in part because it was not, at the start, committed to the decisive use of military force. That President Clinton was surprised at Milosevic's tenacity is, well, surprising. If there is any lesson from history, it is that small powers with everything to lose are often more stubborn than big powers, for whom the conflict is merely one among many problems. The lesson, too, is that if it is worth fighting for, you had better be prepared to win. Also, there must be a political game plan that will permit the withdrawal of our forces -- something that is still completely absent in Kosovo.

But what if our values are attacked in areas that are not arguably of strategic concern? Should the United States not try to save lives in the absence of an overriding strategic rationale? The next American president should be in a position to intervene when he believes, and can make the case, that the United States is duty-bound to do so. "Humanitarian intervention" cannot be ruled out a priori. But a decision to intervene in the absence of strategic concerns should be understood for what it is. Humanitarian problems are rarely only humanitarian problems; the taking of life or withholding of food is almost always a political act. If the United States is not prepared to address the underlying political conflict and to know whose side it is on, the military may end up separating warring parties for an indefinite period. Sometimes one party (or both) can come to see the United States as the enemy. Because the military cannot, by definition, do anything decisive in these "humanitarian" crises, the chances of misreading the situation and ending up in very different circumstances are very high. This was essentially the problem of "mission creep" in Somalia.

The president must remember that the military is a special instrument. It is lethal, and it is meant to be. It is not a civilian police force. It is not a political referee. And it is most certainly not designed to build a civilian society. Military force is best used to support clear political goals, whether limited, such as expelling Saddam from Kuwait, or comprehensive, such as demanding the unconditional surrender of Japan and Germany during World War II. It is one thing to have a limited political goal and to fight decisively for it; it is quite another to apply military force incrementally, hoping to find a political solution somewhere along the way. A president entering these situations must ask whether decisive force is possible and is likely to be effective and must know how and when to get out. These are difficult criteria to meet, so U.S. intervention in these "humanitarian" crises should be, at best, exceedingly rare.

This does not mean that the United States must ignore humanitarian and civil conflicts around the world. But the military cannot be involved everywhere. Often, these tasks might be better carried out by regional actors, as modeled by the Australian-led intervention in East Timor. The U.S. might be able to lend financial, logistical, and intelligence support. Sometimes tough, competent diplomacy in the beginning can prevent the need for military force later. Using the American armed forces as the world's "911" will degrade capabilities, bog soldiers down in peacekeeping roles, and fuel concern among other great powers that the United States has decided to enforce notions of "limited sovereignty" worldwide in the name of humanitarianism. This overly broad definition of America's national interest is bound to backfire as others arrogate the same authority to themselves. Or we will find ourselves looking to the United Nations to sanction the use of American military power in these cases, implying that we will do so even when our vital interests are involved, which would also be a mistake.

DEALING WITH THE POWERFUL

ANOTHER CRUCIAL TASK for the United States is to focus on relations with other powerful states. Although the United States is fortunate to count among its friends several great powers, it is important not to take them for granted -- so that there is a firm foundation when it comes time to rely on them. The challenges of China and North Korea require coordination and cooperation with Japan and South Korea. The signals that we send to our real partners are important. Never again should an American president go to Beijing for nine days and refuse to stop in Tokyo or Seoul.

There is work to do with the Europeans, too, on defining what holds the transatlantic alliance together in the absence of the Soviet threat. NATO is badly in need of attention in the wake of Kosovo and with the looming question of its further enlargement in 2002 and beyond. The door to NATO for the remaining states of eastern and central Europe should remain open, as many are actively preparing to meet the criteria for membership. But the parallel track of NATO's own evolution, its attention to the definition of its mission, and its ability to digest and then defend new members has been neglected. Moreover, the United States has an interest in shaping the European defense identity -- welcoming a greater European military capability as long as it is within the context of NATO. NATO has a very full agenda. Membership in NATO will mean nothing to anyone if the organization is no longer militarily capable and if it is unclear about its mission.

For America and our allies, the most daunting task is to find the right balance in our policy toward Russia and China. Both are equally important to the future of international peace, but the challenges they pose are very different. China is a rising power; in economic terms, that should be good news, because in order to maintain its economic dynamism, China must be more integrated into the international economy. This will require increased openness and transparency and the growth of private industry. The political struggle in Beijing is over how to maintain the Communist Party's monopoly on power. Some see economic reform, growth, and a better life for the Chinese people as the key. Others see the inherent contradiction in loosening economic control and maintaining the party's political dominance. As China's economic problems multiply due to slowing growth rates, failing banks, inert state enterprises, and rising unemployment, this struggle will intensify.

It is in America's interest to strengthen the hands of those who seek economic integration because this will probably lead to sustained and organized pressures for political liberalization. There are no guarantees, but in scores of cases from Chile to Spain to Taiwan, the link between democracy and economic liberalization has proven powerful over the long run. Trade and economic interaction are, in fact, good -- not only for America's economic growth but for its political aims as well. Human rights concerns should not move to the sidelines in the meantime. Rather, the American president should press the Chinese leadership for change. But it is wise to remember that our influence through moral arguments

and commitment is still limited in the face of Beijing's pervasive political control. The big trends toward the spread of information, the access of young Chinese to American values through educational exchanges and training, and the growth of an entrepreneurial class that does not owe its livelihood to the state are, in the end, likely to have a more powerful effect on life in China.

Although some argue that the way to support human rights is to refuse trade with China, this punishes precisely those who are most likely to change the system. Put bluntly, Li Peng and the Chinese conservatives want to continue to run the economy by state fiat. Of course, there should be tight export controls on the transfer of militarily sensitive technology to China. But trade in general can open up the Chinese economy and, ultimately, its politics too. This view requires faith in the power of markets and economic freedom to drive political change, but it is a faith confirmed by experiences around the globe.

Even if there is an argument for economic interaction with Beijing, China is still a potential threat to stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Its military power is currently no match for that of the United States. But that condition is not necessarily permanent. What we do know is that China is a great power with unresolved vital interests, particularly concerning Taiwan and the South China Sea. China resents the role of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region. This means that China is not a "status quo" power but one that would like to alter Asia's balance of power in its own favor. That alone makes it a strategic competitor, not the "strategic partner" the Clinton administration once called it. Add to this China's record of cooperation with Iran and Pakistan in the proliferation of ballistic-missile technology, and the security problem is obvious. China will do what it can to enhance its position, whether by stealing nuclear secrets or by trying to intimidate Taiwan.

China's success in controlling the balance of power depends in large part on America's reaction to the challenge. The United States must deepen its cooperation with Japan and South Korea and maintain its commitment to a robust military presence in the region. It should pay closer attention to India's role in the regional balance. There is a strong tendency conceptually to connect India with Pakistan and to think only of Kashmir or the nuclear competition between the two states. But India is an element in China's calculation, and it should be in America's, too. India is not a great power yet, but it has the potential to emerge as one.

The United States also has a deep interest in the security of Taiwan. It is a model of democratic and market-oriented development, and it invests significantly in the mainland's economy. The longstanding U.S. commitment to a "one-China" policy that leaves to a future date the resolution of the relationship between Taipei and Beijing is wise. But that policy requires that neither side challenge the status quo and that Beijing, as the more powerful actor, renounce the use of force. U.S. resolve anchors this policy. The Clinton administration tilted toward Beijing, when, for instance, it used China's formulation of the "three no's" during the president's trip there. Taiwan has been looking for attention and reassurance ever since. If the United States is resolute, peace can be maintained in the Taiwan Strait until a political settlement on democratic terms is available.

Some things take time. U.S. policy toward China requires nuance and balance. It is important to promote China's internal transition through economic interaction while containing Chinese power and security ambitions. Cooperation should be pursued, but we should never be afraid to confront Beijing when our interests collide.

RUSSIAN WEAKNESS

RUSSIA PRESENTS a different challenge. It still has many of the attributes of a great power: a large population, vast territory, and military potential. But its economic weakness and problems of national identity threaten to overwhelm it. Moscow is determined to assert itself in the world and often does so in

ways that are at once haphazard and threatening to American interests. The picture is complicated by Russia's own internal transition -- one that the United States wants to see succeed. The old Soviet system has broken down, and some of the basic elements of democratic development are in place. People are free to say what they think, vote for whom they please, and (for the most part) worship freely. But the democratic fragments are not institutionalized -- with the exception of the Communist Party, political parties are weak -- and the balance of political power is so strongly in favor of the president that he often rules simply by decree. Of course, few pay attention to Boris Yeltsin's decrees, and the Russian government has been mired in inaction and stagnation for at least three years. Russia's economic troubles and its high-level corruption have been widely discussed in recent months; Russia's economy is not becoming a market but is mutating into something else. Widespread barter, banks that are not banks, billions of rubles stashed abroad and in mattresses at home, and bizarre privatization schemes that have enriched the so-called reformers give Moscow's economy a medieval tinge.

The problem for U.S. policy is that the Clinton administration's embrace of Yeltsin and those who were thought to be reformers around him has failed. Yeltsin is Russia's president and clearly the United States had to deal with the head of state. But support for democracy and economic reform became support for Yeltsin. His agenda became the American agenda. The United States certified that reform was taking place where it was not, continuing to disburse money from the International Monetary Fund in the absence of any evidence of serious change. The curious privatization methods were hailed as economic liberalization; the looting of the country's assets by powerful people either went unnoticed or was ignored. The realities in Russia simply did not accord with the administration's script about Russian economic reform. The United States should not be faulted for trying to help. But, as the Russian reformer Grigori Yavlinsky has said, the United States should have "told the truth" about what was happening.

Now we have a dual credibility problem -- with Russians and with Americans. There are signs of life in the Russian economy. The financial crash of August 1998 forced import substitution, and domestic production has increased as the resilient Russian people have taken matters into their own hands. Rising oil prices have helped as well. But these are short-term fixes. There is no longer a consensus in America or Europe on what to do next with Russia. Frustrated expectations and "Russia fatigue" are direct consequences of the "happy talk" in which the Clinton administration engaged.

Russia's economic future is now in the hands of the Russians. The country is not without assets, including its natural resources and an educated population. It is up to Russia to make structural reforms, particularly concerning the rule of law and the tax codes, so that investors -- foreign and domestic -- will provide the capital needed for economic growth. That opportunity will arise once there is a new government in Moscow after last December's Duma elections and next June's presidential election. But the cultural changes ultimately needed to sustain a functioning civil society and a market-based economy may take a generation. Western openness to Russia's people, particularly its youth, in exchange programs and contact with the private sector and educational opportunities can help that process. It is also important to engage the leadership of Russia's diverse regions, where economic and social policies are increasingly pursued independently of Moscow.

In the meantime, U.S. policy must concentrate on the important security agenda with Russia. First, it must recognize that American security is threatened less by Russia's strength than by its weakness and incoherence. This suggests immediate attention to the safety and security of Moscow's nuclear forces and stockpile. The Nunn-Lugar program should be funded fully and pursued aggressively. (Because American contractors do most of the work, the risk of the diversion of funds is low.) Second, Washington must begin a comprehensive discussion with Moscow on the changing nuclear threat. Much has been made by Russian military officials about their increased reliance on nuclear weapons in the face of their declining conventional readiness. The Russian deterrent is more than adequate against the U.S. nuclear arsenal, and vice versa. But that fact need no longer be enshrined in a treaty that is almost 30 years old and is a relic of

a profoundly adversarial relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Anti -- Ballistic Missile Treaty was intended to prevent the development of national missile defenses in the Cold War security environment. Today, the principal concerns are nuclear threats from the Iraqs and North Korea of the world and the possibility of unauthorized releases as nuclear weapons spread.

Moscow, in fact, lives closer to those threats than Washington does. It ought to be possible to engage the Russians in a discussion of the changed threat environment, their possible responses, and the relationship of strategic offensive-force reductions to the deployment of defenses. The United States should make clear that it prefers to move cooperatively toward a new offense-defense mix, but that it is prepared to do so unilaterally. Moscow should understand, too, that any possibilities for sharing technology or information in these areas would depend heavily on its record -- problematic to date -- on the proliferation of ballistic-missile and other technologies related to WMD. It would be foolish in the extreme to share defenses with Moscow if it either leaks or deliberately transfers weapons technologies to the very states against which America is defending.

Finally, the United States needs to recognize that Russia is a great power, and that we will always have interests that conflict as well as coincide. The war in Chechnya, located in the oil-rich Caucasus, is particularly dangerous. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has used the war to stir nationalism at home while fueling his own political fortunes. The Russian military has been uncharacteristically blunt and vocal in asserting its duty to defend the integrity of the Russian Federation -- an unwelcome development in civil-military relations. The long-term effect on Russia's political culture should not be underestimated. And the war has affected relations between Russia and its neighbors in the Caucasus, as the Kremlin hurls charges of harboring and abetting Chechen terrorists against states as diverse as Saudi Arabia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. The war is a reminder of the vulnerability of the small, new states around Russia and of America's interest in their independence. If they can become stronger, they will be less tempting to Russia. But much depends on the ability of these states to reform their economies and political systems -- a process, to date, whose success is mixed at best.

COPING WITH ROGUE REGIMES

AS HISTORY MARCHES toward markets and democracy, some states have been left by the side of the road. Iraq is the prototype. Saddam Hussein's regime is isolated, his conventional military power has been severely weakened, his people live in poverty and terror, and he has no useful place in international politics. He is therefore determined to develop WMD. Nothing will change until Saddam is gone, so the United States must mobilize whatever resources it can, including support from his opposition, to remove him.

The regime of Kim Jong Il is so opaque that it is difficult to know its motivations, other than that they are malign. But North Korea also lives outside of the international system. Like East Germany, North Korea is the evil twin of a successful regime just across its border. It must fear its eventual demise from the sheer power and pull of South Korea. Pyongyang, too, has little to gain and everything to lose from engagement in the international economy. The development of WMD thus provides the destructive way out for Kim Jong Il.

President Kim Dae Jung of South Korea is attempting to find a peaceful resolution with the north through engagement. Any U.S. policy toward the north should depend heavily on coordination with Seoul and Tokyo. In that context, the 1994 framework agreement that attempted to bribe North Korea into forsaking nuclear weapons cannot easily be set aside. Still, there is a trap inherent in this approach: sooner or later Pyongyang will threaten to test a missile one too many times, and the United States will not respond with further benefits. Then what will Kim Jong Il do? The possibility for miscalculation is very high.

One thing is clear: the United States must approach regimes like North Korea resolutely and decisively. The Clinton administration has failed here, sometimes threatening to use force and then backing down, as it often has with Iraq. These regimes are living on borrowed time, so there need be no sense of panic about them. Rather, the first line of defense should be a clear and classical statement of deterrence -- if they do acquire WMD, their weapons will be unusable because any attempt to use them will bring national obliteration. Second, we should accelerate efforts to defend against these weapons. This is the most important reason to deploy national and theater missile defenses as soon as possible, to focus attention on U.S. homeland defenses against chemical and biological agents, and to expand intelligence capabilities against terrorism of all kinds.

Finally, there is the Iranian regime. Iran's motivation is not to disrupt simply the development of an international system based on markets and democracy, but to replace it with an alternative: fundamentalist Islam. Fortunately, the Iranians do not have the kind of reach and power that the Soviet Union enjoyed in trying to promote its socialist alternative. But Iran's tactics have posed real problems for U.S. security. It has tried to destabilize moderate Arab states such as Saudi Arabia, though its relations with the Saudis have improved recently. Iran has also supported terrorism against America and Western interests and attempted to develop and transfer sensitive military technologies.

Iran presents special difficulties in the Middle East, a region of core interest to the United States and to our key ally Israel. Iranian weaponry increasingly threatens Israel directly. As important as Israel's efforts to reach peace with its Arab neighbors are to the future of the Middle East, they are not the whole story of stability in the region. Israel has a real security problem, so defense cooperation with the United States -- particularly in the area of ballistic missile defense -- is critical. That in turn will help Israel protect itself both through agreements and through enhanced military power.

Still, it is important to note that there are trends in Iran that bear watching. Mohammad Khatami's election as president has given some hope of a new course for a country that once hosted a great and thriving civilization -- though there are questions about how much authority he exercises. Moreover, Khatami's more moderate domestic views may not translate into more acceptable behavior abroad. All in all, changes in U.S. policy toward Iran would require changes in Iranian behavior.

BUILDING A CONSENSUS FOR THE NATIONAL INTEREST

AMERICA IS BLESSED with an extraordinary opportunity. It has had no territorial ambitions for nearly a century. Its national interest has been defined instead by a desire to foster the spread of freedom, prosperity, and peace. Both the will of the people and the demands of modern economies accord with that vision of the future. But even America's advantages offer no guarantees of success. It is up to America's presidential leadership and policy to bridge the gap between tomorrow's possibilities and today's realities.

The president must speak to the American people about national priorities and intentions and work with Congress to focus foreign policy around the national interest. The problem today is not an absence of bipartisan spirit in Congress or the American people's disinterest. It is the existence of a vacuum. In the absence of a compelling vision, parochial interests are filling the void.

Foreign policy in a Republican administration will most certainly be internationalist; the leading contenders in the party's presidential race have strong credentials in that regard. But it will also proceed from the firm ground of the national interest, not from the interests of an illusory international community. America can exercise power without arrogance and pursue its interests without hectoring and bluster. When it does so in concert with those who share its core values, the world becomes more prosperous, democratic, and peaceful. That has been America's special role in the past, and it should be again as we enter the next century.

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SECTION: REVIEWS; Responses; Money for Nothing; A Penny Saved, Not a Penny Earned, in the U.S. Military; Pg. 149

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HEADLINE: Sized Up

BYLINE: LAWRENCE KORB; LAWRENCE KORB is Director of Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and was Assistant Secretary of Defense during the Reagan administration.

BODY:

When he was running the Pentagon, James Schlesinger was fond of responding to his critics by saying that everyone is entitled to his or her own opinions but not to his or her own facts. Unfortunately, Condoleezza Rice ("Promoting the National Interest," January/February 2000) and Robert B. Zoellick ("A Republican Foreign Policy") ignore Schlesinger's dictum when describing the Clinton administration's impact on military spending and the state of U.S. armed forces.

According to Rice, the Bush administration "was able to reduce defense spending somewhat at the end of the Cold War," but the Clinton administration "witlessly accelerated and deepened these cuts." Actually, in the Bush administration's four years, defense spending fell by 18 percent -- more than 4 percent each year. In the Clinton administration's seven years, defense spending has fallen by slightly less than 10 percent, which is slightly more than 1 percent each year. Moreover, Rice conveniently ignores the six-year plan Bush presented to Congress in January 1993, which projected a continuing decline in defense spending through 1999. Clinton's actual defense budgets were \$ 2 billion more than the final Bush defense plan for 1994 -- 99, as Daniel Goure and Jeffrey Ranney explain in their new book, *Averting the Defense Train Wreck in the New Millennium*.

Rice then details the "devastating results" of Clinton's large cuts on the U.S. military. According to her, readiness has declined, training has suffered, pay has slipped 15 percent below civilian equivalents, the services are forced to cannibalize existing equipment, and the military has much difficulty recruiting and retaining people. Leaving aside whether these (at best, misleading) statements are true and resulted from Clinton's reductions, these conditions are not related to the amount of money spent on defense. The nonpay portion of the operations and maintenance account in the defense budget, which funds training, readiness, and maintenance, is 13 percent higher now than when Bush left office. Moreover, if the spending on operations and maintenance is calculated on a per capita basis, it is nearly 40 percent higher today than in 1993.

Rice also accuses the Clinton administration of cutting defense spending to its lowest point as a percentage of GDP since Pearl Harbor. Using shares of GDP as a measure of military capability is both meaningless and misleading. If Clinton had not presided over such an extraordinary period of economic growth, his current defense budget might account for four, instead of three, percent of GDP. Should he be castigated for helping the economy grow? By Rice's GDP standard, Jimmy Carter was better for defense than George Bush.

Most troubling is Rice's suggestion that the U.S. armed forces in 2000 resemble what they were in 1940. But 60 years ago, our military ranked 16th in the world (between Portugal and Romania), was one-tenth the size of Germany's military, and had only 1.6 percent of the world's military personnel. The best way to measure the adequacy of defense spending is to compare it with that of other nations. During the Clinton administration, the U.S. share of worldwide military spending has increased. America now outspends all of its adversaries or potential adversaries combined. Together with its allies, it accounts for nearly 80 percent of the world's military expenditures.

Zoellick is also off base in his critique of the Clinton administration. He writes that it has cut the military by around 40 percent. But it was the Bush administration that reduced the active forces by 444,000, or 21 percent, in four years, unlike Clinton, who cut it only 16 percent over seven years.

Reading Rice's and Zoellick's critiques of Clinton's defense budget reminds one of the early days of the Reagan administration, when several of the president's lieutenants complained about the 1970s as the "decade of neglect of defense spending." They should be reminded that in the first seven years of that decade, the Republicans were in charge and that during President Carter's tenure, defense spending actually increased.

Unfortunately, Rice's and Zoellick's "facts" found their way into presidential candidate George W. Bush's September 1999 speech on defense policy. If the governor becomes the chief executive, one hopes he will discover that the defense funding gap during the 2000 election is like the missile gap during the 1960 election. He should also read George Wilson's new book, which cites former Air Force Chief of Staff Ron Fogelman and former Army Deputy Chief of Staff Jay Gardner as stating that an annual defense budget of \$ 250 billion, plus inflation, should be plenty for the armed services in the post -- Cold War period if spent properly. (The budget is now \$ 280 billion.) Finally, Bush should remember that during the Cold War, not a single Republican president, except Ronald Reagan, allowed defense spending to increase.

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HEADLINE: A Republican Foreign Policy

BYLINE: Robert B. Zoellick; ROBERT B. ZOELLICK served as Undersecretary of State, White House Deputy Chief of Staff, and Counselor to the Secretary of the Treasury during the Reagan and Bush administrations.

BODY:

AN ERA OF CHANGE

AT THE OPENING of the twentieth century, the United States began a quest similar to today's. The rise of American power, revolutions in technology, and great clashes abroad set the stage for a historic transformation. Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson dominated the age, as they debated and labored to promote their visions of America's role in a new international system. In 2000, the world is again in an era of rapid change, reminiscent of a century ago. The vitality of America's private economy, the preeminence of its military power, and the appeal of the country's ideas are unparalleled. But as former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher cautioned her colleagues, we must "expect the unexpected." A primary task for the next president of the United States is to build public support for a strategy that will shape the world so as to protect and promote American interests and values for the next 50 years.

At the end of the Cold War, President George Bush built on Ronald Reagan's legacy by beginning to adapt American foreign

policy to the challenges of changed circumstances. Recognizing the importance of economic ties, his administration negotiated the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), supported a free-trade agreement with Chile as a step toward free trade throughout the western hemisphere, and promoted the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) group to bind U.S. economic interests across the Pacific. The United States then employed these regional initiatives to bring the global trade talks of the Uruguay Round to the edge of conclusion. Those initiatives have created the most powerful movement toward free trade in history.

The United States also took advantage of its preeminent position to push hard for peace in a number of vital areas. In the Middle East, the United States used its standing after the Cold War and the Gulf War to break old deadlocks at the Madrid Conference and to push the Arab-Israeli peace process to a totally new plane. The Bush administration sought to reshape the strategic landscape across Europe and Russia by uniting Germany within NATO in 1990, defining a new strategic concept for NATO in 1991, opening the alliance to former enemies in 1990 and 1991, and negotiating landmark conventional and nuclear arms reduction agreements to underpin the new security framework. U.S. ties with Russia reached an impressive level of effectiveness, as demonstrated by their cooperation in the Gulf War. U.S. links with China were also slowly improving after the Tiananmen Square tragedy, as the Bush administration handled sharp differences in a way that still enabled it to foster positive change. By the end of its term, the administration had created a climate of cooperation among the world's major powers.

CLINTON'S FLAWED APPROACH

PRESIDENT BILL CLINTON'S intelligence and his ability to synthesize policy and politics at home held out the prospect that he could build on Bush's initial efforts to redefine America's position in the world. Unfortunately, the Clinton administration never adopted a guiding strategy or even demonstrated a sustained commitment to foreign policy. As a result, Clinton has failed to define a new internationalism for the United States, thus letting historic opportunities slip away.

Clinton's foreign policies have been stymied by five flaws. The first, an unwillingness to remain committed to his own priorities, has been demonstrated by his drift on international trade. Clinton started with an encouraging emphasis on trade, perhaps because he inherited a signed NAFTA deal and a partial Uruguay Round agreement that he could not abandon easily. But after 1994, the Clinton administration changed its course: it made pledges for free trade, but the reality of its policies did not match the rhetoric. Instead, the United States demanded managed-trade quotas with Japan -- precisely the wrong remedy for a country needing deregulation -- until it was compelled to retreat. Fearful of alienating protectionist political constituencies, Clinton was unwilling to build on NAFTA or even to defend it. After deferring to the new economic isolationists, Clinton seemed surprised in 1997 when he could muster only about 40 out of 200 members of his own party in the House of Representatives to support his forlorn search for the authority necessary to negotiate additional trade agreements.

These mistakes have had lasting consequences. In the early 1990s, countries throughout Latin America were competing to negotiate free-trade agreements with the United States. Recognizing the strategic value of NAFTA, they wanted to connect their economies, societies, security, and even political systems to America. Today, no one in Latin America or elsewhere expects the current administration to follow through on its statements. Latin Americans proceeded with their own customs union, which has been negotiating new trade ventures with the European Union (EU) and Japan. When East Asian economies faced their greatest financial shock in generations -- creating possibilities for structural reforms but also a need to fight protectionism with mutual liberalization -- U.S. trade negotiators stood on the sidelines. Without the initiative and leadership of the United States, all participants involved in launching the global trade talks in Seattle last November approached the meeting defensively. So the new trade round was stymied by stalemate. Washington has the power to shape global economic relations for the next 50 years, but it has marginalized itself in this crucial area.

The White House's second flaw has been to erode its credibility by offering words that are not backed by actions; this has taken a special toll with U.S. allies. It is ironic that an administration that came into office proclaiming "assertive multilateralism" has dissipated America's energies as a coalition leader. The Gulf War coalition is in tatters, not surprisingly, after years of strong language about the dangers of Saddam Hussein's machinations, followed by only tepid and reflexive

actions. Despite the American military's overwhelming superiority in Kosovo, at the end of the bombing its European allies concluded that they needed to create their own alternative to U.S. political and security leadership. After China harshly criticized Japan for agreeing to new defense guidelines with the United States, Clinton could not find one minute during his nine-day trip to China to stand by his struggling Japanese ally. The administration managed to boot out a U.N. secretary-general, but it has never developed a sustained, consistent strategy toward the organization that would serve U.S. ends. (Only a few years earlier, America had proved that a more constructive approach to the U.N. was possible when it built the Gulf War coalition and organized the repeal of the "Zionism is racism" resolution.)

The Clinton administration's third flaw is its inability to frame strategies supported by operations, which has particularly damaged its dealings with China and Russia. Neither one is the "strategic partner" that Clinton proclaimed. In fact, the distrust created by the administration has made it hard for the United States to cooperate with either country on long-term mutual interests. Sadly, the Clinton legacy with both China and Russia -- the two great powers whose future paths remain uncertain and potentially unstable -- is one of tense and suspicious relations that have been getting worse.

In the case of China, at first the administration linked human rights to normal trading relations, but it later backed down -- a clear sign of weakness. Clinton then mistakenly promised the Chinese that the United States would not grant a travel visa to the president of democratic Taiwan, Lee Teng-hui; his subsequent reversal of that decision generated distrust and counterreactions that have increased dangers between Beijing and Taipei. During Clinton's high-profile trip to China in 1998, he neglected to explain serious security differences, ultimately misleading China and failing to prepare the American public for China's missile buildup, its nuclear espionage, and its crack-downs on democracy. Next, Clinton prodded Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongji to offer the United States concessions in exchange for Chinese membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) but then inexplicably spurned Zhu's proposal during a high-profile visit, thereby weakening China's reform efforts. The agreement with China on the WTO in November 1999, although welcome, only underscores that Clinton could have cut a deal earlier that was as good or better -- avoiding a crisis that left unnecessary scars.

Clinton's Russia policy has discredited free-market economics, squandered money from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and generated widespread anti-Americanism. His "Monroeski doctrine" and his comparison of the battle in Chechnya to the U.S. Civil War have encouraged both a view of state power that conflicts with a modern, democratic Russia and a revival of Russian imperialistic attitudes. The administration's indifference to Yeltsin's shelling of the Russian legislature, among other autocratic measures, revealed a blind spot in the importance of Russia's rule of law and democratic process. Clinton has never seemed to grasp the costs of embracing an elected czar, one who oversaw a privatization drive that turned into massive theft and who now presides over pervasive corruption. Not surprisingly, this system has failed to improve the livelihood of average Russians, setting the stage for future trouble.

A fourth flaw has been Clinton's uncertainty on when and how to use American power -- frequently hesitating, then overcommitting, and regularly failing to match means with ends. This weakness has shadowed his initiatives to resolve humanitarian and ethnic strife with military intervention. His "nation-building" failure in Somalia was costly in terms of lives, the reputation of the United States, and America's confidence that it can deal effectively with such problems. The U.S. invasion of Haiti and its multi-billion-dollar effort to bring "democracy" turned out to be an unhappy reminder that supposedly good intentions cannot save a flawed policy. The United States continued to be drawn into miniwars in the Balkans without clarifying its goals or being honest about the ongoing commitment of human and material resources these U.N. "colonies" would require. The history of false starts and missteps was captured well by Clinton's own new "doctrine" on intervention in such conflicts: his words were at first stunning in their reach but were then quickly reinterpreted, leaving the world to conclude that America is confused, cynical, or both.

Finally, many of Clinton's ventures have the disquieting feature of being driven significantly by political polls and calculations; this perception has made it exceedingly hard for him to call credibly for bipartisan foreign policies. As Clinton's ad hoc foreign policies have frayed, the administration has lashed out at its critics, calling them isolationists. In fact, Clinton's inability to develop a foreign policy disciplined by sustained priorities, reliability, strategy, selectivity, and frankness has squandered opportunities. The president's mistakes have made it harder for him to complete work in areas -- such as the Middle East and Northern Ireland -- where he has invested considerable effort in bringing parties together for peace

processes. The Clinton foreign policy style has also taken its toll abroad. The administration has caused too many countries to be weary, and even resentful, of the United States. The power of the United States is obvious to the world, but Clinton has failed to use that power wisely or diplomatically. His rhetoric has contained much hubris but little credibility. America is more influential if it speaks softly, but with firm conviction. If it asserts that it is committed to do everything, its commitments to everything are suspect.

REPUBLICAN PRINCIPLES

FIVE PRINCIPLES distinguish a modern Republican foreign policy. First, it is premised on a respect for power, being neither ashamed to pursue America's national interests nor too quick to use the country's might. By matching America's power to its interests, such a policy can achieve its objectives and build credibility both at home and abroad. U.S. policy should respect the histories, perspectives, and concerns of other nations, but it should not be paralyzed by intellectual penchants for moral relativism. All states do not play equally important roles. Given America's responsibilities in the world, it must retain its freedom to act against serious dangers.

Second, a modern Republican foreign policy emphasizes building and sustaining coalitions and alliances. Effective coalition leadership requires clear-eyed judgments about priorities, an appreciation of others' interests, constant consultations among partners, and a willingness to compromise on some points but to remain focused on core objectives. Allies and coalition partners should bear their fair share of the responsibilities; if they do, their views will be represented and respected. Similarly, to have an effective U.N., the key nations that compose it must recognize that their actions -- not their speeches and posturing in an international forum -- will determine whether problems can be solved.

Third, Republicans judge international agreements and institutions as means to achieve ends, not as forms of political therapy. Agreements and institutions can facilitate bargaining, recognize common interests, and resolve differences cooperatively. But international law, unlike domestic law, merely codifies an already agreed-upon cooperation. Even among democracies, international law not backed by enforcement mechanisms will need negotiations in order to work, and international law not backed by power cannot cope with dangerous people and states. Every issue need not be dealt with multilaterally.

Fourth, a modern Republican foreign policy must embrace the revolutionary changes in the information and communications, technology, commerce, and finance sectors that will shape the environment for global politics and security. Because of these changes, people's aspirations -- to exercise their free will and transform their lives -- are rising in all corners of the globe. Communities of private groups, whether organized for business or social ends, will achieve results far beyond the reach of governments and international bureaucracies. The United States can leverage this dynamism to open minds and markets. America's foreign policy must promote these global trends. It must take practical steps to move the world toward greater freedoms and human rights. It should link itself to the agents of change around the world through new networks of free trade, information, and investment.

Finally, a modern Republican foreign policy recognizes that there is still evil in the world -- people who hate America and the ideas for which it stands. Today, we face enemies who are hard at work to develop nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, along with the missiles to deliver them. The United States must remain vigilant and have the strength to defeat its enemies. People driven by enmity or by a need to dominate will not respond to reason or goodwill. They will manipulate civilized rules for uncivilized ends.

POWER AND ECONOMICS

A MODERN Republican foreign policy should apply these principles within a long-term strategy to promote peace, security, and liberty. America must capture the dynamism of the era and transform its new elements into the economic and security foundations for a future system. The United States and its partners need to link the world's continental regions within a global economic system that secures the benefits of integration while coping with the inevitable stresses of capitalism. Looking at the

twentieth century, it is clear that peace is not ensured through closer economic ties alone; so the United States must navigate changing great-power relations, strengthen its alliances, and maintain unquestioned military superiority over dangerous regimes.

In the information age, America should promote an open architecture in order to capitalize on its greatest assets: a vibrant, innovative economy and a society that continually reinvents itself. American concepts of corporate governance, shareholder value, benchmarking, and the "value chain" are now discussed in executive offices around the globe. By incorporating advances in information and communications technologies into business processes, U.S. corporations have triggered gains in productivity similar to those achieved when companies learned how to reengineer their businesses using electrical power 100 years ago. The surge in e-commerce, already a \$ 500 billion activity, is transforming business models again. Governments everywhere are turning to privatization and deregulation to help their countries keep pace. The American entrepreneur commands an awe that matches the respect accorded the American military.

The American private sector is a powerful, attractive magnet. But the U.S. government has not used this energetic force to transform others in ways that enable America to build on its successes. Instead, growth and market imbalances have led to the largest trade deficits in American history. Although U.S. markets are generally open to the world, too many others remain closed to the United States. Countries should embrace changes that will tap the vitality and genius of people around the world, improve their livelihood and health, and open doors to freedom. Government efforts to turn back the clock, even if well-meaning, will end up hurting people. Instead, governments and societies should help people adjust to and benefit from new possibilities. Therefore, a successful U.S. foreign policy must also be based on superior education at home, low taxes that reward work and risk-taking, and secure savings and pensions for retirees.

The United States needs a strategic economic-negotiating agenda that combines regional agreements with the development of global rules for an open economy. To link up with Latin America and the Asia-Pacific region, the United States should propose free-trade agreements, with either individual countries or regional groups. If India continues its reforms, the United States should offer it a new economic partnership beginning with those Indian sectors that are open to the world or can offer large public gains through deregulation. As a new generation of leaders gains authority in the Middle East, possible peace agreements can be buttressed by drawing these societies into information-age economics and integrating their economies into world markets. African countries seeking to abandon the old, failed state controls need the incentive of open U.S. and world markets for their emerging enterprises, as well as financial backing for serious reforms. The EU and the United States should follow the lead of their increasingly integrated businesses by opening even more sectors to cross-investment and greater competition, with the aim of achieving transatlantic free trade.

These agendas should be ambitious -- ranging from farm products to e-commerce. Tariffs should be cut further. The United States should support innovative business ventures to streamline common standards. It should promote the deregulation and opening of vast new global markets for services -- in areas such as energy, airlines, finance, and entertainment. The United States should apply successful regional precedents in economic and trade liberalization to other regions or to global negotiations through the WTO. By operating at the center of this changing network, the United States -- the one economy with a truly global reach -- should promote openness among regions.

If some regions are too slow to open their markets, the United States should move on to others. America should spur a competitive dynamic for openness and transparency. Competition can work wonders: when the United States pursued NAFTA and APEC, the EU finally felt the pressure to complete the global Uruguay Round trade negotiations. If others hold back in the new WTO round, the United States should repeat this strategy of regionalism with a global goal in order to break the logjam.

This modern Republican design recognizes the benefits of regional integration and seeks to harness it for global purposes; regional integration can help countries deal more effectively with transnational problems, such as the environment or narcotics trafficking. The practice of joint action within regions, especially by private-sector groups, can be expanded to deal with common political and even security issues. The history of U.S. foreign policy is full of examples of private parties --

from missionaries to engineers -- who forwarded America's belief in the future by helping others face the challenges of the day. The very nature of the "new economy" -- with its rapidly adapting technologies, fast-paced change, and innovative spirit -- will elevate the role of private parties; they will often surpass the government in their ability to resolve inevitable disputes. These parties are not zero-sum thinkers. The U.S. government should create a climate in which citizens can serve both the private and the public good. Prosperity with a purpose is an idea that reaches far beyond U.S. borders.

If America links its economy to those of key regions, it can also promote its geopolitical agenda. Deeper integration with Latin America, Europe, and East Asia will support U.S. security commitments as citizens of these regions recognize their common interests. At best, economic interdependence will be a new glue that draws partners close together. More modestly, creating common rules for open economies will connect private sectors and help manage a combination of cooperation and competition.

This blueprint expands on America's political and economic principles. It promotes open markets and open societies, the free flow of information and ideas, and the development of the private sector -- all of which contribute to the growth of economies, middle classes, and liberties. If China, Russia, India, and others want to keep up, they will have to open up. This plan offers a positive program around which internationalists of both parties can rally to counter protectionists and isolationists. It also challenges America to sustain its openness, a feature that attracts great thinkers and doers from all over the world. It creates a dynamism that gives its diverse society cohesion and a shared purpose; and it safeguards liberty and freedom.

The public international financial institutions -- especially the IMF and the World Bank -- also need to be overhauled to match the demands of the information age and the globalization of financial markets. Considering how private-sector financial firms have changed in recent years, it is understandable that the Bretton Woods institutions of 1944 require major reengineering. First, the operations of the IMF and the World Bank must be more transparent, on-line, and real-time. They should fight corruption, which can drain both money and confidence. But they should not, out of technocratic hubris, usurp the proper roles of either creditor or debtor governments or of the private financial sector. A dependency on international bureaucracies for solutions to tough problems will dissuade national governments from taking responsibility for their countries' futures and will ultimately erode the legitimacy of both governments and international financial institutions.

The IMF still has a role to play in buffering national financial markets against shocks that threaten global stability, until self-help rebalances the capital movements. But the IMF must exercise this role in a fashion that does not add to long-term financial instability by encouraging risks for which investors are not willing to pay. Furthermore, since today's global economy (different from what it was 50 years ago) rests on private capital flows, the IMF must "bail-in" creditors, not bail them out. Private creditors must play a financial role in restructuring "national bankruptcies," just as when they have loaned money to companies in trouble; creditors can reschedule loans, take discounts, and extend more money during workouts. The World Bank should concentrate on helping people adjust to change. In poor countries, this agenda may involve improving basic health and subsistence needs while creating economic opportunities. In other low-income countries, the World Bank can assist in developing markets that will enable people to benefit from self-help.

ALLIES, ENEMIES, AND IN-BETWEENS

IN PURSUING a reinvigorated foreign policy, the United States first needs to overhaul ties with its partners and allies: its North American neighbors and its two primary partners abroad, Europe and Japan. Mexico, Canada, and the United States share an interest in building on their common democracy and prosperity by addressing problems that require greater regional cooperation -- such as narcotics, the environment, and illegal immigration. To operate effectively overseas, the United States must ensure that it has a strong neighborhood at home. Transatlantic and transpacific alliances can go a long way toward ensuring security in the eastern and western parts of Eurasia, where in the past dangerous powers have threatened the United States. These partnerships can enhance America's ability to address the uncertain futures of China and Russia. The EU and Japan are also important colleagues in ensuring an international economy hospitable to growth, dynamism, and the creative spirit.

The United States should not be complacent about its allies' roles. Europeans say they want to shoulder a greater defense responsibility -- and they should -- especially when it comes to policing their own continent. But a wide gap still separates Europe's defense oratory and its actual spending on the necessary capabilities. The United States should encourage its NATO allies to face this reality and to recognize the mutual benefit in having European defense forces operating in close concert with the U.S. military through coalitions. Ultimately, an effective European defense arm will require serious participation by British, French, and German troops.

Japan should evolve gradually toward assuming more responsibility for East Asian security, in concert with America and its allies. Only the United States can help Japan's neighbors accept this historic adjustment, which is the key to transforming Japan's domestic opinion. As a start, Japan, the United States, Korea, and Australia should form closer defense ties. Over time, Japan's forces should be more closely integrated to support the U.S. military in Asia. These steps will strengthen the posture of the Pacific democracies toward North Korea, demonstrate to China that it should seek security cooperation (and not competition) with the Asia-Pacific democracies, and channel any increased Japanese capabilities into a reassuring framework.

Second, the United States and its partners face three great challenges in Eurasia: China, Russia, and India. China has been rising, Russia has been weakening, and India has been reassessing its outlook. These are the "big ones," and more mistakes with them could cost America dearly in the future. The United States must be realistic, not romantic, about the prospects for China and Russia. These states should be integrated into the economic, security, and political arrangements that America and its allies have sponsored, although we must be prepared to shield against these countries if integration is not possible. These countries are "works in progress"; they are not yet friends and are certainly not partners, but they need not be enemies. The United States and its allies should explain to both China and Russia the steps that can build on shared interests and lessen differences. Ultimately, America will evaluate its own ability to cooperate -- and the world will assess America's willingness to do so -- based on concrete actions, not photo opportunities.

India, the world's largest democracy and before long its most populous nation, will play an increasingly important role in Asia. To grow and prosper, it will need to adjust to the global economy. To contribute to its prosperity and regional security, India will need to lower the risk of conflict with its neighbors. And to have influence with India, America must stop ignoring it. A more open India, possessing a broader understanding of its place in the world, could become a valuable partner of the United States in coping with Eurasia's uncertainties. In addition to proposing trade and investment liberalization, the United States should open a regular, high-level security dialogue with India on Eurasia and the challenges to stability.

Third, North America, the EU, and Japan need to reach out to the next group of potential partners. In varying degrees, moving at different paces, countries in central and eastern Europe, Latin America, and East Asia have been opening private markets, building middle classes, and developing representative democracies that respect individual liberties. But these countries have been subject to enormous stresses. With Latin America in particular, the United States has resumed its old, bad habit of overlooking its neighbors until problems compel it to pay attention. Resistance is slowing the momentum for democracy and free markets that Latin America kicked off a decade ago. More debt defaults, rising populism, frustrations with the lack of tangible results from economic reforms, and narcotics traffickers seeking to control governments all threaten to eclipse the movement toward what should be a historic and strategic achievement: a fully democratic and prosperous western hemisphere.

Fourth, the United States must counter those dangerous states that threaten its closest friends, such as Israel, or its vital interests, such as maintaining access to oil in the Persian Gulf. In dealing with the likes of Iraq and North Korea, the United States needs to offer consistent long-term directions to guide coalitions that will deter and even replace their brutal regimes. Concessions to blackmail and threats, even if they serve as temporary expedients, will exacerbate these problems. The United States must retain the initiative so that its opponents are so worried about what America is planning that they cannot plot attacks or new forms of blackmail. Theater and national missile defenses will let the United States counter missiles carrying weapons of mass destruction from those countries that might target U.S. conventional forces or paralyze the United States if it intervenes against their threats. Time is on America's side -- not that of these decaying dictatorships -- if the United States has the confidence and determination to stand up to, and if necessary defeat, its enemies.

MILITARY MIGHT

AMERICA'S LEADERSHIP in the next century requires a strong military, wisely used. The Clinton administration has too often relied on the U.S. military to bail out speculative diplomatic ventures that turned sour. Concurrently, America's military has been cut back some 40 percent. At some point, doing more with less just becomes doing less with less. Given the current demands on the U.S. military, the Pentagon has made the troublesome choice of trying to fund present needs at the expense of future capabilities. This spending improvisation is divorced from the administration's own plans. As the military equipment bought in the early 1980s ages, the armed services are spending more and more funds just to keep old planes, ships, and tanks operating. The administration's undersecretary of defense called this quandary a "death spiral." The chair of the joint chiefs of staff called it a "nosedive." These are strong words. The failure to prepare for the future will become sharply apparent during the next decade, when the wheels start to come off the weapons purchased some 25 years ago. As one Marine general said, "If parents are uncomfortable sending their sons and daughters to college in 25-year-old cars, what will they think about sending them into harm's way in 25-year-old helicopters?"

The challenge for the next president is not just to spend more on defense but to spend wisely. In transforming its defense strategy for the future, the United States should seek to align the military's strength with the nation's strengths: America's people and technology. U.S. companies that have not incorporated the revolutionary advances in information and communications technologies have been swept away by their competition with surprising rapidity. The Pentagon cannot afford to run a similar risk. The United States must invest in a combination of sophisticated sensors, information technology, real-time communications, and precision-guided weapons that will enable the individual services to fight together seamlessly in joint operations. Future networked forces should be smaller, quicker, easier to deploy, more dispersed, and able to destroy targets with fewer sorties and greater "standoff" capabilities. They must be able to act together when executing discrete missions -- such as suppressing air defenses, achieving complete air dominance, and destroying small, mobile targets -- that will be vital in the new security environment. They will need "more teeth and less tail." At the end of the day, gutsy soldiers in muddy boots will still have to hold ground, but they need to be the fastest to get to decisive points, with the most precise firepower to support them.

This transformation will take time. In many respects, technology is the easy part. The challenge is to integrate technology into new operational concepts, doctrines, and organizational structures -- and then to practice them. (In June 1940, the French army had more and better tanks than the German army, but the panzer leaders knew how to use blitzkrieg operations to overwhelm France within weeks.) The experience of the private sector points the way toward a smart, modernized defense for the future. Like private business executives facing new challenges, the next generation of military officers needs clear goals to guide change -- and strong support in making the country's forces achieve these goals. Only the president can establish these goals and provide the needed leadership.

The Pentagon can also learn from the private sector about cutting costs. Although the cost of civilian information-technology systems has fallen tremendously, the price of analogous military systems has not. Like other professional organizations, the Defense Department must focus on its core missions and outsource supporting activities. In leading this transformation, the next president must also challenge America's allies to keep up. In critical areas, U.S. allies in Europe and the Pacific can share significant burdens and make major contributions. In order to fight together, their forces must be interoperable. And allies should assume greater roles in peacekeeping operations, supported by unique U.S. capabilities and backed by the hammer of its robust force.

THE RIGHT TRACK

AS AMERICANS enter a new century, the history of the last one may inspire a sense of both caution and opportunity. The United States in 1900 seemed to have unbounded potential. But the first half of the twentieth century involved frightful costs. And although America achieved great accomplishments over the past 50 years, these came at a high price of lives, money, and national attention. Now a new generation must chart a course for America amid revolutionary changes in technologies, economies, societies, and weaponry. It is a mistake for the United States simply to react to events. America needs a strategy

that blends traditional truths with the opportunities of a networked market-place and a modernized army. It must be realistic about human nature and conflicting interests while being optimistic about the world's potential. America must deploy its power wisely, selectively, and consistently to mold an international system that will enhance its influence in future events. Drawing on this influence, modern Republicans believe they can work with like-minded Democrats so that America can advance both its interests and its ideals. America's potential is extraordinary, and so is the world's. It is time to get on the right track.

Editors' Note: Democratic views will be published in forthcoming issues.

GRAPHIC: Illustration, no caption

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SECTION: REVIEWS; Responses; Money for Nothing; A Penny Saved, Not a Penny Earned, in the U.S. Military; Pg. 152

LENGTH: 398 words

HEADLINE: Zoellick Replies

BYLINE: ROBERT B. ZOELLICK served as Under-secretary of State, White House Deputy Chief of Staff, and Counselor to the Secretary of the Treasury during the Reagan and Bush administrations.

BODY:
Why defenders of the Clinton administration, after its more than seven years in office, still try to blame the administration's problems on a predecessor continues to baffle me. As Lawrence Korb writes, President Bush did indeed reduce the size of America's military after the Cold War ended. The question that Korb sidesteps is why President Clinton and Vice President Gore would continue the cuts, year after year, in the face of numerous military problems: a hectic tempo of operations around the world, shortfalls in maintenance, the slippage in readiness, declines in relative pay, gaps in recruitment, housing problems, troubles in retention, increased threats from states with missiles, and the failure to procure new equipment to replace the depreciating investments made 20 years ago.

Korb's devotion to facts also wanes when he selectively cites other works on the subject. If he respects the authority of Jim Schlesinger or Dan Goure, he might have pointed out that Goure's new book, with a supportive forward by Schlesinger, documents that the Clinton administration's defense budget is nearly \$ 100 billion short each year in funding its own force plan for the next five years. This mismatch underscores my larger policy points. The administration's foreign and defense policies have been greatly weakened by its failure to match means and ends, connect strategies with operations, and back up rhetoric with actions. Korb's comments reveal that he, like Clinton, is strategically challenged. Whereas Korb maintains that the test of U.S. defense spending should be a comparison with the expenditures of other nations, a strategist would compare resources to U.S. objectives.

Unfortunately, Korb's accounting also misses the key point that leading Republican presidential candidates are making about defense policy. The strategic challenge is how the country's money should be spent transforming the military to meet new threats and to take advantage of America's existing strengths -- especially its educated people and technology. Presidential

leadership is needed to press the U.S. military to maintain its superiority under new circumstances. The Clinton administration's uncomfortable relationship with the military and its failure to understand these challenges has led it to abdicate its responsibility for designing the American military of the future.

Editors' Note: Democratic views will be published in forthcoming issues.

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March, 2000 / April, 2000

SECTION: REVIEWS; Responses; Money for Nothing; A Penny Saved, Not a Penny Earned, in the U.S. Military; Pg. 150

LENGTH: 572 words

HEADLINE: Rice Replies

BYLINE: CONDOLEEZZA RICE is Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution and Professor of Political Science at Stanford University. She is also foreign policy adviser to Republican presidential candidate George W. Bush.

BODY:

Lawrence Korb's protest of my facts reminds me of a dictum as well: If you find yourself with a mess on your hands, blame your predecessor. That is the essence of his defense of the Clinton administration.

Yes, defense spending declined during the Bush years in accordance with major reductions in American military personnel at the end of the Cold War. During such a big demobilization, 18 percent was not outrageous. It has been forgotten that the Democratic Congress thought the cuts not deep enough. The first Clinton budget was, by the way, nine percent below the Bush projections. What has happened since then? The cannibalization of equipment, pay scales inadequate to retain personnel, substandard housing, strained training budgets, and low morale are not imaginary. Read the congressional testimony of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the administration's testimony last year. Did the military's troubles occur overnight?

Indeed, the most irrelevant "fact" presented by Korb is the comparison of Bush's long-term projections with Clinton's actual budgets. Would Bush have increased the operations tempo of the military to the degree Clinton has? Would Bush then have carried through with projected cuts in defense spending and allowed the armed forces to reach the state they are now in? I rather doubt it.

But this is a moot point. Long-term projections are just that: projections. The defense budget is put together annually. George Bush has not been the commander-in-chief for seven years. So there are only two possible conclusions. Either Clinton's defense budgets have been inadequate or the Pentagon during his administration has been incompetent in managing resources. Both are probably true. If the Pentagon has not divided money properly, where has the secretary of defense been? In case Korb does not remember, the management of the Pentagon is also the administration's responsibility.

As to the low percentage of GDP spent on defense, this is simply a measure of the nation's priorities. It is not meant to be more. But Korb's analysis begs the question, Why in such good times was the military permitted to fall into this state?

Korb is also selective in the data he chooses. Operations and maintenance accounts are indeed nearly 13 percent higher now than in Bush's administration. Why? Largely because they have been funding the multiplying missions -- from Haiti to Bosnia to Kosovo -- this administration has assigned its military. These operations have been at the expense of procurement and research and development (R&D). Democratic members of the Senate Armed Services Committee recently sent a letter to the administration complaining about the lack of investment in defense R&D, which has stayed flat for several years. The operations and maintenance number exposes the shortsighted strategy that the administration's own undersecretary has called a "death spiral" -- robbing the future to pay for the present.

The Clinton administration has had seven years to build a military more robust and better suited to face post -- Cold War challenges. It inherited a strong hand -- a military that won the Gulf War. Now, under congressional and electoral pressures, the president is sprinting to undo the damage he has inflicted on the armed forces. A two-term administration is responsible for what has happened on its watch. That is a fact no analysis can erase.

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