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007	Draft	SAIS - Rostov Lecture (Dr. Rice)	10	09/11/2001	P5;

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08/31/2001 03:31:49 PM

Record Type: Record

To: John D. Gibson/NSC/EOP@EOP

cc:

Subject: Condi and Zoellick pieces in FA with replies

Condi:

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Foreign Affairs

January, 2000 / February, 2000

SECTION: EDITORS NOTE; Campaign 2000; Pg. 45

LENGTH: 6922 words

HEADLINE: Promoting the National Interest

BYLINE: Condoleezza Rice; CONDOLEEZZA RICE is Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution and Professor of Political Science at Stanford University. She is also foreign policy adviser to Republican presidential candidate George W. B

BODY:

LIFE AFTER THE COLD WAR

THE UNITED STATES has found it exceedingly difficult to define its "national interest" in the absence of Soviet power. We do not know how to think about what follows the U.S.-Soviet confrontation is clear from the continued references to the "post -- Cold War period." Yet such periods of transition are important, because they offer strategic opportunities. In these fluid times, one can affect the shape of the world to come.

The enormity of the moment is obvious. The Soviet Union was more than just a traditional global competitor; it strove to provide a universal socialist alternative to markets and democracy. The Soviet Union quarantined itself and many often-unwitting captives and clients from the rigors of international capitalism. In the end, it sowed the seeds of its own destruction, becoming in isolation an economic and technological dinosaur.

But this is only part of the story. The Soviet Union's collapse coincided with another great revolution. Dramatic changes in information technology and the growth of "knowledge-based" industries altered the very basis of economic dynamics, accelerating already noticeable trends in economic interaction that often circumvented and ignored state boundaries. Global competition for capital investment has intensified, states have faced difficult choices about their internal economic, political, and social structures. As the prototype of this "new economy," the United States has seen its economic influence grow and with it, its diplomatic influence. America has emerged as both the principal benefactor of these simultaneous revolutions and their beneficiary.

The process of outlining a new foreign policy must begin by recognizing that the United States is in a remarkable position. Powerful secular trends are moving the world toward economic openness and -- more unevenly -- democracy and individual liberty. Some states have one foot on the train and the other off. Some states still hope to find a way to decouple de-

and economic progress. Some hold on to old hatreds as diversions from the modernizing task at hand. But the Unit and its allies are on the right side of history.

In such an environment, American policies must help further these favorable trends by maintaining a disciplined and consistent foreign policy that separates the important from the trivial. The Clinton administration has assiduously av implementing such an agenda. Instead, every issue has been taken on its own terms -- crisis by crisis, day by day. courage to set priorities because doing so is an admission that American foreign policy cannot be all things to all pe rather, to all interest groups. The Clinton administration's approach has its advantages: If priorities and intent are no they cannot be criticized. But there is a high price to pay for this approach. In a democracy as pluralistic as ours, the absence of an articulated "national interest" either produces a fertile ground for those wishing to withdraw from the w creates a vacuum to be filled by parochial groups and transitory pressures.

THE ALTERNATIVE

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY in a Republican administration should refocus the United States on the national inte the pursuit of key priorities. These tasks are

- * to ensure that America's military can deter war, project power, and fight in defense of its interests if deterrence fail
- * to promote economic growth and political openness by extending free trade and a stable international monetary sy all committed to these principles, including in the western hemisphere, which has too often been neglected as a vita U.S. national interest;
- * to renew strong and intimate relationships with allies who share American values and can thus share the burden o promoting peace, prosperity, and freedom;
- * to focus U.S. energies on comprehensive relationships with the big powers, particularly Russia and China, that ca mold the character of the international political system; and
- * to deal decisively with the threat of rogue regimes and hostile powers, which is increasingly taking the forms of the for terrorism and the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

INTERESTS AND IDEALS

POWER MATTERS, both the exercise of power by the United States and the ability of others to exercise it. Yet man United States are (and have always been) uncomfortable with the notions of power politics, great powers, and powe balances. In an extreme form, this discomfort leads to a reflexive appeal instead to notions of international law and and the belief that the support of many states -- or even better, of institutions like the United Nations -- is essential t legitimate exercise of power. The "national interest" is replaced with "humanitarian interests" or the interests of "the international community." The belief that the United States is exercising power legitimately only when it is doing so of someone or something else was deeply rooted in Wilsonian thought, and there are strong echoes of it in the Clin administration. To be sure, there is nothing wrong with doing something that benefits all humanity, but that is, in a s second-order effect. America's pursuit of the national interest will create conditions that promote freedom, markets, peace. Its pursuit of national interests after World War II led to a more prosperous and democratic world. This can h again.

So multilateral agreements and institutions should not be ends in themselves. U.S. interests are served by having s alliances and can be promoted within the U.N. and other multilateral organizations, as well as through well-crafted international agreements. But the Clinton administration has often been so anxious to find multilateral solutions to p that it has signed agreements that are not in America's interest. The Kyoto treaty is a case in point: whatever the fa global warming, a treaty that does not include China and exempts "developing" countries from tough standards whil penalizing American industry cannot possibly be in America's national interest.

Similarly, the arguments about U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty are instructive. Since 1992, t

States has refrained unilaterally from testing nuclear weapons. It is an example to the rest of the world yet does not own hands "in perpetuity" if testing becomes necessary again. But in pursuit of a "norm" against the acquisition of n weapons, the United States signed a treaty that was not verifiable, did not deal with the threat of the development o weapons by rogue states, and threatened the reliability of the nuclear stockpile. Legitimate congressional concerns substance of the treaty were ignored during negotiations. When faced with the defeat of a bad treaty, the administra attacked the motives of its opponents -- incredibly branding long-standing internationalists like Senators Richard Lu (R-Ind.) and John Warner (R-Va.) as isolationists.

Certainly, Republican presidents have not been immune to the practice of pursuing symbolic agreements of questio value. According to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, some 52 conventions, agreements, and treaties still a ratification; some even date back to 1949. But the Clinton administration's attachment to largely symbolic agreemen pursuit of, at best, illusory "norms" of international behavior have become an epidemic. That is not leadership. Neith isolationist to suggest that the United States has a special role in the world and should not adhere to every internati convention and agreement that someone thinks to propose.

Even those comfortable with notions of the "national interest" are still queasy with a focus on power relationships an great-power politics. The reality is that a few big powers can radically affect international peace, stability, and prosp These states are capable of disruption on a grand scale, and their fits of anger or acts of beneficence affect hundre millions of people. By reason of size, geographic position, economic potential, and military strength, they are capab influencing American welfare for good or ill. Moreover, that kind of power is usually accompanied by a sense of enti play a decisive role in international politics. Great powers do not just mind their own business.

Some worry that this view of the world ignores the role of values, particularly human rights and the promotion of dem fact, there are those who would draw a sharp line between power politics and a principled foreign policy based on v polarized view -- you are either a realist or devoted to norms and values -- may be just fine in academic debate, but disaster for American foreign policy. American values are universal. People want to say what they think, worship as wish, and elect those who govern them; the triumph of these values is most assuredly easier when the international of power favors those who believe in them. But sometimes that favorable balance of power takes time to achieve, b internationally and within a society. And in the meantime, it is simply not possible to ignore and isolate other powerf that do not share those values.

The Cold War is a good example. Few would deny that the collapse of the Soviet Union profoundly transformed the democracy and human rights in eastern and central Europe and the former Soviet territories. Nothing improved hum as much as the collapse of Soviet power. Throughout the Cold War, the United States pursued a policy that promot political liberty, using every instrument from the Voice of America to direct presidential intervention on behalf of diss But it lost sight neither of the importance of the geopolitical relationship with Moscow nor of the absolute necessity o retaining robust American military power to deter an all-out military confrontation.

In the 1970s, the Soviet Union was at the height of its power -- which it was more than willing to use. Given its weak economic and technological base, the victories of that period turned out to be Pyrrhic. President Reagan's challeng power was both resolute and well timed. It included intense substantive engagements with Moscow across the entir issues captured in the "four-part agenda" (arms control, human rights, economic issues, and regional conflicts). The administration then focused greater attention on rolling back Soviet power in central and eastern Europe. As the So Union's might waned, it could no longer defend its interests and gave up peacefully (thankfully) to the West -- a trem victory for Western power and also for human liberty.

SETTING PRIORITIES

THE UNITED STATES has many sources of power in the pursuit of its goals. The global economy demands econo liberalization, greater openness and transparency, and at the very least, access to information technology. Internati economic policies that leverage the advantages of the American economy and expand free trade are the decisive to shaping international politics. They permit us to reach out to states as varied as South Africa and India and to enga neighbors in the western hemisphere in a shared interest in economic prosperity. The growth of entrepreneurial cla throughout the world is an asset in the promotion of human rights and individual liberty, and it should be understood

as such. Yet peace is the first and most important condition for continued prosperity and freedom. America's military must be secure because the United States is the only guarantor of global peace and stability. The current neglect of America's armed forces threatens its ability to maintain peace.

The Bush administration had been able to reduce defense spending somewhat at the end of the Cold War in 1991. Clinton administration witlessly accelerated and deepened these cuts. The results were devastating: military readiness declined, training suffered, military pay slipped 15 percent below civilian equivalents, morale plummeted, and the service cannibalized existing equipment to keep airplanes flying, ships afloat, and tanks moving. The increased difficulty in people to the armed forces or retaining them is hardly surprising.

Moreover, the administration began deploying American forces abroad at a furious pace -- an average of once every week. As it cut defense spending to its lowest point as a percentage of GDP since Pearl Harbor, the administration deployed the armed forces more often than at any time in the last 50 years. Some of the deployments themselves were questionable, such as in Haiti. But more than anything it was simply unwise to multiply missions in the face of a continuing budget reduction. Means and mission were not matched, and (predictably) the already thinly stretched armed forces came close to a breaking point. When all these trends became so obvious and embarrassing that they could no longer be denied, the administration finally requested increased defense spending. But the "death spiral," as the administration's own under-secretary of defense called it -- robbing procurement and research and development simply to operate the army -- was already well under way. That the administration did nothing, choosing instead to live off the fruits of Reagan's buildup, constitutes an extraordinary neglect of the fiduciary responsibilities of the commander in chief.

Now the next president will be confronted with a prolonged job of repair. Military readiness will have to take center stage, particularly those aspects that affect the living conditions of the troops -- military pay, housing -- and also training. New weapons will have to be procured in order to give the military the capacity to carry out today's missions. But even in current state, the American military still enjoys a commanding technological lead and therefore has a battlefield advantage over any competitor. Thus the next president should refocus the Pentagon's priorities on building the military of the 21st century rather than continuing to build on the structure of the Cold War. U.S. technological advantages should be used to build forces that are lighter and more lethal, more mobile and agile, and capable of firing accurately from long distances. In order to do this, Washington must reallocate resources, perhaps in some cases skipping a generation of technology leaps rather than incremental improvements in its forces.

The other major concern is a loss of focus on the mission of the armed forces. What does it mean to deter, fight, and win wars and defend the national interest? First, the American military must be able to meet decisively the emergence of hostile military power in the Asia-Pacific region, the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and Europe -- areas in which not only American interests but also those of our key allies are at stake. America's military is the only one capable of this deterrence function and it must not be stretched or diverted into areas that weaken these broader responsibilities. It is the role that the United States played when Saddam Hussein threatened the Persian Gulf, and it is the power needed to deter trouble on the Korean Peninsula or across the Taiwan Strait. In the latter cases, the goal is to make it inconceivable for North Korea or China to force because American military power is a compelling factor in their equations.

Some small-scale conflicts clearly have an impact on American strategic interests. Such was the case with Kosovo, which was in the backyard of America's most important strategic alliance: NATO. In fact, Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic's rejection of peaceful coexistence with the Kosovar Albanians threatened to rock the area's fragile ethnic balance. Europe is a patchwork of ethnic minorities. For the most part, Hungarians and Romanians, Bulgarians and Turks, Ukrainians and Russians have found a way since 1991 of preventing their differences from exploding. Milosevic was an exception, and the United States had an overriding strategic interest in stopping him. There was, of course, a humanitarian disaster looming as well, but in the absence of concerns based on the interests of the alliance, the case for intervention would have been more tenuous.

The Kosovo war was conducted incompetently, in part because the administration's political goals kept shifting and because it was not, at the start, committed to the decisive use of military force. That President Clinton was surprised by Milosevic's tenacity is, well, surprising. If there is any lesson from history, it is that small powers with everything to lose are often more stubborn than big powers, for whom the conflict is merely one among many problems. The lesson, too, is that if you are worth fighting for, you had better be prepared to win. Also, there must be a political game plan that will permit the

withdrawal of our forces -- something that is still completely absent in Kosovo.

But what if our values are attacked in areas that are not arguably of strategic concern? Should the United States not save lives in the absence of an overriding strategic rationale? The next American president should be in a position to when he believes, and can make the case, that the United States is duty-bound to do so. "Humanitarian intervention" be ruled out a priori. But a decision to intervene in the absence of strategic concerns should be understood for what. Humanitarian problems are rarely only humanitarian problems; the taking of life or withholding of food is almost always a political act. If the United States is not prepared to address the underlying political conflict and to know whose side the military may end up separating warring parties for an indefinite period. Sometimes one party (or both) can come to the United States as the enemy. Because the military cannot, by definition, do anything decisive in these "humanitarian" crises, the chances of misreading the situation and ending up in very different circumstances are very high. This was essentially the problem of "mission creep" in Somalia.

The president must remember that the military is a special instrument. It is lethal, and it is meant to be. It is not a civil police force. It is not a political referee. And it is most certainly not designed to build a civilian society. Military force is used to support clear political goals, whether limited, such as expelling Saddam from Kuwait, or comprehensive, such as demanding the unconditional surrender of Japan and Germany during World War II. It is one thing to have a limited goal and to fight decisively for it; it is quite another to apply military force incrementally, hoping to find a political solution somewhere along the way. A president entering these situations must ask whether decisive force is possible and is likely to be effective and must know how and when to get out. These are difficult criteria to meet, so U.S. intervention in these "humanitarian" crises should be, at best, exceedingly rare.

This does not mean that the United States must ignore humanitarian and civil conflicts around the world. But the military cannot be involved everywhere. Often, these tasks might be better carried out by regional actors, as modeled by the Australian-led intervention in East Timor. The U.S. might be able to lend financial, logistical, and intelligence support. Sometimes tough, competent diplomacy in the beginning can prevent the need for military force later. Using the American armed forces as the world's "911" will degrade capabilities, bog soldiers down in peacekeeping roles, and fuel concerns among other great powers that the United States has decided to enforce notions of "limited sovereignty" worldwide in the name of humanitarianism. This overly broad definition of America's national interest is bound to backfire as others arrogate that authority to themselves. Or we will find ourselves looking to the United Nations to sanction the use of American military in these cases, implying that we will do so even when our vital interests are involved, which would also be a mistake.

DEALING WITH THE POWERFUL

ANOTHER CRUCIAL TASK for the United States is to focus on relations with other powerful states. Although the United States is fortunate to count among its friends several great powers, it is important not to take them for granted -- so that there is a firm foundation when it comes time to rely on them. The challenges of China and North Korea require coordinated cooperation with Japan and South Korea. The signals that we send to our real partners are important. Never again should an American president go to Beijing for nine days and refuse to stop in Tokyo or Seoul.

There is work to do with the Europeans, too, on defining what holds the transatlantic alliance together in the absence of a Soviet threat. NATO is badly in need of attention in the wake of Kosovo and with the looming question of its further enlargement in 2002 and beyond. The door to NATO for the remaining states of eastern and central Europe should be open, as many are actively preparing to meet the criteria for membership. But the parallel track of NATO's own evolution, its attention to the definition of its mission, and its ability to digest and then defend new members has been neglected. Moreover, the United States has an interest in shaping the European defense identity -- welcoming a greater European military capability as long as it is within the context of NATO. NATO has a very full agenda. Membership in NATO means nothing to anyone if the organization is no longer militarily capable and if it is unclear about its mission.

For America and our allies, the most daunting task is to find the right balance in our policy toward Russia and China. Both are equally important to the future of international peace, but the challenges they pose are very different. China is a rising power; in economic terms, that should be good news, because in order to maintain its economic dynamism, China must become more integrated into the international economy. This will require increased openness and transparency and the growth of private industry. The political struggle in Beijing is over how to maintain the Communist Party's monopoly on power.

see economic reform, growth, and a better life for the Chinese people as the key. Others see the inherent contradiction between loosening economic control and maintaining the party's political dominance. As China's economic problems multiply -- slowing growth rates, failing banks, inert state enterprises, and rising unemployment, this struggle will intensify.

It is in America's interest to strengthen the hands of those who seek economic integration because this will probably sustain and organize pressures for political liberalization. There are no guarantees, but in scores of cases from Spain to Taiwan, the link between democracy and economic liberalization has proven powerful over the long run. The economic interaction is, in fact, good -- not only for America's economic growth but for its political aims as well. Human rights concerns should not move to the sidelines in the meantime. Rather, the American president should press the leadership for change. But it is wise to remember that our influence through moral arguments and commitment is still in the face of Beijing's pervasive political control. The big trends toward the spread of information, the access of young Chinese to American values through educational exchanges and training, and the growth of an entrepreneurial class that does not owe its livelihood to the state are, in the end, likely to have a more powerful effect on life in China.

Although some argue that the way to support human rights is to refuse trade with China, this punishes precisely those who are most likely to change the system. Put bluntly, Li Peng and the Chinese conservatives want to continue to run the economy by state fiat. Of course, there should be tight export controls on the transfer of militarily sensitive technology to China. But trade in general can open up the Chinese economy and, ultimately, its politics too. This view requires faith in the power of markets and economic freedom to drive political change, but it is a faith confirmed by experiences around the world.

Even if there is an argument for economic interaction with Beijing, China is still a potential threat to stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Its military power is currently no match for that of the United States. But that condition is not necessarily permanent. What we do know is that China is a great power with unresolved vital interests, particularly concerning Taiwan and the South China Sea. China resents the role of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region. This means that China is a "status quo" power but one that would like to alter Asia's balance of power in its own favor. That alone makes it a competitor, not the "strategic partner" the Clinton administration once called it. Add to this China's record of cooperation with Iran and Pakistan in the proliferation of ballistic-missile technology, and the security problem is obvious. China will do what it can to enhance its position, whether by stealing nuclear secrets or by trying to intimidate Taiwan.

China's success in controlling the balance of power depends in large part on America's reaction to the challenge. The United States must deepen its cooperation with Japan and South Korea and maintain its commitment to a robust military presence in the region. It should pay closer attention to India's role in the regional balance. There is a strong tendency to connect India with Pakistan and to think only of Kashmir or the nuclear competition between the two states. But India is an important element in China's calculation, and it should be in America's, too. India is not a great power yet, but it has the potential to emerge as one.

The United States also has a deep interest in the security of Taiwan. It is a model of democratic and market-oriented development, and it invests significantly in the mainland's economy. The longstanding U.S. commitment to a "one-China" policy that leaves to a future date the resolution of the relationship between Taipei and Beijing is wise. But that policy must be one that neither side challenges and that Beijing, as the more powerful actor, renounces the use of force. U.S. resolve anchors this policy. The Clinton administration tilted toward Beijing, when, for instance, it used China's form of the "three no's" during the president's trip there. Taiwan has been looking for attention and reassurance ever since. The United States is resolute; peace can be maintained in the Taiwan Strait until a political settlement on democratic terms is available.

Some things take time. U.S. policy toward China requires nuance and balance. It is important to promote China's transition through economic interaction while containing Chinese power and security ambitions. Cooperation should be pursued, but we should never be afraid to confront Beijing when our interests collide.

RUSSIAN WEAKNESS

RUSSIA PRESENTS a different challenge. It still has many of the attributes of a great power: a large population, vast territory, and military potential. But its economic weakness and problems of national identity threaten to overwhelm it. Moscow is determined to assert itself in the world and often does so in ways that are at once haphazard and threatening.

American interests. The picture is complicated by Russia's own internal transition -- one that the United States wants to succeed. The old Soviet system has broken down, and some of the basic elements of democratic development are missing. People are free to say what they think, vote for whom they please, and (for the most part) worship freely. But the democratic fragments are not institutionalized -- with the exception of the Communist Party, political parties are weak -- and the concentration of political power is so strongly in favor of the president that he often rules simply by decree. Of course, few pay attention to Boris Yeltsin's decrees, and the Russian government has been mired in inaction and stagnation for at least three years. Russia's economic troubles and its high-level corruption have been widely discussed in recent months; Russia's economy is not becoming a market but is mutating into something else. Widespread barter, banks that are not banks, billions of dollars stashed abroad and in mattresses at home, and bizarre privatization schemes that have enriched the so-called reformers have given Moscow's economy a medieval tinge.

The problem for U.S. policy is that the Clinton administration's embrace of Yeltsin and those who were thought to be reformers around him has failed. Yeltsin is Russia's president and clearly the United States had to deal with the head of state. But support for democracy and economic reform became support for Yeltsin. His agenda became the American agenda. The United States certified that reform was taking place where it was not, continuing to disburse money from the International Monetary Fund in the absence of any evidence of serious change. The curious privatization methods used as economic liberalization; the looting of the country's assets by powerful people either went unnoticed or was ignored. Realities in Russia simply did not accord with the administration's script about Russian economic reform. The United States should not be faulted for trying to help. But, as the Russian reformer Grigori Yavlinsky has said, the United States has "told the truth" about what was happening.

Now we have a dual credibility problem -- with Russians and with Americans. There are signs of life in the Russian economy. The financial crash of August 1998 forced import substitution, and domestic production has increased as the resilient Russian people have taken matters into their own hands. Rising oil prices have helped as well. But these are short-term gains. There is no longer a consensus in America or Europe on what to do next with Russia. Frustrated expectations and "fatigue" are direct consequences of the "happy talk" in which the Clinton administration engaged.

Russia's economic future is now in the hands of the Russians. The country is not without assets, including its natural resources and an educated population. It is up to Russia to make structural reforms, particularly concerning the rule of law and the tax codes, so that investors -- foreign and domestic -- will provide the capital needed for economic growth. An opportunity will arise once there is a new government in Moscow after last December's Duma elections and next June's presidential election. But the cultural changes ultimately needed to sustain a functioning civil society and a market-based economy may take a generation. Western openness to Russia's people, particularly its youth, in exchange programs, contact with the private sector and educational opportunities can help that process. It is also important to engage the leadership of Russia's diverse regions, where economic and social policies are increasingly pursued independently of Moscow.

In the meantime, U.S. policy must concentrate on the important security agenda with Russia. First, it must recognize that American security is threatened less by Russia's strength than by its weakness and incoherence. This suggests immediate attention to the safety and security of Moscow's nuclear forces and stockpile. The Nunn-Lugar program should be funded and pursued aggressively. (Because American contractors do most of the work, the risk of the diversion of funds is small.) Second, Washington must begin a comprehensive discussion with Moscow on the changing nuclear threat. Much has been made by Russian military officials about their increased reliance on nuclear weapons in the face of their declining conventional readiness. The Russian deterrent is more than adequate against the U.S. nuclear arsenal, and vice versa. That fact need no longer be enshrined in a treaty that is almost 30 years old and is a relic of a profoundly adversarial relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty was intended to preclude development of national missile defenses in the Cold War security environment. Today, the principal concerns are threats from Iraq and North Korea and the possibility of unauthorized releases of nuclear weapons.

Moscow, in fact, lives closer to those threats than Washington does. It ought to be possible to engage the Russians in a discussion of the changed threat environment, their possible responses, and the relationship of strategic offensive force reductions to the deployment of defenses. The United States should make clear that it prefers to move to a cooperative new offense-defense mix, but that it is prepared to do so unilaterally. Moscow should understand, too, that any possibility for sharing technology or information in these areas would depend heavily on its record -- problematic to date -- on

proliferation of ballistic-missile and other technologies related to WMD. It would be foolish in the extreme to share d with Moscow if it either leaks or deliberately transfers weapons technologies to the very states against which Ameri defending.

Finally, the United States needs to recognize that Russia is a great power, and that we will always have interests th as well as coincide. The war in Chechnya, located in the oil-rich Caucasus, is particularly dangerous. Prime Ministe Putin has used the war to stir nationalism at home while fueling his own political fortunes. The Russian military has uncharacteristically blunt and vocal in asserting its duty to defend the integrity of the Russian Federation -- an unwe development in civil-military relations. The long-term effect on Russia's political culture should not be underestimate war has affected relations between Russia and its neighbors in the Caucasus, as the Kremlin hurls charges of harb abetting Chechen terrorists against states as diverse as Saudi Arabia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. The war is a remin vulnerability of the small, new states around Russia and of America's interest in their independence. If they can bec stronger, they will be less tempting to Russia. But much depends on the ability of these states to reform their econo political systems -- a process, to date, whose success is mixed at best.

COPING WITH ROGUE REGIMES

AS HISTORY MARCHES toward markets and democracy, some states have been left by the side of the road. Iraq prototype. Saddam Hussein's regime is isolated, his conventional military power has been severely weakened, his p in poverty and terror, and he has no useful place in international politics. He is therefore determined to develop WM will change until Saddam is gone, so the United States must mobilize whatever resources it can, including support f opposition, to remove him.

The regime of Kim Jong I1 is so opaque that it is difficult to know its motivations, other than that they are malign. Bu Korea also lives outside of the international system. Like East Germany, North Korea is the evil twin of a successfu just across its border. It must fear its eventual demise from the sheer power and pull of South Korea. Pyongyang, to little to gain and everything to lose from engagement in the international economy. The development of WMD thus p the destructive way out for Kim Jong I1.

President Kim Dae Jung of South Korea is attempting to find a peaceful resolution with the north through engageme U.S. policy toward the north should depend heavily on coordination with Seoul and Tokyo. In that context, the 1994 framework agreement that attempted to bribe North Korea into forsaking nuclear weapons cannot easily be set asid there is a trap inherent in this approach: sooner or later Pyongyang will threaten to test a missile one too many time the United States will not respond with further benefits. Then what will Kim Jong II do? The possibility for miscalcula very high.

One thing is clear: the United States must approach regimes like North Korea resolutely and decisively. The Clinton administration has failed here, sometimes threatening to use force and then backing down, as it often has with Iraq. regimes are living on borrowed time, so there need be no sense of panic about them. Rather, the first line of defens be a clear and classical statement of deterrence -- if they do acquire WMD, their weapons will be unusable because attempt to use them will bring national obliteration. Second, we should accelerate efforts to defend against these we This is the most important reason to deploy national and theater missile defenses as soon as possible, to focus atte U.S. homeland defenses against chemical and biological agents, and to expand intelligence capabilities against ter all kinds.

Finally, there is the Iranian regime. Iran's motivation is not to disrupt simply the development of an international sys on markets and democracy, but to replace it with an alternative: fundamentalist Islam. Fortunately, the Iranians do n the kind of reach and power that the Soviet Union enjoyed in trying to promote its socialist alternative. But Iran's tac posed real problems for U.S. security. It has tried to destabilize moderate Arab states such as Saudi Arabia, though relations with the Saudis have improved recently. Iran has also supported terrorism against America and Western in and attempted to develop and transfer sensitive military technologies.

Iran presents special difficulties in the Middle East, a region of core interest to the United States and to our key ally Iranian weaponry increasingly threatens Israel directly. As important as Israel's efforts to reach peace with its Arab

are to the future of the Middle East, they are not the whole story of stability in the region. Israel has a real security partnership with the United States -- particularly in the area of ballistic missile defense -- is critical. That will help Israel protect itself both through agreements and through enhanced military power.

Still, it is important to note that there are trends in Iran that bear watching. Mohammad Khatami's election as president given some hope of a new course for a country that once hosted a great and thriving civilization -- though there are about how much authority he exercises. Moreover, Khatami's more moderate domestic views may not translate into acceptable behavior abroad. All in all, changes in U.S. policy toward Iran would require changes in Iranian behavior.

BUILDING A CONSENSUS FOR THE NATIONAL INTEREST

AMERICA IS BLESSED with an extraordinary opportunity. It has had no territorial ambitions for nearly a century. Its interest has been defined instead by a desire to foster the spread of freedom, prosperity, and peace. Both the will of the people and the demands of modern economies accord with that vision of the future. But even America's advantages guarantee success. It is up to America's presidential leadership and policy to bridge the gap between tomorrow's possibilities and today's realities.

The president must speak to the American people about national priorities and intentions and work with Congress to shape foreign policy around the national interest. The problem today is not an absence of bipartisan spirit in Congress or the American people's disinterest. It is the existence of a vacuum. In the absence of a compelling vision, parochial interests fill the void.

Foreign policy in a Republican administration will most certainly be internationalist; the leading contenders in the presidential race have strong credentials in that regard. But it will also proceed from the firm ground of the national interest, not from the interests of an illusory international community. America can exercise power without arrogance and pursue interests without hectoring and bluster. When it does so in concert with those who share its core values, the world becomes more prosperous, democratic, and peaceful. That has been America's special role in the past, and it should be again in the next century.

Editors' Note: Democratic views will be published in forthcoming issues.

Zoellick:

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Foreign Affairs

January, 2000 / February, 2000

SECTION: EDITORS NOTE; Campaign 2000; Pg. 63

LENGTH: 6179 words

HEADLINE: A Republican Foreign Policy

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BODY:

AN ERA OF CHANGE

AT THE OPENING of the twentieth century, the United States began a quest similar to today's. The rise of America

revolutions in technology, and great clashes abroad set the stage for a historic transformation. Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson dominated the age, as they debated and labored to promote their visions of America's role in a new international system. In 2000, the world is again in an era of rapid change, reminiscent of a century ago. The vitality of America's private economy, the preeminence of its military power, and the appeal of the country's ideas are unparalleled. As former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher cautioned her colleagues, we must "expect the unexpected." A task for the next president of the United States is to build public support for a strategy that will shape the world so as to protect and promote American interests and values for the next 50 years.

At the end of the Cold War, President George Bush built on Ronald Reagan's legacy by beginning to adapt American policy to the challenges of changed circumstances. Recognizing the importance of economic ties, his administration negotiated the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), supported a free-trade agreement with Chile as a free trade throughout the western hemisphere, and promoted the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) group to advance U.S. economic interests across the Pacific. The United States then employed these regional initiatives to bring the global trade talks of the Uruguay Round to the edge of conclusion. Those initiatives have created the most powerful move toward free trade in history.

The United States also took advantage of its preeminent position to push hard for peace in a number of vital areas. In the Middle East, the United States used its standing after the Cold War and the Gulf War to break old deadlocks at the Conference and to push the Arab-Israeli peace process to a totally new plane. The Bush administration sought to reshape the strategic landscape across Europe and Russia by uniting Germany within NATO in 1990, defining a new strategic course for NATO in 1991, opening the alliance to former enemies in 1990 and 1991, and negotiating landmark conventional arms reduction agreements to underpin the new security framework. U.S. ties with Russia reached an impressive level of effectiveness, as demonstrated by their cooperation in the Gulf War. U.S. links with China were also slowly improving. In the wake of the Tiananmen Square tragedy, as the Bush administration handled sharp differences in a way that still enabled it to bring about positive change. By the end of its term, the administration had created a climate of cooperation among the world's major powers.

CLINTON'S FLAWED APPROACH

PRESIDENT BILL CLINTON'S intelligence and his ability to synthesize policy and politics at home held out the promise that he could build on Bush's initial efforts to redefine America's position in the world. Unfortunately, the Clinton administration never adopted a guiding strategy or even demonstrated a sustained commitment to foreign policy. As a result, Clinton failed to define a new internationalism for the United States, thus letting historic opportunities slip away.

Clinton's foreign policies have been stymied by five flaws. The first, an unwillingness to remain committed to his own priorities, has been demonstrated by his drift on international trade. Clinton started with an encouraging emphasis on free trade, perhaps because he inherited a signed NAFTA deal and a partial Uruguay Round agreement that he could not abandon easily. But after 1994, the Clinton administration changed its course: it made pledges for free trade, but the reality of its policies did not match the rhetoric. Instead, the United States demanded managed-trade quotas with Japan -- a precisely wrong remedy for a country needing deregulation -- until it was compelled to retreat. Fearful of alienating protectionist constituencies, Clinton was unwilling to build on NAFTA or even to defend it. After deferring to the new economic isolationists, Clinton seemed surprised in 1997 when he could muster only about 40 out of 200 members of his own party in the House of Representatives to support his forlorn search for the authority necessary to negotiate additional trade agreements.

These mistakes have had lasting consequences. In the early 1990s, countries throughout Latin America were competing to negotiate free-trade agreements with the United States. Recognizing the strategic value of NAFTA, they wanted to open their economies, societies, security, and even political systems to America. Today, no one in Latin America or elsewhere expects the current administration to follow through on its statements. Latin Americans proceeded with their own customs union, which has been negotiating new trade ventures with the European Union (EU) and Japan. When East Asian countries faced their greatest financial shock in generations -- creating possibilities for structural reforms but also a need to fight off protectionism with mutual liberalization -- U.S. trade negotiators stood on the sidelines. Without the initiative and leadership of the United States, all participants involved in launching the global trade talks in Seattle last November approached the meeting defensively. So the new trade round was stymied by stalemate. Washington has the power to shape global trade.

economic relations for the next 50 years, but it has marginalized itself in this crucial area.

The White House's second flaw has been to erode its credibility by offering words that are not backed by actions; it has taken a special toll with U.S. allies. It is ironic that an administration that came into office proclaiming "assertive multilateralism" has dissipated America's energies as a coalition leader. The Gulf War coalition is in tatters, not surprising after years of strong language about the dangers of Saddam Hussein's machinations, followed by only tepid and reflexive actions. Despite the American military's overwhelming superiority in Kosovo, at the end of the bombing its European allies concluded that they needed to create their own alternative to U.S. political and security leadership. After China harshly criticized Japan for agreeing to new defense guidelines with the United States, Clinton could not find one minute during his nine-day trip to China to stand by his struggling Japanese ally. The administration managed to boot out a U.N. secretary-general, but it has never developed a sustained, consistent strategy toward the organization that would see it succeed. (Only a few years earlier, America had proved that a more constructive approach to the U.N. was possible with the Gulf War coalition and organized the repeal of the "Zionism is racism" resolution.)

The Clinton administration's third flaw is its inability to frame strategies supported by operations, which has particularly damaged its dealings with China and Russia. Neither one is the "strategic partner" that Clinton proclaimed. In fact, the distrust created by the administration has made it hard for the United States to cooperate with either country on long-term mutual interests. Sadly, the Clinton legacy with both China and Russia -- the two great powers whose future paths are uncertain and potentially unstable -- is one of tense and suspicious relations that have been getting worse.

In the case of China, at first the administration linked human rights to normal trading relations, but it later backed down, a clear sign of weakness. Clinton then mistakenly promised the Chinese that the United States would not grant a trade agreement to the president of democratic Taiwan, Lee Teng-hui; his subsequent reversal of that decision generated distrust and counterreactions that have increased dangers between Beijing and Taipei. During Clinton's high-profile trip to China he neglected to explain serious security differences, ultimately misleading China and failing to prepare the American people for China's missile buildup, its nuclear espionage, and its crack-downs on democracy. Next, Clinton prodded Chinese Minister Zhu Rongji to offer the United States concessions in exchange for Chinese membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) but then inexplicably spurned Zhu's proposal during a high-profile visit, thereby weakening Chinese efforts. The agreement with China on the WTO in November 1999, although welcome, only underscores that Clinton has cut a deal earlier that was as good or better -- avoiding a crisis that left unnecessary scars.

Clinton's Russia policy has discredited free-market economics, squandered money from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and generated widespread anti-Americanism. His "Monroeski doctrine" and his comparison of the battle in Chechnya to the U.S. Civil War have encouraged both a view of state power that conflicts with a modern, democratic Russia and a revival of Russian imperialistic attitudes. The administration's indifference to Yeltsin's shelling of the Russian legislature among other autocratic measures, revealed a blind spot in the importance of Russia's rule of law and democratic principles. Clinton has never seemed to grasp the costs of embracing an elected czar, one who oversaw a privatization drive that led to massive theft and who now presides over pervasive corruption. Not surprisingly, this system has failed to improve the livelihood of average Russians, setting the stage for future trouble.

A fourth flaw has been Clinton's uncertainty on when and how to use American power -- frequently hesitating, then overcommitting, and regularly failing to match means with ends. This weakness has shadowed his initiatives to resolve humanitarian and ethnic strife with military intervention. His "nation-building" failure in Somalia was costly in terms of the reputation of the United States, and America's confidence that it can deal effectively with such problems. The U.S. invasion of Haiti and its multi-billion-dollar effort to bring "democracy" turned out to be an unhappy reminder that good intentions cannot save a flawed policy. The United States continued to be drawn into miniwars in the Balkans without clarifying its goals or being honest about the ongoing commitment of human and material resources these U.N. "coalitions" would require. The history of false starts and missteps was captured well by Clinton's own new "doctrine" on intervening in such conflicts: his words were at first stunning in their reach but were then quickly reinterpreted, leaving the world to wonder if that America is confused, cynical, or both.

Finally, many of Clinton's ventures have the disquieting feature of being driven significantly by political polls and calculations. This perception has made it exceedingly hard for him to call credibly for bipartisan foreign policies. As Clinton's administration's policies have frayed, the administration has lashed out at its critics, calling them isolationists. In fact, Clinton's inability

develop a foreign policy disciplined by sustained priorities, reliability, strategy, selectivity, and frankness has squandered opportunities. The president's mistakes have made it harder for him to complete work in areas -- such as the Middle East and Northern Ireland -- where he has invested considerable effort in bringing parties together for peace processes. The foreign policy style has also taken its toll abroad. The administration has caused too many countries to be weary, and resentful, of the United States. The power of the United States is obvious to the world, but Clinton has failed to use it wisely or diplomatically. His rhetoric has contained much hubris but little credibility. America is more influential if it is softly, but with firm conviction. If it asserts that it is committed to do everything, its commitments to everything are squandered.

REPUBLICAN PRINCIPLES

FIVE PRINCIPLES distinguish a modern Republican foreign policy. First, it is premised on a respect for power, being ashamed to pursue America's national interests nor too quick to use the country's might. By matching America's power to its interests, such a policy can achieve its objectives and build credibility both at home and abroad. U.S. policy should take into account the histories, perspectives, and concerns of other nations, but it should not be paralyzed by intellectual pieties or relativism. All states do not play equally important roles. Given America's responsibilities in the world, it must retain the freedom to act against serious dangers.

Second, a modern Republican foreign policy emphasizes building and sustaining coalitions and alliances. Effective leadership requires clear-eyed judgments about priorities, an appreciation of others' interests, constant consultation with partners, and a willingness to compromise on some points but to remain focused on core objectives. Allies and coalition partners should bear their fair share of the responsibilities; if they do, their views will be represented and respected. To have an effective U.N., the key nations that compose it must recognize that their actions -- not their speeches or posturing in an international forum -- will determine whether problems can be solved.

Third, Republicans judge international agreements and institutions as means to achieve ends, not as forms of political therapy. Agreements and institutions can facilitate bargaining, recognize common interests, and resolve differences cooperatively. But international law, unlike domestic law, merely codifies an already agreed-upon cooperation. Even democracies, international law not backed by enforcement mechanisms will need negotiations in order to work, and international law not backed by power cannot cope with dangerous people and states. Every issue need not be decided multilaterally.

Fourth, a modern Republican foreign policy must embrace the revolutionary changes in the information and communication technology, commerce, and finance sectors that will shape the environment for global politics and security. Because of these changes, people's aspirations -- to exercise their free will and transform their lives -- are rising in all corners of the globe. Communities of private groups, whether organized for business or social ends, will achieve results far beyond the reach of governments and international bureaucracies. The United States can leverage this dynamism to open minds and markets. America's foreign policy must promote these global trends. It must take practical steps to move the world toward greater freedoms and human rights. It should link itself to the agents of change around the world through new networks of free information, and investment.

Finally, a modern Republican foreign policy recognizes that there is still evil in the world -- people who hate America and ideas for which it stands. Today, we face enemies who are hard at work to develop nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, along with the missiles to deliver them. The United States must remain vigilant and have the strength to defeat its enemies. People driven by enmity or by a need to dominate will not respond to reason or goodwill. They will manipulate civilized rules for uncivilized ends.

POWER AND ECONOMICS

A MODERN Republican foreign policy should apply these principles within a long-term strategy to promote peace, stability, and liberty. America must capture the dynamism of the era and transform its new elements into the economic and social foundations for a future system. The United States and its partners need to link the world's continental regions within a global economic system that secures the benefits of integration while coping with the inevitable stresses of capitalism. Looking back on the twentieth century, it is clear that peace is not ensured through closer economic ties alone; so the United States must navigate changing great-power relations, strengthen its alliances, and maintain unquestioned military superiority over

dangerous regimes.

In the information age, America should promote an open architecture in order to capitalize on its greatest assets: a innovative economy and a society that continually reinvents itself. American concepts of corporate governance, share value, benchmarking, and the "value chain" are now discussed in executive offices around the globe. By incorporating advances in information and communications technologies into business processes, U.S. corporations have triggered productivity similar to those achieved when companies learned how to reengineer their businesses using electrical technology a year ago. The surge in e-commerce, already a \$ 500 billion activity, is transforming business models again. Governments everywhere are turning to privatization and deregulation to help their countries keep pace. The American entrepreneur commands an awe that matches the respect accorded the American military.

The American private sector is a powerful, attractive magnet. But the U.S. government has not used this energetic force to transform others in ways that enable America to build on its successes. Instead, growth and market imbalances have led to the largest trade deficits in American history. Although U.S. markets are generally open to the world, too many others are closed to the United States. Countries should embrace changes that will tap the vitality and genius of people around the world, improve their livelihood and health, and open doors to freedom. Government efforts to turn back the clock, even well-meaning, will end up hurting people. Instead, governments and societies should help people adjust to and benefit from new possibilities. Therefore, a successful U.S. foreign policy must also be based on superior education at home, laws that reward work and risk-taking, and secure savings and pensions for retirees.

The United States needs a strategic economic-negotiating agenda that combines regional agreements with the development of global rules for an open economy. To link up with Latin America and the Asia-Pacific region, the United States should propose free-trade agreements, with either individual countries or regional groups. If India continues its reforms, the United States should offer it a new economic partnership beginning with those Indian sectors that are open to the world or that have large public gains through deregulation. As a new generation of leaders gains authority in the Middle East, possible agreements can be buttressed by drawing these societies into information-age economics and integrating their economies into world markets. African countries seeking to abandon the old, failed state controls need the incentive of open U.S. world markets for their emerging enterprises, as well as financial backing for serious reforms. The EU and the United States should follow the lead of their increasingly integrated businesses by opening even more sectors to cross-investment and greater competition, with the aim of achieving transatlantic free trade.

These agendas should be ambitious -- ranging from farm products to e-commerce. Tariffs should be cut further. The United States should support innovative business ventures to streamline common standards. It should promote the deregulation and opening of vast new global markets for services -- in areas such as energy, airlines, finance, and entertainment. The United States should apply successful regional precedents in economic and trade liberalization to other regions or to global negotiations through the WTO. By operating at the center of this changing network, the United States -- the one economy with a truly global reach -- should promote openness among regions.

If some regions are too slow to open their markets, the United States should move on to others. America should spur a competitive dynamic for openness and transparency. Competition can work wonders: when the United States pursued NAFTA and APEC, the EU finally felt the pressure to complete the global Uruguay Round trade negotiations. If others fall back in the new WTO round, the United States should repeat this strategy of regionalism with a global goal in order to clear the logjam.

This modern Republican design recognizes the benefits of regional integration and seeks to harness it for global purposes. Regional integration can help countries deal more effectively with transnational problems, such as the environment or drug trafficking. The practice of joint action within regions, especially by private-sector groups, can be expanded to deal with common political and even security issues. The history of U.S. foreign policy is full of examples of private parties -- missionaries to engineers -- who forwarded America's belief in the future by helping others face the challenges of the very nature of the "new economy" -- with its rapidly adapting technologies, fast-paced change, and innovative spirit. We must elevate the role of private parties; they will often surpass the government in their ability to resolve inevitable disputes. Private parties are not zero-sum thinkers. The U.S. government should create a climate in which citizens can serve both themselves and the public good. Prosperity with a purpose is an idea that reaches far beyond U.S. borders.

If America links its economy to those of key regions, it can also promote its geopolitical agenda. Deeper integration Latin America, Europe, and East Asia will support U.S. security commitments as citizens of these regions recognize common interests. At best, economic interdependence will be a new glue that draws partners close together. More creating common rules for open economies will connect private sectors and help manage a combination of cooperation and competition.

This blueprint expands on America's political and economic principles. It promotes open markets and open societies, free flow of information and ideas, and the development of the private sector -- all of which contribute to the growth of the middle classes, and liberties. If China, Russia, India, and others want to keep up, they will have to open up. This is a positive program around which internationalists of both parties can rally to counter protectionists and isolationists. It challenges America to sustain its openness, a feature that attracts great thinkers and doers from all over the world. It is a dynamism that gives its diverse society cohesion and a shared purpose; and it safeguards liberty and freedom.

The public international financial institutions -- especially the IMF and the World Bank -- also need to be overhauled to meet the demands of the information age and the globalization of financial markets. Considering how private-sector finance have changed in recent years, it is understandable that the Bretton Woods institutions of 1944 require major reengineering. First, the operations of the IMF and the World Bank must be more transparent, on-line, and real-time. They should free themselves from corruption, which can drain both money and confidence. But they should not, out of technocratic hubris, usurp the proper roles of either creditor or debtor governments or of the private financial sector. A dependency on international bureaucracy for solutions to tough problems will dissuade national governments from taking responsibility for their countries' futures. It will ultimately erode the legitimacy of both governments and international financial institutions.

The IMF still has a role to play in buffering national financial markets against shocks that threaten global stability, and in self-help rebalancing the capital movements. But the IMF must exercise this role in a fashion that does not add to global financial instability by encouraging risks for which investors are not willing to pay. Furthermore, since today's global economy (different from what it was 50 years ago) rests on private capital flows, the IMF must "bail-in" creditors, not bail them out. Private creditors must play a financial role in restructuring "national bankruptcies," just as when they have loaned money to companies in trouble; creditors can reschedule loans, take discounts, and extend more money during workouts. The World Bank should concentrate on helping people adjust to change. In poor countries, this agenda may involve improving health and subsistence needs while creating economic opportunities. In other low-income countries, the World Bank should assist in developing markets that will enable people to benefit from self-help.

ALLIES, ENEMIES, AND IN-BETWEENS

IN PURSUING a reinvigorated foreign policy, the United States first needs to overhaul ties with its partners and allies. North American neighbors and its two primary partners abroad, Europe and Japan. Mexico, Canada, and the United States share an interest in building on their common democracy and prosperity by addressing problems that require greater cooperation -- such as narcotics, the environment, and illegal immigration. To operate effectively overseas, the United States must ensure that it has a strong neighborhood at home. Transatlantic and transpacific alliances can go a long way toward ensuring security in the eastern and western parts of Eurasia, where in the past dangerous powers have threatened the United States. These partnerships can enhance America's ability to address the uncertain futures of China and Russia. The EU and Japan are also important colleagues in ensuring an international economy hospitable to growth, dynamism, and creative spirit.

The United States should not be complacent about its allies' roles. Europeans say they want to shoulder a greater share of responsibility -- and they should -- especially when it comes to policing their own continent. But a wide gap still separates Europe's defense oratory and its actual spending on the necessary capabilities. The United States should encourage NATO allies to face this reality and to recognize the mutual benefit in having European defense forces operating in concert with the U.S. military through coalitions. Ultimately, an effective European defense arm will require serious participation by British, French, and German troops.

Japan should evolve gradually toward assuming more responsibility for East Asian security, in concert with America and its allies. Only the United States can help Japan's neighbors accept this historic adjustment, which is the key to transforming Japan's domestic opinion. As a start, Japan, the United States, Korea, and Australia should form closer defense ties.

time, Japan's forces should be more closely integrated to support the U.S. military in Asia. These steps will strengthen posture of the Pacific democracies toward North Korea, demonstrate to China that it should seek security cooperation (not competition) with the Asia-Pacific democracies, and channel any increased Japanese capabilities into a reassurance framework.

Second, the United States and its partners face three great challenges in Eurasia: China, Russia, and India. China rising, Russia has been weakening, and India has been reassessing its outlook. These are the "big ones," and more mistakes with them could cost America dearly in the future. The United States must be realistic, not romantic, about prospects for China and Russia. These states should be integrated into the economic, security, and political arrangements that America and its allies have sponsored, although we must be prepared to shield against these countries if integration not possible. These countries are "works in progress"; they are not yet friends and are certainly not partners, but they should not be enemies. The United States and its allies should explain to both China and Russia the steps that can build common interests and lessen differences. Ultimately, America will evaluate its own ability to cooperate -- and the world will evaluate America's willingness to do so -- based on concrete actions, not photo opportunities.

India, the world's largest democracy and before long its most populous nation, will play an increasingly important role. To grow and prosper, it will need to adjust to the global economy. To contribute to its prosperity and regional security, it will need to lower the risk of conflict with its neighbors. And to have influence with India, America must stop ignoring it. More open India, possessing a broader understanding of its place in the world, could become a valuable partner of the United States in coping with Eurasia's uncertainties. In addition to proposing trade and investment liberalization, the United States should open a regular, high-level security dialogue with India on Eurasia and the challenges to stability.

Third, North America, the EU, and Japan need to reach out to the next group of potential partners. In varying degrees at different paces, countries in central and eastern Europe, Latin America, and East Asia have been opening private markets, building middle classes, and developing representative democracies that respect individual liberties. But these countries have been subject to enormous stresses. With Latin America in particular, the United States has resumed its old, bad habit of overlooking its neighbors until problems compel it to pay attention. Resistance is slowing the momentum for democratic free markets that Latin America kicked off a decade ago. More debt defaults, rising populism, frustrations with the lack of tangible results from economic reforms, and narcotics traffickers seeking to control governments all threaten to eclipse movement toward what should be a historic and strategic achievement: a fully democratic and prosperous western hemisphere.

Fourth, the United States must counter those dangerous states that threaten its closest friends, such as Israel, or its interests, such as maintaining access to oil in the Persian Gulf. In dealing with the likes of Iraq and North Korea, the United States needs to offer consistent long-term directions to guide coalitions that will deter and even replace their brutal policies. Concessions to blackmail and threats, even if they serve as temporary expedients, will exacerbate these problems. The United States must retain the initiative so that its opponents are so worried about what America is planning that they plot attacks or new forms of blackmail. Theater and national missile defenses will let the United States counter missiles carrying weapons of mass destruction from those countries that might target U.S. conventional forces or paralyze the United States if it intervenes against their threats. Time is on America's side -- not that of these decaying dictatorships -- if the United States has the confidence and determination to stand up to, and if necessary defeat, its enemies.

MILITARY MIGHT

AMERICA'S LEADERSHIP in the next century requires a strong military, wisely used. The Clinton administration has often relied on the U.S. military to bail out speculative diplomatic ventures that turned sour. Concurrently, America's military has been cut back some 40 percent. At some point, doing more with less just becomes doing less with less. Given current demands on the U.S. military, the Pentagon has made the troublesome choice of trying to fund present needs at the expense of future capabilities. This spending improvisation is divorced from the administration's own plans. As the military equipment bought in the early 1980s ages, the armed services are spending more and more funds just to keep old ships, and tanks operating. The administration's undersecretary of defense called this quandary a "death spiral." The joint chiefs of staff called it a "nose dive." These are strong words. The failure to prepare for the future will become apparent during the next decade, when the wheels start to come off the weapons purchased some 25 years ago. As a Marine general said, "If parents are uncomfortable sending their sons and daughters to college in 25-year-old cars,

they think about sending them into harm's way in 25-year-old helicopters?"

The challenge for the next president is not just to spend more on defense but to spend wisely. In transforming its defense strategy for the future, the United States should seek to align the military's strength with the nation's strengths: American people and technology. U.S. companies that have not incorporated the revolutionary advances in information and communications technologies have been swept away by their competition with surprising rapidity. The Pentagon cannot run a similar risk. The United States must invest in a combination of sophisticated sensors, information technology, real-time communications, and precision-guided weapons that will enable the individual services to fight together seamlessly in joint operations. Future networked forces should be smaller, quicker, easier to deploy, more dispersed, and able to strike targets with fewer sorties and greater "standoff" capabilities. They must be able to act together when executing difficult missions -- such as suppressing air defenses, achieving complete air dominance, and destroying small, mobile targets. This will be vital in the new security environment. They will need "more teeth and less tail." At the end of the day, gutsy soldiers and muddy boots will still have to hold ground, but they need to be the fastest to get to decisive points, with the most powerful firepower to support them.

This transformation will take time. In many respects, technology is the easy part. The challenge is to integrate technology into new operational concepts, doctrines, and organizational structures -- and then to practice them. (In June 1940, the French army had more and better tanks than the German army, but the panzer leaders knew how to use blitzkrieg to overwhelm France within weeks.) The experience of the private sector points the way toward a smart, modernized military for the future. Like private business executives facing new challenges, the next generation of military officers needs clear goals to guide change -- and strong support in making the country's forces achieve these goals. Only the president can establish these goals and provide the needed leadership.

The Pentagon can also learn from the private sector about cutting costs. Although the cost of civilian information-technology systems has fallen tremendously, the price of analogous military systems has not. Like other professional organizations, the Defense Department must focus on its core missions and outsource supporting activities. In leading this transformation, the next president must also challenge America's allies to keep up. In critical areas, U.S. allies in Europe and the Pacific must share significant burdens and make major contributions. In order to fight together, their forces must be interoperable. Allies should assume greater roles in peacekeeping operations, supported by unique U.S. capabilities and backed by the hammer of its robust force.

THE RIGHT TRACK

AS AMERICANS enter a new century, the history of the last one may inspire a sense of both caution and opportunity. The United States in 1900 seemed to have unbounded potential. But the first half of the twentieth century involved frightful wars. And although America achieved great accomplishments over the past 50 years, these came at a high price of lives, treasure, and national attention. Now a new generation must chart a course for America amid revolutionary changes in technology, economies, societies, and weaponry. It is a mistake for the United States simply to react to events. America needs a strategy that blends traditional truths with the opportunities of a networked marketplace and a modernized army. It must be realistic about human nature and conflicting interests while being optimistic about the world's potential. America must use its power wisely, selectively, and consistently to mold an international system that will enhance its influence in the future. Drawing on this influence, modern Republicans believe they can work with like-minded Democrats so that America can advance both its interests and its ideals. America's potential is extraordinary, and so is the world's. It is time to get on the right track.

Editors' Note: Democratic views will be published in forthcoming issues.

Korb's letter to the editor in response to Zoellick and Condi:

March, 2000 / April, 2000

SECTION: REVIEWS; Responses; Money for Nothing; A Penny Saved, Not a Penny Earned, in the U.S. Military; P

LENGTH: 831 words

HEADLINE: Sized Up

BYLINE: LAWRENCE KORB; LAWRENCE KORB is Director of Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and was Assistant Secretary of Defense during the Reagan administration.

BODY:

When he was running the Pentagon, James Schlesinger was fond of responding to his critics by saying that everyone is entitled to his or her own opinions but not to his or her own facts. Unfortunately, Condoleezza Rice ("Promoting the Interest," January/February 2000) and Robert B. Zoellick ("A Republican Foreign Policy") ignore Schlesinger's dictum describing the Clinton administration's impact on military spending and the state of U.S. armed forces.

According to Rice, the Bush administration "was able to reduce defense spending somewhat at the end of the Cold War," while the Clinton administration "witlessly accelerated and deepened these cuts." Actually, in the Bush administration's first four years, defense spending fell by 18 percent -- more than 4 percent each year. In the Clinton administration's seven years, defense spending has fallen by slightly less than 10 percent, which is slightly more than 1 percent each year. Moreover, Rice conveniently ignores the six-year plan Bush presented to Congress in January 1993, which projected a continuing decline in defense spending through 1999. Clinton's actual defense budgets were \$2 billion more than the final Bush defense budget for 1994 -- 99, as Daniel Goure and Jeffrey Ranney explain in their new book, *Averting the Defense Train Wreck in the Millennium*.

Rice then details the "devastating results" of Clinton's large cuts on the U.S. military. According to her, readiness has declined, training has suffered, pay has slipped 15 percent below civilian equivalents, the services are forced to cannibalize existing equipment, and the military has much difficulty recruiting and retaining people. Leaving aside whether these (misleading) statements are true and resulted from Clinton's reductions, these conditions are not related to the amount of money spent on defense. The nonpay portion of the operations and maintenance account in the defense budget, which covers training, readiness, and maintenance, is 13 percent higher now than when Bush left office. Moreover, if the spending on operations and maintenance is calculated on a per capita basis, it is nearly 40 percent higher today than in 1993.

Rice also accuses the Clinton administration of cutting defense spending to its lowest point as a percentage of GDP since Pearl Harbor. Using shares of GDP as a measure of military capability is both meaningless and misleading. If Clinton presided over such an extraordinary period of economic growth, his current defense budget might account for four, three, percent of GDP. Should he be castigated for helping the economy grow? By Rice's GDP standard, Jimmy Carter was better for defense than George Bush.

Most troubling is Rice's suggestion that the U.S. armed forces in 2000 resemble what they were in 1940. But 60 years ago our military ranked 16th in the world (between Portugal and Romania), was one-tenth the size of Germany's military, and only 1.6 percent of the world's military personnel. The best way to measure the adequacy of defense spending is to compare it with that of other nations. During the Clinton administration, the U.S. share of worldwide military spending has increased. America now outspends all of its adversaries or potential adversaries combined. Together with its allies, it accounts for 80 percent of the world's military expenditures.

Zoellick is also off base in his critique of the Clinton administration. He writes that it has cut the military by around 4 percent. But it was the Bush administration that reduced the active forces by 444,000, or 21 percent, in four years, while Clinton, who cut it only 16 percent over seven years.

Reading Rice's and Zoellick's critiques of Clinton's defense budget reminds one of the early days of the Reagan administration, when several of the president's lieutenants complained about the 1970s as the "decade of neglect of

spending." They should be reminded that in the first seven years of that decade, the Republicans were in charge and during President Carter's tenure, defense spending actually increased.

Unfortunately, Rice's and Zoellick's "facts" found their way into presidential candidate George W. Bush's September speech on defense policy. If the governor becomes the chief executive, one hopes he will discover that the defense gap during the 2000 election is like the missile gap during the 1960 election. He should also read George Wilson's book which cites former Air Force Chief of Staff Ron Fogelman and former Army Deputy Chief of Staff Jay Gardner as stating an annual defense budget of \$ 250 billion, plus inflation, should be plenty for the armed services in the post -- Cold War if spent properly. (The budget is now \$ 280 billion.) Finally, Bush should remember that during the Cold War, not a single Republican president, except Ronald Reagan, allowed defense spending to increase.

Condi's reply:

Copyright 2000 Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.
Foreign Affairs

March, 2000 / April, 2000

SECTION: REVIEWS; Responses; Money for Nothing; A Penny Saved, Not a Penny Earned, in the U.S. Military; P

LENGTH: 572 words

HEADLINE: Rice Replies

BYLINE: CONDOLEEZZA RICE is Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution and Professor of Political Science at Stanford University. She is also foreign policy adviser to Republican presidential candidate George W. Bush.

BODY:

Lawrence Korb's protest of my facts reminds me of a dictum as well: If you find yourself with a mess on your hands you are your predecessor. That is the essence of his defense of the Clinton administration.

Yes, defense spending declined during the Bush years in accordance with major reductions in American military spending at the end of the Cold War. During such a big demobilization, 18 percent was not outrageous. It has been forgotten that the Democratic Congress thought the cuts not deep enough. The first Clinton budget was, by the way, nine percent below Bush projections. What has happened since then? The cannibalization of equipment, pay scales inadequate to retain personnel, substandard housing, strained training budgets, and low morale are not imaginary. Read the congressional testimony of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the administration's testimony last year. Did the military's troubles occur only

Indeed, the most irrelevant "fact" presented by Korb is the comparison of Bush's long-term projections with Clinton's budgets. Would Bush have increased the operations tempo of the military to the degree Clinton has? Would Bush have carried through with projected cuts in defense spending and allowed the armed forces to reach the state they are now in rather than doubt it.

But this is a moot point. Long-term projections are just that: projections. The defense budget is put together annually. Bush has not been the commander-in-chief for seven years. So there are only two possible conclusions. Either Clinton's defense budgets have been inadequate or the Pentagon during his administration has been incompetent in managing resources. Both are probably true. If the Pentagon has not divided money properly, where has the secretary of defense? In case Korb does not remember, the management of the Pentagon is also the administration's responsibility.

As to the low percentage of GDP spent on defense, this is simply a measure of the nation's priorities. It is not mean more. But Korb's analysis begs the question, Why in such good times was the military permitted to fall into this state

Korb is also selective in the data he chooses. Operations and maintenance accounts are indeed nearly 13 percent now than in Bush's administration. Why? Largely because they have been funding the multiplying missions -- from H Bosnia to Kosovo -- this administration has assigned its military. These operations have been at the expense of pro and research and development (R&D). Democratic members of the Senate Armed Services Committee recently se to the administration complaining about the lack of investment in defense R&D, which has stayed flat for several ye operations and maintenance number exposes the shortsighted strategy that the administration's own undersecretar called a "death spiral" -- robbing the future to pay for the present.

The Clinton administration has had seven years to build a military more robust and better suited to face post -- Cold challenges. It inherited a strong hand -- a military that won the Gulf War. Now, under congressional and electoral pr the president is sprinting to undo the damage he has inflicted on the armed forces. A two-term administration is resp for what has happened on its watch. That is a fact no analysis can erase.

Zoellick's reply:

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Foreign Affairs

March, 2000 / April, 2000

SECTION: REVIEWS; Responses; Money for Nothing; A Penny Saved, Not a Penny Earned, in the U.S. Military; P

LENGTH: 398 words

HEADLINE: Zoellick Replies

BYLINE: ROBERT B. ZOELLICK served as Under-secretary of State, White House Deputy Chief of Staff, and Coun the Secretary of the Treasury during the Reagan and Bush administrations.

BODY:

Why defenders of the Clinton administration, after its more than seven years in office, still try to blame the administ problems on a predecessor continues to baffle me. As Lawrence Korb writes, President Bush did indeed reduce the America's military after the Cold War ended. The question that Korb sidesteps is why President Clinton and Vice Pr Gore would continue the cuts, year after year, in the face of numerous military problems: a hectic tempo of operatio the world, shortfalls in maintenance, the slippage in readiness, declines in relative pay, gaps in recruitment, housing problems, troubles in retention, increased threats from states with missiles, and the failure to procure new equipme replace the depreciating investments made 20 years ago.

Korb's devotion to facts also wanes when he selectively cites other works on the subject. If he respects the authorit Schlesinger or Dan Goure', he might have pointed out that Goure's new book, with a supportive forward by Schlesin documents that the Clinton administration's defense budget is nearly \$ 100 billion short each year in funding its own plan for the next five years. This mismatch underscores my larger policy points. The administration's foreign and de policies have been greatly weakened by its failure to match means and ends, connect strategies with operations, an up rhetoric with actions. Korb's comments reveal that he, like Clinton, is strategically challenged. Whereas Korb ma that the test of U.S. defense spending should be a comparison with the expenditures of other nations, a strategist w compare resources to U.S. objectives.

Unfortunately, Korb's accounting also misses the key point that leading Republican presidential candidates are mak defense policy. The strategic challenge is how the country's money should be spent transforming the military to mee threats and to take advantage of America's existing strengths -- especially its educated people and technology. Pre leadership is needed to press the U.S. military to maintain its superiority under new circumstances. The Clinton administration's uncomfortable relationship with the military and its failure to understand these challenges has led it

abdicate its responsibility for designing the American military of the future.

Withdrawal Marker

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FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
Draft	SAIS - Rostov Lecture (Dr. Rice)	13	09/11/2001	P5;

**This marker identifies the original location of the withdrawn item listed above.
For a complete list of items withdrawn from this folder, see the
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet at the front of the folder.**

COLLECTION:

National Security Council - Media Communications and Speechwriting

SERIES:

Gibson, John - Chron Files

FOLDER TITLE:

09/11/2001, Rice - Nitze School (Cancelled) [1]

FRC ID:

34849

OA Num.:

NSC 0612

NARA Num.:

FOIA ID and Segment:

2014-0508-F

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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The Paul H. Nitze
School of Advanced
International Studies

1740 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036-1984
202.663.5626
202.663.5647 fax

News Release

www.sais-jhu.edu

September 4, 2001

National Security Adviser Rice to Speak at JHU SAIS

Condoleezza Rice, national security adviser and assistant to the president for national security affairs, will give the annual Rostov Lecture on International Affairs at the Johns Hopkins Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) on **Tuesday, September 11 at 5:30 p.m.**

Rice, who most recently served as Stanford University's provost, is expected to speak about "Foreign Policy Under the Bush Administration."

Admittance to the lecture is by invitation only. However, the event is open to the media for coverage. Following her lecture, Rice will respond to questions from the SAIS community audience only.

The event will be held in Kenney Auditorium located on the first floor of the school's Nitze Building, 1740 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C.

Established in 1990, the Rostov Lecture on International Affairs honors the memory of Johns Hopkins alumnus and businessman Charles Rostov.

**Members of the media who plan to cover the event must respond to
Felisa Neuringer at the SAIS Public Affairs Office at
202.663.5626 or fneuringer@jhu.edu.**

JOHNS HOPKINS

UNIVERSITY

The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies

1740 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036-1984
202.663.5626 / 202.663.5647 fax
email: fneuringer@jhu.edu
www.sais-jhu.edu

Office of Public Affairs
Felisa M. Neuringer
Director

TO: Colby Cooper
National Security Council

FROM: Felisa Neuringer
SAIS Public Affairs

DATE: September 7, 2001

SUBJECT: Dr. Rice's Lecture at SAIS on September 11, 2001

I just wanted to let you know that when Dr. Rice arrives on Tuesday at approximately 5:15 p.m., we will greet her at the curb and bring her up to Dean Stephen Szabo's office on the 2nd floor of the building.

While up in the dean's office, Dr. Rice also will meet with Ambassador Paul Nitze and his wife, Leezee Porter. I believe Dr. Rice and Ambassador Nitze, SAIS's co-founder, have met on several other occasions related to a board affiliation he had at Stanford.

In addition, Dorothy Rostov, widow of Charles Rostov, and her son, Gene Rostov, will be present. This lecture series is named in the memory of Charles Rostov, a businessman and Johns Hopkins alumnus (fyi...he attended JHU in Baltimore not SAIS here in Washington).

After this brief meeting, the above guests will proceed to the auditorium to be seated. Then Dean Szabo and Dr. Rice will follow a few minutes later. We hope to start the event as close to 5:30 p.m. as possible.

Here are phone/fax numbers for the dean's suite if you need them:
202.663.5622 or 5624 (phone) and 202.663.5621 (fax). The dean's assistant is Lois Weiss.



**Confirmed Media for Condoleezza Rice Event at SAIS on September 11, 2001
As of 9/7/01 at 6 p.m.**

Agence France Press—Olivier Knox 202.414.0577
Al Khartoum (Sudanese paper)—Ahmed Elbashir
Associated Press of Pakistan—Khalid Hasan
Associated Press/Latin America Desk—Nestor Ikeda
Associated Press—Barry Schweid 202.776.9498
China TV—Jessica Kung and Joc Tompkin
Chinese TV System—Ting Chung
Confirmed Media for Condoleezza Rice Event on September 11, 2001
Danish Broadcasting—Jon Kaldan
Egyptian Press (?)—Mohammed Hakki 202.662.8800
El Cronista Newspaper (Argentina)—Sergio Serrichio
Financial Times/Germany—Yvonne Esterhazy
FSN-TV (independent TV/radio)—Catherine Drew
GAMMA Magazine (Indonesia)—Irawan Nugroho
India Abroad—Aziz Haniffa
ITAR-TASS News Agency of Russia—Andrei Sitov
Jerusalem Post—Janine Zackaria
Kyodo News Agency—Yoichi Kosukegawa
Liberation (French daily paper)—Pascale Riche
Liberty Times/Taipei Times—Nadia Tsao 202.744.4984
Power TV (Taiwan)—John Zang
Press Trust of India—T.V. Parasuram
Radio France—Laura Simon
Taipei Times—Charles Snyder
Turkey TV-8—Tulin Daloglu
UPI/Eurasian Affairs—Derk Kinnane
VOA/Eastern Europe—Edit Velenyi
VOA/Indonesia—Spozhmai Maiwandi
Washington Post—Nora Boustany 202.334.7474
Yomiuri Shimbun—Mike Hayashi

Stephen F. Szabo, Ph.D., Interim Dean, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of European Studies

Author of *The Diplomacy of German Unification* (1992) and *The Changing Politics of German Security* (1990); editor, *The Bundeswehr and Western Security* (1990) and *The Successor Generation: International Perspectives of Postwar Europeans* (1983). Former fellow, Woodrow Wilson Center and the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, Bonn, Germany; taught at Georgetown and George Washington universities, the University of Virginia and the National War College.

Dr. Szabo received his Ph.D. in political science from Georgetown University.

Paul H. Nitze

Paul H. Nitze, adviser to five presidents and leading strategist and arms control expert, founded the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in 1943 along with Christian Herter and other leading statesmen.

In 1989 the school, which became a division of The Johns Hopkins University in 1950, was renamed in his honor to recognize his distinguished private and public career and exceptional service to SAIS and the university for five decades.

After graduation from Harvard University and a decade as an investment banker at Dillon, Read & Company and P.H. Nitze & Company, Nitze joined the U.S. government in 1940 and advised every president from Franklin Roosevelt to Ronald Reagan, with the exception of Jimmy Carter. In 1950, while at the State Department, Nitze was responsible for the formulation of NSC 68—the document which provided the framework for the Cold War between the U.S. and the former Soviet Union. He also served as director of the Department of State Policy Planning Staff, secretary of the Navy, deputy secretary of Defense, and member of the U.S. delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks from 1969 to 1974. In 1962, he was a member of the group of top officials who met daily with President Kennedy to advise him during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

As head of the U.S. negotiating team at the Arms Control Talks in Geneva (1981-1984), Nitze took his now famous “walk in the woods” with Soviet negotiator Yuli Kvitsinsky in an effort to break the deadlock between the super powers on Euromissiles. From 1984 to 1989, he was ambassador-at-large and special adviser to the president and secretary of State on arms control matters, playing a crucial role in negotiating the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) and strategic arms treaties.

Nitze's public life has been chronicled in several books including Strobe Talbott's 1988 *The Master of the Game* and David Callahan's 1990 book *Dangerous Capabilities: Paul Nitze and the Cold War*. Nitze published his memoirs, *From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Center of Decision*, in 1989 and then *Tension Between Opposites: Reflections on the Practice and Theory of Politics* in 1993. In 1985, President Reagan awarded Nitze the Presidential Medal of Freedom, the highest civilian honor in the United States.

In launching the school in 1943, he and Christian Herter convinced business friends to fund the fledgling institution. Eleven years later, while working and teaching at SAIS, he succeeded Herter as chairman of the SAIS Advisory Council, a position that only he or Herter held until 1981.

In 1957, Nitze conceived the idea of a SAIS-related think tank—now the Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute—to involve the school more directly in the discussion of U.S. foreign policy issues. Three years later he was instrumental in helping then JHU President Milton Eisenhower raise \$4.2 million for the SAIS building at 1740 Massachusetts Avenue in Northwest Washington, D.C. The building was named for Nitze and his wife, the late Phyllis Pratt Nitze, in 1986. In 1980, he helped establish the security studies program at the Foreign Policy Institute and co-taught a course on security issues there.

When SAIS had outgrown its one building in 1988, Nitze offered to match any amount raised by SAIS up to \$5 million to expand the school. The challenge was successfully met in 1989, doubling the school's physical plant with the addition of the Rome Building at 1619 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.

Nitze resides with his wife, Leezee Porter, and their dog Max in Washington, D.C. He has four children, 11 grandchildren and seven great-grandchildren. His wife is the president of Antique and Contemporary Leasing, a fine furniture leasing company.

DRAFT

June 29, 2001

Dr. Condoleezza Rice
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Dr. Rice,

On behalf of the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of The Johns Hopkins University, it is my privilege to invite you to deliver the 2001 Rostov Lecture.

The Rostov Lecture on International Affairs, honoring the memory of Hopkins alumnus and businessman Charles Rostov, is given at the School each academic year by an internationally prominent official or scholar. Last year, United States Secretary of State Madeline Albright delivered an address entitled "Sustaining Democracy in the Twenty-First Century." Other lecturers have included Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin; Paul Volcker, the former Chairman of the Federal Reserve; Senator Richard Lugar of Indiana; Corazon Aquino, then President of the Philippines; Mr. Yasushi Akashi, Under Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator at the United Nations; and the Honorable Sadako Ogata, the United National High Commissioner for Refugees.

Established in 1990, the Rostov Lecture is a source of great pride to the Nitze School, and it is a lecture we look forward to each year. The topic is of the speaker's own choosing and can include the full spectrum of international affairs. This year we would like to hold the lecture the week of September 10-14 during the early afternoon or early evening. If these dates are not possible, feel free to suggest additional times that accommodate your schedule.

The audience of approximately 400 would include government officials, international affairs specialists, business and community leaders, journalists, faculty, alumni, and students who would be interested in hearing your views. If your schedule permits, a reception would be held in your honor before or after the lecture. It would be a great privilege for the School as the entire SAIS community values hearing from our nation's leaders.

Thank you for considering this invitation and I hope that you will agree to deliver the 2001 Rostov Lecture at SAIS.

Sincerely,

Stephen F. Szabo
Interim Dean



Fact Sheet

www.sais-jhu.edu

The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies

1740 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036-1984

202.663.5626
202.663.5647 fax

The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) is a leading graduate school of international affairs, educating students for professional careers in government, business, journalism, international law and non-profit organizations. Founded in 1943 by Paul Nitze and Christian Herter, SAIS has been a division of The Johns Hopkins University since 1950.

GRADUATE STUDENTS (2000-2001)

480

International students from about 70 countries comprise more than one-third of the student body.

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M.A.-M.B.A.

with Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania and European Institute of Business Administration (INSEAD) in Fontainebleau, France

M.A.-J.D.

with Stanford University Law School

M.A.-M.H.S.

with the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health

M.A.-M.P.A.

(concurrent) with the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University

OVERSEAS CENTERS

SAIS Bologna Center in Italy
(established 1955)

Approximately 150 American and non-American students study at the center, the only American graduate institution of its kind in Europe. A multi-national faculty teaches courses in international politics and economics, European studies and foreign languages.

Hopkins-Nanjing Center in the People's Republic of China (established 1986)

The center, host to as many as 100 Chinese and American students, is administered jointly by Nanjing University and SAIS. Classes for American students are taught in Mandarin by Chinese professors, while Chinese students study in English with American professors.

RESEARCH CENTERS IN WASHINGTON

- Foreign Policy Institute (FPI)
- Central Asia-Caucasus Institute
- International Energy and Environment Program
- Center for Strategic Education
- Center for Canadian Studies
- Edwin O. Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies
- Center for International Business and Public Policy
- The Protection Project
- Swiss Foundation for World Affairs
- Center for Transatlantic Relations

FACULTY

50 full-time

110 part-time

ALUMNI

More than 10,000 working in approximately 140 countries

130 SAIS graduates have become ambassadors throughout the world.

MAIN CAMPUS

Two buildings on Massachusetts Avenue along Washington's Embassy Row in Dupont Circle

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FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
Draft	SAIS - Rostov Lecture (Dr. Rice)	10	09/11/2001	P5;

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For a complete list of items withdrawn from this folder, see the
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COLLECTION:

National Security Council - Media Communications and Speechwriting

SERIES:

Gibson, John - Chron Files

FOLDER TITLE:

09/11/2001, Rice - Nitze School (Cancelled) [1]

FRC ID:

34849

OA Num.:

NSC 0612

NARA Num.:**FOIA ID and Segment:**

2014-0508-F

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Michelle N. Brawer
09/10/2001 05:25:20 PM

Record Type: Record

To: John D. Gibson/NSC/EOP@EOP
cc: Evan Wagner/WHO/EOP@EOP
Subject: Truman Quotes

see if you like any of these. we're still working on nitze.

----- Forwarded by Michelle N. Brawer/WHO/EOP on 09/10/2001 05:25 PM -----

From: Evan Wagner on 09/10/2001 05:20:12 PM
Record Type: Record

To: Michelle N. Brawer/WHO/EOP@EOP
cc:
Subject: Truman Quotes

"Men make history, and not the other way around. In periods where there is no leadership, society stands still.

Progress occurs when courageous, skillful leaders seize the opportunity to change things for the better. "
(Date unknown at the moment)

SOURCE: <http://www.nwlink.com/~donclark/leader/change1.html>

"The President must represent all the people. Therefore, the President must be a sort of super-public relations man. His powers are great, but he must know how to make people get along together... Some people think that public relations be based on polls. That is nonsense. I wonder how far Moses would have gone if he had taken a poll in Egypt? What would have preached if He had taken a poll in the land of Israel? Where would the Reformation have gone if Martin Luther had or public opinion alone of the moment that counts. It is right and wrong, and leadership -- men with fortitude, honesty and the right that make epochs in the history of the world." - Harry S. Truman in an interview with William Hillman (Date unknown)

SOURCE: <http://www.geocities.com/beberius/bio/TRUMAN/HSTquotes.html>

"The presidency of the United States carries with it a responsibility so personal as to be without parallel. . . . No one can for [the president]. No one can know all the processes and stages of his thinking in making important decisions. . . . To United States is to be lonely, very lonely at times of great decisions." (Date unknown at the moment)

SOURCE: <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/presidents/frames/teach/truman/trumaniq.html>

"When you get to be President, there are all those things, the honors, the twenty-one gun salutes, all those things. You have to remember it isn't for you. It's for the Presidency." - Harry S. Truman (1884-1972),
Quoted in: Merle Miller, Plain Speaking: Conversations with Harry S. Truman, ch. 15 (1973).

SOURCE: <http://www.co.yakima.wa.us/auditor/election/kquotes.htm#truman>

"All my life, whenever it comes time to make a decision, I make it and forget about it." (Date unknown at the moment)

"It is amazing what you can accomplish if you do not care who gets the credit." (Date unknown at the moment)

"I come to the office each morning and stay for long hours doing what has to be done to the best of my ability. And when you've done the best you can, you can't do any better. So when I go to sleep I turn everything over to the Lord and forget it." (Date unknown at the moment)

SOURCE: <http://www.dailycelebrations.com/050801.htm>

From: Evan Wagner on 09/10/2001 11:27:27 AM

Record Type: Record

To: Michelle N. Brawer/WHO/EOP@EOP, John D. Gibson/NSC/EOP@EOP

cc:

Subject: Schultz Quote

This may not be precisely the quote for which you were searching, but it's all that I could find.

"Wise men come and wise men go, but decade after decade there is Paul Nitze." - George Schultz

Source: May 21, 1992 article off the Federal News Service, entitled "Remarks By General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff To The School of Advanced International Studies Commencement Ceremonies Washington, DC"

I printed the article, in case you want to use the quote.

Withdrawal Marker

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FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
Draft	SAIS - Rostov Lecture (Dr. Rice)	10	09/11/2001	P5;

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COLLECTION:

National Security Council - Media Communications and Speechwriting

SERIES:

Gibson, John - Chron Files

FOLDER TITLE:

09/11/2001, Rice - Nitze School (Cancelled) [1]

FRC ID:

34849

OA Num.:

NSC 0612

NARA Num.:

FOIA ID and Segment:

2014-0508-F

RESTRICTION CODES

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Key Themes on Missile Defense

Missile Threat Growing; More robust missile defense development effort needed: The Secretary of Defense has laid out a program to explore the most promising technologies. The President's budget includes funding to address years of neglect and to enhance test realism. The proposed missile defense funding makes up about 2.5% of the total defense budget. Of the nearly \$33 billion in new defense funding requested, about 10% has been earmarked for missile defense.

Missile defenses are an essential component of the President's comprehensive strategy against new threats: The 1972 ABM Treaty is outdated, prohibits us from defending the U.S. from missile attack, prevents us from exploring the most promising technologies, and prevents us from cooperating with allies and Russia on defenses. Article I of the Treaty explicitly prohibits us from defending our territory from missile attack. Those that claim that effective missile defenses can be deployed within the Treaty conveniently ignore it's fundamental premise.

Law Calls for Deployment of Effective Defenses ASAP: The NMD Act of 1999, which Pres. Clinton signed into law states, "It is the policy of the United States to deploy as soon as is technologically possible an effective National Missile Defense system capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized or deliberate..." The Senate passed the bill by a vote of 97 to 3; (Senators Biden and Levin voted for it).

Need for a New Strategic Relationship with Russia: Although the Soviet Union is no more and the Cold War is over, some continue to cling to the concept of mutual assured destruction as the guiding principle in our relations with Russia. The Administration is engaged in intensive consultations with Russia to move beyond the ABM Treaty to develop a new strategic framework appropriate for the 21st century.

Yet some would drastically cut missile defense funding and link it to perpetuation of the ABM Treaty. These efforts tie the President's hands and undercut our ability to reach agreement with Russia on a new strategic relationship. Politics should stop at the waters edge. These provisions, if retained in the final Defense bill, would severely impede our development and testing program to counter today's threats and block progress on a new cooperative relationship with Russia based on mutual interests, not mutual vulnerability.

Rebuttal to Key Points Made by Sen. Biden on Missile Defense

In a return to "Star Wars," the Bush Administration intends to pursue a "massive" missile defense program. Although the President has spoken of a limited defense, in order to provide protection to friends and allies and to defend against an accidental launch of a Russian ICBM that would employ sophisticated countermeasures, a very large missile defense system will be needed.

- The Administration has said all along that we seek missile defenses to deal with the threat posed by a small number of missiles in the hands of rogue states.
- The limited defenses we intend to deploy will only be capable of defending against handfuls of incoming missiles, not hundreds or thousands. Such defenses will not undercut the Russian nuclear deterrent, even at levels below those reportedly contemplated by Russia.
- There is a growing recognition among friends and allies that the threat from WMD and missiles is increasing and that missile defenses are an essential element of the response to this threat. This is clearly seen in the remarks by a number of allied leaders. The President is committed to working together with friends and allies to address this common threat.
- However, the assertion that the President intends to pursue a "world-wide" missile defense system on a "massive" scale is unfounded.

In light of the President's tax cut, the United States cannot afford to spend hundreds of billions of dollars on missile defense.

- Like other major defense programs, such as those to develop new fighter aircraft or ships, missile defense will require significant funding. Even so, it will only represent a small fraction of the defense budget -- about 2.5% in FY 2002.
- Bearing the cost of missile defense is a national security imperative given the growing threats we face from rogue

states armed with weapons of mass destruction and seeking long-range missiles.

- The cost to inaction cannot be measured in dollars, namely vulnerability to blackmail or attack from rogue states armed with WMD and missiles.

The Administration is rushing to deploy missile defenses that will not be 100% effective.

- Few things in life are certain except death and taxes. No weapon system is 100% effective, 100% of the time and this will be true of our missile defense systems as well.
- Our determination to field missile defenses as soon as possible is driven by the urgency of the threat.
- For example, in 1998 North Korea launched a three-stage Taepo Dong 1 missile that overflowed Japan. The Intelligence Community assesses that this launch demonstrated the ability of North Korea to deliver a small payload to the United States. The Taepo Dong 2 missile currently under development will have an even greater range and payload capability.
- Our programs will be structured so that the limited number of interim systems initially deployed can be progressively improved and replaced by more capable systems able to keep up with the threat. Such capabilities, even if not perfect, will provide more protection than we currently have -- which today is no capability at all against longer-range missiles able to strike American cities.

The ABM Treaty and Mutual Assured Destruction have kept the peace for decades and are a more effective means of dealing with the threat than the missile defense initiative proposed by the President.

- The world has changed fundamentally since the ABM Treaty was signed in 1972 and Cold War arrangements no longer make sense.
- We need to update our concept of deterrence to reflect the realities of the current security environment, which

includes weapons of mass destruction in the hands of some of the world's least responsible states. These leaders place great value in possessing even a small number of long-range missiles.

- The leaders of these states have demonstrated a willingness to take large gambles and are acquiring weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles as their means to deter us from coming to the assistance of our friends and allies in vital regions of interest.
- These leaders may well believe that they can blackmail us -- prevent us from helping the victims of their aggression -- if they can hold even a small number of our cities or those of our friends and allies hostage to attack.
- The ABM Treaty no longer makes sense in such a world. It codified the adversarial relationship between the two superpowers that existed during the Cold War. It was premised on a relationship of distrust and mutual vulnerability.
- We need to move beyond the concept of mutual assured destruction with Russia. Russia is not the Soviet Union and is not an enemy. Retaining MAD at the center of our relationship with Russia perpetuates suspicions and encourages the retention of artificially large nuclear arsenals. Nuclear weapons should no longer be the principal currency of our relationship.
- Instead, the Administration intends to move beyond the ABM Treaty and MAD to construct a new strategic framework for our relationship with Russia premised on common interests and cooperation.

The United States can do all the missile defense research and testing it needs in the next couple of years without breaking the ABM Treaty like the Clinton Administration did.

- The ABM Treaty prevents us from acquiring the capabilities we need to deter and defend against the new threats we face.
- Under Article I of the Treaty, the United States is not permitted to defend all 50 states against missile attack,

nor are we permitted to defend even a single city under the Treaty's 1974 Protocol. We are only permitted to defend a missile field in North Dakota.

- Article V of the Treaty prohibits the development, testing, and deployment of some of the most promising technologies and basing modes, including sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based;
- Article VI bans the development, testing, and deployment of "theater defenses" that have the capability to counter longer-range strategic missiles; and
- Article IX prevents us from sharing and working on defenses against longer-range missiles with our allies and even with Russia.
- The Clinton Administration designed its missile defense development and test programs to be consistent with the ABM Treaty. Once so designed, that Administration could and did claim that the ABM Treaty was not inhibiting missile defense development and testing. However, contrary to the claims of many, even the Clinton Administration's NMD system, which involved the placement of ground-based interceptors and construction of an ABM radar in Alaska, could not be deployed under the Treaty, as President Clinton himself acknowledged.
- As the President has said, we will examine all available technologies and basing modes for missile defense. As we have informed our allies and Russia, we expect our RDT&E efforts will conflict with ABM Treaty limitations in a matter of months, not years.

Extensive debate is needed on the President's missile defense initiative, since polls show most American's don't know much about missile defense and generally do not support it.

- Missile defense has been one of the most widely discussed and debated security issues in recent years. Major newspapers routinely report on it and the op-ed pages around the country are filled with articles on the subject. Congress has held numerous hearings in recent years, and legislation on the subject has been hotly debated.

- We welcome this debate, because the facts and arguments in favor of missile defense are compelling.
- Furthermore, recent polls show the American public supports the President's missile defense initiative. For example, a poll conducted by the Pew Research Center in collaboration with the Council on Foreign Relations in May shows that the Administration's missile defense initiative is supported by a majority of the public (51 to 38 percent margin).
- This poll also showed that the public has a substantially greater awareness of the arguments against missile defense than those favoring it. Despite this "awareness gap," the arguments in favor of defenses were accepted by a clear majority of respondents as important reasons to support the program. None of the counter-arguments was considered an important reason to oppose the program.

Missile defense does not defend against the more likely means of delivering a WMD payload to the U.S. involving terrorist use of a suitcase or car bomb, or placement of a nuclear weapon on a ship in a harbor.

- The United States must also defend against these other threats.
- The United States spent about \$11 billion last year on counter-terrorism efforts, about twice as much as we did on missile defense. We also work closely with friends, allies, and the broader international community on counter-terrorism initiatives.
- The President recognizes the need to do more to protect America's homeland and citizens against the possibility that a terrorist group could use weapons of mass destruction against targets in the United States.
- In May, the President launched a major initiative, appointing Vice President Cheney to oversee the development of a coordinated national effort that will expand and integrate the myriad federal, state, and local government efforts in the WMD preparedness area.
- But, in addition to defending against the potential terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction in the United

States, we also need missile defense because countries like Iran and North Korea are making enormous efforts to acquire and develop long-range ballistic missiles -- suggesting that ballistic missiles are the "weapons of choice" for these nations for coercion and blackmail.



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News Release

www.sais-jhu.edu

September 4, 2001

National Security Adviser Rice to Speak at JHU SAIS

Condoleezza Rice, national security adviser and assistant to the president for national security affairs, will give the annual Rostov Lecture on International Affairs at the Johns Hopkins Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) on Tuesday, September 11 at 5:30 p.m.

Rice, who most recently served as Stanford University's provost, is expected to speak about "Foreign Policy Under the Bush Administration."

Admittance to the lecture is by invitation only. However, the event is open to the media for coverage. Following her lecture, Rice will respond to questions from the SAIS community audience only.

The event will be held in Kenney Auditorium located on the first floor of the school's Nitze Building, 1740 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C.

Established in 1990, the Rostov Lecture on International Affairs honors the memory of Johns Hopkins alumnus and businessman Charles Rostov.

Members of the media who plan to cover the event must respond to
Felisa Neuringer at the SAIS Public Affairs Office at
202.663.5626 or fneuringer@jhu.edu.

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Office of the Dean

Dr. Condoleezza Rice
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Dr. Rice,

On behalf of the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of The Johns Hopkins University, it is my privilege to invite you to deliver the 2001 Rostov Lecture.

The Rostov Lecture on International Affairs, honoring the memory of Hopkins alumnus and businessman Charles Rostov, is given at the School each academic year by an internationally prominent official or scholar. Last year, United States Secretary of State Madeline Albright delivered an address entitled "Sustaining Democracy in the Twenty-First Century." Other lecturers have included Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin; Paul Volcker, the former Chairman of the Federal Reserve; Senator Richard Lugar of Indiana; Corazon Aquino, then President of the Philippines; Mr. Yasushi Akashi, Under Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator at the United Nations; and the Honorable Sadako Ogata, the United National High Commissioner for Refugees.

Established in 1990, the Rostov Lecture is a source of great pride to the Nitze School, and it is a lecture we look forward to each year. The topic is of the speaker's own choosing and can include the full spectrum of international affairs. This year we would like to hold the lecture the week of September 10-14 during the early afternoon or early evening. If these dates are not possible, feel free to suggest additional times that accommodate your schedule.

The audience of approximately 400 would include government officials, international affairs specialists, business and community leaders, journalists, faculty, alumni, and students who would be interested in hearing your views. If your schedule permits, a reception would be held in your honor before or after the lecture. It would be a great privilege for the School as the entire SAIS community values hearing from our nation's leaders.


Thank you for considering this invitation and I hope that you will agree to deliver the 2001 Rostov Lecture at SAIS.

Sincerely,

Stephen F. Szabo
Stephen F. Szabo
Interim Dean



POC: Lois
663-5624
6-9210



June 29, 2001

663-5626
703 820 0971
dH 800
Felicita?

2:30

Szabo - his bio

500-600 - primarily students, alumni, faculty

Rostov - Dorothy + Gene (son)
Nitze coming 94
Leezee Porter