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DOCUMENT NO.	FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
015	Report	[Report]	5	09/19/2002	P1/b1; P5;
016	Draft	Telcon with Prime Minister of United Kingdom	6	09/18/2002	P1/b1; P5;
017	Note	[Notes]	1	09/19/2002	P1/b1; P5;
019	Draft	[Talking Points]	4	09/19/2002	P5;
021	Draft	Telcon with Prime Minister of Japan	4	09/19/2002	P1/b1;
022	Draft	Telcon with President of Philippines	3	09/19/2002	P1/b1;
023	Draft	[Talking Points]	4	N.D.	P5;
024	Draft	Telcon with President of Poland	5	09/19/2002	P1/b1;

COLLECTION TITLE:
National Security Council - National Security Advisor, Office of the

SERIES:
Rice, Condoleezza

FOLDER TITLE:
[Iraq] [Folder 3] [2]

FRC ID:
34717

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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027	Draft	Telcon with President of Russia	4	09/20/2002	P1/b1;
028	Note	[Notes]	1	09/19/2002	P1/b1; P5;

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Cooper, Colby J. (NSA)

From: Broz, Marko R. (WHSR)
Sent: Thursday, September 19, 2002 2:28 PM
To: @APNSA; @NENA; @EXECSEC; @Vice President; @Press Office
Cc: @WHSR
Subject: Naji Sabri Delivers Remarks To The United Nations General [UNCLASSIFIED, Record]

Importance: High

Follow Up Flag: For Your Information
Due By: Wednesday, September 18, 2002 5:00 PM
Flag Status: Flagged

Below is the text of the Iraqi Foreign Minister's speech to the UNGA.

UNCLASSIFIED

AP/Infostream
F1248

I was instructed by President of the Republic of Iraq, Mr. Saddam Hussein, to convey to you in the allotted time excerpts of a letter he addressed to the General Assembly where His Excellency tackled Iraq's position on the latest developments in the relationship between Iraq and the Security Council. Following are excerpts from the letter, and I quote:

``In his speech at the General Assembly that was preceded and accompanied by noisy propaganda and extensive preparation, the U.S. president, instead of paying attention to common issues of particular concern to humanity at large, he presented the security problems of his own country and the sacrifices it has suffered since the events of September 11. It is a good sign that the United States has resorted for the first time after the end of the Cold War to the General Assembly to put forward one of the problems, after years of disregard to the weight, effect and opinion of others.

``Nevertheless, the U.S. president revealed his basic purpose when he jumped to the issue of Iraq without any introduction or acceptable progression. He portrayed this issue as if it were the most dangerous situation, not only for the life, security and the future of the United States, but for the life, future and security of the whole world.

``Along (ph) his generalizations, which implied deliberate insinuations, he presented the utmost distortions on the so-called nuclear, biological, chemical threats so as to make American citizens believe the deliberate insinuation that Iraq was linked to the American people's tragedy of September 11.

``He seems to have assumed that the countries of the world are unaware of the American administration and its methods, nor do they know Iraq and its high sense of responsibility towards humanity, its desire for peace and stability, or the fact that the Iraqis are creative people and work for production and innovation in addition to being the head of the most ancient human civilizations.

``The U.S. president talked about the importance of applying democracy by the government of Iraq. He pretended to care for the people of Iraq, after he and other presidents before him have killed by the use of weapons, including depleted uranium, and by the blockade which is now more than 12 years old, more than 1,700,000 innocent Iraqis, out of a population of 25 million citizens.

``So after a long time of utilizing the American propaganda machine, along with official statements of lies, distortion and falsehood, the focus was deliberately turned on inciting the American public against

Iraq and pushing them to believe the U.S. administration's schemes of aggression as a fait accompli, as if it were the solution of the necessary (inaudible) that would allow American citizens to live in security and stability after what they had gone through in September 11 events.

``When the U.S. administration realized that it was necessary to have an international cover for using force against Iraq and that the world did not believe the lies that it tried to propagate to link Iraq to the September events, it changed the issue and began to shed crocodile tears on international law and the necessity to comply with the resolutions of international legitimacy alleging that Iraq is not complying with Security Council resolutions, especially with regard to U.N. inspectors.

``This implied the allegation that Iraq had the intention to develop or that it had already possessing nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and according to this allegation, it may give such weapons to terrorist organizations that pose a threat to world security.

``Now that Iraq has accepted the return of U.N. inspectors, we will all be able to see how they work. In our past experience in the period 1991-1998 with them, Iraq used to ask inspection teams to do their job in accordance with declared goals of the Security Council. But some of the inspectors went on doing intelligence and espionage work that had nothing to do with the official mandate of inspection teams. Some of those inspectors have publicly admitted this. Some, including an American, are still publicly talking about this. Even Mr. Rolf Ekeus, the former chief of the U.N. Special Commission, UNSCOM, has recently stated that the inspectors overstepped the limits of their defined duties by spying on the Iraqi leadership. And I quote, 'The United States and other powers exploited the inspection teams for their own political ends, including monitoring President Saddam Hussein's whereabouts.' He also said that the inspection teams deliberately created the problems to prepare the ground for possible military attacks."

Ladies and gentlemen, Iraq has always defended the principles and values that you have willingly put down in the U.N. Charter, and the purposes for which the Security Council was created; i.e., to preserve security and to establish peace. Therefore, by confronting evil for 12 years now, Iraq has not been only defending its own patriotism, but rather it's acted as if it were defending your own patriotism. It has been acting on your behalf without being assigned to do so. In targeting Iraq, the United States administration is acting on behalf of Zionism, which has been killing the heroic people of Palestine, destroying their property, murdering their children and seeking to impose their domination on the whole world, not only militarily, but also economically and politically

.

The U.S. administration wants to destroy Iraq in order to control the Middle East oil and consequently control the politics, as well as the oil and economic policies of the whole world. If it succeeded in that, God forbid, it would dictate on you what each country needs for its economic development, what quantities of oil it is allowed to buy, and at what the price is, along with other conditions.

Ladies and gentlemen, in short, what Iraq wants is the respect of the principles of the U.N. Charter, international law, whether regarding its own interests and sovereignty or those of the other member states of the United Nations. On this basis, Iraq was and still is ready to cooperate with the Security Council and international organizations.

However, Iraq rejects any transgression (inaudible) at the expense of its rights, sovereignty, security and independence that is in contradiction with the principles of the charter and the international law.

From this and other facts, you see, ladies and gentlemen, that Iraq has not rejected the (inaudible) resolutions of Security Council, even though what relates to Iraq in them is unjust and at odds with the U.N. Charter and international law. Iraq, rather, calls on members of the Security Council and on the U.S. administration in particular

to respect their own obligations under the charter and under international law and relevant Security Council resolutions.

Iraq demands that its inalienable rights, stipulated in those very resolutions, are met, including respect of its sovereignty and security. lifting the blockade imposed on it, and applying paragraph of resolution 687 of 1991 to the Zionist entity, as stipulated in the text, in the same manner as it was applied to Iraq.

Ladies and gentlemen, I hereby declare before you that Iraq is totally clear of all nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. If there are anyone amongst you who might still worry that the fabrications announced by American officials about Iraq may possibly be true, our country is ready to receive any scientific experts, accompanied by politicians , you choose to represent, any one of your countries, to tell us which places and scientific and industrial instillations they would wish to see, particularly those about which the American officials have been fabricating false stories alleging that they contain prohibited materials or activities. If such experts and politicians visit Iraq, we shall provide them with all the facilities they need to achieve their objective; that is to see the true facts as they are.

As what matters for Iraq, for us basically is that our rights, sovereignty and security be respected in accordance with international law. We have accepted the return of inspection teams to Iraq, taking into consideration the arrangements that should safeguard these principles and achieve with transparency the goal of making sure that Iraq no longer possesses nuclear, biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction.

Along with this, we are waiting to see. The blockade imposed on Iraq, ladies and gentlemen, has been in place for more than 12 years now, during which time our assets and oil revenues have been frozen, and we are unable to use them except through a U.N.-run inefficient system already proven to be unfeasible. Substantial amounts of our revenues have been illegitimately seized in a manner tantamount to looting, contrary to the principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter.

Therefore, we call for a discussion of the issue of the inspection teams in accordance with international law. It should be done on a comprehensi ve basis, with discussion of Iraq's obligations, including the issue of the inspection teams, as well as the obligations of the Security Council towards Iraq, as stated in the resolutions themselves, particularly resolution 687.

There are these reciprocal obligations of which the Security Council has presented nothing, including the obligation of respecting Iraq's sovereignty, which is being violated by America, interruptin g on a daily basis through their ongoing aggression and their artificially drawn parallel latitude lines over northern and southern Iraq.

Ladies and gentlemen, you may notice how the policy of the Zionist entity, which has observed (ph) Palestine and other Arab territories since 1948 and afterwards has become now as one with the policies and capabilities of the United States. The United States administration has been making up problems with Iraq in order to derail the application of paragraph 14 of Resolution 687 of 1991 and to prevent the Security Council from lifting the blockage imposed on Iraq.

The reason lies in the fact that the council's obligations and the relevance of resolutions of the Security Council, including Resolution 687 of April 3, 1991, contain a clear paragraph demanding that the Middle East be made a zone free from weapons of mass destruction. Thus, the American administration does not want to embarrass the Zionist entity or to deprive it of its nuclear, chemical and biological weapons it actually possesses.

Moreover, it is because the United States administration is aware that Iraq has, indeed, honored all its obligations and is demanding, along with Arab countries, that paragraph 14 be applied to the Zionist entity.

Iraq has been keen to see the inspection issue discussed between Security Council and Iraq toward the United Nations secretary general

and the representatives of Iraq with a view to reaching a balanced formula based on the principles of the charter and the (inaudible) resolutions of the Security Council within a comprehensive solution which should bring to an end the cyclone of American accusations and fabricated crises against Iraq. At the same time, this would assure Iraq with regard to its security, sovereignty, territorial integrity and its right to choosing its own way without interference in accordance with the rules established in the charter of the United Nations.

The U.S. president said in his speech that Iraqis are providing financial support to the Palestinian people. My comment is that this is correct. Yet we feel now the support we have extended has not been as high as we should, as we have hoped because of the circumstances which have curtailed our means. And extending this support, we act in accordance with the United Nations charter and the resolutions of this August assembly in which the national struggle of peoples against the occupation of colonialism is considered to be an inalienable national right.

But what grounds does America and its president have in supporting the Zionist entity, which has been occupying Palestine and other Arab territories and permitting its criminal policy of killing Palestinians, destroying their property and encroaching upon and destroying the sanctities of Muslims and Christians there. But the principles and what laws does the American president rely on in killing the Iraqis located in that country, destroying their property and interfering in their internal affairs?

And the court thanks you, Mr. President.

(APPLAUSE)

(END AUDIO FEED)

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

Margaret M. Suntum
09/19/2002 04:30:38 PM

Record Type: Record

To:

cc:
Subject: Background briefing on draft JR, 09/19/02

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release September 19, 2002

BACKGROUND PRESS BRIEFING BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS
ON THE CONGRESSIONAL RESOLUTION

James S. Brady Press Briefing Room

3:01 P.M. EDT

MR. MCCORMACK: We have two senior administrations here to talk about the proposed language for a joint resolution which the President sent up to the Hill today. So without further ado, I'll turn it over to our senior administration officials.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Good afternoon. Let me have a brief opening statement, and then we will be prepared to take questions.

This morning, the President sent to Congress proposed language for a joint resolution to authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. The President is asking Congress to support him in using all means he determines to be appropriate, including force, to enforce United Nations Security Council resolutions, to defend the national security of our country against the threat posed by the Iraqi regime. The President is reviewing all of his options to ensure that the threat posed by Saddam Hussein's regime is addressed in an effective manner.

For more than a decade, Saddam Hussein has defied U.N. Security Council resolutions demanding that, among other things,

he give up his stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons, stop his aggressive efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, stop his violent oppression of the Iraqi people, and end his support for terrorism. Iraq also agreed to do all of these things after its defeat in the Gulf War as part of a cessation of hostilities.

The President has urged the United Nations Security Council to act now to enforce its own resolutions, and he expects that the U.N. will live up to its responsibilities. But the world should not doubt the resolve of the United States to do what is necessary to defend its national security interests. Secretary Powell is working closely with U.N. Security Council members and other parties to draft language for a new, effective resolution that makes clear what is required of Saddam Hussein's regime, as well as the potential consequences if the regime fails to act.

Long experience has shown us the character of Saddam Hussein's regime. We know what he is capable of. For more than a decade, he has been in violation of U.N. resolutions. The burden of proof does not rest with the Security Council to prove that Saddam continues to defy the United Nations. The burden is on Saddam Hussein to prove that he is complying with Security Council resolutions, and complying with the agreements he made at the end of the Gulf War. The burden is on him to prove that he has destroyed all chemical and biological weapons, and ended his nuclear weapons program.

The President and members of his administration will consult closely with Congress as it moves toward a vote on a joint resolution. It is important that this nation be united in confronting the threat posed by Saddam Hussein's regime. The President is confident that the Congress will act in the best traditions of our democracy in debating and voting on a resolution.

Thank you. Do you have any comments you want to add?

All right, we'll take questions. Ron.

Q A couple of questions on the technical merits of this. Does -- there's no explicit mention of regime change in Section 2. Because of the reference to the earlier "whereas"-es, are you saying that there is -- that he is asking --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's there --

Q -- clearly for a regime change, and to use military force to do so?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's there in the "whereas"-es. And I'd just remind everybody that the policy of the United States since 1998 has been regime change. So, yes, it concerns regime change.

Q And secondly, the language, it says "the threat posed by Iraq" and "restore international peace and security in the region." Could that be interpreted to include threats outside of Iraq, either now or in the future?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it's very clear that the President is asking for support on Iraq at this point.

Q Could it be interpreted, though, to react to threats, either now or in the future, outside of Iraq?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the President has -- I'll let my colleague speak to this, but the President constitutionally has authority to react to any threat to the United States and the people. But this resolution is specific to Iraq.

Do you want to add anything?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, my colleague is right. The President would have the constitutional authority to take any actions to restore peace and security to the region. But the focus here is on Iraq and the threat that is posed by Iraq to the United States and to the region.

Q Can I follow up on that issue?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sure, follow up.

Q The question is, could this language, as written, be used somewhere down the road to make the argument that Congress has, in fact, authorized military force in the region elsewhere besides Iraq?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Could the language be -- first of all, let me make one point perfectly clear. This is an initial draft by the White House. We're going to be meeting with Congress to debate these kind of points with the Congress. The objective here is to provide to the President the maximum flexibility to deal with the threat posed by Iraq, and to provide, as the resolution says, peace and security to the region.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Note that this -- it really refers to peace and security in the region in the context of Iraq.

Q There are some members on the Hill who would have some kind of language in here that would refer to what's going on at the United Nations -- maybe a direct link, maybe not a direct link, but in some way acknowledge what's happening in the international community. Is that something the White House would oppose, any kind of reference or connection to --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the important thing here is to provide maximum flexibility to the President to react to this threat. But again, let me just underscore what my colleague said. This is a draft. We are going to talk with members of the Congress about what needs to go into this resolution.

What would not make sense, of course, is for the United States to -- as the President as Commander-in-Chief, to be wholly obligated to only act on behalf of the United States if the U.N. did something. I mean, that would not give the President maximum flexibility. But we'll talk about how the language might be, and it's obvious that we're working in the U.N.

Q Can I ask about the legal doctrine in here and the precedence. It talks about because 9/11 showed the gravity of terrorist attacks, and there's a threat that Iraq could transfer weapons of mass destruction to terrorists, and the United States has the right of self-defense, therefore the President should be authorized to use force. What's the precedent for that kind of anticipatory defense doctrine in international law?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, there is the inherent right of self-defense for all member-nations under the U.N. charter.

Q Against a threat?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And the question is, what do you mean by responding in self-defense to a threat? The theory of anticipatory threat, or anticipatory self-defense, is one that is long recognized. It is something that has been utilized by the United States in the past. If you look at the Cuban missile crisis, the embargo, for example, one could characterize that as anticipatory self-defense, the use of force -- a blockade is a use of force. So there is some history for this.

Q If I could ask you to respond to the Iraqi Foreign Minister's contention, among many, that the U.S. is not consistent in enforcing U.N. resolutions about weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, and that Israel's weapons of mass destruction, if, in fact -- Israel's weapons of mass destruction are off the table, as far as the U.S. is concerned.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As far as the United States is concerned, Saddam Hussein, who fought a war of aggression, a war that he began in 1991, during that war and the war previously -- I'm sorry, war that he began in 1990 -- but, and a war that he previously launched against another neighbor, has used chemical weapons against those people and against his own people; a bloody tyrant that represses his people at the level that he does, including minorities, to the point that the U.N. human

rights reports continue to cite him as one of the worst offenders, is -- and given the way that he has defied the United Nations time and time and time again is in a class by himself. And it probably should not be the Iraqi Foreign Minister's job to start trying to hold the United States to consistency. I mean, this is a ludicrous argument.

Q So there are regimes that are okay to have those weapons in that region, and regimes which aren't?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Look, we -- obviously, weapons of mass destruction have to be put into context. And the context here is a bloody dictator who has used a weapon of mass destruction against his own people and against his neighbors, who has tremendous animus against the United States, has tried to assassinate an American President, has paid suicide bombers. I think the equation of Iraq with almost anybody else in this context really doesn't make any sense.

Q Would you point to any significant differences, or any important differences, between the language you're now asking for and the language from 1998?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me have my colleague do that, because he did most of the drafting of this.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The 1998 language, of course, the resolution in 1998 had a series of "whereas"-es that basically makes the case for the breaches that occurred. So that's one difference. The other difference is the specific grant; it urges the President, I believe, to take "appropriate" or maybe "necessary" means to bring Iraq into compliance with U.N. resolutions. So that was the language of the '98.

Q And this one is saying that -- while we're pursuing a different resolution at the U.N., this one says that should he not do that, then the U.S. would act on its own?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Absolutely not. It's not tied to any actions by the U.N. What we're asking -- again, what the President is asking for is maximum flexibility to deal with the threat posed by Iraq to the interests of the United States. It's not in any way tied or conditioned on what happens at the U.N.

Q Which you believe the '98 language was?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The '98 language was not tied to any future action, or further action by the U.N. And what I'm saying is the language used in the grant of authorization used the word "urges" the President to exercise his powers under the Constitution and under applicable laws to bring Iraq into compliance. And that -- we've used different language. Here, the grant of authority is a lot more explicit.

Q Senator Daschle said today that he would want to approve this with an understanding that before a trigger was pulled, there would be additional consultations with Congress. This -- the wording here reads like this is the last stop for Congress. Is that the correct way to read it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, consultations go on with Congress all the time. But, obviously, this is a grant of support and of authority. And that would stand. But consultations would, of course, continue with Congress as we go forward, and as we think about what options the President needs to pursue. But it must be understood that when there's a resolution, there's been a grant of authority.

Q In the part that talks about the right of self-defense in the U.N. Charter, under Chapter 7, that speaks specifically to a response to a direct attack. I wonder if you're now saying that the President's doctrine of preemption is the administration's interpretation of Article 51 of Chapter 7.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I'm going to go back to my colleague again, but let's remember that -- first of all, it is not a new idea that you do not have to wait to be physically attacked before you try to take out the means that might attack you. That is not a new idea.

As the other official said, we blockaded Cuba in expectation that missiles that were being put there -- missiles that nobody was even clear on how operational they might be -- might be used against the United States. And so, in a sense, that's anticipatory self-defense. It is also the case that the United States maintained throughout the Cold War a policy that refused to say that there would be no first use of nuclear weapons, because there was an expectation that you might have to use weapons to prevent a worse attack against the United States.

So this is not a new idea. Nobody has ever said that you have to wait to physically be attacked in order to take out the means that might attack you.

Q I'm not asking if it's been U.S. policy before, but is it the specific administration interpretation of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter that it explicitly authorizes a preemptive attack that is not in response to an attack?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There is no precise definition of imminence in international law. And I think it is a word, a definition, that evolves over time. As you find weapons that can be delivered with more speed, with more destruction, I think it's appropriate to redefine or look at imminence, and consider a wide variety of factors -- such as the probability that a threat will materialize; the degree of harm that will result if that threat materialized; the

probability that the risk of that threat materializing increasing over time; and perhaps the amount of time that one can anticipate before that threat will materialize. So I think that there are a variety of things that one ought to look at in defining whether or not a threat is imminent.

Q I'm sorry, I don't mean to belabor the point, but you speak specifically of the United Nations Charter, which as I understand it, doesn't use the word imminent at all, let alone try to interpret it. So I'm asking if your interpretation of the Charter is that it specifically authorizes a preeminent -- preemptive -- sorry -- attack.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think if you look at the history of actions by member states, I don't think there's any kind of requirement that you have to wait until you're physically being attacked or about to be attacked. And I think also, again, that the doctrine of self-defense and the incorporation of the term of imminence, I think that is something that has evolved, and will continue to evolve as the threat changes.

Q Sir, if there's a possibility that the President might go to war against Iraq, why under the Constitution is he not obligated to get a declaration of war from Congress?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He is coming to the Congress to get whatever authority he believes is appropriate in this case. I think as a matter of constitutional theory, the President has the authority, under the Constitution, as the Commander-in-Chief, to use force to defend this country. It is true that the Constitution grants Congress only the power to declare war. That does not mean that the President is precluded from defending this country as Commander-in-Chief.

Q There's talk at the U.N. that it could take months to get weapons inspectors up and running. How long are you willing to wait for the U.N. to act?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think that we don't believe that the time line needs to be months. But one of the things that we have to assess with others on the Security Council is what the time line really should look like here. Let me just say that weapons inspectors may well be a part of the story of how you get Saddam Hussein disarmed. But the United States is withholding at this point, pending discussions and pending consultations on what means you use to disarm him. The question -- weapons inspectors are simply a means, not an end in and of themselves. So the key here is to get an effective resolution that deals with the threat, not just to get one that might deal with weapons inspections.

So we'll see how long some of this would take. But I've heard varying estimates of how long such a thing could take. I think we have to just talk with people and see.

Q What's the state of play --

Q Doesn't this --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He's got a follow-up, just a second.

Q What's the state of play with discussions with the Russia and France?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, Secretary Powell has had a couple of conversations with various foreign ministers of the Perm Five. It was important for people to go back to capitals and to talk, obviously, to the heads of state and to get instructions. You might note that the Russian Foreign Minister is here today, so they'll have another opportunity to talk. Although, let me be clear, the visits of the Russian Foreign and Defense Ministers have long been planned in accordance with the Moscow Treaty, which has a consultative group with the four ministers. So this is not Iraq specific.

But, obviously, while the Foreign Minister is here, he will, and he'll continue phone conversations with him. I think that we're impressing upon people that strong Security Council action through a new resolution is required, that we -- to the degree that Iraq was concerned about such -- it made this ploy the other night, but it does mean that you've got Iraq's attention -- this isn't the time to let up if you want a road to, this time, a successful outcome.

Q Doesn't this new doctrine, the preemptive strike idea, introduce a certain element of arbitrariness in your decisions? That is, what is to prevent you, or what is to prevent a government from deciding they didn't -- somebody they don't like, that they will use this a pretext for attacking them and eliminating a bad -- what they consider to be a bad guy, in spite of the fact there might not be a threat? Really, it's an arbitrary decision on your part, or on the part of government, to decide, okay, this is a guy who represents a threat in the future, therefore, we should eliminate him.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'd be the first to say there have never been any hard and fast rules about when to use force. Never. And it is, in fact, not a new matter to think that you don't have to wait to be attacked until you attack. That's simply not a new concept.

Now, we believe that the particular notion of anticipatory self-defense or preemption is a pretty limited concept. This isn't something that you go around the world preempting and changing regimes around the world. Nobody is making that claim. There are circumstances in which you have no other option to protect yourself but to try and deal with a growing threat before

it becomes a devastating attack on you.

There are many other cases in which diplomacy might work, in which other counter-means might work. All of those have actually been tried with Iraq. You might note the President made a long list of all of the things that have been tried with Iraq. But nobody would say that this is something that you go out and do every day. And as to whether others might do this, I think we have to be a little careful in assuming that others will be deterred from doing aggressive acts, that we would consider aggressive acts, just because the United States doesn't say that it's going to protect itself against an emerging threat. And I think that norm -- people are going to do what they need to do.

In the cases that have been most often cited, like India-Pakistan, we continually talk to the Indians and the Pakistanis about the available means that they have to deal with the conflict between them. And indeed, we have been very intimately involved -- we, and particularly the British -- in trying to find a means for them to resolve that conflict. And we're very clear with them that the use of military force is not going to resolve that conflict and it's going to make the situation worse.

So when there are other means, you by all means ought to try them. You ought to try to deal with threats in any way that you can. But there will come times when, in order to prevent an attack against you, you have to preempt that threat.

Last question.

Q Did you all speed up work on this resolution in a way to kind of influence skeptical U.S. allies in the U.N. to act with a new resolution?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. Kelly, if you remember, all the way back on -- when the President first came back from Crawford, he made clear that he thought that this resolution needed to be before the members went out for the recess. We do believe that the effect of a united front by the United States will be to show the seriousness of purpose of the United States and to underscore that the United Nations Security Council should act because the United States is prepared to act in the absence of action by the Security Council.

Q Isn't it likely the Security Council will act before Congress gets around to its resolution?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't -- I don't know, Jim. That would also be great. But I think just the fact that the United States is debating this, that there's a seriousness of purpose within the United States is having an effect. It is also the case that other parliaments are debating this, as well. The British Parliament will come in on Tuesday to debate it.

Thank you.

END 3:24 P.M. EDT

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FOLDER TITLE:
[Iraq] [Folder 3] [2]

FRC ID:
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OA Num.:
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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 19, 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Draft Congressional Resolution on Iraq

Attached for your information is a copy of the draft Congressional Resolution on Iraq that the President sent to the Hill this morning.

CONDOLEEZZA RICE
CR FOR

Condoleezza Rice
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

cc:
Scooter Libby
Steve Hadley
Rich Armitage
Paul Wolfowitz
John McLaughlin
Gen. Pete Pace

Attachment
Tab 1 Draft Congressional Resolution

WHITE HOUSE DISCUSSION DRAFT
9/19/02

Joint Resolution

To authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against Iraq.

Whereas Congress in 1998 concluded that Iraq was then in material and unacceptable breach of its international obligations and thereby threatened the vital interests of the United States and international peace and security, stated the reasons for that conclusion, and urged the President to take appropriate action to bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations (Public Law 105-235);

Whereas Iraq remains in material and unacceptable breach of its international obligations by, among other things, continuing to possess and develop a significant chemical and biological weapons capability, actively seeking a nuclear weapons capability, and supporting and harboring terrorist organizations, thereby continuing to threaten the national security interests of the United States and international peace and security;

Whereas Iraq persists in violating resolutions of the United Nations Security Council by continuing to engage in brutal repression of its civilian population, including the Kurdish peoples, thereby threatening international peace and security in the region, by refusing to release, repatriate, or account for non-Iraqi citizens wrongfully detained by Iraq, and by failing to return property wrongfully seized by Iraq from Kuwait;

Whereas the current Iraqi regime has demonstrated its capability and willingness to use weapons of mass destruction against other nations and its own people;

Whereas the current Iraqi regime has demonstrated its continuing hostility toward, and willingness to attack, the United States, including by attempting in 1993 to assassinate former President Bush and by firing on many thousands of occasions on United States and Coalition Armed Forces engaged in enforcing the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council;

Whereas members of al Qaida, an organization bearing responsibility for attacks on the United States, its citizens, and interests, including the attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, are known to be in Iraq;

Whereas Iraq continues to aid and harbor other international terrorist organizations, including organizations that threaten the lives and safety of American citizens;

Whereas the attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001 underscored the gravity of the threat that Iraq will transfer weapons of mass destruction to international terrorist organizations;

Whereas the United States has the inherent right, as acknowledged in the United Nations Charter, to use force in order to defend itself;

Whereas Iraq's demonstrated capability and willingness to use weapons of mass destruction, the high risk that the current Iraqi regime will either employ those weapons to launch a surprise attack against the United States or its Armed Forces or provide them to international terrorists

who would do so, and the extreme magnitude of harm that would result to the United States and its citizens from such an attack, combine to justify the use of force by the United States in order to defend itself;

Whereas Iraq is in material breach of its disarmament and other obligations under United Nations Security Council Resolution 687, to cease repression of its civilian population that threatens international peace and security under United Nations Security Council Resolution 688, and to cease threatening its neighbors or United Nations operations in Iraq under United Nations Security Council Resolution 949, and United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 authorizes use of all necessary means to compel Iraq to comply with these "subsequent relevant resolutions;"

Whereas Congress in the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1) has authorized the President to use the Armed Forces of the United States to achieve full implementation of Security Council Resolutions 660, 661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 667, 669, 670, 674, and 677, pursuant to Security Council Resolution 678;

Whereas Congress in section 1095 of Public Law 102-190 has stated that it "supports the use of all necessary means to achieve the goals of Security Council Resolution 687 as being consistent with the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq (Public Law 102-1)," that Iraq's repression of its civilian population violates United Nations Security Council Resolution 688 and "constitutes a continuing threat to the peace, security, and stability of the Persian Gulf region," and that Congress "supports the use of all necessary means to achieve the goals of Resolution 688";

Whereas Congress in the Iraq Liberation Act (Public Law 105-338) has expressed its sense that it should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove from power the current Iraqi regime and promote the emergence of a democratic government to replace that regime;

Whereas the President has authority under the Constitution to take action in order to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism against the United States, as Congress recognized in the joint resolution on Authorization for Use of Military Force (Public Law 107-40); and

Whereas the President has authority under the Constitution to use force in order to defend the national security interests of the United States;

Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This joint resolution may be cited as the "Further Resolution on Iraq".

WHITE HOUSE DISCUSSION DRAFT
9/19/02

SEC. 2. AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES.

The President is authorized to use all means that he determines to be appropriate, including force, in order to enforce the United Nations Security Council Resolutions referenced above, defend the national security interests of the United States against the threat posed by Iraq, and restore international peace and security in the region.

'5. Subject to prior notification to the Committee of the flight and its contents, the Committee hereby gives general approval under paragraph 4 (*b*) of resolution 670 (1990) of 25 September 1990 for all flights which carry only foodstuffs or supplies intended strictly for medical purposes. This procedure applies equally to the civilian and humanitarian imports referred to in paragraph 3, the supply of which is subject to the no-objection procedure laid down in paragraph 4.

'6. It notes with satisfaction that the Government of Iraq has assured Mr. Ahtisaari's mission that it would accept a system of monitoring of imports and their utilization. The Secretary-General is requested, in consultation with the Government of Iraq and the International Committee of the Red Cross, to arrange for such a system of on-the-spot monitoring to proceed in conjunction with the despatch of United Nations personnel to Iraq to supervise the effective utilization, for the benefit of the civilian population in all areas, of all imports to be established under the responsibility of the United Nations.'

"I have the honour to request that you bring the above-mentioned decision to the attention of all States."

In a letter dated 26 March 1991,[55] addressed to the President of the Security Council for the attention of members of the Council, the Secretary-General referred to the letter of 19 March 1991 from the President of the Security Council[47] and informed the President that he had, on 26 March 1991, designated Mr. Richard Foran, Assistant Secretary-General, Office of General Services, Department of Administration and Management, as the official responsible for coordinating the return of property from Iraq to Kuwait.

At its 2981st meeting, on 3 April 1991, the Council decided to invite the representatives of Iraq and Kuwait to participate, without vote, in the discussion of the item entitled "The situation between Iraq and Kuwait".

Resolution 687 (1991)
of 3 April 1991

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990, 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990, 662 (1990) of 9 August 1990, 664 (1990) of 18 August 1990, 665 (1990) of 25 August 1990, 666 (1990) of 13 September 1990, 667 (1990) of 16 September 1990, 669 (1990) of 24 September 1990, 670 (1990) of 25 September 1990, 674 (1990) of 29 October 1990, 677 (1990) of 28 November 1990, 678 (1990) of 29 November 1990 and 686 (1991) of 2 March 1991,

Welcoming the restoration to Kuwait of its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity and the return of its legitimate Government,

Affirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Kuwait and Iraq, and noting the intention expressed by the Member States cooperating with Kuwait under paragraph 2 of resolution 678 (1990) to bring their military presence in Iraq to an end as soon as possible consistent with paragraph 8 of resolution 686 (1991),

Reaffirming the need to be assured of Iraq's peaceful intentions in the light of its unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait,

Taking note of the letter dated 27 February 1991 from the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the President of the Security Council[41] and of his letters of the same date addressed to the President of the Council and to the Secretary-General,[40] and those letters dated 3 March[56] and 5 March[57] he addressed to them, pursuant to resolution 686 (1991),

Noting that Iraq and Kuwait, as independent sovereign States, signed at Baghdad on 4 October 1963 "Agreed Minutes between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq regarding the restoration of friendly relations, recognition and related matters",[58] thereby formally recognizing the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait and the allocation of islands, which Agreed Minutes were registered with the United Nations in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations and in which Iraq recognized the independence and complete sovereignty of the State of Kuwait with its boundaries as specified in the letter of the Prime Minister of Iraq dated 21 July 1932 and as accepted by the ruler of Kuwait in his letter dated 10 August 1932,

Conscious of the need for demarcation of the said boundary,

Conscious also of the statements by Iraq threatening to use weapons in violation of its obligations under the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925,[59] and of its prior use of chemical weapons, and affirming that grave consequences would follow any further use by Iraq of such weapons,

Recalling that Iraq has subscribed to the Final Declaration adopted by all States participating in the Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and Other Interested States, held in Paris from 7 to 11 January 1989,[60] establishing the objective of universal elimination of chemical and biological weapons,

Recalling also that Iraq has signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, of 10 April 1972,[61]

Noting the importance of Iraq ratifying the Convention,

Noting also the importance of all States adhering to the Convention and encouraging its forthcoming review conference to reinforce the authority, efficiency and universal scope of the Convention,

Stressing the importance of an early conclusion by the Conference on Disarmament of its work on a convention on the universal prohibition of chemical weapons and of universal adherence thereto,

Aware of the use by Iraq of ballistic missiles in unprovoked attacks and therefore of the need to take specific measures in regard to such missiles located in Iraq,

Concerned by the reports in the hands of Member States that Iraq has attempted to acquire materials for a nuclear-weapons programme contrary to its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968,[62]

Recalling the objective of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

Conscious of the threat that all weapons of mass destruction pose to peace and security in the area and of the need to work towards the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of such weapons,

Conscious also of the objective of achieving balanced and comprehensive control of armaments in the region,

Conscious further of the importance of achieving the objectives noted above using all available means, including a dialogue among the States of the region,

Noting that resolution 686 (1991) marked the lifting of the measures imposed by resolution 661 (1990) in so far as they applied to Kuwait,

Noting also that despite the progress being made in fulfilling the obligations of resolution 686 (1991), many Kuwaiti and third-State nationals are still not accounted for and property remains unreturned,

Recalling the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages,[63] opened for signature in New York on 18 December 1979, which categorizes all acts of taking hostages as manifestations of international terrorism,

Deploring threats made by Iraq during the recent conflict to make use of terrorism against targets outside Iraq and the taking of hostages by Iraq,

Taking note with grave concern of the reports transmitted by the Secretary-General on 20 March [53] and 28 March 1991,[64] and conscious of the necessity to meet urgently the humanitarian needs in Kuwait and Iraq,

Bearing in mind its objective of restoring international peace and security in the area as set out in its recent resolutions,

Conscious of the need to take the following measures acting under Chapter VII of the Charter,

1. *Affirms* all thirteen resolutions noted above, except as expressly changed below to achieve the goals of the present resolution, including a formal cease-fire;

A

2. *Demands* that Iraq and Kuwait respect the inviolability of the international boundary and the allocation of islands set out in the "Agreed Minutes between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq regarding the restoration of friendly relations, recognition and related matters",[58] signed by them in the exercise of their sovereignty at Baghdad on 4 October 1963 and registered with the United Nations;

3. *Calls upon* the Secretary-General to lend his assistance to make arrangements with Iraq and Kuwait to demarcate the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait, drawing on appropriate material including the maps transmitted with the letter dated 28 March 1991 addressed to him by the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations,[65] and to report back to the Council within one month;

4. *Decides* to guarantee the inviolability of the above-mentioned international boundary and to take, as appropriate, all necessary measures to that end in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;

B

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General, after consulting with Iraq and Kuwait, to submit within three days to the Council for its approval a plan for the immediate deployment of a United Nations observer unit to monitor the Khawr 'Abd Allah and a demilitarized zone, which is hereby established, extending ten kilometres into Iraq and five kilometres into Kuwait from the boundary referred to in the "Agreed Minutes between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq regarding the restoration of friendly relations, recognition and related matters"; to deter violations of the boundary through its presence in and surveillance of the demilitarized zone and to observe any hostile or potentially hostile action mounted from the territory of one State against the other; and also requests the Secretary-General to report regularly to the Council on the operations of the unit and to do so immediately if there are serious violations of the zone or potential threats to peace;

6. *Notes* that as soon as the Secretary-General notifies the Council of the completion of the deployment of the United Nations observer unit, the conditions will be established for the Member States cooperating with Kuwait in accordance with resolution 678 (1990) to bring their military presence in Iraq to an end consistent with resolution 686 (1991);

C

7. *Invites* Iraq to reaffirm unconditionally its obligations under the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925,[59] and to ratify the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, of 10 April 1972;[61]

8. *Decides* that Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of:

(*a*) All chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities related thereto;

(*b*) All ballistic missiles with a range greater than one hundred and fifty kilometres, and related major parts and repair and production facilities;

9. *Decides also*, for the implementation of paragraph 8, the following:

(*a*) Iraq shall submit to the Secretary-General, within fifteen days of the adoption of the present resolution, a declaration on the locations, amounts and types of all items specified in paragraph 8 and agree to urgent, on-site inspection as specified below;

(*b*) The Secretary-General, in consultation with the appropriate Governments and, where appropriate, with the Director-General of the World Health Organization, within forty-five days of the adoption of the present resolution shall develop and submit to the Council for approval a plan calling for the completion of the following acts within forty-five days of such approval:

(i) The forming of a special commission which shall carry out immediate on-site inspection of Iraq's biological, chemical and missile capabilities, based on Iraq's declarations and the designation of any additional locations by the special commission itself;

(ii) The yielding by Iraq of possession to the Special Commission for destruction, removal or rendering harmless, taking into account the requirements of public safety, of all items specified under paragraph 8 (*a*), including items at the additional locations designated by the Special Commission under paragraph (i) and the destruction by Iraq, under the supervision of the Special Commission, of all its missile capabilities, including launchers, as specified under paragraph 8 (*b*);

(iii) The provision by the Special Commission to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency of the assistance and cooperation required in paragraphs 12 and 13;

10. *Decides further* that Iraq shall unconditionally undertake not to use, develop, construct or acquire any of the items specified in paragraphs 8 and 9, and requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Special Commission, to develop a plan for the future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with the present paragraph, to be submitted to the Council for approval within one hundred and twenty days of the passage of the present resolution;

11. *Invites* Iraq to reaffirm unconditionally its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, of 1 July 1968;[62]

12. *Decides* that Iraq shall unconditionally agree not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapon-usable material or any subsystems or components or any research, development, support or manufacturing facilities related to the above; to submit to the Secretary-General and the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency within fifteen days of the adoption of the present resolution a declaration of the locations, amounts and types of all items specified above; to place all of its nuclear-weapon-usable materials under the exclusive control, for custody and removal, of the Agency, with the assistance and cooperation of the Special Commission as provided for in the plan of the Secretary-General discussed in paragraph 9 (*b*); to accept, in accordance with the arrangements provided for in paragraph 13, urgent on-site inspection and the destruction, removal or rendering harmless as appropriate of all items specified above; and to accept the plan discussed in paragraph 13 for the future ongoing monitoring and verification of its compliance with these undertakings;

13. *Requests* the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, through the Secretary-General and with the assistance and cooperation of the Special Commission as provided for in the plan of the Secretary-General referred to in paragraph 9 (*b*), to carry out immediate on-site inspection of Iraq's nuclear capabilities based on Iraq's declarations and the designation of any additional locations by the Special Commission; to develop a plan for submission to the Council within forty-five days calling for the destruction, removal or rendering harmless as appropriate of all items listed in paragraph 12; to carry out the plan within forty-five days following approval by the Council and to develop a plan, taking into account the rights and obligations of Iraq under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, for the future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with paragraph 12, including an inventory of all nuclear material in Iraq subject to the Agency's verification and inspections to confirm that

Agency safeguards cover all relevant nuclear activities in Iraq, to be submitted to the Council for approval within one hundred and twenty days of the adoption of the present resolution;

14. *Notes* that the actions to be taken by Iraq in paragraphs 8 to 13 represent steps towards the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and all missiles for their delivery and the objective of a global ban on chemical weapons;

D

15. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the steps taken to facilitate the return of all Kuwaiti property seized by Iraq, including a list of any property that Kuwait claims has not been returned or which has not been returned intact;

E

16. *Reaffirms* that Iraq, without prejudice to its debts and obligations arising prior to 2 August 1990, which will be addressed through the normal mechanisms, is liable under international law for any direct loss, damage - including environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources - or injury to foreign Governments, nationals and corporations as a result of its unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait;

17. *Decides* that all Iraqi statements made since 2 August 1990 repudiating its foreign debt are null and void, and demands that Iraq adhere scrupulously to all of its obligations concerning servicing and repayment of its foreign debt;

18. *Decides also* to create a fund to pay compensation for claims that fall within paragraph 16 and to establish a commission that will administer the fund;

19. *Directs* the Secretary-General to develop and present to the Council for decision, no later than thirty days following the adoption of the present resolution, recommendations for the Fund to be established in accordance with paragraph 18 and for a programme to implement the decisions in paragraphs 16 to 18, including the following: administration of the Fund; mechanisms for determining the appropriate level of Iraq's contribution to the Fund, based on a percentage of the value of its exports of petroleum and petroleum products, not to exceed a figure to be suggested to the Council by the Secretary-General, taking into account the requirements of the people of Iraq, Iraq's payment capacity as assessed in conjunction with the international financial institutions taking into consideration external debt service, and the needs of the Iraqi economy; arrangements for ensuring that payments are made to the Fund; the process by which funds will be allocated and claims paid; appropriate procedures for evaluating losses, listing claims and verifying their validity, and resolving disputed claims in respect of Iraq's liability as specified in paragraph 16; and the composition of the Commission designated above;

F

20. *Decides*, effective immediately, that the prohibitions against the sale or supply to Iraq of commodities or products other than medicine and health supplies, and prohibitions against financial transactions related thereto contained in resolution 661 (1990), shall not apply to foodstuffs notified to the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait or, with the approval of that Committee, under the simplified and accelerated "no-objection" procedure, to materials and supplies for essential civilian needs as identified in the report to the Secretary-General dated 20 March 1991,[53] and in any further findings of humanitarian need by the Committee;

21. *Decides* to review the provisions of paragraph 20 every sixty days in the light of the policies and practices of the Government of Iraq, including the implementation of all relevant resolutions of the Council, for the purpose of determining whether to reduce or lift the prohibitions referred to therein;

22. *Decides also* that upon the approval by the Council of the programme called for in paragraph 19 and upon Council agreement that Iraq has completed all actions contemplated in paragraphs 8 to 13, the prohibitions against the import of commodities and products originating in Iraq and the prohibitions against financial transactions related thereto contained in resolution 661 (1990) shall have no further force or effect;

23. *Decides further* that, pending action by the Council under paragraph 22, the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait shall be empowered to approve, when required to assure adequate financial resources on the part of Iraq to carry out the activities under paragraph 20, exceptions to the prohibition against the import of commodities and products originating in Iraq;

24. *Decides* that, in accordance with resolution 661 (1990) and subsequent related resolutions and until it takes a further decision, all States shall continue to prevent the sale or supply to Iraq, or the promotion or facilitation of such sale or supply, by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of:

(*a*) Arms and related *matériel* of all types, specifically including the sale or transfer through other means of all forms of conventional military equipment, including for paramilitary forces, and spare parts and components and their means of production for such equipment;

(*b*) Items specified and defined in paragraphs 8 and 12 not otherwise covered above;

(*c*) Technology under licensing or other transfer arrangements used in the production, utilization or stockpiling of items specified in paragraphs (*a*) and (*b*);

(*d*) Personnel or materials for training or technical support services relating to the design, development, manufacture, use, maintenance or support of items specified in paragraphs (*a*) and (*b*);

25. *Calls upon* all States and international organizations to act strictly in accordance with paragraph 24, notwithstanding the existence of any contracts, agreements, licences or any other arrangements;

26. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in consultation with appropriate Governments, to develop within sixty days, for the approval of the Council, guidelines to facilitate full international implementation of paragraphs 24, 25 and 27, and to make them available to all States and to establish a procedure for updating these guidelines periodically;

27. *Calls upon* all States to maintain such national controls and procedures and to take such other actions consistent with the guidelines to be established by the Council under paragraph 26 as may be necessary to ensure compliance with the terms of paragraph 24, and calls upon international organizations to take all appropriate steps to assist in ensuring such full compliance;

28. *Agrees* to review its decisions in paragraphs 22 to 25, except for the items specified and defined in paragraphs 8 and 12, on a regular basis and in any case one hundred and twenty days following the adoption of the present resolution, taking into account Iraq's compliance with the resolution and general progress towards the control of armaments in the region;

29. *Decides* that all States, including Iraq, shall take the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the Government of Iraq, or of any person or body in Iraq, or of any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or body, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was affected by reason of the measures taken by the Council in resolution 661 (1990) and related resolutions;

G

30. *Decides* that, in furtherance of its commitment to facilitate the repatriation of all Kuwaiti and third-State nationals, Iraq shall extend all necessary cooperation to the International Committee of the Red Cross by providing lists of such persons, facilitating the access of the International Committee to all such persons wherever located or detained and facilitating the search by the International Committee for those Kuwaiti and third-State nationals still unaccounted for;

31. *Invites* the International Committee of the Red Cross to keep the Secretary-General apprised, as appropriate, of all activities undertaken in connection with facilitating the repatriation or return of all Kuwaiti and third-State nationals or their remains present in Iraq on or after 2 August 1990;

H

32. *Requires* Iraq to inform the Council that it will not commit or support any act of international terrorism or allow any organization directed towards commission of such acts to operate within its territory and to condemn unequivocally and renounce all acts, methods and practices of terrorism;

I

33. *Declares* that, upon official notification by Iraq to the Secretary-General and to the Security Council of its acceptance of the above provisions, a formal cease-fire is effective between Iraq and Kuwait and the Member States cooperating with Kuwait in accordance with resolution 678 (1990);

34. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter and to take such further steps as may be required for the implementation of the present resolution and to secure peace and security in the region.

Adopted at the 2981st meeting by 12 votes to 1 (Cuba) with 2 abstentions (Ecuador, Yemen).

Decision

At its 2983rd meeting, on 9 April 1991, the Council decided to invite the representatives of Iraq and Kuwait to participate, without vote, in the discussion of the item entitled "The situation between Iraq and Kuwait: report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) (S/22454 and Add.1-3)".[7]

Resolution 689 (1991)
of 9 April 1991

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolution 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Approves* the report of the Secretary-General of 5 and 9 April 1991 on the implementation of paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991);[66]

2. *Notes* that the decision to set up an observer unit was taken in paragraph 5 of resolution 687 (1991) and that the unit can be terminated only by a further decision of the Council; the Council shall therefore review the question of its termination or continuation every six months;

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Draft	Telcon with President of Russia	4	09/20/2002	P1/b1;

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National Security Council - National Security Advisor, Office of the

SERIES:
Rice, Condoleezza

FOLDER TITLE:
[Iraq] [Folder 3] [2]

FRC ID:
34717

OA Num.:
NSC 0480

NARA Num.:

FOIA IDs and Segments:
2014-0457-F

RESTRICTION CODES

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P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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Note	[Notes]	1	09/19/2002	P1/b1; P5;

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COLLECTION:
National Security Council - National Security Advisor, Office of the

SERIES:
Rice, Condoleezza

FOLDER TITLE:
[Iraq] [Folder 3] [2]

FRC ID:
34717

OA Num.:
NSC 0480

NARA Num.:

FOIA IDs and Segments:
2014-0457-F

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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To:

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Subject: REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT IN ADDRESS TO THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY - New York, New York

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
(New York, New York)

For Immediate Release
September 12, 2002

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT IN ADDRESS TO THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

United Nations Headquarters
New York, New York

10:39 A.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Secretary General, Mr. President, distinguished delegates, and ladies and gentlemen: We meet one year and one day after a terrorist attack brought grief to my country, and brought grief to many citizens of our world. Yesterday, we remembered the innocent lives taken that terrible morning. Today, we turn to the urgent duty of protecting other lives, without illusion and without fear.

We've accomplished much in the last year -- in Afghanistan and beyond. We have much yet to do -- in Afghanistan and beyond. Many nations represented here have joined in the fight against global terror, and the people of the United States are grateful.

The United Nations was born in the hope that survived a world war -- the hope of a world moving toward justice, escaping old patterns of conflict and fear. The founding members resolved that the peace of the world must never again be destroyed by the will and wickedness of any man. We created the United Nations

Security Council, so that, unlike the League of Nations, our deliberations would be more than talk, our resolutions would be more than wishes. After generations of deceitful dictators and broken treaties and squandered lives, we dedicated ourselves to standards of human dignity shared by all, and to a system of security defended by all.

Today, these standards, and this security, are challenged. Our commitment to human dignity is challenged by persistent poverty and raging disease. The suffering is great, and our responsibilities are clear. The United States is joining with the world to supply aid where it reaches people and lifts up lives, to extend trade and the prosperity it brings, and to bring medical care where it is desperately needed.

As a symbol of our commitment to human dignity, the United States will return to UNESCO. (Applause.) This organization has been reformed and America will participate fully in its mission to advance human rights and tolerance and learning.

Our common security is challenged by regional conflicts -- ethnic and religious strife that is ancient, but not inevitable. In the Middle East, there can be no peace for either side without freedom for both sides. America stands committed to an independent and democratic Palestine, living side by side with Israel in peace and security. Like all other people, Palestinians deserve a government that serves their interests and listens to their voices. My nation will continue to encourage all parties to step up to their responsibilities as we seek a just and comprehensive settlement to the conflict.

Above all, our principles and our security are challenged today by outlaw groups and regimes that accept no law of morality and have no limit to their violent ambitions. In the attacks on America a year ago, we saw the destructive intentions of our enemies. This threat hides within many nations, including my own. In cells and camps, terrorists are plotting further destruction, and building new bases for their war against civilization. And our greatest fear is that terrorists will find a shortcut to their mad ambitions when an outlaw regime supplies them with the technologies to kill on a massive scale.

In one place -- in one regime -- we find all these dangers, in their most lethal and aggressive forms, exactly the kind of aggressive threat the United Nations was born to confront.

Twelve years ago, Iraq invaded Kuwait without provocation. And the regime's forces were poised to continue their march to seize other countries and their resources. Had Saddam Hussein been appeased instead of stopped, he would have endangered the peace and stability of the world. Yet this aggression was stopped -- by the might of coalition forces and the will of the United Nations.

To suspend hostilities, to spare himself, Iraq's dictator accepted a series of commitments. The terms were clear, to him and to all. And he agreed to prove he is complying with every one of those obligations.

He has proven instead only his contempt for the United Nations, and for all his pledges. By breaking every pledge -- by his deceptions, and by his cruelties -- Saddam Hussein has made the case against himself.

In 1991, Security Council Resolution 688 demanded that the Iraqi regime cease at once the repression of its own people, including the systematic repression of minorities -- which the Council said, threatened international peace and security in the region. This demand goes ignored.

Last year, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights found that Iraq continues to commit extremely grave violations of human rights, and that the regime's repression is all pervasive. Tens of thousands of political opponents and ordinary citizens have been subjected to arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, summary execution, and torture by beating and burning, electric shock, starvation, mutilation, and rape. Wives are tortured in front of their husbands, children in the presence of their parents -- and all of these horrors concealed from the world by the apparatus of a totalitarian state.

In 1991, the U.N. Security Council, through Resolutions 686 and 687, demanded that Iraq return all prisoners from Kuwait and other lands. Iraq's regime agreed. It broke its promise. Last year the Secretary General's high-level coordinator for this issue reported that Kuwait, Saudi, Indian, Syrian, Lebanese, Iranian, Egyptian, Bahraini, and Omani nationals remain unaccounted for -- more than 600 people. One American pilot is among them.

In 1991, the U.N. Security Council, through Resolution 687, demanded that Iraq renounce all involvement with terrorism, and permit no terrorist organizations to operate in Iraq. Iraq's regime agreed. It broke this promise. In violation of Security Council Resolution 1373, Iraq continues to shelter and support terrorist organizations that direct violence against Iran, Israel, and Western governments. Iraqi dissidents abroad are targeted for murder. In 1993, Iraq attempted to assassinate the Emir of Kuwait and a former American President. Iraq's government openly praised the attacks of September the 11th. And al Qaeda terrorists escaped from Afghanistan and are known to be in Iraq.

In 1991, the Iraqi regime agreed to destroy and stop developing all weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles, and to prove to the world it has done so by complying with rigorous inspections. Iraq has broken every aspect of this fundamental pledge.

From 1991 to 1995, the Iraqi regime said it had no biological weapons. After a senior official in its weapons program defected and exposed this lie, the regime admitted to producing tens of thousands of liters of anthrax and other deadly biological agents for use with Scud warheads, aerial bombs, and aircraft spray tanks. U.N. inspectors believe Iraq has produced two to four times the amount of biological agents it declared, and has failed to account for more than three metric tons of material that could be used to produce biological weapons. Right now, Iraq is expanding and improving facilities that were used for the production of biological weapons.

United Nations' inspections also revealed that Iraq likely maintains stockpiles of VX, mustard and other chemical agents, and that the regime is rebuilding and expanding facilities capable of producing chemical weapons.

And in 1995, after four years of deception, Iraq finally admitted it had a crash nuclear weapons program prior to the Gulf War. We know now, were it not for that war, the regime in Iraq would likely have possessed a nuclear weapon no later than 1993.

Today, Iraq continues to withhold important information about its nuclear program -- weapons design, procurement logs, experiment data, an accounting of nuclear materials and documentation of foreign assistance. Iraq employs capable nuclear scientists and technicians. It retains physical infrastructure needed to build a nuclear weapon. Iraq has made several attempts to buy high-strength aluminum tubes used to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon. Should Iraq acquire fissile material, it would be able to build a nuclear weapon within a year. And Iraq's state-controlled media has reported numerous meetings between Saddam Hussein and his nuclear scientists, leaving little doubt about his continued appetite for these weapons.

Iraq also possesses a force of Scud-type missiles with ranges beyond the 150 kilometers permitted by the U.N. Work at testing and production facilities shows that Iraq is building more long-range missiles that it can inflict mass death throughout the region.

In 1990, after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the world imposed economic sanctions on Iraq. Those sanctions were maintained after the war to compel the regime's compliance with Security Council resolutions. In time, Iraq was allowed to use oil revenues to buy food. Saddam Hussein has subverted this program, working around the sanctions to buy missile technology and military materials. He blames the suffering of Iraq's people on the United Nations, even as he uses his oil wealth to build lavish palaces for himself, and to buy arms for his country. By refusing to comply with his own agreements, he bears full guilt for the hunger and misery of innocent Iraqi citizens.

In 1991, Iraq promised U.N. inspectors immediate and unrestricted access to verify Iraq's commitment to rid itself of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles. Iraq broke this promise, spending seven years deceiving, evading, and harassing U.N. inspectors before ceasing cooperation entirely. Just months after the 1991 cease-fire, the Security Council twice renewed its demand that the Iraqi regime cooperate fully with inspectors, condemning Iraq's serious violations of its obligations. The Security Council again renewed that demand in 1994, and twice more in 1996, deploring Iraq's clear violations of its obligations. The Security Council renewed its demand three more times in 1997, citing flagrant violations; and three more times in 1998, calling Iraq's behavior totally unacceptable. And in 1999, the demand was renewed yet again.

As we meet today, it's been almost four years since the last U.N. inspectors set foot in Iraq, four years for the Iraqi regime to plan, and to build, and to test behind the cloak of secrecy.

We know that Saddam Hussein pursued weapons of mass murder even when inspectors were in his country. Are we to assume that he stopped when they left? The history, the logic, and the facts lead to one conclusion: Saddam Hussein's regime is a grave and gathering danger. To suggest otherwise is to hope against the evidence. To assume this regime's good faith is to bet the lives of millions and the peace of the world in a reckless gamble. And this is a risk we must not take.

Delegates to the General Assembly, we have been more than patient. We've tried sanctions. We've tried the carrot of oil for food, and the stick of coalition military strikes. But Saddam Hussein has defied all these efforts and continues to develop weapons of mass destruction. The first time we may be completely certain he has a -- nuclear weapons is when, God forbids, he uses one. We owe it to all our citizens to do everything in our power to prevent that day from coming.

The conduct of the Iraqi regime is a threat to the authority of the United Nations, and a threat to peace. Iraq has answered a decade of U.N. demands with a decade of defiance. All the world now faces a test, and the United Nations a difficult and defining moment. Are Security Council resolutions to be honored and enforced, or cast aside without consequence? Will the United Nations serve the purpose of its founding, or will it be irrelevant?

The United States helped found the United Nations. We want the United Nations to be effective, and respectful, and successful. We want the resolutions of the world's most important multilateral body to be enforced. And right now those resolutions are being unilaterally subverted by the Iraqi regime. Our partnership of nations can meet the test before us, by making clear what we now expect of the Iraqi regime.

If the Iraqi regime wishes peace, it will immediately and unconditionally forswear, disclose, and remove or destroy all weapons of mass destruction, long-range missiles, and all related material.

If the Iraqi regime wishes peace, it will immediately end all support for terrorism and act to suppress it, as all states are required to do by U.N. Security Council resolutions.

If the Iraqi regime wishes peace, it will cease persecution of its civilian population, including Shi'a, Sunnis, Kurds, Turkomans, and others, again as required by Security Council resolutions.

If the Iraqi regime wishes peace, it will release or account for all Gulf War personnel whose fate is still unknown. It will return the remains of any who are deceased, return stolen property, accept liability for losses resulting from the invasion of Kuwait, and fully cooperate with international efforts to resolve these issues, as required by Security Council resolutions.

If the Iraqi regime wishes peace, it will release or account for all Gulf War personnel whose fate is still unknown. It will return the remains of any who are deceased, return stolen property, accept liability for losses resulting from the invasion of Kuwait, and fully cooperate with the international efforts to resolve these issues, as required by Security Council resolutions.

If the Iraqi regime wishes peace, it will immediately end all illicit trade outside the oil-for-food program. It will accept U.N. administration of funds from that program, to ensure that the money is used fairly and promptly for the benefit of the Iraqi people.

If all these steps are taken, it will signal a new openness and accountability in Iraq. And it could open the prospect of the United Nations helping to build a government that represents all Iraqis -- a government based on respect for human rights, economic liberty, and internationally supervised elections.

The United States has no quarrel with the Iraqi people; they've suffered too long in silent captivity. Liberty for the Iraqi people is a great moral cause, and a great strategic goal. The people of Iraq deserve it; the security of all nations requires it. Free societies do not intimidate through cruelty and conquest, and open societies do not threaten the world with mass murder. The United States supports political and economic liberty in a unified Iraq.

We can harbor no illusions -- and that's important today to remember. Saddam Hussein attacked Iran in 1980 and Kuwait in

1990. He's fired ballistic missiles at Iran and Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Israel. His regime once ordered the killing of every person between the ages of 15 and 70 in certain Kurdish villages in northern Iraq. He has gassed many Iranians, and 40 Iraqi villages.

My nation will work with the U.N. Security Council to meet our common challenge. If Iraq's regime defies us again, the world must move deliberately, decisively to hold Iraq to account. We will work with the U.N. Security Council for the necessary resolutions. But the purposes of the United States should not be doubted. The Security Council resolutions will be enforced -- the just demands of peace and security will be met -- or action will be unavoidable. And a regime that has lost its legitimacy will also lose its power.

Events can turn in one of two ways: If we fail to act in the face of danger, the people of Iraq will continue to live in brutal submission. The regime will have new power to bully and dominate and conquer its neighbors, condemning the Middle East to more years of bloodshed and fear. The regime will remain unstable -- the region will remain unstable, with little hope of freedom, and isolated from the progress of our times. With every step the Iraqi regime takes toward gaining and deploying the most terrible weapons, our own options to confront that regime will narrow. And if an emboldened regime were to supply these weapons to terrorist allies, then the attacks of September the 11th would be a prelude to far greater horrors.

If we meet our responsibilities, if we overcome this danger, we can arrive at a very different future. The people of Iraq can shake off their captivity. They can one day join a democratic Afghanistan and a democratic Palestine, inspiring reforms throughout the Muslim world. These nations can show by their example that honest government, and respect for women, and the great Islamic tradition of learning can triumph in the Middle East and beyond. And we will show that the promise of the United Nations can be fulfilled in our time.

Neither of these outcomes is certain. Both have been set before us. We must choose between a world of fear and a world of progress. We cannot stand by and do nothing while dangers gather. We must stand up for our security, and for the permanent rights and the hopes of mankind. By heritage and by choice, the United States of America will make that stand. And, delegates to the United Nations, you have the power to make that stand, as well.

Thank you very much. (Applause.)

END

11:04 A.M. EDT

MEDIA COMMENTARY: News from Outside the Beltway
September 18, 2002

What they're saying about:

War with Iraq

St. Louis Post-Dispatch, editorial (09/17/02): "President George W. Bush is probably right when he says that Saddam Hussein's agreement to open Iraq to weapons inspectors is merely a tactic designed to delay strong United Nations action. But the best way for the president to prove his point is to call Saddam's bluff and send in the weapons inspectors. ... Mr. Bush is undoubtedly eager to bring the confrontation with Saddam to a head. But he must not be so eager as to appear trigger-happy and to lose international support."

The Atlanta Journal and Constitution, Editorial (9/18/02): "Saddam Hussein's 'unconditional acceptance' of U.N. arms inspectors is almost certainly a ploy . . . . The issue now becomes whether 'without conditions' means without conditions. . . . The answer is probably no, but the United States has no choice but to find out. The situation requires patience. . . . If we're patient – and if we've been honest about our goals – this turn of events cannot help but aid the U.S. cause."

Chicago Tribune , editorial (09/17/02): "If Iraq's agreement on Monday to allow the return of weapons inspectors proves to be nothing but a feint, George W. Bush will doubtless find himself in a stronger position to take military action, able to count on cooperation from other nations instead of resistance. ... But if multilateralism is showing new promise, that doesn't mean the president was reckless or irresponsible to threaten unilateral action. Perhaps the best explanation for why Bush is getting so much cooperation from the UN is that he made it clear he was ready to proceed without the UN if necessary."

Newsday, editorial (9/18/02): "Bush is right to be skeptical of Hussein's offer. It is transparently aimed at letting fence-sitters at the UN off the hook. ... Still, Bush cannot afford to dismiss the offer out of hand, as he seems to have done initially, if only because that would alienate reluctant supporters."

Beaumont Enterprise (TX), editorial (09/17/02): "Our overriding goal must remain a peaceful solution to this lingering crisis. If the U.N. inspectors can neutralize Saddam's most dangerous weapons, Bush will have won an important victory for world peace without firing a shot."

Cape Cod Times (MA), column by By Sean Gonsalves (09/17/02): "[W]hat ought to tone down the self-righteousness coming out of Washington these days is the fact that ... under the administrations of Reagan and Bush No. 41, we sold Iraq anthrax, VX nerve gas, West Nile fever germs and botulism."

Charleston (WV) Gazette, editorial (09/17/02): "Monday night, White House officials still were beating war drums, but we assume that neither Congress nor the U.N. Security Council will vote for an attack, now that Iraq is opening its doors to examiners looking for weapons of mass destruction. This bizarre episode has raised the question: Why does Bush want war so badly? ... Now that Iraq has agreed to admit inspectors, we hope the international community makes sure the small nation is examined thoroughly from border to border — and this finally cuts the ground out from under Bush's odd craving for a war."

Chicago Tribune, editorial (09/17/02): "The declaration Monday by Iraq that it will allow the unconditional return of United Nations weapons inspectors affirms one thing: Saddam Hussein respects nothing so much as the barrel of a gun. ... Hussein may well accede to every UN demand. If all the pieces fall into place, President Bush's bold speech at the UN could save the U.S. from taking unilateral action and possibly incurring the wrath of Arab and other nations."

Dallas Morning News, column by Robert Dennis (0916/02): "Clearly, Saddam Hussein has committed both war crimes and crimes against humanity. Finally, a president focuses the world's attention on those crimes. But however horrendous they are, they don't justify a war on the Iraqi people. They do justify taking our complaints about Saddam Hussein's actions to the United Nations Security Council to ask for the creation of a special war crimes tribunal, just as we did for Yugoslavia's and Rwanda's war criminals."

Daytona Beach News-Journal, editorial (09/17/02): "President Bush had every reason to boast of how 'one by one we're hunting the killers down.' But in that boast is also the reason why Bush should not look beyond the hunt of al-Qaida why any broader initiative, whether it's a war on Iraq or even a "war on terror" disconnected from al-Qaida, would jeopardize what ought to be the only objective right now: Hunting down the leaders responsible for the Sept. 11 attacks and destroying their organization. ... Bush's endless wars on endless enemies would be a strategic disaster that would endanger the war on al-Qaida, amplify anti-Americanism abroad and risk wrecking the domestic economy while alienating allies and a sizable chunk of the American electorate."

Jackson Clarion-Ledger (MS), editorial (9/17/02): "Since President Bush reversed his 'go it alone' stance on Iraq and took his concerns to the United Nations, more pressure has been brought to bear on the rogue nation. ... When the nations of the Earth are united, legitimacy results. Now, if the president can better explain his position to Americans, he might find even greater support."

Monessen Valley Independent (PA), editorial (09/17/02): "Despite the Monday promise to allow, without condition, access to weapons inspectors, the Bush administration rightly expressed distrust and skepticism. ... Iraq agreed to submit only after President Bush delivered strong words to the United Nations. ...Bush and Congress should declare that any nation unwilling to put pressure on Iraq is no friend."

New York Daily News (NY), column by Michael Kramer (9/17/02): "The scene: In a Baghdad bunker, Saddam Hussein analyzes the current crisis for his mustached sycophants: Why so glum, fellas? We've defied the U.S. for years. If we play our cards right, we'll survive this Bush, too. Look at the victory we've had so far. The countries who want our oil and trade fear that a new war against us will destabilize the entire region. They've caused Bush to pause before hitting us, to go to the UN for international support first. This creates many options for us to manipulate - assuming we don't revert to stiffing the inspectors altogether, which would be stupid..... Vice President Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld have been screaming that inspections are a waste of time. They're right, but they've lost that internal debate for Bush's mind to Secretary of State Powell."

Newsday (NY), editorial (9/17/02): "President George W. Bush's strategy to build international support for action against Iraq through his United Nations gambit is beginning to pay off handsomely, with a noticeable shift in Arab sentiment and an emerging international consensus for the U.S. position. This shows that Bush was right to go to the UN last week to make his case and shame the Security Council into assuming responsibility for forcing Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein to comply with its resolutions for disarmament. ... Washington may still have to confront Iraq alone, but at least it will do so with Arab acquiescence, if not complete support."

Odessa American (TX), editorial (09/17/02): "The Bush administration should cool the war rhetoric and focus instead on getting weapons inspectors back into Iraq. Until then, the American public — and the Congress empowered by the Constitution to declare war — should resist such hubris."

Pittsburgh Post-Gazette , editorial (09/17/02): "In the past Iraq has promised to comply with U.N. resolutions only to backslide. If that occurs this time, the case for military action will be clear. Once an attack is launched, it should continue until Iraq -- under Saddam Hussein or a successor -- accepts the implementation of Security Council resolutions that should have been honored years ago."

Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, opinion (09/17/02): "It is too early to pass judgment on the sincerity or completeness of Iraq's offer yesterday to allow the return of U.N. weapons inspectors. What is clear is that the political context has been changed by the Bush administration's determination to make sure that Iraq does not have the capacity to make and use weapons of mass destruction. ... It is fairly clear that the American people want to see the Iraq problem dealt with, but not by the United States alone, not without authorization by the U.N. Security Council and not without a say-so from their representatives in Congress."

Raleigh News & Observer (NC), editorial (9/17/02): "This newfound respect for multilateralism is a deft political gesture that may win Bush some official sanction for his attack. But receiving permission is not the same thing as providing a justification for war.... The Bush administration is right when it says that America is threatened. But that threat comes from Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaeda network. The administration is allowing itself to be distracted from defending our real national interests."

San Francisco Chronicle, editorial (09/17/02): "Iraq's unconditional acceptance of renewed U.N. weapons inspections -- should Baghdad live up to its assurance to U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan -- attests to the power of international opinion in heading off a dangerous confrontation. ...President Bush's speech to the U.N. General Assembly last week, after months spent preparing U.S. opinion for the forcible ouster of Hussein, put the ball in the world court. ...Hussein may be untrustworthy, but he is also pragmatic. He is facing formidable foes from near and far. It's in his interest to cooperate. It's in our interest to give him a chance."

Scranton Times & Tribune, opinion (09/17/02): "Mr. Bush's address to the United Nations is a step away from a unilateral approach on Iraq. The United Nations should embrace it now in order to avoid another destabilizing war in the Middle East."

St Petersburg Times, editorial (09/17/02): "The White House threatens to short-circuit that process by insisting on a congressional vote in October -- just before November's congressional elections. . . . The president deserves credit for beginning a dialogue with Congress and the United Nations, but he should not expect formal expressions of support for military action against Iraq until he finishes the job of making the case for it."

Tacoma News Tribune (WA), opinion (9/17/02): "...on Monday, came the news that Iraq had 'unconditionally' agreed to accept the return of U.N. weapons inspectors. If nothing else, this demonstrates the extent to which U.S. and British diplomacy has thrown the Iraqi government on the defensive.... Weapons inspections must not become a toothless charade that serves chiefly to let Saddam pursue a nightmare arsenal with diplomatic impunity."

The Baltimore Sun, editorial (09/17/02): "The determined leader who made a thoughtful, eloquent appeal Thursday to the United Nations for global action against Iraq was transformed Friday into the neighborhood bully...to inject, as Mr. Bush did, election-year politics into the equation -- severely undermines his credibility at a time when he needs it more than ever. ... Mr. Bush warns wary Democrats to consider what voters will think of them. The administration says it wants congressional support to bolster its case with the U.N. But that's another form of wagging the dog. Congress must act on its own timetable."

The Boston Globe, editorial by Thomas Oliphant (09/17/02): "Here is the largely unnoticed sentence that shows President Bush's adoption of a wiser collision course with Iraq: 'We will work with the UN Security Council for the necessary resolutions.' . . . The Bush administration has at last decided to challenge the UN rather than ignore it."

The Columbian (Vancouver, WA.), editorial (09/17/02): "Saddam Hussein blinked and dictated his letter of capitulation to the secretary general. Will it turn out to be real? People in the administration from the president on down will remain properly skeptical. They do not really think Saddam has the ability to see reason. The people of the United States, who agree in large majority that Saddam is a threat, won't be put off by another game of dodge."

The Record (Bergen County, NJ) , column by Matthew Rothschild (09/17/02): "You may have to go all the way back to the days of Nikita Khuschev to find a more undiplomatic speech before the United Nations than President Bush's on Thursday. ... The assembled leaders of the world, along with U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, must have been taken aback at the audacity of the president of the United States when he said that the United Nations would be "irrelevant" if it did not buy into Washington's strategy. That strategy could end up killing thousands and thousands of innocent Iraqis... By waging war against Saddam Hussein, Bush not only is aiming at the wrong target, he may be sowing the seeds of future terrorist attacks against us."

Troy Messenger (AL), editorial (09/17/02): "Taunting the United Nations with challenges to its legitimacy is a risky step to take. The line between global protector and global bully is a thin one; we hope our president treads lightly as he dances along that line."