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National Security Council - National Security Advisor, Office of the
Rice, Condoleezza

Stack:	Row:	Sect.:	Shelf:	Pos.:
V	1	6	8	1

FRC ID:

34579

Location or
Hollinger ID:

1000003263

Folder Title:

Iraq, Fall 2002

This is now folders Iraq, Fall
2002[1] - Iraq, Fall 2002 [5].

Withdrawn/Redacted Material

The George W. Bush Library

DOCUMENT NO.	FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
001	Briefing	[Briefing]	19	10/18/2002	P1/b1; P5;
002	Email	[Email] - To: @APNSA - From: Elliot Abrams	3	08/18/2002	P1/b1; P5;
003	Memorandum	United States Voting Record at the United Nations - To: Stephen Hadley - From: Elliot Abrams	1	08/21/2002	P5;
003	Report	Voting Practices in the United Nations, 2001	10	06/17/2002	P5;
004	Cover Sheet	[Cover Sheet]	1	N.D.	P1/b1;
004a	Cover Sheet	[Cover Sheet]	2	08/16/2002	P1/b1;
004b	Report	[Report]	5	08/16/2002	P1/b1;

COLLECTION TITLE:

National Security Council - National Security Advisor, Office of the

SERIES:

Rice, Condoleezza

FOLDER TITLE:

Iraq, Fall 2002 [1]

FRC ID:

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RESTRICTION CODES

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005	Fax Cover Sheet	[Fax Cover Sheet]	1	08/22/2002	P1/b1;
005a	Note	Note - To: [Steve Hadley] - From: John McLaughlin	1	08/22/2002	P1/b1;
006	Report	[Report]	2	08/29/2002	P1/b1; P5;
007	Draft	Rose Garden Statement	4	10/01/2002	P5; P6/b6;
008	Memorandum	Memorandum - To: Harriet Miers - From: Neil Patel	1	10/04/2002	P6/b6;
008a	Memorandum	[Memorandum] - To: Mike Gerson - From: Scooter Libby	1	10/04/2002	P5;
008b	Draft	Speech on Iraq	9	10/07/2002	P5;

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009	Note	[Note] - To: David Shedd - From: Steve [Hadley]	1	10/07/2002	P5;
009a	Email	[Email] - To: @APNSA & @Legislative Affairs - From: David R. Shedd	2	10/07/2002	P1/b1;
013	Email	[Email] - To: Stephen J. Hadley - From: Richard Perle	1	10/14/2002	P5;
014	Memorandum	Memorandum for Condoleezza Rice - From: Will Tobey	2	10/07/2002	P1/b1; P5;

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OA Num.:

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NARA Num.:**FOIA ID and Segment:**

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Memorandum	United States Voting Record at the United Nations - To: Stephen Hadley - From: Elliot Abrams	1	08/21/2002	P5;

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Report	Voting Practices in the United Nations, 2001	10	06/17/2002	P5;

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FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
Note	Note - To: [Steve Hadley] - From: John McLaughlin	1	08/22/2002	P1/b1;

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COLLECTION:

National Security Council - National Security Advisor, Office of the

SERIES:

Rice, Condoleezza

FOLDER TITLE:

Iraq, Fall 2002 [1]

FRC ID:

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2014-0457-F

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FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
Report	[Report]	2	08/29/2002	P1/b1; P5;

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FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
Draft	Rose Garden Statement	4	10/01/2002	P5; P6/b6;

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OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

October 4, 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR HARRIET MIERS

ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND STAFF SECRETARY

FROM:

NEIL PATEL 

ASSISTANT TO THE VICE PRESIDENT AND STAFF SECRETARY

SUBJECT:

SPEECH ON IRAQ

The Office of the Vice President has reviewed the above-referenced draft remarks. Please find attached a memorandum and line-in-line-out suggestions provided to Mike Gerson by Scooter Libby. If you have any questions or would like further information, I can be reached this weekend on my mobile phone (b)(6)

Attachment

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FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
Memorandum	[Memorandum] - To: Mike Gerson - From: Scooter Libby	1	10/04/2002	P5;

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FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
Draft	Speech on Iraq	9	10/07/2002	P5;

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Note	[Note] - To: David Shedd - From: Steve [Hadley]	1	10/07/2002	P5;

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FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
Email	[Email] - To: @APNSA & @Legislative Affairs - From: David R. Shedd	2	10/07/2002	P1/b1;

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Time for Toppling

By Bernard Lewis

Among the many arguments that have been adduced for not taking action against the present regime in Iraq, two have received special emphasis. The first is that the governments and peoples of the Middle East attach far greater importance to the Arab-Israeli conflict than to Iraq or any other problem in the region, and that therefore one should begin by solving that. The second is that even a successful attempt at regime change in Iraq would have a dangerous destabilizing effect on the rest of the region, and could lead to general conflict and chaos.

Undelected Anger

The conflict with Israel certainly receives overwhelmingly major attention in the Arabic media, but since this is the only specific grievance that may be publicly expressed in a region of numerous and painful problems, that is hardly surprising. One may therefore wonder whether Middle Eastern governments would indeed wish for a peace settlement, which would deprive them of this valuable safety valve, leaving them to face the undelected anger of their subjects, including those who live under the rule of the Palestine authority. From the almost monotonous regularity with which a series of promising peace processes have failed at the moment when they seemed most likely to succeed, one may be driven to the conclusion that they prefer to keep the conflict unresolved, but at a low level—simmering not boiling, and usefully controllable.

In any case, requiring a settlement of the Palestine question as a prerequisite to dealing with Saddam Hussein sends him a clear signal that he must at all costs prevent such a solution. Saddam Hussein has indeed already responded to that signal in various ways, both secret and open. The most notable of his open responses is the increase of the bounty he pays to the families of suicide bombers from \$10,000 to \$25,000. This is the most public but probably not the most important of his contributions to the conflict. To make the settlement of that conflict—which even in its present form is more than half a century old—a prerequisite for any action concerning Iraq is a sure formula for indefinite inaction.

The fear of destabilization is both genuine and serious, and it is easy to understand the anxiety provoked in the regimes of the Middle East by the prospect of a regime change in Iraq. The crucial question here is not how or by whom Saddam is removed, but what comes in his place. The clear preference of some influential groups in this country and elsewhere is for his replacement to be a kinder and gentler tyrant, who would be amenable to our interests and requirements, while avoiding the hazards of regime change. This would certainly be the preference of our so-called allies in the region, most of whom would feel mortally threatened by the existence of anything like a democratic regime.

But why should we feel threatened by such a change? The overwhelming evidence is that the majority of our terrorist enemies come from purportedly friendly countries, and their main grievance against us is that, in their eyes, we are responsible for maintaining the tyrannical regimes that rule over them—an accusation that has, to say the very least, some plausibility. Apart from Turkey and Israel, the two countries in the region where the governments are elected and can be dismissed by the people, most of the countries of the Middle East can be divided into two groups: those with whom we are pleased to call friendly governments, and therefore increas-

ingly hostile people who hold us responsible for the oppression and depredations of those governments, and, on the other hand, those with bitterly hostile governments, whose people consequently look to us for help and liberation.

The most notable of these are Iraq and Iran. In countries under dictatorship, the political joke is often the only authentic and uncensored expression of political opinion. An Iranian joke, current during the campaign in Afghanistan, related that many Iranians put signs on top of their houses, in English, with the text:

"This way please!"

It is noteworthy that after the events of Sept. 11, great numbers of people came out into the streets in Iranian cities, where, in defiance of the authorities, they lit candles and held vigils in sympathy and solidarity with the victims in New



York and Washington. This contrasted markedly with the scenes of rejoicing elsewhere. One is often told that if we succeed in overthrowing the regimes of what President Bush has rightly called the "Axis of Evil," the scenes of rejoicing in their cities would even exceed those that followed the liberation of Kabul.

The overthrow of a regime must inevitably raise questions concerning first what will follow, and then what impact this will have in neighboring countries. A regime change may well be dangerous, but sometimes the dangers of inaction are greater than those of action.

There may indeed be, as is so often said, a link between a settlement of the Palestine conflict and a regime change in the region—but in the reverse order to that usually adduced. It is often said and generally agreed that democracies do not start wars. Democratic governments are elected by the people and are answerable to the people, and with exceedingly rare exceptions, the people prefer peace. Even the great Winston Churchill—certainly no warmonger, but seen by his people as a war leader—was thrown out of power by the British people in the general election of 1945. It is equally true, but less recognized, that dictatorships do not make peace. The world war started by the Axis ended with its defeat. The Cold War started by the Soviet Union ended with its collapse.

The Tyranny of Conflict

In the same way, the dictatorships that rule much of the Middle East today will not, indeed cannot, make peace, because they need conflict to justify their tyrannical oppression of their own people, and to deflect their peoples' anger against an external enemy. As with the Axis and the Soviet Union, real peace will come only with their defeat or, preferably, collapse, and their replacement by governments that have been chosen and can be dismissed by their people and will therefore seek to resolve, not provoke, conflicts.

Mr. Lewis, professor emeritus of Near Eastern studies at Princeton, is the author, most recently, of "What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response" (Oxford, 2002).

State Of The Union

Rummy's European Adventures

By Matthew Kaminski

Early last year in a Munich hotel men's room, Donald Rumsfeld and I had a chance meeting. The new Pentagon boss, appointed two weeks before, had just flown in from Washington to address the annual Wehrkunde security conference. He was the first member of the Bush cabinet to brief anxious Europeans about the incoming administration's global outlook.

"That went pretty well, don't you think?" Mr. Rumsfeld said, turning to an aide. "Absolutely, Don. You told it to them straight," came the response. "I thought so too," he said energetically and dashed off.

European dignitaries publicly fawned over the new American defense secretary. But behind his back, the Europeans turned sour. Over coffee, the EU's man in Washington grumbled that the word "European Union" didn't appear in Rummy's speech.

Others bristled at Mr. Rumsfeld's misgivings about a planned EU military force; "weaken NATO and we weaken Europe, which weakens all of us," he had said. The Greek defense minister complained about the "one-sided decision" by Washington on missile defense -- and this was months before Sept. 11 and Iraq.

No doubt, Mr. Rumsfeld sincerely felt things had gone well, since his speech said Europe still matters to America, offered to share missile defense technology with them, and endorsed a strong and enlarged NATO. The Europeans chose to hear the new administration was contemptuous of Europe and international treaties, and eager to pull out of Balkan peacekeeping and pick a fight with Russia.

Rummy came back to Europe this week to visit Poland and stayed on for a NATO defense ministers meeting.

The intervening 18 months have redrawn the strategic map of the world. And little has changed in this strange disconnect between America and Europe -- more precisely between the Bush administration's leading hawk and the continent's foreign-policy establishment -- that I glimpsed in Munich.

Lots of ink gets spilled trying to understand the relationship. It may be churlish, if not inaccurate, to suggest the "great rift" across the Atlantic -- as the Times of London put it this spring -- may be more about style and perceptions than any deepening differences in outlook or values.

Even more so than his boss in the White House, Mr. Rumsfeld comes across in the Old World as, well, very American. (Americans will rightly be baffled by this description; most Europeans know immediately what I mean.) He sounds, looks and behaves as if he walked off the set of Dynasty -- a tough, no-nonsense character, savvy and gruff.

True to form, Mr. Rumsfeld got plenty of attention in Warsaw for snubbing Germany's defense minister and saying the election campaign "poisoned" the relationship. Some columnists claimed here was the U.S. pushing Europe around again.

Mr. Rumsfeld got less notice for unveiling America's plans to bring NATO, the institution at the heart of the trans-Atlantic alliance, into the 21st century. It may seem like a curious turn for a man Atlanticists in the U.S. and Europe blame for undermining the alliance in the first place. At NATO headquarters, diplomats still bristle at Mr. Rumsfeld's insistence last year that missions dictate the coalition, not the other way around. His Pentagon kept NATO out of Afghanistan; the alliance will likely be sidelined in Iraq.

Yet his reform plan makes military and political sense. The U.S. wants NATO to create a new 20,000-strong rapid reaction force, bringing together crack units from allied army, navy and air forces. Its remit would be global. It could act within seven days and fight

high-intensity wars and engage in extraction missions.

The U.S. can contribute the assets Europeans lack and look unlikely to budget for, such as cargo planes, chemical and biological defenses and precision-guided missiles. The Europeans and Canadians could contribute seasoned special forces and light-infantry units.

"If we can have a larger fraction of our capabilities agile and able to get in and out of places and move around in places with a smaller footprint -- this is something that NATO countries are perfectly capable of doing if they decided to do it," Mr. Rumsfeld said. He added a NATO with improved capabilities will "have much to offer the world in the 21st century." Mr. Rumsfeld said the same thing about the need to update American forces before September 11 -- and nearly lost his job for it, before becoming a household name in its aftermath.

As a former ambassador to NATO in the early 1970s, Mr. Rumsfeld knows the institution and Europe intimately. By most accounts, he's not dewy-eyed with nostalgia about his time in Brussels. He's also not Europe's best friend in Washington.

So what's Mr. Rumsfeld up to? Taken literally, this is a straight-forward way to make NATO a useful tool for America and its allies in an era where terrorism and rogue states rather than the Soviet Union present the gravest danger to Western civilization. Earlier this summer, Mr. Rumsfeld pushed allies to recommit themselves to a timetable to improve their military capabilities. In his speech before the German parliament last spring, President George W. Bush called on the Europeans to become "full partners" with the U.S.

The U.S. alone in the alliance presents fresh ideas about how to make NATO relevant to today's problems. No country acts out of charity, including the U.S. Looking out for the national interest, this administration wants help from its allies to fight wars of the future or, as in Afghanistan, keep the peace. While the Kosovo conflict in 1999 left a bad taste about NATO, the

Rumsfeld-backed overhaul clearly suggests the U.S. is willing to keep the alliance as a war-fighting institution. Where's the go-it-alone posture here?

If Europeans want to strengthen the trans-Atlantic relationship, they should engage the U.S. directly about its current concerns and plans with their own ideas. For its part, Washington should be aware of European interests in the Balkans and in keeping the United Nations in the loop. The U.S. has kept troops in the Balkans and going through the U.N. on Iraq. Most European powers are coming around to the U.S. view on the need to confront Saddam Hussein.

As in Munich, however, the public response to Rummy this week was warm -- and the private, chilly. Paris called the Rumsfeld plan an "interesting idea" while its diplomats put out the word the American's ulterior motive was to undermine the EU's own mooted rapid reaction force, due out next year.

Some whispers at NATO headquarters were that the U.S. was tabling plans that were so ambitious that the Europeans couldn't or won't accept -- giving the U.S. a perfect excuse to walk away from the alliance for good.

If the U.S. really wanted to weaken NATO or abandon Europe, it would do so. Instead, Washington is pushing the most radical military overhaul and the most far-reaching enlargement in NATO's history at next month's Prague summit. Mr. Rumsfeld may just be damned if he does and damned if he doesn't.

Mr. Kaminski, editor of the State of the Union column, can be reached at matthew.kaminski@wsj.com.

New York Times
September 26, 2002

Why Iraq Can't Be Deterred

By Kenneth M. Pollack

WASHINGTON — As the United States moves closer to war with Iraq, some have suggested relying instead on deterrence to deal with the threat Saddam Hussein poses. Those who favor deterrence acknowledge that the containment regime that constrained Iraq during the 1990's has frayed beyond repair, but argue that Mr. Hussein can still be kept in check by American threats to respond to any new Iraqi aggression with force — including nuclear bombardment, if necessary.

Certainly war should be a last resort, and deterrence is a seemingly reasonable alternative; after all, it worked with the Soviet Union for 45 years. Unfortunately, however, those who seek to apply it to Iraq base their views on a dangerous misreading of Mr. Hussein, and so fail to recognize how risky such a course is likely to be.

Proponents of deterrence argue that Mr. Hussein will not engage in new aggression, even after he has acquired nuclear weapons, because he is not deliberately suicidal and so would not risk an American nuclear response.

But what they overlook is that Mr. Hussein is often unintentionally suicidal — that is, he miscalculates his odds of success and frequently ignores the likelihood of catastrophic failure. Mr. Hussein is a risk-taker who plays dangerous games without realizing how dangerous they truly are. He is deeply ignorant of the outside world and surrounded by sycophants who tell him what he wants to hear.

When Yevgeny M. Primakov, a Soviet envoy, went to Baghdad in 1991 to try to warn Mr. Hussein to withdraw, he was amazed to find out how cut off from reality Mr. Hussein was. "I realized that it was possible Saddam did not have complete information," he later wrote. "He gave priority to positive reports . . . and as for bad news, the bearer could pay a high price." These factors make Mr. Hussein difficult to deter, because his calculations are based on ideas that do not necessarily correspond to reality and are often impervious to outside influences.

In 1974, for example, he attacked the Kurds even though Iran had been arming and supporting them (with American and Israeli support). He believed, for reasons unknown, that Iran would do nothing to help its proxies. The shah responded decisively, sending troops into Iraqi Kurdistan, mobilizing his army and provoking clashes along the border. To stave off an Iranian invasion that he feared would end his regime, Mr. Hussein was forced to sign the humiliating Algiers accord, which gave Iran everything it wanted from Iraq, including contested territory.

This pattern has been repeated many times since, and it is fair to say that Mr. Hussein's continued survival is far more attributable to luck than it is to any prudence on his part. Thus in 1980 he attacked Iran under the misguided assumption that the new Islamic Republic was so unpopular that it would collapse after one good shove. In so doing, he embroiled Iraq in a war that nearly destroyed his own regime.

In 1991, rather than withdrawing from Kuwait and heading off a war, he convinced himself that the American-led coalition would not attack and that even if it did, his army would emerge victorious. By confidently pursuing this path he again nearly destroyed himself and his regime.

The best evidence that Mr. Hussein can be deterred comes from the Persian Gulf war, when he refrained from using weapons of mass destruction because of American and Israeli threats of nuclear retaliation. But a closer look at the evidence provides more ominous lessons.

When Secretary of State James Baker met with Tariq Aziz in Geneva on the eve of the war, the letter he presented from President Bush to Mr. Hussein threatened the "severest consequences" if Iraq took any of three actions: use of weapons of mass destruction, destruction of the Kuwaiti oil fields or terrorist action against the United States.

The first point to make is that this did not stop Mr. Hussein from destroying the oil fields or dispatching hit squads

to the United States, so the notion that he is easily deterred is dubious. Mr. Hussein did not use chemical munitions against coalition ground forces because he initially believed that he did not need them to prevail. Nevertheless, he did keep stockpiles farther back from the front, suggesting he planned to use them if the battle did not go as he expected. Whether he would have used these weapons is an open question, because the coalition ground advance was so rapid that Iraq's forces never had a chance to deploy them.

A better case can be made that Mr. Hussein was deterred from launching Scud missiles tipped with chemical or biological agents at Israel for fear that the Israelis would retaliate with nuclear weapons, but even here the evidence is hardly perfect. After the war, United Nations weapons inspectors reported that the Iraqi engineers knew that their warheads were awful and probably would have done little damage. For this reason, Mr. Hussein might have considered the conventionally armed Scuds to be the most potent arrows in his quiver.

After the gulf war, moreover, United Nations inspectors and Iraqi defectors revealed a set of secret plans and orders, issued by Mr. Hussein, that are disturbing at best. First, he had set up a special Scud unit with both chemical and biological warheads that was ordered to launch its missiles against Israel in the event of a nuclear attack or a coalition march on Baghdad. Since no one outside Iraq knew at the time about this unit and its orders, it was clearly intended not as a deterrent but simply as a force for revenge.

Second, in August 1990 — after he realized that the United States might challenge the invasion of Kuwait — Mr. Hussein ordered a crash program to build one nuclear weapon, which came close to succeeding. (It failed only because the Iraqis could not enrich enough uranium in time.) His former chief bombmaker has said that Mr. Hussein intended to launch the bomb as a revenge weapon at Tel Aviv if his regime started to collapse. His former chief of intelligence has said that he believes that Mr. Hussein wanted to build a nuclear weapon in

order to deter the United States from launching Desert Storm.

Third, Iraqi defectors and other sources report that Mr. Hussein told aides after the war that his greatest mistake was to invade Kuwait before he had a nuclear weapon, because then the United States would never have dared to oppose him.

What all this suggests is that if Saddam Hussein is able to acquire nuclear weapons, he will see them as tools to achieve his goals — to dominate the Arab world, destroy Israel and punish America. He might not launch such weapons immediately in pursuit of these aims, but that is cold comfort. There is every reason to believe that he would brandish them to deter the United States from interfering in his efforts to conquer or blackmail neighboring countries.

With 1990's-style containment fading quickly and unlikely to be revived, both of the remaining Iraq policy options — invasion and deterrence — carry serious costs and risks. But a well-planned invasion, one that mustered overwhelming force and the support of key allies, could keep those risks to a minimum.

On the other hand, staking our hopes on a policy of deterrence would cost little now (except a loss of face), but it would run the much greater risk of postponing the day of reckoning to a time of Iraq's choosing. Given Mr. Hussein's history of catastrophic miscalculations and his faith that nuclear weapons can deter not him but us, there is every reason to believe that the question is not one of war or no war, but rather war now or war later — a war without nuclear weapons or a war with them.

Kenneth M. Pollack, a former C.I.A. analyst of the Iraqi military, is director of research at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy. He is author of "The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq."

Washington Post
September 26, 2002
Pg. 33

Gore On War

By Richard Cohen

Bully for Al Gore!

Speaking in San Francisco the other day, the president of most of the people -- he won the popular vote, remember -- ventured where few prominent Democrats have dared and criticized President Bush's approach to a war with Iraq. Almost instantly, of course, Gore was excoriated for playing politics with such a serious matter and, worse -- much, much worse -- complicating his party's strategy for the midterm elections.

One of the first responses to Gore's speech came from Jim Dyke, a spokesman for the Republican National Committee. "It seems to be a speech that was more appropriate for a political hack than a presidential candidate," he said, calling the kettle black.

This, though, was the very same Republican National Committee that was told back in January to use the war on terrorism as a way for the GOP to win back the Senate and retain control of the House. The speaker was Karl Rove, Bush's chief political adviser.

"We can go to the country on this issue because they trust the Republican Party to do a better job of protecting and strengthening America's military might and thereby protecting America," Rove advised his partisan audience. For some reason, I cannot find any record of Dyke's criticizing that remark, but I shall, as always, persevere.

As for the Democrats, many of them are so afraid of being labeled appeasers that they want to quickly give the president the war resolution he wants -- so they can then turn to the weak economy as a campaign issue. Many of these Democrats happen to share Gore's misgivings, but, to put matters in their crassest terms, they seem quite willing to sacrifice the odd

19-year-old soldier for the odd congressional seat.

From the reaction to Gore's speech, you would have thought he had advocated unilateral disarmament followed by an aid package for Iraq. On the contrary, he advocated "taking on Saddam Hussein in a timely fashion," but only after the United States had built an "international coalition" to do so. He also said that Washington ought to first finish the job against Osama bin Laden and ensure that Afghanistan does not once again become a Club Med for terrorists.

These are some of the same points made by three retired four-star generals who testified that same day before Congress. The three -- John M. Shalikashvili, Wesley K. Clark and Joseph P. Hoar -- warned the Bush administration against going it alone on Iraq and said that war there could detract from the campaign against terrorism. These three are not generally considered to be in the peace wing of the Democratic Party.

For that matter, neither is Gore. He was one of only eight Senate Democrats to vote for the Persian Gulf War -- and, just for the record, he served in Vietnam. He knows a bit more about war than some of the drumbeaters who want not only to knock out Hussein (I'm for that) but also to virtually annex the Middle East. (What are these people talking about?) War is a serious matter and it ought to be debated seriously.

But it is not. All across the landscape, charges of "appeasement" fill the air. The accusers range from Fox News's Sean Hannity -- "Am I wrong? Are we watching something similar to appeasement before our eyes?" -- to the editorial pages of more than a few newspapers. Almost always, Hussein is likened to Hitler, Munich is mentioned and sometimes the Holocaust as well. The question, though, is not whether to give Hussein the Middle Eastern version of the Sudetenland but how -- and when -- to render him impotent or, better yet, gone. The means, not the ends, are in doubt.

You may not agree with everything Gore said. But he raised some legitimate concerns. After all, the Bush administration has promoted this war with something less than a punctilious regard for fact or, for that matter, tact. It implied a nonexistent connection between al Qaeda and Hussein. It suggested the imminence of an Iraqi nuclear capability that's hardly imminent. It barged ahead unilaterally, pausing at the United Nations only after being forced to do so, and it shredded international law and precedent by asserting it can do whatever it wants in the name of self-defense. This is not a doctrine; it's an impulse.

So, bully for Gore. He has raised some important issues. This is the solemn obligation of the opposition party and its de facto leader. And the solemn obligation of the president and his supporters is not to shout appeasement but to provide some answers.

We're waiting.

New York Times
September 26, 2002

Gore Versus Blair

By William Safire

WASHINGTON — Al Gore's speech in San Francisco attacking the Bush pre-emption doctrine was the opening gun in the 2004 presidential campaign.

His initial charge was that the U.S. military could not do two things well at once: "multilateral cooperation in the war on terrorism can be severely damaged in the way we go about undertaking unilateral action against Iraq." The U.S. should not "jump from one unfinished task to another."

Thus the former vice president made it possible to appear to be tough on terror without seeming to go soft on Saddam. He even recycled a 1999 Clinton budget slogan: "First things first." By arguing that the removal of Saddam would delay, rather than

speed, vengeance for Sept. 11, Gore offered hawkish-sounding political harbor for multilateralists, pacifists and others unworried about Saddam's secret buildup.

Gore also stirred partisan passion by charging the president was using war talk for a political purpose by "demanding, in this high political season," a Congressional resolution permitting him to strike Iraq, and for operating "in a manner calculated to please the portion of its base that occupies the far right." His imputation of political motive was followed by a delicious demurral, worthy of the dark side of my old boss: "I have not raised those doubts, but many have."

So far, an artful antiwar polemic. But then Gore's speech made a sudden lurch toward unilateralism, as if he reminded himself that he might be president one day. No new U.N. resolution is required, he said, for the U.S. to lawfully attack Iraq: "Existing U.N. resolutions, passed 11 years ago, are completely sufficient from a legal standpoint, so long as it is clear that Saddam Hussein is in breach of the agreements" — a dozen breaches that not even U.N. officials dispute.

Further stressing presidential power, Gore gave a recent example to prove that a unilateral strike into a sovereign country to destroy dangerous weaponry is well within international law. "The Clinton administration launched a massive series of air strikes against Iraq for the stated purpose of setting back his capacity to pursue weapons of mass destruction." (This was in the prepared text released by algore2004.com. Two other texts I have seen differ.)

Maybe most of us forgot the precedent set by that "massive series of air strikes," but Gore reminded us that if the U.S. decides Saddam presents an imminent threat, "we would be free to act" in self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N. charter. Even if that threat is not imminent, "there is a case to be made that further delay works to Saddam Hussein's advantage" though "hurrying the process would be costly" in terms of international support.

Defeating Saddam

By Stephen Peter Rosen

How can the U.S. conduct a war to remove Saddam Hussein from power if Saddam Hussein has weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them? If a war to remove him is going well, the argument goes, Saddam will see that he, personally, is doomed, and will decide that he might as well inflict as much pain as he can on his enemies before he dies. The logic of pure reason says that you cannot deter a leader who has nothing to lose.

Lessons of History

There are several things wrong with this argument. The first is history. This is not the first time a war has been waged to effect regime change against a leader who had weapons of mass destruction. Adolf Hitler's Third Reich had stockpiles of nerve gas and a weakened but still effective military chain of command to execute his orders. But when the Red Army was entering Berlin, there were no clouds of sarin or tabun unleashed against the Soviet soldiers who would, without doubt, deal out the roughest kind of justice to Germany and Hitler himself. Earlier in the war, Hitler's orders to destroy Paris as the Germans withdrew were not obeyed. Even the killings of Jews and others in the death camps halted, at least for some periods of time.

Tyrants do not commit mass murder with their own hands. They have subjects who carry out their commands. Tyrants are obeyed because they are feared, and go to great lengths to ensure that their subjects fear them more than they fear the external enemies of the regime. But when they begin to lose a total war, the balance of fear among those they have been oppressing begins to shift. People begin looking around them to see if it is safe to defect or mutiny. If one prominent subordinate successfully disobeys orders, others learn the lesson and act accordingly, creating a cascade of increasing numbers of defections.

This is why dictatorships that seem so solid can so rapidly fall apart when the first cracks in the regime become publicly visible. In a regime guilty of crimes against humanity, subordinates

will not want to be taken prisoner while in the act of committing mass murder, defending a tyrant who is on the verge of total defeat.

Logically, this suggests that tyrants might unleash their stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction before it is obvious to their subordinates that the regime will be overthrown. If Saddam Hussein saw the inevitable coming early enough, he could order his remaining SCUDs loaded with chemical or biological weapons and launched against Israel, by generals who still feared him more than the American armies that might falter before they got to Baghdad.

This overlooks another major characteristic of tyrants. They tend to have hefty amounts of self-confidence. They have, after all, gained and held absolute power against all comers. They have survived attempts to kill or defeat them. They have difficulty believing that they can lose. Hitler, when hearing of the death of Franklin Roosevelt in April of 1945 cheered himself up with the thought that, like Frederick the Great, he would still pull out a victory because a key adversary had died.

In addition, tyrants are not surrounded by people who bring them down to earth. All the evidence we have from the Hitler, Stalin, and Mao regimes shows that their subordinates did not present, but rather concealed, information that revealed the ongoing failure of policies ordered by the tyrant. The subordinates of the tyrant know, long before the tyrant is forced to believe, that the game is up. The idea that men like Saddam Hussein will believe that they are doomed, and order apocalyptic action before the very last moment, is to ignore everything we know about the most basic part of their personalities.

Before the tyrant is forced to believe, that the game is up. The idea that men like Saddam Hussein will believe that they are doomed, and order apocalyptic action before the very last moment, is to ignore everything we know about the most basic part of their personalities.

If what is written above is correct, there are some clear policy implications for the U.S. as it plans its war against Saddam Hussein. First, we should say, publicly and often, that Iraqi commanders who commit mass murder will be found and executed, and that those who forbear will be treated mercifully. We should state publicly that we know that Saddam Hussein has given his commanders operational control of chemical and biological weapons, so that if the weapons are used, it is because of the actions of local commanders, who will be held accountable.

We should state, finally, that the war will be waged to destroy Saddam Hussein's internal security apparatus, so that military commanders

will not have the excuse that they were acting under compulsion from Saddam. If nothing else, this is sure to initiate a round of purges by Saddam of his military that will weaken it, just as the Red Army was weakened in the years before World War II.

When the war starts, inducing senior Iraqi military defections will be an objective more important than destroying tanks or gaining territory. News of the defections should be broadcast continuously back into Iraq.

Second, the earliest American military actions in the war should be massive. Saddam Hussein's command structure and military capabilities should be hit as hard as possible with air and ground forces in the first days of the war, while he still believes that he can dodge the bullet with his name on it one more time. By the time he realizes that he is history, there should be as little left as possible of his military and security structure.

This will require a war very different from the war we recently waged in Afghanistan, in which logistical problems and legal considerations of what leadership targets were legitimate to destroy led to a tempo of war that built slowly to a climax. It should also be far different from the 1991 Gulf War, in which the air campaign was waged for weeks before the ground campaign began.


Lightning War

If and when U.S. forces attack Iraq it should be staged as a new form of lightning war, the purpose of which is to shock and paralyze the enemy leadership with air strikes, special forces and helicopter air assaults. New weapons, including directed-energy weapons, may be deployed to scramble the electronics of Iraqi military computers and communications systems.

New weapons, but more importantly new ideas about how to use them, were the key to solving strategic problems in past conflicts. The British were the first to realize that the stalemate in the trenches in World War I could be broken by a combination of tanks, aircraft, and motorized infantry. The Marine Corps invented amphibious warfare, which made it possible to island-hop across the Pacific, bypassing Japanese strongholds during World War II, and to achieve decisive results in Korea by landing troops at Inchon.

The problems associated with attacking a tyrant with weapons of mass destruction are real, but not insuperable. A victory will require new modes of military thought and action. When debating whether now is the appropriate time to act against Saddam, however, one should understand that those problems will only become more formidable over time.

Mr. Rosen is the director of the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University.



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Iraq, Fall 2002 [1]

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
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Dear Friend: Should we be rethinking our plans for Prague in November? Steve

stations in his district, the state election supervisor promptly had them replaced.

"I do not want even a small bit of suspicion to overshadow the fairness of the polling process," said Pramod Jain, chief electoral officer for Jammu and Kashmir. "I don't think anyone will dare make these mistakes."

WASHINGTON POST EDITORIAL

NATO's Iraq Summit

By Jackson Diehl

President Bush's challenge to the United Nations - act on Iraq or become irrelevant -- will soon haunt another post-World War II creation struggling to find a place in the post-9/11 world: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

NATO's first full summit meeting in three years is scheduled in Prague in nine weeks' time. It was supposed to be about expansion -- as many as seven nations in Eastern Europe probably will be invited to join -- and "transformation," though no one was sure what that meant. Never mind: The Prague summit now almost certainly will become an Iraq summit, which, with the upcoming debate in the Security Council, could determine whether the United States continues to bind itself to the familiar multilateral institutions of the Cold War.

The prospect is enough to make defense establishments on both sides of the Atlantic queasy. Donald Rumsfeld's Pentagon ruthlessly excluded NATO forces from the war in Afghanistan and has been deeply skeptical about whether the alliance still has a value beyond political symbolism and Balkan peacekeeping. Many NATO members, in turn, don't want war with Iraq and are deeply reluctant to support it even rhetorically, much less on the battlefield. Still, officials on both sides were beginning to accept last week that there will be no dodging the issue -- the only thing worse than an Iraq debate at a NATO summit would be a NATO summit that fails to address U.S. preparations for a war it portrays as essential to preserving Western security. Moreover, the Bush administration's sometimes beleaguered multilateralists are beginning to sense an opportunity: Now that the president has decided to seek allies for his Iraqi mission, Prague could provide the opportunity to decisively arrest NATO's drift toward insignificance and give it a meaningful place in what could be a decades-long conflict with terrorists and outlaw regimes.

No one is supposing that a war against Iraq could become a full-fledged NATO operation, like the 1999 campaign in Kosovo. But the optimistic scenario, at least in Washington, goes like this:

First, the prospect of a second post-9/11 American military campaign in the Near East could propel NATO's embrace of an emerging Bush

administration initiative to create a permanent "reaction force," made up of European troops and able to join the United States in combat missions beyond Europe's borders. Administration officials began briefing NATO governments about the idea only in the past couple of weeks but hope to make its approval a Prague centerpiece.

This would go a long way toward solving NATO's largest practical problem, which is the inability of most of its members to field forces capable of fighting effectively on a battlefield outside of Europe -- or even to get there -- and the manifest unwillingness of its governments to spend the money to acquire them. The new reaction force essentially would take the modest pieces of existing European armies that have been modernized, combine them under a new command and prepare them to join U.S. forces in Afghan-like missions on short notice. It would achieve the neat trick of reviving NATO as a working military alliance without requiring an increase in European defense budgets; one of its intellectual authors, Richard Kugler of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, estimates it would absorb only 2 percent to 3 percent of European defense spending. Not surprisingly, Assistant Secretary of Defense J.D. Crouch got a warm reaction when he briefed on the plan in Brussels this month.

Inside the Bush administration, meanwhile, a consensus is growing that the United States needs help from NATO in Iraq and was wrong to turn away allies in Afghanistan. Not only could the administration use the political cover provided by allied participation, but its incipient plans for postwar Iraq foresee substantial European involvement in a peacekeeping force and nation-building project, contributions that will be easier to arrange if NATO forces are committed from the beginning. The State Department's NATO ambassador, Nicholas Burns, has laid out a series of options in a cable getting wide circulation in Washington: They range from a resolution by the NATO's governing council supporting a military operation, to the granting of air bridges and port facilities for use by American forces, to participation of units from NATO countries, either

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Report

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intell community
think of this
report?

Weekend Developments, 16 September -- 0730 EDT

(U) **GERMANY/IRAQ:** *Weekly claims Iraq has drone armed with biological, chemical weapons; BND denies report.* Yesterday's edition of the German weekly *Welt am Sonntag* claimed Iraq has developed an unmanned aircraft from MiG-23 fighters that can release "deadly biological and chemical" substances "over a range of 1000 kilometers," reported AFP. The paper cited a "classified conversation" between the head of the German Intelligence Service [BND] and members of parliament. A BND spokesman, however, said they "do not have any information" about a new Iraqi weapons system, Berlin's ddp news agency reported. [EUP20020914000064 independent French press agency, EUP20020914000180 independent news agency]

(U) **IRAQ:** *Iraqi defector affirms Saddam can produce 'three nuclear weapons.'* Khidir Hamza, an Iraqi scientist who defected in 1994, claimed Iraq is already using pirated copies of German equipment to process enough uranium to produce "three nuclear weapons," London's *The Times* reported today. Hamza asserted that 1.3 tons of low-enriched material was bought "many years ago" from Brazil, and yellow-cake uranium has been extracted from phosphates for processing. [EUP20020916000020 influential center-right daily]

(U) **TURKEY/IRAQ:** *15,000 Turkish troops amass on Iraqi border.* "Local sources" report that the Turkish Army has sent 15,000 troops and "large numbers" of tanks, mortars and helicopters to the Turkey-Iraq border region, according to *Ozgur Politika* today. [GMP20020916000022 daily supportive of Kurdish cause, PKK and HADEP]

(U) **FYROM:** *Preliminary results of parliamentary elections show opposition ahead.* Yesterday's preliminary election tallies show the opposition coalition, comprising the Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia, led by Branko Crvenkovski, and the Albanian Democratic Union for Integration, headed by former National Liberation Army leader, Ali Ahmeti, are in the lead, Radio Makedonija reported today. Prime Minister Ljubco Georgievski, leader of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity, today stated his party "will not be in a position" to form the new government. [EUP20020916000001 state-owned national radio, EUP20020915000366]

(U) **INDIA:**

- *Jammu and Kashmir elections begin amid 'elaborate security.'* The first phase of elections began today in Jammu and Kashmir amid "elaborate security," reported Doordarshan DD-1 National Television. A defense spokesman said nine "terrorists, mostly foreign mercenaries" who were trying to "disrupt" polling were killed by army forces in the Kupwara sector. [SAP20020916000003 formerly government-run television, now being restructured as an independent broadcaster]

17
Jan -
What does the
intell. community
think of this
report?

Weekend Developments, 16 September -- 0730 EDT

(U) **GERMANY/IRAQ: Weekly claims Iraq has drone armed with biological, chemical weapons; BND denies report.** Yesterday's edition of the German weekly *Welt am Sonntag* claimed Iraq has developed an unmanned aircraft from MiG-23 fighters that can release "deadly biological and chemical" substances "over a range of 1000 kilometers," reported AFP. The paper cited a "classified conversation" between the head of the German Intelligence Service [BND] and members of parliament. A BND spokesman, however, said they "do not have any information" about a new Iraqi weapons system, Berlin's ddp news agency reported. [EUP20020914000064 independent French press agency, EUP20020914000180 independent news agency]

(U) **IRAQ: Iraqi defector affirms Saddam can produce 'three nuclear weapons.'** Khidir Hamza, an Iraqi scientist who defected in 1994, claimed Iraq is already using pirated copies of German equipment to process enough uranium to produce "three nuclear weapons," London's *The Times* reported today. Hamza asserted that 1.3 tons of low-enriched material was bought "many years ago" from Brazil, and yellow-cake uranium has been extracted from phosphates for processing. [EUP20020916000020 influential center-right daily]

(U) **TURKEY/IRAQ: 15,000 Turkish troops amass on Iraqi border.** "Local sources" report that the Turkish Army has sent 15,000 troops and "large numbers" of tanks, mortars and helicopters to the Turkey-Iraq border region, according to *Ozgur Politika* today. [GMP20020916000022 daily supportive of Kurdish cause, PKK and HADEP]

(U) **FYROM: Preliminary results of parliamentary elections show opposition ahead.** Yesterday's preliminary election tallies show the opposition coalition, comprising the Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia, led by Branko Crvenkovski, and the Albanian Democratic Union for Integration, headed by former National Liberation Army leader, Ali Ahmeti, are in the lead, Radio Makedonija reported today. Prime Minister Ljubco Georgievski, leader of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity, today stated his party "will not be in a position" to form the new government. [EUP20020916000001 state-owned national radio, EUP20020915000366]

(U) **INDIA:**

- **Jammu and Kashmir elections begin amid 'elaborate security.'** The first phase of elections began today in Jammu and Kashmir amid "elaborate security," reported Doordarshan DD-1 National Television. A defense spokesman said nine "terrorists, mostly foreign mercenaries" who were trying to "disrupt" polling were killed by army forces in the Kupwara sector. [SAP20020916000003 formerly government-run television, now being restructured as an independent broadcaster]

- **Indian, Pakistani troops exchange fire across LoC.** Indian and Pakistani troops exchanged "artillery and heavy machinegun" fire across the Line of Control [LoC] in southern Poonch district today, reported AFP. An Indian police spokesman said Pakistani troops opened fire "without any provocation" and another official said the fire was meant to scare voters in Kashmir from going to the polls. Meanwhile, speaking at a press conference in New York, Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee "firmly" rejected conversion of the LoC into an international border, Doordarshan DD-1 National Television reported. [JPP20020916000043, SAP20020916000070]

- **Bomb explodes on Hyderabad bus, one dead.** Police in Hyderabad are investigating a blast yesterday caused by a two-pound bomb placed under a seat on a bus, killing one and injuring six, *The News* reported today. Police said al-Qa'ida's involvement "cannot be ruled out." [SAP20020916000012 independent daily]

(U) ISRAEL/WEST BANK & GAZA STRIP: IDF continue operations in several towns, arrest Fatah official. Israel Defense Forces arrested Abd-al-Jalil Zurayqat, secretary of the Fatah Movement in Taffuh, Voice of Palestine reported two days ago. IDF imposed curfews in Hebron's old city and commercial center and in Qalqilyah, where they also made arrests. In the Janin Governorate, IDF continued the curfew for the tenth consecutive day. [GMP20020914000068 official radio station of the Palestinian Authority.]

(U) NEPAL: Bomb blasts in Katmandu herald general strike. No injuries resulted from four small bombs that exploded yesterday in the commercial areas of Katmandu, one day ahead of a nationwide strike called by Maoists as part of their demand for constitutional changes, AFP reported. Witnesses said security squads diffused "at least three other bombs." [JPP20020915000017]

(U) LIBERIA: President lifts state of emergency. Liberian President Charles Taylor two days ago lifted a state of emergency and a ban on mass political rallies imposed in February because he said a threat to the capital from the group Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy had been "considerably reduced," AFP reported. [AFP20020914000137]

(U) SWEDEN: Social Democrats win general election. Swedish Prime Minister Goeran Persson's Social Democrats and his left-wing allies won an absolute majority in yesterday's general election, according to AFP. [EUP20020915000369]