

Withdrawn/Redacted Material

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DOCUMENT NO.	FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
024	Briefing	[Briefing] - From: Condoleezza Rice <i>LPHWB 2016-0148-M, #4467 released in full, 9/16/2019</i>	4	10/21/2002	P1/b1 ; P5; P6/b6;
025	Draft	[Talking Points]	2	10/19/2002	P5;
026	Report	[Report]	4	N.D.	P1/b1; P5;
027	Report	Iraq: The Day After <i>LPHWB 2016-0148-M, #4469 denied in full, 04/24/2019</i>	12	10/21/2002	P1/b1; P5;
028	Note	Notes...	1	10/08/2002	P1/b1; P5;

COLLECTION TITLE:

National Security Council - National Security Advisor, Office of the

SERIES:

Rice, Condoleezza

FOLDER TITLE:

Future of Iraq [5]

FRC ID:

34579

RESTRICTION CODES

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

Deed of Gift Restrictions

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Records Not Subject to FOIA

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2014-0227-F 1

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American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research



"Post-Saddam Iraq" Conference Series

Demobilizing, Reforming, and Rebuilding the Iraqi Armed Forces & Dismantling and Transforming Iraq's Military Industries

Friday, November 15, 2002, 9:00–11:00 a.m.
Wohlstetter Conference Center, Twelfth Floor, AEI

Few issues will be more important to a post-Saddam transition than military reform. How can the world's fourth-largest military be demobilized without causing widespread unemployment and social unrest in Iraq? The vast military-industrial complex that supports this military must also be dismantled in a way that will prevent the proliferation of technologies integral to the development of weapons of mass destruction. How can the Iraqi military become a bulwark of democracy? This event continues AEI's "Post-Saddam Iraq" conference series.

8:45 a.m. Registration

9:00 Moderator: MICHAEL EISENSTADT,
Washington Institute for Near East Policy

Panelists: GENERAL SADOON AL-DULAIMI
BRIGADIER GENERAL TAWFIK AL-YASSIRI
BRIGADIER GENERAL MUHAMMAD BARAA NAJIB AL-RUBAIE
GENERAL FAWZI AL-SHAMMARI
BRIGADIER GENERAL NAJIB AL-SALHI
GENERAL WAFIQ SAMARRAI

11:00 Adjournment

Conference



**Demobilizing, Reforming, and Rebuilding the Iraqi Armed Forces
& Dismantling and Transforming Iraq's Military Industries**

Friday, November 15, 2002

Biographies

General Sadoun al-Dulaimi defected from Iraq in 1991 and now serves as a colonel for the Iraqi opposition. After receiving degrees in sociology and social psychology from Baghdad University, he was a security officer for the Iraqi forces and was in charge of the Center of Socio-psychological and Security Studies. He was also a lecturer at the Police Academy and the National Security College. General al-Dulaimi is currently working on research in the field of security and its relevance to Iraqi society.

Brigadier General Najib al-Salhi is the head of the Iraqi Free Officers Movement, which aims to overthrow Saddam Hussein's regime and establish a new government based on democratic institutions. A 1995 defector, General al-Salhi began working in the underground opposition in 1979. In Iraq he has served as commander of the Republican Guards tank battalion; commander of the 16th Armored Brigade; chief of staff of the 6th Armored Division, 3rd Corps; staff officer of the 4th Corps; commander of the 27th Mechanized Infantry Brigade; and chief of staff of the 1st Mechanized Division, 5th Corps. He was also an instructor at the Military Command College in Baghdad. General al-Salhi is the author of many publications including *The Earthquake, Human Rights in Iraq, The Social and Political Problem in Iraq, The Problem of Administration in the Parts of the Iraqi State, The Future of the Military in Iraq, and The Army and National Unity*.

Brigadier General Muhammad Baraa al-Rubaie is the former vice director of the Iraqi Infantry. He served as platoon commander from 1964 to 1969, company commander from 1970 to 1975, and battalion commander from 1976 to 1978. General al-Rubaie also served as the director of the Army Committee at the General Armed Forces Headquarters and administrative director of the Marshals Force Command Headquarters.

General Fawzi al-Shammari is the founder of the Iraqi Officers Movement. In Iraq, General al-Shammari held all military leadership positions, including leading nine divisions and heading the southern sector of 250,000 troops in the Iraq-Iran War. A graduate of the Iraq Military Academy and the Iraqi National Defense College, he has also studied in the Soviet Union from 1975 to 1976. General al-Shammari currently writes on Iraqi military and political situations.

Brigadier General Tawfik al-Yassiri is the cofounder of the Iraqi National Coalition, also serving as its secretary general and spokesman for the Iraqi Military Council, the military wing of the Coalition. Previously he served in Iraq as general and commander of the Officers Administrative Affairs School. In the aftermath of the Gulf War, General al-Yassiri led the popular uprising in southern Iraq before being seriously wounded and transported to Saudi Arabia.

Michael Eisenstadt is a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Before coming to the Institute, he was a military analyst with the United States Army and in 1992 he worked on the United States Air Force Gulf War Air Power Survey where he contributed a chapter on Iraqi security and planning prior to the Gulf War. Mr. Eisenstadt currently writes on Arab-Israeli and Persian Gulf security affairs. He is the author or coauthor of *Arming for Peace? Syria's Elusive Quest for "Strategic Parity"* (1992); *Like a Phoenix from the Ashes? The Future of Iraqi Military Power* (1993); *Supporting Peace: America's Role in an Israel-Syria Peace Agreement* (1994); *Iranian Military Power: Capabilities and Intentions* (1996); and *Knives, Tanks, and Missiles: Israel's Security Revolution* (1998).

General Wafiq Samarraï is a former head of Iraqi Military Intelligence. He defected in 1994, bringing with him valuable information about Iraq's military, weapons systems, and programs to develop weapons of mass destruction. General Sammarai now lives in exile in England, where he is a key player in the Iraqi opposition movement and the INC.



Upcoming Monthly Seminars on Rebuilding Post-Saddam Iraq

Dates and panelists are subject to change; please visit www.aei.org/iraq/iraqfront.htm for updates. All Seminars will be held at AEI and will begin at 9:00 a.m. Each panel will be roughly 2 hours in length. For more information please contact Molly McKew at mmckew@aei.org.

Monday, December 16, 2002

De-Ba'athification Programs and the Dismantling of the Mukhabarat

Monday, January 6, 2003

Reforming the Educational System

Monday, February 3, 2003

Constructing a Viable, Independent Judicial System

Constitutional Issues and Federalism (the Ethnic/Sunni-Shi'i Questions)

Monday, March 3, 2003

Debt, Reparations, and Sanctions

Friday, April 4, 2003

Environmental Rehabilitation, Water Resources, and Agriculture

Health and Social Services

Friday, May 2, 2003

The Iraqi Diaspora and the Return of Deportees and Forced Immigrants

AEI Post-Saddam Iraq

Updates on events in this series, as well as registration information, articles, conference summaries, and papers, are available at

www.aei.org/iraq/iraqfront.htm

The next event in this series will be on December 16th, 2002. The topic will be "De-Ba'athification Programs and the Dismantling of the Mukhabarat."



The Day After: Planning for a Post-Saddam Iraq

Thursday, October 3, 2002, 8:30 a.m.–5:00 p.m.

The stakes for a successful transition to a democratic regime in Iraq have never been higher. The post-war requirements to replace Saddam Hussein with a representative democracy and assure long-term stability and democratic peace in the region are significant. Policymakers, defense analysts, and foreign policy specialists must consider a host of critical questions to ensure that Iraq's totalitarian system is not reborn under different leadership. A functional democracy in Iraq could serve as a model for other Middle Eastern nations.

How high should the United States set the bar for a post-Saddam Iraq? Are Iraq and the Arab world ready for democracy? How can Saddam Hussein and others be brought to justice for their crimes? How can we minimize the impact of military action in Iraq on the global energy market? What role can Iraq play in regional and international relations? These and other policy challenges will be addressed in a full day conference with some of the world's leading experts on human rights, international law, petroleum economics, and foreign policy.

8:30-9:00 a.m. **Registration, Coffee & Continental Breakfast**

9:00-9:30 a.m. **Welcome:** CHRISTOPHER DEMUTH, PRESIDENT, AEI

Introduction: AMBASSADOR RYSZARD KRYSTOSIK,
Former Chief of United States Interest Section, Baghdad

9:30-10:55 a.m. **Panel I: Ambitions for Iraq?**

Presenter: KANAN MAKIYA, HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Discussants:

AHMAD CHALABI, IRAQI NATIONAL CONGRESS
REND RAHIM FRANCKE, IRAQ FOUNDATION
MICHAEL O'HANLON, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
SIYAMEND OTHMAN, INDEPENDENT IRAQI ANALYST
RICHARD PERLE, AEI

Moderator: DANIELLE PLETKA, AEI

(Continued on next page)

11:05 a.m.-12:30 p.m. **Panel II: War Crimes**

Presenter: FEISAL ISTRABADI, TRIAL LAWYER AND IRAQI ACTIVIST

Discussants: MUNTHER AL FADHAL, HUMAN RIGHTS AUTHOR & LEGAL SCHOLAR
 HANIA MUFTI, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LONDON
 RUTH WEDGWOOD, YALE UNIVERSITY

Moderator: REUEL MARC GERECHT, AEI

12:30-2:00 p.m. **Lunch**

2:00-3:25 p.m. **Panel III: Oil and the Iraqi Economy**

Presenter: PATRICK CLAWSON, WASHINGTON INSTITUTE

Discussants: IBRAHIM ALOLOM, INDEPENDENT ANALYST
 SINAN AL-SHABIBI, UN CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEVELOPMENT
 S. ROB SOBHANI, CASPIAN ENERGY CONSULTING

Moderator: DANIELLE PLETKA, AEI

3:35-5:00 p.m. **Panel IV: Post-Saddam Foreign Policy & Iraq's International
Obligations, UN Resolutions, and Regional Relations**

Presenter: BERNARD LEWIS, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

Discussants: SERIF EGELI, TURKISH-USA BUSINESS COUNCIL
 NAWAF OBAID, SAUDI OIL AND SECURITY ANALYST
 OLIVIER ROY, CENTRE NATIONAL DES RECHERCHES SCIENTIFIQUES

Moderator: REUEL MARC GERECHT, AEI

5:00 p.m. Adjournment

AEI Conference Summaries

The Day After: Planning for a Post-Saddam Iraq

October 2002

On October 3, 2002, AEI was proud to gather some of the world's most eminent scholars on Iraq, including many Iraqi expatriates, to discuss the challenges that will face the Iraqi state after Saddam Hussein is removed from power. While the full series on post-Saddam Iraq will address many issues relating to the future of Iraq, the inaugural conference focused on the prospects for democratization in Iraq, war crimes, oil and the Iraqi economy, and Iraq's international obligations and regional relations.

Introduction

Ambassador Ryszard Krystosik
Former chief of U.S. Interest Section in Iraq

In recent months there has been considerable debate about the external reasons to remove Saddam Hussein from power, but little attention is given to the domestic conditions that mandate regime change. For the majority of Iraqi people, the harsh reality of daily life is in sharp contrast to the wealth and privilege enjoyed by Saddam's elite. As salaries have continued to decline since 1991, the support of the middle class for the regime has similarly fallen. While living conditions for many Iraqis are appalling, a small elite continues to blame sanctions while skimming money from the "Oil for Food" program to maintain their standard of luxury.

Crime has grown unchecked in most urban areas; censorship has become increasingly rigid. Most people only have access to state-run television and its edited news and propaganda. Satellite television and the Internet continue to be available only for official state use and prohibited for the rest. There have been some adjustments in the internal policy of the Iraqi state, but the regime still exerts complete control over the lives of the Iraqi people. The presence of Saddam Hussein is all-pervasive.

Saddam cannot be prevented from rebuilding his arsenal of weapons of mass destruction as long as he retains power, and as long as he retains power the Iraqi people will pay the heaviest price for his continued rule. A successful transition to a democratic system of government, not a rebirth of the present dictatorship under a different ruler, is the only way to ensure improvement in the quality of life for the people of Iraq.

Panel 1: Ambitions for Iraq?

Kanan Makiya

Harvard University and Human Rights Committee of the Iraqi National Congress

Thus far, the debate surrounding the coming war has not risen to the challenge of discussing the possibility of democracy in Iraq. In America, the debate has been focused on the threat to the West; in Europe, on the moral issues of American hegemony; and in the Arab world, on the possibility that regime change will upset the regional relations of the entire Middle East. None of this includes those who live within the grasp of one of the most brutal dictators in history. The people of Iraq believe that military action is the only way to remove Saddam and his regime, and the outcome of any action will depend on the willingness of the United States to involve itself in nation-building in Iraq, not just regime change.

Picturing Iraq post-Saddam and creating a political vision not just for a future Iraq but also for the entire Middle East requires imagination and should not be based on limited expectations. Assuming 1) that the United States proceeds with regime change, 2) that removing Saddam from power does not cause large-scale civilian casualties in Iraq or Israel, 3) that the Iraqi opposition decides to adopt these precepts of democratization, 4) that the United States remains involved in rebuilding Iraq long-term, and 5) that the U.S. agrees to keep a military force in Iraq to guarantee the territorial integrity of the state once regime change occurs, then Iraq has the economic and human resources to become as much an icon of democracy and economic viability as it has been a symbol of autocracy.

Federalism is the best solution to the internal problems of a democratic Iraqi state; it is advocated by almost all of the groups that oppose the current regime, in one form or another. A federal state structure is a mandatory condition for keeping the Kurds in the Iraqi state after Saddam is removed from power. If federalism is to become the founding principle of a new Iraqi state, then it must delineate both the separation and division of powers among the regions. This will reinforce the idea that the rights of the minority should never be sacrificed to the will of the majority, and will likewise indicate that the federal structure cannot be based on ethnicity, on the division between Kurd and Arab.

An ethnically divided state would result in battles over the control of resources and the marginalization of other ethnic groups; therefore the federal order must be based on geography. Each region must receive its share of national resources and revenues based on the size of its population. This will ensure the equality of citizenship for all and the re-definition of the Iraqi state as non-Arab. Arabs will still form a majority, but they will not be in a position to exclude all others from power and influence. Iraqis also need to invent a concept of statehood that gives all religions the opportunity to flourish and that keeps politics and faith separate from one another.

Demilitarization is a key issue in rebuilding the Iraq state. A professional army must be established in the place of the conscript one, its budget limited to 2 percent of the national income and its purpose purely defensive and never for internal use. Just as in Japan after World War II, the Iraqi people must renounce the right to use force as a means to settle international disputes.

A federal, non-Arab, demilitarized Iraq will be a greater opportunity for the Middle East than any since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. This is possible in partnership with the United States, if the U.S. can rise to the creative challenge.

Rend Rahim Francke
Iraq Foundation

The United States must commit to democracy for post-Saddam Iraq. It must make plans for the transition now, along the lines delineated by Kanan Makiya, and not continue to promote anti-democratic tendencies in the Iraqi opposition. The United States has enormous leverage with the opposition, and must not be reluctant about forming a transitional authority to handle civilian affairs in Iraq after Saddam falls. The administration has endorsed not the democratic vision for Iraq but instead the regressive forces within Iraq. Current political thinking within Iraq is based on extraterritorial principles like Arab nationalism, Islamism, and communism. Iraq needs to develop a way to deal with its internal politics; the Bush administration [or do you mean Washington?] has been slow to realize this.

Siyamend Othman
Expert on Kurdish issues

Iraqis of all ethnicities and religions are skeptical and apprehensive about America's commitment to democracy in Iraq, particularly after the United States left Saddam Hussein in power in 1991. The battle for Baghdad will be won in Washington. If the U.S. really believes that its national interests lie in promoting democracy and human rights beyond its own borders, it must give Iraqi democrats the support to introduce these ideas after Saddam.

Richard Perle
AEI

The failure of the Bush administration to attend this discussion is tragic not because of what they might have said but because of what they might have heard. The challenge of nation-building will ultimately be in the hands of Iraqis, not the administration, and the representatives at this conference prove that they are more than up to this challenge. When addressing the liberation of Iraq, the U.S. must not fear to alter the status quo. It must place the power in the hands of people like those at this table. The Iraqi diaspora will play a crucial role in the rebuilding process and must not continue to be marginalized by the State Department. The Arab world will not align itself with Saddam if we attack, and to assume so is demeaning. Saddam is despised by the Muslim world as well as the West, and he must be removed.

Ahmad Chalabi
Iraqi National Congress

Iraqis have given great thought to their own future. Just because a future leader has not been made evident does not mean that no action should be taken against Saddam. President Bush's speech to the United Nations on September 12 has acted as a galvanizing force for Iraqis because the United States is finally focusing on removing Saddam and his oppressive regime, not just disarmament. The Iraqi people have a long history and want to keep their state together; a provisional coalition government must be formed to take power in the wake of

Saddam. This will allow the coordination of emergency relief and defecting units of the Iraqi army. After the war, a constitutional assembly can be called and elections held. Iraq's neighbors fear a successful transition and what it will mean in the region, but the U.S. must follow a vision that agrees with its own values and ideas and not support tyranny over freedom in Iraq.

Michael O'Hanlon
Brookings Institution

A firm multilateral ultimatum must be placed before Iraq before other action can be taken. War will likely still be the outcome, but this will give the U.S. time to strengthen the support of Arab countries for U.S. actions. The U.S. must win the war quickly and be prepared to help stabilize Iraq over an indefinite period of time. The support of European allies will aid in this process.

Points from the discussion:

- The presence of U.S. civilian institutions, both governmental and nongovernmental, will be needed in post-Saddam Iraq. A military presence will be necessary, but should be discreet and limited to maintaining territorial integrity and protecting Iraqi interests from the interference of other regional actors such as Turkey. Much greater efforts to rebuild the police force must be made than have been in Afghanistan.
- Israel must decide for itself how to defend itself in the case of an Iraqi attack, but its defensive capabilities have greatly increased since 1991. The United States has made it clear that no Nuremberg defense will be available for Iraqi officers and soldiers who carry out such attacks, which may belay last-ditch actions against Israel.
- U.S. administrations, whether Republican or Democrat, have largely viewed the entire Middle East as beyond redemption; this has limited the scope of their policy toward the region and is partially responsible for their reluctance to support democracy for Iraq. This ideological block must be overcome in order to mediate positive change in the region.

Panel 2: War Crimes

Feisal Istrabadi
Boesch & Istrabadi

In order for war crimes to be prosecuted in Iraq, the Baathist government must not be replaced by another dictator but by a functioning democracy. Members of the Iraqi regime can be held accountable for war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity. The transitional Iraqi government will have the duty, as bound by the Geneva Conventions, to investigate, prosecute, and punish those Iraqis guilty of targeting civilians and individuals; attacking indiscriminately; committing or threatening to commit murder, torture, or mutilation; taking hostages; and failing to prevent those in their command to commit such crimes. If vigilantism is to be avoided in Iraq, the people must believe that the government will bring those who violated the rights of its citizens to justice. The leaders of Iraq could also be charged with treason for waging war against their own people; issues of immunity will have to be addressed.

Many guilty of genocide, the systematic rape of women, and the torture and murder of political prisoners must be held liable under Iraq's domestic criminal code. Trying Iraq's leadership under provisions of both domestic and international law can be very valuable. It will establish publicly that internal abuses of civil and human rights will no longer be tolerated, and it will help Iraqis build domestic political and judicial institutions. Training for lawyers and judges must be supported by the international community. The death penalty must be abolished in order to prevent abuse. In support of the investigation process, the names of informers must be released to the public, intelligence records made public, and the financial records of Saddam and his family disclosed.

Four categories of violators should be held accountable for their actions. First, the decision-makers enacting policies of the Iraqi government that violated international and domestic norms should be fully prosecuted under international and domestic laws. This would include the president and vice presidents of Iraq, members of the Revolutionary Command Council, cabinet members, senior corps commanders, and some other high-ranking officials. Second, mid-level violators, including lower-rank intelligence and military officers, party officials, judges, and prosecutors, will have to be prosecuted based on the severity of the crime committed. Third, perpetrators of ordinary crimes under domestic law must be prosecuted according to the Iraqi criminal code. The fourth and final category represents the need for total de-Baathification. Active participants in the Baath party should be prohibited from holding any office in Iraq. The idea of amnesty should be rejected for all but members of the third and fourth categories.

Justice is more important in Iraq than immediate reconciliation, but justice can only be delivered if a democratic transition occurs. The success of this transition will depend on the manner in which regime change occurs. Civilian infrastructure should not be targeted in the attacks in order to win the sympathy and cooperation of the Iraqi people and transform Iraq into a Western-oriented democracy.

Hania Mufti
Human Rights Watch, London

Evidence of human rights abuses committed by the Iraqi government is considerable enough for the leaders to be held accountable under international law. To truly respect human rights, however, it is necessary to safeguard the rights of those suspected of committing crimes as well as those of the victims; an international criminal tribunal for Iraq may be the best way to ensure fair and timely trials for all of those concerned. Prosecuting past crimes will be a deterrent for future abuses and will help revive belief in the rule of law. Those responsible for the most serious crimes must not be included in the new Iraqi government and no amnesties for these people should be granted, in order to prevent a culture of impunity. International monitoring of human rights can be very valuable and those implicated in past human rights abuses should be prohibited from joining the new military or police forces.

Munther Al Fadhal
International College of Law, London

Delineation between war crimes and regular crimes should be established carefully. Severe crimes against the Iraqi people should be prosecuted as war crimes; regular crimes should be

deferred to regular prosecution. It is also important to distinguish between interior and exterior war crimes.

Ruth Wedgwood
Yale University

Iraq remains a member of many treaty arrangements that can potentially be used against Saddam Hussein, such as the Geneva Convention. War crimes can be prosecuted using: an ad hoc tribunal created by the UN Security Council; a mixed tribunal of local and international prosecutors and judges; military tribunals; or local courts. War crimes trials take a long time, and must be done carefully to provide an exemplary process for the new democratic culture. The trials should not become, however, a forum for those of trial. The trials should provide a moral foundation for the political future of Iraq.

Panel 3: Oil and the Iraqi Economy

Patrick Clawson
Washington Institute for Near East Policy

There is little evidence that American policy towards Iraq is driven by oil. Oil is an indirect reason that the U.S. is concerned about Iraq. Oil provides Iraq with revenue that can be used, for example, to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Concerns over WMD, terrorism, and regional stability take precedence at the moment, and energy security—in terms of the international oil supply—has had a very low priority in Washington over the last decade. For example, the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act was renewed by an overwhelming majority despite loud protest by international oil companies, who would prefer the complete de-politicization of the oil industry.

From 1998–2000, the global economy was reasonably prosperous despite the doubling of oil prices. War in Iraq is unlikely to disrupt the world oil supply or the global economy, which is well adapted to fluctuating oil prices. Iraq is a negligible contributor to world energy supplies, producing only 3 percent of global output. Should supply be disrupted, the increasing non-OPEC supply and the spare OPEC capacity can easily replace the missing Iraqi oil. It is unlikely that war in Iraq would influence oil output elsewhere in the Arabian Peninsula. The Strategic Petroleum Reserve can also be used to stabilize oil prices.

After the removal of Saddam Hussein, Iraq, which is second only to Saudi Arabia in oil reserves, has the potential to become a major oil producer, capable of producing 8 million barrels per day within a decade. The role of international oil companies in Iraq is highly disputed. Many Russian, French, and Chinese oil firms already hold contacts for oil development with the Iraqi government, which most other companies would like to see evaporate when the regime changes. Many members of the Iraqi oil industry will also protest international investment. The shape of the oil industry will have to be determined by Iraqis themselves, rather than shaped by outside influence.

Iraq has vast natural and human resource potential, but the strength of the Iraqi economy after Saddam will depend on the economic policies adopted by the new government. At the moment,

the Iraqi economy is severely underdeveloped, and many of Iraq's economic problems predate Saddam Hussein, although they were exacerbated by his rule. Nationalist policies have impeded oil development, for which Iraq blames the West. Post-Saddam, the United States and international organizations will be tempted to offer abundant economic advice to open markets and increase foreign investment and trade, but these decisions must ultimately be made by Iraq in order to be viewed as legitimate.

Iraq also has an unsustainable amount of debt (over \$100 billion) and war compensation payments, particularly to Kuwait and the Kuwaiti oil company. The United States should set an example by supporting dramatic debt reductions post-Saddam. The focus must remain on developing the Iraqi economy, not unintentionally making them dependent on foreign aid. If Iraq adopts wise economic policies and is unburdened of much of its debt, it can become a prosperous nation within a decade after Saddam is overthrown.

S. Rob Sobhani
Caspian Energy Consulting

The foundation of a post-Saddam economy has to be in the rule of law, without which there will be no capital investment. Iraqi debts incurred under Saddam Hussein's regime should be entirely forgiven when the regime changes in order to jumpstart the economy. Agriculture will become a central aspect of the economy, as it was before Saddam took power.

Iraq's known oil reserves are likely to double once they are explored, putting them on par with Saudi Arabia. It also has extensive natural gas reserves. Production sharing agreements, such as those used in post-Soviet Azerbaijan, could be a good model for the oil industry to rebuild upon. International oil companies can help revitalize the industry much faster than Iraq could accomplish this alone.

Sinan al Shabibi
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

Debt and reparations will remain a huge burden to the Iraqi economy even after sanctions are removed, and the deficit they cause will trigger rampant inflation. Debt and sanctions should be removed simultaneously. In addition to the political and human rights related reasons for regime change, there are extensive economic reasons, including the extraordinary waste of resource potential. There has never been an oil development program in Iraq, which will be an essential component of the post-Saddam economy. The first economic priority must be to restore stability, and then maintain it.

Inflation, the cause of many Iraqi social problems, must be stopped by raising the value of the dinar. This can be achieved by: releasing Iraqi assets and infusing the economy with resources; releasing the unspent balances in the escrow account of the Oil for Food" program; and helping Iraq re-attain maximum oil export capacity. These efforts can be bolstered if the international community indicates that it is willing to help address the Iraqi debt problem. Foreign direct investment will also be very important to economic revival, which means that establishing the rule of law is crucial. All sectors of the economy must be developed, including agriculture, not just oil alone.

Ibrahim Alolom
Independent analyst

Iraq has the potential to become one of the top three oil-exporting countries in both the long- and short-term. In the future, Iraqi oil can play a much bigger role in oil strategy and the balance of supply and demand. This is contingent, however, upon both political stability and increased access to oil technology. Maintaining a multilateral UN force in Iraq after regime change will help ensure continued social and political change and help attract international oil companies.

Oil reserves exceed current estimates, particularly in the south and the west. Iraq has the human resources to run the oil industry, but it needs better technology to repair equipment and develop new fields. This can only be done with the assistance of international oil companies, who will have to balance their own profits with Iraqi interest.

Points from the discussion:

- In recent years, Iraq has not been actively threatening its neighbors, but this does not mean that the rhetoric and the mindset have evaporated; they are merely checked by the large American military presence.
- It has been suggested that Russia's difficulty constructing viable post-Soviet tax policies, property rights, and contract rights has been due to the government's reliance on large tax revenues from the oil industry. Whether or not this will be true in Iraq remains to be determined, but in Iraq oil also has a cohesive societal effect. The major ethnic groups in Iraq may have difficulties coexisting, but they all want their share of the oil income. Establishing an efficient tax system is important to making the government accountable to the people.
- The means of production must be removed from the hands of the state in order to stimulate a liberal democracy. For the last seventy-five years, Iraqi nationalism has defined itself around the control of oil and resistance to foreign investment in the oil sector. Privatization will be very difficult for this reason, but can be achieved by allowing the Iraqi national oil company to become a partner in shared contracts and eventually selling its interests to the public.

Panel 4: Post-Saddam Foreign Policy & Regional Relations

Bernard Lewis
Princeton University

Iraq's post-Saddam foreign policy and international relations evoke two great fears. One is that the attempt to establish a democracy will fail; the other, greater fear is that it might succeed. The latter is of particular concern to other Middle Eastern countries.

Two opinions currently dominate the discussion of these fears. The first is that the Arabs are incapable of democratic government, which is purely a Western phenomenon and beyond the reach of a country like Iraq. Since these countries will always be ruled by tyrants, our foreign policy should aim to support friendly ones. The opposing opinion says that while it will be

difficult to establish democracy in these countries, it is possible with the right help and guidance. India is perhaps the best example of this, as is Turkey in the Middle Eastern and Islamic context.

The projected failure of democracy in Iraq is linked to the fear that the state will disintegrate along ethnic or religious lines when strong central rule is removed. This could destabilize the region, but democracy *succeeding* in Iraq is a far greater threat to stability. Dictatorships in the Middle East are a modern phenomenon, aided by the modernization of the surveillance apparatus and the weakening of intermediate powers, and will not be impossible to overcome. Concepts of modernization in the Middle East are closely linked to ideas of westernization, which is a source of much of the anti-Western sentiment. There are far older traditions in the Middle East, based on Islamic ideology, of government by law, consent, and contract. This means that there is hope for this region's future.

There is no reason to assume that Iraq's post-Saddam foreign policy will be pro-Western or more sympathetic to Israel; however these two trends seem likely if the government is truly democratic and answerable to an electorate. While dictatorships are dependent on a constant state of war, more democratic forms of government are inclined to seek peaceful solutions to problems, including the Palestinian issue. The larger regional context is also an important consideration, and will likely be dependent on external actors as well as internal factors.

Serif Egeli
Turkish-USA Business Council

Iraq has immense oil and agricultural wealth in addition to a well-educated population. The rise of the Ba'ath party was coupled with the decline of the Iraqi middle class, however, which had a devastating effect on business and development. Rebuilding the middle class is crucial to the establishment of democracy in Iraq, as is the separation of Islamic statute from the law and a government supported by the military. Iraq's well-educated and trained female population will also be an asset to creating a modern, liberal state. The Turkish Republic would welcome improved economic and political relations with a newly democratic Iraq. Iraq should also then be considered for membership in NATO.

Nawaf Obaid
Saudi oil and security analyst

Saudi opinions about Iraq are controlled by three power centers: the royal family, the religious establishment, and the council of tribal leaders. There are concerns about the potential breakup of Iraq post-Saddam, and also about the nature of the regime that will replace him. There is significant doubt in Saudi Arabia that a democratic regime could maintain power.

Olivier Roy
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Iraq's neighbors prefer a weak, united Iraq over a potentially unstable and volatile one. They are driven by security and defense concerns. There are three main issues to be addressed: The first is whether or not the Kurds will take advantage of the downfall of Saddam to vie for independence or real autonomy; the second is that if a strong central government is maintained,

there will be little real change in Iraq; finally, democracy in Iraq will likely not be a model for other Middle Eastern countries, where nationalism, and not Islamism, remains the primary driving factor. Each state will have to democratize, if it so chooses, along its own model.

Points from the discussion:

- The restoration of previous monarchies in the Middle East, while not viewed as progress by the West, can represent the best possibility for establishing a stable and decent regime. This also addresses the issues of a regime's legitimacy and succession. A former monarch could also, however, play a role in establishing a democracy. (This question was asked with Jordan's Prince Hassan in mind.)
- Nationalism has, to some degree, waned in the Middle East. This is due to its simultaneous failure and success. Nationalism succeeded in achieving independence, but failed to deliver freedom. This has discredited nationalism among many people and also given impetus to Islamism as an alternative view. The collapse of the Soviet Union has revived Islamism by giving pious Muslims what they perceive as a great victory over one of the world's two great evils. The line between Islamists and secular nationalists has been blurred, but pan-Islamism has no political appeal for most of the people of the Middle East.
- The tradition of strong central government in Iraq will likely hold the state together even after regime change.

AEI research assistant Molly McKew prepared this summary.

AEI Conference Summaries

Democracy for the Arab World

On October 21, 2002, Shafeeq Ghabra, professor of political science and the director of the Center for Strategic and Future Studies at Kuwait University, addressed the debate surrounding the prospects for democratization in the Arab world, including how regime change in Iraq could affect regional dynamics in the Middle East. Ghabra argued against the notion that democracy and Islam are fundamentally incompatible.

In order to address the prospect of democracy for the Middle East, it is necessary to look at six historic and modern aspects of the region: the regional potential, the lost potential, governance and accountability, the nature of opposition movements, the restrictive impact of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the idea of challenging the status quo.

Regional Potential: The Arab world (including Iran) holds 61 percent of the world's oil reserves and 21 percent of gas reserves. Historically important to all three major religions, the Middle East is ethnically diverse. By 2025 its population will grow to 500 million from the current figure of 270 million. The people are highly educated, and many have been educated in the United States. With such resources, this region could be a natural ally of globalization. There is a vast spectrum of behavior and lifestyles in the Arab world, which can alternately be repressive (especially for women) or somewhat liberal. There are democratic dynamics at work in Kuwait and Bahrain. Lebanon and Qatar are attempting reforms.

Lost Potential: The twenty-two Arab states lag behind the rest of the world in every category, including freedom, democracy, human development, research fields, and GDP per capita. The energies, education, and entrepreneurial spirit of the people are wasted. The United Nations Development Program's Arab Human Development Report (2002) was as shocking to many Arabs as it was to the West. Over 60 percent of the illiterate are women. This figured has increased in the last twenty years, which raises questions about the priorities of the states and their respect for human rights. However, with 70 percent of the population of the Arab world under the age of twenty-five, rapid change is possible if the young so desire. But at the moment, the institutions needed for reform simply do not exist.

Governance and Accountability: Without good governance, the Arab world will continue to retreat from reform. There are five areas where reform is needed. First, the government must restrain itself from interfering in the legal process. Second, the legislative process, based on elected officials, needs to be developed in order to separate the powers of the state and increase transparency. Freedom of the press is dependent on the legislative

branch, and a crucial element of a healthy opposition. Some aspects of reformed legislatures and freedom of the press exist in Kuwait and Lebanon, but not in most of the heavyweight Arab states.

Third, the bureaucracy must be restructured and decentralized so that it does not continue to drain economic resources and undermine the private sector. Fourth, new leaders have to be cultivated. The long periods of "reform" in the Middle East during which no change has actually occurred have weakened the states and led to a centralization of power and a fear of taking risks; this system does not provide for the development and emergence of new leadership. People must be allowed to fail and be protected by a system of laws in order for the new generation to learn how to lead effectively.

Finally, the role of the school and the role of the mosque in the Arab world must be redefined. The mosque has become the primary institution of education and religion, while the schools have been marginalized and do not teach critical thinking or good citizenship. Education reform has been neglected by the governments and the current curriculae are bereft of social sciences. The mosque has filled this vacuum, which has helped to promote the radicalization of Islam.

The Nature of the Opposition: For a long time opposition to the government was illegal; this meant that most true opposition groups operated in exile outside of the state. Because of their minimal interactions with the ruling regime, they tend not to be trained in compromise. This has resulted in the political polarization of the region where people are forced to embrace either one extreme or the other with very little room for alternate views in between (for example, there is either the regime or bin Ladenism, but nothing else). This has undermined legitimate opposition efforts and contributed to a lack of critical thinking on important issues.

The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Since Israel's victory in 1967, it has slowly turned from the secular Israel of Ben Gurion [Is it Ben-Gurion?] and embraced fundamentalism and religion in both the government and the schools. The same thing has happened in the Arab world. The defeat of Arab nationalism in 1967 was also the defeat of the Arab secular movement. Since 1967, Islam has been highly politicized, and the interpretation of the religion has become harsher. The Arab-Israel conflict has reinforced the problems of governance: The constant struggle with Israel has allowed the governments to maintain control, restrict progress, and radicalize the Arab world.

Challenging the Status Quo: The current political and cultural situation in the Arab world is not permanent; forty years ago Islam was more open and more tolerant. In recent decades, religious differences have become far more delineated in the Middle East. In the aftermath of September 11, the United States has challenged the Arab states to eliminate terrorist groups, support regime change in Iraq, stop Palestinian terror campaigns, and end extremism. In short, the Islamists have been challenged to reevaluate their opinions, just as public opinion is undergoing a shift. As Arabs begin to feel the need for readmittance into the world order again, the potential for change is created. The debate over Iraq has led to greater self-examination—even among Islamic movements—and

revealed the flaws in the system. If the radicals shift their thinking, it is possible that a dialogue could be created.

In the current era, no ideology can claim that it has won in the Middle East. The idea of a secular Arab state has failed; the idea of a pure Islamic state has failed. Because of these failures, an entire generation is close to being lost. Democracy could be a competitive ideology in the region as the value of tolerance begins to be understood. If democracy and tolerance do not take hold, the cycle will begin again, only the outcome will be more disastrous than before. If we do not address these issues today, then the accumulation of evil could be hard to undo.

Discussion

Many people have raised the question of why there is no democracy in the Arab world, but it is very difficult to answer completely. Arab tribal culture has a serious problem concerning relations with the state. In Egypt and Morocco, there is some tradition of statehood, but elsewhere there are politically complicated relationships between majority and minority, tribe and state, and the various factions. A strong leader was needed to create order and prevent the continual overthrow of the government. Populations become accustomed to this order and have allowed leaders like Saddam to stay in power. Too much order for too long can lead to stagnation.

There are also economic factors to consider: Arab states have not faced up to the challenges that free markets present, and many nations use oil money to mask the structural problems of the government. However, there are aspects of Arab culture that also reinforce democratic values. The outcome is largely dependent on the leader and the desire for reform. Current Arab leaders have managed to use the anger generated from the Arab-Israeli conflict to their advantage. Substantial self-examination is required to overcome the historical problems.

The United States has failed to commit to democracy in the region because it is worried about failed states and vacuums of power that could be filled by radicalism. For regime change in Iraq to succeed, there would have to be serious American engagement in the region afterward. Many Arab states realize that regime change in Iraq would bring a regime friendly not only to the United States but to Iraq [Do you mean the region/the Middle East], as well, and if the United States manages to maintain the legitimacy and stability of the state, the pragmatic school in Arab politics (which was dominant during the cold war) will gain more influence. If regime change in Iraq succeeds, large groups of Islamists will reconsider their views.

For example, the recent killing of an American soldier in Kuwait has brought about the first serious debates about the role of Islam in education in years. The government issued a statement saying that the incident is a reflection of the need to reexamine school curriculae, separate religion from culture in education, and reevaluate the role of both mosques and schools. The future of the Arab world will be closely linked to the ability to

channel excess energy from extremism into productive societal elements and the economy.

Nation-building in Iraq will depend on the Iraqis and how much they are able to work through their defeat and emerge from the other side with a new cultural identity. There will be wide support in the Persian Gulf for the reconstruction of Iraq, as it is in the Gulf states' interests to have a stable state as a neighbor. Arab states have also come to accept the idea of democracy in Iraq, even if they await it with a critical eye.

AEI research assistant Molly McKew prepared this summary.