

Withdrawn/Redacted Material

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DOCUMENT NO.	FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
018	Presentation	[Report]	18	N.D.	P5;
019	Report	[Report]	3	10/08/2002	P1/b1;
020	Letter	[Letter] - To: Condoleezza Rice - From: John J. Hamre	1	10/08/2002	P5;
021a	Memorandum	Information Memorandum - To: The Secretary - From: Richard N. Haass	15	09/26/2002	P1/b1; P5;
022	Fax Cover Sheet	[Cover Sheet] - To: Gennifer Koch - From: James J. Foster	1	10/04/2002	P1/b1;
022a	Memorandum	[Memorandum]	4	04/05/2002	P1/b1; P5;
023a	Memorandum	Memorandum - To: Maura Harty, et al. - From: Stephen E. Biegun	1	10/17/2002	P1/b1;

COLLECTION TITLE:

National Security Council - National Security Advisor, Office of the

SERIES:

Rice, Condoleezza

FOLDER TITLE:

Future of Iraq [4]

FRC ID:

34579

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

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023b	Agenda	Agenda	1	10/18/2002	P1/b1; P5;

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2014-0457-F

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POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION

*A joint project of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
and the Association of the United States Army (AUSA)*



The Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction

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*Former Administrator, USAID
President, Citizens International*

Peter Bell
President and CEO, CARE USA

Doug Bereuter
United States House of Representatives

Paul Brest
President, The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation

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Nancy Lindborg
Executive Vice President, Mercy Corps

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Charles Wilhelm (USMC, Ret.)
*Former CINC, SOUTHCOM
Member of the Board, MIC Industries*

Timothy E. Wirth
President, United Nations Foundation

Frank Wolf
United States House of Representatives

For more information on the project and the Commission please contact
Elizabeth Latham (elatham@csis.org or 202-775-3204) or
Betty Marshall (bmarshall@ausa.org or 703-907-2400)

POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION

*A joint project of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and
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Task Framework[®]

May 2002

Post-Conflict Reconstruction Task Framework

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PURPOSE

Countries emerge from conflict under differing and unique conditions. Therefore, the priority, precedence, timing, appropriateness, and execution of tasks will vary from case to case. The attached framework presents the range of tasks often encountered when rebuilding a country in the wake of violent conflict. It is designed to help indigenous and international practitioners conceptualize, organize, and prioritize policy responses. By laying out the universe of options, the framework is intended to help identify shortfalls and gaps in reconstruction process and capabilities. It is also geared to assist planning and coordination efforts. The framework is not a political-military plan; nor is it a checklist of mandatory activities for all cases or strategy for success. Rather, it provides a starting point for considering *what* needs to be done in most cases. It does not suggest *how* it should be done, or *who* should do it.

The specific answers to what, how, and who will be different in every case. In some cases they will be largely determined by a peace agreement, while in others they will be worked out by multiple actors on the ground. In some cases there will be significant human, financial and institutional capacity in the society in question to draw upon, while in others there may be minimal capacity. In some cases there will be great international interest, while in others little or none. Because of differing histories, baselines and interested parties, each case must be addressed on its own merits. In all cases, however, it is important to create a strategic planning process that establishes priorities and an appropriate division of labor among the many local and international actors involved. In general, indigenous actors should have the primary responsibility and should play central roles throughout the reconstruction process, since it is indeed their own future that hangs in the balance. To the extent that international actors are required to fill key gaps during certain stages of the process, building capacity among indigenous actors and institutions then facilitating hand-offs to them are crucial to long-term success.

USING THE FRAMEWORK

While it is generally understood that reconstruction often takes place at various times during and after conflict), the framework places tasks between the cessation of *violent conflict* and the return to *normalization*. For the purposes of this framework, normalization is reached when: 1) extraordinary outside intervention is no longer needed; 2) the processes of governance and economic activity largely function on a self-determined and self-sustaining basis; and 3) internal and external relations are conducted according to generally accepted norms of behavior.

The framework is organized into three conceptual phases, defined as *initial response, transformation, and fostering sustainability*. While primary responsibility for reconstruction must lie with indigenous actors, international intervention is often critical during the early stages of post-conflict transition. Not surprisingly, initial response is often characterized by military intervention for basic security, stability, and emergency services. The second phase, transformation, focuses on developing legitimate and sustainable indigenous capacity, often with special attention to restarting the economy, establishing mechanisms for governance and participation, and securing a foundation of justice and reconciliation. The final phase, fostering sustainability, consolidates long-term recovery efforts, often leading to the withdrawal of all or most of the international military involvement. It is this phase that also lays the foundation for the prevention of conflict and the reemergence of violence. These phases occur over a time span that varies according to local conditions and by each individual task. As such, this framework should be read horizontally as transitions are task specific. Comparing different tasks vertically is misleading because not all of the tasks that appear in a given phase will occur at the same time. The framework also assumes that some phases, such as the initial response, which entails humanitarian aid, may well overlap into the period of transformation. Likewise, fostering sustainability, the path toward normalization, may also emerge during the transformation time frame.

THE FOUR PILLARS OF RECONSTRUCTION

The framework tasks are organized around four distinct issue areas, or “pillars”: **security; justice/reconciliation; social/economic well-being; and governance/participation.**

- **Security** addresses all aspects of public safety, in particular establishment of a safe and secure environment and development of legitimate and stable security institutions. Security encompasses the provision of collective and individual security, and is the precondition for achieving successful outcomes in the other pillars. In the most pressing sense, it concerns securing the lives of civilians from immediate and large-scale violence and the restoration of territorial integrity.
- **Justice and Reconciliation** addresses the need for an impartial and accountable legal system and for dealing with past abuses; in particular, creation of effective law enforcement, an open judicial system, fair laws, humane corrections systems, and formal and informal mechanisms for resolving grievances arising from conflict. These tasks encompass the provision of mechanisms to redress grievances, exact appropriate penalties for previous acts, and build capacity to promulgate and enforce the rule of law. Incorporating the concept of restorative justice, they include extraordinary and traditional efforts to reconcile ex-combatants, victims, and perpetrators.
- **Social and Economic Well-Being** addresses fundamental social and economic needs; in particular provision of emergency relief, restoration of essential services to the population, laying the foundation for a viable economy, and initiation of an inclusive, sustainable development program. Often accompanying the establishment of security, well-being entails protecting the population from starvation, disease, and the elements. As the situation stabilizes, attention shifts from humanitarian relief to long-term social and economic development.
- **Governance and Participation** addresses the need for legitimate, effective political and administrative institutions and participatory processes; in particular, establishing a representative constitutional structure, strengthening public sector management and administration, and ensuring active and open participation of civil society in the formulation of government and its policies. Governance involves setting rules and procedures for political decision-making, and delivering public services in an efficient and transparent manner. Participation encompasses the process for giving voice to the population through the development of civil society that includes the generation and exchange of ideas through advocacy groups, civic associations, and the media.

CROSS-CUTTING TASKS

There are several crosscutting tasks inherent in post-conflict reconstruction that do not appear in the framework. Policy-makers need to gather and analyze information to make **assessments** about the requirements of reconstruction. **Planning and coordination** must establish objectives, develop strategy, determine appropriate divisions of labor, mobilize the necessary resources and manage competing demands of multiple actors working together. **Training** is essential both for the development and maintenance of sustainable efforts. Finally, appropriate **funding** mechanisms and levels are integral to short-term and long-term reconstruction.

The project has developed a practitioners’ database of lessons learned to accompany this framework. The database draws from the vast experience and literature in post-conflict operations.

POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION FRAMEWORK

SECURITY

→ → → → → →

	INITIAL RESPONSE	TRANSFORMATION	FOSTERING SUSTAINABILITY
	Goal: Establish a safe and secure environment	Goal: Develop legitimate and stable security institutions	Goal: Consolidate indigenous capacity
Control of Belligerents			
<i>Ceasefire</i>	Enforce ceasefire; Supervise disengagement and withdrawal of belligerent forces (including foreign); Identify and neutralize potential spoilers; Establish and maintain secure conditions for relief workers; Negotiate terms for exchange of prisoners of war (POWs)	Supervise truces and ceasefires; Separate civilian population from soldiers and militias; Establish and control buffers, including demilitarized zones; Monitor exchange of POWs	Transfer monitor requirements to indigenous security institutions
<i>Enforcement of Peace Agreement</i>	Provide security for peace monitors and observers; Provide security for negotiations among belligerents; Develop confidence-building measures with and amongst belligerents; Employ information operations and other needed operational measures; Conduct counterinsurgency operations	Investigate complaints and alleged breaches of agreements; Provide military support to civil authorities; Support and enforce political, military, and economic terms of peace plan; Support confidence-building measures amongst belligerents; Support and enforce territorial adjustments directed in peace plan	Transfer enforcement requirements to indigenous authorities; Support and sustain confidence-building measures
<i>Disarmament</i>	Establish and enforce weapons control regimes, including collection and destruction; Identify international arms merchants and their activities; Identify indigenous arms control capacity; Provide reassurances and incentives for disarmed faction	Disarm belligerents; Reduce availability of unauthorized weapons; Collaborate with neighboring countries on weapons flows, including apprehension of illegal arms dealers; Cooperate with legal authorities to prosecute arms dealers	Secure, store, and dispose of weapons; Develop indigenous arms control capacity
<i>Demobilization</i>	Establish demobilization camps; Ensure adequate health, food provisions, and security for belligerents	Identify, gather and disband structural elements of belligerent groups; Monitor and verify demobilization; Ensure safety of quartered personnel and families	Decommission camps

VIOLENT CONFLICT

NORMALIZATION

<i>Reintegration</i>	Design reintegration strategy, including assessment of absorptive capacity of economic and social sectors	Provide job training, health screening, education, and employment assistance for demobilized forces; Provide stipends and material support for demobilized forces	Reintegrate ex-combatants into society; Provide follow-up services for reintegration
Territorial Security			
<i>Border and Boundary Control</i>	Establish border/boundary monitoring mechanism; Prevent arms smuggling; Interdict contraband (i.e. drugs and natural resources); Prevent trafficking of persons; Regulate immigration and emigration	Develop indigenous capacity to control border/boundary; Develop capacity to interdict contraband and arms smuggling; Develop capacity to manage immigration and emigration	Begin transfer of border/boundary control functions to indigenous actors
<i>Movement</i>	Establish and disseminate rules relevant to movement; Ensure freedom of movement for security forces and humanitarian assistance; Establish freedom of movement for civilian population and international observers/monitors; Dismantle roadblocks and establish checkpoints; Regulate air and overland movement	Disseminate and enforce rules pertaining to movement	Provide full freedom of movement; Transfer responsibility to indigenous actors
<i>Points of Entry</i>	Establish control over major points of entry (e.g. airports, airspace, overland and maritime navigation)	Protect air and shipping operations; Regulate movement of commercial air and naval operations; Enforce controls with the assistance of indigenous authorities	Ensure air and naval freedom of movement; Establish indigenous port and airport authority
Protection of the Populace			
<i>Non-Combatants</i>	Protect vulnerable elements of population (refugees, IDP, women, children); Ensure humanitarian aid and security force access to endangered populations and refugee camps; Designate protection zones	Establish and maintain order in refugee camps and population centers; Disarm and remove belligerents from camps and population centers; Provide interim security programs for at-risk populations	

<i>Public Order</i>	Provide public order including international police or constabulary operations	Enforce public order; Maintain positive relations between international military and police forces and indigenous population; Prevent reprisals; Design and implement civic education programs for law and order and public security	Transfer public security responsibilities to indigenous police force
<i>Clearance of Unexploded Ordnance (UXO)</i>	Conduct emergency de-mining and UXO removal; Conduct mapping and survey exercises of mined areas; Mark mine fields; Identify and coordinate emergency requirements; Establish priorities and conduct de-mining operations	Initiate large-scale de-mining and UXO removal operations; Promote mine awareness; Train and equip indigenous de-mining elements	Transfer de-mining and UXO removal operations to indigenous actors
Protection of Key Individuals, Infrastructure, and Institutions			
<i>Private Institutions and Individuals</i>	Protect political and religious leaders, judges; Protect and secure places of religious worship and cultural sites; Protect private property and factories	Create indigenous capacity to protect private institutions and individuals	
<i>Critical Infrastructure</i>	Protect and secure critical infrastructure (e.g. airports, roads, bridges, hospitals, telecommunications, banks, electricity plants, dams, water reservoirs, pipelines)	Create indigenous capacity to protect critical infrastructure	
<i>Military Infrastructure</i>	Identify, secure and protect stockpiles of nuclear and chemical materials; Secure military equipment and means of communication	Create indigenous capacity to protect military infrastructure	Identify modernization needs and means to achieve them
<i>Public Institutions</i>	Protect and secure strategically important institutions (e.g. government buildings, courthouses, etc.)	Create indigenous capacity to protect public institutions	

Reconstitution of Indigenous Security Institutions			
<i>National Armed Forces</i>	Identify roles, missions, and structure of indigenous national security institutions; Vet individuals for past abuses	Assist in and monitor the rebuilding and reorganization of official national security institutions; Promote civilian control of military; Professionalize and enhance the capabilities of indigenous military forces; Support use of force policies based on rule of law; Establish transparent entry, promotion, and retirement systems	Provide conventional military assistance programs; Establish military to military programs with the host country's forces
<i>Non-Military Security Forces</i>	Plan for the reorganization and transformation of police force and/or paramilitary; Develop recruitment practices that promote more representative security forces; Vet individuals for past abuses; Develop training programs for police forces	Professionalize and provide assistance to indigenous non-military security forces; Establish transparent entry, promotion, and retirement systems; Create a non-military intelligence capacity	Establish community requirements for indigenous public safety
Regional Security			
<i>Regional Security Arrangements</i>	Negotiate or modify regional security arrangements with all interested parties	Establish mechanisms for implementing regional security arrangements	Monitor compliance with and reinforce arrangements

POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION FRAMEWORK

JUSTICE & RECONCILIATION

→ → → → → →

	INITIAL RESPONSE	TRANSFORMATION	FOSTERING SUSTAINABILITY
	Goal: Develop mechanisms for addressing past and ongoing grievances	Goal: Build legal system and process for reconciliation	Goal: Functioning legal system based on international norms
<i>Justice</i>			
Transitional Justice	Deploy transitional justice package, including: international police, police monitors, judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, corrections capacity, court administrators, codes and procedures	Dispense justice in central or sensitive jurisdictions	Transfer responsibilities to permanent justice institutions
Law Enforcement			
<i>International Police</i>	Establish international civilian police authority; Disseminate rules, purpose, and objectives of the international force	Conduct co-patrols with indigenous police; Provide police monitors	Phase-out international police and reduce monitoring presence; Retain minimal international oversight of policing
<i>Indigenous Police</i>	Vet and reconfigure existing police forces; Recruit law enforcement and administrative personnel; Establish police academies; Train, educate, and equip/resource existing indigenous police in international policing standards; deploy police monitors	Develop investigative capability and institutionalize procedures for national police; Secure funding to maintain police academies and administrative support to law enforcement; Establish transparent entry, promotion, and retirement systems for national police	Provide ongoing technical support and training; Encourage relationships with relevant national and international law enforcement associations
<i>Accountability/Oversight</i>		Establish office of Inspector General to investigate police corruption and abuse; Establish ombudsman's office to address citizens' complaints and criticisms of law enforcement	Institutionalize offices of Inspector General and ombudsman by securing line-item budgetary funding
Judicial System			
<i>Reorganization</i>	Review existing court system	Pass laws and statutes to foster judicial independence; Review role of prosecutor and promote role of defense lawyer	Institutionalize new structures and responsibilities

VIOLENT CONFLICT

NORMALIZATION

<i>Training/Recruitment</i>	Inventory indigenous legal professionals; Select individuals for judicial positions; Establish professional code of conduct for judicial system	Vet and train judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and court personnel; Ensure diversity of selection of court personnel; Establish law schools and recruit professors to educate next generation of legal professionals	Provide additional training for judicial specializations; Develop pay structure for legal professionals to counteract "brain drain"
<i>Infrastructure</i>	Inventory courts, law schools, legal libraries, and bar associations	Rehabilitate or construct necessary facilities	
<i>Citizen Access</i>	Establish liaison mechanism between civilians and transitional authorities (or international forces) on legal matters	Educate indigenous population on accessing the judicial system	Extend legal representation to underprivileged community through a public defender system and legal services organizations; Institute formal alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, e.g. arbitration and mediation
Laws			
<i>Code and Statutory Reform</i>	Review existing laws	Promulgate revised legal code and statutes (civil and criminal) consistent with protection of basic human rights	Implement legal code through legislation
<i>Participation</i>	Create and strengthen legal aid and NGO groups; Channel citizen input into law-drafting process	Initiate public dialogue with all sectors of civil society on legal reform	Provide oversight and monitoring of code implementation
Human Rights			
<i>Capacity Building</i>	Assess capacity of indigenous human rights groups	Establish government mechanisms to protect human rights; Support citizen advocacy organizations	Create mechanisms for organizing human rights NGOs; Design processes for government/NGO interaction on human rights
<i>Monitoring</i>	Establish international monitoring presence; Develop indigenous human rights monitoring capacity	Conduct joint human rights monitoring missions with indigenous monitors	Create sustainable indigenous human rights monitoring mechanism
<i>Security Force Reform</i>	Vet security forces for human rights abuses	Purge violators and train reconstituted forces in humanitarian law and practices; Revise military code and doctrine to comply with laws of war and domestic criminal law	Institutionalize human rights education into training programs; Ensure legal system prosecutes violators

Corrections			
<i>Incarceration and Parole</i>	Determine status of prisoners held (political prisoners and war prisoners)	Evaluate release on case-by-case basis; Reconfigure probations and parole system	Transfer penal authority to indigenous authorities; Monitor compliance with internationally accepted corrections standards
<i>Infrastructure</i>	Refurbish prison facilities at key sites; Provide emergency lock-up facilities	Rebuild correctional institutions, including administrative and rehabilitative capacities	Ensure continued funding of correctional facilities
<i>Training</i>		Vet existing and recruit new corrections officers; Train officers according to internationally accepted standards	Establish indigenous sustainable corrections training programs
International Courts and Tribunals			
<i>Establishment of Courts and Tribunals</i>	Establish jurisdiction and mandate of international courts and tribunals; Ensure compatibility of international court with national and international legal mechanisms	Recruit court staff; Identify secure facilities; Provide logistical and technical support to international courts and tribunals; Develop intelligence-sharing agreements; Second expert personnel (prosecutors, forensics)	Bring cases to trial
<i>Investigation and Arrest</i>	Document and preserve evidence of mass atrocities; Coordinate efforts with UN and NGO investigations	Assist in investigation, arrest, and transfer of suspected war criminals to international courts	Assist indigenous forces efforts to arrest and transfer human rights violators and war criminals
<i>Citizen Outreach</i>	Publicize progress and work; Publish indictments and statements	Broadcast court proceedings; Support media access	Translate and disseminate court records and decisions
Reconciliation			
Truth Commissions			
<i>Organization</i>	Solicit voluntary contributions from international donors; Hire indigenous and international staff to set up commission; Create indigenous dialogue on structure and mandate of commission; Involve diverse groups in establishment of court, including teachers, unions, ex-combatants, women's groups, and police	Determine mandate, mission, size, duration, and enforcement powers; Train international and indigenous staff; Provide infrastructure and technical assistance; Ensure indigenous involvement and ownership in the process; Ensure compatibility and coordination of commission with national and international mechanisms	Support commission's work and final recommendations; Deploy investigators; Hold hearings; Collect testimony; Prepare report and recommendations, Provide restitution, reparations, and compensation

<i>Citizen Education</i>	Identify misperceptions stemming from miscommunication; Establish broad public information programs to promote efforts for reconciliation	Dispel myths through educational curricula; Support programs that publicize and raise awareness of truth and reconciliation activities	Evaluate reconciliation mechanisms; Widely disseminate proceedings and documents produced by commission
<i>Reparations</i>	Determine appropriate means and levels of reparations	Identify classes of eligibility	Implement reparation measures
Community Rebuilding			
<i>Confidence Building</i>	Provide neutral meeting places for discussions and activities; Identify and use third-party advisors and mediators to build trust and cooperation; Enhance participation through public outreach	Provide reconciliation training and resources; Bring adversaries together where possible; Incorporate a wide range of stakeholders; Establish mutually beneficial resource-sharing arrangements; Organize recreational and educational activities	Foster informal, indigenous mechanisms for dispute resolution; Provide resources for community projects; Publicize successful confidence building programs
<i>Religion and Traditional Practices</i>	Identify religious institutions and leaders on local and national levels; Provide interim meeting locations for religious groups to congregate; Design community programs to support reconciliation based on religious and traditional practices	Ensure participation of diverse religious elements; Rebuild places of worship and sacred sites; Implement traditional reconciliation mechanisms, such as purification rituals and reburial ceremonies	Create and implement faith-based initiatives to rebuild communities
<i>Women</i>	Assess traditional role of women in society and their potential to contribute to reconciliation process	Support initiatives devised by women's groups	Ensure women's rights and influence
Individual Healing and Empowerment			
<i>Closure</i>	Provide localized counseling to victims and perpetrators of the conflict; Establish missing persons initiatives; Solicit funds and technical experts for identifying bodies and running missing persons programs	Implement counseling programs focusing on victim's redress and post-violence trauma; Create citizen's councils to establish memorials, scholarship funds, performances, and other commemoration activities	Routinize memory through public activity and historical records (e.g. museums, archives, and oral histories)
<i>Individual Empowerment</i>	Identify individual needs	Develop activities promoting sense of self-worth through employment, education, and recreational opportunities; Provide counseling and training to enhance contributions to society	Ensure sufficient employment opportunities and avenues to participate in civil society

POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION FRAMEWORK

SOCIAL & ECONOMIC WELL-BEING

	→	→	→	→	→	→
	INITIAL RESPONSE		TRANSFORMATION		FOSTERING SUSTAINABILITY	
	Goal: Provide for emergency humanitarian needs		Goal: Establish foundation for development		Goal: Institutionalize long-term development program	
Social Well-Being						
Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDP)						
<i>Prevention of Displacement</i>	Provide emergency food, water, shelter, and medicine <i>in situ</i> ; Prevent flow of refugees		Ensure reliable and adequate supply of assistance to population centers;		Develop and provide economic opportunities and services to support permanent populations	
<i>Management of Refugees</i>	Negotiate agreements to establish IDP camps; Build camps to provide adequate services; Establish registration and identification system; Establish public information campaign to manage refugee flows		Obtain services from and provide support to host countries; Provide assistance to refugee camps and surrounding communities; Provide reintegration services and develop repatriation plans; Continue information campaign		Close camps; Repatriate refugees; Monitor conditions for refugees after their return	
<i>Management of IDP</i>	Negotiate agreements to establish IDP camps; Provide services to IDP and surrounding communities; Establish public information campaign to manage IDP; Establish registration and identification system		Continue provision of assistance to IDP and surrounding communities; Develop relocation plans		Relocate IDP to permanent locations; Monitor conditions for IDP after their return	
Food Security						
<i>Emergency Distribution</i>	Secure emergency food aid distribution channels; Deliver emergency food to most vulnerable populations; Protect food distribution network; Supply adequate storage facilities to prevent food contamination		Collaborate with international and local relief actors to implement distribution programs; Prevent and punish theft and misappropriation of food resources; Re-assess distribution programs		Phase out emergency relief distributions; Transition to traditional food aid programs	
<i>Market Mechanisms</i>	Identify existing markets		Channel food aid to promote indigenous market activities; Establish transportation and distribution networks			

VIOLENT CONFLICT

NORMALIZATION

<i>Agricultural Development</i>	Re-establish domestic food production; Supply tools and seeds to farmers in affected regions; Reopen markets and sell food to prevent food shortages and accompanying price explosions	Rehabilitate agricultural system; Restore rural irrigation systems; Designate authority to provide low-interest loans to farmers; Develop land reform plan	Implement land reform measures; Promote diversification of agriculture
Public Health			
<i>Water and Waste Management</i>	Ensure proper sanitization, purification and distribution of drinking water; Provide interim sanitation and waste disposal services	Evaluate water sources to protect against contamination; Support indigenous waste management capacity; Develop geographic plan of action for waste management	Build indigenous capacity to deliver clean drinking water; Expand regular waste management activities to rural areas
<i>Medical Capacity</i>	Stockpile and distribute emergency medical supplies and drugs; Set up or re-open accessible clinics to deal with emergency health problems (disease, infection, wounds); Recruit doctors, nurses, and staff	Ensure sufficient stockpile of medical supplies and drugs; Review status of medical resources; Establish ambulance service; Provide sufficient external medical support while integrating indigenous expertise; Train health care providers	Modernize medical equipment and solidify public health sector; Expand hospitals to provide specialized care for greater numbers; Build capacity for local administration of clinics; Transfer administration of clinics to indigenous actors
<i>Prevention of Epidemics</i>	Prevent epidemics through immediate vaccinations	Establish vaccination and screening programs to deal with potential epidemics (especially in refugee camps) through local clinics	Institutionalize country-wide vaccination programs to prevent infectious diseases
<i>Health Education</i>	Educate population about crisis-induced health risks	Develop community-based programs geared to identify, prevent, and reduce health risks	Implement long-term health care education programs, including family planning and HIV/AIDS education
Shelter			
<i>Construction</i>	Provide emergency shelter for immediate needs; Develop housing development strategy to address refugees/IDP as well as reintegration of ex-combatants	Repair existing housing stock; Establish standards for housing construction and development; Clear devastated housing and assess damage	Construct affordable housing
<i>Adjudication of Property Disputes</i>	Develop roster of contested property; Establish criteria and mechanisms for property dispute resolution	Conduct investigations and hearings	Administer remuneration and compensation system
Educational System			
<i>Human Resources</i>	Identify and recruit teachers and administrators; Register school-aged population; Create equal opportunity education policy	Train teachers and administrators	Strengthen continued education for teachers and administrators

<i>Infrastructure</i>	Evaluate need for new schools; Build and repair schools and universities; Obtain educational materials	Open schools and universities	Maintain and enlarge new or restored schools and universities
<i>Curriculum</i>	Develop curriculum that respects diversity	Distribute curriculum and supporting teaching materials	
<i>Literacy Campaign</i>	Survey literacy levels and linguistic groups; Develop literacy campaign	Conduct literacy campaign	Institutionalize opportunities for adult education to sustain efforts of literacy campaign
Social Safety Net			
<i>Pension System</i>	Evaluate existing pension systems for government and parastatal employees	Design or reconfigure pension system based on agreed criteria and ability of new government to support	Secure funding stream and institutionalize pension system
<i>Social Security</i>	Evaluate existing social security system	Design or reconfigure social security system based on agreed criteria and ability of new government to support	Secure funding stream and institutionalize system
Economic Well-Being			
Economic Strategy and Assistance			
<i>Strategy</i>	Survey macroeconomic situation	Develop plan to facilitate economic revival	Institutionalize strategic planning capability
<i>International Financial Assistance</i>	Define indigenous representation at donor conferences; Develop mechanism for donor and in-country coordination; Recruit donors	Hold donor conferences to mobilize resources; Negotiate agreement between indigenous authorities and donors concerning terms of aid conditionality	Reschedule or forgive debts; Secure grants and loans; Monitor status of contributions and implementation
<i>Absorption</i>	Identify capacity of key institutions and individuals	Enhance government ability to absorb and administer donor funds; Enhance NGO ability to absorb and administer funds	Develop funding capacity for long-term institution-building
Physical Infrastructure			
<i>Power</i>	Restore power (electricity and fuels) to critical institutions	Expand power to private and public consumers in densely populated areas; Design and implement system for administering energy resources	Integrate power demands and generation capabilities with overall economic strategy
<i>Transportation</i>	Ensure access to airports, roads, rail-lines and ports for humanitarian and crucial economic functions; Regularize urban transportation	Reconstruct major arteries and bridges; Upgrade capacity for more intensive commercial usage	Develop and diversify transportation networks

<i>Telecommunication & IT</i>	Restore critical telecommunications & IT capacities	Design and implement telecommunication & IT networks, beginning with major population centers	Expand telecommunications & IT capability to rural regions
Employment Generation			
<i>Public Works</i>	Design initiatives to provide immediate employment, soliciting projects ideas from local communities	Implement public works projects	Rationalize public works projects with long-term development program
<i>Micro-Enterprise</i>	Create micro-enterprise mechanisms; Solicit proposals at local level	Identify funding sources and implement priority projects	
Markets			
<i>Market Reconstitution</i>	Create basis for legal markets	Supplant black market activities with legal alternatives; Facilitate transformation of informal markets	Expand reach of national markets
Legal and Regulatory Reform			
<i>Property Rights</i>	Draft laws and codes to establish or strengthen property rights	Adopt laws and codes	Ensure equitable implementation of laws and codes
<i>Business</i>	Design laws and regulations to provide incentives for economic growth and development	Implement laws and regulations, including provisions to protect intellectual property rights	Promote business growth through regulatory streamlining and tax incentives
<i>Labor</i>	Design laws and regulations to protect labor rights, including workplace safety, minimum wage, child labor and union rights provisions	Implement and enforce labor laws and regulations	Promote management-labor dispute mechanisms
International Trade			
<i>Enabling Environment</i>	Evaluate tariffs, tax structures and barriers to trade	Reduce tariffs, taxes, and barriers to trade	Foster economic integration through local, regional, and global organizations
<i>Trade Facilitation</i>	Set trade priorities and explore new trade opportunities; Initiate dialogue between country economic team and international actors responsible for granting preferential trading status	Provide technical assistance to firms and trade groups to develop non-traditional export capacities; Take steps to qualify for preferential market access under GSP and regional trade arrangements	Increase export diversification to enhance economic stability; Seek accession into regional or global trade organizations

Investment			
<i>Private</i>	Establish business environment conducive to economic growth	Assist businesses with start-up grants and loans; Encourage investment by international actors, including diaspora communities; Provide all investors with legal protections and incentives	Offer risk protection to facilitate sustained investment
<i>Public</i>	Consider top public investment needs	Invest in critical projects neglected by the private sector (i.e. large-scale investment in education, health care, mining, oil, and public transportation)	Continue to use government resources to promote public needs; Consider private-public investment partnerships
<i>Subsidies</i>	Evaluate subsidized sectors, industries, and firms	Rationalize subsidies with regard to cost to government and impact on employment levels	
<i>Natural Resources and Environment</i>	Secure and account for valuable natural resources; Safeguard/eliminate most dangerous health hazards; Draft and adopt specific environmental standards for industry and agriculture	Promote development of natural resources to attract potential investors; Establish environmental protection and regulatory mechanisms	Rationalize national resource policies with long-term economic development strategies; Enforce environmental protection provisions; Contain or reverse environmental damage
Banking and Finance			
<i>Central Banking Authority</i>	Gain agreement on recognized interim currencies; Create central banking authority	Introduce national currency and develop monetary policy	
<i>Banking Regulations and Oversight</i>	Develop regulatory system to govern financial transactions by banks as well as private and public entities	Recruit and train regulators; Emphasize transparency in banking system to prevent corruption and enhance economic stability	Enforce banking regulations; Monitor banking transactions; Enforce violations of banking regulations
<i>Capital Markets</i>			Create conditions conducive to formation of capital markets

POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION FRAMEWORK

GOVERNANCE & PARTICIPATION

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	INITIAL RESPONSE	TRANSFORMATION	FOSTERING SUSTAINABILITY
	Goal: Determine governance structure and establish foundation for citizen participation	Goal: Promote legitimate political institutions and participatory processes	Goal: Consolidate political institutions and participatory processes
Governance			
National Constituting Processes			
<i>National Dialogue</i>	Establish process at national, regional, and/or local levels to represent views of citizenry	Commence dialogue at national level to define national identity (citizenship criteria, languages, etc)	Implement conclusions of national dialogue and support constitutional process
<i>Constitution</i>	Establish constitutional commission and determine method of adoption; Provide legal advisors	Draft or reform constitution; Ensure fair, inclusive process for drafting or reform of constitution; Launch public information campaign to promulgate new/revised constitution	Adopt constitution; create outlet for popular discussion of new constitution
Transitional Governance			
<i>International Transitional Administration</i>	Consult with indigenous and international actors to establish interim government; Restore transitional political authority	Design structure of future governance system Establish interim civil administration; Include indigenous actors in decision-making process	Phase out and transfer authority through elections or other means
<i>National Transitional Administration</i>	Establish rules and timetable for interim national government	Determine power-sharing arrangements and recruit individuals to serve on and advise the national transitional government; Determine process of choosing permanent national government	Phase out transitional government in favor of permanent national government through previously decided means
Executive Authority			
<i>Public Sector</i>	Identify unmet institutional needs for structuring major government functions	Establish ministries and independent agencies, including specifying organization and lines of authority	Provide ongoing technical support for institutional development of the public sector
<i>Civil Service</i>	Determine structure and affordable size of civil service to meet ongoing and future needs	Select and train indigenous civil servants; Establish transparent entry, promotion, and retirement systems	Implement civil service reforms; Appoint and empower civil servants at national and regional levels

VIOLENT CONFLICT

NORMALIZATION

<i>Revenue Generation</i>	Identify sources and design a workable, efficient system that is able to generate revenue for government services	Implement plans for revenue generation, banking, customs, taxation, and financial services; Create capacities to manage budget and personnel issues	
<i>Recruitment and Training</i>	Identify key individuals in executive authority to receive training; Educate executive leaders and staff about principles of responsible governance; Encourage diaspora with leadership skills to return to country	Provide management and technical assistance training to selected civil servants; Develop ethical standards and code of conduct	
<i>Infrastructure</i>		Improve physical infrastructure of executive branch (i.e. buildings, libraries, information systems, and office equipment)	Establish line-items in budget to sustain physical infrastructure of executive branch
Legislative Strengthening			
<i>Mandate</i>	Establish role and mandate of legislative branch in national and indigenous decision-making processes	Develop guidelines concerning passage of laws and regulations through legislature; Increase legislative influence on national policy and budgets	Determine mechanisms to resolve disputes between various branches of government; Ensure enforcement of laws passed by legislature
<i>Citizen Access</i>	Identify obstacles and potential means to facilitate citizen access	Facilitate avenues for advocacy and interest group activities; Enable communication between legislators and their constituents	Guarantee public's right to attend meetings, hearings, and examine records; Establish means to provide indigenous constituent services
<i>Technical Assistance</i>	Identify infrastructure and training needs	Provide legislators and staff with training and support; Develop ethical standards and code of conduct; Improve physical infrastructure (i.e. buildings, libraries, information systems, and office equipment)	Conduct parliamentary exchanges to strengthen democratic principles and encourage legislative independence
Local Governance			
<i>Legal Basis</i>	Establish legal foundation for indigenous governing structures; Determine method of indigenous representation and participation	Implement new structures for indigenous control that ensures compatibility with national laws and community traditions	Allow for indigenous decision-making and budgetary control
<i>Decentralization</i>	Conduct review of political organizational structure; Determine scale and form of decentralization	Conduct decentralization in administrative, financial, and political areas; Ensure civilian authority	Establish liaison process between national and local governing institutions
<i>Institution-Building</i>	Identify indigenous capacity and needs for institutional development	Provide technical and financial assistance to indigenous governmental structures	Monitor indigenous governance performance

<i>Traditional Representation</i>	Identify traditional community structures	Utilize traditional structures to help govern and ensure participation	Reconcile traditional structures with formal government structures
Transparency and Anti-Corruption			
<i>Anti-Corruption</i>	Develop laws promoting anti-corruption, accountability and transparency within government and private sector; Create mechanisms to curtail corruption, including special prosecutors, witness and judge protection; Design and implement anti-corruption campaign, including education	Enforce anti-corruption laws, including removal of corrupt officials; Dismantle organized crime networks; Empower legal and civil society mechanisms to monitor governmental behavior; Foster transparent governing practices in public and private sectors	Prosecute violators and enforce standards; Seek international cooperation to combat corruption
<i>Watchdogs</i>	Encourage formation of watchdog organizations in public and private sectors to monitor international and national institutions	Establish legislative protections for indigenous watchdog groups; Ensure adequate resources and standing for oversight mechanisms	Promote indigenous transparency monitoring presence in public and private sectors
Participation			
Elections			
<i>Planning and Execution</i>	Set timetable and goals for elections; Determine mode of representation; Conduct census; Establish independent national electoral commission; Establish and verify voter registry	Develop appropriate procedures and rules for election, including security of candidates and ballot box; Promulgate rules of election; Ensure secure and fair election campaign	Provide logistical support for elections (ballot boxes, voting stations, etc.); Assist in planning and execution of election; Promote sustainable election methods and mechanisms
<i>Monitoring</i>	Secure agreements for international and domestic monitoring presence	Recruit and organize indigenous and international election monitoring teams	Deploy monitoring team
<i>Citizen Outreach</i>	Advertise election timetable and encourage citizen participation	Disseminate information about electoral process; Undertake voter education campaign	Make election results widely available to avoid fraud and misperception
Political Parties			
<i>Formation</i>	Define political party system; Ensure clear legal status, protections, and regulations of political parties	Encourage creation of multiple competitive parties in multi-tiered system through transparent and legal funding mechanisms; Register political parties in accordance with election laws	Support political activities by backing democracy promotion objectives; Link parties to legitimate international counterparts

<i>Training</i>	Identify potential political party leaders	Sponsor workshops to develop political parties (i.e. advertisement, issue analysis, media relations, fundraising, voter mobilization, campaign strategy)	Facilitate democracy, management, and negotiation skills education for party leaders; Encourage women candidates in leadership roles
Civil Society			
<i>Development</i>	Promote participation in society through establishment of unions, professional associations, religious groups, and civic associations,	Provide funding, technical assistance, and training to civil society groups	Develop indigenous capacity to advise, fund, and train new indigenous groups
<i>Enabling Environment</i>	Review existing regulations on NGOs and civil society actors; Conduct survey of existing NGOs	Draft or alter statutes establishing rights and restrictions of NGOs (including taxation status, etc.)	Create and strengthen an umbrella organization of NGOs to represent civil society views to the government; Encourage inter-group partnerships and community building functions at the town and village levels
Media			
<i>Public Information</i>	Establish international news media outlet; Utilize media as public information tool to provide factual information and control rumors	Widely disseminate news; Lobby for fair free speech and free press rules and regulations; Provide regular updates on the peace process and other critical developments	Foster indigenous media presence and promote establishment of open broadcast networks; Continue to use media as facilitator of dialogue and information
<i>Training</i>	Recruit and train media personnel; Encourage media professionals to return	Establish journalism schools	Turn over media programming to indigenous actors; Provide incentives for the creation of new, independent newspapers and TV/radio stations
<i>Professionalism/Ethics</i>	Develop media code of conduct	Educate reporters and media executives about best practices and role of media; Establish indigenous journalist association	Foster continued journalistic independence



POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION

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Interagency Strategy and Planning for Post-Conflict Reconstruction¹

Introduction: Why Bother with Strategy and Planning?

The idea that, "No plan survives contact with the enemy,"² has made many in Washington skeptical of the value of interagency planning for complex contingency operations, including those aimed at assisting post-conflict reconstruction. But for those who have actually participated in such operations, another premise holds true: no operation succeeds without a strategy and a plan. One of the most powerful lessons learned during the 1993 operation in Somalia was that the absence of rigorous and sustained interagency planning and coordination can hamper effectiveness, jeopardize success, and even court disaster. This lesson has particular relevance today, as the United States begins to address post-conflict reconstruction in Afghanistan.

Given the sheer complexity of post-conflict reconstruction efforts, developing a clear strategic plan of action at the outset is critical to success. Such a plan should articulate the U.S. interests at stake and define as clearly as possible U.S. objectives for the intervention. Developing a common set of objectives across the U.S. government is of paramount importance to creating unity of effort. The plan should also lay out the strategy for achieving these policy objectives, and a clear division of labor delineating who is responsible for what aspects of the plan's implementation. Obviously, any U.S. strategic plan must be developed in the context of and in coordination with the broader international effort of which U.S. operations are a part.

Perhaps even more important than the plan itself is the strategy development and planning *process*. While strategy obviously informs planning, in practice, planning also helps refine strategy by framing and assessing alternative approaches, identifying tradeoffs, and highlighting policy disconnects for decision makers. The process produces more than just a set of documents: it allows key players to build working relationships, hammer out differences, identify potential inconsistencies and gaps, synchronize their actions, and better understand their roles. Smoothing out such wrinkles is much less costly in terms of blood and treasure before an operation begins than during its execution. Interagency planning also provides an antidote to some of the more disruptive effects of the high turnover in military and foreign service personnel.

This paper focuses on strategy development and planning at the Washington interagency level for U.S. participation in post-conflict reconstruction operations. It begins by briefly examining the history of recent efforts to improve interagency planning and coordination, identifies key elements of success based on the last decade of experience, and then offers several specific recommendations for improving the U.S. Government's performance in this area.³

¹ This is a draft white paper for the PCR project last updated March 27, 2002. If you have any questions, please contact the author, Michèle Flournoy, at (202) 775-3136 or mflournoy@csis.org. Additional funding for this project has been provided by the Better World Fund and the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation.

² Attributed to the 19th century Prussian Field Marshal, Helmuth Von Moltke.

³ Interagency coordination at the operational or field level will be discussed in a separate paper on coordination.

Recent Interagency Planning Efforts: From Haiti to Afghanistan

As planning began in mid-1994 for operations in Haiti, lessons from Somalia were in the forefront of many participants' minds. The Deputies Committee established an Executive Committee (ExCom) at the Assistant Secretary level, to be chaired by the NSC's Senior Director for Global and Multilateral Affairs, with a mandate to develop policy options and plans for a possible U.S.-led intervention. The Haiti ExCom developed the first ever interagency political-military plan, which articulated the overall objectives of the mission, an interagency strategy for meeting them, and a division of labor delineating which agencies had responsibility for which tasks. This plan was rehearsed before the Deputies Committee prior to the launch of the U.S.-led Multi-National Force.

The strides made in planning for Haiti led several participants to seek a way to institutionalize lessons learned and best practices from the experience. This resulted in Presidential Decision Directive 56 on Managing Complex Contingency Operations (PDD-56), which was signed by President Clinton in May 1997.⁴ PDD-56 called for:

- the Deputies Committee to establish an interagency Executive Committee to assist in policy development, planning, and execution of complex contingency operations;
- the development of a political-military implementation plan as an integrated planning tool for coordinating U.S. government actions;
- an interagency rehearsal or review of the plan's main elements prior to execution;
- an after-action review of each operation;
- and interagency training to support this process.

Although PDD-56 was never fully implemented, the Clinton Administration's implementation of aspects of the PDD in the major complex contingency operations that followed did generate many useful planning processes and tools. As pol-mil plans were prepared for the Deputies Committee for crises in Kosovo, East Timor, and elsewhere, several innovations were adopted to strengthen the U.S. government's limited planning capacity. Some of these innovations, which continue today in some form, include: the development of an advance planning process; establishment of the interagency contingency planning working group; creation of standing interagency working groups for humanitarian response, information operations and public security; inclusion of civilian agency requirements in the Pentagon's deliberate planning process – the so-called “Annex V” of a military plan; and the inclusion of coalition building efforts as a major component of the interagency planning effort. While these innovations made substantial progress in building institutional capacity in the last administration, there remained some pockets of resistance to interagency pol-mil planning for crises, reflecting both an anti-planning bias on the part of some senior regional officials (State, Defense and NSC) and an overestimation of the time and resources needed to undertake a full-fledged planning effort.

After coming into office, the Bush administration decided to develop National Security Policy Directive (NSPD) “XX”⁵ which builds on PDD-56 but is broader in scope, in that it provides guidance on providing warning, advanced planning, prevention, and response options for complex contingency operations. With regard to interagency strategy and planning, the NSPD calls for the establishment of an NSC-chaired Contingency Planning Policy Coordination Committee (CP-PCC) at the Assistant Secretary level to lead the development of interagency contingency plans for emerging crises with a focus on U.S. objectives, a desired endstate, policy options, interagency responsibilities, resource issues, and strategies for various aspects of the operation.

⁴ See PDD-56 White Paper, at <http://clinton2.nara.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/html/documents/NSCDOC2.html>.

⁵ The NSPD is designated “XX” because it is still awaiting the President's signature.

NSPD-XX has not yet been signed by the President and in the case of Afghanistan, below the Deputies Committee, there has been no person or entity in charge of interagency planning and coordination. This gap between theory and practice creates a significant hurdle for NSDP-XX's future implementation: a precedent has been set in practice that does not conform to guidance laid out in the NSPD. The crucial test will be whether the Bush administration fully implements the NSPD in preparing for the next complex contingency operation.

Unfortunately, interagency planning frequently falls short of achieving its full potential, largely due to recurring bureaucratic factors and inexperience at senior levels. Past shortcomings underscore the need for capable NSC leadership from the outset, improved methods to overcome bureaucratic inertia, personal rivalries, and internal communication disconnects during the planning process, and better ways to monitor agency implementation as an operation unfolds. All of these shortcomings point the way toward improvements that need to be made.

Key Elements of Success

Accountability: Perhaps the most significant determinant of success in interagency planning is the degree to which participants are held accountable for meeting U.S. objectives and for the roles they play in the process. Accountability begins with putting someone clearly in charge of strategy development and planning. Ideally, the President's point person for this should be a Senior Director on the National Security Council staff positioned to act as an honest broker and empowered with the authority to task other agencies to assist in the planning process. Past attempts to put senior officials from the State Department or DoD in charge have faltered miserably.

The second aspect of accountability is ensuring that the head of each department or agency is held responsible for delivering on his or her organization's part(s) of the plan. For example, the Secretary of State might be held responsible for developing the political, diplomatic and humanitarian assistance aspects of the plan, while the Secretary of Defense might be held accountable for the military aspects of the security mission. Accountability also requires ensuring that agency representatives have the resources they need to deliver on the commitments they make.⁶ Furthermore, all agencies responsible for some aspect of policy implementation must be represented at the strategy and planning table, including those traditionally outside the NSC process, such as USAID, Treasury, Justice, Commerce, and parts of the State Department like PRM and INL. These agencies and offices must also be given appropriate incentives to play – particularly the opportunity to influence the development of the strategy and how their resources will be used. Bringing additional parties to the table will require aggressively avoiding overclassification of plans as well as prudent handling of genuine operational security issues that may exist.

A third aspect of accountability is adequate consultation with Congress during the planning process. Key members of Congress should be consulted early and often as an administration develops its strategy and plans for a given post-conflict reconstruction operation. As the ultimate allocator of resources for such operations, Congress should be briefed not only on the objectives and basic strategy for an operation but also on anticipated funding requirements, measures of success for various aspects of the plan, and key handoff or transition points in the operation.

Leadership: Too often in the past, lessons learned and best practices have been ignored because the National Security Advisor and NSC staff allowed anti-planning biases to trump the President's planning guidance. More often than not, when an ExCom is created for a particular complex contingency operation, a functional NSC Director is put in charge and ignored by regional NSC Directors and regional Assistant Secretaries.

⁶ This issue will be addressed in more detail in both the civilian rapid response paper and a future paper on funding.

Given concerns about putting too much of evolving U.S. policy down on paper for fear of the diplomatic ramifications of leaks, and a desire to avoid having functional experts meddling in their work, senior regional experts often come to the table disinclined to develop formal interagency plans for an operation. The National Security Advisor needs to ensure that an effective interagency strategy and planning process that reflects the President's priorities is developed early on (if not in advance of) a crisis and that the necessary players participate in the process.

Responsiveness: To be effective, the strategy and planning process must be responsive to the requirements of the anticipated post-conflict reconstruction operation and start early enough to allow participants adequate time to plan. In the past, planners have been given anything from months (in the case of Haiti) to hours or days (in the case of Rwanda). Ensuring that planning gets started early enough to make a difference argues for establishing a trigger mechanism for the planning process. Commendably, NSPD-XX calls for a quarterly review by the Deputies Committee of crises that could result in complex contingency operations and a determination as to whether the initiation of planning is warranted. Such a determination should trigger not only the launch of an interagency planning process but also the suspension of certain staffing constraints to allow the NSC to augment its planning staff with detailees from other agencies. In addition, having a known, exercised process in place would allow for planning to get started more rapidly.

In addition to time, senior agency representatives also need the authority and flexibility during the planning process to rapidly commit the resources that their agencies can bring to bear in an operation. Too often in the past, planning has been delayed by interagency debates about funding authorities, resources, and arrangements. Several aspects of this issue will need to be addressed, including possible revision of agency authorities, increased resources and capacities in specific task areas, and empowerment of senior participants in the process to make commitments on behalf of the agencies they represent.⁷

Shared Frame of Reference: In the past, several mechanisms have been used to help get participants working off the same sheet of paper, including a comprehensive interagency assessment of the crisis situation. Frequently, this begins well before a crisis takes shape in the minds of policy-makers. Such an assessment can help focus the strategy and planning effort from the outset by aiding the development of a common appraisal of what needs to be done on the ground to achieve our policy objectives. It can also help to establish ways of sharing information over the course of the planning process. While any such assessment should be a living document that is revised over time, it provides an invaluable foundation for developing a common view of policy aims, strategy, and plans. It is essential that this assessment process include the "reality check" of perspectives from personnel in the field.

The strategy development and planning process may also be greatly assisted by the establishment of a common template or generic plan. Equally important is codifying a set of standing interagency arrangements for USG post-conflict reconstruction efforts (similar to arrangements agreed to in the Federal Response Plan used by FEMA for domestic disasters). Such a template could conceivably be tailored on a case by case basis, depending on factors such as the complexity of the operation and the level of U.S. involvement. It focuses analysis and debate on the key issues that must be resolved at the strategic level. It also provides a shared foundation on which individual agencies can build their own operational responses. In any case, planning done at the Washington interagency level should avoid preempting more detailed planning that is more appropriately done at the operational level.

⁷ The question of revising agency funding authorities to make them more flexible and responsive will be addressed in a subsequent paper on funding. The question of increasing resources and capacity in some areas is addressed, in part, in the paper on civilian rapid response.

A third key aspect of establishing a shared frame of reference is putting into place mechanisms to help ensure coordination between civilian and military USG agencies, between Washington (the planners) and the field (the implementers), and between the USG and other elements of the international community (such as coalition partners, international organizations, and NGO's playing key roles in post-conflict operations). Effective interagency planning is necessarily a multi-layered process; planning and coordination must occur at and between both the strategic and operational levels. Again, it is invaluable, if not critical, for each party to know what the others are planning on doing and to identify any issues that need to be resolved prior to execution.⁸

Adequate Capacity: A successful strategy development and planning process requires a degree of capacity -- particularly trained and available personnel -- on the NSC staff and in participating agencies. In the past, such efforts have been hampered by the fact that each agency representative in the process was effectively a one-person show, and most had additional responsibilities completely unrelated to planning. Planning requires devoting quality NSC personnel to the process on a full-time basis. In addition, as noted above, during the planning process the NSC should be allowed to temporarily augment its staff with personnel on loan from other agencies. In agencies where planning is not a routine or valued endeavor, and other priority areas may already be understaffed, building the internal capacity necessary for success will require substantial leadership and a culture change initiated at the highest levels.

Rehearsals and Training: A critical but often neglected part of effective interagency planning is the rehearsal -- that is, a seminar style walk-through of the plan as if it were being implemented. Rehearsals are an invaluable and low-cost way of discovering gaps and problems in a plan before an operation actually begins -- and without placing U.S. lives, credibility and resources on the line. They can also be critical to ensuring smooth hand-offs of responsibility from one agency or actor to another. Ideally, rehearsals should be conducted not only prior to an operation's initiation, but also before any major transition. Lessons learned from rehearsals can provide invaluable "fixes" to interagency plans and can anticipate discontinuities for which planners may want to develop additional contingency plans. The challenge here is to ensure that insights gained at senior level rehearsals actually "trickle down" to implementers in the field.

Over the longer term, interagency training is a key element of success for post-conflict reconstruction operations. Both PDD-56 and NSPD-XX establish interagency training programs to develop a cadre of professionals capable of planning for complex contingency operations. There are valuable planning skills that can be honed in advance and one should have opportunities to make mistakes and learn lessons in a training environment, without the pressures and high stakes of a real-time operation. Training also provides an opportunity for building familiarity with and buy-in to the shared frame of reference described above. Ensuring that interagency training actually occurs will require additional funding.⁹ Personnel selected for training should be assigned to positions where their training will have the most beneficial impact on the planning process.

Looking to the Future: Actionable Recommendations for the Bush Administration

1. Sign and fully implement NSPD-XX. The new NSPD includes several of the elements of success described above -- accountability, responsiveness, training -- and should be signed and implemented as

⁸ Issues of operational and international coordination will be addressed in more detail in a separate paper on coordination.

⁹ A subsequent training paper will address these issues in much greater detail.

quickly as possible.¹⁰ But the real test of this NSPD will not be whether it is signed, but rather whether it is actually used to organize the U.S. government's preparation efforts the next time the need for a complex contingency operation arises. Institutional cultures that undervalue planning are a fundamental and persistent obstacle that must be surmounted if the United States is to increase its success in post-conflict reconstruction operations. Doing so will require sustained leadership on the part of the National Security Advisor to ensure that strategy development and planning are conducted according to the President's guidance as well as specific steps to change the anti-planning culture in some agencies of the U.S. government. If the new NSPD is fully implemented, it will likely become the touchstone for future efforts; if it is ignored, it will likely become irrelevant.

2. Adequately resource the NSC's Directorate for Democracy, Human Rights, and International Operations to be in charge of and accountable for interagency strategy development and planning for complex contingency operations. Currently, interagency planning is the purview of one staff person in this office. If the Bush administration is serious about implementing the guidance in its NSPD, it will need to devote additional personnel to the interagency planning portfolio.

3. Include all agencies with implementation responsibility in the strategy development and planning process and establish a mechanism for including key field representatives on a regular basis. It is particularly important to involve relevant Ambassadors, the CINC, the USAID DART team leader, and the USAID mission director, among others, to give interagency planning in Washington periodic "reality checks." This might be accomplished by consulting them periodically during the planning process, in person or by secure video teleconference, as well as requiring them to participate in rehearsals. Regular consultations over the life of an operation are essential to both synchronization of USG efforts and smooth hand-offs of responsibility from one agency to another.

4. Establish a common, generic interagency planning template and rehearsal process. Building on NSPD-XX, the NSC staff should develop such a template for use in interagency planning for complex contingencies. Having in place such a template as well as an agreed division of labor among the relevant agencies would not only avoid the problem of having to reinvent one's planning approach for each new operation, but would also provide the interagency training program with an authoritative and solid foundation.

5. Integrate planners into the regional staffs of the State Department and other agencies. Developing planning expertise and capacity in key offices likely to play important roles in designing post-conflict reconstruction operations, particularly State's regional bureaus, is critical to improving USG performance. Currently, there is little strategic planning expertise outside the U.S. military and little training done on the civilian side.¹¹ In order to enhance planning capacity in the State Department, each regional Assistant Secretary of State should be given at least two staff persons trained as political-military planners.¹² This will require additional billets and resources. In times of calm, these personnel could be used to support deliberate planning and interagency coordination and training efforts. Over time, integrating planners into regional

¹⁰ Particularly important is the NSPD's requirement that OMB review all of the relevant funding authorities of various agencies with an eye toward improving responsiveness and flexibility. Improving how the United States funds PCR efforts will be discussed in more detail in the subsequent paper on funding.

¹¹ There is, however, substantial planning expertise in pockets of the U.S. government like USAID, but this agency often gets left out of interagency strategy and planning processes.

¹² The need for an interagency training program to develop such a cadre of professionals will be addressed in the subsequent paper on training.

staffs could go a long way toward changing the anti-planning culture that pervades several civilian agencies, like State, Treasury, and Justice.

6. Review all funding authorities and program budgets relevant to post-conflict reconstruction in order to ensure alignment between agency responsibilities and resources/capacity. If agency representatives are to be held accountable for the commitments they make in preparation for a post-conflict reconstruction operation, agencies must be given adequate authorities and resources to do the jobs they are expected to perform. There are a number of critical capability gaps across the U.S. government that must be identified, prioritized, and addressed.¹³

7. Establish a secure intranet for participants, including relevant intelligence and information, collaborative planning tools, and decision support tools. A shared virtual space that enables interagency participants to communicate, share information, and coordinate with one another on a real time basis could meaningfully improve both the quality and speed of the interagency planning process. It could also enable finished products to better reach individuals in the field responsible for operational implementation of the strategic plan. The technologies and tools exist, and a modest investment could substantially increase efficiency.

8. Establish mechanisms for early and regular consultation with other key players outside the U.S. Government, including international organizations like the UN, regional organizations, NGO's, and coalition partners. The U.S. government needs mechanisms for determining what other key players in a post-conflict reconstruction effort plan on doing, as their actions may directly affect the United States' ability to achieve its objectives in an operation – and vice versa. It may also be in USG interests to provide support, direct or indirect, to the efforts of various international actors. In addition to meeting with key partners and organizations on a regular basis early on in the planning process, the NSC should consider inviting key non-USG and international participants to a rehearsal of the U.S. plan. The United States should also consider including its closest allies as partners in the U.S. planning process. While there may be legitimate operational security concerns, these could be managed, as they are in the U.S. interagency process.

9. Consult with key members of Congress early and often. Engaging those who hold the “power of the purse” early on in the planning of an intervention can pay enormous dividends over the life of an operation. Congress is a key stakeholder and regular consultations with key members on issues such as objectives, strategy, funding requirements, and measures of success should be the norm.

Conclusion

In sum, interagency planning at the strategic level is critical to success in post-conflict reconstruction operations. The past decade of experience offers a number of invaluable lessons to be learned and some clear guidelines for improving the United States government's performance in this area. The key elements of success are known and largely agreed. With a minimum expenditure of political capital, the President and his National Security Advisor could take the nine steps recommended above to meaningfully improve the USG's ability to prepare for post-conflict reconstruction operations and to meet critical objectives on the ground.

¹³ The most critical capability gaps to be addressed are identified in a number of other PCR project papers, including the paper on civilian rapid response, the papers on each of the four PCR “pillars,” and the paper on funding.



Milan Vaishnav <MVaishna@csis.org>
10/09/2002 07:20:46 PM

Record Type: Record

To: Thomas S. Marsh/NSC/EOP@EOP
cc: Steven Netishen <SNetishe@csis.org>
Subject: Documents for Dr. Rice

Hi Tom,

Thanks for helping me out with my mini-document crisis here. Attached please find some documents from Dr. John Hamre, President and CEO of CSIS, that are for Dr. Rice. I have spoken with her office and they are expecting them.

Should you have any difficulties, please give me a call at (202) 775-7318. Thanks once again for your help. It is much appreciated.

Best,

Milan Vaishnav

Milan Vaishnav
Project on Post-Conflict Reconstruction
Center for Strategic & International Studies
1800 K Street, NW
Washington, DC 20006
Tel: (202) 775-7318
Fax: (202) 775-3199



- ltr rice 10-9-02.doc



- Members of the CSIS-AUSA Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction.PDF



- Final PCR Framework.pdf



- strategy.pdf

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

29/4

To Vice President Cheney
Secretary Don Rumsfeld
NSA Condoleezza Rice
Director George Tenet

Interesting thought
piece prepared by
Richard Haass' Policy
Planning staff.

LP

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FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
Memorandum	Information Memorandum - To: The Secretary - From: Richard N. Haass	15	09/26/2002	P1/b1; P5;

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COLLECTION:

National Security Council - National Security Advisor, Office of the

SERIES:

Rice, Condoleezza

FOLDER TITLE:

Future of Iraq [4]

FRC ID:

34579

OA Num.:

NSC 0342

NARA Num.:

FOIA IDs and Segments:

2014-0457-F

RESTRICTION CODES

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

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FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
Fax Cover Sheet	[Cover Sheet] - To: Gennifer Koch - From: James J. Foster	1	10/04/2002	P1/b1;

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Memorandum	[Memorandum]	4	04/05/2002	P1/b1; P5;

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~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

8842

October 17, 2002

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR CONDOLEEZZA RICE

THROUGH: JOHN BELLINGER

FROM: JOCK SCHARFEN

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Detainees

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to agencies forwarding the proposed agenda for a Principals Committee meeting on detainees on October 18, 2002.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Steve Biegun to sign the memorandum to agencies at Tab I.

Approve HH Disapprove _____

Steve Biegun -

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Agencies

Tab A Agenda

PC Notified — 7:40 AM
Paper Delivered to Suite
H- 11:00 AM
Papers signed out by
Suite Very late

*This memo is
at least 24 hrs.
late. And it could
not be simpler.
What's the problem?*

Steve

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5(a) (b) (3)

Declassify on: 10/16/12

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4(B), Sept. 11, 2006
By NH NARA, Date 12/12/2014

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Memorandum	Memorandum - To: Maura Harty, et al. - From: Stephen E. Biegun	1	10/17/2002	P1/b1;

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