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National Security Council - Records and Access Management

PRS Originals Files

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V	19	6	6	1	34539	47293		NSC 0302

Folder Title:

0108466

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 0108466
RECEIVED: 09 NOV 01 19

TO: CARTER, JIMMY

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 05 DEC 01
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NICARAGUA
HUMAN RIGHTS

PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

PERSONS: CARTER, JIMMY

SUBJECT: REPLY RE NICARAGUA

ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE: 21 NOV 01 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ROWLAND-GOUGH

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MAISTO
NSC CHRON
ROWLAND-GOUGH

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTSM

CLOSED BY: NSSWL

DOC 4 OF 4

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 0108466

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001	ROWLAND-GOUGH	Z	01110919	PREPARE MEMO FOR RICE
002	RICE	Z	01113018	FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR SIGNATURE
003	PRESIDENT	Z	01120319	FOR SIGNATURE
004		X	01120610	PRESIDENT SGD LTR
004	WH STRIPPING DESK	X	01120610	FOR DISPATCH

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

003	011203		VICE PRESIDENT
003	011203		WH CHIEF OF STAFF
004	011205	CARTER, JIMMY	

UNCLASSIFIED

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

PROOFED BY: MCHLOG # 8466

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM (RRS) INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG MCH A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
HAINES	_____	_____	_____
LUKENS	<u>1</u>	<u>M 12/6</u>	<u>OK</u>
LOEWER	_____	_____	_____
BASH	<u>F</u>	_____	_____
BIEGUN	_____	_____	_____
EDSON	_____	_____	_____
HADLEY	_____	_____	_____
RICE	_____	_____	_____
SITUATION ROOM	_____	_____	_____
WEST WING DESK	<u>2</u>	<u>AK 12/6</u>	<u>D</u>
RECORDS MGMT.	<u>3</u>	<u>AK 12/6</u>	<u>D</u>
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A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:
WIDE 500 800

COMMENTS:

FOR REVIEW

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE _____

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

PROOFED BY: MCN LOG # 8466
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) INT ARS
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG MCN A/O _____



	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
HAINES	_____	_____	_____
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LOEWER	<u>1</u>	<u>MCN 11/30</u>	_____
BASH	_____	_____	_____
BIEGUN	_____	_____	_____
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HADLEY	_____	_____	_____
RICE	<u>2</u>	<u>MCN 12/3</u>	_____
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A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:

COMMENTS:

Date 12/4/01

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE yes

FORM 10-10-10

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
THE WHITE HOUSE

PROOFED BY: MCN LOG # 8466
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) INT ARS
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG MCN A/O _____



SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
HAINES		
LUKENS		
LOEWER	<u>1</u>	<u>MCN 11/30</u>
BASH		
BIEGUN		
EDSON		
HADLEY		
RICE	<u>2</u>	<u>MCN 12/3</u>
SITUATION ROOM		
WEST WING DESK	<u>3</u>	
RECORDS MGMT.		

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CC:

COMMENTS:

Date 12/4/01

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE

YES

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
THE WHITE HOUSE

PROOFED BY: MCN LOG # 8466
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) INT ARS
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG MCN A/O _____

SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
HAINES		
LUKENS	<u>1</u>	<u>MCN 12/6</u> <u>OK</u>
LOEWER		
BASH	<u>2</u>	
BIEGUN		
EDSON		
HADLEY		
RICE		
SITUATION ROOM		
WEST WING DESK	<u>2</u>	<u>MCN 12/6</u> <u>D</u>
RECORDS MGMT.	<u>3</u>	<u>MCN 12/6</u> <u>D</u>

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:

COMMENTS:

FOR REVIEW

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 5, 2001


The Honorable Jimmy Carter
1 Copenhill
453 Freedom Parkway
Atlanta, Georgia 30307

Dear Mr. Carter:

Thank you for sending your observations and assessment of the recent presidential election in Nicaragua. I share your concern about the many political challenges that await President-elect Bolanos and appreciate your generous offer of assistance to him from the Carter Center. Bolanos will need all our encouragement and support when he takes office in January.

The Carter Center played an essential role over the past year in helping ensure that this election was open and transparent. Please accept my personal thanks for your dedication and my gratitude to all those who joined you in working to give Nicaraguans another opportunity to express their support for democracy. We are fortunate to have your expertise as a resource.

Sincerely,



George W. Bush

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ID 0108466

REFERRAL

DATE: 06 DEC 01

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH STRIPPING DESK

ROOM 80, EEOB

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: CARTER, JIMMY

SOURCE: PRESIDENT

DATE: 05 DEC 01


SUBJ: REPLY RE NICARAGUA

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE: 07 DEC 01

COMMENT:

FOR


JOHN W. FICKLIN

NSC RECORDS MANAGEMENT OFFICE

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 3, 2001

ACTION

'01 DEC 3 PM 8:08

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE 
SUBJECT: Response to President Carter on Nicaragua

Purpose

To reply to President Carter.

Background

President Carter and a large delegation from the Carter Center served as official observers for the Nicaraguan presidential election on November 4, 2001. President Carter wrote to you to offer his observations on how the election process unfolded. He also shares some thoughts on the recent World Series.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to President Carter
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff



JIMMY CARTER

Trip to Nicaragua
November 2-7, 2001**History:**

For 100 years, the United States' relations with Nicaragua have always been interesting and filled with drama. For me, they began during my term as president. In 1977, Nicaragua was controlled completely by a dictator, Anastasio Somoza, who enjoyed a firm working relationship with the U.S. government and some very influential American corporations. We condemned Somoza's human rights abuses, but with little effect. Dissension increased as he became more oppressive, and a number of revolutionary groups were formed, whose fervor and cohesiveness were intensified in January 1978, when a prominent newspaper editor, Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, was murdered, purportedly by Somocistas. Violence erupted nationwide, and approximately 50,000 people died in the revolution.

In May 1979, the OAS called for a coalition of revolutionary groups to be formed and for Somoza to resign. He left the country two months later, and I recall that a group of eight foreign ministers from Latin America escorted the victorious revolutionaries into Managua to assume power. Although the revolution originally comprised a broad coalition including educators, business leaders, intellectuals, and others, it soon became apparent that the leftist Sandinistas would be playing a dominant role.

When Ronald Reagan became president, he launched a military effort to overthrow the government. There were hot debates in the U.S. Congress about this policy, and although a majority passed laws to the contrary, the administration continued secretly to foment and finance the war. The United States provided weapons and other support to the counterrevolutionaries, or Contras, and helped them establish a base in Honduras. (Revelations of these activities resulted in the so-called Iran-Contra scandal.) A multiparty election was held in 1984, and Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega was elected president. Although OAS observers said it was fair, the United States condemned it as fraudulent.

The Contra war continued until the end of Reagan's term, with Oliver North and others secretly channeling assistance through various intermediaries, including Panama strongman Manuel Noriega. After George Bush became president in 1989, his administration approved plans of The Carter Center and Latin American leaders to assist with a democratic election process, to be monitored by us and other international observers. To the surprise of the Sandinistas, a coalition of 14 political parties called UNO received 55% of the votes, and Violeta Chamorro (widow of the slain newspaper editor and one of the 1979 revolutionary leaders) became president.

Page 2...Nicaragua

During her term, our Center offered advice on bringing hyperinflation (36,000% annually!) under control, and attempted, with some success, to resolve the still continuing arguments about ownership of property that changed hands in accordance with a decree (signed by Doña Violeta and two others) at the end of the revolution. Rosalynn and I had been to Nicaragua in 1986 to help with a Habitat for Humanity project (during the Contra war) and again immediately following Hurricane Mitch, when we marshaled aid for victims in the devastated areas.

In 1996 we monitored another election, which was fair and peaceful, and Arnoldo Aleman became president. His administration has earned a reputation as one of the most corrupt in this hemisphere. His Liberal party (PLC) and the Sandinistas (FSLN) orchestrated a new national constitution in 2000 which, in effect, provided for sharing political power and spoils between these two major parties and practically excluding all others.

Background for the 2001 election:

Beginning 16 months ago, The Carter Center has monitored the political situation in Nicaragua, attempting to make the election process more open, democratic, and technically effective. Although earlier the process was hamstrung by a lack of funds and an inadequate system for transmitting election returns by fax, most of these problems were reported to be resolved. According to polling results, the presidential election seemed to be a dead heat between PLC candidate Enrique Bolaños and FSLN candidate Daniel Ortega. The campaign was relatively free of violence, and both candidates were able to present their views to the public.

Bolaños is a wealthy cotton grower, who was head of the business community and challenged Doña Violeta Chamorro for UNO's nomination in 1990, when she was chosen and elected president. He joined Aleman in 1996 as his vice-president. Generally believed to be honest, he did not condemn the well-known corruption of the president, who totally dominates the Liberal party organization.

Friday, 11/2/01

I arrived in Managua on November 2, to head an observer team of 50 persons from about a dozen countries. We immediately met with U.S. Ambassador Oliver Garza, who made it clear that he was strongly supporting the PLC candidates. In addition to public statements, he had news coverage handing out U.S. food aid with Bolaños and told me how he was advising Bolaños and Aleman about speech material to lessen the adverse effect of reported corruption in the government.

Page 3...Nicaragua

We then visited members of the 7-member Supreme Electoral Council (CSE). There are three Sandinista and three Liberal members plus the president, Roberto Rivas, who is known to be very close to Cardinal Obando y Bravo (who strongly opposes the Sandinistas). One potential problem was that the losing side might boycott meetings, preventing a legal quorum of five, but we were assured that the Council would not adjourn until at least a month after the election, making the quorum issue moot. Council members and Carter Center staff expressed some concerns about proper transmission of voting results from the 17 regional departments into the CSE center, and Rivas assured us that there would be physical carrying of the records paralleling the fax transmissions. The likelihood was that no partial results would be available until after midnight. A CSE regulation prevented the publication of any quick counts until after the CSE announced a victor, but plans were for the domestic observer group Ética y Transparencia (E&T) to deliver their results to all seven of the CSE members, which ensured public revelation by word-of-mouth. E&T had about 5,000 data points, which should give an extremely accurate report (less than 1% error).

We drove south of Managua to one of the homes of President Aleman, the last 12 miles on a fine new mountain road constructed just for his use. We were told that the government has provided similar services to all his other fincas. Although he was quoted in the morning newspaper as not desiring my presence in Nicaragua, he and his associates were very gracious. I was surprised when entering his office to confront a double-life-sized statue of Augusto Sandino, the "patron saint" of the Sandinistas who fought against U.S. intervention forces in the 1920s and was assassinated in 1933. Aleman explained that he had placed its duplicate in Sandino's hometown. He predicted that Bolaños would win by a 6-7% margin. He told us that he and his cabinet would be assembled in Managua as the election ended, in case there was a "national emergency," somewhat corroborating an earlier announcement that a close and uncertain election would precipitate a negotiated result, regardless of the vote.

Back at our hotel, we met the observer delegation leaders of the European Union and the Organization of American States, and shared concern about Aleman's obvious desire to remain in power by "negotiating the votes" in case of a small margin of victory. We international observers agreed to share information and to consult before making any kind of definitive statements to the news media. I decided after these meetings to talk directly to Army Commander General Carrión, who would play a key role in deciding what would constitute a national emergency warranting an alternative to vote counts in determining who would be president.

Saturday, 11/3/01

Our delegation met with Gabriel Solórzano and other leaders of Ética y Transparencia, an NGO that would be doing the extensive quick count. They were also concerned

Page 4...Nicaragua

about reports of a negotiated vote, and promised to give us their presidential election results when available. Next, we made our regular visit to Cardinal Obando y Bravo, respected Catholic leader, who has always opposed the Sandinistas in his personal influence and in a homily on Sundays preceding elections. His sermon this year was less vitriolic than in previous years, and he assured us that he would support the vote count and not any behind-the-scenes negotiations.

Daniel Ortega and other FSLN leaders met with us, discussed the same concern, said they were prepared with well-trained observers, etc., and pledged peaceful reaction to results no matter who won. Then we went to visit General Carrión, who expressed his quandary if forced to question a declaration of his civilian commander-in-chief, but assured us that he was strongly opposed to any alternative to the citizens' votes unless there was serious violence on the streets. I let him know that the international observers agreed with this position and that he would have our backing. We then met with PLC candidate, Vice-president Enrique Bolaños. Surprisingly, he also brought up the same concern about a subversion of the electoral process, apparently convinced that Aleman might very well prefer Ortega (with whom he has been sharing power and spoils for five years) to Bolaños, who might take over control of the PLC party and parliamentary members. He seemed confident of victory, and said he would expose and root out corruption in all previous administrations.

Our last meeting before election day was with Alberto Saborio, the Conservative party candidate. "El Pacto" between the Liberal and Sandinista leaders has done everything possible to prevent any other parties from participating, and I congratulated this group for their persistence. They had no hope for the presidency but expected some seats in the national assembly. Although some of them have shifted political alignments, I have known the top leaders in all the parties during three presidential elections. Everyone was emphasizing peace, education, and jobs.

At our press conference, there were predictable questions about prospects for a fair and open election, with the results to be determined solely by who gets the most votes. Two questions were about the deliberate actions of the U.S. ambassador in support of the Liberal candidate. I expressed disapproval of any outside interference, but pointed out that President Bush had stated that our country would honor the results of the election and work with either successful candidate.

After former president Oscar Arias arrived from Costa Rica to join our delegation, we gave him a briefing and then attended a reception at the U.S. embassy. A congressional delegation was there, along with other ambassadors and leaders of international observer groups.

I watched the Diamondbacks wipe out the Yankees before sleeping.

Page 5...Nicaragua

Sunday, 11/4/01 (election day)

The morning news headlines were that Aleman still saw the likelihood of a national emergency, obviously attempting to precipitate tension in the country. At the polling sites we found long and patient lines and meticulously organized procedures to prevent any aspect of fraud. The parties nominated polling officials, so that there was always dual (or triple) oversight of each step of the process. Beginning at 6 a.m., every blank ballot was examined and counted (1,600 in all), which took until 7:20 a.m. The ID card of each voter was examined under ultraviolet light under a black cloth to assure its authenticity, each ballot was signed on the back by the voting officials, indelible ink was applied thoroughly on voters' right thumbs, ID cards were perforated to prevent voting twice, and party observers were ever-present. Even illiterate voters could make informed choices by the parties' symbols, acronyms, and photographs of presidential candidates. At other sites, we found some of them opening late and voting slowly, but with everyone peaceful and patient.

We then went to see Doña Violeta Chamorro, and found her gracious and extremely careful not to express any preference. She did regret that Aleman had "wasted a wonderful opportunity," and seemed bemused that her son-in-law, Antonio Lacayo, had endorsed Ortega and agreed to serve as foreign minister in a Sandinista administration.

We observed final counting in a Sandinista stronghold, and saw that Bolaños was getting 53% of the vote, indicating a strong shift in his favor. After watching the end of one of the greatest world series in history, I slept until about 3 a.m., when we received the quick count result from É&T, showing the PLC winning with a surprising margin of about 10%.

Monday, 11/5/01

Bolaños called me several times during the night, and I visited him before day-break Monday. He was quite concerned that no results had been announced and was ready to claim his victory. While I was with him, 5% of the results were announced, with his lead at 10%. He was still quite concerned about possible collusion between President Aleman and the Sandinista group (called Convergencia), especially regarding seats in the assembly. I assured him of the backing of all international observers, pledged that we would monitor "the last vote" in all races, and offered the continuing services of The Carter Center as he begins his new administration in January. He'll have a difficult time wresting political authority from Aleman, who is powerful and domineering and has total control of the PLC party apparatus and Liberal members of the parliament. Bolaños will need all the help he can get from us and from the opposition. He expressed public disapproval of Aleman's suggestion that he be president of the next national assembly.

I also called Daniel Ortega, who had the quick count results and promised to acknowledge his defeat as soon as the CSE made a substantive announcement.

Page 6...Nicaragua

Shortly before noon, the CSE announced a clear lead for Bolaños (still with only 13% of the returns), and Ortega conceded, pledged that the Convergencia would serve as a responsible opposition, and Ortega and Bolaños greeted each other warmly on television.

After an early afternoon press conference, where I denounced the inept and politically subverted electoral council, we spent the rest of the day in meetings with business and civic leaders, and with an impressive group of Convergencia leaders. These are about 20 former opponents, including Contras and UNO leaders who now pledge to work with the FSLN during the coming years. I advised them strongly to forego secret deals and openly support much-needed reforms in the electoral process and the judiciary and parliamentary systems, and to join Bolaños in exposing and rooting out corruption. Both they and Bolaños know that The Carter Center is willing to help with these controversial tasks.

That night, no additional returns had been published, and there was serious dissension in the CSE, so we went there to meet with President Rivas. He tried to convince us that the other members had subverted the process, but it was obvious that gross confusion, last minute changes in software and computer operators, and a politically charged atmosphere were the responsibility of all members. We still suspect that the entire arrangement was designed to precipitate a crisis if the presidential election had been as close as expected.

Tuesday, 11/6/01

There was little more that I could do personally, so I decided to come home. On the way to the airport, I talked with President-elect Bolaños and Ambassador Garza, pledging continued involvement of The Carter Center as long as we are needed. Nicaragua is a nation of great promise and with citizens dedicated to peace and democracy, but too long prevented by war, extreme political rivalry and polarization, and corruption from realizing its potential. El futuro de los nicaragüenses is still uncertain, and they need all the help they can get.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

November 27, 2001

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR CONDOLEEZZA RICE

THROUGH: JOHN F. MAISTO 

FROM: DONNA ROWLAND-GOUGH 

SUBJECT: Response to President Carter on Nicaragua

Former President Jimmy Carter wrote to President Bush on November 8, 2001 to share his assessment of the Nicaraguan presidential election. President Carter was an official international observer at that election.

The NSC received the incoming correspondence on November 9, 2001.

Concurrence by: John Bellinger ; Courtney Nemroff 

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum to the President
- Tab A Letter to President Carter
- Tab B Incoming Correspondence

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 0108466
RECEIVED: 09 NOV 01 19

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: CARTER, JIMMY

DOC DATE: 08 NOV 01
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NICARAGUA
HUMAN RIGHTS

PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: RPT ON ELECTIONS IN NICARAGUA

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR RICE

DUE DATE: 21 NOV 01 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: ROWLAND-GOUGH

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
ROWLAND-GOUGH

FOR CONCURRENCE
BELLINGER
NEMROFF

FOR INFO
ABRAMS
MAISTO
MCILHENNY
STURTEVANT

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTSM

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED



Nov-08-01

05:41pm

From-THE CARTER CENTER

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T-483 P.001

F-371

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0466



JIMMY CARTER

PLEASE STAFF

FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION*From the OFFICE OF JIMMY CARTER*Date November 8, 2001Number of pages including cover sheet 7

To:

President George BushThe Honorable
Condoleeza Rice

Phone

Fax Phone 202.456.9230

CC:

From:

Jimmy Carter

CONTACT:

Faye PerduePhone 404.331.3900Fax Phone 404.331.0283**REMARKS:**☐ Urgent☒ For your review☐ Reply ASAP☐ Please comment

A hard copy is being forwarded via U.S. Postal Service.

Thank you.

1 Copen hill
453 Freedom Parkway
Arlington, VA 22207

NOV 9 11:00

President Jimmy Carter
1 Copenhill
453 Freedom Parkway
Atlanta, GA 30307

Dear President Carter:

Thank you for sending your observations and assessment of the recent presidential election in Nicaragua. I share your concern about the many political and economic challenges that await President-elect Bolanos and appreciate your generous offer of assistance to him from the Carter Center. Bolanos will need all our encouragement and support after he takes office in January.

The Carter Center played an essential role over the past year in helping ensure that this election was open and transparent. Please accept my personal thanks for your dedication and my gratitude to all those who joined you in working to give Nicaraguans another opportunity to express their support for democracy. We are fortunate to have your expertise as a resource.

Sincerely,

George W. Bush



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 4, 2001

The Honorable
~~President~~ Jimmy Carter
1 Copenhill
453 Freedom Parkway
Atlanta, GA 30307

Dear President Carter:

Thank you for sending your observations and assessment of the recent presidential election in Nicaragua. I share your concern about the many political challenges that await President-elect Bolanos and appreciate your generous offer of assistance to him from the Carter Center. Bolanos will need all our encouragement and support when he takes office in January.

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Sincerely,

George W. Bush



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 4, 2001

The Honorable Jimmy Carter
1 Copenhill
453 Freedom Parkway
Atlanta, Georgia 30307

MR,
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Sincerely,

George W. Bush

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE

SUBJECT: Response to President Carter on Nicaragua

Purpose

To reply to President Carter.

Background

President Carter and a large delegation from the Carter Center served as official observers for the Nicaraguan presidential contest on November 4, 2001. President Carter wrote to you to offer his observations on how the election process unfolded. He also shares some thoughts on the recent World Series.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to President Carter
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

17

PRESIDENTIAL/NSA CORRESPONDENCE

IMMEDIATE ACTION REQUIRED

ACTION OFFICER: DULAND - Gault LOG NUMBER: 8466

DUE DATE: 21 NOV

DATE STAFFED: 9 NOV

CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESSED TO:



PRESIDENT



NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR

FROM: CARTER, Jimmy

PREPARE A RESPONSE FOR THE PRESIDENT'S OR NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR'S SIGNATURE WITHIN 10 DAYS. IF A LETTER DOES NOT REQUIRE A RESPONSE, PLEASE RETURN IT TO RECORDS MANAGEMENT (RM 379) WITH THIS FORM, ANNOTATED ACCORDINGLY.