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| DOCUMENT NO. | FORM             | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                                                               | PAGES | DATE       | RESTRICTION(S)                                            |
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| 002          | Email            | strategic principles for the Intelligence fight - To: Steve Hadley - From: Newt Gingrich                    | 7     | 10/25/2003 | P3/b3; P5; P6/b6;<br>( <del>50</del> USC 4039, Section 6) |
| 003          | Handwritten Note | [Note to Karl Rove] - To: Karl Rove - From: POTUS                                                           | 1     | 10/10/2003 | P5;                                                       |
| 004          | Email            | Here's the text - attachments will follow [with attachment] - To: Melissa S. Bennett - From: Carolyn Nelson | 3     | 10/07/2003 | P5;                                                       |
| 005          | Email            | FW: Important Follow-Up Message from Counsel's Office - To: Melissa S. Bennett - From: Carolyn Nelson       | 2     | 10/07/2003 | P5;                                                       |

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Droege, Philip (Phil)

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| DOCUMENT NO. | FORM             | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                                       | PAGES | DATE       | RESTRICTION(S) |
|--------------|------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------|------------|----------------|
| 006          | Letter           | [Letter to Charles Stone] - To: Charles Stone - From: Andrew H. Card                | 1     | 11/25/2003 | P6/b6;         |
| 007          | Letter           | [Letter to Andrew Card] - To: Andrew Card - From: Charles W. Stone                  | 2     | 11/05/2003 | P6/b6;         |
| 008          | Handwritten Note | WHIG (White House Iraq Group) - To: WHIG (White House Iraq Group) - From: Karl Rove | 1     | N.D.       | P5;            |

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
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## Bush Falls to Pre-9/11 Approval Rating

By Ronald Brownstein  
Times Staff Writer

October 2, 2003



WASHINGTON — Beset by reversals at home and abroad, President Bush has seen his job-approval rating tumble to its level before the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, and he now faces an electorate as narrowly split as in the 2000 election, new polls have found.

In a succession of surveys, Bush's support has eroded — amid public anxiety over the rising price tag and casualty count in Iraq and the continued sluggishness of the domestic economy — to the point where Americans divide almost exactly in half on whether he is doing a good job as president and whether they prefer him or a Democrat in the 2004 election.

Both in its precarious balance and its sharp polarization along lines of partisanship, race and education, the country's assessment of Bush today closely resembles the achingly close divide that defined the 2000 vote and the first months of his presidency.

"We are back to where we were in 2000 and where we were on Sept. 10 [2001]," said Andrew Kohut, director of the nonpartisan Pew Research Center for the People and the Press. "In a sense, we are back to square one."

Most analysts in both parties agree that Bush is stronger today than he was before Sept. 11 in one key aspect — voters have more confidence in him as a leader, particularly in the war against terrorism. And in next year's campaign, Bush should benefit from an enormous fund-raising lead over the eventual Democratic nominee, as well as a formidable Republican effort to turn out supporters.

But growing doubts about Bush's policies on Iraq and the economy have depressed his support in most polls to the 50% level that experts in both parties consider the danger zone for an incumbent.

GOP strategists were quick to point out that other presidents with approval ratings even lower than Bush's during their third year — including Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton — easily won reelection.

But the approval ratings for Reagan and Clinton were rising around this point in their presidencies. In the last 50 years, the only presidents whose approval ratings were unambiguously falling in Gallup surveys as they entered their election year were Gerald R. Ford and George H. W. Bush, the president's father. Both were defeated.

"There is plenty of time still for [the younger Bush] to recover," said Alan Abramowitz, a political scientist at Emory University in Atlanta. "But the trend is more worrisome for him at this point than where he is in absolute terms."

Bush's approval ratings fell after an avalanche of bad news. He has been hurt by continuing U.S. casualties in Iraq, public sticker shock over his request for \$87 billion that would mostly go to that country for security and rebuilding efforts, and the reluctance of allies who resisted the war to contribute troops or money.

At home, he is struggling against a continued loss of jobs — almost 2.7 million since he took office — that threatens to leave him the first president since Herbert Hoover to preside over a net job loss during a full term.

Also, the Census Bureau reported recently that in 2002, the income for average families declined for the second consecutive year, poverty shot up by 1.7 million (the largest one-year increase since the elder Bush was president) and the number of Americans without health insurance grew by 2.4 million (again, the biggest annual increase since his father was in office).

On top of that, Bush now faces a brewing scandal. As Democrats push for an independent counsel, the Justice Department is investigating reports that administration officials disclosed to journalists the name of a CIA operative to retaliate against her husband, former diplomat Joseph C. Wilson IV. Wilson had concluded in a study for the CIA that there was no evidence to support claims Bush voiced in his State of the Union speech in January that then-Iraqi President Saddam Hussein had tried to obtain enriched uranium for nuclear weapons in Niger.

Stanley B. Greenberg, a leading Democratic strategist, said Bush's troubles might have crystallized when he gave his speech in early September unveiling the \$87-billion spending request — apparently far more than most Americans were expecting.

"For two years, he was the commander in chief and his image was shaped by that circumstance and people's desire for him to succeed," said Greenberg. "What happened in Iraq was people lost confidence both in what was happening on the ground and his honesty, and that led people to look at him differently on all aspects. Suddenly, problems that were accumulating matter a lot more."

Abramowitz, who specializes in studying the relationship between public opinion, economic performance and election outcomes, says the good news for Bush is that all this bad news is coming now. Most voters don't solidify their opinions on a president until his fourth year, with attitudes about the economy hardening about six months before election day, he said.

That leaves Bush a substantial window of opportunity to rebuild support. However, in a judgment echoed by other analysts, Abramowitz said Bush's decline in support has left him largely hostage to events: He's unlikely to see his approval rating rise enough to guarantee an easy reelection unless he can point to tangible improvements at home and in Iraq.

For Bush to find himself in such a position is a remarkable change in the political landscape. After Sept. 11, he enjoyed the most sustained boost in approval that any president in recent times had experienced amid a national crisis.

Before Bush, every president who got such a boost had seen his approval ratings fall back to pre-crisis levels in 46 weeks or less, GOP pollster Bill McInturff found.

But Bush's boost lasted just over two years. In a CNN/USA Today/Gallup Poll taken just before the 2001 attacks, 51% of Americans said they approved of his performance. He remained above that level until last week, when the latest CNN/USA Today/Gallup survey put him at 50%, the weakest showing of his presidency.

Five other new national surveys have shown Bush hovering between 49% and 55%. Likewise, polls matching Bush against a generic Democrat, or asking whether he deserves a second term, are now consistently finding the country divided almost exactly in half — just as it was in the 2000 race between Bush and Democrat Al Gore.

Indeed, careful examination of the recent polls suggests that Bush is once again strong where he was strong in 2000, and weak where he was weak.

The new Pew Center survey, for instance, found that 45% of Americans would vote to reelect Bush today, while 43% would prefer the Democrat. Bush led by 12 percentage points among men; in 2000, he carried men by 11 points, according to network exit polls.

Women, who gave Gore an 11-point margin in 2000, preferred the Democrat by seven points in the Pew Center poll.

Bush led among Republicans by 83 percentage points (exactly his margin in 2000), and trailed among Democrats by 67 points, a slight improvement from his showing three years ago. Independents in the survey preferred Bush by two percentage points — exactly his margin in 2000.

While these numbers indicate that Bush retains a solid base of support among Republicans and conservative-leaning independents, they suggest that he has failed to significantly expand that base.

"Where he is now suggests that he hasn't capitalized on the positive feelings that the public had for his administration in the weeks, months and even year following [Sept. 11]," Kohut said.

Matthew Dowd, chief strategist for Bush's reelection committee, says it is unrealistic to believe that the president can secure lasting allegiance from voters outside his base because the nation has become so polarized in its political attitudes.

"You've got 80% to 90% of the country that look at each other like they are on separate planets," Dowd said.

But others believe that Bush may have squandered the opportunity to win over voters attracted to his leadership on terrorism by advancing an ideologically polarizing agenda centered on tax cuts at home and the pursuit of war in Iraq without explicit U.N. approval.

"His style has been to play to his base," Abramowitz said.

That approach could still carry Bush to victory next year. McInturff noted that incumbent presidents usually lose only when they suffer significant defections within their party and face strong primary challenges — the circumstances that helped doom Ford in 1976, Jimmy Carter in 1980 and Bush's father in 1992.

Still, with the huge wave that lifted him after Sept. 11 having dissipated, Bush appears to be approaching the 2004 election much the way he began his term: with the country polarized almost evenly for and against him, and a critical slice of swing voters ready to break the tie based less on personal allegiance than the results he delivers.

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Goergen, Barbara J.

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From: Karl Rove [kr@georgewbush.com]  
Sent: Monday, November 24, 2003 11:57 AM  
To: Goergen, Barbara J.  
Subject: Fw: Fwd: "What's Wrong with the CIA?" by Herbert E Meyer, Hillsdale College Speech



'What's Wrong with  
the CIA?" b...

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Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com <Thirdwave2@aol.com>  
To: Karl Rove <kr@georgewbush.com>; jbolten@omb.eop.gov <jbolten@omb.eop.gov>  
Sent: Sat Nov 22 11:01:07 2003  
Subject: Fwd: "What's Wrong with the CIA?" by Herbert E Meyer, Hillsdale College Speech  
  
t <<"What's Wrong with the CIA?" by Herbert E Meyer, Hillsdale College Speech>> his is  
well worth reading newt

**Goergen, Barbara J.**

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**From:** E Joseph West (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Sunday, October 26, 2003 6:46 PM  
**To:** Alvin S Felzenberg (E-mail); Alvin S Felzenberg (E-mail 2)  
**Subject:** "What's Wrong with the CIA?" by Herbert E Meyer, Hillsdale College Speech

This ought to be required reading for the 9-11 Commission members and anyone else who thinks they know what ails the CIA.

Best regards,  
Joe

Joe

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What's Wrong with the CIA?

Herbert E. Meyer

Herbert E. Meyer is founder and president of Real-World Intelligence, Inc., a company that designs business intelligence systems for corporations and financial institutions, and of Storm King Press. During the Reagan administration, he served as special assistant to the director of the Central Intelligence Agency and as vice chairman of the CIA's National Intelligence Council. He is the recipient of the National Intelligence Distinguished Service Medal, the intelligence community's highest honor. Prior to his service with the government, Mr. Meyer was an associate editor of Fortune, where he specialized in international reporting. He has written widely in newspapers and periodicals, including the Wall Street Journal, Policy Review and National Review Online, and is the author of several books, including Real-World Intelligence, The War Against Progress and Hard Thinking. He has also produced a new video entitled The Siege of Western Civilization.

<[http://www.hillsdale.edu/newimprimis/2003/october/Meyer\\_large.jpg](http://www.hillsdale.edu/newimprimis/2003/october/Meyer_large.jpg)>

The following is adapted from a lecture at a Hillsdale College seminar entitled "The History, Purpose and Propriety of U.S. Intelligence Activities," held on the Hillsdale campus on September 14-18, 2003.

### What's Wrong with the CIA?

It's obvious that something is wrong with the CIA. The 9/11 attacks were, by definition, the worst intelligence failure in our country's history. More recently, we have had trouble locating Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and have been consumed by the flap over whether the CIA signed off on President Bush's accurate observation in his State of the Union speech that British intelligence believes Saddam Hussein had tried to purchase uranium ore in Niger.

In each of these cases, the CIA was asleep at the switch, not quite on the ball, or tossing a banana peel under the president's feet. In the midst of a war in which intelligence must play a central role, we need a CIA that is razor sharp and playing offense, not one that blindsides the country or embarrasses the commander-in-chief.

So what's the problem? Before answering this question, we need to acknowledge two points: First, intelligence is the riskiest, toughest business in the world. Compared with trying to project the future of world politics or discovering a country's most closely guarded secrets, day trading in the stock market is child's play and exploring for diamonds is a piece of cake. In the intelligence business, no one gets it right every time - or even most of the time - and it's easy to take potshots at honorable people who are doing their best under difficult circumstances.

The second point is that the CIA employs some of the hardest working and most decent men and women I have ever known. They are absolutely wonderful; we are lucky to have them and we owe them our gratitude.

The problem with the CIA lies within its structure and culture. It doesn't match the task, because the analytic side of intelligence is unlike any other function of government. It is unlike budget-making, diplomacy, or the setting of policy for trade or agriculture. Intelligence is like science, which means that success depends utterly on having the most brilliant people studying a problem. Only they will know how to go about finding the right answer - and how to communicate it clearly and early enough to make a difference.

As geniuses like Albert Einstein and Jonas Salk remind us, in science there is no substitute for sheer intellectual firepower - in other words, for brains. This is why scientific research institutes hire the smartest people they can find, and why they place scientists at the top who are even more brilliant to manage the team and, when necessary, to decide which of their proposed experiments to back and which to stop. That's why so many leading research institutes are headed by Nobel laureates. And it's why the big breakthroughs in science come from research institutes rather than government-operated labs.

During World War II, we had the kind of intelligence service that matched this model. It was the Office of Strategic Services. Led by a brilliant and tough-minded lawyer named William J. Donovan, the OSS was a free-wheeling collection of our country's best minds. Donovan recruited them from Wall Street, the corporate world, academia, research labs - wherever they were working. They were lawyers, administrators, financiers, economists, technicians, writers and university professors. What they had in common - besides a burning sense of patriotism - was a special kind of brilliance that you find in scientists and must have in intelligence analysts: the ability to spot a pattern with the fewest possible facts. They didn't wait until two and two were sitting on their desks to realize they had four. They could make intuitive and logical leaps quickly and figure out what the indicators meant before it was obvious to everyone. And they articulated their conclusions clearly enough, and early enough, to get the policymakers moving before it was too late. To this day, intelligence experts consider the OSS to be among history's greatest and most effective intelligence services.

### How Reagan Did It

When the Cold War revved up in the late 1940s, Congress created the CIA to pick up where the OSS had left off. Indeed, in its early years the CIA was led and staffed by scores of OSS veterans. But over the years, the CIA became more like every other government agency - the Commerce Department or the Agriculture Department or what have you. It began to hire young people who joined in hopes of making the CIA their careers. Their objective was to do well, move up through the ranks, and provide their families with a decent income, good health-care coverage and a government pension. To be sure, some truly brilliant analysts did join up. Sometimes they would become so frustrated by the CIA's culture that they would resign. Others stayed and did their heroic best in a culture that rarely appreciated their contributions and all too often blocked them from rising to positions their talents deserved.

By the time President Reagan took office in 1981, the CIA had become bureaucratic, sclerotic and woefully inadequate to its mission. The man President Reagan chose as his Director of Central Intelligence, William J. Casey, understood the problem. Indeed, during World War II, Casey had been Bill Donovan's protégé, based in London as head of secret operations for the OSS. Casey did two things to solve the problem, of which only the first has received much attention. He strived mightily to improve and reform the CIA itself, and his efforts generated more leaks, lies, smears and congressional inquiries than any of us who worked with Bill Casey care to remember.

And while all this gave the Washington establishment something juicy to blather about at their lunches and dinner parties, Casey did something else that the kibitzers failed to notice and that few people other than President Reagan understood: He created an OSS within the CIA itself. That is, he brought in a small cadre of outsiders to work with him - people whom he could protect from bureaucratic attacks - to get the job done.

As one of those privileged to be among that cadre, let me try to give you a sense of what it was like on the inside. In doing so, please keep in mind that I am talking about the CIA during the Reagan administration, and that was quite some time ago. Nevertheless, it's clear that, in the years since President Reagan led our country, the CIA has reverted to its pre-Reagan culture. It's better now than it was before 9/11 - especially in operations - but still it falls short of where it needs to be. And again I remind you that the CIA then and now includes many fine people - and a few who are just outstanding. It's the culture in which they work that's the problem, and which I am trying to describe.

The most striking feature of the CIA's analytic culture was its blandness. The secrets were fascinating, of course, but intellectually it was a boring place to work. Most of the analysts simply weren't as well read as they should have been. For instance, they seemed not to have read much more in history than most college graduates. That may be acceptable for people elsewhere in the government, but not for people on whom the president relies to know what is really going on in the world and to predict the future soon enough so that he can change that future before it happens. They read the Washington Post, the New York Times, Time or Newsweek, perhaps U.S. News & World Report, and occasionally the Economist. I rarely met anyone who read Commentary, National Review, the Wall Street Journal editorial page, or any other cutting-edge publication where the world's leading thinkers expound their ideas and perceptions about the world. The CIA's analysts thought that the secret information to which they alone had access made all of that "open-source" insight unimportant.

In addition, the analysts weren't as well-connected as they ought to have been. Because they had spent most, if not all, of their careers at the agency (and, in fairness, because of the agency's stringent rules about talking with outsiders), they hadn't had the opportunity to meet and get to know people who were forging high-powered careers in business, in the investment community and in politics. As a result, the analysts were cut off from some of the world's smartest people, from the ideas these people were bringing into the commercial and intellectual marketplaces and, perhaps more importantly, from the information about the world these people were picking up along the way. The CIA's analysts worked hard - very hard, actually - but all too often they just didn't have the knowledge or the intellectual firepower you would find at our country's leading think tanks or university faculties.

#### Connecting the Dots

Getting CIA analysts to "connect the dots" was sometimes excruciating. One now-famous incident involved a National Intelligence Estimate regarding state-sponsored terrorism. The question was whether the Soviet Union was itself involved. The analysts insisted it

was not. "But look," I said. "We know there are terrorist training camps in Soviet-bloc countries - we have pictures of them. It just isn't possible those governments are unaware of these camps. And we know these governments don't so much as buy a box of paper clips without Moscow's approval. So the Soviet Union must know about these camps, and if they know about them and allow them to operate, that means the Soviet Union is involved."

The analysts responded with the classic CIA reply: "We have no evidence of that." They wouldn't concede that it was the logic of the situation that comprised the evidence, rather than some purloined document from the safe in Leonid Brezhnev's office. One reason they wouldn't concede the point is that they simply didn't grasp it. Another reason - and I'm dragging my heels as I say this, because it's impressionistic rather than provable, but it simply must be said to understand the problem - is that they didn't want to see it.

To put this as bluntly as possible, when I was there, most career CIA analysts - like their civil service counterparts in agencies throughout the government - weren't Reagan supporters. They didn't like the president, and they thought his policies were misguided or even downright nuts. So they didn't want to give him any ammunition he could use to make his case and drive his policies forward. I am not suggesting that the analysts withheld supporting evidence on purpose. Rather, I am suggesting that they are human beings like the rest of us, and it is human nature not to go out of your way to help someone accomplish a goal you believe is wrong or dangerous.

Sometimes we were able to convince the analysts to modify the final product. Other times we were able to bludgeon them into making the changes we wanted - although these episodes had a nasty habit of turning up in the next day's edition of the Washington Post. Then, before lunch, Casey would find himself hauled before some congressional committee and shredded by senators or representatives - mostly, but not always, Democrats - who professed to be outraged that a bunch of right-wing extremist crazies were "interfering with the intelligence professionals" or pressuring them to change their judgments to support the president's policies.

When convincing and bludgeoning failed, our last resort was to go two ways at once: Casey would permit the analysts to say whatever they wanted in their report or estimate. Then, very quietly and often with no paper trail to be found later, he would authorize one or another member of his inner circle - the OSS he had built within the CIA - to produce an alternate memo that reflected their, and his own, judgment. He would allow the official report to be published and distributed, so no one could accuse him of "interfering with the intelligence professionals." But he would put a few copies of the unofficial memo in his briefcase and head down to the White House to hand them out personally to President Reagan and other key members of the administration, all the while suggesting - with Bill's version of a wink and a nod - that when they had finished reading the official CIA version, they take a moment to read this, too. It wasn't elegant or pretty. But it was legal (really, it was), and it reduced the chances of President Reagan being blindsided by a CIA whose career analysts weren't as good as they should have been or embarrassed by a bureaucracy that disliked him and his policies and just plain hated to give him any ammunition.

President Bush deserves no less. He needs a CIA that is razor sharp, playing offense and led by people who support him and his policies. Alas, he doesn't have that. For instance, the incumbent Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet, is a Clinton administration holdover. Of course, the War on Terrorism is different from the Cold War. And today, unlike in the Reagan years, the president's party controls both Houses of Congress. So, the Reagan/Casey solution of creating an OSS within the CIA may not be the right way to go. But it's the idea of finding some way to jump-start the Agency that remains valid, indeed vital. The good news for President Bush is that our country is fairly teeming with talented men and women from all walks of life who want to help fight and win the War on Terrorism, and who would make superb intelligence officers. It's up to the president to figure out how best to harness all of this talent and make today's CIA the sharpest, most effective intelligence service the world has ever known.

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6307

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2014-0234-F

### OA Num.:

8098

### NARA Num.:

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- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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- P5 Release would disclose confidential advise between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

#### Deed of Gift Restrictions

- A. Closed by Executive Order 13526 governing access to national security information.
- B. Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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## QUESTIONS

### 1. The pre-war intelligence was wrong.

- "That fundamental question is, are we using or are we abusing intelligence data to make the case with regard to foreign policy? And if that intelligence data is abused, what circumstances were created that allowed for that to happen and what do we do about it?" (Sen. Tom Daschle On CNN's "Inside Politics," 7/15/03)
- "It's a disgrace that the case for war seems to have been based on shoddy intelligence, hyped intelligence and even false intelligence. All the evidence points to the conclusion that they've put a spin on the intelligence and a spin on the truth. They have undermined America's prestige and credibility in the world." (Sen. Ted Kennedy On CNN's "Inside Politics," 7/15/03)

### 2. We were deliberately misled into war.

- "Rockefeller said U.S. worries about Iraqi nuclear weapons were not based primarily on the documents, but 'there is a possibility that the fabrication of these documents may be part of a larger deception campaign aimed at manipulating public opinion and foreign policy regarding Iraq.'" (Ken Guggenheim, "Rockefeller Requests FBI Investigation Of Forged Iraq Documents," *The Associated Press*, 3/14/03)
- "He said, for example, it was the White House, not the intelligence community, that tried to connect Iraq to the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks -- although such a link has never been proved. It is increasingly clear that much of the intelligence 'was not accurate.' Rockefeller said. But I think a greater problem is whether it was shaped, whether it got that way because of influence or intimidation." (Sonru Efron and Greg Miller, "Intelligence Veteran Faults Iraq Arms Data," *Los Angeles Times*, 10/29/03)

### 3. Iraq wasn't an imminent threat.

- "It is clear to me that there was not an imminent threat from weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Saddam Hussein may have had aspirations to develop such weapons, but, as the interim report indicates, whatever aspirations he had ran well beyond Iraq's capabilities. Because the threat was not imminent, there was certainly time for more diplomatic efforts to be made before we went to war." (Rep. Nancy Pelosi, "Statement after Meeting with Weapons Inspector David Kay," Press Release, 10/3/03)
- "Last fall, I came here to reaffirm my conviction that 9/11 had not nullified the long-standing basic principle that war should be the last resort, and to argue the case that America should not go to war against Iraq unless and until all other reasonable alternatives had been exhausted. Then -- as now -- I believed that the threat posed by Saddam Hussein was not serious enough or imminent enough to justify a rush to war, and that we were going to war under false pretenses." (Sen. Ted Kennedy, Remarks At The Johns Hopkins University's School Of Advanced International Studies, 7/15/03)

### 4. We've abandoned the war on terror.

- "Well, let me first say I voted against the resolution that authorized war in Iraq, not because of the issues of Niger but because I thought it would take our focus away from the principal enemy to the people of the United States, al-Qaida and other international terrorist groups, and that is precisely what has happened. They have been allowed to regroup, regenerate, and now conduct a series of terrorist attacks in one of which seven Americans were killed." (Senator Bob Graham On CBS' "Face The Nation," 7/20/03)
- "[A]s long as Iraq continues to dominate our attention, we cannot give other aspects of the war against terrorism the focus they deserve. Has the American occupation of Iraq defeated Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda? No. Has it increased our security against the continuing Al Qaeda threats in Afghanistan and other terrorist sanctuaries? No. Has our action in Iraq led Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda to lay aside their sworn purpose of killing Americans and destroying our way of life? No. It is not just what happens in Iraq itself, as important as that issue is, but the continuing urgency of the ongoing fight against terrorism that should compel this Administration to enlist our allies in an international plan to put Iraq back on track. Otherwise,

we run the grave risk of exposing our nation to more terrorist attacks.” (Sen. Ted Kennedy, Remarks At The Johns Hopkins University’s School Of Advanced International Studies, 7/15/03)

- “We are presently engaged in not one, but two wars. There is the war begun by Osama Bin Laden who attacked this nation on the 11th of September, 2001. Then there is the war begun by George W. Bush when he directed U.S. forces to attack the city of Baghdad on March 19, 2003. The first war was thrust upon us. ... The second war was a war of our choosing. It was an unnecessary attack upon a sovereign nation. This President and this Administration have tried mightily to convince the people of America that attacking Iraq was critical to protecting them from terrorism. The case they make is false, flimsy, and, the war, I believe, was unwise. The war against Iraq has crippled the global effort to counter terrorism.” (Sen Robert Byrd, Remarks On “Losing Dollars and Sense in Iraq,” 9/17/03)

## 5. We won the war but we’re losing the peace.

- “On May 1, President Bush announced aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln that the United States and our allies had prevailed and that ‘major combat operations’ in Iraq had ended. Not exactly. American troops in Iraq are now serving as police officers in a shooting gallery. In recent weeks, they’ve been subjected to 10 to 25 violent attacks a day by hostile fighters or forces. In the 76 days that have passed since the President spoke, 81 more American troops have died. For the men and women of our armed forces who are dodging bullets in the streets and alleys of Baghdad, and other parts of Iraq, the battle is far from over. President Bush says of the attackers, ‘Bring em on.’ But how do you console a family by telling them that their son or daughter is a casualty of the post-war period?” (Sen. Ted Kennedy, Remarks At The Johns Hopkins School Of Advanced International Studies, Washington, DC, 7/15/03)
- “Senate Democratic leader Tom Daschle of South Dakota distinguished between the war itself and the handling of its aftermath. ‘It’s the building of peace that has been the subject of a great deal of criticism,’ Daschle said. ‘It’s very important that we draw the distinction. And it’s in that keeping of the peace and building up a new peaceful Iraq that I think the president has failed so far.’” (Ken Guggenheim, “A Year After War Vote, Frustrated Democrats Again See Little Choice On Iraq,” *The Associated Press*, 10/13/03)

## 6. We should only have gone in with a real international coalition under the U.N. or NATO

- “In our view, they have failed diplomatically. In our view, they are rushing to war without adequate concern for the ramifications of doing so unilaterally or with a very small coalition of nations.” (Senator Tom Daschle As Quoted In Carl Hulse, “Top Democrats Say A War Against Iraq Is Premature,” *The New York Times*, 3/7/03)
- “We would have been better off if we had internationalized this from the start, but we didn’t. ... We must internationalize the effort so our troops are not taking all the risks and our taxpayers paying all the bills.” (Rep. Nancy Pelosi, *Congressional Record*, 10/16/03)
- “We knew – or should have known – that if we went into this without the genuine support of the international community, there would be no easy way out. As [Assistant Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Navy in the Reagan Administration] James Webb also warned, ‘Those who are pushing for a unilateral war in Iraq know full well that there is no exit strategy if we invade and stay.’” (Sen. Ted Kennedy, Remarks At The Johns Hopkins School Of Advanced International Studies, Washington, DC, 7/15/03)

## 7. We need to turn Iraqi reconstruction over to United Nations.

- “In his speech today, the President missed an opportunity to show his commitment to securing a United Nations mandate for an international force to bring security and stability to Iraq. I had hoped the President would have sought international consensus in a spirit of cooperation. By not doing so, the President underscored how much difficult work remains before we get a significant amount of international participation in the effort to stabilize Iraq.” (Rep. Nancy Pelosi, “President Bush Missed An Opportunity At The U.N. Today,” Press Release, 9/23/03)
- “As we all know, a number of countries supported our military action against Saddam Hussein. Many others did not. But if the Administration is willing to put the national interest ahead of its own ideological pride, I believe that we can secure broad international support and participation in the stabilization and

reconstruction of Iraq. After all, so much is clearly at stake for the rest of the world." (Sen. Ted Kennedy, Remarks At The Johns Hopkins School Of Advanced International Studies, Washington, DC, 7/15/03)

#### **8. Preemptive doctrine is wrong and dangerous.**

- "This is the war we should not have fought. It's a war to carry out the preemptive strike doctrine. That's what it really began with. And so now we're in Iraq. We're having real problems that we did not foresee. And we're trying to wrap the Iraq problems around the 9/11 disaster that hit this country. We're trying to view everything now in the context of the war on terrorism, which began under the preemptive strike doctrine. That's why we're in Iraq. I was opposed to it. I thought we could achieve everything we were seeking to achieve just by using a little more patience, the word, General [Myers], that you used." (Sen. Robert Byrd [D-WV], Committee On Armed Services, U S Senate, Hearing, 9/9/03)
- "Now this preemptive war doctrine bothers me, because I used to hear that during the Cold War when we were squared off against the Soviet Union. And you'd hear these strident voices, why don't we hit those buggers now when we have a nuclear lead? We didn't do that. We contained them. We deterred them with our own nuclear force. And eventually both China and Russia have swung around to a more moderate, constructive position. ... This is the course I'd really like to see us follow with regard to Saddam Hussein." (Former Sen. George McGovern, Fox News' "Hannity & Colmes," 10/21/02)

#### **9. We should have given more time to diplomacy and inspections.**

- "I say that if waiting a month will get Russia, Germany, France, Chile, Canada, Angola, you know, these countries -- to say -- you know, the American people, the people in Nevada want another resolution. The president told us in his press conference. There's going to be a vote. Let people be accounted -- let countries be accounted for how they stand on this issue. I think we should have another resolution and a vote on it." (Sen. Harry Reid [D-NV] On CNN's "Late Edition," 3/16/03)

#### **10. We've angered important allies and alienated the U.S. from the international community.**

- "At issue are the stability and the future of the entire highly volatile region. None would be immune from the dangers that a disunited and disorganized Iraq could present for its neighbors and for nations everywhere. These are not just American or British concerns. They are true international concerns. We need to take the chip off our shoulder, mend fences with France and with Germany, and stop the divisiveness. America cannot be effective in its mission in Iraq if old wounds don't heal and bitterness continues to fester." (Sen. Ted Kennedy, Remarks At The Johns Hopkins School Of Advanced International Studies, Washington, DC, 7/15/03)
- "Instead of linking arms with a world which offered its heart in sympathy after the brutality of the terrorist attack in September of 2001, this White House, through hubris and false bravado, has slapped away the hand of assistance. This Administration has insulted our allies and friends with its bullying, and go-it-alone frenzy to attack the nation of Iraq. In order to justify such an attack, it was decided somewhere in the White House to blur the images of Saddam Hussein and Osama Bin Laden." (Sen. Robert Byrd, Remarks On "Losing Dollars and Sense in Iraq," 9/17/03)

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Aside from the daily violence, Dep. Sec/Defense **Paul Wolfowitz** said Iraqis "fear" that Bush may lose WH 2004. He said "one worried resident ... of Najaf asked him ... at a town hall meeting, 'What's going to happen to us if George Bush loses the election?' Wolfowitz "said he tried to assure the Iraqis, but 'when they hear the message that we might not be there next year, they get very scared.'" DNC spokesperson **Debra DeShong**: "Iraqis are more worried about bombs and bullets than they are about ballots" (Sisk, New York *Daily News*, 10/31).

### Clock's Ticking...

The Senate Intell Cmte sent a letter to Rice demanding that the WH "lift 'its objections and hand over ... documents related to intelligence about Iraq" and its WMD "before the war." The "panel set a deadline of noon" today "for compliance" by the WH, "the same as it has set" for the CIA, the State Dept. and the Pentagon "to provide documents and schedule interviews that the committee has been seeking for months. ... Among the documents sought by the committee ... are copies" of Bush's "Daily Brief, a document prepared by the CIA that the White House has until now maintained was off limits to Congress because of executive privilege." Cong. officials "said the documents also included" memos "between the CIA and the White House discussing disputed claims that Iraq was seeking to obtain enriched uranium from Niger for its nuclear weapons program" (Jehl, New York *Times*, 10/31). WH officials "said they were cooperating with the committee" (Miller, Los Angeles *Times*, 10/31).

### ...Tick-Tock, Tick-Tock...

*Dallas Morning News* **Leubsdorf** writes, "The Bush White House could be asking for trouble by resisting demands from the independent commission investigating" 9/11. "The commission is believed to be especially interested in the text of briefings in the weeks before" 9/11. "That might show the extent to which" Bush "had any warnings of the attacks. ... That, in turn, could help to answer the question of whether he could have done anything to prevent them. ... Ultimately, the truth about how" Bush "handled any pre-Sept. 11 warnings will come out. But it looks as if the White House would just as soon have this happen later rather than sooner" (10/30).

*Washington Post*: "If Mr. Bush did not mean to share the country's most sensitive secrets with the commissioners, he should not have signed the bill in the first place. Since he did so, it makes no sense for him now to refuse it access to material its members regard as critical. It isn't reasonable to expect commissioners to put their names on a report they know to be based on incomplete information, only to look like fools when that information comes out and contradicts their conclusions (10/31).

### Politicians Have Long Memories

The House "approved the Iraq package on a vote of 298 to 121 ..., and the Senate was expected to follow on" 11/3 to send Bush the bill providing \$87B for Iraq and Afghanistan. "But beneath the apparent victory" for Bush "lie deep tensions even among" GOPers "who have felt shut out and taken for granted."

*F. Hagel* Sen. **Chuck Hagel** (R-NE): "They have treated us like a nuisance and appendage" (Hook, Los Angeles *Times*, 10/31).

More Hagel, on the relationship between Bush and Congress on Iraq: "We need to ask questions, and sometimes that requires a little tension. But tension grinds down flabby policy and flabby arguments. And to just go along with the president because he's my party or my president is not a responsible action on my part. I fail my country when I do that. And I would hope the president himself and his administration understands that each of us, elected by the people, take the same oath of office as he does. And we have responsibilities to be partners. It is a co-equal branch of government. The Constitution is clear on that. And I think those where we've had some break down, not only in understanding responsibility but appreciating how much knowledge and experience and help the president can get from the Hill if he will reach out



F: 576011

*N New York's Senator*

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**FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE**  
October 29, 2003

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## STATEMENT OF SENATOR SCHUMER ON NOMINATION OF JAMES COMEY

I want to thank James Comey for the opportunity to introduce him. It's a sign of the kind of person Mr. Comey is that after we met yesterday, he still wanted me to introduce him. Because while I told him I'd praise his experience, reputation, and character, I was going to insist on answers to some tough questions about the CIA leak investigation before I would decide how to vote. Nonetheless, Mr. Comey wanted me to introduce him and I'm proud to do so.

Before I get to his professional qualifications, I should note that Jim is a Yonkers native and, if he's confirmed, my state will lose seven constituents: Jim, his wife Patrice, and their five children. I've gotten to know Jim personally and I'm convinced that he's a man of honor and integrity. He puts family and country before all other interests and every day he works hard to ensure he serves both to the best of his abilities.

Everyone you talk to who knows him says great things about him and in a world where it's easy to make enemies, Jim Comey has managed to do nothing but win admirers. When it comes to the professional, it would be hard to find a more impressive resume and reputation.

Jim Comey is a prosecutor's prosecutor. When Mary Jo White left her post as the US Attorney in the Southern District of New York, she left some pretty big shoes to fill. The White House proposed Jim Comey and I don't know that they could have come up with a better man for the job. With his terrorism prosecution experience – including handling the Khobar Towers case – his management experience running the US Attorney's office in Richmond – and his reputation as a guy who doesn't pull punches, it was an easy choice to support him.

Since he became the Southern District's top prosecutor, Jim has only burnished his reputation. He has been an excellent US Attorney and has solidified his standing as one of the best.

So there's no question that he's qualified, there's no question he's a fine man, and, under normal circumstances, there would be no question of my unqualified support for him. But these are not normal circumstances.

Over the past several weeks, the Department of Justice has been handling – or should I say mishandling – the investigation into who leaked the identity of a covert CIA agent.

**MEDIA ATTENTION FILE**  
**ON**



**Mr. Karl Rove**  
**Senior Advisor to the President**

October 21, 2003 – October 26, 2003

***Published By The Office Of Strategic Initiatives***



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**SECTION:** Section 6; Page 26; Column 1; Magazine Desk

**LENGTH:** 844 words

**HEADLINE:** THE WAY WE LIVE NOW: 10-26-03: ON LANGUAGE;  
Frog, March!

**BYLINE:** By William Safire

**BODY:**

'It's of keen interest to me," said the former ambassador Joseph C. Wilson IV, a war critic furious with the revelation of his wife's name as a C.I.A. agent, "to see whether or not we can get Karl Rove frog-marched out of the White House in handcuffs."

Unable to produce any evidence that Rove, the top White House political adviser, was the one who "outed" his wife, Wilson modified his charge to say that Rove "condoned" the leak. But Don Imus, the radio interviewer, unfamiliar with the British colloquialism, put the question to Wilson of more direct interest to word-watchers: "What does frog-marched mean?"

"Maybe you should ask Mr. Safire," Wilson said.

"Was he the one -- ?"

"No," Wilson assured him, absolving me of being a nefarious leakee, "but isn't he the arbiter of language?"

This doesn't need an arbiter of usage as much as an etymologist of slang. (An arbiter would address Wilson's whether or not, in which the or not is pleonastic -- excess verbiage -- but has long been common usage.) Wilson's own understanding of the phrase he popularized was "two guys, one on either side, marching somebody out."

Close, but no cigar. The Briton John C. Hotten, in his classic 1873 Slang Dictionary, defined frog's march as "the manner in which four or more policemen carry a drunken or turbulent man to the station-house. The victim is held face downwards, one constable being at each shoulder, while the others hold on above the knees. Often another officer beats time on the recalcitrant hero's posteriors."

After Wilson's well-publicized usage, the usual suspects in the derivation dodge were rounded up by David Montgomery in The Washington Post. A prisoner so carried "was thought to look like a frog," speculated Jesse Sheidlower of the O.E.D. At Webster's New World, Mike Agnes offered his personal mental image: "A guard on each side grabbing one arm and lifting both feet off the ground, and the legs are scrambling for purchase on the ground, and hence kinked like a frog's." The author of the Harry Potter series, J. K. Rowling, who used the colorful verb in one of her books for children, gave her understanding of the compound to a questioner on the "Today" show: "That's when two people stand on either side of a third

person and they force them to walk along. It's like you're under arrest."

Is the meaning associated with the slur frog, directed at a French person? That deliberate offense, possibly influenced by the use of frog's legs as a delicacy in French cuisine as well as the fr sound, can be found in a 1772 British doggerel: "They will fly at the French with the stomach of hogs/And, like storks, in a trice clear the sea of the frogs." In a 1922 letter, Ernest Hemingway asked, "Do you speak frawg?"

My judgment is that frog-march is not limited to the manhandling of French people. The meaning now has been generalized to "hustle out, under restraint" prisoners of any nationality. In his 1998 "Picturesque Expressions," Larry Urdang notes French walk as the American equivalent of the British frog's march. He defines it as synonymous with the bum's rush, exquisitely described as "the forcible removal or expulsion of a person, usually from a public place, especially by lifting him by the shirt collar and the seat of his pants to a walking position and propelling him toward the door."

A subtle difference exists, however, relating to the conclusion of the action. Today's frog march (as a noun, two unhyphenated words) implies incarceration after the spread-eagled carriage or its modern grabbing of the arms. A bum's rush -- the Americanism's first citation is 1910 -- suggests the rushee is left lying at the doorway of the saloon after being ousted, roughed up but free.

The slang synonym is the old heave-ho, perhaps originating in sailors' lingo and coined in its metaphoric sense -- to discard a spouse or lover -- by the columnist Damon Runyon in the 1930's. Strictly speaking -- and that's what we do in this space -- the old heave-ho is the act of rejection, while the bum's rush is the act of ejection.

Who wants my wont?

"Both of the senators," said Dr. Howard Dean of Senators John Kerry and Joe Lieberman, "with all due respect, are exaggerating, as is sometimes our wont in politics."

"This morning," wrote Jonathan Chait in (on?) The New Republic Online, "I was reading The National Review Online, as is my wont."

Oxymoronic as it sounds, this archaism is in vogue. The pronunciation wunt is awkward, somewhere between "I won't dance" and "I want out."

It means "custom; habit; usual practice." Frank Sinatra could have sung "I'll do it my wont." It comes from the Old English verb wonen, "to dwell, to be accustomed to the surroundings," and appeared in the legal phrase ought and wont, "due and customary."

Listen for this arch archaism in coming political debates, as candidates strain to become front-runners. As the king said of Gloucester in the second part of Shakespeare's "Henry VI," "'Tis not his wont to be the hindmost man."

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**LOAD-DATE:** October 26, 2003

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Date: 10/20/03

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From: Strategic Initiatives Karl Rove

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- ☐ Appropriate Action
- ☐ Direct Response
- ☐ Prepare Response For My Signature
- ☐ Per Our Conversation
- ☐ Let's Discuss
- ☐ Per Your Request
- ☐ Please Return
- ☐ Deadline
- ☐ Other

*Copy for Dan  
+ return*

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_  
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
*ask if Dan has  
read this.*

# Are the News Media Soft on Bush?

*That much-  
ballyhooed  
"liberal press"*


*hasn't been nearly  
as tough on President  
Bush as it was on his  
predecessor. One key  
reason: Bush's controversies  
have involved policy rather  
than personal peccadilloes, and  
the media have a much bigger  
appetite for the latter. But does  
the weapons of mass destruction  
flap presage a shift?*

BY RACHEL SMOLKIN



**N**inety-four reporters gathered in the stately East Room of the White House to bear witness to a rarity in George W. Bush's presidency: a solo, prime-time press conference.

At 8 p.m. on March 6, Bush began his remarks about "our war against terror," flatly asserting that Saddam Hussein "possesses weapons of terror" and that he and his weapons "are a direct threat to this country." Bush then parried with 18 reporters, who asked 30 questions about the looming war against Iraq and three about North Korea's development of nuclear weapons. Nary a word passed from reporters' lips about the ballooning deficit, rising oil prices, surging unemployment, soaring prescription drug



LARRY DOWNING/REUTERS

**Journalists covering President Bush's March 6 press conference were roundly criticized for their meek performance. One writer called the session a "mini-Alamo for American journalism."**



prices or any other domestic issue.

If a sure loser emerged from that evening assembly, it was the White House press corps. Scathing commentary followed. New York Press contributing writer Matt Taibbi likened the press conference to "a mini-Alamo for American journalism, a final announcement that the press no longer performs anything akin to a real function." Washington Post TV critic Tom Shales panned Bush's performance, then said that the "lethargy was contagious; correspondents were almost as logy as Bush was. Nobody even bothered to ask a question about Osama bin Laden."

ABC News White House correspondent Terry Moran, who participated in the questioning, told the New York Observer that Bush wasn't "suffi-

ciently challenged" by reporters and that the president's performance left the press corps "looking like zombies." Letters posted on Poynter's Romanesko Weblog branded the news conference a "sorry spectacle"; one observed, "the pack appears to have been totally domesticated."

Bush himself acknowledged the event was "scripted" when he called on CNN's John King from a predetermined list of reporters. Critics argued the press should not have succumbed so meekly to such an indignity, and some even accused the White House press corps of submitting questions for advance approval—an allegation that beat reporters vehemently denied.

"I was amazed at the reaction after the press conference," says George E. Condon Jr., Washington bureau chief of Copley News Service, who

asked two of the three North Korea questions and thought most queries were appropriately tough. "It just became an article of faith among a lot of people: 'Look at this White House press corps; it's just abdicated all responsibility.'"

That pre-war press conference crystallized critics' frustration with coverage of Bush. While complaints about reporters' treatment of a president are as widespread as political polls, these protests cannot be dismissed merely as the howls of liberals stranded in the wilderness.

Reporters have handled Bush gingerly, particularly after the September 11 terrorist attacks prompted a surge of patriotism. The administration skillfully capitalized on that sentiment, just as it excelled at controlling information, staying on message and limiting access to Bush from the nascent days of his presidency.

Bush and his allies also have benefited in press coverage from having a weak opposition party. Democrats foundered after 9/11; then the discordant voices of 10 presidential candidates diluted attempts at a unified message.

And as voices from the right saturate radio and cable talk shows, the media have become increasingly sensitive to the venerable conservative shibboleth of liberal bias, a development that also favors the first Republican president in eight years.

These factors softened the adversarial coverage that defined Bill Clinton's presidency—at least until July, when 16 words from Bush's January State of the Union address sparked the first sustained negative coverage of the president since the terrorist attacks.

"Any objective person would say that in some ways Clinton was covered too aggressively in some areas, and Bush is not covered aggressively enough," says ABC News Political Director Mark Halperin. Among stories receiving insufficient attention in his view: the growing deficit, the lack of transparency regarding energy policy formation and, at least initially, the rationale for committing troops to the war in Iraq.

Halperin attributes the uneven coverage in part to the demise of the Independent Counsel law used relentlessly by Clinton's opponents and to the dwindling prestige of the White House beat after the Cold War that gradually led to "less experience and, in some cases, less skill" among White House correspondents. "People like [ABC's] Terry Moran and [CBS'] Mark Knoller are not able to battle the White House by themselves," says Halperin. The president and his staff know the public mistrusts the press and that they can "dismiss us and steamroll over us."

Darrell West, a Brown University political science professor, concurs "there certainly has been a dramatic change in scandal coverage in that Bush has gotten much less scrutiny than Clinton. Bush has not had lifestyle scandals the way that Clinton did, but there are lots of questions about the energy commission and possible conflicts of interest within the Bush administra-



**ABC's Terry Moran says that President Bush's performance made the White House press corps look "like zombies" at a March 6 press conference.**

tion, and those have gotten relatively little attention." The terrorist attacks "made everybody focus on external problems more than internal ones, and that has played to the Bush administration in a lot of different ways. It's helped the Bush administration set the agenda on security grounds, which always makes it more difficult for the press to do their jobs."


Frank Sesno, former CNN senior vice president and Washington bureau chief, says the rising influence of Fox News Channel and concerns about allegations of liberal bias also have shaped coverage. "American journalism has been Foxified essentially, especially television," Sesno says. "The combination of the Fox influence, and the overhang from 9/11, and the overall presumption in America that the media have leaned terrifically left, have made it harder for tough questions to be asked."

**O**f course, the notion that the press has bestowed kinder, gentler treatment upon Bush is by no means unanimous. "Each president I've covered dating back to [Gerald] Ford thinks no other president gets more heated coverage than he did—they all think they get it hotter than their predecessors," says CBS' Knoller. "That tells me that the press is treating each president without fear or favor."

Tucker Carlson, conservative cohost of CNN's "Crossfire," adds: "I never thought that anybody could whine more about the media than the right. But it turns out I was wrong. The left has turned out to be every bit as whiny as conservatives ever were." Carlson says the disputed presidential election fueled unfounded charges from the left about soft media coverage. "There are people who believe that [Bush] won unfairly or didn't win," Carlson says. "If you believe that, you're casting about for ways to explain how it happened."

A July report released by the nonpartisan Council for Excellence in Government examined the first year of three presidential administrations—Ronald Reagan's, Bill Clinton's and George W. Bush's—and concluded that coverage was predominantly "negative" for all three. "Bush is being treated normally for a president, which is to say negatively," says S. Robert Lichter, president of the Center for Media and

**President Bush and his lieutenants "are the best I've seen at getting their message out and making it difficult for you to get beyond that message," says Copley's George E. Condon Jr.**



Public Affairs, an independent group that conducted the study. "The media are tough on presidents."

Investigators analyzed the evening news programs of ABC, CBS and NBC (but not the cable networks) and the front pages of the New York Times, the Washington Post and four regional newspapers—the Austin American-Statesman, Des Moines Register, San Jose Mercury News and St. Petersburg Times. They determined that TV and print favored Clinton's administration over Reagan's to a statistically significant degree, and Clinton's personal coverage did not diverge significantly from the two Republicans'. The national media had treated Bush's administration about the same as Clinton's "except for a slight tilt toward the Clinton team's domestic policies in the New York Times." However, the regional papers studied favored Clinton's administration to Bush's. The most pronounced pro-Clinton coverage emerged in the Des Moines Register; the Mercury News and the American-Statesman provided the most balanced White House coverage.

The study also found that although Bush was covered more favorably after 9/11, overall coverage of his administration became more critical. But the report, which purports to be objective because it crunches numbers, does not distinguish between appropriate skepticism—the role of an engaged press corps—and unjust negativity.

Despite these findings of pro-Clinton leanings, some critics perceived gentler handling of Bush early in his term. In "What Liberal Media?" Eric Alterman, a liberal media columnist for The Nation, contends that Bush "received extremely indulgent coverage from the so-called 'liberal media' long before September 11." Alterman dissects coverage of the short-lived China "crisis" after a U.S. spy plane collided with a Chinese fighter in spring 2001 and concludes the Bush administration "succeeded in manipulating the media to the point where its incompetence was portrayed as heroism."

On May 6, 2001, former Washington Post White House correspondent John F. Harris observed in a story in the paper's Outlook section that "this new president has done things with relative impunity that would have been huge uproars if they had occurred under Clin-

"I never thought anybody could whine more about the media than the right. But it turns out I was wrong," says TUCKER CARLSON, conservative cohost of CNN's "Crossfire." "The left has turned out to be every bit as whiny as conservatives ever were."



ton.... What is being hailed as Bush's shrewd diplomacy [regarding the surveillance plane] would have been savaged as 'Slick Willie' contortions."

These observations highlight two Bush advantages that softened coverage from the early days of his presidency: the media's minimal expectations of his acumen, and their propensity to fixate on peccadilloes rather than policy.

Rich Lowry, editor of the conservative National Review, contends the prevailing narrative about Candidate Bush shaped misleading coverage of President Bush. "The press for a long time was locked into a totally unwarranted and clichéd view of Bush: that he was sort of a dim weakling led around by his wily adviser, Karl Rove, and propped up by other advisers," including Vice President Dick Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld. The media's attitude was no doubt unfair to Bush, but it also triggered positive stories about the president's prowess whenever he exceeded media expectations, as the spy plane incident illustrates. This tone in coverage, noticeable before 9/11, became even more pronounced after the terrorist attacks, when, as the New York Times editorial page put it on October 12, 2001, Bush displayed a "new gravitas."

Bush also precipitated favorable coverage early on by managing to avoid salacious faux pas: He fired no travel office employees; he solicited no exorbitant haircuts on the tarmac at Los Angeles International Airport; he had no Paula Jones specters stalking him in the White House.


Bush's controversies generally have centered not on character but on policy, an arena where newspaper and television reporters are less comfortable characterizing actions. New Republic Editor Peter Beinart says newspapers today allow reporters more freedom to analyze a politician's character and gaffes, "but there's still this notion that on policy you need to convey both sides." For example, many of the administration's tax-cut claims, he says, have been "probably bogus." But reporters have balanced Democrats' criticisms and the administration's defense "without arbitrating in that dispute.... [The Bush administration has] benefited a lot from the media's reticence."

**N**ine months into Bush's term, the terrorist attacks transformed the nation's mood and heightened media restraint. Confronting unfathomable horror, the press largely abdicated its watchdog role. In late January 2002, Washington Post reporters Bob Woodward and Dan Balz penned a nearly 40,000-word, eight-part series offering an "inside account" of what happened from September 11 to September 20 but skirting the issue of whether the administration missed signs of terrorism. American flags fluttered on newscasts and anchors' lapel pins, and Bush was

portrayed as a brave leader shouldering a painful burden.

"Principally on cable television, journalists have sounded off in a very pro-administration, very pro-patriotic tone," says Marvin Kalb, a senior fellow at Harvard University's Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy, who coedited "The Media and the War on Terrorism" with Stephen Hess of the Brookings Institution. The flags in news broadcasts had "very little to do with journalism, very much to do with patriotism."

James P. Pinkerton, a Newsday columnist and former aide to presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush, says the current Bush's "war on terror" is larger and less tangible than Clinton's controversies. "The Clinton scandals, such as they were, were kind of embraceable: did or did not cheat on his wife, did or did not cheat on his real-estate deals, did or did not molest Paula Jones," says Pinkerton, a contributor to Fox News Channel. "It's a little harder



**President Clinton was covered too aggressively while President Bush has not been covered aggressively enough, says ABC News Political Director Mark Halperin.**

taries, Moran was awaiting then-White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer's arrival in the briefing room when he overheard some print reporters. "I heard people saying, 'All right, we're back, to hell with the war [in Afghanistan],' as if chasing the shadows and ghosts of potential appearances or possible conflicts of interest was more important than the

war the country had been thrust into," Moran says. "I was shocked.... I'm not sure that lower Manhattan had actually stopped smoldering."

But White House ties to Enron never exploded into a full-fledged Bush "Gate"—as in Travelgate, Filegate or other early Clinton brouhahas—and only briefly marred laudatory coverage of the president in the months after the terrorist attacks.

National Review's Lowry concedes "coverage was relatively favorable in the wake of September 11.... There were exceptions, certainly, including the New York Times," particularly when the Times in August 2002 inaccurately described Henry Kissinger as one of the "lead-

ing Republicans" breaking ranks with Bush over his administration's "high-profile planning for war with Iraq." The ensuing outcry stoked perceptions that now-deposed Executive Editor Howell Raines was using the news pages to advance a personal agenda.

But the Kissinger misstep hardly embodies the media's performance prior to the war in Iraq. In the weeks before the Pentagon commenced its "shock and awe" campaign in Iraq, questioning of the administration's assertions—a subject that dominated coverage in July—was noticeably absent.

On March 17, Bush ordered Saddam Hussein to leave within 48 hours or face invasion. The next day, Washington Post national securi-



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
when you come across the Bush doctrine. It takes a little longer to get your legs under you intellectually."

Scandals in the Clinton administration provided easy targets for reporters. ABC's Moran says Clinton coverage "was way over the top, excessive scandal-mongering, pointless." He believes Bush has been covered aggressively, with examinations of his environmental, fiscal and foreign policies. But rather than "fully and fairly informing the American public," Moran says White House reporters tend to focus on scandal—a tendency that did not evaporate after 9/11.

In January 2002, when the press learned the scandal-plagued Enron Corp. had sought help from the Commerce and Treasury secre-

**Cable news networks aired live coverage and adoring commentary of President Bush's "Top Gun"-style landing on the USS Abraham Lincoln on May 1.**

**Conservative complaints about the "liberal media" used to have merit, but now the pendulum has swung wildly rightward on radio and TV, says former CNN executive Frank Sesno.**



ty reporter Walter Pincus and White House correspondent Dana Milbank wrote that the administration was preparing to attack Iraq based on a number of allegations "that have been challenged—and in some cases disproved—by the United Nations, European governments and even U.S. intelligence reports." Among the evidence "refuted by subsequent discoveries": Bush's assertion that Iraq had sought to purchase uranium. The story, headlined "Bush Clings To Dubious Allegations About Iraq," was buried on page A13, while coverage of Bush's ultimatum appeared on the front page—but it was one of the few stories to challenge the administration's evidence at the outset of war.

Although reporters lacked access to intelligence reports and security briefings, they should have treated administration declarations more skeptically—even emphasized that some claims could not be independently confirmed—and published and aired dissenting international voices more prominently.

"Did the media do their job in the march up to the war?" asks former CNN Vice President Sesno. "I certainly don't think the broadcast media were sufficiently rigorous. There was not sufficient discussion as to why the French, Germans, Chinese, Japanese and Turks felt as they did. There was not sufficient healthy skepticism as to why the administration's case was not strong.... I was told flat-out by a network producer that there were not more international voices put on the air because it would have been a ratings killer."

But Sesno qualifies his remarks by saying, "Certainly post-9/11, there has been some excellent and even heroic journalism."

New Republic Editor Beinart says the press "really needs to take a step back and look at the way in which certain claims and statements were repeated so often that they were just taken as fact." At some point, the media dropped cautious phrasing about weapons programs that Iraq might have, opting for assertions such as "they have" or "they possess."

The media also permitted the impending war to dominate coverage, neglecting important domestic issues. Brookings' Hess, a one-time speechwriter for President Eisenhower, deems the March 6 Q&A session a "terrible"

**"The Clinton scandals, such as they were, were kind of embraceable: did or did not cheat on his wife, did or did not cheat on his real-estate deals, did or did not molest Paula Jones," says JAMES P. PINKERTON, a columnist for Newsday. "It's a little harder when you come across the Bush doctrine. It takes a little longer to get your legs under you intellectually."**

press conference. "When it was quite clear that the president wasn't going to say anything about Iraq," he says, reporters "should have changed the subject to try to get some other news."

Once combat began, the press quickly discarded upbeat dispatches in favor of dire predictions that the war could drag on for months. But those negative assessments predominantly focused on Rumsfeld's strategy rather than Bush's leadership. (See "Media Mood Swings," June/July.)

When Bush celebrated the war's official conclusion on May 1 with a "Top Gun"-style landing on the USS Abraham Lincoln, cable news networks aired live coverage and adoring commentary. Bush arrived in "historic, spectacular fashion," Fox News Channel host John Gibson gushed. On rival MSNBC, correspondent Bob Kur enthused, "Now, a little bit more on what we're calling the president's excellent adventure today," while Kur's colleague, John Elliott, exclaimed, "It's cool. I mean, it's history in the making.... And that's new to me from Bob Kur, that we're calling it the president's excellent adventure. I like that. Kudos to the gang at MSNBC."

The on-air team at CNN was a bit more restrained—although correspondent Chris Burns observed that Bush "used to fly with the National Guard in his younger days, so this is not a big, big new thing for him," but failed to mention that Bush had never flown in combat situations.

"That was not, journalistically speaking, a reason for wall-to-wall coverage," Kalb says. "Nothing happened, so the idea of having him be carried live by all of the cable operations seemed to me excessive."

Newspapers devoted front-page coverage to Bush's evening address, even though Pentagon officials had declared an end to major combat operations on April 14. New York Times White House reporter David E. Sanger wrote in a page A17 sidebar that Bush "walked across the flight deck with a swagger that seemed to suggest he had seen 'Top Gun'.... Even in a White House that prides itself on its mastery of political staging, Mr. Bush's arrival on board the Lincoln was a first of many kinds. Never before has a president landed aboard a carrier at sea, much less taken the controls of the aircraft." (A correction published May 3 stated that while Bush was the first president to land in a plane on a carrier, other presidents have flown in helicopters to carriers.)

Although several reporters, including Sanger, noted White House officials "clearly intend" to use the triumphal image in the 2004 presidential campaign, few questioned the political wisdom of staging a victory lap when chaos still reigned in Iraq.

Bush received much more muted coverage of a July 2 challenge to Iraqi militants attacking U.S. troops. "My answer is: Bring 'em on," Bush declared. "We've got the force necessary to deal

with the security situation." Washington Post reporters Milbank and Vernon Loeb wrote about Bush's "colloquial taunt" in a front-page story: "The colorful challenge by Bush provoked indignation from some congressional Democrats, who said the president's bravado was inviting attacks on U.S. soldiers."

But other major newspapers buried or ignored the president's controversial declaration. The New York Times tacked Bush's quote to the end of a page A10 story by Amy Waldman headlined, "U.S. Attributes Explosion at Iraqi Mosque to Bomb-Making Activity." Below the story came this cursory addendum by the Times: "Reaction From Bush," followed by two paragraphs with Bush's quote and no context or reaction from Democrats. Bush's declaration appeared on page 14A of the Baltimore Sun; USA Today published a wire report on page 16A.

**I**n early July, the media seized on the first prolonged controversy surrounding Bush since the September 11 devastation. At issue were 16 ill-fated words from Bush's January State of the Union address in which he declared, despite earlier CIA warnings to avoid the dubious claim: "The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa" for its nuclear weapons program. But even this media firestorm needed four months to kindle.

As early as March 7—the day after the cataclysmic press conference at the White House—Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, announced that documents purportedly showing Iraqi officials shopping for uranium in Africa were "not authentic." Seymour M. Hersh tackled the administration's culpability in a tough New Yorker piece March 31 headlined, "WHO LIED TO WHOM?; Why did the Administration endorse a forgery about Iraq's nuclear program?" Hersh included the soon-to-be infamous State of the Union sentence and noted that the forgery "became the object of widespread, and bitter, questions in Europe about the credibility of the United States. But it initially provoked only a few news stories in America, and little sustained questioning about how the White House could endorse such an obvious fake."

Hersh then posed some pointed questions: "Who permitted it to go into the President's State of the Union speech? Was the message—the threat posed by Iraq—more important than the integrity of the intelligence-vetting process? Was the Administration lying to itself? Or did it deliberately give Congress and the public what it knew to be bad information?"

After this explosive piece, questions about faulty intelligence and Bush's State of the Union speech faded, overshadowed by the war and its aftermath. Anxious to appear supportive of U.S. armed forces, congressional Democrats muted their criticisms of Bush—an attitude not shared by their counterparts in London, who merciless-

"This White House very wisely and very effectively created a message system that made it seem as [if] the Bush administration walked on water, and the media went along for the walk," says MARVIN KALB, a senior fellow at Harvard University's Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy.



**National Review Editor Rich Lowry says President Bush received "relatively favorable" coverage in the wake of September 11.**

ly hounded British Prime Minister Tony Blair. The uranium dispute did not take off in the mainstream U.S. media until July 7, when the Bush administration acknowledged for the first time that the allegation should not have been included in the speech.

The previous day, Joseph C. Wilson IV, a former U.S. ambassador, disclosed on the New York Times' op-ed page that he traveled to Niger at the CIA's behest in February 2002 and concluded then that "it was highly doubtful" the uranium transaction had occurred. "I have little choice but to conclude that some of the intelligence related to Iraq's nuclear weapons program was twisted to exaggerate the Iraqi threat," Wilson wrote.

Then, on July 7, a British parliamentary report questioned the credibility of British intelligence—the same intelligence Bush cited in bolstering his case for war. After a "day of questions—and sometimes contradictory answers from White House officials," in the words of the New York Times' David Sanger, the administration released a statement conceding that the uranium declaration should not have appeared in Bush's address.

With postwar fatalities in Iraq mounting, no promised weapons of mass destruction in sight and an admission of fallibility from the White House, the press corps finally seized on the 16-word controversy. A White House famous for discipline and message control for the first time could not straighten out its story.

Energized Democrats called for investigations, further fueling coverage. The Washington Post in particular played the uranium dispute as a high-profile story, publishing 15 front-page articles on that issue or related intelligence controversies from July 8 to July 30, when Bush took responsibility for his words during the ninth solo news conference of his presidency. The uranium contretemps in that time period earned seven page-one stories in the New York Times, four in the Los Angeles Times and one in USA Today—a story leading with Secretary of State Colin Powell's defense of the administration.

"We're looking at information that Bush gave to the public [to] cast a light on that and hope to hold the president accountable for his words," says Post National Editor Liz Spayd. The administration's arguments for war "began to be drawn more into question once the war had largely

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ended, and we had had no success in finding weapons of mass destruction. It became obvious that at least there were a lot of questions about assertions the administration had made.... We all began to look harder at some of the claims preceding the war."

Unfortunately the Post, like other major media outlets, did not consistently play up coverage of precarious intelligence claims until after the war. But Pincus had provided excellent, albeit not very prominently showcased, reporting on Iraq intelligence questions long before such stories became en vogue. In addition to the March 18 "dubious allegations" story he wrote with Milbank, Pincus authored an A17 story on March 16 headlined "U.S. Lacks Specifics on Banned Arms" that examined the "concerns among some members of the intelligence community about whether administration officials have exaggerated intelligence." On February 7, two days after Powell's speech to the U.N. Security Council, Pincus wrote an A21 story, "Alleged Al Qaeda Ties Questioned; Experts Scrutinize Details of Accusations Against Iraqi Government." On January 30, he and Dana Priest wrote an A14 story, "Making The Case Against Baghdad; Officials: Evidence Strong, not Conclusive." In late May, the Post began playing Pincus' stories more prominently. He wrote or co-authored seven page-one stories on Iraq intelligence claims from May 29 to June 30.

Once the uranium issue ignited in July, the Post stories dissected inconsistencies in administration statements and called for accountability. "In the face of persistent questioning about the use of intelligence before the Iraq war, administration officials have responded with evolving and sometimes contradictory statements," wrote Priest and Milbank in a page-one story on July 15. Two weeks later, on July 29, Milbank wrote in his White House Notebook, "five times, questioners have invited the president to take responsibility for the Iraq-uranium allegation that found its way into his State of the Union address. Five times, Bush has deflected the question." The Post's editorial page, which had vociferously supported the war in Iraq, that day called on Bush to hold a news conference; the next day, he did just that, telling reporters, "I take personal responsibility for everything I say, of course."

**N**otwithstanding its July stumbles, the White House communications team has molded coverage throughout Bush's incumbency by limiting press access, plugging administration leaks, rationing information, crafting images and coordinating messages. This mirrors the way the Bush administration handled the media while he was governor of Texas (see "On Message," April 2001).

"You could certainly argue that being so incredibly disciplined and controlling leaks has led to improved coverage" from the administration's point of view, Copley's Condon says. "When you don't have leaks, you have fewer stories about internal dissension. They are the best I've seen at getting their message out and making it difficult for you to get beyond that message."

Harvard's Kalb agrees Bush aides have put together an "exceptionally effective press program.... This White House very wisely and very effectively created a message system that made it seem as [if] the Bush administration walked on water, and the media went along for the walk." Each day, a single message is delivered by a single person, or by multiple people echoing one another.

Team Bush is equally proficient at fashioning the resplendent television pictures that served Reagan so well. In a front-page New York Times story published May 16, White House reporter Elisabeth Bumiller asserted that Bush's carrier landing "was only the latest example of how the Bush administration, going far beyond the foundations in stagecraft set by the Reagan White House, is using the powers of television and technology to promote a presidency like never before." The White House has stocked its communications operation with former network television experts in lighting, camera angles and backdrops, and Bumiller quoted Michael K. Deaver, Reagan's image guru, as observing that Bush's aides "understand the visual as well as anybody ever has."

Bush's team also knows which settings the president prefers, and the extended press conference is not among them. As of August 29, Bush had held 58 press conferences, compared with Clinton's 101 at the same point in his first term and George H.W. Bush's 101 as well, says Martha Joynt Kumar, a Towson University political science professor who specializes in White House communication. The younger Bush had held only nine solo news conferences without a foreign leader or administration official joining him, compared with Clinton's 34 and his father's 63. And he had held only two in prime time: one March 6, the other October 11, 2001, four days after launching airstrikes against targets in Afghanistan.

Bush has "turned the tradition into a rarity, both because of his distaste for the format and his staff's determined message management," Washington Post White House reporter Mike Allen wrote March 7. Allen also noted that

Bush's aides say he frequently takes short bursts of questions in other settings, particularly when cameras are allowed for photo-ops at the beginning or end of a presidential event.

Those controlled bursts do not satisfy many White House reporters, who crave more sustained interrogations of the president. "A spokesman can never replace the president of the United States," says Hearst Newspapers columnist Helen Thomas, who has covered every president since John F. Kennedy. "We want to hear it from the horse's mouth." Thomas calls press conferences "indispensable to a democracy" and "the only forum we have to make a president accountable."

Brookings' Hess says presidents generally maintain control even during press conferences, where questioning isn't usually too aggressive. "Reporters have lost the art of asking the sort of tough question that it's very difficult to avoid," Hess says. "There was a time when I thought that Sam Donaldson was a master at that—construc-



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
the press corps, Donaldson suggests that reporters ask direct questions and eschew multi-part queries. "Like the old World War II torpedo language, it's got to be hot, straight and true" so the viewer or reader will realize when Bush dodges a question. Donaldson also advises reporters to "remember that this is not a social occasion" and skip comments such as "Thank you

for taking the question" or "Good evening, sir." "You can be respectful, but when called upon, you rise and ask a direct question," Donaldson says. Still, he emphasizes there is only so much reporters can do. "If he's not going to answer the question, he's not going to.... You can't hog-tie him, throw him down and stand there and debate him."

Complaints also have surfaced over White House treatment of reporters who annoy the administration. Robert Kuttner, coeditor of the liberal American Prospect, argued in a July 16 Boston Globe piece that "the press has given the administration an astonishingly free ride." Kuttner contends the Bush team is "very effective at pressuring and isolating reporters

who criticize Bush, so working reporters bend over backwards to play fair. And the administration benefits from a stage-managed, right-wing media machine that has no counterpart on the liberal left." In an interview, Kuttner cited the dogged Milbank as "the classic example. They freeze him out. They don't return his phone calls." (Milbank says his calls are returned, although he can't judge whether White House officials return them as quickly as those of other reporters.)

In "What Liberal Media?" Alterman asserts the "Bush team plays a kind of hardball that the Clintonians were never able to master." He cites Houston Chronicle reporter Bennett Roth's May 10, 2001, question to Fleischer about underage drinking by the president's



RUSSEL BOYCE/REUTERS

tion of a question [in a way] that the president answered it or looked devious for not answering it."

But Donaldson himself felt "great sympathy" for the press corps during the March 6 news conference. "I'm not going to sit back here in my retirement chair and hurl brickbats [at] the White House press corps," says the ABC News correspondent and former White House reporter. "I don't put the problem of obtaining information from this president at the reporters' doorstep as much as I put it at the president's doorstep. I've never seen a president who is so confident in not answering the question that the public will not think ill of him in any way."

Because Bush is so successful at stiff-arming

**While Britain's Tony Blair was hounded for months for asserting Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, the Bush administration took little heat in the media over the issue until July.**

**ABC News correspondent Sam Donaldson says, "I've never seen a president who is so confident in not answering the question that the public will not think ill of him in any way."**



daughter. Fleischer later called Roth and ominously informed him that his question had been "noted in the building."

More recently, then-Washington Post gossip columnist Lloyd Grove disclosed on July 18 that somebody at the White House was "apparently hopping mad" over a story by ABC News correspondent Jeffrey Kofman about declining morale among U.S. soldiers in Iraq. Internet gossip Matt Drudge told Grove that "someone from the White House communications shop" tipped him to the ABC story and a profile of Kofman in the *Advocate*, a gay newsmagazine. Drudge "quickly linked the two stories on his popular Web site," wrote New York Times columnist Maureen Dowd on July 20, "first headlining the *Advocate* piece 'ABC NEWS REPORTER WHO FILED TROOP COMPLAINTS STORY—OPENLY GAY CANADIAN.' Eight minutes later, he amended the headline to read, 'ABC NEWS REPORTER WHO FILED TROOP COMPLAINTS STORY IS CANADIAN.'" Dowd concluded: "Beset by problems, the Bush team responds by attacking those who point out the problems."

Scott McClellan, who replaced Fleischer as press secretary, said in a July 23 briefing that if there were any truth to reported White House involvement, "it's totally inappropriate...that's simply not the way we operate." But he added that he had "no reason to believe that there is any truth that that has happened."

Drudge is but one example of the legion of conservative columnists, radio talk-show hosts, cable hosts and pundits who disseminate the administration's views, overpower a muffled chorus of liberals and blame the media for purported bias. In "What Liberal Media?" Alterman constructs a compelling case challenging conventional wisdom that the media lean left. "The myth of the 'liberal media' empowers conservatives to control debate in the United States to the point where liberals cannot even hope for a fair shake anymore," Alterman writes.

Former CNN executive Sesno concurs that the "discussion about liberal bias has gotten altogether skewed and altogether out of proportion. There were legitimate complaints by the right a few years ago, but now the pendulum has swung wildly to the other side in terms of radio and talk shows on television."

CNN and MSNBC, he adds, are "dealing with

**"Reporters have lost the art of asking the sort of tough question that it's very difficult to avoid," says the Brookings Institution's STEPHEN HESS. "There was a time when I thought that Sam Donaldson was a master at that—construction of a question [in a way] that the president answered it or looked devious for not answering it."**



the harsh reality that Fox has become the ratings leader, built on the pretention that it is 'fair and balanced.' " The Post's Shales in late July called Fox "shamelessly pro-Republican in its treatment of the news." (Fox officials declined repeated requests for comment for this article.)

When the uranium story exploded in July, some conservatives pounced on the media. William Kristol, the influential conservative editor of *The Weekly Standard*, wrote in the July 28 issue that "American journalism's frenzy over the thing—the hyperbolic, rush-to-judgment, believe-the-worst character of the coverage—has been plenty bad enough."

But Sesno offered a more positive take. "It's sort of like the media is finding their voice again," he said in late July, adding, "the question is, do they immediately transition into a feeding frenzy, which is just as illogical." The American Prospect's Kuttner, while arguing that the "politicization of intelligence" is a larger story than articles about the State of the Union sentence indicated, nevertheless says he's glad the press covered it as a serious issue. "This could be a real turning point both in the Bush presidency and in the way the press treats the Bush presidency," Kuttner said July 21. One day later, the deaths of Saddam's sons knocked the 16 words off newspapers' front pages.

The deaths of Uday and Qusay Hussein showed the futility of trying to predict a turning point in coverage during this volatile, post-September 11, post-Iraq war period. Rising U.S. fatalities in Iraq and a reinvigorated debate over the quality of intelligence that led us to war may darken coverage of Bush's presidency. Despite White House efforts at damage control, the Washington Post has continued to chip away at pre-war claims about the Iraqi menace. The headline for a 5,587-word, front-page story on August 10 by Barton Gellman and Pincus declared, "Depiction of Threat Outgrew Supporting Evidence." As the 2001 terrorist attacks recede into painful history and the 2004 presidential election nears, coverage will turn more adversarial, particularly when a Democratic victor emerges from the swarming field of contenders.

Unless the Bush administration unearths those elusive weapons of mass destruction. Or Congress passes a prescription drug bill. Or another unfathomable terrorist attack shakes us. Or the Democratic candidate fails to find an effective line of attack. Or...

"With the deaths of Saddam Hussein's sons on Tuesday in Iraq, a bad political month for President Bush got palpably better," New York Times White House reporter Richard W. Stevenson wrote in a story published July 24. "Suddenly the big summer story was no longer whether Mr. Bush had misled the nation in his State of the Union address." •

*Contributing writer Rachel Smolkin wrote about the Salt Lake Tribune in AJR's August/September issue.*

chatterbox

**Whopper of the Week: Joseph Wilson**

Say goodbye to Plamegate.

By Timothy Noah

Posted Wednesday, Dec. 3, 2003, at 11:29 AM PT

F. Wilson 576030

Any goodwill that has come my way, and there has been an overwhelming support from Republicans who are highly indigent about this as well as some Democrats, but any goodwill accrues to my wife. Not to me. And my wife has made it very clear that—she has authorized me to say this—she would rather chop off her right arm than say anything to the press and *she will not allow herself to be photographed* [italics Chatterbox's]. So while I believe she would make a wonderful politician, it is tough to run a campaign if you're not talking to the press and you're *not being photographed* [italics Chatterbox's].

—Joseph Wilson on Meet the Press, October 5.

Former CIA officer Valerie Wilson (nee Plame) made her first public appearance among journalists yesterday as she watched her husband, Joseph C. Wilson IV, receive the first Ron Ridenhour Award for Truth-Telling.

Wilson, 53, is the retired diplomat who was sent by the CIA to Niger last year to investigate claims that Iraq had tried to buy 'yellowcake' uranium there for possible use in nuclear weapons. In July he accused the Bush administration of using the bogus allegations to help make a case for war. President Bush later backed away from the claim.

After Wilson went public, Valerie Wilson's name and occupation were leaked to journalists in what her husband calls retaliation for his criticism of the administration. The Justice Department is investigating the leak. ...

Wilson was most emotional when addressing his wife's exposure. 'I'm sorry for that,' he said, looking at her and fighting back tears. 'If I could give you back your anonymity ... I would do it in a minute.'

She sat quietly, wiping away a tear, as her husband added, 'Frankly, frog-marching is too good for those who decided that their political agenda was more important than either American national security or your life.'

...Valerie Wilson would not talk to reporters and attended the event only after receiving assurance that she would not be photographed [italics Chatterbox's].

—Reilly Capps, "Paying Homage to Truth and Its Consequences," in the Oct. 16 Washington Post

Even before the president's budget director parked his motorcycle outside the front door, there was an only-in-Washington feel to the Sunday night sendoff of NBC News White House correspondent Campbell Brown, on her way to New York and *Today* show stardom.

**At the buffet at Brown's home in Adams Morgan, former ambassador Joseph Wilson IV waxed indignant about the perfidies of the senior administration officials who he believes leaked the identity of his CIA-agent wife, Valerie Plame Wilson. ... The buzz, though, focused on a shy and attractive blonde who sat nibbling finger sandwiches and discreetly introduced herself only as 'Valerie.'**

—Washington Post *"Names and Faces" column, Oct. 22.*

**Plame ... mingled unobtrusively last month at a party at the home of the Washington Post's Ben Bradlee and Sally Quinn.**

—Howard Kurtz, *"CIA Agent Valerie Plame Goes Undercover in Vanity Fair,"* in the Dec. 3 Washington Post.

—Vanity Fair, January 2004 (on newsstands today). The photograph, by Jonas Karlsson, was taken Nov. 8 and "styled by" Ann Caruso. Hair, makeup, and grooming by Terri Grauel for *T.H.E. Artist Agency*.

**'The pictures should not be able to identify her, or are not supposed to,' Wilson said yesterday. 'She's still not going to answer any questions [italics Chatterbox's] and there will not be any pictures that compromise her.' The reason, said Wilson, is that 'she's still employed' by the CIA 'and has obligations to her employer.'**

—Howard Kurtz, *"CIA Agent Valerie Plame Goes Undercover in Vanity Fair,"* in the Dec. 3 Washington Post.

**Plame talked to Vanity Fair writer Vicky Ward on a not-for-attribution basis. ...**

—*Ibid.*

*Comment.* Chatterbox spares Plame Whopper status, possibly on grounds of misplaced gallantry. But Plame's extended striptease, enthusiastically touted by her husband, now has Chatterbox wondering how much of Wilson's story to believe. (It also has Chatterbox wondering when the couple will start renting themselves out for birthday parties.) Regardless of the merits, this photograph will surely give the Bush Justice Department whatever slim justification it seeks in dropping its Plamegate investigation.

Got a whopper? Send it to [chatterbox@slate.com](mailto:chatterbox@slate.com). To be considered, an entry must be an unambiguously false statement paired with an unambiguous refutation, and both must be derived from some appropriately reliable public source. Preference will be given to newspapers and other documents that Chatterbox can link to online.

#### *Whopper Archive:*

Oct. 31, 2003: [G.W. Bush](#)

Oct. 17, 2003: [Grady Little](#)

Sept. 16, 2003: [John Ashcroft](#)

Sept. 5, 2003: [Christy Whitman](#)

Aug. 29, 2003: [Donald Rumsfeld](#)

Aug. 22, 2003: [Arianna Huffington](#)

Aug. 8, 2003: [Howard Dean](#)

July 25, 2003: [Condoleezza Rice](#)

July 18, 2003: [President Bush](#)

Ralston, Susan B.

536139

From: Karl Rove [kr@georgewbush.com]  
Sent: Monday, September 29, 2003 7:42 PM  
To: Ralston, Susan B.  
Subject: Please run this off

Interview With Bob Novak

> CNN> '> s Wolf Blitzer Reports  
> October 1, 2003

> CNN> '> s WOLF BLITZER: He's at the center of this storm, the  
> CNN> controversy that

is raging here in Washington. The naming of the CIA operative appeared in his column back on July 14. That popular columnist syndicated across the country by 'The Chicago Sun-Times.' And he's well known, of course, to our CNN viewers as the co-host of 'CROSSFIRE.' Joining me now for an exclusive conversation, the veteran journalist, is my colleague, Bob Novak. Bob, thanks very much for joining us. Let's talk about this. What made you decide to go out, first of all, and write about former Ambassador Joe Wilson?

> CNN> '> s BOB NOVAK: Former Ambassador Wilson broke the secrecy that a  
> CNN> retired

diplomat, unknown, had gone to Niger in the year 2002 to investigate whether the Iraqis tried to buy yellow cake, uranium from Niger.

> BLITZER: You mean when he wrote that op-ed page article in 'The New  
> York  
Times'?

> NOVAK: 'New York Times.' That was on a Sunday morning. On Monday, I  
> began to

report on something that I thought was very curious. Why was it that Ambassador Wilson, who had no particular experience in weapons of mass destruction, and was a sharp critic of the Iraqi policy of President Bush and, also, had been a high-ranking official in the Clinton White House, who had contributed politically to Democrats--some Republicans, but mostly Democrats--why was he being selected? I asked this question to a senior Bush administration official, and he said that he believed that the assignment was suggested by an employee at the CIA in the Counterproliferation Office who happened to be ambassador Wilson's wife, Valerie Plame. I then called another senior official of the Bush administration, and he said, Oh, you know about that? And he confirmed that that was an accurate story. I then called the CIA. They said that, to their knowledge, he did not--that the mission was not suggested by Ambassador Wilson's wife, but that she had been asked by her colleagues in the Counterproliferation Office, to contact her husband. So she was involved.

> BLITZER: Because he was a former ambassador in Gabon, he knew that  
> part of  
Africa, and that's, presumably, why they wanted to send him on this mission.

> NOVAK: I'm not going into motives. I thought it was strange because he  
> is not  
an expert in counterproliferation. He had not been ambassador to Niger, he had served in Niger at one time.

> BLITZER: But he was a senior on African affairs at the NFC under  
> Clinton?

> NOVAK: Under Clinton, that's correct. So that was the story I wrote,  
> was about

the details of Ambassador Wilson's mission, which created a great storm. And in the sixth paragraph of a ten-paragraph story I mentioned that two senior administration officials had said it was suggested by his wife, who worked at the CIA.

>  
> BLITZER: Now, in today's column, I think you wrote in ``The Chicago Sun-Times'' and ``The Washington Post,'' appearing as well, you wrote this: ``He asked me not to use her name,'' referring to a CIA official, ``saying she probably never again will be given a foreign assignment, but that exposure of her name might cause difficulties if she travels abroad. He never suggested to me that Wilson's wife or anybody else would be endangered. If he had, I would not have used her name.'' How much did they press you and say, you know what, this is really a problem? Please don't use her name. She's a covert operative.

>  
> NOVAK: It was what I call a weak request. In journalism we are asked  
> not to  
use things constantly. I'm sure you have been. Don't use that, Wolf. I was asked by the CIA official not to use it. He did not, at any point, say her life was in danger. He did not press it. I thought it was in the nature of a pro forma request after a conversation in which he had detailed Ambassador Wilson's mission, explained to me that the mission--that there was never a written report. A lot of people don't even know that. There was no written report. >

>  
> (CROSSTALK)  
>  
> NOVAK: .. oral report. And that it was not very convincing, not a very convincing report. But it was--and at the end of that suggested that I not--asked me, requested that not use the name.

>  
> BLITZER: But the notion, even that she would never be able to have a  
> foreign  
assignment, shouldn't that alone have been enough to maybe give you pause?

>  
> NOVAK: Oh, no. Let's read what I said, Wolf, not what you said.

>  
> BLITZER: This is in today's column.

>  
> NOVAK: Yes, read what I said.

>  
> BLITZER: ``He asked me not to use her name saying she probably never  
> again  
will be given a foreign assignment.''

>  
> NOVAK: Yes. That was not anything--whether I wrote anything or not, he  
> said  
she would never be given a foreign assignment. That was a fact that she had moved on to a different phase of her career. It was not because of anything I was writing.

>  
> (CROSSTALK)  
>

> BLITZER: ... this would only cause her difficulties? That's what they  
> said to  
you?

>  
> NOVAK: Difficulties if she was traveling abroad, I guess, on vacation  
> or

something. But they said she would not be given a foreign assignment. I thought that was a very weak request, let me repeat. And the editor of ``The Washington Post,'' Fred Hyatt, said in an editorial as well that if the request had been made by the CIA not to put this information in for the fear of the safety of Mrs. Wilson or anybody else, I certainly would not have used her name. But that request was not made. Now, why was it not made? There's one of two reasons. One possible reason is that it was a mistake by the CIA. They

screwed it up. The other reason is they didn't think her life was in danger. I don't know the answer. It's one of the two though.

>

> BLITZER: It is the subject of an investigation right now. The other  
> issue

that's coming out is the use of your word 'operative' to suggest that you knew she was a covert, clandestine operative as opposed to an analyst. There's been some debate. She's currently an analyst, but according to all the sources we have, she used to be an operative.

>

> NOVAK: Well, I have sources, too. I have sources that tell me that she  
> was

never an analyst--I mean, never an operative. She was never covert. She was never covert. Put it that way. She was never covert. She was always what they call 'light covert.' That is, she was covered, she was working under the cover of another government agency, but she was not a covert operator. I have been told that by other sources...

>

> (CROSSTALK)

>

> NOVAK: But I just want to say that the word operative that I said in  
> today's

column, Wolf, was a mistake, using that word on my part. I have called hack politicians operatives if you read my column carefully over 40 years. And it's just kind of a throw-away word. I had no knowledge whether or not she was an operative.

>

> BLITZER: All right, the other issue that's come out is this article  
> that

appeared in 'Newsday,' the newspaper on Long Island, July 22 after your July 14 column. The reporters said this. They were following up on your story. 'Novak, in an interview, said his sources had come to him with the information. 'I didn't dig it out. It was given to me,' he said. 'They thought it was significant, they gave me the name, and I used.''

>

> NOVAK: Now, these reporters made a bad mistake. They said they came to  
> me with  
the information. I never told them that. And that's not in quotes, is it?

>

> BLITZER: They said that the sources said they--your sources had come  
> to you...

>

> NOVAK: Yes, but that's not in quotes.

>

> BLITZER: That's not in quotes.

>

> NOVAK: So then they made that up. I never said that. I said I didn't  
> dig it

out in the sense I went through the files of the CIA. It was given to me, as I just told you. There's no inconsistency there at all. But that is--you have to be very careful, Wolf, with these things because they say that the idea that--they're saying they came to me. They did not come to me. >

>

> (CROSSTALK)

>

> BLITZER: ... the quote part is correct, 'I didn't dig it out. It was  
> given to  
me'.

>

> NOVAK: I just told you it was given to me. I didn't dig it out of the  
> files

there. Let me tell you this. There are people putting out stories that the White House was trying to find a pawn to put out this information. They went through six people...

>  
> (CROSSTALK)  
>  
> BLITZER: ... to smear Joe Wilson.  
>  
> NOVAK: Yes. And finally came to me. That's not true. As I have told  
> you in  
detail this story, nobody came to me. Nobody came to me. I never said that. The story in  
"Newsday" is absolutely incorrect. It's not in my quotes. They never came to me. I went  
to them in reporting that story.

>  
> BLITZER: Other reporters are suggesting that they got these calls, but  
> they  
didn't do anything...

>  
> NOVAK: I don't know if they did or not. But I resent--and I resented  
> it when  
you said it the other day, I really resented when you said that they went to six people  
and finally found Novak. That is just not the truth. Nobody came to me with this story. I  
was reporting on Joe Wilson...

>  
> BLITZER: This was your initiative?  
>  
> NOVAK: Entirely.  
>  
> BLITZER: All right. Now let's--speaking of Joe Wilson, he was on  
> "Nightline"  
last night. And he said, as he has in the past, some very, very derogatory words about  
Karl Rove, the chief political adviser to the president. Let's listen precisely to what  
Joe Wilson said.

>  
> (BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)  
>  
> JOE WILSON, FRM. U.S. AMBASSADOR: What I do know or what I have  
> confidence in,  
based upon what respectable press people in this town have told me, is that a week after  
the Novak article came out, Karl Rove was still calling around, talking to press people  
saying Wilson's wife is fair game.

>  
> (END VIDEO CLIP)  
>  
> BLITZER: And the suggestion has been made--and we're not going to ask  
> you to  
reveal your sources because I know you would never reveal your sources--that Karl Rove  
somehow is manipulating this whole thing to get even with Joe Wilson who was critical of  
the president.

>  
> NOVAK: Ambassador Wilson, I'm not going to call him a liar. Certainly,  
> it  
seems highly improbable that after the story had appeared in print and it was not--I would  
like to say that this was a hell of a column that rocked Washington. It didn't. It was in  
the sixth paragraph of a ten-paragraph story. But after it appeared, Mr. Rove, the idea  
that he would be going around trying to pedal this column after it appeared in print, it  
doesn't make sense to me. Maybe it did happen, maybe it didn't. I have no information of  
that. I would like to see the names of the reporters, though, wouldn't you?

>  
> BLITZER: Definitely. A lot of people want it a lot more. And I'm sure  
presumably in the days and weeks to come we'll know a lot more. We're almost out of time.  
But a couple--just to wrap a couple things up. Had you known that this information,  
releasing the name, could have endangered her or her colleagues, you would never have

reported this?

>  
> NOVAK: No, no. I want to rephrase your question. Had I known. You're  
> saying it  
would have endangered her and her colleagues. I still don't know that to this day. I will  
tell you this. If a CIA official said, "You are endangering the life of Mrs. Wilson and  
her colleagues," I never would have printed it.

>  
> BLITZER: But do you have any reason to believe that the source or  
> sources that  
you spoke to in the administration themselves knew that by giving her name or telling you  
about her, that this would be causing her any kind of problem?

>  
> NOVAK: I really resent that premise that it endangers her life because  
> you're  
saying if they knew that...

>  
> (CROSSTALK)

>  
> BLITZER: ... they may have thought she was simply an analyst, too.

>  
> NOVAK: She might have been. You don't know whether she was and I don't  
> know

whether she was. There's no way--we do not know that fact. I have been told, not by the  
official sources at the CIA, but the unofficial sources, that she was not a covert  
operative whose life was in danger. >

>  
> BLITZER: Because this is significant, as you know, because the law  
> also states  
that you have to have intent, you have to know that by revealing the identity of a covert  
agent, you're committing this crime. They may not have known.

>  
> NOVAK: Let me say one other thing I had in today's column. The person  
> who gave  
me the original story, I said it was given in an off-handed way during in this  
conversation and he was not a partisan gun slinger. I said that. I'm not going to go into  
more description, but I did feel that the idea that this was some kind of a carefully  
arranged plot to destroy this woman and her husband, as far as I'm concerned, was  
nonsense. It didn't happen that way, and this kind of scandal that has perpetrated in  
Washington is Washington at its worst.

>  
> BLITZER: Bob Novak speaking bluntly as he always does. Thanks very  
> much.

>  
> NOVAK: Thank you, Wolf.

>  
> BLITZER: Thank you and good luck.  
>  
>  
>

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM: Terry Good

RE: Karl Rove material --- case #576004

This page -- 16 of 57 -- was received from Karl Rove's office.

It appears that the information of interest was related to "Speaking of Arnold. . ." not "And The Wilson Affair Continues. . ." Otherwise, page 17 of 57 would have also been copied.

576004

"By and large," NH voters "are as fiercely independent, fiscally conservative and socially tolerant as they were back in 2000." However, "the times have gotten tougher," and the Bush reelection team "has to hope voters feel they are changing for the better 13 months from now." Ex-NH GOP exec. dir. **Charles Arlinghaus**: "If jobs come back, the president is re-elected. If they do not, the president is defeated." However, Bush-Cheney '04 strategist **Matt Dowd** maintains that "Americans realize the economy has been on the radar of this president" (*Nashua Telegraph*, 10/9).

Meanwhile, Bush's visit "was eagerly anticipated by his critics"; "peace activists, health care advocates and others" planned protests outside the Newington and Manchester events. The WH '04 Dems "stayed away from the state" (AP, 10/9).

### Will Meet The Govinator

During a fundraising trip to CA next week, Bush "will appear at the side of" Gov.-elect **Arnold Schwarzenegger** (R-CA), according to a GOPer "close to" the WH. The two will meet in Fresno or Riverside, "between fundraisers" 10/15 or 10/16.

The visit comes as some of Bush's "religious conservative supporters" said they were "troubled by accusations" that Schwarzenegger "engaged in sexual misconduct." However, "the conservatives said their concerns would not spill over to" Bush; noting "it was unthinkable" that a GOP POTUS "would not stand with a newly elected" GOP governor -- particularly on a trip to a state the WH hopes to win in '04. WH advisers "pronounced themselves elated with" the outcome of the recall, "and insisted" accusations that Schwarzenegger groped women "were politically motivated" (**Bumiller**, *New York Times*, 10/9).

### Speaking Of Arnold...

*Dallas Morning News*' **Jackson** reports, With Schwarzenegger's election, GOPers "are fired up," saying that having a GOP governor in the nation's largest state "can only help" Bush as he seeks re-election in '04. However, Dems "have a different take," saying "it reflects voter anger at incumbents trying to deal with bad economies" -- a phenomenon "that could repeat itself" with Bush in '04. Meanwhile, political analysts "offer a more middle-ground assessment" -- Bush "profits from a Schwarzenegger governorship only if the newcomer's administration is seen as very successful."

However, ex-NRCC Chair/Rep. **Tom Davis** (R-VA) said fellow GOPers "should not take too much comfort from the Schwarzenegger victory, especially if there are continuing problems with Iraq and the U.S. economy." Davis: "What worked against Gray Davis works against Bush" (10/8).

### And The Wilson Affair Continues...

The DNC on 10/8 sent an email to activists, urging them to email GOP members of the House and Senate Intel Cmtes and "demand" an investigation of the disclosure of an undercover CIA agent. From the email: "We don't trust **John Ashcroft** to investigate President Bush -- Ashcroft owes his job to Bush and **Karl Rove**. It's time for Congress to express its support for an independent investigation by a special counsel. The White House leak put our national security at risk" (release, 10/8).

DNC Chair **Terry McAuliffe** called on House Intel Cmte Member **Sherwood Boehlert** (R-NY 24) to postpone a 10/10 fundraiser with Rove until the DoJ probe of the leak is completed (release, 10/8).

Meanwhile, under the header "Leak Isn't The Worst Problem," *Dallas Morning News*' **Leubsdorf** writes, "For 10 days," DC "has been consumed by one of those controversies that bedevils the government and consumes the press at frequent intervals. But behind all the speculation swirling around the leak that led to blowing the undercover status of Ambassador **Joseph Wilson**'s wife is a crucial policy question: Was it faulty intelligence, deliberate deception or both that prompted President Bush and his top advisers to mislead Americans into

Message

Page 1 of 1

FYI  
536139

**Goergen, Barbara J.**

**From:** McDonald, Rebekah  
**Sent:** Monday, September 29, 2003 2:55 PM  
**To:** Goergen, Barbara J.  
**Subject:** Wilson Quote

I can't find the quote you're looking for from NPR this morning, but he apparently said the same thing on Good Morning America. This from a CNN transcript dated today, 12:10 pm:

---

Wilson said at one point that he believes the person who broke his wife's cover was Karl Rove, Bush's senior adviser and political strategist.

On ABC's "Good Morning America" on Monday, however, Wilson said, "In one speech I gave out in Seattle not too long ago, I mentioned the name Karl Rove. I think I was probably carried away by the spirit of the moment. I don't have any knowledge that Karl Rove himself was either the leaker or the authorizer of the leak. But I have great confidence that, at a minimum, he condoned it and certainly did nothing to shut it down."

**Ralston, Susan B.**

536/39

**From:** McDonald, Rebekah  
**Sent:** Monday, September 29, 2003 4:33 PM  
**To:** Ralston, Susan B.; Goergen, Barbara J.  
**Subject:** NPR Interview of Amb. Joe Wilson

\*\*\*This is a rough transcript and should probably not be distributed externally.\*\*\*

Ambassador Wilson On Identity Link

9/29/2003

<http://www.npr.org/features/feature.php?wfid=1449923>

NPR's Alex Chadwick: I spoke earlier with Ambassador Joseph Wilson, the man whose wife's identity was exposed. Here's what he had to say:

Ambassador Joseph C. Wilson: Well, when I first spoke to Bob Novak about this, (he called me for confirmation which I declined to provide,) but when asking the question, he said that CIA officers had told him my wife's name. After he printed his article which referred to two senior Administration officials, I called him back to ask for clarification whether it was CIA or senior Administration, and he told me he misspoke the first time. So that takes it basically out of the CIA and puts it somewhere else in the government, as best I can figure the etiquette of these types of sourcing decisions. Subsequent to that, in the week following the Novak article, I received calls from journalists who, quoting White House sources, asked me for comments. So the White House was certainly pushing the story for a full week after the Novak article came out.

Chadwick: Why do you think the White House would do that?

Wilson: I have always operated on the assumption it was to intimidate and prevent others from coming forward and speaking. As you recall, at the time, there were a number of analysts who had been speaking off-of-the record, on background, or not-for-attribution, complaining that there had been undue pressure placed on them by repeated visits by the Vice President, his chief of staff, and Mr. Gingrich out to the CIA.

Now in the Washington Post, yesterday and today, a source is quoted as saying that it was pure spite and revenge because I'd written my article saying there was nothing to this uranium sales story. If that's the case, I find it reprehensible that a public servant, who is paid by the US taxpayer, is wasting America's time seeking revenge on somebody who told a story that just happened to be true.

Chadwick: Mr. Ambassador, let me just ask you this. Is it really credible that it would be a significant blow to you or an intimidating tactic to others to disclose the fact that your wife has been a CIA agent? How does that affect your wife?

Wilson: Certainly, for my wife it is a little bit disconcerting. She has to answer all these questions, but more to the point, for our own national security, if she is as was asserted, which is to say a CIA operative involved in non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction programs, then it takes a national security asset off the table.

Chadwick: What are you hoping will come out of all this?

Wilson: I have no hopes or desires whatsoever. I think it's despicable what has happened. But what has happened has happened. Where we are now is really between the Justice Department and the leaker.

Chadwick: You named, at one point, the President's chief political advisor Karl Rove as the source of this leak. Do you believe that it came from that high in the Administration?

Wilson: No, actually, I didn't name him as the source. What I did is I did name him in a speech I gave out in Seattle and it has been interpreted as naming him as the source. I will freely admit that in the spirit of the moment

there may have been an excess of exuberance on my part. I will say that I have every confidence that Karl Rove condoned the leak and certainly did nothing to stop it and he condoned it after the fact. But I don't know who the leaker is or who authorized the leak.

Chadwick: Who is your chief suspect?

Wilson: I don't have chief suspects. I will leave that to the Justice Department.

Chadwick: Mr. Ambassador, thank you for speaking with us.



**Senior Advisor to the President**  
**The White House**

**Karl Rove**

**Phone: (202) 456-2369**

**Fax: (202) 456-0191**

576224  
F Goob-207

**Date:** Tuesday, November 18, 2003

**Date Due:** December 2, 2003

**To:**

**Action Requested:**

**Barry Jackson OSI 468**

**Respond directly with copy to the Senior Advisor**

**Correspondence Subject:**

10/29/03 ltr from Gabriel Bullock re: CIA. Please respond directly and handle as appropriate. Return this form to advise of action taken. Thank you.

**Prepared by:**

BJ Goergen (202) 456-2369

Barry

EXEC. OFC. PRESIDENT  
WH STRATEGIC INITIATIVES

SAINT BEDE ACADEMY

2003 NOV -7 PM 3:38

Route Six West • Peru, Illinois 61354 • (815) 223-3140

Oct. 27, 2003

576224

Dear Mr. Rove,

The President is going to have to do something about the C.I.A. before the election, or the Democrats will use it as one more club to beat up on him.

Herbert E. Meyer is a support of President Bush, and he has a good idea that you and the President ought to consider poor.

Please read the enclosed speech given by Mr. Meyer at Hillsdale College, and you will see what I mean.

You might invite this man to the White House to speak to you and the President. He has a wealth of good experience and many contacts.

Sincerely,  
Gabriel Bullock

The national speech digest of Hillsdale College

# Imprimis

October 2003 • Volume 32, Number 10

OVER 1,100,000 READERS MONTHLY



## What's Wrong with the CIA?

**Herbert E. Meyer**

Founder and President, Real-World Intelligence, Inc.

.....

HERBERT E. MEYER is founder and president of Real-World Intelligence, Inc., a company that designs business intelligence systems for corporations and financial institutions, and of Storm King Press. During the Reagan administration, he served as special assistant to the director of the Central Intelligence Agency and as vice chairman of the CIA's National Intelligence Council. He is the recipient of the National Intelligence Distinguished Service Medal, the intelligence community's highest honor. Prior to his service with the government, Mr. Meyer was an associate editor of *Fortune*, where he specialized in international reporting. He has written widely in newspapers and periodicals, including the *Wall Street Journal*, *Policy Review* and *National Review Online*, and is the author of several books, including *Real-World Intelligence*, *The War Against Progress* and *Hard Thinking*. He has also produced a new video entitled *The Siege of Western Civilization*.

*The following is adapted from a lecture at a Hillsdale College seminar entitled "The History, Purpose and Propriety of U.S. Intelligence Activities," held on the Hillsdale campus on September 14-18, 2003.*

It's obvious that something is wrong with the CIA. The 9/11 attacks were, by definition, the worst intelligence failure in our country's history. More recently, we have had trouble locating Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and have been consumed by the flap over whether the CIA signed off on President Bush's *accurate* observation in his State of the Union speech that British intelligence believes Saddam Hussein had tried to purchase uranium ore in Niger.

In each of these cases, the CIA was asleep at the switch, not quite on the ball, or tossing a banana peel under the president's feet. In the midst of a war in which intelligence must play a central role, we need a CIA that is razor sharp and playing offense, not one that blindsides the country or embarrasses the commander-in-chief.

So what's the problem? Before answering this question, we need to acknowledge two points: First, intelligence is the riskiest, toughest business in the world. Compared with trying to project the future of world politics or discovering a country's most closely guarded secrets, day trading in the stock market is child's play and exploring for diamonds is a piece of cake. In the intelligence business, no one gets it right every time — or even most of the time — and it's easy to take potshots at honorable people who are doing their best under difficult circumstances.

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN  
9/15/03

### Meet the Press – NBC

RUSSERT: Mr. Vice President, welcome back to Meet the Press.

CHENEY: Good morning, Tim. It's good to be back.

RUSSERT: Two years ago, September 11, 2001, you went to New York City, just the other day. Attacks on the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, the crash in Shanksville, Pennsylvania.

Has this nation recovered from September 11, 2001?

CHENEY: Well, I think in many respects, recovered, yes. On the other hand, there are some things that will never be the same. And I look back on that, and I think about what we've been engaged in since.

And in a sense, sort of the theme that comes through repeatedly for me is that 9/11 changed everything. It changed the way we think about threats to the United States. It changed about our recognition of our vulnerabilities. It changed in terms of the kind of national security strategy we need to pursue, in terms of guaranteeing the safety and security of the American people.

And I'm not sure everybody has made that transition yet. There are a number of people out there who hope we can go back to pre-9/11 days, and that somehow 9/11 was an aberration that happened one time and will never happen again.

But the president and I don't have that luxury. You know, we begin every day reading the intelligence reports from the CIA and the FBI on the nature of the threat that's out there, on the plotting by Al Qaida members and related groups to launch attacks against the United States and contemplating the possibility of an attack against the U.S. with far deadlier weapons than anything we have seen to date.

So, on the one hand, I'm sure everybody wants to get back to normal, and we have, in many respects. But on the other hand, we all have to recognize as a nation that 9/11 changed a great deal in our lives.

RUSSERT: You fully expect that there will be another attack on the United States?

CHENEY: I have to assume that. The president has to assume that. It would be nice to be able to say that that can't happen. But if we've learned anything, if we look back now, it seems to me that we have learned that there was a campaign of terror mounted against us. Before 9/11, we tended to think in terms of a terrorist act as a criminal enterprise. And the appropriate response was a law enforcement response. You go find the bad guy, put him in jail, case closed.

And what we've learned since is that that's not the case at all. That, in fact, a lot of the terrorist attacks we suffered in the 1990s were Al Qaida-directed. Certainly two of them--the World Trade Center in '93 and the East Africa embassy bombings in '98. And the USS Cole in 2000 and, obviously, on 9/11.

It's very important we make that transition to understanding that we're at war, that the war continues, that this is a global enemy that struck in not only New York and Washington but in Bali, in Jakarta, in Mombasa, in Casablanca and Riyadh since 9/11, that this is an enterprise that is global in scope.

And while we've had major success against it, the fact of the matter is that there were thousands of people that went through those training camps in Afghanistan. We know they are seeking deadlier weapons--chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, if they can

get it. And if anything, those basic notions developed in the early days after 9/11 have been reinforced by what we've learned since.

RUSSERT: There's grave concern about surface-to-air missiles shooting down American commercial aircraft. Should we not outfit all U.S. commercial airliners with equipment to detect and avoid that?

CHENEY: Well, there are technologies available. They are extremely expensive, if you are going to put them on every airliner. You've got to make choices here about, you know, when you're dealing with a risk, there may be a certain aircraft flying into certain locales that are especially vulnerable and that you may want to deal with.

But I wouldn't automatically go to the assumption that we need to put the most sophisticated system on every single airplane.

RUSSERT: The Washington Post asked the American people about Saddam Hussein, and this is what they said. Sixty-nine percent said he was involved in the September 11th attacks. Are you surprised by that?

CHENEY: No, I think it's not surprising that people make that connection.

RUSSERT: But is there a connection?

CHENEY: We don't know. You and I talked about this two years ago. I can remember you asking me this question just a few days after the original attack. At the time, I said no, we didn't have any evidence of that.

Subsequent to that, we have learned a couple of things. We learn more and more that there was a relationship between Iraq and Al Qaida that stretched back through most of the decade of the '90s. That it involved training, for example, on BW and CW, that Al Qaida sent personnel to Baghdad to get trained on the systems. It involved the Iraqis providing bomb-making expertise and advice to the Al Qaida organization.

We know, for example, in connection with the original World Trade Center bombing of '93, that one of the bombers was Iraqi, returned to Iraq after the attack of '93. And we've learned subsequent to that, since we went into Baghdad and got into the intelligence files, that this individual probably also received financing from the Iraqi government as well as safe haven.

CHENEY: Now, is there a connection between the Iraqi government and the original World Trade Center bombing of '93? We know, as I say, that one of the perpetrators of that act did, in fact, receive support from the Iraqi government after the fact.

With respect to 9/11, of course you've had the story that's been publicly out there: The Czechs alleged that Mohammed Atta, the lead attacker, met in Prague with a senior Iraqi intelligence official five months before the attack. But we've never been able to develop any more of that yet, either in terms of confirming it or discrediting it. We just don't know.

RUSSERT: But we could establish a direct link between the hijackers of September 11th and Saudi Arabia.

CHENEY: We know that many of the attackers were Saudi. There was also an Egyptian in the bunch. That doesn't mean those governments had anything to do with that attack. That's a different proposition than saying the Iraqi government or the Iraqi intelligence service had a relationship with Al Qaida that developed throughout the decade of the '90s. That was clearly official policy.

RUSSERT: There are reports that the investigation Congress did does show a link between the Saudi government and the hijackers, but that it will not be released to the public.

CHENEY: I don't want to speculate on that, Tim, partly because I was involved in reviewing those pages. It was the judgment of our senior intelligence officials, both CIA and FBI, that that material needed to remain classified.

At some point we may be able to declassify it, but there are ongoing investigations that might be affected by that release, and for that reason we kept it classified.

The committee knows what's in there. They helped to prepare it. So it hasn't been kept secret from the Congress, but from the standpoint of our ongoing investigations we needed to do that.

One of the things this points up, that's important for us to understand, there's this great temptation to look at these events as discrete events. We got hit on 9/11, so we can go investigate it. It's over with now. It's done, it's history, and we can put it behind us.

From our perspective, trying to deal with this continuing campaign of terror, if you will, the war on terror that we're engaged in, this is a continuing enterprise. The people that were involved in some of those activities before 9/11 are still out there. We learn more and more as we capture people, detain people, get access to records and so forth that this is a continuing enterprise.

And therefore, we do need to be careful, when we look at things like 9/11, the commission report from 9/11, not to jeopardize our capacity to deal with this threat going forward in the interest of putting out information that's interesting that relates to the period of time before that. These are continuing requirements on our part, and we have to be sensitive to that.

RUSSERT: Vanity Fair magazine reports that about 140 Saudis were allowed to leave the United States the day after the 11th, allowed to leave our airspace, but were never investigated by the FBI, and that departure was approved by high-level administration figures.

Do you know anything about that?

CHENEY: I don't, but a lot of folks from that part of the world left in the aftermath of 9/11 because they were worried about public reaction here in the United States or that somehow they might be discriminated against.

So we have had, especially since the attacks of Riyadh in May of this year, from the Saudi government great support and cooperation in going after terrorists, especially Al Qaida.

I think the Saudis came to realize, as a result of the attacks of last May, that they were as much of a target as we are, that Al Qaida did have a foothold inside Saudi Arabia--a number of members of the organization are from there--that there have been private individuals in Saudi Arabia that provided significant financial support and assistance, that there are facilitators and operators working inside Saudi Arabia to support the Al Qaida network.

And the Saudis have been, as I say, in the last several months, very good partners in helping us go after the people in the Al Qaida organization.

RUSSERT: Let me turn to the situation in Iraq. We all remember this picture from May 1st, the president on the USS Lincoln on May 1st, "Mission accomplished."

Since that time--these are the rather haunting figures coming out of Iraq--we had lost 138 soldiers before May 1st, and 685 wounded, injured. Since that time, since the president came on the carrier and said major combat was over, we've lost 158, and 856 wounded and injured.

Those numbers are pretty troubling.

CHENEY: Well, it's significant, Tim. Any loss of life or injury suffered by American military personnel is significant. Everyone wishes that that weren't necessary. But from the standpoint of the activity we're engaged in over there and what we've been able to accomplish over the last two years, I think it's important to keep all of this in perspective.

I looked at some numbers yesterday. I had them run the numbers, for example, in terms of our casualties since we launched into Afghanistan, the beginning of the war on terror, a little over two years ago now.

CHENEY: And the number killed in combat, both in Afghanistan and Iraq, as of yesterday, was about 213. When you add in those from non-hostile causes--the plane crashes, helicopter goes down without hostile fire--we've got a total of 372 fatalities since we started the war.

And remember, we lost 3,000 people here on 9/11.

And what we've been able to accomplish, although, I say we regret any casualties, you'd like to be able to do everything casualty-free, when you look, think about what we've accomplished in terms of Afghanistan, where we had a total of 30 killed in action in Afghanistan; taking down the Taliban, destroying the capacity of the Al Qaida to use Afghanistan as a base to attack the United States; launching an attack into Iraq, destroying the Iraqi armed forces, taking down the government of Iraq, getting rid of Saddam Hussein, capturing 42 out of the 55 top leaders, and beginning what I think has been a fairly significant success in terms of putting Iraq back together again, the price that we've had to pay is not out of line, and certainly wouldn't lead me to suggest or think that the strategy is flawed or needs to be changed.

RUSSERT: Do you believe that Saddam Hussein had a deliberate strategy, a deliberate, calculated plan, not to have the big battle of Baghdad, but rather to dissolve away into the mainstream population and then mount this guerrilla war?

CHENEY: I don't. I think that, in effect, he lost control at the outset. If you look at what transpired during the course of the campaign, the campaign that Tommy Franks mounted, the speed with which they moved, the element of surprise that was involved here, the fact that we were basically able to sever communications between the head, Saddam Hussein, and his forces, I don't think he had any choice ultimately but to flee Baghdad as he did. The level of resistance continues out there, obviously, but I think we're making major progress against it. And I think it's important not to let anecdotal reporting on individual resistance conflicts somehow color or lead us to make misjudgments about the total scope of the effort.

The fact is, most of Iraq today is relatively stable and quiet. There are still ongoing incidents, attacks on coalition forces or on others--on the Jordanian Embassy, on the U.N. delegation, on the Shia clerics in Najaf--from one of two sources, I believe, either from the remnants of the old regime, the Baathists, the Fedayeen Saddam, or terrorists, Al Qaida types, many of whom were in Iraq before the war, some of whom have arrived since the war.

Those are the main two sources that we've got to deal with. But we are dealing with them. The actual number of incidents, according to General Abizaid, this month is significantly below what it was last month on a daily basis.

So we just have to keep working the problem, and we're doing that.

RUSSET: Joe Lieberman, the senator from Connecticut, running for president, had this to say. "What President Bush gave the American people on Sunday night was a price tag, \$87 million, not a plan. And we in Congress must demand a plan."

What is our plan for Iraq? How long will the 140,000 American soldiers be there? How many international troops will join them? And how much is this going to cost?

CHENEY: Well, some of those questions are unknowable at present, Tim, and it will depend on developments, it will depend on how fast it takes us to achieve our objectives. Remember why we went there. That we went there specifically to take down the Saddam Hussein regime, to wrap up all WMD capability that he had possessed or developed, to deal with the threat that his regime represented to the region and to the United States.

A very significant challenge. But we have, in fact, I think, been very successful at achieving it.

In terms of where we're going now, we're moving aggressively to deal with the security situation, we're continuing those efforts. We've got some first-rate troops undertaking those efforts. And as I say, we've had major success, major progress when you think about the number of Iraqi bad guys that we've eliminated or captured.

We're working very aggressively, Bremer is, to stand up a new government. We've now got a 25-man Governing Council in place, made up of Iraqis, a broad, representative group of Iraqi officials. We've got Iraqis now in charge of each ministry in the government. We've got 90 percent, over 90 percent, of the cities and towns and villages of Iraq are now governed by democratically elected or appointed local councils.

We've got all the schools open, we've got all the hospitals up and functioning. We're making major progress in restoring the electricity to pre-war levels. We're rebuilding the oil system and infrastructure in the country.

So all of that's happening and is a very important part of our total strategy.

We're also working to stand up an Iraqi security force. And in four months, we've put together a force now of some 55,000 Iraqis serving in the police force, serving in the border secure force and so forth, at the local level. But that will continue to grow.

CHENEY: The second-largest security contingent in Iraq today, behind the U.S., is Iraqi.

We've been successful, to some extent, in getting international support. We've got a Polish division that we stood up, Polish-led division we stood up a few weeks ago that has troops in it from 17 countries.

With respect to the financing, the \$87 billion we've asked for is--about three-fourths of that is to support our military and security operations. About one-fourth of it will go specifically to helping make the investments Bremer believes we need to make in order to get the Iraqis back and functioning on their own capability.

So how long will it take? I don't know. I can't say. I don't think anybody can say with absolute certainty at this point.

We've achieved already, when you consider that we've only been there about four months, a great deal. And we're well on our way, I think, to achieving our objective.

But the key here for us is to stay committed, to get the job done, to give the guys on the ground the resources they need, both from a military as well as a civilian standpoint, and that's exactly what the president's doing.

RUSSET: Let's go through some of those things, because there have been suggestions of misjudgments by the administration.

When you were on the program in March, I asked you about troop levels. Let's watch.  
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

RUSSET: The Army's top general said that we would have to have several hundred thousand troops there for several years in order to maintain stability.

CHENEY: I disagree. To suggest that we need several hundred thousand troops there after military operations cease, after the conflict ends, I don't think is accurate. I think that's an overstatement.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

RUSSET: We, in fact, have about 140,000 troops, 20,000 international troops as well. Did you misjudge the number of troops necessary to secure Iraq after major combat operations?

CHENEY: Well, you're going to get in a debate here about--talking about several years, several hundred thousand troops for several years. I think that's a non-starter. I don't think we have any plan to do that, Tim. I don't think it's necessary to do that.

There's no question but what we've encountered resistance, but I don't think anybody expected the time we were there to be absolutely trouble-free. We knew there were holdover elements from the regime that would fight us and struggle, and we also knew Al Qaeda was there and Ansar al-Islam up in northeastern Iraq, which we'll come back to and talk about in a minute.

So I don't think there was a serious misjudgment here. We couldn't know precisely what would happen. There were a lot of contingencies we got ready for but never did happen. For example, one of the things we spent time worrying about was Saddam would destroy his own oil industry, that he'd do in Iraq what he did in Kuwait 12 years ago.

The consequence of that--if he'd gone in and blown up those wells, as they contemplated doing and, in fact, wired some of them for destruction--would have been that the oil industry would have been shut down to zero production probably for several years while we tried to restore it.

We were able to defeat that. That didn't occur. We had plans for it that we didn't have to execute or implement.

So it's like any other process. A plan is only as good until you start to execute, then you've got to make adjustments and so forth.

But I don't think there's been a major shift in terms of U.S. troops levels, and I still remain convinced that the judgment that we'll need, quote, "several hundred thousand for several years" is not valid.

RUSSET: The Congressional Budget Office said this, that they warn the Army lacks the sufficient active-duty forces to maintain its current level of nearly 150,000 troops in Iraq beyond next spring, and that the stress will mean increasing the number of National Guard and Reserves.

Can we keep 150,000 troops beyond next spring without, in effect, breaking the Army?

CHENEY: Tim, we can do what we have to do to prevail in this conflict. Failure is not an option.

And go back again and think about what's involved here. This is not just about Iraq or just about the difficulties we might encounter in any one part of the country, in terms of restoring security and stability.

This is about a continuing operation on the war on terror. And it's very, very important we get it right.

If we're successful in Iraq, if we can stand up a good representative government in Iraq that secures the region so that it never again becomes a threat to its neighbors or to the United States, so it's not pursuing weapons of mass destruction, so that it's not a safe haven for terrorists, then we will have struck a major blow right at the heart of the base, if you will, the geographic base of the terrorists who had us under assault now for many years, but most especially on 9/11.

They understand what's at stake here. That's one of the reasons they're putting up as much of a struggle as they have, is because they know if we succeed here, that that's going to strike a major blow at their capability...

RUSSET: So the resistance in Iraq is coming from those who were responsible for 9/11?

CHENEY: I wouldn't--I was careful not to say that. With respect to 9/11, 9/11, as I said at the beginning of the show, changed everything.

CHENEY: And one of the things that it changed is, we recognized that time was not on our side, that in this part of the world in particular, given the problems we've encountered in Afghanistan which forced us to go in and take action there, as well as in Iraq, that we in fact had to move on it.

The relevance for 9/11 is that what 9/11 marked was the beginning of a struggle in which the terrorists come at us and strike us here on our home territory. And it's a global operation that doesn't know national boundaries or national borders.

And the commitment of the United States to go into Afghanistan and take down the Taliban and stand up a new government, to go into Iraq and take down Saddam Hussein's regime and stand up a new government, is a vital part of our long-term strategy to win the war on terror. America's going to be safer and more secure in the years ahead when we complete the task in Iraq successfully.

And we will complete it successfully. And whatever the cost is, in terms of casualties or financial resources, it's a whale of a lot less than trying to recover from the next attack in the United States.

So, what we do on the ground in Iraq, our capabilities here are being tested in no small measure. But this is the place where we want to take on the terrorists. This is the place where we want to take on those elements that have come against the United States. And it's far more appropriate for us to do it there, and far better for us to do it there, than it is at home.

We talk about \$87 billion. Well, that's a significant expense, no question about it. But it's going to be much more expensive down the road if we wait, and it'll be much more expensive--it's less money, frankly, than the events of 9/11 imposed on us here in the United States.

RUSSET: In terms of costs, Mr. Vice President, there are suggestions, again, it was a misjudgment by the administration, or even misleading--Lawrence Lindsey, who used to work for the White House, had predicted it would be \$100 billion to \$200 billion for the war. We've already spent \$160 billion after this \$87 billion is expended. The Pentagon

had predicted \$50 billion. And Mitch Daniels, who used to be the top budget official at the White House, said it would cost \$50 billion to \$60 billion, that Lindsey saying \$100 billion to \$200 billion was too high.

And Paul Wolfowitz, the deputy secretary of defense, went before Congress and said this: "We're dealing with a country that can really finance its own reconstruction relatively soon," and that oil revenues would generate between \$50 billion and \$100 billion over the course of the next two or three years.

It looks like the administration truly misjudged the costs of this operation.

CHENEY: I didn't see, you know, a one-point estimate there that you could say, this is the administration's estimate. We didn't know. And if you asked Secretary Rumsfeld, for example, I can remember from his briefings he said repeatedly he didn't know. And when you and I talked about it, I couldn't put a dollar figure on it.

RUSSET: But Daniels did say \$50 billion.

CHENEY: Well, that might have been, but I don't know what his basis was for making that judgment.

We do know that we are prepared and need to be prepared to do whatever it takes to make it work, but this is not a situation where, you know, it's only a matter of us writing a check to solve the problem.

Iraq sits on top of 10 percent of the world's oil reserves. A very significant reserve, second only to Saudi Arabia. The fact is, there are significant resources here to work with.

And the notion that we're going to bear the burden all by ourselves, from a financial standpoint, I don't think is valid. We've got a donors' conference scheduled coming up next month, where the international community will come together and pledge funds to cooperate and support with the Iraqi operation.

The U.N. resolution now that Colin Powell's been working on this weekend involves, as well, authorization for the international financial institutions to come support that. There's money at the U.N. left over in the oil-for-food program that's going to be available.

There are funds in frozen Iraqi assets in various places...

RUSSET: How much is all that?

CHENEY: I don't have a final dollar figure...

(CROSSTALK)

CHENEY: ... who will pony up for that.

The \$87 billion, again, remember, about three-fourths of that is to support the U.S. military operations, or about one-fourth of it actually goes to Iraq operations. And a portion clearly will be used in Afghanistan and for the war on terror.

RUSSET: Is the \$87 billion the end of it? Will the American people be asked for any more money?

CHENEY: I can't say that.

It's all that we think we'll need for the foreseeable future, for this year. It shouldn't be-- people shouldn't be surprised that the request is coming now either. What we've done consistently, since we started this enterprise, working with the Congress, is, we did not want to incorporate the Iraq cost within the base-line DOD budget, so we've always dealt with it on the side, as a separate appropriation. That's what we're doing here.

The reason we're going now is because we've had the work done in Iraq, Bremer's been there long enough to put together a good budget looking over the next year, he's got a

pretty good idea what it's going to cost him. We've got more information now than we've had before about what our continuing needs and requirements are going to be, so now we're making the request.

We have not tried to hide it under a bushel, and the president's been very direct. We're working closely with the Congress in putting the request together.

But I come back again to the proposition of, what's the cost if we don't act? What's the cost if we do nothing? What's the cost if we don't succeed with respect to our current operation in Iraq?

CHENEY: And I think that's far higher than getting the job done right here.

RUSSERT: Democrats have written you letters and are suggesting profiteering by your former company, Halliburton. And this is how it was reported.

"Halliburton, the company formally headed by Vice President Cheney, has won contracts worth more than \$1.7 billion under Operation Iraq Freedom, and stands to make hundreds of millions more dollars under a no-bid war contract awarded by the U.S. Corps of Engineers, according to newly available documents.

"The size and scope of the government contracts awarded to Halliburton in connection with the war in Iraq are significantly greater than was previously disclosed, and demonstrate the U.S. military's increasing reliance on for-profit corporations to run its logistical operations."

Were you involved in any way in the awarding of those contracts?

CHENEY: Of course not, Tim. Tim, when I was secretary of defense, I was not involved in awarding contracts. That's done at a far lower level.

Secondly, when I ran Halliburton for five years, and they were doing work for the Defense Department, which, frankly, they've been doing for 60 or 70 years, I never went near the Defense Department. I never lobbied the Defense Department on behalf of Halliburton.

The only time I went back to the department during those eight years was to have my portrait hung, which is a traditional service rendered for former secretaries of defense. And since I left Halliburton to become George Bush's vice president, I've severed all my ties with the company, gotten rid of all my financial interest. I have no financial interest in Halliburton of any kind and haven't had, now, for over three years.

And as vice president, I have absolutely no influence of, involvement of, knowledge of, in any way, shape or form of contracts led by the Corps of Engineers or anybody else in the federal...

RUSSERT: Why is there no bidding?

CHENEY: I have no idea. Go ask the Corps of Engineers.

One of the things to keep in mind is that Halliburton is a unique kind of company. They are there are very few companies out there that have the combination of the very large engineering construction capability and significant oil field services--the first-or second-largest oil field service company in the world. And they've traditionally done a lot of work for the U.S. government and the U.S. military. That expertise has stood the military in good stead over the years.

But it's a great company. There are fine people working for it. I also have a lot of confidence in the people in the Department of Defense. Nobody has produced one single shred of evidence that there's anything wrong or inappropriate here, nothing but innuendo and, basically, political cheap shots, I guess is the way I would describe it.

I don't know any of the details of the contract because I deliberately stay away from any information on that. But Halliburton is a fine company. And, as I say, I have no reason to believe that anybody's done anything wrong or inappropriate here.

RUSSERT: Let me turn to one of the most quoted passages from Meet the Press when you were on in March. And that was trying to anticipate the reaction we would receive from the Iraqi people. Let's watch.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

CHENEY: I think things have gotten so bad inside Iraq from the standpoint of the Iraqi people, my belief is we will, in fact, be greeted as liberators.

RUSSERT: If your analysis is not correct, and we are not treated as liberators but as conquerors, and the Iraqis begin to resist, particularly in Baghdad, do you think the American people are prepared for a long, costly and bloody battle with significant American casualties?

CHENEY: Well, I don't think it's likely to unfold that way, Tim, because I really do believe we will be greeted as liberators. I've talked with a lot of Iraqis in the last several months myself, had them to the White House, the president and I have met with them-- various groups and individuals, people who've devoted their lives from the outside to trying to change things inside Iraq.

The read we get on the people of Iraq is there's no question but what they want to get rid of Saddam Hussein. And they will welcome as liberators the United States when we come to do that.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

RUSSERT: We have not been greeted as liberators.

CHENEY: Well, I think we have by most Iraqis. I think the majority of Iraqis are thankful for the fact that the United States is there, that we came and took down the Saddam Hussein government.

And I think if you go in vast areas of the country, the Shiite in the south, which are about 60 percent of the population, 20-plus percent in the north, in the Kurdish areas, and in some of the Sunni areas, you'll find that, for the most part, a majority of Iraqis support what we did.

RUSSERT: People like Ahmed Chalabi, former Iraqis who came and briefed you, that you talked about, did they sell us a bill of goods? Did they tell us this would be easier, that we'd be welcomed with flowers and not the kind of armed resistance we're being met with?

CHENEY: No. I think they felt certainly they were advocates of the U.S. action because they wanted to liberate Iraq from the--you know, what has been one of the worst dictatorships of the 20th century, the Saddam Hussein regime.

And I see and receive evidence on a fairly regular basis. I mean, if you go out and look at what's happening on the ground, you will find that there is widespread support.

There was a poll done, just random, in the last week. First one I've seen. Carefully done, admittedly, it's a difficult area to poll in. Zogby International did it, with American Enterprise magazine. But--that's got very positive news in it, in terms of the numbers it shows with respect to the attitudes of what Americans have done.

One of the questions it asked is, if you could have any model for the kind of government you would like to have, and they were given five choices, which would it be? The U.S. wins hands down.

If you want to ask them, do they want an Islamic government established, by two-to-one margins they say no, including the Shia population.

If you ask how long they want Americans to stay; over 60 percent of the people polled said they want the U.S. to stay for at least another year.

CHENEY: So, admittedly there are problems, especially in that area where Saddam Hussein was from where people benefited most from his regime and who've got the most to lose if we're successful in our enterprise, and continuing attacks from terror.

But to suggest that somehow that's representative of the country at large, or the Iraqi people are opposed to what we've done in Iraq, or are actively and aggressively trying to undermine it, I just think that's not true.

RUSSERT: You also told me, Mr. Vice President, in March that you thought Saddam would be captured or killed, turned in by his own people. Why hasn't that happened if they view us as liberators?

CHENEY: Well, we're working on it, and we'll continue to work on it. His sons were turned in by the Iraqi people. A great many of the folks that we've captured, those top 55, the 42 we have got, a great many of them were turned in as a result of tips from the Iraqis.

And as we're there longer and get an Iraqi government stood up, get more and more Iraqis involved in the security service and the security force, the intelligence, I think, will improve, and people will be willing to come forward and offer even more information than they have in the past that will help us wrap up these bad guys, and that will include get Saddam Hussein.

RUSSERT: You have no doubt you'll find him?

CHENEY: No doubt.

RUSSERT: Let me turn to weapons of mass destruction. I asked you back in March what you thought was the most important rationale for going to war with Iraq.

There's the question, and here is your answer: "The combination of Saddam's development, use of chemical weapons, development of biological weapons, his pursuit of nuclear weapons."

CHENEY: And the tie to terror.

RUSSERT: Where are they?

CHENEY: Well, I think that the jury is still out, in terms of trying to get everything pulled together with respect to what we know.

But we've got a very good man now in charge of the operation, David Kay, who used to run UNSCOM, a highly qualified, technically qualified and able individual. He's in charge of the operation now.

And I also think, Tim, that if you go back and look at what we've found to date, there's no doubt in my mind but what Saddam Hussein had these capabilities. This wasn't an idea cooked up overnight by a handful of people, either in the administration or out of the CIA.

The reporting that led to the National Intelligence Estimate, upon which I base my statements to you, that was produced a year ago, the essence of which has since been declassified, that was the product of hundreds of people working over probably 20 years, back at least to the Osirak reactor in 1981.

The conclusions in that NIE I think are very valid. And I think we'll find, in fact, that they are valid.

What we're dealing with here is a regime that had to learn after we hit them in '91 that anything above-ground was likely to be destroyed in the air campaign. They'd gone through many years of inspections; they knew they had to hide and bury their capabilities in this region inside their civilian structure. And I think that's what they did.

And if you look--talk about the nuclear program. The judgment in the NIE was that if Saddam could acquire fissile material, weapons-grade material, that he would have a nuclear weapon within a few months to a year. That was the judgment of the intelligence community of the United States, and they had a high degree of confidence in it.

What do we know he had? Well, we know he'd worked on the program for 20 years. We know he had technicians who knew how to do this stuff, because they'd been working on it over that period of time. We believed, the community believed, he had a workable design for a bomb. And we know he had 500 tons of uranium. It's there today, at Tuwaitha, under seal of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

All those are facts that are basically not in dispute. And since we got in there, we've found--we had a gentleman come forward, for example, with the full designs for a process centrifuge system to enrich uranium and the key parts that you need to build such a system. And we know Saddam had worked on that kind of system before.

That's physical evidence that we've got in hand today. So to suggest that there's no evidence there that he had aspirations to acquire a nuclear weapon, I don't think is valid. And I think David Kay will find more evidence as he goes forward and interviews people, as we get to folks willing to come forward now as they become more and more convinced that it's safe to do so, that in fact he had a robust plan, had previously worked on it and would work on it again.

Same on biological weapons. We believe he'd developed the capacity to go mobile with his BW production capability, because, again, in reaction to what we'd done to him in '91. CHENEY: We had intelligence reporting before the war that there were at least seven of these mobile labs that he'd gone out and acquired. We, since the war, have found two of them. They are in our possession today--mobile biological facilities that can be used to produce anthrax or smallpox or whatever else you wanted to use during the course of developing a capacity for an attack.

So on CW and chemical weapons, my guess is, it's buried inside his civilian infrastructure. That's not an unusual place to put it.

And again, David Kay's task is to look for the people that were involved in the program, to find documentary evidence to back it up, to find physical evidence when he can find that. It's a hard task, but I've got great confidence that he can do this.

And again, the whole notion that somehow there's nothing to the notion that Saddam Hussein had WMD or developed WMD, it just strikes me as fallacious. It's not valid. Now, nobody drove into Baghdad and had somebody say, "Hey, there's the building over there where all of our WMD is stored." That's not the way the system worked.

RUSSET: There's a real debate about those labs, but I want to talk about something very specific. And that was the president at the State of the Union message when he said that the British had learned that Saddam was acquiring uranium from Africa.

That was in January. Then, in March, the head of the International Energy Atomic Agency, ElBaradei, issued this statement: "A key piece of evidence linking Iraq to a nuclear weapons program appears to have been fabricated. Documents that purportedly

show Iraqi officials shopping for uranium in Africa two years ago were deemed not authentic after careful scrutiny by the U.N.

"ElBaradei also reported finding no evidence of banned weapons or nuclear material in an extensive sweep of Iraq using advanced radiation detectors. 'There is no indication of resumed nuclear activities.'"

Eight days after that, you were on Meet the Press, and we talked about that specifically. Let's watch.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

RUSSERT: And even though the International Atomic Energy Agency said he does not have a nuclear program, we disagree.

CHENEY: I disagree, yes. And you'll find the CIA, for example, and other key parts of our intelligence community disagree. And we believe he has, in fact, reconstituted nuclear weapons.

I think Mr. ElBaradei, frankly, is wrong. And I think if you look at the track record of the International Atomic Energy Agency in this kind of issue, especially where Iraq's concerned, they have consistently underestimated or missed what it was Saddam Hussein was doing. I don't have any reason to believe they're any more valid this time than they've been in the past.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

RUSSERT: Reconstitute nuclear weapons. You misspoke.

CHENEY: I did misspeak. I've said repeatedly during the show, weapons capability. We've never had any evidence that he had acquired a nuclear weapon.

RUSSERT: Now, Ambassador Joe Wilson, a year before that, was sent over by the CIA because you raised the question about uranium from Africa. He says he came back from Niger and said that, in fact, he could not find any documentation that, in fact, Niger had sent uranium to Iraq or engaged in that activity, and reported it back to the proper channels.

Were you briefed on his findings in February-March of 2002?

CHENEY: No. I don't know Joe Wilson. I've never met Joe Wilson.

A question had arisen. I'd heard a report that the Iraqis had been trying to acquire uranium from Africa, Niger in particular. I get a daily brief on my own each day before I meet with the president to go through the intel, and I ask lots of questions.

One of the questions I asked at that particular time about this is, "What do we know about this?" They take the question. He came back within a day or two and said, "This is all we know. There's a lot we don't know." End of statement.

And Joe Wilson, I don't know who sent Joe Wilson. He never submitted a report that I ever saw when he came back.

I guess the intriguing thing, Tim, on the whole thing, this question of whether or not the Iraqis were trying to acquire uranium in Africa in the British report, this week the committee of the British Parliament, it just spent 90 days investigating all of this, revalidated the British claim that Saddam was, in fact, trying to acquire uranium in Africa--what was in the State of the Union speech and what was in the original British white papers.

So there may be a difference of opinion there. I don't know what the truth is on the ground with respect to that. But I guess, as I say, and I don't know Mr. Wilson. I probably shouldn't judge him. I have no idea who hired him, and it never...

RUSSERT: The CIA did.

CHENEY: Yes, but who in the CIA, I don't know.

RUSSERT: This is what concerns people, that the administration hyped the intelligence, misled the American people.

This article from The Washington Post about pressuring from Cheney visits: "Vice President Cheney's most senior aide made multiple trips to the CIA over the past year to question analysts studying Iraq's weapons programs, alleged links to Al Qaida, creating an environment in which some analysts felt they were being pressured to make their assessments fit with the Bush administration's policy objectives, according to senior officials.

RUSSERT: "With Cheney taking the lead in the administration last August in advocating military action against Iraq by claiming it had weapons of mass destruction, the visits by the vice president's chief of staff sent signals, intended or otherwise, that a certain output was desired from here," one senior agency official said."

CHENEY: In terms of asking questions, I plead guilty. I ask a hell of a lot of questions. That's my job.

I've got--I've had an interest in the intelligence area since I worked for Jerry Ford 30 years ago, served on the Intel Committee in the House for years, in the '80s; ran a big part of the intelligence community when I was secretary of defense in the early '90s.

This is a very important area. It's one the president's asked me to work on, and I ask questions all the time. I think, if you're going to provide the intelligence and advice to the president of the United States to make life-and-death decisions, you need to be able to defend your conclusions, and go into an arena where you can make the arguments about why you believe what you do based on the intelligence...

RUSSERT: No pressure?

CHENEY: Shouldn't be any pressure. I can't think of a single instance--maybe somebody can produce one, I'm not aware of any--where the community changed a judgment that they made because I asked questions.

RUSSERT: If they were wrong, Mr. Vice President, shouldn't we have a wholesale investigation into the intelligence failure, that they predicted that Saddam had biological, chemical, and a developing nuclear program?

CHENEY: My guess is, in the end, they'll be proven right, Tim.

In the intelligence business, first of all, it's intelligence. There are judgments involved in all of this. But we've got, I think, some very able people in the intelligence business that reviewed the material here. This was a crucial subject. It was extensively covered for years. We're very good at it.

They say the British just revalidated their claim. So I'm not sure what the argument is about here. I think, in the final analysis, we will find that the Iraqis did have a robust program.

How do you explain why Saddam Hussein, if he had no program, wouldn't come clean and say, I haven't got a program, come look? Then he would have had sanctions lifted, he would have earned \$100 billion more in oil revenue over the last several years, he'd still be in power. The reason he didn't is because, obviously, he couldn't comply and wouldn't comply with the U.N. resolutions demanding that he give up his WMD.

The Security Council, by a 15-0 vote a year ago, found him still in violation of those U.N. Security Council resolutions. A lot of the reporting isn't U.S. reporting, it's U.N.

reporting, on the supplies and stocks of VX and nerve agent and anthrax and so forth that he's never accounted for.

So, I say I'm not willing at all, at this point, to buy the proposition that somehow Saddam Hussein was innocent and he had no WMD, and some guy out at the CIA, because I called him, cooked up a report saying he did. That's crazy. That makes no sense, it bears no resemblance to reality whatsoever.

And in terms of asking questions, you bet I do. I've seen, in times past, when there's been faulty intelligence, because they don't always get it right. I think, for example, of having missed the downfall of the Soviet Union. And so I ask a lot of questions based on my years of experience in this business, but that's what I get paid to do.

RUSSET: We have to take a quick break.

We'll be right back with more of our conversation with Vice President Dick Cheney, and talk about the economy, right after this.

RUSSET: And we are back.

Mr. Vice President, the economy and the Bush-Cheney record.

The day you took office, Inauguration Day, as compared to now, Dow Jones is down 11 percent, unemployment rate is up 49 percent, a \$281 billion surplus is now a \$500 billion-plus deficit. Jobs, net loss of 2.6 million. The debt is up 20 percent and still growing.

How can you run for re-election on that record?

CHENEY: Well, Tim, right there we were starting into a recession. And we certainly didn't bear responsibility for creating the circumstances that led to the recession.

The combination of the recession, the economic slowdown, the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the war on terror, have obviously created economic problems for the country.

But we're making significant progress. The president's policies, in terms of especially the tax cut package that we've passed now three times, does offer very bright prospects for the future. The forecast by nearly everybody I've talked with for the last half of the year is we're looking at 4 to 5 percent real growth, a significant boost over where we've been.

Going into next year, we anticipate, most of the forecasters, growth on the order of 4 percent or better in GDP.

So I think we've turned the corner, and we're making significant progress, and that's part of the normal business cycle, as well as the added unusual factors of a national emergency.

RUSSET: If you froze the tax cut for the top 1 percent of Americans, it would generate enough money to pay for the \$87 billion for the war. If you did it for just one year. Would you consider that?

CHENEY: I think it would be a mistake. Because you can't look at that without considering what its impact would be on the economy. An awful lot of the returns in that top bracket are small businesses, and they provide an awful lot of the job growth in this economy.

If you're going to go increase taxes on small businesses, you're going to slow down the extent to which we're able to reduce unemployment. So I think it's a serious mistake. It's the wrong time to raise taxes.

RUSSET: The president said in 2002 the tax cut would generate 800,000 jobs; in 2003, he said there'd be another million jobs. None of that has happened. What has happened is the deficit is skyrocketing, over \$500 billion.

You used to be a real deficit hawk. We went back when you were the leader in Congress, this is what you said about Ronald Reagan's deficit. You said that, "It puts at risk everything Reagan believes in. The deficit potentially is Mr. Reagan's Vietnam." And then this: "Some of us are frustrated by the failure of the administration to do anything about deficits. Asked how the president looked after his cancer surgery, Cheney said, 'He looks good, he's just a little soft on deficits.'" (LAUGHTER)

That's when the deficit was below \$200 billion. What happened to Dick Cheney, deficit hawk?

CHENEY: I was just looking at the picture you got there, Tim. I hadn't seen it in a long time.

I am a deficit hawk. So is the president.

The fact of the matter is, we've always made exceptions for recession, national emergency, time of war. The deficit that we're running today, after we get the approval of the \$87 billion, will still be less as a percentage of our total capacity to pay for it, our total economic activity in this country, than was back in '80s or the deficits we ran in the '90s. We're still about 4.7 percent of our total GDP.

So the notion that the United States can't afford this, or that we shouldn't do it, is I think seriously flawed.

One of the reasons the deficit got as big as it did, frankly, was because of the economic slowdown, the fall-off in deficits, the terrorist attacks. A significant chunk was taken out of the economy by what happened after the attacks of 9/11.

RUSSERT: And tax cuts.

CHENEY: Tax cuts accounted for only about 25 percent of the deficit.

RUSSERT: But we see deficits for the next 10 years. Big ones. How do you deal with that, when you have Social Security, Medicare coming up?

CHENEY: We anticipate, even with the added spending that we've asked for now, we'll cut the deficit roughly in half from where it will be next year over the next five years. So we'll be moving in the right direction. We've got to have--without question, we've got to make choices, we've got to have fiscal discipline on the rest of the budget.

But the idea that we can't defend America, or that we can't go do what needs to be done in the Middle East with respect to Iraq and Afghanistan--support the troops, rebuild those countries so they never again become safe havens for terrorists to threaten our safety and our security--is silly. The cost of one attack on 9/11 was far greater than what we're spending in Iraq.

RUSSERT: What do you think of the Democratic field?

CHENEY: I haven't really frankly paid a hell of a lot of attention to it, Tim. I'm awful busy with my normal day job, and I just, I haven't, really haven't looked at it.

I know some of them. Joe Lieberman, Dick Gephardt are people I've known for some time. Others, like Howard Dean, frankly I don't have any relationship with.

And I'll watch with interest. Whoever they nominate, we're ready to take them on.

RUSSERT: Do you think the president is betting his presidency on the war in Iraq?

CHENEY: This president is betting his presidency on the importance of fighting the war on terror, of recognizing that 9/11 changed everything, of adopting a strategy that's going to make this nation safer and more secure for our kids and grandkids.

And it takes a president willing to take risk, willing to use the power of the United States to make that happen, and this president has done it.

RUSSERT: Mr. Vice President, we thank you for joining us and sharing your views.

CHENEY: Thank you, sir.

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THE CASE HAS BEEN  
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# the weekly Standard

## Why We Went to War

From the October 20, 2003 issue: The case for the war in Iraq, with testimony from Bill Clinton.

by Robert Kagan & William Kristol

10/20/2003, Volume 009, Issue 06

*"When I left office, there was a substantial amount of biological and chemical material unaccounted for. That is, at the end of the first Gulf War, we knew what he had. We knew what was destroyed in all the inspection processes and that was a lot. And then we bombed with the British for four days in 1998. We might have gotten it all; we might have gotten half of it; we might have gotten none of it. But we didn't know. So I thought it was prudent for the president to go to the U.N. and for the U.N. to say you got to let these inspectors in, and this time if you don't cooperate the penalty could be regime change, not just continued sanctions."*

**--Bill Clinton, July 22, 2003**

FORMER PRESIDENT CLINTON is right about what he and the whole world knew about Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction programs. And most of what everyone knew about Saddam's weapons of mass destruction had nothing to do with this or any other government's intelligence collection and analysis. Had there never been a Central Intelligence Agency--an idea we admit sounds more attractive all the time--the case for war against Iraq would have been rock solid. Almost everything we knew about Saddam's weapons programs and stockpiles, we knew because the Iraqis themselves admitted it.

Here's a little history that seems to have been completely forgotten in the frenzy of the past few months. Shortly after the first Gulf War in 1991, U.N. inspectors discovered the existence of a surprisingly advanced Iraqi nuclear weapons program. In addition, by Iraq's own admission and U.N. inspection efforts, Saddam's regime possessed thousands of chemical weapons and tons of chemical weapon agents. Were it not for the 1995 defection of senior Iraqi officials, the U.N. would never have made the further discovery that Iraq had manufactured and equipped weapons with the deadly chemical nerve agent VX and had an extensive biological warfare program.

Here is what was known by 1998 based on Iraq's own admissions:

- \* That in the years immediately prior to the first Gulf War, Iraq produced at least 3.9 tons of VX, a deadly nerve gas, and acquired 805 tons of precursor ingredients for the production of more VX.
- \* That Iraq had produced or imported some 4,000 tons of ingredients to produce other types of poison gas.

- \* That Iraq had produced 8,500 liters of anthrax.
- \* That Iraq had produced 500 bombs fitted with parachutes for the purpose of delivering poison gas or germ payloads.
- \* That Iraq had produced 550 artillery shells filled with mustard gas.
- \* That Iraq had produced or imported 107,500 casings for chemical weapons.
- \* That Iraq had produced at least 157 aerial bombs filled with germ agents.
- \* That Iraq had produced 25 missile warheads containing germ agents (anthrax, aflatoxin, and botulinum).

Again, this list of weapons of mass destruction is not what the Iraqi government was *suspected* of producing. (That would be a longer list, including an Iraqi nuclear program that the German intelligence service had concluded in 2001 might produce a bomb within three years.) It was what the Iraqis *admitted* producing. And it is this list of weapons--not any CIA analysis under either the Clinton or Bush administrations--that has been at the heart of the Iraq crisis.

For in all the years after those admissions, the Iraqi government never explained, or even tried to explain, to anyone's satisfaction, including most recently, that of Hans Blix, what had become of the huge quantities of deadly weapons it had produced. The Iraqi government repeatedly insisted that most of the weapons had been "secretly" destroyed. When asked to produce credible evidence of the destruction--the location of destruction sites, fragments of destroyed weapons, some documentation of the destruction, anything at all--the Iraqis refused. After 1995, the U.N. weapons inspection process became a lengthy cat-and-mouse game, as inspectors tried to cajole Iraqis to divulge information about the fate of these admitted stockpiles of weapons. The inspectors fanned out across the country looking for weapons caches, stashes of documents, and people willing to talk. And sometimes, the inspectors uncovered evidence. Both American and French testers found traces of nerve gas on remnants of warheads, for instance. The Iraqis claimed the evidence had been planted.

After 1996, and partly as a consequence of the documents they had discovered and of Iraqi admissions, weapons inspectors must have started getting closer to uncovering what the Iraqis were hiding. For at about that time, inspectors' demands to visit certain facilities began to be systematically blocked by Saddam. There was the famous confrontation over the so-called "presidential palaces," actually vast complexes of buildings and warehouses, that Saddam simply declared off-limits to inspectors.

At the end of 1997, this limitation on the inspectors' freedom of movement precipitated an international crisis. The Clinton administration demanded that the inspectors be given full access to the "palaces." The Iraqis refused. Instead, Saddam demanded the removal of all Americans from the U.N. inspection team and an end to all U-2 flights over Iraq, and even threatened to shoot the planes down. In case there was any doubt that his aim was to conceal weapons programs that the inspectors were getting close to discovering, Iraq at this time also began moving equipment that could be used to manufacture weapons out of the range of video cameras that had been installed by the U.N. inspection team.

The New York Times reported at the time that the U.N. weapons inspectors (*not* American intelligence) believed that Iraq possessed "the elements of a deadly germ warfare arsenal and

perhaps poison gases, as well as the rudiments of a missile system" that could launch the warheads. But because of Saddam's action at the end of 1997, the Times reported, the U.N. inspection team could "no longer verify that Iraq is not making weapons of mass destruction" and specifically could not monitor "equipment that could grow seed stocks of biological agents in a matter of hours." Saddam's precipitating of this crisis was a bold move, aimed at splitting the U.N. Security Council and isolating the Clinton administration. And it worked. The Clinton administration tried but failed to get French and Russian support at the Security Council either for military action or for a tightening of sanctions to force Saddam to cease these activities and comply with his commitment to disarm. The French and Russian position by 1997 was that the "books" should be closed on Iraq's WMD programs, sanctions should be lifted, and relations with Saddam should be normalized. That remained the French position for the next five years.

It was in response to this crisis that we at this magazine began calling for Saddam Hussein's ouster by means of a ground invasion. And in a letter sent to President Clinton on January 26, 1998, we and a number of other former government officials urged military action against Saddam on the grounds that the situation had become untenable and perilous. As a result of recent events, we wrote, the United States could

*no longer depend on our partners in the Gulf War coalition to continue to uphold the sanctions or to punish Saddam when he blocks or evades U.N. inspections. Our ability to ensure that Saddam Hussein is not producing weapons of mass destruction, therefore, has substantially diminished. Even if full inspections were eventually to resume, which now seems highly unlikely, experience has shown that it is difficult if not impossible to monitor Iraq's chemical and biological weapons production. The lengthy period during which the inspectors will have been unable to enter many Iraqi facilities has made it even less likely that they will be able to uncover all of Saddam's secrets. As a result, in the not-too-distant future we will be unable to determine with any reasonable level of confidence whether Iraq does or does not possess such weapons. Such uncertainty will, by itself, have a seriously destabilizing effect on the entire Middle East.*

IN EARLY 1998, the Clinton administration, following this same logic, prepared for war against Iraq. On February 17, President Clinton spoke on the steps of the Pentagon to explain to the American people why war was necessary. The speech is worth excerpting at length, because it was then and remains today the fundamental case for the invasion of Iraq and the removal of Saddam Hussein from power.

President Clinton declared that the great threat confronting the United States and its allies was a lethal and "unholy axis" of international terrorists and outlaw states. "They will be all the more lethal if we allow them to build arsenals of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and the missiles to deliver them." There was, Clinton declared, "no more clear example of this threat than Saddam Hussein's Iraq. His regime threatens the safety of his people, the stability of his region and the security of all the rest of us." Before the Gulf War of 1991, Clinton noted, "Saddam had built up a terrible arsenal, and he had used it. Not once, but many times in a decade-long war with Iran, he used chemical weapons against combatants, against civilians, against a foreign adversary and even against his own people." At the end of the Gulf War, Saddam had promised to reveal all his programs and disarm within 15 days. But instead, he had spent "the better part of the past decade trying to cheat on this solemn commitment." As Clinton explained:

*Iraq repeatedly made false declarations about the weapons that it had left in its possession after the Gulf War. When UNSCOM would then uncover evidence that gave*

*the lie to those declarations, Iraq would simply amend the reports. For example, Iraq revised its nuclear declarations four times within just 14 months, and it has submitted six different biological warfare declarations, each of which has been rejected by UNSCOM.*

*In 1995 Hussein Kamal, Saddam's son-in-law and the chief organizer of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program, defected to Jordan. He revealed that Iraq was continuing to conceal weapons and missiles and the capacity to build many more. Then and only then did Iraq admit to developing numbers of weapons in significant quantities--and weapons stocks. Previously it had vehemently denied the very thing it just simply admitted once Saddam's son-in-law defected to Jordan and told the truth.*

*Now listen to this: What did it admit? It admitted, among other things, an offensive biological warfare capability, notably, 5,000 gallons of botulinum, which causes botulism; 2,000 gallons of anthrax; 25 biological-filled Scud warheads; and 157 aerial bombs. And I might say UNSCOM inspectors believe that Iraq has actually greatly understated its production. . . .*

*Next, throughout this entire process, Iraqi agents have undermined and undercut UNSCOM. They've harassed the inspectors, lied to them, disabled monitoring cameras, literally spirited evidence out of the back doors of suspect facilities as inspectors walked through the front door, and our people were there observing it and had the pictures to prove it. . . .*

*Over the past few months, as [the weapons inspectors] have come closer and closer to rooting out Iraq's remaining nuclear capacity, Saddam has undertaken yet another gambit to thwart their ambitions by imposing debilitating conditions on the inspectors and declaring key sites which have still not been inspected off limits, including, I might add, one palace in Baghdad more than 2,600 acres large. . . .*

*One of these presidential sites is about the size of Washington, D.C. . . .*

*It is obvious that there is an attempt here, based on the whole history of this operation since 1991, to protect whatever remains of his capacity to produce weapons of mass destruction, the missiles to deliver them, and the feed stocks necessary to produce them. The UNSCOM inspectors believe that Iraq still has stockpiles of chemical and biological munitions, a small force of Scud-type missiles, and the capacity to restart quickly its production program and build many, many more weapons. . . .*

*Now, let's imagine the future. What if he fails to comply and we fail to act, or we take some ambiguous third route, which gives him yet more opportunities to develop this program of weapons of mass destruction and continue to press for the release of the sanctions and continue to ignore the solemn commitments that he made? Well, he will conclude that the international community has lost its will. He will then conclude that he can go right on and do more to rebuild an arsenal of devastating destruction.*

*And some day, some way, I guarantee you he'll use the arsenal. . . . In the next century, the community of nations may see more and more of the very kind of threat Iraq poses now--a rogue state with weapons of mass destruction, ready to use them or provide them to terrorists, drug traffickers, or organized criminals who travel the world among us unnoticed.*

*If we fail to respond today, Saddam, and all those who would follow in his footsteps, will be emboldened tomorrow by the knowledge that they can act with impunity, even in the face of a clear message from the United Nations Security Council, and clear evidence of a weapons of mass destruction program.*

The Clinton administration did not in fact respond. War was averted by a lame compromise worked out by U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan. But within a few months, Saddam was again obstructing U.N. inspectors, driving a deeper wedge into the U.N. Security Council and attempting to put a final end to the inspections process. He succeeded. At the end of 1998, the Clinton administration launched Operation Desert Fox, a four-day missile and bombing attack on Iraq that was aimed principally at known and suspected facilities for producing weapons of mass destruction and missiles. The effect of the bombings on Iraq's programs and stockpiles, however, was unknown, as Clinton acknowledges. But one effect of Operation Desert Fox was that Saddam expelled the U.N. inspectors altogether. Beginning in December 1998 and for the next four years, there were no U.N. inspectors in Iraq.

What did Saddam Hussein do during those four years of relative freedom? To this day, no one knows for sure. The only means of learning Iraqi activities during those years were intelligence, satellite photography, electronic eavesdropping, and human sources. The last of these was in short supply. And, as we now know, the ability to determine the extent of Saddam's programs only by so-called technical means was severely limited. American and foreign intelligence services pieced together what little information they could, but they were trying to illuminate a dark cave with a Bic lighter. Without a vast inspection team on the ground, operating unfettered and over a long period of time, it was clear that the great unanswered questions regarding Iraq--what happened to the old stockpiles of weapons and what new programs Saddam was working on--could never be answered.

The rest of the story, we assume, most people remember. The Bush administration's threat of war beginning last summer led France and Russia to reverse themselves and to start taking the Iraq weapons issue seriously again. In U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441, the Security Council agreed on a new round of inspections, during which Saddam was to do finally what he had promised to do back in 1991 and ever since: make a clean breast of all his programs, answer all the unanswered questions about his admitted stockpiles of weapons, and fully disarm. Resolution 1441 demanded that, within 30 days, Iraq provide "a currently accurate, full, and complete declaration of all aspects of its programmes to develop chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and other delivery systems such as unmanned aerial vehicles and dispersal systems designed for use on aircraft, including any holdings and precise locations of such weapons, components, sub-components, stocks of agents, and related material and equipment, the locations and work of its research, development and production facilities, as well as all other chemical, biological, and nuclear programmes, including any which it claims are for purposes not related to weapon production or material."

Iraq did not comply with this demand within 30 days--or, for that matter, within 90. In his March 6, 2003, report to the U.N. Security Council, Hans Blix reported that the declared stocks of anthrax and VX remained unaccounted for. In the last chance given to Iraq by Resolution 1441, Iraq had failed to provide answers. As Blix reported again in May 2003, "little progress was made in the solution of outstanding issues....the long list of proscribed items unaccounted for and as such resulting in unresolved disarmament issues was not shortened either by the inspections or by Iraqi declarations and documentation."

We have retold this long story for one simple reason: This is why George W. Bush and Tony Blair and Jose Maria Aznar led their governments and a host of others to war to remove the Saddam

Hussein regime in March 2003. It was not, in the first instance, to democratize the Middle East, although we have always believed and still believe that the building of a democratic Iraq, if the United States succeeds in doing so, will have a positive impact on the Arab world. It was not to increase the chances of an Arab-Israeli peace, although we still believe that the removal of a dangerous radical tyrant like Saddam Hussein may make that difficult task somewhat easier. It was not because we believed Saddam Hussein had ordered the September 11 attack, although we believe the links between Saddam and al Qaeda are becoming clearer every day (see Stephen F. Hayes's article on page 33 of this issue). Nor did the United States and its allies go to war because we believed that some quantity of "yellowcake" was making its way from Niger to Iraq, or that Saddam was minutes away from launching a nuclear weapon against Chicago. We never believed the threat from Saddam was "imminent" in that sense.

The reason for war, in the first instance, was always the strategic threat posed by Saddam because of his proven record of aggression and barbarity, his admitted possession of weapons of mass destruction, and the certain knowledge of his programs to build more. It was the threat he posed to his region, to our allies, and to core U.S. interests that justified going to war this past spring, just as it also would have justified a Clinton administration decision to go to war in 1998. It was why Bill Clinton, Madeleine Albright, William Cohen, and many other top officials had concluded in the late 1990s that Saddam Hussein was an intolerable menace to his neighbors, to American allies, and ultimately to the United States itself, and therefore had eventually to be removed. It was also why a large number of Democrats, including John Kerry and General Wesley Clark, expressed support for the war last year, before Howard Dean and his roaring left wing of the Democratic party made support for "Bush's war" untenable for Democratic candidates.

NOTHING THAT HAS or has not been discovered in Iraq since the end of the war changes this fundamental judgment. Those who always objected to the rationale for the war want to use the failure so far to discover large caches of weapons to re-litigate the question. Democrats fearful of their party's left wing are using it to jump off the positions they held last year. That's politics. But back in the real world, the fact that David Kay's inspections teams have not yet found out what happened to Saddam's admitted stockpiles is not surprising. U.N. weapons inspectors did not find those caches of weapons in 12 years; Kay and his team have had about four months. Yes, we wish Saddam had left his chemical munitions and biological weapons neatly stacked up in a warehouse somewhere marked on the outside with a big, yellow skull and crossbones. We wish he had published his scientists' nuclear designs in the daily paper. Or we wish we could find the "Dear Diary" entry where he explains exactly what happened to all the weapons he built. But he did not leave these helpful hints behind.

After Operation Iraqi Freedom, the U.S. military was led by an Iraqi to a part of the desert where, lo and behold, a number of MiG fighter jets had been buried under the sand. Note that the Americans did not discover the jets themselves. Discovering chemical and biological munitions will be somewhat harder. Kay recently reported to Congress that there are approximately 130 Ammunition Storage Points scattered across Iraq, a country the size of France. Many of the ammunition depots take up more than 50 square miles. Together they hold 600,000 tons of artillery shells, rockets, aviation bombs, and other ordnance. Under Saddam, U.N. inspectors learned, the Iraqi military stored chemical ordnance at the same ammunition depots where the conventional rounds were stored. Do you know how many of the 130 Iraqi ammunition depots have been searched since the end of the war? Ten. Only 120 to go.

Saddam Hussein had four years of unfettered activity in which to hide and reconfigure his weapons programs. Our intelligence on this, as we noted earlier, may have been lousy. David Kay's task has essentially been to reconstruct a story we don't know. In fact, he's learned quite a bit in a very short

time. For instance, as Kay reported to Congress, his team has uncovered "dozens of WMD-related program activities and significant amounts of equipment that Iraq concealed from the U.N. *during the inspections that began in late 2002*" (emphasis added). In addition, based on admissions by Iraqi scientists and government officials, Kay and his team have discovered:

- \* A clandestine network of laboratories and safehouses within the Iraqi Intelligence Service that contained equipment suitable for research in the production of chemical and biological weapons. This kind of equipment was explicitly mentioned in Hans Blix's requests for information, but was instead concealed from Blix throughout his investigations.
- \* A prison laboratory complex, which may have been used in human testing of biological weapons agents. Iraqi officials working to prepare for U.N. inspections in 2002 and 2003 were explicitly ordered not to acknowledge the existence of the prison complex.
- \* So-called "reference strains" of biological organisms, which can be used to produce biological weapons. The strains were found in a scientist's home.
- \* New research on agents applicable to biological weapons, including Congo Crimean Hemorrhagic Fever, and continuing research on ricin and aflatoxin--all of which was, again, concealed from Hans Blix despite his specific request for any such information.
- \* Plans and advanced design work on new long-range missiles with ranges up to at least 1,000 kilometers--well beyond the 150-kilometer limit imposed on Iraq by the U.N. Security Council. These missiles would have allowed Saddam to threaten targets from Ankara to Cairo.

In addition to these banned activities, which were occurring right under the noses of the U.N. inspectors this past year, Kay and his team also discovered a massive effort to destroy evidence of weapons programs, an effort that began before the war and continued during it and even after the war. In the "looting" that followed the fall of Baghdad, computer hard drives were destroyed in government buildings--thus making the computers of no monetary value to actual looters. Kay also found documents burned or shredded. And people whom the Kay team tried to interview were in some cases threatened with retaliation by Saddam loyalists. Indeed, two of the scientists were subsequently shot. Others involved in the weapons programs have refused to talk for fear of eventual prosecution for war crimes.

Nevertheless, Kay has begun piecing together the story of what happened to Saddam's weapons and how he may have shifted direction in the years after 1998. It is possible that instead of building up large stockpiles of weapons, Saddam decided the safer thing would be to advance his covert programs for producing weapons but wait until the pressure was off to produce the weapons themselves. By the time inspectors returned to Iraq in 2002, Saddam was ready to be a little more forthcoming, because he had rejiggered his program to withstand somewhat greater scrutiny. Nevertheless, even then he could not let the inspectors see everything. Undoubtedly he hoped that if he could get through that last round, he would be home free, eventually without sanctions or further inspections.

There are no doubt some Americans who believe that this would have been an acceptable outcome. Or who believe that another six months of inspections would have uncovered all that Saddam was hiding. Or that a policy of "containment"--which included 200,000 troops on Iraq's borders as an inducement to permit inspections--could have been sustained indefinitely both at the U.N. Security Council and in Washington. We believe the overwhelming lesson of our history with Saddam is that none of these options would have succeeded. Had Saddam Hussein not been removed this year, it

would have been only a matter of time before this president or some future president was compelled to take action against him, and in more dangerous circumstances.

There are people who will never accept this logic, who prefer to believe, or claim to believe, that the whole Iraq affair was, in the words of Ted Kennedy, a "fraud" "made up in Texas" for political gain, or who believe that it was the product of a vast conspiracy orchestrated by a tiny little band of "neoconservatives." Some of the people propagating this conspiratorial view of the Iraq war are now running for the Democratic nomination for president; one of them is even a former general who led the war against Slobodan Milosevic in 1999. We wish them the best of luck selling their conspiracy theories to the American people. But we trust Bill Clinton won't be stumping for them on this particular issue.

*--Robert Kagan & William Kristol*

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MISCELLANEOUS CORRESPONDENCE THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

October 09, 2003

THROUGH

October 24, 2003

# Withdrawal Marker

## The George W. Bush Library

| FORM             | SUBJECT/TITLE                                     | PAGES | DATE       | RESTRICTION(S) |
|------------------|---------------------------------------------------|-------|------------|----------------|
| Handwritten Note | [Note to Karl Rove] - To: Karl Rove - From: POTUS | 1     | 10/10/2003 | P5;            |

**This marker identifies the original location of the withdrawn item listed above.  
For a complete list of items withdrawn from this folder, see the  
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet at the front of the folder.**

### **COLLECTION:**

Records Management, White House Office of

### **SERIES:**

Droege, Philip (Phil)

### **FOLDER TITLE:**

WILSON/WHIG (White House Iraq Group) 01/2004: Documents Given to Counsel's Office

### **FRC ID:**

6307

### **FOIA IDs and Segments:**

2014-0234-F

### **OA Num.:**

8098

### **NARA Num.:**

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#### **Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

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- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advise between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

...any more  
 In carving out a disproportionate amount of seats for themselves, Republicans are costing Texas decades of precious seniority in Congress. Whether you like them or not, senior Democrats like Charles Stenholm of Abilene occupy leading positions on committees. That benefits Texas. Under this map, he and several others could be gone.

Republicans had a chance to produce districts that were fair to Texas and favorable to them. They have chosen to go only with the latter aim. For the state's sake, the map should go no further.

...interest principle  
 ...Collin and Rock  
 ...reaches of rural  
 Texas. The needs of suburbanites  
 and voters are pretty distinct. Roping  
 them together does neither any good.  
 Also consider the map's impact on minority

we  
 crisis  
 health  
 insured  
 Why  
 \$298.46 per  
 spend \$3.5  
 people in Iraq  
 Andy

## Road plan

It seems the n  
 Mound, Highland  
 are serving their  
 poorly by signing on to  
 FM 2499. Why turn  
 feeder road in a residential  
 to a major north-south,  
 go artery with its attendant  
 traffic and pollution?

If they foresee a "sea of  
 tops" — or should we say a ve  
 of Calcutta on the Texas plains  
 would be far better for the  
 dents to channel some of the  
 million in highway funds into  
 ing up open spaces for parks,  
 recreational activities, Gen  
 tions from now those things  
 matter, and open spaces make  
 a great community (just look  
 New York's Central Park or t  
 arklands of London).

Jon Erik Dorms  
 Flower Mound

# In the Know

## U.S. needs good, unbiased intelligence

**G**ood intelligence is vital to U.S. national security. That's because Islamist terrorists depend on stealth and President Bush has pledged to strike pre-emptively against countries that might be plotting to attack the United States with nuclear, biological or chemical weapons. Without good intelligence, the United States has less hope of preventing catastrophic attacks such as those that occurred on Sept. 11, 2001, and of anticipating the designs of an Iran or a North Korea.

Is U.S. intelligence good enough? And can the Bush administration be trusted to not manipulate intelligence to its policy ends? One must wonder given the United States' failure to find weapons of mass destruction in occupied Iraq and the administration's:

- Previous insinuation of a connection between former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein and the Sept. 11 hijackers.
- Apparent exaggeration of reports that Iraq may have tried to obtain nuclear raw materials from Niger.
- Apparent exaggeration of a biological weapons threat from Fidel Castro's Cuba.
- Exposure of a U.S. undercover spy's identity to journalists.

The administration believed that Iraq had

weapons of mass destruction because of evidence provided to it by the CIA. Therefore, one can reasonably question the adequacy of U.S. intelligence without impugning the administration's motives.

However, the administration's motives are very open to question with regard to what it now admits was an inaccurate linking of Mr. Hussein with the hijackers and Niger, as well as its failure to substantiate its claims against Mr. Castro and its injudicious and possibly illegal "outing" of the U.S. spy. In each case, the administration appears to have bent intelligence to its ends — even to the point of undermining the very spy apparatus on which the United States depends during one of the most vulnerable periods in its 227 years.

Whether the problem is bad or cooked intelligence or the sabotaging of one's own spies and spy networks, the status quo is disconcerting. In the continuing war against its shadowy enemies, the United States can be only as good as the intelligence it receives and the uses to which its political leaders put that intelligence. Unless the United States corrects itself, it risks that its enemies will have greater success and that its subsequent decision about war and peace will be flawed.

## Recognize the problem

Re: "Two pastors create Christian 'porn site' to reach those leering on the Internet," by Berta Delgado, Saturday Religion concerning the "#1 Christian Porn Site," [www.xxxchurch.com](http://www.xxxchurch.com).

At the end of the Sunday Masses I attend, there are usually announcements about upcoming events in the church community such as fund-raisers, marriage classes or ways to renew your faith. It does not seem that the church is offering to help people with their sex addictions, which is something that I think the Catholic Church

602975

**MORE IMPORTANT MAIL ADDRESSED TO THE  
PRESIDENT AND BULKED TO VARIOUS OFFICES  
AND STAFF ON**

**DATE**

1/9/04

**BATCH #**

602975

**WH004-01**



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Associated Students

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Senate Bill: 03-04-04  
Date: 9-23-03  
Authored by: External Affairs Committee  
Chaired by Senator Ovanes Manucharyan

SUBJECT: REBEL: Resolution to End Belligerence

LONG TITLE:

A Resolution against the War, Intervention, and Occupation of the Middle East; against the decay of Civil Liberties and Freedom at the hands of the Bush Administration through the USA Patriot Act; and against the expenses of the War that takes away from social programs and the students of the United States.

Referred to: A.S. Senate  
Senate Action: Approved on September 23, 2003

- 1) WHEREAS, the people of the United States have already suffered grievous loss of life and well-being as a result of the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001;
- 2) WHEREAS, immediately after September 11, the U.S. government passed the USA PATRIOT Act, which severely curtails civil liberties of American citizens;
- 3) WHEREAS, immediately after September 11, declaring a war on terrorism, the U.S. invaded Afghanistan;
- 4) WHEREAS, immediately after the horrible events of September 11, the Bush administration officials claimed Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi government had strong links to Al-Qaida and began lobbying for an invasion of Iraq;<sup>i</sup>
- 5) WHEREAS, the Bush administration, in blatant disrespect and violation of the will of Congress, is apparently impeding the investigation into the intelligence failures and possible criminal negligence by senior U.S. officials; <sup>iii</sup>
- 6) WHEREAS, certain provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act, the revised Attorney General Guidelines to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and other related measures expand the authority of the federal government to investigate citizens and non-citizens, to engage in surveillance, and to threaten civil rights and liberties guaranteed under the United States Constitution and Bill of Rights;

- 7) WHEREAS, the USA PATRIOT Act (Section 412) would allow incarceration of non-citizens and immigrants without due process;
- 8) WHEREAS, the USA PATRIOT Act (Section 215) broadens the official term for "terrorism," allowing certain domestic groups which engage in civil disobedience to be classified as terrorist and silenced;
- 9) WHEREAS, in recently proposed amendments to the USA PATRIOT Act, Pres. Bush is seeking additional powers, which would further degrade and erase civil liberties of U.S. citizens;<sup>iv</sup>

NOTING WITH APPROVAL, the American Library Association's "Resolution on the USA Patriot Act and Related Measures That Infringe on the Rights of Library Users";<sup>v</sup>

NOTING WITH APPROVAL, that on July 21, 2003, Senators Lisa Murkowski (R-AK) and Ron Wyden (D-OR) introduced the "Protecting the Rights of Individuals Act" (S. 1552) as a first step towards correcting the shameful violations of the Bill of Rights, which the USA PATRIOT Act allows;<sup>vi</sup>

- 10) WHEREAS, more than two years after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden and other alleged masterminds of September 11 are still to be found, yet thousands of Afghani civilians have had to suffer the consequences of a U.S. military occupation;
- 11) WHEREAS, beginning in the late 1970's, according to former U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, the U.S. provided military assistance and financial support to certain terrorist groups in order to provoke the USSR to invade Afghanistan;<sup>vii</sup>
- 12) WHEREAS, approximately 150,000 Iraqis died during the first Gulf War, but even more people died from water-borne diseases that spread because the U.S. systematically destroyed Iraq's infrastructure, including electrical, sewage treatment and water treatment systems;<sup>viii ix x</sup>
- 13) WHEREAS, since 1991 the U.S. has maintained for over a decade the most severe economic sanction regime in history and UNICEF has estimated that 7, 500 people die every month as a result of the sanctions, most of these are children;<sup>xi</sup>
- 14) WHEREAS, the current invasion and occupation of Iraq by foreign forces is an act of aggression in violation of the United Nations Charter and international law;
- 15) WHEREAS, the US and UK governments have repeatedly lied to the public on the causes for invading Iraq;<sup>xii</sup>

- 16) WHEREAS, top Bush administration officials repeatedly claimed that Iraq's alleged development of nuclear weapons as a key reason for the U.S. invasion of Iraq;<sup>xiii</sup>
- 17) WHEREAS, "A Decade of Deception and Defiance, Fact Sheet" a background paper for Pres. Bush's speech in front of the United Nations General Assembly on September 12, 2002 contains the following: "Iraq has sought the supply of significant quantities of uranium from Africa";<sup>xiv</sup>
- 18) WHEREAS, President Bush in his 2003 State of the Union address implied that Iraq had tried to buy uranium from Niger, an allegation which was subsequently proven to be a "blatant"<sup>xv</sup> forgery;<sup>xvi</sup>
- 19) WHEREAS, in one example, on March 16, 2003, Vice-President Cheney said: "We believe he has, in fact, reconstituted nuclear weapons..." to NBC's "Meet the Press";<sup>xvii</sup>
- 20) WHEREAS, the same officials have recently begun to amend their claims;
- 21) WHEREAS, recently, Vice-President Cheney said: "We never had any evidence that he had acquired a nuclear weapon..."<sup>xviii xix</sup>;
- 22) WHEREAS, while the U.S. administration has a seemingly aggressive non proliferation policy when it concerns other nations, the U.S. itself is the single largest manufacturer of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction;<sup>xx</sup>
- 23) WHEREAS, President Bush stated on September 17, 2003, that Saddam Hussein did not have Al-Qaida ties;<sup>xxi</sup>
- 24) WHEREAS, based on the aforementioned admissions, the events of September 11 have no ties whatsoever with Iraq;
- 25) WHEREAS, more U.S. forces have died since Pres. Bush declared the end of major combat operations than during the invasion and conquest of Iraq;<sup>xxii</sup>
- 26) WHEREAS, the American unilateral, preemptive, and even preventive use of force seriously undermines the global balance of power, by reducing sovereignty of other nations, while, at the same time, threatening to increase terrorist actions against America and Americans;<sup>xxiii</sup>
- 27) WHEREAS, the unnecessary wars have taken the lives of at least 6000<sup>xxiv</sup> civilians in Iraq alone;<sup>xxv</sup>
- 28) WHEREAS, the wars have further caused injury to at least 20,000<sup>xxvi</sup> civilians in Iraq alone;

- 29) WHEREAS, having already spent \$75 billion dollars on war efforts, the Bush administration has requested an additional \$87 billion;<sup>xxvii</sup>
- 30) WHEREAS, due to the national financial crisis, partially caused by aggressive and unnecessary military expenditures, the government is forced to cut back on much needed spending on education and social programs;
- 31) WHEREAS, a large portion of the income taxes levied on U.S. citizens goes to support the military and military spending adds up to more than half of the federal government's annual discretionary spending;<sup>xxviii</sup>
- 32) WHEREAS, \$66 billion dollars out of that request is going to be used towards military operations and only \$21 billion to rebuild the countries of Iraq and Afghanistan;<sup>xxix</sup>
- 33) WHEREAS, unfairly offloading the costs of war on the students, the State cut \$387 million from the CSU budget, much more than the initially expected \$200 million;
- 34) WHEREAS, the Governor has asked the Chancellor's office to cut another 20% from the CSU budget;<sup>xxx</sup>
- 35) WHEREAS, according to Richard West, the Executive Vice-Chancellor, a 20% cut would mean "a \$482.6 million loss and could mean turning away 100,000 students or cutting 54,000 courses or imposing a 90 percent fee increase or cutting 6,700 faculty jobs and 9,200 administrative positions";<sup>xxxi</sup>

**NOW, THEREFORE,**

- 1) BE IT RESOLVED that the AS senate condemns the Bush administration for taking the nation to an immoral and unjust war against Iraq and calls for an immediate military withdrawal and transfer of authority over Iraq to the United Nations.
- 2) BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the AS senate supports the "Protecting the Rights of Individuals Act" (S. 1552) as introduced by Senators Murkowski and Wyden as a first step in removing dangerous threats to civil liberties and rights of U.S. citizens;
- 3) BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the AS senate condemns the State government for putting the financial burden of the war on students, demanding that the student fee hike be rolled back and no new fee increases be instituted;

- 4) BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the AS senate directs all agencies and subordinates of the Associated Students to publicize the immorality of the war against Iraq and use available resources to educate CSUN students about this matter.
- 5) BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the AS senate directs all agencies and subordinates of the Associated Students to publicize the issue of the student fee increase and possibilities of new increases and use available resources to educate CSUN students about this matter.
- 6) BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that the A.S. shall forward copies of this resolution to President Bush, Senators Barbara Boxer and Dianne Feinstein, CSUN Administrators, CSUN Faculty Senate, and to all members of California's U.S. Congressional delegation, CSUN Sundial, and all local media, AS Public Relations/Marketing Assistant for bulletin boards and web page.

<sup>1</sup>News Center. Common Dreams. Retrieved: September 23, 2003.

<http://www.commondreams.org/headlines03/0713-01.htm>

<sup>2</sup>Institute For Public Accuracy. Home page. Retrieved: September 23, 2003.

[http://www.accuracy.org/press\\_releases/PR031803.htm](http://www.accuracy.org/press_releases/PR031803.htm)

<sup>3</sup>Mckenzie, Nick. "Questions linger about Sept 11 intelligence failures." Australian Broadcasting Corporation. Friday, 12 September, 2003. Retrieved: September 23, 2003.

<http://www.abc.net.au/am/content/2003/s944373.htm>

<sup>4</sup>Hudson, Audrey. "Patriot II' bid garners little favor on Hill" The Washington Times. Friday, 12 September, 2003. Retrieved: September 23, 2003. <http://washingtontimes.com/national/20030912-120125-9220r.htm>

<sup>5</sup>American Library Association. Home page. Retrieved: September 23, 2003.

[http://www.ala.org/Template.cfm?Section=IF\\_Resolutions&Template=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=11891](http://www.ala.org/Template.cfm?Section=IF_Resolutions&Template=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=11891)

<sup>6</sup>"Support the "Protecting the Rights of Individuals Act."" American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California. Home Page. Retrieved: <http://ga1.org/campaign/s1552/explanation>

<sup>7</sup>Blum, Bill. "The CIA's Intervention in Afghanistan: Interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski."

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<http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/BRZ110A.html>

<sup>8</sup>Dorrel, Frank. "Addicted to war." 2002.

<sup>9</sup>Ramsey, Clark. The Fire This Time: U.S. War Crimes in the Gulf (New York: International Action Center, 2002) pp 64-64

<sup>10</sup>Nagy, Thomas J. "The Secret Behind the Sanctions: How the U.S. Intentionally Destroyed Iraq's Water Supply." The Progressive, Sept. 2001.

<sup>11</sup>Dorrel, Frank. "Addicted to war." p25

<sup>12</sup>News Center. Common Dreams. Retrieved: September 23, 2003.

<http://www.commondreams.org/headlines03/0713-01.htm>

<sup>13</sup>News Center. Common Dreams. Retrieved: September 23, 2003.

<http://www.commondreams.org/headlines03/0708-04.htm>

<sup>14</sup>The White House. "A Decade Of Deception And Defiance - Iraq Fact Sheet." Scoop Media. Friday, 13 September 2003. Accessed: September 13, 2003.

<http://www.scoop.co.nz/mason/stories/WO0209/S00129.htm>

- <sup>xv</sup>Walsh, Declan. "No answers to questions on blatant forgeries that helped spur Iraq war." *The Irish Times*. August 5, 2003.
- <sup>xvi</sup>Whitaker, Raymond. "The diplomat, the forgery and the suspect case for war." *independent.co.uk*. 10, August 2003. Retrieved: September 23, 2003.  
<http://news.independent.co.uk/uk/politics/story.jsp?story=432228>
- <sup>xvii</sup>Sperry, Paul. "Top Bush officials amend war claims: Cheney, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz admit previous statements in error." *WorldNetDaily*. 17 September, 2003. Retrieved: September 23, 2003.  
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<http://www.commondreams.org/headlines03/0713-01.htm>
- <sup>xx</sup>International Institute for Strategic Studies. *The Military Balance 1999\*2000*. Oxford Press. London, 1999.
- <sup>xxi</sup>*News Center*. Common Dreams. Retrieved: September 23, 2003.  
<http://www.commondreams.org/headlines03/0713-01.htm>
- <sup>xxii</sup>"The death toll of U S. forces ..." *The Washington Post*, pg. A12. September 02, 2003.
- <sup>xxiii</sup>Ikenberry, John G. "America's Imperial Ambition." *Foreign Affairs*. September/October 2003. Retrieved: September 23, 2003. <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20020901faessay9732/g-john-ikenberry/america-s-imperial-ambition.html>
- <sup>xxiv</sup>iraqbodycount.net Home page. Accessed September 17, 2003. Retrieved: <http://www.iraqbodycount.net>.
- <sup>xxv</sup>Ford, Peter. "Surveys pointing to high civilian death toll in Iraq." *Christian Science Monitor* (Boston, MA, May 22, 2003).
- <sup>xxvi</sup>iraqbodycount.net Home page. Accessed September 17, 2003. Retrieved: <http://www.iraqbodycount.net>.
- <sup>xxvii</sup>Angle, Jim. "President Sends Iraq Funding Request to Congress" *Fox News*. 18, September 2003. Accessed: September 23, 2003. "<http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,97626,00.html>
- <sup>xxviii</sup>Dorrel, Frank. "Addicted to War". 2002
- <sup>xxix</sup><http://www.newsday.com/news/nationworld/world/wire/sns-ap-us-iraq-spending,0,6297696.story?coll=sns-ap-world-headlines>
- <sup>xxx</sup>SF Chronicle Staff. "State universities expect grim year: 20% cut could turn away 100,000 students." *San Francisco Chronicle*. 17, September, 2003. Accessed: September 23, 2003.  
<http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2003/09/17/BA242513.DTL>
- <sup>xxxi</sup>SF Chronicle Staff. "State universities expect grim year: 20% cut could turn away 100,000 students." *San Francisco Chronicle*. 17, September, 2003. Accessed: September 23, 2003.  
<http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2003/09/17/BA242513.DTL>

# Withdrawal Marker

## The George W. Bush Library

| FORM  | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                                                               | PAGES | DATE       | RESTRICTION(S) |
|-------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------|------------|----------------|
| Email | Here's the text - attachments will follow [with attachment] - To: Melissa S. Bennett - From: Carolyn Nelson | 3     | 10/07/2003 | P5;            |

**This marker identifies the original location of the withdrawn item listed above.  
For a complete list of items withdrawn from this folder, see the  
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet at the front of the folder.**

### **COLLECTION:**

Records Management, White House Office of

### **SERIES:**

Droege, Philip (Phil)

### **FOLDER TITLE:**

WILSON/WHIG (White House Iraq Group) 01/2004: Documents Given to Counsel's Office

### **FRC ID:**

6307

### **FOIA IDs and Segments:**

2014-0234-F

### **OA Num.:**

8098

### **NARA Num.:**

8015

### **RESTRICTION CODES**

#### **Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

#### **Deed of Gift Restrictions**

- A. Closed by Executive Order 13526 governing access to national security information.
- B. Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

#### **Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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# Withdrawal Marker

## The George W. Bush Library

| FORM  | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                                                         | PAGES | DATE       | RESTRICTION(S) |
|-------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------|------------|----------------|
| Email | FW: Important Follow-Up Message from Counsel's Office - To: Melissa S. Bennett - From: Carolyn Nelson | 2     | 10/07/2003 | P5;            |

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☐ FA

CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT  
THE WHITE HOUSE

578267  
FG006-03A

Andrew H. Card, Jr.  
Phone: (202) 456-6798  
Fax: (202) 456-1907

DATE: Tuesday, November 25, 2003

| TO                        | ACTION REQUESTED        |
|---------------------------|-------------------------|
| Brian Montgomery (CAB) WW | Take Appropriate Action |
|                           |                         |
|                           |                         |
|                           |                         |
|                           |                         |
|                           |                         |
|                           |                         |

NOTES:

Please forward the attached to the Department of Energy. Thanks!

PREPARED BY:

Sarah Campbell..... (202) 456-2455



CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT  
THE WHITE HOUSE

November 25, 2003

Mr. Charles Stone


(b)(6)

Dear Mr. Stone,

Thank you for your letter regarding nuclear weapons programs during World War II and their relevance to today. The information you provided was interesting. Please know that I have forwarded your letter to the Department of Energy for their review. I know they will give your letter every consideration.

Again, thank you for writing and best wishes.

Sincerely,

  
Andrew H. Card, Jr.

NOV 25 2003

Mr. Charles Stone

(b)(6)

578267

The White House  
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW  
Washington, DC 20502  
Attn: Andrew Card, Chief of Staff

November 5, 2003

Dear Mr. Card:

For several years I have been researching a number of WW II related atomic related topics. This has led to publication in Japan, Korea and Russia. I have found information relating to the origins of the North Korean atomic program, weapons of mass destruction debate and the Niger uranium controversy.

Several books to which I have contributed detail how purified uranium or powdered uranium metal can be enriched PASSIVELY using a neutron source and/or low temperature techniques. We have found documentation that these techniques were almost certainly used in Nazi Germany to produce a very small (1 kilo ton) atomic terror device. It appears these weapons were tested in 1944 in the Baltic region. The evidence comes from newspaper reports from Sweden and Great Britain, the reports of Italian officials visiting the test site and a US Navy Intelligence report rated B1 in reliability which describes an atomic test. This report has information which only a very few people knew at that time (August 1945). Senior officers, a Navy Captain and Commodore, signed the report. This story is part of a very interesting book by Geoffrey Brooks, Hitler's Terror Weapons, Pen and Sword, 2002, United Kingdom. Philip Henshall, The Nuclear Axis, has also mentioned the passive techniques in an earlier book. I found the Naval Intelligence report at The Archives in College Park.

There is a similar series of books and articles by Japanese, American and British authors about the WW II era Japanese atomic program. It is well documented the North Korean program came from the Japanese program. This includes opening the mines, creating underground labs and training the scientists. In fact several of the early Directors of the North Korean program were trained in Japan. We have substantial evidence that small crude devices were devised by Japan before the war ended. One atomic device may have been tested the day before the war ended.

A key player was Yoshio Kodoma. He was one of three Class A war criminals freed from Sugamo Prison after TOJO was hung. He became a behind the scenes power broker in Japan. A second player Mr. Kishi became the Prime Minister. The third player, Mr. Sasagawa became a multi-billionaire and founder of the Sasagawa Foundation, the largest giving foundation in the world! He was close to Jimmie Carter. A picture of the two jogging together has been published. Mr. Sasagawa had been a prominent fascist in 1930's Japan. You are of course aware of the crucial role Jimmy Carter played in the 1996 North Korean agreements which led to the completion of several nuclear devices!

I believe these are important stories for the Bush Administration. I have tried to contact Secretary Abraham and through other groups in Washington. You can reach me at


(b)(6)

(b)(6)

11/00/00 00:04 FAX 7002007

This helps to counter the serious claims regarding weapons of mass destruction and the uranium exports from Niger et al. In fact a very rich source in Africa was considered by North Korea several years ago! I am trying to reach the key Bush Administration staff members working on these topics. Your assistance is appreciated.

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Charles W. Stone". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned above the printed name.

Charles W. Stone

I

F: WHIG

F: WHIG

576003

John Shinkus  
9 members of Congress

QTR @ Christmas -

give Division Teams

4 each - 4 Diamonds - one in ~~each~~ each division over

holiday program -

have

# Withdrawal Marker

## The George W. Bush Library

| FORM             | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                                       | PAGES | DATE | RESTRICTION(S) |
|------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------|------|----------------|
| Handwritten Note | WHIG (White House Iraq Group) - To: WHIG (White House Iraq Group) - From: Karl Rove | 1     | N.D. | P5;            |

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## Schedule of the Chief of Staff

Thursday, July 24, 2003

|                     |                                                                             |                |
|---------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------|
| 5:45 am             | Depart Residence en route The White House                                   |                |
| 7:15 am<br>(15 min) | Meeting                                                                     | COS Office     |
| 7:30 am<br>(30 min) | Senior Staff Meeting                                                        | Roosevelt Room |
| 7:45 am<br>(5 min)  | NSC Pre-Brief<br>(Rice)                                                     | Oval Office    |
| 7:50 am<br>(10 min) | Phone Call to the President of<br>South Korea (T) (goldline only)<br>(Rice) | Oval Office    |
| 8:00 am<br>(30 min) | Intelligence Briefing<br>(Rice)                                             | Oval Office    |
| 8:30 am<br>(20 min) | FBI Briefing<br>(Gordon)                                                    | Oval Office    |
| 8:55 am<br>(10 min) | Daily Briefing<br>(Bartlett)                                                | Oval Office    |
| 9:05 am<br>(10 min) | Personal/Staff Time                                                         | Oval Office    |
| 9:15 am<br>(10 min) | Depart The White House en route<br>Andrews AFB                              |                |
| 9:25 am             | Arrive Andrews AFB                                                          |                |
| 9:30 am<br>(35 min) | Depart Washington, DC en route<br>Philadelphia, PA                          |                |
| 10:05 am            | Arrive Philadelphia International Airport                                   |                |

**Note: There will be a Freedom Corps greeter upon arrival.**

10:10 am  
(30 min)

Depart Philadelphia International Airport  
en route Financial Management Service  
Facility

10:40 am

Arrive Financial Management Service  
Facility

10:45 am  
(15 min)

Tour of Financial Management Service  
Facility  
(Rove/Friedman)

Philadelphia, PA –  
PRESS POOL

**Note: The President will meet with  
Families prior to Remarks.**

11:10 am  
(40 min)

Remarks on the Jobs and Growth Plan  
(Rove/Friedman)

Philadelphia, PA –  
OPEN PRESS

11:55 am  
(30 min)

Depart Financial Management Service  
Facility en route Philadelphia International  
Airport

12:25 pm

Arrive Philadelphia International Airport

12:30 pm  
(1 hr 20 min)

Depart Philadelphia, PA en route  
Detroit, MI

1:50 pm

Arrive Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County  
Airport

**Note: The President will have  
50 minutes of Personal/Staff time  
aboard Air Force One.**

**Note: There will be a Freedom Corps  
greeter.**

2:30 pm  
(30 min)

**(FYI) WHIG Meeting**

**Situation Room**

2:45 pm  
(25 min)

Depart Detroit Metropolitan Wayne  
County Airport en route Livonia, MI –  
Beaver Aerospace and Defense, Inc.