

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

C0001-07

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: SEPTEMBER 12, 1989

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE JAMES A. MALOOF

SUBJECT: ENCLOSURES BOOKLET ON THE SITUATION IN THE
MIDDLE EAST

		ACTION		DISPOSITION	
ROUTE TO:		ACT	DATE	TYPE	C COMPLETED
OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	CODE	YY/MM/DD	RESP	D YY/MM/DD
JOHN SUNUNU		ORG	89/09/12	NAN	C 89/09/19
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MANAGEMENT.

OFFICE OF THE MAYOR



James A. Maloof
mayor

September 8, 1989

Mr. John Sununu
Chief of Staff
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear John:

I don't expect you to read this entire booklet, but
I do ask you to read the A Modest Proposal that
makes really good sense.

Each day that Syria or other Communist support
forces are allowed to stay in Lebanon, innocent
people area being slaughtered.

Your help is vital in stopping this.


Warmest regards,


James A. Maloof
Mayor

JAM/ab

Governor,

We are getting a
letter from Maloof weekly
(or biweekly). I can
start keeping track and
acknowledge every third
or fourth letter.

 lc



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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
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NATIONAL ALLIANCE OF LEBANESE AMERICANS

"For a united Lebanon"

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A MEMORANDUM ON LEBANON

By - JOSEPH L. BOOHAKER
PRESIDENT

NATIONAL ALLIANCE OF LEBANESE AMERICANS
(N.A.L.A.)

May 19, 1989

MEMORANDUM FROM: JOSEPH L. BOOHAKER

PRESIDENT, NATIONAL ALLIANCE OF
LEBANESE AMERICANS

TO: THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR NEAR EASTERN & SOUTH ASIAN
AFFAIRS, UNITED STATES STATE DEPARTMENT

RE: UNITED STATES POLICY REGARDING THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN
FORCES IN THE REPUBLIC OF LEBANON.

I. BACKGROUND

As I write this paper, I am aware, as are you, that the Arab League sponsored cease fire has proved to be only a "slow fire". On Saturday May 6, 1989, without warning, while the people of East Beirut were out of the shelters enjoying the 9th day of the "cease-fire", the Syrian army opened up on the residential areas killing 20 and wounding another 100 Lebanese. On May 12, 1989, Syrian gunners targeted Bkirki, the residence of the Maronite Patriarch, a man of peace and reconciliation, and wounded 8 of the Patriarch's relatives. As of May 12, 1989 the casualty toll since March 14 has been 359 killed and 1393 wounded (AP). On May 16, 1989 the Mufti of the Republic was callously assassinated in Syrian occupied Beirut. All of these attacks have been part of broader attacks that have taken place since the Arab League announced a cease fire between the Syrian and Lebanese Armed Forces on April 28, 1989.

I have the understanding that the Arab League operates on a unanimous vote basis. With Syria as a member, I find it difficult to understand why the U.S. has placed so much confidence in the League's ability to negotiate the Syrians out of West Beirut, much less out of the rest of Lebanon.

Nevertheless, we have reached the point where it would appear that the Arab League effort, standing alone, will not produce the desired results. As this latest experience has shown, a cease-fire without a comprehensive withdrawal schedule of Syrian and other occupying forces is only a temporary pause in the violence being inflicted upon the people of Beirut. There must be a coupling of an effective cease fire with a withdrawal of Syrian forces, so as to place all of Beirut beyond the range of Syrian artillery, as an initial phase of a plan of withdrawal.

The Lebanese Army (LA) under the command of Gen. Michel Aoun, has been mischaracterized as a Christian force. Actually there is a substantial number of Muslims among the troops as well as in the officer corp. Its actions, in defense of its own population on Lebanese soil, is taken in the oldest tradition of the sovereign right of a people to resort to military means in self defense against a foreign force.

The Syrian Armed Forces, on the other hand, are in Lebanon without any legal basis. The former legal justification for their presence, that being the request of the Lebanese President made every six months to confine the Syrian presence, has not been renewed since July of 1982. The Syrian forces are acting clearly beyond any precept of international law and civilized conduct by shelling the residential Lebanese population; in arming the Druze militia; and, in "encouraging", supporting and participating in the armed attacks on the Lebanese Armed Forces.

Acknowledgement of these two legal fine points, unfortunately, does not get the Syrian artillery tubes off of the mountains overlooking Beirut. This is our immediate interest. As President Bush told the delegation with which he met on April 21, we in the American Lebanese community, to be constructive, must be creative in arriving at solutions for Lebanon which are pragmatic and can be executed by the U.S. within the context of current U.S. policy and which recognizes current U.S. priorities in the region.

II. CURRENT U.S. POLICY AND PRIORITIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST - REFERENCE LEBANON.

The balance of this memorandum discusses U.S. policy, U.S. priorities and possible avenues of U.S. action within

those parameters.

A. Current U.S. Policy. As I understand U.S. policy toward Syria regarding Lebanon, the U.S. is still operating under the policy initiated in the mid-70's. Under decisions made over ten years ago, Syria is allowed to remain in Lebanon as a "stabilizing force". Syria initially entered Lebanon, ostensibly, at the request of the United States Government and the Israelis to prevent the PLO from successfully establishing a de facto state inside Lebanon. At that time, the only serious resistance to a PLO takeover in Lebanon was a then loose coalition of nationalist militia. The LA was made ineffective by political impotence in the central government. Under this set of circumstances, with the consent of the United States and the Israelis, the Syrians were allowed to operate in Lebanon north of a demarcation line to control and contain the PLO from waging further attacks on the Lebanese Republic, and indirectly to lessen the ability of the PLO from waging a terrorist war against Israel from its camps in Lebanon.

This policy has since evolved to encompass the reform of the Lebanese constitution under Syrian tutelage. This policy, both before the Israeli interlude of 1982-84, and since, has adopted the Syrian demand that the Lebanese conduct a constitutional convention and adopt the outcome of

such a convention as a precondition to Syria's withdrawal from Lebanese territory. Since stated U.S. policy for Lebanon is the restoration of an independent, free Lebanon, with its unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity restored, we can only assume that Syria has been entrusted by the United States Government (USG) to execute these U.S. objectives in Lebanon.

Under this policy construct, the militia, especially those that contest the Syrian role in Lebanon are obstacles. General Aoun, by openly challenging Syrian authority in Lebanon is also an obstacle, in theory, to the process which is dictated by the current policy construct.

In the same way, Lebanese nationalist demands for reforms to be discussed and implemented only after withdrawal of the occupying forces is accomplished is seen as a ruse for a true intent by the Lebanese nationalists to wrongfully assert dominance over the rest of the population. The Syrians thus justify their continued presence as necessary to protect one faction against dominance by the other. The U.S. according to statements from Department officials that have been cited in the media seems to accept this justification. (The Washington Post, Often Burned U.S. Reluctant to Rejoin Lebanon Fray, April 29, 1989)

Thus, under this policy construct and its underlying

assumptions, General Aoun's action in closing the militia ports in West Beirut is not viewed as an assertion of the legitimate authority of the state over illegal activity, but as the action of a megalomaniac Lebanese Christian (read Nationalist) who has the gall to suppose that he can challenge the Syrian security forces in Lebanon in a bid to enhance his own personal power. Thus General Aoun is seen as the dangerous destabilizing force, and the Syrians are established as the stabilizing force that must bring the unruly General to heel by conducting punitive artillery strikes against civilian population centers that support Aoun's actions. A siege of a population of approximately 1.5 million people is thus justified under the construct of the current policy.

B. Operating Assumptions of Current U.S. Policy.

There are certain assumptions that one must make to justify continuation of the current policy and if that policy is to have any rational relation to the objective to be served.

First, we must assume that the cause for the Syrian entry into Lebanon remains unresolved. That is, there

continues to exist within Lebanon an external military threat to the integrity of the Lebanese Government and State. The PLO was the threat in 1976.

Since the Arafat led factions of the PLO have been defeated by Syria and by Israel north of the demarcation lines in Lebanon, and it is under Israeli control in the South, we must assume that some other foreign force is in Lebanon which Syria must contain and control so that it can not threaten the Lebanese Government, or use Lebanon to wage war against regional states. To justify the continuation of a stabilizing force, there first must be a continuation of instability.

Second, we must assume that under Syrian direction, Lebanon will emerge from this crisis with a reformed government which will reflect the collective will of the Lebanese people, guaranteeing to them the blessings of independence, freedom, security, democracy and the integrity of its international frontiers. Historical precedent for a policy of effecting reforms, which produce a democratic outcome, in a country while it is occupied, include the reforms implemented in Japan following the end of World War II while under U.S. occupation, and in West Germany while under Allied Occupation. We must assume that Syria will act

as the surrogate of the United States to bestow upon Lebanon the same type of democratic reforms that the U.S. would implement if we were directly involved in the process.

Third, we must assume that Syria has no extra-territorial motives or independent Syrian national motives in maintaining its 40,000 man force in Lebanon. We must assume that Syria is strictly serving U.S. national interests and acting in furtherance of U.S. regional objectives by providing the man power for the U.S. policy of achieving stability in Lebanon so that a settlement can be achieved. Without this assumption, accomplishment of U.S. objectives for Syria in Lebanon would not necessarily trigger a withdrawal of Syrian troops. Rather, withdrawal would be triggered only after accomplishment of Syrian national objectives. Without this assumption, the Syrians would have to create one destabilizing event after another to justify continuation of its stabilizing presence in Lebanon, thus prolonging accomplishment of its role in Lebanon under U.S. policy until it has accomplished its purposes in Lebanon in terms of Syrian national interests. If Syrian national interests in Lebanon are at cross purposes with U.S. interests for Lebanon, then continuation with the current policy can become self defeating for the United States if this assumption does not underlie our policy.

If these assumptions have any basis in fact or logic, then any person or group that opposes Syria in Lebanon opposes the means of accomplishing U.S. objectives for Lebanon. Under this set of assumptions, General Aoun is acting against the accomplishment of U.S. objectives for Lebanon by defying the Syrian presence there.

This is the policy and its operating assumptions which, we are told, defines the range of actions that the USG is willing to undertake to end the unrestricted shelling of the citizens of Beirut by the Syrian army.

C. An Analysis of Current Empirical Facts with the Operating Assumptions of Current Policy To Determine Continued Validity of Current Operating Policy.

Many of us in the American Lebanese community question the validity of current policy and of its underlying operating assumptions. Many feel that continued pursuit of this policy will not only fail to achieve the stated objective of the policy, but will actually produce the opposite results for Lebanon.

Assumption: The circumstances that existed at the time of the initiation of the current policy continue to exist in Lebanon.

Facts: Chairman Arafat and his faction of the PLO no longer pose a credible threat to Lebanese sovereignty north of the

demarcation lines in which Syria operates in Lebanon. The principle faction of the PLO which remains militarily active in Lebanon is the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC). This faction is headquartered in Damascus and is supported in Lebanon by the Syrian regime. To the extent that the PSP and Amal militias operate militarily in Lebanon, they are armed, directed and funded by the Syrian regime, either directly or indirectly. Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards are Iranian supported, but permitted to operate out of bases inside the Syrian occupation zone.

The Christian militia supports itself primarily from taxes levied in their area of operation. Lately, they have been the beneficiary of Iraqi arms shipments.

The Syrians have been the catalyst for the fomentation of divisions among the Lebanese communities and within the communities. Through Syrian manipulation, they have tried to create inter as well as intra communal divisions. Serious divisions among the Christians have been attempted repeatedly. By the introduction of Hezbollah and the Revolutionary Guards, they created divisions among the Shiites. The Syrians have been in open war with the Sunni of Tripoli by transplanting 40,000 Syrian Alawi nationals

into the Tripoli district. By keeping the major communities of Lebanon divided within themselves and divided from each other, Syria has institutionalized instability in Lebanon and thus has been able to justify to the United States her indefinite stay in Lebanon.

The lesson that the Syrian regime taught to the people of Hama, Syria in 1981 has not been lost on any of the people or leaders of occupied Lebanon. To test or question the actions of the Syrian regime, as did the political opposition of Hama, will invoke the most extreme punitive measures from the Syrian Government.

The Syrian presence, rather than bringing stability and acting as a surrogate military force for the Lebanese Government, is actually having the opposite effect. With no external force, such as the PLO, threatening the Lebanese State, the Syrians are generating conflict and instability where, but for Syrian intervention, there would be none. In this latest round, the PSP, nominally the Lebanese faction at war with the Lebanese Army, can not maintain the type of siege that we have seen in Beirut by their own resources. But for Syrian "encouragement", Syrian funding, Syrian supplies and shells and Syrian direction, there would have been no siege of Beirut in the spring of 1989.

The primary threat to the integrity of the Lebanese

State is, unsurprisingly, that state which never acknowledged the existence of the Lebanese State from the date of its independence. It is that state to which the United States, ironically, entrusted the defense of Lebanese independence and the integrity of Lebanese sovereignty. It is Syria.

Assumption: The Republic of Lebanon can undergo reform of its constitution with a democratic outcome while a major portion of the State and its population is under Syrian occupation.

Facts: If history has shown us anything, in this regard, it is that reforms directed by an occupying force usually result in the creation of a mirror image of the occupying country in the occupied country. Also, with a state, such as Alawi Syria, that is so fully aware of its national interests and which pursues them so ruthlessly, the logical expectation is that Syrian directed "reform" in Lebanon will first have to pass the test of service to Syrian national interests, with Lebanese national interests subordinated. The Tripartite Accord of December 1985 stands in witness to this point.

The United States, a democratic republic directed the restructuring of the Japanese government and economic system

as the military occupier of Japan. The result is a Japan with functioning democratic governmental institutions and a market oriented economy.

Syria, on the other hand is a police state. The minority Alawi faction rules the 80% Sunni majority by means of a very active secret police and by intimidation of any who would dissent with brutal displays of reprisals against its own citizenry. The Syrian economy is a basket case command economy that even the Soviets now acknowledge is a nonfunctional model. Demographicly, Lebanon is not like Syria. In Lebanon there is no one demographic group with the type of overwhelming majority in the population as are the Sunni of Syria. In Lebanon, no one demographic group holds an absolute majority.

Without experience in pluralistic politics and systems of government, we have nevertheless assumed that Syria can oversee the creation of a reformed pluralistic system in Lebanon. We can not assume that Syria will create or even make possible in Lebanon the type of government and market economy that it has not created for its own people. In fact to do so in Lebanon would constitute a threat to the Syrian regime.

Syria has historically harbored an abhorrence for the political freedoms that the people of Lebanon have

traditionally enjoyed and has viewed such freedom in Lebanon as a threat to the survival of which ever dictatorship was then in power in Syria. President Assad came to power in Syria via a military coup in 1970. It is not a coincidence that Lebanon has been in turmoil during a great majority of that time.

Assumption: Syria maintains a military presence in Lebanon solely to serve the U.S. interest of maintaining stability in Lebanon.

Facts: The Syrian presence in Lebanon serves both short term and long term Syrian national interests, separate and apart from their apparent willingness to assist the United States to bring stability to Lebanon.

The Syrians are clearly using Lebanon to obtain diplomatic leverage and to enhance their standing as an indispensable party to the eventual Israeli/ Palestinian settlement. President Assad clearly does not want to be left out of the process, losing whatever chance he may yet have to retrieve sovereignty over the Golan. He is prepared to obstruct or sabotage any negotiation which does not serve his ends. Witness his undoing of the May 17, 1983 Lebanese/Israeli Accord.

President Assad is chilled by the idea of an

Israeli/Arafat rapprochement, which could possibly include Jordan, and exclude Syria. His strategy seems to be to use the PFLP-GC and Ahmed Jabril, as well as other such organizations which he supports in the Syrian occupied Bekaa to make for naught Chairman Arafat's disavowal of terrorism against the State of Israel as a means to achieve the legitimate expression of Palestinian rights to self determination. Arafat's inability to control Jabril and the Syrian based PFLP-GC makes him a less desirable and less serious negotiating partner for the Israelis. President Assad, by this strategy, is seeking to establish himself as the negotiating party with whom the Israelis must deal if they wish to end the terrorist threat to their northern settlements. Such negotiations will start if and when President Assad decides and will conclude upon terms acceptable to him. It is by achieving such leverage with the Israelis that Assad hopes to win back the Golan. However, this strategy can not work for Assad unless his army can remain in control of the Bekaa. With Lebanese territory denied to Assad as base camps and staging areas for the terrorists groups that he supports, Assad would have no avenue to logistically conduct such raids on Israeli settlements. Also, Israeli reprisals for these raids have taken place in the Bekaa, so Assad has been spared from

paying the political price in terms of Syrian assets destroyed and Syrian civilian casualties. The Lebanese pay this price and have been paying it for some years now. With Lebanon denied to him, if the raids could be mounted from Syria, Israeli reprisal raids would take place in Syria. The price would, thus, be too high to pay both domestically and internationally for Assad to pursue this strategy without his controlling Lebanon.

By occupying West Beirut, Syria also holds the key to the American hostages. To the extent that U.S. policy options factor in the lives of the hostages, Assad retains a certain degree of leverage over the degree and the type of U.S. response to anti-U.S. activity on the part of Syria. For example, Syria has participated in the bombings of the U.S. Embassy and the Marine compound. Syria participated, through support and sponsorship of Abu Nidal and Ahmed Jabril in terrorist acts such as the bombing of Pan Am 103. Syria participates in the drug trade of the Bekaa and the shipment of the drugs from the illegal militia ports under the control of its client militia in Lebanon.

All of this activity is possible in Lebanon with little or no U.S. response because of Syrian leverage in the Hostage issue and the perception that Syria has created of its indispensability to a comprehensive regional settlement.

In the longer term, Syria seeks strategic and military parity with Israel in the region. Assad also harbors dreams of one day incorporating Lebanon, or at least a part of it, into Syria. And then, without a Lebanese resistance holding him down in Lebanon, seriously challenging Israel for dominance in the region. Withdrawal from Lebanon, at this point would not at all serve this long term Syrian national interest.

In short, the weight of the evidence and the course of events indicate quite clearly that the underlying operating assumptions of the current U.S. policy toward Syria regarding Lebanon are clearly out of touch with reality. While the ultimate stated objectives of U.S. policy are shared by us all, the means of achieving those objectives are seriously flawed and are not founded on assumptions that find any basis in the facts or logical assumptions that flow from the facts..

Nevertheless, we are asked to develop ideas within the context of this policy and to propose courses of action for the USG, the implementation of which would not signal a change of policy.

III. UNITED STATES PRIORITIES IN THE REGION.

The established priorities of U.S. policy for the

region has also been suggested to the community as a parameter which will limit the range of options for U.S. initiatives regarding Lebanon. Our understanding of U.S. priorities is that our strategic ally in the region, Israel, and its security holds the top priority. Since the withdrawal of U.S. Marines from Beirut in 1984, we have returned to a linkage of the Lebanon settlement to settlement of the broader regional disputes.

Lebanon's priority, it would seem, has for the past few years been directly linked to the extent to which it contributes to settlement of the top priority item. If Assad needs Lebanon to use as a bargaining chip to create in him the incentive to negotiate, then we acquiesce. If Israel needs Lebanon as a place to keep its "demographic problem" of 800,000 displaced Palestinians while some solution is worked out, then we acquiesce to this use as well. If Arafat needs southern Lebanon to use as a point of concentration for his supporters and his army so as to create the "critical mass" necessary to make a credible claim for the Palestinians as a people and as a nation in exile, then in deference to our friends, the Saudis, we acquiesce.

As the principle parties to the regional conflict, the Israelis, the PLO and the Syrians, posture and delay,

Lebanon's priority has become that of a pawn or a doormat. Lebanon and Lebanese lives are sacrificed at the altar of a "broader regional settlement".

While a peaceful regional settlement is everyone's common objective, we must question the logic of destabilizing Israel's northern neighbor as a means of achieving a stable regional settlement. There are better ways to achieve peace for the region than to dismember Lebanon. In fact current policy which is witnessing the dismemberment of Lebanon will not bear the fruits of peace. It will bear only the fruit of a wider regional war.

IV. PROPOSED OPTIONS FOR U.S. ACTION

A. Proceed with the Status Quo. Remaining with the status quo in terms of policy and U.S. action regarding Lebanon will mean that Syria will continue with its unrestricted shelling of East Beirut and the Free Zones until either they run out of money, shells or Lebanese to kill, whichever ever occurs first. U.S. total reliance on the Arab League to stabilize the fighting, cause a withdrawal of Syrian forces is reckless, to say the least, and acquiesce in the liquidation of the Lebanese Republic at worst.

Staying this course will also mean that as Gen. Aoun and the Lebanese have less and less to lose, and we are

quickly approaching that point, then the more likely it will become that Aoun will measure the benefits outweighing the costs of escalating his response to Syrian shelling by employing his SCUD missiles against targets inside of Syria proper, or by employing his infantry in an offensive thrust out of his defense perimeter.

Anticipated Syrian response to such a challenge would have to include a similar infantry thrust across the current "red lines" or possibly use of the Syrian air force. The threat of a Syrian ground assault into the free districts is seen as so acute that the United States and British Governments have urged their citizens in Lebanon to leave immediately. (AP May 20, 1989). This alert coming only 48 hours after our meeting with NEA officers in which this possibility was discounted as pessimistic thinking borders on active deception regarding the truth of the situation. A fierce blood letting in Lebanon with terrible loss of life on all sides has become a probable consequence of staying the current course.

The Israelis could be anticipated to respond to prevent this final act of incorporation of Lebanon into Syria and the liquidation of the Free Lebanon resistance. The Big Pines operation of 1982 was, among other things, a response to a real threat of the formalization of a Palestinian State

in Southern Lebanon. While chaos in Lebanon does not seem to concern the Israelis much, the specter of a hostile neighbor establishing itself there has drawn their attention.

Clearly, something beyond the status quo response is called for.

Continued pursuit of a regional settlement under the status quo option leaves Syria, the country over which we have the least diplomatic and economic leverage, in the drivers seat. It leaves Israel without any real domestic pressure on its political leadership to deal seriously with resolving the issue of final status for the people of the West Bank and Gaza. And it leaves Arafat with all of the trappings of a head of state while leaving his people stateless.

B. A Modest Proposal. Within the parameters outlined by the President, there is an alternative course of action open to the United States which can be implemented within the context of current U.S. policy and which will better serve U.S. regional objectives of bringing about a regional settlement.

1. The United States should openly acknowledge in the various international and national forums available the undeniable fact that Syria is in serious violation of the

terms under which it maintains a military presence in Lebanon. By its unrestricted shelling of the Lebanese population and its direct challenge to the Lebanese Army on Lebanese soil, Syria has placed itself clearly outside of the law.

2. The United States should acknowledge the interim Prime Ministership of Michel Aoun as the sole lawful authority in Lebanon, until his mandate to arrange for the meeting of Parliament to elect the next President of the Republic, as provided under the Lebanese Constitution, has been accomplished.

3. The United States should give political and diplomatic support to Prime Minister Aoun's efforts to terminate all shipment of the narcotics and other contraband which are cultivated, manufactured and transshipped by Syria in and through Lebanon by means of illegal ports along the Lebanese coast.

4. In conjunction with the Soviet Union and the other members of the UN Security Council, as well as through the moderate Arab states who are members of the Arab League, the United States must sanction and punish Syrian violation of the trust placed in her by the United States and the world community to bring order to Lebanon.

These first four steps are clearly within the context

of current U.S. policy. Without sanctions for overstepping the scope of the mission in Lebanon, the Syrians would have a carte blanche to take Lebanese life at will. The Syrians must know that there are enforceable limits and bounds to U.S. allowance of their presence in Lebanon.

Current U.S. policy supports the sovereignty of Lebanon. It can not be outside of the context of U.S. policy to refuse to acknowledge the lawful authority in Lebanon, which authority is founded on the Lebanese Constitution. To deny the authority of Michel Aoun is the equivalent of denying the operation of the Lebanese Constitution.

Since the United States has declared war against the drug traffic, it surely can not be beyond the context of U.S. policy to assist a sister republic, a member nation of the UN, to stem the flow of illegal narcotics flowing from his sovereign territory, even if most of that product, reportedly is going to Western Europe.

5. As sanctions, the world community acting through the UN and the regional community of states in the Arab League, should agree to an economic and diplomatic boycott of Syria, to include a military sales embargo, and a cutoff of financial aid, a boycott of Syrian national airlines and

of the national airlines of any country that does not honor the boycott. This boycott should continue until such time as General Assad orders an immediate withdrawal of his troops from Greater Beirut to Chtura, from the port of Tripoli and agrees to a timetable for complete withdrawal of all forces.

6. Following the reuniting of Beirut, the reconvening of Parliament, the election of a head of state and the selection of a cabinet, the issues of South Lebanon must be addressed. The Israelis have committed to turning security duty in the South over to the LAF once a credible government has been reestablished in Beirut and a credible legitimate force can be put in place in the South.

Those brigades of the U.S. trained Lebanese Army that have fought the Syrian Army have shown great valor in battle and great staying power. Chairman Arafat has already stated publicly that he will assist Gen. Aoun in any way in his fight against the Syrians and he has committed that forces under his command will no longer stage raids into Israel from Lebanon. The only threats to the Lebanese lines in south Lebanon would be from Syrian sponsored groups, whose days would be numbered with the adoption of a timetable for the withdrawal of Syrian forces from the Bekaa.

With the removal of all foreign forces, the militia would be called upon to militarily stand down and to return to competing with each other as political parties.

7. Only in the absence of all occupying forces on its soil will the Lebanese - Christian, Moslem and Druze - be ready willing and able to reactivate their parliamentary government under the terms of the Lebanese Constitution. This is the consensus. Any democratic reforms that the elected representatives of the Lebanese people may deem appropriate must be debated in freedom and implemented in accordance with the Lebanese Constitution. The types of reforms called for by the Syrians are by their nature undemocratic, since they cannot be an expression of the Lebanese people.

In order to insure that no Lebanese ethnic, religious or political group operates under the active influence of and outside power, Lebanon must be freed of all outside parties and all outside assistance flowing to any particular group, as an essential precondition to the type of Parliamentary democratic process that will produce the desired results of true democratic reforms, guaranteeing freedom and security to all of the people of Lebanon,

C. Impact of this Modest Proposal on U.S. Priorities in the Region.

U.S. officials have been quoted in the press as opposing any substantive action against Syria for the benefit of Lebanon out of apprehension that we may lose

whatever leverage we may have for dealing with Syria over larger regional issues. (The Christian Science Monitor, France, US Seek to End Shelling, April 21, 1989).

Since Secretary Baker has said that the U.S. has scant influence over Syria (Senate Foreign Relations Committee testimony April 18, 1989), it would seem that we fear losing something that we do not even have.

Taking action in Lebanon as described herein, would in all likelihood produce adverse results for President Assad in Syria. If his army is forced by circumstances to withdraw from Lebanon, this could destabilize his hold on power in Syria. The question would then become would this circumstance factor in adversely toward achieving the U.S. objective of a regional settlement.

Since President Assad is attempting to establish himself as the spoiler of a settlement and he is a party over whom we have the least diplomatic and economic leverage, bringing him down a notch in Lebanon may pave the way for a settlement.

We must rethink the wisdom of placing the foundation for a lasting regional settlement, which will require long term commitments, on an agreement to which the current Syrian regime would be a signatory. A regime which holds power from the barrel of artillery emplacements in the hills

around Damascus and which depends on the illegal occupation of its neighbor for diplomatic leverage is not a long term stable proposition. We have the experience of the Shah of Iran as our guide and as testimony to the folly of placing reliance required in international agreements on governments that rule without the benefit of the consent of the governed.

If we learned anything from the Iran experience, it should have been not to make the same mistake twice.

Regarding the effects of a Lebanon settlement as a prelude to a regional settlement on the other principles, we turn to the PLO. Chairman Arafat must now realize that the "critical mass" necessary to give credibility to his claims to a nation in need of a homeland is not the 800,000 refugees of Southern Lebanon, it is the 1,500,000 Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza who are fighting for Palestinian self determination rights on the land which they claim to be theirs.

Finally regarding the Israelis. For too long, the Israelis have had a free ride, at the expense of the Lebanese in dealing with their aboriginal population dilemma. Just as the United States had to deal with the people that occupied America before us, as have the

Australians and the South Africans, the Israelis must come to terms with the people who lived on the land of Israel before the Israelis came to occupy the land.

To indefinitely attempt to put off dealing with this issue by using Lebanon as well as other regional Arab states as refugee sites is no answer. Sooner or later, the Israelis must come to terms with what has come to be described in Israel as their "demographic problem". If the Israelis think the problem will simply go away or can be deported to Lebanon, they are only fooling themselves. Under current birth rates we will see during our life time an Israel that does not have a Jewish majority. When this happens, what will become of Israeli democracy.

Israel does itself a disservice by not facing up to this problem now. The Lebanon option is the choice to defer an ultimate solution, it is not the ultimate solution. Resolving Lebanon as a prelude to a regional settlement will make the Israeli leadership have to deal with the Palestinian issue now. This can only bode well for the Israeli leadership to be under domestic political pressure to negotiate some political accommodation with the Palestinian Arab population.

V. CONCLUSION

We believe that the actions proposed in this statement can clearly be accomplished within the framework of the

objectives of current U.S. policy on Lebanon. After engaging the senior officials in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs in a frank discussion of these options on May 18, 1983, a determined resistance to these modest diplomatic and economic measures was clearly conveyed.

We believe that the current policy which places the United States on the sidelines as a passive spectator, encouraging others, but not taking action herself, is giving ambiguous signals to Assad, which are being interpreted in Damascus as a green light from Washington to continue with the effort to liquidate all resistance in the Free Districts of Lebanon.

We believe that the current policy of abandonment of the Free Lebanese Resistance will leave it dangerously exposed to liquidation, which in turn will strengthen the Syrian position in the region beyond anyone's control, and risk triggering another regional war.

Accordingly, this document is being simultaneously distributed to the majority and minority staffs of the following committees of Congress:

The Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.

The House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East.

The House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control.

We will be demanding, as is our right, that any or all

of these Subcommittees exercise their oversight duties to investigate the causes for the deafening silence and the refusal of the United States to take action in response to the gross violations of Lebanese Human Rights, and of United States acquiesce in the gross violation of those rights by the Syrian regime of Hafaz el Assad.

In light of the AP reports of May 20, 1989, we should all consider this matter of the greatest urgency. I invite your immediate written response to this proposal which is the work product of the delegation with which you met on May 18. Should the response not be forthcoming or without change from the responses that we received on May 18, then we shall press for immediate action in the Subcommittees listed to exercise their oversight duty with regard to the default that is taking place in the Bureau.



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