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In Russia, Is It 1905 Again?

By Vladimir Bukovsky

"By late October the Baltic provinces were in a state of full-blown rebellion; the Caucasus was afire with ethnic and nationalistic violence . . ." And, of course, Poland was "completely ungovernable." Is this what a historian will write about our time? No, this is what a historian has written about the Russian revolution of 1905.

Admittedly, there is no comparison between the Russian monarchy and a totalitarian nuclear superpower. It is not just a century that separates them, a century of incredibly fast developments in all spheres of human life; the principles upon which they were built have nothing in common. Yet the current Soviet crisis is remarkably similar to that of 1905.

It is little remembered today that the events of 1905 were set in motion by a campaign of *glasnost*. Prince Svyatopolk-Mirsky, former chief of gendarmes, was appointed minister of the interior in order to inaugurate "an epoch of rapprochement between the authorities and the people." The prince himself explained his program of reform, every word of which would have been endorsed by Mikhail Gorbachev, as a desire "for broad progress, at least to the extent that this is not incompatible with the existing order."

The events of 1905 were set in motion by a campaign of glasnost, to inaugurate "rapprochement between the authorities and the people."

Like all policemen-turned-reformers, past and present, Svyatopolk-Mirsky was immediately acclaimed in the Western press as a liberal. The Russian people, however, had a completely different idea of progress. Encouraged by glasnost, a conference of representatives from the rural councils, meeting with the prince's permission, adopted a resolution clearly "incompatible with the existing order." In short, they demanded a constitution and a parliamentary democracy.

Although newspapers were promptly forbidden to print or discuss the conference resolution, the public perceived it as an opportunity for change: After all, the conference was officially sanctioned. There followed a season of banquets, declarations, protests, petitions and manifestations, in which all sorts of corporations and associations expressed their support for the resolution.

Meanwhile, excitement spread into the streets in the form of student demonstrations and popular processions that the liberal prince had to disperse with the help of the Cossacks. On Jan. 9, 1905, a huge procession of workers went to the Winter Palace to present their petition, with icons and prayers, to Czar Nicholas II. The soldiers opened fire, killing hundreds.

Bloody Sunday

After this episode, known to history as "Bloody Sunday," the government and the people were clearly on a collision course. Protests and riots, strikes and mutiny in the army and navy continued throughout the year, culminating in the All-Russia Political Strike in the middle of October. Even after a frightened czar granted a kind of a constitution (the Manifesto of Oct. 17th) and a kind of a parliament (the Duma), the unrest continued. Nationalities wanted independence; peasants, land; workers, social justice; and all of them together craved revolution.

"The spirit of mutiny swept the land. . . . Having freed itself from inherited fears and imaginary obstacles, the mass did not want to, and could not, see the real obstacles in its path. Therein lay its weakness, and also its strength. It rushed forward like the ocean tide whipped by a storm. . . . It was as though someone were stirring the social cauldron, right to its very bottom, with a gigantic spoon. . . . Workers' strikes, incessant processions, wreckings of country estates, strikes of policemen and janitors, and finally unrest and mutiny among the soldiers and sailors. Everything disintegrated, everything turned to chaos."

It is hard to believe that this passage is not yesterday's dispatch from Moscow, but a page from a book by Leon Trotsky. To be sure, we still do not have an outright mutiny in the Soviet Army, nor do we see rebellious peasants looting and burning estates of the landlords, as they did in 1905. The breakdown of law and order is, however, undeniable. "It is an explosion of crime, a real explosion," the minister of the interior, V. Bakatin, has complained in Literaturnaya Gazeta.

Racketeers and youth gangs terrorize entire cities, sometimes even storming police stations when one of their lot is arrested. Shootings have became common on the streets of Moscow. Although possession of firearms is a criminal offense, according to police estimates there are 16 million or 17 million firearms in private hands, and the number is growing. A popular joke—the best barometer of public sentiment in the Soviet Union—asks, "What is the next stage after *perestroika*? *Perstrelka*" (shootout).

Every day Yuri Shatalin, the three-star general in charge of the Internal Troops, receives several requests from local, district and regional authorities begging him to send them his men. At least 21,000 of them are already deployed in the hottest spots of unrest in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Like his predecessors 84 years ago, Gen. Shatalin knows that there are not enough troops to protect every district, and that sending small detachments to every town and village, where they will be easy targets for propaganda or bullets, is hardly a solution. So, as in 1905, most of those requests are denied. "It is not our task to disperse peaceful demonstrations, or to fight with strikers and criminals," the general has argued in the Moscow News.

The glamour of history very often distorts our perception, turning events of the past into something bigger than reality. But which feature of the 1905 events cannot be seen at present?

The humiliating defeat in the war with Japan in 1904-1905, a war that revealed the czarist government's bureaucratic incompetence and callous disregard for human life, is comparable to the Soviet adventure in Afghanistan. Even if the latter was not a military defeat, it affected public morale in exactly the same way.

To Soviet leaders, glasnost and perestroika are designed to save the system. To the people, they are a chance to change the system.

We have not seen yet a "Bloody Sunday" in Moscow, but the slaughter in Tbilisi last spring took a comparable number of casualties. At least the czar did not use chemical weapons against his people. In any case, we might yet see such an event in Moscow. The Chinese reformers did not hesitate to shoot students in front of the television cameras. Why should their Soviet comrades be more camera-shy?

There is even a Soviet equivalent of the Black Hundred," the aptly titled "Pamyat" (Memory), which is as anti-Semitic and chauvinist as its 1905 counterpart ever was, and no less inspired by the secret police. The first anti-Jewish pogrom was just reported in Georgia in October.

And the "People's Congress" this spring—was it not in many ways similar to the first Duma? It certainly was equally powerless to influence the course of the government's policy.

But the most spectacular event of the 1905, the one which brought the czar to his knees and forced him to grant a constitution, was the All-Russia Political Strike. Starting as a minor pay dispute in Moscow's printing shops, it quickly spread to other parts of the country and other industries. It virtually brought the entire country to a standstill by paralyzing the railways. Even the liberal professions joined in. It rapidly became a political, instead of an economic, action. Nothing could stop it, like a wildfire.

The Soviet wildfire began as a minor pay dispute in the coal mines of Vorkuta, and spread to other coal mines in Kuzbass and Donbass. A mere threat of a railroad strike—the railroad's are still Russia's motor nerves—frightened Mr. Gorbachev so much that he hastily accepted all the miners' demands, even though he knew he could not possibly fulfill his promises.

In the pause since then, Mr. Gorbachev rushed through his Duma a ban on all strikes of any significance, as if a ban could ever stop a wildfire—but the strikes returned two months later, this time, illegally. The striking miners of Vorkuta are not asking for a pay increase any longer, nor for a better supply of goods to their shops. They are demanding a removal of the Communist Party from power, and fair and free elections.

A totalitarian regime creates a class of rulers, 18 million of them in the Soviet Union. They are an occupying army that cannot be forced to withdraw.

No historical analogy could be so complete as to offer us a timetable. The Russian winter may even cool down this fire, at least for a while. But as in 1905, the people and the regime are on a collision course. To the leadership, glasnost and perestroika signal a change of policy, designed to save the system. To the people, they are a chance to change the system.

The West may still think of Mr. Gorbachev as a liberal reformer. To his people, however, he is just another party boss in charge of the state machine responsible for their misery. The fact that economic necessity forced him to introduce certain reforms could make no people grateful for very long. A crack in the prison wall is always perceived by a prisoner as an opportunity to escape, not as an improvement in the ventilation.

Anyway, where is the reform? After four years of frantic activity, known to the bedazzled world as perestroika, the Soviet economy has become even less productive, the budget deficit has swelled, the lines outside the shops are longer, the goods are scarcer. Clearly, the half-measures of Mr. Gorbachev's celebrated reforms, his New Deal aimed at salvaging socialism, have failed to incite the popular enthusiasm needed to improve economic performance.

However, what was not enough for economic revival is proving to be too much for political survival. The Soviet empire is in turmoil. From the Baltic Sea to the Caucasian mountains, and from the Danube to Siberia, former "captive nations" are rising up to demand their national independence. In the Soviet Union itself, last spring's elections, restricted and manipulated as they were, showed a clear vote of no confidence in the Communist Party. Further economic decline is bound to swell the wave of strikes and to radicalize workers' demands. The people want democracy. Not a "socialist democracy," not "democratization," but democracy.

By the fall of 1988, the Soviet leaders already knew that their reforms had failed and were preparing to cope with the consequences. The most radical reforms, such as the deregulation of prices, were suspended. New restrictive laws were hastily introduced, curbing freedom of public meetings, limiting freedom of the press, restricting cooperatives and extending police powers to the army. In April of this year, an attempt was made to introduce a new and even more severe law in place of the notorious articles 70 and 190 of the Criminal Code used against dissidents under Brezhnev. Although the law was withdrawn for re-drafting at the last moment, the authorities' intention was unmistakable. Then this fall came another round of emergency legislation: a ban on strikes, more restrictions on cooperatives and an increase in the number of the Internal Troops.

While no one can tell exactly when the crackdown may occur, the task itself will be much easier than is believed. The 1905 revolution was, remember, crushed, even though the czarist police were no match for the KGB, and the czarist army, most of which was trapped in the Far East as a result of the war with Japan, was only about one-fifth of the size of the present Soviet army, with at least one-third of the troops in a state of mutiny. All in all, the czar could rely only on some 60,000 Cossacks, three divisions of gendarmes and a few regiments of Imperial Guards.

By contrast, apart from the army, the Soviet authorities have at their disposal 230,000 KGB troops (a Soviet version of the Waffen SS equipped with tanks, helicopters, artillery and planes, aimed at dealing with a military mutiny); 340,000 Internal Troops; special elite units like the 30,000 Spetsnaz; 70,000 paratroops; two divisions of Marines and a few particularly trusted Guards divisions. In total, 750,000 highly reliable fighting men. The population has only doubled since 1905, but the repressive apparatus has increased eight times.

The Soviets have techniques and equipment—tanks, planes, helicopters—unthought of in 1905. Nor are there well-organized revolutionary parties in Russia today, as there were 84 years ago. Above all, we should bear in mind that the majority of the Soviet people, who have lived through past terrors, will be easily scared into submission. This is why it is realistic to compare the present Soviet crisis with 1905, and not with 1917. In Lenin's words, this is just a "dress rehearsal."

1917 Too

But there will be a 1917 too. The present Soviet crisis is far more grave than anything known in Russian history. If anything, the Russian economy was growing too fast at the turn of the century, causing socio-political problems and challenging the outdated autocracy. The Soviet economy, on the contrary, is rapidly declining. This alone is going to provide a constant source of unrest, not to mention growing national movements in the republics.

Still, destroying the "framework of socialism" will be no easy task. Unlike an autocracy, where the ruling elite tainted by the regime's crimes is tiny, a totalitarian regime creates a whole class of rulers, 18 million of them in the Soviet Union, who are incapable of any other social function. They are a state within a state, an occupying army that cannot be finished off by a coup and cannot be forced to withdraw as they have no place to withdraw to.

This tragic development is by no means unique to the Soviet Union. We are witnessing an event of truly historic proportions, unfolding before our eyes in the entire world of socialism from Havana to Belgrade and from Warsaw to Peking. To paraphrase Marx, we are witnessing the world-wide crisis of socialism, a crisis whose roots go back to the beginning of our century, when the wrong choice was made by so many. As the Russian Prime Minister, Count Sergei Witte, wrote in 1905:

"One, and perhaps the main reason of our revolution is a delay in the development of the principle of individualism and, therefore, in the sense of ownership, in the meaning of citizenship, including civil liberties. All of these were not allowed to develop naturally, and as life pressed on, the people had either to be stifled or to burst this cocoon by force. A bad steam engine is blown up by steam: The choice is either not to increase pressure and, therefore, fall behind, or to modernize the engine while speeding along. The principle of private ownership forms today all economic relations; the whole world is based on it."

Mr. Bukovsky, the author of "To Build a Castle" (Viking, 1979), is at work on a book about the current Soviet crisis.

The Moderate Democrat's Curse

By Fred Barnes

Democratic Sen. Ernest Hollings of South Carolina was hardly a dove. He'd opposed both nuclear arms control treaties, SALT I and SALT II. He defended the war in Vietnam. He endorsed most Pentagon spending. But when President Reagan ordered the invasion of Grenada in 1983, Mr. Hollings balked. Instead he asked his staff what position he should take. Most urged him to oppose the invasion, and that's what he did. He denounced Mr. Reagan for indulging in "macho politics."

This puzzling conduct has a simple explanation: He was a Democratic presidential candidate at the time. And he did what moderates invariably do in the heat of a Democratic presidential race. He neglected his moderate base and wooed liberal voters. It didn't work. Mr. Hollings failed to inspire moderate voters in the primaries and caucuses, and he didn't get many liberal votes either.

Ignominious Losses

The moderate alternative always loses nowadays. Sometimes the loss is ignominious. Sen. John Glenn of Ohio, the former astronaut lionized in "The Right Stuff," was billed as the moderate Democrat with the best shot at winning the 1984 nomination. But, like Mr. Hollings, he concentrated on pressing liberal buttons (he criticized the Grenada invasion). He lost badly.

Despite the disastrous examples of Mr. Glenn and Mr. Hollings, the moderate alternatives in 1988, Sen. Albert Gore of Tennessee and former Gov. Bruce Babbitt of Arizona, took roughly the same tack and suffered the same result. Now Gov. Bill Clinton of Arkansas is positioned as the moderate alternative for 1992. He faces the temptation to appease the party's liberal wing. If he does, he'll soon be history.

What causes moderates to cloak their moderate views when seeking the Democratic presidential nomination? It's an important question. Because Democrats, who've lost five of the last six presidential elections, desperately need a moderate nominee to challenge the Republican candidate in the Sun Belt and West, where George Bush, Ronald Reagan and Richard Nixon amassed their electorate majorities. A liberal who suddenly becomes a moderate (Walter Mondale, Michael Dukakis) in the fall isn't credible there. A true moderate would be. The problem is that moderates panic in the primaries, hide their identity as moderates, and lose the nomination. How come?

They're afraid. The party's liberal elite dominates the nominating phase, and moderates are wary of crossing them. The activists who take a keen interest in presidential politics, sign up for campaign jobs, or show up for candidate events are mostly liberals. Thus there's not much positive feedback for moderate positions. Mr. Hollings got little from his campaign staff. Rep. Dave McCurdy of Oklahoma, who briefly considered a 1992 race, got a cool reception when he gave a moderate pitch to the Democratic National Committee last month. An aggressive moderate candidacy would make liberals furious. Moderates have been unwilling to risk that.

The nomination process is stacked against the moderate candidate who sticks to his guns. The important thing is early momentum, and it comes from collecting endorsements and money. "It's the institutional left and the institutional liberal interest groups that give money and endorsements," says Mike McCurry, the former spokesman for the Democratic National Committee. They don't give either to noisy moderates.

What's worse for moderates, hordes of moderate voters have abandoned the Democratic primaries. In 1976, 20% of eligible voters in Florida participated in the Democratic primary. Jimmy Carter, the moderate alternative that year, won. In 1988, 13% voted. Mr. Dukakis, the liberal favorite, won. Some of the missing Democratic voters have become Republicans. Others have given up on politics. Getting them to vote in Democratic primaries again is no easy feat. Mr. Glenn tried to organize disaffected Democrats in the Iowa caucuses in 1984. Not many showed up to vote, but then he didn't give them much reason to. Mr. Babbitt tried again in 1988 and fared no better. Now Mr. Clinton is eager to attract them.

It can be done, but not by a faint-hearted moderate who mimics liberals. To be successful, a moderate must play up his moderate positions relentlessly and use them as a weapon against opponents. Liberals may boo, but that will signal moderate voters there's a kindred spirit in the race. In California, Senate candidate Dianne Feinstein was booed by liberal Democrats in 1990 when she endorsed capital punishment and lauded President Bush's tough posture against Saddam Hussein. She lost liberal votes, but attracted many more from moderates. John Anderson got a boost in the 1980 Republican presidential race when he was booed at a forum sponsored by gun owners.

Moderates panic in the primaries, hide their identity as moderates, and lose the nomination. The party's liberal elite dominates the nominating phase, and moderates are wary of crossing them.

A moderate should be thrilled if liberal activists are angry. That means clear distinctions are being drawn between the moderate and his or her liberal rivals. Of course the distinctions have to be ones that appeal to the moderate Democratic electorate, mostly middle-class whites. Mr. Glenn, Mr. Hollings and Mr. Babbitt stressed economic austerity. It wasn't well received. "I haven't seen a market yet for tough choices," says Stan Greenberg, Mr. Clinton's pollster. Gov. Douglas Wilder of Virginia is running in 1992 as a fiscal conservative. That has little resonance with Democratic voters.

Four clusters of issues are available to a moderate alternative who pursues a strategy of differentiation. Mr. Clinton has touched vaguely on all of them in recent speeches.

The Party. Disaffected Democrats are looking for a sign that they weren't wrong in rejecting Democrats in four of the last five presidential elections," says Will Marshall of the Progressive Policy Institute, a moderate Democratic think tank. This can be telegraphed by blaming liberal fundamentalism for scaring away moderate Democrats and losing elections. Mr. Clinton came close to saying this in May. "Too many of the people who used to vote for us, the very burdened middle class we're talking about, have not trusted us in national elections to defend our national interests abroad, to put their values into our social policy at home, or to take their tax money and spend it with discipline," he said. But he hasn't repeated that lately. He needs to, now that voters are beginning to listen. Certainly no other Democratic candidate is likely to zing the party.

National Security. It's crazy for a moderate Democrat to yield this issue. There's fertile ground to plow to the right of President Bush on foreign policy. A moderate Democrat could criticize him for failing to oust Saddam Hussein, for cozying up to Mikhail Gorbachev while ignoring democratic leaders like Boris Yeltsin and delaying recognition of the Baltics, for recklessly cutting America's nuclear arsenal, for being soft on Chinese communists. The only Democrat who's worked this angle is Mr. Wilder. And he backed off after his comment about killing Saddam stirred controversy. Alone among announced Democratic candidates, Mr. Clinton backed Desert Storm. That gives him entree to criticize his opponents as isolationists for balking at the use of force and, later, to go after Mr. Bush.

Race. Democratic candidates either steer clear of this sensitive issue or say what the civil rights lobby wants to hear. A Democrat who aggressively questions affirmative action and quotas will be treated as a pariah by liberals. But a moderate candidate who ducks the issue won't be taken seriously by disaffected Democrats. To them, race is critical. Mr. Clinton's current stance won't win moderates. He dismisses the quota flap as a cynical attempt by Mr. Bush to divide white males from the Democratic party. Maybe so, but middle-class moderates don't see it that way.

Revulsion Against Welfare

Values. Abortion, pornography and the flag don't matter much in the Democratic race. Welfare, crime and the underclass do. Moderate voters are looking for a candidate who reflects their revulsion. Mr. Marshall says he's been shocked by "the violence of feelings" against welfare in focus groups of Democratic voters. In a vague way, Mr. Clinton is trying to tap this by talking up "personal responsibility." In announcing his candidacy Oct. 3, he said, "we should insist that people move off welfare rolls and onto work rolls." That's a start, but he'll have to flesh it out.

Should all else fail, there's a surefire way to be noticed by disenchanted moderates: get in a feud with Jesse Jackson. This thought has crossed Mr. Clinton's mind. Even if Mr. Jackson doesn't run, he'll still be on the sidelines kibbitzing. To white moderates, Mr. Jackson is the symbol of all that's wrong with the Democratic party. But in 1984 and 1988, Mr. Jackson's foes gave him a free ride. Mr. Babbitt said everyone should lay off Mr. Jackson because "there has been so much racism in this society." A moderate alternative who treats Mr. Jackson like that will lose every time.

Mr. Barnes covers the White House for The New Republic.

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL FRIDAY, JULY 21, 1989

Who Needs Peace in the Middle East?

By Irving Kristol

Whom the gods would destroy, they first make mad. Whom the gods would make mad, they first inflame with the ambition to bring peace to the Middle East. For years now, both the State Department and White House have been suffering acutely from such an inflammation.

Somehow or other, the U.S. foreign policy establishment has become convinced—and has convinced the media—that the key to peace in the Middle East is to be found in a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Why do they believe this when the evidence of their senses refutes it? After all, the bloody civil war between Arabs that is ravishing Lebanon has nothing whatsoever to do with the Palestinian conflict. Moreover, there are clear signs that Syria's involvement in the Lebanon mess could lead to a war with Iraq, which will not tolerate President Haffez Assad's design for a greater Syria that incorporates Lebanon. Or it could lead to a war with Israel, since such a greater Syria, restored to its pre-World War I boundaries, would also include all of Palestine.

Destroy Israel

In fact, the three most powerful Islamic states in the region—Syria, Iraq and Iran—have told the world, in no uncertain terms, that one of their major foreign policy goals is the destruction of Israel. None of these states has ever evinced the slightest interest in the question of a Palestinian state on the tiny sliver of territory we call the West Bank. Nor have they ever shown any interest in the fate of the Palestinian Arabs, a tiny population that could never play a role in the power politics of the Middle East. So how could there be an Israel-Arab "peace settlement" in the region that excludes those three Moslem states? They would never sign any such treaty, they would not be bound by any such treaty, they would contemptuously ignore any such treaty.

Now, the State Department actually does know all this—knows that a settlement of the Israel-Palestinian conflict is of marginal significance and has precious little to do with "peace in the Middle East." But it is led to focus on this issue, to the exclusion of almost all others, because there are three Arab countries for which it is indeed an important matter. They are Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. These are the only Arab nations that have relatively friendly relations with the U.S., and the State Department treasures them as its "assets" in the region, though "client states" would be more accurate.

These nations are either too small and weak (Jordan and Saudi Arabia) or too geographically removed (Egypt) to play a major role in Middle Eastern affairs. But they all abut (in the case of Saudi Arabia, almost) on Palestine, have large numbers of Palestinian refugees, and have populations that do care, far more than their governments care, about what is happening on the West Bank. They care especially about the holy city of Jerusalem, with which they have a more intimate and more heartfelt connection than do the other Arab and Islamic nations.

A strong case can be made that the importance the U.S. attaches to these three countries, and the degree to which they are allowed to influence official thinking on the Middle East, is an instance of the tail wagging the dog. True, Saudi Arabia is an oil-rich land and merits respectful attention. But it is no longer a cash-rich country as oil prices (in real terms) have come down drastically, and it has a papier mâché regime that could be blown away tomorrow. Egypt has the potential to become an important and, within the region, a powerful country, but it seems utterly incapable of realizing a fraction of this potential. As for Jordan, its very survival is a daily miracle.

It is fair to say that, even if some kind of Israeli-Palestinian agreement could be reached, the situation of these three countries would not much improve, and might even much worsen. Popular opinion would be temporarily assuaged. But Jordan would probably be absorbed into a Palestinian state—it already has a Palestinian majority—while the Saudis and Egyptians would find their relations with Israel and the U.S. at the mercy of a Palestinian state whose volatile politics would of necessity, and to a large degree, be shaped by irredentist passions.

Board of Contributors

Even if some kind of Israeli-Palestinian agreement could be reached, the situation of Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan would not much improve, and might worsen.

This irredentist dynamic is built into Palestinian realities. The million or so Palestinian refugees—by now mainly children and grandchildren of the original refugees—did not come from the West Bank, have no family connections on the West Bank, have no memories of the West Bank. The "homeland" of which they dream is the part of Palestine that is now Israel. It is a homeland that has real cities—Jerusalem, Jaffa, Haifa, Acre—and green pastures in Galilee, as against the dusty, rustic towns and villages of the West Bank surrounded by arid scrubland. During the 20 years that Jordan occupied the West Bank, prior to the 1967 war, it never occurred to anyone that this area might be a suitable homeland for the Palestinians or the site of a Palestinian state.

So it is not surprising that most Israelis take it for granted that a Palestinian state on the West Bank, so far from representing a "peace settlement," would be but a preliminary stage in an ever-intensifying conflict with Israel. Nor is it surprising that the governments of Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, while formally endorsing a Palestinian state but having no desire for another war with Israel, have kept the PLO at arm's length. It is no accident that PLO headquarters is in far-off Tunis, not Cairo, and that when the PLO has its conventions they take place in farther-off Morocco.

It is perhaps just as well, therefore, that there is no possibility of a negotiated Israeli-Palestinian peace settlement, which could be only a guaranteed prelude to a war that might convulse the entire Middle East. Israel will never yield East Jerusalem, which has an Arab majority but also includes all the holy places, to the Palestinians (or anyone else). At the same time, no Arab leader, Palestinian or otherwise, would dare envisage a Palestinian state without East Jerusalem as its capital. Moreover, even the "doves" in Israel foresee the necessity of an eventual "adjustment," for security reasons, in Israel's borders, while no Palestinian leader could sign a treaty that legalized any such "adjustment."

The State Department has staked its reputation on being a mediator in circumstances where active mediation leads only, and quickly, to a dead end. Watchful waiting would make much more sense.

This is not to deny that the current situation on the West Bank is tragic in human terms, and pointless in political terms. Israel cannot hope to repress the intifada indefinitely, while waiting for a "moderate" Palestinian leadership to emerge. It won't emerge because prompt assassination would be its fate. Most Israelis understand this by now, but public opinion in Israel with regard to the West Bank is so divided, so far from anything even resembling a consensus, that no coherent policy is available to its government.

A Settlement of Sorts

Ironically, one can discern in Israel the emergence of an idea, appealing to many "hawks" and "doves" alike, for an Israeli initiative that would bring about a settlement of sorts, although not a peaceful settlement. This involves Israel drawing a line down the West Bank that would delineate the slice of territory important to its national security, annexing that territory outright, and then withdrawing from the rest of the West Bank, leaving it to its own (presumably chaotic) destiny.

Israel would then cope with West Bank turmoil as it copes with the turmoil in Lebanon. The Israelis may well prefer this to the futile policing of an occupied territory. The State Department would be outraged—as would the ultra-nationalist sector of Israeli opinion—at being presented with such a fait accompli, which is why Israeli leaders are loath even to contemplate the idea. The Middle East, however, is constantly being shaped and reshaped by faits accomplis. It could happen once again.

Mr. Kristol, an American Enterprise Institute fellow, co-edits The Public Interest and publishes The National Interest.

PATRICK BUCHANAN

Crackup of the conservatives

Well before Old Dutch rode off into the sunset, the movement he had led to power in 1980 had begun to break apart.

A first, deep fissure surfaced in '81 when respected Old Right scholar M.E. Bradford was savaged by neo-conservatives because he stood in the path of one of their own, then-Democrat Bill Bennett, who wanted to take over that cornucopia of academic prestige and pork, the National Endowment for the Humanities.

There were other collisions — over money, issues and power (most of which the neo-cons won). But their tactics — including the smearing of opponents as racists, nativists, fascists and anti-Semites — left many conservatives wondering if we hadn't made a terrible mistake when we brought these ideological vagrants in off the street and gave them a warm place by the fire.

Last week, a piece arrived suggesting that the Old Right and its allies have had it, that they are ready to hang out the dirty linen, if necessary, to restore their movement to its first principles.

Like the fleas who conclude they are steering the dog, the neo-cons' relationship to the movement has always been parasitical.

Written by Politics Professor Paul Gottfried of Elizabethtown College, the piece, "Scrambling for Funds," appears in the March issue of RRR, the Rothbard-Rockwell Report (a monthly put out by the Center for Libertarian Studies, of Burlingame, Calif.). Mr. Gottfried documents the capture of the four big conservative foundations by neo-con staffers who are steering $30 million a year to front groups, magazines, scholars and policy institutes who toe their party line. The "four sisters" — Olin, Scaife, Bradley and Smith-Richardson foundations — he argues, have been co-opted by neo-cons the same way liberals co-opted the great foundation of Henry Ford.

Who is fed the tax-free dollars? American Spectator, writes Mr. Gottfried, gets $450,000 a year. The New Criterion got $150,000 in 1989 from Scaife and gets annual grants of $100,000 from Olin. The Free Congress Foundation receives "hundreds of thousands of dollars yearly from the Bradley and Olin Foundations." "[A]n even greater amount . . . from Bradley, Olin and Smith-Richardson goes to the Institute for Educational Affairs.

"In late 1988 Bradley conferred $475,000 on the James Madison Center, which was subsequently incorporated into I.E.A. The center was organized as a forum for William Bennett, who, together with Jack Kemp, has emerged as one of the two preferred presidential candidates of the neo-conservatives."

Mr. Gottfried has names, dollars, dates, of who got what, when.

Other big beneficiaries of the four sisters: Hudson Institute, Michael Novak's "Crisis," Richard John Neuhaus' "First Things," and the National Endowment for Democracy, two-thirds of whose budget is handed over to that great conservative Lane Kirkland of the AFL-CIO In 1988, Olin gave a three-year gran of $376,000 to Irving Kristol.

Who is being cut out? "The Old Right Fund for American Studies, the National Humanities Institute, [James] Taylor's Young Americans Foundation, the Conservative Caucus of Howard Phillips and even the black conservative Lincoln Institute [whose leader Jay Parker dared to dress down Jack Kemp] have all been deemed unfit for funding."

As a tiny handful of neo-cons now control the money spigot of the American Right, who are they, and what do they believe?

Ex-Great Society liberals, almost all of them, they support the welfare state and Big Government. They are pro-civil rights and affirmative action, though anti-quota. They are pro-foreign aid, especially for Israel. They favor higher immigration quotas, and some demand open borders. Many are viscerally hostile to the Old Right, and to any America First foreign policy. They want to use America's wealth to promote "global democracy" abroad and impose "democratic values" in our public schools.

see **BUCHANAN,** *page G4*

Patrick Buchanan is a nationally syndicated columnist.

The new "recons..
serve divisions suggested n... ...an are sometimes known as "cadre" divisions.

The idea of such partly manned units is part of a larger proposal advanced by Mr. Wolfowitz as a basis for building up forces in a crisis. The broader plan calls for storing equipment from dismantled units and retaining officers who could train and lead if it became necessary.

Some elements of the plan have drawn sharp criticism from the services. Pentagon officials said final decisions on important elements will not be reached by Mr. Cheney until the commanders in the field and the Joint Chiefs of Staff meet later this month and studies are completed on issues like the proper mix of active and reserve forces.

One point of contention revolves around the possibility, raised in deliberations on the plan, that the United States would modify its longstanding policy of keeping some aircraft carriers constantly stationed near areas of potential conflict. The United States could deploy other types of vessels in some areas where carriers have traditionally operated and develop plans to "surge" carriers to trouble spots in a crisis.

Mr. Wolfowitz and General Powell have reportedly raised the question of reducing the Navy to 11 deployable aircraft carriers as part of a minimal Navy force. The fleet of 11 carriers would not include a carrier used for training and another that is usually in overhaul.

The Navy has complaining that such

Panamanians Celebrate in Streets Over News of Noriega's Flight

PANAMA, From A1

that the Panamanian government was "knowledgeable that the deal was going down." He said he believed that no representative of the Panamanian government was present when Noriega surrendered to U.S. soldiers.

Thurman praised Papal Nuncio Jose Sebastian Laboa as "extraordinarily competent," saying he has performed "Herculean work." First Vice President Ricardo Arias Calderon said, "We owe a great debt to Laboa. His work resulted in peace."

Second Vice President Guillermo Ford also said Noriega had decided of his own accord to turn himself over to U.S. forces. "There weren't any conditions," Ford told a local television interviewer. "He did it all voluntarily."

Shortly after 9:00 p.m, two Black Hawk helicopters touched down in a sports field adjacent to the Vatican embassy. Videotape taken by American news networks stationed on the balconies of a high-rise hotel across the street showed four men leaving the embassy accompanied by at least eight U.S. soldiers.

The groups divided into two and boarded the aircraft, which then took off without lights. The helicopters were visible across the brightly lit urban skyline as they flew in the direction of Howard Air Base, which is located on the outskirts of the capital near the Panama Canal.

Asked how he felt about seeing Noriega in U.S. custody, Gen. Thurman said, "My mood was, a job well done by the troops who have come down here."

plexion, and became a banned opposition symbol.

Bare-chested boys dodged through standstill traffic, swigging from champagne bottles and screaming their heads off. Every father seemed to be carrying a child aloft. One man yelled repeatedly, "Progress! Liberty! Happiness! We are free!"

Earlier today, more than 10,000 Panamanians rallied outside the Vatican embassy demanding that Noriega be turned over to the United States.

"Justice! Justice! Justice!" and "Assassin!" chanted the people, shaking their fists and waving flags. Most of the demonstrators wore white, the trademark of opposition to Noriega when he was in power.

The crowd, estimated to range from 10,000 to 20,000 demonstrators, stretched for more than a mile down Balboa Avenue as it curved along Panama Bay.

Hundreds of demonstrators at one point got past small barricades erected by U.S. troops between the marchers and the embassy, running a half-block until they encountered concertina wire and a line of U.S. soldiers.

Also today, the new government of President Guillermo Endara accepted the resignation of Lt. Col. Roberto Armijo, who had been the controversial head of the new Panamanian Security Force for just eight days.

First Vice President Arias Calderon said Armijo had offered to resign after the government "obtained information related to his personal finances." He said the difficulty was unrelated to the Security Force but refused to elaborate. Armijo's second-in-command, Lt. Col. Eduardo Herrera Hassan, was named to replace him.

Endara chose Armijo to build a new national security force Dec. 26, six days after the U.S. invasion routed Noriega's Panama Defense Forces, which performed police functions. The choice of Armijo was widely criticized because of his long service under both Noriega and one of his predecessors, Gen. Omar Torrijos.

Endara defended Armijo as the top PDF official thought to have been free of corruption after those above him fled or were arrested.

Herrara Hassan is a former Panamanian ambassador to Israel. He was cashiered from the army by Noriega in April 1988, ostensibly for disobeying orders. However, it was reported that Noriega suspected Herrara Hassan of leading a plot to overthrow him. Herrara Hassan is the nephew of Torrijos.

Three U.S. senators and a high-ranking team of U.S. diplomats and economic officials led by Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger met with Panamanian government officials today.

REUTER

Panamanians hold signs saying "Asylum, No!" and "Never Again" in anti-Noriega protest before Noriega's arrest.

Eagleburger, who characterized his delegation's visit as a fact-finding mission, said in a statement: "We are bullish on the Panamanian economy, and we are going to spread the word on our return to the U.S. that there are great opportunities here for foreign investment."

He said the new Endara administration had pledged to rebuild Panama by promoting private enterprise and with little government interference.

While Eagleburger promised that the United States would be "actively involved" and "cooperating very closely" with the new government, he steered clear of estimates of how much U.S. aid it would take to get the country's troubled economy going again.

He added, however, that the United States has "great sympathy" for Panamanians who lost their homes in the U.S. invasion, and mentioned that he had discussed rebuilding Chorrillo, a neighborhood largely destroyed in fighting around Noriega's former headquarters and in fires allegedly set by members of Noriega's civilian Dignity Battalions.

An official for the Agency for International Development said that AID had already provided $550,000 to help house Chorrillo's displaced residents temporarily and to clean up damage caused by the fires.

Panamanian Second Vice President Ford has estimated the country's immediate economic needs at between $700 million and $3 billion. Other estimates put it at $1.5 billion.

Ford reportedly told the Eagleburger delegation that Panama would work to eliminate drug trafficking, for which the United States indicted Noriega.

Correspondent Lee Hockstader contributed to this report.

Roadblocks around the Vatican embassy, where Noriega took refuge Christmas Eve, became giant party spots, with champagne and American flags in abundance. White fireworks burst in the air.

"I am so happy. I feel democracy inside me," said Max Amar, 20, who works in a candy shop and lives in the Paitilla neighborhood close to the Vatican embassy.

Throughout the city, teenagers jumped in their cars and, hanging out of the windows, shouted and waved white flags, a symbol of popular opposition to Noriega.

U.S. troops tried to control traffic and, while some celebrated, most seemed subdued with all the commotion. "To them it's everything, to us it's just a battle," said one soldier sitting on the grass watching the festivities.

When the news broke, much of Panama City was finishing dinner and heading home in time for the 11 p.m. curfew that has been in effect since last weekend, but the street party appeared likely to continue most of the night.

"We really kicked his ass," shouted one U.S. Marine above the clamor as the crowd danced around him on 50th Street, the prime avenue for political protest against Noriega over the past two years.

"Will your troops leave now?" asked one of the hundreds of passengers leaning out of the column of automobiles honking their way along 50th Street. "I hope not. We don't trust our own."

"There are a lot of women tonight with green faces," said Cpl. Robin Hicks, 28, of Southern California, referring to the facial camouflage makeup he had just donated to a woman's ecstatic kiss. "I'm awed. This is something I can tell my kid, who's going to be born this year."

All around, people chanted a Spanish rhyme: "Soldier, friend, the people are with you."

Flags bearing the message "Just Cause," the code name of the U.S. invasion, were flapped by hundreds of Panamanians as they rode, walked and cycled down main avenues of the city.

One resourceful Panamanian pulled all his windshield wipers away from the glass to hold white banners, which waved back and forth.

Not everyone was on the streets celebrating, however. Ricardo Herrera, 45, a taxi driver, stood scowling on a side street, watching the party. "I wanted to see him dead," he said, referring to Noriega. "Justice would have been to murder him. He was such a coward. He was very macho to the Panamanian people with his Dignity Battalions, but now he can't hurt the people anymore."

One tall American held aloft a flagpole on which was tied both a U.S. and Panamanian flag. He was surrounded by Panamanians chanting, "Gracias a Dios"—Thank God.

One man called a radio talk show to call Noriega a bastard. The host said, "Well, normally we don't let that sort of thing on the radio, but tonight we'll let it go."

Asked what the news meant to him, one man said, "It means now you can eat pineapple. I haven't eaten pineapple for two years." Pineapple was Noriega's nickname because of his pockmarked com-

JOHN NORTON MOORE

For more than one reason

The Security Council "pause of goodwill . . . to allow Iraq one final opportunity" to comply fully with all relevant resolutions in the Gulf crisis, as embodied in Resolution 678 of Nov. 29, will end in just four weeks on Jan. 15.

It seems likely that with the approach of this deadline, the release of hostages, a reciprocal exchange of foreign ministers and the convening in early January of the 102nd Congress, the national debate about appropriate action in the Gulf crisis will intensify. It is to be hoped that such a debate will be overtaken by events as Saddam Hussein pulls out of Kuwait and complies fully with Security Council resolutions. If not, however, we must not forget that the crisis is about far more than the taking of hostages.

In considering the case for effective action against Mr. Hussein, it is an illusion to believe that there must be a single reason for such action. The sport of citing differing reasons given by the Bush administration as though this proves there is no valid basis may be good political theater, but it is both bad logic and potentially harmful to rational appraisal.

The Gulf crisis is a compelling case precisely because there are so many re-enforcing reasons for action in a unique setting. Moreover, for those willing to listen, the administration has repeatedly given an important range of reasons for the action, most recently in President Bush's Nov. 30 address to the nation.

Paradoxically, the most important reason for effective action is precisely that mankind must take effective action to end aggressive war, and we now have one of the best chances in human history to work against aggression. Aggressive war,

see **MOORE,** *page G4*

John Norton Moore is Walter L. Brown Professor of Law and director of the Center for National Security Law at the University of Virginia. He formerly was counselor on international law to the State Department and was a United States ambassador.

MOORE

From page G1

as condemned by the U.N. Charter, is an outrage, and it is time to end it. We must not think of war as an inevitable part of the human condition against which mankind is forever helpless. Like slavery before it, aggressive war can and will be ended.

Collective security as currently embodied in the U.N. Charter is potentially one of the most important mechanisms for ending such war. If collective security can be made to work in a new era of East-West cooperation, we will truly have bequeathed something worthwhile to the next generation. If it cannot, in a case as blatant as the Iraqi blitzkrieg against Kuwait, then a hope for peace supported by generations of world leaders will be dead.

On Nov. 29, for only the second time in the history of organized efforts at collective security, and only the first time for an action supported by both East and West, the Security Council authorized nations to "use all necessary means," including the use of force, to ensure the defense of Kuwait against an outrageous aggression. It will be a tragedy of historic proportions, as great as the American failure to join the League of Nations, if a self-proclaimed "anti-war" movement or a well-meaning faction of Congress undermines this opportunity for strengthening collective security and building a new world order across East and West based on the rule of law.

Beyond collective security through the United Nations, aggressive war can be reduced by an overall climate of deterrence against extremist regimes that are willing to use force aggressively against their neighbors.

Systemic deterrence depends on a totality of effective community law, politics, economic, military power and perceived will that changes the cost-benefit equation for a potential aggressor.

Establishing an effective international climate of deterrence against aggression is not merely a theoretical construct. It is one of the prerequisites for peace, not just in our time but also in this world. And, paradoxically, establishing a climate in which Mr. Hussein *knows* effective action will be taken may be the fastest way to secure his compliance with Security Council directives and avoid a wider war. Indeed, this is the judgment of the U.N. Security Council.

The Gulf crisis presents additional reasons why world order is centrally at stake. One of the true evils in the international system is the seizure of innocent civilians as hostages. In both numbers seized and levels of cynical manipulation before their ultimate release, the Iraqi seizure and timed release of thousands of international hostages in an effort to prevent a community response to its aggression reached a new low.

In addition, Mr. Hussein has now commenced two wars of aggression. His first war against Iran may have killed as many as 1 million people. If he is not stopped, there is a real — not just imagined — possibility that Mr. Hussein will carry out further attacks, as he has repeatedly threatened.

It also is relevant that Iraq is currently a beacon to terrorists — attracting some of the most extreme elements from all over the Middle East. In its global dimension, citizens of more than 84 nations were the victims of international terrorist attacks in 1988, resulting in almost 3,000 casualties. As if these world order concerns are not enough, Mr. Hussein has blatantly flouted important international firebreaks against the first use of lethal chemical weapons and, production of biological weapons, and it is widely reported that he is working both on nuclear weapons and on means of delivering weapons of mass destruction.

Quite apart from the central world order concerns at stake in the Gulf crisis, Mr. Hussein's actions, if unchecked, will forever end the self-determination rights of the people of Kuwait.

As for the rule of law, Mr. Hussein's actions openly flout the most important fundamentals of the international system: the prohibition against aggressive attack — the obligation to adhere to 12 binding Security Council resolutions that were adopted under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter in accordance with the Security Council's core responsibility for the maintenance of international peace; the protection of human rights; the prohibitions against terrorism and hostage taking; solemn obligations of the Geneva Conventions concerning protection of civilian populations; arms control and law of war treaty obligations; and treaty obligations concerning the protection of diplomats and the diplomatic process.

Importantly, if we are to continue to have difficulty in our national debates in understanding the crucial difference between force used aggressively and force used defensively, then, because we treat aggressive attack and defensive response the same, we will both have killed the most important underpinning of the rule of law between nations and have reduced the deterrent effect of law nearly to nothing.

The Gulf crisis also presents a

very real issue of American resolve and credibility in international relations generally and toward its commitment to an effective United Nations specifically. While arguments about American credibility have sometimes been overdone, credibility is genuinely at stake when the United States has taken the lead against a brutal international aggression and has led the Security Council to authorize the use of "all necessary means" to secure the withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait and end the crisis. After providing such leadership, if the United States itself backs away as a result of a protracted domestic debate, it will be far more difficult for this nation or any nation to take the lead against aggression in the future.

The record shows that this point of national credibility in our commitment to the United Nations was fully understood by members of Congress as they debated the U.N. Participation Act in 1945. Thus, Sen. Robert Taft, a tough advocate of congressional prerogative, said during the debate on the act: "I want to make it clear that I am wholly in favor of giving authority to the Security Council to use armed force, permitting its use without references to Congress." And again:

"I have always felt that the crucial point of action on the part of the United States was when our representative voted on the Security Council at the direction of either the president or the Congress. Once the vote is cast, it seems to me we are in duty bound, under the Charter, to go ahead with the armed forces which the senator is discussing."

Similarly, in seeking to establish a legal structure that would avoid undermining Security Council decisions made with U.S. approval, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee both quoted in their reports on the U.N. Participation Act a passage from a Senate Foreign Relations Committee report on the charter:

"Preventive or enforcement action by these forces upon the order of the Security Council would not be an act of war but would be international action for the preservation of the peace and for the purpose of preventing war. Consequently, the provisions of the Charter do not affect the exclusive power of Congress to declare war."

While the effect of this congressional language concerning the use of earmarked forces is not by itself decisive in the current war powers debate, it is clear that the Congress that initially approved U.S. participation in the United Nations understood the importance of the United States not undercutting Security Council actions by later divisive congressional debate.

Finally, while oil is not the central reason for taking action, to ignore the global economic consequences of a protected oil crisis is to ignore reality. An Iraq with Kuwait would control more than one-fifth of total world oil reserves, and if Iraq is able to even marginally intimidate Saudi Arabia and the Emirates, with another one-fifth of world reserves, it could dictate financial terms for a not inconsiderable future.

Whether we like it or not, oil is the most important commodity in world trade. The issue is not, as sometimes popularly presented in the debate, one of oil company profits or American consumption of oil. The issue is nothing less than global economic health for a period measured in years, not months.

To an extent not properly appreciated, the global economy — not just the American economy — has been put on hold while the world awaits resolution of the Gulf crisis.

A prolonged crisis or one that results in even a partial victory for Mr. Hussein may have cruel, lasting and potentially disastrous impacts on the whole world economy, which is already weakened by two previous oil shocks. Through time, of course, if a Saddam Hussein drives the price of oil too high, such a price will bring about its own decline. But the time for such a decline is measured in years, and the damage to the global economy in the meantime will be substantial and a permanent loss for all mankind.

And, we should recall, the first and second oil price shocks particularly cruelly affected developing nations. This time, in an ironic twist of fate, the economic cost of a third oil shock also will be borne heavily by the emerging democracies in Eastern Europe, and the crisis will certainly exacerbate Soviet economic problems at a time of hopeful change.

An outside observer not privy to full information on the effect of economic and other potential sanctions against Mr. Hussein cannot well predict which combination of measures against Mr. Hussein will be effective. Certainly, if a war can be avoided, we must make every effort to do so. The clear commitment in the Gulf crisis, however, must be to *effective* measures. On this issue, the organized international community has taken a stand, and our nation must not waiver.

Now is not a time for extended national debate. It is a time for the Congress of the United States to join the organized international community in supporting effective action to ensure that the Security Council resolutions on Iraq will be promptly honored.

Excerpts From the Remarks of President Bush and ANC Leader Mandela

From News Services

Following are excerpts from the remarks of President Bush and African National Congress leader Nelson Mandela before the two met privately yesterday at the White House.

President Bush

Well, welcome to all of you. And it is a great pleasure, a sincere pleasure, for Barbara and me to welcome to the White House Mr. and Mrs. Mandela—Mr. Mandela, a man who embodies the hopes of millions. . . .

We meet at a time of transition for South Africa. We applaud the recent steps President de Klerk and the government of South Africa have taken to expand the rights and freedoms of all South Africans. These are positive developments, steps toward a fully free and democratic future that we all wish to see for all of the people of South Africa.

In order for progress to continue, we must see on all sides a clear commitment to change. All parties must seize the opportunity to move ahead in a spirit of compromise and tolerance, flexibility and patience. And from all parties we look for a clear and unequivocal commitment to negotiations leading to peaceful change.

I call on all elements in South African society to renounce the use of violence and armed struggle. Break free from this cycle of repression and violent reaction that breeds nothing but more fear and suffering . . . .

Mr. Mandela, in the eyes of millions around the world, you stand against apartheid, against a system that bases the rights and freedoms of citizenship on the color of one's skin. That system is repugnant to the conscience of men and women everywhere—repugnant to the ideals that we in America hold so dear. . . .

The United States, committed to the concept of free market and a productive private sector, is ready to do its part to encourage rapid and peaceful change toward political and economic freedom. We will continue to urge American firms that are still doing business in South Africa to play a progressive role in training and empowering blacks, and building a foundation for future prosperity. . . .

Our sanctions have been designed to support change. And when the conditions laid down in our law have been met, then and only then will we consider, in consultation with the Congress, whether a change in course will promote further progress through peaceful negotiations. . . .

Mr. Mandela, you said many years ago, before the first of your 10,000 days in prison, that there is no easy walk to freedom. Your years of suffering, your nation's suffering, have borne that out.

But just as this past year so many millions of people in Eastern Europe and elsewhere tasted freedom, so too South Africa's time will come. As Martin Luther King said on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial: "We cannot walk alone." Sir, we here in America walk in solidarity with all the South Africans who seek, through nonviolent means, democracy, human rights, and freedom.

Once again it is a sincere privilege to welcome you to the White House, and may God bless you and all the people of South Africa. Welcome, sir.

Nelson Mandela

Mr. President, it is an honor and a pleasure for my wife, my delegation, and I to be welcomed by you. This is a continuation of the rousing welcome which we have received from the people of New York and Boston, black and white.

That welcome has far exceeded our wildest expectations. . . . That mood expresses the commitment of all the people of the United States of America to the struggle for the removal of apartheid.

One thing that is very clear, and it has been made even more clear in the remarks by the president, is that on the question of the removal of apartheid and the introduction of a non-racial democracy in our country, we are absolutely unanimous. . . . And this has been a source of great encouragement to our people.

To receive the support of any government is, in our situation, something of enormous importance. But to receive the support of the government of the United States of America, the leader of the West, is something beyond words.

If today we are confident that the dream which has inspired us all these years is about to be realized, it is in very large measure because of the support we have got from the masses of the people of the United States of America, and, in particular, from the government and from the president.

There are very important political developments that have taken place in our country today and it is my intention to brief the president as fully as possible on these developments. We are doing so because it is necessary for him to understand not only in broad outline what is happening in our country; he must be furnished with the details which may not be so available to the public, so that the enormous assistance that he has given us should be related to the actual developments in the country.

I will also ask the president to maintain sanctions, because it is because of sanctions that such enormous progress has been made in the attempt to address the problems of our country. I will also inform him about developments as far as the armed struggle is concerned. The remarks that he has made here are due to the fact that he has not yet got a proper briefing from us.

I might just state, in passing, that the methods of political action which are used by the black people of South Africa were determined by the South African government. As long as the government is prepared to talk, to maintain channels of communication between itself and the governed, there can be no question of violence whatsoever.

But when a government decides to ban political organizations of the oppressed, intensifies oppression, and does not allow any free political activity, no matter how peaceful and nonviolent, then the people have no alternative but to resort to violence.

There is not a single political organization in our country inside and outside parliament which can ever compare with the African National Congress in its total commitment to peace. If we are forced to resort to violence, it is because we had no other alternative whatsoever.

But even in this regard, there have been significant developments, which I hope to brief the president on. . . .

I am going to urge on the president not to do anything without full consultation with the ANC in regard to any initiative which he might propose to take in order to help the peace process in the country. . . .

Finally, Mr. President, I would like to congratulate you and President Gorbachev for the magnificent efforts that you are making in order to reduce international tensions, and to promote peace.

It is my hope that governments throughout the world will follow your example and attempt to settle problems between governments and between governments and dissidents inside each country by peaceful methods. You and Comrade Gorbachev have opened a chapter in world history which might well be regarded as a turning point in many respects.

And here we congratulate you and wish you every success.

Mandela, Rejecting Appeal by Bush, Refuses to Renounce Armed Struggle

MANDELA, From A1

Mandela by First Lady Barbara Bush to move the entourage off the lawn and into the Oval Office for the meetings.

In welcoming Mandela to the White House, Bush invoked the memory of King to call for an end to the armed struggle in South Africa, quoting the slain civil rights leader as saying, "Let us not seek to satisfy our thirst for freedom by drinking from the cup of bitterness and hatred."

With Mandela looking on impassively, Bush praised de Klerk for steps he has taken and condemned apartheid as "repugnant to the ideals that we in America hold dear." He said when conditions in U.S. law have been met by the de Klerk government, the administration "will consider, in consultation with Congress, whether a change in course will promote further progress."

In his response, Mandela blended praise for Bush with suggestions that the president was not fully informed on the history and reality of the ANC struggle to end the rule by South Africa's five million whites over its 28 million blacks.

"If today we are confident that the dreams which have inspired us all these years are about to be realized, it is, in very large measure, because of the support we have got from the masses of people of the United States of America, and in particular from the government and from the president," Mandela said.

That support, he said, should be predicated on an understanding by Bush of the "armed struggle." Both at the White House and in his news conference later, Mandela repeated that the South African government, by banning political organizations, imprisoning black political leaders, and outlawing free political activity in effect determined the ANC's approach to the use of violence.

However, White House officials and Mandela described as near the removal of the last obstacles to talks. Mandela said he is scheduled to meet with government officials on his return to South Africa and expects issues such as release of political prisoners will be resolved.

Herman Cohen, an assistant secretary of state, said the Mandela statements pledging a cessation of hostilities were welcome, but not good enough. "We're not supremely happy," Cohen said, "just partially happy."

On sanctions, Cohen said Mandela asked that sanctions remain in place even after negotiations begin. Bush, Cohen said, retains his position that once the Pretoria government has met the conditions in the sanctions law, discussions on lifting or easing those sanctions will begin with Congress. The sanctions were enacted over the veto of then-President Ronald Reagan, and Bush has hinted that de Klerk should be rewarded with their removal once negotiations begin.

On U.S. aid to the ANC, Mandela pressed both Bush and Baker. Congress last month approved up to $10 million in aid to groups promoting democratic institutions in South Africa.

The National Endowment for Democracy (NED), a nonpartisan group that helped facilitate elections recently in Nicaragua and elsewhere, is considered the prime candidate for getting the funds and channeling them to other groups in the form of small grants. NED could give grants to organizations helping in the formation of democracy in South Africa, but the legislation requires that such groups agree to a suspension of violence while negotiations are occurring.

Cohen said Mandela's agreement to a "cessation of hostilities" once obstacles to talks are cleared up may well meet the intent of the law. "I'm predicting that they will issue that statement," he said, and become eligible for some of the NED funds. Other State Department officials were not sure Congress would go along with funds going indirectly to what one called "a movement . . . not a political party, and a movement that still embraces Marxism."

BY JAMES A. PARCELL—THE WASHINGTON POST

President Bush greets ANC leader Nelson Mandela at the White House.

Mandela's public support for leaders, some of them Marxist, drew some criticism in Congress and at the White House yesterday. In a session with reporters on Sunday, Mandela criticized U.S. support for the non-communist rebels trying to oust the Marxist government in Angola. Cohen said the issue came up at the White House and that the president and Mandela "agreed to disagree."

Mandela"s expressions of support for Cuba's Fidel Castro, Libya's Moammar Gadhafi and the Palestine Liberation Organization were also subjects on which Bush and Mandela agree to disagree, officials said. But officials stressed those issues played virtually no role in the official discussions.

In Congress, Rep. Howard Wolpe (D-Mich.), a strong supporter of the ANC, said of Mandela's statements, "I wish he had not said those things . . . they were not helpful."

Rep. Lawrence J. Smith (D-Fla.), another supporter of sanctions, complained of Mandela: "He comes here and espouses support, not just casual, offhand support, but significant support, for people whose methods and backgrounds are terrorists, outlaws, or communist dictators."

Staff writers Gwen Ifill and Nora Boustany contributed to this report.

The Washington Times

BOOK REVIEW / William F. Gavin

A land where the individual counts



Michael Barone's "Our Country: The Shaping of America from Roosevelt to Reagan," is ambitious in scope, detailed in analysis, forthright in judgment and as entertaining and provocative as it is informative. He believes our country has been and remains basically decent and resilient, with a great capacity for renewal after disasters such as war and economic depression. He bases this analysis on "three guiding theses":

The first of these is "[that] in the United States, politics more often divides Americans along cultural than along economic lines"; secondly, "that in time of war, America, like other countries, tends to choose bigger government and cultural uniformity, while in time of peace, we tend to want smaller government and cultural diversity"; and third, "that people — individual people — matter."

Mr. Barone is no maker of systems or of occult cyclical explanations of historical trends. Anyone who writes of "the public's refusal to follow syllogisms through to their logical conclusions" and who believes that "no election settles everything in American politics even in the short term" understands that politics is neither an art nor a science but a mystery.

The author brings to this formidable task the same methodology he has used so successfully for many years as co-author of "The Almanac of American Politics," that invaluable compendium of analysis, facts and figures about congressmen, senators and the 50 states. He mixes and matches information about personalities, regions, political trends, demographics and social movements to create unique insights and dives below the surface of polling and census data to come up with some glistening pearl of interpretation.

OUR COUNTRY: THE SHAPING OF AMERICA FROM ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN
By Michael Barone
Free Press, $29.95, 805 pages

Mr. Barone is a political writer for the microchip age, with an ability to pack more and more information into smaller and smaller spaces. We learn that in 1930 payments to veterans made up one-quarter of the federal budget; that if Franklin Delano Roosevelt's percentage of the vote in 1940 had been reduced by exactly 3.7 percent in every state, Wendell Willkie would have had 306 electoral votes to Roosevelt's 225; that in 1946, "the most strike-ridden year in American history," Republicans won 52 percent of the total vote for House seats, the only time between 1928 and 1988 they exceeded 50 percent; and that the difference in many elections "was not so much between men and women as it was between married women, who voted much like men, and unmarried women."

Mr. Barone approaches his material from what I would call an idiosyncratic liberal point of view. His political hero is Franklin Roosevelt and his journalistic beau ideal is The Washington Post's columnist David Broder. He believes government can and ought to do good for people, although this 1930s faith is tempered by a 1980s realism.

But he has written history, not liberal hagiography, and he brings his critical powers to bear on some left-liberal myths. According to Mr. Barone, "As the Cold War began, it was obvious to many, not just to right-wing nuts, that a domestic communist threat did exist." In 1945, there were communists in important posts in the CIO (Congress of Industrial Organizations) and "in government." Joe McGiniss' "The Selling of the President" receives a long overdue critical look, and the "counter-culture" of the 1960s is described as "economically parasitic and culturally subversive."

Do individuals matter, as Mr. Barone claims? On the anecdotal and biographical evidence he offers on hundreds of fascinating characters, from Henry Wallace to George Wallace, I'd say he's proved his case.

Do Americans want big government during wartime and small government in peace? Here the evidence is not as clear. I don't know the alternative to some form of big government during wartime, so it may be that instead of getting what we like, we like what we get.

Do Americans divide more along cultural than economic lines? I am not at all convinced that the evidence in the book proves Mr. Barone's thesis (one I happen to believe is correct, nonetheless). He presents abundant documentation about cultural differences, but amidst all of the data it was hard for me to discover a clear pattern of cultural, as opposed to economic, divisions.

Moreover, Mr. Barone devotes relatively little space to the rise of the religious right during the 1980s, surely a topic that deserves more than passing attention in a book about cultural divisions, especially when his own definition of culture refers to "religious and personal values and mores."

What seems to be lacking is the kind of unifying vision found in Paul Johnson's "Modern Times," which in certain respects "Our Country" resembles. Whether or not you agreed with Mr. Johnson, his firm convictions about the 20th century inspired every page of the book and gave it direction.

Michael Barone at times appears to be putting on a virtuoso display of astounding skill, doing with data what Glenn Gould did with a piano, but with little apparent relevance to his major themes. But, all in all, he has written a book that deserves and I hope will receive great critical and popular success.

William F. Gavin is special assistant to House Republican Leader Robert H. Michel.

The Washington Post

Style



BY JOHN PACK FOR

Dreaming of the Good Fight of Yesteryear

Reactions to Gulf Conflict Through the Lens of WWII

By Henry Allen
Washington Post Staff Writer

Before the Persian Gulf blew up in August, war in the age of the good war was starting to look like sex in the age of safe sex—you wondered if it was possible for Americans to ave it at all.

Then on Aug. 2, Saddam Hussein sent his tanks into Kuwait. It was a real war, all right, not some rice-paddy reform movement or "police action." And it fit the American mold for a good war, a war "in which there was no doubt who started it, or what we were fighting for, or who were the good guys and who were the bad guys—it was a war that could have been written by Hollywood," as Van Johnson, who starred in a lot of World War II movies, says about that one in a documentary called "Going Hollywood—The War Years."

An Arab dictator crushed a small nation, threatened to choke off our oil supply, took American hostages, sent his troops looting and raping through Kuwait City, got condemned by the United Nations, turned the United States and the Soviet Union into allies for the first time since 1945 and provoked George Bush into comparing him to Hitler.

Bush said: "This will not stand." He sent in American troops.

His approval rating climbed to 82 percent in a USA Today poll. Granted, we always rally around the flag, but there was something more going on with the Persian Gulf.

"It feels like the start of the Second World War," said an excited senior State Department official in September.

That was "The Good War," as Studs Terkel titled his oral history, but after the good war came Korea and Vietnam. They were hard to und were not good wars. Now things wer able again.

For a moment, Washington made yo Wayne standing on the bridge of a Wo stroyer, barking to his engine room, "(thing ya got," and the engine room co House Majority Leader Richard Geph this crisis, we are not Republicans or D are only proudly Americans. The presid for our support. He has it." (No one t but when you counted up the years, it w

See WAR, D2, Col. 1

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OP Chairman

By Joel Achenbach
Washington Post Staff Writer

ick the job with the lowest status:

Michelle Wong and Lucie Arnaz in "Sons and Daughters."

TV Preview

'Sons and Daughters': Crude Brood

By Tom Shales
Washington Post Staff Writer

A title like "Sons and Daughters" has a generic ring, doesn't it? But for the new CBS drama series, even "generic" is too flattering a term. So is "competent" or "coherent."

This isn't just bad, it's irritating, as irritating as those plastic grocery bags that fall over in the car on the way home; as irritating as commercials for Sports Illustrated magazine that air 564 times a day; as irritating as aspirin bottles that refuse to open when you have a screaming, shrieking headache.

Come to think of it, this show is a screaming, shrieking headache. It's one of those adult-sized bangeroos Robert Urich is always complaining about.

The much-delayed premiere, at 10 tonight on Channel 9, introduces the far-too-innumerable members of an overextended family, the yammering Hammersmiths of Portland, Ore. Irrepressible Tess (Lucie Arnaz, in under her head) lives with her adopted Asian daughter Astrid (Michelle Wong), while irrepressible brother-in-law Spud (Rick Rosso-

See TV PREVIEW, D6, Col. 3

Media Notes

Going Against Convention In Providence

By Howard Kurtz
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Providence Journal Co., taking a giant step beyond mere hometown boosterism, is using its corporate treasury to shore up the city's ailing convention center project.

The company's front-page announcement late last month that it is joining with a p a new downtow an existing on skepticism in t reporters ques paper's dual rol coverage of the

"Conflicts o drunk driving— impaired your ju umnist Brian J very little criti convention cent anything that tailed way whe project."

Reporter Joh has been coveri one has tried to ries. But, he sai tain amount o you're an empl

See MEDIA

Good War, Bad War

WAR, From D1

War veteran had been president on the brink of World War I, or a decorated Spanish-American War officer had led us in World War II.)

The U.N. passed resolutions, different lands banding together like the old World War II movie where the first sergeant asks for volunteers and he gets O'Hara, Koslowski, Jackson, Shapiro, Andreotti, Garcia. (Was that movie ever made, or was it just a routine for stand-up comics on "The Ed Sullivan Show"?) In a nation dispirited by a budget crisis, collapsing banks and an oncoming recession, the Persian Gulf looked like it had every chance of being the kind of war people mean when they say, "What we need is a good war."

Then something happened. Or didn't happen. As if World War II were turning into Vietnam, a good war into a bad war, from "Sands of Iwo Jima" to "Apocalypse Now," from "Hollywood Canteen" to "China Beach"—and all of this before the war has even begun.

On an episode of "Designing Women" in late November, Charlene talked about her husband who had been called away by the military: "I have these fantasies about World War II and everybody's part of the effort, women bought war bonds and planted victory gardens and went without stockings and just drew the lines up the back of their legs with eyebrow pencil. Now, I don't do any of that. I just ramble around my big new house and wait for the mailman. I'm mad at the government, and that's not very patriotic."

With hundreds of thousands of armed men staring at each other, there hasn't even been a scary overflight or a ship-bumping. Bush says "It's not going to be another Vietnam," but anti-war protesters light their vigil candles, as much in memory of the bad war of Vietnam as in fear of whatever kind of war the Persian Gulf might be. They sue the executive branch. They sign newspaper ads. Recruiters fail to make their quotas. Congress warns of higher taxes, a draft, a divided country. Public approval of Bush's handling of the crisis slipped from 75 percent in late August to 65 percent a month later, to 55 percent in November—it took a year of massive troop buildup and combat deaths in Vietnam for Johnson's rating to get that low in 1966. After Bush proposed talks with Iraq, his showing improved slightly. The country is divided as to what to do next, the polls say. "It's going to make a lousy movie," says Art Buchwald.

In the cool, pragmatic world of the last 50 years, policy makers and strategists haven't thought much about cultural archetypes and national myths.

"The president and the people around him have not been doing a good job, seeing that Central Casting sent us the perfect Arab villain," says Eliot Cohen, who is both a captain in the Army Reserve and a professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Meanwhile, Cohen told the House Armed Services Committee, the mental picture that the Iraqis have of the American fighting man is not John Wayne but "the helicopters on the roof of the embassy in Saigon, and [the bombing of] the Marine barracks in Beirut—Saddam has said as much."

Robert W. Tucker, another SAIS professor (emeritus), argues that the president has done a fine job of making his case, but that the public "simply has not responded to it."

Michael Vlahos, director of the State Department's Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, says: "We let the moment pass. We started to get self-conscious about it, and the more self-conscious we got, the less self-righteous we could be. In America, you don't go to war for state policy, you have to act on crusade. . . . The good war is so embedded in our mythology, and that's what the government doesn't understand—and if we don't understand our own culture, we can't get on top of foreign policy."

The good war, "there is no substitute for victory," as MacArthur said.

In a good war, the other guy starts it. He is a bad guy, he has to attack us. The Japanese had been crushing us on three continents for years before Pearl Harbor roused Americans to fight. If Saddam attacked us—even a provocation as small as the blurry fracas that provoked Congress into passing the Tonkin Gulf resolution in 1964—national unity might be ours. Remember Pearl Harbor, the Lusitania, the Maine, the Alamo. We seem to need catalysts. So now Hank Williams Jr. sings a threatening song addressed to Saddam: "Don't Give Us a Reason." So far, he hasn't.

A good war doesn't seem to have much to do with the goodness of our allies. Not only was Stalin a butcher out to conquer the world, but he'd been allied with Hitler. The Italians fought on both sides in the good war. So what's a little medieval autocracy in Saudi Arabia? Who cares if our chaplains aren't allowed to wear their crosses on their lapels?

The good war is not ambiguous or ironic. There is no colonel saying, "I love the smell of napalm in the morning," as Robert Duvall says in "Apocalypse Now." There is no real-life colonel saying, as one actually said at Ben Tre, Vietnam, "We had to destroy the village in order to save it." And there are no truckloads of troopers driving past the press shouting, "We're not supposed to be here! This isn't our war! Why are we here?"—this happened during Bush's Thanksgiving visit to Saudi Arabia.

"If any evidence were needed that force is not obsolete in the 1990s, Saddam Hussein has provided it," says Bruce W. Jentleson in the just-published winter Brookings Review. But with no Pearl Harbor or Alamo to remember, the American public has seemed more comfortable with the idea of defending Saudi Arabia than attacking Iraq when the tanks first went into Kuwait.

The public had "doubts about offensive military action all along," Jentleson says. "What they had been strongly supportive of was defending Saudi Arabia." A USA Today poll on Aug. 9, for instance, showed that 81 percent of the public approved of sending troops to Saudi Arabia, while 49 percent approved of invading Iraq and only 35 percent were in favor of bombing Iraq. Other polls in August showed similar feelings.

Jentleson has studied public reaction to a decade of American use or support of force in Libya, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Panama and El Salvador, concluding that new concepts of a good war mean that "the American public, I contend, is much more likely to support the use of force when it perceives the objective as the restraint rather than the remaking of another government."

Consequently, Jentleson says, "when President Bush announced on November 8 a doubling of U.S. forces to nearly 400,000 troops and a shift in strategy to insuring 'an adequate offensive military option,' the consensus began to crack. Congressional leaders became much more critical, public opinion polls fell sharply and the first teach-ins sprang up on college campuses."

In a good war, we are "innocent, unsuspecting, the underdog, the victim," says Van Johnson. But this means that we're unready for it, as we were in World War II. In "A Country Made by War," Geoffrey Perret writes: "The idea of perennial unreadiness . . . fits the American self-image of a peace-loving people dragged reluctantly into war. Civilians and military men alike find that idea appealing. For another thing, it is the stuff of epic drama—the ultimate triumph, after near defeat, of good over evil, us over them."

The good war is fought with American know-how, ingenuity and industrial might: modern cannon from Yankee factories, the Great White Fleet of the late 19th century, the B-17, McNamara's electronic wall in Vietnam, the F-111s that attacked Gadhafi in Libya. They will win the war cheaply, efficiently and scientifically.

In "Wartime," culture critic Paul Fussell says that the start of World War II was much like the Persian Gulf buildup: "At first everyone hoped, and many believed, that the war would be fast-moving, mechanized, remote-controlled, and perhaps even rather easy."

As John Updike has written: "America is beyond power, it acts as in a dream, as a face of God. Wherever America is, there is freedom, and wherever America is not, madness rules with chains, darkness strangles millions. Beneath her patient bombers, paradise is possible."

BY JOHN PACK FOR THE WASHINGTON POST

We have a particular romance with air power, and last August, when cynics suggested it hadn't turned Vietnam into a good war, the answer was: "Ain't no trees to hide under in the desert."

Since World War II, the definition of the good war has become one thing for intellectual policy makers and another for the rest of us.

Among the intellectuals of the 1950s and 1960s, a good war was a tool rather than a crusade, therapy rather than brute violence. It was a precise means of attaining ends with carefully graduated responses, surgical air strikes, systems analysis and highly trained elite forces such as the Green Berets. Good war would be free of the sort of racism we showed toward the Japanese.

We now have a prudery of violence, and among the people that UCLA's James Q. Wilson calls "the chattering classes," war has come to be seen not so much as wicked but as vulgar, like professional wrestling or deer hunting—another reason for the popularity of air power, death from a lofty distance. In the middle '80s, Fred Downs, a decorated Vietnam infantry officer, lectured an infantry class about killing and was told afterward by a high-ranking Army officer that the word "killing" had been replaced by "servicing the target." Nowadays, no liberal senator could say that he had joined up "to get myself a Jap," as Illinois' Paul Douglas once said.

Oscar Wilde predicted: "As long as war is regarded as wicked, it will always have its fascination. When it is looked upon as vulgar, it will cease to be popular."

On the other hand, when it is looked upon as vulgar, the vulgar thumb their noses the way they thumb their noses at other upper-class pruderies. Hence the popularity of the sort of T-shirts you see in Army-Navy stores, with slogans like "Kill 'Em All, Let God Sort 'Em Out." The educated cult of cultural relativism gets summed up in: "Join the Army, Travel to Distant Lands, Meet Interesting People and Kill Them." Another shirt shows a phone company slogan born of the Age of Feelings: "Reach Out and Touch Someone." The words are under a telescopic rifle sight. The lower classes maybe be lower in class, but not in brains.

For their part, the upper classes have responded by remembering the Vietnam War, a bad one, as a period when they had to wean bloodthirsty rednecks away from slaughter, to cure them of a sort of mental illness. In fact, this is one of the big lies about Vietnam—the other being that blacks died in numbers vastly out of proportion to their numbers in the U.S. population, a bit of propaganda that has been revived in the debate over the Persian Gulf. As for support, a look at six years of polling from 1965 to 1971 shows that the college-educated supported the war far more than the high school- and grade school-educated.

"When I sent a book to the printer with a graph showing that, they called up and said that I must have gotten the labels reversed," says Wilson. "People can't believe it."

Now, in the Age of Feelings, the publicly accepted way of talking about war deals with emotions rather than blood: Among Vietnam veterans, it's their post-traumatic stress syndromes rather than their missing legs that excite our pity and fascination. In "Dispatches," Michael Herr wrote his famous passage about coming under fire in Vietnam: ". . . your senses working like strobes, free-falling all the way down to the essences and then flying out again in a rush to focus, like the first strong twinge of tripping after an infusion of psilocybin, reaching in at the point of calm and springing all the joy and all the dread ever known . . . the feeling you'd had when you were much, much younger and undressing a girl for the first time." How different from a Marine in the Pacific half a century ago, saying: "I just want to spit in a dead Jap's face." Nowadays, a newspaper ad reads: "It's not the desert heat. It's not Saddam Hussein. It's wondering if you care."

It is also taboo to want to kill the enemy leaders. This is new. In World War II, the final training film in Frank Capra's series "Why We Fight" showed pictures of the Nazi hierarchy while a voice said: "If you ever see one of these men, KILL HIM!"

War heroes have gone the way of John Henry, defeated by the steam-hammer of the machine gun, the tank, the B-52, missiles, nuclear weapons, all of which have made survival in combat far more a matter of chance than of skill. Only the Oliver Norths of this world go to war for glory. The Army recruits its soldiers with a pitch that makes it sound like a combination of an encounter group and a junior college: "Be all that you can be." We continue to talk about Saddam Hussein in the language of psychobabble—he isn't getting our signals, we're failing to communicate, he doesn't understand our feelings. Perhaps Saddam Hussein has a different definition of the good war. Does he wonder what kind of war we can fight when we talk about it as if it's a combination of corporate management and psychotherapy?

The intellectual celebrities of America supported World War II—Archibald MacLeish, John Steinbeck and Carl Sandburg helped lead the American propaganda effort for instance. Instead of being vulgar rednecks, our soldiers were the salt of the earth, Bill Mauldin's Willie and Joe. "I'm no hero, I'm just a guy, I just want to get this thing over and go home," said William Bendix in one movie. But this came at the end of more than a decade of intellectuals' celebration of the common man.

After World War II, American art turned to the international language of abstraction. Dwight MacDonald warned of the tackiness of mid-cult America. Joseph Heller published "Catch-22" just as our advisers were moving into Vietnam, Kurt Vonnegut was becoming a literary hero to the young and the myth of the good war started to look a little moth-eaten.

A war in the Persian Gulf would come at the end of a decade of flag waving, "Rocky" movies, Arnold Schwarzenegger movies and Reaganite patriotism, even if it takes the peculiar post-apocalyptic form of a singer like Lee Greenwood getting onto a stage with a week's worth of stubble on his face, looking like a wino while he sings that he's proud to be an American, and "at least I know I'm free."

Good war, bad war. It's hard to tell which is which.

When Air Force Gen. Michael Dugan said we could bomb Baghdad in the total good-war style, he got fired. In a Senate hearing when Richard Perle, a former assistant secretary of defense under Reagan, laid out plans for the sort of limited wars intellectuals have been planning since World War II, Teddy Kennedy erupted at him: "Look out, boys, you can destroy some of the soldiers and facilities but not all— be sure and miss one out of three."

A war in the Persian Gulf "may be the first war that was ever nitpicked to death before it could start," writes columnist Michael Kinsley. On the other hand, it may not be. In 1948, author and presidential adviser Robert E. Sherwood recalled that World War II was "the first war in American history in which the general disillusionment preceded the firing of the first shot."

The disillusionment in question had come after the previous good war, World War I. In 1937, disgust with World War I was so great that only 28 percent of Americans said we should have fought in it, but that number doubled as Pearl Harbor made the first war look good again. Then again, months after Pearl Harbor, a Gallup poll showed that only about half of Americans knew why we were at war.

"Americans tend to support any war the president begins," says UCLA's Wilson. "The percentage of the public saying they approve of how the president is doing his job goes up when troops go in. The month before Korea began, Truman's rating was 37; the month after it was 46. Ford went from 40 to 51 with the Mayaguez incident, Reagan went from 43 to 53 with Grenada. This even happens when the operations are failures—Kennedy went from 73 to 83 with the Bay of Pigs, and Carter went from 39 to 43 after the failure of the hostage rescue mission."

Only a few years ago war, particularly the good war, was looking impossible.

"War today is a luxury that only the weak and the poor can afford," said Zbigniew Brzezinski, who was national security adviser to Jimmy Carter.

"War has fallen upon hard times," wrote Army intelligence analyst Robert L. O'Connell in "Of Arms and Men." He went on: "Two centuries of increasingly pointless, financially disastrous and above all, lethal conflicts, culminating in the discovery and proliferation of nuclear weapons, have rendered this venerable institution virtually incapable of performing any of the roles classically assigned to it."

With any kind of luck at all in the Persian Gulf, we will not find out if he's right.

PATRICK BUCHANAN

The next Golden Calf?

If communism was the god that failed the Lost Generation, democracy, as ideal form of government, panacea for mankind's ills, hope of the world, may prove the Golden Calf of this generation.

Disillusionment with the newest idol is already setting in.

In the Soviet Union, the ills attendant to all modern democracies — crime, rampant vice, social decomposition — have arrived, without, as yet, its material blessings. In the Soviet republics, democracy is seen as a halfway house to the greater goal: liberation and nationhood. Mr. Gorbachev, sensing the souring mood, is shifting his base away from the glasnost reformers to the old order.

In East Europe, communism's passing has exposed the old ethnic quarrels. Bulgarians, rid of Stalinism, want to settle scores with domestic Turks. Romanians, with the Ceausescus dead, wish to put down the Hungarians of Transylvania. Far more important to these people than how decisions are made is what decisions are made.

In Latin America, the common characteristic of democracies is that they cannot resist the clamor of the crowd, and they will not pay their bills. The great exception: Gen. Augusto Pinochet's Chile.

In Algeria, Tunisia, Yemen and Jordan, elections are advancing religious fundamentalists whose dream is to impose Islamic law on the masses who vote them power. "Democracy" is seen as the means to a higher end, the good society, the godly society, in Moslem eyes.

The realization is dawning that Western institutions put down their roots in a particular subsoil — religious, political, cultural, historic — that is not easily replicated in the Third World.

What is democracy? George Orwell could not define it: "[N]ot only is there no agreed definition, but the attempt to make one is resisted from all sides. . . Words of this kind are often used in a dishonest way."

The world hails democracy in principle; in practice, most men believe there are things higher in the order of value than how their rulers are chosen. Among them, tribe and nation, family and faith.

Our European ancestors who founded America believed that not only was their civilization superior to what they found here but that the opinions of native Americans were not even worth listening to. Were they wrong?

"Journalists have heralded news of global democracy as if it were the triumphal entry of Christ," writes F.W. Schnitzler in "The Deification of Democracy" in January's Chalcedon Report. "For the development of genuine freedoms, we ought to be thankful, but when the praises of any political system are sung with the zeal and admiration due to God alone, Christians ought to be concerned. The deification of democracy is a development worthy of our concern."

The American press is infatuated to the point of intoxication with "de-

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Patrick Buchanan is a nationally syndicated columnist.

BUCHANAN

From page G1

mocracy." But do we really believe our own propaganda?

In a recent editorial, the Wall Street Journal deplored the ruin into which its elected mayor had driven Philadelphia; and contrasted the Philadelphia story with that of a small-town economic czar:

"In 1986, Ecorse, Mich., a working-class community of 11,000 near Detroit, was $6 million in debt and in violation of court orders to balance its budget. A judge placed Ecorse in receivership, and gave Louis Schimmel, a municipal bond expert, wide-ranging powers to clean up the city, unhindered by the politicians.

"Today, the deficit has disappeared, a model city has been created and this year Ecorse was turned back to local control. Mr. Schimmel's methods? 'To privatize just about everything,' he says. In four years, he held the line on taxes, cut the municipal work force almost in half and hired private firms to handle most services. Excluding police, fire and elected officials, there are now only 18 city employees."

But if quasi-dictatorial rule is good for Ecorse, why not for New York? If granting men "wide-ranging powers ... unhindered by the politicians" is the way out of fiscal crisis, why not try it at the federal level? Have elected "politicians" become an impediment to good government? What does that tell us about our democracy?

"Democracy, in and of itself," writes F.W. Schnitzler, is "a valueless form of government. It does not imply, suggest or impart moral, ethical or religious values, blessings or benefits. It merely proposes a political process ... whereby the actual feelings and demands of the majority can be determined and satisfied, right or wrong."

T.S. Eliot agreed: "The term 'democracy' ... does not contain enough positive content to stand alone against the forces you dislike."

Indeed, how defend our municipal democracies when big city mayors everywhere lack the backbone to resist union demands and an underclass that insists the power to tax be used to dispossess the propertied class? As our ancestors once fled English kings, German princes and Russian czars, millions today flee the cities of the republic for the sanctuary of the suburbs.

Of IBM, the Marine Corps, the Redskins and the D.C. government, only leaders of the last are chosen by democratic procedure. Only the last is run on democratic, not autocratic, principles. Yet who would choose the last as the superior institution? Anyone who grew up in the District, when there was no right to vote and no city government, can empathize with the Congolese peasant who begged the Belgian diplomat to ask the king if he would be willing to take them all back.

The cure for the ills of democracy is more democracy, said Al Smith. The Happy Warrior had it wrong. If the people are corrupt, the more democracy, the worse the government.

Split Between Kissinger and Brzezinski on Iraq Reflects Search for New Foreign-Policy Consensus

By GERALD F. SEIB
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

WASHINGTON—Henry Kissinger foresees disaster if the U.S. waits for sanctions to drive Iraq out of Kuwait: International resolve will crumble, the military option will evaporate, Saddam Hussein will prevail. "I believe that many of those who advocate sanctions are using it as a cop-out," he declares.

Nonsense, says Zbigniew Brzezinski. Sanctions will work over time, he insists. The real disaster, he argues, would be a war. "It could be quite expensive in both money and blood."

He scoffs at Mr. Kissinger's theory that the conflict could be limited in scope, saying acidly that it "reminds me a little bit of his arguments for how to terminate the Vietnam War."

Henry Kissinger

Mr. Kissinger calls that an "unworthy comment." The real calamity, he says, would be for the U.S. to slink away, which would "undermine all friends in the area."

In the first crisis of the post-Cold War era, these two titans of the foreign-policy establishment, whose world view was usually in sync during the Cold War, are proposing diametrically opposed courses of action. Mr. Kissinger thinks the proposed diplomatic mission to Baghdad by Secretary of State James Baker—which remains unscheduled because of a U.S.-Iraqi dispute over dates—is a bad idea; Mr. Brzezinski applauds it. They disagree on the usefulness of sanctions, on how much time the administration has and on what course would leave a more stable Middle East.

Their disagreement over virtually every aspect of the showdown with Iraq symbolizes the schism dividing America's foreign policy thinkers and the country at large—a schism that has only deepened since Iraq's decision to release American hostages.

These disagreements come from two men who exercise enormous influence on official American thinking in both political parties. Mr. Kissinger, the top foreign-policy adviser to Presidents Nixon and Ford, was a mentor of Brent Scowcroft, who is now President Bush's national security adviser, and Lawrence Eagleburger, the No. 2 man in the Bush State Department. White House aides say Mr. Kissinger has talked privately with Mr. Bush, and he has generally supported the administration publicly.

Mr. Brzezinski, who was President Carter's national security adviser and who has privately counseled Mr. Bush on European issues, is close to many in Congress, including Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn (D., Ga.). His views have seeped into congressional broadsides.

Mr. Brzezinski recently had a private session with Democratic Sen. Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts, for instance. Shortly afterward, the senator used statistics Mr. Brzezinski had provided on civilian casualties during the bombing of North Vietnam as ammunition against a witness testifying before the committee. The target: Mr. Kissinger.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

The two are also illustrative of the schism in the nation's opinion-making community. In Mr. Kissinger's corner are such heavyweights as former top Defense Department adviser Richard Perle and former United Nations Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick. But this camp is an increasingly lonely place; Mr. Kissinger sometimes muses that his position is like Churchill's in the 1930s as he argued in vain about the dangers of Nazi Germany.

In Mr. Brzezinski's corner are such heavy hitters as former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger and many former U.S. military leaders, ranging from former Joint Chiefs Chairman William Crowe to former Navy Secretary James Webb.

The split also has important long-range meaning. In the past, the foreign-policy establishment was often galvanized around a strategy designed to deter Soviet advances, but the Soviet threat is gone. "The old foreign-policy consensus built around containment and all those things that worked is no longer there, because the Soviets as a threat are gone," says Nicholas Veliotes, a foreign service officer and former assistant secretary of state.

More immediately, the debate among opinion leaders is critical to the Bush administration as the clock ticks toward the Jan. 15 deadline contained in a United Nations resolution authorizing the use of force to drive Iraq out of Kuwait.

The debate even reflects some personal animosity. "Quite frankly, I don't think Kissinger's interested in resolving the issue," Mr. Brzezinski says. "I think Kissinger wants to destroy Iraq, period. Kuwait is just an excuse."

"A very unjust statement," counters Mr. Kissinger, who asserts he hasn't any desire to destroy Iraq, merely to see its offensive capabilities reduced. He won't detail on the record what he thinks about Mr. Brzezinski's stand.

But Mr. Kissinger argues that if the U.S. had confined itself to protecting Saudi Arabia and had left the liberation of Kuwait to the world community—"the Brzezinski option," he calls it—"it would have been a bad mistake, but a retrieveable one." It didn't happen that way, though; the U.S. took the lead in pushing for liberating Kuwait and sent hundreds of thousands of troops. If the U.S. now shrinks away, he argues, "it will be perceived that the radicals faced us down, that 1,000 American hostages were taken without any consequence, that the moderate governments who bet on us would be discredited."

At the heart of the split is a dispute over whether economic sanctions can be counted on to force Iraq out of Kuwait.

Mr. Kissinger says that there's nothing even close to a guarantee they will work. Sanctions advocates "are saying that they think in 12 to 18 months sanctions will work," he says. "They have produced no evidence that this is true. ... I have said from the beginning that time wasn't on our side. I said from the beginning that we would have to choose between sanctions and military options somewhere along the line."

Mr. Brzezinski counters that there isn't any evidence sanctions *won't* work in this case, because the sanctions on Iraq are far more severe than any ever imposed. "I think sanctions have already had a massive attriting impact on Iraq, and if maintained for a year or so they would probably bring that economy to a total standstill," he says. "So they have already established the lesson that the aggression didn't pay."

Mr. Kissinger maintains that "the best that sanctions can do is to begin negotiations"—and negotiations are another area where the two men cleanly split.

Mr. Kissinger fears that a process of negotiating with Iraq will inevitably be dragged out by Saddam Hussein, leading to the collapse of the international coalition opposing him, an easing of sanctions and a reduction of the American military force in Saudi Arabia.

And in negotiations, he says, America inevitably would have to compromise on its goals to get a deal: "If the U.S. leaves under conditions that are a disguised Iraqi success—that is to say, where Iraq gains something in Kuwait even if it is given to them by the Kuwaitis, or by an Arab summit—and if the military preponderance of Iraq remains unaffected, then I think we will have suffered a defeat," he says.

That's why Mr. Kissinger has publicly voiced his disapproval of Secretary of State Baker's trip to Baghdad, though he's now ceasing his criticism to avoid undercutting the secretary. The prospective Baker mission to Baghdad, though, remains in doubt after the U.S. and Iraq failed over the weekend to resolve a dispute over dates. Iraq has insisted that Mr. Baker see Saddam Hussein on Jan. 12. The Bush administration maintains that's too close to the Jan. 15 deadline set by the United Nations for Iraqi withdrawal and therefore would represent an opportunity for Iraq to push back the deadline. The administration has insisted on a date no later than Jan. 3. As a result of the dispute, a visit to Washington by Iraq's foreign minister, once expected to occur today, has been postponed.

The Brzezinski camp, by contrast, hasn't any such fear of negotiations. Mr. Brzezinski says he prefers the term "discussion," but sees no problem in talking with Iraq about ways it could resolve its disputes with Kuwait over their common border, its desire to lease two Kuwaiti islands or its big debts to Kuwait. The discussions, he says, might produce "some arrangement for adjudication" of those issues.

"I see nothing wrong with that, and I find such an outcome perfectly acceptable," Mr. Brzezinski says.

One of the most emotional splits involves the question of whether the U.S. could limit military action to air and naval strikes. Mr. Kissinger maintains that even with such contained fighting the U.S. could force Iraq to retreat. Mr. Brzezinski says wide-scale ground combat would be inevitable, arguing that air strikes didn't succeed in Korea or Vietnam.

The broadest area of dispute encompasses the future of the Middle East: whether war or a failure to cut Saddam Hussein down to size would cause the more dangerous mess.

Mr. Kissinger argues that the U.S. must find a way to scale back Iraq's dangerous chemical and nuclear weapons programs now or face a far deadlier conflict down the road as the Iraqi dictator expands his control over the Persian Gulf and its oil fields.

America's friends would crumble in the face of such a hostile power—an outcome Mr. Kissinger suggests needs to be prevented even if it means some military action now. "I balance the fear of the collapse of all the moderates against whatever the result may be of my preferred option of selective reduction of Iraqi military preponderance," he says.

But in Mr. Brzezinski's eyes, military conflict itself would create "long-lasting enmity" toward the U.S. that would destroy governments friendly to the U.S. Just as bad, the positions of Syria and Iran would be enhanced and the region even more destabilized.

Continued Iraqi occupation of Kuwait would be "sad," Mr. Brzezinski says—but not as sad as the result of military conflict. "I just don't see the argument for the proposition that a major war by the U.S. in this area is a solution," he says.

George F. Will

10/12/90

It's Not Modesty, It's Arrogance

When King Edward I in 1294 summoned the clergy and demanded half their income, the dean of St. Paul's dropped dead on the spot. That was a tax protest beyond the dreams (so far) of Newt Gingrich.

The 1990 budget tedium began a few months ago with promises to cut about $50 billion from a deficit of about $200 billion. Then the promise was revised to $40 billion from a deficit of about $250 billion. Now it is $34 billion (the costs of Desert Shield will not be counted) from a deficit that probably will be well over $300 billion.

The newest "deadline" (cross the line and die? hardly) that will be missed is Oct. 19. By then, the House and Senate are supposed to have approved the various committee plans for cutting spending and raising revenues to comply with this week's achievement, the budget resolution.

That resolution is a promise. The reconciliation bill due by Oct. 19 is the delivery. Those committees have Democratic majorities. President Bush has been reduced to a bystander.

His "summit" deal collapsed in part because the process that produced it made most of Congress marginal. And Bush's aides (the tone of a White House is set at the very top and trickles down) seemed overbearing.

Richard Darman, the budget director, is commonly called "brilliant," but that handicap is no excuse for ignoring banal but important truths, such as: Decisions made without the concurrence of Congress are in the subjunctive mood.

John Sununu (who dismissed a Republican senator, Mississippi's Trent Lott, as "insignificant") is not the first clever person to become impatient with the culture of Congress or to relish the role of a president's designated thug.

But the serious problem is Bush's mentality, one that produces his preference for policy-making in private by a few in an aura of bipartisanship that blurs party differences by de-emphasizing principles and ideas. This preference is a facet of Bush's and his White House's temperament, concerning which there is confusion.

What has been described as Bush's modesty is actually arrogance. His modesty is supposedly shown by his emotional minimalism, his complacent inarticulateness, his de-emphasis to the point of disparagement of the rhetorical dimension of the presidency. Bush and his handlers have spent 20 months telling the country what the country this month has told him: He is no Reagan.

He discounts rhetoric because he discounts persuasion of the public. He is governing less by continuous acts of public consent than by a small elite's entitlement, the right of the political class to take care of business cozily.

So, naturally, he has no need to do what Reagan did—argue, persuade, precipitate confrontations with Congress, force polarizing choices. All those things shave points off a president's popularity, but solidify a committed base outside Washington's Beltway.

Now the mountain (actually, the Hill) will labor mightily and bring forth a modified mouselet, a package of mini-measures cutting the 1991 deficit about 10 or 12 percent (depending on the gravity of the recession). The economic effects of $34 billion trimmed from the $300 billion deficit of a $1.3 trillion budget in a $5 trillion economy will be trivial. But the political consequences of this month's spectacle may be large.

We stand on the lip of a recession, and perhaps of war, with a president who is being outmaneuvered and toyed with by Democrats who like him as much as ever and fear him less than ever. A president who will not appeal over Congress' head to the country is Congress' dream.

By his capital-gains obsession, Bush is dissipating the principal Reagan effect on the Republican Party, the appeal to those blue-collar Democrats who for a while stopped seeing Republicans as "the rich." And Bush's syrupy bipartisanship—secluded summits, Sunday togetherness in the Rose Garden—is convincing an unenthralled public that Republicans are not, as until recently had been thought, better than Democrats at budgeting.

Finally, incumbents of both parties are being hurt as the budget debacle fuels a nationwide campaign to limit the number of terms elected officials can serve.

In 1988, the Baltimore Orioles lost 108 games with a lot of expensive veteran players. Then the Orioles management thought: Hey, we can lose 107 games with hungry, spirited rookies—and might do better. In 1989, the Orioles had baseball's youngest team, and smallest payroll—and almost won a division title.

Today many voters are saying: Hey, 535 political rookies—535 people plucked from the concourse at O'Hare Airport—could bollix things up as badly as the experienced politicians have done (how experienced do you have to be to close the Washington Monument?), and they might do better.

MAX LERNER

Birth of a new metaphor

"An age ends when its metaphor dies." I thought of Archibald MacLeish's line as I listened to President Bush's second talk to the American people, this time amid the ritual and panoply of the Pentagon. If an age has ended, what military metaphor has died with it?

This is not an idle question. What is at stake is the political and military will of the American people.

Despite all the talk about the "end of war," even the "end of history," we have not reached either. The case of Saddam Hussein shows that history still has its surprises, and that we must still meet wars of aggression with stern deterrence.

The one era that seems clearly to have ended is the East/West Cold War. Its obsequies were delivered by the image of Secretary of State Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, at the same rostrum, denouncing Mr. Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, and by the unanimous vote in the U.N. Security Council for sanctions against Iraq.

With that era's passing, has its metaphor died? I mean the metaphor of world nuclear destruction — of the end of life on Earth in a showdown between the Soviets and America, the two world nuclear powers.

In past Middle East crises, during the Cold War era, the apocalyptic shadow of such a showdown was ever-present in the American mind and set the limits of popular support for the actions of its leaders.

Those limits are no longer there. That doesn't mean that the threat of lethal weapons has ended. Israel has nuclear weapons and Mr. Hussein was within a couple of years of getting them. He has used chemical weapons and would use them again if he dared. What inhibits him is only the fact of a world armada gathering in Saudi Arabia as a staging area, to deter any further outrages against world opinion and law.

It must be said of Mr. Bush that he seized the moment — perhaps the last moment — when this world opinion and a world force could be mobilized against Mr. Hussein. Had Mr. Bush waited, even for days, Mr. Hussein's forces would now be in Saudi Arabia. The moment would have passed, and the world today would be a far more dangerous place than it is.

That doesn't mean the dangers are past. But they come less from Mr. Hussein's military array than from the religious and political warfare that he and his supporters have unleashed — in the Arab world and indeed in America and the West.

Mr. Bush was wise, in his second major talk, to expose the entire tissue of Mr. Hussein's falsehoods, about who and what are today arrayed against whom and what. Aimed primarily at splitting the Arab world, Mr. Hussein's propaganda also is meant to undercut the resolve of Americans to stand behind their government.

A letter Henry Adams wrote to a historian friend, in 1910, may shed some light here. The old cynic was looking back at the Civil War. "Fifty years ago," he wrote, "we fought — God knows why — but we believed in it. Whom ought I to fight now? I wish I may be hung up another 50 years to dry utterly out, if I have the smallest notion whom I ought to fight."

The will of a people to fight — backing its leaders — is always a function of its will to believe in a cause. In the Civil War the belief was there, and again in World War II. In the Korean and Vietnam wars it had dissipated.

Thus far in the present crisis it is an active belief, as every probing of opinion testifies. Without it, the American forces in the Saudi desert would be stranded, irresolute. And their irresolution would infect their allies.

In his desperation, Mr. Hussein knows this. Hence his tissue of falsehoods, aiming his arrows of doubt at the American will and belief.

Americans can withstand the onslaught. I sense in them a dawning conviction that, as the old metaphor pass, a new metaphor is being bo Its name may be world law.

Max Lerner is a nationally syndicated columnist.

11/17/90 NY POST

War with Iraq: In the end, the president must have freedom to move

MAX LERNER

CIVILIZATION WATCH

THE Great Debate over war with Saddam Hussein and Iraq has reached enough clarity to define the major adverbial questions we must resolve. There are five: whether, why, how, when, and by whose act?

The *whether* is of course the central question but it involves answering the *why* first. The why has to do with what is at stake and its formulation.

Despite George Bush's waverings and wafflings from time to time in his phrasing, the why has a clarity that goes beyond him or any other head of state.

It also goes beyond the blindered isolationists who mock the idea that America would place its young in the killing fields of the Middle East in the interest of oil prices and profits.

Oil is involved, yes, on a sheer geopolitical level. What is at high risk is access to oil — access not only for America but for all industrial societies for whom oil is the lifeline.

But that still doesn't spell out the full stakes, which involve non-industrial and non-Western nations as well. The *why* is quite simply the imperative of collective security when a critical threat emerges to even a minimum of world order.

This was the high stake in Hitler's Europe in the 1930s, and the democracies — including America — failed to rise to it, to their grief.

This leaves the *whether* question — to war or not to war — only in part answered. Many feel, in all conscience, that while the stakes are high they are not high enough for war and its gruesome costs.

My own answer is that war and its alternative — the continuing squeeze of sanctions — don't require an immediate solution. What is central to both is world resolve. When it becomes clear that sanctions won't work — probably in the next few months — then the coalition troops and armaments are fortunately in place.

Unlike Vietnam, the American domestic front is unlikely to have eroded by that time. What is critical is to avoid the kind of "deal" with Saddam that leads to his triumph as an Arab hero, and the consequent toppling of moderate Arab regimes.

The *how* is the hardest. The war planning must continue, but for what kind of war? Answer: the quickest, the least protracted, with the fewest casualties.

Easier said than done. In a fine piece in the current issue of Commentary, Eliot A. Cohen, of Johns Hopkins, opts for a move "sooner rather than later, with a prolonged and intensive air campaign," followed up (at some remove) by "advances on the ground." It makes considerable sense to me.

I should think that the "sooner rather than later" answers the *when* question, were it not for William Safire's powerful columns arguing that every week and month of delay brings Saddam closer to his goal of contriving nuclear weapons and other lethal missiles. This sets a grim limit to our waiting game.

The final question, of constitutional powers, is serious but not decisive.

Modern electronic war, on land or sea but especially in the air, demands suppleness and surprise, and the capacity to keep the enemy guessing. What would it profit us and the coalition if we sacrificed these critical factors to an overly rigid view of congressional powers?

The president is chief, if not sole, agent of foreign policy, as well as commander-in-chief of the armed forces. This president will not, dare not, give the orders for war without getting a rough consensus of popular support.

Congress ratifies that consensus but doesn't create it. Only the current great debate can create and validate it. Which is how a true democracy works.

Madonna — Finally, a Real Feminist

By Camille Paglia

PHILADELPHIA

Madonna, don't preach. Defending her controversial new video "Justify My Love" on "Nightline" last week, Madonna stumbled, rambled and ended up seeming far less intelligent than she really is.

Madonna, 'fess up.

The video is pornographic. It's decadent. And it's fabulous. MTV was right to ban it, a corporate resolve long overdue. Parents cannot possibly control television, with its titanic omnipresence.

Prodded by correspondent Forrest Sawyer for evidence of her responsibility as an artist, Madonna hotly proclaimed her love of children, her social activism and her condom endorsements. Wrong answer. As Baudelaire and Oscar Wilde knew, neither art nor the artist has a moral responsibility to liberal social causes.

"Justify My Love" is truly avant-garde, at a time when that word has lost its meaning in the flabby art world. It represents a sophisticated European sexuality of a kind we have not seen since the great foreign films of the 1950's and 1960's. But it does not belong on a mainstream music channel watched around the clock by children.

On "Nightline," Madonna bizarrely called the video a "celebration of sex." She imagined happy educational scenes where curious children would ask their parents about the video. Oh, sure! Picture it: "Mommy, please tell me about the tired, tied-up man in the leather harness and the mean, bare-chested lady in the Nazi cap." O.K., dear, right after the milk and cookies.

Mr. Sawyer asked for Madonna's reaction to feminist charges that, in the neck manacle and floor-crawling of an earlier video, "Express Yourself," she condoned the "degradation" and "humiliation" of women. Madonna waffled: "But I chained myself! I'm in charge." Well, no. Madonna the producer may have chosen the chain, but Madonna the sexual persona in the video is alternately a cross-dressing dominatrix and a slave of male desire.

But who cares what the feminists say anyhow? They have been outrageously negative about Madonna from the start. In 1985, Ms. magazine pointedly feted quirky, cuddly singer Cyndi Lauper as its woman of the year. Great judgment: gimmicky Lauper went nowhere, while Madonna grew, flourished, metamorphosed and became an international star of staggering dimensions. She is also a shrewd business tycoon, a modern woman of all-around talent.

Madonna is the true feminist. She exposes the puritanism and suffocating ideology of American feminism, which is stuck in an adolescent whining mode. Madonna has taught young women to be fully female and sexual while still exercising total control over their lives. She shows girls how to be attractive, sensual, energetic, ambitious, aggressive and funny — all at the same time.

American feminism has a man problem. The beaming Betty Crockers, hangdog dowdies and parochial prudes who call themselves feminists want men to be like women. They fear and despise the masculine. The academic feminists think their nerdy bookworm husbands are the ideal model of human manhood.

But Madonna loves real men. She sees the beauty of masculinity, in all its rough vigor and sweaty athletic perfection. She also admires the men who are actually like women: transsexuals and flamboyant drag queens, the heroes of the 1969 Stonewall rebellion, which started the gay liberation movement.

"Justify My Love" is an eerie, sultry tableau of jaded androgynous creatures, trapped in a decadent sexual underground. Its hypnotic images are drawn from such sado-masochistic films as Lililana Cazani's "The Night Porter" and Luchino Visconti's "The Damned." It's the perverse and knowing world of the photographers Helmut Newton and Robert Mapplethorpe.

> Down with hangdog dowdies and prudes.

Contemporary American feminism, which began by rejecting Freud because of his alleged sexism, has shut itself off from his ideas of ambiguity, contradiction, conflict, ambivalence. Its simplistic psychology is illustrated by the new cliché of the date-rape furor: "'No' always means 'no'." Will we ever graduate from the Girl Scouts? "No" has always been, and always will be, part of the dangerous, alluring courtship ritual of sex and seduction, observable even in the animal kingdom.

Madonna has a far profounder vision of sex than do the feminists. She sees both the animality and the artifice. Changing her costume style and hair color virtually every month, Madonna embodies the eternal values of beauty and pleasure. Feminism says, "No more masks." Madonna says we are nothing but masks.

Through her enormous impact on young women around the world, Madonna is the future of feminism. □

Camille Paglia, author of "Sexual Personae: Art and Decadence from Nefertiti to Emily Dickinson," teaches at the University of the Arts.

Pentagon Drafts Post-Cold War Strategy

Continued From Page A1

by some senior military officers who think the cuts go too far, is still being refined by the Pentagon. But Bush Administration officials say the main thrust has been favorably received by the President, who is expected to draw on some of some of the Pentagon's latest planning in a speech on military policy he will deliver in Aspen, Colo., on Thursday.

The new blueprint represents the first comprehensive effort by senior Pentagon officials, under heavy pressure from Congress to reduce spending, to adapt American strategy and forces to the political and military sea change that has taken place in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

Criticism From Congress

Until now, the Pentagon has presented only fragmentary suggestions of how it would adjust to the receding Soviet threat, most dwelling on budget-cutting measures. This has drawn sharp criticism from members of Congress who have assailed the Defense Department for failing to articulate a long-term strategic vision.

The Pentagon told Congress in June, for example, that it was considering a 25 percent cut in forces over five years and offered an illustrative breakdown of how such a reduction might be accomplished. But the June report made no mention of strategy, did not explain the projected cuts in detail and was cast primarily as a budget exercise to explain the fiscal consequences of force reductions.

In Line With Budget Plans

Pentagon officials said that the new strategic plan reflects an acceptance that the military budget is in decline. It is generally consistent with current Administration plans to cut military spending, after taking account of inflation, by 10 percent over five years. Somewhat greater savings could be achieved if the pace of the reductions in forces were accelerated.

But at the same time, the plan is intended to help the Pentagon hold the line against more severe budget cuts, by arguing that there is a "base force" that the United States cannot go below.

The blueprint is the result of more than five months of planning and meetings, encouraged by Mr. Cheney, and is based on the work of General Powell and Paul Wolfowitz, the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, who oversaw separate efforts to update military planning. General Powell and Mr. Wolfowitz came to similar conclusions about the size of forces that would be needed.

In recent weeks, an effort has been made to coordinate the positions of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the civilian policy experts, and a paper reflecting a common position was recently presented to the Defense Policy Resources Board, the top-level planning group in the Pentagon.

Four Basic Components

The new plan, in keeping with the think of General Powell, organizes the military into four basic components. It would establish an Atlantic Force that would include armored units and sizable Army and Air Force reserves to guard against a renewed Soviet threat, and to meet threats in the Persian Gulf. There would also be a Pacific Force that would emphasize naval and tactical air units to defend South Korea and other American allies in Asia.

Additionally, the military would have a Contingency Force for rapid response to brush-fire conflicts in the Third World and to be the leading edge in a major American military intervention. There would also be the Strategic Force of long-range nuclear weapons.

Based on the revised forecast of the Soviet military threat, the blueprint calls for cutting Army and Air Force units oriented toward the defense of Western Europe.

The United States has already proposed shrinking its force of 305,000 Army and Air Force troops in Europe to 225,000 in the conventional arms talks. Pentagon officials say the new plan does not explicitly identify what further cuts might be possible in Europe if Moscow completely withdrew its forces from Eastern Europe, as projected by the Defense Department.

But these officials add that the plan implies there would be further such reductions. In fact, senior Pentagon officials are now weighing plans to cut to the level of 100,000 to 125,000 or so if Moscow should withdraw from Eastern Europe.

'Reconstitutable' Divisions

"Reconstitutable" Army reserves, saying that it requires further study and expressing concerns that the widespread application of the proposal would lead to even sharper cuts in the Army. In addition to these two "reconstitutable" units, tits, the blueprint would keep 6 other reserve divisions.

Senior Air Force officials have said the service needs more than the roughly 25 active and reserve tactical air wings suggested by the new blueprint. The Air Force currently has about 36 air wings and has proposed shrinking that to 28.

Pentagon officials say that the new plan assumes that Soviet forces will be withdrawn from Europe by the mid-1990's, that a new East-West conventional arms pact will be agreed and that the Western alliance will be intact.

Following such developments, Moscow would still capable of launching limited attacks on the northern and southern flanks of the NATO alliance or even in central Europe. But the Soviet Union would need a year or two of advance preparation to fight a global conventional war involving a major multi-front attack on Western Europe.

The study also assumes that the third world powers, such as Iraq, which is already regarded as a formidable opponent, will become more powerful. The growth of regional powers in the Middle East is leading to some important modifications in military planning.

Because a nation such Iraq could launch an attack on short notice, warning an such attack is likely to less than that of a Soviet invasion, Pentagon planners say. To cope with the growth of such regional threats, Pentagon planners are putting more emphasis on tactical air forces, instead of ground troops, and might draw on forces from the Pacific as well as the Atlantic force.

The Pentagon's Plan

THE ATLANTIC FORCE

Would include armored units and Army and Air Force reserves. Could respond to a Soviet attack against Western Europe or tank warfare by Iran or Arab nations in the Persian Gulf region.

Army: Five active Army divisions, two in Europe. Would also include six reserve Army divisions and two new "reconstitutable" divisions. These would be partially staffed reserve units that could be brought to full strength during periods of heightened tension.

Air Force: Three to four tactical fighter wings based in Europe. Two active Air Force tactical fighter wings based in the United States, along with a reserve force equivalent to nine fully staffed and equipped Air Force tactical fighter wings.

Navy: Six carriers, one deployed in the Mediterranean Sea.

Marines: The Mediterranean Amphibious Ready Group, a 2,400-member expeditionary unit with tanks, artillery, helicopter and Harrier jets that is currently deployed off the coast of Liberia, would be on station near Europe. Marine force based in the United States would include two active and one reserve Marine expeditionary brigades, units of from 13,500 to 18,000 members.

THE PACIFIC FORCE

Would have a maritime character. Air Force tactical units would defend South Korea, Japan and other Asian allies.

Army: One division deployed in South Korea, with a reinforcing division deployed in Hawaii or Alaska.

Air Force: Three to four tactical fighter wings based in the Pacific.

Navy: Six carriers, one of which would be based in Japan.

Marines: Four Marine expeditionary brigades: one based in Japan, one in Hawaii and two in the United States.

THE CONTINGENCY FORCE

Would be designed for rapid response to brush-fire conflicts in the third world. Would be leading edge in a major intervention.

Army: Five divisions, including the 82d Airborne division, 101st air assault division equipped with helicopters, 24th mechanized infantry division, equipped with tanks and armored troop carriers, and the 7th and 10th "light" infantry divisions.

It would include seven active fighter wings and forces trained to rescue hostages and conduct operations against terrorists.

It could draw on Navy carriers and Marine units.

A reflection of reductions in tensions and funds.

a force is not sufficient to keep carriers in the Mediterranean Sea and the Western Pacific constantly, while also maintaining a presence in the Indian Ocean six months out of the year. The Navy, which currently has 14 deployable carriers, says that at least 12 are needed.

An aide to Mr. Cheney said that the Secretary currently favors retaining a force of 12 carriers but added that the matter is under review along with other questions about the Navy's future.

The Marine Corps objects to the blueprint's proposal to reduce the service to about 150,000 men, a 25 percent cut. Gen. Alfred M. Gray, the Marine Corps commander, has argued that the 196,000-member corps should not be reduced below 180,000, and some Marine officials say a force in the 170,000 range would be acceptable. The Marines argue that from a strategic standpoint, the services forces are needed more than ever to deal with conflicts in the Third World.

Top Army officials appear reconciled to the proposal to cut the service to 12 active divisions from the current 18. This would be two fewer active divisions than proposed by the Army in internal budget deliberations.

Uniformed Army officials, however, are cautious about the idea for creating two "reconstitutable" divisions in the

LOS ANGELES TIMES

B-2 Backers Urge White House to Save Embattled Plane

■ **Defense:** Bush draws criticism for what critics call a tepid response. They fear it may be too late to save the bomber during upcoming budget battles.

By MELISSA HEALY
TIMES STAFF WRITER

WASHINGTON—As congressional debate on defense spending has shifted into high gear, lawmakers who support the embattled B-2 Stealth bomber are complaining that White House support for the program has lacked resolve.

Although the Bush Administration seems to have been jolted to some degree by a committee vote Tuesday to terminate production, some supporters warn that it already may be too late to keep the B-2 from crashing during budget battles on the House and Senate floors.

Proponents of the $63-billion program have been pressing the Administration for weeks to push its most powerful advocate—the President—into the political fray in an effort to pluck the program from death at the hands of budget cutters. To their mounting frustration, they continue to get what they consider a tepid response.

"The White House and the secretary of defense have been dragging their heels on explaining the need for the B-2 to the American public," complained Sen. J. James Exon (D-Neb.), the Senate's leading proponent of the radar-eluding aircraft. "The President had better spend some political capital on this aircraft or it could be very, very dead—and so stealthy that no one will be able to see it."

effort faint-hearted, saying that it is likely to be too little, too late.

The Pentagon has reinforced that impression, they said, by being unwilling to single out the B-2 for special treatment. While Cheney has touted the plane in speeches and congressional hearings, Pentagon officials said that he has been careful not to suggest that the B-2 is a non-negotiable priority in the defense budget.

"You have to resist the urge to cut side deals on special projects," said a senior defense official. "We're still trying to go for an overall budget," he added.

If Congress' final version of the 1991 defense budget leaves out the B-2, will Bush use his most powerful weapon—the legislative veto—to get the funds restored?

Rep. William L. Dickinson (R-Ala.), the ranking Republican on the House Armed Services Committee, predicted Wednesday that Bush would veto the House bill if it came to him in its current form. But other proponents of the revolutionary plane warned that Bush cannot let the situation come to that, because it probably won't work.

"You can veto offending provisions out of a bill," said one congressional aide who is key to the fight. "But you really can't veto something into a bill."

Some Democratic supporters of the B-2, including Exon, said they suspected that behind the White House's muted support lies a more intricate strategy: to let Congress kill the bomber program that the Bush Administration itself has concluded is too costly, and then accuse the Democrats in future campaigns of having abandoned the nation's defenses.

Staff writer David Lauter contributed to this story.

There were some signs of action Wednesday, a day after the House Armed Services Committee dealt the B-2 program its most serious blow yet, adopting a $283-billion 1991 defense bill that would terminate production of the plane.

Defense Secretary Dick Cheney and Brent Scowcroft, Bush's national security adviser, began inviting senators to the White House to urge them to support the B-2. And White House spokesman Roman Popadiuk suggested that the President will boost the foundering program in a speech today, in which Bush "will address how he perceives the U.S. defense budget and U.S. force structure in meeting the changing demands."

That description of Bush's coming speech, however, failed to comfort critics who complain that the White House is dealing with the plane as part of a larger package of defense modernization programs. White House sources add that the Administration believes it is too early for the President to go to the mat for the plane because Congress is at least two months away from completing its debate.

In Southern California, as many as 17,000 jobs are at stake. For the Northrop Corp., the prime contractor of the beleaguered B-2, the termination of the program could bring serious financial trouble, according to industry and Pentagon analysts.

With the Senate floor debate due to start as early as today, the House committee's vote to kill the B-2 was just the first of many challenges the plane will face.

The Senate Armed Services Committee in mid-July recommended approval of $4.5 billion—the Administration's full request—to build and test two of the bombers. But in a White House meeting last Monday, the bomber's most influential Senate advocate, Armed Services Chairman Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), warned that without strong White House intercession, he might not be able to fend off opponents of the program on the Senate floor.

As debate moves to the floors of the House and Senate, the B-2 program is expected to be buffeted by criticism, including some from the Administration's Republican allies.

During that process, one knowledgeable source said that Vice President Dan Quayle, once a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, might be sent to Capitol Hill to whip errant Senate Republicans into line on the B-2. So far, however, Quayle remains on the sidelines.

According to Rep. Jerry Lewis (R-Redlands), a staunch B-2 supporter, the Bush Administration decided recently that it must focus its efforts on later stages of the budget-writing process, including the conference between the House and Senate Armed Services committees and the drafting of the defense appropriations bills.

"Those who are already singing at the B-2's funeral are doing so a little too early," warned Lewis.

But several lawmakers, speaking privately, called the White House

PENTAGON DRAFTS NEW BATTLE PLAN

Would Cut Armed Forces by 500,000 by Mid-1990's

By MICHAEL R. GORDON
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 1 — The Pentagon has drafted a blueprint for United States military strategy in the 1990's with the assumption that once Soviet forces withdraw from Eastern Europe it would take Moscow up to two years to mobilize for a major invasion.

The plan marks a striking change from the assumption underlying American military strategy during the cold war, that Washington might have as little as two weeks to reinforce NATO forces if Moscow appeared to be marshaling troops and weapons for an attack on Western Europe.

The confidential plan, which was presented to President Bush in late June by Defense Secretary Dick Cheney and Gen. Colin L. Powell, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the plan would cut the armed forces by 500,000 troops from the current level of 2.1 million, reduce overseas deployments and establish a new organizational framework for the military. The plan envisions achieving those goals by about the mid-1990's.

A Type of Army Units

It would also take advantage of the longer warning time of a possible Soviet attack on Europe by creating new Army reserve divisions that could be be brought up to full strength only if needed for a a prolonged crisis. These "reconstitutable" units would be partially manned and their equipment would be held in storage.

The plan, which has been criticized

Continued on Page A14, Column 4

In East Europe, Only Poland Makes Hard Decisions

By Karen Elliott House

WARSAW—If, as an Italian Communist Party leader once said, "there are many roads to socialism," these days there are at least as many roads back from it. All of them are full of potholes and other pitfalls.

Every country in East Europe has now embarked on such a journey—or is at least discussing what bags to pack. The desired destination in each case is some nebulous mix of democratic institutions, the alluring but confusing benefits of capitalism, and the social safety net to which they've all become accustomed during more than 40 years of Marxist stagnation. They start, however, from very different stages of political sophistication and economic development and have significantly different chances of success.

Recent travel in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland leads to the perhaps surprising conclusion that it is Poland—the country starting from farthest behind and traveling the rockiest road—that stands the best chance of actually making the transition to genuine capitalism. Poland already has packed its bags and set off while its wealthier neighbors are still planning their voyage.

In any analysis of East Europe these days, one must set aside East Germany. Though it shares the past miseries of Marxism, it has a unique future as an integral part of an enlarged German nation. At the other extreme, Bulgaria and Romania, despite recent and enormous change, start from so far back that they are destined to remain laggards. Thus, the focus on problems and potential for Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland.

Chained to Soviet Economy

Clearly there are commonalities. All three have the burdensome legacy of ossified, uncompetitive economies. All three have also been chained to the rigid Soviet economy. To a degree generally overlooked by Americans, all three still count the Soviets as their largest trading "partner." The Lilliputians in this case remain tightly tied down by Gulliver. There simply isn't any quick way out of dependency on Soviet raw materials, nor an immediate alternative to the Soviet market, which, unlike the West, is willing to barter for frequently shoddy goods made by unmotivated workers in antiquated factories.

"We trade our stray dog for their blind cat," says Peter Bod, a youthful, market-oriented economic adviser to Hungary's new prime minister.

The three countries also share officials mostly new to government and overwhelmed by the challenge of creating capitalism. A visit to the finance ministry in Czechoslovakia is typical. "Czechoslovakia is a madhouse," says Dusan Triska, a frantic, fortyish economist with an Einstein-like coiffure. He is responsible for privatization programs. "We are trying to do everything at once. New laws are being introduced every day; we can't keep up with it all."

All three countries covet German markets and money. Yet, on the one hand, they fear it won't materialize as German resources pour into East Germany; on the other hand, they fear becoming German economic satellites.

Also, to a degree that ought to concern Americans, officials in all three countries are surprisingly reconciled to the general irrelevance of America to their immediate economic futures. They may look to America as a source of inspiration, but they have reluctantly concluded that it isn't going to supply much practical financial support. The surprising thing to an American visitor is how infrequently America is even mentioned in the offices or coffee houses of Eastern Europe.

If such similarities cut across all three ex-satellites, there also are significant differences in atmospherics and substance.

Czechoslovakia, which statistically enjoys a per-capita standard of living well beyond Poland's $1,100, still is so desperate for foreign currency that all visitors are forced upon arrival to exchange $16 for every day they will be in the country. While Poland is coping with the consequences of last January's sudden conversion to market, rather than centrally administered, prices, Czechoslovakia's officials continue to meet weekly to debate what economic reforms to pursue. Its president seems more interested in making peace between Arabs and Israelis than in resolving economic policy disputes among his own ministers. Debate drags on in government while Parliament busies itself changing street names and discussing whether the name Czechoslovakia should be hyphenated—or whether Czechs and Slovaks should inhabit the same nation at all.

East Europeans may look to America as a source of inspiration, but they have reluctantly concluded that it isn't going to supply much practical financial support.

Some Czechs already are suggesting that perhaps socialist economics, absent Soviet overlords, isn't so bad after all. Since the Czechs have more to start with, they fear they have more to lose. With a degree of comfort has come a higher degree of complacency.

The Czechs are searching for a route to risk-free capitalism. For example, they continue to debate a national voucher system whereby citizens each would receive a paper "right" to buy equity in various state enterprises. Among the problems with this paper privatization, however, is that vouchers couldn't be freely traded, meaning that both vouchers and enterprises will lack real market value: What should happen to uneconomic enterprises in which no Czech chooses to invest vouchers? "We can sell those to the Japanese," says Mr. Triska.

Vladimir Dlouhy, Czechoslovakia's new minister of planning, who really would like to become the country's minister of unplanning, sits in Prague's largest bastion of bureaucracy, and says with a smile, "welcome to the heartbeat of communist planning."

Increasingly frustrated by political indecisiveness, Mr. Dlouhy says, "We know what steps we have to take, but the politicians aren't ready to take them." Optimists here believe Czechoslovakia's direction will be set following national elections Friday. But it's far from clear that much will really change.

At this point, Czechoslovakia, with its pre-war industrial base, its artistic and intellectual tradition and its telegenic president, is quite clearly the world's darling. But the world's darling risks ending up one of the world's economic orphans if it continues to delay hard decisions.

In Hungary's capital of Budapest a different kind of disillusionment is setting in. Hungary over the last decade managed to move significantly further toward a mix of Marxism and market economics than any other state in East Europe. It operated on a looser leash from Moscow, established more trade with Western Europe, and built a reputation with Western banks.

Hungary is perplexed by several paradoxes. Precisely because they managed to advance under communism, external expectations these days are higher for the Hungarians. Westerners arrive expecting a functioning market economy. Hungary, however, was never a highly industrialized nation and it never was willing or able genuinely to privatize its economy; Hungarians are reluctant to yield elements of their socialist safety net for the risks of greater economic freedom.

Frustrations exist in daily Hungarian life, like a six-year wait to take title to an automobile. But the frustrations aren't so great as to prompt strong public demand for sharp change. The winners of this spring's divisive election pledged to move the country "compassionately" toward capitalism. The party promising more economic pain en route decisively lost.

"We've gone halfway on economic reform for 20 years and it hasn't worked," says Ferenc Bartha, chairman of the Hungarian National Bank.

Indeed, if complacency is the problem in Czechoslovakia, gradualism is the difficulty in Hungary. "I warn against the philosophy of gradualism," says a senior executive of Germany's Deutsche Bank. "Gradualism nourishes the illusion you can avoid pain."

Prime Minister Jozsef Antall recently sought to reassure Western bankers who have financed Hungary's $20 billion foreign debt. "Our mandate of election means we have the moral trust to make the public accept hard decisions." But, he added, "Harsh measures can be executed only in parallel with the creation of a social safety net."

It's not surprising that Hungarian officials want it both ways. Genuine economic change would require harsh measures for which there could be a political price. Any political instability would scare off creditors and investors, leaving Hungary bereft of external private support. One further complication: Hungarians are engaged in divisive politics over minorities in neighboring countries. To foreigners looking in on East Europe, there are a number of distinct countries with defined borders. But to many in East Europe, there are rather a number of distinct nationalities who transcend postwar borders. The issue of Romanian treatment of Hungarian minorities dominates Hungarian politics more than issues of socialism and capitalism.

While the Czechs and Hungarians are seeking painless paths to prosperity, the Poles are accepting genuine economic sacrifice.

In January, Poland's new Solidarity government launched what it calls its "leap to the market." The government slashed the budget, including a wide range of subsidies. It tightened the money supply. It radically devalued the zloty. It largely decontrolled prices, though not yet—wages. It encouraged foreign competition at the risk of bankrupting state enterprises.

The effects were predictably quick and traumatic. Costs of such basic necessities as electricity rose by more than 300% within a matter of weeks, and even the price of a bottle of vodka doubled. Inflation soared—to 80% in January—but has subsided since to roughly 5% a month. Wages, deindexed from price increases, dropped sharply in real terms. Polish unemployment rose to roughly 300,000 (still less than 2%) and is predicted to rise to one million by year-end; by contrast, the Hungarians fret about 4,000 jobless.

As the money supply shrank, the monthly interest rate shot to 40% in January—though it, too, has since fallen to 8% in April and 5.5% in May. The zloty was devalued 35% but the result is a freely convertible currency that enables Poland's economy to engage in internationally competitive commerce. Indeed, few Poles any longer demand payment in dollars, as the zloty is readily redeemable by any citizen at a local bank for hard currency. Six months ago a hotel maitre d' would chase down patrons offering to tear up the zloty equivalent of a $50 dinner check in exchange for a $10 bill.

The immediate downside of this high-stakes program has been a significant decline in industrial production and fears of a major recession. "We expected a drop of production," says Wojciech Misiag, deputy finance minister and an architect of the economic reform plan. "Once you create a real market, a lot of production here isn't salable; some Polish products are too costly to produce." Industrial production fell 30% in January and February but has stabilized, and Mr. Misiag believes the downward trend is reversing.

The signs of robust commerce on Warsaw's main streets seem to support Mr. Misiag's optimism. If some old enterprises are foundering in the newly competitive marketplace, new entrepreneurial activity is flourishing. This city now teems with sidewalk sellers offering everything from formerly unattainable fresh fruit to fashionable Italian footwear.

The Kulibab Model

Typical is Jan Kulibab, a sidewalk shoe salesman, peddling his total inventory of two dozen pairs of Italian shoes from behind a table on a Warsaw street corner. Mr. Kulibab is selling the shoes for $19 a pair; he buys them at $16 a pair from a wholesaler who travels back and forth by bus to Germany, where he buys the shoes for $12 a pair. Mr. Kulibab, however, doesn't intend to remain a sidewalk shoe salesman. His ambition is to save enough zlotys to rent a vacant sausage shop where he can display a wider range of shoes and undercut the shoddy merchandise at the state-owned department store down the street. "Last month I made an 800,000 zloty profit (about $80), but with a shop I could do much better," he says.

In addition to the enterprise of its Kulibabs, Poland also benefits from a degree of political unity still unknown elsewhere in East Europe. In Hungary and Czechoslovakia—and even more so in Romania and Bulgaria—the "new" political leadership consists of at best a handful of former opposition politicians who sit atop layer upon layer of politicians and bureaucrats, who may have changed their party affiliation but not necessarily their Marxist mentality. In the rest of East Europe political reformation runs only skin deep. But in Poland there is genuine political revolution.

That revolution, of course, has been under way for nearly a decade—since Lech Walesa and his Solidarity movement first challenged the monolithic power of the Polish Communist Party. Here the pressure for political change has come from below—from shipyard workers rather than playwrights.

Skeptics, and there are many, still argue that there is little in Poland's long history of division to justify much optimism about transition to long-term democracy and prosperity. But the facts support some optimism. Few outsiders believed back in the dark days of martial law suppression of Solidarity that the movement could rise again to challenge communist control. More recently, many doubted whether the Solidarity government would have the guts to take what amounts to a free fall into market economics. In each case, Poles confounded skeptics.

With all they've been through, Poles are not dreamers about the future, but neither are they whiners or worriers about the present. The clear impression is that they have resolutely embarked on a rocky road back from communism and that they mean to see the journey through.

Ms. House is vice president, international, of Dow Jones & Co., publisher of The Wall Street Journal.

OTHER SIDE SKL

Why the Cries of 'Fascism'?

...was moved by Claudia Rosett's ...hic description of the brutal and tragic ...ts in Tiananmen Square ("The Party ... the Trigger," editorial page, June 5). ...rtheless, I believe she is trying to ... a political point that is not applica... She refers frequently to the demon...ors' hostility to communism. Yet she ... "From the student loudspeaker ... the stirring communist anthem, the ...nationale, which the demonstrators ...ed many times that night."

...he says "... students moved toward ..., shouting 'Fascists! Fascism!' until soldiers again began shooting." (Ap...ently they didn't shout: "Commie ...s!") She makes no reference to the stu...nts' demands for an end to corruption, ...d there is nothing in her account to show ...at the students were opposed to commu...ism per se. She adds that China's reform-...inded party chief, Zhao Ziyang, had ex...essed some sympathy for the students' ...mocratic demands. (That's *Communist* party chief.")

I'm concerned that here at home brutal...y is widely accepted as characteristic of ...ommunism and that any kind of anti-com...munism is preferable by far. Thus, Presi...ent Bush, in his otherwise commendable ...atement denouncing the unrestrained use ...force in China, saw no evil in our sup...rt of fascism in Central America. Must ... be so intent upon beholding the beam in ...r brother's eye, that we consider not ... huge mote in our own eye?

GEORGE J. BERNSTEIN
...mpia Fields, Ill.

Ms. Rosett eloquently describes the Chi...se fighting for reforms using rocks and ...tles against AK-47s and armored per...nel carriers. How different the story ...ght have been if Chinese citizens had the ...ht to keep and bear arms... us of the inherent nature of communist regimes—persecution, repression and terrorism aimed at its own people, often in the name of the people. With one eye on Beijing, we should turn the other toward Moscow. Dramatic events are unfurling there also amid starry-eyed euphoria among Western democracies—the same euphoria through which we saw China until just a few weeks ago.

Our yearning for peace is so strong that at times it clouds our vision of reality. It happened in the "detente" of the 1970s, and it may be happening again now. We look to Beijing and to Moscow with hope that eventually democracy will prevail, but we must remember that brutal totalitarian regimes are not easily transformed.

MICHAEL A. ROSEN
Los Angeles

Going Nowhere Fast

Regarding your May 24 Centennial Journal on Igor Sikorsky: Another interesting aspect of Mr. Sikorsky's career is that he built a huge, three-engined biplane in which Rene Fonck, the French World War I ace, was to fly the Atlantic with a crew of three men. Reputedly, it had a bed, a stove for hot meals, two radios and red leather upholstery. But the overloaded plane crashed during takeoff, killing two of the crew.

Charles Lindbergh, rightfully believing that four men weren't necessary for flying across the Atlantic, said he would have ripped out all that extra weight in favor of more fuel.

THOMAS A. SOUSA
Palo Alto, Calif.

Science vs. Politics: Arrested Development

A Funeral in Budapest Restores Hungary's Pride

Europe

By Peter Keresztes

BUDAPEST—Hungarians waited more than 30 years for the funeral that took place Friday. The nation finally gave a proper burial to its former prime minister, Imre Nagy, four members of his government and more than 230 others executed during the reprisals that followed the Soviet invasion of November 1956.

In splendid morning sunshine, 250,000 jammed Heroes' Square. With solemn melodies by Schubert, Mozart and Beethoven, they heard a reading of the martyrs' list. On the colonnade of Hungary's ancient kings, six banners of the Hungarian tricolor were stretched on a black backdrop. A hole in each symbolized the holes freedom fighters had left in 1956 when they tore the socialist seals from Hungarian banners. A procession of mourners piled flowers at the catafalque. Many foreign governments—but not Albania, China, North Korea and Romania—paid respects, as did representatives from Poland's Solidarity and Czechoslovakia's Charter 77.

The eulogies by the colleagues of Nagy, including Gen. Bela Kiraly, who directed the Hungarian national guard's defense against Marshal Zhukov's attackers, were conciliatory. They urged the nation to seek independence, justice and democracy, not vengeance. Representatives of the organizer, a major political opposition movement, the Democratic Forum, politely assisted the crowds. Unarmed police directed traffic.

Among the six coffins was an empty one, marked "Martyrs of '56," in memory of the 230 still in unindentified graves. There have been countless other victims of political persecution over the past 40 years. Those who escaped murder suffered internment, forced labor, deportation and confiscation. Such survivors, as many as two million, are now also organizing for recognition and compensation.

Three of Nagy's four associates, all 40 years old at the time, were hanged. His minister of state, Geza Losonczy, who began a hunger strike in prison, is said to have been choked to death on Dec. 21, 1957, while being force-fed. Nagy's cabinet secretary, Jozsef Szilagyi, was executed on April 24, 1958, after a trial during which he condemned the Soviet intervention and the puppet regime it brought to power. The legs of Nagy's defense minister, six-foot-five Pal Maleter, were broken, apparently so he would fit into his temporary burial crate. Miklos Gimes was an editor who after the Soviet invasion composed demands for the restoration of Nagy's government and for an independent and neutral Hungary. Maleter, Gimes and Nagy were put to death 31 years ago Friday.

Nagy had started out as a docile conformist in the Communist apparatus. As interior minister in the 1940s he set up the secret police force, which in the end murdered him. What set Nagy apart was a humanitarian instinct and a tendency toward moderation. Nagy eulogized Stalin as "the great leader of all humanity"; but when Nagy first became prime minister in 1953, he dissolved the forced labor camps. He accepted his own purge in 1955 and remained faithful to the party line even after the outbreak of the revolution in 1956. When the idea of a multiparty system was broached his response was, "Not while I live!" He had a change of heart only after he realized the depth of democratic sentiment. On Oct. 24, 1956, he became prime minister again—this time in the revolutionary government.

Nagy refused to believe the Soviets were preparing an attack until the tanks reached the city center on Nov. 4. The Russians deposed him later that day, and he was given refuge at the Yugoslav embassy. Assured safe passage from the country on the 22nd, he walked into a Soviet trap and was taken to Romania. The next word of his fate came on June 17, 1958, when the Hungarian government announced that he, Gimes and Maleter were executed the previous day after being condemned on the 15th. Some believe Nagy could have saved himself by lining up behind Janos Kadar, who betrayed Nagy's government when he vanished from Budapest three days before the Russian invasion and declared himself premier on November 4. Mr. Kadar, whose signature apparently was stamped on Nagy's death warrant, said recently that his conscience troubles him somewhat over the deed.

If so, that is something he hid well for the three decades of his rule, during which 1956 was a taboo topic. But since Mr. Kadar's ouster as party chief a year ago, the subject has become current. With Mikhail Gorbachev acknowledging so many Communist mistakes, the Hungarian party could no longer deny the victims of 1956 a proper burial. As interest in the funeral grew, some in the Communist party seized the opportunity to join. A government statement declared that the party today is carrying forth Nagy's reform politics. The current prime minister, Miklos Nemeth, and reformist Politburo member, Imre Pozsgay, paid their respects Friday.

This has caused some resentment. The representative of the independent youth organization, FIDESZ, Victor Orban, said at the funeral, "We feel that we owe no gratitude for the fact that after 31 years we may bury our dead, [the party] deserves no thanks for the fact that today our political organizations can operate." Mr. Orban called for forcing the party to submit to free elections and suggested that "if we don't lose sight of the ideals of 1956, we can elect a government that will immediately begin discussions for the withdrawal of Russian troops." The statement, as well as anti-Soviet demonstrations organized by FIDESZ the night before, brought a relatively mild rebuke from Moscow. America's ambassador in Budapest, Mark Palmer, plans to bring FIDESZ together with President Bush during his visit here July 11 to 13.

The Bush visit is being eagerly anticipated by Hungary's Communist regime. It is facing multiparty elections within a year. An internal division could dethrone its chief, Karoly Grosz, even before the autumn congress. In the aftermath of the funeral Washington has decided to offer 5-year, instead of 2-year terms of most-favored-nation trade status to the country and to grant certain investment insurance for U.S. corporations doing business here.

That alone won't rescue the country's economy. Hungary must pay 120% of its export income to service its foreign debt. The standard of living is deteriorating. In the capital one now sees the poor rummaging in garbage bins for food. Headlines tell of 28,000 people competing for fewer than 900 flats offered by the Budapest housing authority. The country needs fundamental changes, such as absolute property rights and a price reform that frees rather than arbitrarily inflates prices. That is being avoided because it would create political heat that a weakling authoritarian regime could not survive.

The nascent opposition still faces its own difficulties. The nine alternative movements that have begun a dialogue with the party on how to hold the elections have difficulty agreeing among themselves. They lack the organization, program and candidates to be able to stage a Solidarity-type challenge. Nevertheless, the political gains Hungary has achieved in the last 12 months are nothing short of astonishing. This past weekend Hungarians regained their national pride.

Mr. Keresztes is deputy editorial page editor of The Wall Street Journal/Europe.



OTHER SIDE — Hungan

Thrift Bailout Bill: The House's Tough Stance Is Likely to Carry Into Negotiations With Senate

By Paulette Thomas And Brooks Jackson
Staff Reporters of The Wall Street Journal

WASHINGTON—The tough mood that prevailed in the House as it approved its savings and loan overhaul bill last week seems certain to carry over in its negotiations with the Senate.

It's clear, as the House and Senate begin selecting their committee negotiators this week, that the S&L industry can't look to Congress for the sort of exemptions and favors that it has historically been given in past S&L legislation.

Instead, when President Bush receives the $157 billion legislation this summer, probably before the August recess, the odds are heavy that it will more closely resemble the House version, with tougher rules regarding how an S&L must account for its capital, what it may invest in, and how far it may stray from its mission of home mortgage lending.

The Bush administration, jubilant over the House bill's strict standards, even appears to be backing down in a dispute over the president's more costly financing scheme, which was soundly thrashed in the House.

"We're on a macho legislative trip down the road of toughness," said Rep. Thomas Ridge (R., Pa.), who was on the losing side of an effort to relax the accounting standards that emerged in the final House bill.

That appraisal extends to the Senate chamber. "The atmosphere in which the conference begins is an atmosphere of strictness, stringency and toughness," said Kevin Gottlieb, staff director of the Senate Banking Committee. "That is expected to have an impact on the discussions that occur between the two houses."

To the surprise of most, the House legislation is more stringent than the Senate's on the critical issue of how much private capital a thrift must maintain to back its assets. The Senate would allow non-cash intangibles, such as good will, to count as some capital for 25 years, while the House would prohibit intangibles after five years. The House version has increased even more than the Senate's how much a thrift must invest in home mortgages. A confrontation also lies ahead on the House bill's special breaks for low-income home buyers, which the Senate rejected.

The shape of the final bill will be influenced in part by who is appointed to the conference committee this week, which is expected to be unusually large. House Banking Committee Chairman Henry Gonzalez (D., Texas) is likely to appoint senior members before including junior members who are sympathetic to his views. The House must also appoint members from at least four other committees that helped draft the bill. Members say privately that this will make it all but impossible to meet Speaker Thomas Foley's (D., Wash.) objective of a compromise by July 4.

The surest bet is that the strict accounting rules approved by the House—which hundreds of S&Ls don't currently meet—are likely to emerge in the final bill. As House members grew jittery under growing public scrutiny, in fact, it passed capital rules that are much tougher than those proposed in the Bush plan, which would have allowed some exemptions.

"The members looked at it from the perception of how is this going to look in the next election if I'm not tough here," said Rep. William McCollum (R., Fla.), who reversed his position to vote for the tougher standard, despite its adverse effect on many Florida institutions.

More difficult to predict is how the conferees will resolve differences in the complicated financing plan. The Senate approved the Bush plan, which would use industry bonds that wouldn't be carried on the federal budget.

The House shrugged off an earlier veto threat and passed, 280-146, a plan to include the cost of financing on the federal budget. The move lowers the final bailout cost by more than $5 billion, but it would require an exemption from the Gramm-Rudman deficit-reduction law, a precedent the Bush administration is loath to set.

Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady, reacting to the House vote, said he was disappointed but stopped short of mentioning a veto. And House Democrats pushing for their financing plan believe they have momentum going into the conference. "I think we are going to be able to persuade a senator or two," said Rep. Charles Schumer (D., N.Y.).

Likely conferees are also privately predicting that the House bill prohibiting S&L investment in high-yield junk bonds will be moderated. Easing the restriction to 3% to 6% of a thrift's portfolio may be a compromise with the Senate's 11% limit.

Another split-the-difference compromise is likely on the issue of when bank holding companies will be permitted to acquire healthy S&Ls—acquisitions prohibited by current law. The House would allow those acquisitions immediately, while the Senate would delay them for two years so that sick S&Ls might find buyers.

The House vote Thursday saw the Democrats, once the industry's stalwart defenders, desert their S&L campaign donors in droves, according to a computer-aided tabulation by The Wall Street Journal.

Of the top 18 recipients of S&L political action committee money during the past three elections, only one voted for the amendment sponsored by Rep. Henry Hyde (R., Ill.) that would have relaxed capital standards. He was Illinois Rep. Frank Annunzio of Chicago, until recently the headquarters of the U.S. League of Savings Institutions.

Mr. Annunzio, for years among the staunchest of the industry's allies on the Banking Committee, received $29,660 in PAC funds. He remained loyal even while other members who received more were voting against the amendment. Banking Committee member Rep. Richard Lehman (D., Calif.) received the most, $50,169, and was among the California Democrats who unanimously voted down the Hyde amendment.

Republicans, on the other hand, were more likely to favor their S&L benefactors than were Democrats. GOP members who voted with the S&L lobby got an average of $6,515, while Republicans who opposed the industry's position got somewhat less, $4,809.

In total, current House members received nearly $2.2 million in contributions from thrifts and their trade associations during the past three elections. Those who voted with the industry on the crucial capital-requirement issue received only slightly higher contributions—an average of $5,847 over the six-year period—than did those who voted against the S&L lobby. The latter got an average of $5,563.

Among those who voted against the S&L lobby was former Democratic Whip Tony Coelho (D., Calif.), who got $14,595 and who had raised many times that amount from S&L executives for the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, which he headed from 1981 through 1986. The vote occurred on Rep. Coelho's last

The Thrift Bill: The Three Plans

	BUSH PLAN	HOUSE	SENATE
Minimum capital requirements, including good will (% of assets)	3-6%	3%	3%
Timetable for eliminating good will as capital	10 years	5 years	25 years
Limits on junk bonds	11% of portfolio	Must be sold within 2 yrs.	11% of portfolio
How $50 billion will be raised	Borrowings by quasi-government agency	Treasury borrowings	Borrowings by quasi-government agency
When banks may buy healthy S&Ls	2 yrs.	Immediately	2 yrs.
Aids low-income housing	No	Yes	No

The Myth of Tiananmen Square

The Students Talked Democracy, But They Didn't Practice It

By Sarah Lubman

DAVID McLIMANS FOR THE WASHINGTON POST

AMERICA embraced the student-led Chinese democracy movement as a new wave of change. But the awkward truth about the movement, behind its familiar symbols, is that student demonstrators didn't understand the democracy they craved—and they were even less able to put it into practice.

The American response to the Chinese democracy movement and its suppression was based on the understandable but emotional assumption that the students and their supporters not only want the same kind of political system we have, but, if encouraged, would have gravitated naturally towards it. Reporters covering the students during the days leading up to the ultimate confrontation in Tiananmen square, occasionally noted that the students' calls for democracy were nowhere near as sophisticated as either U.S. sympathizers, or the paranoid Chinese government, wanted to believe. Even more striking, to an observer of the activities in and around the square, was the fact that in their pursuit of democracy, the students created a system much like the one they wanted to reform.

Left to their own devices, the students created an overly bureaucratic, highly policed system which, like the old, operated on personal connections, or *guanxi*. Credentials to enter the inner sanctum and leaders' headquarters of the tent city could be obtained through guanxi but could just as easily be rejected if the wrong person was in charge on a particular day.

Security around the martyrs' memorial, the symbolic center of Tiananmen square and the site of the students' financial and propaganda operations, was especially tight. On one day in late May during the height of the hunger-strike-turned-sit-in, even a signed pass bearing the official seal of the Beijing Students' Self-Governing Association (*Gaozilian*) wasn't enough to penetrate security lines. Only the chance sighting of a student with whom this reporter occasionally played volleyball, and who had since climbed the ranks of the Tiananmen hierarchy, allowed entry into a press conference.

What began as an efficient and necessary security system degenerated into a petty abuse of authority. Security guards, originally posted to protect the hunger strikers from infiltrators as well as the hordes of foreign press in town for Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's visit, multiplied and became increasingly aggressive. When out-of-town students donned red headbands and joined the security ranks, the problem grew worse. One security guard on the steps of the monument, asked who his superior was, replied in the manner familiar to anyone who has had the frustrating experience of dealing with the Chinese bureaucracy, "I don't know. I'm only responsible for this step."

The students' makeshift society resembled the communist state in structure as well as operation. The Self-Governing Association had a standing committee, liaison offices with provincial students organizations and the foreign press, and a tireless propaganda department. The movement undoubtedly needed organization, but the form it took grew as bureaucratic as the adversary itself.

A proposed draft for the Beijing University Autonomous Union, posted on campus in late April, called for an advisory commission of elders similar to the commission which has been so active recently in the government. A student who belonged to the Gaozilian and who regularly attended its meetings complained that little was actually accomplished. "We don't decide any policy. People just sit around arguing over who's going to fill what position and what their responsibilities in the hierarchy should be," he said on the morning of June 3.

Some student leaders realized the weakness of the movement's intellectual underpinnings. But as one remarked, "People criticize us for being too vague, for not being specific enough about the kind of system we want. But just making people conscious of democracy is a big step for us."

That may be true. But the clearest indication of the students' inability to go beyond certain ideological barriers came from the language they used to describe their own movement.

In the May 4 issue of Beijing University's independent student newspaper, one student wrote, "The tide of democracy allows no obstruction; all must comply with this trend. If not, they will be condemned by history." One word has been changed, but the rhetoric is the same as that of Marxist arguments for the historical inevitability of socialism. Propaganda leaflets used similar language.

Students used the same vocabulary among themselves. A student leader, now a fugitive, once described fellow student leader Wuer Kaixi as "having no major errors in his thought." The notion of a single line of thought intolerant of any deviation is a familiar one, as veteran hardliners in Beijing have been forcefully reemphasizing. And in early May, one Beijing University student was called a "traitor" for opposing an on-campus demonstration in favor of continuing a class boycott instead. She responded defiantly, "What kind of democracy is that, if I can't even give my opinion? It's no better than the Cultural Revolution!"

Even students who have been in the United States for some time can find it hard to translate their yearnings for change into a specific political platform. The director of Yale University's student-teaching program in China remarked recently that, despite their earnest desire for change, Chinese students and dissidents now in the United States are also having trouble finding a common voice and advancing their thinking beyond the totalitarian system that is all they know.

The students can't be blamed for recreating the old in the name of the new. The fault is not their own but lies with a restrictive educational system and years of indoctrination which are proving hard to shake. Their vagueness about democracy is the result of an educational system which presents, limited—and biased—information about the West.

In an ominous indication of what the future holds for the current generation of college-age Chinese, an American academic visiting Beijing University in late June was told that courses on the West are to be reduced. University students in Beijing say that extra "political education" classes have been added to the fall curriculum, and new admissions are to be halved.

U.S. programs play an important role in keeping cultural and educational channels open. Regrettably, U.S. decisions to suspend some important exchange programs may inadvertently aid the triumphant hardline regime's stepped-up attacks on Western ideology. Important academic exchanges, such as programs sponsored by the National Academy of Sciences, have been temporarily suspended to show opposition to the government which so brutally slaughtered its own citizens. Despite the moral impetus behind these suspensions, such a response helps perpetuate the very system it intends to protest.

China's veteran ideologues are already taking measures to limit access to the West. America has few means to counteract this crackdown. But restricting meaningful educational and cultural exchange programs when they are needed most only helps limit alternatives to China's existing system.

Sarah Lubman was a student at Beijing University from last September until June. From April to July, she did free-lance reporting for The Washington Post in Beijing.

PATRICK BUCHANAN

Requiem for kinder, gentler

If a rising appreciation of Christian sobriety and the sanctity of marriage were propelling the lynching of John Tower, there might be redeeming social value to this sorry soap opera.

But there is not. Among those about to cast stones at their old colleague are some of the most compulsive boozers and satyrs in the U.S. Senate, and among those standing alongside Mr. Tower are senators whose private lives are models of probity, sobriety and rectitude.

Conceding he had been a heavy drinker in the 1970s, that he had not always been faithful to his marriage vows, Mr. Tower threw up a challenge Wednesday to the people about to destroy his public career: "I accept that the secretary of defense must adhere to a higher standard than members of the U.S. Senate. But, my question is, how much lower an acceptable standard is there for members of the Senate?"

John Kennedy

Apparently, however, when it comes to hypocrisy, there is no depth the Democratic majority will not explore.

Consider. These same Democratic senators about to terminate Mr. Tower's career over allegations of drinking and philandering, to a man, celebrate the memory of John F. Kennedy. Yet, within days of Mr. Kennedy's election in 1960, his closest aide declared, "This administration is going to do for sex what Eisenhower did for golf"; and JFK made good on that commitment.

How can one consistently and credibly deny Mr. Tower the Department of Defense for allegations of womanizing and continue to insist that JFK be held up as a paragon of political virtue? How can the same Democrats, about to destroy John

see BUCHANAN, *page D4*

Patrick J. Buchanan is a nationally syndicated columnist.

BUCHANAN

From page D1

Tower, continue to insist that we pay annual homage at the altar of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., whose womanizing was notorious?

Of the last five Democratic presidents, three, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Mr. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, had extramarital affairs; and two, Harry S. Truman and LBJ, had the same familiarity with the sauce as Mr. Tower. How can members of the Senate majority look at themselves in the mirror if they ruin Mr. Tower's career for personal failings or character flaws common to their own greatest heroes?

There has long been a tradition in the U.S. Senate that if a man was qualified for a Cabinet appointment and if his personal behavior did not impede the performance of his office, he would be approved. The president was as entitled to have his own men in the executive branch as members of Congress were to hire, and fire, congressional staff.

Again, if the Senate's opposition to Mr. Tower bespoke newer, higher standards for all appointees to public office, it would be defensible. But that is not the case. There is no indication the Senate intends to hold itself to the standard by which it is denouncing and condemning John Tower. There is no indication that the Democratic majority now wishes the Senate Ethics Committee to take up charges of philandering and drinking against its own membership. There is no evidence these pious judges of the personal morality of John Tower have the least intention of imposing the same standards on themselves.

When all 11 Democrats on the Senate Armed Services Committee vote to reject the nominee approved by all nine Republicans, the standard of judgment is not ethical, but political. John Tower is not the hapless victim of a resurgent, stricter morality; he is the latest casualty of a savage new partisanship.

John Tower is the latest casualty of a savage new partisanship.

Whatever the origin of Georgia Sen. Sam Nunn's concern about Mr. Tower, when — after Mr. Tower gave his word he would give up alcohol — Sam switched his argument to conflict of interest, he gave the game away. President Bush should reflect long and hard at what has happened here.

Accepting this city's thesis that President Reagan's problems with Congress stemmed from the combativeness and partisanship of his more ideological followers, George Bush offered Congress a new deal.

He held out the hand of friendship; he opened up his house; he declared he would never question their motives; he even endorsed their outrageous pay raise. His payment: The Senate Democratic majority is about to give Mr. Bush an unprecedented political insult — rejection of a first Cabinet appointment on the unprecedented grounds of personal morality.

With its vote, the Senate Armed Services Committee sent Mr. Bush a quasi-ultimatum. The price of peace with Congress, Mr. President, is veto power over appointments and policy decisions. Just as Jim Wright took Central America away from President Reagan, Sam Nunn now wants the Pentagon portfolio.

The time is coming when Mr. Bush is going to have to choose: between getting along with Congress, and remaining true to his constituency; between good relations with the City of Washington, and fidelity to the people who elected him.

Goodbye, kinder, gentler; hello, us and them.

5/19/89

THE WASHINGTON POST



Charles Krauthammer

Why Play Gorbachev's Game?

Today's conventional wisdom, repeated daily by the nation's herd of independent minds, is that the administration has been timid, slow, entirely inadequate in responding to the Gorbachev challenge. The cry, left, right and center, is for a foreign policy of boldness and vision.

The complaint starts with the Bush style: In the face of a virtuoso performance by the traveling Gorbo circus—like the wholly insignificant and breathlessly received SNF (short-range nuclear forces) cuts he announced last week—the president's PR has been woeful. Sure, he unveiled a carrot-and-stick policy toward Poland and Eastern Europe at Hamtramck. Sure, he has advanced proposals for drastic asymmetrical cuts in conventional arms in Europe. Sure, last week at Texas A&M, he outlined a new post-Cold War vision of the "integration of the Soviet Union into the community of nations." But the perception, you see, is that he is footdragging, and perceptions are ultimately what count in the politics game.

Savor the irony. After eight years of caterwauling about Reagan's Wizard of Oz, perception-is-reality, media manipulation, the press is now demanding it, in the name of national security, no less. Without a blush or a memory, the press is now on Bush's tail for poor Deaverism: no stage presence, weak backdrops, lousy scheduling. Bush goes to Texas and gives one of the most important foreign policy speeches of the decade, and the host of one political talk show is obsessed with the fact that he gave it at 4 p.m. Friday, bad for sound-bite coverage.

When the complainers get around to substance, the charge is timidity. Bush is not advancing bold and decisive enough negotiating positions. Translated, this generally means that Bush has adopted an incorrect position on SNF in Europe. The Bush (and British) policy is that so long as the Soviets maintain a vastly superior conventional force in Europe, we need to modernize our few remaining nuclear weapons there. The Germans, who inhabit the battlefield for these SNF nukes (that is the price a nation pays for starting World War II), are naturally anxious to get rid of them. They are, therefore, pushing hard for immediate SNF negotiations.

That is not surprising. What is surprising is that so many Americans, from Paul Nitze to Joe Biden, take their view. It is a prescription for political grief. We know exactly what the Soviets want from any SNF negotiations: their elimination. After all, the Soviets, being a continental European power and conventionally superior, do not need short-range nukes to deter war in Europe. We do. Which is why they are the last thing that we should be trading away.

If we cave in to the German position, it will be the first. SNF negotiations will be short. Much shorter than the negotiations on conventional arms, which are immensely complicated and harder to verify. With an SNF agreement in sight, and conventional talks dragging on, Biden's next op-ed piece will write itself: "The intransigence of the Bush administration, niggling over details of conventional arms reduction, is today holding up the promise of a Central Europe entirely free from the nuclear nightmare. How long can we tolerate . . ."

The other conventional wisdom complaint against Bush is his failure to respond to Gorbachev's (announced) unilateral concessions—troop and nuke reductions in Europe—with unilateral concessions of his own. But doing so would be strategically stupid. Russia is a European power. Only by accident, not by nature, is America a European power. When we pack to go home, we will not be coming back, absent a Pearl Harbor II. The Soviets, when they will, threatened to violate the INF Treaty and stop dismantling Soviet missiles. It is inconceivable that an American secretary of state could ever make such a threat or ever carry it out.

But the best reason for not making unilateral American concessions is that we do not have to. We are not in economic crisis. We are not reeling from the ruin of a newly acquired external empire of Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Mozambique and Vietnam. We are not spending 13 to 19 percent of GNP on defense. (We spend 6.7 percent.) We have not by foolish overmilitarization—the Soviets explicitly admit this in their own press—created an opposing alliance that includes all the great powers of the world. We are winning. It is the Soviets who are suing for peace in the Cold War. It is for suers to make unilateral concessions.

In the Texas speech, Bush said that the United States will respond if the Soviets meet certain tests of good faith. Arthur Schlesinger Jr. is dismayed. "How would we like it if Mr. Gorbachev laid down tests for us?" he asks. We would not like it, but who cares? Liking is not a particularly useful category of thought in international relations. We wrote Japan's constitution. Would we have liked it if they had written ours? In this same article, Schlesinger insists that we have won the Cold War. Well, when you win a war, you do not care one way or the other whether the loser likes your conditions. What is important is that he respond to them.

And for PR, Bush has allowed his foreign policy to be called "status quo plus." It is the right idea (when the other guy is committing suicide, stand aside) but a tough sell. He should send for the genius who invented the term "affirmative action" and get him to think up a virile, New Frontier-like name to embellish the Bush foreign policy. Washington—pining for Reagan, yearning for show—will hail him as a statesman.

S&Ls, a problem Congress "solved" with a $166 billion bailout.

We hear that HUD Secretary Jack Kemp is toying with going along with [illegible] Congress is solving, not ignoring.

MIN WAGE

Asides 11/21/89

Minimum Consistency

Earlier this year, President Bush made a final "take-it-or-leave it" offer on the minimum wage: an increase to $4.25 an hour over three years, and only if accompanied by a lower wage for the first six months of a job. Now, the White House has decided to accept the higher wage over only two years. The sub-minimum wage would apply only to first-time teen-age workers for 90 days. The White House had enough votes to sustain a veto, but chose to avoid a confrontation. The only permanent losers will be the 200,000 or so workers everyone agrees will be priced out of a job at the $4.25 rate Congress is likely to approve today. It is compromises such as this that convince Washington's liberals that if they simply stay the course, this administration will stray from its own course on this and other issues.

Gorbachev Criticizes Bush on Pace Of Nuclear-Arms Cuts in Europe

Soviet Leader Opens Visit To West Germany to Say Delays Aren't Fruitful

By Peter Gumbel
And Thomas F. O'Boyle
Staff Reporters of The Wall Street Journal

BONN—Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, seeking to reopen a divisive squabble in the NATO alliance, criticized President Bush's recent arms initiatives and said there is no basis to delay talks over short-range nuclear weapons.

Mr. Gorbachev's remarks, made in a dinner speech on the first day of his official visit to West Germany, were his first reaction to the recent NATO summit, at which Bonn and Washington papered over their differences on nuclear forces in Europe.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization agreed at the summit in Brussels to delay negotiations on the reduction of short-range nuclear missiles until talks are concluded with the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact on cutting conventional forces in Europe. But Mr. Gorbachev, whose warm welcome in Bonn yesterday was a clear demonstration of his enormous popularity in Germany, sought to capitalize on continuing unease here about the concentration of nuclear weapons on German soil.

Mikhail Gorbachev

"The question of the complete elimination of tactical nuclear means must not be removed from the agenda," he told a grim-looking Chancellor Helmut Kohl. "We are convinced that there is no reason to postpone the negotiations."

Polls show that some 70% of the German public favor immediate negotiations to at least reduce the numbers of short-range missiles, most of which are based in Germany. Many were disappointed by the NATO decision. The issue has assumed increasing importance in West German politics as Mr. Kohl fights to retain his party's grip on power—and perhaps his own job—prior to European elections Sunday and national elections next year.

Mr. Gorbachev was careful to praise Mr. Kohl's positive and concrete contribution to disarmament, saying that NATO for the first time has stopped dismissing Soviet initiatives out of hand. But he was scathing about the substance of President Bush's proposals, which U.S. and West German officials at the time hailed as an important compromise.

"Both in the text and between the lines, [the NATO document] contains a lot of goal-setting and methods of approach that are inherited from the period of confrontation," he said. Although welcoming the U.S. decision to cut troops in Europe, he snidely qualified his praise by suggesting that the move was long overdue. And he dismissed the U.S.-German compromise formula linking the start of talks on short-range nuclear arms to the end of talks on conventional forces, saying parallel negotiations would be the quickest way to overcome "the anachronism" of military confrontation in Europe.

Mr. Kohl, in his dinner speech preceding Mr. Gorbachev's, briefly touched on the issue, saying talks on short-range nuclear weapons should start "as soon as possible." He urged Mr. Gorbachev to speed the process by making further reductions in Soviet conventional forces in order to ease the "particularly threatening" superiority of the Warsaw Pact.

During their first meeting, a 70-minute session in the chancellor's office that was attended only by interpreters and two aides, Mr. Gorbachev and Mr. Kohl both outlined in general terms their positions on a range of international and bilateral issues. Both sides termed the talks "friendly and constructive," but made clear that more substantive discussions will take place today. They are expected to issue a joint political declaration that is being touted as the highlight of Mr. Gorbachev's four-day stay in West Germany.

Despite the show of friendship and good will on the first day, the two leaders clearly remain at odds over one of the trickiest questions of their relationship: the status of Berlin and ties between the two German states. Mr. Kohl called the separation of East and West Germany "an open wound," and said the Berlin Wall should be torn down.

Mr. Gorbachev, however, without directly mentioning Berlin, said "specific difficulties" in the Soviet-West German relationship shouldn't stand in the way of the common interests of the two nations and of Europe. Perhaps to reassure his allies, the Soviet leader also praised the contribution of the East German leadership to maintaining peace and stability in Europe.

Mr. Gorbachev is the most popular foreign leader ever in West Germany, as was demonstrated in Bonn when he arrived yesterday. In contrast to the trip just two weeks ago by President Bush, who was generally ignored by citizens except for a few isolated protests, people flocked to see the Soviet leader.

As he drove to the residence of West German President Richard von Weizsaecker for an official welcoming ceremony, several hundred pedestrians crowded by the front gate to catch a glimpse. Mr. Gorbachev responded with a wave from his black Zil limousine.

During his visit, Mr. Gorbachev will see more of the country than he usually does on his trips abroad. Following his political talks today, he is scheduled to address a group of leading German industrialists in Cologne.

However, his official program has been curtailed, leaving him with a considerable amount of free time. This has somewhat damped the pre-summit euphoria in Bonn and prompted speculation that the Soviet leader needs to keep in close contact with events taking place back home.

In an editorial, the influential Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung newspaper concluded that domestic problems such as ethnic unrest and food shortages may make him vulnerable. "Measured by his successes so far, Gorbachev's chances aren't good," the conservative paper said. "The West can try to help, but it must always be prepared for the possibility that this bold experiment could end one day as suddenly as it began."

BUSH DISCOVERS THE 'LID': President Bush, strolling from Oval Office to White House residential quarters Tuesday evening, questioned why reporters still were hanging around the press office. He was told they had to wait for him to leave and his staff to declare the "lid." He asked what a lid was and was told one of his aides announces it each evening, via telephone hooked up to press room loudspeakers. It signals there'll be no more news that day. Apparently intrigued, Bush asked for the phone, and at 6:40 p.m. startled reporters heard his voice booming from the speakers: "Ladies and gentlemen of the press, the president having gone home for the day, there is a lid on."

STUART AUERBACH

The Pacific Economic Compact: Bob Hawke's Plan Moves It Closer to Reality

For decades, academics and business executives have touted the vision of a Pacific economic community, binding that vast region together in a way that could approximate the European Common Market.

The idea has had to overcome the vast economic, political, social and cultural diversity of the nations of the Pacific rim—which stretches in a vast arc from the West Coast of the Americas through Southeast Asia to Korea, Japan and Australia. Pulling together these disparate parts is far harder than creating a Common Market from Europe, a process that has been in progress for 30 years.

Under pressures of emerging trade blocs in Europe and North America, however, a limited version of a Pacific economic compact now appears at hand. Australia and Japan favor it, as does the United States. Secretary of State James A. Baker III, who is pushing the idea as a way to foster democratic, free-market values in Asia, has called it "an idea whose time has come."

"For the first time there is real momentum and support in the governments for it," said R. Sean Randolph of the Pacific Basin Economic Council, a private organization based in San Francisco.

The fast-growing countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have expressed reservations, fearful that their six-nation grouping would be swamped by the more powerful economies on either edge of the Pacific rim. They also fear that a Pacific economic organization would undermine international free trade rules that they depend on to allow them to sell their products around the world.

Nonetheless, the first manifestation of the new Pacific compact should come in November, when Australia will host an exploratory meeting of trade and foreign ministers of major nations in the region. Baker and U.S. Trade Representative Carla Hills are expected to attend for the United States.

Canada will be there also, as will Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand. It remains unclear just how many of the ASEAN nations—Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand—will attend. Since the meeting is limited to free market economies, China was not invited. And out of sensibility to China's claims on their territory, neither were Hong Kong or Taiwan, even though they are economic forces in the region.

Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke was picked as host because he was responsible for the latest revival of a Pacific compact in a speech last January. He acted largely out of concerns that the world was dividing itself into trading blocs that would leave his nation standing alone. To counter that, he devised a plan that would wrap Australia—a nation populated largely by immigrants from Britain that traditionally has looked more toward Europe than to its Asian neighbors—more closely into the fast-growing Pacific economic framework.

His concerns stemmed from the signing in January of the U.S.-Canada free trade agreement, which Australia feared would emerge as a North American trading bloc; the creation of an integrated market within the 12-nation European Community, and movements by Japan, which has been investing in the economies of its Asian neighbors, to take a leadership role in an Asian economic community.

But Asian nations, with still-vivid memories of Japan's attempt to conquer the region militarily during World War II, are fearful of the newfound Japanese economic muscle and have no desire to see Tokyo become the dominant power of the Pacific.

For that reason, many Asian nations opposed the original Hawke plan because it excluded the United States but included Japan. They made it clear they wanted Washington involved to act as a counterweight to Tokyo in any Pacific grouping.

The idea of a Pacific compact appealed to Baker when he was Treasury secretary, and he was planning for a Pacific economic conference before he resigned a year ago to run the Bush presidential campaign. Although he never publicly offered his plan, Baker was leaning toward a grouping that would encompass the United States, Japan and the four industrialized countries of Asia—Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan.

As secretary of state, Baker repackaged his idea in a major speech last June to the Asia Society in New York in which he called for "a new Pacific partnership" involving an area of the world in which U.S. economic interests were growing. A historic shift took place early in the 1980s, when U.S. trade across the Pacific for the first time became larger than trade across the Atlantic with its traditional partners in Europe. By 1988, trans-Pacific trade totaled $271 billion—far more than the $186 billion in U.S. trade across the Atlantic.

A senior administration official suggested that the moves to the West by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev created a new urgency to strengthen democratic and free market institutions across the Pacific as the glue that held them together—the fear of Soviet expansionism—is abating.

The official placed the Pacific initiative in the context of a series of moves by the Bush administration to take the lead in a new international environment in which the threat from Moscow no longer is the driving force. At the NATO summit, for instance, President Bush stressed new missions for the Western alliance in the areas of the environment, nuclear proliferation and regional issues. And in Asia, the administration is seeking new ways to demonstrate that the United States intends to remain engaged in a leadership role in the Pacific in spite of the Japan's economic muscle.

In his Asia Society speech and in a meeting last month with ASEAN foreign ministers, Baker tried to ease concerns that a new Pacific organization would create a new trade bloc that could undermine existing free trade compacts.

He didn't fully succeed. The ASEAN meeting was marked by attacks by European officials who were upset that the EC would not be included in the regional grouping. "We do not like the creation of trading blocs," said Edwige Avice, a French Foreign Ministry official.

But the real test will come in November when reluctant ASEAN nations will have to decide whether to accept the Hawke invitation or not. Without a large representation from ASEAN, the compact will die stillborn.

)URNAL.

WHITE OAK, MARYLAND

The Outlook

Dick Darman Wants His Maypo!

WASHINGTON

If President Bush is still having problems with the "vision thing," he may want to look across the street to his budget director, Richard Darman. In a recent speech, Mr. Darman gave a sweeping diagnosis of the ills afflicting American society and offered the outlines of a vision for the future.

Unlike most people in Washington, the budget director writes his own speeches. He spends hours turning over phrases in his mind and wakes in the middle of the night to scratch down thoughts on the pad at his bedside table. His staff says that months before this speech, Mr. Darman had them chasing after tidbits of pop-culture trivia to be used in illustrating his points.

The theme of the speech was that America is suffering from a cultural "now-now-ism"—a "short-hand label for our collective short-sightedness, our obsession with the here and now; our reluctance to address the future." The entire nation, he charged, is like the spoiled child in the '50s commercial who screams: "I want my Maypo! I want it NOW!"

The manifestations of cultural now-now-ism, he suggests, are everywhere. Rising drug abuse is a sign that young people care too much about the next two hours and too little about the next two decades. The decline in education reflects a society lacking a commitment to future generations. The nation's economic problems stem from a culture that favors current consumption over long-term savings, and institutions that "feel obliged to chase near-term financial plays."

To Mr. Darman, the "pre-eminent symbol of public policy commitment to the future" is the space program. He delivered his speech on the 20th anniversary of Neil Armstrong's walk on the moon, and he praised President Kennedy's expansive vision in launching the moon program. The current generation seems to have lost that vision, he lamented, and "moonwalking" has become a Michael Jackson dance that gives the appearance of forward movement, but is actually a backward slide.

For all its fun metaphors and fine rhetoric, however, Mr. Darman's speech was tarnished by more than a touch of deceit. The budget director's first responsibility, after all, is the budget. And the budget's massive deficits over the past decade provide the most brazen symbol of the nation's failure to tend to the future.

So far, neither Mr. Bush nor Mr. Darman has demonstrated a determination to tackle the problem. Instead, they've joined Congress in seeking ever more artful ways to avoid it by adopting one-time savings and accounting gimmicks.

To be sure, the deficit has declined in the past few years. But that decline is entirely the result of a rising surplus in the Social Security trust fund. That money should be invested to help defray the future retirement costs of the baby boomers; instead, it is being used to paper over the deficit. That's yet-another symptom of Mr. Darman's national now-now-ism.

In his speech, Mr. Darman praised President Bush for his new plan to send men to Mars. But that announcement was a symptom of the very problem that Mr. Darman decries. The cost of the program will be some $400 billion over the next 30 years, and the White House hasn't given a hint of where that much money might be found.

At a breakfast meeting last week, Mr. Darman again cited the Kennedy administration as the model. Taxes, as a percentage of the nation's total output, were lower during the Kennedy years, he argued. And yet the budget was closer to balance, and twice as much money, as a percentage of GNP, was being spent on space. If President Kennedy could do it, why can't we?

25 Years Later

Percent of GNP

	1963	1988
Total spending	**18.9%**	**22.3%**
Social Security and Medicare	2.6	6.2
Other spending	16.3	16.1
Total receipts	**18.1%**	**19.1%**
Social Security and Medicare	3.4	7.0
Other receipts	14.7	12.1

The answer to that question is found behind the budget numbers. Spending has soared in the past 2½ decades, from 18.9% of the nation's output to 22.3%. But all of that can be accounted for by the increase in the two programs that care for the elderly—Social Security and Medicare. If you exclude those two programs, the picture looks very different. Spending is roughly unchanged, while taxes have dropped.

Can we return to Camelot? The budget numbers make it clear that such a move would require action on one of two fronts. Either the soaring cost of programs for the elderly must be drastically contained or taxes to pay for the rest of government must be increased. President Bush and Mr. Darman have pledged to do neither; a politically acceptable solution would probably have to involve some of both.

At the end of his speech, Mr. Darman warned against the dangers of focusing too much on the budget deficit. "The American Dream," he said, "is not meant to be filtered through green eyeshades." Fair point. But the American Dream also shouldn't be offered up as a free lunch. If the president is serious about his plans for sending a man to Mars, he'd better start thinking of ways to pay for it. Otherwise, he may start sounding like that kid in the Maypo ad.

—ALAN MURRAY

*** 50 CENTS

Hard Economics

Even a 'Soft Landing' Could Prove Painful, Hurt Administration

Tension Grows as President And Aides Push the Fed To Ease Its Credit Policy

What Bush Needs: Perfection

By Alan Murray
Staff Reporter of The Wall Street Journal

WASHINGTON—Fasten your seat belts. The much-heralded "soft landing" may include some hard knocks—not just in the economy, but at the White House.

Economic growth so far this year has skidded to a 1.7% annual rate. And the Federal Reserve's latest forecast suggests that growth will slow further, hovering between 1% and 1.5% through the middle of next year. That's just the sort of "soft landing" many economists and Wall Street investors hope for.

But behind that benign-sounding expression lies a painful truth: Even a soft landing—with its benefits of avoiding both a recession and a surge in inflation—would inflict a lot of pain. It could throw half a million people onto the unemployment rolls, according to Data Resources Inc. It could cut $30 billion out of corporate profits. And it could shave $800 off the annual income of the average American family.

And just as important to President Bush, such a slowdown could quickly balloon the budget deficit by as much as $25 billion, threatening his "read my lips" campaign pledge against a tax increase.

Mounting Pressures

For the White House, in short, the Fed's projection isn't good enough. With midterm congressional elections approaching and other pressures mounting, the administration needs more than a soft landing. It needs a perfect landing.

"You're going to see increasing tension between the administration and the Federal Reserve," says William Niskanen, the president of the CATO Institute in Washington. "This will jeopardize Bush's whole budget strategy."

Already, the tensions are evident. In public comments, White House officials have studiously avoided criticizing the Fed. Aware of the political sensitivities involved, Fed Vice Chairman Manuel Johnson and other administration allies have told the White House that public pressure only makes it harder to get the Fed's independent-minded regional-bank presidents to go along with the president's wishes.

But in private, relations between Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan and Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady, in particular, have been severely strained by Mr. Brady's continual prodding for easier credit, officials say. Michael Boskin, the chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers, enjoys better rapport with the Fed chairman but has also kept the heat on. President Bush himself has also weighed in with the Fed chairman on several occasions, meeting with him in the Oval Office and gently urging an easier credit policy.

Public Fight Possible

If the economy slows further, the tensions are bound to multiply, and the closed-door skirmishes may turn into open battle. "It may become necessary in the future to go public," one administration official confides.

The Bush team has made no secret of its view that a Fed-engineered soft landing isn't necessary to keep inflation under control. The administration's current forecast shows real growth softening only slightly, to a 2.6% pace next year, and then returning to 3%-plus in subsequent years. Mr. Boskin says such a forecast is "consistent with stabilizing, and eventually falling, inflation." And Budget Director Richard Darman insists that "neither a recession or a soft landing is inevitable."

But in the battle over economic policy, the Fed holds most of the cards. Administration officials have little power to influence the economy over the next year and a half, but the Fed can do a great deal by manipulating short-term interest rates. If the central bank is determined to slow economic growth to less than 2%, it can.

Indeed, many economists believe that the Fed's tight-money policies earlier this year have already set the stage for not just a soft landing but a full-fledged recession. And at least one Fed official agrees.

Crash Landing?

"The next six months or so are cooked," says Fed Governor Martha Seger, who has tended to favor an easier monetary policy than most other governors. "It's going to be very difficult to land the aircraft in a nice, gentle way. Instead, we may take a wing off."

Right now, one thing that seems clear is that the economy is slowing. In the second quarter, growth hit its lowest level in nearly three years. And while the White House ponders the effects on its revenue forecasts and on the 1990 congressional elections, the "soft landing" already looks like anything but to many Americans.

"We're not going to have a recession in the technical sense, but it's going to be very unpleasant for certain key sectors and key companies," says Walter Joelson, the chief economist at General Electric Co. "For many, many people, it will *feel* like a recession." The auto and home-building industries have already been hard hit.

Mary Rider, whose Oldsmobile dealership just outside Richmond, Va., began liquidation proceedings July 12, says as far

Please Turn to Page A4, Column 1

The New York Times

Comparing Health Care Systems

*Estimate
†In thousands

EXAMPLES OF DIFFERING INVESTMENTS IN TECHNOLOGY	Canada Population	Canada Units Per Unit†	U.S. Population	U.S. Units Per Unit†
Cardiac Catherization Labs Diagnosis and treatment of cardiovascular disease	31	816	1,500	166
Lithotripters Pulverize kidney stones and gallstones	4	6,325	228	1,096
Magnetic Resonance Imagers Diagnosing a wide range of diseases	12	2,108	1,375	182

Source: Canadian Health and Welfare Ministry; U.S. Health Care Financing Administration

Debating Canadian Health 'Model'

By MILT FREUDENHEIM

Special to The New York Times

TORONTO — Executives at the Ford Motor Company are dismayed that the auto maker is spending the equivalent of $311 a vehicle for health care for its American employees, while in Canada, a half-hour drive from Ford's headquarters in Michigan, the cost is $49.80.

Striking differences like this are leading a growing number of American employers, economists and legislators to examine Canada's taxpayer-financed system of national health care. They are looking for solutions not only to the problem of rising health costs but also to the lack of insurance for 37 million Americans.

But the new scrutiny has produced sharp debate. While some employers who pay for care are inclined to see the bright side of the Canadian system, many doctors and hospital administrators are skeptical.

'Deficiencies and Problems'

Indeed, the American Medical Association decided at its semiannual meeting last week to "document and publish the truth about the deficiencies and problems that characterize Canadian health care."

By some measures at least, Canadians are healthier than Americans. They live longer, on average, and their infant mortality rate is 25 percent lower, according to the Employee Benefit Research Institute, a nonprofit research center in Washington. What is more, all Canadians are guaranteed care, at no charge.

Yet Canada has held health spending to 9 percent of its gross national product, while in the United States, spending on health has spurted to 11.3 percent of the G.N.P.



Canapress/John Smee for The New York Times

W. Vickery Stoughton, president of Toronto General Hospital, with the hospital's computerized scanner. Canada's provinces limit hospitals' purchases of expensive equipment.

Both critics and proponents of Canada's system say its costs are lower because doctor and hospital fees are tightly controlled and the purchase of advanced technology lags behind that in the United States. The result can be longer waits for certain kinds of care.

"They really believe in equity and equal access and are willing to go without some things that we take for granted," said Senator David F. Durenberger, Republican of Minnesota, and vice chairman of a Senate-House commission on comprehensive health care, after a visit here recently. "The kind of rationing they have is the same kind we should have. Rather than pay the price in dollars, they pay the price in waiting time."

Administrative costs are also lower in Canada, where overhead and paperwork absorbs about 3 percent of the health budgets. In the United States, where most health care is paid for by Federal, state and private insurers, the 1,500 private insurers have overhead costs of close to 12 percent, covering items like marketing, reserves for future claims, taxes and profits, Federal data show. The Federal Medicare and Medicaid programs have overhead costs of about 3.5 percent.

But a committee report at the A.M.A. meeting denounced Canada's system as "socialized medicine managed by an ever-enlarging and more expensive bureaucracy, financed by ever-increasing taxation and featuring rationing, shortages, health-care waiting lists and an absence of private-sector alternatives."

Spokesmen for Canadian medical associations register similar objections.

Canadians say they like their system, however. In recent polls by

Continued on Page D6

Time Inc. Meeting Is Allowed

Stock Falls $6; Paramount Rises In Active Trading

By STEPHEN LABATON

Special to The New York Times

WILMINGTON, Del. June 28 — A Delaware chancellor today declined to block the annual stockholders meeting of Time Inc., which is scheduled for Friday.

The ruling came in response to a suit by three major stockholders, who contended that Time's directors had not adequately kept them and other shareholders informed of their reasoning in rejecting takeover offers from Paramount Communications Inc. and moving instead to buy Warner Communications Inc.

Chancellor William T. Allen made clear during the hourlong hearing that he did not think his ruling had any bearing on how he might address the larger issues in the takeover battle.

He has scheduled a hearing for July 11 on Paramount's suit, which asserts that Time has engaged in illegal defensive tactics by refusing to negotiate with Paramount and offering instead to buy Warner.

Ruling Treated as Indicator

Nonetheless, investors treated today's ruling as an indicator that the Time-Warner deal might proceed unimpeded.

Time would take on considerable debt to buy Warner for $14 billion. Time's shares fell $6, to $157.25 today on the New York Stock Exchange. It was the ninth-most-active issue, with 1.35 million shares traded.

Warner rose on the Big Board $1.625, to $60.75, with 1.27 million shares traded.

Paramount, which would have a great deal of cash on hand if it did not buy Time, rose $3.375, to $62.875. It was the Big Board's most-active stock, with 2.7 million shares traded.

Some people on Wall Street said rumors were swirling that a bidder might emerge for Paramount. Several arbitragers noted that Dan Dorfman, a financial writer with USA Today, had said on television on Tuesday night that a bid for Paramount was likely soon. Mr. Dorfman had correctly predicted both of Para-

Bush Seeks Ways to Assert Leadership

PRESIDENT, From A1

restless and impatient with the process. Although he has not been specific, Bush has told advisers that he needs new and "creative" ideas for dealing with the extraordinary events unfolding in the Soviet Union, the sources said. Bush's impatience appeared to boil over this week when, in an unusual and spontaneous action, he personally rewrote two major foreign policy speeches at the last minute.

"He's saying, 'Where's the beef?' " one foreign policy aide said. Another senior official added, "His impatience is with the substance—it's not public relations. He's saying, 'I want to be able to shape the changes.' There is a risk of action, but some people only focus on the risks of action and not the risks of inaction."

Now, the sources said, Bush is turning to a new, relatively small group to formulate these ideas with Secretary of State James A. Baker III spearheading the effort on foreign policy and Defense Secretary Richard B. Cheney on military issues.

A group of their subordinates is already at work redrafting most of Bush's speeches for the Europe trip, officials said.

The policy review did produce an overall goal for Bush's approach to Moscow, which he has described as "integration of the Soviet Union into the community of nations" and going "beyond containment," the post-World War II policy of seeking to isolate and check Moscow. However, with the exception of several minor proposals, such as resurrecting President Dwight D. Eisenhower's "Open Skies" concept or providing economic incentives to Poland, Bush has been unable to say precisely how he intends to reach this goal.

"If we find a way, if I can think of a good proposal that'll move the world towards a more lasting peace, we'll be out front with that," Bush said in an interview this week with four Western European journalists.

But so far, Bush has displayed an abundance of caution toward the fast-paced events in the Soviet Union. At first, he and national security adviser Brent Scowcroft commissioned the lengthy strategic reviews. During the four months they were under way, Bush refused to comment on his policy or respond to Gorbachev's initiatives. Lamented one high-ranking official of the time-consuming reports, "They just grew like Topsy."



JAMES A. BAKER III
... urges expanding Soviet contacts

RICHARD B. CHENEY
... said to favor cautious approach

Meanwhile, Bush's top advisers have expressed markedly differing views on how to respond to Gorbachev. Baker has been a leading advocate of expanding contacts with Moscow on a wide range of issues, from arms control to drugs and terrorism. One official described Baker's approach as building many bridges to the Soviets that will help lock in or "institutionalize" Gorbachev's reforms.

Baker, in a speech May 4, said, "There are some who say that we don't need to do much of anything because trends are so favorable to us. Their counsel is to sit tight and await Soviet concessions. I don't happen to be of this school. I don't think we can be passive in the face of these great strategic changes ...."

But other advisers, such as Cheney and deputy national security adviser Robert M. Gates, have urged Bush to take a cautious approach, sources said. They have concluded that Gorbachev's domestic reforms are already failing, and warned that the Soviet leader's survival is not assured.

Cheney created a stir when he suggested this publicly in a recent television interview that accurately reflected the view of some Bush advisers. Gates has warned against the historical cycles of Soviet reform and retreat. Paul Wolfowitz, undersecretary of defense for policy, told Congress recently that "virtually all" Gorbachev's political and economic reforms "could be reversed" and that Soviet foreign policy "continues to challenge U.S. interests around the world."

Bush seems to have embraced all the differing views; he has been both positive and cautious. In his address at Texas A&M University, he spoke of "our sincere desire" to see Gorbachev's reforms succeed, but he warned that "the Soviet Union has promised a more cooperative relationship before, only to reverse course and return to militarism." This dual message has run through the recent speeches, even as he personally redrafted them, trying to inject a more positive tone.

In February, Bush invited a group of specialists on the Soviet Union to his family compound in Kennebunkport, Maine, and in recent interviews several took note of Bush's cautious approach.

"The policy I'm hearing about isn't like the man I met," said Edward A. Hewett III of the Brookings Institution. "The man I met had a little more vision and was less frightened of the Soviets than the policy that's come out," which he described as "pablum." He added, "I think the president is better than his policy. He's going to have to get a hold of his bureaucracy and do what Gorbachev has done .... You're going to have to take risks."

Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr., of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, praised Bush's initial caution. "I would argue that the motivations of Soviet policy are such that it operates independent of our blandishments or even threats," he said. "So it is not inappropriate to allow Gorbachev to make changes that he must from his own self-interest make."

Pfaltzgraff said Bush lacks the credentials as a hard-liner that former president Ronald Reagan brought to office, and so Bush may be more constrained than his predecessor. "The president who called the Soviet Union an Evil Empire and who had long established his credentials in this regard could perhaps swing more widely in the other direction than Bush can," he said. "What we are likely to get from Bush for the next four years is a more balanced and cautious policy."

Adam B. Ulam, professor of history at Harvard, said Gorbachev's domestic reforms may be irreversible, but his foreign policy remains in flux and Bush should try more aggressively to influence it. "There is a great sort of uncertainty about what to do," he noted. "It's a completely new ball game and we still haven't discovered any way to deal with the ball game."

Bush initially gave his advisers two basic instructions for his approach to Moscow. One was that he did not feel the need to compete with Gorbachev in a public relations battle. The other was that he wanted "creative new initiatives" that would help the U.S. manage and cope with the sweeping military, political and economic changes that Gorbachev has set in motion.

The sources, including five senior-level advisers who were interviewed on condition of anonymity, quoted Bush as reminding them that one of the most important tests of his presidency will be how he responds to the historic shifts now taking place in the communist bloc.

But for a number of reasons, the early months of the Bush presidency did not produce options for dealing with the Soviet Union that Bush found satisfactory, the sources said.

"You're asking people who have been in the bureaucracy for 20 years to come up with new ideas—and they can't," said the foreign policy aide. "You're asking a president who basically succeeded himself to come up with new ideas—he won't."

PRESIDENT BUSH'S TRIP TO EUROPE

Today: Departs Andrews Air Force Base for Rome.

Saturday: Meets with Italian government leaders, Pope John Paul II.

Sunday: Departs Rome for Brussels. Meets with Belgian Prime Minister Wilfried Martens.

Monday: NATO summit.

Tuesday: Summit concludes. Press conference. Departs Brussels for Bonn and meeting with West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl.

Wednesday: Final meeting with Kohl. Travels to Mainz for speech on NATO alliance. Riverboat trip down Rhine. Departs Frankfurt for London.

Thursday: Meeting with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, luncheon with Queen Elizabeth II.

Friday: Departs London for Pease Air Force Base, N.H. Weekend in Kennebunkport, Maine.



THE WASHINGTON POST

William Raspberry

The Mail on Black Males

Sometimes I feel like those door to door proselytizers. You know, the ones who have glimpsed Truth and who are convinced that if you will only listen to them and think about what they are saying, you too will see the light.

It was my notion that it would be plain to everyone, once it was pointed out, that (1) much of what has gone wrong in America stems from the deterioration of the family and (2) that one reason for the deterioration—particularly in the low-income black community—is that black boys learn tragically early to view themselves as expendable.

My proposal: Let's find ways to save the boys.

There's no need to prove that boys are in special trouble. The merest glance at a college, high school or even grade school classroom will make clear that the boys are disappearing. A review of the crime, imprisonment and homicide statistics will make clear where they are disappearing to. The more they wind up in jails or graveyards, the less they will be available to form families. Fatherless households already constitute the poorest category of Americans.

But though many readers share my view that we need to find ways to rescue the boys from their uselessness, a surprisingly large minority take a different view.

Three themes run through their letters. The first is a double-pronged feminism: it is sexist to talk about saving boys rather than saving *children*. Moreover, my notion that we should train young men to become family providers is backward. As one reader put it, "It is the expectation of males as providers and women as partners who have the *option* of being providers that is causing men—especially black men—so much trouble."

The second theme is that it is up to young men to save themselves. They can stop being lazy or lawless or irresponsible whenever they choose.

Well, if it's sexist to urge special help for the boys (who are demonstrably in special trouble), then the Biblical parable of the lost sheep amounts to reverse discrimination. The point is not to abandon the 99, but to restore the entire flock.

What of the notion that a man's proper role is that of provider? Maybe, as the reader suggests, it is mere socialization. I suspect it runs a lot deeper than that, making it hard for any man who has never functioned as a provider to feel like a man. The inability of so many young black men to see themselves as providers—or even as necessary to their families—may be one explanation for their irresponsible behavior.

Nor does it make sense to me to expect that boys who have never experienced responsible fatherhood can, on their own, become responsible fathers.

The third, and saddest, theme is typified by a letter from a woman who describes herself as "a black single female head of household." She challenges my "bring back the family" notion at its heart.

"I *have* a family," she says. "How can one bring back that which is here? Be accurate. What you intend to say is, 'Put a black man in the residence of every black woman and her children.'

"Are you out of your mind? Any bearable black man who is outside a family is so by his own choice. Women who, in order to be physically safe and mentally secure, have removed themselves and their families from the proximity of abusive, destructive males will passionately resist the efforts of anyone to impose this unwanted element on their families and into their lives.

"The theory that improving the employment rate of men is the *sine qua non* of a healthy community is a simplistic and totally erroneous response to a complex societal puzzle. It ignores the reality that black men in alarming numbers are physical and psychological batterers and abusers of women.

"Daily, black women attempt to avoid, even flee, situations in which they are demeaned, belittled and stripped of their dignity and humanity. In truth, if the black American community is to survive, black women and girls must learn trades and skills which will enable them to become healthy, independent, self-respecting, competent individuals.

"What should be done to cause/enable black men to become intelligent, responsible, supportive, desirable family members?

"I don't know, and really don't care."

Red Storm Rising in the Ukraine

By Roman Solchanyk

Ever since Mikhail Gorbachev assumed leadership of the Soviet Communist Party, observers of the Soviet scene have been predicting the demise of Vladimir Shcherbitsky. Mr. Shcherbitsky is the Communist Party leader in the Ukraine. He is also the last remaining full member of the Politburo, apart from Mr. Gorbachev himself, to be installed by the now discredited Leonid Brezhnev.

Conventional wisdom has held that Mr. Shcherbitsky, an unreconstructed "Brezhnevite," would be swept away with other political leftovers. The Ukraine has seen events in recent years that might seem to damage Mr. Shcherbitsky. Yet in spite of such calamities as Chernobyl, the growing rift between the party and Ukrainian intellectuals, and the popular dissatisfaction so strikingly reflected in the poor showing of regime candidates in recent elections, Mr. Gorbachev has not shown interest in removing his Ukrainian subordinate.

National Ferment

Four years is a long time to hold one's breath, and the various convoluted explanations for the Shcherbitsky phenomenon will no longer do. The answer must be sought in the national ferment that has been steadily growing in the Ukraine, and in its implications for the future of the Soviet multi-ethnic polity. Mr. Gorbachev himself posed the problem succinctly during his Ukraine visit: "You can only imagine what would happen if there were disorder in the Ukraine. Fifty-one million people live here. The whole fabric of the Soviet Union would be amiss and perestroika would fall."

Presumably the leader of the Soviet Union knows what he is talking about and should be taken at his word. Faced with nationalist demands almost everywhere, the Kremlin scarcely needs political mobilization in its largest and most economically vital non-Russian republic, the Ukraine. This is precisely where developments in the Ukraine have been leading.

The clearest indication of this is the recent emergence of the Baltic-type Popular Movement of Ukraine for Restructuring. The "Rukh," as it is commonly known, is independent of the party and claims mass support. The moving force behind the Rukh is the Ukrainian intelligentsia, especially the writers who have consistently been the most visible and vocal advocates of radical change. On the eve of the Gorbachev visit the Rukh organizers published their draft program in the writers' union weekly, Literaturna Ukraina. The establishment responded immediately with a campaign in the party press in the form of irate letters from the public, accusing the Rukh of fomenting "civil war" and aiming at an "independent Ukraine." A recent issue of the literary weekly reports that Mr. Gorbachev, when meeting with Ukrainian writers in Kiev, even asked for assurances that the Rukh was not intent on forming a new political party.

Faced with nationalist demands almost everywhere, the Kremlin scarcely needs political mobilization in its largest and most economically vital non-Russian republic.

The reaction to the formation of another mass organization, the Shevchenko Ukrainian Language Society, was also something less than positive. The group held its inaugural meeting in early February, ending with a demand that the Ukrainian language be given state or official status. In the course of the two-day proceedings, party representatives found themselves listening to speeches by former political prisoners, loud applause for the Ukrainian popular front, and calls for Mr. Shcherbitsky's resignation. In the end the local party ideology secretary abandoned the hall. It comes as no major surprise that thus far the society has not been registered by authorities.

The following month a third grass-roots organization held its founding congress in Kiev. The Ukrainian Memorial Society is dedicated to the full exposure of Stalinist crimes against the Ukrainian nation. Once again respected writers shared the speakers' platform with former dissidents and representatives of the oppositionist Ukrainian Helsinki Union. The final resolution adopted, moreover, included several points that, in the words of the Ukrainian party daily Radyanska Ukraina, "went beyond the bounds of the direction and objectives of the conference." The meaning here is the meeting's support for the Ukrainian popular front and the demand to legalize the underground Ukrainian Catholic Church and the banned Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox church. Both national churches are viewed by authorities as seedbeds of Ukrainian nationalism.

The latest indication of a sharpening of tensions came last month at the plenum of the Ukrainian Central Committee. This group, Radio Moscow reported, "has urged the party locals to resolutely rebuff nationalists and extremists and consistently improve inter-ethnic relations." On the face of it, these two requirements appear contradictory. In the Ukraine today, the "nationalist" and "extremist" labels are liberally applied to anyone who deviates from the Shcherbitsky line.

Clearly Messrs. Gorbachev and Shcherbitsky are not interested in a specifically Ukrainian perestroika. In fact, the notion of perestroika on an ethnic basis is anathema to the Kremlin. This was stated by Moscow's representative to a conference on nationality relations convened in April in the Western Ukrainian city of Ternopil: "In our interconnected society, there can be no separate Uzbek or Georgian, Ukrainian or Russian perestroika—there can be no purely national perestroika, as some would have it. Perestroika is international, although, naturally, it should also consider the national factor."

How the "national factor" is to be reconciled with perestroika may become clearer after the Soviet party holds its long awaited Central Committee plenum on nationality relations. Until the meeting takes place this summer, Ukrainians will be expected to heed Mr. Gorbachev's call, made to the writers in Kiev, to be patient and to promote "the unity of the Slavic people, above all the Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians." If there is discord among the Slavic people, Mr. Gorbachev argued, "it will be very difficult to talk about unity among all the peoples of the Soviet Union."

This is the core of the national question in the Soviet Union today. The operative principle of Soviet nationalities policy has been to shift the focus of the Soviet Union's more than 100 nations and nationalities from an ethnic-cultural to a political-ideological allegiance. From this came the notion that there exists a "Soviet people." The nucleus of this allegedly supranational entity has been the Slavic bloc of Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians who together account for more than 70% of the population. To tamper with this construct would quite likely spell the end of the Soviet multi-ethnic society as we know it.

What the Soviet Leaders Know

The main problem is not the conflict between Armenians and Azerbaijanis or between Georgians and the Abkhaz, although in both cases the anti-Russian sentiment that has developed as a byproduct of Moscow's incompetent handling of these regional disputes can be potentially dangerous. The Baltic states, where anti-Russian and anti-Soviet sentiment is at the heart of the issue, could become a serious problem, particularly if the three republics work out a viable common platform, which they have now begun. Yet the Ukrainian capital of Kiev has almost double the population of Estonia, and the Lvov region alone is more populous than Latvia.

The real problem is in the Ukraine, without which the Soviet Union would cease being a major power. This is something that every Russian leader, from Lenin to Mr. Gorbachev, has understood better than most Kremlinologists.

Mr. Solchanyk, director of program research and development at Radio Liberty in Munich, co-wrote "Ukraine Under Gorbachev," to be published by Macmillan.

Charles Krauthammer

The U.N.'s Complicity With Evil

BY BILL RUSSELL—KRT

One fact largely forgotten in the current hostage crisis is that Lt. Col. William Higgins, though an American officer, was on a United Nations mission and in U.N. uniform when kidnapped by Lebanese Shiites. One has come to expect little of the United Nations, but its cravenness in the Higgins affair surprises even the cynical. No emergency Security Council meetings. No condemnations. No denunciations. No pressure on Hezbollah's Iranian sponsors or Syrian protectors.

Instead, the United Nations sends Marrack Goulding to Lebanon to "fact-find" and to pick up Higgins' body. He gets neither facts nor the body. He meets with Hezbollah leaders—Hezbollah, remember, kidnapped and murdered Higgins, who, remember, was on a U.N. mission—and issues not a critical word about them. Instead he criticizes Israel for having captured another Hezbollah leader, Sheik Obeid, who was involved in kidnapping Higgins and reportedly used his own apartment to imprison Higgins.

Crisis, which strips things down to its elements, is a deeply revealing condition. This crisis demonstrated (to those who still require a demonstration) that the United Nations has progressed far beyond impotence to a state of meek and sick complicity with evil.

The crisis did not bring out the best in George Bush either. "Ready on Day One to be a Great President," said the campaign ads last year. Then, on Day One of its first real crisis, the Bush administration was panicked. Bush instinctively and unwisely went into the Jimmy Carter Rose Garden mode: canceling a trip, returning to Washington, calling emergency meetings that one knew in advance would have no issue. In short, handing the entire American agenda over to terrorists.

Then there was the infamous statement in which Bush called for the release of all hostages in the Middle East—a remark pointedly aimed at Israel and pointedly classifying Sheik Obeid as a hostage, as if Israel had picked a Lebanese schoolgirl off the street rather than a kidnapper and a terrorist.

Whenever an outrage such as the murder of a Navy diver on a TWA jet is committed against Americans, the question of retaliation arises. The argument against retaliation, which almost invariably prevails, is that a nation as great as ours does not mete out group justice. Instead we will track down, apprehend and try the particular individuals responsible.

Call this policy discriminate retribution. Generally speaking, it is less a policy than an evasion. It gets you off the hook because it is extremely hard to identify who actually carried out a certain outrage, harder to find them and harder still to capture them. (On occasion it can be done; witness the capture of the Achille Lauro hijackers and the kidnapping by American agents of airline hijacker Fawaz Yunis.)

Well, discriminate retribution is exactly what Israel engaged in with its capture of Obeid. In November 1988, Bush declared that this kind of action is America's ideal: "We will bring terrorists to justice. We will continue to cooperate with friendly nations to identify, track, apprehend, prosecute and punish terrorists." Nine months and one election later, he calls such action "kidnapping and violence."

Bush, to his credit, and in character, righted himself after his initial unsteadiness. He backed off the Israel-bashing and let the terrorists know that if they harmed their next hostage he was prepared to unleash American military power. The threat to hostage Joseph Cicippio was lifted and the immediate crisis passed. Now upon some reflection it becomes clear that Israel's capture of Obeid has provided an opening on the hostage issue that had been closed since the Iran-contra scandal broke.

What to do? The administration, clearly fighting the Iran-contra memories, has said that it will not bargain with terrorists. This is an entirely disingenuous position. Iran hints at releasing hostages in return for Iranian assets held in the United States, and the administration "rejects" the demand but does aver that it would look favorably on the asset issue if hostages are released. The secretary of state says that he will not bargain with terrorists, but adds that if Israel wants to do so he will not stand in the way.

If you want your hostages back, you have to bargain. But how? First make clear and public the limits of your demands. In this case, the U.S. demand should be the return of all American (and, if we are feeling particularly magnanimous toward our "allies," all Western) hostages. No more one-by-one, as in the Iran-contra affair. Shiite/Iranian counter-demands will be entertained. The address is the White House. Any mailman will do.

Then, put pressure on the terrorists. Set a time limit. We know that what Sheik Obeid fears most is extradition to the United States. We should announce that if the hostage issue is not resolved within, say, two weeks, we will begin extradition proceedings to bring him to American justice for kidnapping and accessory to murder of Col. Higgins. This is a less Draconian measure than threatening an air war against Shiite Lebanon, but it does tell the terrorists that time is not on their side.

If Hezbollah will trade for Obeid, fine. We will defer justice for the sake of eight Americans. Otherwise, we try him. The threat would have the salutary effect of concentrating the mind of his colleagues on releasing American hostages. The execution of the threat would make them think twice before picking Americans as their target next time.

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John R. Block

Free Trade: Coming Up Roses

TRADE 7/5/89

To most people, roses evoke images of blossoming romance. But in Washington, roses have recently come to represent not just romantic symbols, but a strong lesson about economic realities. It's a story not of the blush of first love, but the benefits of free trade.

The international trade debate is filled with enough conflicting theories to numb the minds of most policy makers as well as most consumers. The terms "free trade," "fair trade," "national treatment," "managed trade," "reciprocity" and "protectionism" are frequently presented with much enthusiasm, but without much explanation. It is sometimes necessary to focus on the trade of a single product to sort through these conflicting theories and to reaffirm the benefits to the consumer and the nation of free trade.

A recently issued report by the International Trade Commission on the "Competitive Conditions in the U.S. and World Markets for Fresh Cut Roses" offers some perspective. The study was mandated by Congress as part of last year's trade bill. It arose from concerns expressed by congressional supporters of the domestic rose industry (located mainly in California, Michigan and Colorado) that increased imports of these flowers (mainly from Colombia, but also from Mexico, Holland and Israel) were threatening the domestic industry.

Sales of roses in the United States are not inconsequential. Overall rose sales are expected to top 830 million stems in 1989. U.S. producers' market share has fallen in recent years, however, from 73 percent in 1985 to 62 percent in 1988.

Six months ago, conventional wisdom was ready to blame the loss of domestic market share on the usual culprit: foreign, government-subsidized imports. The uproar in Washington was strong enough to mandate a full-scale investigation of the U.S. rose market by the International Trade Commission.

The ITC released its 113-page report in April. The principal finding? That both domestic production and imports of fresh cut roses have risen in recent years because of rapid growth in consumer demand. The reason is simple: aggressive sale efforts by rose importers have helped open up new markets for roses that never before existed. Both domestic and foreign rose producers have benefited from these developments, which have made roses available to consumers in supermarkets and other convenient outlets for the first time.

U.S. rose production, for example, has jumped from 476 million stems to 522 million stems, a 10 percent increase. During this period, U.S. rose industry revenues accelerated by 12 percent, reaching an estimated $171 million in 1988.

Foreign producers have experienced even stronger growth. According to the ITC analysis, longer growing seasons and efficient distribution (not government support) enabled these producers to meet growing U.S. consumer demand, which increased a remarkable 190 million stems (30 percent) from 1985 to 1988. Foreign producers were thus able to respond to substantial new U.S. demand for roses that domestic producers would have been unable to meet because of a lack of land and labor.

The ITC results are clear. Both domestic and foreign rose producers profited from growing domestic U.S. demand. The increase in supply also allowed new vendors to enter the market for the first time. Most important, the clear winner was the U.S. consumer, who found ample supplies of roses available year-round at competitive prices.

The economics of roses provides a rather dramatic example of the substantial benefits of open agricultural trade in the new global economy. But roses are not the first products in which foreign imports have helped stimulate the growth of domestic agricultural markets, and in turn, benefited U.S. producers.

Recent expansions in the domestic production of Granny Smith apples and kiwi fruit are the healthy response to new agricultural product markets that were initially developed by foreign importers. U.S. production in these two emerging domestic industries is expected to be between $47 million and $80 million in 1989. More generally, the year-round availability of popular fresh fruits, such as cantaloupe and pineapple—only possible through winter importing—have helped boost domestic demand by re-shaping the shopping and eating habits of many Americans.

These types of economic success stories are possible only in an environment that encourages free and fair trade for agricultural goods. America's willingness to take down barriers to agricultural trade—to welcome the challenge of competition—is clearly paying off. New domestic product markets are being created, many of which offer U.S. farmers and agricultural producers needed diversification opportunities. At the same time, U.S. consumers are seeing widening choice at their local market.

Unfortunately, antiquated tariff structures abroad continue, in some cases, to limit U.S. export opportunities. In regard to roses, for example, the International Trade Commission study found that high tariffs placed on summer rose imports by the European Community had "significantly impeded the inflow of roses from non-EC member countries," including the United States. U.S. growers' export potential is therefore limited—particularly during the peak production months of summer. The ITC also found that Japan's nontariff barriers, such as lengthy quarantine inspection procedures, result in extensive damage to imported products and therefore reduce the overall attractiveness to exporting fresh-cut flowers to Japan.

For consumers both in and outside the United States, an end to unproductive agricultural trade policies would offer the promise of lower prices at the grocery checkout line in years ahead. The lesson of the rose market—where the tide of rising imports has helped buoy U.S. producers—is important to keep in mind.

The resolution of trade disputes will no doubt be a critical topic at the upcoming Paris economic summit. At the meeting, President Bush, West German Chancellor Kohl and other industrial nation leaders will discuss the pros and cons of tariffs and other barriers to agricultural trade. One hopes there will be a few roses on the table as well.

The writer is president of the National-American Wholesale Grocers' Association.

Popular Music

Records

Well-Tuned Country Songstress

From Mary Chapin Carpenter, a Lyrical 'State of the Heart'

By Mike Joyce
Special to The Washington Post

It's a natural: Mary Chapin Carpenter opening for Emmylou Harris at Wolf Trap tonight. And not merely because both honed their talents while playing clubs in and around the Washington area. After all, if it weren't for Harris's major label success a generation ago, it's likely that Carpenter and numerous other female singers with a similar flair for combining folk and country music would be performing for much smaller audiences these days.

Mary Chapin Carpenter: 'State of the Heart'

For Carpenter, at least, the timing of the concert couldn't be better. She has just scored her first bona fide country hit single, a breezy, flirtatious tale called "How Do." With its rockabilly rhythms, western swing colors and carefree spirit, it's a sharp contrast to some of the reflective ballads also contained on Carpenter's new album, "State of the Heart" (Columbia). But it's not likely to be the only hit generated by the album. The hook-laden chorus and brassy tone that distinguish "Never Had It So Good" and the earthy, Judds-like rhythm that propels "Read My Lips" may well allow these songs to follow "How Do" right up the charts.

In fact, now that "How Do" has attracted considerable airplay around the country, perhaps even some of Carpenter's introspective lyrics will get some well-deserved exposure. Unabashed sentiment clearly has its place on the album, especially on the ballad "This Shirt." But for the most part Carpenter's lyrics convey genuine warmth and emotion without tugging at the heartstrings.

"Slow Country Dance" is a beautifully drawn portrait of aging and loneliness. "Something of a Dreamer" combines a lilting melody with a story about a foolish, incurable romantic, while "Goodbye Again" quietly explores a love triangle and its impact on the "other woman." The only song on the album not composed by Carpenter is "Quittin' Time," which is given an upbeat arrangement here. But as Carpenter proved when she sang a slower version of it with Shawn Colvin at the Birchmere recently, the poignant lyric is perfectly in keeping with many of her own ballads.

In addition to the first-rate songs, "State of the Heart" is graced by some fine instrumental work, not just from guitarist John Jennings, Carpenter's longtime collaborator and coproducer, but by guests Mike Auldridge and Tommy Hannum and an excellent band. Moreover, Carpenter has seldom sounded more confident as a singer or more comfortable with her material. Her slightly husky alto brings a soulful, occasionally sassy edge to some songs, and a rare intimacy to others.

Cee Cee Chapman: 'Twist of Fate'

By contrast, subtlety is not one of Cee Cee Chapman's strengths. She's part honky-tonk angel, part torch singer, and on her new album, "Twist of Fate" (Curb-MCA), the Portsmouth-born singer's got the goods to prove it. Chapman delivers love songs, or, more precisely, love-gone-bad songs, with a vengeance that's almost palpable. "Frontier Justice" is a typically blunt response to a love betrayed; "You Lie" and "Love Is a Liar" are as bitter and as anguished as they sound; and "Gone but Not Forgotten" stirs up even more painful memories.

True, "Rainbow Rider" and other tunes soften the mood here and there, but this is basically a one-note album. The good news is that Chapman sings that note with unbridled and unforgiving passion at times. The bad news is that the album occasionally suffers from slick, anonymous Nashville arrangements that do neither the singer nor the songs justice.

Laurie Lewis: 'Love Chooses You'

Like Carpenter's album, San Francisco Bay Area singer, songwriter and fiddler Laurie Lewis's new release "Love Chooses You" (Flying Fish) is mostly devoted to the pleasures and pain engendered by affairs of the heart. By and large, the songs don't rival the caliber of Carpenter's, and given some of the bluegrassy arrangements they're not likely to enjoy anywhere near the commercial exposure. But they're sturdy, well-crafted songs just the same, and all of them take advantage of a remarkable array of talent: Mandolinist Sam Bush, dobroist Jerry Douglas, guitarist Russ Barenburg and Nashville Bluegrass Band members Alan O'Bryant, Pat Enright and Mark Hembree are all on hand. The album's title

track is the most likely to make Lewis better known in Nashville, since it was recently covered by Kathy Mattea. And yet Lewis's own arrangement, sinuously laced with Douglas's dobro, possesses a simple, heartfelt charm all its own, as does "The Light" and "The Point of No Return."

If other tunes, notably "When the Night Bird Sings," seem tailored to appeal to a broader audience than your typical string band recording, Lewis isn't bashful about revealing her traditional influences from time to time. On the contrary, she fiddles up a storm on "Ryestraw," and joins her band in creating a haunting chamberlike setting for the melancholy air "The Women of Ireland."

5/25/89

Bush's Stance on Soviets Gives Him Political Trouble at Home, Abroad

By Gerald F. Seib
Staff Reporter of The Wall Street Journal

WASHINGTON—President Bush's slow-and-careful course in dealing with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev is leading the president toward some heavy political turbulence.

Mr. Bush leaves tomorrow for his maiden presidential voyage to Europe and a high-profile summit meeting of the North Atlantic TreatyOrganization. His immediate task will be to paper over a messy spat with West Germany, which wants him to launch into quick negotiations with the Soviets to cut short-range nuclear weapons in Western Europe.

President Bush

The president's broader task is even more difficult. He must mollify increasingly restive Western European allies, who want him to be bolder and quicker in responding to Mr. Gorbachev's proposals for arms cuts and other broad changes in East-West relations.

As he prepared to depart, Mr. Bush tried yesterday to reassure allies that he intends to "seize every—and I mean every—opportunity" to build a better relationship with the Soviets. In a commencement speech at the U.S. Coast Guard Academy, Mr. Bush welcomed a new Soviet proposal to cut conventional forces in Europe and said that "through negotiations, we can now transform the military landscape of Europe." His aides acknowledged that he chose his words in an effort to avoid appearing "too negative" toward the Soviets.

Pressure Building

As the White House realizes, restiveness about Mr. Bush's cautious approach hasn't been limited to Western Europe. Similar pressure for more action is building on the political left and right in the U.S.

Influential Democrats in Congress are beginning to grumble that Mr. Bush is losing the immediate public-relations battle with the Soviets. Worse, they say, he is running the risk of squandering a historic opportunity to ease Cold War tensions.

"I think Bush is not articulating where most Americans are with respect to responding to the Gorbachev initiatives," says Rep. Lee Hamilton (D., Ind.), a senior member of the Foreign Affairs Committee. "He's behind the curve, I guess I would put it."

More surprisingly, conservatives, who are generally pleased that Mr. Bush has shown skepticism and resolve toward the Soviets, also are beginning to press for a more aggressive U.S. strategy. They don't want Mr. Bush to react to Mr. Gorbachev by offering concessions, of course. Rather, they call for more moves to ratchet up pressure on the Kremlin to make more fundamental changes in its system.

'Common Feeling'

"Our view is that he should be seizing the initiative to help transform the Soviet Union, by making the kind of aid, trade and technology they are obviously eager to get contingent on fundamental change," says Frank Gaffney, a former Pentagon official who currently is a conservative analyst at the Center for Security Policy. Mr. Gaffney says that, despite their different prescriptions for action, there is a "common feeling" among liberals and conservatives that "the U.S. isn't served by a passive strategy."

Those who applaud Mr. Bush's cautious approach say such a course is simply destined to attract criticism. Mr. Bush has shown that he's "prudent and knowledgeable, and he isn't stampeded by the right or the left," says William Hyland, editor of Foreign Affairs magazine and a Soviet analyst who has occasionally advised Mr. Bush. But, Mr. Hyland adds, "he's going to be criticized for it, because there's an overwhelming desire from all outside critics for more action."

In any event, there is little reason to think Mr. Bush is about to sharply alter his course. He is an inherently cautious man who has succeeded in life mostly by taking carefully considered steps rather than risky gambits.

For instance, when he was beaten badly in the Iowa caucuses last year and his political future hung in the balance, many wanted him to jettison some of his campaign staff and break more cleanly from President Reagan. Instead, Mr. Bush called his top advisers together for a low-key pep talk, pulled even closer to President Reagan—and proceeded to win the crucial New Hampshire primary.

Today, Mr. Bush's closest White House advisers are unusually knowledgeable in Soviet affairs—but also notably cautious. National security adviser Brent Scowcroft is a longtime Soviet scholar who is on a first-name basis with many top Soviets, and his deputy Robert Gates is a Sovietologist from the intelligence community with broad knowledge of Soviet history and language. But their experiences with the Soviets also have left Mr. Bush and these aides inherently skeptical.

They argue that in the current climate of ferment and uncertainty in the Soviet bloc, the West can't know whether Mr. Gorbachev will succeed. Therefore, they say, the U.S. can't risk making security concessions in the mere hope he will.

More broadly, the Bush team has concluded that the demands for openness and democratic reforms coursing through the Soviet Union and China indicate that historic trends are moving in the direction of the U.S. Administration aides believe that a flurry of concessions from Washington isn't necessary to keep the powerful trend moving ahead.

"We live in a time where we are witnessing the end of an idea, the final chapter of the Communist experiment," Mr. Bush said yesterday. "Communism is now recognized even within the Communist world itself as a failed system, one that promised economic prosperity but failed to deliver the goods."

The trans-Atlantic debate over the wisdom of this Bush approach is being played out largely in the argument with West Germany over whether to negotiate cuts in short-range nuclear weapons—an argument that still threatens to badly mar the NATO summit in Brussels next Monday and Tuesday.

Short-range nuclear forces include missiles and artillery shells that weren't eliminated by the 1987 intermediate-range arms treaty. The U.S. has, on its own, cut its stockpile of such weapons by 2,400 during the past decade, down to roughly 4,000. But NATO long has steered clear of negotiations over the arms, because they are needed to offset the Warsaw Pact's big superiority in conventional weapons.

Several weeks ago, though, the West German government caved in to domestic political pressure and insisted that the U.S. quickly open negotiations with the Soviets to cut those arms. The Bush administration balked. Meanwhile, Mr. Gorbachev tried to grab the initiative by making a showy but militarily insignificant announcement that he was removing 500 of the Warsaw Pact's 10,000 short-range weapons and by pressing for talks.

Now the Bush administration has agreed to consider talks, but it insists that cuts first be made in Soviet conventional arms and that the West declare that short-range arms wouldn't be eliminated entirely. Though the revised U.S. position is considered wise by most analysts, West Germany is balking at the conditions.

Even if Mr. Bush finds the diplomatic skills to paper over the dispute on this trip, it's unlikely he'll be able to resolve the broader problem of getting the West to unite behind a defense strategy in the face of the crafty Mr. Gorbachev. "What we're facing is a much longer-range problem," says Rep. Les Aspin (D., Wis.), chairman of the House Armed Services Committee.