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Subseries: Subject File, 1988-1993

OA/ID Number: 13896
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Folder Title:
[News Articles 1989-1991]

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RAP

Mr. President and Eazy-E

Arnold Schwarzenegger belongs. So do George Shultz, Estee Lauder and Joe Coors. Now Eric (Eazy-E) Wright of the rap group N.W.A. (Niggers With Attitude) is also a member of the Republican Senatorial Inner Circle, an elite group of GOP high rollers. Eazy-E was invited to join last month by Texas Sen. Phil Gramm: "I believe your accomplishments prove you worthy of membership," wrote Gramm. Among those accomplishments: N.W.A.'s megahit record "F— tha Police." E, a Bush fan, ponied up the $2,500 dues, and this week he and a partner are off to D.C. for a luncheon with the president.

GOP rap outreach? Wright

INTERVIEW

Will Americans Work For $5 a Day?

Former Labor Secretary **WILLIAM BROCK** warns that we must either provide better training for our workers or risk paying Third World wages

By GISELA BOLTE

Q. Do we have a work-force crisis?
A. Yes, but it pales in comparison with the management crisis. Workers work with the tools they are given. Workers do not reorganize the workplace. Managers do. It has to tell us something if Japanese and German and Swiss firms come to the U.S., put up a plant, hire American workers and produce a competitive product that is better than one produced in an American plant. It happens too often.

We can make our workplace so much more fun, and we can get rid of so much overhead. We have as much bureaucracy in some of our businesses as we have in Washington, because by de-emphasizing the quality of workers, we have to increase the number of supervisors. What a waste.

Q. What kind of labor force does America need?
A. All my life people have talked about the global economy in prospect. Suddenly it is here. We are moving in the most fundamentally different world in history, a world in which individual nations are increasingly vulnerable. Governments are going to be faced with increasing pressures to deal with issues like global growth or the environment or drugs that are almost invariably subject only to an international solution.

In economic terms, the world is moving beyond multinationals to firms that are truly transnational. The successful firm will be one that is very fast on its feet, capable of short production runs, short product life cycles, very creative, very flexible. That will drive them to have a work force that is equally flexible and responsive and that can adapt to rapidly and even radically changing economic demands.

Q. We have had economic growth for seven years. Why worry?
A. We increased our production significantly. We did it in part by investing in more productive equipment. But the biggest single source of growth came from the surge of women, young people and immigrants into the work force. That pool of low-skill, low-wage labor is going to dry up. If we are going to have growth, it has to come from greater human productivity.

Q. And what has happened to productivity?
A. The rate of improvement is half of what it was 20 years ago. The only reason family income is up is because we've got two-earner families. Wages in real terms are lower today than in 1973. Business tried to pull wages down and put in laborsaving machinery because so many workers who are coming in from our educational system cannot read and write. The easy answer is to buy the most idiot-proof machinery so business can continue to compete.

Today every country in the world can buy the same machinery. If there are people in other parts of the world who will work for $5 a day and they have the same equipment as Americans who want $10 or $15 an hour, either we have to change the way people work here—not only work harder but smarter, more effectively—or we have to compete on the basis of wages. The choice is between high skills and low wages. We seem to be continuing to compete on the basis of wages, which means that the effort will constantly be to pull wages down instead of building skills up. We are making the wrong choice.

Q. What is the consequence of going the low-wage route?
A. We take on the characteristics of a Third World country after a while. We will gradually have less and less net real income in the U.S. Our savings will continue to be inadequate, and businesses will have to either shut down because Americans won't work for Third World wages or go overseas for their production. The net effect is an economy that goes downhill very fast.

Q. What are businesses doing about upgrading the skills of their workers?
A. Less than 1% of our businesses are spending 95% of the training money. Most are doing very little, and the ones that are doing very much are using their funds to train management. There is almost nothing in most companies for the great majority of workers, but the workplace is changing underneath their feet. The average young person coming out of high school today will have at least four to six jobs in his working life, two to three different careers. If workers are given continuing training and education by the firms they work for, that is not going to be a problem. If they are not, we are going to leave 15% to 30% off to the side of the road every year. We proposed in our Commission on the Skills of the American Workforce that those firms that do not train their workers pay a 1% tax so that we as a country can train them and that those employees are not disadvantaged by working for those companies.

Q. Is this the fault of the public schools?
A. We have put our emphasis on the college bound, who are 30% of our young people. We have the finest university system. We have public education at the elementary and secondary level that ranks below every industrial competitor we have



KURT WILSON

"We are the only country in the industrial world that says to 1 out of every 4 of its young people, We are going to let you drop out of sight."

End of the Third World

The term never made much sense, but as the cold war fades, it's become totally meaningless

The Third World is gone. It has been vanishing for a long while, but now it has completely disappeared. Oh, the countries once assigned to the Third World are still there, but the concept of the Third World is no longer connected to any reality.

We will still deal (quite obviously) with the Brazils, Indonesias, Nigerias and Indias. But the idea that these many nations represent anything like a single bloc with similar characteristics and interests is shattered forever. It is yet another casualty of the end of the cold war. The term Third World originally reflected a globe divided into the First World (the industrialized democracies), the Second World (the communist bloc) and everyone else. Bingo. The implosion of the communist bloc obliterates this geopolitical arithmetic.

What this means is that developing countries, as a group, have lost much of their political leverage. The Third World was once viewed as a vast terrain on which the free world and the communist bloc struggled for power and influence. In this situation, countries could subtly (or not so subtly) tout their importance in the cold-war contest as a way of winning more foreign assistance. No longer.

"Their value as pieces on the strategic and ideological chessboard has significantly depreciated," writes political scientist Mark Falcoff in the current issue of The American Enterprise magazine. "These countries will find it increasingly difficult to extract concessions and resources from Western governments."

What we will see is rich nations everywhere trying to stabilize their regions with some aid and trade concessions to their poorer neighbors. The United States is already focusing on Latin America, Japan on China, and Western Europe on the former Soviet bloc. But even here, poorer countries will increasingly be thrown back on their own resources: they're not likely to get much help unless they demonstrate the ability to organize legitimate governments and to stimulate internal economic development.

The discipline will be imposed not only by stingy taxpayers in richer countries but also by the multinational companies that control large private investment. Companies will locate plants where they think they can count on productive workers and political stability.

Of course, the Third World was always a simplistic label, whose relevance has progressively faded. In the 1950s and 1960s, there were repeated efforts by many new nations to act as a bloc and exploit their position between the free world and the communist bloc. Colonial empires were being rapidly dismantled. Britain freed India and Pakistan in 1947 and Nigeria in 1960. In 1955, President Sukarno of Indonesia hosted the first conference of 29 nonaligned nations in Bandung. Many more conferences followed.

It was always easy to denounce imperialism and ask for more foreign aid. Unity on other issues was strained or nonexistent. Countries' interests and circumstances diverged too much. "The commonalities between Mexico and Mali are hard to find," says John Sewell, head of the Overseas Development Council, a Washington think tank.

What has also fragmented the Third World are huge differences in economic growth. In its World Development Report, the World Bank—the largest international development agency—publishes the following table. It gives average annual growth rates of per-person income for poor regions. (East Asia generally stretches from Indonesia through Thailand to China; South Asia covers Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and nearby nations.)

	1973-80	1980-89
Sub-Saharan Africa	**0.1**	**-2.2**
East Asia	**4.7**	**6.7**
South Asia	**1.7**	**3.2**
Eastern Europe	**5.3**	**0.8**
Latin America	**2.6**	**-0.6**
Middle East, North Africa	**2.1**	**0.8**

Here is a snapshot of progress and poverty. With rapid population growth, poverty has deepened in sub-Saharan Africa, and disruptions in food production threaten famine. In Latin America, middle-class living standards have declined, and the poor have gotten poorer. Meanwhile, much of East Asia has boomed. South Korea's income per person has climbed 7 percent a year since 1965. In 1988 it stood at $3,600. South Korea has more in common with the United States than with Zaire (per-person income, $170).

You can make two generalizations about the past 30 years. First, there have been big gains in reducing poverty. Incomes in most countries have risen. Diets and life expectancies have generally improved. In Colombia, the mortality rate for children under 5 fell from 135 per thousand in 1965 to 42 per thousand in 1985. Second, massive poverty remains. The World Bank counts as the poorest of the poor anyone who lives on $1 a day or less. By this measure, a billion of the world's 5-plus billion people are in poverty.

One thing we have learned is that foreign aid doesn't permanently cure poverty. Countries do it on their own or don't. Culture matters. So do competent governments with popular support that pursue sensible economic policies. When conditions are favorable, foreign aid can help.

The recognition of this reality is a further reason why the idea of the Third World no longer makes sense. The concept of a Third World implicitly presumed that all poor nations could be made wealthier with the correct doses of outside money and advice. This was a wild exaggeration. In 1989, foreign assistance to developing countries from richer nations amounted to $51 billion. But skepticism about the therapeutic power of aid means that—aside from Eastern Europe and, perhaps, the Soviet Union—there won't be a dramatic increase during the 1990s.

In many ways, some countries of the former Third World will become increasingly important as time passes. Brazil, Korea, Taiwan and Thailand are already major trading nations. Countries like China, Brazil and India will be crucial in any negotiations on the "greenhouse effect." But as for a Third World agenda, forget it.

The label may linger until someone invents a new one to describe today's more muddled situation. The Third World still sounds nice. It just doesn't mean much.

Communism is dead; now who will restore decency?

The past gives no answers to present-day problems. The past only has lessons showing us that we can no longer live like we did," said Mikhail Gorbachev at the 28th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. Lenin the opportunist would approve; Lenin the icon might have more qualms. As Gorbachev puts his imprimatur on heresies such as private property, stock markets and the rights of individuals, it is clear that nothing less than the Communist Party's Leninist legacy—"that dead weight on the mind of the nation," according to the historian Yuri Afanasyev—is being jettisoned.

Lenin's followers have been adept scavengers, picking and choosing those articles of faith that suit them at the time. At the end of his life Lenin was preoccupied by three themes vital to *perestroika:* Economic recovery, nationalism and bureaucratic resistance to change. Gorbachev, who has no other source of legitimacy, is still trying to mine Lenin's texts. But the faith has gone; fully 80 percent of the delegates to the Party Congress admit that Lenin's "scientific theory" needs "purification"—a code word for his trip to the dustbin of history. Led by that charismatic enigma Boris Yeltsin, some of Communism's most zealous reformers last week gave up on trying to reform Leninism and abandoned Lenin's sinking ship.

'Lenin's peculiar legacy was a system where values were inverted. Lying became a virtue; charity was a dirty word'

Other delegates at the party conference stopped short of quitting, but they hardly referred to Marxism-Leninism at all, and the masses are taking their cue. Soviet universities are dropping mandatory courses in Marxism-Leninism. In Tbilisi, Georgia, Lenin's statue is guarded by a wire cage to protect it from marauding mobs. Now, the first public criticisms are being aired. As *Pravda* put it recently, Lenin was "by no means a saint."

Worse indignities lie ahead: Leningrad may be renamed St. Petersburg, and the new Moscow City Council may succeed in expelling Lenin's bust from its meeting chamber. Radicals have even suggested that Lenin's body be removed from its Red Square mausoleum and given "a Christian burial." Meanwhile, a Russian parliamentary inquiry is studying "the violent overthrow of the legal and democratic government of the Russian Republic in 1917." Today, the savior's halo is slipping. Tomorrow, it will be gone altogether.

That has been the great lesson for totalitarians in this century. Leninism has done better than its fascist counterparts, surviving a civil war, mass purges, a world war and seven decades in power. But as with fascism, there is no middle ground. Democracy can swing from socialism to Thatcherism and back and barely miss a beat. That is the nature of free choice and compromise. Once the followers of totalitarian ideologies start to doubt, they are apt to pull down the whole house.

Recently, Soviet newspaper readers were asked to list all that is bad and ugly in the Soviet Union. Along with empty shelves and rising crime, many mentioned *bezdushi,* or heartlessness—the absence of decent human feelings. No one, of course, mentioned addressing *bezdushi* in all the embittered hard-line rhetoric about "true Leninist values" that flew about the Communist Party Congress. But there is every reason to believe that little else in Soviet society will change until *bezdushi* is cured.

Lenin's peculiar legacy was a system in which values were inverted. Lying became a virtue; charity was a dirty word; good manners were synonymous with counterrevolution, and corruption and fear were natural conditions of life. Nationalism has begun to exploit this void. It may be too late for any product of the system, such as Gorbachev, to pose as the enemy of *bezdushi.* Yet *perestroika*—indeed, the Soviet *Union*—depends on it. "Communism with a heart" may be the Soviet party's, and Gorbachev's, last hope.

by Robin Knight ■

Exit, stage left. *Lenin's followers have been*

EDUCATION

GOP Senators Block Passage Of Bush School Initiatives

President's program dies on final day of session, prompting recriminations from all quarters

Once again, members of President Bush's own party have thwarted his agenda. Despite Bush's proclaimed desire to be the "education president," several conservative Republican senators blocked action the last day of the 101st Congress on legislation (HR 5932) that carried his education initiatives.

The defeat came just weeks after House Republicans rebelled en masse against a White House-congressional budget summit agreement that Bush had urged them to support.

The $800 million education bill appeared headed for enactment after negotiations between administration officials and key members of Congress reached agreements on three sticking points. *(Weekly Report, p. 3614)*

But the administration could not line up the GOP support needed to call up the bill. Republican members kept a rolling hold on the legislation — as soon as one member lifted his objection to the bill, another member put a hold on it.

In the last few days of any session, it takes only one senator's objections to block a bill. Without a unanimous-consent agreement to limit debate, nothing can move.

Objection, Objection

Majority Leader George J. Mitchell, D-Maine, first tried to call the bill up for a vote around 6:00 p.m. on Oct. 27. But Daniel R. Coats, R-Ind., said he still had problems with it.

Coats was concerned that a provision by Rep. Peter Smith, R-Vt., would allow or even encourage schools to start clinics that might provide information on abortion or family planning.

Staffs, however, had already worked out report language explicitly stating that it was not the intent of the Smith provision to allow federal funds to be used for school-based clinics. The Smith language was designed to help school districts combine federal funds, and avoid rules and regulations that might prevent schools from doing a better job educating students.

Coats finally lifted his hold.

But when Mitchell again tried to call the bill up at about 7:30 p.m., Jesse Helms, R-N.C., spoke up: "Mr. President, there are $800 million of taxpayers' money in here, and I suggest the absence of a quorum."

Helms has spent the last year protesting that the bill contains a grant to the National Board for Professional Teaching Standards, headed by his 1984 Democratic opponent, James B. Hunt Jr., a former North Carolina governor. The board is developing a voluntary certification process for teachers. The grant, originally set at $25 million, was pared to $10 million during negotiations with the administration.

Even before Helms protested, staff members had worked out language to exempt private-school and home-school teachers from the certification process — which is entirely voluntary.

About an hour later, Mitchell tried one last time to bring the bill to the floor, but Charles E. Grassley, R-Iowa, objected. At that point, Democrats began lamenting the measure's demise.

The bill's failure will not disrupt current education programs. It contained a number of proposals by Bush for cash awards to excellent schools and teachers, math and science scholarships and alternative methods for certifying teachers. In addition, it would have coordinated literacy programs at the local and regional levels, and authorized programs to improve teacher training and recruitment.

When Congress reconvenes in January, members will be preoccupied with the reauthorization of the Higher Education Act. William D. Ford, D-Mich., who is expected to be the next chairman of the House Education and Labor Committee, has already said he does not look favorably on the Bush proposals and is not interested in moving them next year.

White House officials say they do not know whether they will try again.

BOXSCORE

Bill: HR 5932 — Omnibus education authorization.

Latest action: Bill died in Senate on Oct. 27. House had approved it on Oct. 26.

Background: Previously numbered HR 5115, S 695, S 1310 and S 1676. Combined into one bill, compromise negotiated Oct. 18.

Reference: Compromise advancing, Weekly Report, p. 3614; partisan jockeying, p. 3427; House passage, p. 2317.

Casting Blame

Democrats complained that the bill had been languishing since July because administration officials had lost interest and did not want to negotiate the details. But two weeks before the end of the session, when Bush was taking a shellacking on the budget from GOP members, White House officials began asking for meetings.

Although Sen. Nancy Landon Kassebaum, R-Kan., and Rep. Bill Goodling, R-Pa., had worked long hours to move the legislation, a small number of Republicans accused Democrats of subverting the process. They included Helms, Coats, Grassley, and Sens. Malcolm Wallop, R-Wyo., and Gordon J. Humphrey, R-N.H., among others.

The GOP senators noted, for example, that there was never any formal conference between the House and Senate. The House had passed one bill (HR 5115), while the Senate had passed two (S 695, S 1310) and still needed to pass its teacher-training measure (S 1676) in order to go to conference.

Like the final education measure, the teacher-training bill was not allowed to move forward. So House and Senate members got together anyway and melded all the bills in a "pre-conference." The House then proceeded to pass a new bill — the result of the conference — on Oct. 26.

At the White House, officials complained that House members had sat on the president's bill since it was first sent to Capitol Hill in April 1989.

"If you're looking for villains, look to the House and the failure to get it through earlier," said Roger B. Porter, assistant to the president for economic and domestic policy. "The fact was that it went down to the wire, and the Senate is a place where a small number of people can hold something up." ■

By Jill Zuckman

Who Needs the Marines?

From the halls of Montezuma to the shores of redundancy

By BRUCE VAN VOORST

They are the nation's oldest fighting unit. Their stirring anthem and brave slogan—"Semper Fidelis," always faithful—have lifted patriotic hearts for 122 years. They have won some of the most revered battles in military history: Belleau Wood, Guadalcanal, Iwo Jima, Inchon. Their nicknames are synonyms for fierce fighting men: Jarheads, Leathernecks, Devil Dogs.

But now the U.S. Marine Corps is battling its most awesome and implacable enemy: the defense budget squeeze. Says Marine Commandant General Alfred Gray: "The coming budget climate creates the most difficult times for the Marines since World War II."

FREDERICK SUTTER

A new role needed

The corps's problem is to find a mission that would justify its continued existence. In what defense specialist Edward Luttwak calls a "geopolitical meltdown," the collapse of the Warsaw Pact has forced the Pentagon to reassess what sorts of war the U.S. may have to fight in the future. Rather than a huge tank-and-artillery Armageddon on the central front of Europe, the most likely outbreaks will be "low-intensity conflicts" such as the American invasions of Grenada and Panama. Although these are precisely the sort of assignment for which the Marines were created, they played no central role in either of them. Their absence bolstered the arguments of those who want to dismantle the corps.

In their attempt to define a new role, the Marines have reoriented themselves toward becoming a contingency force for low-intensity conflicts. What unnerves the Marines is that, as Grenada and Panama demonstrated, other armed services are grabbing the action. Acting on its post-Vietnam review, the Army has added five light divisions to two legendary units of its own, the 82nd paratroopers and the 101st Airborne Division. The Army now has seven light divisions, so called because they are highly mobile forces boasting most of the same fighting capabilities as the Marines. On top of that, the Pentagon has developed the 38,000-troop Special Operations Forces which include the Navy's sea, air and land SEAL forces; the Air Force's First Special Operations Wing; and the Army's highly trained Ranger force, for use against terrorists and in guerrilla warfare.

In a nation that maintains four air forces (the real one plus one in each of the other services), it should come as no surprise that taxpayers are supporting more low-intensity warfare units than they need. But the budget squeeze has sparked a debate about whether the U.S. can afford three military forces designed to do the same job. "We just can't maintain all these forces in this budget climate," says defense expert Steven Canby.

Earlier this month General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, predicted that the Pentagon budget would be slashed 25% to $218 billion in five years. For the Army, that would mean a one-third cut in personnel, to 500 million. For the Marines, a proportional reduction would mean losing 60,000 of its 195,000 Marines.

On the record, Marine and Army officials insist that their units do not overlap. Behind the scenes, however, Army officers charge that the Marines may be fine for assaulting enemy shorelines but "can't engage beyond the beaches." Marine Brigadier General John Sheehan counterattacked last fall by claiming that an Army light division, which has less firepower than a comparable Marine unit, "is light enough to get there, but just light enough to get itself into trouble. You don't need the Army building toward another Marine Corps." When Powell heard that senior Marine and Army officers would testify before Congress, he insisted on appearing with them to head off any public sniping. "The need for flexibility," he declared, "dictates that we maintain both Marine and Army ground forces."

Powell has a point in saying that the three forces do not exactly duplicate one another. The Marines, prepositioned in three expeditionary forces for power projection overseas, have the capacity to come ashore and sustain themselves for 30 days without further help. Their units come equipped with their own close air support, while the Army has to depend on the Air Force. The Army's mobile divisions, on the other hand, can drop on targets from aircraft. But to gain such mobility, they must travel with less artillery and heavy armor. The lightly armed Special Operations Forces are equipped to make lightning raids behind enemy front lines. Still, there is enormous overlap between the three separate forces. Taken together, they are simply too much of a good thing.

In an analysis of the Pentagon, defense specialist Richard Halloran argues that the best way to eliminate the glut of low-intensity forces would be to meld the Marines into the Army. Although many experts agree with Halloran, any move in that direction would encounter huge political land mines. Harry Truman once tried to slash the Marines on the grounds that the Navy did not need its own army, but he was beaten by what he described as a Leatherneck "propaganda machine that is almost equal to Stalin's." Aside from the clout of ten Senators and 21 Representatives in the current Congress who served in the Marines, the corps exudes such a mystical aura that it is unassailable.

As the budget battle rages, the Marines will take heavy hits, but they seem sure to prevail once again, a testament to their political firepower. ■



SUTTER

WHO PACKS THE MOST PUNCH?

Though a Marine expeditionary battalion has fewer personnel, it is equipped with more heavy tanks and armored vehicles than the combined forces of the Army's 82nd Airborne Division and 7th Light Infantry.

	Marine Battalion	Army Division*
Personnel	18,000	24,000
Tanks	17 (Heavy M1A1)	58 (Light M551)
Armored vehicles	74	0
Artillery	33	62
Attack helicopters	12	29
Attack aircraft	74	0†

*Includes the 7th Light and 82nd Airborne
†Close air support supplied by the Air Force

Essay

George J. Church

The Case for War

So Congress wants to reassert its constitutional prerogative to decide whether or not the nation should go to war. About time. U.S. Presidents have gone much too far toward claiming (or rather exercising without even bothering to claim) the power of Louis XIV to send a whole nation into battle on his sole judgment, even whim. The makers of the Constitution were determined never to give one man that power in the new republic, and they were right. If the U.S. is to fight Iraq, it should be by conscious decision of its elected representatives, reached after full debate.

But that debate should not be dominated by the antiwar critics, as the front and op-ed pages have been in the past few days. In a full-fledged congressional debate, one may hope, the case for war will be argued more forcefully and cogently than an oddly tongue-tied Bush Administration has lately managed to do. And there *is* a compelling case for war. Yes, even if one believes, as I do, that it will probably not be won in a week or so by heavy bombing, but may turn into a long, bloody and disruptive struggle with major casualties.

Oil is one reason, and to make (not concede) that point is by no means to admit that we would be fighting for a few cents a gallon on the price of gasoline or to maintain a fat, self-indulgent life-style. What is at stake is the power to shut off the heat in millions of homes, freezing the old and frail; to close down thousands of factories and utility plants, causing mass unemployment and no little additional poverty. A price run-up or supply restriction sharp enough could touch off a similar worldwide recession—and an inflationary recession to boot. That power cannot be put into the hands of a megalomaniac who can be trusted to deal with anyone who might try to stop him by squeezing in the most vulnerable spot. And if Saddam Hussein gets away with his seizure of Kuwait, he will be master not only of the supplies from that nation and his own Iraq, but also, through invasion or bullying, of the oil pumped out of Saudi Arabia, the gulf sheikdoms and other states. Of course, the U.S. should have acted long ago to lessen its dependence on foreign oil. Of course, it should do everything it can in that direction now. So what? For the immediate future, a reliable supply of oil at affordable prices is vital to any modern economy. It just is, and the loftiest moral and ecological disapproval cannot change that brute fact.

But oil is not the only or even main cause for war, whatever the cynics say. Would the U.S. have fought to conquer the Middle Eastern oil fields if Saddam Hussein had peacefully persuaded Kuwait, Saudi Arabia et al. to restrict production enough to shoot the price up to $40 per bbl.? Get real. The central issue is aggression, and how—make that whether—it can be contained in the post–cold war world. And forget all the moaning about shedding blood to keep feudal autocracies in control of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. One might well wish for more appealing victims and potential victims to champion. But if aggression is to be opposed only when the targets are kindly liberal democracies, the world is going to become a far more dangerous, savage and bloody place.

Comparisons of Saddam Hussein to Hitler may be overblown. The Iraqi dictator has not built a Middle Eastern Auschwitz—yet. But Saddam does seem to share one Hitlerian trait identified by British historian Alan Bullock: he is "consumed [by] the will to power in its crudest and purest form . . . power and domination for its own sake," to be expanded without limit. If Saddam is allowed to keep part of Kuwait—and make no mistake, that is what those advocating a "diplomatic solution" are hinting at—he will be back to take a bite out of another victim. Not right away, maybe, but after the U.S. troops have left Saudi Arabia and all has returned to a delusive quiet. If he meets resistance, he will use chemical, bacteriological and, one day, nuclear weapons. Millions may die.

Nor is Saddam the only leader who would redraw the map of the world by force—to rectify border disputes, reclaim "unredeemed" territory, seize a neighbor's natural resources. What lesson would these others draw from a failure to stop Saddam? Go ahead. The U.S. certainly will not stop you. Oh, it may shout and scream and bluster. But if it did not use force when a vital economic interest was threatened, when it had a clear moral justification and the support of a worldwide coalition, when would it? Letting Iraq's aggression stand is a recipe for a world of endless aggressions, of local and not-so-local wars, some possibly nuclear (India vs. Pakistan for a fourth round? Israel against the Arabs yet again?), and of bloody chaos from which the U.S. could not forever stand aloof.

But, says the antiwar faction, Saddam can be turned back without war, by persistence in the embargo. If only that were true! All too probably, those who make this argument are deluding themselves. Far more likely, if Iraq is still occupying Kuwait next Aug. 2, a year after the invasion, much of the world will conclude that Saddam has won. The embargo will begin leaking badly; nation after nation will start casting around for a diplomatic solution; Washington itself will be under growing pressure to bring G.I.s home from Saudi Arabia where they will have been "sitting around in the sand for a year accomplishing nothing." A formula will be found to let Iraq keep part of Kuwait. Curtains for any hope of a world in which aggression does not pay.

Maybe, just maybe, Saddam can be scared out of Kuwait by the threat of a war that would destroy his military machine and/or his life. But that would require something like an ultimatum, backed by a genuine readiness to fight, and Saddam might not believe it even then. So the U.S. has to prepare for war. Anyone with a shred of human feeling can say that only with a suppressed scream of fear and pain. The U.S. confronts a bitter, tragic, even ghastly necessity. But, this time, it is a necessity that there is no honorable way to avoid. ■

by DAVID R. GERGEN
Editor at Large

CAN AMERICA STAY ON TOP?

If you find the world confusing, don't worry: You have plenty of company. Events have suddenly gone on fast-forward so that we are whirling through history at a dizzying speed. Moscow, Berlin, Brussels, Tokyo and this week Houston—every dateline brings news of incredible changes. To make sense of it all, it is worth remembering two essential points.

First, history is moving decisively in America's favor. In intellectual circles, it is fashionable to argue that we face a dark, foreboding future. Just the opposite is true: America stands on the threshold of what could be a golden era. Thanks in considerable measure to our own perseverance, our most dangerous enemy is imploding, totalitarianism is on the run and the world is rushing to embrace political and economic freedoms. It is plain foolishness to keep flagellating ourselves at the very moment that Western values—our values—are triumphing.



There is also good reason to believe that America can remain the world's leader. We can no longer call every shot from the Oval Office; we must be part of an international steering committee with the Europeans and Japanese. But have no doubt, the rest of the world wants us to continue as first among equals. Should we falter and Japan or Germany step forward to take our place, the chandeliers in every world capital would vibrate from the seismic shocks. Thankfully, no one knows that better than today's generation of Japanese and German leaders.

As barriers have come down around the world, economic growth is picking up. The cover package in this week's issue, together with a provocative new book by Charles Morris, makes clear that the world is heading toward an economic boom. America can not only share in it but can stay on top economically. There was a time during the 1970s and early 1980s when our companies grew fat and lazy. The Japanese started to blow us away in key industries. Then, as Morris points out in his book, many of our best corporations—IBM, Xerox, GE, Ford, Cummins, Caterpillar—began fighting back and can now compete with anybody, anywhere. Our chemical and food companies remain the best in the world. The productivity of our manufacturing workers rose dramatically in the late 1980s.

But there is a second point to remember that is equally important: America cannot afford complacency. During our fat years, we inflicted lots of damage upon ourselves that is still there and could get worse. We allowed our public debts to skyrocket, our schools to plummet, our middle class to stagnate, our poor to grow more disillusioned. As much as other nations want our leadership, they worry that we will lose faith in ourselves. A runaway bestseller in France, written by President Mitterrand's closest adviser, argues that America, like the Soviet Union, is fading. And that causes fear. America has carried the banner of world leadership so long that no one can be sure what would happen if we dropped it. Probably, the world would retreat into regional power blocs, scrapping over bits and pieces of commercial advantage and drifting toward conflict.

Not long ago, a colleague obtained a private paper from the Japan Economic Planning Agency forecasting that throughout the 1990s America would continue growing but Japan would grow twice as fast. He later asked Britain's Margaret Thatcher what difference that would make. "It would be a disaster," she reportedly said. Mrs. Thatcher is right (as usual). While Japan has a much smaller economy than ours, it now commands world finance and before the end of the decade, its per capita income could far exceed America's. A united Europe will be the largest marketplace, and investors are hopping to get in on its future. The United States should welcome high growth rates in Japan and Europe, but we must learn better ways to keep up. Should we allow them to outpace us, or if we slid into recession while they chugged happily along, Americans would turn crabby and our latent xenophobia would explode into the open.

It is thus essential, both for our own welfare and for world stability, that we pull ourselves together. We have led the world to the edge of a promised land, and if we just live up to our own values, we'll love every minute of the coming world boom. ■

IRISH AMERICA

JULY/AUGUST 1990

$2.95

AN INTERVIEW WITH

PEGGY NOONAN



Children of the North * The First Irish American Saint?

Read Her LIPS

An Interview With Peggy Noonan

As speechwriter for President Reagan and for President Bush during his election campaign, Peggy Noonan offers a unique insight into life in the White House. She is interviewed by Michael Scanlon.

It was New Orleans, August, 1988. George Bush was behind Dukakis by 14 points in the polls. Dukakis had just made the speech of his life at the Democratic National Convention. Bush waited on deck for his chance to address his own crowd and the nation. He had just stumbled badly by picking Dan Quayle as his running mate. The press was all over him. His acceptance speech would make or break him. The speech, the speech, the speech. The media was ready to spring into action the second after he delivered it and pounce on the comparisons. Bush needed a big one. Nothing less than a home run. He stepped up.

Remember? "I want a kinder, gentler nation"..."Read my lips—no new taxes"...and then, "This is America: The Knights of Columbus, the Grange, Hadassah ... a brilliant diversity spread like stars, like a thousand points of light in a broad and peaceful sky."

It was a grand slam! The beginning of the end for Dukakis. The next day the 14 points began to melt away in the hot August sun. In November, Bush won the election by nine points. And whom had George Bush called in to write his "do-or-die" acceptance speech - to fashion the phrases that have now become part of our popular speech? He turned to the same person who had done it for Reagan in his most memorable speeches—the 40th-anniversary D-Day speech and his stirring remarks the day the "Challenger" blew up.

Her name: Peggy Noonan - a young, good-looking, Brooklyn-born, Irish American and author of the current best-seller *What I Saw at the Revolution —A Political Life in the Reagan Era.* These days you see her on TV talk shows or read about her in gossip columns, a recent one referring to her as "The Belle of the Ball," with Henry Kissinger and Laurence Rockefeller vying to sit next to her at a big Republican dinner.

But before this fame and celebrity, and before returning to New York from Washington, she had served two and a half years as a special assistant to Ronald Reagan. She tells all about it in her memoir. The book paints rich, vivid and memorable portraits of the powerful in the Reagan White House. With style and a keen sense of humor, Peggy Noonan describes how government in the executive branch works on a day-to-day basis where history unfolds by the minute.

The day before this interview, Noonan delivered the commencement address at her alma mater, Fairleigh Dickinson University, where she had been honored with a Doctorate of Humane Letters. "I told my two-and-a-half-year-old son, Will, he may now refer to me as 'Dr. Mom' - that is if he wants his dessert."

Scanlon: You make several references to the Irish and things Irish in your book. How Irish are you?

Noonan: I am as Irish as you can be. I was born in Brooklyn in an Irish-Italian neighborhood, which was intensely Catho-


THE LAND BREAKERS
The Romagnolis' Table
THE HOME BOOK OF
AMERICAN QUOTATIONS
APOLLO
JEAN STAFFORD
OSCAR
TRAIL of TEARS
ULYSSES
WHAT I SAW AT THE REVOLUTION
NOONAN

lic. And the people I grew up around were my mother's parents, who were Irish. My mother's name is Mary Jane Byrne. Her father came from County Donegal and her mother was Mary Dorian from County Clare. My father, Jim Noonan, was born here and his parents were born here and nobody quite knows when the Noonans and the Dalys on my Dad's side came over. It looks like sort of late 19th century.

But the biggest emotional presence in my life when I was a kid were my mother's father's two sisters, Aunt Jane-Jane and Aunt Etta. They came over here about 1912 or 1915 and they were pure Irish. They taught me to go to Mass and they taught me attitudes about life. I absorbed from them the very lovely, beautiful old patriotism that the Irish felt about America. It came naturally to them. They embraced America very quickly and saw it totally as a place of promise and literally unlimited possibilities.

Scanlon: And have you been to Ireland?

Noonan: Oh, yes. I've been to Ireland three or four times. The first time I ever went back, I met a very old man named Paddy Kennedy, who as a little boy had grown up with my mother's father. He was so excited when I came to see him that he poured me a glass of whiskey and we sat and drank the whiskey and he told me about the day my grandfather left Ireland. My great-grandfather walked my grandfather down to the end of the road where he was to be picked up and taken to a train. And my great-grandfather put his hand on grandpa's shoulder and shook his hand, didn't kiss, didn't embrace—very Irish. Shook his hand and said,"Go now and never come back to hungry Ireland." A whole class, a whole race of people, who thought it was finished where they came from. And who had—luckily for the American gene pool—enough grit and optimism and wit to come here.

Scanlon: So you were always proud to proclaim your Irishness.

Noonan: I've always thought being Irish was wonderful. I don't mean special like Jewish, like the Chosen. I just mean wonderful, you know. Lucky. I found, by the way, when I became involved in conservative politics in the '80's that every now and then I'd meet some guy, a big intellectual or a conservative writer, and I'd sit and talk with him and we're having coffee and eventually — and this happened more than once —we'd talk about ethnic backgrounds and our families. And they would say,"I like the Irish. I always wished I was Irish." Among conservatives, there's a special thing about being Irish. They're charmed, or they see something in the Irish. It did not pass without notice by me that in Tom Wolfe's *Bonfire of the Vanities*, which is very rough and unillusioned about all of New York's ethnic groups, that the only heroic ethnic group was the Irish.

Scanlon: I noticed that too.

Noonan: Remember the tough little guy in the DA's office?

Scanlon: Yes, there are a few colorful Irish characters in that book with that certain integrity and toughness.

Noonan: He's not Irish, Wolfe. He's got that thing, though, that conservative Irish love. Interesting.

Scanlon: Speaking of affection for the Irish, you, as a young girl,were enamored of JFK weren't you?

Noonan: The family hero.

Scanlon: But then after JFK you started to move towards conservatism, although you quote your mother, in your book, as saying, "My father always said, stick with the Democrats."

Noonan: That's right, "the party of the working man." As soon as the Irish landed here, the Democrats organized them. Everybody was a Democrat in those neighborhoods in Brooklyn in the 30's, 40's and 50's. You didn't have to say it. It was like saying you were Catholic. Of course, you're Catholic, you live here. Of course, you're a Democrat.

Scanlon: But many of the children of these people have now gone over to become Republicans like you.

Noonan: That's right.

Scanlon: In your book you introduce a kind of central-casting character named "Wadsworth Worthington, III" and you describe him as a certain type of Republican: over 45, a man of pinstripes, parentage and pedigree. A country-club type, the kind who wear those funny plaid pants. How does a woman with your background feel about these people?

Noonan: When I was a teenager, I resented them. And one reason I would never be a Republican in my early 20's was because of "Wadsworth Worthington-ism." Because you see, I wasn't on the side of the members of the country club, I was on the side of the waiters. But I'll tell you how I feel about them now. I feel a certain tenderness towards the "Wadsworth Worthingtons," because they are a vanishing race and a vanishing breed. America is changing. The Protestant ascendancy is over. Those people are not only increasingly in the minority, but somehow their traditions and their values and their way of understanding the world is leaving little by little, as America changes demographically, as we all change, as the world changes. I don't mean to sound patronizing, that's not how I feel, but there's something that makes me feel almost protective about them. We're losing them. That may seem funny. I mean, the great universities are still graduating "Wadsworth Worthington IVs" (laughs). We probably shouldn't worry too much about ole "Wadsworth."

Scanlon: How many people switched to the Republican Party because they somehow saw it as the "white" party in this country?

Noonan: I would say not many. People from Democratic families became Republicans in the late 60's, the 70's and then the 80's. That's when the trend began and it was about two issues. Probably the most important one was taxes and what your government is doing to you and should do for you. And the other was America and foreign affairs, America vis-a-vis Communism, America vis-a-vis strength in the world. They came to see the Democrats as the big-spending, big-taxing, weak, bloated government party. That's why they went Republican.

Scanlon: You see, I sometimes say to my friends who have switched to the Republican party,"What about your grandparents who came over here on the boat and were taken care of by the Democrats, and now you're going off and joining the bankers and 'Wadsworth Worthingtons' of this world. Don't you feel some sense of betrayal?" And after we are finished talking, I sometimes perceive it comes down to a black/white issue and that's why they really switched.

Noonan: We don't perceive it the same way. America is not a racist country. It would be silly not to declare that we have certainly had our racial problems but Americans are not perniciously racist. Americans perceive at this time that the black/welfare statist/pressure group/special interest group people have gained an extraordinary power in the Democratic party. There is this radical wing of the Democratic party, like the leftist Jackson wing, the "hug-Fidel, increase-the-welfare-state, hug-Arafat, and apologize-for-Louis-Farrakhan-wing." And that makes people wary of the Democrats. You know, the American people do have an understanding that if you're going to be ruled by pressure groups, you probably will not successfully look out for the whole. Republicans at least have resisted being ruled by pressure groups within their own party in this way. And I should add, by the way, that blacks like George Bush to an extent they haven't liked a Republican in a long time, which is very heartening and very

good.

Scanlon: So it looks like you'll never have the problem of becoming a Democrat again.

Noonan: I had an early defensiveness about it, of course. I'm Irish! (laughs). But look, the Democratic Party changed. Sometime you've got to get over it. It isn't what it was when you were a kid or when I was a kid or when our parents were kids. It changed in the 70's. Sometimes you've got to admit change happened. Now if the Republicans are smart, they will open up their doors in a really big way and become a much more inclusive party. They'll be teaching all their party operatives to speak Spanish, to begin with.

Scanlon: Now turning to your book, has Reagan contacted you about it?

Noonan: No. He never did. Reagan was someone I worked for and admired very much, but he was not my friend and I didn't have the illusion that he was. He was not a man who was ever in touch with me and I thought that he would never be in touch with me about the book. And he hasn't been. And I suspect he didn't read it, which disappoints me.

Scanlon: That's amazing to me.

Noonan: But it's not his type of book. It's just not.

Scanlon: Well, is he that much of a reader to begin with?

Noonan: Yes, he is. But he's the kind of reader who likes authors like Louis L'Amour and Tom Clancy—a little history sometimes.

Scanlon: I sensed from your book a big disparity in the kind of attention you gave him and the response you got from him.

Noonan: That's Reagan. That's the central paradox of the man, really, in a way. He had a lovely, and genuine, but surface, warmth, a warmth that was utterly egalitarian. He could sit for two hours with the doorman from the Mayflower Hotel and they could shoot the breeze and talk about life and Reagan would have a ball. He wasn't doing *noblesse oblige*. He'd have fun. When you met him, he made you comfortable in a way that sometimes made you feel that you ought to make him a little comfortable. But he was a paradox. When you came right down to it, there was what his friends called "the wall," past which you did not get. And behind this wall was a man who didn't have many friends, and who was, it appeared, not close even to members of his own family. It was jarring. I still don't understand it. That actually may be a character or personality perfectly suited for modern politics. But it was jarring.

Scanlon: There seemed to be something about him which fascinated you in an almost teenage adoration kind of way. Have you thought about that? Or what do you make of it?

Noonan: I have. Maybe the best way I can explain it was that, in the late 70's, early 80's, I really thought my country was in trouble in so many ways. First of all economically, and then in terms of our spirit, in terms of our understanding of the world and our role as a player for good in the world. And I came to see Reagan as the leader of the modern Conservative movement, as the man who might arguably be the only man who could really help us out. He was this enormously attractive, funny, unpretentious, charming, slightly roguish fellow. I just thought, "This guy is great, this guy I feel sure is the FDR of my time." And I really wanted to work for him. And when I did work for him, I just adored him. But being close to him, or being someone in his proximity for a year or two years, made me, not lose my admiration—I walked out of there admiring him—but feeling the disorientation that those who worked around Reagan always inevitably felt.

Scanlon: You certainly worked well together judging from the fine speeches that resulted. Wilfred Sheed said in his review of your book in the *New York Times* that you worked with the part of Reagan that was the best Reagan, the Irish workingman's Reagan.

Noonan: Yes, and since that is where I am from, that's where my sympathies lie, and since that is part of what he is, I do think, yes, there was a certain pinging and ponging off the two of us.

Scanlon: But as a reader of your book, one wished for him to be less withholding.

Noonan: Yes, and as a person one did too, really.

Scanlon: When you left the White House, he didn't even acknowledge it.

Noonan: It's true and it hurt me. Look, there was a guy, a very top, top aide, who spent almost every day in the Oval office with Reagan the first four years of the administration, and he left and went somewhere else. And Reagan never called him to chat. Reagan never called to say, "You know, I miss you, buddy." Reagan never called and asked his advice. Reagan liked him. But the guy wasn't in the room anymore, so, he disappeared off Reagan's radar screen. It hurt me. I'd worked there almost two and a half years and I felt in my imagination that I had some relationship with him. And when I left and got a goodbye letter from the autograph pen that had nothing to do with Reagan, it hurt. You know, those things do hurt.

Scanlon: Now Bush, on the other hand

Noonan: Different cat.

Scanlon: Seems like a regular straight arrow kind of guy from what I read in your book. He calls you from the airplane, "How're you doing, can I help out?" and so on.

Noonan: A different kind of cat. He still does it. I was at the Gridiron dinner a few weeks ago in Washington. I was extremely flattered to be invited. Five years in Washington, no one ever asked me to go to the Gridiron. I wanted to go and see it. I wanted to observe it as the insiders' inside dinner, you know. The press puts on a big show for the politicians and they get some good shots in on the pols and the pols make speeches, get some good shots in on the press. So I get dressed up in my gown and I go.

And Bush did a very gracious thing. As we all sat down to our appetizer, the President sends over his personal aide, Tim, who says: "Peggy, I hate to disturb you while you are eating, but the President wants to see you, could you go up and see him?" And, naturally, my first impulse was to be funny and say, "It's all gimme-gimme with you guys" (laughs). But naturally, what I did say was, "Of course, Tim, I'd love to see him." So this is Bush—and he's so different from Reagan—he's up there on the dais with Bill Rehnquist and Mrs. Graham and the First Lady and Donnie Graham and the Washington establishment. And he's just sitting around shooting the breeze and he just wanted me to come up and spend time with him and chat.

And he wanted to tease me very nicely and say, "We all see you on TV. What's it like being a celebrity?" This from the President of the United States. And he asked me about my baby. He knows my son and he knows how close I feel with my son. So that was always a thing between us because he's got the same thing with his kids. He introduced me to everyone on the dais, and then he just wanted to sit and chat. And that's Bush just being a person. I used to work for him. He hasn't seen me since January of '89—actually, that's not true, he's seen me a lot since then, but he hasn't had a chance to sit down and talk. And he just made me feel I missed him, and he made me feel, oh, I've got a friend here. And that's a nice way to feel with people you used to work with.

Scanlon: And I'm sure he's very appreciative that you wrote this great acceptance speech for him when he really needed a great speech.

Noonan: Well, we worked well together, I must say.

Scanlon: And I wonder if he's thinking about asking you back from time to time to write more speeches. Wouldn't you think that he would?

Noonan: No, I wouldn't. The day I left him to finish my book and then come here to New York, we shook hands on, "If you're ever in a jam, here I am." But his presidency is not, and was not intended to be, a rhetorical presidency. It's not the thing he gives the most attention to.

As for me, I hoped my book would kind of blast me out of speech-writing and help to situate me as a writer. And I live in New York now. Although if he ever asked me to, if something terrible ever happened, and he said I really want to work with you on this, I'd say, of course. And I'd take the shuttle down there.

Scanlon: Getting back to Reagan for a moment, how do you think he is doing now?

Noonan: Not well. I think the realm of former presidents is an intensely awkward one. It has been awkward for Nixon for some special reasons. But it would have been awkward for him anyway. It has been awkward for Jimmy Carter, and it is awkward for Reagan. I think he has made some mistakes. He is a private citizen now, but a former President is never a private citizen, and he never will be again. And if he chooses to go out to our biggest economic competitor and make a speech for $2 million, making it almost appear as if an American President had been rented by our competitors, it becomes a public relations disaster. It should not have been done. Reagan, you see, had a really wonderful ear. Some people have a tin ear and some people have a great ear. Reagan had a great ear for the mood of the American public and for what the common guy was saying. And when I read in the paper he's going to Japan, I thought, fine, he's going to make a speech. But for $2 million, uh-oh, his ear is failing. He doesn't know that people are not going to like this, the people who love him, like myself, are not going to like this. So it was a mistake. When you make a mistake that big and colorful, it takes a while to recoup the loss. But he will.

Scanlon: Some people have suggested that Nancy may have had something to do with the Japan trip.

Noonan: The gossip. One thing unfortunate about being Mrs. Reagan is that she gets blamed for everything that he does which doesn't work. I'll tell you, being a First Lady is a horrible position if you are not universally beloved. And she was not, of course. So, I don't know. People say it's her greed. You know what? Maybe it was his greed. I don't know.

Scanlon: Now how about some of the others in the Reagan White House? You worked for Pat Buchanan. How Irish was he?

Noonan: I'll tell you it's impossible for me to think of Pat as anything but Irish. However, I think he's part Irish, part Scottish, and his mother may be German. I don't know. He explains it in his book but I forgot. And I forgot it in part because to me he's Irish.

Scanlon: How about Don Regan? You depict a scene comparing Tip O'Neill and Don Regan, both Boston Irish, and O'Neill comes off better—at least the way I read it.

Noonan: Well, Don Regan had a case of "Wadsworth Worthingtonitis," you know. He wasn't put off by them. He thought: "Where's the country club? What's the address? I'll join." This was not a man who went nuts identifying with waiters (laughs). And see, as we Irish become Republican, forgive me, Don Regan, but that is not what we want to become. We want to remain true to ourselves and to our own sympathies and our own people, and be in the Republican party for the right reasons, and not just because we're climbing. Not just because we want to join the club. Yes, the club is a nice place to be, nothing wrong with it, but for the right reasons.

Scanlon: I enjoyed the scene in your book where you are working with Richard Darman and some Harvard types on Bush's acceptance speech and they were dictating what words they thought the average citizen likes and doesn't like. And you were correcting them.

Noonan: I had fun with it. But that is not so much a story about ethnicity as it is a story about politics. These are upper-middle-class and sometimes wealthy guys who came from a certain America and who tried to keep in touch, but they are too busy running the world to be in touch. But they know it's good to be in touch, so they have these odd ideas on what the "people" think. And when Dick Darman, whom I adore, would say things like, "Don't write the word 'excellent', that's an elitist term," it would bring out the Jimmy Cagney in me. Do you know what I mean?

Scanlon: Yes, and you must have felt a sense of power in pointing out to them what the average person was thinking.

Noonan: Yes, because I knew more, and also because when you bother to know more, there is an implicit respect in it, and when you just get these odd ideas about what quotes "they"—meaning the people—like and don't like, it's disrespectful.

Scanlon: You were actually offered the job as head of the Office of Public Liaison, which, by long tradition, is the highest staff position held by a woman in the White House. Was there a part of you that considered taking that job?

Noonan: Yes, the part of me that would like to rise, the part of me that likes to be treated well at cocktail parties and that knew that if I took that job, all of a sudden my status within Washington would have increased to the extent that people would have paid more attention to me at cocktail parties, because they would have had to lobby me. And I would have been a good person to know. I would have been an assistant to the President. So all of that was good. But my reasons for ultimately not taking it had nothing to do with class and ethnicity and that stuff. It had much more to do with temperament and knowing what my talents are. I mean, I didn't want the Peter Principle to work in my life. I knew what my talents were and I knew I was a writer and that's where I ought to be. And I should not be a greeter and deal-maker and compromise-putter-together and all that because I don't have the right temperament for it. And it doesn't seem as much fun as writing, you know?

Scanlon: And indeed, as far as getting the attention and fame, it seems to have come to you from writing anyway. In your book you mention how reading poetry helped you in the writing of the speeches.

Noonan: Yes, it knocks down barriers in the head somehow.

Scanlon: Do you still read much poetry?

Noonan: Yes, just the other day I was reading Marianne Moore. I like her baseball poetry best, "Hometown Piece for Mssrs. Alston and Reese." Wonderful stuff. I went through a major Edna St. Vincent Millay period last summer. I loved poetry when I was a kid. I could recite poetry - a very Irish thing to do. I grew up with people who would recite "In Flanders Field" and sentimental poems about America. Henry Van Dyke type poems. I grew up with them and I thought it was normal to know poetry and it still means a lot to me. And I still read it. I thought of Matthew Arnold's "Dover Beach" the other day and picked it up and read it. I don't understand a lot of that poem but it just sends me. I went through a big W. H. Auden time while I was in the White House. I grew up when poets were as big as movie stars, when *Life* did major stories on people like Robert Frost and Carl Sandburg. Poets were the real thing. They're not so much now. Poetry is too often obscure, in words sometimes utterly

inaccessible, except to other self-obsessed neurotics in New York.

Scanlon: What kind of writing are you working on these days?

Noonan: A novel. It's based in New York, and it's about the people at the heart of the dysfunction of New York. What used to be page one of the *Daily News* headline and is now page 13: "Girl, 4, Thrown from Roof of Housing Project." I'm fascinated by "Girl, 4." I'm fascinated by who she is and what her life is like and the dysfunction there. I'm about to go up to Mother Teresa's people in Harlem to see just what they do. Another central character in the book is this girl's mom, who is in trouble and trying to solve her problem but can't manage to do it. I'm in the part of creativity, well, I'm in the obsessed stage. When I go into full obsession on something, on a thought or an idea, I start clipping things from newspapers and magazines that have to do with it. And I start taking notes. And sooner or later, I'll be going through my house after a few weeks or months, and in whatever drawer I open, I find clippings. When there're clippings in every drawer, I know I'm really totally obsessed. Then I go through my notes and I realize, oh, you've got 20 pages of ideas here. So then I start to type it up. Then I put it in a large notebook. Now I'm in the part where I go to lunch with people who I think are very smart and might be helpful to me. I tell them what I'm up to with regard to the novel and ask, "If you have any ideas or thoughts or if anything crosses your desk, please call and tell me." And people tell me wonderful things.

Scanlon: Will this novel have a political theme?

Noonan: It will have a political subtext. It would have to, if I'm writing it. But also because I think I am a somewhat hopeful person. And if you are writing about profound and pervasive dysfunction in America's cities, it may be good enough, if you are an artist, to just write about it. But if you are a journalist and a person who cares very much about the cities, it is also right for you to consider the definition of the problem and also remedies and answers to it.

Scanlon: But is that really the function of a novel?

Noonan: Well, suppose you have an author like Alan Drury who is so much fun to read. Alan Drury was always getting his political subtext in there. And that's fine and that's legitimate. I mean, what an honorable thing to entertain people while informing them. So I tend also a little bit in that direction.

Scanlon: Sounds like there's a little bit of Peggy Noonan who wants to carry on an apostolic mission.

Noonan: (Laughs) I wouldn't put it that way, but there is a sense of, well, there must be answers. Also, as a person, I happen to be engaged by people who are looking for answers. I'm very excited by the things they tell me. I'm excited by people who see problems and look for answers. It's very moving to me.

Scanlon: So this is the future of Peggy Noonan?

Noonan: Yes, writer. I'll always stay in politics, of course. I love politics.

Scanlon: Now I know this is switching gears a bit, but you mentioned earlier that you are a hopeful person. Are you a religious person, I mean, do you go to church?

Noonan: I do these days. I didn't for a long time, and then I went back. Then I went away, then I came back. I'm in the back phase now. It's funny. I don't know if this is Irish or—maybe it is—I don't know. But I cannot—I cannot pluck the Catholicism from my heart. It is there. And I don't wish to pluck it from my heart anyway. It is there as strong as when I was a kid. The beliefs I had then are the beliefs I have now. And I stray from them, always knowing God will forgive me. But I still believe in everything. And I guess it's the greatest gift the Irish and my family have given me. They taught me and I believed. But it's a lovely gift to have.

Scanlon: When did you go back?

Noonan: My big going back was when

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"Father Capuchin" to Detroiters. He represented his order at auto-workers union meetings, at high school commencements and the like. He loved people and he was loved, even by those who called him "that damned Irishman."

When World War II broke out, he was seventy, and, when the bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, he grieved that man, blessed with reason, should have to conceive an instrument of such wholesale destruction. He said, "Like a vast school for supposed-to-be philosophers that elaborate their days and go into eternity blowing bubbles, so is that generation that fails to foster gratitude to God. "The first sign of intelligence," he said later, "is gratitude to God." Man's inhumanity in time of war puzzled him and saddened him. His own faith was absolute.

During his final years, the Capuchins shifted Solanus to St. Michael's in Brooklyn and to St. Felix in Huntington, Indiana, to provide him relief, but petitioners sought him out. "Father, through the years I have often heard people speak of you," said a persistent caller. Solanus shrugged off the compliment with a practiced ease. "People speak often of Jesse James, too," he'd jest.

When he died on July 31, 1967, at 86 years and 60 years a Capuchin, after a long, painful illness, he sat upright and declared, "I give my soul to you, Jesus Christ." He left nothing material, only a legacy of love. More than 5,000 people filed passed his coffin at St. Bonaventure's chapel; more than 6,000 attended his requiem. As our people would say, "He had a grand funeral, thank God."

I am, of course, proud of Solanus. I would be proud of him if we were only related through Adam. I am indebted to Patrick James Derum, who wrote *The Porter of Saint Bonaventure's*, for his text and for this quote from Daniel Rops: "In the accounts of all men of genius and sanctity, there is always something which evades our grasp and rebuffs our analysis. That something is precisely the genius and the sanctity." Solanus Casey apparently had both gifts aplenty.

In July, 1987, during my first week as academic vice president at the College of Our Lady of the Elms, one of the sisters stopped by the office with a copy of *The National Catholic Reporter*. The front page headlined the exhumation of Solanus' remains. The sister laughed and said that she thought maybe the saint and I were related. "We are," I answered with an authority not of this world.

Having worried through this canonization process with him over the years, I now feel a closer kinship with Father Solanus. I know that he will soon be recognized as a modern saint in the company of the saints for his generosity of spirit, his uncommon decency, and for his abiding love of God. And, because I'm no saint, I can't help adding this petition: "Solanus, please grant me a leg up on the rest of the clan—the Casey tribes in Ireland and of the *diaspora*, the in-laws and the outlaws, and even 'Allie of the North'—when it's canonization time at St. Peter's."

Peggy Noonan

CONTINUED FROM PAGE 27

I was in my early thirties, when I hadn't been in the church or to confession in 15 years, and then I went to confession and joined the church again, and enjoyed a very intense religious time. Then I married a man who had been divorced a few times and we couldn't marry in the church. So I was living in sin. So I thought, why am I going to bother? Then, of course, I left the man and decided, well—go to church. My non-Catholic friends laugh when I tell them this: "Oh, you Catholics!"

Scanlon: And when you go to Mass these days, do you see it the same way as when you were younger?

Noonan: Yes. I think a miracle happens at every Mass. I honestly do. I went to Mass once at the great old Catholic Church in Georgetown called Holy Trinity. It's so Washingtonian it looks like an old Protestant church. I like the old Catholic stuff, I like candles, I like statues, I like the whole deal. But this church is very non-Catholic looking. It's like an "upscale" church, you know, we don't need candles and statues. But I was watching the priest give communion. I must have been sitting up front and the priest was making the sign of the cross with each wafer and said, as they always do: "Body of Christ," as he gave it over. And suddenly, I had a—I don't know what the word is "epiphany" isn't quite it—but suddenly, I knew it was true, which is something I also knew when I was a child. I believe in what Flannery O'Connor said. Remember when Flannery O'Connor went out to dinner with Mary McCarthy, and someone at the dinner table asked why Catholics make so much of communion? And Mary McCarthy said, like a sophisticated Catholic, "Well, I don't really mean to, it's just symbolic, you know, it's symbolic of the body and blood of Christ." And Flannery O'Connor — who was a very serious Catholic, of course—said, "Well, if it's symbolic, then the hell with it. Who needs symbols? We have enough symbols." She was saying, "No, it's real." So I don't see it as an acting out or symbolism. I just don't have a problem with it. It's a little hard to talk about this because it sounds like I'm virtuous. I'm not virtuous. I'm great at sin and can sin in a big way (laughs). But I still really believe all of this.

Scanlon: It seems to be the answer for a lot of people.

Noonan: It's a good thing to have. Old Rose Kennedy, it must have kept her going. I mean, an utterly genuine, daily communicant. And the woman in Stephen Birmingham's book *Real Lace*. She was one of those old Irish Catholic Cuddahy's from this old Irish Catholic American family. She tells Birmingham, "If I couldn't have communion, I'd just die." And she meant it. She was happy. She wasn't this tormented person. She was a daily communicant and it was bread for her. It was bread.

Scanlon: Well, that's good. So you're lucky. That's good.

Noonan: Yes, that is lucky. But I also think I was taught by the right people.

When George Bush sauntered out of his log cabin at Camp David to attend a joint press conference with his weekend guest, West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, last spring, his aides were dismayed. First of all, the president was wearing a brown shirt—always a poor choice for television, but a particularly bad one when hosting the leader of the country where the fashion was once synonymous with Fascism. Even worse, Bush had chosen an incongruous and clashing silver-and-blue rep tie, knotted tightly at the collar of his western-style shirt. The president topped off the Texas shirt and Yale tie with a tweedy sport coat that looked as if it had been plucked from Mr. Chips's closet.

For Bush, this combination did not seem strange; he was wearing his life. His politics, speech and cultural taste have always been an offbeat amalgam of patrician and cowpoke. But to Sig Rogich, the ultra-stylish Las Vegas advertising-and-public-relations man who was brought into the White House last fall to polish the president's image, this burst of cross-dressing was simply too much.

"Nice touch," Rogich teased Bush. "Was there a power outage? Did you dress in the dark?"

Bush, who is known as the fastest dresser in Washington (ten minutes, shower included), took the jibe with good humor. Shaking his finger with a show of mock sternness, Bush warned Rogich, "You're not getting off to a good start with your president."

Washington, D.C., knows a lot about power but very little about clothes. Dedicated to the conservative business of politics and devoid of any bohemian quarter to provide inspiration otherwise, the capital breeds conformity. Year after year, decade after decade, the uniform for men remains basically the same: a gray or navy single-breasted three-button suit, a white buttondown shirt and a red tie. The mainstream here is J. Press, Brooks Brothers and Garfinckel's. Hickey-Freeman and Hart Schaffner & Marx are getting out on the edge. Flusser, Armani and Boss are still considered the domain of gigolos and New York investment bankers.

"Anyone who shows any individuality is deemed a fop, eccentric or dangerous," says John Buckley, a Republican political consultant. "The Brooks Brothers dress code that wouldn't be up to the minimum standards of Wall Street is the outer envelope of what they wear in Washington.

READ MY HIPS

By Maureen Dowd and Michael Duffy

IF YOU KNEW WHAT SUNUNU, WOULD YOU DRESS LIKE THIS?



STEPHEN KRONINGER

There are entire categories of buttons for buttondown shirts earmarked just for the Washington market. Pleats didn't even hit this town until 1987."

Fred Khedouri, who became an investment banker, at Bear, Stearns's Washington office, after a stint working on Vice-President George Bush's staff, says he feels "weird" every time he visits his old workplace sporting his new look. "My custom-made Italian suit, my Savile Row shirt, my Italian tie all seem perfectly normal in my office. But when I go into the White House, suddenly I feel ostentatious."

Edward McNally, one of Bush's thirtysomething speechwriters, showed up one day on *Air Force One* wearing a dress shirt with blue horizontal stripes and a white collar. It was noted with disapproval. But the president's rumpled, crumpled advisers forgave McNally his impetuosity because he did not ever attempt to go horizontal aloft again. A former prosecutor, McNally recalls how he used to envy his writer friends who could wear whatever they wanted while he toiled away, restrained by a lawyer's dress code. But when McNally got his job writing for the president, he also got a uniform. "For me, it's torture," he says. "This is the only writer's job in America that requires you to wear a suit."

Roger Stone may be the only man in Washington with enough chutzpah to mix politics with high fashion. The political consultant, an aficionado of double-breasted suits and an investor in the pricey new Alan Flusser made-to-order boutique in the District, takes a harsh view of Washington sartorial standards: "We're talking high-water pants too tight in the crotch, black socks down around the ankles with a lot of skin showing, jacket sleeves that come down and almost cover the knuckles—the sort of look that's big with Chinese leaders."

Designer Flusser, who's based in New York and who franchised the shop in Washington, defines the difference between the two cities more diplomatically. While New York and Washington are both in the eastern corridor of style, he says, New York has been influenced by international trends and Washington by "the Virginia Ivy League" look. Just as the women wear what one wag calls "contrived Virginia"—outfits from Neiman-Marcus, patent-leather flats with bows, gold Chanel jewelry, black velvet headbands and Hermès scarves—so the men who work in the capital lean toward a Dixie interpretation of the preppy look. "In the southern influence, there is a bit more of the Fifties idea of traditional business garb," Flusser says, adding compassionately, "I would have to call Washington a single-vented town."

He may be giving the capital too much credit. Asked if he was a side-vent or a single-vent sort of guy, top White House aide Ed Rogers replied: "What's a vent?"

President John Kennedy once joked that Washington is a city of northern charm and southern efficiency. The stereotypical sartorial image of the capital is that of the old, fat southern senator wearing his ice-cream suit on a hot summer day and fanning himself with a straw hat. Washington was built on a swamp, and there's still more seersucker here than anyplace outside Calcutta. The Dixie influence can also be observed among presidential aides at play, wearing their Alabama State or University of Virginia sweaters tucked into their sharply creased jeans.

But George Bush, who boasts a tall, fit, very American kind of build, wears the clothes of his class—and well. In an essay in *The New Republic*, Alessandra Stanley dubbed Bush's administration the Ralph Lauren Presidency, claiming Bush's imagemakers had exploited the value of a large and attractive Connecticut clan brimming with the Wasp aesthetics and pseudo-English gentility that Lauren has been selling to middle-class Americans for over a decade. Crested blazers, polo shirts, tennis sweaters, faded natural fibers. "The Bushes come by their subdued fashion sense the old-fashioned way," Stanley wrote. "They inherited it."

So while the president scorns fashionable duds—he still picks up running suits at Sears—he does have a classic eastern-Establishment look that suits the office he holds. Bush picked up a snappier look during his 1988 run for the White House. Desperately trying to shake his elitist-preppy-wimp label, he shed his buttondown collars, half-rimmed glasses and striped watchband. Now he favors shirts of solid blue or of blue vertical stripes with white spread collars, and shops for himself at J. Press and, until recently, at Arthur A. Adler. (It is a frightening thought that, since J. Press is owned by Kashiyama, a Japanese manufacturing-and-distributing company, even the president of the United States has been taken over by the Japanese.)

"We're talking high-water pan too tight in the crotch and bla socks down around the ankles with a lot of skin showing...."

With the exception of a certain pair of lime-green golfing pants, the president looks his best when he sports Abercrombie & Fitch–style rugged wear. It's hard sometimes to tell which he likes best, the fishing and the hunting or the

costumes that such hobbies require. The president never looks happier than when quail hunting in Beeville, Texas, as he does every Christmas, wearing snake-resistant boots, camouflage pants and a baseball cap from the local dog kennel, and toting a shotgun. This look appeals to his "kick-a-little-ass" self-image, the same side that likes beef jerky and pork rinds slathered with Tabasco sauce.

It must have been Bush's flair for colorful layering that inspired the look of a photo spread of the Bush family at Kennebunkport in the March issue of *Paris Match*, "*le plus populaire des Presidents.*" In a shot in the living room, Bush is wearing black cowboy boots, cuffed gray trousers, a red T-shirt, a green polo shirt and a gray tweed sport coat with a burgundy stripe. In a shot in the kitchen, where he is helping Paula Rendon, the cook, make "*un gâteau traditional*," the president has changed to a blue-striped work shirt and a gray herringbone jacket over a red turtleneck. In a third shot, on his speedboat, the Ralph Lauren president is wearing a rust-colored polo shirt and a white Nike pullover sweater with dark-green chinos.

Nicholas Brady, *opposite page*, dresses in the manner of old money, as befits a treasury secretary. Bush's inner circle includes, *this page, left to right*, Budget Director Richard Darman, whose trademark is a self-inflicted haircut; James Baker, known to wear orange ties; and White House Counsel Boyden Gray, wearer of very old clothes.

Yet, despite Bush's natural feel for sportswear, Alan Flusser does not think Mr. Smooth—as the president refers to himself on the links—will have much lasting impact on the nation's sense of style. "I don't think he'll help it or hurt it," Flusser said. "There will be no dominant theme—kind of like his presidency. No here or there."

Indeed, to his near and dear, Bush is a hapless dresser who uses clothes primarily as props. "He does things because he wants to be kidded," Barbara Bush has said. "I kid him about his clothes. I almost fainted when he was named one of the ten best-dressed men in America." One object of family scorn is the president's favorite pair of cowboy boots, on which Bush's initials and a map of the Lone Star State are hand-tooled. The Bush kids also used to tease their dad mercilessly about a pair of green double-knit trousers that Bush seemed to wear constantly. When her father was voted preppiest dresser in America, "Doro" Bush, 31, could not believe it: "All these preppies would roll over in their graves. He doesn't care about it. He's not your typical Wasp."

But Bush's playfulness about clothes isn't catching on in his workplace. In a town where the style is studiously square, the squarest styles can be found at the Bush White House. If fashion scares a lot of high-powered men, these guys are terrified: If they deviate from the uniform, someone might begin to doubt their membership in the Club. And then where would they be? Back in Minnesota or South Carolina faster than you can say "double-vented."

"There are no double-breasted people," Sig Rogich complains about his staid West Wing colleagues. "The only variation is the width of the pinstripe—if you want to really do it up, you go from a quarter inch to a half inch. It's madcap! It's wild! It's zany! It's cool!

"The most risqué they get is argyles," he adds. "That's their little 'I'll-throw-caution-to-the-wind' gesture."

For the Bush inner circle of advisers, men such as Budget Director Richard Darman, Treasury Secretary Nick Brady and White House Counsel Boyden Gray, the look is Studied Oldness. This is the "This-sport-coat-was-handed-down-to-me-by-my-grandfather-when-I-was-at-Harvard" crew. The model here is Claiborne Pell, the blue-blooded Rhode Island senator who, at age 71, still wears suits that once belonged to his father. As Jim Pinkerton, an official in the White House domestic-policy office, describes the noblesse-oblige approach to dressing, "The trick is to wear an originally good-quality shirt until it falls off you and the sweat stains become like tree rings. You might even use a length of rope from your yacht as a belt. None of this upwardly mobile thing for you. You come from ten generations of money, and now you're doing a little public service. You don't give a damn."

This group is oblivious to all trends in fashion. National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft alarmed reporters last fall in Kennebunkport when he showed up for a golf game wearing brown-and-white-checked pants hemmed neatly above the ankle. When a White House official is described in a newspaper or magazine profile as "disheveled," he views it as a compliment, and great pride is taken in those 1975-vintage wash-and-wear shirts and suit trousers with the hems falling out. You want to look as though you've been up all night thinking about Social Security offset taxes and budget-deficit-reduction plans—even if you haven't. A stain on your tie doesn't convey sloppiness, it just proves that you had soup at your desk as you sorted through those troublesome lumber tariffs.

John Buckley, who lived in New York before moving to Washington, jokes that all of this is an advantage because "just as you find the prices of housing and restaurants cheaper when you get here, you find you don't have to throw out your old clothes."

When it comes to the White House dress code, as aide Ed Rogers says, "there's Sig, and there's everybody else."

Rogich, unrepentantly nouveau, has a look that one colleague describes as "Gucci-Pucci-Fiorucci." He grew up dirt-poor outside of Las Vegas and parlayed political connections into a multimillion-dollar public-relations firm. He blew into Washington last fall with a flashy $3,000 chain-link Bertolucci watch, Bally loafers and a closetful of Versace, Valentino and Armani. The White House hasn't been the same. Rogich gets teased relentlessly about everything he wears, from his loosely fitting navy-blue washable-silk Missoni Uomo trench coat ("Is that your bathrobe, Sig?") to his brown suede Cole-Haan loafers. "Your shoes cost more than my car," Rogers teases Rogich. Or as Secretary of State James A. Baker likes to ask the imagemaker with mock scorn, "I'm fighting for freedom around the world so you can wear shoes like that?"

As chief executive, George Bush must wear many hats. But must he wear these hats? Or, for that matter, these duds? "It's hard sometimes to tell which he likes best," write the authors, "the fishing and the hunting or the costumes that such hobbies require." *Opposite page,* Secretary of State James Baker strikes a Marlboro-man pose on his ranch.

Rogich ignores the taunts and tries to win converts. He has persuaded his aide, Bruce Zanka, to wear smarter ties and spread-collared shirts. "It's not stamped on your job application that you have to wear buttondown collars," he told the suspicious Zanka.

After teddy-bearish White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater lost fifty-five pounds on a liquid diet, Rogich talked him into getting some khakis with pleats. Fitzwater, who buys most of his clothes from the Spiegel and L.L. Bean catalogues, with an occasional trip to Sy and Marcy Syms's discount store in Falls Church, Virginia, didn't go hog-wild. He bought the pants at Hecht's, a large local department store, and followed what is now known around the White House as Sig's Rule: "Get six-inch pleats because if you get four-inch pleats they'll pull apart."

"It was my first venture into pleatism," says Fitzwater, sounding pleased with his newfound daring. "Now, if I can just stay skinny long enough to wear them."

But this is not the beginning of a whole new look. Fitzwater, whose daily press briefings make him the most visible White House official besides the president, intends to stick with his standard-issue navy sport coat, khaki trousers and black loafers. "I can't imagine going out in front of my press corps wearing a double-breasted suit with a purple silk handkerchief drooping out of the pocket," he says. "The press corps doesn't dress that way, and I couldn't be taken seriously if I did."

Besides, the 47-year-old Kansas native is intimidated by department stores and expensive boutiques. "When I have tried to go to a store, the clerks are extremely threatening. They say things like 'May I help you?'

"Shopping by-mail is the most satisfying physical event in recent years for me," he says with his staccato laugh. "You can get everything but food from these catalogues—closet hangers, shoe trees, boots, hats, buttondown oxford-cloth shirts. If L.L. Bean had suits, I'd be a customer.

"The basics never disappoint," Fitzwater concludes, in the sage tone of a man who has seen the future and declared it buttoned-down.

Like light from a distant galaxy, even the few fashion trends that penetrate the District of Columbia's borders arrive about seven years late. Women in Washington are just now turning up at hot Italian restaurants wearing little black dresses, just as the style has been banished from the pages and corridors of *Vogue* by editor Anna Wintour. You can just now see acres of yellow power ties—big on Wall Street in the go-go mid-Eighties—appearing in the White House mess, worn by administration officials on a lark.

There is a small cabal of younger aides at the Office of Management and Budget who favor full-cut suits, Forties ties and flashy footwear. Among them is Robert Grady, 33, a Harvard-trained economics-and-policy whiz kid who occasionally sported a ponytail before the inauguration. But the Young Turks at OMB are the stark exceptions to the rule and are tolerated, perhaps, because they work for Dick Darman, the budget director who is famous for cutting his

own hair—jaggedly—to save money.

For the most part, it's not how your clothes move and drape, it's how they bulge that counts: At the White House, it's gear, not cut, that connotes power. Most Bush aides wear their beepers even while at their desks. When they leave Washington on trips with the president, many strap walkie-talkies to their belts. One wire, running down the sleeve to the shirt cuff, is for talking to colleagues; another goes up the back, over the collar and into the ear. Lower-level aides bulk up their pockets with calculators, pens and pencils, plastic pen holders and pencil guards. The coolest bulges belong to the Secret Service agents, who carry automatic pistols, automatic bullet reloaders and other manly equipment. Even Bush tends to fill up his pockets with notes, presidential tie clips and secret memos. At one televised press conference, the president had a fingernail-sized triangle sticking out of his jacket pocket. The tension was unbearable as reporters tried to figure out whether the white spot was a handkerchief or an index card. "Handkerchief," Rogich proudly said afterward.

Suffice it to say that this is not a look to which Cary Grant or Fred Astaire ever aspired.

A checklist for Washington power dressers:

BELTS: George Bush is crazy about old belts. Although he prides himself on being prudent and cautious, he stops short of imitating the Kirk Douglas character in *The Big Carnival*, who wore suspenders and a belt, explaining "I am a careful man." Even when wearing a nice suit, Bush will cinch his trousers with a length of worn leather that looks like a barber's strop. He also cherishes one belt with a Texas Lone Star buckle.

After Marlin Fitzwater shed six inches from his waist, it did not occur to him to buy a new belt. He wandered back to the galley on *Air Force One* one morning to ask the steward for a corkscrew so that he could punch in some new holes. The Secret Service agents wear wildly patterned suspenders, probably to help with the weight of their guns. But besides Rogich, who has many pairs of elegant suspenders, the rest of the White House staffers consider the wearing of braces to be ostentatious, and, besides, they always keep their jackets on. The meticulous secretary of state, James Baker, never even unbuttons his suit jacket.

SHIRTS: The style is white and monogrammed. Fitzwater recently stepped outside his office and saw three reporters in striped shirts. "Striped shirts, huh?" he said as though a light bulb had switched on over his head. "I may have to get some of these." The occasional light-blue shirt with a white collar is the outer limit, though Secretary of State Baker wears a classy striped version with a small "JAB III" monogrammed on its front. There are fewer French cuffs in this White House—although Baker wears them with expensive gold cuff links and the president sometimes wears them, with presidential-seal or souvenir cuff links given to him by other heads of state. Bush also wears whimsical cuff links, such as a pair that features large gold-plated elephants.

TIES: Once upon a time, a media consultant told an ambitious politician that he should wear a red tie because it would be telegenic. Politicians took this suggestion as the Eleventh Commandment. John Sununu, the White House chief of staff, wears a blood-red tie every day (except when he surprised his staff by sporting a green number on Saint Patrick's Day). An engineer by training, Sununu, when he first decided to get into politics, had been told to wear a red vest because it would be a conversation piece and memorable. Not a vest type, he started wearing red ties instead. "He thinks it keeps reporters from asking the tough questions because they're always asking about his ties," says Sununu aide Ed Rogers.

President Bush does have a weakness for holiday ties and was seen sporting a green-and-red-striped version at Christmastime and a pumpkin-adorned variation for Halloween. Commerce Secretary Robert Mosbacher said he and his modish wife, Georgette, had sent the president the pumpkin tie, as well as an Easter tie with a large bunny on it.

But on normal days, according to Bush's tailor, John Adler, owner of the recently closed Arthur A. Adler clothes shop, the president favors traditional designs. "What he's gotten from us is basic, classic neckwear: prints, reps, foulards," says Adler. His favorite tie colors are gray and burgundy; his preferred knot a half-Windsor. (Unfortunately, Bush has a strange habit of clipping his tie clip to his tie but not to his shirt, so the presidential neckwear swings like a pendulum.)

Secret Service agents, who dress to fit in but also to flex their working-class sex appeal, prefer full-Windsor knots. There is a growing bright-green-tie faction, headed by Baker to challenge the red-tie faction. Baker proves the rule that if you are influential enough, you can make variations on the theme. Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady bravely picked up on the style, but the ever-slippery Baker has now switched to bright orange.

UNDERSHORTS. No blue-bikini town, this. The president, like most *(continued on page 260)*

imes Baker taunts imagemaker
g Rogich: "I'm fighting for
eedom around the world so you
n wear shoes like that?"

READ MY HIPS

(continued from page 227) good preppies, wears white boxer shorts. Just trust us on this one.

SHOES: Wing tips are so deeply rooted in the Washington mentality that when Richard Nixon was filming a political commercial while ostensibly strolling casually on the beach, he wore—as his aides, blanching, noticed—a pair of the heavy-soled shoes. Bush is a less uptight president, and his cardinal rule of style is "Wear what is comfortable." In those pictures of the Kohl press conference that now hang in the White House, the president is featured wearing brown Hush Puppies that match his brown shirt. He wears New Balance running shoes during his frequent exercise sessions. And he has extended this casual note by donning rubber-soled Rockports for both day and evening dress. Presidential aides immediately picked up on the new status symbol, asking reporters where they could get "these Rockport things," and now they are everywhere. Rogich, naturally, was less than enthusiastic about this trend and asked Bush to try not to cross his legs when he is on-camera so that the inexpensive shoes would not get in the frame. "At least he's not wearing the kind with ridges," Rogich notes.

Shortly after the election, Dan Quayle was criticized for wearing shirts with frayed collars. He visited Arthur Adler to get some suits and shirts that would make him look more like his mentor, Bush. But there is still the occasional fashion slip. At a Washington black-tie dinner, Quayle sported *faux*-alligator tasseled loafers with his tuxedo. "He just can't get it together, can he?" an administration official said, sighing.

HATS: Ever since John Kennedy refused to wear one at his inauguration, leaving his thick chestnut hair to rustle freely and make women swoon, hats have been unfashionable in Washington. Marlin Fitzwater may single-handedly bring them back, though. Fitzwater began wearing hats in 1971 after a bout with skin cancer and now has a collection of hundreds—from Australian outback hats to Chinese Army caps to Amish straw hats. He keeps a fox-fur cossack number on a couch in his bedroom, claiming that he will give it only to the woman he falls in love with. "Marlin is a hat man," according to the president. "Unafraid about what his peers might think, he'll try any hat."

Although most politicians hate to wear the funny hats that are proffered at every campaign stop, Bush loves them. "He puts on funny hats and he does these silly things," said Barbara Bush. Ronald Reagan popularized cowboy hats, but Bush, the former Yale first baseman (good field, no hit), prefers baseball caps. He also wears, when on winter walks in Maine, a very strange fur number with earflaps, which gives him the look of a Canadian trapper.

Although there seems to be little indication that Washington is ready to move into the 1990s, many haberdasheries are betting otherwise. Besides the Flusser shop recently opened by Mark Rykken, a veteran of Britches of Georgetowne, there is a new Hugo Boss shop and talk that Paul Stuart and Barneys might open stores. Rykken—whose shop carries suits in the $1,100 to $1,600 range—seeks to bring a double-breasted Douglas Fairbanks–Duke of Windsor sort of elegance to the men of Washington. We're talking lisle-cotton socks with a pattern of tiny clocks. We're talking butter-yellow cashmere sweater vests and rich and supple woven-jacquard ties and French-cuffed shirts with horizontal stripes and trousers with reverse pleats and a rainbow of pocket squares and silk summer suits and brown-and-white and black-and-white spectator shoes and shawl-collared tuxedos.

Asked if he could ever get into this sort of look, Marlin Fitzwater merely shakes his head in wonder. "I don't know who they're going to sell that stuff to. They're not going to sell it to any of the GS-15's I know.

"What's next?" he marvels. "Sequins?" ●

Maureen Dowd and Michael Duffy cover the White House for, respectively, The New York Times *and* Time *magazine.*

ENGLAND'S LAKE DISTRICT

(continued from page 221) presence of Wordsworth or of the great men, such as De Quincey, Charles Lamb or Scott, who had communed with him in these rooms.

And I could hardly expect to find a muse at Greta Hall. The former home of Coleridge and Southey is now a girls' dormitory and not normally open to the public. My guide for a quick, unofficial tour was a tall 17-year-old blonde in a brief tennis skirt and a T-shirt. As she whisked me from room to room, I saw little to indicate that this had been the home of great poets, other than a few hand-lettered signs on some doors denoting where each had slept. The walls were covered with rock posters, the air was rent by loud music. Had Southey walked in then, no doubt he would have said "Lower that music! And *who's* been sleeping in my bed?"

In desperation, I wondered if it was worth visiting a memorial to a mere literary mortal, children's writer Beatrix Potter. Her home is along a narrow, twisting road leading south through Hawkshead to the hamlet of Near Sawrey: thirty-odd houses and a pub. Incredibly, some 90,000 visitors a year come to see Potter's Hill Top Farm, where she wrote thirteen books. They get to tour an unassuming two-story cottage with stucco walls, green-framed windows and a gabled doorway guarded by quince and wisteria vines. I was enlightened by caretaker Bill Latham, who showed me around, that this was the house where Pigling Bland, Tom Kitten and other ankle-high creatures romped. In that vegetable garden, he said, *right there,* is the rhubarb patch where Jemima Puddleduck laid her eggs. I can't honestly say I was thrilled.

Fortunately, Don Brookes had invited me back to Rydal Mount for a poetry reading the next night. He does the readings on weekends in the off-season and most nights throughout the summer. Often, parties of tourists set out from the big hotels in Keswick or Windermere, cruise the length of the lake at Windermere, visit Dove Cottage briefly and then round out the evening with a glass of wine and a few poems at Rydal Mount. Tonight's group was an hour late, but I waited by the fireplace, with Brookes's mutt collie, Clio, lying peacefully at my feet, and concluded that there were worse ways to spend a chilly, wet evening in the Lakes.

Finally, the group trooped in, about thirty strong and all pretty much past retirement age. They cleared the wine tray in less than two minutes but became very quiet when Brookes announced that he would read Wordsworth's poetry once they had toured the house.

"Don't look so horrified, gentlemen," Brookes added. "It's *not* compulsory."

Nonetheless, the entire group convened in the drawing room when Brookes stood at the ready beside the fire grate. Gone were the painting clothes; he wore a blazer and held a pipe in one hand and a slim volume of poetry in the other. He began with "She Was a Phantom of Delight," and then on through "Lines Written in Early Spring"—"Have I not cause to lament/What man has made of man?"—and finally, "I Wandered Lonely as a Cloud."

By the window, with the light over Rydal all but gone, I could just see Windermere in the distance. The fire at Brookes's feet was now just a glow, and when he finished, there was a heartbeat of silence and then the room filled with applause.

Nice moment, but certainly there was more to learn, something I was missing. In one of his poems, Wordsworth himself had advised "Up! up! my Friend, and quit

ESSAY
William Safire

The Counter-Revolution

WASHINGTON

The emperor of Communism has lost the Mandate of Heaven. The Chinese people, led by young idealists, have amazed themselves and thrilled the world by crying out for freedom in a great non-violent chorus; now Communist tyranny will try to demonstrate who is in charge.

As this is written, hope still exists for compromise between the split rulers and united demonstrators in Tienanmen Square. But if they can gain the support of the army, the humiliated leaders — stripped publicly of their claim of legitimacy — are likely to use that army's force sooner or later to retain their bastard power.

Tyranny never abdicates voluntarily.

A few weeks ago, I asked a Western leader what would be necessary to bring about genuine changes in the rigid economy of the Soviet Union and in the rigid political system of China. The answer, in the plain brown wrapper of anonymity, came in a single word: "Counterrevolution."

Communist leaders brand all serious internal opposition as "counterrevolutionary." They gain, hold and concentrate their power subtly at first, in the name of democracy, and brutally at the end, in the name of order.

Aware of this, student leaders in China asked only for "reform" and not the replacement of the totalitarian system. They played on the unpopularity of the sclerotic Deng and resentment of rampant nepotism, but their first specific demand — an independent student union — was the wedge, like Solidarity in Poland, in Communism's one-party system.

Shrewdly, they chose the moment of extreme vulnerability, a summit meeting, to launch their demonstration. China's Communist leaders, who a few months earlier had been embarrassed by having to arrest a dissident on the way to meet President Bush in Beijing, this time chose not to create any martyrs.

The students created their own martyrdom. By showing the courage to die of hunger for their noble beliefs, and by actually starting to die of self-starvation on world television, the students ignited the enthusiasm of multitudes.

Then followed the regime's post-summit fury. It is in the nature of tyranny to deride the will of the people as the voice of the mob, and to denounce the cry for freedom as the roar of anarchy.

That is why the order to clear the central square of demonstrators by force is expected — if the party maintains control of the army. Communist rulers know a real counterrevolution when they see one. Dictators do not abdicate voluntarily.

Apply this lesson to the same forces at work in the Soviet Union. The fit is not exact because the Chinese were supplying the bread of perestroika without the circus of glasnost, while the Soviets have been successes at the publicity circus and failures at providing bread. But both regimes face the same problem: Any gain of freedom creates its own momentum.

Having been used as the launching pad of counterrevolution in Beijing, Mr. Gorbachev returns to Moscow as the world's most celebrated *agent provocateur*.

He will have to have an answer for three questions sure to be posed by his Communist colleagues: (1) Doesn't this prove that your attempt to replace the party apparat with your own cult of personality will lead to counterrevolution? (2) What do we do when the Poles and Hungarians start to pull away? (3) What happens when that urge for independence and freedom erupts in the non-Russian republics of the U.S.S.R.?

His answers will be: (1) Shut up, the people are with me; (2) We can afford to trade Poland and Hungary to the West in return for a new alignment with Germany; and (3) if the Ukrainians riot in Kiev, we'll roll in tanks with Russian or Mongolian crews, kill all the rioters, and that will be the end of counterrevolution.

So the Communist image will suffer; first things first, and to a Communist the first thing is power. It underscores the central fact of totalitarian power: Who controls the Army controls the nation.

When tectonic plates move, earthquakes follow; it happens every decade in Communist China, every generation or so in the Soviet Union. Outsiders do not start or stop these internal convulsions — but what should the U.S. say to the people in agony who are brave enough to oppose armed Communists clinging to power?

Sometimes quiet diplomacy asks too much. Americans should never fail to assert loudly that we stand on the side of human liberty and condemn any violence done to the nonviolent.

Our President is sending cautionary public signals; Mr. Gorbachev is saying nothing, but must be renewing his ties to the men he has put in place to command the Red Army. □

Dan -
FYI -
M.K.
good stuff
stuff
May 89

The Washington Times

DATE: 3/13/91

PAGE: E1

Don Kowet's

DESERT STORM HALL of SHAME

Today's inductee:

The Washington Times

During the Persian Gulf war, America's pundits, journalists and politicians barraged the public with hysterical opinions and predictions. In commemoration, each day "Desert Storm Hall of Shame" honors one or more sages whose pronouncements proved preposterous.

Today's inductee is **The Washington Times**. Here are some choice comments by this paper's staff and contributors during the war and the months leading up to it:

■ **The powerless ones:** "The United Nations is powerless to stop the invasion of Kuwait; the American defense posture is being reduced as a result of the easing of the Cold War; and even if it wanted to employ force, the United States would be hard pressed to do so, given Iraq's geographic location, and almost certainly would be widely criticized." — **Thomas DiBacco**, Aug. 3, 1990.

■ **Kuwait is history:** "Kuwait is history, and the world is a different place. . . . Once [Saddam Hussein] has the oil, he will have most of our allies. If he quickly grabs the rest of the oil properties [in surrounding Arab states], he will get less grief than if he sits where he is. . . . It is up to [Saddam] whether he seizes the rest of the oil properties. We are not capable of acting fast enough to prevent him. Indeed, we are probably not even capable of recognizing the threat." — **Paul Craig Roberts**, Aug. 6.

■ **Terrorism alert:** "If Saddam Hussein of Iraq is forced to back down by world economic pressure and the threat of American military force, he should be expected to use terrorism against the United States, the Soviets and all others who dare to frustrate him." — **Jeff Kamen and Robert Kupperman**, Aug. 9.

■ **Bush policy in ruins:** "President Bush's Middle East policy is in ruins. . . . The Iraq dictator now owns Kuwait. . . . We can now also expect an outburst of terrorism against European and North American civilians." — **Arnold Beichman**, Aug. 13.

■ **Rampant terrorism:** "Whatever the outcome of the current American showdown with Iraq, the end result is going to be a dramatic upsurge of terrorism in the [illegible] years ahead." — **Neil Livingstone**, Aug. 28.

■ **Tens of thousands of U.S. dead:** "President Bush's [demanding] 'the immediate, unconditional and complete withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait' and the restoration of Kuwait's ruling Sabah family . . . upped the ante and thus increased the likelihood of a conflict that could take tens of thousands of American lives." — **Editorial**, Aug. 21.

■ **Little orphan Billy:** "If war breaks out, there will be many thousands of casualties. . . . [Women] may not die in the tanks or manning the anti-aircraft guns, but the remains of American women will be coming home in the same government-issue steel caskets as our men. . . . If there ever was a conflict that threatened 'our way of life,' the first battle was lost when our government succumbed to the will of those who would put little Bill Brown's mother in the line of enemy fire — in this case to safeguard not 'our way of life' but the oil reserves of the Persian Gulf." — **Editorial**, Aug. 23.

■ **Goofy Bush:** "Bereft as he is of 'the vision thing,' there's no way this president could dream up the goofy things he does — his habit of one strategy in the morning and an opposite strategy for the afternoon.

"That's why some people are taking comfort in the notion that maybe what appears to be the kind of goofiness you expect to find at the bar at the country club is really a clever plan laid out for him by a mad genius hidden in a White House closet." — **Wesley Pruden**, Dec. 3.

■ **The doo-doo Midas:** "Everything poor George touches turns to deep doo-doo.

"The tougher he tries to get in the Persian Gulf, the more people laugh at him. Except back at the ranch, where the Republicans are crying.

"We've abandoned our embassy in Kuwait, but insist it's still 'open' because the flag is still flying. The order to abandon was given by the president who loved the flag so much he tried to get a law forbidding anyone to burn it. We're counting on Saddam Hussein to take care of it now." — **Wesley Pruden**, Dec. 14.

■ **Commander Cub Scout:** "You couldn't blame Saddam Hussein for thinking he's up against regiments of children. . . . The commander in chief of the American expeditionary force, or the expeditionary force of the United Nations, or the Legion of the New World Order, or whatever we may be calling ourselves on this given day, projects an ambivalence not seen since Ado Annie roamed all over 'Oklahoma!' singing about the peculiar misery of a girl who just can't say no." — **Wesley Pruden**, Dec. 24.

■ **Who needs Arab allies?:** "Why does Mr. Bush desire Arab military assistance in the Iraqi war anyway? The greater the number of nations that shed blood in the war effort, the greater the obstacles to a successful and enduring peace settlement." — **Bruce Fein**, Jan. 28, 1991.

■ **Confused:** "Our own war objectives, after weeks of war, appear even more confused. Is our aim just to liberate the territory of Kuwait? Then we will be sucked into a maelstrom of street-fighting every bit as terrible as the 6th Army faced in the ruins of Stalingrad. Or are we planning to destroy the Iraqi army? Then we will have to fight the Iraqi army on its home turf, where it won its greatest victories against Iran. And the killing fields will be reminiscent of the mud hell of World War I on the western front." — **Martin Sieff**, Feb. 11.

■ **Sorry about that, chief:** "I'm Sorry! I'M REALLY, REALLY SORRY!

"In December I wrote a column making fun of President Bush and his threat to kick Saddam Hussein's tail. . . . Unfortunately for me and fortunately for the world, it was wrong. Wrong. Wrong. Wrong." — **John Podhoretz**, Feb. 26.

And finally — pass the envelope, please — the prize-winning prediction of **The Washington Times**:

■ **No war:** "There will be no war to liberate Kuwait." — **Editorial**, Dec. 7.

Arlington Journal

11/17/90

After 48 Years, a B-17 Crew Returns

By B. DRUMMOND AYRES
Special to The New York Times

ARLINGTON, Va., Nov. 15 — It was a war mission that lasted more than 48 years. But it finally ended today amid the soldierly rows of white tombstones in Arlington National Cemetery.

There, with the crack of rifles for a last salute and the melancholy notes of "Taps" for a final farewell, the eight-man crew of a B-17 Flying Fortress bomber lost in the Pacific Theater in World War II was laid to rest.

Some of the planes flown in that war are still missing. But "Fort" No. 41-2505, which disappeared on April 25, 1942, in the humid predawn darkness of eastern New Guinea, is no longer among them.

Five years ago, an islander found the old B-17, shattered and mouldering on the jungled slopes of 3,100-foot-high Mt. Obree. That discovery led to today's service and to a graveside scene both sad because of the death of the young crew, however long ago, and joyful because after half a century the rest of the story was known.

• • •

The patrol that No. 41-2505 made that April morning over the Coral Sea, the scene a few days later of one of the decisive battles of the war, apparently ended not in a burst of gunfire but in a desperate, losing struggle against engine trouble. There was no sign of combat damage.

Not long after the wreckage was discovered, a Defense Department team hacked its way up Mt. Obree and brought the remains to an Army laboratory in Hawaii for identification. Relying on personal effects like dog tags as well as on dental records and other aids, the laboratory's technicians identified the bodies of five of the eight crew members. The remains of the three others were placed in a single coffin.

Sadness and joy mingle at a burial ceremony.

The survivors, wives and siblings who are close to 70 years old or older, along with a few children in their 40's who never really knew their fathers, agreed that there should be a single service in Arlington National Cemetery. Men who died together, they said, should be buried together.

• • •

Most burials at Arlington are achingly somber, made even more so by the sense of sacrifice and history that the military pomp and circumstance evokes. But today, despite the presence of six Government-issue coffins, there were more smiles than tears and much amiable conversation.

"I was only 10 months old when the plane went down and I've spent just about all of my life wondering," said Denise Grant Waterman, the daughter of the Flying Fortress's bombardier, Second Lieut. Jim S. Grant of Malvern, Ark. "At last there's relief, and a lot of joy, too."

Ms. Waterman's mother, Marian, said word that her husband's plane had been found had come as a "terrific jolt" because she had always assumed that the plane had fallen into the Coral Sea. "I had put it all behind me as best I could and gone on and remarried and even become a widow again," she said. "It's just incredible to have Jim Sam back."

• • •

But all movement and talking halted when the Army band broke into "America, the Beautiful." And as the chaplin presented each family a folded flag, a tear or two glistened, and some eyes seemed fixed on a distant point, one well beyond the Washington Monument and Capitol dome that rose on the horizon.

Then it was over and back to 1990.

As the family members headed away from the cemetery for a luncheon at a nearby home, workers began to prepare the site for sodding and new tombstones. The honor guard marched off to make ready for another burial.

Besides a stone for Lieutenant Grant, there also will be stones for Second Lieut. Robert R. Meyer Jr. of Birmingham, Ala., Second Lieut. Ralph Howard of Los Angeles, Staff Sgt. Elton J. Rose of Long Beach, Calif., and Sgt. Joe A. Carter of Hillsboro, Ore. A single stone will carry the names of First Lieut. Daniel W. Fagen of Kiefer, Okla., Sgt. Edward L. Hargrove of El Centro, Calif., and Sgt. Paul A. Reimer of Reedley, Calif.

Warner Presses for New ABM Effort

House Rejects Similar Proposal to Renegotiate Treaty With Soviets

By Helen Dewar
Washington Post Staff Writer

Capitalizing on success of the Patriot anti-missile weapon in the Persian Gulf War, Sen. John W. Warner (R-Va.) teamed with the Bush administration yesterday to try to put Congress on record as seeking new U.S.-Soviet negotiations to permit development and testing of missile defenses.

But Democrats quickly countered with an alternative that would significantly increase proposed spending for more Patriot missiles and accelerate development of ground-based missile defenses at the expense of more exotic, space-based systems favored by many Republicans.

A vote on the proposals, providing an early test of postwar defense strategies as well as a scramble for the high ground in postwar politics, is scheduled today.

Even before the Senate could act, a GOP proposal similar to the Senate Republican plan was rejected by a vote of 281 to 145 in the House after a brief debate in which opponents argued it should be brought up after hearings and further deliberation.

The Senate proposal, offered with White House support by Warner, ranking Republican on the Senate Armed Services Committee, calls for renegotiating the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty to remove restrictions on development of missile defense systems.

Warner sought to attach the nonbinding "Sense of Congress" resolution to a bill authorizing a wide range of benefits for gulf war troops and their families. This move prompted complaints from Democratic leaders trying to hold off amendments that might bog down the benefits measure and delay passage.

Later, Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) introduced a substitute proposal to add $224 million to $100 million authorized for new Patriots in the Senate version of a supplemental spending bill to cover gulf war costs. The new weapons would be placed on ships for rapid deployment to world trouble spots.

Nunn's proposal also would shift $218 million within the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) budget to accelerate production of quickly deployable ground-based tactical missile defenses, with costs to be offset by a 9 percent reduction in other SDI programs. Nunn and other Democrats succeeded last year in restructuring SDI along this same line.

Nunn said he was willing to work later on a modified version of Warner's proposal. But he contended that the real obstacle to development of usable missile defenses is not the ABM Treaty but rather the focus of SDI officials on exotic, long-term systems. Noting that the Patriot was developed outside of the SDI program, he said, "If we'd waited for SDI, we'd have had no [missile] defense in the Middle East."

Warner's proposal cited the death and destruction caused by Iraq's Scud missiles during the gulf war, the Soviet Union's continuing strategic defense modernization program and the increasing ballistic missile capabilities of developing nations as reasons to modify the 19-year-old ABM restrictions.

The resolution states that it is "in the national interest" to develop and test ballistic missile defense systems and that the ABM Treaty modifications should be negotiated and signed within two years. If an agreement is not reached by then, the president should "immediately" determine whether the United States should continue to adhere to the treaty.

The resolution modified an earlier Warner proposal to direct the defense secretary to begin immediate development of missile defenses in disregard of the treaty.

Sources said the White House objected to any tampering with the treaty by legislative action but supported Warner's subsequent proposal as a reflection of administration policy on development of anti-missile weapons.

"I believe it will send an unmistakable signal of our determination to proceed with ballistic missile defenses that enhance our national security," Brent Scowcroft, President Bush's national security adviser, said in a letter to Warner yesterday.

Warner's move followed a week of discussions with White House officials and Vice President Quayle, who said Sunday that the United States would discuss with the Soviets "how the ABM Treaty could be structured to accommodate" space-based defenses. Quayle said he believed the Soviets would find a restructuring in their interest because they are more vulnerable to ballistic missiles than the United States.

Staff writer Ann Devroy contributed to this report.

STATE OF AMERICA: CENSUS REPORT

The Census Bureau is periodically releasing information about individual states, including the first figures showing how racial composition has changed since 1980. The Washington Post will publish this information as it becomes available.

GEORGIA

POPULATION

	All Residents
1980	5,463,105
1990	**6,478,216**
Change	+18.6%

POPULATION BY RACE

	White	Black
1980	3,947,135	1,465,181
1990	4,600,148	1,746,565
Change	+16.5%	+19.2%

	American Indian*	Asian/ Pacific Islander
1980	7,616	24,557
1990	**13,348**	**75,781**
Change	+75.3%	+208.6%

	Other race	Hispanic origin
1980	18,716	61,260
1990	**42,374**	**108,922**
Change	+126.4%	+77.8%

* Also includes Eskimos or Aleuts.

NOTE: Persons of Hispanic origin can be of any race. Percent change is rounded to the nearest tenth.

BY CLARICE BORIO—THE WASHINGTON POST

SDI
3/14/91

The Washington Times

DATE: 3/14/91

PAGE: A7

Postwar politics jeopardize veterans' benefits, 'star wars'

By Major Garrett
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

Postwar politics imperils a package of veterans' benefits and has resurrected the debate over whether to proceed with testing and deploying a "star wars" system.

These apparently unrelated issues came up in both the House and Senate yesterday as lawmakers considered a raft of new benefits for Persian Gulf war personnel.

Congress is eager to approve the new benefits, which include higher combat pay, increased educational grants, extended health insurance coverage, more generous death benefits and expanded home and small business loan programs.

The House passed a package authorizing $1.1 billion in benefits over five years on a vote of 398-25, after protracted debate over the bill's potentially ruinous effect on last year's budget pact.

The White House threatened to veto the bill because it includes benefits for non-Gulf personnel. Rep. G.V. "Sonny" Montgomery, Mississippi Democrat and chairman of the Veterans Affairs Committee, defended the extra spending as an overdue recognition of veterans' past contributions to national defense.

Under last year's budget agreement, all supplemental spending, such as the veterans' benefits, must be offset with spending cuts or higher taxes, or be designated "emergency" spending by Congress and the White House.

The Office of Management and Budget agreed to label the Gulf benefits "emergency" spending but has balked at the others. The House bill requires Mr. Bush to accept all the benefits or veto the entire package — even those targeted for Gulf veterans.

OMB officials reached a deal with a bipartisan Senate team to bring a $500 million veterans package to the floor today. Senate leaders hope to approve the package next week.

The Senate bill would have been debated yesterday except for a "sense of the Senate" resolution introduced by Sen. John Warner, Virginia Republican, that seeks to abrogate the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty with the Soviet Union. Mr. Warner proposed that the United States proceed with testing and deployment of so-called "star wars" technology.

The administration announced its support for the resolution in a letter National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft sent to Mr. Warner yesterday.

"In the coming years, the United States itself will face the growing threat of ballistic missile attack," Mr. Scowcroft said. "[The resolution] will send an unmistakable signal of our determination to proceed with ballistic missile defenses that enhance our national security."

Sen. Sam Nunn, Georgia Democrat and chairman of the Armed Services Committee, opposed the resolution on the grounds it would damage superpower relations and promote spending on "stars wars" weaponry that he considers ill-conceived.

Administration silence frustrates Democrats

THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

The Bush administration has dragged its feet in answering Congress' questions about prewar U.S. diplomacy in the Middle East, Rep. Lee Hamilton complained yesterday.

"We've had a very difficult time asking questions of policy on the Gulf and on postwar follow-up," said Mr. Hamilton, Indiana Democrat and chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Middle East subcommittee.

That and other gripes from lawmakers reflect Democratic frustrations over what they see as the administration's success in keeping its prewar failures obscured by the postwar glow of success, which has driven the president's popularity to record heights.

Mr. Hamilton's complaints followed months of futile requests that the administration send witnesses to testify before his panel. Three administration witnesses who did appear yesterday declined to answer all but the most basic factual questions.

"That same pattern appears to be continuing," Mr. Hamilton said. "We cannot get policy questions answered."

In particular, requests to have Assistant Secretary of State John Kelly and the U.S. ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, testify have been stymied. Secretary of State James A. Baker III has come to Capitol Hill, but his time has been limited, Mr. Hamilton said.

"Our last policy testimony from the State Department with respect to the Gulf was Sept. 18," Mr. Hamilton said. Then, Mr. Kelly came and received a tongue lashing for having said publicly just before Iraq's invasion of Kuwait that the United States had no commitment to defend Kuwait.

"The problem we face is we have scores, if not hundreds, of questions to ask," said Mr. Hamilton. "I do expect the department to answer at an appropriate level."

A U.S. official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said the State Department gets dozens of requests a week for witnesses.

"We try to work out satisfactory arrangements. Sometimes we offer lower-level officials than they ask for, and they're not satisfied."

A senior House Democratic aide said lawmakers would not relent in seeking to force answers to some potentially embarrassing questions about U.S. diplomacy before the war.

"The more people take Democrats to task for their votes in January [against granting President Bush authority to go to war], the more Democrats are going to go after this administration for creating a situation where we had to go to war," the official said.

Richard Cohen

WP 6/6/89

Facing Down a Tank

Even in replay, when the outcome was known, the tension was unbearable. He stood, white shirt and dark slacks, and faced down a column of tanks in Tiananmen Square. When the lead tank moved to the left, so did he. When it inched forward, he held his ground. He scampered onto the tank, seemed to speak to the crew and then came down.

Who can fathom such bravery? Who can understand such courage when all around was evidence that the hero of one moment is the martyr of the next? And yet, this sort of thing has become routine in China. What we are seeing on television, what we are reading in the newspapers, is not news or current events but grand history—when ordinary people do extraordinary things.

Dictators and despots know their enemy: you and me. They know, too, the truth of the cliché that nothing is as dangerous as an idea. Give the right people the right idea and history turns on its axis. Give the blacks and whites of the old segregationist South the idea of civil rights and you get a revolution. There was bravery then, too. Men and women did what they never thought possible. They, too, risked their lives—and some were killed.

Television both exalts and trivializes. Events from China—the murder of students, the killing of the wounded, the crushing of people by tanks—come to us as they happen. We watch, rapt, asking over and over, "Could I do that?" We watch, trying in vain to make sense of what we see, confused because all we have is the image and the cool commentary, but not the feel of the place.

And then the television pictures change. China is replaced by a game show. The cracking voice of a foreign correspondent is supplanted by the gleeful shriek of someone who has just won a refrigerator. CNN, whose correspondents have performed heroically, switches from Beijing to the latest gossip from Hollywood. Could you imagine a report from Valley Forge interrupted by a commercial for a toilet-bowl cleaner? This, too, is historic truth. The momentous and the banal exist side by side.

Conservatives must be braced by events in China. Here is the vaunted evil of communism in living color. Here are the formerly smiling leaders of China turning, almost instantly, into ogres. Just a few months ago, they were being interviewed on television, pleasantly saying such nice things about the United States, about reform and, of course, human rights. Like the prayers of the forcibly converted, their words hardly came from the heart.

And the conservatives could point at Moscow: Listen, don't we hear the same words coming from there? Yes. And doesn't Mikhail Gorbachev talk about reform, about democracy and about joining the community of nations? Yes, he does. Like the Chinese leaders, Gorbachev could also turn on a dime. The forces of reaction are strong in his country, too. What will he do if events truly get out of hand in Soviet Georgia, in the Baltic republics or, maybe more explosively, in Eastern Europe?

But the other lesson in all this is that history is on the march. Those who point a finger at the past and say it is the future—that Russia will always be Russia—have scant respect for the power of the all-powerful ordinary person. The Israelis say that about the Palestinians—look at what they have done—but the Israeli government cannot now see what Palestinians are really doing. As in China, ordinary people are risking—and losing—their lives for an idea: Palestinian nationalism. Nothing really can stop it—just as nothing could stop the original Israelis from redeeming the Biblical promise of a Jewish homeland.

Chinese authorities are deaf to their own history. It was the people who brought them to power, and it will be the people who topple them. They are even deaf to the events of the last two decades in their own backyard. It was the extraordinary efforts of ordinary Vietnamese that wearied and ultimately defeated the United States.

At moments like this we can only stand aside, mouths agape. The revolutions of our textbooks are happening right on the television screen. Here is Valley Forge and the Bastille. Here is the taking of the Winter Palace and a massive demonstration led peaceably by Gandhi. Here are the anti-apartheid blacks (and some whites) of South Africa or, even, the ordinary soldier on Mao's Long March. Here is revolution.

So, who is that man who stopped the tanks in Tiananmen Square? Who is that guy and what prompted him to do what he did? He is that most dangerous of individuals: a man with an idea. Stand aside and wish him well. In the past he has changed history, and he may do so again.

WP 6/6/89 To: Dan

THE WASHINGTON POST

George F. Will

Death of the Totalitarian Pretense

These are the most momentous months in mankind's history. This is so not merely because of the scale of events shaking regimes from the Danube to the China Sea but also because of the clarity with which great ideas are clashing and historic controversies are being resolved.

Imagine, said Orwell, a boot in your face—forever. His nightmare is the totalitarians' dream, the terrifying promise of permanence. What died in Tiananmen Square was the totalitarian pretense, the claim to have broken history, and all human spontaneity, to the saddle of a party's political will.

To sense the stakes of today's turbulences, go back 33 years. But first go back 2,500 years. Political philosophy began with Plato, who sought ways to prevent cycles of civic virtue from decaying into tyranny. His comprehensive prescriptions concerned education, poetry, rhetoric.

Modernity has meant preoccupation with history as linear, not cyclical. History is a narrative infused with the drama of the possibility of progress.

The last two centuries have given birth to various historicisms—doctrines purporting to decipher laws of historical development. Theories claim to explain the course of history in terms of vast impersonal forces. These theories stipulate that history is a series of inevitabilities independent of individuals' political wills and choices.

The totalitarian impulse arises from historicism. It arises from the claim that a particular party has a monopoly on understanding and has a right to unbridled administration of insight, however brutal that might be for those who contest its monopoly of interpretation.

Paradoxically, in the 20th century, when history has accelerated giddily, the great political invention, totalitarianism, has promised regimes that would perpetuate themselves—forever. The world has been haunted by the specter of permanence, the permanent boot in the face.

In 1951, Hannah Arendt, a refugee from Hitler's Europe, published a stunning treatise, "The Origins of Totalitarianism." Her deeply troubling thesis was that ideological intoxication, combined with modern instruments of social control, might make totalitarianism an unassailable tyranny, immune to all dynamics of change from within.

Terrorism—the end of legality; random violence—is but one totalitarian instrument. Another is gray bureaucracy controlling all cultural institutions. Totalitarianism aims at the conscription of the citizen's consciousness—state ownership not merely of industries but of minds. So totalitarianism requires control of the flow of information. It requires the central scripting of all public argument—which means no real argument in public.

Intermediary institutions standing between the individual and the state—schools, churches, clubs, labor unions, even families—must be pulverized or permeated by the state. The totalitarian aim is the atomization of society into a dust of individuals. This dust is to be blown around by gusts of ideology emitted by the tutelary party.

The totalitarian enterprise is the extirpation of all autonomous institutions and hence of autonomous impulses in society. Instead of Marx's withering away of the state, there would be the withering away of society through the unlimited penetration of life by the state—by politics.

In 1956, in the streets of Budapest, Arendt's profoundly pessimistic theory was slain by a luminous fact. For 12 days, Hungary flung its unconquered consciousness in the face of the totalitarian state. There was no civil war because the nation was not divided: Ideological indoctrination had left the public utterly unmarked.

In Budapest, as in Tiananmen Square, tanks prevailed, but Arendt rejoiced in the refutation of her hypothesis. In an epilogue to the 1958 edition of her book, she wrote:

"The voices from Eastern Europe, speaking so plainly and simply of freedom and truth, sounded like an ultimate affirmation that human nature is unchangeable, that nihilism will be futile, that even in the absence of all teaching and in the presence of overwhelming indoctrination, a yearning for freedom and truth will rise out of man's heart and mind forever."

A striking fact about Tiananmen Square is that there was no single acknowledged leader there. Note a stirring similarity. A Hungarian professor speaking 33 years ago: "It was unique in history that the Hungarian Revolution had no leaders. It was not organized, it was not centrally directed. The will for freedom was the moving force in every action."

What made Tiananmen Square terrifying to the totalitarians was precisely what made it insubstantial in the face of force but will make it triumphant in time: no leaders, just unconscripted spirits.

A watching world marveled at the bravery, politeness and good will of the protesters, but wrongly spoke of their moderation. The watching world, like the protesters themselves, did not understand the inherent, irreducible radicalism of their categorical challenge to the totalitarian pretense. The regime understood.

BY THE AUTHOR

WALDHEIM: THE MISSING YEARS (*Paragon House*)
THE WAR THAT HITLER WON: GOEBBELS AND THE NAZI MEDIA CAMPAIGN (*Paragon House*)
WHEN NAZI DREAMS COME TRUE
THE NAZIS
WESTERN CIVILIZATION
ADOLF HITLER AND THE GERMAN TRAUMA

ROOSEVELT & HITLER

PRELUDE TO WAR

ROBERT EDWIN HERZSTEIN

PARAGON HOUSE
New York

producer Carl Laemmle's 1930 motion picture *All Quiet on the Western Front*. Telling the story of men "destroyed in the war," Laemmle created a sensation with this movie. Nazis rioted in the streets of Berlin and released snakes and white mice in theaters showing the film. The fact that Laemmle was a German-American emigré of Jewish origin particularly enraged these thugs. Although the film was approved by the German board of censors, the government forced the board to rescind its approval. The failure of the German republic to resist this Nazi pressure was a harbinger of its own destruction. Pacifist Oswald Garrison Villard, writing for the *Nation*, foresaw this in early 1931.[5]

Producer Laemmle and director Lewis Milestone destroyed all the romantic, nationalist shibboleths of an earlier generation. The movie's setting is the German home front, but at no point are the soldiers mere German caricatures. They could just as well be Frenchmen or Americans. The opening scene of this film shows a teacher whipping his students into a patriotic frenzy in 1914. Happy boys march off behind the teacher, anxious to sign up for the army. He, of course, returns to the classroom, where he lectures more young men on the virtues of death for the fatherland.

The boys go off to boot camp, festooned with flowers. The marching bands fade from memory, for basic training is harsh, dirty, and boring. And people seem to change when they wear a uniform. Dehumanization is the order of the day. Learn to kill; forget higher cultural aspirations. The boys are glad to leave the training camp. Now, at last, they will be soldiers, fighting for the sacred fatherland. Milestone graphically portrays the horrors of the trenches, where men fight rats for a few crumbs of bread.

The constant roar of artillery and machine guns causes some men to go mad. Here at the front no one speaks of "causes" or "fatherlands," but of survival and of home. There is indiscriminate slaughter, to no purpose (hence the ironic title of the film). No one really knows or cares who started the war. Some soldiers believe that the Kaiser or greedy manufacturers are responsible, but the men are not sure.

There are individual acts of humanity. Some are the gestures of Paul Baumer, a sensitive young man portrayed by actor Lew Ayres, himself a pacifist. Paul cares about his friend, the nineteen-year-old Franz, who lies dying in a field hospital. His love, however, is almost stupid, out of place in this brutal conflict. Later, Paul tries to comfort Duval, a dying French soldier whom he has stabbed. As if to mock such sentimentality,

Milestone shows us the home front. On leave, Paul has to listen to his father's armchair strategist friends, comfortable in their taverns, telling him how to win the war. Paul's teacher, still preaching patriotism and glory, shows him off to the class. Paul stammers something about what the front is really like. The boys are all shocked. "Coward!" yells one youth, though Paul is actually a decorated hero. A new generation is being readied for the slaughter.

In the end, the whole war effort seems meaningless. Paul reaches out beyond his sandbag barrier, hoping to capture a butterfly. A French sharpshooter kills him. In the final powerful scene, the dead and the living march off into eternity, against the backdrop of a huge military cemetery. Paul turns toward us, looking the living reproachfully in the eye. He seems to say, "Never again war!"

Reviewers were overwhelmed. The noncommunist left wing and the pacifist press loved the movie, while the mainstream *New York Times* described it as "vivid and graphic." *Liberty* reviewed the film in glowing terms, as did *Film Daily* and other trade publications. *All Quiet on the Western Front* strengthened pacifist sentiments in the United States. One could only contrast the stirring rhetoric of President Wilson with the carnage in northern France. Confused and disenchanted, Americans now saw that the great Wilsonian crusade had led to the rise of bolshevism and fascism. The Europeans and their endless wars, many Americans claimed, were to blame for the Depression engulfing the nation during the production of *All Quiet on the Western Front*.

The nation was in near despair when FDR gained his party's presidential nomination. He was inaugurated on 4 March 1933, five weeks after Hitler assumed the German chancellorship. Roosevelt struck the famous pundit Walter Lippmann as well-intentioned and charming, but lacking in intellectual depth or ideological commitment.

During his first administration, Roosevelt devoted most of his energy to the enactment of measures aimed at overcoming the economic and moral crisis that gripped the nation. Under his "New Deal," the federal government greatly expanded its powers. Roosevelt and his "Brain Trust," working with a heavily Democratic Congress, tackled a vast array of problems, ranging from unemployment to unionization, from agriculture to social security.

Foreign policy was secondary, but here, too, Roosevelt embraced an

economic nationalism quite in keeping with his expansion of federal authority. The president exuded some vaguely internationalist sentiments from time to time, but he was careful to avoid being tagged a "Wilson II." The press, Secretary of State Cordell Hull observed, was of the "unanimous opinion that we must not allow ourselves to become involved in European political developments." Most Americans agreed. In this atmosphere, FDR was careful to maintain what he called a "more or less detached position," based on "impartiality." In 1933, the president supported the ill-fated Disarmament Conference and advocated close cooperation with Great Britain on arms issues. FDR believed that disarmament, along with economic cooperation and recovery, could overcome the "tyranny of fear" gripping Europe. It took Roosevelt and Hull some time to realize that a distant, largely disarmed nation, acting as a noncommittal mediator, could hardly convert Hitler and Mussolini to its liberal values.

Hull, a former Tennessee senator, had become secretary of state in 1933, at the age of sixty-one. He served for eleven years. Cordell Hull was a passionate believer in free trade, an adherent of the old liberal maxim that protectionism leads to war. A Wilsonian internationalist who had drawn certain lessons from the debacle of the league debate in 1919, Hull was cautious and hardworking. He was loyal to the president, though there was little warmth in the relationship. Roosevelt, outwardly respectful of Hull, often circumvented him. FDR contributed to the formulation and execution of policy.[6] His combination of nationalism and globalism contrasted with Hull's legalistic obsession with treaties and free trade. Hull was useful to Roosevelt for many years, precisely because he offered the president political cover.

Roosevelt needed this protection. Isolationists recalled his enthusiastic interventionism and his support for U.S. membership on the World Court. By the time FDR took office, opposition to Wilsonian internationalism had become a powerful factor in American political life. Those who resented American involvement in the last war and wished to avoid international commitments compromising American sovereignty were sometimes referred to as "isolationists."[7] These people believed that the United States could and should isolate itself from the crises looming in Europe and the Far East. They opposed American involvement in the League of Nations and even on the World Court. Led by powerful, senior members of the United States Senate, the congressional isolationists could make life difficult for an independent-

minded president. In the second year of FDR's term, Congress passed the Johnson Act, which forbade extending loans to nations defaulting on previous commitments. Britain and France might never pay up, but they would never get another penny.

"Internationalists," in contrast, advocated an American role in collective security measures aimed at deterring aggression. They believed in the utility of the league and favored U.S. membership on the World Court. While Roosevelt's roots and intellect were internationalist, his political instincts told him to pay heed to isolationist concerns. Polls taken during Roosevelt's first term consistently indicated that ninety-five percent of those questioned wanted the United States to avoid becoming entangled in a new European war. In 1934, the Hearst newspapers organized a petition drive opposing U.S. membership in the World Court. Though the court was far less controversial than the league, Hearst collected almost a million and a half signatures.

Senator Thomas D. Schall (Republican of Minnesota) captured the isolationist mood when he said, "To hell with Europe and the rest of those nations!" In 1934, the Nye Committee, named after Senator Gerald P. Nye (Republican of North Dakota), began its famous investigation into the origins of American intervention in 1917. Some congressmen pointed their fingers at unpopular, but plausible culprits: In Senator Nye's words, "[M]unitions sales, bankers' loans to the Allies, and Americans sailing upon the vessels of nations at war, such as the *Lusitania*, tended to bring us into a conflict which was in its inception of no relation to us."[8] Money, rather than idealism, had motivated the Wilson administration. The influential Kansas publisher William Allen White summed up the feelings of the era. "The boys who died just went out and died," he wrote. "And for what?" asked White, and millions of others.[9]

Peace activists touched the lives of many Americans during this era. Pacifists, who opposed the use of organized armed force in international affairs, had many supporters. Rabbi Stephen Wise, as well as the Reverend Harry Emerson Fosdick, pledged to refrain from using religion for the sanctification of war. In 1933, the year in which Hitler became chancellor of Germany, Brown University's student newspaper polled students attending sixty-five colleges. It discovered that about forty percent of them claimed to be committed to absolute pacifism. In the spring of 1935, sixty thousand American students sponsored antiwar rallies and marches. Many of them took the "Oxford Oath," commit-

ting themselves to avoiding military service, even in the event of war.[10] The National Council for the Prevention of War, a Quaker group, helped to coordinate the work of thirty-one pacifist and peace-oriented organizations. Socialist Norman Thomas, an ordained minister, was active in the influential Fellowship of Reconciliation. Later, the famous A.J. Muste, an absolute pacifist, joined the group. (It was Muste who liked to say, "If I cannot love Hitler, I cannot love any man.")

In 1932, Roosevelt had dispatched an indirect emissary to Adolf Hitler, hoping to learn more about his intentions. Nothing important came of these tentative feelers. Hitler soon came to power, and Roosevelt decided, "I want an American liberal in Germany as a standing example." His choice for ambassador fell upon historian William Dodd of Virginia. Dodd, who became the annual president of the American Historical Association in 1934, had earned his doctorate at the University of Leipzig back in 1900.

Ambassador Dodd had few illusions about the Nazis, though in the beginning he did convince himself that "Germany can hardly fail to realize the importance of friendly cooperation with the 120,000,000 people of the United States. . . ." FDR hoped that the professor was right, though he himself feared a coming war between the victors and the vanquished of 1918.[11]

From the earliest days of his presidency, Roosevelt had insights into Hitler's nature and intentions. Writing in 1933 in his copy of the book *Mein Kampf,* Roosevelt noted, "This translation is so expurgated as to give a wholly false view of what Hitler really says—The German original would make a different story." Roosevelt was right. The abridged work gave no real sense of Hitler's Jewish obsession, nor of his frightening foreign policy goals. There was no complete English translation of the work until later in the decade. How did Roosevelt know about the difference? Perhaps from conversation, perhaps from looking at the German edition of *Mein Kampf.* Roosevelt had more pressing matters to deal with in 1933, and so did most Americans. Still, it is interesting to see that FDR had doubts from the start about the Nazis.

Despite these early concerns about Hitler, Roosevelt did not speak much about events in Germany. His comments about the Nazis were highly unflattering, but FDR devoted little time to a study of Hitler's policies. Ambassador Dodd had direct access to Roosevelt, and soon

became the president's tutor. Nazi brutality, reflected in the bloody purge of 30 June 1934, shocked Dodd, and he conveyed his dismay to the president.[12]

Roosevelt, preoccupied with domestic questions and fearing political opposition to bold foreign policy initiatives, reacted cautiously in public to cries of alarm about the Nazi danger. He continued to exchange formal greetings with the Reich government. At times, both countries lodged notes of protest with one another, but there was no sense of imminent crisis. For his part, Ambassador Dodd did not at first fully grasp the extent of Hitler's ambitions, though he understood German resentment about the outcome of the last war. At the right moment, Dodd predicted, Hitler would wage war in order to restore the frontiers of 1918.[13] This appraisal proved to be too conservative by far. While Dodd fretted about German belligerence, the United States Congress decided to put severe constraints upon the president's powers in the domain of foreign affairs. Dodd realized that American isolationism could only foster the ambitions of this new generation of German leaders. So did Frank N. Belgrano, national commander of the American Legion. Perhaps looking ahead to unthinkable events such as the German domination of Europe, or a Japanese attack on the United States, Belgrano uttered prophetic words. "Those," he said, "who practice the theory of splendid isolation are smoking the opium of self-deception. They may have pleasant dreams for the moment, but some day they will awake to a nightmare of tragic reality." The American Legion repudiated its commander's comment.[14]

Reaction against the intervention in 1917, pacifism, and fear of unforeseen temptations and crises resulted in the Neutrality Act of 1935, as well as subsequent neutrality legislation. Roosevelt, having been burned by the World Court issue, overcame his misgivings and signed the act into law.

In the event of war, it read, the president "shall proclaim such fact, and it shall thereafter be unlawful to export arms, ammunition, or implements of war from any place in the United States, or possessions of the United States, to any port of such belligerent states, . . . or for the use of [a] belligerent country." Section 3 also prohibited American vessels from carrying implements of war to neutral ports, if these arms and munitions were destined for transshipment to a belligerent power. The legislation established strict governmental supervision over the armaments industry, which many Americans now blamed for U.S. inter-

vention in the Great War. And mindful of the *Lusitania* tragedy of 1915, Congress authorized the president to warn American citizens sailing on belligerents' ships that they did so at their own risk. This legislation, if not rescinded or amended, doomed any effective American intervention on behalf of collective security against aggression. Politics was politics, however, and an election was coming up. Reports indicated that the looming war between Ethiopia and Italy might be a prelude to a broader European struggle.

Speaking of this Neutrality Act, former secretary of state Henry L. Stimson observed, "The President had done little or nothing to head off this legislative folly which would discourage the victims of aggression and not its perpetrators. . . ." Roosevelt, in signing the legislation, did wisely point out that "inflexible provisions might drag us into war instead of keeping us out."

Roosevelt's supporters in Congress wondered about the future course of American foreign policy. Would it take the form of adamant isolationism? Many British and French leaders believed that this legislation could only encourage hotheads in Berlin and Rome.[15] It was now clear to all that America was willing to surrender some of its rights as a neutral nation if it could thereby avoid becoming a belligerent power. The neutrality law was soon tested.

Mussolini's Italy attacked Ethiopia in early October 1935, and FDR promptly embargoed the export of arms and munitions to the warring parties. The League of Nations then voted to impose limited economic sanctions upon Italy. Secretary of State Cordell Hull, however, promptly informed the British that America would not feel bound by sanctions voted by the league.[16] Instead, Hull and the president called for a "moral embargo." This meant that American exporters were admonished to maintain the existing level of exports to Mussolini's Italy. In fact, American exporters made large profits by increasing exports of strategic metals and oil to fascist Italy. In his memoirs, Hull lamely argues that, absent the "moral embargo," the situation would have been even worse.[17]

In the name of freedom of the seas, neutrality, and profits, the American economy helped to prevent an Italian collapse. Roosevelt remained passive, as Mussolini demonstrated that aggression worked. The American public was not unduly upset. A Gallup poll showed that seventy percent of Americans opposed enforcing sanctions in cooperation with the league. Through all of this, Roosevelt could only promise,

"[T]he United States of America shall and must remain . . . unentangled and free."[18] While Marshal Pietro Badoglio prepared for his final victory drive in Ethiopia, and a week before Hitler sent German troops into the demilitarized Rhineland, Congress widened the neutrality legislation, though it now permitted the president to determine *when* "there exists a state of war between, or among two or more foreign states. . . ." Once the president had made this determination, however, the arms embargo would apply to any additional parties entering the conflict. This could only discourage collective security measures, for the amendment in question mandated an arms embargo applicable even to nations at war against an *aggressor.* And according to the new law, belligerents could receive no loans or credits. Roosevelt quickly applied the legislation to the war in eastern Africa, though this action did nothing to save Ethiopia, the victim of aggression. Later, Cordell Hull ruefully admitted, "If total sanctions had been applied, Mussolini might have been stopped dead in his tracks."[19]

"Total sanctions" would have required stronger measures by the league, and full support for them by its members, as well as by the United States. The failure of the league, whatever America's responsibility, hurt the interventionist cause. In the Midwest, where editorial opinion had been predominantly internationalist since 1917, isolationism took over as the dominant voice of the region.[20]

Roosevelt's growing hostility to the Nazis had not yet taken him past the way station labeled peaceful multilateralism. A collective antifascist alliance was out of the question, as was unilateral American action. Roosevelt mused about a peace conference, perhaps even a summit meeting with Hitler and Mussolini. FDR's program contained two basic elements: mutual reduction in armaments, and free access for all nations to international markets and raw materials. The problem was that the president did not yet realize that the acceptance of such principles was anathema to fascist states. If they agreed, they would cease to be fascist. Thus, far from being a kind of "appeasement," as some scholars have alleged, Roosevelt's idea was an impractical, idealistic concept predicated upon the return of Germany, Italy, and Japan to liberal political principles.

After the outbreak of General Francisco Franco's Spanish rebellion in the summer of 1936, the president invoked a "moral embargo" on arms

sales to the insurgents and prevented the shipment of badly needed warplanes to the legitimate government of the Spanish Republic.[21] "Lift the embargo!" implored much of the American left, while pro-Franco activists in the Catholic community demanded, "Keep the embargo!" To rescind it, Roosevelt believed, "would mean the loss of every Catholic vote in the coming fall election. . . ."[22] After the election, when Congress passed another Neutrality Act, which prevented the export of arms, munitions, and implements of war to Spain, Ambassador Dodd sourly documented the elation of the German press.

It was clear that the Versailles peace structure was collapsing. Hitler had begun his massive arms buildup. France was politically unstable; Britain seemed to lack political will. Mussolini had taken Ethiopia, while the league had disintegrated as an effective body. FDR, concerned about the rise of dictatorships and the threat of war, ruminated about various approaches to the world crisis. Perhaps the president could persuade Hitler to outline his foreign policy goals for the next ten years. Maybe he could coax the Nazis into re-entering disarmament negotiations. He considered convening an international conference, but he hesitated to share this idea with a suspicious American people. On at least one occasion, FDR considered endorsing American participation in a multinational blockade of Germany, at least in a theoretical sense.[23] Yet it is hard to take these ideas too seriously, except as guides to FDR's increasing fear of Nazi aggression and barbarity. Presiding over an economically troubled nation separated from Europe and Asia by great oceans, Roosevelt commanded a paltry army of fewer than 200,000 men, and an unprepared, undermanned navy.

Concerned about American isolationism, Roosevelt found himself in a difficult position.[24] Most Americans disliked the Nazis, when they thought about them at all. Yet they detested the thought of another intervention in a European war even more. How could one change the worldview of an American majority? This was a great challenge; as the president put it in 1936, "A Government can be no better than the public opinion which sustains it."[25] Roosevelt's caution has led to much criticism. Some have seen his foreign policy during these years as that of a man unwilling "to make use of America's power and influence in international affairs." Ambassador Dodd was closer to the mark. He wrote that Roosevelt "fears violent opposition to any progressive move that he might make."

President Roosevelt's stunning reelection landslide in 1936 made

him more amenable to interventionist suggestions. FDR's image, particularly in Europe, was becoming that of a world statesman. Roosevelt now believed that his great powers of persuasion might be brought to bear upon Hitler himself. Foreign reaction to Roosevelt's victory confirmed his own instinct about the American role in a world where evil forces, preying upon social misery, were planning new wars. As if to prove FDR correct, the Nazi press grew more hostile to him, while *Paris-Soir* exulted, "Henceforth democracy has its chief!" French political leader Paul Reynaud shared this view of FDR, as did Foreign Minister Yvon Delbos. The president would, they hoped, work to change public opinion, "to orient American policy in the direction of . . . the democratic countries and to [France] in particular."[26] That day would come, but not for at least two more years.

Democratic Europe, leaderless and demoralized, thus agreed with the ambassador to France, William Bullitt, who later told Roosevelt, "You are . . . beginning to occupy the miracle man position." The president heard from another admirer that "[o]nly the President of the United States, triumphantly re-elected by his entire nation, enjoys a prestige . . . which enables him to utter an appeal for peace which would have a chance of being heard."[27]

CHAPTER EIGHT

TOWARD SELECTIVE CONFRONTATION WITH GERMANY

DESPITE GROWING PUBLIC QUALMS about the goals of the dictators, FDR knew that dramatic presidential action might frighten and alienate the public. The neutrality mania was not the only problem. More than any other president in this century, FDR faced hatreds that were enduring and implacable. Many people from FDR's social class (or those who aspired to that status) viewed him as a "traitor to his class." To a large number of corporate executives, Roosevelt was a slave to distasteful ethnic and racial groups. Sitting in posh clubs in New York City or Chicago or relaxing in Westchester country club locker rooms after a golf game, these men cursed Roosevelt as a closet bolshevik. Eleanor's belief in racial equality filled these men with loathing. Many a Roosevelt-hater shook his head with disgust when discussing the famous "Nigger pictures," widely circulated photographs of Mrs. Roosevelt in conversation with Negro ROTC cadets from Howard University. Roosevelt may have boasted that he had saved capitalism; to his enemies, he had destroyed the good old order, and paved the way for "socialism," if not for dictatorship or even communism. Governor Alf M. Landon of Kansas, a progressive Republican, fell prey to some of

this rhetoric during his ill-fated 1936 campaign. "Franklin D. Roosevelt," he told the electorate, "proposes to destroy the right to elect your own representatives."[1]

Others went further, charging that Roosevelt was the "real candidate—the unofficial candidate of the Comintern. . . ." Lieutenant Colonel Edwin M. Hadley voiced the thoughts of many a citizen: "What we have in Washington today is not a Republican administration. *Neither is it a Democratic administration.* It is a Socialistic-Communistic administration. . . ."

Roosevelt-haters included William Randolph Hearst, who had access to millions of people from all social classes through his control of twenty-eight newspapers and numerous radio stations, magazines, and assorted media outlets. Hearst's newspapers had a daily circulation of six million copies, perhaps one-seventh of the American readership. His contempt for the democracies, and his fear of the Soviet Union turned him into a major burden for Roosevelt. Hearst's hatred inspired various denunciations, one of them in verse:

A Red New Deal with a Soviet seal
Endorsed by a Moscow hand,
The strange result of an alien cult
In a liberty-loving land

Like Hearst, Chicago press lord Colonel Robert McCormick was a Roosevelt-hater, as well as a major spokesman for the isolationist consensus. McCormick's *Chicago Tribune* argued that the British Empire was hardly superior to Hitler's Germany, and warned that Roosevelt was bent upon establishing a dictatorship, with the help of communists and other New Deal proponents.[2] By 1935, McCormick, along with Hearst and two other Roosevelt-bashers, controlled about one-fifth of the daily national newspaper circulation, and over one-third of the Sunday readership.[3]

Of patrician background and manner, Roosevelt used his office on behalf of people despised by many members of his own social class. For this, they could not forgive him. "Old money" resented its loss of control, for the expansion of governmental power came on the heels of its own failure in the face of the Great Depression. A liberal with a great name had usurped its power.[4] Now, at the end of 1936, well-dressed ladies sometimes visited newsreel theaters, waiting for the moment

when they could jeer the sight of FDR. Others refused to mention the name of "that man in the White House." Rumors circulated describing Roosevelt as a drunk, a syphilitic, a megalomaniac. At times the jibes were humorous, as in the cartoon in which God suffers from delusions of grandeur. "He thinks He's Franklin D. Roosevelt," read the caption. Upon occasion, an exasperated Roosevelt-hater was heard saying, "Well, let's hope somebody shoots him."

Many of the Roosevelt-haters rallied to the Liberty League, which claimed over 124,000 members in the summer of 1936. Its Washington offices were larger than those of the Republican National Committee. The league supported various reactionary groups, including the Southern Committee to Uphold the Constitution. This organization put out propaganda revealing that "President Roosevelt has . . . permitted Negroes to come to the White House Banquet Table and sleep in the White House beds. . . ." The league failed in its attempt to foil FDR's reelection. Indeed, it saddled the Republicans with an "economic royalist" and "fat cat" image that hurt candidate Alf M. Landon. Although its day had passed, the league left a legacy of opposition to Roosevelt that now assumed new forms.[5]

Wealthy Roosevelt-haters intended to sabotage foreign policy initiatives favored by the president. They much preferred fascism to communism, and they mistrusted Roosevelt's commitment to democracy. Nor were the right-wingers an isolated fringe. One poll found that Americans, when forced to choose between communism and fascism, chose the latter by a margin of twenty-two points.[6]

A strange "isolationist" alliance began to emerge, reaching its high point early in the next decade. Those supporting this foreign policy coalition included people who supported Roosevelt on New Deal issues. Among them were "Anglo-Saxon" Progressives, who recalled that war had brought about the demise of Wilsonian liberalism. They thus recoiled at the thought of renewed intervention in Europe. The isolationists also gained the support of many Italian-Americans. Proud of Mussolini's Italy, they resented FDR's growing coolness to the dictator. Aversion to America's onetime allies reinforced these isolationist tendencies. Roosevelt himself sometimes voiced fears about British attempts to inveigle the United States into actions intended to shore up the British Empire. Representative George H. Tinkham, Republican of Massachusetts, spoke for many when he claimed, "The President of the United States and the Department of State, his agent, are under the

domination and control of the British Foreign Office." Reactionaries who hated Roosevelt saw his interest in the European crisis as the prelude to a new executive power play.[7]

So Roosevelt, unclear about his course and fearful of his critics, proceeded cautiously. In a widely heralded speech, he stated, "I have passed unnumbered hours, I shall pass unnumbered hours thinking and planning how war may be kept from this nation." As if to renounce Wilsonian messianism, FDR added, "I wish I could keep war from all nations, but that is beyond my power." At times, Roosevelt seemed to regret American entry into the Great War. He found some merit in the "merchants of death" argument. The great actor and supreme politician had not yet discovered his role as world statesman.[8]

Roosevelt's letters, conversations, and speeches reveal a man who was grappling with feelings of suspicion and unease. FDR would, over the next three years, become convinced that coexistence between the Western democratic community and Nazi Germany was unlikely. Roosevelt began to see himself as a kind of savior of the Western democracies. He foresaw the need for the creation of an anti-Nazi diplomatic coalition. The American ambassador to Berlin noted in his diary that "the real fear here . . . is that the President [Roosevelt] may organize all American peoples against Fascist Europe and even boycott any power that starts another war."[9] Dodd's comment proved to be prescient. By 1939, Hitler was telling his generals, "The attempt of certain circles in the U.S. to lead the continent in a direction hostile to Germany is certainly without success at the moment, yet in the future it could lead to the desired result. Here too time must be seen as working against Germany." Hitler's sense of urgency stemmed in part from his concern about the future of American policy. He needed to reorganize Europe in preparation for a global conflict that he both feared and desired.[10] Hitler's fear of America, expressed in his abortive 1928 book, was growing stronger.

If the United States eventually helped to destroy fascism, it would not do so in Spain. Americans influenced the ongoing civil war, but only because thousands of volunteers flocked to fight in the communist-dominated international brigades. Despite their heroism and the suffering of the Spanish Republicans, the government failed to crush General Franco's rebels, who were aided by German aircraft and military advisers, as well as by numerous Italian "legionaries." Roosevelt's sympathies were with the Republic, but he did nothing to terminate (or

circumvent) the rigid arms embargo. The horrors inflicted by the Japanese Imperial Army upon Chinese civilians soon joined events in Spain as front-page news. Partially disarmed and committed to neutrality, the United States was not about to intervene militarily in Spain or China.

The United States could make its presence felt in other ways, however, and to the detriment of Germany. FDR seized this opportunity. German-American trade, which had been declining for years, deteriorated further. In 1929, the United States had produced 13.3 percent of Germany's imports, while absorbing 7.4 percent of her exports. By 1938, the figures were 3.4 percent and 3.4 percent, respectively. Secretary Hull, a passionate believer in free trade, strongly objected to Nazi trade policies. The secretary conveyed his anger to a sympathetic president. Hull argued, "The system upon which Germany conducts its international commercial relations . . . runs diametrically contrary to the principles upon which the commercial policy of the United States is based." The anti-Nazi boycott further undermined commerce between America and the Third Reich.

Roosevelt agreed in 1936 that certain German exporters would have to pay countervailing duties on goods exported to the United States. Despite qualms about German trade policies, Secretary Hull, more than the president, attempted to prevent a total breakdown in bilateral trade. Hull opposed the imposition of additional duties on imports, fearing their "deplorable repercussions on our foreign trade . . . with respect to Germany." FDR, in contrast, noted, "If it is a borderline case I feel so keenly about Germany that I would enforce the countervailing duties." Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau crusaded for these duties, and he usually prevailed. Hull seemed to miss the point entirely. He protested that the Treasury Department was not applying the duties to other nations "engaging in currency manipulation similar to Germany's."[11] Roosevelt, concerned about German rearmament and Hitler's foreign policy, was tending toward the view that there were few, if any, nations that could be called "similar to Germany." And that, of course, was the whole point. Germany now denounced the German-American trade agreement, in order to put pressure on Washington. The German-American Chamber of Commerce worked to reverse the Roosevelt-Morgenthau decision.[12] Both ploys failed.

Despite these problems, German-American trade did not cease. Complicated patent agreements between corporations doing business in both countries permitted the continued export of strategic products and

materials to the Reich. Aircraft, petroleum, and chemical industries supplied Germany with important strategic materials, and some of this commerce flourished even after the outbreak of war in Europe. Americans promoting this trade subscribed to the philosophy of Alfred Sloan, Jr., head of General Motors. "[A]n international business operating throughout the world," wrote Sloan, "should conduct its operations in strictly business terms, without regard to the political beliefs of its management, or the political beliefs of the country in which it is operating."[13]

In December 1933, Standard Oil of New York deposited one million dollars in Germany for making "gasoline from soft coal for war emergencies." A few months later, United Aircraft negotiated the sale of numerous crankshafts, cylinder heads, and other items of military importance. These products enabled the German aircraft industry to produce about "100 airplanes per month." Sperry Gyroscope delivered automatic pilots, as well as the latest gyro compasses to the Germans, enough to equip "50 airplanes per month." It also sold some of its fire prevention systems, used on antiaircraft guns, to the Askania works in Germany. Bendix exported automatic pilot data to Siemens and Halsko. Such products were essential to the Luftwaffe, and the Germans paid in hard currency. In addition, American companies continued to sell patents to the Germans, who then exported some of their aviation technology to other aggressor states, such as fascist Italy. As early as 4 April 1934, Douglas Miller, acting commercial attaché in Berlin, warned the administration about American involvement in German rearmament. In his letter, Miller named names, showing how American firms were assisting in the construction of the German Luftwaffe.[14]

This lucrative and important strategic commerce proved to be the exception to the rule. German-American trade continued on its steep descent. Roosevelt had the authority to prevent the export of certain items, such as helium, and, at the urging of Interior Secretary Harold Ickes, he did so. The Germans would have liked to have imported large amounts of American cotton, selected foodstuffs, and steel, but were unable to place their orders. In some cases, American shareholders objected, as in the instance of steel exports. A more important factor was the ideological incompatibility between the two economic systems.[15] Morgenthau and Roosevelt had no intention of improving trade relations with an economy based upon autarky, export subsidies, and currency manipulation.

In Berlin, Ambassador Dodd grew more impatient. He warned Roosevelt that "pacifism will mean a great war and the subordination of all Europe to Germany if the pacifist peoples do not act courageously. . . ." Dodd informed the president that "Hitler and Mussolini intend to control all Europe." The ambassador believed that "Hitler is simply waiting for his best opportunity to seize what he wants." Roosevelt did not disagree, but relations remained outwardly "correct." The President, Goering, and Hitler exchanged condolences after a tragic explosion in New London, Texas. Roosevelt expressed formal regrets after the crash of the dirigible *Hindenburg* near Lakehurst, New Jersey.

The Spanish tragedy continued unabated. Hull and Roosevelt convinced themselves that the embargo on the export of arms to the Republic was the wisest course. Congress had made this policy mandatory, of course, but Roosevelt did nothing to change it.[16] The Americans claimed to be endorsing the European commitment to nonintervention in Spain, but the fact remains that Congress and the Roosevelt administration helped to seal the fate of the Republic. Had the Franco forces been crushed after their failure to take Madrid in late 1936, the Republic might well have prevailed. Roosevelt later regretted his own policy, but he believed in it at the time of its adoption. After all, as Hull recalled, "the United States was set in a concrete mold of isolation." Roosevelt refused to break that mold, except in cases related to bilateral trade and activities in the Western Hemisphere.[17]

During this first year of Roosevelt's second term, Congress modified the neutrality law. The Neutrality Act passed in 1937 maintained the mandatory arms embargo to belligerents. The law was more flexible in one sense, however. It contained a "cash and carry" clause, and this represented a victory for the president and for American exporters. Belligerents could buy American goods, including those of a strategic nature, so long as they exported the purchased goods to their homelands in ships other than those flying the flag of the United States. The purchasers would also have to pay cash in advance. This clause, scheduled to expire on 1 May 1939, could only favor Britain and France, because their naval power far exceeded that of Germany and Italy. Furthermore, the president had obtained discretionary authority in the application of the "cash and carry" measure. Another regulation flatly forbade American citizens from sailing on ships flying the flags of belligerent powers. The New York *Herald Tribune* called the law "An Act

to Preserve the United States From Intervention in the War of 1917–1918."[18]

Roosevelt's concern about fascism was growing, but his policy of caution in regard to European commitments remained unimpaired. He moved more boldly, however, when confronting German influence closer to home.

Roosevelt's knowledge of geography convinced him that American security and prosperity depended upon a stable South American continent. Roosevelt and Secretary Hull were aware of the disturbing statistics. United States trade with Latin America had declined by about 75 percent between 1929 and 1933. In 1929, the U.S. had absorbed 34 percent of Latin America's exports; by 1934, the figure had dropped to 29.4 percent. In 1929, the Germans purchased 8.1 percent of Latin America's exports, and provided 10.8 percent of its imports. By the mid-1930s, the Germans absorbed 10.8 percent of these exports, and accounted for 16.2 percent of Latin America's imports.

In 1935, Germany provided Brazil with 20.7 percent of its imports, a figure comparable to that applicable to the United States. By 1936, Brazil was importing more automobiles from Germany than from Great Britain. In that year, it acquired 86,000 tons of coal from the Reich; a year later, the figure shot up to 200,000 tons. The Germans were making inroads into Chile and Mexico as well. Their share of these nations' imports rose dramatically. By 1937, the Germans accounted for 26 percent of Chile's imports and 17.7 percent of Mexico's. The Germans hoped to gain unlimited access to South American raw materials. They had a long tradition of trade with Latin America, and most of this commerce was nonstrategic in nature. And despite German gains, both Britain and the United States continued to maintain higher levels of capital investment in the region.[19]

Nevertheless, Hull and Roosevelt were greatly concerned, particularly after reading a report from Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace. This memorandum heightened FDR's fears of German and Japanese trade with Latin America. As early as December 1935, Roosevelt had thought about assisting Latin American countries with "supplies of one kind or another." Roosevelt, Hull, and Morgenthau had not, however, formulated a coherent policy for Latin America.[20] They were

now beginning to do so. The administration was preparing the way for the first geopolitical conflict between the Third Reich and the United States. Here Roosevelt could operate in the realms of politics, economics, and ideology. Even isolationists supported the Monroe Doctrine.

The Germans usually paid for their Brazilian imports with blocked currency accounts that could only be used for the purchase of German exports, such as coal. The Reich government was subsidizing German exports, while preventing countries like Brazil from using German "currency" for the purchase of British or American products. Bilateral and exclusionary, the "Aski" system violated every principle of Hull's free trade ideology.[21] Worse still, countries like Argentina, Chile, and Brazil contained large Italian and German populations, and FDR was becoming more concerned about their rumored affinity for fascist or Nazi ideology.

Hans Stöckl, a German nationalist, had years before argued that a resurgent Germany could build bridges to *Auslanddeutschtum*, to the German communities in places like Chile. Now, with the Nazis in power, some nationalists believed that awakened German communities, working with their host nations, could contribute to the resistance against absorption by the Yankee behemoth.[22] The Nazis, moreover, were fully capable of denouncing the Monroe Doctrine, for their own rather transparent purposes. Roosevelt's State Department advisers knew that such siren sounds could tempt their restive Latin targets. In 1930, after all, a Mexican supreme court judge had announced that "[f]or Mexico the Monroe Doctrine does not exist," that it was merely "an infantile theory, to cloak the tutelage on the part of the United States over Latin America."[23] The president's advisers rushed to provide him with the requisite background information on his latest obsession, German influence in Latin America. It was clear to FDR that his global ideals of democracy, capitalist development, and free trade could never be achieved if Latin America became a pawn in the hands of hostile totalitarian powers.

The evolution of the "Good Neighbor" policy reflected FDR's worries about Axis subversion in Latin America. He wished to dominate Latin America's foreign trade, but with the approval of the republics there. This would be difficult, for, as Roosevelt knew, powerful nationalist currents affected the political cultures of countries like Argentina and Mexico. Diplomatic pressure, promises of credits and other investments, and sensitivity to differing viewpoints thus replaced gunboat diplomacy. There was a potentially dangerous trade-off, however, at least from Roosevelt's viewpoint. If America forswore armed intervention, might not other powers be tempted to establish bases in Latin America? The president was coming to equate American economic interests and strategic security with an anti-Nazi policy in Latin America.

Alarming reports continued to reach Roosevelt. Ambassador Dodd informed him that "a Chile man reported a Nazi Party in that country of 35,000 men, adding that the Chilean Government expects to be a German colony in a year or two. The Colombian Minister came to see me two days ago and said that the activity all over Latin America was so great that he wished me to report it."[24] Even Cordell Hull, who usually kept his emotions under tight control, expressed alarm. The Germans, he believed, were organizing their Latin American brethren into Nazi storm-troop units. Sumner Welles, a State Department expert on the Caribbean and Latin America, worked to strengthen the "Good Neighbor" policy. FDR came into closer contact with him, particularly after Welles's appointment as under secretary of state in May 1937.

Hull disliked Sumner Welles and feared that FDR was grooming the bright and scholarly under secretary as his successor. This appears not to have been the case. FDR needed Hull's contacts with his former colleagues in Congress, and he appreciated his loyalty. FDR would, however, use Welles when necessary. Roosevelt liked to keep the strings in his own hands. This meant working on the crucial issues of war, peace, and diplomacy with selected political appointees, among them Anthony Biddle, William Bullitt, and Sumner Welles. This talented team would serve Roosevelt well in the two years that lay ahead. These men challenged Roosevelt, helped him to formulate his ideas, and pushed him toward the achievement of goals that mattered to him.

CHAPTER NINE

QUARANTINE OR APPEASEMENT?

IN THE AUTUMN of 1937, President Roosevelt appeared to strike out in a bold new direction. He gave public voice to some of his private concerns about the direction of world affairs.[1] In a Chicago speech, delivered on 5 October, Roosevelt denounced unnamed aggressors, thanks to whom "civilians . . . are being ruthlessly murdered with bombs from the air." For the first time, Roosevelt warned the people that isolation and neutrality were no guarantees of American security. He implied that aggressor nations, if not checked elsewhere, might one day turn against the "Western Hemisphere," a vague phrase left undefined. Roosevelt spoke of "positive endeavors to preserve peace," such as imposing a quarantine on the aggressor.

The man who had signed the neutrality legislation, acquiesced in continuing American military weakness, and embargoed arms shipments to the Spanish Republic was reacting uneasily to the emergence of a new "Axis" stretching from Berlin to Rome. Japan, Germany, and Italy were soon linked in a so-called "Anti-Comintern" pact, directed at the Soviet Union. Roosevelt received more disturbing news from Secretary of State Hull, who informed FDR that Germany was "hell-bent on

war." Other incoming reports indicated that the Third Reich was in the hands of psychopaths.[2]

The "Quarantine Speech" received some support, both from newspaper editorialists and from concerned individuals. Clark M. Eichelberger, the national director of the League of Nations Association worked hard on behalf of the president's ideas. The Council on Foreign Relations, a body representing and serving the internationalist establishment, redoubled its efforts to inform the public about America's stake in collective security measures. The Carnegie Corporation soon provided it with fifty thousand dollars. The council was run by the kind of people who, like Roosevelt, sympathized with Wilsonian internationalism. Like Roosevelt, Hamilton Fish Armstrong, editor of the council's prestigious journal, *Foreign Affairs*, doubted that the United States could remain neutral in the event of a new war. Unlike the president, he soon said so publicly, because *his* constituency was sympathetic to this position.[3]

Despite these pockets of support, the loudest voices were raised in opposition to the president's speech.[4] Secretary of State Cordell Hull, taken aback by the furor, recalled, "The reaction against the quarantine idea was quick and violent." Hull saw the speech as a serious setback to the internationalists' "constant educational campaign." There were more substantial reasons for Hull's negative reaction. Despite his insights into Hitler's aims, the secretary had no use for Roosevelt's plan to convene an international conference dedicated to settling outstanding issues of trade, frontiers, and armaments. And Hull knew that polls showed that sixty-nine percent of the people favored *stricter* neutrality legislation. Even in the supposedly internationalist East, papers like the *Boston Herald* constantly warned against intervention in Europe. "Crusade if you must," it told FDR, "but for the sake of several millions of American mothers confine your expanding to the continental limits of America."[5] Only twenty-six percent of those polled wished to see the United States enter the League of Nations.

Soon after delivering the Chicago speech, the president told Endicott Peabody, his old headmaster at Groton School, "I am fighting against a public psychology of long standing—a psychology which comes very close to saying 'Peace at any price.' " The *Boston Herald* invoked bitter memories: "The mantle of Woodrow Wilson lay on the shoulders of Franklin Roosevelt when he spoke in Chicago." The *New York Daily News*, contradicting itself at every turn, praised Roosevelt for

his initiative and advocated the provision of arms to China. In the same breath, however, the *News* urged Britain to share some of its colonies with Germany, and warned against American involvement overseas!

A nine-power conference, convened in Brussels to deal with Japanese aggression, accomplished nothing, thanks in part to American caution and Japanese contempt. Despite this setback, Roosevelt devoted more thought to the creation of an antiaggressor coalition. FDR still wanted to convene an international conference committed to furthering the causes of disarmament and open markets, though he was uncertain about its prospects. Ever convinced of his own powers of persuasion, Roosevelt continued to muse about a meeting with Hitler and Mussolini.

The Nye Committee, the World Court uproar, and the "Quarantine Speech" imbroglio proved once again that interventionism was a political mine field. Early in 1938, the House of Representatives barely defeated the notorious Ludlow Resolution. This legislation would have required a national plebiscite before the United States could go to war, except in the instance of a direct attack upon American territory. Roosevelt needed to puzzle out his course. He was not acting decisively or consistently in foreign affairs.[6] Neville Chamberlain, now British prime minister, welcomed Roosevelt's friendship, but counted "on nothing from the American but words."

The president received uncertain and divided counsel from the State Department. The chief of the division of European affairs, Pierrepont Moffat, described himself as preoccupied with preventing the "involvement of the United States in hostilities anywhere," and worked to "discourage any formation of a common front of the democratic powers." From his ambassadors, Roosevelt sometimes received the opposite advice. A political optimist, FDR did not doubt that strong executive leadership might change public attitudes. Polls, which fascinated him, seemed to bear this out. As early as the spring of 1936, forty-four percent of the polled public thought that the United States "will be drawn into the next European War." Within three years, that figure had risen to fifty-eight percent. If the public was fatalistic about war, it might be receptive to a message garbed in the rhetoric of "defense" and "preparedness."[7]

Some of the more articulate pacifists and peace activists were beginning to change their views, or at least their tactics. The rise of fascism was splitting the peace movement. Pacifist Reinhold Niebuhr, a distinguished theologian, had described all war as "worthless" in 1929. A few years later, he justified violence by oppressed classes and peoples, while advocating international intervention against fascist aggressors. Socialist Norman Thomas, while still favoring the use of nonviolent methods, now rejected pacifism as a response to fascist aggression. Meanwhile, the "Oxford Pledge," which required those who adopted it not to serve in their nation's armed forces or fight in its wars, was becoming less popular on college campuses. The communists, who had strongly supported the peace movements, now had second thoughts. When the Soviet Union entered the League of Nations (1934) and called for collective security measures, the Communist League Against War and Fascism transformed itself into the American League for Peace and Democracy.[8] The communists became less hostile to Roosevelt. Though small in number, the Communist party enjoyed the support of many trade unionists and intellectuals.

Certainly, the press would have to play its part in changing public perceptions of the American role in the world. Fifty million newspaper readers constituted the bulk of the potential electorate. The Hearst newspapers gave FDR much grief, as did Colonel McCormick and the *Chicago Tribune*. FDR went directly to the people with his "fireside chats" on the radio. And Roosevelt knew how to circumvent the prejudices and politics of powerful press moguls. He was a great manipulator of the print media. In the words of Washington bureau chief of the *New York Times*, Arthur Krock, FDR was the "greatest reader and critic of newspapers who had ever been in the president's office." Roosevelt tried to show reporters how to write a column, and he was not above conspiring to bring about the reassignment of a difficult newsperson.[9] Despite his complaint that "eighty-five percent" of the press was against him, the president often received fair, even favorable, treatment in the news columns. In fact, about seventy percent of the newspapers described themselves as Democratic or independent.

FDR held six times as many press conferences during his first term as had President Hoover.[10] FDR understood public opinion, and he learned a lot from the unprecedented flood of mail that arrived in the cluttered White House mail room (450,000 communications during his first week in office!). Roosevelt put this knowledge to good use. He played upon popular hopes and anxieties at his press conferences. With one hand, FDR gauged public opinion; with the other, he manipulated it.

Roosevelt diligently cultivated favored syndicated columnists, such

as Walter Winchell of Hearst's *New York Daily Mirror.* An early admirer of Roosevelt, Winchell hated Hitler, calling pro-Nazis "swastinkas," and "Hitlerrooters." Winchell was a power-hungry egotist, but he was also a politically courageous man. Because he worked for Hearst, who now despised Roosevelt with a vengeance, Winchell proved particularly useful to FDR. His syndicated column was read throughout the nation, and his famous radio broadcasts became standard fare for millions of Americans. Hearst tried to censor Winchell, but failed. Winchell had enough clout to write his own ticket. "He had power," recalled a former co-worker at the *Mirror.*

Roosevelt captivated reporters with his humor, knowledge, self-confidence, and accessibility. Hedley Donovan, a young journalist, still remembered the famous charm more than forty years later. "I was greatly flattered one day . . . ," Donovan writes, "to receive a large wink from the President as he delivered some transparent piece of humbug." Roosevelt was, he quickly adds, a "personality of deep subtleties and complexity."[11] He knew how to pique interest by remaining silent until he was ready to show his hand. An observer described the result in these terms: "He won them [reporters] and he has still a larger proportion of them personally sympathetic than any of his recent predecessors." One correspondent spoke for many when he rejoiced, "[W]e're not only welcome but we have the distinct feeling—for the first time—that we belong here, that he's *our* President." They laughed at his jokes, and if warned by the president about a foreign menace, they would alert their readers without asking too many questions. Gathered around the president's desk while he smiled, chatted, evaded, and manipulated, all the while scattering cigarette smoke and ashes about him, reporters were mesmerized. Still, Roosevelt never let the press forget who was president. He liked reporters when he could use them, but he also knew when and how to avoid them.[12]

By the time of the "Quarantine Speech," Ambassador Dodd had fulfilled his role. He had taught Roosevelt what he needed to know about Hitler. Old, ill, and tired, Dodd retired. His outspoken anti-Nazism had antagonized both Berlin and Washington. Powerful friends of Roosevelt, including William C. Bullitt and Sumner Welles, believed that a moderate career diplomat might accomplish more in Berlin.[13] The

president acquiesced, by replacing Dodd with the more flexible Hugh R. Wilson. Roosevelt paid little attention to Wilson on policy matters.

As for Ambassador Dodd, he performed two more acts of selfless public service. Despite a debilitating illness, he embarked upon extensive lecture tours, warning complacent Americans of the Axis threat to democracy. Dodd then devoted much of his remaining time to preparing his diaries for publication. A scathing indictment of Nazi coarseness and brutality, they served to enlighten many American readers. Dodd had been one of the early prophets, warning of Hitler's ambitions. Roosevelt now turned more and more often to Anthony J.D. Biddle and William Bullitt, ambassadors to Warsaw and Paris. Biddle and Bullitt stimulated and cajoled the president, providing him with extra eyes and ears in Europe.[14]

Roosevelt needed to change public opinion; for the moment this objective was more important than the mechanics of collective security. He informed Biddle, "We cannot stop the spread of Fascism unless world opinion realizes its ultimate dangers." He hinted at an Anglo-American alliance directed against the dictators and militarists, stating, "[T]he United States and Great Britain have one great common concern—the preservation of peace throughout the world." Now, in this same year, the widely read columnist Walter Lippmann echoed FDR's words. "No matter what we wish now or now believe," he wrote, "though collaboration with Britain . . . is difficult and often irritating, we shall protect the connection because in no other way can we fulfill our destiny."[15]

Roosevelt was pleased when Ambassador Biddle reported that Polish reaction to the "Quarantine Speech" was highly favorable. The president hoped that the Poles, allies of the French, would reject any German demands that might be in the offing. Privately, FDR made some prophetic comments that give us a clue to his growth as a political manipulator and a global strategist. Speaking to his son Elliott, Roosevelt said, "Sooner or later there'll be a showdown in Europe." He then speculated on the unpleasant prospect of becoming embroiled in a two-ocean war. "Then," he commented, "you would have to be a bit shifty on your feet. You have to lick one of them first and then bring your military forces around and then lick the other."[16]

Ambassador William Bullitt forced Roosevelt to ponder some hard choices.[17] An erratic, brilliant man, Bullitt had accompanied Wilson to

the 1919 peace conference. He quickly became disillusioned with Wilson at Versailles. Testifying against that president's foreign policy, Bullitt earned the reputation as a disloyal and flighty young man. Bullitt took his revenge by writing a scathing study of Wilson's personality (Sigmund Freud contributed to the work), but political ambition caused him to delay publishing the book for thirty-five years.

A staunch Democrat, Bullitt received another chance in 1933, when FDR recognized the Soviet Union. Appointed the first U.S. ambassador to Moscow, Bullitt changed his views. Originally sympathetic to the young Soviet state, Bullitt was now a fervent anticommunist, to the exclusion of most other considerations. After he took up his duties in Paris, he began to pay more heed to the menace across the Rhine River. For at least a year, however, the ambassador judged the Nazi threat in terms of the expansion of world communism. He feared that war would lead to massive Soviet territorial gains, and would unleash revolutions within the belligerent nations.[18]

Watching Hitler changed the ambassador's point of view. He became as obsessed with the Nazis as he had been with the communists. Bullitt now warned the president of the Nazi commitment to the preservation of American isolation and neutrality. He foresaw an era of German aggression. Over and over again, Bullitt spoke on behalf of those French leaders who feared Nazi Germany. He stubbornly refused to acknowledge the need for a Franco-Russian military pact, because he still hoped for a peaceful settlement of the European crisis. Germany, he argued, would have to be the dominant power in the new European order. Still, Bullitt was moving toward an antifascist position. The ambassador worked to convince FDR of the crying need for dynamic leadership. He voiced the hunger for a democratic leader of global stature, because "Hitler has the ball and can run with it in any direction he chooses."

FDR encouraged Bullitt and Biddle to deal with him through back channels that led right into the Oval Office. Roosevelt listened carefully to their reports, but his thoughts still raced ahead of his political program. FDR stubbornly clung to his idea of an international conference; he also warned Biddle and Bullitt that they could make no commitments on behalf of the American government.

Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain disliked Roosevelt's idea of a multipower conference, in part because of the American refusal to make prior commitments to collective security. Stubborn, self-righteous, and

unschooled in foreign affairs, Chamberlain intended to defend British interests by assuming center stage himself. Chamberlain did not understand the value of bringing the United States to a high-level international conference on trade and armaments issues. If he had, he might have assisted Roosevelt in moving American public opinion in a more interventionist direction.

Beginning no later than November 1937, when he sent Edward Halifax, Lord Privy Seal, to Berlin for high-level discussions, Chamberlain resolved to pacify Europe through bilateral discussions with Hitler. Roosevelt's ideological mutterings, devoid of any real threat to act, could only, Chamberlain believed, antagonize the dictators and render "appeasement" impossible. Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden thought differently, and feared Roosevelt's resentment. Chamberlain prevailed, and Eden was soon outside of the government.[19]

By the time the Nazis seized Austria on 11 March, FDR's conference proposal was outmoded. Chamberlain steadfastly continued his policy of appeasement. Appeasement required bilateral dealings with Hitler; the French, Italians, Czechs, Soviets, Americans, and other interested parties would be minor players, if invited at all. Above all, Chamberlain wanted to avoid being dragged into a war by Czech or Polish intransigence, or by French miscalculation. The prime minister was an anomaly, responsible for the British Empire, yet basically an isolationist. The French, however, appeared to be following Chamberlain's lead; they were delighted to avoid painful decision making. Bullitt was working hard to change this situation, but France's revival required time.

Chamberlain's policy rested upon the assumption that one could coexist with a strong (and perhaps stronger) Germany. Roosevelt was reaching the opposite conclusion, but public opinion needed to be monitored, as always. Roosevelt, reported British ambassador Sir Ronald Lindsay, "is strongly anti-German and is revolted at what the German Government are doing but . . . at the same time he fully appreciated limitations which public opinion places on his policies and actions."[20]

Between May and September, the European crisis grew more acute. Hitler prepared for an attack on democratic Czechoslovakia, whose "oppression" of its minority of three million Germans greatly aggrieved him. Many of these Germans lived in the border region known to the Germans as the Sudetenland. The Nazis seemed to be conjuring up the ghost of Woodrow Wilson: All the Germans wanted was "self-

determination" for their oppressed brethren across the border. A war scare erupted in May, when there was talk about a German attack on Czechoslovakia.

Most Americans viewed the crisis as one more in a series of unending European quarrels. Even Bullitt seemed to blame the intransigent Czechs for the crisis. His reports to Roosevelt, however, did contain a new and crucial point. European states, said the ambassador, were convinced that if they resisted aggression, the United States would, at some point, be drawn into the new war. And Roosevelt knew that this conviction was worth mulling over.

FDR badly needed some new challenge. In 1937, he had suffered a major political defeat. He had attempted to strike back at a hostile Supreme Court by gaining the authority to expand it, under certain circumstances, to a maximum of fifteen members. Failing in this, the president in 1938 tried to "purge" some of the conservative Democrats who had deserted him. His candidates in the spring and summer primaries usually met with defeat. The polls predicted major gains for the Republicans in the fall elections.

Despite these domestic difficulties, FDR had preserved and expanded democracy at home. His vision now encompassed a similar victory abroad. A concept, however, was one thing; bringing it to fruition would be quite another, requiring both guile and brilliance.

In Berlin, U.S. ambassador Hugh R. Wilson sought consolation in the fact "that the relatively disinterested power of Great Britain is taking an active part in the [Czech] matter and [is] endeavoring to act as a sort of mediator between [Czech President Edvard] Beneš and Hitler." To Wilson, as to Chamberlain, appeasement had come to mean disinterested mediation between competing German and Czech claims. Wilson, like Chamberlain, would pay almost any price for the avoidance of war, for this was "the paramount consideration."

Roosevelt, in contrast, harbored growing doubts about Chamberlain's appeasement policy, though he kept them from the public. If Chamberlain succeeded in avoiding war, FDR believed, Hitler would be the stronger for it. In the meantime, however, a more powerful Hitler could only undermine appeasement and strengthen the president's own foreign policy hand. Roosevelt continued to exercise caution; he watched

the public opinion polls and paid heed to the forthcoming congressional elections.[21]

Bullitt, meanwhile, was playing an interesting game, one which Roosevelt watched with approval. The ambassador held frequent conferences with French leaders. Bullitt was urging resistance to Hitler, without indicating how or with what means America would assist Germany's adversaries. The ambassador then took care to remind his interlocutors that they could *not* count upon American aid in the event of war. Bullitt thus protected both himself and Roosevelt against politically damaging leaks implicating the administration in meddling in the crisis "over there."

Despite his disclaimers, however, Bullitt did have confidence in Roosevelt's ability to maneuver around the Neutrality Act, short of going to war. He knew that the French were particularly frightened of German air power, for Colonel Charles A. Lindbergh, Jr., had told them about the "ten thousand warplanes" possessed by the Luftwaffe.[22] In addressing the president, the ambassador sometimes quoted foreign leaders who believed that the United States would ultimately intervene. He did so without comment.[23] Action belonged to the sphere of presidential decision making. Bringing about a massive shift in public opinion was Roosevelt's job.

The May war scare passed, but in August the Czech problem again became acute. Bullitt became more pressing in his messages to FDR, arguing that "[f]ear of the United States is unquestionably a large factor in Hitler's hesitation to start a war." He suggested that Roosevelt have a "quiet conversation" with German ambassador Dieckhoff. Roosevelt demurred. Such an encounter might remind Americans of President Wilson's talks with the German ambassador on the eve of American entry into the last war. Instead, in a related move, Roosevelt journeyed to Kingston, Ontario.

FDR delivered a powerful speech there, one that marked a turning point in his thinking. The talk was unilateralist and revolutionary in nature, though Roosevelt made it sound like a routine restatement of American foreign policy goals. In it, the president attacked brutal, undemocratic regimes, once again not naming them. Then, in a stunning statement, Roosevelt warned, "[T]he United States will not stand idly by if domination of Canadian soil is threatened by any other Empire." The press in Ontario was kinder to FDR after the Kingston

speech than the American newspapers had been after the Chicago speech. His Kingston speech was complex, and not a little devious. FDR knew that Hitler could not yet threaten North America. If Chamberlain permitted continued Nazi expansion, however, this danger could one day become a reality. Since only Congress could declare war, Roosevelt was committing himself to a vast expansion of his authority as commander in chief. His vision of American democratic capitalism, at once hegemonic and altruistic, was taking shape.[24]

The growing Nazi threat led Roosevelt to move more quickly now. The president ordered the Joint Army and Navy Board to consider "various practicable courses of action . . . in the event of . . . violation of the Monroe Doctrine by one or more of the Fascist powers." Roosevelt defined this "violation" ever more broadly. Still, events in Europe preoccupied him for the rest of this dangerous summer.

Once back in the United States, the president was careful to reiterate his allegiance to the spirit of the neutrality law. In September, with Europe on the verge of war, he informed the French, "You may count on us for everything except troops and loans." Roosevelt hoped to strengthen Chamberlain's resistance to Hitler's demands.

Early in September, Hitler castigated Czech president Beneš and the Czechs in ferocious terms. While Bullitt pushed Roosevelt toward confrontation with Hitler, the president's ambassadors in London and Berlin urged him to support Chamberlain. Ambassador Joseph P. Kennedy admired the prime minister precisely because of his willingness to compromise with Hitler. In a proposal that reveals much about Kennedy and even more about British policy, the ambassador suggested that he be allowed to make a public statement disavowing American support for Britain in the event of war. Secretary of State Hull, with the concurrence of Roosevelt, refused to permit the issuance of the proposed statement. Kennedy, upset by this decision, moaned, "I can't for the life of me understand why anybody would want to go to war to save the Czechs."

Appointing a clever and magnetic Boston Irishman to be emissary to the court of St. James had been good politics but proved to be bad policy. Kennedy, a stock speculator, whiskey importer, and campaign financier (for Roosevelt in 1932) had served FDR as his first head of the new Securities and Exchange Commission. Roosevelt respected the charming, fifty-year-old Kennedy for both his business sense and his political connections. The problem was that FDR, dubious about appeasement from the beginning, was now moving to undermine Chamberlain's policy. Kennedy, on the other hand, had become a confidant of the prime minister and a fervent disciple of appeasement. "I have four boys," he once said, "and I don't want them to be killed in a foreign war." Ambassador Kennedy believed that Germany needed to expand to the east, and hoped that this development would be accepted by the democracies. Kennedy bemoaned the influence of Jews upon the American press and, by implication, upon Roosevelt.

FDR was unhappy with Kennedy, but he retained him in London for political reasons. While outwardly supporting Chamberlain's peace policy, Roosevelt spoke of it with contempt. The prime minister was, he said, working for "peace at any price if he could get away with it and save his face." When war finally came, Kennedy was in a state of despair, while Roosevelt seemed to feel particularly jaunty. This opposition of moods was reflected in Kennedy's decline in importance. Meanwhile, Ambassador Bullitt in Paris emerged to play a greater role. From Warsaw to London, he was soon coordinating American policy at FDR's behest.[25]

Englishman Oliver Harvey, private secretary to the foreign secretary, an antiappeaser, now observed, "Roosevelt is fully with us, and he authorised . . . Bullitt to make some strong remarks in a speech at a war memorial last week." The State Department, having seen the text in advance, wanted Bullitt to tone down his remarks. The ambassador appealed to the president, who did not appreciably weaken the text. Bullitt then went on to make the extraordinary statement that "[i]f war breaks out again in Europe, no one can say for sure if the United States would be dragged into such a war."[26] Roosevelt and Bullitt quickly corrected the impression given by the comment. Nevertheless, after duly noting the purely moral nature of Roosevelt's support, Harvey concluded that it was still "a very great deal more than we had in 1914."[27] Roosevelt diverted two U.S. cruisers to Great Britain, the *Nashville* and the *Honolulu*. The *Chicago Tribune* responded by a warning against repeating the mistakes of 1917.[28] In 1937, the *Tribune* had attacked FDR for what he said; now McCormick could lambaste the president for what he was doing.

Chamberlain and Daladier, however, were not satisfied by these gestures. Their countries, after all, were the ones that would have to go to war. They put even more pressure upon the Czechs, hoping that Prague would yield to the major German demands. Roosevelt was unhappy with this development, but proved unwilling to distance him-

self from the popular peace policy pursued by the Western powers. He also feared that war at this time would result in a quick Axis victory. In private conversation, however, FDR mused about a common blockade of (rather than a war against) Germany, a course of action that would enable him to evade the letter and spirit of the Neutrality Act. He confided to Sir Ronald Lindsay, the British ambassador, that "the United States might again find themselves involved in a European war," and that "an American army might be sent overseas." He could only conceive of such a course, the president quickly added, if Germany were on the verge of conquering Britain.

In remarkable detail, Roosevelt had sketched out his course of action over the next year. His global strategy was maturing, even as political caution caused him to give grudging support to Chamberlain's pursuit of peace. Privately, Roosevelt believed that there would be "an inevitable conflict within the next five years." German Ambassador Dieckhoff, intuiting Roosevelt's ultimate intention, urgently informed Berlin that if Germany used force, "the whole weight of the United States [would] be thrown into the scale on the side of Britain." Such an intervention would represent the culmination of what one keen observer of the president called his "slowly deepening and strengthening internationalism."[29]

Franklin Roosevelt, a deeply political man, could only be encouraged by the work of many makers of American public opinion. The image of Nazi Germany was changing, and rapidly. Time was of the essence, for FDR would be struggling against forces pledged to oppose him if he undertook to impose an interventionist policy upon a confused nation.

CHAPTER TEN

THE GROWTH OF ANTI-NAZI SENTIMENT IN THE UNITED STATES

FOR SEVERAL YEARS, Edgar Prochnik, the shrewd Austrian minister to the United States, had closely monitored American attitudes toward Hitler's Third Reich. Prochnik knew how an interventionist American president could arouse the public, then lead it to war. Few Americans disliked Austria-Hungary in 1914; four years later, their government helped to destroy that empire. Now, in the mid-1930s, Prochnik hoped for a reversal of the process, a turnabout that might lend American support to his government's struggle for an independent Austria.

Prochnik's American sources were diplomats and politicians, as well as journalists. He described them as people concerned about the Nazi regime's irrationality. America's revulsion against Nazi persecutions, Prochnik knew, coexisted uneasily with a desire to avoid involvement in another European war. Americans would have to feel shocked, then threatened, before they would support a new interventionism. This transformation would require a massive public relations campaign, as well as brilliant political leadership.

* * *

On 27 March 1933, less than a week after Hitler consolidated his power, the American Jewish Congress, led by Honorary President Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, conducted a large, well-publicized anti-Nazi rally in Madison Square Garden. Politicians, clergy, and labor leaders addressed the gathering. As Rabbi Wise put it, "The time for caution and prudence is past. We must," he argued, "speak up like men." The rally heard from William Green, president of the American Federation of Labor (AFL), who told the cheering audience, "We will not remain passive and unconcerned when the relatives, families and brethren of the Jewish members of our great economic organization are being persecuted and oppressed."[1] Rabbi Wise and others, particularly Jews affiliated with the American Jewish Congress, now wanted to go further. They intended to hurt the Nazis by organizing a nationwide boycott of German exports. (Here the congress was following the lead of the Jewish War Veterans.)[2] Wise believed that the boycott would weaken Hitler by undermining his economy.

The fervor of the Madison Square Garden meeting masked severe divisions within the Jewish community. Wealthier, more established elements, often of German-Jewish origin, controlled B'nai B'rith and the American Jewish Committee. They favored cautious tactics, fearing for the safety of relatives and friends in Germany. In some cases, economic ties to the Reich influenced Jewish tactics. Judge Joseph M. Proskauer, a power on the American Jewish Committee, and Judge Irving Lehman, the older brother of New York governor Herbert Lehman, warned that a boycott of German imports could only hurt the German Jews themselves. "I implore you," begged Lehman, ". . . don't let anger pass a resolution which will [bring harm to] Jews in Germany." The Nazi anti-Jewish boycott of 1 April undermined the conservatives' position. On that day, storm troopers had picketed, defaced, and trashed Jewish retail shops, screaming, "Germans, defend yourselves! Don't buy from Jews!"

At this point, Samuel Untermeyer emerged as the most energetic leader of the boycott movement. A famous attorney and Zionist, Untermeyer had powerful political connections, both inside and outside the Jewish community in New York City. Untermeyer and other boycott leaders soon ran into opposition from some of the Jewish-owned department stores, such as R.H. Macy's. For many months, Percy S. Straus, Macy's president, resisted the boycott. His excuses included responsibility to shareholders and opposition to censorship. In January 1934,

sign-bearing demonstrators surrounded Macy's. Among them marched the conscience of American pacifism and social reform, Norman Thomas. Straus decided that he would, after all, close down his German operations.[3]

Samuel Untermeyer realized that the boycott movement had to transcend its purely Jewish image. Its expansion resulted in the founding, in November 1934, of the Non-Sectarian Anti-Nazi Council (later, League) to Champion Human Rights. Untermeyer became its president. Hitler's boycott of the Jews, the Nazi harassment of Christian churches, the book burnings and violence, all contributed to the league's growth. Supported by William Green, head of the AFL, and John L. Lewis, longtime chief of the United Mine Workers, the league spearheaded the move to boycott German exports. The league also exposed the criminal backgrounds of many American fascists. Soon joined by left-wing groups such as the American League Against War and Fascism, the boycott movement distributed leaflets, put pressure on businesses advertising in pro-Nazi publications, and rendered militant anti-Nazi sentiments broadly acceptable to the public. The boycott did not greatly affect the policies of the Hitler government, but it indirectly helped to change American attitudes toward the German regime.

Watching these developments from Berlin, Professor Friedrich Schönemann grew concerned about the rising tide of American anti-Nazism. Drawing upon his many academic contacts, Schönemann came to America in the autumn of 1933. The professor lectured before a large, curious, and orderly audience in the chapel at Drew University in New Jersey. Schönemann came equipped with responses to some obvious questions. The concentration camps? Like "college dormitories," replied the professor. Schönemann even quoted a former socialist newspaper editor, who had allegedly "been happier in the concentration camp than when he had been [while] editing a newspaper." The answer reflected a kind of cynicism that was beyond the understanding of most Americans. Schönemann left Drew looking forward to his next assignment.

News about the professor's visit quickly spread to various campuses. Here, word had it, was a representative of Hitler's Germany, a professor from the land of book burnings. By the time Schönemann reached

Chicago, the antifascist hecklers and agitators were out in full force. The professor provoked one audience with gratuitous comments about the Jews in Germany. "Today," Schönemann declared, "there are many Jews in Berlin holding fine positions and [they] will continue to hold them." The professor had a ready explanation for the incineration of books by Jewish authors: They were pornographic in nature. "Einstein?" screamed a member of audience. Hitler, Schönemann implied, was opposed to the Jews only because left-wing leaders were "nearly always Jewish." Police in the auditorium prevented some nasty confrontations.

By the time Schönemann reached New England, in late November, he had become infamous. Ten thousand demonstrators awaited his entry into Ford Hall, near the Boston Common. Protected by mounted police, Schönemann entered the building, while arrests occurred around him. The professor looked puzzled, though the title of his talk, "Why I Believe in the Hitler Government," was rather provocative.

Addressing the issue of the concentration camps (Dachau was becoming a famous place), Schönemann described their inmates as criminals. Then, in a cynical phrase that reads like a ghastly prophecy, the professor righteously proclaimed, "I myself think it more humane to put people into these camps than to murder them." The audience was becoming more restive. Schönemann droned on, ascribing Hitler's victory to the democratic will of the German people. "Our Jews are happy and prosperous," Schönemann assured his American friends. A few moments later, with many listeners on the verge of revolt, a voice cried out, "You're a liar!" Sarcastic laughter, sprinkled with some loud curses and a thunderous burst of applause, filled the hall. Order was restored, for a moment.

Then, in this tense setting, a lady raised her hand, asking the speaker, "What was the reason for Professor Lessing's murder in Nüremberg the day I was there?" Schönemann seemed to freeze. He fumbled for an answer, but all that came out was a hapless, and incriminating, "I don't know." The jeering began all over again. It was time to end the agony. The host of the meeting was angry with the audience, and he praised the "courage and patriotism" of Dr. Schönemann. A shaken professor left Ford Hall. Things were worse over here than he had imagined.[4] Nazi propagandists clearly confronted a daunting challenge.

Politicians did not create the atmosphere that ruined Schönemann's tour, but they were quick to exploit it. In New York, Samuel Levy, borough president of Manhattan, refused to accept office furnishings provided by the city's department of purchase. The twenty-four spanking new cuspidors, he explained, were products of German industry. The leading New York political beneficiary of anti-Nazi activity was not Levy, however, but Mayor Fiorello H. LaGuardia. LaGuardia's constant fights with the Nazis fortified anti-Nazi sentiments in the United States. New Yorkers chuckled when the mayor ordered the protection of the German general consulate by Jewish policemen.[5] They laughed some more when he declared, "I have Jewish blood, but not enough to boast about." (Actually, he had more than enough, being one of a rare breed, an Italian Episcopalian of part-Jewish descent.)

The growth of anti-Nazi sentiment soon reached far beyond New York City. Denunciations of Nazi atrocities, even by congressmen from isolationist states with large German-American populations, became common.[6] Senator Harry S. Truman of Missouri and congressmen from Iowa, North Dakota, and Utah endorsed the massive anti-Nazi rally held in New York in 1937. That same spring, many great American universities refused to send representatives to the University of Göttingen's bicentennial celebrations. When Karl T. Compton, president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, accepted Göttingen's invitation, the student newspaper, *The Tech*, denounced him for condoning "political and racial bigotry."

A church going American Protestant informed Rolf Hoffmann, of the Nazi media apparatus, "[N]o propaganda can be effective with most Americans while [Pastor] Martin Niemöller is in a Concentration Camp." Charles S. Macfarland, a respected cleric, had opposed the boycott movement in 1934; he now endorsed it. Publisher and columnist Ernest Meyer of the *Washington Post* who opposed the boycott, glumly reported that "the boycott movement seems to be successful." How could it be otherwise, when conservative newspapers told of a husky German ship steward badly beating a short rabbi? People were outraged when the media described how a Nazi consul whipped a nineteen-year-old girl until "there wasn't a white spot on her back."[7] Meyer, however, remained opposed to the boycott movement. He feared unleashing hatreds that would "destroy not only Hitler and the Germans but us and half of the civilized world." Meyer, like the Nazis

who denounced the "Jewish boycott agitation," dimly foresaw the time when a leader with a sense of mission would use anti-Nazi sentiment for his own ends.[8]

Distinguished refugees from Hitler's terror were having a great impact upon American opinion. Writers Heinrich and Thomas Mann and physicist Albert Einstein received wide press coverage when they expressed their views of the Hitler regime. (Heinrich and Mann reported, "My political passion began when I hated the Nazis.") Progressive and labor-oriented newspapers and magazines described the regimentation and exploitation of the German worker. Social Democratic refugee Wilhelm Sollmann warned American labor about the fate of its German counterpart. Only massive rearmament, Sollmann concluded, could save the world from Nazism. In New York, German-Jewish refugees founded the influential newspaper *Aufbau* (Reconstruction), which served as a bridge between pre-Hitler Germany and Roosevelt's America. Denounced as "Refu-Jews" by the Bund, these uprooted men and women were, according to *New York Herald Tribune* columnist Dorothy Thompson, the only good thing to emerge from Germany since Hitler had taken over.[9] Among those assisting the refugees in getting their message across was Mrs. Alfred A. Knopf, wife of the distinguished publisher.

The print media were instrumental in bringing about this change in public attitudes toward the Hitler regime. Mass circulation magazines became steadily less timid about venting their concerns. In the early 1930s, their editors seemed to believe that Americans were reluctant to read pieces on foreign policy questions unless a conflict or a war was imminent. Serious magazines, such as *Harper's Magazine* and the *Atlantic Monthly*, reflected an important change taking place in the public's mood, particularly after 1936. People were now hungry for information about the Nazis and other aspects of the global crisis. Frederick Lewis Allen, an associate editor of *Harper's*, recalled, "We tried a couple of years ago [in 1939], getting out an issue of *Harper's* with no public problems at all in it. . . . It was a flop." The views of the magazine's readers could indirectly influence the actions of the politicians and the media elites, for "the publisher was inclined to give his readers what he thought the majority wanted and agreed with."[10]

Harper's and the *Atlantic* soon enjoyed paid circulations of over

100,000. Well-educated, high-income opinion makers read these magazines. These largely upscale readers, however, were often hostile to President Roosevelt and his New Deal. A survey conducted early in 1939 indicated that Roosevelt's foreign policy had the support of only thirty percent of college-educated adults of high economic status, precisely the people who read the serious magazines. Gaining the backing of this group for a bolder foreign policy might assure President Roosevelt's political survival.

During the first years of the Nazi regime, the *Atlantic* tried to be "evenhanded." Articles covered topics such as Hitler's economic plans, written as if his was just one more normal, if slightly unpredictable, government. Other essays did mention Nazi landmarks such as the Dachau and Buchenwald concentration camps, but went out of their way to be "fair." The net effect was unfavorable to the Nazis, but only mildly so. Some writers found it possible to downplay Nazi pogroms and brutality, describing them as unpleasant growing pains, or ugly birthmarks.

After 1936, the *Atlantic*'s writers became more outspoken, thanks to growing unease over Hitler's foreign policy aims. By 1938, Joseph Barber, Jr., had concluded, "[T]he shadow of Hitler over Europe grows ever more ominous." While the *Atlantic* continued to publish pieces by apologists for the Nazis, such as Otto Jellinek, Fritz Berber, and Charles A. Lindbergh, Jr., their essays lacked the impact of more objective articles. "Dr. X.," for example, described a personal experience in a Nazi camp: "I received a violent blow . . . with a heavy stick."

German ambassador Dieckhoff reported in 1937 that few Americans held anything but negative views about Nazi Germany.[11] Anti-Nazism was becoming mainstream and respectable. Pollster George Gallup found that seventy percent of the American people supported the boycott movement. Even staunchly isolationist magazines, such as the *Saturday Evening Post* and *Reader's Digest*, published pieces exposing Nazi atrocities. This would not have happened without the deterioration of the international situation between 1935 and 1938. Could nation after nation be erased from the earth, while the United States remained untouched?

By February 1938, diplomat Edgar Prochnik could report a dramatic change in American attitudes.[12] He observed that Americans were "unusually upset" about the Nazi threat to his homeland. Five years of anti-Nazi propaganda, reinforced by Nazi aggression and barbarism,

had altered the public mood—in certain ways. It was now clear that the attack upon the Jews, while unique in its ferocity, foreshadowed other violations. In the late winter of 1938, Edgar Prochnik's homeland disappeared from the map, becoming Hitler's *Ostmark*. Fewer people advocated "evenhandedness" in dealing with Hitler. A large majority of those polled believed that newspapers and magazines should be permitted to attack the Nazi regime.[13] The Nazi challenge was becoming a focal point of American interest. In 1937, Americans had not included a single European crisis (except for King Edward VIII's abdication) among the year's top ten news stories. A year later, the two "most interesting" news events were the Czech crisis and the Nazi persecutions.

Surveys indicated that anti-Nazi agitation had made the boycott a popular issue. In October 1938, fifty-six percent of those questioned supported the boycott movement. In November, sixty-one percent of polled respondents "would join [the boycott] of German goods." Six months later, the figure had gone up to sixty-five percent. Seventy-eight percent favored levying countervailing duties on German imports.[14] Thanks to popular pressure, Congress now required that imported products bear the name (in English) of the country of origin. This action could only hurt German exporters.

In 1935, Americans picked Germany as the country toward whom they felt most unfriendly. England won the "most friendly" contest. More revealing, however, was the fact that *half* the respondents still had no opinion. By the spring of 1937, after the fascist conquest of Ethiopia and the onset of civil war in Spain, the "no opinion" category dropped to less than ten percent. Pollster George Gallup's American Institute of Public Opinion found that two-thirds of those polled believed that Germany was the most untrustworthy nation in the world. By the winter of 1938, two-thirds of Gallup's respondents thought that "we should do everything possible to help England and France win, except go to war ourselves." A few months later, sixty-five percent of those polled hoped that Britain and France would win the next war, while only three percent favored Germany. After Hitler dismembered Czechoslovakia, ninety-two percent of the American public believed that the Führer harbored further territorial ambitions. Eighty-three percent of Americans opposed the return of any of Germany's former colonies to the Third Reich. Over the next year, polls indicated that between eighty-

two and ninety-four percent of the people believed that Germany, or Germany and Italy together, would bring about another war.

A German agent reported in 1939, "The hatred for Hitler and National Socialism in this country is being fanned not only by the press and innumerable books, pamphlets, etc., and not only by the C.I.O. and the A.F.L. and other labor unions, but also by the American Legion; it is also being preached in the high schools and universities, and from the pulpits."[15] Polls vindicated the judgment of newspaper editors committed to anti-Nazism. In the summer of 1938, according to Roper, eight percent of those responding to a poll described the press as "too antagonistic" to Nazis and fascists. Only twenty percent believed that the press should *not* be allowed to "attack the Nazis in Germany."[16]

Americans now favored a substantial buildup of their armed forces. They were more hesitant about insisting upon the repayment of old war loans by Britain and France. Many powerful people were still loath to unlearn the "lessons of 1917," however. An important Senator, William E. Borah of Idaho, could say that the Nazi conquest of Austria was "not of the slightest moment" to the United States. The same people who thought the United States would be dragged into the next war opposed entering it, even if such intervention was vital to the achievement of goals they endorsed.[17]

Indignation, wishful thinking, and cost-free antifascism seemed to dominate the public mood. Seventy-two percent of those polled *opposed* allowing "a larger number of Jewish exiles from Germany into the U.S." In fact, fifty-two percent of respondents opposed providing government funds "to help Jewish and Catholic exiles from Germany settle in other lands."[18] Anti-Semitism, isolationism, and selfishness formed a powerful coalition. Aligned against this array of sentiments was a cautious liberal internationalism, antifascist but also hesitant about making sacrifices or taking bold actions. Only new shocks, accompanied by strong leadership, could change the mind of the American people.

The isolationists played a major role in sowing confusion among the American people. Their bromides permitted citizens to think that fascism in Europe and anti-Nazism at home could coexist indefinitely. When President Roosevelt pointed to the immorality and danger represented by aggression, Senator Nye suggested that we try "correcting our own ills . . . saving our own democracy rather than soliciting the trouble to come from any move to police and doctor the world." Senator

Hiram Johnson of California, an erstwhile "progressive," believed that "[Roosevelt] wants . . . to knock down two dictators in Europe, so that one may be firmly implanted in America."[19]

On Halloween Eve 1938, thousands of New Jerseyites fled their homes when Orson Welles and the Mercury Theater on the Air broadcast a dramatization of H. G. Wells's *War of the Worlds*. Those running in panic believed that Martians or other hostile creatures were invading the United States. Surveys of those who had fled from their homes often yielded phrases like "I felt the catastrophe was *an attack by the Germans*. . . ." Gloating Nazis asked, "How can a people which trembles before the attack of the Martians . . . solve world problems?"[20]

Other fears emerged from concerns closer to home. Writings predicting a fascist takeover in South America began to appear regularly. Carleton Beals's many books and articles informed Americans that "German colonization of the Americas has become more determined." Beals, writing in prestigious journals such as *Harper's* and *Foreign Affairs*, believed, "Efforts to plant Germans in strategic points are constantly made, often in conjunction with trade negotiations."[21]

These alarms affected public opinion. In the spring of 1937, 28.7 percent of Americans polled by *Fortune* favored the use of force in the defense of any Latin American country against an attack by a non-American power. By the summer of 1939, 54.17 percent of respondents were ready to defend Brazil. The percentage favoring the defense of Mexico was 76.5 percent. It was clear that an administration willing to use the rhetoric of the Monroe Doctrine could greatly influence public opinion. The danger, however, loomed not in Brazil, but along the Rhine.

In 1936, a minority (forty-four percent) of polled Americans believed that the United States would be drawn into a new European war. By 1939, that figure had risen to seventy-six percent. German chargé d'affaires Hans Thomsen concluded that "public opinion is being systematically reduced to a state of trance in which the proposition that it is inevitable that war will break out and that America will become involved is being given the force of an axiom."[22] This expectation, however, differed from a determination to *affect* events in Europe. Nations resigned to doing their duty, without enthusiasm, rarely win wars.

Opinion polls registered the changing attitude of Americans toward

Nazism, but they also exposed a crippling hesitancy about taking action to destroy Hitler. Public opinion needed to ascend to a higher level of consciousness. As Roosevelt understood, an unprepared nation going to war in a trancelike state was unlikely to frighten or defeat its enemies. Anti-Nazism and fear of Hitler ~~were laudable emotions; they did not~~ add up to a policy. Unless some leader in the West created an anti-Nazi front, Hitler might never be stopped.

Few Americans wished to face the consequences of the following, painful possibility: England and France might not be able to win a war against Germany *unless* we went "to war ourselves." Chargé Hans Thomsen reported from Washington that the "greater part of the press is advocating support of the democracies in Europe even more vigorously than before." He overlooked one vital fact, however. Americans did not look upon this "support" as a *prelude* to intervention (with its grim memories of 1917). Rather, people insisted on seeing it as a *substitute* for intervention.

At least two men had more prophetic insights. Edgar Prochnik believed that if the test finally came, the United States would not permit the defeat of the British Empire by Germany. And, in a remarkable article in the *Atlantic*, published in 1939, David L. Cohn painted a similar scenario.[23] Asking the grim question, "What will the United States do in the event of a world war?," Cohn warned that after a Nazi victory, "friendless and alone, we shall face the most powerful and ruthless dictator the world has ever known." Yet even Cohn offered no solution. Like most people, Cohn detested Nazi brutality, but he also wished to avoid confrontation with a European power.

The political implications of the polls were not lost upon the president. His own evolution on the Nazi problem was a complex affair. At first aloof from the boycott movement FDR came to see it as one weapon in democracy's struggle against totalitarianism. Yet he remained cautious. His concerns were mounting, but he kept his moistened finger to the wind. A strategy calculated to destroy National Socialism while isolating its domestic sympathizers, would take several years for him to develop. Whatever he did, Roosevelt would never publicly equate the destruction of Hitlerism with global intervention, war, and the foundation of a *pax americana*. To do so would have been poor politics.

* * *

Arrayed against Roosevelt and the growing anti-Nazism of the American media were the formidable resources of the German Reich, as well as numerous groups and individuals in the United States. Their number included persons who admired, took orders from, or agreed with Hitler on some fundamental points, including the need for permanent American neutrality. These people worked with great energy for Roosevelt's political demise. Other Roosevelt-haters conspired to rid American public life of alleged Jewish influences. A few of these people were Nazis, others were American fascists, while many were self-styled patriotic Americans whose success was in the interest of National Socialism. For three years, the Roosevelt administration would fight a two-front war against "Hitler's Americans" on the one hand, and the Third Reich on the other.

PART THREE



HITLER'S AMERICANS

Davis/Blymire
Title: Time
Date: Nov. 14, 1990
Draft: One

TIME MAGAZINE

After spending Thanksgiving dinner with our troops in Saudi Arabia, President Bush has returned to cheers and strengthened support. Predictably, some will still say our country remains confused -- even sharply divided -- over our mission in the Persian Gulf. I believe the pundits, once again, seriously underestimate the judgment and resolve of the American people.

Perhaps the greatest confusion is in the newsroom. Some reporters still ask me: Are we conducting Operation Desert Shield to keep down the world price of oil? Or is it to protect distant emirates and regimes? Or is it to help the economies of Japan and other countries? I believe these questions are already answered.

Several months ago, the President gave a prime-time address to Congress and the American people on the Persian Gulf crisis -- what we are doing, and why. It is a testament to Washington's short memory that so few remember his eloquence or his reasoning. The President spelled out many objectives, including the defense of a "new world order" of free nations. But of the many reasons he has given, all sprang from one concern -- to defend America from a growing threat.

Let me tell you, again, why American servicemen and women are in the Persian Gulf. They are there to protect America's security. To stand by America's friends. To safeguard America's freedom. And, most of all, to defend American lives and America's future. As before, our protection of other nations is more than an exercise in idealism. It is first and foremost an act of self-defense.

America's security: We demand the unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait for one reason, and for one reason alone. It is in our national interest. How can such a distant and middling power as Iraq be a threat? Simple. Just look at how much the world has changed in the last two years alone. We live in a time of breakneck change in technology and world politics; a precarious time when empires can rise as fast as they crumble. If Iraq is allowed to control the world oil market, if it is allowed to conquer and dominate the Middle East it could -- no, <u>it will</u> -- become a threat to world peace. And if we have learned anything in this century, it is that such a threat will ultimately turn against America.

America's friends: We demand the restoration of Kuwait's original government because we want to live in a world where no nation has the right of conquest. What was once a sovereign nation and a proud people is now called Province Nineteen. It could just as easily be called a province of hell: premature babies ripped from their incubators to die, children shot to death before their parents, whole families executed for the slightest show of defiance. Most armies forbid their soldiers to loot and rape on pain of death. Saddam's army lives off of plunder, and encourages rape as an instrument of suppression.

I believe that to demand anything less than a full, unconditional return of Kuwait to its government and its people would encourage Saddam and half-a-dozen other would-be Napoleons. Again, to give in now would create greater threats to America later.

America's freedom: Last week, the President also spoke to the brave people of Czechoslovakia -- and he found a warning for America in that friendly nation. Like the other new-found democracies of Eastern Europe, the Czechs already faced a staggering challenge in making the transition to a free market. But the added weight of higher oil prices is a crushing burden they cannot afford. It is sapping their strength, and endangering the freedoms they won just last year.

For America, this is also more than an economic problem. In the long run, we will be asked to pay economic blackmail -- in effect, to pay at the pump for Iraq's armies of conquest. And if we should give in to this blackmail, how soon would it be before Iraq began to exert economic pressure on our foreign policies, even our very liberties? Make no mistake, our response is about the price of freedom, not the price of oil. And that is why America will never pay tribute to a foreign conqueror.

We are in the Persian Gulf to protect American lives and the American future: For those who still ask if Operation Desert Shield is about oil, I say oil is not at the root of the problem -- Saddam's aggression is. Oil simply magnifies the danger. Saddam, by controlling a fifth of the world's proven oil reserves, can instantly become one of the most powerful men on earth. His minions are already furiously developing biological, chemical and nuclear weapons, and the missiles to deliver them. Saddam has not hesitated to use weapons of mass destruction <u>against his own people</u>. Little doubt, then, that he poses a strategic threat to Cairo, Riyadh and Ankara. And if Saddam corners the world energy market, it is only a matter of time before he can become a credible, strategic threat to New York, Dallas or Los Angeles.

Certainly Saddam has not hesitated to put American lives on the line in Iraq. That is why President Bush demands nothing less than the immediate release of all Americans held hostage. And that is also why he has sent a message to those in the Iraqi chain-of-command: Should anything happen to our people, look to the Nuremburg trials for an instructive precedent.

Of course, these reasons will not quell all controversy over our building force in the Middle East. I know that many of one generation see the shadow of Vietnam cast across this build-up of American forces half-way around the world. President Bush's generation, which also lived through Vietnam, sees a greater lesson from a previous war: Even if lives are lost, more lives are saved if we stop aggression early.

An American woman, who left her Kuwaiti husband behind, wrote to President Bush: "I know the terror of Saddam Hussein's forces. I had to hide in a closet while ten armed soldiers searched our home. If they had found me I would have been taken to Baghdad. But I would have gotten off easily since all the male members of my family would have been shot."

But she went on to plead: "It would be better to take the chance of an immediate death than suffer a prolonged torturous death at the hands of the Iraqis . . . The night before I left Kuwait my husband, his family and other Kuwaitis begged me to tell what the Iraqis have done to Kuwait and plead to America to send in military forces to liberate Kuwait."

Courage like this is born of noble indignation. Whatever happens, America will defend a new order among the nations of the world -- a growing commonwealth of sovereign peoples living in peace. And in so doing, we are doing more than defending the world. We are defending ourselves.

1171 words

JFK, Dec 17, 1962

it said that this system would save billions of dollars in tax dollars if developed. Now, did you regard that as pressure on you?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, I think it was an attempt to influence our decision. I see nothing wrong with that. The fact of the matter is that this Skybolt is very essential to the future of the Douglas Company. There are thousands of jobs that are involved. There are a good many people in the United States who feel that this program would be useful, and of course the British feel very strongly about it. So I think the ad was an attempt to bring what the Douglas Company feels are the facts to my attention, to Mr. McNamara's, in a different form. In fact, I saw that ad today. The only thing that we ought to point out is, we are talking about $2.5 billion to build a weapon to hang on our B–52's, when we already have billions invested in Polaris, and Minuteman, we are talking about developing now Titan III and other missiles. There is just a limit to how much we need, as well as how much we can afford to have a successful deterrent. Your submarines in the ocean, we have Minutemen on the ground, we have B–52 planes, we still have some B–47's, we have the tactical forces in Europe. I would say when we start to talk about the megatonnage we could bring into a nuclear war, we are talking about annihilation. How many times do you have to hit a target with nuclear weapons? That is why when we are talking about spending this $2.5 billion, we don't think that we are going to get $2.5 billion worth of national security. Now, I know there are others who disagree, but that is our feeling.

Mr. Herman: As we move forward technically, Mr. President, new weapons systems and new devices which may be vital to the future of the country seem to get more and more expensive, and to involve more and more thousands of men working on them. Are we coming to a point where perhaps we are going to be so involved that once you start a new weapons system into the works, you will be almost bound to continue it, because to discontinue it would dislocate the economy, put thousands out of work again, and so forth?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, that is a problem. In addition, these systems are always two or three or four times more expensive than they look like they are going to be. One of the problems that we have now is the question of whether we should begin to put out the Nike-Zeus system, which is an anti-missile missile system around this country. We hope sometime to develop a system which will permit us to fire a missile at a missile coming toward us and destroy it, and thereby prevent an atomic attack on the United States. But it will cost billions. There is no sense going ahead until that system is perfected. Some think now is the time, but we are going to wait for a further period of investigation. But there isn't any doubt that if you don't build the B–70 or you don't build the Skybolt, this involves thousands of jobs, and the welfare of communities, and this is one of our toughest problems. On the other hand, we can't have our defense budget go out of sight. We are now spending $52 billion a year, which is a tremendous amount of money, and we could go up to 60 or 65 billion if we didn't tighten as much as we can.

Mr. Herman: Did the Nike-Zeus program get any impetus from Mr. Khrushchev's boast that he can hit a fly in the sky at the moment?

THE PRESIDENT. He might hit a fly, but whether he could hit a thousand flies with decoys—you see, every missile that comes might have four or five missiles in it, or would appear to be missiles, and the radar screen has to pick those out and hit them going thousands of miles an hour, and select which one is the real missile and which are the decoys, when there might be hundreds of objects coming through the air. That is a terribly difficult task. You can hit one. What you are trying to do is shoot a bullet with a bullet. Now, if you have a thousand bullets coming at you, that is a terribly dif-

ficult task which we have not mastered yet, and I don't think he has. The offense has the advantage.

Mr. Herman: You think he has mastered the art of hitting one bullet?

THE PRESIDENT. Yes; so have we.

[14.] Mr. Lawrence: Mr. President, you spoke the other day of the dangers and difficulties of slow communications between here and the Soviet Union, as it exhibited itself during the Cuban crisis. I suppose this would be an even graver problem if your radar screen were to pick up missiles or at least what appeared to be missiles in any substantial number?

THE PRESIDENT. Yes. Well, there is—one of the arguments for the continuation of the airplane is that if you picked up missiles coming toward you, you could have your planes take off and be in the air. Then if it proved to be a false alarm, then you could call them back. For missiles, you can't do that, and the President might have to make a judgment in a 15-minute period, and the information would be incomplete. You recall that incident where the moon came up, and it appeared to be a whole variety of missiles coming in. Of course, it was picked up several years ago. I think that is oversimplified. The fact of the matter is that the United States could wait quite long because we have missiles in hardened sites, and those missiles, even if there was a missile attack on the United States, those missiles could still be fired and destroy the Soviet Union, and so could the Polaris submarine missiles. So that I don't think there is a danger that we would fire based on incomplete and inaccurate information, because we were only given 5 or 6 minutes to make a judgment. I think the Polaris alone permits us to wait to make sure that we are going to have sufficient in hand that he knows that we could destroy the Soviet Union. After all, that is the purpose of the deterrent. Once he fires his missiles, it is all over anyway, because we are going to have sufficient resources to fire back at him to destroy the Soviet Union. When that day comes, and there is a massive exchange, then that is the end, because you are talking about Western Europe, the Soviet Union, the United States, of 150 million fatalities in the first 18 hours. Now, you could go on, if everybody aimed at cities in order to have as many killed as possible in all these communities with all the weapons you could fire, you could kill, and then you might be having more fire. So that the nuclear age is a very dangerous period, and that is why I frequently read these speeches about how we must do this and that. But I think they ought to just look at what we are talking about.

Mr. Lawrence: How urgent is this need for quicker communication between here and the Soviet Union?

THE PRESIDENT. It is desirable. It is not—if he fires his missiles at us, it is not going to do any good for us to have a telephone at the Kremlin—but I do think that—and ask him whether it is really true. But I do think that it is better that we should be quicker than we now are. It took us some hours in the Cuban matter, and I think that communication is important. In addition to the communications with the Kremlin, we have very poor communications to a good deal of Latin America, and we don't know what is going on there very frequently. So we are trying to improve our communications all around the world, because that knowledge is so vital to an effective decision.

[15.] Mr. Vanocur: Mr. President, have you noted since you have been in office that this terrible responsibility for the fate of mankind has—notwithstanding the differences that divide you—has drawn you and Mr. Khrushchev somewhat closer in this joint sense of responsibility? He seems to betray it, especially in his speech to the Supreme Soviet earlier.

THE PRESIDENT. I think in that speech this week he showed his awareness of the nuclear age. But of course, the Cuban effort has made it more difficult for us to carry out any successful negotiations, because this was an effort to materially change the balance of

Bill Lavin

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Spring 1990 *$6.95 a copy*

Thus any review of American policy eventually returns to the point where the Cold War started. Because the changes in the Soviet Union are so far-reaching, for perhaps the first time since 1917 Washington has a chance to work out a genuinely new relationship with Moscow. Americans have given little thought to what could be expected of a postcommunist Russia. That is no longer a subject for idle fantasizing. The Bolshevik Revolution has finally run its course, and we may be witnessing the breakup of the Soviet empire; that is, of the Soviet Union itself. But we cannot know what will replace it—a relatively benign confederation or a belligerent, nationalistic Russia.

What can, or should, the United States do about it? Where do America's interests lie?

VI

It is often argued that the United States needs a new "vision" of its role in the world. Such arguments take on added weight if one also agrees with the conventional wisdom that the United States will have less and less influence in world affairs and therefore will be forced to navigate more skillfully. But as events of the past year show, there is good reason to question conventional wisdom. Who would have thought one year ago that any Soviet leader would propose the dismantling of the leading role of the Communist Party, that the Berlin Wall would be torn down and Germany be united, that a dissident playwright would become president of Czechoslovakia? It has not been a vintage year for punditry, and as America begins to reconsider its world role, it might do well to prepare for more surprises that will defy any carefully crafted vision.

A final note of warning is also in order. One of the most astute observers of American foreign policy, the late Hans Morgenthau, warned against the tendency of American policy to swing between the extremes of an "indiscriminate isolationism and an equally indiscriminate internationalism or globalism." Both extremes, he concluded, are "equally hostile to that middle ground of subtle distinctions, complex choices and precarious manipulation which is the proper sphere of foreign policy."

Richard Thornburgh

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE RULE OF LAW

Mikhail Gorbachev and the Soviet leadership have recognized the need for fundamental legal reform in the U.S.S.R., and their emphasis is well placed. Law is the lifeblood of any democratically organized polity. It shapes social and economic structures and relationships, and provides normative rules for private and public conduct. Moreover, given the tradition of Russian absolutism and some seventy years of Soviet totalitarianism, a requisite component of democratization in the U.S.S.R. must be the development of some form of limitation on government power. This suggests, among other things, a legal system independent of government control.

Last fall I participated in a historic meeting between representatives of the U.S. Department of Justice and Soviet government, party and law enforcement officials.[1] The unprecedented candor with which Soviet officials were willing to discuss the ills plaguing their society was certainly refreshing. It reflected the leadership's apparent readiness to put aside ideological clichés and rigid, doctrinaire solutions. I was also impressed by the obvious excitement about change displayed by these officials. My Soviet interlocutors seemed genuinely interested in the American legal and democratic experience, and our discussions, while reflective, were by no means ab-

[1] The October 1989 visit was at the invitation of Justice Minister Venyamin F. Yakovlev, and was the first by a sitting United States attorney general. Its purpose was to discuss the meaning and importance of the rule of law. During my stay in Moscow, I had the opportunity to explore significant legal, political and even philosophical issues with several officials, including Nikolai I. Ryzhkov, prime minister of the U.S.S.R.; Anatoly I. Lukyanov, the chairman of the Supreme Soviet; Vladimir Kryuchkov, chairman of the KGB; Vadim V. Bakatin, minister of internal affairs; Aleksandr Y. Sukharev, chief prosecutor of the U.S.S.R.; and Chief Justice Yevgeny A. Smolentsev. As governor of Pennsylvania in 1979, I also had an opportunity to visit the Soviet Union and participate in discussions with leading government, legal and party officials.

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stract. Clearly the Soviets were searching for ideas that might take root in their own country.

In my view the Soviet leadership should reestablish the legitimacy of the state by basing it upon genuine popular sovereignty—the only acceptable basis of any government in the final decade of this twentieth century. For that, however, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) must relinquish its monopoly on power, in fact as well as theory, and compete alongside other political organizations in the electoral arena.

Furthermore the Soviet Union must create a constitutional structure that includes a legal system that is not subordinate to the state but rather offers equal justice under law to everyone, thus fulfilling the law's traditional role as a mediator among conflicting societal interests. As a predicate to accomplishing these objectives, a "rule of law" must be established in the Soviet Union. By rule of law I mean not just normative rules but a systemic process that inculcates the principles of limited government, due process and a "legal culture." The leadership's initial goal, therefore, should be nothing less than turning the Soviet Union into a law-abiding state.

II

The task is formidable since there is a legacy of lawlessness and arbitrary rule that must be overcome. The Soviet system today is primarily an amalgam of distinctive legal traditions that, over the course of a thousand years, have stubbornly resisted the inroads of Western liberal thought. In the Russian tradition law has always been the instrument of ruling elites. For the tsar the law was a tool through which to control his empire. Legal power was exercised through what was commonly known as the *ukase*—a proclamation or decree having the force of law.

This legacy has been worsened by the supervening years of Soviet rule. For the tsar's Soviet successors the law has been a device for the arbitrary exercise of total power as well as for social engineering, essentially for turning a particular social and economic theory into reality. In sum, whether tsar or commissar, Russia's rulers have historically stood above the law, changing or ignoring it at will to meet their own immediate political or ideological needs; law as a replacement for arbitrary political power or a check on despotism has never existed.

Significantly, orthodox Marxism postulated that the law, like the state itself, must ultimately "wither away," a position eagerly embraced by a number of Bolshevik enthusiasts. At the time of the revolution, however, the new rulers of the Russian state had to be more practical. Thus, while the tsarist legal forms were abolished, a revolutionary Marxist structure, designed to oversee the transition toward a stateless society, was adopted. Under the constitution of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, proclaimed on July 10, 1918, private property was abolished, universal (i.e., forced) labor was decreed and revolutionary tribunals, free of all procedural limitations and operated by the secret police, were erected to deal with all "enemies of the revolution." In fact members of the "exploiting classes" were formally declared to be second-class citizens and deprived of their right to vote. As in the past, although with a newly enhanced brutality, the law was made to serve the interests of Russia's rulers, now the Communist Party.

In 1921 Lenin changed tack and, in a desperate attempt to shore up the Soviet economy and state, which were battered by the bloody civil war and on the verge of complete collapse, adopted the New Economic Policy. Instead of continuing the failed radical policy of War Communism, the regime now pursued "transitional" capitalism. As part of this program, Western models for civil and criminal law were embraced, at least in theory. This limited Westernization of the Soviet legal system, prompted by the needs of the rapidly growing private sector, was viewed by most Bolshevik leaders as a necessary but temporary evil. Lenin, for one, declared that "we must apply to private law relations, not the *corpus juris romani*, but our revolutionary concept of law."[2] Not surprisingly the rule of law never took hold and, for the most part, the Communist Party continued to exercise authority arbitrarily and secretively.

In any case, by 1929 Stalin had consolidated his power, and what remained of the freer atmosphere of the NEP was crushed. Collectivization was enforced and totalitarianism was finally cemented. To the new leadership of the CPSU, "bourgeois" forms of law were no longer relevant. Codes of law that represented Western values, such as the right to hold private property and punishment calculated according to the seriousness of an offense, were rejected. An effort to move away

[2] I. V. Gsovski, *Soviet Civil Law*, 28 (1948).

entirely from all legal precepts, in line with traditional Marxist teachings, was also made. In the 1930s a debate emerged between the so-called legal nihilists, who advocated a swift and complete abandonment of all formal laws and resolution of all disputes by people's courts according to the precepts of proletarian justice, and legal realists, who wanted to retain laws and a judiciary system.

Stalin, in a befittingly cruel irony, recognized the value of retaining the language and forms of a Western legal system and sided with the legal realists. Western-style legal structures (based on the German and French models) were considered efficient methods of furthering the dominance of the state and the CPSU, as well as a means of impressing Western intellectuals with ersatz liberality. Accordingly the new constitution of 1936 had a more formal structure than its two predecessors. It—like Western-style constitutions—combined regularized legal forms and a long list of (mostly fictional) political rights. Stalin preferred to deal with the enemies of his regime through separate legislation and, whenever expedient, bypassed the law codes with "extralegal" procedures.

After Stalin's death the Soviet constitution was amended, yet his legacy of masking totalitarianism with false constitutionality remained. In 1957 the Soviet constitution was again changed, and in 1961 a new law code, the U.S.S.R. Fundamentals of Civil Legislation, appeared, defining and regulating legal relationships such as tortious conduct, contractual obligations, insurance, credit, foreign transactions and treaties, and based generally on Western legal principles.[3] Contracts were generally permitted, legal capacity and civil rights were no longer based upon class definition, corporate-type entities gained legal rights and obligations similar to those of natural persons, and even testamentary freedom was guaranteed. The document, however, continued to provide the traditional escape clause: "Civil rights shall be protected by law, except as they are exercised in contradiction to their purpose in socialist society in the period of communist construction."[4]

Soviet criminal law and procedure in form also resembled Western models (including the right to be represented by counsel), although they contained abusive and arbitrary as-

[3] "Fundamentals of Civil Legislation of the U.S.S.R. and the Union Republics," in *Fundamentals of Legislation of the U.S.S.R. and the Union Republics*, at 150. See also Osakwe, "An Examination of the Modern Soviet Law of Torts," 54, *Tul. L. Rev.* 3 (1979).

[4] *Ibid.*

pects. For example, "socially dangerous" acts were still punishable as crimes, although such acts remained undefined in law, and agencies such as the KGB continued to routinely harass and persecute dissidents with absolute disregard for legal strictures.

The apogee of the formal "legalization" process was the constitution of 1977 promulgated under Leonid Brezhnev. Twice as long as Stalin's constitution, the 1977 version is far more explicit in delineating the political and legal structure of the Soviet state. Unlike its predecessors, it details the leading role of the party in all aspects of governance. Like earlier Soviet charters, the 1977 constitution contains a long litany of essentially fictional individual rights—leading a generation of courageous Soviet dissidents to declare that their goal was simply to force the Soviet government to comply with its own constitution.

In sum, since the revolution the Soviet leaders have expended considerable energy creating the facade of a legal system similar to that in the West. Throughout the entire period the individual rights and limitations on government power contained in these constitutional provisions were illusory. The law remained a tool of the state and, since any "crime" had political implications, the rule of law gave way to unbridled arbitrariness. Similarly, despite its Western structure the entire purpose of the civil law was to harness the energies of the Soviet citizen in service to the policies of the party.

III

Recognizing the dire state of the economy and the deep malaise in the country, the Soviet leadership has—under Gorbachev—turned to an increasingly radical program of reform. One part of that effort to restructure the Soviet Union and to modernize its economic and political structures is a new emphasis on the rule of law and encouragement of pluralism. The February 1990 Central Committee Plenum, seen by many in the Soviet political elite as a watershed, took the historic step of recommending the amendment of Article 6 of the 1977 constitution, which guarantees the party a monopoly of power over virtually all aspects of Soviet life. The plenum also advised allowing for some form of party pluralism and adopting a strong presidency.

These government and party changes were approved by the

Congress of People's Deputies this spring, and concurrence by the 28th Party Congress is likely this summer. The net result is that Lenin's establishment of a "dictatorship of the proletariat" as the Soviet mode of governance has been undermined. It should be underscored that Gorbachev's willingness to amend Article 6 and to subject the party to electoral competition amounts to nothing less than a repudiation of the major tenet of Leninism—namely, that the party, as vanguard of the proletariat, has the right to hold power irrespective of the actual wishes of the populace.

It is conceivable that Gorbachev expects that the party, once cleansed of corruption, might become a viable political force that can compete in electoral contests. If so, his hope is unlikely to be realized. Just as he has in the past underestimated the extent of ethnic animosity in the Soviet Union, Gorbachev may be failing to grasp the degree of unpopularity of the CPSU.

During my visit to the Soviet Union I was struck by the strident criticism of the party. Significantly, many of these criticisms came from high-ranking party functionaries. In urban areas the party is blamed for food shortages, and in many instances the Soviet populace has literally thrown out corrupt local politicians, either through direct public pressure or in the recent March local elections. Outside of the Russian Republic the party's position is even less tenable—it is viewed not only as responsible for corruption and incompetent economic administration, but also as an occupying colonial force. It is possible that the reforms recommended by the February plenum may indeed lead to the "withering away" of the party.

It should be stressed, however, that electoral difficulties faced by the party do not guarantee that a genuine multiparty system will coalesce in the Soviet Union. The Communist Party still has an organizational structure and financial resources that could tilt the playing field in any election—at least to the extent of preventing the emergence of any major new political organization at the national level. Indeed, in the immediate future, the most likely scenario is that the Communist Party itself may fracture. It appears that many disgruntled Soviet communists prefer this route—a sentiment well expressed in a statement attributed to one party leader, Sergei B. Stankevich: "We are not going to walk away from the party with empty

hands and bare bottoms."[5]

The last time something akin to legal opposition existed within the Communist Party was during the period 1919–22, when this role was played by the Mensheviks. Thereafter, any factions within the party were outlawed and all party affairs were conducted pursuant to the rule of "democratic centralism and monolithic unity." It is quite likely that, spurred by the decisions of the February 1990 Central Committee Plenum, real "intraparty democracy" may emerge, and it is conceivable that Gorbachev will permit a much greater decentralization of the CPSU, whereby local and regional organizations would enjoy greater autonomy. This approach could help the party cast itself as the champion of local interests.

However, when all is said and done, the likely "withering away" of the party offers a number of advantages to Gorbachev. It weakens the ability of the entrenched party bureaucracy to obstruct Gorbachev's reforms. Even more significantly, Gorbachev is trying to decouple his own future from the political future of the party. If he is successful and if the party continues to fail in electoral contests and does, in fact, "wither away" and crumble, Gorbachev would remain at the center of power, through his control of the presidency and influence in the Soviet Union's new legislature. This strategy is not, however, without risks. Eastern Europe has seen many communist reformers swept from power in the rush to multiparty systems. As the father of perestroika, Gorbachev might be spared the fate of the others, but the future course of the Soviet Union's own revolution—and Gorbachev's role in it—is unclear.

The new 2,250-member Congress of People's Deputies met for its maiden session last spring. Its bicameral, 542-member, permanent working core, termed the Supreme Soviet, began last September to consider a number of new legislative proposals. This in itself is a marked reform. In the past, laws were drafted by experts from government ministries or other bodies, such as the Soviet Academy of Sciences. These laws were reworked by other government bureaucrats and were eventually rubber-stamped by the Supreme Soviet, which met for about three days twice a year.

The Supreme Soviet has now been reorganized to act much

[5] Quoted in Bill Keller, "Upheaval in the East: The Soviet Party is Not Over," *The New York Times*, Feb. 8, 1990, p. 1.

more like a legitimate legislature, dividing itself into 14 parliamentary committees of about forty members each, which review various proposed bills and draft final versions for consideration by the entire body. There are also competing versions of a small number of proposals and bills, which marks a remarkable departure from past practice. In fact the volume of reform legislation is so great and the attendant confusion so widespread, I was informed during my discussions in Moscow, that many of these laws need to be continuously amended, superseded or repealed.

The Supreme Soviet is currently considering about twenty new laws that, taken together, will amount to a wholesale revision of the country's legal codes. In fact during my fall trip to the Soviet Union I had the privilege of observing extensive debate in the Supreme Soviet on reform measures. Most notable among these are laws concerning private property, leasing of land, "socialist enterprises" (public businesses), cooperatives (private businesses) and taxation. Also included would be laws that establish the right of Soviet citizens to seek redress against their government, party officials and even the secret police. The Supreme Soviet is also considering a Western-style "criminal procedure" bill, in addition to new laws permitting liberalized freedom of speech, the press and emigration. Astonishingly, an oversight committee to monitor such institutions as the military and the KGB has been formed, although it is heavily dominated by members of the Soviet defense-industrial complex.

The introduction of party pluralism in the Soviet Union could create challenges to the operation of the government if the Communist Party once again performs poorly in parliamentary elections. In theory, it would be possible for the Supreme Soviet to pass a law over the objections of both the government and the Communist Party. Further, the entire Congress of People's Deputies has the right to veto any legislation passed by the Supreme Soviet. Of course, given the absence of any organized national political parties in the Soviet Union other than the Communist Party, both the congress and the Supreme Soviet are unlikely to gain a working opposition majority. The future membership is more likely to be divided among a great number of diverse local and regional organizations as well as various factions of the Communist Party. This, combined with what is so far an absence of workable parliamentary procedures, is likely to perpetuate the current state of legislative gridlock.

Nevertheless the establishment of an apparently legitimate legislature raises an issue never before faced in Russia—the separation of powers. At present, the executive (including both the government Council of Ministers and the party Politburo) has no formal authority over the Supreme Soviet. When, cajoled by Gorbachev, the Congress of People's Deputies narrowly approved the creation of a strong unitary executive, the constitutional change far exceeded the American paradigm in that the Soviet president, in addition to having nearly unfettered executive authority, also possesses considerable legislative powers. The decision not to choose the first president through direct national elections, and instead to allow him to assume his new post by vote of the Congress of People's Deputies alone, is also disturbing.

All of this amounts to an unprecedented augmentation of Gorbachev's power—not necessarily a good precedent for Soviet democracy. To be sure, local, regional and republic-level Supreme Soviets are likely to function as real legislative bodies and acquire greater power. At the national level, however, it remains to be seen to what extent legislative power, housed in an unwieldy and fractious Supreme Soviet, would be able to balance the new executive. To make the system work, the Supreme Soviet, in addition to passing new legislation, would need to alleviate its legislative gridlock and develop workable oversight and budgeting processes.

During my trip to the Soviet Union, Justice Minister Venyamin F. Yakovlev also spoke approvingly of inculcating a system of separation of powers that, in addition to an independently elected executive and legislature, would include an independent court system. This is highly important. At present the Soviet Supreme Court, which was established in 1922 as a body to "assist revolutionary justice," and which at first also played a prosecutorial role, has no real judicial review authority. Its current modest function was described by Chief Justice Yevgeny A. Smolentsev as "giving guidance to lower courts to assure uniformity." Even under the proposed changes, the Soviet Supreme Court would not possess a power of judicial review. Instead a Council of Review, made up of leading lights of academia and law, would scrutinize legislation for constitutionality.

Whether judicial review is conducted by a court or by a

Council of Review, a "Madisonian dilemma" arises, whereby a nonelected body would be empowered to nullify democratically promulgated legislation. After years of absolutism one temptation inexorably facing the new judiciary or Council of Review would be to advance reforms beyond those contained in legislation. However, it is democracy and the rule of consent by the governed that legitimizes any law. Any judicial review extending or rejecting legislation based on the vision, no matter how well-meaning, of one individual or group of individuals acting as Platonic guardians could weaken the rule of law, the democratic spirit, and even the legitimacy of the new Soviet regime.

IV

The most contentious proposal to be considered by the national legislature will probably be the response to the unrest among the non-Russian nationalities. One must remember that the Soviet constitution provides a right of secession for the union republics. As an inducement to forestall such a move a "law on republican and regional autonomy" has been drafted whereby local republics would exercise some control over their own land and resources and would be able to veto or nullify Supreme Soviet legislation that regulates their natural resources in ways they consider undesirable. Yet laws to that effect enacted by several republics have been declared unconstitutional by the central authorities in Moscow. With the ethnic turmoil in several republics and what can only be termed incipient civil war in Azerbaijan, reform of the Soviet republican federal structure has been shelved for fear of increasing tensions that might split the union asunder.

Significantly, tensions are not limited exclusively to the outlying republics. Even in the Russian Republic itself signs of fragmentation abound, with such key regions as Siberia complaining that Moscow extracts too many resources from them, providing too little in return. Meanwhile many cities throughout the U.S.S.R. have enacted ordinances that require locals to prove residency before they can purchase items in short supply.

A possible solution to the nationalities dilemma might be some sort of mechanism to defend the republics' prerogatives—"states' rights" if you will. There must be some limitations on the central government's authority to bind the local and regional governments. A judicially enforced federalism would be one safeguard against the national government

or even against arbitrary republican governmental usurpation of the rights and privileges of resident minorities.

In another area, the most remarkable reforms being considered in the Soviet Union are in the category of property law. Currently, in accordance with tenets of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, Soviet law does not recognize private ownership of the "means of production." The civil codes are designed primarily to protect the property of state enterprises against all infringement, and the property of cooperatives against all except the state's. While theft of private property is punishable under the criminal code, the punishments involved are significantly lighter than those for the theft of state property.

The recent party plenum, however, called for the recognition and legalization of at least some private property. A new proposed property law will legalize various forms of private property, including "joint-venture" and "share-holding" property. "Joint-venture" property would be corporate property, and "share-holding" property is a suitably socialist euphemism for private property owned by a number of people, emphasizing that ownership is shared by many. Both state property and cooperative property would still be recognized. Significantly, on March 6 the Supreme Soviet approved a property law that, for the first time since the NEP, gives private citizens the right to own small-scale factories and protects private property against confiscation by the state.

Indeed, what really matters is that real and equal protection is expected to be accorded to all types of property. A "law of leasing" is also being considered. This would allow lease contracts to be created, and both perpetual and hereditary leases are envisaged, although the long-suffering Russian peasants are still not likely to be able to own their land in *fee simple*. Since land in the Soviet Union comprises a much greater percentage of national wealth than in any Western country, the decision not to privatize land ownership effectively removes a large percentage of Soviet resources from the market. Meanwhile the decision to register all cooperatives and other forms of free enterprise before they can operate is certain to ensure delays and bureaucratic gridlock.

Protection, therefore, of what Locke called the "fruits of one's labor," the sine qua non of liberty, is still subject to state control. The basis of Gorbachev's new reformed communist state is still the utopian dream of a propertyless, classless

society. Protection by law of nearly all forms of private property, including the ability to assign, sell and alienate, is still not simply regulated (as in the West) but *prohibited* unless the law allows exceptions. Perestroika still has not changed this.

V

Soviet reformers have proposed several significant criminal law reforms, including expanding access to legal counsel. This proposal stresses broadening the rights of suspects and accused persons and emphasizes the development of an adversarial process—in the pretrial, as well as trial, stage. Included in this reform is the opening up of at least the trial stage to greater public access, under the theory that public supervision would ameliorate mistakes and abuses by investigators in an inquisitorial system.

Another crucial reform is contained in legislative proposals that emphasize the admission of counsel at the time of detention, or at the pretrial stage. Thus, investigators will not be able to question suspects *ex parte* before the arrival of counsel.

Another significant legislative reform proposal would adopt the presumption of innocence as the standard for Soviet criminal law. This concept, however, is alien to Soviet doctrine, and some public officials have strenuously resisted this effort to reform Soviet criminal law. Indeed, during my visit to the Soviet Union our delegation asked Internal Affairs Minister Vadim V. Bakatin about the need for expanded protection for the rights of suspects and prisoners in particular, and basic human rights in general. His response was that because the crime rate increased last year by at least forty percent (he was not sure about the rate since not all crimes are reported, and opined that the increase was probably closer to seventy percent), it was not yet the "right season" for criminal justice reform. He also stated that one significant problem facing law enforcement was the prevalent "romantic view," persistent in Soviet history, that no crime exists in the socialist paradise.

In addition to the above measures, reform of the judicial structure itself is on the agenda. The leadership, intent on abolishing "telephone justice," has recommended to the Supreme Soviet that party officials should be prohibited from interfering with the work of the courts on pain of expulsion. Furthermore, Justice Minister Yakovlev said during our meetings that a law would be sought setting criminal penalties for obstruction of justice and interference with the judiciary.

It is widely believed that the independence of the courts would be enhanced by giving judges life tenure. Indeed, during my visit Minister of Justice Yakovlev informed me that, in addition to being granted life tenure, judges will be given a 100-percent pay raise—an action presumably designed to remove at least some of the present incentives for judicial corruption and to raise the status and prestige of the judiciary. Other structural proposals include transforming the entire Bar and raising the status of the defense Bar. This is to be done by increasing pay and honoraria of lawyers and encouraging students to study law. It has been proposed that a national association of advocates, free from political control, be formed. Also advanced as a "structural" change is the proposal that political management of the Bar, or "colleges," be reduced, as well as granting the colleges the right to screen candidates without outside pressure.

VI

What is the significance of the widespread changes in the Soviet society and state? It is apparent that the magnitude and the thrust of Soviet reforms are of more than academic interest to the American people. Clearly there is a connection between the content of Soviet foreign and defense policy and the nature of the relationship between Soviet society and its government. So long as Soviet foreign policy decision-making remains the exclusive province of the Politburo, even with the heightened input of foreign policy professionals and a Supreme Soviet Foreign Affairs Committee playing a limited "oversight role," the possibility always exists that the moderation of today can be replaced with a new round of expansionism and aggression tomorrow. By contrast, were the Soviet Union to become a full-fledged participatory democracy, with decision-makers at all levels ultimately accountable to the electorate, the possibility of a reversion of Soviet foreign policy to its old expansionist ways becomes considerably less probable. While democracy does not obviate all foreign policy blunders, the historical experience accumulated during this century, and especially since the end of World War II, indicates that democratic governments are more inclined toward a cooperative and pacific foreign policy than totalitarian ones.

Moreover, only the development of democratic institutions, at both the national and local levels, can possibly ameliorate political and ethnic tensions and stabilize the situation in the

Soviet Union. This, of course, is a prerequisite both to much-needed Soviet economic growth and to the Soviet ability to play a positive and legitimate role in the existing international system. Likewise, a principal reason for the Soviets' interest in the rule of law is that only a body of commercial law respecting the sanctity of contract and private property will provide the predictability and stability necessary to attract foreign investment, thus bolstering their ailing economy.

To be sure, only the Soviet Union can reform itself, and the process is in its early—and very uncertain—stage. America cannot, and should not, force its ideals and system on the Soviet peoples. History and culture are important regulators of what is and is not acceptable political behavior in a given society. I do believe, however, that a new Soviet revolution is necessary—one similar to the British Glorious Revolution of 1688 and our own revolutionary period of 1776 through 1787—that is, peaceful (in the sense of avoiding a reign of terror and other accoutrements of a police state) and constitutional in the broad sense of structural change producing a more perfect government and society.

The peoples of the Soviet Union are struggling for democracy and economic freedom against one of the most oppressive tyrannies the world has ever known, the Leninist Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The ethnic nationalities today are asserting political freedom and their cultural heritage against the last vestige of colonialism in the world, the Great-Russian-dominated U.S.S.R. The Soviet republics are confronted with political choices similar to those faced by the eighteenth-century American states, which also had a multitude of conflicting economic, commercial and political interests. Because the underlying problems of the Soviet Union are at least similar to those of eighteenth-century America, Justice Minister Yakovlev was perhaps prescient last fall, several months before the recent party plenum, when he told me that the American system of separation of powers and federalism is a "far better system for the Soviet Union to copy than the parliamentary system."

Accordingly, Americans have much to share with the Soviet reformers. For instance, federalism and federation are lessons from the American experience that may be instructive as the Soviet Union undertakes reforms. Here, however, the comparison between the American experience and the Soviet one must be made with particular care. The United States is a

union of fifty separate states. Both the federal government and the state governments may be said to be "sovereign" in their own spheres, as defined by the Constitution. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, is composed of distinct ethnic or national units, added over a period of centuries by conquest or forced annexation. With the decline of communism, there is no overriding uniform culture or belief that unites these "nations." Gorbachev can hold together the Soviet republics only by convincing them that it is in their interest to remain a part of the U.S.S.R. He must, in short, adopt a "new federalism" that will satisfy the national aspirations of the Soviet peoples, as well as give them co-equal status with the presently dominant Great Russians.

Furthermore, while democracy is indispensable, more than mere majoritarian rule is needed to safeguard liberty. In addition to the question of democratic license, the Soviets must address the fundamental matter of restrictions on majoritarian rule necessary to protect minority rights and safeguard personal liberty. This requires establishing some version of a separation of government powers. The purpose of divided government, whether based on the American model of separation of functional powers (executive from legislative from judicial), or on the traditional British model of "mixed government," is to limit the despotic tendencies common to any regime.

But, again, limiting government by separating government functions is not enough. An accompanying system of checks and balances is necessary to prevent one unit of government from encroaching upon the duties and responsibilities of another. I discerned from my meetings in Moscow that the Soviets simply do not comprehend how a political structure can exist with deliberate tensions built in among government branches and political factions, since in their tradition decisions are reached either through the unanimity of dictatorial fiat or by consensus motivated by utopian vision.

We should do all we can to encourage a system of checks and balances. The primary problem before the Soviet people and their leaders is to prevent the new Soviet Union from becoming a revived version of the autocratic monarchy, to foster instead true political pluralism and limited government reflected in the rule of law and respect for natural rights. It is in the interest of the United States, and indeed of the entire world, for Gorbachev to succeed in these endeavors.

Charles Krauthammer

Rush to Diplomacy

How to disguise defeat.

For six weeks, since Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) opened the first high-level assault on President Bush's road-to-war Persian Gulf policy, the debate has been war vs. sanctions. That argument is over. A radical shift has taken place in the Gulf debate. It is now war vs. diplomacy.

The end of sanctions as a serious policy alternative was signaled by a white paper issued in late December by House Armed Services Committee Chairman Les Aspin (D-Wis.). It subjects the sanctions option to close scrutiny, under which it simply falls apart. Sanctions are a multi-year proposition, and before Iraq succumbs, the anti-Iraq coalition—its cohesion, its morale, even some of its leaders (by bullet or coup)—will long ago have succumbed.

Moreover, switching now to sanctions-only would not just be a great psychological victory for Saddam, effectively canceling the U.N. Jan. 15 ultimatum. It would necessitate the draw-down of American forces in Saudi Arabia, panicking the Gulf Arabs who sided with us. That would drive them to Saddam and us out of the Gulf.

It is, finally, hard to take sanctions seriously when both the Associated Press and The Post report from Baghdad that 1,000 Soviet nationals in Iraq have decided to stay rather than return home to conditions in the Soviet Union. A thousand people with firsthand experience of the Baghdad A&P choose life in a war zone under total international sanctions over life in Moscow. Some sanctions.

As sanctions fade, the only alternative to the Bush policy of securing Saddam's retreat by war—or, if we are both convincing and lucky, the threat of war—is a "diplomatic solution." As Jan. 15 approaches, there will be an explosion of diplomatic activity as the French, the Russians, the European Community, the "nonaligned" and some Arabs send emissaries to Baghdad looking for a deal.

What kind of deal? In his Sept. 24 U.N. speech, Francois Mitterrand gave Saddam the outline: withdraw from Kuwait, after which "everything would be possible." Les Aspin, being less Gallic and thus less cryptic, has spelled out what "everything" means. There are three kinds of goodies we can give Saddam if he is a nice boy and gets out of Kuwait:

BY OLIPHANT

Conditional withdrawal means aggression rewarded and Saddam strengthened.

1) Pieces of Kuwait or, in a more sophisticated version, a mechanism for continuing to press claims against Kuwait.

2) Nice treatment of Iraq, e.g., promises to leave Saddam and his regime intact, to lift the embargo, to seek no reparations for raping Kuwait, etc.

3) Linkage to the Arab-Israeli issue, which for the French and most everyone else means selling Israel to buy Kuwait, and which for Saddam means achieving legendary status in the Arab world as the man who sacrificed his 19th province to redeem Palestine.

Now everyone understands that rewarding Saddam with these goodies constitutes rank American capitulation. The art of this deal, therefore, is to disguise the capitulation by interposing a decent interval between Saddam's withdrawal and his subsequent payoff. The hope is that a gullible and distracted American public will not notice that Saddam won.

Of course, the Arabs will notice. Those who sided with the loser, i.e. us, will rue the day they decided to cast their lot with America. The rest will quickly submit to the man who stood down America and the world. And in a very few years, even Americans will be forced to notice when Saddam, on the move again, reappears on American radar, this time with intercontinental missiles and nuclear weapons.

What is disastrous about "after Kuwait, everything" is that it abandons the U.N. demand that withdrawal be not just total but unconditional. The point is crucial not because of some legalistic belief in the sanctity of U.N. resolutions, but because to allow a conditional withdrawal from Kuwait is to undermine the whole purpose of American policy in the Gulf.

The liberation of Kuwait is important, but American soldiers have not journeyed 6,000 miles to the sands of Arabia just for that. If a bunch of local Kuwaitis had staged a coup and proclaimed an equally brutal, pro-Iraqi, anti-American regime, we would, rightly, not have lifted a finger. The reason we are in the Gulf is not Kuwait but Iraq. Kuwait happens to be the place that a heavily armed, utterly ruthless, endlessly ambitious, highly dangerous regional thug made his first grab for Gulf and Arab hegemony. Kuwait is Saddam's first target. The point of our policy is to make sure that Kuwait is his last.

That is why evacuating Kuwait is not enough. Liberating Kuwait is the means. Defeating Saddam is the end. And unconditional withdrawal—nothing to show for two wars of aggression, 10 years of blood—might well undo him. A conditional withdrawal, on the other hand, which is what a "diplomatic solution" is all about, means aggression rewarded and Saddam strengthened. (For Kuwait, it means dismemberment and domination in perpetuity by Iraq.)

Conditional withdrawal is defeat by tape delay. But because it might sell in the West, President Bush will in the next few days be under tremendous pressure to accept just this kind of deal. The Europeans are already urging it on him. The Democrats are next.

It is all very tempting. The media, with a historical memory measured in weeks, will hail him as a peacemaker and liberator. Bush will know better. He will know that he forfeited security in the Gulf, America's standing in the Arab world and any possibility for a stable, post-Cold War order. But all that will come later. First will come the praise. For Bush, resisting the temptation is the greatest test of his political life.

Robert V. Keeley

EAST SIDE STORY

by James P. Pinkerton

There are half a million people jammed into the eleven square miles of the Los Angeles Police Department's East Side Division. The newest immigrants are from south of south of the border, mostly El Salvador. The demographics are Third World: few old people, lots of children. Many are on public assistance, but the ambition that brought them to El Norte inspires them to work, starting with the gritty jobs citizens spurn.

Spend one Saturday night with the CRASH (Community Resources Against Street Hoodlums) Unit of the LAPD and you'll wonder how people could ever romanticize street gangs. On the screen they sing and dance in finger-snapping formation, fighting chivalrously for love and honor. In today's Los Angeles they idle amid alcohol and urine on stoops and porches, pawing at their women and toying with their guns, waiting for the next petty rip-off or drive-by shooting.

If the East Side Division has no relation to *West Side Story*, neither is it like *Fort Apache, The Bronx*, the 1980 Paul Newman movie that defined urban decay for the popular imagination. It is poor but upwardly mobile, a hub of light manufacturing, and home to the service workers who clean the offices, houses, and pools of the Anglophone affluent. A good analogy is Hell's Kitchen, the brawling, boozing Manhattan underworld that steeled the Irish for their climb up the ladder.

As a "ride-along" with the East Side CRASH Unit on a recent Saturday night, I watched twelve cops deal with about 5,000 "gangbangers." The "bangers" are the sharks of the East Side sea: predatory, yet part of the urban ecology. The dragnet of the law may catch the big fish—the green card counterfeiters, the wanted killers—but a wide legal mesh lets the rest slip through.

Ten p.m. My guide for the evening, Sgt. Knight,[1] has driven the black-and-white just a few blocks from the station before he points into a sidewalk crowd. All I see is a tableau of neon, white shirts, and shadows. "Crack dealers," he says, with the precision of an ornithologist. I squint, straining to identify a familiar visual cue. It feels like first grade, puzzling over *My Weekly Reader*, trying to count the giraffes hidden in the picture.

"Why don't you bust them?"

"Wouldn't stick," says Knight. "The lawyers would say, 'No probable cause. How could the arresting officer have seen the alleged transaction from a moving car at night?' Maybe the perp[*etrator*] plea bargains, or we can get him on a pro[*bation*] violation. So he does six months. These dudes aren't afraid of jail: it's an extension of their lifestyle, not much worse than the way they live now." What they *do* fear is deportation: a perverse tribute to the standard of living America affords its prison population.

On the next corner a teenager signals. What does he want? As Knight stops the car, he has no way of knowing whether the kid wants to give him a tip or shoot him. The kid doesn't know, either. He's stoned; wants to get to Hyacinth Boulevard. Not tonight. LAPD's motto is "To Protect and to Serve": nothing about "to transport."

A bulletin blusters over the radio: "Three-CRASH-one. See the man, Ninth and Remington. Shots fired. Suspect described as Hispanic male, black pants, white T-shirt." Amazing: just like "Adam 12." We arrive to back up two cops who have five suspects hugging a wall. Barking at them in Spanish to keep their legs apart, their hands behind their heads, and their fingers locked, the cops frisk them roughly and thoroughly. It looks harsh, but they've learned that a tiny derringer can kill you just as dead as an AK-47.

However, these guys aren't out to hurt anyone. They're Hispanic Ralph Kramdens, working-class stiffs who were drinking *cerveza* on the street when the cops responded. They say they don't know who fired the shots. They may be gangbangers, but that loose term covers everyone from trigger-happy adolescents to the mellow middle-aged. (Hispanic gangs are generally territorial, organized into "sets" to defend turf. By contrast, the mostly black Bloods and Crips focus on money, sharing the city's drug traffic with Asian and white biker gangs.)

When the cops arrived, one of the men was cradling a shiny metal contraption with knobs and hooks, easily mistaken for a sawed-off shotgun. He finally persuades the officers that it's a carpet-puller. It's no crime to carry a gun look-alike, but it's not too bright in an area where so many carry the real thing. The carpet man gets his implement back, along with a lecture on street deportment.

Another shooting: the turf of the Loco Ponies, a wild bunch implicated in a recent drive-by shooting. Adrenalin thrills through me as we race over. "Secret Agent Man," the old Johnny Rivers song, reverberates in my naive head ("There's a man who leads a life of danger . . . "). Then I think to ask whether the cops wear bulletproof vests. "Of course," comes the answer. A chill goes down my unprotected spine. The night was young, but the spring was out of my step. Naked prey that I was, I quickly adapted to crouching and terrain-hugging.

Our black-and-white and an unmarked police car converge from opposite ends of the street. Knight and the other driver kill their headlights; police never illuminate each other in unknown situations. Two teenage couples lounging on the stoop proclaim their innocence before the cops say a word.

More cops come and probe the darkness with their flashlights, finding more bangers in the alley. Soon a dozen teens line the sidewalk. The CRASH Unit knows most of them, but they carry packs of "field identification cards" to record new information, including "*moniker/alias*." Often fellow gangbangers know each other only as "Cuchito," or "Droopy," or "Juke." The boys are ordered to remove their shirts, revealing serpentine tattoos on their left shoulder blades. They've all been "jumped in" to the gang, an initiation that includes a brutal beating. If they can survive that, these "made" homeboys can laugh at a post-Miranda police interrogation.

Sometimes the girls are more responsive. But not Little Suzie. Asked if she's been arrested before, she answers with some pride that she was busted for GTA (Grand Theft Auto). When? Age 12. She was shot in the back last year. Having made a full recovery, she's an equal opportunity gang member.

Sergeant Knight escorts another girl, Serena, away from the group. He takes a fatherly approach: Why is she hanging with these losers? "I'm not in the Loco Ponies," she says, although she likes to kick back with them. Knight tells Serena that a girl her age was shot in a drive-by the previous Tuesday.

[1]The names have been changed to protect the innocent, the guilty, and the everyday heroic.

James P. Pinkerton works in Washington, D.C.

Serena shrugs. Knight presses: "We think the Loco Ponies did it."

"It wasn't us—I mean them. It wasn't the Ponies." Serena covers her mouth, winces, and looks away. She's scared now—not of Knight, but of her peers, who must wonder what she's saying to the cops.

"How old are you?" Knight asks. Serena says 18. Right. She'll be of age by the '96 Olympics, if she lives that long. Serena is from Glendale, an old-line suburb ten miles away. What can you say to a kid who commutes to be part of . . . this? Sgt. Knight shakes his head and returns her to the line-up.

A cop finds a loaded .38 in the bushes. Since nobody claims ownership, the piece will be taken to the lab for an evidence check and destroyed. As for the shots fired, no witness means no arrest. I look around and understand why the neighbor who anonymously called 911 does not want to come forward. Since loitering isn't a violation anymore, all the CRASH cops can do is disperse the bangers. They'll reassemble tomorrow, maybe even later tonight.

Cop talk here is a stilted jargon of Latinate words, acronyms, and numbers. They don't say: "Sgt. Knight talked to the girl and then let her go." They say: "The officer counseled and released the detainee." Cops never arrest someone if they can "apprehend the individual." Arrests for "CCW" (carrying a concealed weapon) and "ADW" (assault with a deadly weapon) are common. Armed robbery is a "Two-eleven," after its citation in the California Penal Code. Domestic disputes are "Two-seven-threes." A prostitute is a "Bee," for Section 647-B.

The gangs are on to the police patois. Murder is Section 187 of the Code: when bangers want to intimidate someone they spraypaint his name and "187" in conspicuous places. If that person should happen to die, the gangs superimpose a cross on the original graffito. I thought of the ace of spades, death's calling card in the Old West. Same thing. The ancient Greeks did it, too. Small world.

Another shooting. Code 2. That means hurry, but don't use your "reds" or your siren. Code 1 means "Pick up your laundry on your way over," while at the words "officer down," all available radio cars scramble, and even the most fearless urban bicycle messenger is wise to stay on the sidewalk.

As we roll, Knight spots a derelict shambling across the asphalt. He brakes the car, deliberately blocking the intersection to prevent another vehicle from mowing the man down. One more story in the naked city, which Knight would never think to log. Knight has been a part of these stories for his two decades on the force. Pushing fifty, he is still lean and taut, but also graying and wrinkling. Knight has no desire to be another black-bordered photograph on the wall at the station house; but unconscious courage empowers him to walk up to strangers in pitch-black alleys with only a flashlight in his hand.

Our Code 2 is a bug-eyed man silently clutching his bloody forearm. A .22 slug has made a clean entrance and a slightly less clean exit. It looks painful; if it were my arm, I'd share my feelings with the world. But then I've never used fortified wine or crack as an anaesthetic.

"Who shot you?" the cops ask. Dunno, he says. Maybe he's in shock, or too wasted to remember. Maybe he doesn't want to fink on a buddy who plunked him. His mellow attitude toward ballistic trauma argues for the proposition that life is cheap. Knight opines that the crime will probably not be solved.

The ambulance comes, followed by a mobile TV news unit (they monitor the police frequencies). The emergency medical technician examines the victim, who refuses a gurney. "Okay, stallion, have it your way," the EMT sighs. He knows better than to challenge a man who barely notices a bullet wound. The mini-cam guys take off, too. Not enough blood.

That night, the number of drive-by shootings for the year surpassed 100 when three Lynwood kids were killed as they sat in their Oldsmobile. Three children were kidnapped. Another boy played Russian roulette—and lost.

Enforcing the law in this part of town is like picking mercury off a floor. In a city of 3.3 million, the 8,253 cops can move crime around with sweeps and barricades, but they can't clean it up. Last year the cops recorded 324,486 crimes, a quarter of them violent, including 873 homicides. For the most part, the police just process misery, like actuaries or epidemiologists.

The city is starting to turn the wheels of justice a little faster. The new Street Terrorism Enforcement and Protection Act (STEP) is what L.A. attorneys call "a baby RICO": if cops can "establish a pattern of gang activity," prosecutors can serve them with an injunction, which effectively relaxes search-and-seizure rules for the police. STEP will make a real difference if it survives a court challenge.

Driving past a herd of stretch limos corraled in front of an old warehouse, Knight identifies "Delirium," a trendy club for Hollywood slummers. As in the East, the hippest, hottest places are in dangerous neighborhoods. Whites from the West Side, dressed in night-crawler black, queue up to boogie down. The knowledge that locals are shot and killed around the corner only adds to the fun of cruising down to the wild side of town, so long as valet parking is provided.

East Side is violent, but so were Dodge City and Al Capone's Chicago, and the gumption and pluck that has brought people to the East Side, to the threshold of the American Dream, will someday soon carry them over. The newest hyphenated Americans deserve life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Their progress would be eased if they were physically safer, if a jaded avant-garde had to look elsewhere for violence to romanticize. □

Calling on George Bush

A Guide to the 1990 Elections

There's only so much even a popular President can do for his party's candidates. Raising large sums is one of them, and President Bush is ready and willing to help.

BY BURT SOLOMON

Six hundred well-dressed Virginians let their watercress and Belgian endive grow limp while they listened to country-and-western singer Moe Bandy and his Americana Band in the Washington suburb of Vienna. At the head table in the hotel's elegant Grand Ballroom, Barbara Bush, dressed in black velvet, swayed her head in time to the smooth tune. Her husband sang along, then was introduced by the man being saluted, Sen. John W. Warner, R-Va., who was fittingly adulatory about the man whose presence at this March 8 fund-raising dinner had enriched Warner's reelection campaign by $600,000.

President Bush was hyperbolically admiring in return, lauding Warner as a "symbol of Virginia at its best" who once had trudged three hours through a heavy snowfall in 1979 to read George Washington's farewell address on the Senate floor. More recently, Warner had helped negotiate a revamped Clean Air Act, backed Bush's antidrug strategy and (as ranking Republican on the Armed Services Committee) had been busy "encouraging peace" in Eastern Europe, Bush eulogized. "I'm looking to him to help guide new treaties and new [defense] budgets. . . . If you need a little extra campaign work, call the White House."

Warner won't need to: He may be unopposed for reelection. Bush agreed to a fund-raiser last year when Warner feared a contest from departing Democratic Gov. Gerald L. Baliles and went ahead with the logistically simple appearance—a helicopter ride away from the White House—even after Baliles refrained. Despite a search by Virginia's Democratic leaders, no one has shown interest in the party's nomination to contest a third term for Warner except a follower of extremist Lyndon LaRouche.

Warner, in an interview the following day, waxed grateful for the financial surge that had swelled his campaign treasury past $1 million—thereby permitting a "credible campaign"—and for Bush's kind words. That "wasn't a lot of puffery last night," he said.

Bush, the first former national party committee chairman ever to reside in the White House, has taken energetically to electioneering in his first cycle of presidential campaigning. On Feb. 27, on the eve of the President's second trip in three weeks to politically crucial but Bush-aloof California, White House press secretary Marlin Fitzwater was asked how Bush could justify devoting an entire day to politics. He replied: "A day is nothing, man. We're going to be spending more time on politics than you ever dreamed possible."

Bush, wielding the allure of the Oval Office, has raised more than $8 million for Republicans at political events in Washington and $14 million on the road in a dozen appearances last year and nearly as many so far in 1990. This spring, his schedule calls for fund-raising jaunts to two to three cities every 10-12 days and for campaigning about a day each week after Labor Day. By Election Day, White House political director James R. Wray figures, Bush will have come to the aid of Republican candidates running for "most" of the 34 Senate and 36 gubernatorial seats at stake. Bush also has been active in recruiting candidates—telephoning prospective congressional aspirants and occasionally meeting with batches of 30-40 Republicans considering state legislative races.

Bush's tepid, frequently rambling rhetoric rarely sets hearts aflutter. And there's only so much even a popular President can do. Ronald Reagan learned this in 1986, when his intensive Senate campaigning failed to avert the GOP's loss of eight seats. Bush's lesson came last year, when he campaigned for four congressional and gubernatorial candidates (plus a mayoral aspirant) and saw only one—Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, R-Fla.—elected. In, say, Iowa, where voters pride themselves on their independence, Bush's endorsement won't "frankly matter for much" in luring voters to support Rep. Thomas J. Tauke, who is now running for the Senate against Democratic incumbent Tom Harkin, Tauke press secretary Allen L. Finch acknowledged.

But it matters in other ways. In money,

Associated Press

President Bush appears with Senate hopeful Rep. Lynn Martin in Chicago.

for one. Bush's appearance for Tauke last December at a dinner and rally in Des Moines raised $250,000 that Tauke spent principally on building an organization in the five-sixths of Iowa he hasn't represented in Congress. ("Smart early dimes beat late dumb dollars," as Republican Governors Association executive director Michele M. Davis expressed the political professionals' maxim.) That boosted Tauke's fund raising ahead of Harkin's for the second half of 1989, which in turn impressed political action committees that are deciding whom to support, Finch said, postulating: "Organization begets organization. Fund raising begets fund raising."

A presidential visit can also increase a candidate's credibility. Iowans able to identify Tauke rose by 4-5 percentage points immediately following Bush's visit. Rep. Claudine Schneider, R-R.I., also challenging a Democratic Senator, found that her reputation "solidified" as "someone who can get things done" in Washington after Bush traveled to Rhode Island last November "calling [her] his friend," Schneider aide Robert J. Rendine said. That may prove more valuable to her campaign than the $175,000 Bush's visit raised for a campaign expected to cost $2 million or more.

Nebraska Gov. Kay A. Orr perhaps fared better still. Bush's Feb. 8 stop in Omaha raised $300,000 for Orr that otherwise would have entailed 8-10 smaller events and also helped with "a problem we have [ensuring that] voters are aware of her accomplishments," said former Reagan White House political aide William B. Lacy, a political consultant who is advising Orr (and Tauke). He hopes for more. Unlike Rhode Island, the state where Democratic presidential nominee Michael S. Dukakis drew his greatest support in 1988, Nebraska is one of a handful of states where a majority of voters register as Republicans, increasing the chance that Bush's soaring popularity there (as high as 85 per cent) might rub off on Orr. "I hope his job rating stays up where it is," Lacy said.

These potential benefits of presidential politicking are bound to bring more Republican candidates seeking assistance than even an accommodating President can satisfy. Because the White House is willing to help only incumbents or established challengers, Bush has been able to grant 60-65 per cent of the requests for political appearances he's received so far, Wray said. That will decline, however, as the approaching primaries put more candidates in a position to ask. All 36 Republican gubernatorial standard-bearers, for instance, are expected to request Bush's help, and only 15 may be told yes.

The winnowing will follow certain principles. Bush will concentrate on races for Senate and governor and—in choosing among them—will pursue the Marxist principle "To each according to its need." His fall schedule will be left flexible so that appearances can be scheduled for candidates deemed likeliest to benefit with only two weeks' notice rather than—as now—four-to-six. In addition, Bush's "associations and friendships and loyalties come into play," Wray said, acknowledging a lack of coincidence in Bush's appearances for Reps. Schneider, Tauke and Lynn Martin, R-Ill., all venerable Bush supporters who aspire to the Senate.

Bush political strategists have also kept reapportionment at the front of their minds, prompting attention to governorships in Sunbelt states expected to pick up House seats after this year's census and to state legislatures that will redraw the lines. Bush raised $1.2 million for Sen. Pete Wilson—running for California governor—on Feb. 28 in San Francisco and $1.25 million last January for Florida Gov. Bob Martinez. Both candidates' political needs also have entered into Bush's calculations as he ponders whether to permit controversial sales of offshore oil and natural gas leases off their states' coastlines. *(See NJ, 3/10/90, p. 588.)*

Candidates who don't merit Bush's personal presence still may get lesser forms of assistance—a presidential signature on a fund-raising letter, say, or a visit by a so-called surrogate. Vice President Dan Quayle, as part of his own master plan to gain favor first from Republican activists and then from the citizenry, will render aid to numerous candidates, including some too lowly for presidential attention. He plans, for instance, a March 21 fund-raiser in Providence for freshman Rep. Ron Machtley; attendees will pay $150 to attend a breakfast and $500 for a reception beforehand.

Barbara Bush raised $150,000 for Schneider at a Rhode Island reception last June, while Environmental Protection Agency chief William K. Reilly, in the state to address an environmental group on March 11, met privately with Schneider and several environmentalists who presumably will feel warmer toward her Senate candidacy as a result. Tauke has received fund-raising help so far from Quayle, Reagan and White House chief of staff John H. Sununu.

Using surrogates could conceivably backfire. Harkin expects "most of the Cabinet [to] stroll through Iowa this year" on his opponent's behalf, said Harkin campaign aide Phil Roeder, who hopes that includes Agriculture Secretary Clayton K. Yeutter, who's "right up there with Earl Butz"—Agriculture chief for Presidents Nixon and Ford—in his unpopularity among farmers.

Besides, there's no substitute for a President, even one whose rhetoric has been described as veal rather than red meat. And Bush's tone may harden as Election Day draws nigh. Aides expect that voters this fall will hear less of the bland, upbeat tone Bush has lavished recently at fund-raisers and more of the hard-edged, stump-style rhetoric he offered, to decidedly mixed reviews, in 1988. □

Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dan —

Here's an article on one of the subjects we discussed. The chart pretty much says it all — less investment in technology not only means a lower standard of care, but more importantly, less tech. progress. You'll probably never have to write a speech on this, but if you do... Best Josh

BALT.SUN;05-06-89

The Spirit Of '89

301/173/33 Chicago.

THIS YEAR'S celebration of the bicentennial of the French Revolution reminds us that our own celebration of independence is already 13 years behind us. It is hard to believe that 13 years now

By Garry Wills

separate us from the Tall Ships, that surprising (and somewhat irrelevant) hit of the American show.

If our celebrations of 1976 are any indication, French fascination with a bicentennial will build to the July anniversary date — July 4 for us, July 14 for the French (Bastille Day) — and then it will slacken off, rapidly decreasing the rest of the year.

It is fitting that Americans lead the way in this celebration of history, since our revolution inspired many of the French Revolution's original supporters — military men such as Lafayette and Rochambeau; naval officers such as de Grasse and d'Estaing. In his brilliant new history of the French Revolution, "Citizens," Simon Schama pays special attention to the role of American veterans in the early years of the French Revolution.

The French deliberately patterned their revolution on the American precedent. The Declaration of Independence offered a model for the French "Declaration of the Rights of Man." Even after the revolution was over, Napoleon claimed that he was preserving the achievements of '89. When George Washington died, Napoleon had his military forces wear black crepe trimming on their own colors, in order to mourn the first revolutionary of the modern world.

For us, the spirit of '76 is a uniting force. For the French, the spirit of '89 has always been divisive.

But America, imitated by the French Revolution, also imitated the French Revolution. America tried, as it were, to catch up with its own offspring. The majority of Americans voted for Jeffersonian politicians, when more conservative Americans considered them too radical.

Yet in the end, despite these mutual imitations, the two revolutions took very different courses. For us, the spirit of '76 is a uniting force. For the French, the spirit of '89 has always been divisive. French fought French in their revolution. We did not fight loyalist sympathizers — we certainly did not guillotine them or even seize their property in an irrevocable way.

King George III, from whom we separated the colonies, was far away, and the bulk of his empire easily survived the revolt of one batch of his colonies. From the first, the king the French overthrew was near at hand, in the country's very capital; and when he was overthrown, he was executed.

Thus, despite all the points of similarity, the two revolutions were entirely different in character and in outcome. America's revolution was successful in terms of stability. Our government was by the revolutionaries themselves. The French revolution killed a king, and went on to kill the very citizens formed by the revolution itself.

But the French Revolution, if less successful than ours, had far the greater impact on world history. America could stay safely distant from the struggle of the great powers in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. France was at the center of the struggle, and on several sides of it. King Louis XVI joined the Americans in their war of independence; then, when the French had set in motion their own revolution, America gave no more support beyond repayment of its own war debts. We had a little war of colonial secession. They remade the map of Europe.

the consequences of the falling off of Grenadian affection. An American photographer I know has had nearly all of his attempts to record the daily lives of Grenadians met with streams of colorful but unprintable verbal abuse. To put it mildly, our presence here—particularly in the poorer western and northwestern sections of the island—no longer occasions the universal adoration that is supposed to be our due as heroic champions of democracy.

The reason for our cool reception is not entirely clear, but it seems to have less to do with our invasion/imperialist rescue/adventure mission itself than with the follow-up. That vast flood of American investment in Grenada, much anticipated in the years following the invasion, has not materialized. Although the Agency for International Development has helped build some dandy roads and a nice mental hospital on a hill below Fort George (presumably to replace the one we accidentally bombed), U.S. companies have overwhelmingly decided that wonderful opportunities lie elsewhere. And now that Uncle Sam is starting to cut back on the economic aid (to a still hefty $10 million a year, after pumping $110 million into the country over five years), people are getting the impression that Grenada, having served its public relations function, will now be cast aside like a jilted lover. And to be honest, who can blame them? What started out as a marriage made in heaven has begun to look more like a one-night stand.

Although the hoteliers and government functionaries keep assuring us that all is well, it's clear that everything in York House is not as the Bush administration would have it. New elections must be called sometime before March 1990, and they promise to be messy at the very least. For one thing, there's been a highly disruptive split in the hierarchy of the ruling NNP, known to many these days as the New National Problem. In January Keith Mitchell, a minister in Blaize's government, was elected party leader, a position that would normally be held by the PM himself. Meanwhile, the National Democratic Congress (NDC), the official opposition party, is leading in what pass for opinion polls in this country. To this must be added the lingering (and, to some, bewildering) popularity of Sir Eric Gairy and his Grenadian United Labor Party (that's right, GULP), the persistent rumblings of the MBPM, and the recent formation of yet another political party by former Gairy protégé Raphael Fletcher. No wonder our State Department observers—who can be distinguished from the other sunglassed, straw-hatted tourists by their nervous eyes and sweaty palms—are on edge. Just keeping the parties' acronyms straight is a tough enough chore, especially for us Americans, who tend to reserve our acronyms for truly powerful entities like television networks and ad agencies.

The newspapers don't help much, either. About a half-dozen weeklies, most of them organs of the political parties, are published on the island, but they are pretty much innocent of facts. Even the major unaffiliated paper, *The Informer* ("The Fearless Weekly That Tells It As It Is"), has its lapses. "KEITH MITCHELL KILLED," ran one headline not too long ago. No, this was not hard news, but rather a vision received "in the wee hours" by a prophet named Justine F. McBurnie.

So pity those poor State Department observers. They have to make sense of all this and decide whom the United States should root for in the coming elections. Grenada, after all, is still regarded as a Caribbean bellwether, and the prospect of political chaos should give the State Department a few wee-hours visions of its own.

GARY KRIST is the author of *The Garden State* (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich), a collection of short fiction.

Uncle Sam needs you.

JUST SAY YES

By Morton M. Kondracke

Within the Washington Beltway, it's fashionable to smirk at George Bush's vows to make this a kinder, gentler nation with the help of "a thousand points of light" and little or no new money. In Washington, if a program doesn't have big bucks behind it, it's "just p.r."

So there may be big yawns during White House-designated "national service week" in mid-April, when Bush unveils his low-budget (reportedly, $25 million per year) Youth Engaged in Service (YES) program, designed to encourage both well-off and poor kids to join volunteer local projects to help the needy. Bush will mount his bully pulpit and promise that this is just the first of many innovations to come from his new White House Office of National Service, but almost certainly, the YES initiative will be greeted by snorts of contempt from jaded souls in Congress and the media.

And yet, philosophically, Bush is on to something important that's stirring in America, and he should be ambitious about its possibilities. It could be that the plight of homeless families didn't mesh with Ronald Reagan's woozy image of America as a great and noble land, and that this fact has dawned on more and more Americans. Or it could be that yuppies have discovered that BMWs don't offer the inner fulfillment promised in magazine ads. But there exists an abundance of evidence that the country is in the midst of a new surge of communitarianism—albeit, conservative communitarianism—that expresses itself not in '60s-style mass protest, but in locally based volunteer activity.

According to a 1988 Gallup Poll commissioned by Independent Sector, a Washington group representing non-profit agencies, more than 80 million Americans volunteer some of their time to a cause, and the average time spent is five hours per week for a total of 19.5 billion hours in 1987, a 34 percent increase since 1985. The Campus Outreach Opportunity League Compact, a nationwide consortium of 500 colleges, has about 250,000 students engaged in volunteer service activity. Half of all private high schools in the country

already require some community service, and the trend is spreading to public high schools. Atlanta, Detroit, and Springfield, Massachusetts, require service as a condition for graduating. The governors of Pennsylvania and Minnesota are pushing statewide programs to give graduation credits for service work; Maryland already requires all schools to do so. In addition, New York City, Philadelphia, and the state of California have created service corps on the model of the Job Corps or the Civilian Conservation Corps, mainly enrolled in by poor high school dropouts.

And there is both an expansion of adult volunteer activity and an increase in its fashionability quotient. In New York, 21 wealthy businessmen—including investment bankers Felix Rohatyn and Peter Flanigan—have followed Eugene Lang's much-publicized example in "adopting" a class of poor sixth-graders, guaranteeing to send them to college if they finish high school and establishing $250,000 funds to hire full-time coordinators to look after their adoptees' social welfare and educational needs. Financier Ray Chambers, chairman of the Boys and Girls Clubs of Newark, has persuaded 1,100 corporate executives to serve as mentors for impoverished kids and guarantee them a college education. The Habitat for Humanity program has inspired volunteers—the most famous being Jimmy Carter—in 300 cities to build houses for poor people, who own them after paying a small fee and investing "sweat equity" in finishing the property. Atlanta has created the Cities and Schools program, under which community leaders coordinate the delivery of school, health, and social agency services to poor families and organize mentor programs for children.

There are, in reality, millions of points of light already illuminating America—in homeless shelters, foster homes for AIDS babies, soup kitchens, tutoring programs, food delivery services, emergency hotlines, Mothers Against Drunk Driving, church outreach programs, and settlement houses. Will this end poverty and establish justice in the country? Of course not. But then government programs have not done so either. Lyndon Johnson's War on Poverty was a noble cause, but it became bureaucratized and lost its popular consensus. If there is ever to be a consensus again behind efforts to help the poor, it will have to come—or, at least, is most likely to come—from sustained human contact between middle-class voters (and rich people, too) and individual poor people.

How much of this Bush has thought through is not clear. Obviously, though, the idea of community service fits nicely with his personality and his Brahmin sense of public obligation. He devoted fully a third of his inaugural address—the first third—to communitarian, service-oriented declarations, and the theme comes up often in other speeches. In St. Louis on February 17, for example, Bush said, "When I talk about a thousand points of light, it is neighbor helping neighbor, it is kid helping kid, it is friends holding out their hands to other friends. From now on in America, any definition of a successful life must include serving others."

Although as president he will be the nation's foremost advocate of voluntary action, Bush was far from the first major politician to understand the virtues of the volunteer ethic. The earlier advocates have been Democrats—notably, Sam Nunn and other leaders of the Democratic Leadership Council, who have promoted a huge (minimum: $5.3 billion per year) and controversial national service idea that would replace existing college grant programs with vouchers that young people would earn by performing two years of civilian or military service. The program's supporters dismiss Bush's efforts as an outgrowth of mere noblesse oblige. They assert that theirs is a "society-changing proposal" like the GI Bill, "a national mobilization, creating almost a whole new culture" in which service would be a natural part of growing up, and then of adult citizenship.

Nunn's measure is not going to be passed anytime soon—and it shouldn't be. There are many reasons to doubt that it will work. Clearly, its burdens will fall heaviest on the poor, who will have to do community service in order to afford a college education. It's supposed to encourage young people to join the military, but it will also encourage them to leave after two years to collect their vouchers (also redeemable to buy a house or get job training). So much attention has been paid to designing incentives that too little attention has been paid to the costs and problems of supervising and usefully employing volunteers.

One should also be suspicious of the DLC's urgent (and admitted) search for a big new idea that might revive the Democratic Party. The idea of "shared civic obligation" sounds good, but Nunn and company have not explained how incentives based on coercion and the promise of payment will create a national sense of community. Previous mass mobilizations—military service during wartime and the cold war, and the civil rights and anti-war movements—grew out of a widely shared consensus about national life. The DLC plan seems to be an effort to create a new ethos artificially, when it's clear that a natural movement already exists but is headed in a different direction—toward genuinely voluntary service on the part of individuals. The state should encourage this, not force it.

This spirit does inform a number of other Democratic proposals, including that of Senator Edward Kennedy to establish a $100 million national-state fund to promote volunteer youth service and to help create more local jobs corps. Senator Barbara Mikulski has sponsored a $250 million proposal to create a civilian volunteer corps, modeled on the National Guard, that would pay participants $3,000 a year in education or home-purchase benefits in return for service on weekends and two weeks in the summer. Senator Chris Dodd has a $150 million bill to fund an American Conservation Corps.

Republicans have been waiting—some impatiently—for the Bush initiative. It's being worked out by a 39-year-old businessman, Gregg Petersmeyer, who is brand new to the fields of volunteer service and poverty-fighting. A personal friend of Bush's since his days as a college intern in the Nixon White House, Petersmeyer has put himself through a crash course on America's social problems. He is also taking advice from a "Points of Light Initiative" working group headed by Ray

Chambers and including, among others, Flanigan and the originators of Habitat for Humanity and Atlanta's Cities and Schools effort.

That group also is being advised by Richard Danzig, a Washington lawyer and co-author of a book on national service, who says that the key to a successful national effort may lie in stimulating the local organization of "teams" of young people and adults, linking churches, corporations, and schools. Petersmeyer says that his goal is to increase the number of volunteers, hours worked, and money donated by 15 percent per year.

Everything depends, though, on presidential leadership. Since Bush is not going to devote a lot of money to fighting poverty—and it's clear that there's no political consensus for doing that anyway—he should devote time and political energy to it. That includes not just making speeches, but pushing family members (besides his wife, who is already active in literacy work) and administration appointees into high-visibility activity. Bush's goal ought to be that every church, corporation, law firm, school, and social club is involved in community work and that Americans genuinely feel that the definition of a successful life includes serving others. This wouldn't replace the need for government assistance, but it's a powerful energy source to supplement government in the short run and humanize it later on.

A new way to fight drugs and crime.

THE NO-BAIL SOLUTION

By Robert Nagel

In late January, after an argument over who would sit next to a girl at lunch, two youths sprayed semi-automatic machine-gun fire into a crowd of students leaving Wilson High School in Northwest Washington. The suspects were arrested, but they posted bail and were released within a week. Ten days later, in the hallway of Gar-Field High in the capital's Virginia suburbs, sophomore Damon Yorker was shot in the groin, apparently after he told some outsiders to stop staring at him. An 18-year old dropout, Shannon Monts, was arrested. He posted bail and was released in a day—before Yorker was out of the hospital.

The shootings were big news in Washington. The prompt release of the suspected shooters was not. Monts's release made page B5 of the *Washington Post*, and you had to read 13 paragraphs into a follow-up story on the Wilson High incident to learn that the suspects were back on the streets. "Gunman posts bail" stories lack a quality deemed essential to newsworthiness, namely novelty.

If it weren't such a frequent and typically American event, the prompt release of apparently dangerous criminals would seem bizarre. In some perfectly civilized countries (Sweden, for example) those charged with violent crimes are regularly held until trial. Yet here we are, engaged in a great war on drugs, terrified of urban violence we can't control and criminals we can't catch—and when we do manage to identify and capture a suspect, we calmly set him free again, almost as if we were throwing back a fish caught for sport.

The "drug war" provides an especially auspicious time to reassess the proper role of bail. If we know anything about the criminal drug culture, it's that those in it have what sociologists call short time-horizons. Crack addicts who will do anything for a "rock" are only the most obvious examples. Even dealers who aren't addicts are hardly engaged in long-range strategic planning. One week they're dropping out of high school, next week they're driving BMWs, next week they may be dead.

In a short-term criminal culture, the prospect of even a lengthy prison sentence starting, say, a year from now may not be very scary. A better deterrent would match the time-horizon of those it is meant to deter—it would be not a more severe, but a more *immediate* sanction. Reform of the bail laws to deny serious offenders routine pretrial release is an obvious way of accomplishing this. Kids thinking of making drug dealers their role models would see that, when the dealers were caught, they went to jail immediately and stayed there until trial instead of reappearing on the streets within hours. A no-bail approach certainly seems more promising than calling up a few more National Guardsmen. But it's not likely to happen until both liberals and conservatives reassess their ideas about pretrial detention.

The normal explanation for permissive American bail practices is, of course, the Constitution. There is, we are told, a "right" to bail and a "right" to be free pending trial. These "rights" have worked themselves into popular mythology in the form of the phrase "presumption of innocence"—an idea that, like the equally simplistic "right to bear arms," is usually invoked in order to shut down normal processes of thought and experimentation. In the *New York Times* editorial-page boilerplate, the "noble presumption" means that "the only purpose of holding a person until trial is to safeguard the trial process itself, preventing flight or the intimidation of witnesses." Even violent felons are entitled to walk out of jail after arrest if they can show they've always appeared punctually when tried for their previous crimes.

The legal foundation of this "right to bail" has always been shaky. For starters, the Constitution does not say all crimes must be bailable. Instead, the Eighth Amendment says only that "*excessive* bail shall not be required" (emphasis added). Some right-to-bail advocates have attempted to explain this inconvenient language as a "drafting error." But the same Congress that approved the Bill of Rights allowed denial of bail for capital offenses, which at the time included robbery, arson, and many other commonplace felonies.

In fact, there is a long American legal tradition permitting defendants to be detained before trial on strong proof that they committed serious crimes. Under the Judiciary Act of 1789, judges were told to take into account "the nature and circumstances of the offense,

5. Examples

New fuel for schools

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By Elizabeth A. Brown
Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

Boston

EDUCATION

ENGLISH class at the Roosevelt Middle School in Decatur, Ill., had a star quality last year.

Lee Iacocca told the students to determine what they want and "be willing to work tirelessly" to reach their goals.

Judge James Parsons, an alumnus, and the first black appointed to a federal court, suggested that the students appreciate "things that are noble and good."

Thanks to support from the local education fund, teacher Dorothy Sallee was able to initiate a project of her own design. In an effort to prepare her students for high school and after, Ms. Sallee helped the students write to adults – role models for the community and the nation – to ask for advice. The students printed the replies in a booklet for their classmates and families.

In all, the project cost only $300, with postage and printing. But because the school budget wouldn't cover it, Sallee turned to the community's local education fund, "Partners in Education," from which she obtained a grant.

This local education fund – LEF – is one of many grass-roots groups to start up across the United States in the past five years. They function as an independent third party between the school and the community with the purpose of improving education in the area's schools. They are nonprofit, funded privately, and self-governed.

Today there are more than 300 local education funds, and a central office – Public Education Fund Network – in Pittsburgh is ready to help LEFs get started **(see box)**.

But providing money is not the only purpose of these local funds. Involving the community in its schools is equally important. "We supplement, not supplant, tax dollars," says Andrew Bundy, director of development at the San Francisco Education Fund. "Even if there were enough tax dollars, there would still be a need for [an LEF]," he explains, "because we provide a community-support system . . . a stimulus to do a better job."

The money raised by the funds is not for basic expenses, like teacher salaries, but for special projects initiated by teachers. Projects range from small classroom activities to programs with a specific reach, like the truancy and dropout programs in San Antonio, where citizens work directly with "at-risk students" to develop an interest in school.

Last year, Decatur's fund had an operating budget of $50,000, which was to be distributed among the 56 schools in the county, (22,000 students; about $2.60 per student). Of this money, 60 percent was from local businesses, 20 percent from civic groups (women's clubs, Rotary), and the rest from individual donations and money-raising events.

On a larger scale, Rochester, N.Y., worked with a $270,000 budget last year for the city's 50 schools (33,000 students; about $9 per student). Eighty percent of the budget was from corporate donors (Kodak, Xerox, Gannett), 10 percent ($27,000) from a state legislative grant, and the rest from memberships and individual donations.

Only four years old, the Rochester fund is one of the most active and innovative in the country. Last year several elementary school teachers planned a curriculum around the area's Genesee River Valley. Students looked at plants, rocks, and animals for science, learned about Indians and early settlers on a trip down the river, and wrote about their field studies for English.

Recently the fund opened a clearinghouse of surplus supplies where companies donate unwanted items, and teachers take what they can use – paper, computers, TVs, buttons, a piano. "We've been able to funnel about $400,000 worth of supplies to teachers," says Bea Paul Harris, executive director of the fund.

"Our project is successful because it has created an atmosphere to make education a top priority among people in the community," says Ms. Harris. She notes the importance of including the "power brokers" – corporate and civic leaders, clergy, school administrators, teacher unions – on the governing board.

Back in Decatur, Sallee isn't sure she'll get funds this year for another letter-writing project. "Since it cost so little, I'll probably pay for it myself," she says. "It was definitely worth it."

Nathan Rosser, a student who didn't receive a reply from his adviser, astronaut Sally Ride, says he enjoyed the project anyway. "It made getting ready for school in the morning a lot more fun . . . for a couple of months, anyway."

How to start a local education fund

Network. "Work as much as possible with people in a community that already has one," says Andrew Bundy, director of development at the San Francisco Education Fund. The Public Education Fund Network in Pittsburgh publishes a handbook of step-by-step instructions on start-up, plus a resource list of other funds and projects.

Keep the basis of support broad. "The organization must be representative of its constituency," advises David Sugg of San Antonio's Target 90 program, which has a governing board that is 50 percent Hispanic, reflecting the city's population.

Define specific goals. Do not allow the fund to be used as a slush fund.

Establish financial stability. This may require aggressive fund raising in the beginning, but keep expectations realistic. Remember that small amounts of money can do a lot in the classroom.

Tap local resources. Get citizens, businesses, and civic groups involved.

Keep the community informed of the fund's activities. Give credit when due to classrooms and contributors. And don't forget to report on the school's *progress*.

For more information or to obtain a start-up guide, contact Ms. Gerri Kay, Executive Director, Public Education Fund Network, Allegheny Conference on Community Development, 600 Grant St., Pittsburgh, PA 15219. – E. A. B.

EDITORIAL

BY DAVID GERGEN
EDITOR AT LARGE

THE BARBARITIES OF HUSSEIN

As part of his propaganda war with the United States, Saddam Hussein has flung open the doors of hospitals in Baghdad to put hungry babies on display for American television cameras. But he has systematically barred Western journalists from a peek into hospitals in Kuwait. He has his reasons, it turns out.

Secret U.S. government cables, obtained by *U.S. News,* reveal shocking acts of brutality practiced by the Iraqis against innocent citizens at Kuwaiti hospitals. The cables are based upon eyewitness accounts from Kuwaiti doctors and others traumatized by what they have seen. Among their allegations:

■ On the sixth day of their invasion, Iraqi soldiers reportedly entered the Adan Hospital in Fahaheel looking for hospital equipment to steal. They unplugged the oxygen to the incubators supporting 22 premature babies and made off with the incubators. All 22 children died.

■ The next day, at the same hospital, Iraqi troops brought in a badly injured captain and soldier for treatment. When told both men had died, the troops accused hospital employes of killing them and shot five on the spot. Two days later, the Iraqis cut off water to the hospital.

■ At the intensive-care unit of the Mubarak hospital, Iraqis reportedly cut off the oxygen and IV drip supporting the 75-year-old mother of a Kuwaiti cabinet minister. "They just let her die," said one witness.

■ At one psychiatric hospital, Iraqi troops were said to have turned 250 mental patients, drug addicts and others into the streets. They also evicted 280 to 300 patients at the physiotherapy hospital near the Sulaibikhat roundabout to make way for a military headquarters. Some 80 Kuwaitis were kicked out of a dialysis facility at another hospital.

■ In a bizarre incident, witnesses said Iraqi soldiers settled near Kuwait's national zoo, expelled the zoo keepers and left the animals without food and water for over three days. They then let the animals out of their cages and "started having fun shooting and killing them." A lion managed to escape and ran to a nearby neighborhood where it bit an 11-year-old girl on the shoulder. She could not get proper treatment, developed a secondary infection and died a few days later.

These cruelties are part of a broader pattern of murder and repression unleashed by Saddam Hussein upon his neighbors. Kuwaiti citizens fleeing in terror tell of widespread looting of their hospitals: Blood, frozen plasma, organ-transplant equipment, surgical theaters, X-ray machines, CAT scans, and ultrasound machines have all been stripped away. Homes are ransacked. Rapes and executions are common. Families are thrown out of the country without their papers, their homes taken over by Iraqis imported from the North. Clearly, Hussein is intent upon depopulating the nation of its own people and replacing them with his own.

Of late, the United States and its many allies have entered a tense war of nerves with Hussein. Perhaps a diplomatic solution can be found that will spare lives while also shearing Hussein of his power; unfortunately, the fact that more Iraqi troops are pouring into Kuwait suggests that bloodshed is the more likely outcome. But it could be weeks, even months away. Innocent Kuwaitis should not have to wait that long for relief.

'The U.S. must press forward to build a dossier of war crimes for possible trials after this conflict is resolved'

America and her friends should mobilize through the United Nations to demand that the International Committee of the Red Cross be permitted to enter Kuwait immediately to investigate the plight of its citizens and to offer humanitarian help. The Red Cross already has a team in Baghdad, sent there to check on prisoners of war from the Iran-Iraq War, but Hussein has turned down its request to go to Kuwait.

The press also bears a responsibility to ensure that our readers and viewers get a full story. Too often, we become conveyor belts for the propaganda and photo opportunities of governments, even bloody tyrants like Hussein. We must keep digging and reminding our audiences of the truths behind this awful man.

Finally, the U.S. must press forward to build a dossier of war crimes for possible trials after this conflict is resolved. Hussein and the men who knowingly carry out his orders must know now, not later, that to persist in these barbarities places them in personal jeopardy. "The worst crime of all," as Justice Robert Jackson said at Nuremberg, is to plot and wage aggression upon innocent people. ■

'EMPOWERMENT' BECOMES PART OF . . .

Two years before a presumed bid for reelection that suddenly no longer seems a sure thing, President Bush faces some pressing political needs. He could use a memorable, even visionary, domestic policy that can fit within brutal budgetary constraints. He needs to loosen his association with the wealthy that the recent budget mess evoked. He also would welcome a way to restore Democrats to the defensive, where they'd been from 1980 until recent weeks.

Enter "empowerment."

As a Bush buzzword, strictly speaking, it isn't new. He mentioned it in a policy paper as a presidential candidate in 1988, then while swearing in Housing and Urban Development Secretary Jack F. Kemp after entering the White House.

But only in recent weeks has empowerment and its linguistic derivatives become mainstays of Bushspeak. Sketching alternatives to a civil rights bill he rejected, Bush wrote in his Oct. 22 veto message, "We need initiatives that will empower individual Americans and enable them to reclaim control of their lives." On the campaign trail in recent weeks for Republican candidates, Bush has mentioned empowerment in speech after speech. "Jon Grunseth . . . is determined to empower the people," Bush told supporters of the Minnesota gubernatorial candidate who later withdrew for having allegedly skinny-dipped with teenage girls. At a Sept. 27 fund-raiser for Illinois Senate candidate Lynn Martin, Bush went so far as to describe empowerment as "the cornerstone of our Administration's domestic policy."

That was a case of Bush's speechwriters getting carried away, a senior White House adviser said. But the citizenry is soon to hear more—maybe much more—about the concept of empowerment. Fifteen or so White House aides have gathered at weekly "empowerment breakfasts" since about mid-September, listening to outside speakers and knocking around ideas. The White House plans to announce after the Nov. 6 elections that Bush has created an "empowerment task force" in the Cabinet's Domestic Policy Council that will ponder how to bring empowerment concepts to bear on federal programs. (The group, which hasn't met yet, is headed by Kemp and includes assistant-secretary-level officials from at least eight agencies and five White House offices.) Empowerment is expected to be a theme, if not the centerpiece, in next year's State of the Union message. Rep. Steve Bartlett, R-Texas, chairman of the 37-member congressional Task Force on Empowerment, foresees it as the Administration's "domestic policy agenda [for] the 1990s."

But it's a term that means different things to different people, causing Urban Institute senior fellow Isabel V. Sawhill "some difficulties figuring out what it means." Heritage Foundation domestic policy director Stuart Butler, one of the concept's intellectual authors, describes it as "trusting ordinary people" rather than a paternalistic welfare state to make economic decisions. (He acknowledges "a 1960s' ring to it" but doesn't mind, having admired "the intent though not the outcome" of President Johnson's Great Society.) Inside the White House, a senior aide portrayed it as a concern with "end results rather than programmatic operations"; another cited Bush's televised exhortations to Americans to rid their neighborhoods of drugs and to read to their children.

To White House long-term policy planner James P. Pinkerton, empowerment's in-house theoretician, it is a "post-conservative idea" that means returning economic and social decisions to the "lowest competent unit"—those who are affected. Pinkerton considers it part of a "new paradigm"—a notion he's been peddling for more than a year—that would supplant the decaying "old paradigm" of using centralized bureaucracies to administer government policy with reliance on market forces and decentralization and letting individuals (and companies) decide things for themselves.

The profusion of definitions shouldn't be surprising, for empowerment has emerged as "a unifying theme" from a multiplicity of Administration domestic policy proposals, Bartlett noted, rather than the other way around. The President's pragmatic style, he said, "doesn't lend itself to a unifying theme," but if there's been one, that's been it. Administration officials use the word to describe their policies in education (merit schools, unconventionally certified teachers and manifestations of educational "choice"); housing (rent-subsidy vouchers and tenant ownership of public housing, both in the housing bill recently passed); child care (tax credits rather than grants to states); clean air (marketable permits to pollute); and the disabled (civil rights). That hardly exhausts foreseen applications. Pinkerton expects to take "a long look" at creating "health care IRAs" to funnel federal assistance to patients rather than to hospitals and doctors and at reviving the Reagan White House's Low-Income Opportunity Board that gave fed-



. . . BUSHSPEAK AS '92 ELECTION NEARS

eral waivers to state governments to experiment with antipoverty programs.

Champions of empowerment make big claims for it. Granting parents some choices over where their children attend school counts as "the most radical change in public education since Horace Mann," Pinkerton said, adding that it wouldn't solve all the problems in education but "could solve a lot of them." *(See this issue, p. 2671.)* Empowerment isn't a substitute for federal spending but would require less of it, advocates say. Using housing vouchers and tenant management in place of paying developers to build and fix public housing, Butler figures, could have "a dramatic impact" on inner cities at half or less of what Washington spends now.

But this talk of savings raises suspicions of a yearning for social policy on the cheap. Jack Meyer, president of New Directions for Policy, a centrist think tank in Washington, likes the notion of letting "consumers vote with their feet" but worries that empowerment may give a financially strapped Administration "a thinly disguised cover" for making needy people fend for themselves. Even conservative enthusiasts acknowledge that it would cost more at the front end to change how government policies work and that only then might savings flow.

Empowerment draws plenty of self-interested opposition as well. Educators, developers and other social-service suppliers don't much like it, inspiring opposition in Washington from traditional Democrats who rely on them for political support. Traditional Republicans aren't drawn toward empowerment either. Indeed, all politicians are apt to resist it, Bartlett said, because it would cut the number of ribbon-cutting speeches.

Many social policy experts like the concept but deem it a necessary though insufficient response to domestic problems that will also entail further infusions of money. Rockefeller College provost Richard P. Nathan, once a domestic policy adviser to President Nixon, finds "something to" empowerment but doubts that housing vouchers "can save the cities" and says that educational choice has been oversold. (He recently moved from a neutral stance on choice to opposition.) Sawhill finds empowerment "useful" but no panacea for social problems—she calls it largely but not entirely "a rhetorical exercise." To consider it a solution, she said, "is to misdiagnose the nature and seriousness of the problem." Washington University social work professor Michael W. Sherraden judges empowerment "terrific" if it means giving poor people the sort of subsidies to buy homes and accumulate assets that better-off Americans have long received. If it doesn't, empowerment may not mean much, he said; its impact will depend on "what [its framers] mean and how it is implemented."

These ambiguities may prove useful to advocates of empowerment in the forthcoming debates. Most of its adherents are conservatives. But people of varying political hues see in empowerment—as they see in Bush—whatever they want. Conservative activist Jeffrey A. Eisenach, who employed a similar theme as issues director for 1988 Republican presidential candidate Pierre S. (Pete) du Pont IV, considers empowerment a means toward "equal opportunity, not equal income." Meyer of New Directions sees it as a way to ensure that teenagers get jobs so they can be self-sufficient. To Democrats, empowerment offers "market means to progressive ends," according to Will Marshall, president of the Progressive Policy Institute, associated with moderate-to-conservative Democrats.

As evidence of the odd nature of the concept's political allure, a Pinkerton speech on empowerment was read on the House floor by Minority Whip Newt Gingrich, R-Ga., an ardent conservative, then reprinted by the Ripon Society in its magazine catering to liberal and moderate Republicans. White House empowerment breakfasts have attracted aides of varying ideology, including traditional conservatives, neoconservatives, moderates and libertarians. Among Republicans and Democrats alike, views on empowerment vary more by generation than by ideology, Bartlett said—appealing more to neoconservatives and neoliberals than to traditionalists of either stripe.

That may prove decisive as the White House decides how hard to pursue this guise of a long-sought policy vision. In Administration councils, the heartiest advocates of empowerment are unconventionally conservative or relatively young, including Kemp, Pinkerton, economic and domestic policy adviser Roger B. Porter and members of Vice President Dan Quayle's staff.

There's said to be no overt opposition. But the extent of enthusiasm in certain quarters remains to be seen. Office of Management and Budget chief Richard G. Darman is considered a possible naysayer. But of more concern to advocates is a man who evidently passed through the 1960s unmarked and seems only fitfully interested in domestic policy—the White House's oldest official, who sits behind the Oval Office desk. ■



November 16, 1990

MEMORANDUM TO ALL SPEECHWRITERS

FROM: MARY KATE MKG

SUBJECT: EMPOWERMENT BREAKFAST WITH SECRETARY KEMP

I. THE STRATEGY

Vince Lombardi and Alexander the Great had one thing in common: the philosophy that one should always attack the enemy at their strength. Our enemy's strength, says Kemp, is low-income Americans, no matter what color.

The way to beat the enemy (and, coincidentally, re-unite the GOP) is: an "audicious" pro-growth agenda.

We must redefine civil rights to include:
right to a job
right to a drug-free neighborhood
right to own property
Jefferson's inalienable rights, "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness" were based on Locke's "life, liberty and property." Jefferson recognized that happiness, i.e. upward mobility, is based on a right to property. The key is to change people's attitudes and behavior through labor and capital incentives -- and we know what works: "freedom works."

He wants us to see the minutes from yesterday's first meeting of the Cabinet's "Empowerment Task Force" (I will distribute these as I get them.) If we can list six or eight programs in a speech it will "knock the socks off the liberals and their zero-sum mentality" as well as re-unify the Republican party under the pro-growth banner. Kemp thinks that the party is now split -- not between the Bush and Reagan wings -- but between the growth wing and the austerity wing. Such a list of steps -- from enterprise zones to tenant ownership of public housing, choice in child care and education, vouchers, etc. -- would form the Bush Agenda for 1992. "THIS IS VISION!!"

examples: "If you vote for George Bush in 1992, we will give you the opportunity to own your own unit (of public housing)."

"In the Bush Administration, we want one million new homeowners from the ranks of low-income Americans"

"We want to double the number of black, hispanic and asian owned businesses."

II. US VS. THEM

The Secretary says that Us vs. Them is no longer capitalism vs. communism -- it is **corporate capitalism vs. small business/ entrepreneurial capitalism.**

[Pinkerton adds: "Us vs. Them is an honorable tradition used throughout history to galvanize your base."]

We must encourage as many Americans as we can to get involved in the economy. Unfortunately, the capital gains tax is a transaction tax on all those trying to get through the gate. We must lower the hoop -- and in the process we will most likely expand the tax base. We must destroy the myth that capital gains tax cut = revenue losses.

This time, we must tie capital gains not to the rich, but to eliminating the ghettos, through:

1. capital and labor based incentives
2. pro-family incentives
3. **0% capital gains tax for low-income people**

1. Capital and labor based incentives. Kemp points to the case of Grace Capateo (?) cited in W.S. Journal, who saved her pennies and nickels to send her daughter to college. She saved $3000, then was taken to court for violating AFDC rules ($1000 asset limit) and fined $15,000. However, she didn't have $15,000 so they just took her $3000. Kemp mentioned this in a speech and a GOP businessman in the audience offered to pay for the child's education ...

2. Pro-family incentives. Apparently some HUD rules state that if you are single in public housing, you pay $60 rent a month. If you are married, then your rent jumps to $600 (perhaps someone should check these figures). But when we tried to amend this, the Democrats in Congress stopped the effort. Poor people aren't stupid, he says, and if it's a better deal to stay a single welfare mother than it is to get married, get a job, or save money, then that's what you do. We need to stop preaching at these people and change the rules to give them a better deal that works in their favor. This sounds at odds with Judeo-Christian philosophy, but if we give them economic incentives first, values will follow. Otherwise, we simply perpetuate poverty.

3. 100% capital gains tax break for low-income people. "Nobody ever got rich on wages," says Kemp. At the time when low-income people need it most, poor people have no way to make money -- on a 33% tax on investments. He suggests a graduated capital gains tax from 0-15% depending on your income.

Finally, an enlightening joke that I thought said alot: "Bill Bennett is one of my best friends in politics," said Kemp. "He said to me one day, 'I'll die for my family, I'll die for my church, I'll die for my country. But I just won't die for capital gains.' I grabbed him and said, 'Bill, I AM WILLING TO DIE FOR CAPITAL GAINS.'" # # #

NIXON



BEN STEIN'S DAY OFF

There was always Nixon. In Silver Spring, Maryland, in 1952, when I was in first grade and in love with a girl who spurned me, I read about Nixon's courtship of Patricia Ryan. When he met her, so the story ran, she was engaged to another man. Dick Nixon loved her so much that he waited on her porch for her to come home—even when she came home with the other man. So you could be rejected and win the girl in the end. I learned that from Nixon.

In 1960, when Nixon ran against the gorgeous Jack Kennedy, Kennedy came to speak at my high school and the girls swooned. The underdog, Nixon—awkward Nixon—came within a hair's breadth of winning. So might I, for whom no one ever swooned until much later, win half of the votes in America. Nixon was my inspiration.

In 1968, when I was at Yale Law School, I looked at R.N. and looked at Hubert Humphrey, and tried to imagine each of them staring down Brezhnev. I voted for Nixon. My wife of four months, the most beautiful girl at Vassar College by far, thought I was kidding at first and then stormed out of the car—while it was moving slowly down Elm Street—sobbing with rage and betrayal.

But Nixon won, and my wife was happy to go to White House parties in Washington, brought there by my one and only father, who went from a think tank to the White House—and was made to feel important for the first time in his 52 years on earth by Nixon. The ripples of his importance even fanned out to me, who felt important enough to become a real hippie and demonstrate. Nixon empowered me to stand against him, and maybe there's also something there of what a leader is supposed to do.

In 1972 a rebel teacher at the University of California at Santa Cruz who looked like a thinner, younger version of me heard a man who should have known better liken Nixon to Hitler. I left academe never to return full-time and went to work for Nixon in the Watergate bunker. I parachuted in on November 11, 1973, to the doomed Dien Bien Phu on the Ellipse.

When Nixon slowly, agonizingly fell to earth in flames, I, too, felt the vertiginous occlusion. In the Old Executive Office Building, looking out at the demonstrators (who included my ex-wife), I became beleaguered, demoralized, determined—like my boss.

And perhaps, for a time, deluded as well.

When I came to Hollywood to write and act (as it happened), Nixon came with me. I was never just another schmuck writer, nor another small-scale hustler. I was always the only member of the Writers Guild who had worked for Nixon, the "resident fascist" at Norman Lear's company (as I was repeatedly introduced at tapings).

Then the phoenix of Nixon rose from the ashes, again and again telling me that what counts is persistence and staying alive. In Hollywood, which alternately tries to make you immortal and to kill you, it was a secret nourishment to have the example of Nixon ever before me. (Certainly, it was an example available to no one else in the W.G.A.)

This past summer the resurrection became complete. Sitting only a few feet from him at the dinner for his library, with my wife by my side (again the wife who ran from the car on Elm Street in 1968 and demonstrated against him in Lafayette Square in 1974), I watched him, now old, take his fading hurrahs from those who, like me, were never defeatists. Pat stood by him, looking weary and determined.

R.N. told a story about how, when he came back to California in 1974 after his resignation, after coming so close to death from phlebitis, Wally Annenberg had come to see him and said to him, "Mr. President, life is 99 rounds, and not any less." The crowd roared. I, who feel like one day is usually as many rounds as I can take, listened and felt better.

R.N. said, "Only at the end of the day, only in the evening, can you truly see what a glorious day it's been. Now, Pat and I are in the evening, and we look back, and it has been a *glorious* day," he said, underlining "glorious" in that Nixon way, that rolling, almost Irish inflection that used to be accompanied, 40 years ago, by a sort of uppercut motion with his left hand from the back of a whistle-stop tour.

I cried, because ever since Watergate, just a few words from Nixon make me cry. My wife patted me on the back and said, "Nixon has always been a theme in our lives, I guess."

Yes, he has been. Because Nixon was always there—down in the pit and also up in the heights with the rest of us who are in both places. And because Nixon showed me that the guy who was the also-ran, who everybody made fun of, who often lost, who bled when he was cut . . . because that man not only could survive, but could tell the world how glorious the day had been.

Nov 1990

WP Business Sect Front page 11/17

RICHARD DARMAN
...speech angered some Republicans

OMB Head Asks Restraint On 'Neo-Neo-Ism' of Ideas

By Steven Mufson and Dan Balz
Washington Post Staff Writers

In a speech that ranged from basketball stars Manute Bol and Muggsy Bogues to New Tide detergent and the Hubble space telescope, Office of Management and Budget director Richard G. Darman yesterday warned against a "neo-neo-ism" of new policy fads.

Combining policy prescription, puns and thinly veiled barbs at some of the most cherished notions now popular among conservative Republicans, the Bush administration's budget director warned against a "premature rush" to new policy ideas implemented without testing and evaluation. He dismissed this tendency as "Hubble-ism—recalling the unfortunate recent failure to test what is now the world's largest orbiting victim of near-sightedness."

At the end of his speech to members of the Council for Excellence in Government, an organization of former senior government officials now in the private sector, Darman was presented with a prune, because it is an "older and wiser plum."

But while Darman's speech contained humor, it also angered conservative Republicans and some White House aides by lampooning the tendency for American presidents to come up with plans beginning with the word "new," ranging from the

See DARMAN, C8, Col. 1

DARMAN, From C1

New Deal to the twice-used New Federalism to the New Paradigm.

The last phrase was coined by James P. Pinkerton, deputy assistant to the president for policy planning, and Bush himself talked at some length about the new paradigm notion in a speech last April.

Conservatives have rallied around it as a way for Republicans to reclaim the initiative on domestic issues by introducing the principles of market-orientation, decentralization, choice and empowerment into policy. In child care and education, for example, that would mean tax credits or vouchers as opposed to direct government aid to institutions. In public housing, it would mean private ownership and greater tenant control.

There is an Empowerment Task Force in the administration that has begun meeting to come up with proposals for the budget and State of the Union message. They likely will include measures that would give individuals greater choice in education and offer tenants greater management in public housing. Housing and Urban Development Secretary Jack Kemp heads the task force.

Darman, whom associates describe as increasingly restless in his job, poked fun at the "new" programs and the "inescapable political tendency—the overwhelming political incentive—is to identify problems [or 'crises'] and to meet them with 'new solutions,' or at least press releases pretending to the same."

"It's a bit like soap operas brought to the viewing audience by Tide, New Tide, and insistently New New Tide," the Bush administration budget director said.

He called the New Paradigm "a bit too pretentious for a would-be populist movement" and said it was "perhaps, enigmatically paradigmatic." He said its four principles could be collapsed into one and might conflict with the New Paradigm's fifth principle—an emphasis on what works.

Darman said that "in the real world, others might simply dismiss it by picking up the refrain, 'Hey, brother, can you paradigm?' "

Word of Darman's speech ricocheted from the Capitol to the White House quickly yesterday afternoon among Republicans who see the New Paradigm proponents as the only members of the administration doing any thinking on behalf of conservatives.

A conservative outside the administration complained that Darman was the person who "bankrupted" the only real message the Republicans had and that he was now attacking "the part of the White House doing anything to get it back." He called Darman's remarks a "declaration of war on the only thinking element in the administration."

White House aide Pinkerton said: "After the success of the budget agreement, it's good to see Dick rejoining the intellectual dialogue."

D: "Ideas out of the 60's"
"Only thing they're not is new."
"Get beyond sloganeering."

Asides

Greens Dump on Bush

It's getting harder by the day to take the environmental establishment seriously. Yesterday President Bush signed the expensive and expansive Clean Air Bill. Here's the president of Friends of the Earth: "If I had to grade him, I'd have to give him a low 'D.' A year ago, I'd have given him an 'F,' so he's moving up a little bit." The president of the Wilderness Society: "This is his one and only significant environmental achievement and he certainly is not entitled to take sole credit for it." A Greenpeace spokesman says Mr. Bush "delivered less of the goods than any President." Environmentalists to Bush: Drop Dead.

HUGH SIDEY'S AMERICA

Why We Still Like Ike

A century after his birth, Americans revere Dwight Eisenhower's small-town humanity and commonsense leadership

It was a warm day in 1941 or 1942, and Wes Jackson, who was 5 or 6, climbed into the family's Lafayette sedan with assorted cousins. They drove from their farm near Topeka over to Abilene, Kans., for a family reunion at his great-aunt Ida Eisenhower's white frame house on Fourth Street, south of the tracks. Her son Dwight was either in Washington or Europe, even then on the edge of his great fame.

Wes dutifully greeted the elders present, wandered over the few acres and through the barn out back, then lounged under an old hackberry tree. At noon dinner he loaded up his plate with fried chicken and mashed potatoes and took a seat with a cousin on the back porch. Wes cleaned his plate. His cousin did not. Aunt Ida came inspecting. She spied the wasted food, stopped and delivered a stern dose of family doctrine: "Waste not, want not." Right then another remarkable career may have been started through the mixture of Eisenhower family values and the ethic of that prairie society. Jackson, now one of the nation's most renowned and innovative agriculture researchers, founded the Land Institute in Salina, Kans., in search of perennial prairie grain crops that will halt the wasting of the planet.

He is as much a philosopher as a geneticist, and he has thought a great deal about his first cousin once removed, Dwight David Eisenhower. Jackson believes the bedrock of Ike's achievements and his growing stature in history came from the white frame house in Abilene and the harmony the town required and imposed for a rewarding life. Many strata of worldly experience were laid down over Ike's character during his 50 years of public service. But the final high silhouette of his life followed the outlines shaped in the streets of Abilene.

The tributes for Ike's 100th birthday last week focused on his career as "the most successful general of the greatest war ever fought," to use biographer Stephen Ambrose's words. Ambrose goes further, suggesting that Ike is destined to be ranked "with Wilson and the Roosevelts as one of the four truly great Presidents of the 20th century." He is the most famous American soldier of all time. He commanded 4.5 million men in combat, more than any other man in history.

Victory explains his military stature. Peace and prosperity

WAS THE UNSPOILED LAND AND SMALL-TOWN LIFE THAT THE EISENHOWERS VALUED A ONE-TIME EVENT IN OUR HISTORY, NOW SWEPT AWAY BY EXCESSIVE WEALTH, GREED, WASTE, SOFTNESS AND SELF-PITY?

Photographs for TIME by Steve Liss

CENTENNIAL CELEBRATORS STAND AT ATTENTION DURING THE NATIONAL ANTHEM, A TRIBUTE TO THE MOST FAMOUS AMERICAN SOLDIER OF ALL TIME

define his presidential ranking. Yet those achievements fall short of the sum of Dwight Eisenhower. That other part of him is found in the nature of the man.

Had Ike been around for last week's celebrations, he most probably would have gone back to Kansas and talked about growing up in Abilene. He had been granted, he once said, "the great and priceless privilege of being raised in a small town." After the war he returned to Abilene 19 times, insisted that he be buried there. He had really never let go.

On the night before the Normandy invasion, moving among the men of the 101st Airborne who were loading up for their drop, he met a man from Dodge City. "Go get 'em, Kansas," he said with a thumbs-up. When the great battles were done and Ike stood in London's Guildhall, talking about the successful struggle for freedom, he was back home again. "The valley of the Thames draws closer to the farms of Kansas," he declared.

"Family values," explains Jackson. The Eisenhowers treasured what they had—one another and a fresh land. "Our pleasures were simple—they included survival" is the way Ike put it. Bible Scripture was read three times a day in the Eisenhower home. Those lessons were reinforced in the town where Eisenhower sought and won approval from almost everyone, including the town toughs whom he fought when necessary. Hemmed in by family and neighborhood, he had no other choice—or experience. Happiness was discipline.

At age 10, when Ike was denied the right to go trick-or-treating on Halloween with his brothers, his temper overwhelmed him. He ran outside and pummeled a tree until his small fists were torn and bleeding. He went to bed and sobbed for an hour. His mother came in, salved and bandaged his hands, then explained the futility of uncontrolled anger: "He that conquereth his own soul is greater than he who taketh a city." Much later Ike claimed that was "one of the most valuable moments of my life." Five times in 1954 when he was President, there were emotional appeals from his advisers to strike militarily at the troublemakers in Asia. Each time he went off to think, and each time he heard the echo from that day in Abilene. He kept the peace.

He had neither the inclination nor the need to worry about his financial or social status in Abilene. Ike revered an older man, Bob Davis, who taught him how to play poker and how to net fish on the banks of the Smoky Hill River. Davis was illiterate. Ike's best friend was Everett ("Swede") Hazlett, son of an Abilene physician who lived in the affluent part of town. In his exuberance Ike rounded up companions for baseball, football and camping from anyplace. His most famous fistfight was with Wes Merrifield, and according to Ike himself, the fight went more than an hour, ended in a draw when both boys were exhausted. The two got along out of necessity after that.

In war, Ike's magic was to inspire foot soldiers and generals alike, blending English lords with plain Americans, reconciling and focusing the energies of haughty, contentious commanders such as Britain's Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery and the U.S Third Army's General George Patton. Holding the trust of the grandiloquent politicians such as Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt was just as challenging. It took all Ike had and four packs of Camels a day.

In the White House he soothed the sulking Democrats of Capitol Hill. They still smarted over the fact that he had interrupted their party's long grip on the presidency. He won Speaker Sam Rayburn and Senate majority leader Lyndon Johnson to his side as often as not. One evening after plying L.B.J. with Scotch, Ike pointed to his own chair in the Oval Office and said, "Senator, someday you should be in that chair." Johnson roared back to his office in the Capitol wearing that tribute like a battle ribbon.

In this warm and happy memoir there is a shadow, not over Ike's time or his achievements but over the U.S. of today. Jackson talks about it from his corner of Kansas above the Smoky Hill River, the same one that nurtured Ike. Was the unspoiled land and Abilene and the Eisenhower family—and so many others like them in that era—a one-time event in our history, now swept away by excessive wealth, greed, waste, softness and self-pity? Jackson confesses he has no certain answer. But he is worried by what he sees throughout the nation. When he talks about it, he sounds like Ike might sound were he alive.

"The farms, the ranches and the small towns were our sources of decency," says Jackson. "They seeded the cities in Ike's time. Now they are vanishing. Our cultural seed stock came from church, school and the community baseball team. We must now confront the Jeffersonian idea about living in harmony with the land. Is it mere nostalgia, or is it a practical necessity?"

Not long ago, Jackson went to Harvard to lecture, and he asked his audience if the university was educating people "to go home, not necessarily where they came from, but to some place where they can dig in and support meaningful things, not just upward mobility." Jackson got no firm answer, nor did he expect one. He carries the question with him wherever he travels to make people think again about what they may have lost and what they really treasure. He seeks a new generation that can find and grasp the "great and priceless privilege" that Dwight Eisenhower, perhaps the most beloved and respected American of this century, found in Abilene. ■



THE HERO AS A YOUNG MAN; THE GENERAL'S HAT

========== TV MONITOR ==========

*24 THIS MORNING: All nets led with the memorial service of the sailors and Marines who died on the U.S.S. Iwo Jima. CBS interviewed Sen. William Cohen (R-ME), and NBC interviewed Rep. Les Aspin (D-WI) and Sen. John Warner (R-VA) on the probability of war with Iraq. NBC interviewed pol. analyst Norm Ornstein. Ornstein: "Hard-fought, negative and bitter personality contests -- that's a formula for lower turnout."

LAST NIGHT: All nets led with Bush's statements regarding Saddam Hussein and the hostage situation in the Persian Gulf.

I'VE HAD IT UP TO HERE: All networks carried President Bush's response to a question on the Americans held in the Kuwaiti embassy and in Iraq. Bush: "Do you think I'm concerned about it? You're darn right I am. And what am I going to do about it? Let's just wait and see, because I've had it with that kind of treatment of Americans." CNN's Frank Sesno: "The embassy in Kuwait is a focal point and could be a tripwire because [Bush] does not want a repeat of the 1979 takeover in Iran." ABC's Peter Jennings' lead was "the daily exercise of trying to understand President Bush's intentions in the Persian Gulf." Jennings: "Is the president trying harder to convince Saddam Hussein that he should leave Kuwait peacefully, or is he preparing Americans for violence?" NBC's Tom Brokaw: "Is President Bush preparing the American people for U.S. military action or a rescue mission in the Persian Gulf, or is he just trying to rattle Saddam Hussein with his stepped-up tempo of tough talk?" CBS' Dan Rather: "After weeks of playing down the whole issue of Americans trapped in Iraq and Kuwait, President Bush has now suddenly put it on the front burner, and today he turned up the heat." CBS' Wyatt Andrews: "The policy shift is this: A president who, for three weeks, has asked the American people to wait out the sanctions, is now arguing that patience may no longer be a virtue."

GULF POLITICS: NBC's Jim Miklaszewski reported that Bush responded to "speculation that the White House may be turning up the heat on Iraq to take the heat off [himself] and his political problems at home" as "cynical" and "indecent." NBC's John Chancellor compared quotes from the U.S. embassy in Kuwait last week ("lots of food ... mostly tuna") to statements by Bush and WH CoS Sununu this week that Americans in Kuwait are "starving." Chancellor: "Has the tuna fish run out? ... The White House has toughened its language about American hostages. ... Until now, George Bush has been 'Mr. Cool' on that subject. ... It wouldn't be the first time we've heard the sound of rattling sabres just before an election."

CAMPAIGN '90: CNN's Ken Bode predicted that election night will be "a broadcaster's dream and a pollster's nightmare."

========== TV SOUNDBITE ==========

"Park Service now required to charge him for pony rides."
-- David Letterman, on the effect of the new budget on Quayle, NBC, 10/31

11/1/90

Reagan in Gdansk: 'Making the World Anew'

Excerpts from former President Ronald Reagan's address Saturday at the Gdansk Shipyard in Poland:

A little over 200 years ago, two Polish patriots helped us in America make our world anew. My country had just been born. Its guiding idea was that men and women could govern themselves, free of foreign domination or influence. A skeptical world said the experiment would fail, but that did not deter these two men who had already struggled against foreign domination here in Poland.

Thus it was that a brilliant engineer, Thaddeus Kosciusko, and a daring cavalry commander, Casimir Pulaski, joined the American War of Independence and performed heroic deeds. They were among those who made it possible for the fragile flower of democracy to survive and bloom in American soil.

Now, thousands of patriots have been making the world anew once again. I am speaking of all of you here, the men and women of Solidarity who, in just 10 years since the founding of your movement, have brought about the end of communism's stifling embrace.

Never Lost Hope

You have restored Polish independence from outside influence. You have successfully led the struggle for free, open and democratic elections. You have paved the way for a market economy to replace the failed efforts of centralized planning and control. You have triggered vast changes in the political map of Central and Eastern Europe. One might say this is the shipyard that launched a half dozen revolutions!

Today, Solidarity leads the Polish government and the people—and it all began here 10 years ago. Those 10 years brought hardship and heartache for most of you. To some it brought death. It brought obstacles and reversals. But you never lost hope. You stand as proof of the basic human truth that when men and women thirst for freedom and democracy, their thirst will not be quenched until their goal is achieved. You of Solidarity have now achieved it.

But the goal of freedom and democracy was only the first goal to be achieved—a prelude to something even greater: the rejuvenation of your country. You began that process with a bold move on the first of January this year. You eliminated price controls and most subsidies. You replaced the old communist credit system with a monetary system. So far there are a number of positive results:

- You stopped inflation in its tracks and have rolled it back.
- Your stores are filled with goods today and there are no more long lines.
- The black market is a memory.
- Most important for your future foreign trade, you have created the first convertible currency in the former Communist Bloc of countries.

With the bold economic moves you knew there would be some pain. We have a saying, "no pain, no gain."

Still, pain is pain if your buying power has declined or you are out of work. In the U.S. we believe strongly in people helping people. This time, it is our turn to help the new Poland. Here are a few examples:

- Since July, 29 containers of medical supplies from U.S. Department of Defense stocks in Europe have been delivered to Polish hospitals, orphanages and old people's homes. The shipments were organized by a U.S. citizens' group, the Emergency Committee for Aid to Poland.
- Early this year, at the request of your Ministry of Labor, the same U.S. committee arranged for American corporations to contribute 50 tons of specialized infant formula.
- In June, 60 volunteers from the U.S. Peace Corps arrived to teach English.
- Soon, mid-level managers of Polish business enterprises will be able to learn the latest marketing and management practices at a special exchange program at New York University, organized by the Institute for East-West Business Dynamics, a non-profit U.S. group.
- In Cracow, Project Hope, the principal U.S. sponsor of the American Children's Hospital there, is nearing completion of a large ambulatory care center. In the course of its 16-year-old program here in Poland, Project Hope has sponsored visits by nearly 500 Polish medical professionals to the U.S. and visits to Poland by more than 1,600 of Hope's volunteer health-care specialists. And, for the past two years, Project Hope's health economists and policy analysts have worked closely with your Ministry of Health in developing plans for reform of the health-care delivery system.

Just as long as help is wanted, Americans will be there to provide it. In the long run, however, it is you, the people of Poland, who will solve your economic problems through self-help.

I have had a little experience in the matter of economic growth, so I hope you won't mind if I share with you some of what I've learned.

First, there are two schools of thought about how to achieve lasting economic health and growth. One believes you get it only through severe austerity and belt-tightening. The other believes you achieve it by getting government out of the way so that the people themselves can create and find opportunities. I confess that I side with that second school of thought, the one that believes in incentives for growth. We used that approach when my administration took office and it is still working under President Bush's leadership.

"The goal of freedom and democracy was only the first goal to be achieved—a prelude to something even greater: the rejuvenation of your country."

You have done away with price controls, for they create false shortages and inhibit growth. Wage controls thwart growth, too. Do away with wage controls and the more efficient, growth-minded businesses will pay more, attract good people and keep on growing. Inefficient enterprises will either wither and die or find ways to become competitive.

Ownership is another great incentive for economic growth. If you own your own business you will work hard to make it do well. If your customers are satisfied with your goods and services, they will come back. Thus, there is the closest of connections between the effort you put into it and the rewards you get out of it.

Western banks might find it worthwhile to take a good look at including in their plans a fund for lending to small start-up businesses here in Poland. I understand that there is quite a lot of what we call "mattress money" tucked away. If you put a little credit together with a little mattress money, you could open up a great many bakeries, butcher shops, small factories and repair services all over Poland.

The privatization bill recently enacted by your government will reduce the number of state monopolies, and that is good, for they will be replaced by enterprises that must be competitive. As inefficient ones are scaled down or closed, however, the challenge is to find new jobs for workers laid off.

Your current level of unemployment, 5.2%, would not be very worrisome in the West. We have "safety nets," consisting of unemployment compensation insurance, retraining programs and employment placement services for workers who are laid off. I understand the U.S. Department of Labor is working with your Ministry of Labor to create a similar safety net for Polish workers.

Employee Ownership

Meanwhile, what about the workers in those state monopolies that are being put up for sale? I am reminded of a technique for employee ownership that has worked well for many U.S. companies. It goes by various names, but the best known is "Employee Stock Ownership Program," or ESOP. With such a program, the employees create a trust which borrows money from a bank to buy shares of stock in the company. The loan is paid back over several years from the employees' share of the company's profits.

How can they be sure the company will be profitable? The workers, as owners, make sure by insisting that unprofitable or obsolete products be replaced by new ones; that operating costs be kept down; and that new efficiencies of operation are adopted. When a person owns assets he or she will look after them.

When people believe in something, they can make it work. Just as a pair of Polish patriots helped America make the seeds of its democracy flower, so you of Solidarity have planted those same seeds in Poland. You have nurtured them and seen them grow. Now, you have it within you to make them blossom far, far into the future and to bring renewed vigor to your nation.

Advice F

TALES FROM TWO CITIES (II)

MOSCOW

by James P. Pinkerton

If you can't afford a plane ticket to Moscow ($1,100 round trip), rent the movie *Batman*. You'll save about $1,097 and still see a gray city choking on pollution and corruption, where a few heroes fight for truth, justice, and, yes, the American Way. Moscow is a time warp to the *film-noir* forties: before pollution laws, consumer appliances, and Technicolor. It is a city of broad shoulders—and broad faces, and broad bottoms. Bruce Springsteen could write songs about the hard joes in hard jobs, old before their time, who go to work in a silent rage and come home in a drunken stupor to beat their wives. You could call it Gothamgrad. I should know: I saw the movie *and* took the trip.

I had to fly 10,000 miles to realize what an international disaster high-rise public housing has created. In the twenties, Le Corbusier proposed razing Paris to build a "radiant city" of skyscrapers. His millenarian plan to improve people by destroying their neighborhoods was adopted by modernist bureaucrats on a grand scale in the *Soyuz*. From the air, the miles and miles of brutalitarian monoliths arrayed in geometric patterns look pretty, like topiary. Up close they are as intimidating and demoralizing as they are decrepit. I saw enough material for two hours of "60 Minutes": power outages, broken elevators, standing water, piles of rubble, crumbling walls.

In my hotel room I looked around and asked myself, "What's wrong with this picture?" No tub! Not even a shower curtain or a stall—just a spigot. Won't everything get wet? Not to worry: there's a drain in the middle of the floor. The maids "clean" by squeegeeing dirt around, like a kid shuffling his food to convince Mom that he's eaten his Brussels sprouts. I never did see a true mop or sponge, and I mistook my bathroom towels for dishcloths. A Russian woman told me she was most impressed on her trip to America by the cleanness of the carpets. It's easy. All it takes is a vacuum cleaner.

If you are subject to motion sickness, don't look down into the toilet of a Soviet train—the sight of the railroad tracks underneath will undo you. Flushing such a minimalist device in America violates anti-dumping laws. Plumbing in buildings isn't much better. Since the pipe infrastructure can't handle the volume of waste, Soviet sanitary engineers have developed a standby plan: they put a little can next to the potty for—ahem—used toilet paper. This is gross enough—I won't record how I figured this out.

My hotel had a full set of computers at the front desk, but they weren't used. Generally, Soviet ergonomics recalls the glory days of carbon paper, pneumatic tubes, and steno pools. In this bizarro society the clerks see you coming and walk the other way, on the antinomian paradigm that the customer is always wrong. A small example is the restaurant where we breakfasted three mornings in a row. The first morning, the waitress handed us a check. The second, we were told breakfast was complimentary. The third, they said we were not on the list to eat there.

However forewarned one is about the long lines, shopping is a shock and a nightmare. The luxury goods available to ordinary citizens come from . . . Bulgaria. The system fails so completely to transport fresh fruit that it's profitable for farmers to fly 2,000 miles from Central Asia with an armload of cherries to hawk on a Leningrad street. Everyone drinks Pepsi, which is up to Soviet standards—and no higher. The Soviets view carbonation the way Birchers view fluoridation: as a dangerous foreign enemy. I saw items for sale that few Americans have seen since the rationing days of the Second World War—like a gizmo for repairing nylons.

One button I bought pictured Brezhnev, with the caption "King of Stagnation." Another depicted Stalin atop a mountain of skulls and read "King Joseph the Bloody." The best buy, though, is a red-star lapel pin circling a tiny Gerberesque daguerreotype of Lenin as a baby. For 10 kopecks (about a penny), it's a guaranteed conversation-starter back home.

The system has also squandered a rich human inheritance. On Gogolevsky Boulevard, I made a pilgrimage to the Central Chess Club, which is to chess what Ebbets Field was to baseball. Like everything else in Moscow, the building had seen better days: ornate high ceilings rust-colored from water damage, once-thick carpets ground thin by dirt. Yet the club had the glow of old genius and the spark of young prodigy. Anyone wondering why Russians still excel at chess when Soviet power has so successfully stifled most forms of intellectual achievement will find the answer within. Superficially, chess is passive and contemplative, not at all the medium of radicals and daredevils. Yet, under its nerdy surface, chess is dynamic—perpetual perestroika. The stupid, brutal, literal bureaucrats who repressed writers, poets, and musicians never recognized the iconoclasm and intellectual entrepreneurship of chess. The psychic sanctuary of the sixty-four squares sheltered Russian grandmasters, enabling them to dominate world chess even in the darkest years of Stalinism. Perhaps Gary Kasparov, that media-savvy mix of Byron and Einstein, will popularize this silent sport and remind the world of the vast potential of a free *Rus*.

Elaine Kamarck, a fully liberated Democratic activist from New York who would never be confused with a Stepford wife, made the profound observation that the USSR needs a woman's touch. Soviet society clanks along with the grace and sensitivity of a T-34 tank, grinding the feminine aesthetic under its macho tread. Only a minuscule percentage of the population has any decision-making power, and they're almost all men. In fact, the closest analogue to Soviet society in America is the military. I'm all for a strong defense—our troops should patrol the ramparts of freedom, not walk the runways of Seventh Avenue. But imagine a whole country run like the Pentagon: the spontaneity of Ft. Leavenworth, the gastronomic pleasures of C-rations, and the unleashed creativity of Parris Island.

The Soviets are only slowly discovering that men can't think both for themselves and for women. In the West, female purchasing power sets the tone for everyday life: fashion, household goods, interior design, and so on. These "luxuries" are either pitiful or non-existent in the Soviet Union. The total absence of convenience and style in the state economy derives from the lack of a market. Going to Moscow made me see that much of the brightness of Home Sweet Home comes from commercial advertising. Soviet shopkeepers, who don't care if they actually sell anything, settle for monochrome, with an occasional dash of sepia. A typical storefront at a dairy shows a cow; raincoats are signified by a cloud, televisions by bunny ears, etc. This is not a society worried about subliminal seduction.

Meanwhile, Soviet men have created a stern environment, with its own samurai intensity. On a visit to the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier at the Kremlin, I was moved by the words on the plinth: "Your name is unknown but your deeds are immortal." A Soviet battle standard was draped over one edge asymmetrically, as if the soldier had dropped the flag as he fell, and his reverent comrades had bronzed it in place for eternity. Flowers cascaded over the memorial, often left by newlyweds sharing their vows with the spirit of their heroic forefathers.

Other shrines extol the dated proletarianism at the core of the Soviet ideology. The monument to the Soviet space program is shaped like a ski jump pointing into the sun. Friezes show glorious workers, guided by the ghost of Lenin, assaulting the heavens. I saw a couple of women in the scene, but this commemoration exudes testoster-

James P. Pinkerton works in Washington, D.C.

one. Men strain as they sweat and persevere, their muscles bulging under their overalls. Strange that a monument to advanced scientific undertaking should have the appearance of a Depression-era WPA mural dedicated to coal miners. The country abounds with columns, arches, and temples dedicated to the pre-Information Age articles of Bolshevik faith: Agriculture, Heavy Industry, War, and Revolution.

My final observance of the Soviet creed took me to Lenin's tomb. The guards kept the traffic moving, and the wait was shorter than I had expected—about an hour. I walked in, turned left, down the steps, hung a right, and there he was: Lenin, forever in mortuary amber. The forms of fidelity were omnipresent here, but it was hard to find the faithful. Glasnost permitted the Russian people to roll away the stone in front of Lenin's tomb. They discovered that the savior had not risen, that he was still there, physically intact but very much dead.

In 1937, Leonid Chekayev was arrested by the NKVD for opposing the destruction of a church in his hometown in the Urals and sent to Kolyma, an island of slave labor in the Gulag Archipelago near the Arctic Circle. As a typical *zek* working 12-hour shifts in the gold mines, Leonid wore rags in the 50-below winters and lived on bread. His ration left him short thousands of calories a week. Robert Conquest writes: "All in all, these conditions reflected one main truth. In the minds of its creators and organizers the conscious purpose of Kolyma, which had originally been the production of gold, with death as an unplanned by-product, had become the production, with at least equal priority, of gold and death." Nobody knows how much gold was produced at Kolyma, but an estimated three million people died there. Leonid was one of the lucky five percent who came back.

Leonid's daughter Alexandra recalls her late father saying that World War II, with all its carnage, was not nearly as horrendous for the Soviet people as the Stalinist Terror. Although Conquest, Solzhenitsyn, and many others have established that the death tolls were comparable, we cannot judge barbarism with mere arithmetic. Russian literature provides another gauge. In Pasternak's *Dr. Zhivago*, Major Dudorov, a veteran of the Great Patriotic War, recalls " . . . attack after attack, mile after mile of electrified barbed wire, mines, mortars, month after month of artillery barrage. They called our company the death squad . . . and yet . . . all that utter hell was nothing, it was bliss compared to the horrors of the concentration camp." Foreign invasion was preferable to what Pasternak/Dudorov called "the inhuman reign of the lie."

Alexandra's family of four shares three rooms, a kitchen and a toilet with a married couple and their infant. No shower or bath: they use a public facility two blocks away. Alexandra wants a new deal for the Russians, starting with changing the name of her city back to Petrograd, or even St. Petersburg.

How do you get the truth in the *Soyuz*? You can't just pick up the newspaper or turn on CNN. The hottest rumor I heard was that Mary Jo Kopechne had been found, dry and alive, in East Germany. I felt the information deprivation immediately, but as time passed the sensation ebbed, like hunger pangs in the starving. The Iranian earthquake that killed 50,000 barely registered, because I didn't see it on TV.

The crisis of the Soviet spirit is not that they don't believe in anything; it's that, suddenly inundated by the Information Age, they'll believe *everything*. The twisted result of the 70-year cognitive blockade is a nation of high IQs and no judgment. The occult, ESP, and UFOs are as true to them as government grain production reports.

In Leningrad, amid the heroic statuary of the Champs de Mars, a guide told me that the site was dedicated to Alexander II, who had defeated Napoleon. Wait a minute . . . *Wasn't it Alexander I?* I asked meekly. She smiled and said nothing. I turned to the KGB agents who were accompanying us in the back of the bus: Surely, if you flip through *War and Peace*. . . . No answer. And there's a non-Christian faith healer on daytime TV. Russians are pathetically ignorant of their Judeo-Christian heritage: at the Hermitage the guide told us that Rembrandt's "Abraham's Sacrifice" depicts God telling Abraham to kill Isaac to demonstrate his belief in Jesus Christ. People don't merely refuse to believe what the Soviet establishment tells them, they assume the opposite is true: Russian Hell's Angels, sporting *The South Will Rise Again* belt buckles, are absolutely convinced that America was victorious in Vietnam. Their "proof" that we won is that *Pravda* said we lost.

If knowledge is power, the Russians are very weak. Locked behind the Iron Curtain, they have become book-smart—with what books they could get. But any culture that writes—and more importantly, reads—thousand-page novels has a lot of raw intelligence. A lot of them have learned English. Why? Maybe so they could grow up to be Gulag administrators for the Kansas

City *oblast* after the final victory of the workers. Or maybe, in the back of their minds, they knew their god would fail, and English would help them get jobs as door-openers for joint-venturing foreign investors.

The party still controls TV news, but that won't do it any good, because Mike Deaver was right: the images flooding in from the wider and wider world shape opinion much more than words. I didn't understand a word of the powerful Soviet documentary I watched about water pollution, but millions of Russians saw the same spewing pipes and dead birds juxtaposed with bureaucratic talking heads. Other media are even freer: *Moscow News* is a lively rag—a cross between the *Village Voice* and *Human Events*—irreverent, and given to *ad hominem* attacks and exposés of Stalinist atrocities. Its 300,000 circulation could triple if it could get the newsprint. *Moscow Monthly* profiles Gorbachev's advisers, with a picture and bio for each.

Old Soviet leaders are having trouble with the new tricks. Most still orate. Their long spiels are usually well organized and well argued, but they haven't figured out that electronic eloquence consists of snappy sound bites. They have no sense of the camera: how to look, where to look, what to do with their hands.

The smarter Soviet pols play by the new rules. They are giving up their chauffeurs, donating money to buy syringes for AIDS-ravaged hospitals, and going on live TV to take phone calls from viewers. Inevitably, *apparatchiks* cultivate the press, get on the "right" side of the issues, and distance themselves from failure. The media become visible hands. Such tactics seem calculated and familiar to Americans, but Soviet citizens are delighted by them. This is the *vox populi*, known today as feedback. The new interaction must surely shape the outlook of the leaders as well as the led. If you walk the walk and talk the talk, eventually you'll begin to think the think.

On my last day, I couldn't look at another green tomato or brown cold cut. I went to McDonald's. As I waited in line amidst happy Soviets, it occurred to me that the old Bolshevik slogan—"Peace, Land, Bread!"—was finally being realized. And the capitalists had even thrown in meat! I saw smiles and efficiency behind the counter—was this the New Soviet Man that Lenin dreamed of?

As I munched on my Big Mac, I thought about Phil Sokolof, the Nebraska businessman crusading against fast-food fat. Something, perhaps, for overfed Americans to worry about, but Russians are more afraid of hunger than cholesterol. An old Soviet joke held that "Socialism is the road from capitalism to communism—but we didn't say anything about feeding you on the way!" A modern variant says that "Socialism is the tortuous road from capitalism to capitalism." In Moscow, the last stop on the history-ending Hegel Express is the McDonaldland Station. □

To: Everybody

Re: Lunchtime reading

God

BOSTON HERALD
PATRICK J. PURCELL, Publisher
KENNETH A. CHANDLER, Editor
ALAN S. EISNER, Managing Editor
RACHELLE COHEN, Editorial Page Editor

Is the ACLU for real?

The uncanny ability of the American Civil Liberties Union to come down on the wrong side of an issue — and to traduce its own supposed values — is once again on display.

The ACLU is accusing Longmeadow's superintendent of schools, Thomas McGarry, of having violated the constitutional rights of one Charles Riley. We'll tell you what it was McGarry did — but first we'd like you to know what *Riley* did.

In 1977, Riley, of Enfield, Conn., was convicted in a Connecticut court of third-degree sexual assault. In 1979, he was convicted of attempted *first*-degree sexual assault. Though he was sentenced to serve 4-8 years, he was out on parole in six months. (*Et tu*, Connecticut?) Then back in prison in 1982. Arrested in 1984 for attempted sexual assault and kidnapping of a 12-year-old girl. Arrested again in 1989 and convicted of attempted sexual assault of young girls.

The Enfield, Conn., prosecutor says of Riley: "I consider him to be very dangerous and a threat to society — especially young girls. Every police force in town should have his picture posted." Toward that end, Enfield officials notified the police departments in nearby towns when Riley was released a few weeks ago.

When the Longmeadow Police heard that Riley was free, they alerted Superintendent McGarry — who promptly, and properly, acted to alert the parents in his school district. He mailed letters notifying them that a man with a history of sexually menacing young girls was in the area, enclosing a photograph of Riley.

So the ACLU, naturally, is blasting McGarry for violating Riley's rights. According to its addled reading of the Constitution, school officials are required to keep mum when child molesters are in the neighborhood.

The ACLU has become such a parody of itself that it seems almost a waste of time to describe its increasingly bizarre antics. A responsible, thoughtful civil liberties union would be a welcome participant in the public discourse. It's a pity the ACLU doesn't fit that bill.

RUSH!

Executive Memorandum

The Heritage Foundation

214 Massachusetts Avenue N.E. Washington, D.C. 20002 (202)546-4400

8/23/90

Number 279

HOW TO DEFEAT IRAQ

America may be getting ready to go to war in the Middle East. In the fastest military buildup in history, the United States is moving into position near Iraq: an entire Marine Expeditionary Force of 50,000; parts of at least two tank-laden Army mechanized divisions; four aircraft carriers; and Air Force fighters, bombers, and ground-attack aircraft from the venerable B-52 bomber to the ultra modern radar-evading F-117A stealth fighter.

This military buildup should bring to mind the lessons of history. The Vietnam War taught the U.S. that slow-motion military escalation does not impress a determined opponent, and that putting unnecessary political constraints on the military will lead to defeat. Vietnam also taught that using military force for murky political objectives and without any clearcut idea of victory undermines public support and saps the morale of U.S. fighting forces. Unlike Vietnam, military force was used swiftly and decisively in Grenada, Libya, and Panama and was successful each time. Iraq is a tougher foe, but the principle still stands. George Bush and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Colin Powell appear to have learned well the lessons of recent history, particularly the Vietnam War.

If there is to be war with Iraq, America's rapid military buildup provides the force to strike fast, fight hard, and win. Bush said plainly on August 8 that U.S. objectives are to protect Saudi Arabia and to force the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. If it comes to war, two other objectives should be added: Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein's fall and replacement with a more moderate leadership, and the destruction of Iraq's ability to wage modern warfare. These objectives are necessary not only to protect American security interests, but to fulfill the United Nations mandate "...to bring the invasion and occupation of Kuwait to an end and to restore sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity to Kuwait." If war comes, Kuwait will never be safe unless the rule and power of Saddam Hussein is destroyed. Anything short of this could lead to a protracted struggle with unclear objectives and uncertain public and congressional support.

Issuing An Ultimatum. Several events could require a U.S. military response: if American hostages are harmed; if Iraq attempts to undermine or invade Saudi Arabia or Jordan; or if Iraq fires on any U.S. forces. But Saddam is calculating. He may not provide the U.S. with a clearcut reason for military action. He may prefer instead to play the waiting game in hopes that he will be able to rally Arab support, particularly among the Palestinian Arabs in Jordan, and break the solid front of international support for sanctions against him. If Bush sees that the blockade is not working and Saddam is succeeding, and that time is starting to work against the U.S., he would be justified in issuing an ultimatum to Saddam to release American hostages and withdraw from Kuwait, or face war.

Under any of these circumstances, Bush's military action should be decisive. He should ask Congress for a declaration of war against Iraq. This will galvanize public opinion and free Bush's hand to fight on whatever terms he sees fit. He should use as much force as necessary to bring the crisis to a quick and successful conclusion with minimal loss of American lives. And he should let the Iraqi government know that any official or military officer who is involved in harming hostages or ordering the use of chemical weapons will be brought before a war crimes tribunal as Nazi offenders were at Nuremberg after World

War II. The U.S. cannot afford militarily or politically to become bogged down in a protracted land war on the Arabian peninsula.

Fighting to win. America's major advantages in a war against Iraq are its air power and ability to strike deep inside Iraqi territory, including Baghdad. American, Israeli, and other intelligence sources have identified most of these. If given the leeway, U.S. military commanders are likely to use air power based on aircraft carriers and on the ground in Saudi Arabia and surrounding countries to achieve the following:

Objective #1: Destroy the Iraqi Air Force on the ground and in the air. Also targeted for destruction should be Iraqi short-range ballistic *Scud B* missiles, which may be armed with chemical warheads, ground-based anti-ship *Silkworm* missiles, and the tiny Iraqi navy; these strikes would give the U.S. control of the air and the sea.

Objective #2: Annihilate key strategic targets in Iraq including chemical weapon production plants, nuclear research facilities, and ballistic missile research facilities; this would destroy Iraq's capability to threaten its neighbors – and eventually the U.S. – with weapons of mass destruction.

Objective #3: Target the Iraqi civilian and military leadership, including Saddam himself, until a leader comes to the fore who is willing to negotiate peace on U.S. terms.

Objective #4: Strike key psychological targets, such as electrical generation plants serving Baghdad, to bring home to the Iraqi people the futility of Saddam's policies; avoid strikes against civilian targets, to press home that America's quarrel is with Saddam and the Iraqi government, not the Iraqi people.The air campaign against Iraq should not subside until Iraq has given in to U.S. demands.

This may be enough to bring the Iraqi government to its knees, but if not, the U.S. then can focus the offensive on the Iraqi army. With Iraqi planes grounded, the Iraqi army is open to air attack by U.S. A-10 *Thunderbolt* ground-attack and other jets. Round-the-clock air attacks can cut off most fuel, food, and water to the Iraqi army in Kuwait, immobilizing Iraqi forces. If the Iraqis go on the offensive into Saudi Arabia, they will become even more vulnerable to air strikes as they leave defensive positions and spread out across the open desert. Counter-attacks by highly mobile Marine and Army forces at the flanks and rear of the Iraqi army in Kuwait, combined with actions to slow any Iraqi advances into Saudi Arabia, should halt offensive Iraqi operations, and send the Iraqi army retreating to within its own borders.

Stopping A Menace. America inevitably will pay a heavy price for war against Iraq. Even if the Pentagon is given free reign to fight as it sees fit, hundreds or even more than one thousand GIs still may lose their lives. As tragic, so will a number of U.S. hostages held by Iraq. Some countries may turn against the U.S. But these costs must be measured against the price of appeasement. Saddam is a menace. If he succeeds in his aggression, he will have demonstrated that America cannot protect its own interests and those of the West in the Middle East. He will emerge encouraged in his aggressive course, and stronger politically and militarily. He will continue his programs to develop nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and the next time he strikes he could have missiles capable of attacking American cities with these weapons. He will continue his expansionist ways, controlling Kuwait, probably someday Jordan as well, and he would exercise tremendous influence over Saudi Arabia. He will control much of the world's oil. And he surely will have split the Arab alliance against him, creating greater hostility in the Middle East against the U.S. and Israel, and making an Arab-Israeli War more likely. If he is not stopped, the price to America and its friends and allies will be tremendously greater than the cost of war against Iraq today.

So far, Bush has handled the crisis flawlessly. His decisive action has given him widespread public support. If he proves as decisive in war, America can win quickly and bring its troops home in victory.

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THE WASHINGTONIAN AUGUST 1990 Pg. 78

WHY TRUMAN DROPPED THE BOMB

It Was the Most Terrible Weapon Ever Devised, and No One Knew What Its Effects Would Be. But the New President Didn't Hesitate.

By Victor Gold

Single Atomic Bomb Shakes Japan With Force Mightier Than 20,000 Tons of TNT to Launch New Era of Power

—banner headline, *Washington Post*, August 7, 1945

On the day Special Bombing Mission Number 13 took off from Tinian Island, headed for the Japanese city of Hiroshima, the weather forecast in Washington, DC, called for hot and humid, temperatures in the mid-80s.

It was a typical August day in the nation's capital. The movie houses were filled from noon to midnight with Washingtonians trying to beat the heat in what was advertised as "air-cooled comfort." At the Metropolitan theater, on F Street near 10th, Bette Davis in *The Corn Is Green* was going into its second week. For those looking for mental as well as physical escape, the Capitol theater at F and 14th had Clark Gable and Loretta Young in Jack London's Alaskan melodrama *Call of the Wild*. Onstage at the Capitol was John Calvert, billed as "the Famous Magician," who would be followed later in the week by another live act, the less-famous young comic, Jackie Gleason.

Everybody who was anybody—with the exception of Secretary of War Henry Stimson, Army Chief of Staff George Marshall, and Major General Leslie Groves, director of the top-secret Manhattan Project—was out of town. The president and secretary of state were somewhere in the Atlantic, returning from their meeting with British and Soviet leaders in Potsdam, Germany. The wartime Washington Senators, half a game behind the Detroit Tigers in the American League pennant race, were on a train headed for Chicago, first stop on a western road trip. With the 79th Congress in summer recess, Capitol Hill staffers and lobbyists had headed for seaside resorts like Virginia Beach, close by the naval air station where VT-153, a Navy torpedo bomber group that included Lieutenant j.g. George Bush, was gearing up for operations Olympic and Coronet, the two-stage invasion of Japan expected to begin in the fall.

"Everything I'd experienced in my year and a half of combat in the Pacific told me it was going to be the bloodiest, most prolonged battle of the war," Bush would later write. "Japan's war leaders were unfazed by massive raids on Tokyo. They seemed bent on national suicide, regardless of the cost of human life."

Most Americans, both in and outside the armed services, shared Bush's view of the brutal fighting that lay ahead. The Japanese had put up a suicidal, no-surrender defense of Iwo Jima and Okinawa. Would they do anything less in defending their home islands?

The bomb you are going to drop is something new in the history of warfare. It is the most destructive weapon ever produced. We think it will knock out almost everything within a three-mile radius.

—Captain William (Deke) Parsons, Manhattan Project weapons expert, briefing the members of Special Bombing Mission Number 13, August 4, 1945

Aboard the USS *Augusta* in the Atlantic, President Harry S Truman was eating lunch in the enlisted men's mess when news came that Special Bombing Mission Number 13 had delivered its cargo. The message, from Secretary of War Stimson in Washington, read in part:

BIG BOMB DROPPED ON HIROSHIMA. . . . FIRST REPORTS INDICATE COMPLETE SUCCESS.

Truman, only four months on the job as president, pushed his plate aside and turned to the officer who handed him the message. "This," he said, "is the greatest thing in history." Baffled, the sailors around the table glanced at one another. Moments later a second message arrived:

HIROSHIMA BOMBED VISUALLY. . . . NO FIGHTER OPPOSITION AND NO FLAK. PARSONS REPORTS 15 MINUTES AFTER DROP AS FOLLOWS: "RESULTS CLEAR-CUT SUCCESSFUL IN ALL RESPECTS. VISIBLE EFFECTS GREATER THAN IN ANY TEST. . . .

The president read the message, then got up and walked across the mess to the table where Secretary of State James Byrnes was sitting. He showed it to Byrnes, then picked up a fork and rapped it against a glass. As the room fell silent, he held up the message for everyone to see. "I've just received confirmation from Washington," said the president, "that we've completed a successful bombing mission at Hiroshima, an important Jap army base. One bomb was dropped, an *atomic* bomb, with more power

Although dialogue has in some places been reconstructed for dramatic purpose, this historical narrative is based on actual events. Mary M. Hegarty contributed editorial and research assistance.

cetera. Like the myth of the "enterprise family," the wartime slogan "one-hundred-million hearts beating as one" was an illusive goal rather than a description of reality, and this internal tension and competitiveness is as important as any other legacy to the postwar years. It helps explain both high levels of achievement and what often appears to be indecisive and even two-faced behavior, especially in the international arena in recent years. The curious image that Japan has acquired in the 1980s of being a powerful but seemingly decapitated state, especially when it comes to assuming the responsibilities that should accompany economic eminence, can be partly explained by this internal conflict.

Many observers would agree that nationalism and a paternalistic elitism have held this brokered capitalism together ideologically since the war. If this is so, then what can we say about postwar Japanese democracy? We can say that this too has been brokered, in ways that respect the form but frequently kill the spirit of democracy. The intellectual and ideological legacy of the war is blatantly contradictory in Japan. Without question, there is a radical legacy in the form of antimilitarist sentiments and cynicism toward authority at the popular level. That much of the "democratization" agenda of the early postsurrender years has survived to the present day, as exemplified in the liberal "peace constitution," is testimony to popular support for democratic ideals. Had the conservative elites had their way, the early postwar reforms would have been jettisoned more extensively. Yet, at the same time, regimentation and susceptibility to rather crass indoctrination are also conspicuous legacies of the war. "Loyalty" to the firm and "sacrifice" for the country remain effective appeals. In some instances, acquiescence to these ideals may reflect a real sense of reciprocal obligation; in many instances, it reflects plain weariness and existential resignation on the part of the average citizen. Whatever the case, the ethic of self-denial has depended on the maintenance—even the reinvention—of immense pressures ranging from carefully nurtured social taboos to overtly paramilitary rituals such as company drills and "boot-camp training." As international tensions arise in response to Japan's new economic eminence and economic nationalism, moreover, more strident ideological legacies of the war years have emerged in the form of disturbing neonationalist appeals to the homogeneity and superiority of the "Yamato race."

The nature of Japan's brokered postwar democracy is a subject that still awaits its historian. In suggestive ways, however, it returns us to an observation made at the outset of this essay, namely, the resonance between Japan's mid-nineteenth-century transition from feudalism to industrialization and "Westernization," and its mid-twentieth-century transition from war to peace. In both cases, far-reaching and even revolutionary transformations took place. And in both cases, these were revolutions "from above." Where democratic ideals are not defined by and won by the general populace, they are relatively weak. From the perspective of Japan's civil elites, this too was a useful legacy of the war.

TRUMAN...CONTINUED

Roosevelt White House. As vice president, he was considered a creature of Capitol Hill whose job was merely to preside over the Senate. He visited 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue infrequently. But now, for better or worse, Harry Truman was The Chief.

When the brief meeting ended, the Cabinet members filed out, except for Secretary of War Stimson, who had something on his mind.

"Mr. President," said Stimson. Truman, startled by the title, swung around, half expecting to find that FDR had entered the room. "I'd like a few minutes of your time, Mr. President, to discuss—"

Stimson paused, rubbing his trim mustache, searching for words.

"Yes?" said Truman, knowing that if Henry Stimson had something he wanted to say privately, it must be important. A public servant of the old school, the war secretary wasn't one to waste time. He had served as secretary of state in Herbert Hoover's Cabinet and was called back to duty by FDR to muffle his Republican foreign-policy critics. A starch-collared Tory, Stimson wasn't the sort Harry Truman would invite to a bourbon-and-poker session, but he was a man with an unbending honor code, one Truman knew he could trust.

"Little Boy," the atomic bomb used to destroy Hiroshima, was ten feet long, weighed 9,000 pounds, and had the explosive power of 20,000 tons of TNT. Dropped by the B-29 bomber *Enola Gay* from an altitude of 32,000 feet, the device exploded 660 yards above the ground, leveling four square miles of the city.

"Mr. President," Stimson was saying, "if you'll recall, about a year ago, when your Senate committee was about to investigate certain military expenditures at Oak Ridge, Tennessee—"

"You asked me to call off my investigator because it was a top-secret program," said Truman. "Yes, I remember. And I called off the investigation, didn't I?"

Stimson nodded. "The program is coded S-1," said the war secretary, "otherwise known as the Manhattan Project."

"Manhattan Project?"

"It's a scientific-military project," said Stimson. "Very few people know about it, even in the military."

"I see," said the president, rubbing his thick-lensed glasses with his handkerchief. "And what exactly is there to know? Is it one of those rockets like the Germans are using on London?"

"It's a new kind of bomb," replied Stimson, "with unimaginable explosive power."

"Well, Mr. Secretary," said the pres-

Star Tribune
MINNEAPOLIS
JULY 16, 1990 Pg. 12A

Lies and radioactivity from government

Residents of Washington and Oregon who live downwind of the Hanford Nuclear Reservation have reason to be more than angry with the federal government; they have reason to be outraged to the depth of their beings.

Energy Secretary James Watkins publicly acknowledged last week that during the 1940s and 1950s government officials and contractors building nuclear weapons at Hanford put at risk the health of thousands of nearby civilians, the "downwinders." The largest risk was to babies and young children of downwinder families.

The risk was not accidental; nor was it the result of ignorance. In refining plutonium for nuclear weapons, the Hanford facilities deliberately released large amounts of radioactive iodine into the air. Between 1944 and 1955, the release totaled more than 500,000 curies. Millions more curies were flushed into the waters of the Columbia River. By comparison, the nuclear accident at Three Mile Island released 14 curies. In their water, food and air, residents of the Hanford area absorbed more radiation over a longer period than any known group of people in the world, according to one radiation specialist.

And while the radioactive iodine was going from air to grass, then milk and finally to human thyroid glands, especially in young children, the officials running Hanford were proclaiming that their operations were environmentally clean and safe. The officials knew differently. They lied.

Researchers now estimate that between 1944 and 1947, radiation absorbed by 13,700 people living in the Hanford vicinity exceeds by 1,200 times the amount now considered safe for civilians living near nuclear facilities. Worse, an undetermined number of children absorbed 120,000 times the level of radiation currently judged safe.

Establishing links between that long-ago radiation and illnesses suffered by specific individuals would be difficult. It shouldn't be necessary. Having grossly victimized the downwinders once, the federal government should now move to compensate those who may have been harmed — beginning with anyone from the area who has suffered thyroid disorders. The government should assume responsibility, not require that it be proved.

Energy Secretary Watkins is a straight shooter. He didn't cause this mess, but is responsible for cleaning it up. He can start by advocating compensation for its victims — the Hanford downwinders — and by giving them something omitted from last week's statement: an apology.

TRUMAN...CONTINUED

in 20,000 tons of TNT."

Truman paused to let his words sink in. "What this means," he said, a broad smile on his face as he looked around the room, "is that the war's going to be over a lot sooner than we expected."

Now the crew members of the *Augusta* were on their feet, cheering. Clutching the message in one hand and his secretary of state's elbow in the other, the man who had made the final decision to drop the bomb hustled out of the mess, headed for the officers' wardroom to repeat his announcement. "We've been traveling long enough, Jimmy," he said. "It's time we got on home."

At the Pentagon, Major General Leslie Groves was working on the stub of a cigar, regaling his subordinates with stories about the trials and tribulations of dealing with "scientific double-domes," when an unexpected visitor walked in.

"General Marshall," said Groves, getting to his feet and dismissing his aides. "Great news, eh? I understand from Stimson that the president's doing somersaults."

George Marshall, the Army chief of staff, held out his hand. A man of daunting reserve, he was a military adviser considered indispensible by two presidents, Franklin Roosevelt and now Harry Truman. "Congratulations," said Marshall as the ebullient Groves pumped his arm vigorously. "You've done a magnificent job."

The chief of staff took a seat and began picking at a thread on his trouser leg. Groves, familiar with Marshall's style, sat down and waited.

"I saw the first draft of your proposed statement for the president," said Marshall.

"And?"

"Do we have any estimates from Tinian," Marshall asked, "on the extent of Japanese casualties?"

Groves had begun his day on top of the world, but now he was irritated. Crusty, headstrong, given to biting sarcasm, the director of the Manhattan Project studied his cigar stub and considered his reply. "No estimates," he finally said. "We didn't get any, and, the last I heard, the Japs hadn't given us any."

Marshall, having dealt with Groves since the Manhattan Project got under way in 1942, ignored the insubordination. He considered Groves, like George Patton, an eccentric whose quirks were tolerable as long as the man produced results and didn't get too far out of line.

"I think we have to be careful," replied Marshall evenly, "not to make the president sound too gratified, as if he's crowing, when Japanese casualties are in the tens, possibly the hundreds of thousands."

"*Jap* casualties?" said Groves, his voice rising. He was more than irritated now; he was angry. "Hiroshima is a military target, General, headquarters for the enemy's southern army command."

"I understand that," said Marshall, standing to leave. "But we know there'll also be civilian casualties."

Groves, his face flushed, rose from his chair and ground out his cigar. "I'll tell you straight, General," he said. "When I drafted that statement I wasn't thinking about Jap casualties. I was thinking about the poor bastards who died on the Bataan death march."

"I'll tell you straight, General," Groves said. "When I drafted that statement I wasn't thinking about Jap casualties. I was thinking about the poor bastards who died on the Bataan death march."

In May 1942, some 10,000 American and Philippine prisoners of war had died from starvation, disease, clubbings, and bayonet executions in what came to be known as the Bataan death march. This occurred at the same time that civilians in Manila were being brutalized—men beheaded, women raped—by members of the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy. The official Japanese view was that their country's war against the Americans and British was a racial conflict; Filipinos who allied themselves with the "white intruders" were traitors to their Asian heritage.

Three months earlier the Japanese military had pursued the same ruthless pattern in conquering Malaya. After his troops had pillaged the city, General Tomoyuki Yamashita boasted, "In Singapore, when asked the terms of surrender by the enemy commander, I simply pointed to the document and said, 'Sign here.' I intend to give the same order to the President of the United States at the White House in Washington."

Bataan . . . Manila . . . Singapore . . . Pearl Harbor. But even before the surprise attack on Hawaii, American attitudes toward their enemy in the Far East were being shaped by stories and film of Japanese atrocities in China. There had been the "rape of Nanking" by Japanese troops, with more than 200,000 Chinese civilians slaughtered in 1937; Japan's indiscriminate bombing and strafing of "open cities" in China; the disregard for human life—not only the lives of others but their own as well—shown by Japanese troops and officers under the semi-religious "samurai" code. The "Japs" were a different kind of enemy from any the American people had ever come up against.

These were the attitudes and images that Harry Truman, the consummate Middle American, brought with him when he became president on April 12, 1945. Within moments of being sworn in by Chief Justice Harlan Stone, Truman called his first Cabinet meeting.

"I need every one of you," the new president said, scanning the stunned, sorrowful faces of Franklin Roosevelt's Cabinet. For twelve years they had known only one president. It would take time to get used to the idea that "The Chief" was gone and someone else was sitting in his place. "My aim, and I know it's yours," he continued, "is to see that President Roosevelt's policies are carried out exactly as he planned."

The sentiment was fine, but as everyone in the room understood, Truman knew little about the operation of the

TRUMAN...CONTINUED

ident, slipping his glasses back on. "I have a lot to learn and I'd say knowing more about this new bomb is lesson number one."

With Nazi resistance collapsing, Truman's attention the first days of his presidency turned to the shaping of postwar Europe. Trouble was brewing with Russia over Stalin's refusal to permit free elections in Poland. And plans for the United Nations—the international organization Roosevelt saw as the key to world peace—were being worked out at a conference in San Francisco. Nearly two weeks went by before Stimson, along with General Groves, met with the president to go into detail about the "new bomb."

The meeting took place in the Oval Office at noon, April 25. Stimson opened by reading a memorandum aimed at getting Truman's attention. "Within four months," it began, "we shall in all probability have completed the most terrible weapon ever known in human history, one bomb of which could destroy a whole city." The bomb's power, Stimson continued, came from "splitting the atom." Scientists in other countries knew the theory of atomic energy, but only the US had the resources to build the bomb.

When Stimson finished, he and Groves handed Truman a report covering the history of the Manhattan Project and the basic principles of nuclear energy. Truman glanced at the cover of the report and said he'd read it later.

"With due respect, Mr. President," said Groves, "you ought to read it *now*."

Stimson nodded in agreement. The most important issue facing America, said the war secretary, was whether and how it used its monopoly on atomic power. Truman, his mind on a heated exchange he'd just had with Stalin's foreign minister, was in no mood to plow through a 24-page scientific document. But he respected Stimson's judgment, so he began plowing.

The atomic bomb is shit. . . . It will make a big bang—a very big bang—but it is not a weapon which is useful in war.

—J. Robert Oppenheimer, Manhattan Project director of operations, quoted by Peter Wyden in *Day One*

Germany surrendered on May 8, but the celebration around the Truman White House was brief. Advice was coming in to the new president from all parts of the foreign-policy establishment on how to deal with the Russians and the quickest way to end the war in the Pacific.

On June 1 the Interim Committee, a select group named by the president to counsel him on atomic matters, unanimously recommended that if the A-bomb test scheduled near Alamogordo, New Mexico, in mid-July proved successful, the bomb should be used on a military target in Japan. There was no consensus on whether the Japanese should be warned ahead of time or the bomb should just be dropped and a demand made afterward for unconditional surrender.

Admiral Leahy didn't believe in an A-bomb option. "The damn fool thing isn't going to work," he snapped.

There was also a high-level dispute as to whether the United States should use the term "unconditional surrender" in dealing with the Japanese government. Some of Truman's advisers thought the US ought to give the Japanese some face-saving way to claim "peace with honor." But when Winston Churchill used that phrase, Truman snapped, "The Japs lost any honor they had at Pearl Harbor."

A few presidential advisers insisted that it wasn't necessary to use the A-bomb. The enemy could be blockaded and brought to its knees through conventional bombing. Still others, including Admiral William Leahy, didn't really believe Truman had an A-bomb option.

"The damn fool thing isn't going to work," snapped Leahy. "I say this as a lifetime expert on explosives."

Truman listened to all these arguments, then turned to George Marshall.

"What do you think, General?" he asked. "Can we finish them off with a blockade and conventional bombing?"

"It didn't work in Germany," replied Marshall. "We leveled their cities, cut off their supplies, and it still took ground forces to finish the job."

"What do you estimate it'll take?" Truman asked.

The initial assault on Kyushu Island, said Marshall, quoting a study by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, would require over three-quarters of a million men. A later assault on Honshu Island would take at least another quarter-million.

Truman nodded, then cleared his throat. "Any estimates," he said, "on casualties?"

"We estimate there are 2 million Japanese troops on the home islands," Marshall replied. "Seventeen divisions on Kyushu alone. About 5,000 planes on stand-by for kamikaze attacks on our ships." Marshall turned a page in the Joint Chiefs' report. "On Okinawa," he said, "going up against 170,000 enemy defenders, we lost 41,000 men—about 35 percent of our attacking force."

"I'm familiar with those figures, General," said Truman, "but you still haven't answered my question."

"On land and sea," said Marshall, "based on our Okinawa experience"—he paused, looked down the conference table, then at his commander-in-chief—"we'll lose, at a minimum, half-a-million men."

Even the scientific community that developed the bomb was sending mixed signals to Truman. The three physicists who were members of the Interim Committee—Vannevar Bush, James Conant, and Karl Compton—favored dropping the bomb on Japan if necessary to win the war. But other prominent scientists, including Leo Szilard, opposed direct military use, arguing in favor of a "demonstration" of the bomb's power on an uninhabited island.

Szilard, a key figure on the Manhattan Project, had joined Albert Einstein in bringing the potential of atomic energy to President Roosevelt's attention in October 1939. Now, six years later, he was convinced that using the bomb on a Japanese target would be morally wrong.

"Would it be more moral to end up with half-a-million American casualties and millions of Japanese dead from conventional bombing?" the president asked.

Harry Truman had had it "up to here," as he told Secretary of State James Byrnes, with "moralists sitting in the grandstands." Byrnes was briefing Truman on Szilard's views while the president was taking his morning constitutional on the deck of the USS *Augusta*, en route to meeting Churchill and Stalin at Potsdam.

"Someone even suggested that I warn the Japs ahead of time exactly where and when we intended to drop the bomb," Truman continued. "I said, 'Fine, but what about the pilot who flies the plane? Who'll explain to his family that he was shot down because his damn fool president told the enemy he was coming?' "

Truman was striding across the ship's deck at the same brisk pace he maintained when taking his morning walk down Pennsylvania Avenue. Byrnes was struggling to keep up.

"Well," said the breathless secretary of state, "there's really no decision to make until we find out if we've even got a bomb. If the test at Alamogordo doesn't go right—"

"If it doesn't, the next two weeks are going to be the most miserable I've ever spent," said Truman.

The president stopped walking and turned to face Byrnes. "Jimmy," he said, "I hate making this damn trip. I'm

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not one to whine, but I'd be better prepared to handle Stalin if the people around Roosevelt had let me know what was going on."

Byrnes's face reddened. He, after all, had been in on every White House foreign-policy decision since 1940.

"That's why I made you secretary of state, Jimmy," Truman quickly added, realizing he'd embarrassed his old Senate colleague. "You've got the foreign-policy experience we need at Potsdam. You were with Roosevelt at Yalta. You know the tricks these birds have up their sleeves."

The president looked out at the blue-green waters of the Atlantic. Byrnes, sensing his mood, said, "Don't worry, Harry, you'll do fine. You Missouri country boys—"

"Tell me, Jimmy," Truman broke in, "why did the old man make a secret deal with the bastard at Yalta?"

"Secret deal?"

"The Kurile Islands," said Truman. "I just found out about it two days ago. Stalin gets the Kuriles as a down payment for entering the war against Japan. Why?"

"You've heard Marshall's casualty estimates," replied Byrnes. "If we have to invade, we'll need all the help we can get. Stalin can pin down a million enemy troops in Manchuria, then send in a million of his own to help us take Japan."

"And stay there permanently as an occupying force," said Truman. "You know the problem we face in Europe, Jimmy. The takeover in Poland and eastern Europe, the broken promises. If we end up with a divided Japan—"

"When we made the deal at Yalta," said Byrnes, "we were thinking about American lives. We didn't know how far along Groves had come on the A-bomb. As a matter of fact—"

"You don't have to say it," said Truman, holding up his hand. "We still don't know. If the test at Alamogordo is a dud, there's no alternative. We'll need the Russians to cut our own casualties, and whatever it takes, I've got to get them into the war in the Pacific."

"Exactly," said Byrnes. "Now you understand what we were up against at Yalta."

"I understand," said Harry Truman. "I'd have done the same thing. The only difference is"—the president grinned—"I'd have let my vice president know."

Now I know what happened to Truman yesterday. I couldn't understand it. When he got to the meeting after having read this report he was a changed man. He told the Russians just where they got on and off and generally bossed the whole meeting.

—Winston Churchill, after reading the Groves Report on the success of the July 16 A-bomb test at Alamogordo

The only question left after Alamogordo was where and when to use the bomb. Hiroshima, as the key port and nerve center of Japanese military operations in southern Japan, was the obvious first target. But Truman delayed a final decision until Tokyo had a chance to respond to the Potsdam Proclamation warning of the "utter destruction of the Japanese homeland" unless the enemy surrendered unconditionally.

"Tell me, Jimmy," Truman broke in, "why did the old man make a secret deal with the bastard at Yalta?"

Japan Officially Turns Down Allied Surrender Ultimatum

—*New York Times* headline, July 30, 1945

On the last day of the Potsdam conference, Truman took Stalin aside. The Soviet leader, as he later told his foreign minister, V.M. Molotov, expected the American to try to pin him down on the date Russia would enter the war against Japan. Instead, Truman informed Stalin that America had "a new weapon of unusual destructive force." Stalin merely nodded and said, "Fine. I hope you use it against the Japanese."

On the morning of August 4, 1945, American planes dropped nearly three-quarters of a million leaflets on Hiroshima, warning residents that their city faced destruction unless their government surrendered at once. A million leaflets carrying a similar message were dropped on Tokyo. The warning was ignored. At 8:15 AM, August 6, the B-29 bomber *Enola Gay*, piloted by Colonel Paul Tibbets Jr., dropped the world's first atomic bomb on Hiroshima, killing 100,000 people immediately. Another 100,000 were to die from radioactive aftereffects.

In the 24 hours following the Hiroshima raid, President Harry Truman, headed home aboard the *Augusta*, watched and waited while renewed appeals were made for Japan's surrender.

In Tokyo, Prime Minister Kantoro Suzuki, after notifying Emperor Hirohito of his intention, called an emergency meeting of the Japanese cabinet on August 9. "I have concluded," he said, "that our only alternative is to accept the Potsdam Proclamation and terminate the war. I would like to hear your opinions on this."

No one spoke up. Then, after another request for opinions, three military men in the cabinet objected to any talk of surrender. When a junior officer entered the cabinet room a few minutes later and reported that a second A-bomb had been dropped on the city of Nagasaki, Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo again asked for consideration of the Potsdam offer. Instead, War Minister General Korechika Anami called for total mobilization of both military and civilian forces to fight one last battle on the Tokyo plains.

"We will inflict severe losses on the enemy when he invades Japan," said Anami. He paused to let his final words register with Suzuki and others in the room who favored surrender. "In any case," said the war minister, "our men will simply refuse to lay down their arms. They know they are forbidden to surrender. There is really no alternative for us but to continue the war."

Even after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Japanese cabinet was deadlocked. Only the emperor could make the final decision.

I cannot bear to see my innocent people suffer any longer. Ending the war is the only way to restore world peace and to relieve the nation from the terrible distress with which it is burdened.

—Hirohito to the Japanese Supreme Council, August 9, 1945

The emperor had decided, but the argument still wasn't over. Key leaders in the Japanese military hoped to continue the war. On the night of August 14, junior officers of the Konoye Division attempted to kidnap the emperor in preparation for a suicide defense of the homeland. The coup narrowly failed.

On August 9, the Soviet Union, realizing that the war was coming to an end, invaded Manchuria. Under the terms of the secret Roosevelt-Stalin protocol of Yalta, this guaranteed the cession of the Kurile Islands to Russia. But when the Soviets also demanded the right to share in the military occupation of postwar Japan, their demands were rejected by President Truman and Supreme Occupation Commander Douglas MacArthur.

Oppenheimer told me he had blood on his hands. I told him, "All you did, Professor, was make the bomb. I'm the guy who made the decision to drop it. And if American lives were on the line and I had to make the same decision again, I'd make it [snaps fingers] like that."

—President Harry Truman to Dean Acheson, 1947 □

OUTLOOK

of Silence

the dark of night on March 5, 1980. Years later, he—aided by then-Speaker Wright and House Democratic whip Tony Coelho—helped weaken legislation that would have solved the crisis at an early date. They had plenty of accomplices, many of them lathered with the $11.7 million in 10 years of thrift-industry campaign contributions documented in the Common Cause study.

Fraud no doubt made things worse, but here some distinctions need to be made. If Charles Keating and other S&L operators steered thrift assets for personal use, that's fraud and should be punished. But the key point is that Mr. Keating and others could flourish because the system staked them the taxpayer guarantee of deposit insurance. Even without committing fraud, they had the legal right to speculate on risky loans because they had this giant subsidy. In a phrase that should be repeated again and again, their risk was "socialized" on all of us.

Neil Bush's problems, on the other hand, appear to be of a different sort. As a director of the Silverado thrift, he had a normal fiduciary duty to shareholders. The federal civil suit that may yet be brought against him would be for neglecting that fiduciary duty, not for any fraud. Neil Bush's apparent conflict of interest is that as director he voted to approve loans to a business partner. There is no need to condone this, but unless one is operating solely at the level of political opportunism, Neil Bush does not appear to symbolize the thrift debacle.

Nonetheless, the mythology of "fraud" will build until George Bush explains to the country what really caused the thrift crisis. If he doesn't, Senator Howard Metzenbaum will continue to make things worse by attacking those willing to buy failed thrifts that end up in government hands. His extraordinary one-day inquisition last week sent a message that any thrift buyer can someday expect to appear before his committee. In retrospect, it's clear that the biggest mistake of the Bush presidency has been failing to educate the public about the thrift debacle's roots when it first proposed its bailout legislation. Even 18 months later, the Treasury still has nothing to say about deposit insurance, while Democrats are circling around the president's son. All of us—and Mr.

Keep the Republican

By Peggy Noonan

I have been asked to speak about what Republicans are, and what we must be in the future—not only in order to win, but to lead wisely and justly. I can remember what we were, once, back in the mists of the past.

I was born in the Democratic precincts of Brooklyn, New York in 1950, and I grew up with people, the children and grandchildren of the immigrants of Europe, who thought—as I was taught to think—that the Republican Party, forgive me, was the party of rich dullards. In our neighborhood, Democrats were cops and firemen. Republicans had profoundly uninteresting jobs, like . . . insurance company vice president. They always seemed like—that great cliche—country club guys, fat, a little self-satisfied, kind of snoozy.

The Democratic leadership in those days had something to say. Let's get this country moving again, let's help people. In the early '60s they lowered the top tax rates, cut capital gains, reminded us that a rising tide lifts all boats. They saw communism not only in military and political terms but in moral terms—and they led an America able to articulate its opposition, its superiority, its faith. Liberals had heart; conservatives had adding machines. Liberals wanted to help people; conservatives kept the books, and fretted about the red ink.

Cliches of the Past

It all started changing in the late '60s, you know how and the reasons why. By the '70s, the Democrats, still the majority party, seemed like a giant bound, unable to free itself from the assumptions of the recent past. A party whipped by special interests—tied down by what had become almost an addiction to high taxes and high spending, in the thrall of what George Bush called the "idea boutique" at Harvard Yard—a party farther than ever from the common man's common-sense understanding of the world.

Across the nation you could see the stirrings of discontent. In California, a tax revolt; in middle America, the anti-abortion movement, composed largely of traditional Democrats who could no longer tolerate the position of the party of their parents; in the East, a newly sophisticated anticommunism that was grounded in both passion and scholarship. Throughout the land, a simmering sense of enough is enough.

The Republican Party awoke from its post-Watergate slumber. Suddenly it was saying wait a minute—you can't tax the little guy to death—you can't tax him 40%, 50% on his overtime—you can't take his freedom from him and let government call for the future, it seems to me, is simple: Don't give those issues up.

The message of the '80s, the era of the great Republican resurgence, is: We are at our best when we believe. We are at our best when we are in tune with the country, and respectful of it, when we try not to be more like the Democrats, but more like us. As we owned the '80s, we can own the '90s. And we can, before this decade is out, take Congress.

The economy of course is still the issue. We've all been very happy the past 10 years to have two presidents with high popularity ratings. They deserved and deserve them. But I operate with the theory that when there is peace and prosperity the American people find reasons to like their president, reasons to see their charm and low-key humor. And when we don't have prosperity, they find reasons to decide their president is an unattractive, charmless dolt. (They did it to Carter.)

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Someone told me the other day, "But G doesn't like confrontation." Well, I saw him in he was 14 points down, and when it's time to f mix it up with the best of them.

Not because they're cynical, but because they hire presidents to run things, and they want results.

We Republicans still have the advantage on the economy, because to the men and women of America we're still seen as the grownups on this issue. But we must be true to what we are. We must continue as the party of low taxes, the party of lower spending.

We must not lose the tax issue. We must not lose it for reasons having to do with responsible governance: If we go down the road we went down in the '70s, our least effective decade—if we become "low budget liberals" and let the budget grow—if we go down that road it will hurt the economy and we will stop being the job-producing wonder of the world. We'll stop being the party of hope, the party of the people. And we cannot lose this issue for political reasons: If we become like the Democrats, we will suffer their fate.

President Bush has been statesmanlike in telling Congress he'll do a great deal, go to great lengths, to end the budget mess. Reagan was criticized in the media, and by some thoughtful voters, for seeming sometimes intransigent, confrontational, unwilling to talk. Bush has avoided that charge.

It's right and legitimate that he should tell the Democrats, "I'll consider anything to make serious progress." It's good to be reasonable, in a crisis, to declare your openness to all ideas. But if the ideas offered are, ultimately, the same old bad ideas—"We'll spend, and you raise the taxes to support us"—then it will be right and reasonable for the president to push away from the table and "cut himself a

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Keep the Republican Faith

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curs it will be right and legitimate—and statesmanlike—for the president to push away from the bargaining table, stand up, acknowledge what's happening, declare that an impasse has been reached, and tell the Democrats: I'm taking it to the people.

The 1990 elections are three months away, and there is still no more fruitful and legitimate issue for us, and for the country, than wasteful spending, than a budget out of control, than congressmen raising taxes—there is no more potent issue than this.

There isn't a man or woman in America who doesn't know that the budget's out of control—every American over the age of 12 knows it—and the funny thing is they're not tight, they're not skinflints, they just want to know the money's going to good use.

People are becoming newly re-sensitized to taxes, from New Jersey to California, they're starting to get clobbered again. And there's another part of the mix: an anti-incumbent spirit that is sweeping the country. Everywhere, at the dinner table, the PTA meeting, the cocktail party, you can hear it: Throw the bums out. As the majority of Congress are Democrats this is not exactly bad news. If we take this issue to the people, the people will support us. I always want to say to my old friends in Washington: Trust the people. After all, they had the wit to trust us.

Someone told me the other day, "But George Bush doesn't like confrontation." Well, George Bush likes peace and progress—but I saw him in 1988 when he was 14 points down, and when it's time to fight, he can mix it up with the best of them. The part of him that was an 18-year-old fighter pilot revs up, and with an absolute lack of ferocity, with a kind of gentlemanly conviction, he hits every target.

So my hope is that this party will take the tax and spending issue to the people—because the people are on our side. And sometimes you only make progress in a negotiation when you end it. You remember when Ronald Reagan let the Soviets, in one of their big flamboyant rejections of the U.S. position, walk away from the arms talks. It was a big break, big news, headlines that said "Arms Talks Collapse." Reagan was criticized, as usual. But he said, in his sunny way, "Don't worry, they'll come back." And they did.

A second issue on which the people trust us—an issue which ought by rights to be ours—is crime. You all know the facts, the statistics, how crime most grievously hurts the poor and middle class. I would

ruption of our great cities, the abuses of the machines, a story so constant and pervasive that it's always in the papers in New York, but on page 12 because it's not news anymore—this is another great issue for us. We are ripe for a Teddy Roosevelt or two—we are ripe to seize this issue, because it speaks of the crumbling of the cities, the anxiety of the suburbs and the abuse of the poor. The machines are Democratic—the corruption is Democratic—and a poor woman who spends two hours waiting for a city-run ambulance when her husband has a heart attack is a victim who deserves our attention. She and others like her will, in time, join us if we begin to speak forcefully for their interests.

Another issue, a delicate one, abortion. Lee Atwater is right—we are the party of the big tent—and we old roustabouts stick together as much as we can. If we are to be a modern, viable party then we know that debate and dissension must be a part of us. We care about ideas and can argue for justice. We have room for disagreement, we don't shun people for being politically incorrect.

But I will tell you that I feel strongly that we must continue to be the party that speaks against abortion, that speaks to the conscience of the nation.

I think that no one, pro- or anti-, is entirely 100% comfortable with his or her position on this issue. We all in our hearts have our doubts, and our questions. We all in our hearts, in our best selves, in our private lives, lean against abortion.

Both George Bush and Ronald Reagan have said, eloquently, that abortion on demand coarsens us as a people. You are familiar with their arguments. But I have a hunch. The technology of abortion is changing, and more and more it will come down to one woman, or one couple, standing alone and deciding. And if we are the party that tells her, or them, no, rethink it, think twice and three times—they will not resent it.

Fifty Years Without War

I think the national defense is still a potent issue, because the American people have common sense. They know perfect peace and lasting tranquility have never happened in the history of man and likely never will. A strong America defense is still the greatest peace-preserving force in the history of man. Fifty years without a world war—it was American strength, and the taxes sacrificed by the American people to maintain it—that did that. And when something works, don't be in such a hurry to make radical change.

Another issue looms on the horizon, coming ever closer. We must make a connection with America's new immigrants. So many of them hold the enduring values for which we stand, and yet those values do not necessarily translate into Republican allegiance by any means. I do not know what is the modern equivalent of the local political club—my people became

The Republican Party awoke from its post-Watergate slumber. Suddenly it was saying wait a minute—you can't tax the little guy to death—you can't tax him 40%, 50% on his overtime—you can't take his freedom from him and let government call all the tunes—you can't let the economy stop pumping out the jobs the people need. We backed low taxes, low spending, enduring values, a strong defense.

And along came Reagan. And because of the ideas he represented we owned the '80s. Suddenly, almost without noticing it, the Republican party became the party of the people. Protector of the people, protector of their interests. And one day we looked around and realized: My God, we're not only on the side of the guy at the country club anymore—we're on the side of the waiters!

The differences between the two parties were not always, in a cultural sense at least, clean-cut or unambiguous. But the point is, we had the issues—we were on the right side of the issues—and the key now, for which we stand, and yet those values do not necessarily translate into Republican allegiance by any means. I do not know what is the modern equivalent of the local political club—my people became Democrats originally because the local Democratic boss made sure you had a turkey at Christmas—I don't know what is the modern equivalent of that presence, but it would be in our interests to figure it out.

And a word, in closing, on what I think is, right now, a great challenge to us as a party. It's subtle, in a way. It's that, after 10 years in power, the people will come to see us as the Washington Party, when it is we who have opposed the mischief and machinations and self-interest of that town.

We are not the party that splits the difference with the Democrats in big rooms on the Hill, we're not the "insider party," we are not the party of the bureaucracy, of the federal government, of centralized power of Washington. We are the opposition in power. We forget this at our peril.

And so what we are talking about this fall, in 1990, in every congressional race and state Senate contest, is the continuance of our right and ability to govern this nation—this great and moving nation, this most generous country on earth, this most yearning place—a party, still, worthy of the people, protector of their interests—a party that keeps the faith, that remembers we are at our best when we believe.

If we only remember what we believe we will own the '90s—and we will be right, and we will win.

Miss Noonan, who wrote speeches for President Reagan and for George Bush, is the author of "What I Saw at the Revolution: A Political Life in the Reagan Era," (Random House, 1990). This is adapted from a speech she gave Friday to the Republican National Commmittee in Chicago.

The Techies' Challenge to the Bean Counters

Manager's Journal

By Donald N. Frey

World technological competition in both manufacturing and services is increasing rapidly, requiring a high level of technical sophistication on the part of companies' senior management. However, we in the U.S. have a competitive disadvantage in having fewer technologically oriented chief executives than our principle trading competitors, Japan and Germany.

The U.S. selection process for CEOs is different from those in either Japan or Germany. As a result, American companies end up with more financially oriented types. This country's universities turn out proportionately fewer engineers—and many more MBAs than either competitor.

What to do?

On occasion drastic action is required. As a board member of a heavy machinery company, I watched a non-technical CEO, with no competent technical advisers, almost put the company under with over-cost and under-featured products made with obsolete manufacturing processes. It took forever (or so it seemed) for the board to handle the issue because many of the board members were buddies of the chief executive. Others were non-technical types who had difficulty understanding the problem. But after some false starts, we miraculously found within the company a technically competent engineer, who was fast becoming an excellent businessman and

get my ideas sold (sometimes against resistance to change), but this meant learning to translate my technical message into yet another language. I well remember being asked in the seemingly endless efforts to get approval for the original "Mustang" (for which I was project manager, and Lee Iacocca the sponsor) what the net, "non substitutional" increase in vehicle sales

cuss technical issues such as product features, quality or manufacturing issues in financial terms.

The beanies had enormous political power at Ford, and so it was the better part of valor to join them rather than constantly fight. Of course it didn't hurt that my team put some useful customer features in our products—disc brakes and radial ply tires among them. We also cleaned up some serious product quality problems: leaking windows, power steering pumps and transmissions. But these advances might have been less appreciated had I not learned to express their importance in language the beanies could understand.

I was also interested in getting the support of sales and manufacturing types to

- The ability to translate relevant technology into company-relevant business objectives;
- The ability to network widely into non-technical company sectors (i.e. sales, manufacturing, finance);
- A strong track record of putting new technology successfully into practice.

The latter point is crucial. A track record of success in the marketplace with a new technological innovation is a must. Too many non-technical CEOs turn to their heads of R&D for technical advice. If the head of R&D has not had the experience of working in the marketplace, his or her advice will not be peppered with the patience and appreciation of complexities one develops through real marketing experience. New technology in use involves many more issues than R&D!

Identification of technical advisers is itself an art. CEOs looking for such advisers must take the time to pinpoint those in the company who actually drive new technology into practice and who can explain the innovation to non-technical types. If the CEO spots such people among the company's younger engineers, he should help to get them started up the ranks.

Having dealt with a never-ending series of financial types in my own life, I eventually concluded that they *do* have the company's best interests at heart and are well meaning. Their problem is that financial

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Book World

Of Meat And Machismo

THE SEXUAL POLITICS OF MEAT
Feminist-Vegetarian Critical Theory
By Carol J. Adams
Continuum. 256 pp. $22.95

By Colman McCarthy

George Bush's renunciation of broccoli—the boldest deed of his presidency to date—was good for a passing chortle. He won a follow-up laugh with his pledge to keep on chomping pork rinds. Meat is man-food, by George. Behind the yuks was the un-gleeful playing out of what Carol J. Adams, a feminist and ethical vegetarian, calls "the patriarchal nature of our meat-eating culture."

Until now, no major examination has been attempted on how vegetarianism relates to masculinity or femininity. Plutarch's "Essay on Flesh Eating," or some of Isaac Bashevis Singer's stories on butchers and kosher slaughterers, look glancingly at the issue but only on the way to making other points. Adams, who has a master's degree in divinity from Yale and an angel's touch with language, belongs to a rare species: a clearheaded scholar who joins the ideas of two movements—vegetarianism and feminism—and turns them into a single coherent and moral theory. Her argument—rational and persuasive—is that oppression of women and domination of animals overlap, both caused and perpetuated by male-inspired violence.

Adams's "The Sexual Politics of Meat" is not to be devoured quickly. It should be savored. In at least a dozen contexts, she explores the linkage between vegetarians and feminists. "Questions of definition often predominate," she writes. While "feminists were parlaying questions that trivialized feminism such as 'Are you one of those bra burners?,' vegetarians must define themselves against the trivializations of 'Are you one of those health nuts?' or 'Are you one of those animal lovers?' While feminists encountered the response that 'Men need liberation, too,' vegetarians are greeted by the postulate that 'Plants have life too.' . . . The attempt to create defensiveness through trivialization is the first conversational gambit which greets threatening reforms."

Defensiveness is in the air. Among those applauding Health and Human Services Secretary Louis Sullivan's recent exercise in bombast that animal rights activists are "terrorists" on "the wrong side of morality" were the leaders of the animal corpse industry: the American Meat Institute, the National Pork Producers Council, the National Turkey Federation and others in the audience for that June 7 speech. The thinking of Adams threatens economic ruin to the meat industry. Protesters moving down the street from closed fur stores can change their picket signs from "If you love animals, don't wear them" to "If you love animals, don't eat them."

Adams is doubly threatening to the meat industry because her appeal is to the large feminist constituency, not merely the smaller vegetarian one. "Images of butchering suffuse patriarchal culture," she writes. "A steakhouse in New Jersey was called 'Adam's Rib.' Who do they think they were eating? The Hustler, prior to its incarnation as a pornographic magazine, was a Cleveland restaurant whose menu presented a women's buttocks on the cover and proclaimed, 'We serve the best meat in town!' Who? A woman is shown being ground up in a meat grinder as Hustler magazine proclaims: 'Last All Meat Issue.' . . . When asked about their sexual fantasies, many men describe 'pornographic scenes of disembodied, faceless, impersonal body parts: breasts, legs, vaginas, buttocks.' Meat for the average consumer has been reduced to exactly that: faceless body parts, breasts, legs, udders, buttocks. Frank Perdue plays with images of sexual butchering in a poster encouraging chicken consumption: 'Are you a breast man or a leg man?' "

This is aggressive writing, expressed as conviction, not theory. Both vegetarianism and feminism are ideas that go beyond mere choosing of ideological sides. Adherents act on their beliefs, in ways that people who align themselves on other issues—for or against German unification, the clean air bill—don't. Adams lets the reader know that she is not a dabbler in theories. Instead of a dedication page, she has a memorial page for animals slain for food: "In memory of six billion each year, 16 million each day, 700,000 each hour, 11,500 each minute."

The dietary nonviolent choices that follow a conversion to the vegetarian way are similar to the political choices made by feminists. Adams, whose text is exhaustively footnoted, writes: "the numerous individual feminists who became vegetarians—from the Grimke sisters to Frances Willard, Clara Barton, Annie Besant, Matilda Joslyn Gage, May Wright Sewall, and Mary Walker—evidence a pattern of challenging patriarchal culture not only because it rendered women absent but because it rendered animals absent. As women defined their own subjectivity, their autonomy, animals were released from the object category in which patriarchal culture had placed them."

Little research is available on the number of women who see vegetarianism as a way of rejecting male domination. But it is hard to imagine that it is only coincidence that a society that has a high rate of spouse abuse is also one that sanctions violence against animals. For one example, the predatory viciousness that motivates male hunters to take to the woods on weekends to kill deer isn't much different from the meanness that prompts males to be spouse-abusers or wife-beaters. Picking on the weak is the lust in both sports.

New ground—whole acres of it—is broken by Adams. Large numbers of feminists and vegetarians have yet to see their connectedness with each other. They can now. Larger numbers of flesh-eaters have yet to reflect fully on the consequences of their habit. If they are open-minded, Adams can guide them.

The reviewer is a syndicated columnist and staff writer for The Washington Post.



By Chu
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Out and About

Nixon had the movie
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Some people are counti
to Christmas, but in Sen.
office there's a countdow

By G.B. Trudeau

Cold War:

Jun 22: mentioned.

June 8 - "beginning of the end of the Cold war." (agreements: ~~represent~~) (Branstad)

→ Bush won't answer whether C.W. is over.... ← Dec. 4 too.

June 3: Press conf: We've moved "a long long way from the depths of the C.W."

June 1: "The world has waited long enough. The CW must end."

May ~~1~~ 19: Cold war's cost *

→ (cold war confrontation)

Feb 7 - C.W. is in retreat.

Nov 22: "Let us move beyond ct ment + once + for all end Cold War."

July 12: : "beyond ct, beyond the CW"

June 2 → " , beyond conflict + CW."

May 31: "CW began w the div of Eur. It can only end when E is whole."

Don McGroarty
FY/1 1
Alan's my brother-
in-law

ALAN CHARLES RAUL

Law and the Soviets: Promise and Peril

With the help of the Congress of People's Deputies—the new Soviet supra-legislature whose actions this spring marked a new phase in *perestroika*—Mikhail Gorbachev transformed himself in March from a Communist Party general secretary into a supercharged, Western-style president. The status of the Communist Party was also changed dramatically when, in the same law that annointed Mr. Gorbachev, the deputies voted to eliminate the party's "leading role," formerly enshrined in Article 6 of the Soviet Constitution.

From the lawyer's vantage, these and other changes hold considerable promise that the Soviet Union will become a nation and government subject to law rather than to the whims of party leaders. However, true democracy cannot be achieved with a few big-picture reforms. Instead, the seeds of due process have to be sowed in the very details of Soviet law at every level.

Significantly, and very positively, Mr. Gorbachev—who is himself a lawyer—has taken on the challenge of bringing the rule of law to his country. At the same time, however, he has crafted a presidency rather free of checks and balances. For example, under the new law, Mr. Gorbachev has considerable authority to impose martial law and declare civil emergencies. These extraordinary powers cannot help but wiggle the due-process antennae of any lawyer.

Indeed, the tribulations of Lithuania demonstrate the difficulty in reconciling power with legal process. Mr. Gorbachev's horror over the Lithuanian Republic's desire to secede would seem to clash with the "right of free secession" already preserved for each republic in Article 72 of the current constitution. Clearly, the transition from a state governed by nothing but power politics to one controlled by legal principles can be rather rocky.

Ambitious Agenda

Still, movement to build a government of laws has been steady. The Supreme Soviet—the standing legislature that is subordinate to the Congress of People's Deputies—is working overtime on Mr. Gorbachev's ambitious agenda to change the country's constitutional structure as well as nearly everything about the property, tax, land, and criminal codes. Nonetheless, in the spirit of constructive *glasnost*, let me probe a few strains that continue substantially to undermine the basis of law in the Soviet Union.

The most fundamental issue is this: If Mr. Gorbachev means to advance the rule of law, judicial officers must be freed from political intervention. Not until the judiciary's independence is assured can aspirations to due process be sustained.

But the Soviet Union cannot lay claim to a fair and independent judiciary. To be sure, the current constitution and a new law on "the Status of Judges" provide that "judges . . . are independent and are subordinate only to the law." The reality differs. One deputy did not mince words recently when he said of Soviet judges (as quoted in *The New York Times* of Feb. 28): "The judiciary is riddled with Party appointees. . . . No Supreme Court judge in this country would dream of judging against [President Gorbachev] in his worst nightmare."



TOM TEAGUE

Judges are elected for 10-year terms by the various Supreme Soviets of the republics and, in the case of the Supreme Court, by the country's Supreme Soviet, or they are appointed by the president. The constitution explicitly makes judges accountable to the deputies who have elected them—and who may recall them. This party-dominated process, together with the relatively short judicial tenures, effectively relegates judges to a dependent status. Moreover, the Supreme Court lacks the power of judicial review over legislative and executive acts.

'Telephone Law'

Further complicating matters is that judges, like other Soviet citizens, are beholden to the political apparatus for housing, wages, and office space, as well as for most privileges and perquisites. This has given rise to "telephone law," under which judges take their judicial directives from party members. Happily, as Attorney General Richard Thornburgh reports in the current issue of *Foreign Affairs*, Soviet Justice Minister Venyamin Yakovlev has told him that legislation is being considered to make judicial interference a crime.

In another welcome development, the concept of constitutional review seems to be taking hold. The new statute provides for impeachment of the president "in the event of his violating the U.S.S.R. Constitution or U.S.S.R. laws." It also empowers a new Constitutional Oversight Committee, upon the request of the Congress or the Supreme Soviet, to review the constitutionality of presidential decrees and other laws. This is not *Marbury v. Madison* by any means—the president may simply ignore the committee's advice—but it is a potential check on government lawlessness.

Even if Soviet judges become paragons of independence, the rule of law remains at risk as long as the legal texts at their disposal fail to protect individual rights. One of the most important principles built into the Soviet Constitution is that the state has rights of equal stature with those guaranteed to individuals. This notion is embodied in the constitution's repeated imposition of *duties* on Soviet citizens.

These duties invariably accompany and vitiate the portions of the constitution that offer guarantees of such basic rights as freedom of speech, assembly, and religion, and the "inviolability of the home." This differs markedly, of course, from our own system, in which basic rights are deemed inalienable. (Perhaps the difference reflects a basic desire of the Soviet people to be "taken care of" by their government, while Americans generally just want to be left alone.)

Just the Golden Rule?

The Soviet approach first assures that "citizens of the U.S.S.R. shall possess in their entirety the [guaranteed] socio-economic, political, and personal rights and freedoms." Then, another constitutional passage subtracts from those liberties as follows: "[T]he use by citizens of rights and freedoms should not harm the interests of society and the State nor the rights of other citizens."

This may seem no more constraining than the golden rule. But how much reliance would you place on a conditional First Amendment that protected your speech only so long as you were judged not to "harm the interests of society and the State"? Little comfort, one would imagine, to a dissenter.

Such comfort can only come from the reform and revision of a great bulk of detail in the Soviet legal structure. Apparently recognizing this, Mr. Gorbachev signed a resolution in February in which he called on a Supreme Soviet committee to finish the drafting of new laws on Soviet freedoms, and directed that the committee's findings be presented in April. (Perhaps the Soviet system is truly converging with our own: Displaying a familiar pattern, the Soviet legislature seems to be treating the president's deadlines as non-binding.)

Real legal change and the end of government by fiat may have been foreshadowed when Mr. Gorbachev instructed the committee to draft a new statute "on the Press and Other Mass Media . . . tak[ing] the results of the nationwide discussion into consideration." He echoed this point in his March 15 presidential acceptance speech when he said, "The president must . . . take into account, in a most objective and impartial way, the whole range of society's views and legitimate interests, putting the good of the country and the people above all else." Not a bad first step toward a rule of law and not of men.

Alas, not all steps move in this direction. An April 8 decree made it a crime to "discredit" Soviet officials, and a new constitutional provision adopted by the Congress of People's Deputies directs the Supreme Soviet to "*regulat[e] . . . the procedure for the exercise* of citizens' constitutional rights, freedoms, and duties." Endowing the legislature with this most open-ended of powers is about as remote from inalienable rights as you can get.

Mr. Gorbachev has commissioned legal reforms of enormous breadth and consequence. But continuing down this path will require much more than establishing a powerful presidency, jettisoning Article 6, and listing hollow freedoms in reams of draft statutes. The Soviets must end the practice of enacting "secret," or administrative, law not available to the public, expand the right to counsel, and permit citizens to enforce their rights in court.

Soviet legislators will only reach their president's stated goal when they draft a constitution that reconciles the rights accorded Soviet citizens with the duties demanded of them. So long as citizens' duties trump their rights, law will not fully limit the Soviet state.

Alan Charles Raul, general counsel of the Department of Agriculture, visited the Soviet Union last fall as vice chairman of the U.S. delegation to the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Legal Seminar.



Associated Press

Powell Denies Interest in the Vice Presidency

Gen. Colin L. Powell meeting yesterday at the Capitol with Bob Dole, right, the Senate minority leader, and Senator John Warner. General Powell said that discussion of his replacing Dan Quayle was "speculation that exists in the minds of people who have to write columns." He added that he intends to "remain as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as long as the President wishes me to serve."

G.O.P. on Reaganomics: It Didn't Hurt the Poor

Figures presented by two Republican Senators, Phil Gramm and Pete V. Domenici, intended to show that the poorest Americans fared no worse than others for most of the Reagan years. The Senators blame the Carter Administration for the earlier losses. Year-by-year figures were not made available.

Poorest fifth of the population
Second poorest fifth
Middle fifth
Second richest fifth
Richest fifth of the population

Percentage change in real family income.



Source: Senators Gramm and Domenici, from data supplied by the Congressional Budget Office

The Crime Agenda

In his Gulf victory speech to Congress, President Bush laid down one domestic marker: Pass a crime bill in 100 days. And yesterday he offered up a modest proposal: In gun-control violations, let the juries see all the evidence. Errant policemen could be disciplined without excluding valid evidence of a criminal's guilt. Legal strategists will recognize this as a Tomahawk missile aimed at the exclusionary rule.

So it is not quite true that the President has no domestic agenda. We do think he needs an economic policy. As Stephen Moore demonstrates alongside, while Budget Director Richard Darman was out negotiating tax increases, federal spending has been running out of control. The much-bemoaned $300 billion deficit is almost exactly equal to the $300 billion spending increase under Bush-Darman budget scrutiny.

Still, the crime agenda is not nothing. The Republic certainly does need the "domestic tranquility" envisioned by the Founding Fathers. Making the criminal-justice system work and reducing the crime problem would certainly serve the public interest. It would also be a big political issue, as Willie Horton demonstrated. And the way to start is by ending the notion of excluding evidence instead of disciplining policemen. This is a peculiarity of the American criminal-justice system, applied by the Supreme Court to the states only in 1961, and since elaborated into *Miranda* warning rules and other ludicrous extremes.

"I'm not a lawyer, but I put great stock in common sense," President Bush told a gathering of state attorneys general. "And it never did make sense that because a policeman has made a mistake, a dangerous criminal can get off scot-free. The Supreme Court has invited legislative experimentation with a direct action to prevent illegal searches and seizures. And so today, I'm announcing that we are accepting that invitation."

Yesterday's Bush proposal, which Attorney General Dick Thornburgh and his top aides devised over the past few weeks, says that when federal agents commit a Fourth Amendment violation in seizing a firearm, the evidence can still be given to the jury in two situations. One is where the gun was used during a violent crime or serious drug offense. Also, regardless of the offense, when the defendant is already disqualified by federal law from possessing a firearm—a category that includes everyone who has already been convicted of a felony, which means all repeat criminals. Call this real gun control.

Those civil libertarians who suffer from proceduralitis will no doubt always object to any move to dilute the exclusionary rule. But Mr. Bush is right that the Supreme Court has often said that nothing in the Constitution requires the extreme step of suppressing improperly seized evidence. Indeed, the court has strongly urged the political branches of government to come up with what justices have called "more efficacious sanction."

So the Bush proposal sets up sanctions to punish federal agents who commit unlawful searches and seizures and also creates a way to compensate the innocent victims. The bill would set up a Justice Department Review Board to oversee this alternative to the exclusionary rule. This group would impose disciplinary action directly on the federal agents who broke the rules. It would also administer a new program to pay damages to the people who suffered unlawful searches or seizures.

For the first time, then, we would end the situation where when two people commit offenses—the criminal and the law-enforcement officer—both get to go free. The criminal can be convicted because the jury can see the evidence. Then the officer would be subjected to internal punishment.

As remarkable as this proposal is, it could go further. We don't know why guns should be the only evidence subject to this alternative. Why not also include evidence of drugs, knives, lead pipes? For that matter, so long as confessions are voluntary why ban them just because the *Miranda* warning is garbled? Indeed, why not allow all relevant evidence of a crime to go to juries regardless of errors by law enforcement.

The other problem, of course, is that some 95% of crimes are tried in state courts, not in federal court. The bill includes language aimed at state and federal judges reminding them that the exclusionary rule is not a constitutional requirement so long as there is a better way in place to punish errant policemen. This is a not-so-subtle hint that the states can abolish their own exclusionary rules by adopting similar methods of disciplining officers and compensating victims.

All this could come in time if the initial Bush proposal is passed and works in practice, and it is of course politically clever to link the issue with the liberal pet cause of gun control. But the important point is Judge Cardozo's classic remark that it makes no sense to say "the criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered."

Sure, Bush is a shoo-in for '92, but won't anybody take a flier?

MICHAEL KINSLEY

FOUR years ago there was already politico gridlock in Iowa and New Hampshire. But the only leading Democrat even to hint he might run for president in 1992 is Ye Olde George McGovern.

The widespread feeling is that President Bush's winning gamble on war has put him beyond all competition for 1992. One Democrat suggests canceling the campaign and giving the money to the homeless.

The widespread complaint that 1992 political campaigns haven't started yet might justly elicit the response that there's no pleasing some people.

After the 1988 election, the pundits were all moaning about the "permanent campaign": Electioneering starts too early, lasts too long and so on. Now everyone looks at his watch and says, "Where are the candidates?"

Nevertheless, it's a good question. If the difficulty is that George Bush now looks like a fearless, macho, leaderlike kinda guy, while the Democrats look weak and craven, the reluctance of all the big-name Democrats to take the man on tends to confirm that sad impression.

The best proof that some Democrat has world-class guts would be a willingness to challenge the former wimp while he stands at over 90 percent in the polls.

To be sure, next year's Democratic nominee will probably lose. But think of all the things that might change the prospects.

To be grim, there is always the possibility that something could happen to Bush's health.

Or the economy could decline catastrophically.

Or there could be a horrendous Watergate-style political scandal.

Hoping for bad news is unattractive and unhealthy, so consider as well another possibility, however unlikely: A charismatic Democrat might persuade voters to think about the future, not the past, and inspire them with a vision of a government they find preferable to the Republican one of the previous 12 years. Stranger things have happened.

The chance of any one of these developments occurring is small. Even adding these remote chances together may not get you a likelihood of 51 percent.

But adding them together surely gets you up to 20 percent or 30 percent. Is there really no Democrat who is willing to gamble on a 1-in-5 chance of being president of the United States?

To maximize that chance, this Democrat has got to speak up soon. Now that Bush is such a towering figure, his Democratic challenger needs as much time as possible to become familiar to the public and plausible as a commander in chief.

If his strategy is the positive one of hoping to inspire people rather than the negative one of waiting for national catastrophe, that also takes time.

For the party's good, too, the sooner there is someone who can be identified as "leader" of the Democrats other than George Mitchell and Ron Brown, the better.

American politics is encumbered with a convention, not shared by other democratic systems, that reluctance to run is somehow becoming in a political candidate.

The more one reveals an actual desire for elected office, the less one is considered worthy of it.

Bill Bradley and Mario Cuomo have made careers by now of their preening hesitation about running for president — Bradley perennially honing himself to perfection, Cuomo parading endless tiresome doubts of his own worthiness.

These gentlemen have just about persuaded me, at least, that their hesitation is justified. To counter the new giant-sized Bush will require some genuine enthusiasm.

It is mere irony that Bush's new-found foreign policy "vision" — a world order based on international law and the United Nations — is straight out of the 1988 Dukakis campaign.

For Democrats who opposed the war, I suggest the dignified mantra: "We are delighted to have been proven wrong." And give up that business about how we'll never know if the sanctions would have worked.

It's profoundly true. Give it up anyway.

Michael Kinsley is a senior editor of The New Republic.

NOW, BACK TO THE DEMOCRATS

BEN J. WATTENBERG

RARELY has it been easier to describe, and harder to find, what the Democrats need for a presidential candidate. The oversimplified litmus labels are these: "non-liberal" and "pro-force."

Potential candidates who can't clearly claim those words in 1992 will be swimming upstream against powerful currents of American opinion. They would, deservedly, be forced to spend a general election campaign explaining what they really meant.

Until Jan. 12, four prominent and tough-minded Democratic senators would have fit the bill. On that day Congress voted Yea or Nay on the president's position regarding use of force in the Gulf. One of the four, Sen. Sam Nunn, led the Nay fight. Two others, Sens. Lloyd Bentsen and David Boren, followed suit.

It is now said that, "Then there were Nunn." Not so. A fourth prominent non-liberal/pro-force horse remains unsullied: Sen. Charles Robb voted Yea.

For years, Robb had an all-purpose deflector when asked to run for president. "Let's support Sam," he said. But Nunn says he won't run this time.

There are those who believe that Robb now has not only an opportunity but a duty to make the race and make a fight. For salvation, the Democratic Party needs a public intramural struggle.

Robb says he's ready to fight, but will not run. Absolutely not. He says he would disown and disavow a draft.

Who else passes the litmus tests? Sen. Al Gore wisely voted Yea on the Gulf, but he has a liberal voting record on all but foreign- policy issues. Rep. Steve Solarz is in the same boat.

As governor, Bill Clinton of Arkansas didn't have to vote, wavered and came out Yea after the vote, but before the war.

As for the rest, forget it. Mario Cuomo, Jesse Jackson, George McGovern, Bob Kerrey, Bill Bradley, Doug Wilder and Dick Gephardt all flunk at least one litmus test, and typically two.

It gets worse. Democrats are shaping the 1992 electoral battlefield like a dumbkopf, not Schwarzkopf. Having destroyed their credibility on foreign affairs, they seem eager to achieve a total self-inflicted rout.

This is a national party that hasn't smiled in 25 years. Overarching their unpopular politics, and shaping those politics, has been a pall of pessimism. Now, tone-deaf, they say, hey, here's a fresh idea, let's move the debate back to America's terrible domestic problems, let's peddle a little more doom and decline.

On the other hand, John Kennedy in 1960 had perfect political pitch for an opposition candidate in a successful country.

"Let's get America moving again," he said, and "We can do better."

Could the Democrats do anything else wrong? Don't ask. They could push legislation that the most popular president in polling history calls "a quota bill." And that's what they're doing. (Why isn't there a political suicide prevention hotline?)

Has there ever before been a political party whose only valid proposition is that the election is 20 months away and anything can happen?

And so, if one should be interested in the future of the Democratic Party (why?), one most look to less well-known Democrats.

Who is pro-force and non-liberal? There are several.

Consider Rep. David McCurdy of Oklahoma. He is an 11-year veteran of the House, chairman of the Intelligence Committee, and, at 41, the youngest committee chairman ever.

He is a moderate — that is, he is on the right-wing side of the left-wing party. He believes the Democratic Party has to stop being the party of government and become the party of opportunity. He's got the tone right.

He is an Air Force reservist who in December spent nine days in Saudi Arabia learning about the air strategy before lobbying for it. He studied international economics at the University of Edinburgh. His wife is a child psychiatrist. His father was a maintenance electrician. His mother worked in a factory.

He says: "The Democratic Party needs a fight."

Of course, an unknown Democrat in his early 40s would be a longshot. It hasn't worked since John Kennedy did it.

Ben Wattenberg is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.



DATE: 3/10/91 PAGE: M1

CIVIL RIGHTS

President Blows His Chance to Lead

By Julius L. Chambers

NEW YORK

When President George Bush vetoed the Civil Rights Act of 1990 last October, he claimed that the Administration would introduce legislation to correct recent Supreme Court rulings that have watered down protections against employment discrimination. In part because of that pledge, the President's veto sur[illegible]gle vote in the Senate.

Earlier this month, the Administration unveiled the promised proposal—on a Friday evening, a time designed to attract the least public attention. The reason for the timing is plain when the proposed legislation is analyzed: It is shameful anti-civil-rights legislation.

The Bush Administration has squandered an opportunity to play a decisive leadership role in civil rights. The Gulf War, a war in which one-third of the ground troops are African-American, is now behind us. Many of those serving in the Gulf—minorities and women—would have been beneficiaries of the vetoed 1990 legislation. As a historical matter, many civil-rights gains have come in postwar eras, when the country has attempted to live up to its proclaimed ideals of freedom and equality that its military have defended in battle. How much better it would be for the President to aid, not retard, that process.

The Civil Rights Act of 1990 had a 65% level of support in both houses of Congress. The legislation enjoys wide backing outside Congress as well, ranging from the American Bar Assn. to the Administration's own Civil Rights Commission to conservative columnists such as James Kilpatrick.

The need for new legislation is clear. In its 1989 term, the Supreme Court issued a series of rulings that cut back the rights of minorities and women by depriving employees of protection against on-the-job harassment, no matter how offensive or blatant; by limiting the ability of employees to obtain relief from broad, systemic discrimination, and by permitting long-resolved discrimination cases to be reopened and challenged. The Civil Rights Act of 1990 straightforwardly dealt with these and other problems.

Not having a legitimate difference of substance with the act, the Administration invented the issue of quotas. It argued that the legislation would result in hiring or promotion by the numbers without relation to qualifications, although the act expressly prohibited any quotas.

The Administration leveled its charge notwithstanding the protests of several leading anti-quota organizations—the Anti-Defamation League of B'Nai B'rith, the American Jewish Committee and American Jewish Congress—that the legislation clearly did not require or encourage quotas.

Now, in its own proposal, the Administration has come up very short. Although the legislation is supposed to restore legal protections stripped from employees, one of its key features instead robs them of yet another. It permits employers to force employees, as a condition of employment, to waive their right to sue in case of job discrimination.

The protections that our civil-rights laws give racial and religious minorities and women are crucial. For this reason, Congress has not restricted employees to one remedy or another; since 1974, the law has been that employers cannot require employees to submit to arbitration of discrimination claims and give up their right to sue. Now the Administration wants to force employees to give up that right to pursue justice in a court of law.

If employees cannot sue, employers are not deterred from discriminating; rather, we embolden unscrupulous employers who might take advantage of a recession or other happenstance to deprive hungry employees of civil-rights protection. We should not force a worker to sell his or her birthright for a bowl of porridge; employees deserve both their civil rights and their jobs.

The Civil Rights Act of 1990 also would have given women and religious minorities the right to obtain damages from juries for harassment and other employment discrimination, a right that racial or ethnic minorities had until the 1989 Supreme Court decisions. Last year, the Administration opposed that reform.

This year, it has changed its position to permit women to seek damages for harassment but not for any other discriminatory behavior, such as failure to hire women, denial of promotions or wrongful termination. While other protected groups have these rights under another statute, women will not be able to obtain compensatory or punitive damages no matter how outrageous the discriminatory conduct may be.

Moreover, a woman—but not members of other groups—would be denied a jury trial and be limited to $150,000 in damages, no matter how egregious the employer's illegal acts may have been. The woman would be required to submit her claim to an employer's internal procedure for resolving complaints within 90 days. If she failed to do so, she couldn't sue, although no other employee has to meet such a requirement under the civil-rights laws. There is no way to effectively police the legitimacy of such procedures.

The Administration proposes to help employers in yet another way that opens the door to renewed discrimination.

The Supreme Court decided 20 years ago that the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibited not only intentional discrimination but neutral practices, such as certain written examinations, that had discriminatory effects. In proving these cases, employees had to show the adverse impact of these practices, while employers had the burden of showing that such practices were necessary in their conduct of business.

In 1989, the Supreme Court let the employer off the hook. It said employees had the burden of proving that there was no "business necessity" behind the discrimination. Last year's Civil Rights Act would have restored the employer's burden of proof.

The Administration, however, proposes to restore to the employer only a minimal burden. Its legislation would redefine "business necessity" to mean that some legitimate employment goal is significantly served by the practice being challenged. So employers could argue that ostensibly neutral practices—including subjective selection procedures as well as tests—are justified by something so flimsy as customer preference.

For example, it might well be legitimate under the Administration's bill for a bank to refuse to hire African-American tellers because their white customers might not like them. That reduces the ban on discrimination by so-called neutral, unjustified practices to an empty promise.

There are many other defects in the Administration bill. It is so one-sided, so biased in favor of employers, so directly contrary to Congress' demonstrated concern for civil rights, that it should be summarily rejected. Congress should enact—one hopes with support from the Administration—a Civil Rights Act that will ensure equal and fair employment opportunities for all people. □

Julius L. Chambers is director-counsel of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund & Educational Fund.

The Evening Sun

A8 Baltimore, Friday, March 8, 1991

Will bullishness on Bush persist?

William Schneider

PRESIDENT BUSH'S job approval rating is to Washington what the Dow Jones industrial average is to Wall Street. It's a good indicator of the current mood of the place. But it's not always a good predictor of the future. Right now, Washington is bullish on Bush. The president's approval rating stood at 91 percent in the latest USA Today poll, which is a record for any president since polling began in the 1930s. The minute Bush declared victory in the Persian Gulf on Feb. 27, he was widely believed to have won re-election for 1992. Whether that actually happens depends on two things: the status quo's holding up, and even improving, by November 1992, and the Democrats' failing to nominate a credible challenger. Either will be enough to ensure Bush's re-election.

Commentators are talking about a new George Bush, a man of strong, unequivocal beliefs who is able to rally the nation. But the new George Bush is still the old George Bush — status quo president. What's new is that the status quo, at least in foreign policy, is extremely good.

What Bush did in the Persian Gulf was restore the status quo. He promised that Iraq's act of brutal aggression against Kuwait would not stand, and it didn't. But the United States stopped short of toppling Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, and America shows little inclination to try to shape a new status quo in the Middle East. Unlike President Reagan, Bush doesn't talk about exporting democracy or free enterprise. In fact, his New World Order is really a policy of defending the international status quo against aggressors who would disrupt it.

Bush is unlike Reagan in another respect. He is not motivated by ideological conviction. He is motivated by moral principle, which is quite different. Moral principles are unifying. By defining the Persian Gulf commitment as moral rather than ideological, Bush held the nation together and undermined liberal opposition to the war.

Ideological convictions are divisive. Reagan had a large constituency of people who believed in him and supported him no matter what he did, even through the Iran-contra scandal. He also had opponents who never supported him, no matter what he did, even when the economy was booming. Very few people either love or hate Bush. That's why he can go much higher than Reagan in the polls. And, if things go wrong, much lower.

Bush is popular because he is successful. If he can sustain the peace and add prosperity to it, he will very likely be unbeatable in 1992.

Republicans have even higher expectations, however. "I think it could be bigger than 1984," when Reagan won re-election in a landslide, said Sen. Phil Gramm of Texas, the chairman of the National Republican Senatorial Committee. "I think it could be 1980 (when the GOP took control of the Senate) all over again."

That's asking a lot. Generally, when Republican presidents are re-elected because people are happy with the status quo (1956, 1972, 1984), they re-elect congressional Democrats, too. After all, they're part of the status quo. Why should 1992 be any different?

Because Bush, the argument goes, can unleash his Republican Guard against Democrats in Congress who opposed the war. Gramm argues that the Jan. 12 vote to authorize the war "fits a pattern that is 20 years old. . . . It says to the nation once again that Democrats cannot be trusted to define the destiny of America."

The problem with that is that most members of Congress have a strong personal relationship with their constituents. Most antiwar Democrats will be able to explain their vote as a matter of conscience, particularly 20 months after it happened. The damage is likely to be greatest for Democrats facing new electorates, either as a result of redistricting or because they are running for a different office.

The Democrats' biggest problem is at the presidential level. They have to find a candidate who crosses the threshold of credibility on national security. Most leading Democrats in Congress voted against the war. Most leading Democrats outside Congress lack foreign policy experience.

Those who can pass the commander-in-chief test usually have trouble getting nominated. And it looks as though they will have even more trouble next year. California Democrats are considering a proposal to select up to 40 percent of their convention delegates at party caucuses at the very beginning of the 1992 primary season. Only those who have performed services for the party could become delegates.

Supporters of the plan — which does not require legislative approval — contend that it would enable California to "play the role in national presidential politics that its size, heterogeneity and representativeness demand." But California Democrats are among the most liberal in the nation, and caucuses limited to party activists would almost certainly bias the results strongly to the left. Once again, by trying to make a bad situation better, the Democrats are likely to make it worse.

The Evening Sun

A8 Baltimore, Friday, March 8, 1991

Basking in the gulf war's warm afterglow

Jack W. Germond & Jules Witcover

Washington

IF THE DEMOCRATS had any doubts that President Bush, formerly derogated as a wimp, has become an 800-pound political gorilla and intends to make the most of it, those doubts surely were dispelled by his Persian Gulf victory speech to Congress.

From the uproarious reception he received entering and leaving the House from flag-bearing fellow Republicans to the gracious nonpartisan welcome from House Speaker Tom Foley, the president's appearance was a clear sign of things to come in the months and weeks ahead as American troops return home from the war zone.

While Bush reported that he had ordered Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney to start the first American servicemen homeward even as he spoke, there will be no rush to put the gulf war success behind the country. In calling in the speech for "every community in this country to make this coming Fourth of July a day of special celebration for our returning troops," Bush is making sure at the same time that the afterglow lasts at least until then — nearly four months from now. That nationwide display of flags and yellow ribbons itself is likely to have an afterglow of its own for weeks thereafter.

In the meantime, Bush reportedly is considering going to Kuwait personally for Easter, and towns across the country with local men and women returning certainly are not going to wait for the Fourth of July to turn out the marching bands for heroes' welcomes. This is particularly so because Americans have had a long time waiting for substantial grounds to proclaim the old American pride and patriotism in military success.

Ever since the ignominious flight by helicopter from the U.S. embassy in Saigon in 1975, the Vietnam experience had hung like a bad dream over American self-confidence in the U.S. military. By comparison to the scope and effectiveness of U.S. might in the gulf war, the earlier Bush invasion of Panama and the Ronald Reagan invasion of Grenada were mere fireworks displays, although not, to be sure, to those who fought in them and in some cases gave their lives. Whether Iraq was or wasn't, as advertised before the war started, "the world's fourth largest fighting force," it was no Grenada either, especially with its own Great Satan Saddam to raise American temperatures and anger.

On Politics Today

Bush in his speech did not, as have fellow Republicans Sen. Phil Gramm and House Minority Newt Gingrich, seek overtly to cast the prosecution of the war — and failure to vote for use of force in the first place — in partisan terms. He can afford to take the high road, while these hatchet men slither along the low road for partisan ends.

While the president did specifically proclaim that with the war over, "we must bring the same sense of self-discipline, that same sense of urgency, to the way we meet challenges here at home," he said it should be applied to an already stated domestic agenda that is hardly a comparable challenge to the national will.

That agenda was dismissed as old hat and a collection of rehashed half measures by the Democratic leadership when he presented it in January, and despite his challenge to Congress to pass his crime and transportation proposals in 100 days, the Democrats can be expected to move on their own fronts.

Just as Bush understandably would like to keep the nation's attention on his foreign-policy success with a strung-out afterglow, the Democrats want desperately to switch that focus to domestic needs they argue Bush continues to neglect. As they look forlornly toward next year's presidential contest against this new 800-pound gorilla without an openly declared candidate (George McGovern is still considering), their best hope is to seize the domestic battleground. But the Republicans can be counted on to press once again the argument that Democrats believe the only way to solve problems at home is to throw taxpayers' money at them, an argument that has stood them in good stead in recent years.

The outlook, therefore, between now and that promised Fourth of July super-celebration of flags, yellow ribbons and peans to the leadership brilliance of George Bush is for more of the same legislative wrangling of Bush's first two years. Democrats, no matter how intimidated by his military success, can hardly afford to swallow a Bush domestic agenda that they believe is their one remaining legitimate political target if they are to have any hope at all of making a presidential race of it in 1992.

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The Ghost in the Pentagon

Rethinking America's Defense

Fred Charles Iklé

FROM BERLIN to Baku, popular revolutions are dissolving the world's last empire—the erstwhile evil one. Upheavals continue. The *annus mirabilis* of 1989 liberated political energy that is now beginning to affect every corner of the globe: hastening the demise of Beijing's outdated dynasty, eroding Fidel Castro's and Kim Il Sung's dictatorships, creating a new German nation, transforming the European Community, and perhaps draining the marrow out of NATO.

Routinely, Pentagon planners stake out their work each year with a description of The Threat. Now we see in astonishment that in every arena of confrontation The Threat is being turned upside down. Indeed, our arch-adversary's arch-alliance, the Warsaw Pact, remains strung together only by the thin filament of a vacuous treaty text, having lost its ideological glue and Stalinist discipline.

What, now, are the threats against which the Pentagon should prepare? How should America's strategy and military forces, indeed its overall foreign policy, be changed to take account of the transformed environment?

Fred Charles Iklé was undersecretary of defense for policy in the Reagan administration and is currently a Distinguished Scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C.

This year, Congress will vote on the first defense budget since democratic revolution swept through Eastern Europe. The Bush administration sees this budget as beginning "the transition," in the President's words, "to a restructured military—a new strategy that is more flexible, more geared to contingencies outside of Europe. . . . " But as the defense budget winds its way through Congress, one must fear it will be treated like a big sugar loaf from which to shave off sweet slices: cut more army divisions here, lop off another aircraft carrier there, cancel the new strategic bomber, cut strategic defense by half, and so on—chop, chip, chop.

One can no more construct a new strategy from canceled defense programs than one can build a house from woodshavings. Alas, any sense of urgency in Washington that has now welled up about defense is aimed at budget cuts, not grand strategy. Stubborn fiscal pressures provide today's motive for changing our military programs and forces. As for America's overall strategy, influential voices in the administration and in Congress maintain that because of vast uncertainty in the world we should change warily. The United States would be rash, it is argued, if it sought to shape the ongoing transformation of the global strategic structure, a transformation that is not only unpredictable but, in any event, largely beyond our influence. A renovation of our security strategy, according to the

conventional wisdom in Washington, will have to wait till the dust settles.

This complacency is mistaken. For we should care immensely just how "the dust settles."

To say that the United States can wait to address the fundamentals of our Western security strategy is both too complacent and too unambitious. It is too complacent about the potential losses, the utter disaster that the fragility of today's global transformation could bring. And it is too unambitious and too passive, given the potential gains, the promise for enduring and profound improvement in our security that these pregnant times hold. Both the complacency and the listless passivity stem from a poverty of imagination about the potential for change—indeed, about the impact of the changes that have already occurred. What constricts our imagination are old habits of the mind, an almost unwitting reliance on the strategic concepts that have shaped the ends and means of our defense policy for decades.

The Enduring Mindset

THE MOST influential of these concepts have to do with Europe, precisely the area that has now experienced the greatest change. For more than four decades, year after year, the threat of a massive Soviet invasion of Western Europe has determined the design and purpose of over half of America's resources for defense.

As pervasive as it is obsolete, this mindset took hold forty-three years ago. In 1947, just two years after the Second World War, planners of the Joint Chiefs of Staff set down some views of a possible war with the Soviet Union. "The Soviet land armies and air forces are capable of overrunning most, if not all, of Western Europe in a short time," warned their memorandum. "The ability of the Allies to meet and retard the Soviet efforts would depend to a very large degree upon the length of the period of warning they receive and the use they made of it." Gloomily, the assessment listed what must be done "if the war is not to be lost." The principal requirement, it argued, is to prepare for "an offensive strategic air effort against vital Russian industrial complexes and against Russian population centers."[1]

All these concepts have survived to this day. The whole mindset is there: the Soviet military threat to the center of Europe, U.S. dependence on warning time, and—to compensate for Western weakness—U.S. strategic bombing of Russia. Like a sturdy genetic code, the mindset propagated itself through generations of technological revolutions in armaments; through the Korean and Vietnam Wars; through the Sino-Soviet split and the build-up of British, French, and Chinese nuclear arsenals; through the economic empowerment of Japan and the growing unity and economic expansion of Western Europe.

Let us defer to another day the question whether this concept of the dominant threat remained valid beyond the mid–1950s; that is to say, beyond the death of Stalin, the rebuilding of Western Europe's economies and military forces, the consolidation of NATO, and the massive expansion of U.S. nuclear might. But surely, during the last year a few more things have changed in the center of Europe—and indeed, in Moscow.

Nonetheless, Washington's national security establishment continues to see the world in terms of the 1947 mindset. By regarding the basic strategy as an unchanging core, it recognizes improvement only at the edges. It admits—grudgingly—that the Warsaw Pact's massive attack on Western Europe would be somewhat weaker now and preceded by additional warning time. Having figured out that the attack would be weaker, the Pentagon bureaucracy concluded it could still adhere to the same old

[1] *Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945–1950,* ed. Thomas Etzold and John Gaddis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), pp. 302–6.

strategy, even if it sacrificed two army divisions and a few tactical fighter wings on the budget-cutting altar. Second, having discovered increased warning time, the Pentagon bureaucracy now accepts converting some of our forces intended for Europe from active status to the less costly reserve status. While the shift to reserves has merit, how the bureaucracy rationalizes it is preposterous. It totally misses the import of the revolution that has swept through Eastern Europe to conclude merely that we can trim our active forces a bit because our intelligence experts now promise, say, thirty-seven days of warning (instead of fourteen) in the event of the Second Coming of World War II. Since 1989, NATO's warning time is to be measured neither in fourteen days nor in thirty-seven days, but in years—the years it would take to re-Stalinize Eastern Europe.

Even while Moscow still controlled Eastern Europe, the concept of a fixed warning time measured by a given number of days was mistaken. Advance warning of an attack is almost always ambiguous, and a clever enemy will use every means of deception to deepen ambiguity. It is hard to believe that the United States and its European allies could ever agree, in response to such warning and before the first shot was fired, to the planned deployment of six additional U.S. divisions to Europe.[2]

By postulating that the hoary scenario of the Warsaw Pact onslaught comes packaged with an extra twenty-three days of "warning," the Washington establishment justifies cuts in the defense budget. By trimming the edges of our force posture—cut some divisions here, eliminate some bases there—it can accommodate some further budget cuts. Most of these cuts will be welcomed by most members of Congress—unless and until they hurt vociferous constituents. But the totality of this approach is too passive toward the recent, and still continuing, transformation of the Soviet empire. It fails to cultivate and to secure the hitherto unimagined gains for peace and democracy.

Stability Worship

NOT TO WORRY, say some U.S. officials, these gains will be secured through arms control agreements, particularly through the ongoing talks in Vienna on conventional force reductions in Europe. While a successful conclusion of these talks will undoubtedly bring security benefits, their most lasting impact might yet be to undermine some of the recent gains for Eastern European independence. The talks in Vienna are aimed at a treaty that will enshrine the concept of parity between NATO and the Warsaw Pact and impose the same limits on American forces in Western Europe as on Soviet forces in Eastern Europe. To be sure, President Bush's recent proposal to lower these limits and to move away from equality between American and Soviet forces would improve the outcome. Yet, most of the new governments in Eastern Europe are now seeking agreements with Moscow for the withdrawal of *all* Soviet forces from their countries. When these governments later sign the grand arms treaty in Vienna, they will in effect legitimize a Soviet occupation force in their countries that their new bilateral agreements with Moscow will have happily eliminated.

Why should the United States and its NATO allies labor in Vienna to give birth to a treaty that will help maintain the Warsaw Pact as a coequal to NATO? Why should the

[2]Well before the revolutions in Eastern Europe, senior U.S. defense officials recognized that it would be impossible to rely on a specific warning time. During his seven years as secretary of defense, Caspar Weinberger repeatedly urged the Pentagon and NATO planners to prepare for ambiguous and variable warning periods. David Abshire, after serving as U.S. ambassador to NATO, explained compellingly that warning and response time vary greatly, depending on the contingency. See David M. Abshire, *Preventing World War III* (New York: Harper & Row, 1988), pp. 105–8.

Pentagon bureaucracy still allocate over half its resources to a conventional war in the center of Europe against a Warsaw Pact invasion with only thirty-four days (or whatever) of warning? The answer to both these questions is the same: our arms control policy and our arms policy are dominated by the same obsolete mindset.

The forty-year-old image of the Threat and our forty-year-old strategy constrict our capacity to grasp the immensity of the global change now unfolding before us. We have promoted a "stable balance" between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces for so long that quite a few Westerners have come to think Soviet forces in the center of Europe are needed for the sake of stability. One even hears whisperings in some mossy NATO circles that the Warsaw Pact ought to be preserved to maintain this treasured stability.

In London and Paris, moreover, some officials still pine for a permanent partitioning of Germany; not only to preserve the "stable" East-West balance, but also because they begrudge Germany its growing strength. They try to disguise this envy as legitimate, psychic trauma from both world wars. One wonders, though, if Paris must fear a new invasion by Hitler or the Kaiser, should Bonn fear a new Napoleonic war? Were it not for the democratic vigor of the people in the Eastern and Western part of Germany, these British and French stability worshippers might yet succeed in rebuilding the Berlin Wall. As Dr. Johnson might say today, "Stability is the last refuge of a reactionary."

Again, those who want to "stabilize" the military confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact are, in one sense, too unambitious. Beholden to the old strategic mindset, they eschew improvements in our security that an up-to-date strategy could achieve. In another sense, more dangerously, they are too complacent in believing that NATO could protect itself against a "second Stalin" simply by manning its old fortresses again.

Prudently, our defense planners are worried by intelligence information showing that the Soviet Union, despite its acute economic and nationality crises, continues the mass production of a wide array of powerful armaments, including the most modern nuclear missiles. Our planners would be remiss if they failed to project these formidable military capabilities into a less benign political context than we enjoy today. We might wake up some morning to find a new aggressive dictatorship in Moscow, a ruthless tyrant who could order Russian forces to reconquer Eastern Europe and menace NATO more dangerously than Stalin ever did.

But what a fatal error to believe that, in the event of such a catastrophe, NATO could simply pick up where it left off in 1988! It is grossly unrealistic to assume that our Atlantic Alliance would proudly reassemble at the old ramparts, regenerate its military exercises in West Germany, deploy new short-range nuclear arms in Europe (as had been planned in 1988), and induce its member nations to increase their defense budgets again.

If the will of all the peoples in Eastern Europe had been crushed under Soviet tanks, if the democratic forces from Sofia to Warsaw had been drowned in rivers of blood, if the profound German aspirations for a unified nation were cruelly affronted by new mine fields and walls, if the expectations for a peaceful, open continent now animating all the nations of Europe were totally shattered—how could NATO then return to "business as usual"? Instead, the Atlantic Alliance would be rent by harsh recriminations. Its governments and its people would have lost confidence in the old strategy; they would recoil from the prospect of another forty years of military confrontation in the center of Europe. With so dark a future, the now ebullient spirit of the European community would falter. The fear of nuclear war would again weigh heavily on the public psyche, a fear the enemy could easily exploit to stir up disunity within the alliance.

The conventional arms agreement that is now being painstakingly negotiated in Vienna would offer scant protection in such a calamity. To be sure, thanks to the agreed reductions Russia would enter the new con-

frontation without its former advantage in numbers of troops, tanks, and other equipment. But by violating the agreement while NATO debates what to do, Russia could get a head start. Moreover, once Russia began its reconquest of Eastern Europe, the Vienna conventional arms agreement would be washed away like a sandcastle by the tide.

Changing Priorities

AGAIN IT becomes apparent here that our old strategic mindset imposes mistaken priorities on the renovation of America's (and NATO's) defense effort and on the West's arms control policy. Among the top priorities of our defense policy today ought to be the protection and consolidation of the recent political gains in Eastern Europe, and the removal of temptations among Russian "hard-liners" and would-be Stalins to use military force for a new expansion of the empire—all the way into the center of Germany, to the Adriatic, into Afghanistan, and beyond.

This means we must help to hasten the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact and the withdrawal of Soviet forces from countries where they are not welcome, even at the price of more drastically and more rapidly reducing U.S. troops deployed in the Federal Republic of Germany. On this point, the President's newest proposal moves in the right direction. Of course, we can hope and reasonably expect that a certain presence of American forces east of the Rhine will, for the foreseeable future, be welcomed by the German government and by a majority of the German people. This does not mean we should insist that a united Germany must, in its entirety, be a full-fledged member of NATO. But a residual, continuing U.S. troop presence in Germany would symbolize and give reality to a security link between the United States and Europe, thus complementing the enduring spiritual and cultural bonds of the Atlantic Alliance. To preserve a transatlantic security link is an imperative for the long-term benefit of the world.

We can best preserve the global benefits of the Atlantic Alliance by taking the initiative now, in concert with our allies, to shape a new security system for Europe. Instead of husbanding our military assets to "stabilize" the NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation in the center of Europe, we should shift more resources and effort to help stabilize democracy in Eastern Europe. It is a mistake to wait for the Vienna arms reduction talks to establish such a system. These talks will wind up preserving the Warsaw Pact like a toad in a bottle of formaldehyde.

Fortunately, with every passing month, democracy in Eastern Europe is becoming stronger. Nonetheless, it is conceivable that some new crisis might suddenly tempt Moscow to consider military intervention in Poland, East Germany, or Czechoslovakia, much as Brezhnev stumbled into the decision to invade Afghanistan. *To deter such a decision, under any and all circumstances, is a mission of our national security policy that deserves much higher priority today than the forty-year-old Pentagon mission of deterring the now exceedingly improbable Russian invasion of Western Europe.*

To this end, we must make clear to the leaders in Moscow, whoever they may be, that the West would never accept a new subjugation of Eastern European nations. This means breaking with some shameful past precedents of American indifference. For example, only a few weeks after Soviet tanks crushed the democratic uprising in Hungary in 1956, President Eisenhower stealthily signaled to Moscow that the United States wanted to return to business as usual, despite our vehement public denunciations of the Soviet actions in Budapest. Similarly, after Brezhnev's invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, President Johnson's first priority in East-West relations was to resume the strategic arms talks. Prevented from doing so by the incoming Nixon administration, he felt great disappointment; by contrast, he had been much less troubled by Brezhnev's destruction of Czechoslovakia's democratic forces. We now know that this intervention

set back democratization in Eastern Europe by twenty years.

Brezhnev's invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 provoked a more coherent and, above all, a more persistent American response. The Carter administration started and the Reagan administration greatly expanded military support for the Afghan resistance. Nine years later, the tenacity of this resistance—and, thanks largely to our help, its effectiveness—compelled the withdrawal of the Soviet forces. Moscow learned a lesson that must have weighed heavily on its decision to abandon its imperial expansionism. If Moscow is not to forget this lesson, the West must continue to remember it as well.

A lesson within this lesson is particularly relevant for the Pentagon's current adjustment to the transformation of the Soviet empire. The Pentagon bureaucracy opposed the Reagan administration's efforts to provide more effective weapons to the Afghan resistance. It held no grudges against the Afghan freedom fighters, of course; it merely wanted to save its weaponry (even some of the oldest models) to meet The Threat it knew since 1947, with its anticipated huge tank and air battles in Germany.

Specifically, the U.S. army bureaucracy fiercely opposed giving the Afghan resistance Stinger missiles, the hand-held surface-to-air missiles with which the Afghans could shoot down Soviet aircraft. Only a minimal fraction of the U.S. army stocks of the oldest version of this missile was needed, and once made available, turned the fortunes of the war in Afghanistan decisively against the Soviet invader. While opposing this small contribution, the Pentagon was unstinting in shoring up the ramparts against a Soviet invasion of the Persian Gulf. That there might be a connection between Soviet success or failure in subjugating Afghanistan and Moscow's appetite for invading Iran, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia was not apparent to those who jealously guarded the hoard of thousands of old Stinger missiles.

Would it be unfair to see in this story a parable for today's need to set the right priorities between saving assets for World War III and helping to strengthen the forces for freedom now? Many members of Congress and private foreign policy experts are advocating larger and swifter funding for a whole panoply of reconstruction assistance to Eastern Europe—support for new private agriculture, management training for business and government. Clearly, if democracy can be firmly anchored in these countries the security of our European allies will be immensely improved. Efforts by the U.S. government to this end, hence, could reasonably be regarded as complementing or substituting for other U.S. efforts on behalf of NATO.

The Pentagon, however, tends to resist such a trade-off; and so might, when push comes to shove, various congressional committees. Despite the prudently chosen cuts that Defense Secretary Cheney proposed to Congress for the 1991 budget, about half our defense effort is essentially still devoted to fighting a massive conventional war in Europe. Before cutting our NATO-related forces further, the Bush administration wants a signed agreement to bring Soviet strength in Eastern Europe down to ours in Western Europe—clearly a vast improvement in terms of military force ratios. But if democracy should not survive in Eastern Europe, no piece of paper signed in Vienna would offer us worthwhile protection.

Third World Contingencies

OVER TIME, of course, the Pentagon will try to redesign its conventional forces for contingencies other than a war against a massive Warsaw Pact attack. The newly fashionable arena for our army, navy, and air force planners is the Third World. All types of armaments have suddenly become "vital" for dealing with Third World conflicts. Undoubtedly, each type has considerable military merit—whether it is the new C–17 transport plane that the air force wants, the new V–22 tilt-rotor plane desired by the marines, or the aircraft carriers treasured by the navy.

Four points need to be kept in mind concerning this now fashionable focus on military contingencies in the Third World. First, for the Pentagon, the problem of Third World hostilities is not new at all. Every war in which the United States has been involved since World War II—either directly with its forces or indirectly by providing military aid—occurred in the so-called Third World. (Korea in 1950 was still a Third World country.) Since the war in Vietnam, American defense experts have conducted innumerable studies of the weaponry and tactics for use in Third World conflicts.[3]

A second point of importance is that the concept of "Third World military conflicts" covers many different contingencies with vastly different circumstances in terms of strategic geography, types of forces, and weaponry used. To be prepared for such disparate contingencies, the United States needs to be able to rely on a wide array of different armaments. The Pentagon's planning, hence, needs to address many different possible threats in Third World situations. Some types of equipment that our military services are wont to neglect may well be essential for some of them; for example, devices to clear land mines in insurgency warfare, ships equipped to clear sea mines, drones for intelligence collection, and other types of unmanned air vehicles.

A third significant factor is the dominant role of military assistance. Should the United States have a major stake in a future Third World conflict, chances are it would seek to rely on assisting its friends, rather than engage its own combat forces. This prospect renders all the more urgent the long overdue overhaul of the awkward patchwork of laws governing military assistance, a task that Congress is reluctant to take up.

A fourth point needs to be stressed, although it may not be welcome in the Pentagon. Only a fraction of the Pentagon budget—less than a third—can be justified in the foreseeable future by the need to prepare for possible U.S. involvements in Third World hostilities. Even though some of the Third World countries are heavily armed, their arsenals are still small compared to the Soviet threat to Western Europe against which we have been preparing all these years.

Yet, much as the "Second World"—the Soviet empire—has changed to a degree and with a rapidity that almost no one had foreseen, we must expect to see surprising changes and major geostrategic transformations in the rest of the world. This potential for revolutionary change confronts Pentagon planners with a tough challenge. The ratio of the speed of political and diplomatic transformations—revolutions, alliance shifts, imperial expansion, and disintegration—to the speed of weapons development and procurement is about ten to one or even thirty to one. To complete the research and development of a modern weapons system takes ten years or more, to build and deploy it another ten years, and once deployed the system may remain in our forces for another thirty years. Who can foresee our strategic requirements for half a century?

Nuclear Strategy

THIS EPOCHAL time span has particularly frightening implications for nuclear weaponry. Our nuclear strategy is still under the curse of Joseph Stalin. Few realize the extent to which the design and purpose of our nuclear armaments, doctrine, and war plans date from the same old mindset that since 1947 shaped and governed the bulk of our conventional forces.

In that Stalinist era we sought to deter the Red Army from marching to the English

[3]One of the more recent and comprehensive studies was sponsored by the bipartisan Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, summarized in the commission's overall report, *Discriminate Deterrence* (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988) and presented in greater detail in the follow-on report, *Supporting U.S. Strategy for Third World Conflict* (Department of Defense, 1988).

Channel by threatening to drop atomic bombs on Moscow and on Stalin's war industries. Once we had acquired a great many more nuclear weapons, and once the Soviet Union deployed nuclear bombers and missiles, the top priority for the U.S. Strategic Air Command became the destruction—the instant the Red Army crossed the West German border—of as many Soviet bombers and missiles on the ground as possible. Since then, the concept of such a prompt, all-out strike has become a dogma that warps the design of our strategic forces to this day, even though it had become impossible to disarm the Soviet nuclear forces with such a strike many years ago.

The obsolete dogma that our nuclear retaliation must be prompt is responsible for the Pentagon's insistence that we must maintain a large force of land-based missiles, with all the difficulty and expense this entails. More dangerously, it perpetuates a vulnerable and hence a hair-triggered deterrent of thousands of missiles, both American and Soviet, sitting there like a thousand Chernobyls—till something, someday, goes dreadfully wrong. The confrontation of these U.S. and Soviet missile forces has evoked a morbid fascination among many defense technicians. By a banal and unrealistically abstract calculation—the so-called "missile exchange"—these technicians pretend to measure the "stability" of deterrence.

The Stalinist threat to Western Europe created other evil legacies for our nuclear strategy and forces. To prolong the life, or reach, of our nuclear deterrent against the feared Warsaw Pact invasion, we deployed a great many shorter-range nuclear arms in Europe, especially in Germany. All these nuclear artillery pieces, missiles, and nuclear-armed aircraft eventually, like a Sorcerer's Apprentice, acquired a life of their own. They became "vital," had to be modernized, and gave birth to a totally incoherent doctrine—Flexible Response—which flatly contradicts the "stability" doctrine of the "missile exchange."

Given the contradictions and shortcomings of these strategic concepts, perhaps the time has come to pay some attention to Soviet criticism of our nuclear deterrence doctrine. Gorbachev called mutual deterrence a source of tension. As Soviet foreign minister Shevardnadze put it, "nuclear deterrence inevitably perpetuates the totality of confrontational relations among states."

Defense Secretary Cheney has wisely requested increased funding from Congress for certain research and development projects—in particular, strategic defense—that will purchase us flexibility in terms of doctrine and enemies. What we now develop and build will have to serve our military strategy in the twenty-first century. For the foreseeable future, one must hope, America's nuclear strategy will continue to be an alliance strategy embracing and protecting a non-nuclear unified Germany as well as a non-nuclear Japan—but a strategy that can put behind us the "confrontational" bipolar relationship with the Soviet Union to which Shevardnadze referred.

Yet before we wax lyrical about the dawn of a new era, free of the danger of instant nuclear holocaust, we have to remember that Stalin's legacy is not so easily overcome. The laws of physics, to be sure, do not ordain that there must be two nuclear superpowers, dividing the world into "two sides" threatening each other indefinitely with mutual annihilation. It is habits of mind and bureaucratic inertia, in both Washington and in Moscow, that cling to the apocalyptic "two sides" confrontation Stalin inflicted on the world at the end of World War II.

Such inertia casts a dark shadow far into the next century. The Pentagon bureaucracy continues to disparage strategic defense, contrary to the policy of the President and Secretary Cheney; it keeps designing our nuclear forces to deter a Warsaw Pact onslaught—and thus favors nuclear weapons installed in the middle of Germany and hair-triggered missile forces. Stalin has been buried twice in Moscow, but his ghost lives on in the Pentagon.

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Cranston Linked to Another S&L, p. 8; Studds Attacked, p. 10

ROLL CALL

THE NEWSPAPER OF CONGRESS

VOL. 35, NO. 96 MONDAY, JUNE 11, 1990 $1.75

I Was a Teenage Paparazza

Photo by Laura Patterson

Touring the Capitol with her school group, Elizabeth Skipper, 14, of Aiken, S.C., hometown of Sen. Strom Thurmond, took OUR picture. We smiled.

Apply Civil Rights Bill To House, GOP Urges

By Timothy J. Burger

When the House Judiciary Commitee marks up the Civil Rights Act of 1990 later this month or in early July, Republicans will vigorously pursue an amendment that would provide House employees with protections under the measure.

Redistricting Prospects In Southern States, p. 14

Republicans, with some Democratic support, are increasingly forcing the issue of Congressional coverage under laws affecting the workplace.

One aim of the effort is to force Members to move more conservatively in passing legislation, like civil rights reform, that puts demands on American businesses.

Republicans will face an uphill battle in their attempt to amend the new civil rights bill, but one top Democratic aide said that the GOP Members stand a good chance of securing coverage for the House.

The bill, H.R. 4000, would overturn several recent Supreme Court cases which proponents say dealt a setback to recent civil rights progress. It would allow workers to sue their employers for discrimination if the workers are members of a minority group that is under-

Continued on page 20



Photo by Stephen M. Rosenberg

Said Sensenbrenner: "There will be an amendment."

Heard On The Hill

See page 26

'The First Time the Sun Fell on Her Face'

Photo by Laura Patterson

Del. Walter Fauntroy and his wife Dorothy brought their three-month-old "boarder" baby Melissa home from the hospital a week ago. The child suffers symptoms of her natural mother's crack abuse. Said Fauntroy, "It was the first time in her life that the sun fell on her face." Details, page 10.

N.H. Candidates Agree To Limits on Spending

By Kim Mattingly

As Senate negotiators last week continued to grapple with the deadlock over campaign reform, at least five Senate candidates and 11 House candidates this year have agreed to abide by state-imposed spending limits in their campaigns.

Ironically, given the GOP's usual opposition to limits, this list of candidates includes more than twice as many Republicans as Democrats. And the campaign limits are strict. Ceilings are only half as high as those proposed by Senate Democrats in federal legislation.

The phenomenon is occurring in New Hampshire, where candidates for state and federal office are in the midst of an official

Continued on page 25

Why Just 435? After 80 Years, This May Be the Time To Increase the Number of Members in the House

By James K. Glassman

Here's a question that we guarantee at least half your friends will answer wrong:

What is the number of Members of the House of Representatives, as mandated by the Constitution?

Most smart people will answer "435," which, of course, is the current number of House Members. But, not only is that answer incorrect, it also shows a serious misunderstanding of one of the prime intentions of the Framers.

The Constitution, in fact, does not dictate the number of House Members, except to say that the figure should be at least 65, and that each state should have at least one Representative. The Framers simply wanted the House to grow with the population.

With just one exception, after every decennial Census from 1790 to 1910, the size of the House was increased as the size of the US population rose, going, from 142 in 1800, to 237 in 1850, to 391 in 1900, to 435 in 1910 — where it stopped.

John Kromkowski, president of the National Center for Urban Ethnic Affairs at Catholic University, and Charles Kromkowski, Thomas Jefferson Fellow at the University of Virginia, have completed an exhaustive study of the apportionment process and argue that it's time to increase

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The Size of the House: Up, Up, Then Flat



Minimum Wage Act, Which Goes Into Effect In Four Months, Will Change Life in House

Task Force to Release Recommendations Soon on Coping With Job Titles, Overtime

By Timothy J. Burger

A task force is in the final stages of preparing recommendations on how to implement the employee protections that the House required of itself when it passed the Minimum Wage Act last year.

The group is expected to present soon its work to members of the House Administration Committee.

Rep. Frank Annunzio (D-Ill), the committee's chairman, formed a two-tiered, Member-staff task force on March 14, at Speaker Tom Foley's (D-Wash) behest, to grapple with changes that would be required by the law.

Annunzio has been a critic of the law, calling for repeal of provisions that make it apply to the House. The chairman has said that the law would be costly and time-consuming to put into effect on the Hill.

Meanwhile, Rep. Austin Murphy (D-Pa) is stepping up efforts to secure support for a measure that would allow the provision of "comp-time," or extra vacation time, instead of the overtime pay that the Minimum Wage Law requires for House employees who work more than 40 hours in a week.

In a May 17 "Dear Colleague" letter, Murphy urged Members to support his bill, H. Res. 363, to reduce the budgetary strain that could come with having to pay staffers for overtime. So far, Murphy's bill has five co-sponsors, including Rep. Vic Fazio (D-Calif), chairman of the Appropriations legislative branch subcommittee — a key ally.

Effective Oct. 1, the Minimum Wage law brings employees of the House and the Architect of the Capitol under the protections of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. Enforcement of the law for House workers is the responsibility of the Office of Fair Employment Practices. (There is no formal enforcement body for the Architect's staff, but his office has an internal mechanism, according to an aide.)

Under FLSA, November's law not only requires payment of at least the minimum wage (which, in itself, isn't a problem, since nearly all Hill workers already receive that much) but also mandates the writing of job descriptions, the maintenance of accurate time sheets (which have never before been required and could mean nightmarish new accounting concerns for office managers), and overtime pay for certain employees.

Photo by Andrea Mohin



Photo by Laura Patterson

Photo by Andrea Mohin

Rep. Mary Rose Oakar (left, above) chairs the Members' panel of a two-tiered task force appointed at the request of the Speaker to figure out how to implement the changes in accounting procedures and employment policies that are required by the Minimum Wage Act, which takes effect in the House and the Office of the Architect of the Capitol on Oct. 1. Also on the task force: Reps. Tom Manton (center) and John Hiler (right).

FLSA also requires "equal pay for equal work," which means similarly qualified employees performing the same tasks must receive comparable salaries. Some female staffers claim that under the current system — which allows Members to set pay entirely at their own discretion — they are paid markedly less than equally experienced males in the same jobs.

Many on the Hill fear that Minimum Wage provisions could wreak havoc on offices' accounting and compensation systems.

Equal-pay requirements mean intra-office consistency could be required. So if a Member pays an LA $25,000 to handle Education and Labor Committee issues and that LA leaves for another job, the Member would have to pay a new, similarly qualified Education and Labor LA at least $25,000.

Many on the Hill fear that implementation of Minimum Wage provisions could wreak havoc on offices' accounting and compensation systems, not to mention their budgets.

Annunzio's task force is chaired by Rep. Mary Rose Oakar (D-Ohio). The other two Members are Tom Manton (D-NY) and John Hiler (R-Ind).

The staff group — which includes aides to House Administration, the leadership, and the Clerk of the House staffers — has been meeting regularly this month.

While no decisions have been made and the Member group will be the final arbiter, here are several key determinations that will need to be made soon, according to aides familiar with the situation:

• Who is covered under overtime provisions?

FLSA exempts "executive," "professional," and "administrative" employees. But which employees fit these descriptions?

Some cases are fairly clear: A staff attorney is a "professional"; an AA who hires and manages staffers is an "executive."

But what about LAs and LCs?

Said one aide, "There's not a cookie-cutter description of what an LA does — or an AA, or anybody else. That's the nature of the beast."

A possible resolution is that House Administration will set several job-descriptions as templates for offices to follow in deciding which employees are due overtime pay.

• What is an "employing authority"?

Equal pay and job description provisions of FLSA are applicable within individual "employing authorities." But is the House itself one big employing authority — requiring a midwestern Republican to give an LA the same duties and pay as a northeastern Democrat?

More likely, the definition will break an employing authority down to a more workable size — to the Member, committee, and officer level.

Even then, what about district offices? Under FLSA, a caseworker in the district may have to be paid the same as another, similarly qualified caseworker with the same duties in Washington — despite any cost-of-living differences.

• Where will overtime funds come from?

Unless radical changes are made to the current pay system — under which staffers are paid from the Clerk Hire (in the case of personal aides) or committee or officers' budgets — pay budgets will be strained under the salary structure now in place when overtime is added.

The House leadership intends to seek more money for Members' Clerk Hire budgets next year, to facilitate personal staff salary increases (Roll Call, March 19). But it's unlikely this will amount to more than a 2 percent increase after inflation.

One top House aide said his office already integrates overtime pay into salaries for receptionists and computer operators — positions that will almost certainly be due overtime under FLSA.

But an aide familiar with the work of the House Administration task force said this kind of set-up probably wouldn't be allowed under FLSA. In addition, the aide said, the overtime must be "paid in a timely manner. That is, in the next pay cycle."

Some cases are fairly clear: A staff attorney is a 'professional;' an AA is an 'executive.' But what about LAs and LCs?

This would mean a busy October's extra hours couldn't be compensated in August through a higher overall salary.

Another possible answer lies in Murphy's bill to allow comp-time instead of overtime pay. But the bill has excited little interest.

In the event of a serious complaint, an Office of Fair Employment Practices ruling would be the final arbiter of whether the office had conformed to FLSA.

OFEP's role raises another set of highly sensitive questions surrounding enforcement of FLSA. Will OFEP do spot checks on Members' offices to ensure compliance, or will it await complaints before taking any action? And what remedies will be available to staffers whom OFEP decides have been wronged?

The Minimum Wage Act calls for the House to handle its own enforcement of FLSA rules, so the Labor Department won't be slapping fines on Members. But will OFEP?



Rep. Austin Murphy has introduced a bill that would allow comp-time instead of overtime pay. The bill initially excited little interest but recently attracted one key co-sponsor.



Photo by Maureen Keating

Chairman Frank Annunzio of the House Administration Committee has been a critic of applying the Minimum Wage Act to Congress.

Simple Lessons From the S&L Disaster

By L. William Seidman

New Year's resolutions? Unfortunately, I have several hundred of them. Congress gave my agency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the job of coming up with resolutions for 600 or more dead or dying savings and loan associations that hold about $350 billion in assets.

Chestnuts aren't the only things roasting on an open fire nowadays. It's the taxpayer who is getting toasted in this S&L mess, which will cost every man, woman and child in the U.S. at least $1,000.

That's why I'm adding at least one more resolution to my list: I'd like to help ensure that President Bush's promise of "never again" will be kept.

The country and the FDIC have learned some very expensive lessons from this S&L fiasco. Unlike the Jimmy Stewart movie about the savings and loan business of the distant past, our job today is not such a wonderful life.

The FDIC and the new Resolution Trust Corporation we manage will handle hundreds of billions of dollars in assets acquired from failed S&Ls. Our decisions about whether to hold or sell these properties, and when to sell them, will have great political and economic ramifications.

With those billions of dollars of assets will come tens of thousands of lawsuits. To handle the caseload, we anticipate doubling our legal staff next year to about 1,000. We also plan to increase the number of private law firms we use—already we employ more than 500.

It is also clear that we will be running one of the most scrutinized operations in the history of the U.S. government. Congress, the White House, two inspectors general and an oversight board for the RTC will be among those looking over our shoulders.

Whether you run a government agency or a travel agency, a savings and loan or a five and dime, there are broad and valuable lessons from the S&L crisis.

First, get the facts. In the case of the S&L industry, phony accounting and distorted capital regulations made the real facts difficult to discern. No one knew the magnitude of the thrift crisis until it had reached epic proportions, and then no one wanted to talk about it. Only with sound facts can there be sound solutions.

Second, face the facts. In the case of the S&Ls, the government failed to face the fact that increasing deposit insurance coverage and reducing capital requirements was the equivalent of giving thrifts a government-guaranteed credit card with no limits. The government also failed to face the fact that S&Ls had an inherent flaw—an interest rate mismatch problem. Because they did not recognize the fundamental problems of low capital and high interest rate risk, the federal actions that followed merely added to the misery.

Third, act on the facts. In the case of the S&Ls, the ultimate cost would have been far less than the tab we now face if the government had taken some painful but necessary steps—like imposing tougher supervision; requiring problem institutions to shrink, not grow; and closing down insolvent thrifts—several years ago. Instead, the federal government flew a flag that proclaimed: "Not on my watch."

Fourth, review the results of your actions. In the case of the S&Ls, it became clear early on that the government's answer to problem thrifts—that they "grow" out of their insolvency—was perhaps reasonable at first but was, in the end, counterproductive. The financial swingers and swindlers who were encouraged by the reduced regulation and lax supervision under that "high-growth" policy ended up losing billions funded by your tax dollars.

The facts were there. A mistake in policy had been made. A change of direction was required. But some people in and out of government liked the old route too much to change directions. We just kept driving straight, when the road had turned. But unlike auto insurance, there is no "no fault" insurance for what happened with the S&Ls. The government did the wrong things, at the wrong times, for the wrong reasons. There is plenty of blame to go around.

An old saying goes: "Judgment comes from experience, but experience comes from bad judgment." I might add that bad judgment can come from a bad memory. Let's not forget the lessons of the S&L crisis.

Mr. Seidman is chairman of the Federal

REVIEW & OUTLOOK

The Defense Problem

One of our friends tells a story about working in the Pentagon during the Carter years and grimacing at some crazy congressional "requirement." He thought, gee, haven't I seen this before, and then it hit him: He'd written the requirement himself, while a congressional aide.

The Bush administration will soon release a white paper on the Pentagon and Congress that shows that every Member of Congress needs to undergo our friend's epiphany. The draft we've seen proves that it's impossible to understand America's defense follies without first understanding the mayhem caused by the would-be Metternichs on Capitol Hill. "The current congressional defense process is characterized by a multiplicity of actors, frequent decisions, lack of finality, disintegration and lack of accountability," says the draft white paper, in wild understatement.

The first problem is that all of Congress wants to soak in the Defense hot tub. While only six committees are responsible for the Defense budget, 14 committees and 43 subcommittees or panels held hearings related to Defense in 1988. Some 30 committees and 77 subcommittees claim some degree of oversight. Then there's staff. The white paper notes that there are now more than 1,500 congressional staffers who devote nearly all of their time to defense issues.

All of these people have to justify their existence, which they do by making work for the Pentagon. In 1988, says the study, Congress sent 18,000 letters to Defense. Many of these are based on the legendary "Dingell-gram" model, named after House Energy and Commerce Chairman John Dingell, which lists question after open-ended question. The Pentagon, that is the taxpayers, spent 245,000 hours in 1988 answering this mail.

In 1984, the last year such records are available, Congress also made 599,000 phone calls to the Pentagon. They weren't courtesy calls. And don't forget "reports" demanded by Congress. Those jumped by 2,000% from 1970 (36 reports) to 1988 (719). The average report takes about 1,000 hours to prepare and costs about $50,000. Topics include such urgent issues as black-marketing in Korea and a new hospital at the Army medical center near pork-barreling Rep. Pat Schroeder's Colorado district.

Did someone say "oversight"? The General Accounting Office, Congress's FBI, spends nearly 30% of its resources on defense-related work, at a cost of more than $100 million a year. GAO conducts from 400 to 450 Defense audits a year. The House Armed Services Committee conducts more than 30 investigations in an average year, each one requiring about 1,700 hours of time from Defense officials. There's a legitimate place for congressional oversight in a democracy, but this is ridiculous.

The meddling is most damaging to national security when it gets to the annual Defense budget. Each year Congress demands ever more budget review materials—which are then used as ammunition to coerce Pentagon spending decisions down to the smallest screw and bolt. In 1977, the budget "justification" required by Congress ran to a mere 12,350 pages; in 1988 it ran to 30,114.

Those who claim Congress hasn't enhanced its power in recent years have to explain the explosion in line-item changes Congress makes in the Pentagon budget. The number of changes doubled in the 1970s and multiplied by several hundred percent from 1982 to 1987. Congress now changes more than 60% of the line items in the Pentagon's annual budget request. No weapons system or policy goes unmolested. The study calculates that such intervention—what to buy, how to build, when to test—delayed one weapons system by six years. It also helps explain why the Pentagon has an acquisitions work force of 582,131—a number so absurd it's hard to believe.

A typical congressional ruse is the tag-team mugging of the strategic defense budget this year by Sens. Bennett Johnston and Jeff Bingaman. The pair first tried to cut the overall SDI budget by 20%, while demanding no cuts at all in directed-energy weapons (which are based in Mr. Bingaman's New Mexico). After a veto threat, the Senators merely demanded "balanced" spending among SDI programs, even though SDI officials think directed-energy weapons are the least important.

The draft report recommends several reforms that would help, including a form of line-item veto known as "enhanced rescission." But the problem won't go away until Congress goes on the wagon, or a President and Defense Secretary begin to campaign against this lunacy. We recommend a televised presidential speech, using the mountain of required congressional reports as a prop.

KENNEBUNKPORT CONSERVATION TRUST

NEWSLETTER

SUMMER 1990 VOL. 1, NO. 1

A sailboat tugs at her mooring under the watchful eye of the Goat Island Light.

PHOTO COURTESY JOURNAL TRIBUNE

History provides the perfect moment

By Tom Bradbury
Trust President

"A Small Town Goes Prime-Time" announced a headline in "Time" magazine just one year ago. With the election of President George Bush, the eyes of the nation became focused on the tiny community of Kennebunkport. Many people at that time worried that such widespread attention would lead to unalterable changes in the essential character of the town. The Kennebunkport Conservation Trust, however, chose to think of the positive. At no other time in our town's history, we realized, had each citizen been so aware of their community's potential for change. Each individual had been forced to examine how they would like their town to grow. The decision was in our hands. We could work hard, and plan, and save all we could while the opportunity still existed. We could alert others to the need of protecting those special areas that might otherwise be lost in the revolutionary development process. Or, we could do nothing, and hope that things would work out for the best. We were at the crossroads, and the direction we chose to take was ours.

The Kennebunkport Conservation Trust decided to make 1989 one of the most active periods in its long history. It was a year when many significant projects were undertaken, a year when many accomplishments were made.

Talks were conducted with the United States Coast Guard, and, if all goes well, the Trust should assume control of Goat Island Lighthouse in the near future. Our desire is to protect this town landmark so that it will remain a source of pride for the community that it has guarded since 1835.

Jon and Elizabeth Milligan announced that the name of "Green Island" would be changed to "President Bush Island" in order to honor and perpetuate the name of Maine's first President of the United States. The island, located not far from Bush's Walker's Point estate, was then turned over to the Trust in memory of Elizabeth's uncle, George C. Perkins. This generous donation greatly adds to the protected beauty of Cape Porpose Harbor, a place that Mr. Perkins deeply loved. For this gift, the K.C.T. is extremely grateful.

Another wonderful contribution to the Trust is currently being made by Mrs. Carolyn Craig, who is donating a six-acre parcel of woodland located at the foot of Crow Hill in Cape Porpoise. Following the fire of 1947, the Craigs spent years preparing the land for replanting and then planted 4,500 seedlings on the property. "My husband spent hours among those trees, making benches and paths," Mrs. Craig recently told a Journal Tribune reporter, "We encouraged people to walk the paths. Near the time of his death, when he was ill, he said, 'I can't bear the thought of people cutting down those trees,' and I said that need never happen." Now, because of Carolyn Craig's gift, her husband's legacy will live on forever, providing joy for all those who find beauty in the forest. The K.C.T. is delighted with this most thoughtful donation.

Negotiations for easements were conducted for open space or wildlife buffers on the Tarkington estate, near Lake-of-the-Woods, and off North Street.

Protective efforts were conducted at Goose Rocks Beach to prevent unwise development of the beach.

And, most exciting of all, the Trust began actively working to create a Maine Audubon Society wildlife

See President/Page 4

Trust making conservation a reality at the local level

If the Kennebunkport Conservation Trust did not exist, Carolyn Craig might have found a way to preserve a little piece of land her late husband loved behind their house in the middle of Cape Porpoise.

Might have, but it would have been a lot more difficult. Carolyn Craig's donation of the six acres of woods off Route 9 is a textbook example of how land conservation and preservation can work at the local level if a few people take enough interest to organize the effort. The Craigs bought the land after the fire of 1947. Frank Craig replanted it with 4,500 trees, which he nurtured over the years. He made paths, built benches, Frank and Carolyn encouraged people to walk the paths. When Frank was sick a few years back, he said he couldn't bear the thought of anybody cutting down the trees. With the Conservation Trust's help, Carolyn is making sure that will never happen. People will be able to walk Frank Craig's paths forever.

The Kennebunkport Conservation Trust was founded in 1973. Its first two conservation projects were Vaughn's Island, near the Shawmut Inn in Cape Emmons on Gravelly Brook Road and a 12-acre easement on North Street property owned by Maurice Gendreau behind the former home of Pulitzer Prize winning author Booth Tarkington.

Thomas Bradbury, president of the Kennebunkport Conservation Trust, says that organizations like his not only raise money to buy land outright or acquire conservation easements, they educate the public and potential donors to the value of land preservation and foster a general awareness of the need for land and resource conservation. Bradbury says conservation trusts provide an outlet for people who feel helpless in the face of change brought on by development. Land trusts encourage voluntary land preservation — donation or sale of the land or a conservation easement to the trust, in some cases with tax benefits — rather than forcing conservation through zoning. If you wonder whether conservation works only in so-called rich communities like Kennebunkport, Bradbury points out that there are now 55 land trusts operating in Maine, recording successes all over the state: "The spirit of donating and protecting land is the same everywhere."



Porpoise, and the River Green in Kennebunkport's Dock Square. During the past 15 years, the trust has helped landowners to put several hundred acres of land into protected public use. In addition to the six acres being doanted by Carolyn Craig, the organization is also working on the acquisition of 110 acres owned by Steve and Natalie

way to follow their best instincts and make good on the general wish to preserve open space and Maine's quality of life. Every community in the state should have one.

Reprinted by permission of the Journal Tribune, Biddeford, Jan. 26, 1990.



Steve Emmons surveys his Kennebunkport property.

Bringing our dreams within reach

Conservation of our environment calls for action at many different levels. Some organizations work to solve statewide problems; while others have more local focus for their efforts. Both are vital if we expect to protect the high quality of Maine's environment. And they will be most successful when they work in cooperation.

One of the ways in which Maine Audubon seeks to address its state-wide mission is through a network of sanctuaries. Sanctuaries offer the public unique opportunities for encounters with nature; they can also form the focus for local conservation efforts. Sanctuaries inspire strong volunteer support, and they need a core of active volunteers if they are to reach their full potential, whether in providing education programs or simply trails for quiet contemplation and passive recreation.

That is why we at Maine Audubon are delighted to be working closely with the Kennebunkport Conservation trust as we make plans for a sanctuary for Kennebunkport. The possibility of such a center is the result of a dream shared with Maine Audubon by Steven and Natalie Emmons. Steve and Natalie wanted to ensure that their beautiful land — nearly 100 hundred acres of mixed forest, fields and wetlands harboring a wealth of wildlife — is protected in the future. But their vision is more than that: they want to share it with the people of Kennebunkport.

Together, we have a vision of an education center with opportunities for guided walks, environmental education displays, as well as just plain areas for public access and enjoyment. Steven is already at work cutting trails that will help bring this dream to fruition.

Here is where the Kennebunkport Conservation Trust comes in. Through their local leadership, their purchase of significant tracts of land within the town, for the town, the Kennebunkport Conservation Trust has established an impressive track record, and has won the confidence of all the people of Kennebunkport interested in conservation. I am confident that with their help, we will be able to guarantee the protection of Steve Emmons' land, and provide the community with a top quality sanctuary. Maine Audubon will provide programs and educational materials. We hope that members of the Kennebunkport Conservation Trust will help us maintain and enhance the property.

I have enjoyed my association with the Trust, and look forward to working with Tom Bradbury even more closely as our dream comes within reach. I urge you to join with Maine Audubon in supporting the Kennebunkport Conservation Trust.



Thomas Urquhart of Maine Audubon.

Thomas Urquhart is Executive Director of the Maine Audubon Society.

A tribute to a man who loved nature

A Cape Porpoise woman has fulfilled a promise to her dying husband by donating a parcel of wooded land to the Kennebunkport Conservation Trust.

The six-acre parcel is at the foot of Crow Hill on the north side of Route 9, according to Trust President Thomas Bradbury.

"It's a delightful piece of land, right in the village of Cape Porpoise," donor Carolyn Craig said, adding that the land was purchased and salvaged after the fire of 1947.

"It took my husband, Frank about five years to prepare the land for replanting," she said. With guidance from the forestry department of the University of Maine, the Craigs bought seedlings for a penny apiece and planted 4,500 trees on the property behind their house over three years.

"At the time, I made the statement I hoped I'd live long enough to walk beneath the trees," said Craig, now 80 years old.

"My husband spent hours among those trees, making benches and paths," she says. "We encouraged

On the shore of Cape Island, one of the early trust properties.

How the Trust protects property

people to walk the paths.

"Near the time of his death, when he was ill, he said, 'I can't bear the thought of people cutting down those trees,' and I said that need never happen," Craig says.

Frank Craig died three years ago.

"I realize if this is to be done, now is the time."

Craig will have a right-of-way designated to the woodsy lot. She is dividing a total of nine acres to donate the land. On the remaining three acres stand her home, and three housekeeping cottages she rents.

Trust president Bradbury said the trust paid several thousand dollars to survey the land. Although the parcel has not been appraised, he said, "It's a significant contribution in terms of land prices in Kennebunkport."

"It's six acres of raw land ... it provides an area of open and protected space very close to the center of Cape Porpoise," he said. "Only time will tell how Cape Porpoise will develop its downtown section."

"Hopefully, we can tie it in to other land to increase its benefit many-fold," he said. "That's part of the problem with piecing land like a puzzle — we're hopeful the pieces will fall together."

Craig said her donation can be used as an example for other people who want to preserve land for conservation rather than development.

Reprinted by permission of the Journal Tribune, Biddeford, Jan. 25, 1990.

There are three major ways in which the Trust adds holdings to its list of those lands which are forever protected.

1. Direct Donation of Land: In many cases, landowners who wished to see certain lands held forever in their natural state have made direct donations of these parcels to the Trust. Because the Trust is a private organization, it is able to be very flexible, and donors can avoid the often time consuming and frustrating process of dealing with state and federal agencies. Because the Trust is a non-profit organization, these gifts become tax deductible. Collectively, the woodlands, marsh lands, and open spaces acquired by donations form the permanent open spaces needed to help promote orderly growth in our community.

2. Conservation Easements: Conservation Easements are a unique, effective way of protecting land for a variety of special purposes, including scenic enjoyment, agriculture, wildlife habitat, watershed protection, public recreation, historic preservation, and even low-density residential use. A conservation easement places limitations on the use of property which are voluntarily adopted by the landowner. The limitations are set forth in a legal document granted to a conservation agency and recorded in the county registry of deeds. The easement becomes part of the title to the property and future owners accept the property subject to the limitations of the easement. As owner of the property, the landowner retains all rights which are consistent with the easement, including the rights to control access and to convey the property.

For the landowner, a conservation easement protects the special attributes of land while keeping it in private hands. Also, conservation easements meeting the standards of the Internal Revenue Code are deductable as charitable contributions and other financial benefits may also be available.

Donated easements offer a low cost way to achieve desired land use.

3. Direct Purchase: When necessary, the Kennebunkport Conservation Trust has committed itself to raising the funds needed to acquire areas of special meaning in our community. You can help us attain this goal. Though much has been accomplished, much more needs to be done. As in the past, we remain a privately funded organization. Our activities are dependent entirely on the individual support of those who share our desire of seeing the most beautiful parts of our community forever protected.

We urge you to join us in that effort.

Kennebunkport is a good place to live. Please help keep it that way by becoming a supporter of the Kennebunkport Conservation Trust.

Yes, I'm interested

☐ I would like to donate $_____

☐ I am willing to help the Trust.

☐ I would like more information. Please contact me.

Name: _____

Address: _____

The Kennebunkport Conservation Trust P.O. Box 28 Cape Porpoise, Me. 04104

President/From Page 1

sanctuary and environmental education center here in Kennebunkport. This wonderful opportunity is made possible because of the generosity of Steve and Natalie Emmons, who have pledged their 110 acres to the preserve. In the months to come, you will be receiving much more information concerning this unique project. We hope that we will be able to count on your support to make this dream come true.

Through the support of those who wish to see parts of our community forever protected, and with their financial backing, the Trust has been able to preserve some of our town's most beautiful and enjoyed properties, including: Vaughn's Island, Cape Island, the River Green, Lake-of-the-Woods, Goose Rocks Beach lots, and much more. Our goal for the future is to add to this list. Though much has been accomplished, much more remains to be done.

In the February, 1990, issue of "Habitat" magazine, Paul Karr wrote, "The Kennebunkport Conservation Trust has been widely hailed as the most innovative and effective local land conservation organization in the state." We have been able to earn such praise only because of your continued backing.

As in the past, we remain a privately funded organization. Our activities are dependent entirely on the individual contributions from those who share our desire of protecting Kennebunkport's unique beauty and character. No officer of the Trust receives a salary or any other type of financial consideration. We attempt to keep operating expenses at a minimum. Thus, contributors can feel safe in the knowledge that their donation is being used exclusively for our stated goal.

On behalf of the Board of Trustees, I wish to express my sincere thanks to all of those who have supported, and who continue to support, our efforts. We are most appreciative. And we reach out to others in the community to join us in our protection efforts. Together, we can make a difference.

Former Secretary of State Edmund Muskie, flanked by his wife Jane and Kennebunkport Conservation Trust President Tom Bradbury, at last year's wine-tasting party at Seascapes in Cape Porpoise.

Kennebunkport Conservation Trust
P.O. Box 28
Cape Porpoise, Maine 04014

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