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Konrad
- Adenauer-
Stiftung



Washington Research Office

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September 27, 1990


Mr. Daniel McGroarty
Communications Department
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Telefax: 3 pages -

Dear Mr. McGroarty:

Pursuant to our telephone conversation I am sending you attached the German text as well as the translation of two very good quotes of Konrad Adenauer relating to the German unification. Please let me know if you need any further information.

Sincerely yours,


Helga Leis
Executive Assistant

Enclosures

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Communications Department
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

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Translation

- 1) When I speak of peace in the world and in Europe,
..... I must hark back to the division of Germany. The
division of Germany will one day be lifted - this is
our firm conviction This division of Germany was
caused by tensions that arose between the victorious
powers. These tensions, too, will pass. Then, we
trust, nothing will impede reunification with our
brothers and sisters in the Eastern Zone and Berlin.
(Policy Statement, 20th September 1949)

Translation

- 2) The German question cannot be resolved solely by us
and the adversary who oppresses us; this problem can
be resolved only with the help of our friends. And we
thank God, that we have friends again in this world
..... it is this very friendship within Europe,
outside Europe, with the United States, with all the
free peoples of the world, that allows us to expect
with confidence that reunification in freedom will
come some day.
(Speech, 15th October 1963)

KONRAD ADENAUER**Äußerungen zur deutschen Einheit**

- 1) "Wenn ich vom Frieden in der Welt und in Europa spreche, dann . . . muß ich auf die Teilung Deutschlands zurückkommen. Die Teilung Deutschlands wird eines Tages - das ist unsere feste Überzeugung - wieder verschwinden . . . Diese Teilung Deutschlands ist durch Spannungen herbeigeführt worden, die zwischen den Siegermächten entstanden sind. Auch diese Spannungen werden vorübergehen. Wir hoffen, daß dann der Wiedervereinigung mit unseren Brüdern und Schwestern in der Ostzone und in Berlin nichts mehr im Wege steht."
(Regierungserklärung 20. September 1949)

- 2) "Eine Lösung der deutschen Frage ist nicht möglich allein zwischen uns und dem Gegner, der uns bedrückt; eine Lösung dieser Frage ist nur möglich mit Hilfe unserer Freunde. Und wir danken Gott, daß wir wieder Freunde in der Welt gefunden haben . . . Gerade diese Freundschaft in Europa, außerhalb Europas, mit den Vereinigten Staaten, mit allen freien Völkern der Welt, gibt uns erst ein Recht, mit Sicherheit zu erwarten, daß eines Tages auch die Wiedervereinigung in Freiheit erfolgen wird."
(Ansprache 15. Oktober 1963)

5-09 has
reminded us
that there
is

At the very time it is
restructuring at a time when
its potential missions
may well increase.

Especially, given the
changes of this part of
the ~~State~~ ^{U.S.} necessity of a strong
range for power-projection.

I believe I could bring to
the position a strong ~~background~~
and a proven record of
accomplishment ~~in~~ in high-level
positions at ~~NSA~~ ^{NSA} & DoD.

Chronology of White House Activity in German Unification

- Oct-Nov 89 President tells press of his unqualified support for German unification, establishes his initial credibility on this issue with German public
- Dec 3 89 In Brussels (after Malta Summit), having met earlier in day with Chancellor Kohl, President announces principles to rally NATO support for rapid German unification. Principles are subsequently echoed in EC Summit declaration from Strasbourg.
- Feb 9 90 On eve of Kohl's first trip this year to the Soviet Union, President sends him a message assuring him of US backing on future of Four Power rights. Kohl later said publicly that this letter was a landmark in postwar German-American relations. 8. [
- Feb 10-11 90 President meets with NATO Secretary General Woerner at Camp David to discuss the strategy for relating German unification to the future of the North Atlantic Alliance.
- Feb 24-25 90 President meets with Chancellor Kohl at Camp David, wins unequivocal agreement -- announced publicly -- that a united Germany will remain a full member of NATO, including its integrated military structures.
- Mar 15 90 President talks to Chancellor Kohl on the phone and arrive at a common understanding on handling of Polish border issue.
- Apr 13 90 President meets with Prime Minister Thatcher in Bermuda, reaches common agreement on agenda for Two Plus Four and termination of Four Power rights at time of German unity.
- Apr 19 90 President meets with President Mitterrand in Key Largo, reaches common agreement on agenda for Two Plus Four and termination of Four Power rights at time of German unity.
- Apr 25 90 President writes to Chancellor Kohl and details the emerging common Allied position on Two Plus Four issues.
- May 2 90 President writes to all NATO leaders to preview his Oklahoma State University speech on the goals for the NATO Summit and review US thinking on the agenda for the Two Plus Four, urging that NATO join this position at the upcoming May 4 NATO ministerial (at which Allies did follow the US lead).

- May 17 90 President meets again with Chancellor Kohl in Washington, reaches firm agreement to resist Soviet effort to delink Four Power rights from internal unification and avoid singularizing constraints on a united Germany.
- May 30 90 President talks to Chancellor Kohl on the phone to harmonize approach President will take into his meetings with President Gorbachev.
- Jun 3 90 After meetings with President Gorbachev in Washington, the President announces -- at a joint news conference -- that the two leaders are in full agreement that the matter of Alliance membership is, in accordance with the Helsinki Final Act, a matter for the Germans to decide. Gorbachev does not challenge this statement (which in fact is position he took in announcing his agreement with Kohl on July 16).
- Jun 8 90 President meets again with Chancellor Kohl in Washington and reviews strategy for the coming months, including the NATO Summit.
- Jun 21 90 President writes to Chancellor Kohl, and other key Allied leaders, detailing his approach to the NATO Summit and presenting the US-proposed draft Summit Declaration, the London Declaration for a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance.
- Jul 3 90 Having already sent second messages to Prime Minister Thatcher and President Mitterrand on the NATO Summit, the President talks to Chancellor Kohl and the Prime Ministers of the Netherlands, Belgium, and Denmark to rally Allied support for the US initiatives.
- Jul 5-6 90 NATO leaders, having agreed to work from the US-proposed text, agree to the President's initiatives in a pathbreaking Summit Declaration in London. Soviet leaders promptly welcome NATO's move.
- Jul 16 90 Kohl and Gorbachev make their joint announcement. Gorbachev states: "We have received a very important impulse from the conference in London...which brought very positive steps.... If the ...step of London had not been made, then it would have been difficult to make headway at our meeting."
- Jul 17 90 President talks to Gorbachev and to Kohl. Kohl tells the President: "Without our friends, we couldn't have experienced this day. And that means the United States and you, Mr. President, your performance in the past few months."

Initial Draft 4/17

I am pleased, and satisfied, with the Soviet decisions on Germany. I spoke this morning with Chancellor Kohl and with President Gorbachev. We all feel that the agreement announced yesterday is a historic step forward.

I would like to reflect for a moment on how we got here. In looking back, I think there were three important stages in this process. First, everyone had to accept that the unification of Germany was really going to happen, and that it was right. I remember telling the press last October, before the Berlin Wall came down, that when we said we support German unity we really meant it, without qualifications. And when Chancellor Kohl announced his ten point plan in November, there were a few people who thought he was moving too quickly. So in Brussels after my meeting in Malta with President Gorbachev I offered some principles to help rally NATO support for rapid unification in peace and freedom, and we got that. After the East German elections in March, people began to realize that unification could actually occur this year. My view was: the sooner it comes the better. I think the German people have appreciated that stand.

The second stage was to put together a solid Western position on the external aspects of German unification. We created the Two Plus Four process in Ottawa in February and then [Chancellor Kohl and I had a long talk later that month at Camp David about the alignment of a united Germany.] He came out, after those meetings, and agreed unequivocally that a united Germany needed to remain in NATO, including its integrated military structures. Throughout the spring we worked on the details of our position, and I talked about it with Prime [Minister Thatcher in Bermuda and President Mitterrand in Key Largo. You'll recall that, after each of those meetings, we had a solid meeting of the minds on Germany and I was able to announce that we all agreed that Four Power rights should come to an end at the time Germany is unified.

The third stage, though, was to persuade the Soviet Union. President Gorbachev and I discussed this in Washington. In our joint press conference, I said I thought we both agreed that Germany should be free to choose to which alliance it would belong. President Gorbachev didn't challenge that, and I thought that was a good sign. It in fact turned out to be the position he took yesterday. But we also had to show him that the NATO Alliance was not his enemy, but was a force for stability that could adapt to the new realities in Europe. That's why the NATO Summit in London was so important, where my colleagues agreed to our proposals for a transformed Alliance. I appreciated President Gorbachev's comment yesterday, that without the "very important impulse" from the London Declaration, it would "have been difficult to make headway" in his meeting with Chancellor Kohl.

Both Chancellor Kohl and President Gorbachev have displayed exceptional qualities of leadership during this challenging period. We can all take pride in the way Europe is heading into this new era of freedom. It's a goal we Americans have long worked to achieve.