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REVIEW OF THE PATRIOT ATM HISTORY

1965

SAM-D project office formed 1st program manager Col B. R. Luczak.

Requirement identified need for improved air defenses to replace Nike Hercules. Provide for high altitude air defense and anti-missile defense.

1966

Program authorized by SecDef; contract for concept definition awarded with Raytheon, Hughes, and RCA in competition.

2nd Program manager BG E. M. Dooley

1967-71

Advanced development contract that was to run until 1971.

3rd PM Col James Miller, Jr.

First propulsion control tests in 1970.

1972-74

4th PM BG J. Fimiani.

Program conducts engineering development.

Successful DSARC and review by SecDef.

Requirement for nuclear warhead deleted as a result of cost effectiveness analysis; anti-missile capability also deleted.

1974-76

5th PM MG C. F. Means, Jr.

Program cycle delayed to conduct proof of principle tests of the "track-via-missile" guidance concept which is unique to the Raytheon design.

Proof of principle test firings complete in 1976.

1977-80

6th PM MG Oliver D. Street, III.

Decision to accelerate the program made in 1977.

Engineering development re-initiated in 1977 - completed in 1978-79.

Development tests/operational tests II conducted in 1980.

DSARC III in 1980 approved continued low rate production based on Army prototype confirmation test program; follow-on evaluation to be conducted using production hardware.

First production buy begins in 1980.

1981-83

7th PM BG Jerry M. Bunyard.

Conducted prototype confirmation program successfully; received Army and OSD approval to proceed to production validation and verification follow-on test.

Developed the Patriot Pre-Planned Product Improvement (P3I) Program, which included the software and hardware modifications to the radar and missile (to develop anti-tactical missile (ATM) capabilities.) Presented program to Army and OSD leadership and obtained approval of concept. Briefed Congressional staffs.

USDDR&E (Wade) approved justification for major systems new start for anti missile program with Army as lead.

First Patriot missile battalion (1/43d ARTY) activated at Fort Bliss, TX, May 1982.

First European Battalion activated, 1983.

Army leadership, at program manager's recommendation, directed one year development delay due to production quality problems.

New manufacturing methods initiated for production validation.

Initiated talks with Japan on procurement.

Met with NATO project office leading to bi-lateral agreements with Germany and the Netherlands.

Follow-on evaluation revealed unsatisfactory maintenance and support record. Army leadership directed a one-year European deployment delay and continued follow-on evaluation.

1983-85

8th PM BG Don Infante.

Instituted new manufacturing methods and support concepts for follow-on evaluation and production validation and verification.

Conducted readiness review for Undersecretary of Army and successfully passed follow on evaluation (FOE) III.

Deployed first unit to U.S. forces in Germany in 1st quarter 1985.

The Netherlands, in 1984, becomes first nation to buy Patriot, and plans for deployment of four fire units in its air defense sector. U.S.-German talks begin on the German Patriot program.

"Patriot Self Defense Against Missile Attack" identified as a response to a newly developed JMSNS requirement -- to meet the threat posed by accurate SS-21/\$\$23 conventional missiles that could now target key military targets and SAM sites in deep attack scenarios.

Beyond Patriot's active defense mission, this concept of operations, developed at Fort Leavenworth, also included passive defenses, counterforce, and battle management.

Patriot ATM concept developed as a means to protect a 2KMx10KM footprint centered on the Patriot fire unit itself; modification would require (a) software changes to enhance guidance and radar surveillance -- to enable missile acquisition and tracking; and (b) hardware changes involving Patriot's fuze and warhead -- to improve its lethality.

The Army's Patriot ATM improvements are funded in Army 063302A.

OSD (DDR&E) reach the following conclusions regarding the Patriot upgrade.

- Patriot will only have enough missiles to do the air defense mission and not the anti-missile mission.
- Anti-missile concept is technically too difficult.
- There is clearly a threat to Patriot. A \$.5M \$\$21 can destroy a \$120M SAM fire unit, so defense is needed.

- Wouldn't the concept of anti-missile counter battery fire from the Patriot site make time efficient sense?

- What is the Army plan and intention?

1985-86

9th PM Col Larry Capps.

Japanese select Patriot to replaced Nike Hercules; subsequently select Mitsubishi Heavy to manufacture Patriot under licensed production.

U.S.-German agreement approved -- a complex compensation package providing for production of Patriot components in Germany, provision of Patriots to Germany, German operation of U.S. owned Patriots, and German furnished short range air defense of key air bases in Germany.

Germany buys 14 fire units, is provided 12 additional fire units to operate for the U.S. U.S. deployment to Germany planned ultimately to be 54 fire units.

Army Secretariat commissions Bell Labs review of the ATM upgrades proposed by Raytheon. Initial draft of report is unfavorable -- cites urgent need for anti-missile defense, but questions Raytheon's analysis of the Soviet threat and possibility of unusual warheads. Report suggests that hit-to-kill (second antonymous seeker) technology demonstrated by SDIO/SDC Flage experiment is more pertinent.

→ Bell Labs report is used by Senate Army Services Committee Staffer Toney Battista to delete funds requested by the Army to upgrade the program. Results in delay of a year.

3rd Quarter 1986

Patriot intercepts lance missile at White Sands Missile Range. Test proves PAC I software MODS work and "mission kill" capability of Patriot system under low rate attacks.

Dutch informally inform the Army that they do not want the ATM upgrades for their Patriot systems given the politics of anti-missile systems.

Patriot modifications divided into two packages: PAC I involves software upgrades; PAC II involves hardware upgrades. Plan developed to complete PAC I upgrades by 1988 and begin PAC II in 1991.

Italians begin discussions on their acquisition of Patriot to replace Nike Herclues.

PAC II concept expanded to provide "area" defense around the Patriot fire unit (vs self defense concept of earlier years).

1987-91

10th PM Col Bruce Garnett.

Patriot production plan and multi-year procurement of Patriot missiles continue.

Italians decide to procure Patriot.

SDIO provides funds for Patriot Dual Mode Seeker experiment in 1989-90 and remote launch experiment in 1990-91.

Deputy Secretary of Defense appoints Director of Strategic Defense Initiative Organization as the DoD Central Manager for all anti missile programs -- including Patriot modifications -- beginning FY 1991.

SDIO provides FY 91 funds for Dual Mode Seeker tests and identifies FYDP Research & Development and Procurement funds for Patriot anti missile components.

Iraq attacks Kuwait; U.S. response in August (Desert Shield) leads to decision by Col Garnett to accelerate PAC II missile production. Action changes original plan of providing 3 missiles for test in January 1991 to significant capability in November 1990.



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The President belongs to what I like to describe as the "don't screw around" school of military strategy. That if you're going to send American forces in harm's way, you better assume that they may well in fact become involved in conflict, and it's incumbent upon those of us who send them to make absolutely certain that they've got all the support and all the numbers and all the equipment and all the supplies and munitions they need to deal with any eventuality. Until we've reached that point, until we're absolutely confident that we do indeed have that kind of capability in the area, we have no desire whatsoever to stop the deployments, no matter what some of our expert friends around Washington or on CNN may think the target should be.

The House yesterday finished the House Authorization Bill for fiscal year 1991. Let me say just a word about that if I can. The most damaging part of the bill is the fact that it was a bad piece of legislation when it came out of committee; it did not reflect at all any kind of long term concern for where we ought to be headed with respect to military force; and they made a token gesture yesterday when they finally approved the bill by adding \$1 billion for Desert Shield for fiscal year 1991. That's less than what it would cost us to operate per month -- assuming there are no hostilities. It's a totally inadequate piece of legislation.

My friend, Les Aspin, will argue that this is the first piece of legislation that reflect the new post-war world, I believe is the way he described it. If Les Aspin had been making those decisions 10 or 15 years ago, we wouldn't be able to do today what we're doing in the Persian Gulf.

The bottom line of the bill as it came out of committee, and as the Democrats passed it through the House yesterday, is that it cuts upwards of 130,000 U.S. military personnel in the next 12 months. I'm being told at the same time that we have to maintain our forward deployments in key places around the world, take care of the problem in the Middle East, set up a rotation base so that about a six month tour becomes the norm over there, and oh by the way, get rid of 130,000 active duty military personnel. It totally fails to recognize that that kind of harsh action which would require me to run a reduction in force, not just to handle it through attrition and through careful management of the personnel system, it requires me to go out and RIF people, fire them.

You might remember that everybody wearing the uniform today is a volunteer. There isn't anybody out there who wants to get out of the service. We've got thousands and thousands of reservists trying to get in, and who are banging on the doors to be called to active duty so they can have an opportunity to serve at a time of national need. If we have to live with that piece of legislation, which we won't -- I'm convinced the President will veto it if it lands on his desk in that form -- but if we had to live with that kind of legislation, it would make it absolutely impossible for us to do our job. The claim that Les made yesterday that somehow this bill reflects the new post-war world is just garbage. It's not true, it's not valid, and I would urge everybody to take a very careful look at it.

With respect to the strategic programs in the first part of the bill, it's easy now for everybody to say because things have gotten better with the Soviets we don't need strategic systems any more, we don't need SDI. That's dead wrong. The fact is that while there are significantly improved relations with the Soviets, and while we do indeed see them pulling their troops out of Eastern Europe, and while we do see cuts in the Soviet defense budget and a reconfiguration of their own forces, the one thing they have not stopped is their strategic buildup. They continue to build new, modern, strategic systems. We built one ballistic missile submarine last year, they built two. We built 12 ballistic missiles last year, they built 140. They are deploying two new mobile missiles,

we aren't deploying any. The notion that somehow because relations have improved and we no longer have to be as concerned about the Warsaw Pact as we once were, there are now democratically elected regimes in most of those countries, we do have to be concerned about Soviet strategic capability.

On SDI, the arguments, I think the rationale for strategic defense are more important than they've ever been, for several reasons. One, of course, is that the Soviets do continue to improve their overall strategic posture with new and improved systems. Secondly, because we've got no capability today to defend against a Soviet attack. All we can do is obliterate the Soviet Union. But if we look at the situation we're faced with in the Middle East you see another very strong rationale of the central force ... strategic defenses.

Right now, today, with 150,000 plus troops in Saudi Arabia, ... are facing in Iraq several hundred Scud missiles and Scud variants. The Scud is a Soviet system, about a 300 kilometer range, not very accurate. As a military weapon armed with a conventional warhead it's not of any great concern. It might be able to hit a city, but it's very hard for them to hit a military unit that would have any significant military impact. But if you marry that capability up with chemical weapons, you've got a whole different proposition. Certainly it's an instrument of terror. If you marry it up with the biological and nuclear capabilities, then, of course, the picture begins to be radically different than what it's been in the past.

In addition, Saddam Hussein has taken the Scud and built two variants from it, sort of home-grown vehicles that have smaller payloads but a long range, so he can probably reach out maybe 550-600 kilometers with those systems. He's not going to hit the United States from Baghdad with that kind of equipment, but he can certainly target U.S. forces and U.S. friends and allies in the region. He isn't the only one who has or is developing that kind of capability. We estimate by the end of the decade there will be at least 15 Third World nations with ballistic missile capability. Even though most of that is likely to be short range or intermediate range stuff, the fact is today we've got virtually no capability to defend against that kind of attack -- none, zero, zip. Anybody who tells you to the contrary doesn't know what he's talking about.

That portion of the defense budget, that program under which the capability to deal with that kind of threat is to be found, is SDI -- the Strategic Defense Initiative. That's where we deal with that kind of ballistic missile capability. For the House of Representatives, for my friend Les Aspin, and I won't say the House, I'll say the majority in the House yesterday to take the action they did on SDI in my mind is absolutely incomprehensible. I don't see how at a time when you've got U.S. forces open to that kind of threat and no capability to deal with it, we would want to cut that part of the defense budget that would give us that kind of capability long term.

This notion that somehow the new, more peaceful world means we can dramatically alter the defense budget I think is wrong. I think over four, five, or six years we can in fact reduce our forces. We aren't going to need to be prepared to maintain the troop levels in Europe we have for so many years, and that's been a major driver in terms of our defense budget. Although we do want to stay active in Europe we can draw down some of our forces in the Pacific and we're doing that. But we do need to be able to retain our strategic capabilities. We do need to be able to maintain our forward deployment and be able to retain the forces here at home to reinforce overseas when we need it.

While it is a time for us, I think, to talk about new strategy and the need to respond with new thinking, if you will, about the way we deal with military capabilities, there are a couple of absolutely crucial, what I call enduring realities, that are still going to be valid in the future just as they have in the past.

First and foremost is that peace and stability in the world, more likely than not, will depend upon the military capability of the United States of America. We're going to need robust military forces and be able to deploy them when necessary. We aren't going to have a dog in every fight and we aren't going to want to be in every fight. But when our fundamental interests are threatened, we have to be able to respond.

Secondly, our most important military asset, the thing that counts for more than anything else, the thing that's absolutely crucial in terms of maintaining that kind of capability and being able to use it in the future is in fact the willingness of a great many Americans to put on the uniform and to serve in the United States military, to go in harm's way to defend... The bill that the House passed yesterday is totally inadequate in those respects, and I'm fairly confident that...

(END)

TALKING POINTS ON GPALS

- o President Bush, State of Union Address:
 - directs SDI to provide protection against limited ballistic missile strikes.
 - such a defense can protect the United States, U.S. forces deployed overseas, U.S. power projection forces, U.S. friends and allies.
- o This system is called GPALS
 - Global Protection Against Limited Strikes
- o GPALS is a layered defense concept.
 - Space- and surface-based sensors to provide global, continuous surveillance and tracking, from launch to intercept or impact, of ballistic missiles of all ranges. (Studies show use of space sensors allow for reduction in the size, cost and number of surface-based sensors and weapons, while increasing performance.)
 - Interceptors, based both in space and on the ground or at sea, provide high-confidence protection to targets under attack.
 - Space based interceptors could provide continuous, global interdiction capability against missiles with ranges in excess of 600-800 kilometers.
 - Surface based interceptors, located in the U.S., deployed with U.S. forces and, potentially deployed by U.S. allies, could intercept missiles of any range and with any type of wahead.
 - Interceptors would destroy attacking missiles simply by colliding with them at great speeds.
- o Strategic Defenses will be affordable; less costly than Phase One, even with the added Theater Missile Defense element.
- o GPALS directly addresses security issues that exist today and will become more acute in the future.
- o As a result of refocusing the SDI program toward GPALS, the priority assigned to theater defense programs already underway has been significantly increased.
 - Iraqi use of ballistic missiles against Coalition Forces and Israel in the Middle East highlights the requirement for theater missile defenses as an essential element in our military posture.

REVIEW & OUTLOOK

Brilliant Pebbles

As public policy, strategic defense has begun to resemble one of those giant beach balls that kids play with in swimming pools. No matter how much the critics want to submerge it, sit on it or kick it to the bottom, SDI always has enough buoyancy to rise back to the surface.

Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney himself made the TV-talk-show rounds this week saying both that SDI had been "oversold" and that he remains a "strong advocate" of some form of space-based defense. Perhaps he's already been briefed on "Brilliant Pebbles," the latest SDI technology to bob up despite Establishment skepticism. Lieutenant General George Monahan, the new head of the Pentagon's SDI office, said last week that Brilliant Pebbles has "excellent potential" to reduce costs. And Vice President Dan Quayle last week extolled the concept as "one of the most promising lines of research" into strategic defense.

The current Brilliant Pebbles enthusiasm was kicked off by Lieutenant General James Abrahamson's farewell memo summing up his tenure as head of the SDI office. He focused on Brilliant Pebbles as the route to "both improved performance and dramatic cost reduction." With continued efforts, he wrote, a Brilliant Pebbles concept "can be proven in two years, with deployment starting three years later. This could be accomplished for less than \$10 billion." Throwing in the costs of command and control and fail-safe communications, General Abrahamson figures the whole thing could be deployed for \$25 billion over five years.

Brilliant Pebbles would consist of several thousand small interceptor satellites based in space, floating separately in several different orbits. They would be inert until activated by a command sent from earth upon warning of Soviet or other attack. Each interceptor would have its own "eyes" to be able to track the rocket plume of a ballistic missile, and when activated would head for the nearest missile and ram it at high speed, destroying it with the simple force of impact.

It all sounds like sci-fi fantasy, but of course so did the idea of the U.S. putting a man on the moon or building something called the Space Shuttle. The striking thing about Brilliant Pebbles is how much progress already has been made. While the Luddites were saying it couldn't be done, Low-

SDI scientists were working. As originally conceived, SDI's space-based interceptors were going to be huge and expensive. But Brilliant Pebbles has emerged from America's genius for miniaturization and computerization. Just as the size and cost of computers have fallen dramatically, the same advances may make it possible to shrink the size and cost of "smart"—that is, computerized—interceptors.

Brilliant Pebbles would of course be only a partial defense—not the "perfect umbrella" that President Reagan liked to talk about. But even such a partial defense would have enormous benefits. Since it would circle the globe, it would protect allies in Europe and Asia as well as the mainland U.S. It would make sure a defense is in place if nuclear or chemical missiles are developed by adventuresome small powers like Gadhafi's Libya. It also would make nuclear war much less likely by complicating the task of a Soviet planner contemplating a first strike. How could he be sure, in a world of Brilliant Pebbles, that he'd hit his targets?

General Abrahamson's price tag of \$5 billion a year for five years is not only light years less than the billions and trillions that the skeptics charged any strategic defense would cost, but also is competitive with other strategic alternatives. Washington currently is debating how to spend tens of billions to deploy a new "survivable" land-based nuclear missile—the mobile MX or Midgetman. But as General Abrahamson points out, Brilliant Pebbles has the potential to enhance deterrence just as much, just as quickly, and perhaps for less money than either new missile, let alone the cost of both.

Brilliant Pebbles plays to America's competitive strengths—technology in optics, small computers, guidance systems—instead of trying to match the Soviets at what they do best—rolling out missile after missile without fear of lawsuits from environmentalists or peaceniks. The emergence of so feasible a concept so quickly vindicates Ronald Reagan's judgment in launching the SDI program. He understood that science advances in ways we don't expect, that answers would be forthcoming if we unleashed U.S. scientists on defense. Mr. Reagan's contribution was moral—releasing those pent-up energies by destroying the perverted notion that defense against nuclear at-

August 14, 1990

WHAT THE DEMOCRATS HAVE DONE TO DISMANTLE OUR NATIONAL SECURITY:

-Throughout the last decade, the Democratic Congress has repeatedly tried to kill the:

1. MX
2. Midgetman
3. B-2
4. SDI (25% cuts every year)

-Specifically re. FY '91, the House Armed Services Committee recently voted to:

1. Cut over \$24 billion from the Presidents Defense budget for FY '91.
2. Kill the MX and Midgetman
3. Kill the B-2 ("stealth") bomber
4. Reduce SDI budget from President's request of \$4.6 billion to \$2.9 billion (a cut of \$1.7 billion)

-Meanwhile, the Senate has already:

1. Voted to cut SDI to \$3.6 billion, and to effectively kill the "brilliant pebbles" program with an allotment of \$129 million.
2. Approved the Bingaman/Shelby Amendment which would place 11 line items in the SDI budget, and effectively eliminate the President's ability to ever deploy SDI.

-KEY POINTS HERE:

1. The President is committed to SDI, and his choice of Henry Cooper to head SDI has been widely praised in the defense community as a signal of his commitment.
2. The President is working towards an historic START treaty with the Soviets, a treaty which assumes the future development of MX, Midgetman, B-2, and SDI. These reckless Democratic cuts will render a START treaty useless, and even harmful to our security interests. For example,
 - the Soviets would have two mobile missile programs (as per the treaty) and we would have NONE.
 - the Start treaty favors strategic bombers, but B-2 is our strategic bomber.

-CONCLUSION: THE DEMOCRATS HAVEN'T CHANGED. THEY STILL WANT RECKLESS DEFENSE CUTS, THEY STILL WANT TO SACRIFICE THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES. WE SAID NO BEFORE, AND WE'LL SAY NO AGAIN. PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH BROUGHT AN END TO THE COLD WAR, AND FREEDOM TO NICARAGUA AND PANAMA. NOW IS THE TIME TO CAPITALIZE ON HARD EARNED FREEDOM. THE ISSUE WAS NOT THE COLD WAR; THE ISSUE WAS, AND STILL IS, OUR NATIONAL SECURITY.

Serious Talk About the Nuclear Era

By AARON WILDAVSKY

Both a history and a lament, B. Bruce Briggs's "The Shield of Faith: The Hidden Struggle for Strategic Defense" (Simon & Schuster, 464 pages, \$19.95) is a moving and enlightening history of nuclear defense, poignantly capturing the dismay of those individuals whose lives became bound up in a largely losing effort to persuade their fellow citizens to take defense seriously.

The Strategic Defense Initiative, the author persuades us, can be understood only in the context of the past efforts to reduce the death and damage as well as the likelihood of nuclear war.

Never a dry theorist or a dull geo-strategist, Mr. Bruce-Briggs dwells at the intersection of the personal and the strategic. For example, he notes that Americans don't like suicide missions. When an engineer suggested that air interceptors be used as rammers, their strong wings cutting off weak bomber tails, for instance, this technologically feasible idea was rejected because it reminded the airmen of kamikaze attacks on our B29s. In fact, the Navy became a leader in air defense because it was troubled in late 1944 by suicide planes chock full of bombs, fuel and guidance systems; perhaps the first cruise missiles. Long-range bombers owe their rapid development to the Air Force's unwillingness to send its crews out on one-way missions.

Mr. Bruce-Briggs also is something of a keeper of lost causes, such as civil defense, just because they are right.

Civil defense was destroyed by ridicule. (Who the joke was on we will learn only much later.) It was said that civil defense was ostrichlike: Climbing into holes would not make nuclear war go away. Yet Mr. Bruce-Briggs reminds us that the chilling question—What happens if deterrence fails?—still has no answer. In that case,

who is burying their brains?

Mr. Bruce-Briggs would allow those who think life would not be livable after a nuclear attack to expose themselves to nuclear peril. "But what was ugly—and is ugly," he writes in his usual vigorous vernacular, "is the agitation to prevent others from making the other choice, to live and to recover."

The most serious objection to civil defense was that the greater the belief in the probability of limiting damage, the greater the willingness to contemplate using nuclear weapons. For many, the very thought of defense was pernicious because it increased the chances of initiating nuclear

Bookshelf

*"The Shield of Faith:
The Hidden Struggle
for Strategic Defense"*

By B. Bruce-Briggs

war behind a falsely conceived protective shield. This is how vulnerability was transformed into security.

Who can remember today, as the author usefully reminds us, that in the 1950s liberal Democrats endorsed civil defense, savoring especially its potential for national planning, while conservative Republicans rejected a program of dispersal on the grounds that government would be telling industry where to go and individuals where to live. Nor did opponents ever make clear whether the difficulty was that civil defense was ineffective or provocative. Nowadays President Kennedy's somber caution circa 1962—"Civil defense can readily be justified—as insurance. . . . we trust will never be needed—but insurance which we could never forgive ourselves for forgoing in the event of catastrophe"—would appear not only ludicrous but offensive. Yet

it is no less true now than then.

From the paradox that defenselessness decreases the probability of attack came the corresponding wisdom that defensive measures only breed more dangerous countermeasures to nullify them. "Don't avoid dark streets at night," as Mr. Bruce-Briggs summarizes it, "because that will make the muggers operate in the daylight."

There is, to be sure, an interactive relationship between offense and defense. Calculations about the "cost-exchange" ratio go on all the time. It is hopeless, however to give up defense, if for no other reason than the need to defend the deterrent, our own missiles.

The distinction of "The Shield of Faith," whose very title bespeaks dark humor (practical people presumably want something stronger), lies in its fidelity to the spirit of defense. Had the author expunged a few of his less charitable comments about the individuals involved, his book would gain greater credence. Even so, the people and the pathos of defense come together in a kind of celebration of a cause worthy enough to justify all the personal pain.

The fact that every serious strategist—such as Bernard Brodie, who argued that nuclear offense rendered nuclear defense obsolete—kept qualifying his argument, suggests that the need for defense will always be with us. Should nuclear weapons be reduced to very low numbers, as is now contemplated, however, interest in defense will grow, paradoxically, for it will become both more feasible (fewer weapons to defend against) and more necessary (cheating becomes more important) if we are to rely for our lives and liberties on more than on-sight inspection and faith.

Mr. Wildavsky is professor of political science and public policy at the University of California, Berkeley.

White House Seeks to Show Progress at Pentagon

3/20/89

By George C. Wilson
Washington Post Staff Writer

President Bush plans to lead the ceremonial swearing-in of Defense Secretary Dick Cheney in the Pentagon courtyard Tuesday afternoon in what administration officials said yesterday is an effort to project the image of a Defense Department getting up to full steam after being leaderless for nearly two months as the White House fought for and lost the nomination of former senator John G. Tower (R-Tex.) to be defense secretary.

Rather than wait for this formality, Cheney, who was officially sworn in Friday, has moved quickly to fill key Pentagon posts with several of his associates from the House. However, administration officials said he intends to keep General Motors executive Donald J. Atwood Jr. as his top deputy.

David S. Addington, who worked with Cheney as a Republican counsel to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and as a White House legislative assistant, is expected to play a major role behind the scenes as the new defense secretary's special assistant, a post often filled by a high-ranking military officer.

David J. Gribbin, who as executive director of the House Republican Policy Committee worked closely with Cheney when the Wyoming Republican was minority whip, is slated to become the Pentagon's new chief congressional liaison.

Cheney also intends to name as the Pentagon's top lawyer George Van Cleave, minority counsel when Cheney was ranking Republican on the House committee that investigated the Reagan administration's covert efforts to sell arms to Iran to

generate money for the Nicaraguan Contras.

Cheney's congressional press secretary, Pete Williams, has taken over an office in the Pentagon public affairs enclave in anticipation of becoming the Pentagon's chief spokesman. The Bush administration has approved the selection of Williams, officials said.

Stephen E. Herbits, executive vice president of Seagram Co. Ltd. and former assistant to former defense secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, will be an adviser to Cheney, a longtime friend.

Cheney's choices for deputies leave the futures of many Reagan administration stalwarts at the Pentagon in doubt.

William H. Taft IV, who has been at the Pentagon since the start of the Reagan administration, first as general counsel and since 1984 as

deputy defense secretary, hopes to replace Alton G. Keel as U.S. ambassador to NATO. Former defense secretaries Caspar W. Weinberger and Frank C. Carlucci are backing Taft for the ambassadorship.

Paul D. Wolfowitz, former arms control executive and ambassador to Indonesia, is expected to become undersecretary for policy, officials said. Although Wolfowitz, who was slated to fill the same post for Tower, already is playing the leading role in the Pentagon's review of future strategic forces, his nomination to the policy post has not been made.

Pentagon spokesman Dan Howard, who came to the post from the White House and served under Carlucci, might have kept the position if Tower had been confirmed. But Howard is now looking for an ambassadorship or other government post outside the Pentagon.

Photocopy-Preservation

REVIEW & OUTLOOK

The FSX Flap

What on earth can the Japanese be complaining about? Sure, U.S. Commerce Secretary Robert Mosbacher is trying to scuttle the FSX deal the Japanese made with the U.S. Defense Department. But on the other hand, EPA Administrator William K. Reilly wants to force Americans to buy more Japanese cars, judging from his efforts to persuade the Department of Transportation to raise U.S. fleet mileage standards.

Maybe what the Japanese are complaining about is the confusion. Maybe Americans should complain too.

The FSX flap, which Congress will be revving up again when it returns from Easter vacation this week, is illustrative of a new U.S. inability to make coherent policy.

Up until the FSX became a *cause celebre* in Washington, it didn't seem especially remarkable. Joint ventures between U.S. defense contractors and other allies in weapons development have become routine. When the Japanese suggested that they would like to build a fighter, the Pentagon first tried to persuade them to buy F-16s. Failing that, it agreed to let General Dynamics share F-16 technology with Mitsubishi in the joint development of the FSX. Had it not done so, the Japanese easily could have signed up with the British or French.

Moreover, the F-16 is a 20-year-old design. The U.S. currently is developing the Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF), which is on a higher technological plateau, making more sophisticated use of electronic tracking, aiming and countermeasures and computerized avionics and flight control.

Do the Japanese want to use this project to develop a commercial airliner? Probably. But if Boeing is going to lose its world-wide dominance, it will be mostly Boeing's fault, not the fault of the FSX deal. Nothing will protect the U.S. from industrial decline—something that is by no means imminent—if it throws up protective walls and clings to obsolete technology rather than employing its innovative skills. No country in the world, including Japan, comes close to U.S. capacity for innovation. The "industrial policy" of the Japanese is no match for the decentralized research and development and entrepreneurial activity that thrive in the U.S.

There are, however, problems in the U.S. defense industry, where this country comes closest to having an "industrial policy." Under the current

tangled system of defense procurement and congressional micromanagement, the ATF will require 15 years to develop, compared with just over three years for the F-84 of 30 years ago. It is of course far more complex, but there are other problems. U.S. industry is under more and more pressure from the Pentagon to risk its own money on development, with the result that some contractors are walking away. The "waste, fraud and abuse" witch hunt in Washington has brought a wave of suspensions and debarments of contractors for minor contract violations. No wonder U.S. defense contractors find it more attractive to work for the Israelis or the Japanese than for their own government. Maybe Secretary Mosbacher and Senator Heinz should ask why.

But back to the Japanese. Certainly, with all the dollars accumulated through their insistence on running big trade surpluses, they could have afforded F-16s. That would meet their defense needs and help bring trade and capital flows into better balance. In some sense, they brought this latest congressional dust-up on themselves. While Japan is a sovereign nation and entitled to serve its own needs, it isn't in its own best interests to stir up political resentments in the U.S., a country it is heavily dependent upon for both trade and defense.

The Japanese could go a long way toward taking some of the heat off by making a firm commitment to buy other U.S. equipment to meet U.S. requests that it make a greater effort to defend against the buildup of Soviet military power in the Pacific and Asian coastal waters. It would be timely, for example, to announce a firm commitment for the eight or so AWACS and 17 or so in-flight-refueling tankers they have discussed with the U.S. for years. The FSX won't be operational for 10 years and judging from the trouble the French and Israelis have had with new fighters, maybe not then. The AWACS-tanker deal, at upward of \$5 billion, would help relieve American doubts that the Japanese are interested in two-way trade.

But U.S. policy makers also would profit from self-examination. One question is whether the Secretary of Commerce and Congress are running U.S. defense policy or whether that job still is in the hands of the President and Secretary of Defense.

Cheney Believes Gorbachev Sincere

But Defense Chief Says Cutting West's Forces Would Be Premature

By George C. Wilson
Washington Post Staff Writer

Defense Secretary Dick Cheney, declaring that he has gone from skeptic to believer in the idea that Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev wants to reform his country, said yesterday that the prospect of war between the two superpowers has "receded somewhat."

Cheney, who had a hawkish voting record in the House, said Gorbachev appears to be genuinely committed to restructuring the Soviet Union in ways that lessen the threat to the West but said it is still too early for the United States to reduce military forces in Europe or elsewhere.

Cheney said that in frequent meetings of the National Security Council the Bush administration is focusing on the Gorbachev initiatives and how to respond to them. He said the conclusions from these sessions will shape future U.S. strategic forces and overseas troop deployments.

"At the heart" of this administration review, he said, are "How much of a threat the Soviet Union presents to the West. How has [the threat] changed? What circumstances could lead us to believe that we could reduce our level of vigilance?"

Asked during an interview with four reporters whether the Cold War is over, Cheney replied, "Clearly, the prospects of conflict between the United States and Soviet Union appear to have receded somewhat."

partly because Gorbachev appears "serious" about spending less money on the military.

Questions that need to be answered before the Cold War can be declared over, Cheney added, include what will happen to the Soviet forces to be withdrawn from Eastern Europe, how much the Warsaw Pact military budget will be cut and how much warning the West can expect if relations between the two superpowers suddenly cool.

"It's risky business for us to make basic, fundamental changes in our own posture" until those and other questions, such as "Mr. Gorbachev's tenure," are answered.

"I started out as a real skeptic, frankly, about Mr. Gorbachev," the former Republican representative from Wyoming said.

"Having watched over the last few years, having visited the Soviet Union and [having] visited with him on a couple of occasions and watched this process unfold—sitting in my office last week with the Soviet ambassador discussing the election returns in the Soviet Union, something I never really anticipated having the opportunity to do—I've become a believer in the notion that Gorbachev wants fundamentally to reform Soviet society economically.

"In order to achieve economic change," Cheney said, "he's also going to have to push certain political reforms, i.e. elections. How all that translates into an altered military posture is still an open question."

Turning to key deputies who will help him run the Defense Department, Cheney virtually confirmed Tuesday's Washington Post report that his choices for civilian service secretaries are Assistant Defense Secretary Richard L. Armitage for the Army, Navy Undersecretary H. Lawrence Garrett III for the Navy and Donald B. Rice, head of the Rand Corp., for the Air Force. "I'm not allowed to make announcements of presidential appointments," Cheney said, but he added that the report was based on "good sources."

Cheney, 48, has been criticized, sometimes in letters on editorial pages, for obtaining draft deferments during the Vietnam war but telling the Senate Armed Services Committee during his confirmation hearing that he would have been glad to serve if called. Cheney said that when he was between 18 and 26 there were periods when he was eligible to be drafted but had obtained student and marriage deferments from the draft for most of the period because "I had other priorities in the '60s than military service."

"I don't regret the decisions I made. I complied fully with all the requirements of the statutes, registered with the draft when I turned 18. Had I been drafted, I would have been happy to serve. I think those who did in fact serve deserve to be honored for their service. . . . Was it a noble cause? Yes, indeed, I think it was," he said of U.S. participation in the conflict.

Western military experts have long debated whether specially trained Soviet Operational Maneuver Groups exist. There has been evidence of special, large-scale training exercises in East Germany, but analysts weren't sure what they meant.

Mr. Karber said such groups were part of NATO's "worst-case nightmare," namely, that tank-heavy Soviet units would have the power to quickly exploit NATO weaknesses in northern Germany and punch through to the Rhine River, splitting NATO forces. He believes the Soviet plan was then to encircle and annihilate more powerful U.S. Army units, concentrated mostly in southern Germany.

He said Soviet officials have identified a fifth Operational Maneuver Group in Czechoslovakia, which they say they will remove and disband.

Mr. Karber said that Maj. Gen. G. Batenin, a top military adviser to the Communist Party Central Committee, and other Soviet officials, said the remaining Soviet army units in Eastern Europe will be reconfigured into new, lighter units.

Soviet tank divisions, which have 328 tanks, will be trimmed to 260 tanks. Motorized rifle divisions, which have 270 tanks, will be restructured into new defensive divisions, with 160 tanks and an increased number of light anti-tank weapons. Infantry units based in the Soviet Union, which currently have 270 tanks, will be converted into experimental machine-gun/artillery divisions, which will have about 40 tanks and be trained to fight defensive battles from fortified positions, Mr. Karber said.

Because of their capacity to project offensive power quickly on the ground, tanks have been the measure of aggressive intentions in Central Europe, Mr. Karber said. That Soviet officials have told him that the 5,000 tanks coming out of Central Europe are the Soviet Union's newest tanks, so they will be converted to peaceful uses. He said 5,000 older Soviet tanks, most of them based in the Soviet Union, will be destroyed.

Mr. Karber said the Soviet promises lend credibility to Moscow's campaign to push for military cuts from the West.

What they're talking about is a whole reversal of the structure of military competition that drove the Cold War, he said.

He also said the Soviet leadership's longer-term goals for the year 2000 call for a nuclear weapons-free Europe and for the removal of Soviet military forces from Eastern Bloc countries, with the exception of small command and control and logistics units that would be needed in a military emergency.

The Soviet Navy, he added, is weighing the possibility of removing as many as 50 attack submarines from service, as a gesture to begin bargaining with an eye toward reducing the U.S. carrier fleet.

3/14/89

Soviets Outline Troop-Cut Plan In East Germany

Units Designed to Spearhead NATO Attack to Leave, Aides Tell a U.S. Adviser

By JOHN J. FIALKA

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

WASHINGTON—The Soviet Union says it plans to remove from East Germany four crack army divisions that had been specially prepared to spearhead a possible attack on the West, according to one of the West's leading experts on conventional armaments.

Phillip A. Karber, a senior vice president of Washington-based BDM Corp., said the divisions—called Operational Maneuver Groups—had been given special training, the best commanders, elite troops and extra tanks. But he said they now will be disbanded and their modern tanks will be converted to construction cranes and log-removal machinery, among other uses.

He plans to tell the House Armed Services Committee today that if the Soviets follow their pledge and if North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces remain the same, the threat of a surprise attack on the West has been taken away.

Asked about Mr. Karber's comments, a State Department official said he believed this was the first time the Soviets have acknowledged that they have Operational Maneuver Groups. In effect, they've acknowledged what we've said all along, the official said. They have this offensive capability and it's far beyond what they'd need for defensive purposes.

Mr. Karber is one of the Pentagon's top outside advisers on conventional armament and a well-known hawk on NATO strategy. He said he was taken aside by Soviet officials during a recent trip to Moscow. While other members of a group of touring Western military analysts were taken on a trip on a Soviet Navy cruiser, Mr. Karber said he was invited to a series of meetings with Soviet officials who gave him detailed answers to his questions about a pledge Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev made in December to trim the Soviet army by 500,000 men and 10,000 tanks.

"If the Soviets had asked me to come in and design the cuts so that they would take away the disproportionate (Soviet) threat in Central Europe, I couldn't have done it better, and I can't believe I'm saying that," Mr. Karber said in an interview.

The Soviet proposals, he noted, appear to be part of a master plan that backs up Mr. Gorbachev's propaganda campaign. Already that campaign is causing a signifi-

**The FY 1991
Department of Defense
Budget**



Myths and Reality

**The FY 1991
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Budget**



Myths and Reality


Q: Is most of the DoD Budget allocated to expensive hardware and sophisticated weapons?

A: No. Almost 50 percent (47.2%) of the proposed FY 1991 budget would go to military and civilian personnel and their related costs, including training and medical costs.

Another 12 percent is allocated to the operations and maintenance accounts for the purchase of fuel and for the maintenance and repair of equipment and facilities.

The proposed funding for investment, which totals 40.7 percent of the FY 1991 budget, includes military construction and family housing and; Research, Development, Test and Evaluation of weapon systems, in addition to the procurement of weapons already in production.

Percent Real Growth in Defense Budget Authority




Q: Isn't the Department of Defense budget really continuing to grow?

A: The military budget has declined each year in real terms since FY 1985.

Based on the President's budget for FY 1991, defense has already been cut by 16 percent in purchasing power since FY 1985.

Including budget projections through FY 1995, the total decline since FY 1985 will be 22 percent.

Total Obligational Authority
(\$ in Billions)




Q: Do "big ticket" expenditures on new strategic weapons account for the biggest share of defense budget growth?

A: Strategic forces account for only 8 percent of the proposed FY 1991 budget compared to 9.5 percent five years ago. For example, the Peacekeeper missile, B-2 aircraft, C-17 aircraft, SSN-21 and Strategic Defense Initiative programs represent 6.5 percent of the FY 1991 budget.

If the total budget authority for these programs (\$19.2 billion) were cancelled in FY 1991, it would only save \$4.6 billion in outlays in FY 1991.

**Reductions to FY 1991 Budget Authority
(\$ in Billions)**



Q: Hasn't the Department of Defense budget been left virtually untouched by budget reductions taken to reduce the deficit?


A: The Defense budget has been cut continuously and drastically since January 1986.

The FY 1991 budget level was first projected to the Congress in January 1986 as the last year of the Five Year Defense Plan. This plan called for \$395.5 billion to fund the FY 1991 defense program.

The FY 1991 budget (for the fiscal year that begins on October 1, 1990) is currently being considered by the Congress. The President has requested \$295.1 billion for DoD. That figure is \$100 billion below the original projections in the plan.

1991 DoD Major Force Programs

(Total Budget = \$297.3 Billion)



Q: Does the Department of Defense continue to increase the number of civilian personnel even though the total budget has been reduced each year since 1985?


A: Total DoD civil service employees, by the end of FY 1991, is projected to be the lowest since FY 1984.

A 20,800 reduction is proposed in the number of civilian personnel in the FY 1991 budget.

A reduction of 7,800 personnel is associated with the Defense Management Review and demonstrates the Department's aggressive use of management improvements to reduce staffing wherever possible.

The decreased workload at navy shipyards and aircraft and ordnance facilities results in 13,000 personnel reductions.

Shares of the Budget - Outlays




Q: Does the Department of Defense budget consume the largest share of federal outlays?

A: In 1955, the Department of Defense accounted for 52 percent of all Federal outlays. Payments to individuals (social security, etc.) accounted for 21 percent.

Forty years later, by the end of FY 1995, DoD outlays are projected to decline to 21 percent of total outlays, while payments to individuals will increase to 52 percent. This is a complete reversal of the situation that existed in 1955.

1991 DoD Civilian Manpower (Total Manpower = 1,095,700)



Q: Isn't it true that the Department of Defense budget does not respond to the changes in world events, such as those in Eastern Europe, especially in establishing military manpower levels where the major portion of defense reductions must occur?

A: FY 1991 Active force levels are projected to be 91,400 below the FY 1989 level. Reductions of this magnitude cut into force structure, and two active CONUS (Continental United States) Army Divisions will be deleted in FY 1991.

The proposed total active military end strength will be at the 1980 level. In fact, the Army and Air Force levels will be the lowest since 1950.

Planning is going forward to further draw-down troop strength, equipment and weaponry in Europe in anticipation of the signing of a Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) agreement.

1991 DoD Military Manpower
(Total Manpower = 2,038,800)

