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Series: Speech File Draft Files
Subseries: Chron File, 1989-1993

OA/ID Number: 13538
Folder ID Number: 13538-002

Folder Title:
Aspen Institute 40th Anniversary 8/2/90 [OA 5376] [2]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	26	16	4	2

who's the enemy?
Press Conf.
instability is the enemy

McGroarty/Dooley
July 30, 1990
2:00 pm
[ASPEN]

FIRST DRAFT

PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: THE ASPEN INSTITUTE
ASPEN, COLORADO
AUGUST 2, 1990
5:30 P.M.

*Tone down
sov section*

[Introductory acknowledgements: Aspen officials, alumni.
Prime Minister Thatcher, Ambassador Catto.] I am delighted to
celebrate with you the 40th anniversary of the illustrious Aspen
Institute. //

*add to section
3rd W.?*
*Who's
the
enemy?*

In those 40 years, the **spirit of Aspen** has come to signify
the attempt to bridge the worlds of **thought** and **action**. // And
of course, to understand the tremendous changes taking place
around us. / Think back to the headlines 40 years ago, the
summer of that first Aspen conference in 1950. / North Korea
roared across the 38th parallel. Klaus Fuchs was caught and
convicted for revealing the secrets of the atom bomb to the
Soviets. The **Cold War** -- a term introduced into our political
vocabulary by Bernard Baruch -- **had come into its own, as the
shorthand to describe the half-way house of an armed and uneasy
peace -- a world divided, East from West.** /

That was the world as Aspen came into being -- the world
Aspen sought to **study**, and to **shape**. //

The forty years since then have been a time of tremendous
progress -- for the nations of the West, an era of unparalleled
prosperity, peace and freedom. / But at the same time, we lived
in a constant condition of **tension, Cold War and conflict**. //

That world is now changing. // The decades old division of Europe is now ending -- and the era of democracy-building has begun. In Germany -- the divided nation in the heart of a divided continent -- unity is now assured, as a free and full member of the NATO alliance. / The **Soviet Union** itself is in the midst of a political and economic transformation that has brought unprecedented openness -- and begun a process of change that is at once **full of hope**, and **full of uncertainty.** //

This change has had an undeniable impact on national security strategy as well. / The threat of a large-scale land war -- a Soviet invasion of Western Europe launched with little or no warning -- is today more remote than at any point in the post-war period. / With the emergence of democracy in Eastern Europe, the Warsaw Pact has lost its military meaning -- and after more than four decades of dominance, Soviets troops are beginning to withdraw from Central and Eastern Europe. /

But the fact remains for all these positive changes that the Soviet Union continues to be a world-class military power. They continue to devote 1/4 of their faltering economic capacity to military spending -- and to funnel billions of dollars worth of aid to anti-democratic client-states from Cuba to North Korea. / Even after the conventional arms reductions we are now negotiating, the Soviets will continue to maintain 2 to 3 million men under arms -- a force far larger than any other nation in Europe. / And of course, our number one concern: in spite of

severe economic hardship, the Soviets continue to maintain **and modernize** their arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons. //

We must, therefore, maintain an effective deterrent -- one that secures the peace **not only** in today's climate of reduced tensions, but provides a safeguard against any future reversal from the Soviet Union's present, positive course. [[NSC INSERT ON STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION.]]

Above all, we cannot mistake the great gains democracy has made this past year as proof that America's work in the world is complete. We are all aware of the voices urging America that it can now safely retreat into **isolationism -- that we can turn inward again, now that democracy has won the war of ideas.** //

All of us agree that never before in the post-war era has the likelihood of global war been lower. And yet, for all the distance we have travelled from the depths of the Cold War, we must also recognize that we have not yet entered an era of perpetual peace. //

What we require now is a policy that adapts to the **significant changes** we've witnessed -- without neglecting the enduring realities that will continue to shape our security strategy. // A policy of peacetime engagement every bit as constant and committed to the defense of our interests and ideals in today's world as in the time of conflict and Cold War. //

As long as the United States remains a nation with global interests -- we must maintain a global balance. / American interests in Europe and the Pacific -- the enduring reality of

Soviet power -- all are key reasons why maintaining a forward presence will remain an indispensable element of our strategy.

For instance -- while we may well change our present operating procedures and patterns of deployment -- no amount of **political** change will alter the **geographical** fact that the U.S. **must be a maritime power -- with a Navy second to none.**

And the U.S. will keep a force in Europe as long as our allies believe our presence contributes to stability. The **size and shape** of those forces will change, to suit the new and less threatening circumstances -- and to adapt to a new political climate that calls for forces organized along multinational lines. But for the sake of stability, the overall capability of U.S. forces in Europe will remain substantial. //

In addition to these enduring security interests, America must possess forces capable of responding to emerging threats in corners of the globe that may not at present seem to pose great danger. / In spite of our best efforts to control the spread of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technologies, more nations are acquiring weapons of mass destruction -- and the means to deliver them. / Right now, over 100 countries have cruise missiles -- and 20 countries have the capacity to produce chemical weapons. In the future, even conflicts we once thought of as **regional** may carry far-reaching consequences. //

In this past year, democracy has indeed made great gains. But our world remains one where **radicalism, fanaticism, and a destructive form of nationalism** continue to breed violence and

*new
threats*

leaders, regimes.

terror, aggression and instability. In this world, **American** strength is often the paramount force for peace and freedom. //

Our task today is to shape our defense capabilities to the changing strategic circumstances I've just spoken of. / We know that our forces **will** be smaller. / Secretary Cheney and General Powell are hard at work determining the precise size and composition of the forces we need. But I can tell you now, when all the calculations are complete -- when all our roles and missions are reviewed -- we will be looking at a military force that, **within five years, will be 25% smaller than today's.** //

What matters is how we reshape the forces that remain. The United States would be ill-served by forces that represent nothing more than a scaled-back or shrunken-down version of the ones we possess at present. We could easily end up with more than we need for contingencies that are no longer likely -- and less than we must have to meet emerging challenges. / What we need are not merely **reductions** -- but **restructuring.**

This restructuring must emphasize three key components essential to sustain American security: To cope with the full range of challenges we may confront, we must focus on readiness and rapid response -- and to prepare today to meet the challenges we may face in the future, we must focus on research -- an active and inventive program of defense R&D. //

Let me begin with the component with the greatest long-range consequences -- research. Time and again, we have seen **technology revolutionize the battlefield.** / The U.S. has always

relied upon its technological edge to offset the need to match potential adversaries' strength in numbers. / Cruise missiles, Stealth fighters and bombers, today's "smart" weapons with state-of-the-art guidance systems, and tomorrow's "brilliant" ones -- all of these and more will be a necessary part in prevailing in any future conflict -- and at the same time, saving lives. //

We must realize the heavy price we will pay if we look for false economies in defense R&D. Most modern weapons systems take a minimum of 10 years to move from the drawing board to the battlefield. / The decisions we make **today** -- the programs we push forward, or push aside -- will dictate the kind of military forces we have at our disposal in the year 2000 -- and beyond. // The nature of national defense demands that we **plan now for threats on the distant horizon.** //

Second, as we restructure, we must put a premium on **readiness**. // True military capability never exists **on paper** -- it is measured in the hours spent, and experience gained, on the training ground, under sail, and in the cockpit. Nothing is more short-sighted than cutting training time to cut costs -- and nothing is more demoralizing for our troops than to deny them the training time they need. // **Our soldiers, sailors airmen and marines must be well-trained, tried and tested -- ready to perform every mission we ask of them.** //

In our restructured forces, reserves will continue to play a special role. The need to be prepared for a massive, short-term mobilization has diminished -- along with the threat of Soviet

aggression. Instead of measuring warning time in terms of days and weeks as we were forced to do for the past 40 years -- by the mid-90's, we expect much longer notice of any return to the levels of confrontation that existed in the depths of the Cold War: signs that we could recognize at least one to two years before the outbreak of aggression. // Today we must focus on the capacity to reconstitute our forces -- to **rebuild essential capabilities** -- in a time of increased instability.

Finally, we must focus on rapid response. As we saw most recently in OPERATION JUST CAUSE, the U.S. may be called on to respond to threats from various points on the compass. In an era when threats may well emerge without warning, our ability to defend our interests will depend on our speed and agility.

In many of the conflicts we may face in the future, we will not have the luxury of matching manpower with pre-positioned materiel. That will require **air and sea-lift capacities** at the very least equal to if not more capable than those we possess today. //

A rational restructuring of the kind I've outlined will take five years. And I am confident we can meet the challenges I've outlined today -- provided we proceed with an orderly build-down -- not a fire sale. Any build-down of this magnitude must be managed carefully to **minimize dislocations** -- not just to the military balance, but to morale. And I can say right now, as Commander-in-Chief, that I will not break faith with the young men and women who have freely chosen to serve their country. //

All of us know the challenges we face are fiscal, as well as military. / The budget constraints we face are very real -- but so too is the need for a strong and secure America. The simple fact is: **when it comes to national security, America can never afford to fail or fall short. ///**

Let me say once again how pleased I am to appear here today -- especially with our honored friend, Mrs. Thatcher. / Today, of course, is not the first time President and Prime Minister have shared the stage. That was 44 years ago -- in Fulton, Missouri. // Mrs. Thatcher, the world remembers the address Churchill delivered that day as the "Iron Curtain" speech. / But that wasn't what he called it. He titled it / "**The Sinews of Peace.**" // By that, he meant to summon up a vision of the **strength of free nations -- united in defense of democracy. //**

At long last, we are writing the final chapter of the 20th Century's third great conflict. The Cold War is now drawing to a close. / And yet today -- as in Churchill's time -- the world remains divided. **For all the millions of men and women who won their freedom this past year -- there are hundreds of millions more not yet free. //**

Our challenge today is to overcome this deep division. To marshall the growing forces of the Free World -- to work to bring within reach for the **unfree the liberty that belongs by right to all. //**

Thank you, and may God bless the United States of America.

#

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 31, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
THROUGH: DAVID DEMAREST *DD*
FROM: DAN MCGROARTY *DMG*
SUBJECT: ASPEN INSTITUTE 40TH ANNIVERSARY

I. SUMMARY

On Thursday, August 2, at 3:30 p.m. you will address the opening session of the Aspen Institute's 40th Anniversary Symposium. About 3000 people will attend, 500 of whom are special guests of the Aspen Institute, including Prime Minister Thatcher, Ambassador and Mrs. Catto, business executives, public servants and academics from around the world.

Lodwrick Cook, Chairman and CEO of ARCO, will introduce you. Following the speech, Ann Hudson, a trustee of the Aspen Institute, will present you with a gift.

II. DISCUSSION

The speech (20 min./teleprompter) discusses national security and defense, and the new challenges the U.S. faces in this rapidly changing world.

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McGroarty/Dooley
July 31, 1990
4:45 pm
[ASPEN]

PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: THE ASPEN INSTITUTE
ASPEN, COLORADO
AUGUST 2, 1990
5:30 P.M.

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the attempt to bridge the worlds of **thought and action**. // And
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around us. / Think back to the headlines 40 years ago, the
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The forty years since then have been a time of tremendous
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in a constant condition of **tension, Cold War and conflict.** //

That world is now changing. // The decades-old division of Europe is ending -- and the era of democracy-building has begun. In Germany -- the divided nation in the heart of a divided continent -- unity is now assured, as a free and full member of the NATO alliance. / **The Soviet Union** itself is in the midst of a political and economic transformation that has brought unprecedented openness -- a process that is at once full of hope, and full of uncertainty. //

These changes have transformed our security environment. We are entering a new era. The defense strategy and military structure needed to ensure peace can -- and must -- be different. / The threat of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe launched with little or no warning is today more remote than at any point in the post-war period. / With the emergence of democracy in Eastern Europe, the Warsaw Pact has lost its military meaning -- and after more than four decades of dominance, Soviet troops are withdrawing from Central and Eastern Europe. /

Our task today is to shape our defense capabilities to these changing strategic circumstances. / In a world less driven by an immediate threat to Europe and the danger of global war -- in a world where arms control agreements contribute to stability -- we know that our forces will be smaller. / Secretary Cheney and General Powell are hard at work determining the precise size and composition of the forces we need. But I can tell you now, when all the calculations are complete -- when all our roles and missions are reviewed -- we will be looking at a military force

that, within five years, will be 25% smaller than today's. / America's Armed Forces will be at their lowest level since 1950.

What matters most is how we reshape the forces that remain. The United States would be ill-served by forces that represent nothing more than a scaled-back or shrunken-down version of the ones we possess at present. If we simply pro-rate our reductions -- cut equally across the board -- we could easily end up with more than we need for contingencies that are no longer likely -- and less than we must have to meet emerging challenges. / What we need are not merely reductions -- but restructuring.

What we require now is a defense policy that adapts to the significant changes we are witnessing -- without neglecting the enduring realities that will continue to shape our security strategy. // A policy of peacetime engagement every bit as constant and committed to the defense of our interests and ideals in today's world as in the time of conflict and Cold War. //

And in this world, America remains a **pivotal factor for peaceful change**. / American interests in Europe and the Pacific -- in the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf -- all are key reasons why maintaining a forward presence will remain an indispensable element of our strategy.

And the fact remains for all the positive changes we have seen, the **Soviet Union remains a world-class military power**. Even after the conventional arms reductions we are now negotiating, the Soviets will continue to maintain 2 to 3 million men under arms. / And of course, our number one concern: the

Soviets continue to maintain **and modernize** their arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons. //

We and our allies welcome the new course the Soviet Union has chosen. / But prudence demands that we maintain an effective deterrent -- one that secures the peace not only in today's climate of reduced tensions, but that ensures that renewed confrontation is not an option for any Soviet leadership.

The Soviets will enter a START Treaty with a fully modernized, highly capable and very large strategic force. / We need the B-2. Secretary Cheney has already scaled back the program as much as makes sense. Further delays will only increase costs. / We need to complete the Trident program -- to ensure a survivable, submarine-based deterrent. / We can defer a decision on our land-based ICBMs -- as we see how the START talks proceed -- but we must keep our options open: and that means completing the development of the small ICBM and the rail-based Peacekeeper. / And finally, I am convinced that a defensive strategic deterrent makes more sense than ever before. We must push forward the great promise of SDI -- and we must deploy SDI when ready. //

And the U.S. will keep a force in Europe as long as our allies want and need us there. / The **size and shape** of those forces will change, to suit the new and less threatening circumstances. But we will remain in Europe to deter any new dangers -- and to reassure all of Europe -- East and West -- that the European balance will remain secure. //

Outside of Europe, America must possess forces able to respond to threats in whatever corner of the globe they may occur. / In spite of our best efforts to control the spread of chemical and nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technologies, more nations are acquiring weapons of mass destruction -- and the means to deliver them. / [[Right now, over 100 countries have cruise missiles. 20 countries have the capacity to produce chemical weapons. And by the year 2000, as many as 15 nations will possess ballistic missiles. //]] In the future, even conflicts we once thought of as limited or local may carry far-reaching consequences.

Even in a world where democracy and freedom have made great gains, threats remain. Terrorism. Hostage taking. Renegade regimes and unpredictable rulers -- new sources of instability - - all require a strong and engaged America. //

To cope with the full range of challenges we may confront, we must focus on readiness and rapid response -- and to prepare today to meet the challenges we may face in the future, we must focus on research -- an active and inventive program of defense R&D. //

Let me begin with the component with the greatest long-range consequences -- research. Time and again, we have seen technology revolutionize the battlefield. / The U.S. has always relied upon its technological edge to offset the need to match potential adversaries' strength in numbers. / Cruise missiles, Stealth fighters and bombers, today's "smart" weapons with state-

of-the-art guidance systems, and tomorrow's "brilliant" ones: the men and women in our Armed Forces deserve the best technology America has to offer. //

And we must realize the heavy price we will pay if we look for false economies in defense R&D. Most modern weapons systems take a minimum of 10 years to move from the drawing board to the battlefield. / // The nature of national defense demands that we plan now for threats on the distant horizon. The decisions we make today -- the programs we push forward, or push aside -- will dictate the kind of military forces we have at our disposal in the year 2000 -- and beyond. //

Second, we must focus on rapid response. As we saw most recently in Panama, the U.S. may be called on to respond to a variety of challenges from various points on the compass. In an era when threats may well emerge without warning, our ability to defend our interests will depend on our speed and agility.

We will need forces that give us global reach. No amount of political change will alter the geographic fact that we are separated from many of our most important allies and interests by thousands of miles of water. //

And in many of the conflicts we may face in the future, we may not have the luxury of matching manpower with pre-positioned materiel. That will require air and sea-lift capacities to get our forces where they are needed -- when they are needed. A new emphasis on flexibility and versatility should guide our efforts.

And finally, as we restructure, we must put a premium on

readiness. / Readiness must be our highest priority. / True military capability never exists on paper -- it is measured in the hours spent, and experience gained, on the training ground, under sail, and in the cockpit. Nothing is more short-sighted than cutting training time to cut costs -- and nothing is more demoralizing for our troops than to deny them the training time they need. // Our soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines must be well-trained, tried and tested -- ready to perform every mission we ask of them. //

In our restructured forces, reserves will be important, but in new ways. The need to be prepared for a massive, short-term mobilization has diminished. We can now adjust both the size and readiness of our reserve forces, to help us deal with the more likely challenges we will face.

Our strategy will guard against a major reversal in Soviet intentions by incorporating into our planning the concept of regeneration of our forces. By the mid-90s, the time it would take the Soviets to return to the levels of confrontation that marked the depths of the Cold War will be sufficient to allow us to rely not solely on existing forces -- but to generate wholly new forces. / This readiness to rebuild -- made explicit in our defense policy -- will be an important element in our ability to deter aggression. ///

A rational restructuring of the kind I've outlined will take five years. And I am confident we can meet the challenges I've outlined today -- provided we proceed with an orderly build-down

-- not a fire sale. Any build-down of this magnitude must be managed carefully to minimize dislocations -- not just to the military balance, but to morale. And I can say right now, as Commander-in-Chief, that we will take every step possible to minimize the turbulence these changes will create for our soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines. / I will not break faith with the young men and women who have freely chosen to serve their country. //

All of us know the challenges we face are fiscal, as well as military. / The budget constraints we face are very real -- but so too is the need for a strong and secure America. The simple fact is: when it comes to national security, America can never afford to fail or fall short. ///

Let me say once again how pleased I am to appear here today -- especially with our honored friend, Mrs. Thatcher. / Today, of course, is not the only time President and Prime Minister have shared the stage. The world remembers that day 44 years ago -- in Fulton, Missouri, when Churchill delivered what history calls the "Iron Curtain" speech. / But that wasn't what he called it. He titled it / "The Sinews of Peace." // By that, he meant to summon up a vision of the strength of free nations -- united in defense of democracy. //

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Our challenge today is to overcome this deep division. To marshall the growing forces of the Free World -- to work to bring within reach for the unfree the liberty that belongs by right to all. //

Thank you, and may God bless the United States of America.

#




EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

90 JUL 31 A4:14

NOTICE:

Enclosed are comments from staff members of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Such comments do not necessarily represent the official position of the Director of OMB or of the Office of Management and Budget. If you wish to have the Director's personal comments, please let me know -- and contact me if you have any questions.

If our proposed substantive changes are not made, please let us know before the material is prepared in final.


James C. Mirr
Associate Director for
Legislative Reference
and Administration

CLOSE HOLD SENSITIVE

Document No. 162623SS

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 7/30/90 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 7/30/90 3:00 PM

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: ASPEN INSTITUTE

	ACTION FYI			ACTION FYI	
VICE PRESIDENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	MCCLURE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
SUNUNU	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	NEWMAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
SCOWCROFT	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	PORTER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
DARMAN	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	ROGICH	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
CARD	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	UNTERMAYER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
CICCONI	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	ROGERS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DEMAREST	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	WINSTON	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
FITZWATER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
GRAY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HAGIN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HOLIDAY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

REMARKS:

Please forward any comments directly to Chriss Winston, Rm. 122, x2930, no later than 3:00 PM, Tuesday, July 31, with a copy to my office. Thank you.

RESPONSE:

See comments

CLOSE HOLD SENSITIVE

James W. Cicconi Assistant to the President and Deputy to the Chief of Staff Ext. 2702

McGroarty/Dooley
July 30, 1990
3:30 pm
[ASPEN]

1990 JUL 30 PM 3:55

PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: THE ASPEN INSTITUTE
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AUGUST 2, 1990
5:30 P.M.

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That world is now changing. // The decades-old division of Europe is now ending -- and the era of democracy-building has begun. In Germany -- the divided nation in the heart of a divided continent -- unity is now assured, as a free and full member of the NATO alliance. / **The Soviet Union** itself is in the midst of a political and economic transformation that has brought unprecedented openness -- and begun a process of change that is at once **full of hope, and full of uncertainty.** //

This change has had an undeniable impact on national security strategy as well. / The threat of a large-scale land war -- a Soviet invasion of Western Europe launched with little or no warning -- is today **more remote than at any point in the post-war period.** / With the emergence of democracy in Eastern Europe, the Warsaw Pact has lost its military meaning -- and after more than four decades of dominance, Soviet troops are beginning to withdraw from Central and Eastern Europe. /

But the fact remains for all these positive changes that the **Soviet Union remains a world-class military power.** Even after the conventional arms reductions we are now negotiating, the Soviets will continue to maintain 2 to 3 million men under arms - - a force far larger than any other nation in Europe. / And of course, our number one concern: in spite of severe economic hardship, the Soviets continue to maintain and **modernize** their arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons. //

We and our allies welcome the new course the Soviet Union has chosen. / But prudence demands that we maintain an

The Soviets will enter a START Treaty with a fully modernized, highly capable, very large strategic force. We must continue with our strategic modernization. We need the B-2. Further delays will only increase costs. We need to complete the Trident program -- to ensure a survivable, submarine-based deterrent. We must keep our ICBM options open: and that means completing the development of the small ICBM and the rail-based Peacekeeper. And finally, I am convinced that strategic defense makes more sense than ever before. We must deploy SDI when it is ready.

Howard
X 4657

effective deterrent -- one that secures the peace **not only** in today's climate of reduced tensions, but provides a safeguard against any future **reversal from the Soviet Union's present, positive course.** [[NSC INSERT ON STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION.]]

Above all, we cannot mistake the great gains democracy has made this past year as proof that America's work in the world is complete. // All of us agree that never before in the post-war era has the likelihood of global war been lower. And yet, for all the distance we have travelled from the depths of the Cold War, we must also recognize that we have not yet entered an era of perpetual peace. //

What we require now is a policy that adapts to the **significant changes** we've witnessed -- without neglecting the enduring realities that will continue to shape our security strategy. // A policy of peacetime engagement every bit as ~~constant and~~ committed to the defense of our interests and ideals in today's world as in the time of conflict and Cold War. // A policy that recognizes that ~~our enemy is instability~~ -- and that a strong America must remain a force for stability in the world.

Peace and democracy

*Howard
X 4657*

// As long as the United States remains a nation with global interests -- we must maintain a global balance. / American interests in Europe and the Pacific -- the enduring reality of Soviet power -- all are key reasons why maintaining a forward presence will remain an indispensable element of our strategy.

*N. B.
Instability is sometimes good e.g. the dissolution of the Warsaw pact
Stability is sometimes bad e.g. on unchanging Cuba.
Howard
X 4657*

For instance -- while we may well change our present operating procedures and patterns of deployment -- no amount of political change will alter the geographical fact that the U.S. must remain a maritime power. //

And the U.S. will keep a force in Europe as long as our allies believe our presence contributes to stability. / The size and shape of those forces will change, to suit the new and less threatening circumstances -- and to adapt to a new political climate that calls for forces organized along multinational lines. But for the sake of stability, the overall capability of U.S. forces in Europe will remain substantial. //

In addition to these enduring security interests, America must possess forces capable of responding to emerging threats in corners of the globe that may not at present seem to pose great danger. / In spite of our best efforts to control the spread of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technologies, more nations are acquiring weapons of mass destruction -- and the means to deliver them. / Right now, over 100 countries have cruise missiles. 20 countries have the capacity to produce chemical weapons. And by the year 2000, as many as 15 nations will possess ballistic missiles. // In the future, even conflicts we once thought of as regional may carry far-reaching consequences.

In this past year, democracy has indeed made great gains. But our world remains one where radicalism, fanaticism, and a destructive form of nationalism continue to breed violence and terror -- aggression and instability. / In a world of renegade

regimes and unpredictable rulers -- the U.S. must stand with its allies in defense of our democratic values. ///

Our task today is to shape our defense capabilities to the changing strategic circumstances I've just spoken of. / We know that our forces will be smaller. / Secretary Cheney and General Powell are hard at work determining the precise size and composition of the forces we need. But I can tell you now, when all the calculations are complete -- when all our roles and missions are reviewed -- we will be looking at a military force that, **within five years, will be 25% smaller than today's**. //

What matters is how we reshape the forces that remain. The United States would be ill-served by forces that represent nothing more than a scaled-back or shrunken-down version of the ones we possess at present. We could easily end up with more than we need for contingencies that are no longer likely -- and less than we must have to meet emerging challenges. / What we need are not merely **reductions** -- but **restructuring**.

This restructuring must emphasize three key components essential to sustain American security: To cope with the full range of challenges we may confront, we must focus on readiness and rapid response -- and to prepare today to meet the challenges we may face in the future, we must focus on research -- an active and inventive program of defense R&D. //

Let me begin with the component with the greatest long-range consequences -- research. Time and again, we have seen **technology revolutionize the battlefield**. / The U.S. has always

relied upon its technological edge to offset the need to match potential adversaries' strength in numbers. / Cruise missiles, Stealth fighters and bombers, today's "smart" weapons with state-of-the-art guidance systems, and tomorrow's "brilliant" ones -- all of these and more will be a necessary part in prevailing in any future conflict -- and at the same time, saving lives. //

We must realize the heavy price we will pay if we look for false economies in defense R&D. Most modern weapons systems take a minimum of 10 years to move from the drawing board to the battlefield. / The decisions we make **today** -- the programs we push forward, or push aside -- will dictate the kind of military forces we have at our disposal in the year 2000 -- and beyond. // The nature of national defense demands that we plan now for **threats on the distant horizon.** //

Second, as we restructure, we must put a premium on readiness. // True military capability never exists on paper - -it is measured in the hours spent, and experience gained, on the training ground, under sail, and in the cockpit. Nothing is more short-sighted than cutting training time to cut costs -- and nothing is more demoralizing for our troops than to deny them the training time they need. // **Our soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines must be well-trained, tried and tested -- ready to perform every mission we ask of them.** //

In our restructured forces, reserves will continue to play a special role. The need to be prepared for a massive, short-term mobilization has diminished -- along with the threat of Soviet

aggression. Instead of measuring warning time in terms of days and weeks as we were forced to do for the past 40 years -- by the mid-90's, we expect much longer notice of any return to the levels of confrontation that existed in the depths of the Cold War: signs that we could recognize at least one to two years before the outbreak of aggression. // Today we must focus on the capacity to reconstitute our forces -- to rebuild essential capabilities -- in a time of increased instability.

Finally, we must focus on rapid response. As we saw most recently in OPERATION JUST CAUSE, the U.S. may be called on to respond to threats from various points on the compass. In an era when threats may well emerge without warning, our ability to defend our interests will depend on our speed and agility.

In many of the conflicts we may face in the future, we will not have the luxury of matching manpower with pre-positioned materiel. That will require air and sea-lift capacities at the very least equal to if not more capable than those we possess today. //

A rational restructuring of the kind I've outlined will take five years. And I am confident we can meet the challenges I've outlined today -- provided we proceed with an orderly build-down -- not a fire sale. Any build-down of this magnitude must be managed carefully to minimize dislocations -- not just to the military balance, but to morale. And I can say right now, as Commander-in-Chief, that I will not break faith with the young men and women who have freely chosen to serve their country. //

All of us know the challenges we face are fiscal, as well as military. / The budget constraints we face are very real -- but so too is the need for a strong and secure America. The simple fact is: **when it comes to national security, America can never afford to fail or fall short. ///**

Let me say once again how pleased I am to appear here today -- especially with our honored friend, Mrs. Thatcher. / Today, of course, is not the first time President and Prime Minister have shared the stage. That was 44 years ago -- in Fulton, Missouri. // Mrs. Thatcher, the world remembers the address Churchill delivered that day as the "Iron Curtain" speech. / But that wasn't what he called it. He titled it / **"The Sinews of Peace."** // By that, he meant to summon up a vision of the **strength of free nations -- united in defense of democracy. //**

At long last, we are writing the final chapter of the 20th Century's third great conflict. The Cold War is now drawing to a close. / And yet today -- as in Churchill's time -- the world remains divided. For all the millions of men and women who won their freedom this past year -- there are hundreds of millions **more not yet free. //**

Our challenge today is to overcome this deep division. To marshall the growing forces of the Free World -- to work to bring within reach for the **unfree the liberty that belongs by right to all. //**

Thank you, and may God bless the United States of America.

#

CLOSE HOLD SENSITIVE

Document No. 162623SS

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

90 JUL 30 19: 51

DATE: 7/30/90 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 7/30/90 3:00 PM

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: ASPEN INSTITUTE

	ACTION FYI			ACTION FYI	
VICE PRESIDENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	MCCLURE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
SUNUNU	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	NEWMAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
SCOWCROFT	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	PORTER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
DARMAN	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	ROGICH	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
CARD	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	UNTERMAYER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
CICCONI	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	ROGERS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DEMAREST	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	WINSTON	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
FITZWATER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
GRAY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HAGIN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HOLIDAY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

REMARKS:

Please forward any comments directly to Chriss Winston, Rm. 122, x2930, no later than 3:00 PM, Tuesday, July 31, with a copy to my office. Thank you.

RESPONSE:

S.P. OK

CLOSE HOLD SENSITIVE

James W. Cicconi
Assistant to the President
and Deputy to the Chief of Staff
Ext. 2702

McGroarty/Dooley
July 30, 1990
3:30 pm
[ASPEN]

1990 JUL 30 PM 3.55

PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: THE ASPEN INSTITUTE
ASPEN, COLORADO
AUGUST 2, 1990
5:30 P.M.

[Introductory acknowledgements: Aspen officials, alumni.
Prime Minister Thatcher, Ambassador Catto.] I am delighted to
celebrate with you the 40th anniversary of the illustrious Aspen
Institute. //

In those 40 years, the **spirit of Aspen** has come to signify
the attempt to bridge the worlds of **thought** and **action**. // And
of course, to understand the tremendous changes taking place
around us. / Think back to the headlines 40 years ago, the
summer of that first Aspen conference in 1950. / North Korea
roared across the 38th parallel. Klaus Fuchs was caught and
convicted for revealing the secrets of the atom bomb to the
Soviets. The **Cold War** -- a term introduced into our political
vocabulary by Bernard Baruch -- **had come into its own, as the
shorthand to describe the half-way house of an armed and uneasy
peace -- a world divided, East from West.** /

That was the world as Aspen came into being -- the world
Aspen sought to **study**, and to **shape**. //

The forty years since then have been a time of tremendous
progress -- for the nations of the West, an era of unparalleled
prosperity, peace and freedom. / But at the same time, we lived
in a constant condition of **tension, Cold War and conflict.** //

That world is now changing. // The decades-old division of Europe is now ending -- and the era of democracy-building has begun. In Germany -- the divided nation in the heart of a divided continent -- unity is now assured, as a free and full member of the NATO alliance. / **The Soviet Union** itself is in the midst of a political and economic transformation that has brought unprecedented openness -- and begun a process of change that is at once full of hope, and full of uncertainty. //

This change has had an undeniable impact on national security strategy as well. / The threat of a large-scale land war -- a Soviet invasion of Western Europe launched with little or no warning -- is today **more remote than at any point in the post-war period.** / With the emergence of democracy in Eastern Europe, the Warsaw Pact has lost its military meaning -- and after more than four decades of dominance, Soviet troops are beginning to withdraw from Central and Eastern Europe. /

But the fact remains for all these positive changes that the **Soviet Union remains a world-class military power.** Even after the conventional arms reductions we are now negotiating, the Soviets will continue to maintain 2 to 3 million men under arms - - a force far larger than any other nation in Europe. / And of course, our number one concern: in spite of severe economic hardship, the Soviets continue to maintain **and modernize** their arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons. //

We and our allies welcome the new course the Soviet Union has chosen. / But prudence demands that we maintain an

effective deterrent -- one that secures the peace not only in today's climate of reduced tensions, but provides a safeguard against any future reversal from the Soviet Union's present, **positive course.** [[NSC INSERT ON STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION.]]

Above all, we cannot mistake the great gains democracy has made this past year as proof that America's work in the world is complete. // All of us agree that never before in the post-war era has the likelihood of global war been lower. And yet, for all the distance we have travelled from the depths of the Cold War, we must also recognize that we have not yet entered an era of perpetual peace. //

What we require now is a policy that adapts to the **significant changes** we've witnessed -- without neglecting the enduring realities that will continue to shape our security strategy. // A policy of peacetime engagement every bit as constant and committed to the defense of our interests and ideals in today's world as in the time of conflict and Cold War. // A policy that recognizes that our enemy is instability -- and that **a strong America must remain a force for stability in the world.** //

As long as the United States remains a nation with global interests -- we must maintain a global balance. / American interests in Europe and the Pacific -- the enduring reality of Soviet power -- all are key reasons why maintaining a forward presence will remain an indispensable element of our strategy.

For instance -- while we may well change our present operating procedures and patterns of deployment -- no amount of political change will alter the **geographical** fact that the U.S. **must remain a maritime power.** //

And the U.S. will keep a force in Europe as long as our allies believe our presence contributes to stability. / The **size and shape** of those forces will change, to suit the new and less threatening circumstances -- and to adapt to a new political climate that calls for forces organized along multinational lines. But for the sake of stability, the overall capability of U.S. forces in Europe will remain substantial. //

In addition to these enduring security interests, America must possess forces capable of responding to emerging threats in corners of the globe that may not at present seem to pose great danger. / In spite of our best efforts to control the spread of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technologies, more nations are acquiring weapons of mass destruction -- and the means to deliver them. / Right now, over 100 countries have cruise missiles. 20 countries have the capacity to produce chemical weapons. And by the year 2000, as many as 15 nations will possess ballistic missiles. // In the future, even conflicts we once thought of as **regional** may carry far-reaching consequences.

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What matters is how we reshape the forces that remain. The United States would be ill-served by forces that represent nothing more than a scaled-back or shrunken-down version of the ones we possess at present. We could easily end up with more than we need for contingencies that are no longer likely -- and less than we must have to meet emerging challenges. / What we need are not merely **reductions** -- but **restructuring**.

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aggression. Instead of measuring warning time in terms of days and weeks as we were forced to do for the past 40 years -- by the mid-90's, we expect much longer notice of any return to the levels of confrontation that existed in the depths of the Cold War: signs that we could recognize at least one to two years before the outbreak of aggression. // Today we must focus on the capacity to reconstitute our forces -- to rebuild essential capabilities -- in a time of increased instability.

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Our challenge today is to overcome this deep division. To marshall the growing forces of the Free World -- to work to bring within reach for the **unfree the liberty that belongs by right to all. //**

Thank you, and may God bless the United States of America.


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VISIT OF THE PRESIDENT TO ASPEN, COLORADO

AUGUST 2, 1990

THE ASPEN INSTITUTE

SEATING FOR DAIS



1. Mr. Mortimer Adler, Director
Institute for Philosophical Research
2. Mr. Michael I. Sovern, President, Columbia University
3. Mr. John J. Phelan, Jr., Chairman, Board of Trustees,
The Aspen Institute
4. THE PRESIDENT
5. Mr. David T. McLaughlin, President,
The Aspen Institute

6. Mr. Lodwrick Cook, Chairman and
CEO, ARCO
7. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, Prime
Minister, Great Britain
8. Mr. Henry Catto, Ambassador to
Great Britain
9. Ms. Ann Frasher Hudson, Chairman
40th Anniversary Committee, The
Aspen Institute
10. Mrs. Jessica Catto
11. Mr. Leonard Lauder, Chairman and
Estee Lauder Companies

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

90 JUL 31 A2:50

DATE: 7/30/90 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 7/30/90 3:00 PM

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: ASPEN INSTITUTE

	ACTION FYI			ACTION FYI	
VICE PRESIDENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	MCCLURE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
SUNUNU	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	NEWMAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
SCOWCROFT	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	PORTER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
DARMAN	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	ROGICH	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
CARD	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	UNTERMAYER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
CICCONI	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	ROGERS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DEMAREST	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	WINSTON	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
FITZWATER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
GRAY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HAGIN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HOLIDAY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

REMARKS: Please forward any comments directly to Chriss Winston, Rm. 122, x2930, no later than 3:00 PM, Tuesday, July 31, with a copy to my office. Thank you.

July 31, 1990

RESPONSE: The National Security Council staff has reviewed and forwards the attached comments.

Brent Scowcorft

James W. Cicconi Assistant to the President and Deputy to the Chief of Staff Ext. 2702

1990 JUL 30 PM 3:55

McGroarty/Dooley
July 30, 1990
3:30 pm
[ASPEN]

PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: THE ASPEN INSTITUTE
ASPEN, COLORADO
AUGUST 2, 1990
5:30 P.M.

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In those 40 years, the spirit of Aspen has come to signify
the attempt to bridge the worlds of thought and action. // And
of course, to understand the tremendous changes taking place
around us. / Think back to the headlines 40 years ago, the
summer of that first Aspen conference in 1950. / North Korea
Stalin was at the peak of his power -- and paranoia.
had just roared across the 38th parallel. ~~Klaus Fuchs was caught and
convicted for revealing the secrets of the atom bomb to the
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vocabulary by Bernard Baruch -- had come into its own, as the
shorthand to describe ^{an} ~~the half-way house of an~~ armed and uneasy
truce
peace -- a world divided, East from West. /

That was the world as Aspen came into being -- the world
Aspen sought to study, and to shape. //

The forty years since then have been a time of tremendous
progress -- for the nations of the West, an era of unparalleled
prosperity, peace and freedom. / But at the same time, we lived
in a constant condition of tension, Cold War and conflict. //

That world is now changing. // The decades-old division of Europe is ~~now~~ ending -- and the era of democracy-building has begun. In Germany -- the divided nation in the heart of a divided continent -- unity is now assured, as a free and full member of the NATO alliance. / The Soviet Union itself is in the midst of a political and economic transformation that has brought unprecedented openness ~~[-- and begun a process of change]~~ that is at once full of hope, and full of uncertainty. //

Thus, our security environment, too, is transformed. We are entering a new era. ~~This change has had an undeniable impact on national security strategy as well.~~ / The threat of ~~a large-scale land war~~ ^{be different.}

~~war~~ a Soviet invasion of Western Europe launched with little or no warning ~~is~~ today more remote than at any point in the post-war period. / With the emergence of democracy in Eastern Europe, the Warsaw Pact has lost its military meaning -- and after more than four decades of dominance, Soviet troops are ~~beginning to~~ ^{ing} withdraw from Central and Eastern Europe. /

Our task today is to shape our defense capabilities to ~~these~~ ^{these} changing strategic circumstances. In a world less driven by an immediate threat to Europe and global war, -- in a world where arms control agreements contribute to stability -- we know

that our forces will be smaller. / Secretary Cheney and General Powell are hard at work determining the precise size and composition of the forces we need. But I can tell you now, when all the calculations are complete -- when all ~~our roles and~~ ^{the programs} ~~missions are reviewed~~ ^{are set --} -- we will be looking at a military force that, within five years, will be 25% smaller than today's. //

That will be the lowest level since 1950.

~~most~~

What matters ^{is} how we reshape the forces that remain. The United States would be ill-served by forces that represent nothing more than a scaled-back or shrunken-down version of the ones we possess at present. We could easily end up with more than we need for contingencies that are no longer likely -- and less than we must have to meet emerging challenges. / What we need are not merely reductions -- but restructuring.

~~disturb~~

What we require now is a ^{distinct} policy that adapts to the significant changes ^{we are witnessing --} ~~we've witnessed~~ -- without neglecting the enduring realities that will continue to shape our security strategy. // A policy of peacetime engagement every bit as constant and committed to the defense of our interests and ideals in today's world as in the time of ^{sharper East-West} conflict and Cold War. // ~~A policy that recognizes that our enemy is instability -- and that a strong America must remain a force for stability in the world.~~

//

(4)

We are inescapably a leader, the connecting link in a global alliance of democracies, the pivotal factor for ~~stability~~

peaceful change. / American interests in Europe and the Pacific ~~the enduring reality of~~ ^{in the Mediterranean} and the Persian Gulf -- ~~Soviet power~~ all are key reasons why maintaining a forward presence will remain an indispensable element of our strategy.

A world of terrorism, hostage crises, spreading weapons technology, and new sources of instability is a world that requires a strong and engaged America.

that,

And ~~the~~ the fact remains, ^{we have seen,} for all the ~~the~~ positive changes, ~~the~~ the Soviet Union remains a world-class military power. Even after the conventional arms reductions we are now negotiating, the Soviets will continue to maintain 2 to 3 million men under arms, ~~a force far larger than any other nation in Europe~~ / And of course, our number one concern: ~~in spite of severe economic hardship~~ the Soviets continue to maintain and modernize their arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons. //

We and our allies welcome the new course the Soviet Union has chosen. / But prudence demands that we maintain an

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effective deterrent -- one that secures the peace not only in today's climate of reduced tensions, but ^{that ensures that renewed} ~~provides a safeguard~~ ^{confrontation is not an option for any Soviet leadership} ~~against any future reversal from the Soviet Union's present,~~

We must continue with our strategic modernization. We need the B-2. Secretary Cheney has already scaled back the program as much as makes sense. Further delays will only increase costs. We need to complete the Trident program -- to ensure a survivable, submarine-based deterrent. We can defer a decision on our land-based ICBMs -- as we see how the START talks proceed -- but we must keep our options open: and that means completing the development of the small ICBM and the rail-based Peacekeeper. And finally, ^{I am convinced that strategic defense makes more sense} ~~as long as technology holds out hope, we cannot~~ ^{than ever before} ~~remain without any defense against ballistic missiles attack by~~ ~~choice.~~ We must push forward ^{the} ~~the~~ ^{of} ~~very promising research being~~ ~~done by~~ SDI.

R And the United States will keep a force in Europe as long as we and our allies see a need for it as part of a common security effort. The size and shape of those forces will change, to suit the new and less threatening circumstances. But with all the uncertainties about Europe's future, an American departure would risk a geopolitical earthquake. That is history's lesson. We will remain in Europe to deter any new dangers, to re-assure all of Europe, East and West, that the European balance will remain secure.

Outside of Europe,

~~In addition to these enduring security interests, America must possess forces ~~capable of responding to existing threats~~ in whatever corners of the globe that ~~may not at present seem to pose great danger~~. ^{to} ~~they may occur~~. ~~chemical and~~ In spite of our best efforts to control the spread of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technologies, more nations are acquiring weapons of mass destruction -- and the means to deliver them. ~~[Right now, over 100 countries have cruise missiles 20 countries have the capacity to produce chemical weapons. And by the year 2000, as many as 15 nations will possess ballistic missiles.]~~ ^{local} In the future, even conflicts we once thought of as regional may carry far-reaching consequences.~~

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regimes and unpredictable rulers -- the U.S. must stand with its allies ^{to protect its citizens and to defend its} ~~On defense of our~~ democratic values. ///

~~This restructuring must emphasize three key components essential to sustain American security:~~ To cope with the full range of challenges we may confront, we must focus on readiness and rapid response -- and to prepare today to meet the challenges we may face in the future, we must focus on research -- an active and inventive program of defense R&D. //

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relied upon its technological edge to offset the need to match potential adversaries' strength in numbers. / Cruise missiles, Stealth fighters and bombers, today's "smart" weapons with state-of-the-art guidance systems, and tomorrow's "brilliant" ones -- ~~all of these and more will be a necessary part in prevailing in any future conflict -- and at the same time, saving lives.~~ ^{these technologies will win conflicts and save precious lives.} //

We must realize the heavy price we will pay if we look for false economies in defense R&D. Most modern weapons systems take a minimum of 10 years to move from the drawing board to the battlefield. / The decisions we make today -- the programs we push forward, or push aside -- will dictate the kind of military forces we have at our disposal in the year 2000 -- and beyond.

~~[/] The nature of national defense demands that we plan now for threats on the distant horizon.~~ //

Secondly ~~simply~~, we must focus on rapid response. As we saw most recently in ^{Panama} ~~OPERATION JUST CAUSE~~, the U.S. may be called on to respond to ^{a variety of challenges} ~~threats~~ from various points on the compass. In an era when threats may well emerge without warning, our ability to defend our interests will depend on our speed and agility.

We will need ~~some and all~~ forces that give us global reach. No amount of political change will alter the geographic fact that we are separated from many of our most important allies and interests by thousands of miles of water.

And, ~~in~~ many of the conflicts we may face in the future, we ~~will~~ may not have the luxury of matching manpower with pre-positioned materiel. That will require air and sea-lift capacities at the ~~very least equal to if not more capable than those we possess today.~~ ^{to get our forces where they are needed when they} ~~are needed.~~ A new emphasis on flexibility and versatility should guide our ~~planning~~ ^{efforts}. ~~now that the~~ ~~European Central Front~~ ~~no longer~~ ^{so} ~~a dominant~~ ~~our planning.~~

Finally, as we restructure, we must adjust the readiness levels of our total force. For those active forces we will rely on to respond to crises, readiness will be our highest priority.

- // True military capability never exists on paper -
-it is measured in the hours spent, and experience gained, on the training ground, under sail, and in the cockpit. Nothing is more short-sighted than cutting training time to cut costs -- and nothing is more demoralizing for our troops than to deny them the training time they need. // Our soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines must be well-trained, tried and tested -- ready to perform every mission we ask of them. //

In our restructured forces, reserves will be important, but in new ways. The need to be prepared for a massive, short-notice mobilization ^{-- that so long dominated our planning --} has diminished. We can now adjust both the size and readiness of our reserve forces to help us deal with the more likely challenges we will face.

Our strategy will guard against a major reversal in Soviet intentions by incorporating into our planning the concept of national regeneration of our forces -- a concept significantly different from our concept of mobilization over the past 40 years. By the mid-90s, the much longer notice we can expect of any return to the levels of confrontation that marked the Cold War will allow us to plan to rely not just on existing forces but to generate wholly new forces. This explicit determination to remain ready to rebuild our forces will be an important element in our ability to deter.

A rational restructuring of the kind I've outlined will take five years. And I am confident we can meet the challenges I've outlined today -- provided we proceed with an orderly build-down -- not a fire sale. Any build-down of this magnitude must be managed carefully to minimize dislocations -- not just to the military balance, but to morale. And I can say right now, as Commander-in-Chief, that ~~I will not break faith with the young men and women who have freely chosen to serve their country.~~ //

we will take every step possible to minimize the turbulence these changes will create for our soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines. Let me tell you that your President, the American people, and indeed people the world over ~~know~~ ^{know} of your contribution to Freedom.



All of us know the challenges we face are fiscal, as well as military. / The budget constraints we face are very real -- but so too is the need for a strong and secure America. The simple fact is: when it comes to national security, America can never afford to fail or fall short. ///

Let me say once again how pleased I am to appear here today -- especially with our honored friend, Mrs. Thatcher. / Today, of course, is not the first time President and Prime Minister have shared the stage. That was 44 years ago -- in Fulton, Missouri. // Mrs. Thatcher, the world remembers the address Churchill delivered that day as the "Iron Curtain" speech. / But that wasn't what he called it. He titled it / "The Sinews of Peace." // By that, he meant to summon up a vision of the strength of free nations -- united in defense of democracy. //

At long last, we are writing the final chapter of the 20th Century's third great conflict. The Cold War is now drawing to a close. /

But, in a world marked by rapid change and continuing uncertainty, we will not repeat the historical error of massive demobilization, nor take fleeting comfort in a false sense of insularity. We are forging a strategy, -- a strategy suited to both the opportunities and challenges before us,

CLOSE HOLD SENSITIVE

Document No. 16262355

rcd.
4:50pm

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

90 JUL 30 P9:07

7/31

DATE: 7/30/90

ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 7/30/90 3:00 PM

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: ASPEN INSTITUTE

	ACTION FYI			ACTION FYI	
VICE PRESIDENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	MCCLURE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
SUNUNU	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	NEWMAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
SCOWCROFT	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	PORTER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
DARMAN	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	ROGICH	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
CARD	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	UNTERMEYER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
CICCONI	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	ROGERS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DEMAREST	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	WINSTON	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
FITZWATER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
GRAY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HAGIN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HOLIDAY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

REMARKS:

Please forward any comments directly to Chriss Winston, Rm. 122, x2930, no later than 3:00 PM, Tuesday, July 31, with a copy to my office. Thank you.

RESPONSE:

No Comment 7/30/90

CLOSE HOLD SENSITIVE

James W. Cicconi
Assistant to the President
and Deputy to the Chief of Staff
Ext. 2702

McGroarty/Dooley
July 30, 1990
3:30 pm
[ASPEN]

PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: THE ASPEN INSTITUTE
ASPEN, COLORADO
AUGUST 2, 1990
5:30 P.M.

[Introductory acknowledgements: Aspen officials, alumni.
Prime Minister Thatcher, Ambassador Catto.] I am delighted to
celebrate with you the 40th anniversary of the illustrious Aspen
Institute. //

In those 40 years, the **spirit of Aspen** has come to signify
the attempt to bridge the worlds of **thought and action**. // And
of course, to understand the tremendous changes taking place
around us. / Think back to the headlines 40 years ago, the
summer of that first Aspen conference in 1950. / North Korea
roared across the 38th parallel. Klaus Fuchs was caught and
convicted for revealing the secrets of the atom bomb to the
Soviets. The **Cold War** -- a term introduced into our political
vocabulary by Bernard Baruch -- **had come into its own, as the**
shorthand to describe the half-way house of an armed and uneasy
peace -- a world divided, East from West. /

That was the world as Aspen came into being -- the world
Aspen sought to **study**, and to **shape**. //

The forty years since then have been a time of tremendous
progress -- for the nations of the West, an era of unparalleled
prosperity, peace and freedom. / But at the same time, we lived
in a constant condition of **tension, Cold War and conflict**. //

That world is now changing. // The decades-old division of Europe is now ending -- and the era of democracy-building has begun. In Germany -- the divided nation in the heart of a divided continent -- unity is now assured, as a free and full member of the NATO alliance. / **The Soviet Union** itself is in the midst of a political and economic transformation that has brought unprecedented openness -- and begun a process of change that is at once **full of hope, and full of uncertainty.** //

This change has had an undeniable impact on national security strategy as well. / The threat of a large-scale land war -- a Soviet invasion of Western Europe launched with little or no warning -- is today **more remote than at any point in the post-war period.** / With the emergence of democracy in Eastern Europe, the Warsaw Pact has lost its military meaning -- and after more than four decades of dominance, Soviet troops are beginning to withdraw from Central and Eastern Europe. /

But the fact remains for all these positive changes that the **Soviet Union remains a world-class military power.** Even after the conventional arms reductions we are now negotiating, the Soviets will continue to maintain 2 to 3 million men under arms -- a force far larger than any other nation in Europe. / And of course, our number one concern: in spite of severe economic hardship, the Soviets continue to maintain and **modernize** their arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons. //

We and our allies welcome the new course the Soviet Union has chosen. / But prudence demands that we maintain an

effective deterrent -- one that secures the peace not only in today's climate of reduced tensions, but provides a safeguard against any future reversal from the Soviet Union's present, positive course. [[NSC INSERT ON STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION.]]

Above all, we cannot mistake the great gains democracy has made this past year as proof that America's work in the world is complete. // All of us agree that never before in the post-war era has the likelihood of global war been lower. And yet, for all the distance we have travelled from the depths of the Cold War, we must also recognize that we have not yet entered an era of perpetual peace. //

What we require now is a policy that adapts to the significant changes we've witnessed -- without neglecting the enduring realities that will continue to shape our security strategy. // A policy of peacetime engagement every bit as constant and committed to the defense of our interests and ideals in today's world as in the time of conflict and Cold War. // A policy that recognizes that our enemy is instability -- and that a strong America must remain a force for stability in the world. //

As long as the United States remains a nation with global interests -- we must maintain a global balance. / American interests in Europe and the Pacific -- the enduring reality of Soviet power -- all are key reasons why maintaining a forward presence will remain an indispensable element of our strategy.

For instance -- while we may well change our present operating procedures and patterns of deployment -- no amount of **political** change will alter the **geographical** fact that the U.S. **must remain a maritime power.** //

And the U.S. will keep a force in Europe as long as our allies believe our presence contributes to stability. / The **size and shape** of those forces will change, to suit the new and less threatening circumstances -- and to adapt to a new political climate that calls for forces organized along multinational lines. But for the sake of stability, the overall capability of U.S. forces in Europe will remain substantial. //

In addition to these enduring security interests, America must possess forces capable of responding to emerging threats in corners of the globe that may not at present seem to pose great danger. / In spite of our best efforts to control the spread of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technologies, more nations are acquiring weapons of mass destruction -- and the means to deliver them. / Right now, over 100 countries have cruise missiles. 20 countries have the capacity to produce chemical weapons. And by the year 2000, as many as 15 nations will possess ballistic missiles. // In the future, even conflicts we once thought of as **regional** may carry far-reaching consequences.

In this past year, democracy has indeed made great gains. But our world remains one where **radicalism, fanaticism, and a destructive form of nationalism** continue to breed violence and **terror -- aggression and instability.** / In a world of renegade

regimes and unpredictable rulers -- the U.S. must stand with its allies in defense of our democratic values. ///

Our task today is to shape our defense capabilities to the changing strategic circumstances I've just spoken of. / We know that our forces will be smaller. / Secretary Cheney and General Powell are hard at work determining the precise size and composition of the forces we need. But I can tell you now, when all the calculations are complete -- when all our roles and missions are reviewed -- we will be looking at a military force that, **within five years, will be 25% smaller than today's**. //

What matters is how we reshape the forces that remain. The United States would be ill-served by forces that represent nothing more than a scaled-back or shrunken-down version of the ones we possess at present. We could easily end up with more than we need for contingencies that are no longer likely -- and less than we must have to meet emerging challenges. / What we need are not merely **reductions** -- but **restructuring**.

This restructuring must emphasize three key components essential to sustain American security: To cope with the full range of challenges we may confront, we must focus on readiness and rapid response -- and to prepare today to meet the challenges we may face in the future, we must focus on research -- an active and inventive program of defense R&D. //

Let me begin with the component with the greatest long-range consequences -- research. Time and again, we have seen **technology revolutionize the battlefield**. / The U.S. has always

relied upon its technological edge to offset the need to match potential adversaries' strength in numbers. / Cruise missiles, Stealth fighters and bombers, today's "smart" weapons with state-of-the-art guidance systems, and tomorrow's "brilliant" ones -- all of these and more will be a necessary part in prevailing in any future conflict -- and at the same time, saving lives. //

We must realize the heavy price we will pay if we look for false economies in defense R&D. Most modern weapons systems take a minimum of 10 years to move from the drawing board to the battlefield. / The decisions we make **today** -- the programs we push forward, or push aside -- will dictate the kind of military forces we have at our disposal in the year 2000 -- and beyond. // The nature of national defense demands that we **plan now for threats on the distant horizon.** //

Second, as we restructure, we must put a premium on **readiness**. // True military capability never exists on paper -- it is measured in the hours spent, and experience gained, on the training ground, under sail, and in the cockpit. Nothing is more short-sighted than cutting training time to cut costs -- and nothing is more demoralizing for our troops than to deny them the training time they need. // **Our soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines must be well-trained, tried and tested -- ready to perform every mission we ask of them.** //

In our restructured forces, reserves will continue to play a special role. The need to be prepared for a massive, short-term mobilization has diminished -- along with the threat of Soviet

aggression. Instead of measuring warning time in terms of days and weeks as we were forced to do for the past 40 years -- by the mid-90's, we expect much longer notice of any return to the levels of confrontation that existed in the depths of the Cold War: signs that we could recognize at least one to two years before the outbreak of aggression. // Today we must focus on the capacity to reconstitute our forces -- to rebuild essential capabilities -- in a time of increased instability.

Finally, we must focus on rapid response. As we saw most recently in OPERATION JUST CAUSE, the U.S. may be called on to respond to threats from various points on the compass. In an era when threats may well emerge without warning, our ability to defend our interests will depend on our speed and agility.

In many of the conflicts we may face in the future, we will not have the luxury of matching manpower with pre-positioned materiel. That will require air and sea-lift capacities at the very least equal to if not more capable than those we possess today. //

A rational restructuring of the kind I've outlined will take five years. And I am confident we can meet the challenges I've outlined today -- provided we proceed with an orderly build-down -- not a fire sale. Any build-down of this magnitude must be managed carefully to minimize dislocations -- not just to the military balance, but to morale. And I can say right now, as Commander-in-Chief, that I will not break faith with the young men and women who have freely chosen to serve their country. //

All of us know the challenges we face are fiscal, as well as military. / The budget constraints we face are very real -- but so too is the need for a strong and secure America. The simple fact is: **when it comes to national security, America can never afford to fail or fall short. ///**

Let me say once again how pleased I am to appear here today -- especially with our honored friend, Mrs. Thatcher. / Today, of course, is not the first time President and Prime Minister have shared the stage. That was 44 years ago -- in Fulton, Missouri. // Mrs. Thatcher, the world remembers the address Churchill delivered that day as the "Iron Curtain" speech. / But that wasn't what he called it. He titled it / "**The Sinews of Peace.**" // By that, he meant to summon up a vision of the **strength of free nations -- united in defense of democracy. //**

At long last, we are writing the final chapter of the 20th Century's third great conflict. The Cold War is now drawing to a close. / And yet today -- as in Churchill's time -- the world remains divided. **For all the millions of men and women who won their freedom this past year -- there are hundreds of millions more not yet free. //**

Our challenge today is to overcome this deep division. To marshall the growing forces of the Free World -- to work to bring within reach for the **unfree the liberty that belongs by right to all. //**

Thank you, and may God bless the United States of America.

#

THE ASPEN INSTITUTE 40TH ANNIVERSARY SYMPOSIUM
ASPEN, COLORADO August 2-5, 1990

RENEWAL: LEADERSHIP AND VALUES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

SYMPOSIUM GOALS

The Symposium is designed, on the occasion of the celebration of the 40th Anniversary of The Aspen Institute's first Executive Seminar, to underscore the continuing, and growing, relevance of the themes that have distinguished the Institute's programs since 1950:

- The role of enlightened private and public sector leadership in managing domestic and international challenges.
- The central importance of the philosophical and ethical values that have underpinned the democratic institutions and open societies which, now more than ever, appear as the best and most hopeful form of human community.

The Symposium aims to make a practical contribution to our understanding of how these themes can enhance our ability to deal with major domestic and international challenges that we can foresee in the next 40 years.

PROGRAM OUTLINE

The program of the Symposium will consist of:

- Two major addresses, at the beginning and end.
- Two plenary sessions, one addressed to major domestic issues and the second to major international issues that will challenge leadership and values in the next decade and beyond.
- Two sessions in which the participants will break up into Working Groups to address recommendations for practical action on the key issues raised in the Symposium. The results of these group discussions will be reported to a plenary session just before the closing address.

Keynote and Closing Addresses

These will be given by major public figures who will address the overall themes of the Symposium.

Plenary Session 1: Rebuilding the U.S. National Community

The United States must resolve several major domestic problems if it is to regain the social cohesion and economic strength to which the U.S. people aspire, and which are essential if the nation is to continue to play a leadership role in the world. U.S. society currently lacks the shared values and sense of common purpose on which the leadership needed to resolve these problems can be based. The session will address this need for shared values and a stronger sense of community by reference to three specific issues -- education and economic competitiveness, the challenges posed by the growing problems of poverty and a disadvantaged underclass, with special emphasis on minority communities, and the problem of providing adequate health care for all Americans. The session will also address the respective roles of federal and state governments and the private sector in addressing these issues.

Plenary Session 2: Shaping a New Global Community

Even though the major strategic questions of the post-World War II period have not yet been finally resolved, the outline of the major challenges to the international community in the coming decades is becoming evident -- the challenge of building democratic societies and market economies on the ruins of totalitarian systems, the protection of the global environment, and the problems of economic and social development and their relationship to population growth. The international community is only starting to measure the unprecedented demands for international cooperation and restraint that will be needed to respond to these challenges. The session will discuss these demands, the resources available in the private and public sectors, in the United States and abroad, to address these problems, and the role that the United States and other countries can and should play in guiding the emergence of a true global community.

Working Group Sessions:

Three Working Groups will be convened after each of the plenary meetings. They will each be assigned one of the following topics:

Domestic Issues: Education and Economic Competitiveness
 Poverty and the Underclass
 Health Care

International Issues: Transforming Post-Communist Societies
 Global Environment
 Social and Economic Development in the
 Developing Countries

Each group will be charged to develop practical proposals for action that would help to increase the sense of shared values and goals in the domestic and international communities and stimulate the leadership needed to respond to emerging challenges.

Plenary Session 3:

At the final plenary session, the chairpersons of the Working Groups will report on their groups and on their recommendations for action.

July 10, 1990

ASPEN INSTITUTE 40TH ANNIVERSARY SYMPOSIUM

Program Outline

Thursday, August 2, 1990

4:00 P.M. — 6:00 P.M.

Introductory Session: The Aspen Institute at Forty

Chair: **David T. McLaughlin**
President, The Aspen Institute

Speakers:

Roy Romer, Governor of Colorado
Michael I. Sovern, President, Columbia University
Mortimer J. Adler, Director, Institute for Philosophical Research

Keynote Address

Speaker: **President George Bush**

Friday, August 3, 1990

9:00 A.M. — 12:30 P.M.

Plenary Session 1: Rebuilding the U.S. National Community

Chair: **Bill Moyers**
Public Affairs TV

Speakers:

John J. Phelan, Jr., Chairman and CEO, New York Stock Exchange, Inc.
L. Douglas Wilder, Governor, Commonwealth of Virginia
Gloria Molina, Member, Los Angeles City Council
Albert Shanker, President, American Federation of Teachers
Donald E. Petersen, Former Chairman and CEO, Ford Motor Company
Richard D. Lamm, Former Governor of Colorado; Director,
Center for Public and Contemporary Issues,
University of Denver

ASPEN INSTITUTE 40TH ANNIVERSARY SYMPOSIUM
PROGRAM OUTLINE
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Friday, August 3, 1990 (Continued)

2:30 P.M. — 5:30 P.M.

Working Group Sessions: Domestic Issues

Education and Economic Competitiveness

Chair: **Ernest Boyer**, President, Carnegie Foundation
for the Advancement of Teaching

Speakers: **William P. Hobby**, Lt. Governor of Texas
Albert Shanker, President, American Federation
of Teachers

Poverty and the Underclass

Chair: **Sol Trujillo**, Vice President and General Manager,
US WEST Communications

Speakers: **Mary Jo Bane**, John F. Kennedy School of
Government, Harvard University
Douglas J. Besharov, Director of Social Policy
Studies, American Enterprise Institute

Health Care

Chair: **Charles C. Edwards**, President, Scripps Clinic and
Research Foundation

Speakers: **David U. Himmelstein, M.D.**, Chief, Division of Social
and Community Medicine, Cambridge Hospital, Harvard
Medical School
Alain C. Enthoven, Marriner S. Eccles Professor of
Public and Private Management, Graduate School of
Business, Stanford University

ASPEN INSTITUTE 40TH ANNIVERSARY SYMPOSIUM
PROGRAM OUTLINE
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Saturday, August 4, 1990

9:00 A.M. — 12:30 P.M.

Plenary Session 2: Shaping a New Global Community

Chair: **Barbara Walters**
ABC News

Speakers:

Paul A. Volcker, Former Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Ivan Berend, Former President, Hungarian Academy of Science

Ambassador Olara A. Otunnu, President, International Peace Academy

Nafis Sadik, Executive Director, U.N. Fund for Population Activities

Kiichi Miyazawa, Member of Japanese House of Representatives;

Former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance

Giorgio La Malfa, Secretary, Italian Republican Party

2:30 P.M. — 5:30 P.M.

Working Group Sessions: International Issues

Transforming Post-Communist Societies

Chair: **Joseph S. Nye, Jr.**, Director, Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University

Speakers: **Rita Klimova**, Ambassador of Czechoslovakia
Robert Legvold, Director, Harriman Institute for Advanced Study of the Soviet Union, Columbia University

Global Environment

Chair: **Tim Wirth**, U.S. Senator, Colorado

Speakers: **Jessica Tuchman Mathews**, Vice President, World Resources Institute
Thomas G. Schelling, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

ASPEN INSTITUTE 40TH ANNIVERSARY SYMPOSIUM
PROGRAM OUTLINE
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Saturday, August 4, 1990 (Continued)

Social and Economic Development in the Developing Countries

Chair: **Robert S. McNamara**, Former President, The World Bank

Speakers: **Barber B. Conable**, President, International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development
Sir Shridath Ramphal, Secretary-General of the
Commonwealth
Paul S. Sarbanes, U.S. Senator, Maryland

Sunday, August 5, 1990

8:00 A.M. — 9:30 A.M.

Plenary Session 3: Working Group Reports

Chairs: **Bill Moyers**
Public Affairs TV
Barbara Walters
ABC News

Concluding Address

10:00 A.M. — 11:00 A.M.

Chair: **Henry E. Catto**, U.S. Ambassador, London
Speaker: **Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher**

July 24, 1990