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Aspen Institute 40th Anniversary 8/2/90 [OA 5376] [1]

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July 31, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: DAVID DEMAREST

FROM: DAN MCGROARTY

SUBJECT: ASPEN INSTITUTE 40TH ANNIVERSARY

I. SUMMARY

On Thursday, August 2, at 3:30 p.m. you will address the opening session of the Aspen Institute's 40th Anniversary Symposium. Prime Minister Thatcher will attend the event, as well as Ambassador and Mrs. Catto.

Lodwick Cook, Chairman and CEO of ARCO, will introduce you. Following the speech, Ann Hudson, a trustee of the Aspen Institute, will present you with a gift.

II. DISCUSSION

The speech (20 min./teleprompter) discusses national security and defense, and the new challenges the U.S. faces in this rapidly changing world.

#

THE ASPEN INSTITUTE
ASPEN, COLORADO
AUGUST 2, 1990
3:30 P.M.

THANK YOU, LOD {COOK}. / DAVID MCLAUGHLIN
{PRESIDENT OF ASPEN INSTITUTE. JOHN PHELAN {CHAIRMAN.}
HENRY CATTO, OUR AMBASSADOR TO GREAT BRITAIN. ASPEN
ALUMNI, AND ALL OUR DISTINGUISHED GUESTS: MANY THANKS
FOR THIS WARM WELCOME. / AND OF COURSE OUR SPECIAL
GUEST, MY GOOD FRIEND, MARGARET THATCHER. / MADAME
PRIME MINISTER, LET ME SAY THAT, FOR MORE THAN A DECADE
NOW, AMERICA HAS KNOWN NO BETTER FRIEND OF FREEDOM. /
IT'S AN HONOR TO JOIN YOU TODAY. //

[[KIND OF IRONIC, ISN'T IT? WASHINGTON'S GETTING
MORE AND MORE LIKE A 3-RING CIRCUS -- AND HERE I AM
UNDER THE BIG TENT.]] [[OF COURSE IT'S A PLEASURE TO
EXPERIENCE THE SPLENDOR OF ASPEN IN AUGUST. / THE
CLIMATE IN WASHINGTON'S TOUGH THIS TIME OF YEAR. LOTS
OF HEAT. TEMPERATURES RISING. EVERYONE'S HOT UNDER
THE COLLAR. / THE WEATHER'S FINE: / I'M TALKING
ABOUT THE BUDGET SUMMIT. //]]

[[AND WHEN IT COMES TO POLITICS, IT'S NOT THE
HUMIDITY. IT'S THE HEAT. //]]

I AM DELIGHTED TO CELEBRATE WITH ALL OF YOU THE
40TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE ILLUSTRIOUS ASPEN INSTITUTE. /

IN THOSE 40 YEARS, THE SPIRIT OF ASPEN HAS COME TO
SIGNIFY THE ATTEMPT TO BRIDGE THE WORLDS OF THOUGHT AND
ACTION. // AND OF COURSE, TO UNDERSTAND THE
TREMENDOUS CHANGES TAKING PLACE AROUND US. / THINK
BACK TO THE HEADLINES 40 YEARS AGO, THE TIME OF THAT
FIRST ASPEN CONFERENCE IN 1950. / NORTH KOREA ROARED
ACROSS THE 38TH PARALLEL. KLAUS FUCHS WAS CAUGHT AND
CONVICTED FOR REVEALING THE SECRETS OF THE ATOM BOMB TO
THE SOVIETS. THE COLD WAR -- A TERM INTRODUCED INTO
OUR POLITICAL VOCABULARY BY BERNARD BARUCH -- HAD COME
INTO ITS OWN, AS THE SHORTHAND TO DESCRIBE THE HALF-
WAY HOUSE OF AN ARMED AND UNEASY PEACE -- A WORLD
DIVIDED, EAST FROM WEST. /

THAT WAS THE WORLD AS ASPEN CAME INTO BEING -- THE
WORLD ASPEN SOUGHT TO STUDY, AND TO SHAPE. //

THE FORTY YEARS SINCE THEN HAVE BEEN A TIME OF
TREMENDOUS PROGRESS -- FOR THE NATIONS OF THE WEST, AN
ERA OF UNPARALLELED PROSPERITY, PEACE AND FREEDOM. /
BUT AT THE SAME TIME, WE LIVED IN A CONSTANT CONDITION
OF TENSION, COLD WAR AND CONFLICT. //

THAT WORLD IS NOW CHANGING. // THE DECADES-OLD
DIVISION OF EUROPE IS ENDING -- AND THE ERA OF
DEMOCRACY-BUILDING HAS BEGUN. IN GERMANY -- THE
DIVIDED NATION IN THE HEART OF A DIVIDED CONTINENT --
UNITY IS NOW ASSURED, AS A FREE AND FULL MEMBER OF THE
NATO ALLIANCE. / THE SOVIET UNION ITSELF IS IN THE
MIDST OF A POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION THAT
HAS BROUGHT UNPRECEDENTED OPENNESS -- A PROCESS THAT IS
AT ONCE FULL OF HOPE, AND FULL OF UNCERTAINTY. //

WE'VE ENTERED A REMARKABLE STAGE IN OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE USSR. MY DISCUSSIONS WITH PRESIDENT GORBACHEV HAVE BEEN OPEN AND HONEST. ALL THE ISSUES ARE ON THE TABLE -- WE DON'T DODGE THE TOUGH ONES. THAT'S BEEN THE SECRET TO OUR SUCCESS SO FAR, AND OVER TIME, THAT'S HOW WE'RE GOING TO NARROW OUR DIFFERENCES -- AND SEIZE THIS HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY TO CREATE LASTING PROGRESS.

THE CHANGES I'M TALKING ABOUT HAVE TRANSFORMED OUR SECURITY ENVIRONMENT. WE ARE ENTERING A NEW ERA: THE DEFENSE STRATEGY AND MILITARY STRUCTURE NEEDED TO ENSURE PEACE CAN -- AND MUST -- BE DIFFERENT. THE THREAT OF A SOVIET INVASION OF WESTERN EUROPE LAUNCHED WITH LITTLE OR NO WARNING IS TODAY MORE REMOTE THAN AT ANY OTHER POINT IN THE POST-WAR PERIOD. / WITH THE EMERGENCE OF DEMOCRACY IN EASTERN EUROPE, THE WARSAW PACT HAS LOST ITS MILITARY MEANING -- AND AFTER MORE THAN FOUR DECADES OF DOMINANCE, SOVIET TROOPS ARE WITHDRAWING FROM CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE. /

OUR TASK TODAY IS TO SHAPE OUR DEFENSE CAPABILITIES TO THESE CHANGING STRATEGIC CIRCUMSTANCES. / IN A WORLD LESS DRIVEN BY AN IMMEDIATE THREAT TO EUROPE AND THE DANGER OF GLOBAL WAR -- IN A WORLD WHERE THE SIZE OF OUR FORCES WILL INCREASINGLY BE SHAPED BY THE NEEDS OF REGIONAL CONTINGENCIES AND PEACETIME PRESENCE -- WE KNOW THAT OUR FORCES CAN BE SMALLER. / SECRETARY CHENEY AND GENERAL POWELL ARE HARD AT WORK DETERMINING THE PRECISE COMPOSITION OF THE FORCES WE NEED. BUT I CAN TELL YOU NOW, WE CALCULATE THAT BY 1995 OUR SECURITY NEEDS CAN BE MET BY AN ACTIVE FORCE 25% SMALLER THAN TODAY'S. / AMERICA'S ARMED FORCES WILL BE AT THEIR LOWEST LEVEL SINCE 1950.

WHAT MATTERS NOW IS HOW WE RESHAPE THE FORCES THAT REMAIN. OUR NEW STRATEGY MUST PROVIDE THE FRAMEWORK TO GUIDE OUR DELIBERATE REDUCTIONS TO NO MORE THAN THE FORCES WE NEED TO GUARD OUR ENDURING INTERESTS -- THE FORCES TO EXERCISE FORWARD PRESENCE IN KEY AREAS, TO RESPOND EFFECTIVELY TO CRISES, TO RETAIN THE NATIONAL CAPACITY TO REBUILD OUR FORCES SHOULD THIS BE NEEDED.

THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE ILL-SERVED BY FORCES THAT REPRESENT NOTHING MORE THAN A SCALED-BACK OR SHRUNKEN-DOWN VERSION OF THE ONES WE POSSESS AT PRESENT. IF WE SIMPLY PRO-RATE OUR REDUCTIONS -- CUT EQUALLY ACROSS THE BOARD -- WE COULD EASILY END UP WITH MORE THAN WE NEED FOR CONTINGENCIES THAT ARE NO LONGER LIKELY -- AND LESS THAN WE MUST HAVE TO MEET EMERGING CHALLENGES. / WHAT WE NEED ARE NOT MERELY REDUCTIONS -- BUT RESTRUCTURING.

WHAT WE REQUIRE NOW IS A DEFENSE POLICY THAT ADAPTS TO THE SIGNIFICANT CHANGES WE ARE WITNESSING -- WITHOUT NEGLECTING THE ENDURING REALITIES THAT WILL CONTINUE TO SHAPE OUR SECURITY STRATEGY. // A POLICY OF PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT EVERY BIT AS CONSTANT AND COMMITTED TO THE DEFENSE OF OUR INTERESTS AND IDEALS IN TODAY'S WORLD AS IN THE TIME OF CONFLICT AND COLD WAR.

//

AND IN THIS WORLD, AMERICA REMAINS A PIVOTAL FACTOR FOR PEACEFUL CHANGE. / IMPORTANT AMERICAN INTERESTS IN EUROPE AND THE PACIFIC -- IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE PERSIAN GULF -- ALL ARE KEY REASONS WHY MAINTAINING A FORWARD PRESENCE WILL REMAIN AN INDISPENSABLE ELEMENT OF OUR STRATEGY.

WE ALL REMEMBER WHEN THE SOVIET UNION VIEWED OUR FORWARD PRESENCE AS A THREAT. WHEN WE MET, THEIR MILITARY MEN CAME ARMED WITH MAPS, PURPORTING TO SHOW AMERICAN ENCIRCLEMENT OF THE SOVIET UNION. I'VE TALKED ABOUT THIS WITH MR. GORBACHEV. I THINK HE UNDERSTANDS NOW THAT WE HAVE NO INTENTION OF THREATENING HIS COUNTRY -- AND I HAPPEN TO THINK THAT IT'S THE KIND OF CONVERSATIONS WE'VE HAD AT CAMP DAVID THAT HELP MAKE SUCH PROGRESS POSSIBLE. //

I WAS CANDID WITH PRESIDENT GORBACHEV. / I TOLD HIM THAT -- FOR ALL THE POSITIVE CHANGES WE HAVE SEEN -- THE SOVIET UNION REMAINS A WORLD-CLASS MILITARY POWER. EVEN AFTER THE CONVENTIONAL ARMS REDUCTIONS WE ARE NOW NEGOTIATING, THE SOVIETS WILL CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN 2 TO 3 MILLION MEN UNDER ARMS. AND OF COURSE, OUR NUMBER ONE CONCERN: THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN AND MODERNIZE THEIR ARSENAL OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS. //

WE AND OUR ALLIES WELCOME THE NEW COURSE THE SOVIET UNION HAS CHOSEN. BUT PRUDENCE DEMANDS THAT WE MAINTAIN AN EFFECTIVE DETERRENT -- ONE THAT SECURES THE PEACE NOT ONLY IN TODAY'S CLIMATE OF REDUCED TENSIONS, BUT THAT ENSURES THAT RENEWED CONFRONTATION IS NOT A FEASIBLE OPTION FOR ANY SOVIET LEADERSHIP.

THE SOVIETS WILL ENTER A START TREATY WITH A FULLY MODERNIZED, HIGHLY CAPABLE AND VERY LARGE STRATEGIC FORCE. / TO MAINTAIN CLEAR AND CONFIDENT STRATEGIC DETERRENCE INTO THE NEXT CENTURY, WE NEED THE B-2. SECRETARY CHENEY HAS ALREADY SCALED BACK THE PROGRAM. 75 AIRCRAFT MAKES STRATEGIC SENSE. FURTHER DELAYS WILL ONLY INCREASE COSTS. / WE NEED TO COMPLETE THE TRIDENT PROGRAM. THOSE 18 SUBMARINES WILL ENSURE A SURVIVABLE, SUBMARINE-BASED DETERRENT. / WE CAN DEFER FINAL DECISIONS ON OUR LAND-BASED ICBMS -- AS WE SEE HOW THE START TALKS PROCEED -- BUT WE MUST KEEP OUR OPTIONS OPEN: AND THAT MEANS COMPLETING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SMALL ICBM AND THE RAIL-BASED PEACEKEEPER. / AND FINALLY, I AM CONVINCED THAT A DEFENSIVE STRATEGIC DETERRENT MAKES MORE SENSE IN THE '90S THAN EVER BEFORE. WHAT BETTER MEANS OF DEFENSE THAN A SYSTEM THAT DESTROYS ONLY MISSILES LAUNCHED AGAINST US -- WITHOUT THREATENING A SINGLE LIFE? / WE MUST PUSH FORWARD THE GREAT PROMISE OF SDI -- AND DEPLOY IT WHEN READY. //

AND THE U.S. WILL KEEP A FORCE IN EUROPE AS LONG AS OUR ALLIES WANT AND NEED US THERE. / AS WE AND OUR ALLIES ADAPT NATO TO A CHANGING WORLD, THE SIZE AND SHAPE OF OUR FORCES WILL ALSO CHANGE, TO SUIT NEW AND LESS THREATENING CIRCUMSTANCES. BUT WE WILL REMAIN IN EUROPE TO DETER ANY NEW DANGERS, TO BE A FORCE FOR STABILITY -- AND TO REASSURE ALL OF EUROPE -- EAST AND WEST -- THAT THE EUROPEAN BALANCE WILL REMAIN SECURE.

//

OUTSIDE OF EUROPE, AMERICA MUST POSSESS FORCES ABLE TO RESPOND TO THREATS IN WHATEVER CORNER OF THE GLOBE THEY MAY OCCUR. / EVEN IN A WORLD WHERE DEMOCRACY AND FREEDOM HAVE MADE GREAT GAINS, THREATS REMAIN. TERRORISM. HOSTAGE TAKING. RENEGADE REGIMES AND UNPREDICTABLE RULERS -- NEW SOURCES OF INSTABILITY -- ALL REQUIRE A STRONG AND ENGAGED AMERICA. //

IN SPITE OF OUR BEST EFFORTS TO CONTROL THE SPREAD OF CHEMICAL AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND BALLISTIC MISSILE TECHNOLOGIES, MORE NATIONS ARE ACQUIRING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION -- AND THE MEANS TO DELIVER THEM. / RIGHT NOW, 20 COUNTRIES HAVE THE CAPACITY TO PRODUCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS. AND BY THE YEAR 2000, AS MANY AS 15 DEVELOPING NATIONS COULD HAVE THEIR OWN BALLISTIC MISSILES. // IN THE FUTURE, EVEN CONFLICTS WE ONCE THOUGHT OF AS LIMITED OR LOCAL MAY CARRY FAR-REACHING CONSEQUENCES. ///

TO COPE WITH THE FULL RANGE OF CHALLENGES WE MAY CONFRONT, WE MUST FOCUS ON READINESS AND RAPID RESPONSE. AND TO PREPARE TO MEET THE CHALLENGES WE MAY FACE IN THE FUTURE, WE MUST FOCUS ON RESEARCH -- AN ACTIVE AND INVENTIVE PROGRAM OF DEFENSE R&D. //

LET ME BEGIN WITH THE COMPONENT WITH GREAT LONG-RANGE CONSEQUENCES -- RESEARCH. TIME AND AGAIN, WE HAVE SEEN TECHNOLOGY REVOLUTIONIZE THE BATTLEFIELD. / THE U.S. HAS ALWAYS RELIED UPON ITS TECHNOLOGICAL EDGE TO OFFSET THE NEED TO MATCH POTENTIAL ADVERSARIES' STRENGTH IN NUMBERS. / CRUISE MISSILES, STEALTH FIGHTERS AND BOMBERS, TODAY'S "SMART" WEAPONS WITH STATE-OF-THE-ART GUIDANCE SYSTEMS, AND TOMORROW'S "BRILLIANT" ONES: THE MEN AND WOMEN IN OUR ARMED FORCES DESERVE THE BEST TECHNOLOGY AMERICA HAS TO OFFER. //

AND WE MUST REALIZE THE HEAVY PRICE WE WILL PAY IF WE LOOK FOR FALSE ECONOMIES IN DEFENSE R&D. MOST MODERN WEAPONS SYSTEMS TAKE A MINIMUM OF 10 YEARS TO MOVE FROM THE DRAWING BOARD TO THE BATTLEFIELD. / THE NATURE OF NATIONAL DEFENSE DEMANDS THAT WE PLAN NOW FOR THREATS ON THE DISTANT HORIZON. THE DECISIONS WE MAKE TODAY -- THE PROGRAMS WE PUSH FORWARD, OR PUSH ASIDE -- WILL DICTATE THE KIND OF MILITARY FORCES WE HAVE AT OUR DISPOSAL IN THE YEAR 2000 -- AND BEYOND. //

SECOND, WE MUST FOCUS ON RAPID RESPONSE. AS WE SAW MOST RECENTLY IN PANAMA, THE U.S. MAY BE CALLED ON TO RESPOND TO A VARIETY OF CHALLENGES FROM VARIOUS POINTS ON THE COMPASS. IN AN ERA WHEN THREATS MAY EMERGE WITH LITTLE OR NO WARNING, OUR ABILITY TO DEFEND OUR INTERESTS WILL DEPEND ON OUR SPEED AND AGILITY. // WE WILL NEED FORCES THAT GIVE US GLOBAL REACH. NO AMOUNT OF POLITICAL CHANGE WILL ALTER THE GEOGRAPHIC FACT THAT WE ARE SEPARATED FROM MANY OF OUR MOST IMPORTANT ALLIES AND INTERESTS BY THOUSANDS OF MILES OF WATER. //

IN MANY OF THE CONFLICTS WE COULD FACE, WE MAY NOT HAVE THE LUXURY OF MATCHING MANPOWER WITH PRE-POSITIONED MATERIEL. WE WILL HAVE TO HAVE AIR AND SEA-LIFT CAPACITIES TO GET OUR FORCES WHERE THEY ARE NEEDED -- WHEN THEY ARE NEEDED. A NEW EMPHASIS ON FLEXIBILITY AND VERSATILITY MUST GUIDE OUR EFFORTS.

FINALLY, AS WE RESTRUCTURE, WE MUST PUT A PREMIUM ON READINESS. FOR THOSE ACTIVE FORCES WE'LL RELY ON TO RESPOND TO CRISES, READINESS MUST BE OUR HIGHEST PRIORITY. TRUE MILITARY CAPABILITY NEVER EXISTS ON PAPER -- IT IS MEASURED IN THE HOURS SPENT, AND EXPERIENCE GAINED, ON THE TRAINING GROUND, UNDER SAIL, AND IN THE COCKPIT. NOTHING IS MORE SHORT-SIGHTED THAN CUTTING BACK ON TRAINING TIME TO CUT COSTS -- AND NOTHING IS MORE DEMORALIZING FOR OUR TROOPS. // OUR SOLDIERS, SAILORS, AIRMEN AND MARINES MUST BE WELL-TRAINED, TRIED AND TESTED -- READY TO PERFORM EVERY MISSION WE ASK OF THEM. //

IN OUR RESTRUCTURED FORCES, RESERVES WILL BE IMPORTANT, BUT IN NEW WAYS. THE NEED TO BE PREPARED FOR A MASSIVE, SHORT-TERM MOBILIZATION HAS DIMINISHED. WE CAN NOW ADJUST THE SIZE, STRUCTURE AND READINESS OF OUR RESERVE FORCES, TO HELP US DEAL WITH THE MORE LIKELY CHALLENGES WE WILL FACE.

OUR STRATEGY WILL GUARD AGAINST A MAJOR REVERSAL IN SOVIET INTENTIONS BY INCORPORATING INTO OUR PLANNING THE CONCEPT OF RECONSTITUTION OF OUR FORCES. BY THE MID-90S, THE TIME IT WOULD TAKE THE SOVIETS TO RETURN TO THE LEVELS OF CONFRONTATION THAT MARKED THE DEPTHS OF THE COLD WAR WILL BE SUFFICIENT TO ALLOW US TO RELY NOT SOLELY ON EXISTING FORCES -- BUT TO GENERATE WHOLLY NEW FORCES. THIS READINESS TO REBUILD -- MADE EXPLICIT IN OUR DEFENSE POLICY -- WILL BE AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN OUR ABILITY TO DETER AGGRESSION. ///

A RATIONAL RESTRUCTURING OF THE KIND I'VE OUTLINED WILL TAKE FIVE YEARS. I AM CONFIDENT WE CAN MEET THE CHALLENGES I'VE OUTLINED TODAY -- PROVIDED WE PROCEED WITH AN ORDERLY BUILD-DOWN -- NOT A FIRE SALE. ANY BUILD-DOWN OF THIS MAGNITUDE MUST BE MANAGED CAREFULLY TO MINIMIZE DISLOCATIONS -- NOT JUST TO THE MILITARY BALANCE, BUT TO MORALE. AND I CAN SAY RIGHT NOW, AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, THAT WE WILL TAKE EVERY STEP POSSIBLE TO MINIMIZE THE TURBULENCE THESE CHANGES WILL CREATE FOR OUR SOLDIERS, SAILORS, AIRMEN AND MARINES. I WILL NOT BREAK FAITH WITH THE YOUNG MEN AND WOMEN WHO HAVE FREELY CHOSEN TO SERVE THEIR COUNTRY. //

ALL OF US KNOW THE CHALLENGES WE FACE ARE FISCAL,
AS WELL AS MILITARY. / THE BUDGET CONSTRAINTS WE FACE
ARE VERY REAL -- BUT SO TOO IS THE NEED TO PROTECT THE
GAINS THAT 40 YEARS OF PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH HAVE
EARNED US. THE SIMPLE FACT IS THIS: WHEN IT COMES TO
NATIONAL SECURITY, AMERICA CAN NEVER AFFORD TO FAIL OR
FALL SHORT. ///

LET ME SAY ONCE AGAIN HOW PLEASED I AM TO APPEAR
HERE TODAY -- ESPECIALLY WITH OUR HONORED FRIEND, MRS.
THATCHER. / TODAY, OF COURSE, IS NOT THE ONLY TIME
PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER HAVE SHARED THE STAGE.
THE WORLD REMEMBERS THAT DAY 44 YEARS AGO -- IN FULTON,
MISSOURI, WHEN CHURCHILL DELIVERED WHAT HISTORY CALLS
THE "IRON CURTAIN" SPEECH. / BUT THAT WASN'T WHAT HE
CALLED IT. HE TITLED IT / "THE SINEWS OF PEACE." //
BY THAT, HE MEANT TO SUMMON UP A VISION OF THE STRENGTH
OF FREE NATIONS -- UNITED IN DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACY. //

AT LONG LAST, WE ARE WRITING THE FINAL CHAPTER OF
THE 20TH CENTURY'S THIRD GREAT CONFLICT. THE COLD WAR
IS NOW DRAWING TO A CLOSE. / AFTER FOUR DECADES OF
DIVISION AND DISCORD, OUR CHALLENGE TODAY IS TO FULFILL
THE GREAT DREAM OF ALL DEMOCRACIES: A TRUE
COMMONWEALTH OF FREE NATIONS. / TO MARSHALL THE
GROWING FORCES OF THE FREE WORLD -- TO WORK TOGETHER,
TO BRING WITHIN REACH FOR ALL MEN AND NATIONS THE
LIBERTY THAT BELONGS BY RIGHT TO ALL. //

THANK YOU, AND MAY GOD BLESS THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA.

#

CLOSE HOLD

SENSITIVE

Document No. 162623

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

90 JUL 31 P8:07

DATE: 07/31/90 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: ----

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: THE ASPEN INSTITUTE (07/31 4:45 p.m. draft)

	ACTION FYI			ACTION FYI	
VICE PRESIDENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	MCCLURE	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
SUNUNU	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	NEWMAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
SCOWCROFT	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	PORTER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
DARMAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	ROGICH	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
CARD	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	UNTERMEYER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
CICCONI	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	WINSTON	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DEMAREST	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
FITZWATER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
GRAY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HAGIN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HOLIDAY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

REMARKS:

The attached has been forwarded to the President.

RESPONSE:

SENSITIVE

James V. Cicconi
Assistant to the President
and Deputy to the Chief of Staff
Ext. 2702

CLOSE HOLD

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

1990 JUL 31 PM 5:01

July 31, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH:

DAVID DEMAREST *DD*

FROM:

DAN MCGROARTY *DM*

SUBJECT:

ASPEN INSTITUTE 40TH ANNIVERSARY

I. SUMMARY

On Thursday, August 2, at 3:30 p.m. you will address the opening session of the Aspen Institute's 40th Anniversary Symposium. About 3000 people will attend, 500 of whom are special guests of the Aspen Institute, including Prime Minister Thatcher, Ambassador and Mrs. Catto, business executives, public servants and academics from around the world.

Lodwick Cook, Chairman and CEO of ARCO, will introduce you. Following the speech, Ann Hudson, a trustee of the Aspen Institute, will present you with a gift.

II. DISCUSSION

The speech (20 min./teleprompter) discusses national security and defense, and the new challenges the U.S. faces in this rapidly changing world.

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McGroarty/Dooley
July 31, 1990
4:45 pm
[ASPEN]

PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: THE ASPEN INSTITUTE
ASPEN, COLORADO
AUGUST 2, 1990
5:30 P.M.

[Introductory acknowledgements: Aspen officials, alumni. Prime Minister Thatcher, Ambassador Catto.] I am delighted to celebrate with you the 40th anniversary of the illustrious Aspen Institute. //

In those 40 years, the spirit of Aspen has come to signify the attempt to bridge the worlds of thought and action. // And of course, to understand the tremendous changes taking place around us. / Think back to the headlines 40 years ago, the summer of that first Aspen conference in 1950. / North Korea roared across the 38th parallel. Klaus Fuchs was caught and convicted for revealing the secrets of the atom bomb to the Soviets. The Cold War -- a term introduced into our political vocabulary by Bernard Baruch -- had come into its own, as the shorthand to describe the half-way house of an armed and uneasy peace -- a world divided, East from West. /

That was the world as Aspen came into being -- the world Aspen sought to study, and to shape. //

The forty years since then have been a time of tremendous progress -- for the nations of the West, an era of unparalleled prosperity, peace and freedom. / But at the same time, we lived in a constant condition of tension, Cold War and conflict. //

That world is now changing. // The decades-old division of Europe is ending -- and the era of democracy-building has begun. In Germany -- the divided nation in the heart of a divided continent -- unity is now assured, as a free and full member of the NATO alliance. / The Soviet Union itself is in the midst of a political and economic transformation that has brought unprecedented openness -- a process that is at once full of hope, and full of uncertainty. //

These changes have transformed our security environment. We are entering a new era. The defense strategy and military structure needed to ensure peace **can -- and must -- be different.** / The threat of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe launched with little or no warning is today **more remote than at any point in the post-war period.** / With the emergence of democracy in Eastern Europe, the Warsaw Pact has lost its military meaning -- and after more than four decades of dominance, Soviet troops are withdrawing from Central and Eastern Europe. /

Our task today is to shape our defense capabilities to these changing strategic circumstances. / In a world less driven by an immediate threat to Europe and the danger of global war -- in a world where arms control agreements contribute to stability -- we know that our forces will be smaller. / Secretary Cheney and General Powell are hard at work determining the precise size and composition of the forces we need. But I can tell you now, when all the calculations are complete -- when all our roles and missions are reviewed -- we will be looking at a military force

that, within five years, will be 25% smaller than today's. / America's Armed Forces will be at their lowest level since 1950.

What matters most is how we reshape the forces that remain. The United States would be ill-served by forces that represent nothing more than a scaled-back or shrunken-down version of the ones we possess at present. If we simply pro-rate our reductions -- cut equally across the board -- we could easily end up with more than we need for contingencies that are no longer likely -- and less than we must have to meet emerging challenges. / What we need are not merely reductions -- but restructuring.

What we require now is a defense policy that adapts to the significant changes we are witnessing -- without neglecting the enduring realities that will continue to shape our security strategy. // A policy of peacetime engagement every bit as constant and committed to the defense of our interests and ideals in today's world as in the time of conflict and Cold War. //

And in this world, America remains a pivotal factor for peaceful change. / American interests in Europe and the Pacific -- in the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf -- all are key reasons why maintaining a forward presence will remain an indispensable element of our strategy.

And the fact remains for all the positive changes we have seen, the Soviet Union remains a world-class military power. Even after the conventional arms reductions we are now negotiating, the Soviets will continue to maintain 2 to 3 million men under arms. / And of course, our number one concern: the

Soviets continue to maintain and modernize their arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons. //

We and our allies welcome the new course the Soviet Union has chosen. / But prudence demands that we maintain an effective deterrent -- one that secures the peace not only in today's climate of reduced tensions, but that ensures that renewed confrontation is not an option for any Soviet leadership.

The Soviets will enter a START Treaty with a fully modernized, highly capable and very large strategic force. / We need the B-2. Secretary Cheney has already scaled back the program as much as makes sense. Further delays will only increase costs. / We need to complete the Trident program -- to ensure a survivable, submarine-based deterrent. / We can defer a decision on our land-based ICBMs -- as we see how the START talks proceed -- but we must keep our options open: and that means completing the development of the small ICBM and the rail-based Peacekeeper. / And finally, I am convinced that a defensive strategic deterrent makes more sense than ever before. We must push forward the great promise of SDI -- and we must deploy SDI when ready. //

And the U.S. will keep a force in Europe as long as our allies want and need us there. / The size and shape of those forces will change, to suit the new and less threatening circumstances. But we will remain in Europe to deter any new dangers -- and to reassure all of Europe -- East and West -- that the European balance will remain secure. //

Outside of Europe, America must possess forces able to respond to threats in whatever corner of the globe they may occur. / In spite of our best efforts to control the spread of chemical and nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technologies, more nations are acquiring weapons of mass destruction -- and the means to deliver them. / [[Right now, over 100 countries have cruise missiles. 20 countries have the capacity to produce chemical weapons. And by the year 2000, as many as 15 nations will possess ballistic missiles. //]] In the future, even conflicts we once thought of as limited or local may carry far-reaching consequences.

Even in a world where democracy and freedom have made great gains, threats remain. Terrorism. Hostage taking. Renegade regimes and unpredictable rulers -- new sources of instability - - all require a strong and engaged America. //

To cope with the full range of challenges we may confront, we must focus on readiness and rapid response -- and to prepare today to meet the challenges we may face in the future, we must focus on research -- an active and inventive program of defense R&D. //

Let me begin with the component with the greatest long-range consequences -- research. Time and again, we have seen technology revolutionize the battlefield. / The U.S. has always relied upon its technological edge to offset the need to match potential adversaries' strength in numbers. / Cruise missiles, Stealth fighters and bombers, today's "smart" weapons with state-

of-the-art guidance systems, and tomorrow's "brilliant" ones: the men and women in our Armed Forces deserve the best technology America has to offer. //

And we must realize the heavy price we will pay if we look for false economies in defense R&D. Most modern weapons systems take a minimum of 10 years to move from the drawing board to the battlefield. / // The nature of national defense demands that we plan now for threats on the distant horizon. The decisions we make today -- the programs we push forward, or push aside -- will dictate the kind of military forces we have at our disposal in the year 2000 -- and beyond. //

Second, we must focus on rapid response. As we saw most recently in Panama, the U.S. may be called on to respond to a variety of challenges from various points on the compass. In an era when threats may well emerge without warning, our ability to defend our interests will depend on our speed and agility.

We will need forces that give us global reach. No amount of political change will alter the geographic fact that we are separated from many of our most important allies and interests by thousands of miles of water. //

And in many of the conflicts we may face in the future, we may not have the luxury of matching manpower with pre-positioned materiel. That will require air and sea-lift capacities to get our forces where they are needed -- when they are needed. A new emphasis on flexibility and versatility should guide our efforts.

And finally, as we restructure, we must put a premium on

readiness. / Readiness must be our highest priority. / True military capability never exists on paper -- it is measured in the hours spent, and experience gained, on the training ground, under sail, and in the cockpit. Nothing is more short-sighted than cutting training time to cut costs -- and nothing is more demoralizing for our troops than to deny them the training time they need. // Our soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines must be well-trained, tried and tested -- ready to perform every mission we ask of them. //

In our restructured forces, reserves will be important, but in new ways. The need to be prepared for a massive, short-term mobilization has diminished. We can now adjust both the size and readiness of our reserve forces, to help us deal with the more likely challenges we will face.

Our strategy will guard against a major reversal in Soviet intentions by incorporating into our planning the concept of regeneration of our forces. By the mid-90s, the time it would take the Soviets to return to the levels of confrontation that marked the depths of the Cold War will be sufficient to allow us to rely not solely on existing forces -- but to generate wholly new forces. / This readiness to rebuild -- made explicit in our defense policy -- will be an important element in our ability to deter aggression. ///

A rational restructuring of the kind I've outlined will take five years. And I am confident we can meet the challenges I've outlined today -- provided we proceed with an orderly build-down

-- not a fire sale. Any build-down of this magnitude must be managed carefully to **minimize dislocations** -- not just to the military balance, but to morale. And I can say right now, as Commander-in-Chief, that we will take every step possible to minimize the turbulence these changes will create for our soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines. / I will not break faith with the young men and women who have freely chosen to serve their country. //

All of us know the challenges we face are fiscal, as well as military. / The budget constraints we face are very real -- but so too is the need for a strong and secure America. The simple fact is: **when it comes to national security, America can never afford to fail or fall short.** ///

Let me say once again how pleased I am to appear here today -- especially with our honored friend, Mrs. Thatcher. / Today, of course, is not the only time President and Prime Minister have shared the stage. The world remembers that day 44 years ago -- in Fulton, Missouri, when Churchill delivered what history calls the "Iron Curtain" speech. / But that wasn't what he called it. He titled it / **"The Sinews of Peace."** // By that, he meant to summon up a vision of the **strength of free nations -- united in defense of democracy.** //

At long last, we are writing the final chapter of the 20th Century's third great conflict. The Cold War is now drawing to a close. / And yet today -- as in Churchill's time -- the world remains divided. **For all the millions of men and women who won**

their freedom this past year -- there are hundreds of millions more not yet free. //

Our challenge today is to overcome this deep division. To marshall the growing forces of the Free World -- to work to bring within reach for the unfree the liberty that belongs by right to all. //

Thank you, and may God bless the United States of America.

#

PP. 3+6

McGroarty/Dooley
August 1, 1990
2:30 p.m.
[ASPEN]

PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: THE ASPEN INSTITUTE
ASPEN, COLORADO
AUGUST 2, 1990
3:30 P.M.

SEE CHANGES IN ACKNOWLED. + HUMOR

Thank you, Lod {Cook}. [Acknowledge Aspen officials, alumni. Prime Minister Thatcher. Ambassador Catto.] I am delighted to celebrate with you the 40th anniversary of the illustrious Aspen Institute. //

In those 40 years, the **spirit of Aspen** has come to signify the attempt to bridge the worlds of **thought and action**. // And of course, to understand the tremendous changes taking place around us. / Think back to the headlines 40 years ago, the time of that first Aspen conference in 1950. / North Korea roared across the 38th parallel. Klaus Fuchs was caught and convicted for revealing the secrets of the atom bomb to the Soviets. The **Cold War** -- a term introduced into our political vocabulary by Bernard Baruch -- **had come into its own, as the shorthand to describe the half-way house of an armed and uneasy peace -- a world divided, East from West.** /

That was the world as Aspen came into being -- the world Aspen sought to **study**, and to **shape**. //

The forty years since then have been a time of tremendous progress -- for the nations of the West, an era of unparalleled **prosperity, peace and freedom**. / But at the same time, we lived in a constant condition of **tension, Cold War and conflict**. //

That world is now changing. // The decades-old division of Europe is ending -- and the era of democracy-building has begun. In Germany -- the divided nation in the heart of a divided continent -- unity is now assured, as a free and full member of the NATO alliance. / The Soviet Union itself is in the midst of a political and economic transformation that has brought unprecedented openness -- a process that is at once full of hope, and full of uncertainty. //

We've entered a remarkable stage in our relationship with the USSR. My discussions with President Gorbachev have been open and honest. All the issues are on the table -- we don't dodge the tough ones. That's been the secret to our success so far, and over time, that's how we're going to narrow our differences - - and seize this historic opportunity to create lasting progress.

The changes I'm talking about have transformed our security environment. We are entering a new era: The defense strategy and military structure needed to ensure peace **can -- and must -- be different.** The threat of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe launched with little or no warning is today **more remote than at any other point in the post-war period.** / With the emergence of democracy in Eastern Europe, the Warsaw Pact has lost its military meaning -- and after more than four decades of dominance, Soviet troops are withdrawing from Central and Eastern Europe. /

Our task today is to shape our defense capabilities to these changing strategic circumstances. / In a world less driven by

Our new strategy must provide the framework to guide our deliberate build down to the ~~minimum~~ forces we need to guard our enduring interests -- the ~~minimum~~ forces to exercise forward presence in key areas, to respond effectively to crises, to retain the national capacity to rebuild our forces should this be needed.

an immediate threat to Europe and the danger of global war -- in a world where the size of our forces will increasingly be shaped by the needs of regional contingencies and peacetime presence -- we know that our forces can be smaller. / Secretary Cheney and General Powell are hard at work determining the precise composition of the forces we need. But I can tell you now, we calculate that by 1995 our security needs can be met by an active force 25% smaller than today's. / **America's Armed Forces will be at their lowest level since 1950.**

What matters now is how we reshape the forces that remain. ⊕

Ⓜ The United States would be ill-served by forces that represent nothing more than a scaled-back or shrunken-down version of the ones we possess at present. If we simply pro-rate our reductions -- cut equally across the board -- we could easily end up with more than we need for contingencies that are no longer likely -- and less than we must have to meet emerging challenges. / What we need are not merely **reductions** -- but **restructuring**.

What we require now is a defense policy that adapts to the **significant changes** we are witnessing -- without neglecting the enduring realities that will continue to shape our security strategy. // A policy of peacetime engagement every bit as constant and committed to the defense of our interests and ideals in today's world as in the time of conflict and Cold War. //

And in this world, America remains a **pivotal factor for peaceful change.** / Important American interests in Europe and the Pacific -- in the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf -- all

reductions
to no more
than the

are key reasons why maintaining a forward presence will remain an indispensable element of our strategy.

We all remember when the Soviet Union viewed our forward presence as a threat. When we met, their military men came armed with maps, purporting to show American encirclement of the Soviet Union. I've talked about this with Mr. Gorbachev. I think he understands now that we have no intention of threatening his country -- and I happen to think that it's the kind of conversations we've had at Camp David that make such progress possible. //

I was candid with President Gorbachev. / I told him that -
- for all the positive changes we have seen -- the **Soviet Union remains a world-class military power**. Even after the conventional arms reductions we are now negotiating, the Soviets will continue to maintain 2 to 3 million men under arms. And of course, our number one concern: the Soviets continue to maintain **and modernize** their arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons. //

We and our allies welcome the new course the Soviet Union has chosen. But prudence demands that we maintain an effective deterrent -- one that secures the peace **not only** in today's climate of reduced tensions, but that ensures that renewed confrontation is not a feasible option for any Soviet leadership.

The Soviets will enter a START Treaty with a fully modernized, highly capable and very large strategic force. / To maintain clear and confident strategic deterrence into the next century, **we need the B-2**. Secretary Cheney has already scaled

back the program. 75 aircraft makes strategic sense. Further delays will only increase costs. / We need to complete the Trident program. Those 18 submarines will ensure a survivable, submarine-based deterrent. / We can defer final decisions on our land-based ICBMs -- as we see how the START talks proceed -- but we must keep our options open: and that means completing the development of the small ICBM and the rail-based Peacekeeper. / And finally, I am convinced that a defensive strategic deterrent makes more sense in the '90s than ever before. What better means of defense than a system that destroys only missiles launched against us -- without threatening a single life? / We must push forward the great promise of SDI -- and deploy it when ready. //

And the U.S. will keep a force in Europe as long as our allies want and need us there. / As we and our allies adapt NATO to a changing world, the **size and shape** of our forces will also change, to suit new and less threatening circumstances. But we will remain in Europe to deter any new dangers, to be a force for stability -- and to reassure all of Europe -- East and West -- that the European balance will remain secure. //

Outside of Europe, ~~America must possess forces able to~~ ^{③ When necessary, our forces must be able to} respond to threats in whatever corner of the globe they may occur. / Even in a world where democracy and freedom have made great gains, threats remain. Terrorism. Hostage taking. Renegade regimes and unpredictable rulers -- new sources of instability -- all require a strong and engaged America. //

STET

① America must sustain a presence in key regions to help influence peaceful progress. ~~We must remain stalwart partners with Japan and our other friends in the Pacific. And we must continue to support our friends in the Middle East.~~ ^{Such as Asia and particularly Japan}

In spite of our best efforts to control the spread of chemical and nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technologies, more nations are acquiring weapons of mass destruction -- and the means to deliver them. / Right now, ~~over 100 countries have cruise missiles.~~ 20 countries have the capacity to produce chemical weapons. And by the year 2000, as many as 15 ^{developing} nations ~~could~~ ^{could have their own} possess ballistic missiles. // In the future, even conflicts we once thought of as limited or local may carry far-reaching consequences. ///

To cope with the full range of challenges we may confront, we must focus on readiness and rapid response. And to prepare to meet the challenges we may face in the future, we must focus on research -- an active and inventive program of defense R&D. //

Let me begin with the component with great long-range consequences -- research. Time and again, we have seen **technology revolutionize the battlefield**. / The U.S. has always relied upon its technological edge to offset the need to match potential adversaries' strength in numbers. / Cruise missiles, Stealth fighters and bombers, today's "smart" weapons with state-of-the-art guidance systems, and tomorrow's "brilliant" ones: the men and women in our Armed Forces deserve the best technology America has to offer. //

And we must realize the heavy price we will pay if we look for false economies in defense R&D. Most modern weapons systems take a minimum of 10 years to move from the drawing board to the battlefield. / The nature of national defense demands that we

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FROM NSC.
Hayden
x 4970

plan now for threats on the distant horizon. The decisions we make today -- the programs we push forward, or push aside -- will dictate the kind of military forces we have at our disposal in the year 2000 -- and beyond. //

Second, we must focus on rapid response. As we saw most recently in Panama, the U.S. may be called on to respond to a variety of challenges from various points on the compass. In an era when threats may emerge with little or no warning, our ability to defend our interests will depend on our speed and agility. // We will need forces that give us global reach. No amount of political change will alter the geographic fact that we are separated from many of our most important allies and interests by thousands of miles of water. //

In many of the conflicts we could face, we may not have the luxury of matching manpower with pre-positioned materiel. We will have to have air and sea-lift capacities to get our forces where they are needed -- when they are needed. A new emphasis on flexibility and versatility must guide our efforts.

Finally, as we restructure, we must put a premium on readiness. For those active forces we'll rely on to respond to crises, readiness must be our highest priority. True military capability never exists on paper -- it is measured in the hours spent, and experience gained, on the training ground, under sail, and in the cockpit. Nothing is more short-sighted than cutting back on training time to cut costs -- and nothing is more demoralizing for our troops. // Our soldiers, sailors, airmen

and marines must be well-trained, tried and tested -- ready to perform every mission we ask of them. //

In our restructured forces, reserves will be important, but in new ways. The need to be prepared for a massive, short-term mobilization has diminished. We can now adjust the size, structure and readiness of our reserve forces, to help us deal with the more likely challenges we will face.

Our strategy will guard against a major reversal in Soviet intentions by incorporating into our planning the concept of ~~regeneration~~ ^{reconstitution} of our forces. By the mid-90s, the time it would take the Soviets to return to the levels of confrontation that marked the depths of the Cold War will be sufficient to allow us to rely not solely on existing forces -- but to generate wholly new forces. This readiness to rebuild -- made explicit in our defense policy -- will be an important element in our ability to deter aggression. ///

A rational restructuring of the kind I've outlined will take five years. I am confident we can meet the challenges I've outlined today -- provided we proceed with an orderly build-down -- not a fire sale. Any build-down of this magnitude must be managed carefully to minimize dislocations -- not just to the military balance, but to morale. And I can say right now, as Commander-in-Chief, that we will take every step possible to minimize the turbulence these changes will create for our soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines. I will not break faith

with the young men and women who have freely chosen to serve their country. //

All of us know the challenges we face are fiscal, as well as military. / The budget constraints we face are very real -- but so too is the need to protect the gains that 40 years of peace through strength have earned us. The simple fact is this: when it comes to national security, America can never afford to fail or fall short. ///

Let me say once again how pleased I am to appear here today -- especially with our honored friend, Mrs. Thatcher. / Today, of course, is not the only time President and Prime Minister have shared the stage. The world remembers that day 44 years ago -- in Fulton, Missouri, when Churchill delivered what history calls the "Iron Curtain" speech. / But that wasn't what he called it. He titled it / "The Sinews of Peace." // By that, he meant to summon up a vision of the strength of free nations -- united in defense of democracy. //

At long last, we are writing the final chapter of the 20th Century's third great conflict. The Cold War is now drawing to a close. / After four decades of division and discord, our challenge today is fulfill the great dream of all democracies: a true commonwealth of free nations. / To marshall the growing forces of the Free World -- to work together, to bring within reach for the all men and nations the liberty that belongs by right to all. //

Thank you, and may God bless the United States of America.

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 7/30/90 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 7/30/90 3:00 PM

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: ASPEN INSTITUTE

	ACTION FYI			ACTION FYI	
VICE PRESIDENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	MCCLURE <i>N/C</i>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
SUNUNU	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	NEWMAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
SCOWCROFT	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	PORTER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
DARMAN	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	ROGICH <i>N/C</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
CARD	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	UNTERMAYER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
CICCONI	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	ROGERS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DEMAREST	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	WINSTON	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
FITZWATER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
GRAY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HAGIN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HOLIDAY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

REMARKS:

Please forward any comments directly to Chriss Winston, Rm. 122, x2930, no later than 3:00 PM, Tuesday, July 31, with a copy to my office. Thank you.

RESPONSE:

1990 JUL 30 PM 3.55

McGroarty/Dooley
July 30, 1990
3:30 pm
[ASPEN]

PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: THE ASPEN INSTITUTE
ASPEN, COLORADO
AUGUST 2, 1990
5:30 P.M.

[Introductory acknowledgements: Aspen officials, alumni. Prime Minister Thatcher, Ambassador Catto.] I am delighted to celebrate with you the 40th anniversary of the illustrious Aspen Institute. //

In those 40 years, the **spirit of Aspen** has come to signify the attempt to bridge the worlds of **thought and action**. // And of course, to understand the tremendous changes taking place around us. / Think back to the headlines 40 years ago, the summer of that first Aspen conference in 1950. / North Korea roared across the 38th parallel. Klaus Fuchs was caught and convicted for revealing the secrets of the atom bomb to the Soviets. The **Cold War** -- a term introduced into our political vocabulary by Bernard Baruch -- had come into its own, as the shorthand to describe the half-way house of an armed and uneasy peace -- a world divided, East from West. /

That was the world as Aspen came into being -- the world Aspen sought to **study**, and to **shape**. //

The forty years since then have been a time of tremendous progress -- for the nations of the West, an era of unparalleled **prosperity, peace and freedom**. / But at the same time, we lived in a constant condition of **tension, Cold War and conflict**. //

That world is now changing. // The decades-old division of Europe is now ending -- and the era of democracy-building has begun. In Germany -- the divided nation in the heart of a divided continent -- unity is now assured, as a free and full member of the NATO alliance. / The **Soviet Union** itself is in the midst of a political and economic transformation that has brought unprecedented openness -- and begun a process of change that is at once **full of hope, and full of uncertainty.** //

This change has had an undeniable impact on national security strategy as well. / The threat of a large-scale land war -- a Soviet invasion of Western Europe launched with little or no warning -- is today **more remote than at any point in the post-war period.** / With the emergence of democracy in Eastern Europe, the Warsaw Pact has lost its military meaning -- and after more than four decades of dominance, Soviet troops are beginning to withdraw from Central and Eastern Europe. /

But the fact remains for all these positive changes that the **Soviet Union remains a world-class military power.** Even after the conventional arms reductions we are now negotiating, the Soviets will continue to maintain 2 to 3 million men under arms - - a force far larger than any other nation in Europe. / And of course, our number one concern: in spite of severe economic hardship, the Soviets continue to maintain and modernize their arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons. //

We and our allies welcome the new course the Soviet Union has chosen. / But prudence demands that we maintain an

effective deterrent -- one that secures the peace not only in today's climate of reduced tensions, but provides a safeguard against any future reversal from the Soviet Union's present, positive course. [[NSC INSERT ON STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION.]]

Above all, we cannot mistake the great gains democracy has made this past year as proof that America's work in the world is complete. // All of us agree that never before in the post-war era has the likelihood of global war been lower. And yet, for all the distance we have travelled from the depths of the Cold War, we must also recognize that we have not yet entered an era of perpetual peace. //

What we require now is a policy that adapts to the significant changes we've witnessed -- without neglecting the enduring realities that will continue to shape our security strategy. // A policy of peacetime engagement every bit as constant and committed to the defense of our interests and ideals in today's world as in the time of conflict and Cold War. // A policy that recognizes that our enemy is instability -- and that a strong America must remain a force for stability in the world. //

As long as the United States remains a nation with global interests -- we must maintain a global balance. / American interests in Europe and the Pacific -- the enduring reality of Soviet power -- all are key reasons why maintaining a forward presence will remain an indispensable element of our strategy.

For instance -- while we may well change our present operating procedures and patterns of deployment -- no amount of **political** change will alter the **geographical** fact that the U.S. **must remain a maritime power.** //

And the U.S. will keep a force in Europe as long as our allies believe our presence contributes to stability. / The **size and shape** of those forces will change, to suit the new and less threatening circumstances -- and to adapt to a new political climate that calls for forces organized along multinational lines. But for the sake of stability, the overall capability of U.S. forces in Europe will remain substantial. //

In addition to these enduring security interests, America must possess forces capable of responding to emerging threats in corners of the globe that may not at present seem to pose great danger. / In spite of our best efforts to control the spread of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technologies, more nations are acquiring weapons of mass destruction -- and the means to deliver them. / Right now, over 100 countries have cruise missiles. 20 countries have the capacity to produce chemical weapons. And by the year 2000, as many as 15 nations will possess ballistic missiles. // In the future, even conflicts we once thought of as **regional** may carry far-reaching consequences.

In this past year, democracy has indeed made great gains. But our world remains one where **radicalism, fanaticism, and a destructive form of nationalism** continue to breed violence and **terror -- aggression and instability.** / In a world of renegade

regimes and unpredictable rulers -- the U.S. must stand with its allies in defense of our democratic values. ///

Our task today is to shape our defense capabilities to the changing strategic circumstances I've just spoken of. / We know that our forces will be smaller. / Secretary Cheney and General Powell are hard at work determining the precise size and composition of the forces we need. But I can tell you now, when all the calculations are complete -- when all our roles and missions are reviewed -- we will be looking at a military force that, **within five years, will be 25% smaller than today's**. //

What matters is how we reshape the forces that remain. The United States would be ill-served by forces that represent nothing more than a scaled-back or shrunken-down version of the ones we possess at present. We could easily end up with more than we need for contingencies that are no longer likely -- and less than we must have to meet emerging challenges. / What we need are not merely **reductions** -- but **restructuring**.

This restructuring must emphasize three key components essential to sustain American security: To cope with the full range of challenges we may confront, we must focus on readiness and rapid response -- and to prepare today to meet the challenges we may face in the future, we must focus on research -- an active and inventive program of defense R&D. //

Let me begin with the component with the greatest long-range consequences -- research. Time and again, we have seen **technology revolutionize the battlefield**. / The U.S. has always

relied upon its technological edge to offset the need to match potential adversaries' strength in numbers. / Cruise missiles, Stealth fighters and bombers, today's "smart" weapons with state-of-the-art guidance systems, and tomorrow's "brilliant" ones -- all of these and more will be a necessary part in prevailing in any future conflict -- and at the same time, saving lives. //

We must realize the heavy price we will pay if we look for false economies in defense R&D. Most modern weapons systems take a minimum of 10 years to move from the drawing board to the battlefield. / The decisions we make **today** -- the programs we push forward, or push aside -- will dictate the kind of military forces we have at our disposal in the year 2000 -- and beyond. // The nature of national defense demands that we **plan now for threats on the distant horizon.** //

Second, as we restructure, we must put a premium on readiness. // True military capability never exists **on paper** -- it is measured in the hours spent, and experience gained, on the training ground, under sail, and in the cockpit. Nothing is more short-sighted than cutting training time to cut costs -- and nothing is more demoralizing for our troops than to deny them the training time they need. // **Our soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines must be well-trained, tried and tested -- ready to perform every mission we ask of them.** //

In our restructured forces, reserves will continue to play a special role. The need to be prepared for a massive, short-term mobilization has diminished -- along with the threat of Soviet

aggression. Instead of measuring warning time in terms of days and weeks as we were forced to do for the past 40 years -- by the mid-90's, we expect much longer notice of any return to the levels of confrontation that existed in the depths of the Cold War: signs that we could recognize at least one to two years before the outbreak of aggression. // Today we must focus on the capacity to reconstitute our forces -- to rebuild essential capabilities -- in a time of increased instability.

Finally, we must focus on rapid response. As we saw most recently in OPERATION JUST CAUSE, the U.S. may be called on to respond to threats from various points on the compass. In an era when threats may well emerge without warning, our ability to defend our interests will depend on our speed and agility.

In many of the conflicts we may face in the future, we will not have the luxury of matching manpower with pre-positioned materiel. That will require air and sea-lift capacities at the very least equal to if not more capable than those we possess today. //

A rational restructuring of the kind I've outlined will take five years. And I am confident we can meet the challenges I've outlined today -- provided we proceed with an orderly build-down -- not a fire sale. Any build-down of this magnitude must be managed carefully to minimize dislocations -- not just to the military balance, but to morale. And I can say right now, as Commander-in-Chief, that I will not break faith with the young men and women who have freely chosen to serve their country. //

All of us know the challenges we face are fiscal, as well as military. / The budget constraints we face are very real -- but so too is the need for a strong and secure America. The simple fact is: **when it comes to national security, America can never afford to fail or fall short.** ///

Let me say once again how pleased I am to appear here today -- especially with our honored friend, Mrs. Thatcher. / Today, of course, is not the first time President and Prime Minister have shared the stage. That was 44 years ago -- in Fulton, Missouri. // Mrs. Thatcher, the world remembers the address Churchill delivered that day as the "Iron Curtain" speech. / But that wasn't what he called it. He titled it / **"The Sinews of Peace."** // By that, he meant to summon up a vision of the **strength of free nations -- united in defense of democracy.** //

At long last, we are writing the final chapter of the 20th Century's third great conflict. The Cold War is now drawing to a close. / And yet today -- as in Churchill's time -- the world remains divided. **For all the millions of men and women who won their freedom this past year -- there are hundreds of millions more not yet free.** //

Our challenge today is to overcome this deep division. To marshall the growing forces of the Free World -- to work to bring within reach for the unfree the liberty that belongs by right to all. //

Thank you, and may God bless the United States of America.

#

CW
FYI -
- Dan

NSC Revised Draft

27 JULY 90
~~28 July 90~~
~~9:00 a.m.~~
3 pm

1

(Introductory remarks appropriate to the setting.)
For nearly half a century, we and our Allies have been challenged the world over by ideological struggle and military confrontation. Because we prized liberty, we responded to these challenges. Two generations have stood watch, and manned the ramparts behind which freedom and free people could thrive.

Nowhere was this more true than in Europe, a continent cruelly divided by Soviet power, where we have had to maintain a strong defense against powerful forces, offensively arrayed, with the capacity for sudden and massive invasion. But now, after more than 40 years, we find that it was not Soviet tanks that swept westward but the ideals of democracy that have swept through the East.

We see fledgling democracies in Eastern and Central Europe, the old pattern of Soviet dominance broken, and Germany on the threshold of unity in peace and freedom.

The Warsaw Pact no longer functions as an effective military alliance, Soviet troops are beginning to withdraw from Eastern Europe, and CFE negotiations promise more will follow. We no longer face the threat of a massive conventional attack, launched with little or no warning.

In fact, the Soviet Union itself is undergoing a transformation -- the final outcome of which is uncertain -- but a transformation that so far has given us the chance to move beyond containment.

In short, the third great conflict of the 20th

century -- the Cold War -- is coming to a close. Our strategic relationship with the Soviet Union is being transformed. We are entering a new era. The defense strategy and military forces needed to ensure peace and security can -- and must -- be different. But, in a world marked by rapid change and continuing uncertainty, we must not repeat the historical error of massive demobilization, nor take fleeting comfort in a false sense of insularity. We are forging a strategy suited to the opportunities and challenges before us, one that reflects continued engagement underwritten by an approach to deterrence appropriate for both new and enduring realities.

Continued Engagement

Our strategy will be shaped by a key fact: we are -- and will remain -- a superpower. We are inescapably

a leader, the connecting link in a global alliance of democracies, the pivotal factor of stability. We will not shrink from this responsibility. To do so would serve no one's interests, least of all our own. We want a world in which fundamental values -- the free movement of ideas, people and commerce -- will not only survive, but flourish. Such a world will be beyond our reach if we turn inward and foolishly squander the heritage of security and international cooperation that has sustained us over more than four decades. This means that we will maintain a (forward presence) to defend our interests and those of our allies throughout the globe. We aren't the "world's policeman". That would be beyond our means and beneath our principles -- but our role in ensuring security is indispensable, irreplaceable.

could be condensed but the "American" part, the word "ought" is a little up front in the "American" part.

New Demands of Deterrence

In this role, we will be guided by the new demands of deterrence -- a deterrence suited to likely dangers, the growing strength of our allies, and the unique contributions we can make to the common defense. I see two broad requirements.

First, we must continue to maintain a global balance. Even in a new era the Soviet Union will be there, still a formidable military power. The Soviets surely will maintain their modern, effective strategic arsenal -- an arsenal that has become the last unquestioned hallmark of their superpower status. They will enter a START Treaty with a fully modernized, highly capable, very large strategic force. It is this force that is a number one concern to us. It must be for only the Soviet Union has the capacity to destroy the United States.

We will continue to press ahead with our START negotiations, but both strategy and prudence demand we pursue the modernization of our strategic offensive forces and the promise of strategic defenses. [INSERT]

We must also remember that even after negotiated and unilateral reductions in conventional arms take place, we expect the Soviet Union to field a modern, well-equipped force of 2-3 million men -- dwarfing all others in Europe. These basic facts of power and geography will endure, even in a world where the likelihood of superpower conflict is greatly reduced and the confrontation in Europe is decidedly altered.

For over forty years we and our Allies have

"light fare"

maintained sufficient strength so that major conflict -- nuclear or conventional, in Europe or elsewhere -- was not an option for the Soviets. That strength was essential in creating the conditions for the remarkable changes we are seeing today. Now, as the evolution of the Soviet system takes them into historically uncharted waters, we must maintain sufficient strength -- actual and potential -- so that not even renewed confrontation is an attractive option for any Soviet leadership.

The second broad requirement of today's deterrence is to be prepared for those other contingencies that, even in a new era, can threaten our well-being and security. For all the positive developments we have seen, the world is still a place where hope and peace live side by side with fear and turbulence. Today, crises are not only made more dangerous by the

proliferation of advanced weaponry and battle-hardened armies proficient in their use, they are also made more likely by a tide of new and dangerous currents loose in the world -- currents like resurgent nationalism, a new radicalism, religious fanaticism.

I am often asked to peer into the future to predict just exactly where and how our forces will be used next. The same answer always comes to mind. We use them everyday. We use them to keep us free. We use them to stand guard. We use them to deter the unthinkable. We use them to ferry food and medical supplies. We use them to evacuate Americans in danger in far-off lands. Our forces are a living symbol of our responsibilities and our commitment to peace and freedom. ~~Our forces demonstrate our sense of responsibility toward distant events and our~~


delete

~~commitment to peace and freedom.~~ *delete*

We cannot predict with certainty the direction from which future threats may come. But we can say with certainty that democracies with far-flung interests must have modern, effective military forces that are capable of defending those interests -- and ideally of detering anyone from threatening them.



New Requirements for Forces



The demands of deterrence in a new era will shape the kinds of forces we will need, as well as their size. We would be ill-served by forces that were simply a scaled back version of those we designed for global war with the Soviet Union.

In the future our forces can clearly be smaller.

Secretary Cheney and General Powell are working hard

Smaller.

to refine the exact size and composition of their base force. But I can tell you -- when all the calculations are in, when all the programs are set -- we will be looking at a military force that within five years will be 25% smaller than today's.

✓ The premium we have long placed on naval forces has reflected the geographical facts of life more than the capabilities of a potential adversary. We need not be forever tied to today's operating procedures and deployment patterns, but so long as we remain an "island nation", we will need a Navy second to none.

✓ The most likely military challenges we will face will require speed and agility. Our forces must be able to fight and win quickly, as in Grenada or in Panama. This will require very ready and very competent active forces -- the kind that are created

by intense levels of rigorous peacetime training. We could make no greater mistake than to pretend that usable military power can be created in any other way.

Compare to 1st draft - point on deployment in U.S.

Our forces must also be even more deployable than they have been in the past. They will require air and sealift at least equal to today's levels to get where they are needed, when they are needed. And these forces must also be better able to operate in austere environments -- independent of the kind of extensive infrastructure we have prepared in Europe.

And these forces must be able to rely on the most modern and sophisticated weapons in our arsenal.

Always

The Soviets talk about -- and are planning for -- a technical revolution that will transform the battlefield. In addition, the proliferation of

sophisticated weapons makes almost any theater a potential technological challenge. Our ability to lead this military technologies revolution will largely determine our future security. This will be especially true at lower force levels and in the complex political and military environment in which our forces may operate. // We will always be reluctant to involve U.S. forces in any conflict, but -- when we engage -- we must use our best. Cruise missiles, stealth fighters and bombers, "brilliant" munitions -- these and other modern technologies will win conflicts and save precious lives. We will protect our future with a substantial investment in research and development.

Reserve forces will also remain important, but in new ways. The Cold War demanded we be able to field a force capable of responding to a global

confrontation in a very short order, a few weeks at best. This put a great burden on both the size and readiness of our reserve forces. We can now adjust both as we shape our reserves to help us deal with the more likely challenges we will face.

Chm
→ Our strategy will guard against a major reversal in Soviet intentions by incorporating into our planning the concept of national reconstitution of our forces -- a concept significantly different from our concept of mobilization over the past 40 years. By the mid-90s we expect much longer notice of any return to the levels of military confrontation that marked the Cold War -- notice of at least one to two years. This will allow us to plan to rely not just on existing forces but to generate wholly new forces. This explicit determination to remain ready to rebuild our forces will be an important element

in our ability to deter.

*potential to
turn but, if you
do, keep the
understand the
thought!*

The threats posed by terrorism, insurgency and instability will continue. Where appropriate, we will work to sustain economic and security assistance -- even at the expense of spending on our own forces -- as a long-term investment in global stability and our own security.

We will also maintain an appropriate forward presence, presence that communicates our commitment to continued engagement.

try to return

The alternative to helping our friends and allies defend the values we have in common is ultimately being forced to defend them everywhere ourselves -- the very "policeman" role we have rightly rejected.

Even as we respond to the changing nature and magnitude of the threat in Europe, that Continent

remains of paramount importance. As I said last year in Brussels and reaffirmed recently in London, we will keep a force in Europe as long as our Allies desire our presence as part of a common security effort. In size, this force will be smaller than today's but it will still be substantial -- far more than a token. In form, it will reflect the transformation of military strategy announced at the NATO summit: more mobile and versatile, organized in multinational corps; reliant more on the ability to build-up larger forces and less on the need to resort to nuclear weapons. In mission, it will be there to deter any revival of Soviet military adventurism or intimidation; to reassure all of Europe, East and West, that the European balance will remain secure, that stability is assured, and that America is there -- and will remain -- helping to prevent new dangers.

have
agrees
in
full.

The Transition

These are the basic elements of a new defense posture for the 90s and beyond. In the coming days, the Secretary of Defense will expand on these concepts.

Our mission will change --from one that contains a known and powerful enemy to one that preserves the peace in the face of instabilities that today are only dimly foreseen. America will help maintain the global balance, deter new conflicts, and promote stability so that democracy can flourish. We will have a "peace dividend" -- but we must remember that the biggest dividend is peace itself and that we must continue to pay the premiums on our insurance policy so that the peace will last.

also
see JCS.

day

The challenge before us now is to get from here to there -- safely. A rational restructuring of our forces will take five years. We cannot accept defense cuts so rapid or so deep that the forces that remain will be too disrupted to perform the missions that will still be demanded of them. This will be an orderly build down -- not a fire sale.

The danger will be particularly acute if, in the rush for quick savings, we savage those accounts where dollars are spent the fastest -- operations, and especially personnel. As we build down, we must protect our most important military asset: highly trained, highly motivated and exceptionally dedicated people. It has taken more than a decade to recover from the hollow force of the 70s and I will not break faith with the young men and women who have made today's success possible. We must take

every step available to minimize the turbulence these changes will create for our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines, and their families.

I want to say a few final words today directly to our men and women in uniform. Let me tell you that your President, the American people and indeed people the world over know of your contribution to freedom. General Vuono, Army Chief of Staff, tells of an event that occurred in Germany last Autumn, before the wall came down, when East Germans were taking every opportunity to go west. One group was leaving Czechoslovakia by train, crowded into every available space, traveling through a dark night with no familiar landmarks, anxious to be across the border into freedom. As they pulled into the border town of Hof, in West Germany, one of them noticed a mounted patrol from the U.S. 2nd Armored Cavalry

Regiment and shouted out, "Look! There are the Americans. We are free!"

May it always be so. God bless each and everyone of you and God bless the United States of America.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 31, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF
EDE HOLIDAY
ANDREW CARD
JAMES CICCONI
DAVID DEMAREST
MARLIN FITZWATER
BOYDEN GRAY
FRED MCCLURE
BONNIE NEWMAN
ROGER PORTER
SIG ROGICH
BRENT SCOWCROFT
CHASE UNTERMAYER
SUSAN PORTER ROSE
ED ROGERS
JOE HAGIN
DAVID CARNEY
CHRISS WINSTON
BOBBIE KILBERG
SICHAN SIV
PATTY PRESOCK
LINDA CASEY

WILLIAM KRISTOL
TIMOTHY MCBRIDE
ROSE ZAMARIA
PAUL BATEMAN
RICHARD TREFRY
DAVID VALDEZ
BILLY DALE
JAY ALLISON
JOHN HERRICK
LAURIE FIRESTONE
PEGGY SWIFT
KIM BRADY
TOM HUFFORD
DEB ANDERSON
TONY BENEDI
USSS/PPD OPS
WHCA AUDIO/VISUAL
WHCA OPERATIONS
WHTV
MEDICAL UNIT
PRESIDENTIAL
DOCUMENTS
AIRLIFT OPS

THROUGH:

SIG ROGICH
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
PUBLIC EVENTS AND INITIATIVES

FROM:

JOHN G. KELLER, JR. *JGK.*
DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND
DIRECTOR OF PRESIDENTIAL ADVANCE

SUBJECT:

TRIP OF THE PRESIDENT TO ASPEN, COLORADO,
AUGUST 2 - 3, 1990

For your use and planning purposes, the attached is a preliminary outline schedule for the Trip of the President to Aspen, Colorado, August 2 - 3, 1990. Please keep in mind the following information has not been finally approved and is subject to change.

Attachments

PROPOSED SCHEDULE

Thursday, August 2, 1990

GUEST AND STAFF INSTRUCTIONS:

- NOTE: THE PRESIDENT will travel on a C-20 directly to Aspen with Essential Staff. Remaining Guests and Staff will travel on a C-137.
- 6:00 am **Baggage Call.** Please place all unlocked baggage outside Room 89 1/2 OEOP at this time for those traveling on either C-20 or C-137.
- NOTE: Baggage for both the C-20 and C-137 will be placed on the C-137.
- 7:30 am Vans depart West Basement en route Andrews Air Force Base for Staff traveling on C-137.
- 7:30 am Those with own transportation with baggage should arrive Andrews Air Force Base, Distinguished Visitors' Lounge at this time.
- 7:45 am Those with own transportation without baggage should arrive Andrews Air Force Base, Distinguished Visitors' Lounge at this time.
- 8:30 am C-137 departs Andrews Air Force Base.
- 9:45 am Guests and Staff manifested on Marine One should proceed to South Lawn at this time.
- 10:20 am C-137 arrives Grand Junction
(M.D.T.) Airport, Grand Junction,
Colorado.

Upon arrival at Grand Junction Airport, Guests and Staff should board C-130 immediately for transport to Aspen, Colorado.

10:30 am C-130 departs Grand Junction en route Aspen, Colorado.

11:05 am C-130 arrives Pitkin County Airport, Aspen, Colorado.

9:50 am MARINE ONE departs White House en route Andrews Air Force Base.

(Flying Time: 10 Minutes)

10:00 am MARINE ONE arrives Andrews Air Force Base.

10:05 am AIR FORCE ONE (C-20) departs Andrews Air Force Base en route Grand Junction, Colorado.

(Flying Time: 3 Hours 35 Minutes)
(Interchange: No)
(Time Change: Back 2 Hours)

11:40 am (M.D.T.) AIR FORCE ONE (C-20) arrives Pitkin County Airport, Aspen, Colorado.

11:45 am MOTORCADE departs Pitkin County Airport en route Catto Residence.

(Drive Time: 15 Minutes)

12:00 pm MOTORCADE arrives Catto Residence.

* PRIVATE TIME
(12:05 pm - 12:25 pm)

* BILATERAL MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER
THATCHER
- Photo Opportunity (at beginning only)
(12:30 pm - 2:00 pm)

* PRESS AVAILABILITY
- Expanded Pool
(2:10 pm - 2:30 pm)

* PRIVATE TIME
(2:35 pm - 2:55 pm)

3:00 pm MOTORCADE departs Catto Residence en route Aspen Institute.

(Drive Time: 25 Minutes)

3:25 pm MOTORCADE arrives Aspen Institute.

* ADDRESS ASPEN INSTITUTE SYMPOSIUM
- Open Press
- Remarks
(3:37 pm - 4:05 pm)

opening session

4:10 pm MOTORCADE departs Aspen Institute en route Catto Residence.

(Drive Time: 25 Minutes)

4:35 pm MOTORCADE arrives Catto Residence.

* PRIVATE TIME
(6:00 pm - 7:30 pm)

* PRIVATE DINNER
- 20 - 30 guests
(7:30 pm - 9:30 pm)

RON Catto Residence, Aspen, Colorado.

Friday, August 3, 1990

9:00 am MOTORCADE departs Catto Residence en route Pitkin County Airport.

(Drive Time: 15 Minutes)

9:15 am MOTORCADE arrives Pitkin County Airport.

9:20 am AIR FORCE ONE (C-20) departs Pitkin County Airport
en route Grand Junction, Colorado.
(Flying Time: 55 Minutes)
(Interchange: Yes)
(Time Change: None)

10:15 am AIR FORCE ONE (C-20) arrives Grand Junction
Airport, Grand Junction, Colorado.

10:25 am AIR FORCE ONE (C-137) departs Grand Junction en
route Andrews Air Force Base.
(Flying Time: 3 Hours 5 Minutes)
(Interchange: No)
(Time Change: Ahead 2 Hours)

3:30 pm AIR FORCE ONE (C-137) arrives Andrews Air Force
(E.D.T.) Base.

3:35 pm MARINE ONE departs Andrews Air Force Base en route
Camp David.
(Flying Time: 35 Minutes)

4:10 pm MARINE ONE arrives Camp David.

J.P.S. Chairman Powell alternative closing:

We will keep America strong as we look to a future filled with promise. And, as we do, I want to share with you three principles that will guide my actions in defense of our nation.

First, I will not break the bond between power and purpose. Between our values and our strength. Without our strength we cannot defend. Without our values there is nothing to defend. We do not look for missions or roles. We will always be reluctant to involve US forces in any conflict. But when we do, it will be to defend those values that have sustained us for over two centuries.

Second, I will not allow the insurance premium on our national security to lapse. We cannot and will not entrust our security to declarations or intentions. We will reduce our defense budget but not our defenses. If we cut precipitously, if we try to cash in our insurance premium to buy a peace dividend, we will get neither.

Third, I will never forget the most precious asset this nation has in defense of its liberties: the men and women in the armed forces of America. The ones who have volunteered to deter war, to preserve the peace, to keep us safe and strong. I took pride in doing my part in defeating aggression. They take pride in doing their part in deterring war. They take pride in doing their part in preserving the peace. There is a bond between the

American people and those elected to serve. It is a sacred trust: you have given us your sons and daughters, your brothers and sisters. We will never break faith with the young men and women in union who have made today's success possible.

We will work to maintain the finest peace-time armed forces in our history. We will provide our soldiers with the best equipment drawing on our technological strength. We will ensure the most rigorous training. And we will do all in our power to minimize the disruptions caused by the unfolding new environment.

I want to say a few final words today directly to our men and women in uniform. Let me tell you that your President, the American people and indeed people the world over know of your contribution to freedom. General Vuono, Army Chief of Staff, tells of an event that occurred in Germany last Autumn, before the wall came down, when East Germans were taking every opportunity to go west. One group was leaving Czechoslovakia by train, crowded into every available space, traveling through a dark night with no familiar landmarks, anxious to be across the border into freedom. As they pulled into the border town of Hof, in West Germany, one of them noticed a mounted patrol from the U.S. 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment and shouted out, "Look! There are the Americans. We are free!"

May it always be so. God bless each and everyone of you and God bless the United States of America.