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Subseries: Chron File, 1989-1993

OA/ID Number: 13493
Folder ID Number: 13493-011

Folder Title:
Talking Points - Strategic Defense Initiative 6/30/89

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
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OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

July 11, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR CHRISS WINSTON

FROM:

WILLIAM KRISTOL *WK*

SUBJECT:

TALKING POINTS ON THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE

With reference to your June 30 suggested "Talking Points on the Strategic Defense Initiative", OVP believes the following changes would improve this fine set of talking points.

- The third point categorizes SDI's "primary obstacles" as "technological, strategic, political, and economic." This is a pointless observation, which would be better left unsaid. SDI's principal problems lie in the political and budgetary realms, as strategic and technological problems are being rapidly resolved. This bullet should therefore be deleted.
- ✓ - The seventh point incorrectly identifies SDI's "ultimate goal" as "the devaluation in strategic utility of ballistic missiles." This is a goal for SDI's first phase, but is hardly its "ultimate" objective. To say otherwise would signal radical change in the purpose and direction of the program.
- ✓ - The final sub-point on page one forecasts that the Soviets will have a "hefty first strike capability" in the 21st century. The term "hefty" is inappropriate. Its evasiveness and imprecision understate the severity of the problem. The Soviet emphasis on first-strike weapons should be described as "threatening," "destabilizing," "disconcerting," etc.
- The first point on page 2 observes that "most experts" feel that our capacity to verify mobile missiles is "far from perfect." This understates an important point. Nothing in arms control is "perfectly verifiable;" but mobile missiles pose unique verification problems that would be enormously burdensome in the absence of strategic defense, and we should say this.

We look forward to seeing the final set of talking points and to using them.

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 7/6/89 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 7/7/89 5:00 PM

SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS ON THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE

	ACTION FYI			ACTION FYI	
VICE PRESIDENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	MCCLURE <i>N/c</i>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
SUNUNU	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	NEWMAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
SCOWCROFT	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	PORTER	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
DARMAN	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	STUDDERT	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
BATES	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	UNTERMAYER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
BREEDEN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	ROGERS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
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FITZWATER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
GRAY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HAGIN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

REMARKS:

Please forward any comments directly to Chriss Winston, Rm. 122, x2930, no later than 5:00 PM, Friday, July 7, 1989, with an info copy to my office. Thank you.

89 JUL 7 P12:46

RESPONSE:

James W. Cicconi
Assistant to the President
and Deputy to the Chief of Staff
Ext. 2702

June 30, 1989

TALKING POINTS ON THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE

- * The President is committed to the development and deployment of Strategic Defenses when they are ready.
- * By developing the means to defend against ballistic missiles that threaten us, we also lessen the incentives for aggression thus enhancing stability and deterrence.
- * The primary ~~obstacles to~~ ^{issues concerning} SDI can generally be categorized as technological, strategic, political and economic.

Technology and SDI

- * Though many complex scientific and engineering problems remain, there appear to be no technological show-stoppers for SDI.
- * In some areas such as kinetic kill, ^{important} technological ^{advances} breakthroughs have been achieved. A system popularly known as Brilliant Pebbles is one example. (what is it?)

Strategy and SDI

- * On June 29, 1989, Vice President ~~Quayle~~ outlined how SDI will one day alter the strategic equation between offense and defense.
- * SDI's ultimate ^{to deter a Hack on the U.S. and its allies by} goal is ~~the devaluation in the strategic utility~~ of ballistic missiles.
- * We are seeking a more stable balance that relies increasingly on defense. It would be preferable, but not necessary, if the Soviets would work with us to develop a cooperative arrangement for making this transition.
- * Progress on strategic offensive arms reductions and strategic defense are not mutually exclusive -- on the contrary, START and SDI are complementary.
- ** In general, the more progress we make toward offensive reductions, the more ~~we will need to rely on~~ SDI ^{with} to help us deter, or deal with, possible Soviet cheating or breakout. SDI is an insurance policy for START.
- *** First, the Soviets' largely modern land-based ICBM force is projected to ensure them a ~~hefty~~ first-strike capability well into the 21st century. A reasonably reliable system of strategic defenses would ~~diminish our anxiety over~~ this ICBM threat.

^{increase}
~~improve~~ our security
in the face of ~~this~~

- *** Second, the U.S. would be better able to ^{deal} cope with the problem of Soviet mobile ICBMs. SDI would complement a mobile verification regime in START that ~~most~~ ^{has} experts feel would be far from perfect. ^{many unresolved and important details}
- *** Third, the sheer complexity of the proposed START treaty will probably result in unavoidable loopholes that arms control on its own cannot plug. In turn, this situation would jeopardize treaty ratification. Strategic defenses could help plug the loopholes.
- * Finally, Strategic Defense ^{could} will be the only thoroughly reliable way to address the problem of accidental, unauthorized, or ~~third-world~~ "madman" launches of ballistic missiles.
- ** Concerns are no longer ^{William Webster} hypothetical. The Director of Central Intelligence, testified recently that up to 15 developing nations could have a ballistic launch capability by the turn of the century.
- ** The instability of many regimes raises another frightening scenario -- who has authority to release missiles during periods of intense civil strife? As the nuclear and chemical club grows, this question will be asked more often.
- ** Controlling missile technology ^{also} from the supply side is not enough -- ultimately we must have the capability to defend ourselves against ballistic missiles.
- ** ~~One interesting possibility is that with a space-based defense, the U.S. could also defend~~ ^{other} countries against rogue launches. ^{is another possible use of a US space-based defense.}

Politics and Economics of SDI

- * The recent recommendation by the majority of the members of the House Armed Services Committee to cut the SDI budget by over a billion dollars is a shortsighted move.
- * Just at the time American ingenuity is starting to produce technological breakthroughs, SDI opponents are trying to reduce the funding to a level which could not sustain a viable program.
- * The strategic rationale for ~~SDI~~ SDI must be made clearer to the American public and to their ~~representatives~~ representatives in Congress.
- * Strategic modernization and strategic defense should not be allowed to become an either/or proposition -- as pointed out above, offenses and defenses are synergistic.

What Next?

- * In order to ~~support~~ ^{make sound} a deployment decision in three or four years, the President must be able to depend on the results of his carefully designed research and development program. It must be adequately funded.
- * The program schedule for the next two years includes a number of very important tests and experiments. These include:
 - ** The first-ever test of a Neutral Particle Beam in Space.
 - ** Space tests of tracking, pointing, sensor, and communications technologies.
 - ** Numerous interceptor tests for kinetic kill systems such as Brilliant Pebbles.
- * All these early tests comply with the ABM Treaty. ~~Later on, however, tests that fall outside the Treaty will be required before the President can confidently make a deployment decision.~~

Bottom Line

- * ~~The Congress and the public it serves must come to recognize that~~ SDI is one of several answers to the many strategic problems the U.S. faces going into the next century.
 - ** SDI would dramatically reduce the risk of nuclear war by denying an aggressor the ~~ability~~ ^{the confidence or incentive} to execute a first strike.
 - ** SDI would provide the American people with much-needed insurance against an accidental or inadvertent attack or against a deliberate launch by an irrational government.
- * The Bush Administration continues to believe that strategic defense is technologically feasible, strategically necessary, and morally imperative.



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

NOTICE:

Enclosed are comments from staff members of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Such comments do not necessarily represent the official position of the Director of OMB or of the Office of Management and Budget. If you wish to have the Director's personal comments, please let me know -- and contact me if you have any questions.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "David J. Haun".

David J. Haun
Executive Assistant
to the Director

89 JUL 7 P5:10

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 7/6/89 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 7/7/89 5:00 PM

SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS ON THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE

	ACTION FYI			ACTION FYI	
VICE PRESIDENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	MCCLURE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
SUNUNU	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	NEWMAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
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BATES	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	UNTERMAYER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
BREEDEN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	ROGERS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
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DEMAREST	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
FITZWATER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
GRAY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HAGIN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

REMARKS:

Please forward any comments directly to Chriss Winston, Rm. 122, x2930, no later than 5:00 PM, Friday, July 7, 1989, with an info copy to my office. Thank you.

RESPONSE:

See comments

James W. Cicconi
Assistant to the President
and Deputy to the Chief of Staff
Ext. 2702

June 30, 1989

TALKING POINTS ON THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE

- * The President is committed to the development and deployment of Strategic Defenses when they are ready.
- * By developing the means to defend against ballistic missiles that threaten us, we also lessen the incentives for aggression thus enhancing stability and deterrence.
- * The primary obstacles to SDI can generally be categorized as technological, strategic, political and economic.

Technology and SDI

- * Though many complex scientific and engineering problems remain, there appear to be no technological show-stoppers for SDI.
- * In some areas such as kinetic kill, technological breakthroughs have been achieved. ~~A system popularly known as Brilliant Pebbles is one example.~~
- * *we are initiating the potential of the most rapidly advancing technologies such as SDI.*

Strategy and SDI

- * On June 29, 1989, Vice President Quayle outlined how SDI will one day alter the strategic equation between offense and defense.
- * SDI's ultimate goal is the devaluation in the strategic utility of ballistic missiles.
- * We are seeking a more stable balance that relies increasingly on defense. It would be preferable, but not necessary, if the Soviets would work with us to develop a cooperative arrangement for making this transition.
- * Progress on strategic offensive arms reductions and strategic defense are not mutually exclusive -- on the contrary, START and SDI are complementary.

** In general, the more progress we make toward offensive reductions, the more we ~~will need to rely on SDI to help us~~ deter, or deal with, possible Soviet cheating or breakout. SDI is an insurance policy for START.

*** First, the Soviets' largely modern land-based ICBM force is projected to ~~ensure them a hefty first-strike capability~~ well into the 21st century. A reasonably reliable system of strategic defenses would diminish our anxiety over this ICBM threat.

grow in destructive capability

*Howard
X4624*

Howard

*** Second, the U.S. would be better able to cope with the problem of Soviet mobile ICBMs. SDI would complement a mobile verification regime in START that most experts feel would be far from perfect.

Howard

*** Third, *Could result in ambiguities that the Soviets might seek to exploit*
~~treaty will probably result in unavoidable loopholes that arms control on its own cannot plug. In turn, this situation would jeopardize treaty ratification.~~
Strategic defenses could help plug the loopholes. *would add to security and help treaty ratification.*

- * Finally, Strategic Defense will be the only thoroughly reliable way to address the problem of accidental, unauthorized, or third-world "madman" launches of ballistic missiles.
- ** Concerns are no longer hypothetical. The Director of Central Intelligence testified recently that up to 15 developing nations could have a ballistic launch capability by the turn of the century.
- ** The instability of many regimes raises another frightening scenario -- who has authority to release missiles during periods of intense civil strife? As the nuclear and chemical club grows, this question will be asked more often.
- ** Controlling missile technology from the supply side is not enough -- ultimately we must have the capability to defend ourselves against ballistic missiles.
- ** One interesting possibility is that with a space-based defense, the U.S. could also defend other countries against rogue launches.

Politics and Economics of SDI

- * The recent recommendation by the majority of the members of the House Armed Services Committee to cut the SDI budget by over a billion dollars is a shortsighted move.
- * Just at the time American ingenuity is starting to produce technological breakthroughs, SDI opponents are trying to reduce the funding to a level which could not sustain a viable program.
- * The strategic rationale for SDI must be made clearer to the American public and to their representatives in Congress.
- * Strategic modernization and strategic defense should not be allowed to become an either/or proposition -- as pointed out above, offenses and defenses are synergistic.

What Next?

- * In order to support a deployment decision in three or four years, the President must be able to depend on the results of his carefully designed research and development program. It must be adequately funded.
- * The program schedule for the next two years includes a number of very important tests and experiments. These include:
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Bottom Line

- Howard*
- * The Congress and the public it serves must come to recognize that SDI ~~is one of several answers to the many~~ ^{Answers major} strategic problems the U.S. faces going into the next century.
 - ** SDI would dramatically ^{any incentive} reduce the risk of nuclear war by denying an aggressor ~~the ability~~ to execute a first strike.
 - ** SDI would provide the American people with much-needed insurance against an accidental or inadvertent attack or against a deliberate launch by an irrational government.
 - * The Bush Administration continues to believe that strategic defense is technologically feasible, strategically necessary, and morally imperative.



WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

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7/7/89 5:00 PM

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HAGIN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

REMARKS:

Please forward any comments directly to Chriss Winston, Rm. 122, x2930, no later than 5:00 PM, Friday, July 7, 1989, with an info copy to my office. Thank you.

89 JUL 10 A9:28

RESPONSE:

July 10, 1989

TO: Chriss Winston

NSC concurs with the attached as annotated.

Brent Scowcroft

James W. Cicconi
Assistant to the President
and Deputy to the Chief of Staff
Ext. 2702

cc: James Cicconi

June 30, 1989

TALKING POINTS ON THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE

- * The President is committed to the development and deployment of Strategic Defenses when they are ready.
- * By developing the means to defend against ballistic missiles that threaten us, we also lessen the incentives for aggression thus enhancing stability and deterrence.
- * The primary ^{issues with respect to} ~~obstacles~~ to SDI can generally be categorized as technological, strategic, political and economic.

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- * Though many complex scientific and engineering problems remain, there appear to be no technological show-stoppers for SDI.
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Strategy and SDI


- * On June 29, 1989, Vice President Quayle outlined how SDI will one day alter the strategic equation between offense and defense.
- * SDI's ultimate goal is ^{to deter attack on the U.S. and our} the devaluation in the strategic utility ^{allies} of ballistic missiles. _{by}
- * We are seeking a more stable balance that relies increasingly on defense. It would be preferable, but not necessary, if the Soviets would work with us to develop a cooperative arrangement for making this transition.
- * Progress on strategic offensive arms reductions and strategic defense are not mutually exclusive -- on the contrary, START and SDI are complementary.
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- *** First, the Soviets' largely modern land-based ICBM force is projected to ensure them a ~~lefty~~ first-strike capability well into the 21st century. A reasonably reliable system of strategic defenses would diminish our anxiety over this ICBM threat.

- *** Second, the U.S. would be better able to cope with the problem of Soviet mobile ICBMs. SDI would complement a mobile verification regime in START that ~~most experts feel would be far from perfect.~~ ^{has many unresolved and important details}
- [*** Third, the sheer complexity of the proposed START treaty will probably result in unavoidable loopholes that arms control on its own cannot plug. In turn, this situation would jeopardize treaty ratification. Strategic defenses could help plug the loopholes.]
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- ** Concerns are no longer hypothetical. The Director of Central Intelligence testified recently that up to 15 developing nations could have a ballistic launch capability by the turn of the century.
- ** The instability of many regimes raises another frightening scenario -- who has authority to release missiles during periods of intense civil strife? As the nuclear and chemical club grows, this question will be asked more often.
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Politics and Economics of SDI

- * The recent recommendation by the majority of the members of the House Armed Services Committee to cut the SDI budget by over a billion dollars is a shortsighted move.
- * Just at the time American ingenuity is starting to produce technological breakthroughs, SDI opponents are trying to reduce the funding to a level which could not sustain a viable program.
- [* The strategic rationale for SDI must be made clearer to the American public and to their ~~representatives~~ in Congress.]
- * Strategic modernization and strategic defense should not be allowed to become an either/or proposition -- as pointed out above, offenses and defenses are synergistic.

What Next?

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- * All these early tests comply with the ABM Treaty. ~~however, tests that fall outside the Treaty will be required before the President can confidently make a deployment decision.~~ [later on, 

Bottom Line

- * The Congress and the public it serves must come to recognize that SDI is one of several answers to the many strategic problems the U.S. faces going into the next century.
 - ** SDI would dramatically reduce the risk of nuclear war by denying an aggressor ~~the ability~~ ^{and the confidence} to execute a first strike.
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DEMAREST	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
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REMARKS:

Please forward any comments directly to Chriss Winston, Rm. 122, x2930, no later than 5:00 PM, Friday, July 7, 1989, with an info copy to my office. Thank you.

89 JUL 10 10:51

RESPONSE:

Needs re-writing

James W. Cicconi
Assistant to the President
and Deputy to the Chief of Staff
Ext. 2702

June 30, 1989

TALKING POINTS ON THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE

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- * On June 29, 1989, Vice President Quayle outlined how SDI will one day alter the strategic equation between offense and defense. *[is what follows what he said?] — to enhance our defenses by reducing*
- * SDI's ultimate goal is ~~the devaluation in the~~ strategic utility of ballistic missiles. *stat*
- * We are seeking a more stable balance that relies increasingly on defense. It would be preferable, but not necessary, if the Soviets would work with us to develop a cooperative arrangement for making this transition.
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Tell us what it is

Make more positive

talk re security not "anxiety"

- *** Second, the U.S. would be better able to cope with the problem of Soviet mobile ICBMs. SDI would complement a mobile verification regime in START that most experts feel would be far from perfect.
- *** Third, the sheer complexity of the proposed START treaty will probably result in unavoidable loopholes that arms control on its own cannot plug. In turn, this situation would jeopardize treaty ratification. Strategic defenses could help plug the loopholes.
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What Next?

- justify* *decision to deploy*
- * In order to support a deployment decision in three or four years, the President must be able to depend on the results of his carefully designed research and development program. It must be adequately funded.
 - * The program schedule for the next two years includes a number of very important tests and experiments. These include:
 - ** The first-ever test of a Neutral Particle Beam in Space.
 - ** Space tests of tracking, pointing, sensor, and communications technologies.
 - ** Numerous interceptor tests for kinetic kill systems such as Brilliant Pebbles.
 - * All these early tests comply with the ABM Treaty. Later on, however, tests that fall outside the Treaty will be required before the President can confidently make a deployment decision.

Bottom Line

- * The Congress and the public it serves ~~must~~ come to recognize that SDI is one of several answers to the many strategic problems the U.S. faces going into the next century.
 - ** SDI would dramatically reduce the risk of nuclear war by denying an aggressor the ability to execute a first strike.
 - ** SDI would provide the American people with much-needed insurance against an accidental or inadvertent attack or against a deliberate launch by an irrational government.
- * The Bush Administration continues to believe that strategic defense is technologically feasible, strategically necessary, and morally imperative.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 7, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR CHRISS WINSTON

FROM: ROGER B. PORTER *RBP*

SUBJECT: Talking Points on the Strategic Defense
Initiative

We have no suggested changes from a policy standpoint and
approve of the draft in its present form.

cc: James W. Cicconi

89 JUL 10 49:11

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 7/6/89 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 7/7/89 5:00 PM

SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS ON THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE

	ACTION FYI			ACTION FYI	
VICE PRESIDENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	MCCLURE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
SUNUNU	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	NEWMAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
SCOWCROFT	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	PORTER	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
DARMAN	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	STUDDERT	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
BATES	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	UNTERMAYER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
BREEDEN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	ROGERS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
CARD	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	WINSTON	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
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DEMAREST	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
FITZWATER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
GRAY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HAGIN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

REMARKS:

Please forward any comments directly to Chriss Winston, Rm. 122, x2930, no later than 5:00 PM, Friday, July 7, 1989, with an info copy to my office. Thank you.

RESPONSE:

James W. Cicconi
Assistant to the President
and Deputy to the Chief of Staff
Ext. 2702

June 30, 1989

TALKING POINTS ON THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE

- * The President is committed to the development and deployment of Strategic Defenses when they are ready.
- * By developing the means to defend against ballistic missiles that threaten us, we also lessen the incentives for aggression thus enhancing stability and deterrence.
- * The primary obstacles to SDI can generally be categorized as technological, strategic, political and economic.

Technology and SDI

- * Though many complex scientific and engineering problems remain, there appear to be no technological show-stoppers for SDI.
- * In some areas such as kinetic kill, technological breakthroughs have been achieved. A system popularly known as Brilliant Pebbles is one example.

Strategy and SDI

- * On June 29, 1989, Vice President Quayle outlined how SDI will one day alter the strategic equation between offense and defense.
- * SDI's ultimate goal is the devaluation in the strategic utility of ballistic missiles.
- * We are seeking a more stable balance that relies increasingly on defense. It would be preferable, but not necessary, if the Soviets would work with us to develop a cooperative arrangement for making this transition.
- * Progress on strategic offensive arms reductions and strategic defense are not mutually exclusive -- on the contrary, START and SDI are complementary.
- ** In general, the more progress we make toward offensive reductions, the more we will need to rely on SDI to help us deter, or deal with, possible Soviet cheating or breakout. SDI is an insurance policy for START.
- *** First, the Soviets' largely modern land-based ICBM force is projected to ensure them a hefty first-strike capability well into the 21st century. A reasonably reliable system of strategic defenses would diminish our anxiety over this ICBM threat.

- *** Second, the U.S. would be better able to cope with the problem of Soviet mobile ICBMs. SDI would complement a mobile verification regime in START that most experts feel would be far from perfect.
- *** Third, the sheer complexity of the proposed START treaty will probably result in unavoidable loopholes that arms control on its own cannot plug. In turn, this situation would jeopardize treaty ratification. Strategic defenses could help plug the loopholes.
- * Finally, Strategic Defense will be the only thoroughly reliable way to address the problem of accidental, unauthorized, or third-world "madman" launches of ballistic missiles.
 - ** Concerns are no longer hypothetical. The Director of Central Intelligence testified recently that up to 15 developing nations could have a ballistic launch capability by the turn of the century.
 - ** The instability of many regimes raises another frightening scenario -- who has authority to release missiles during periods of intense civil strife? As the nuclear and chemical club grows, this question will be asked more often.
 - ** Controlling missile technology from the supply side is not enough -- ultimately we must have the capability to defend ourselves against ballistic missiles.
 - ** One interesting possibility is that with a space-based defense, the U.S. could also defend other countries against rogue launches.

Politics and Economics of SDI

- * The recent recommendation by the majority of the members of the House Armed Services Committee to cut the SDI budget by over a billion dollars is a shortsighted move.
- * Just at the time American ingenuity is starting to produce technological breakthroughs, SDI opponents are trying to reduce the funding to a level which could not sustain a viable program.
- * The strategic rationale for SDI must be made clearer to the American public and to their representatives in Congress.
- * Strategic modernization and strategic defense should not be allowed to become an either/or proposition -- as pointed out above, offenses and defenses are synergistic.

What Next?

- * In order to support a deployment decision in three or four years, the President must be able to depend on the results of his carefully designed research and development program. It must be adequately funded.
- * The program schedule for the next two years includes a number of very important tests and experiments. These include:
 - ** The first-ever test of a Neutral Particle Beam in Space.
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- * All these early tests comply with the ABM Treaty. Later on, however, tests that fall outside the Treaty will be required before the President can confidently make a deployment decision.

Bottom Line

- * The Congress and the public it serves must come to recognize that SDI is one of several answers to the many strategic problems the U.S. faces going into the next century.
 - ** SDI would dramatically reduce the risk of nuclear war by denying an aggressor the ability to execute a first strike.
 - ** SDI would provide the American people with much-needed insurance against an accidental or inadvertent attack or against a deliberate launch by an irrational government.
- * The Bush Administration continues to believe that strategic defense is technologically feasible, strategically necessary, and morally imperative.

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 7/6/89 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 7/7/89 5:00 PM

SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS ON THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE

	ACTION FYI			ACTION FYI	
VICE PRESIDENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	MCCLURE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
SUNUNU	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	NEWMAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
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REMARKS:

Please forward any comments directly to Chriss Winston, Rm. 122, x2930, no later than 5:00 PM, Friday, July 7, 1989, with an info copy to my office. Thank you.

RESPONSE:

*No Comment
7/7/89*

89 JUL 10 09:11

James W. Cicconi
Assistant to the President
and Deputy to the Chief of Staff
Ext. 2702

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 7, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR CHRISS WINSTON

FROM: STEPHEN G. RADEMAKER^{SR}
ASSOCIATE COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Talking Points on the Strategic Defense Initiative

Pursuant to James Cicconi's request, Counsel's Office has reviewed the above-referenced matter. We note that the second paragraph of the section on page 3 entitled "Bottom Line" appears to overstate the case for SDI. Even with SDI deployed, an aggressor could "execute" a first strike, in that he could launch his missiles and confidently expect some of them to reach their targets. It would be more accurate say that SDI would reduce the risk of war by "denying an aggressor the ability to confidently launch a first strike."


Apart from this suggestion, Counsel's Office has no legal objection to the talking points.

Thank you for bringing this matter to our attention.

cc: James W. Cicconi

89 JUL 7 4:28

**WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET**



- O - OUTGOING
 - H - INTERNAL
 - I - INCOMING
- Date Correspondence Received (YY/MM/DD) 1/1

Name of Correspondent: James W. Ciccone

MI Mail Report User Codes: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

Subject: Talking points on the Strategic Defense Initiative

ROUTE TO: Office/Agency (Staff Name)	ACTION		DISPOSITION		
	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response	Code	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
<u>Cuoco</u>	ORIGINATOR	<u>89.07.07</u>			<u>1 1</u>
<u>Cy at 14</u>	Referral Note: <u>R</u>	<u>89.07.07</u>			<u>5 89.07.07</u>
	Referral Note:				<u>5:00 pm</u>
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	Referral Note:				

ACTION CODES:

- A - Appropriate Action
- C - Comment/Recommendation
- D - Draft Response
- F - Furnish Fact Sheet to be used as Enclosure

- I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
- R - Direct Reply w/Copy
- S - For Signature
- X - Interim Reply

DISPOSITION CODES:

- A - Answered
- B - Non-Special Referral
- C - Completed
- S - Suspended

FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:

- Type of Response = Initials of Signer
- Code = "A"
- Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

Comments: Please forward my comments directly to Miss Winston, Rm 122, X2930 by 5:00 pm, Friday, July 7, 1989, w/ an info to Ciccone.

Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.
Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEGB).
Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.
Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.

*Info to Ciccone
Thanks!*

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

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 and Deputy to the Chief of Staff
 Ext. 2702

June 30, 1989

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

June 30, 1989

Mary Kate -

Here is the cabled public diplomacy material I mentioned the other day. To my knowledge, no one from your office or any other White House office (besides NSC) had any part in the preparation and approval of parts:

3. "Press Themes"

4. "NST Qs and As"

5. "Qs and As on Verification and Stability Measures."

In other words, I don't have any sense that any Bush political appointee (other than me whose involvement was almost accidental) played a role in developing most of this stuff.

Joe Duggan

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OUTGOING
TELEGRAM

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DODE-00 10-19 IEA-04 ARA-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 EAP-00
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SP-02 HMP-01 SNP-01 PRS-01 OIG-04 SDEL-04 SART-01
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DRAFTED BY: WHITE HOUSE TEXT
APPROVED BY: PM/SNP:KNBROWN
S/S-O: LGERSON

S/S: JFCOLLINS

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MSC WASHDC PRIORITY 0000
DOD WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS STATE 207986

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PARM, NST, US
SUBJECT: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY MATERIALS ON RESUMPTION OF
- NUCLEAR AND SPACE TALKS (NST)

1. THIS CABLE CONTAINS PUBLIC DIPLOMACY MATERIALS FOR THE RESUMPTION OF THE NST (START AND DEFENSE & SPACE TALKS), FOR USE IN BRIEFINGS OR FOR RESPONDING TO PRESS INQUIRES. PARAGRAPH TWO IS TEXT OF A WHITE HOUSE PRESS RELEASE OF JUNE 19, PARAGRAPH THREE IS GENERAL PRESS THEMES FOR NST, PARAGRAPH FOUR IS NST Q'S AND A'S, AND PARAGRAPH FIVE IS Q'S AND A'S ON THE NEW U.S. VERIFICATION AND STABILITY PROPOSAL.

2. STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

TODAY MARKS THE OPENING OF ROUND XI OF THE NUCLEAR AND SPACE TALKS IN GENEVA. AMBASSADOR RICHARD BURT, THE

CHIEF NEGOTIATOR TO THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS, HEADS THE U.S. DELEGATION. AMBASSADOR HENRY COOPER IS OUR CHIEF NEGOTIATOR TO THE DEFENSE AND SPACE TALKS.

MY OBJECTIVE FOR THESE NEGOTIATIONS IS TO ACHIEVE VERIFIABLE AGREEMENTS THAT IMPROVE OUR SECURITY WHILE ENHANCING STABILITY AND REDUCING THE RISK OF WAR. IN THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS, OUR EMPHASIS WILL BE ON CREATING A MORE STABLE NUCLEAR BALANCE AND STRENGTHENING DETERRENCE BY REDUCING AND CONSTRAINING THOSE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES WHICH POSE THE GREATEST THREAT TO SECURITY AND STABILITY. WE WILL PURSUE COMPLEMENTARY GOALS IN THE DEFENSE AND SPACE TALKS, SEEKING AN AGREEMENT ON A COOPERATIVE TRANSITION TO A MORE STABLE NUCLEAR BALANCE THAT RELIES INCREASINGLY ON DEFENSES.

AFTER EXTENSIVE DELIBERATIONS WITH MY ADVISERS, I HAVE APPROVED INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE U.S. START DELEGATION. THESE INSTRUCTIONS REAFFIRM MUCH OF THE TREATY TEXT NEGOTIATED WITH THE SOVIETS BY THE PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION. MODIFICATIONS WILL BE PROPOSED IN SOME CASES. THE U.S. WILL BE PREPARED TO ADDRESS ALL THE ISSUES ON WHICH THE TWO SIDES HAVE NOT REACHED AGREEMENT AS THE NEGOTIATIONS PROCEED. IN ADDITION, I HAVE RESERVED THE RIGHT TO INTRODUCE NEW INITIATIVES AIMED AT FURTHER ENHANCING SECURITY AND STRATEGIC STABILITY.

OF ALL THE OUTSTANDING START ISSUES, VERIFICATION MAY BE THE MOST COMPLEX. IT WILL BE ESPECIALLY CRITICAL IN DETERMINING WHETHER START ENHANCES U.S. SECURITY AND STRATEGIC STABILITY. AS PART OF OUR OVERALL NEGOTIATING EFFORT AS THE TALKS RESUME IN GENEVA, THE UNITED STATES WILL ALSO PROPOSE THAT THE TWO SIDES MAKE A SPECIAL EFFORT TO AGREE ON, AND TO BEGIN IMPLEMENTING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, CERTAIN VERIFICATION AND STABILITY MEASURES DRAWN FROM PROPOSALS THAT BOTH SIDES HAVE ALREADY ADVANCED IN START OR OTHER CONTEXTS. THESE MEASURES WILL ENHANCE VERIFICATION OF A START TREATY AND CONTRIBUTE TO STRATEGIC STABILITY. EARLY AGREEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THEM WILL SPEED RESOLUTION OF OUTSTANDING ISSUES, AND GIVE ADDED MOMENTUM TO THE EFFORTS OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES TO CONCLUDE EXPEDITIOUSLY A START AGREEMENT.

OUR APPROACH TO THESE ARMS NEGOTIATIONS AND TO OUR FORCE MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS ARE COMPLEMENTARY AND MUTUALLY REINFORCING. MAINTAINING CREDIBLE AND EFFECTIVE NUCLEAR DETERRENT FORCES IS ESSENTIAL BOTH TO OUR SECURITY AND TO

OUR ABILITY TO NEGOTIATE SOUND AND STABILIZING AGREEMENTS. A SUCCESSFUL START TREATY WILL REDUCE THE RISK OF WAR, BUT WILL NOT DIMINISH OUR NEED TO RELY ON MODERNIZED, EFFECTIVE STRATEGIC FORCES FOR CONTINUED DETERRENCE. INDEED, OUR SECURITY WOULD BE REDUCED RATHER THAN ENHANCED IF WE DO NOT MODERNIZE OUR FORCES WHILE THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO MODERNIZE THEIRS. WE MUST CONTINUE TO PURSUE BOTH OUR FORCE MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL, AND NOT MAKE THE MISTAKE OF TREATING ONE AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR THE OTHER.

OUR NEGOTIATORS RETURN TO THE BARGAINING TABLE WITH MY FIRM PLEDGE THAT WE WILL WORK VIGOROUSLY TO ACHIEVE FAIR AND FAR-REACHING AGREEMENTS THAT STRENGTHEN PEACE. NOTHING HAS HIGHER PRIORITY. I AM HEARTENED BY THE GROWING EVIDENCE THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY ABOUT AGREEMENTS THAT PROMISE TO REDUCE THE RISK OF WAR. MUCH HAS ALREADY BEEN ACCOMPLISHED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS; MUCH REMAINS TO BE DONE. OUR COMMITMENT IS UNWAVERING. WE MUST BUILD ON OUR ACHIEVEMENTS THUS FAR TO REACH AGREEMENTS THAT FULFILL OUR OBJECTIVES OF REDUCING THE RISK OF WAR AND ENHANCING SECURITY AND STABILITY.

3. PRESS THEMES

ON JUNE 19, THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION RESUMED THE NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS IN GENEVA. AMBASSADOR RICHARD BURT, THE CHIEF NEGOTIATOR FOR THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS, HEADS THE U.S. DELEGATION. AMBASSADOR HENRY COOPER IS THE CHIEF NEGOTIATOR FOR THE DEFENSE AND SPACE TALKS.

-- OUR OBJECTIVES IN THE NUCLEAR AND SPACE TALKS, WHICH COMPRISE THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS TALKS AND THE DEFENSE AND SPACE TALKS, ARE TO CONCLUDE EQUITABLE AND VERIFIABLE AGREEMENTS THAT WILL IMPROVE OUR SECURITY, ENHANCE STABILITY AND REDUCE THE RISK OF WAR.

-- IN THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS, OUR EMPHASIS WILL BE ON CREATING A MORE STABLE NUCLEAR BALANCE AND STRENGTHENING DETERRENCE BY REDUCING AND CONSTRAINING THOSE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES WHICH POSE THE GREATEST THREAT TO SECURITY AND STABILITY.

-- WE WILL PURSUE COMPLEMENTARY GOALS IN THE DEFENSE AND SPACE TALKS, SEEKING AN AGREEMENT ON A COOPERATIVE TRANSITION TO A MORE STABLE NUCLEAR BALANCE THAT RELIES

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INCREASINGLY ON DEFENSES, SHOULD THEY PROVE FEASIBLE, WHILE PRESERVING OUR OPTIONS TO DEPLOY STRATEGIC DEFENSES WHEN THEY ARE READY.

-- OUR PROPOSALS IN THE STRATEGIC ARMS TALKS ARE FOR DEEP REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES AIMED AT CREATING A MORE STABLE NUCLEAR BALANCE. THE REDUCTIONS WE PROPOSE ARE NOT FOR THEIR OWN SAKE. THEY ARE DESIGNED TO SUPPORT OUR GOAL OF STRENGTHENING DETERRENCE BY REDUCING THE CAPABILITY TO LAUNCH A FIRST STRIKE, EVEN IN A CRISIS.

-- THE OBJECTIVES OF OUR START PROPOSALS ARE:

- TO FOCUS REDUCTIONS ON THOSE FORCES WHICH POSE THE GREATEST THREAT TO SECURITY AND STABILITY, AND ENCOURAGE MOVEMENT TO MORE STABILIZING SYSTEMS;
- TO FOSTER GREATER PREDICTABILITY AND LOWER THE UNCERTAINTIES ABOUT THE FUTURE STRATEGIC THREATS THAT EACH SIDE WILL FACE;
- TO ENABLE US TO VERIFY EFFECTIVELY THAT THE OTHER SIDE IS COMPLYING WITH THE AGREEMENT.

-- WE HAVE ALREADY MADE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS TOWARD A START TREATY: A 400 PAGE JOINT DRAFT TREATY TEXT REFLECTS BROAD AREAS OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE SIDES. WE INTEND TO PROCEED IN THIS NEW ROUND OF TALKS ON THE BASIS OF THIS DOCUMENT, AND WILL LOOK FOR WAYS TO REINFORCE OUR EMPHASIS ON SECURITY, SURVIVABILITY AND STRATEGIC STABILITY.

-- VERIFICATION IS ONE OF THE MOST COMPLEX ISSUES IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND ONE OF THE MOST CRITICAL TO OUR SECURITY. AS PART OF OUR OVERALL NEGOTIATING EFFORT AS THE TALKS RESUME IN GENEVA, THE UNITED STATES PROPOSES THAT THE TWO SIDES MAKE A SPECIAL EFFORT TO WORK OUT, AND BEGIN IMPLEMENTING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, CERTAIN VERIFICATION AND STABILITY MEASURES DRAWN FROM PROPOSALS THAT BOTH SIDES HAVE ALREADY ADVANCED IN START OR OTHER CONTEXTS.

-- THESE MEASURES WILL ENHANCE OUR EFFORT TO ACHIEVE AN EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION REGIME FOR THE START TREATY AND CONTRIBUTE TO STRATEGIC STABILITY. EARLY IMPLEMENTATION OF THEM WILL SPEED RESOLUTION OF OUTSTANDING ISSUES, AND GIVE ADDED MOMENTUM TO THE EFFORTS OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES

TO CONCLUDE A START AGREEMENT.

-- OUR APPROACHES TO START AND TO OUR STRATEGIC FORCE MODERNIZATION PROGRAM ARE COMPLEMENTARY AND MUTUALLY REINFORCING. MAINTAINING CREDIBLE AND EFFECTIVE NUCLEAR DETERRENT FORCES IS ESSENTIAL BOTH TO OUR SECURITY AND TO OUR ABILITY TO NEGOTIATE SOUND AND STABILIZING AGREEMENTS. OUR AIMS IN BOTH THE NEGOTIATIONS AND OUR STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION PROGRAM ARE TO ENSURE A MORE STABLE NUCLEAR BALANCE BY REDUCING THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE THREAT TO U.S. FORCES, TO DECREASE THE VULNERABILITY OF OUR FORCES TO THE THREAT THAT REMAINS, AND TO LOWER THE UNCERTAINTIES IN THE EVOLUTION OF FORCES BETWEEN THE SIDES.

-- A SUCCESSFUL START TREATY WILL NOT DIMINISH OUR NEED FOR MODERNIZED, EFFECTIVE STRATEGIC FORCES FOR CONTINUED DETERRENCE. THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO MODERNIZE THEIR FORCES. WE MUST CONTINUE TO PURSUE BOTH OUR FORCE

MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS AND ARMS CONTROL, AND NOT MAKE THE MISTAKE OF TREATING ONE AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR THE OTHER.

-- WE WILL CONTINUE TO INSIST THAT ALL THE RIGHTS ACCORDED BY A START AGREEMENT AND THE LIMITS IMPOSED BY IT WILL APPLY EQUALLY TO BOTH SIDES.

-- IN THE DEFENSE AND SPACE NEGOTIATIONS, AS IN START, OUR FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVE IS TO REDUCE THE RISK OF WAR BY ENHANCING SECURITY, STABILITY, AND PREDICTABILITY. WE BELIEVE THAT ADVANCES IN TECHNOLOGY OFFER NEW PROMISE FOR DEVELOPING EFFECTIVE DEFENSES TO STRENGTHEN DETERRENCE.

-- WE WILL PURSUE DISCUSSIONS IN THE DEFENSE AND SPACE TALKS ABOUT MOVING COOPERATIVELY TOWARD A MORE STABLE STRATEGIC BALANCE WITH INCREASED RELIANCE ON STRATEGIC DEFENSES, SHOULD THEY PROVE FEASIBLE, AND TO PRESERVE OUR OPTIONS TO DEPLOY ADVANCED DEFENSES WHEN THEY ARE READY.

-- U.S. NEGOTIATORS HAVE WORKED TOWARD A DEFENSE AND SPACE TREATY BUILDING ON THE PRINCIPLES OUTLINED AT THE DECEMBER 1987 WASHINGTON SUMMIT. LAST YEAR, THE U.S. PRESENTED DRAFT PROTOCOL PROVISIONS ON PREDICTABILITY OR CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES IN THE FIELD OF STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE.

-- WE WILL NOT AGREE TO ALLOW THE COMPLETION OF A START AGREEMENT TO BE HELD HOSTAGE TO COMPLETION OF A DEFENSE AND SPACE AGREEMENT. WE WILL ALSO NOT CONCLUDE NEW STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS UNTIL THE SOVIET UNION

CORRECTS ITS KRASNOYARSK VIOLATION OF THE ABM TREATY.

-- THE PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION LEFT AN EXCELLENT FOUNDATION UPON WHICH TO BUILD. PRESIDENT BUSH WAS PART OF THAT EFFORT WHEN HE WAS VICE-PRESIDENT. THERE WILL NATURALLY BE CONSIDERABLE CONTINUITY IN OUR APPROACH TO THESE NEGOTIATIONS, BUT WE RESERVE THE RIGHT TO MAKE CHANGES AND INTRODUCE NEW IDEAS IN THE COURSE OF THE TALKS.

4. NST Q'S AND A'S

Q. YOU STATE THAT THE U.S. RESERVES THE RIGHT TO INTRODUCE NEW IDEAS IN THE DRAFT START TREATY. CAN YOU PROVIDE ANY SPECIFICS AS TO WHAT NEW IDEAS YOU MIGHT BE CONSIDERING?

A. AS WE HAVE SAID, THE PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION LEFT AN EXCELLENT FOUNDATION UPON WHICH TO BUILD IN THE AREA OF ARMS CONTROL, AND THERE WILL BE A CONSIDERABLE DEGREE OF CONTINUITY IN THIS ADMINISTRATION. NEGOTIATIONS ARE A GIVE-AND-TAKE PROCESS, SO WE RESERVE THE RIGHT TO MAKE CHANGES AND TO INTRODUCE NEW IDEAS. WE HAVE AND WE WILL PRESENT PROPOSALS TO THE SOVIETS IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

Q. CAN YOU TELL US WHICH ELEMENTS OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S START POSITION YOU ARE PREPARED TO REAFFIRM?

A. AS I HAVE SAID, THERE WILL BE A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF CONTINUITY: WE WILL BE WORKING FROM THE JOINT DRAFT TREATY TEXT WHICH IDENTIFIES AREAS OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE, HOWEVER, TO COMMENT ON SPECIFICS AT THIS TIME.

Q. HAVE YOU COMPLETED YOUR OVERALL REVIEW OF STRATEGIC POLICY BEFORE RETURNING TO THE NUCLEAR AND SPACE TALKS?

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A. ALL PORTIONS OF THE REVIEW RELEVANT TO THE RESUMPTION OF THESE TALKS ARE COMPLETE. OF COURSE, WE WILL CONTINUE TO REVIEW OUR OPTIONS AS THE NEGOTIATIONS PROGRESS.

Q. DISCUSSIONS OF THE U.S. START POSITION SEEM TO PUT LESS EMPHASIS ON THE CONCEPT OF DEEP REDUCTIONS. IS THAT A CHANGE IN THE U.S. POSITION?

A. NO. THE U.S. GOAL IN THE NEGOTIATIONS HAS ALWAYS

BEEN TO REDUCE THE RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR BY CONCLUDING AN EQUITABLE AND EFFECTIVELY VERIFIABLE AGREEMENT FOR REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR ARSENALS, FOCUSING ON THE MOST DESTABILIZING SYSTEMS. THAT OBJECTIVE HAS NOT CHANGED. THE REDUCTIONS ARE NOT MERELY FOR THEIR OWN SAKE BUT ARE DESIGNED TO ENHANCE STRATEGIC STABILITY AND SECURITY.

Q. WILL THE U.S. BE INTRODUCING NEW IDEAS IN THE DEFENSE AND SPACE TALKS AS WELL?

A. THE PRESIDENT HAS DECIDED THAT OUR GOALS FOR SDI AND OUR APPROACH IN THE DEFENSE AND SPACE TALKS ARE SOUND AND REMAIN UNCHANGED. BUT WE RESERVE THE RIGHT TO MAKE CHANGES AND PRESENT NEW IDEAS AS WELL.

Q. WHAT ARE THE MAJOR ISSUES THAT REMAIN TO BE RESOLVED IN START?

A. MAJOR ISSUES REMAINING TO BE RESOLVED INCLUDE:

- MOBILE ICBMS. THE PRESIDENT HAS STATED THAT HE CONSIDERS MOBILITY ESSENTIAL TO ENSURE THE SURVIVABILITY OF OUR ICBM FORCES. HE HAS, THEREFORE, ASKED THE CONGRESS TO FUND THE RE-BASING OF THE PEACEKEEPER (MX) TO MAKE IT RAIL-MOBILE, AND THE DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF THE ROAD-MOBILE SMALL ICBM.

THE CURRENT U.S. POSITION IS TO BAN MOBILE ICBMS. WE CANNOT CHANGE OUR POSITION UNTIL CONGRESS INDICATES ITS APPROVAL OF THE MOBILE MISSILE PROGRAMS WHICH THE PRESIDENT HAS PROPOSED.

LET ME NOTE THAT TO CONCLUDE A START TREATY THAT PERMITS MOBILE MISSILES, WE WOULD NEED TO BE SURE BOTH THAT CONGRESS WILL SUPPORT MOBILE ICBMS OF OUR OWN AND THAT, LIKE ALL TREATY LIMITS, THE START PROVISIONS ON MOBILE MISSILES ARE EFFECTIVELY VERIFIABLE.

- ICBM WARHEAD SUBLIMIT. THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT AGREED TO A SUBLIMIT OF 3,000-3,300 ON THE NUMBER OF ICBM WARHEADS. THE PURPOSE OF THE U.S.-PROPOSED SUBLIMIT IS TO ENHANCE STRATEGIC STABILITY BY FOCUSING REDUCTIONS IN THESE DESTABILIZING WEAPONS SYSTEMS AND TO ENCOURAGE MOVEMENT TOWARD MORE STABILIZING STRATEGIC FORCES.

- SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES. AT THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT THE TWO SIDES AGREED TO FIND A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO THE QUESTION OF LIMITING DEPLOYMENT OF LONG-RANGE, NUCLEAR-ARMED SLICMS OUTSIDE THE

6000 WARHEAD AND 1600 STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DELIVERY VEHICLE LIMITS, AND TO SEEK MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AND EFFECTIVE METHODS OF VERIFICATION OF SUCH LIMITS. DESPITE OUR EXTENSIVE EFFORTS, THE U.S. HAS NOT YET FOUND WAYS TO EFFECTIVELY VERIFY LIMITS ON NUCLEAR ARMED SLICMS. IN THE ABSENCE OF A WORKABLE PLAN FOR EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION, THE U.S. HAS PROPOSED THAT THE SIDES SHOULD MAKE NON-BINDING DECLARATIONS OF PLANNED NUCLEAR SLICM NUMBERS.

- AIR-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES. THE TWO SIDES HAVE AGREED ON THE NEED TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN CATEGORIES OF HEAVY BOMBERS WITH DIFFERENT ARMAMENTS, FOR THE RIGHT TO CONVERT BOMBERS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER, AND FOR SOME OF THE COUNTING RULES FOR HEAVY BOMBERS AND THEIR ARMAMENTS. HOWEVER, IMPORTANT ISSUES STILL NEED TO BE RESOLVED, INCLUDING THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS TO BE ATTRIBUTED TO HEAVY BOMBERS EQUIPPED FOR NUCLEAR ALICMS, HOW TO TREAT HEAVY BOMBERS EQUIPPED FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMS ONLY, HOW TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL ALICMS, AND THE RANGE THRESHOLD ABOVE WHICH NUCLEAR-ARMED AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES WOULD BE SUBJECT TO START LIMITS ON NUCLEAR ALICMS.

- SOVIET LINKAGE OF START TO ABM. THE U.S. BELIEVES THAT START AND DEFENSE AND SPACE TREATIES MUST EACH STAND ON THEIR OWN MERITS. THE CURRENT SOVIET POSITION, WHICH WOULD ALLOW EITHER SIDE TO SUSPEND IMPLEMENTATION OF START REDUCTIONS IF THEY CLAIMED THE OTHER SIDE HAD VIOLATED THE ABM TREATY, IS NOT ACCEPTABLE. SUCH LINKAGE WOULD CRIPPLE THE SDI PROGRAM AND UNDERMINE THE CONFIDENCE NEEDED TO UNDERTAKE FAR-REACHING START REDUCTIONS.

- VERIFICATION. OF ALL THE OUTSTANDING ISSUES, VERIFICATION MAY BE THE MOST COMPLEX. AS PART OF OUR OVERALL NEGOTIATING EFFORT AS THE TALKS RESUME, THE U.S. IS PROPOSING THAT THE TWO SIDES MAKE A SPECIAL EFFORT TO AGREE ON, AND BEGIN IMPLEMENTING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, CERTAIN VERIFICATION MEASURES -- AS WELL AS CERTAIN STABILITY MEASURES -- DRAWN FROM PROPOSALS THAT BOTH SIDES HAVE ALREADY ADVANCED IN START OR IN OTHER CONTEXTS. (SEE BELOW)

Q. HOW SOON CAN YOU GET A START AGREEMENT?

A. WE ARE NOT NEGOTIATING AGAINST ANY DEADLINE. WHILE CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE TOWARD A START AGREEMENT, THE ISSUES WHICH REMAIN ARE COMPLEX AND DIFFICULT. WE RETURN TO GENEVA READY TO TACKLE THESE

DIFFICULT PROBLEMS. IF THE SOVIETS ARE SIMILARLY PREPARED, FURTHER PROGRESS CAN BE ACHIEVED.

Q. WHERE DO WE STAND IN THE DEFENSE AND SPACE TALKS?

A. U.S. NEGOTIATORS HAVE ATTEMPTED TO WORK TOWARD A JOINT DRAFT TEXT OF A DEFENSE AND SPACE AGREEMENT, BUILDING ON THE UNDERSTANDING OUTLINED AT THE DECEMBER 1987 WASHINGTON SUMMIT. WHILE THE SOVIETS HAVE REFUSED TO PREPARE SUCH A TEXT, PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE ON DRAFT PROTOCOL PROVISIONS ON PREDICTABILITY AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES IN THE FIELD OF STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES.

IMPORTANT AREAS OF DIFFERENCE REMAIN:

- NON-WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ABM TREATY. WHILE THE U.S. COULD ACCEPT A LIMITED COMMITMENT NOT TO WITHDRAW FROM THE ABM TREATY FOR A SPECIFIED PERIOD OF TIME IN ORDER TO DEPLOY SDI, IT INSISTS THAT NORMAL INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED WITHDRAWAL RIGHTS - BASED ON SUPREME NATIONAL INTERESTS AND MATERIAL BREACH - BE INCLUDED IN THE D&S TREATY. THE SOVIETS, HOWEVER, WANT AN UNCONDITIONAL COMMITMENT NOT TO WITHDRAW, WHICH NO SOVEREIGN NATION COULD ACCEPT.

- ABM TREATY RESTRICTIONS ON RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING. THE SOVIET UNION SEEKS GREATER RESTRICTIONS THAN THOSE AGREED TO IN THE ABM TREATY IN AN

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EFFORT TO LIMIT THE U.S. SDI PROGRAM. THE U.S. SEEKS TO PRESERVE THE RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND TESTING RIGHTS PROVIDED IN THE ABM TREATY.

- THE REGIME THAT WOULD FOLLOW THE END OF THE NON-WITHDRAWAL PERIOD. THE SOVIET UNION SEEKS CONTINUATION OF AN UNSPECIFIED RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE ABM TREATY FOLLOWING THE NON-WITHDRAWAL PERIOD. THE U.S. AGREES THAT THE ABM TREATY WOULD REMAIN IN EFFECT AFTER THE NON-WITHDRAWAL PERIOD, BUT EITHER PARTY WOULD BE FREE TO CHOOSE TO DEPLOY STRATEGIC MISSILE DEFENSES THAT ARE BEYOND THE LIMITATIONS IN THE ABM TREATY UPON GIVING THE OTHER PARTY SIX MONTHS WRITTEN NOTIFICATION OF ITS INTENTION TO DO SO. IN THAT CASE, THE PARTY COULD DEPLOY STRATEGIC DEFENSES WITHOUT FURTHER REFERENCE TO THE ABM TREATY.

- PREDICTABILITY MEASURES. THE U.S. HAS PROPOSED A SET OF FAR-REACHING CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES TO ENHANCE PREDICTABILITY ABOUT THE SIDES'

FUTURE ACTIVITIES IN THE FIELD OF STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE. THE SOVIET UNION HAS PROPOSED A SET OF UNWORKABLE MEASURES IN AN EFFORT TO ENHANCE VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE ABM TREATY, RATHER THAN ADD PREDICTABILITY TO THE D&S TREATY.

Q. IS SDI A STUMBLING BLOCK?

A. THE PRESIDENT HAS SAID WE WILL VIGOROUSLY PURSUE SDI AND DEPLOY IT WHEN IT IS READY. THE SOVIETS SHOULD UNDERSTAND - PARTICULARLY SINCE PRESIDENT GORBACHEV HAS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THEY HAVE THEIR OWN PROGRAM IN THIS VITAL AREA -- OUR INSISTENCE ON INVESTIGATING FULLY THE FEASIBILITY OF ADVANCED STRATEGIC DEFENSES.

Q. WHAT IS THE U.S. POSITION ON THE BROAD INTERPRETATION OF THE ABM TREATY?

A. IT HAS NOT CHANGED. IN THE DEFENSE AND SPACE TALKS, WE SEEK TO PRESERVE OUR RIGHT UNDER THE ABM TREATY TO DEVELOP AND TEST ADVANCED ABM SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS.

Q. WHAT MUST THE SOVIET UNION DO TO RESOLVE THE KRASHOYARSK VIOLATION? WHY IS THE U.S. EVEN NEGOTIATING IF IT WILL NOT SIGN ANY AGREEMENT UNTIL THE KRASHOYARSK VIOLATION IS CORRECTED?

A. WE HAVE MADE CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS THAT WE WILL NOT CONCLUDE ANY NEW STRATEGIC AGREEMENT UNTIL THEY CORRECT THEIR VIOLATION AT KRASHOYARSK, WHICH IS A VIOLATION OF A CENTRAL ELEMENT OF THE ABM TREATY. WE BELIEVE THE VIOLATION CAN ONLY BE CORRECTED BY DISMANTLEMENT OF THE RADAR AND DESTRUCTION OF THE TRANSMITTER AND RECEIVER BUILDINGS, INCLUDING THEIR FOUNDATIONS, BUT WE WILL CONSIDER OTHER SOVIET PROPOSALS THAT WILL MEET OUR CRITERIA. THE U.S. WILL CONTINUE TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY AT THE NUCLEAR AND SPACE TALKS, SEEKING PROGRESS ON ALL THE OUTSTANDING ISSUES, SO THAT WE WILL BE PREPARED TO MOVE FORWARD QUICKLY AS SOON AS THE KRASHOYARSK PROBLEM IS CORRECTED.

5. Q'S AND A'S ON VERIFICATION AND STABILITY MEASURES

Q. WHAT ARE THE VERIFICATION AND STABILITY MEASURES YOU ARE PROPOSING?

A. THE U.S. IS PROPOSING TO ACCELERATE WORK IN THE START NEGOTIATIONS ON VERIFICATION AND STABILITY MEASURES EVEN

AS WE CONTINUE TO TRY TO RESOLVE ALL OTHER OUTSTANDING ISSUES. THE MAJORITY OF MEASURES ARE DESIGNED TO SUPPORT VERIFICATION, WHICH IS ONE OF THE MOST COMPLEX AREAS, AND WHICH MUST BE RESOLVED BEFORE A START TREATY CAN BE COMPLETED. OTHER MEASURES WOULD IMPROVE STABILITY. EARLY AGREEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF SUCH MEASURES WOULD GIVE BOTH SIDES PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE, WHICH IN TURN WOULD SPEED THE PROCESS OF RESOLVING OUTSTANDING ISSUES AND FACILITATE THE EFFORTS OF THE TWO SIDES TO CONCLUDE A START AGREEMENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

THE MEASURES WE PROPOSE TO WORK ON INCLUDE:

- ESTABLISHMENT NOW OF ON-SITE PERIMETER/PORTAL MONITORING OF CERTAIN MISSILE PRODUCTION FACILITIES;
- AN EXCHANGE OF DATA ON EACH SIDES' STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES;
- PROHIBITING ENCRYPTION OF TELEMETRY ON ICBMS AND SLBMS;
- FAMILIARIZATION WITH PROCEDURES FOR INSPECTION OF BALLISTIC MISSILES;
- ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM OF SHORT-TIME-OF-FLIGHT SLBMS;
- NOTIFICATION OF STRATEGIC EXERCISES; AND
- EXPERIMENTATION ON THE IDENTIFICATION OF MISSILES ("TAGGING").

Q. ARE YOU SAYING THAT THE TWO SIDES HAVE TO AGREE ON THESE VERIFICATION MEASURES BEFORE YOU CAN NEGOTIATE AND SETTLE THE OTHER ISSUES IN THE TREATY? IN OTHER WORDS, IS AGREEMENT ON THIS VERIFICATION PACKAGE A PRE-CONDITION FOR A TREATY?

A. NO. THIS IS NOT A "TAKE IT OR LEAVE IT PACKAGE" OR A PRE-CONDITION. WE ARE GOING TO BE NEGOTIATING IN GENEVA ON ALL OTHER OUTSTANDING ISSUES AS WELL AS VERIFICATION AND STABILITY MEASURES. IT IS A LIST OF PROPOSALS AND IDEAS ON AREAS WHERE WE THINK WE CAN GET A HEAD START ON RESOLVING SOME OUTSTANDING ISSUES.

WHAT WE PROPOSE IS TO MAKE AN ACCELERATED EFFORT IN THIS AREA AS PART OF OUR OVERALL NEGOTIATING EFFORT.

WE BELIEVE THESE IDEAS WILL FACILITATE AGREEMENT ON EFFECTIVE AND WORKABLE PROVISIONS FOR THE TREATY, WHICH

WOULD SPEED CONCLUSION OF A START TREATY.

Q. WHAT HAPPENS IF THE SOVIETS DON'T AGREE? WHAT HAPPENS IF YOU DON'T MAKE QUICK PROGRESS? WILL THIS DELAY COMPLETING THE TREATY?

A. WE WILL WORK ON THOSE THINGS NOW IN WHICH THE SOVIETS EXPRESS AN INTEREST. REMEMBER, THIS IS A LIST, NOT A PACKAGE. BUT, IN THE END, ALL THESE ISSUES NEED TO BE ENGAGED.

Q. ARE YOU PROPOSING NEW VERIFICATION PROCEDURES?

A. THIS PROPOSAL CAPITALIZES ON A LOT OF GOOD WORK THAT HAS ALREADY BEEN DONE ON THE START TREATY, AND WE WANT TO BUILD ON THAT. IT DRAWS ON PROPOSALS, BOTH SIDES HAVE ADVANCED IN THE START NEGOTIATIONS AND IN OTHER CONTEXTS.

THE NEW ELEMENT OF THE PROPOSAL IS TO ACCELERATE

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AGREEMENT AND EARLY IMPLEMENTATION OF SOME OF THESE MEASURES TO HELP WITH VERIFICATION AND WITH THE NEGOTIATION OF THE TREATY AS A WHOLE.

Q. ARE YOU PROPOSING VERIFICATION MEASURES IN START NOW BECAUSE THERE HAVE BEEN PROBLEMS IN VERIFICATION OF THE INF TREATY?

A. NO. THE POINT IS THAT THE INF EXPERIENCE HAS UNDERLINED THE NEED TO ADDRESS VERIFICATION ISSUES EARLY ON IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE AMOUNT OF DETAIL IN THE INF TREATY IS ENORMOUS, AND WE EXPECT THAT VERIFICATION FOR A START TREATY WOULD BE EVEN MORE COMPLEX. BY GETTING A HANDLE ON THESE DETAILS NOW, EVEN AS WE CONTINUE TO NEGOTIATE THE START PROVISIONS, WE CAN FACILITATE RESOLUTION OF OUTSTANDING QUESTIONS AND EXPEDITE CONCLUSION OF A START AGREEMENT.

WE DO NOT WANT TO FIND OURSELVES IN THE POSITION OF HAVING REACHED SUBSTANTIVE AGREEMENT ON ALL OF THE START ISSUES, BUT UNABLE TO COMPLETE THE TREATY BECAUSE WORK ON VERIFICATION REMAINS TO BE DONE.

Q. WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY STABILITY MEASURES? WHAT ARE THE PROPOSALS THERE?

A. CERTAIN MEASURES CAN ALLAY CONCERNS AND ENHANCE BOTH SIDES' CONFIDENCE AGAINST CERTAIN THREATS.

THE PROPOSAL WE HAVE MADE IN GENEVA WILL INCLUDE THIS

OBJECTIVE AS WELL AS VERIFICATION.

Q. IS IT TRUE THAT YOU ARE PUTTING VERIFICATION ISSUES UP FRONT IN THE START NEGOTIATIONS?

A. WE ARE NOT PUTTING VERIFICATION FIRST AT THE EXPENSE OF OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE NEGOTIATION. WE CONTINUE TO WORK ON VERIFICATION AND OTHER ASPECTS OF THE START TREATY SIMULTANEOUSLY. WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO EXPAND THE SCOPE OF THE VERIFICATION ISSUE BY, HYPOTHETICALLY FOR EXAMPLE, ESTABLISHING TECHNICAL GROUPS WHICH CAN SIT DOWN AND DISCUSS THE TYPES OF EQUIPMENT THAT MAY BE NECESSARY FOR VERIFICATION MEASURES. THIS MAY INCLUDE, FOR EXAMPLE, VISITS TO SITES IN EACH OTHER'S COUNTRY. THIS KIND OF APPROACH IS DESIGNED TO ENSURE THAT WHEN THE SUBSTANCE OF THE START NEGOTIATIONS IS AGREED UPON, WE WILL BE FULLY READY TO MOVE FORWARD WITH IMPLEMENTATION.

Q. SOME CRITICS SAY THAT THIS PROCEDURE WILL SLOW DOWN THE START NEGOTIATIONS. IS THIS TRUE?

A. ACTUALLY, THIS APPROACH WILL ACCELERATE THE NEGOTIATIONS. VERIFICATION IS ONE OF THE MOST COMPLEX AREAS TO DEAL WITH, THEREFORE, IT MAKES SENSE TO WORK ON IT INTENSIVELY NOW. IN ANY EVENT, A START TREATY CANNOT BE CONCLUDED UNTIL EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION PROVISIONS ARE AGREED, SO WE NEED TO TACKLE THE VERIFICATION ISSUE SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH OTHER START ISSUES.

THE U.S. PROPOSAL IN NO WAY INVOLVES ANY PRE-CONDITION.

6. LENINGRAD MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. BAKER

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Mary Kate,

Here is a clear,

original copy

of the material

I boxed you.

Joe



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

June 30, 1989

TO: MARY KATE GRANT
OFFICE OF COMMUNICATIONS, THE WHITE HOUSE
Fax 456-6218
Confirmation No. 456-2930

FROM: JOSEPH DUGGAN
OFFICE OF AMBASSADOR ROWNY
647-4153

Attached are draft talking points we have prepared on SDI, following the format of the talking points you showed me earlier this week.

The talking points are drawn largely from up-to-date information from the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization at the Pentagon and from the Vice President's definitive speech on SDI delivered yesterday at the National Academy of Sciences.

June 30, 1989

TALKING POINTS ON THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE

- * The President is committed to the development and deployment of Strategic Defenses when they are ready.
- * By developing the means to defend against ballistic missiles that threaten us, we also lessen the incentives for aggression thus enhancing stability and deterrence.
- * The primary obstacles to SDI can generally be categorized as technological, strategic, political and economic.

Technology and SDI

- * Though many complex scientific and engineering problems remain, there appear to be no technological show-stoppers for SDI.
- * In some areas such as kinetic kill, technological breakthroughs have been achieved. A system popularly known as Brilliant Pebbles is one example.

Strategy and SDI

- * On June 29, 1989, Vice President Quayle outlined how SDI will one day alter the strategic equation between offense and defense.
 - * SDI's ultimate goal is the devaluation in the strategic utility of ballistic missiles.
 - * We are seeking a more stable balance that relies increasingly on defense. It would be preferable, but not necessary, if the Soviets would work with us to develop a cooperative arrangement for making this transition.
 - * Progress on strategic offensive arms reductions and strategic defense are not mutually exclusive -- on the contrary, START and SDI are complementary.
- ** In general, the more progress we make toward offensive reductions, the more we will need to rely on SDI to help us deter, or deal with, possible Soviet cheating or breakout. SDI is an insurance policy for START.
- *** First, the Soviets' largely modern land-based ICBM force is projected to ensure them a hefty first-strike capability well into the 21st century. A reasonably reliable system of strategic defenses would diminish our anxiety over this ICBM threat.

- *** Second, the U.S. would be better able to cope with the problem of Soviet mobile ICBMs. SDI would complement a mobile verification regime in START that most experts feel would be far from perfect.
- *** Third, the sheer complexity of the proposed START treaty will probably result in unavoidable loopholes that arms control on its own cannot plug. In turn, this situation would jeopardize treaty ratification. Strategic defenses could help plug the loopholes.
- * Finally, Strategic Defense will be the only thoroughly reliable way to address the problem of accidental, unauthorized, or third-world "madman" launches of ballistic missiles.
 - ** Concerns are no longer hypothetical. The Director of Central Intelligence testified recently that up to 15 developing nations could have a ballistic launch capability by the turn of the century.
 - ** The instability of many regimes raises another frightening scenario -- who has authority to release missiles during periods of intense civil strife? As the nuclear and chemical club grows, this question will be asked more often.
 - ** Controlling missile technology from the supply side is not enough -- ultimately we must have the capability to defend ourselves against ballistic missiles.
 - ** One interesting possibility is that with a space-based defense, the U.S. could also defend other countries against rogue launches.

Politics and Economics of SDI

- * The recent recommendation by the majority of the members of the House Armed Services Committee to cut the SDI budget by over a billion dollars is a shortsighted move.
- * Just at the time American ingenuity is starting to produce technological breakthroughs, SDI opponents are trying to reduce the funding to a level which could not sustain a viable program.
- * The strategic rationale for SDI must be made clearer to the American public and to their representatives in Congress.
- * Strategic modernization and strategic defense should not be allowed to become an either/or proposition -- as pointed out above, offenses and defenses are synergistic.

What Next?

- * In order to support a deployment decision in three or four years, the President must be able to depend on the results of his carefully designed research and development program. It must be adequately funded.
- * The program schedule for the next two years includes a number of very important tests and experiments. These include:
 - ** The first-ever test of a Neutral Particle Beam in Space.
 - ** Space tests of tracking, pointing, sensor, and communications technologies.
 - ** Numerous interceptor tests for kinetic kill systems such as Brilliant Pebbles.
- * All these early tests comply with the ABM Treaty. Later on, however, tests that fall outside the Treaty will be required before the President can confidently make a deployment decision.

Bottom Line

- * The Congress and the public it serves must come to recognize that SDI is one of several answers to the many strategic problems the U.S. faces going into the next century.
 - ** SDI would dramatically reduce the risk of nuclear war by denying an aggressor the ability to execute a first strike.
 - ** SDI would provide the American people with much-needed insurance against an accidental or inadvertent attack or against a deliberate launch by an irrational government.
- * The Bush Administration continues to believe that strategic defense is technologically feasible, strategically necessary, and morally imperative.



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

June 30, 1989

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Attached are draft talking points we have prepared on SDI, following the format of the talking points you showed me earlier this week.

The talking points are drawn largely from up-to-date information from the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization at the Pentagon and from the Vice President's definitive speech on SDI delivered yesterday at the National Academy of Sciences.

What Next?

- * In order to support a deployment decision in three or four years, the President must be able to depend on the results of his carefully designed research and development program. It must be adequately funded.
- * The program schedule for the next two years includes a number of very important tests and experiments. These include:
 - ** The first-ever test of a Neutral Particle Beam in Space.
 - ** Space tests of tracking, pointing, sensor, and communications technologies.
 - ** Numerous interceptor tests for kinetic kill systems such as Brilliant Pebbles.
- * All these early tests comply with the ABM Treaty. Later on, however, tests that fall outside the Treaty will be required before the President can confidently make a deployment decision.

Bottom Line

- * The Congress and the public it serves must come to recognize that SDI is one of several answers to the many strategic problems the U.S. faces going into the next century.
 - ** SDI would dramatically reduce the risk of nuclear war by denying an aggressor the ability to execute a first strike.
 - ** SDI would provide the American people with much-needed insurance against an accidental or inadvertent attack or against a deliberate launch by an irrational government.
- * The Bush Administration continues to believe that strategic defense is technologically feasible, strategically necessary, and morally imperative.

- *** Second, the U.S. would be better able to cope with the problem of Soviet mobile ICBMs. SDI would complement a mobile verification regime in START that most experts feel would be far from perfect.
- *** Third, the sheer complexity of the proposed START treaty will probably result in unavoidable loopholes that arms control on its own cannot plug. In turn, this situation would jeopardize treaty ratification. Strategic defenses could help plug the loopholes.
- * Finally, Strategic Defense will be the only thoroughly reliable way to address the problem of accidental, unauthorized, or third-world "madman" launches of ballistic missiles.
 - ** Concerns are no longer hypothetical. The Director of Central Intelligence testified recently that up to 15 developing nations could have a ballistic launch capability by the turn of the century.
 - ** The instability of many regimes raises another frightening scenario -- who has authority to release missiles during periods of intense civil strife? As the nuclear and chemical club grows, this question will be asked more often.
 - ** Controlling missile technology from the supply side is not enough -- ultimately we must have the capability to defend ourselves against ballistic missiles.
 - ** One interesting possibility is that with a space-based defense, the U.S. could also defend other countries against rogue launches.

Politics and Economics of SDI

- * The recent recommendation by the majority of the members of the House Armed Services Committee to cut the SDI budget by over a billion dollars is a shortsighted move.
- * Just at the time American ingenuity is starting to produce technological breakthroughs, SDI opponents are trying to reduce the funding to a level which could not sustain a viable program.
- * The strategic rationale for SDI must be made clearer to the American public and to their representatives in Congress.
- * Strategic modernization and strategic defense should not be allowed to become an either/or proposition -- as pointed out above, offenses and defenses are synergistic.

June 30, 1989

TALKING POINTS ON THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE

- * The President is committed to the development and deployment of Strategic Defenses when they are ready.
- * By developing the means to defend against ballistic missiles that threaten us, we also lessen the incentives for aggression thus enhancing stability and deterrence.
- * The primary obstacles to SDI can generally be categorized as technological, strategic, political and economic.

Technology and SDI

- * Though many complex scientific and engineering problems remain, there appear to be no technological show-stoppers for SDI.
- * In some areas such as kinetic kill, technological breakthroughs have been achieved. A system popularly known as Brilliant Pebbles is one example.

Strategy and SDI

- * On June 29, 1989, Vice President Quayle outlined how SDI will one day alter the strategic equation between offense and defense.
- * SDI's ultimate goal is the devaluation in the strategic utility of ballistic missiles.
- * We are seeking a more stable balance that relies increasingly on defense. It would be preferable, but not necessary, if the Soviets would work with us to develop a cooperative arrangement for making this transition.
- * Progress on strategic offensive arms reductions and strategic defense are not mutually exclusive -- on the contrary, START and SDI are complementary.
- ** In general, the more progress we make toward offensive reductions, the more we will need to rely on SDI to help us deter, or deal with, possible Soviet cheating or breakout. SDI is an insurance policy for START.
- *** First, the Soviets' largely modern land-based ICBM force is projected to ensure them a hefty first-strike capability well into the 21st century. A reasonably reliable system of strategic defenses would diminish our anxiety over this ICBM threat.