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develop in accordance with imports from Austria, Hungary's Trade Minister Tamas Beck complained. The outspoken minister stated that economic relations between Hungary and Austria "have by far not reached the level of political relations which are considered exemplary."

Beck openly stated that within the framework of the new geographic orientation of Hungary's foreign trade and its new openness to the world market, above all to its traditional partner Austria, the expansion of institutional relations with EFTA [European Free Trade Association] would be desirable and useful. [passage omitted]

New Joint Enterprise Founded With United States
AU0906085989 Budapest MTI in English
1306 GMT 7 Jun 89

[Text] Budapest, MTI, 07/06/1989—The first US-Hungarian securities trading company was founded in Budapest on Wednesday with a starting capital of 525 million forints, shared equally by the founders.

On the US side, the investors include companies with interests in a New York-based firm, and on the Hungarian side the Termin Financial Consulting Group.

The Hungarian-US broker firm intends to take part in the establishment of a stock exchange in Hungary. They also propose to recruit and involve Hungarian private capital in business transactions.

When the Hungarian exchange is in operation, the joint venture intends to act as dealer for US clients, mediating the sale of Hungarian company shares.

Radio Free Europe 'Wishes' Office in Budapest
AU0906095589 Budapest MTI in English
0852 GMT 3 Jun 89

[Text] Budapest, June 8 (MTI)—Radio Free Europe (RFE) wishes to have a representative accredited to Budapest and to open offices here. There is no obstacle to this in principle, and its implementation is already in progress. Jenő Szombath, deputy director of the Press Department at the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, told the Thursday issue of the daily MAGYAR HIRLAP.

An open information policy is in the country's interest, and we do not make a distinction between RFE and other news services. The final document of the Vienna follow-up meeting went a step further than the Helsinki Final Act when it set down in point 39 that journalists can neither be expelled nor punished for legally carrying out their profession. In addition, signatories have agreed not to hinder journalists' activity either for the contents of their own reports or for those of the news company they work for.

Improving the working conditions of foreign journalists should be made a long-term element of Hungarian foreign policy, since journalistic activity is an important element in the assertion of human rights, set down in the third basket of the documents. This is why we advocate at all international forums the need for international openness. Mr Szombath pointed out.

CSSR Envoy Views Bos-Nagymaros Construction
AU0906092489 Budapest MTI in English
1808 GMT 7 Jun 89

[Text] Budapest, MTI, 07/06/1989—"The construction of the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros barrage is a clearly scientific issue, the solution of which is the task of scientists", stressed Czechoslovak Ambassador Vlastimil Ehrenberger, at a forum on Hungarian-Czechoslovak relations, held on Wednesday in Budapest, in the Political College of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party [MSZMP]. According to the ambassador, scientists are capable of solving the problems related to the construction of the power plant, taking the current technical standard into consideration. In his view, the barrage construction should not be turned into a political issue, only the numbers, scientific arguments and laws can have a say in this issue.

The ambassador, who participated in the recent talks between the Hungarian and the Czechoslovak prime ministers, said that at these talks, the Hungarian side mentioned seismographical and ecological problems, and profitability problems in connection with suspending the further construction of the complex. Mr Ehrenberger said: They are not familiar in detail with the new scientific arguments that justified to suspend the construction, but the Czechoslovak scientists are ready to examine the material together with their Hungarian colleagues. In conclusion, the ambassador said that if the contract for the common construction of the barrage is not observed, Czechoslovakia would request compensation, as would, according to its information, Austria.

Pozsgay To Establish New Movement, Social Model
AU0906093589 Budapest MTI in English
2006 GMT 7 Jun 89

[Text] Budapest, June 7 (MTI)—"What is needed is to create a new social model, as the political, power and economic order of dictatorial socialism has become bankrupt. The squandering of the forces of advance, and the continuous deterioration of the living circumstances meanwhile, offers a scope of movement for the extremist groups. The various forces of pro-order dictatorship and revenge are threateningly present, and can strengthen." Imre Pozsgay stresses, among others, the appeal made public on Wednesday in Budapest, at the session of the preparatory committee of the Movement for Democratic Hungary. The movement wishes to rally people who accept the rise of the nation, European progress and democratic socialism together, irrespective of their party

standing or membership in organizations. The movement awaits all who reject marking time and roll-back, who accept that a democratic road has to be taken to create a democratic Hungary. The movement is expected to hold its founding session within one month.

Imre Pozsgay, member of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party Political Committee and minister of state, stressed at the session of the preparatory committee:

"All sober political forces in our country are alike in that a renewed, democratic Hungary is needed, and that this should be attained on a peaceful road, with an anti-catastrophe policy. The movement needs members who feel responsibility for a democratic Hungary, who firmly take a stand for peaceful transition, who support the change in model, as according to some people there is a chance to create a group in politics in the old fashion, by exploring its reserves. This would pose a danger to transformation, would promote roll-back, and this is what contemporary Hungary needs least of all. The fundamental goal is to create a new statehood, democracy and constitutional state, and to organize free elections," Mr Pozsgay said, among others.

Members of Parliament Consider Defense Budget

LD0706224389 Budapest MTI in English
1434 GMT 7 Jun 89

[Text] Budapest, June 7, 1989 (MTI-ECONEWS)—The Hungarian Government intends to sell off barracks and other buildings which become empty as a result of the withdrawal of part of the Soviet troops stationed in Hungary.

The government is counting on a budget income of 1 billion forints from such sales, Ministry of Defence officials informed members of the parliamentary Defence Committee.

The MPs [Members of Parliament] wanted to know how the 100 million forints owed by the Soviet Army to Hungarian electric power supply companies will be recovered.

At the meeting, the MPs pointed out that the Army still considered itself in a state of "intensive development" when it came to the issue of what consequences the cutting of the military budget might have.

This year, Hungary is to cut down on military expenditure by 3.7 billion forints as compared to the amount the state budget approved last year.

It was also announced at the Defence Committee meeting that the effective professional and civilian force of the workers' militia will be reduced by 30 per cent by September. (The workers' militia was set up in 1957 as the HSWP [Hungarian Socialist Workers Party]'s armed force, but was placed under government supervision in 1989).

The body is now seeking to work out a solution whereby the workers' militia can be transformed into an armed force equivalent to a voluntary militia of the Hungarian People's Army. The armed body is trying to make up the 100-million-forint loss which came about with the cut in state budget support, through renting out its camps and vehicles.

Shooting Incident Reported at Romanian Border
AU1206113489 Budapest MTI in English
1759 GMT 9 Jun 89

[Text] Budapest, June 9 (MTI)—Colonel Sandor Barna, chief commissioner of the Csongrad county police, told journalists on Friday that on June 4, Sunday, at dawn separate and serial shots were heard and the light of signal rockets seen in the vicinity of Nagylak on the Romanian side of the border. This was observed by both locals and frontier guards who, in Hungarian territory, rushed in the direction of the shooting. They saw Romanian frontier guards chasing and surrounding three persons in civilian clothes, including a woman. None of the shots violated Hungarian territory. On June 8, Thursday, in the same region a Hungarian fisherman found a girl's body in the Maros River, pulled it out to a sand island and notified the frontier guard. As the island belongs to Romania, no Hungarian police investigations can be carried out there. On Friday morning the Romanian authorities examined the body in the presence of the Hungarian frontier officer. Although they found no traces of gunshot on the body, the child's ear bled because of a head injury caused by a blow or a shock. No connection was revealed between the two events. The Romanian authorities denied to have captured people, stating that what the eyewitnesses saw from the Hungarian side was an exercise to arrest presumed terrorists.

Nemeth, Szuros Plan To Attend Nagy Funeral
LD0806204589 Budapest MTI in English
1154 GMT 8 Jun 89

[Text] Budapest, June 8 (MTI)—Matyas Szuros, president of the Hungarian National Assembly, and Miklos Nemeth, chairman of the Council of Ministers, are to represent parliament and the government at the June 16 funeral of Imre Nagy and associates, all unlawfully executed after 1956.

Agreement to this effect was reached between representatives of parliament, the government and the Committee for Historical Justice in the parliament building, Budapest, on Thursday morning. The meeting was attended by Matyas Szuros, Miklos Nemeth and, on behalf of the Committee for Historical Justice, by Miklos Vasarhelyi, Imre Mecsi, Andras B. Hegedus and Arpad Goncz.

Supreme Court Asked To Invalidate Nagy Ruling
LD0906132189 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 1000 GMT 9 Jun 89

[Text] We have just received news that the supreme prosecutor has submitted a protest on legal grounds regarding the case of Imre Nagy and his martyr associates, and he asks the Presidential Council of the Supreme Court to invalidate the illegal verdicts and to acquit Imre Nagy, Ferenc Donat, Miklos Gimes, Zoltan Tildy, Pal Maleter, Sandor Kopacsi, Jozsef Szilagyi, Ferenc Janosi, and Miklos Vasarhelyi.

On the basis of investigations, the Supreme Prosecution has ascertained that the authorities dealing with the case at the time severely and in sequence violated the then valid regulations of the rules of court. They limited the accused's rights of freedom and defense. The prosecution almost exclusively gathered and utilized data considered incriminating. They refrained from gathering evidence that would disprove guilt.

The accusation was unfounded and illegal. Further, the prosecution against the case of Imre Nagy and his associates was not necessary because the verdict does not contain any statement at all which would correspond to the criterion of any kind of crime defined by the then legal regulations.

The documents, which were recently obtained from Yugoslavia, prove that in November 1956, the Hungarian Government gave a written guarantee to Imre Nagy and his associates who were staying at the Budapest Yugoslav Embassy stating that they were not going to make any kind of reprisal against them. Personal immunity based on international law should have been given to those who were later sentenced, which, even according to laws at the time, would have been the obstacle to their being punished.

Pozgay Interviewed on Imre Nagy's Legacy
LD1006194389 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 1400 GMT 10 Jun 89

[From the "168 hours" program; Akos Mester interview with Imre Pozgay, Hungarian Socialist Workers Party Central Committee Politburo member; date, place not given—recorded]

[Text] [Announcer] What is the value of the spiritual legacy of Imre Nagy and his fellow fighters today? What is valid in the example of their lives? Imre Pozsgay is interviewed by Akos Mester.

[Mester] I acknowledge that the question with which I begin this conversation is oversimplified in view of the complexity of the answer that it requires. How do you see Imre Nagy's historical role?

[Pozsgay] Indeed, this is a very difficult question to answer, probably because we lack the necessary knowledge. But perhaps even more difficult because what happened to him burdens the conscience of a whole age and it is now that we are trying to face up to the facts. I am certain—and for this no particular research is needed—that in 1953 he was the first statesman in Eastern Europe to take a truly determined step toward the dismemberment of the Stalinist structure, its destruction. He was the one who through his own fate experienced the consequences of the so-called roll-back; and I am sure that at the time of the 1956 popular uprising, too, he fought for the creation of a free, independent, and democratic Hungary, in line with the same reform spirit and also under the pressure of the popular uprising.

Taking these facts into consideration, and also weighing all his political acts, one can only reach one conclusion, namely that we owe him justice. It is unavoidable to give him justice; and this is what will take place on 16 June at the funeral ceremony.

Although the funeral of Imre Nagy and those who shared his fate is organized by an independent organization—the Committee for Historical Justice—and the families, this event on 16 June will be a matter for the nation, the end of a historical period. Perhaps the momentum of self-purification will also be involved and we hope that it will bring about national reconciliation.

[Mester] Yes, but can we close a historical period when in the weeks before the funeral there are opposing camps which try to claim Imre Nagy, as a historical personality, as their own?

[Pozsgay] This is something that generally happens to historical personalities. This is true because his life and his life's work carry values from which everyone would like to benefit. I would only regard this as a problem if this would once again be a cause for opposition and a continuation of the trials, if it were to give rise to rancor, or if it were to increase the dangers besetting the country. However, I believe that with the exception of the extremists—people who are also confused in their attitudes to themselves—the majority's will, the fundamental will, is something different.

[Mester] The life's work of Imre Nagy and of those who shared his fate has a validity which is felt to this day. It is this which justifies the question: **What do the lessons of 1956 mean in 1989?**

[Pozsgay] First of all, that as early as 1956 all those important issues which occupy Hungarian society and public opinion today had been formulated. This includes all the criticism of the Stalinist type of dictatorial socialism, the demand for political institutions based on the new type of conscious and self-directed citizen, concerning civil society, the multiparty system, the political manifestation of pluralism. The lesson is that had it been possible to realize all this in 1956 and in the years before that, within the framework of an honorable political struggle, peacefully, then the popular uprising would have been avoidable.

If this is the lesson, then I believe that in organizing in 1989 for the solution of the very same basic issues it is possible to reach a peaceful transition. I believe that it is possible to create human cooperation and solidarity among Hungarians; that there will not be self-destructive, tragic, catastrophic events; and that, avoiding these, Hungary will solve its problems.

[Mester] Yes, but the mere fact that you have brought this up shows that there are certain analogies. According to many people, your public activities, your commitment to reform, strongly recall Imre Nagy's political approach.

So the possibility cannot be excluded that just like Imre Nagy, you too, even if in a different form, might become the victim of your own party.

[Pozsgay] This is not impossible either. A politician must think such things through as well, particularly if I accept what you have just said, namely that I regard what Imre Nagy did as one of the precursors of my own activities, even if this was not necessarily the motive force of my actions at every turning point. If I immerse myself in the study of this period, if I acquaint myself with Imre Nagy's initiatives, then I have to say that I can still identify with his goals. However, I hope that the fate will be different, because though it is beyond question that the majority in society agrees with me—I have been able to verify this in many ways—I have also found that if I can come into direct contact with the party membership, I can also persuade them of the truth of my ideas.

Nonetheless, there are also murderous passions in this country, the passions of a minority who have had the ground taken from under their feet but whose interests and groundlessness are tied to the institutional form which has long lost its validity—which we often call dictatorial socialism—with which the people never identified itself. Thus, even today these people tend to think in terms of force rather than in terms of politics. I know of such people. Nonetheless, I believe and my experience shows that they are in the minority, that they like to be with each other; and this is why they do not leave where they should have left a long time ago.

I know that it is like shouting in the wilderness to call upon these people to do this; nonetheless, I hope that they show some sense of reality and that they are isolated, for in reality they have never lived with the people, though they have never stopped speaking of the people. They have always spoken about the working class, they always cherish a working class mythology in themselves merely to claim some sort of intellectual foothold, while during the past 40 years the worker has never experienced that which they proclaimed. The worker never felt that he was in power, never felt that he had the possibility of self-determination. Rather, he always felt that they were misusing his name, the term "worker."

Well, this is why it is my view that it is not the use of the word "worker" which shows a feeling of solidarity with the workers but rather when someone also tries to act and tries to create a system where they can feel happy, where they receive scope for action and security of existence.

[Mester] So the exit from power of these people is only one of the preconditions for national reconciliation. I think that there are a host of preconditions for national reconciliation.

[Pozsgay] Yes, there are even bigger barriers in the way of national reconciliation than the stirring of such imbedded insects. The biggest barrier is the situation of the people, which is far from rosy. The situation of the people is extremely difficult; impoverishment is advancing at a rapid rate; the circumstances of life are deteriorating; people cannot protect even that which has been achieved, even with overtime and excess efforts. This is where I see the really great danger: That they will not understand that it is those who caused the great problems who are now referring to them in the name of curing the problems, that they will not notice that this decline of the country was caused by the functioning of the system of those who as the proud one-time possessors of posts think that they can once again become the saviors of the people. These savior of the people must be revealed to the people; it must be shown where they have come from and what they did during the past decades.

[Mester] In Hungarian public life the intention to improve things comes from various directions. The event on Wednesday where you were also present, as the number one person of a new movement, a movement which calls itself the Movement for a Democratic Hungary, was also perhaps one manifestation of this. I have already heard a number of contradictory views. One of them asserts that there is some sort of elitism involved here, another that it is a faction of whining intellectuals, while a third says that this movement is the beginning of the organization of a party split.

[Pozsgay] Let me start with the last of these points. I do now know the bogymen they call a party split. In a European political culture this is one of the most natural things and not something in the sphere of traumatology. But this was not what was involved here and now. Rather, it stemmed from the intention that among the political movements moving in different directions, having various intentions but possessing the will to improve matters, there should be one which can play a mediating role between the healthy, well-meaning large majority inside the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party and the various other parties, movements, and institutions, mobilizing people to create through peaceful means the reform, the new model to replace dictatorial socialism, a democratic Hungary. Somebody always has to formulate these mature necessities. But just this does not make it an elitist movement. On the contrary, its role is to create a link with the silent majority, which is endangered from many directions. I also have in mind that which I just spoke about, namely that without a genuine political orientation, the silent majority might come under the influence of the extremists and social demagogues, might become victims of misleading actions, whereas an open dialogue can turn society into mature citizens. It is in the joint creation of this maturity that we want to engage and not in a pedagogical campaign. This movement would also like to undertake to clear away of this previous all-knowing, omnipotent view of the party, this condescending and paternalistic approach.

[Mester] At the May party conference you concluded your speech by saying that there will be a Hungarian resurgence. Do you think that you now have more allies for this goal than you had in those days, in May?

[Pozsgay] I think so and my experience shows that. I am skeptical, very self-critical regarding my own abilities and possibilities. But I am optimistic regarding the situation. Hungary has never had such a good chance of bringing about a new statehood through self-determination, as a sovereign country; and through this new statehood, a new popular spirit and society.

Politburo Member Nyers Interviewed on Nagy Issue
LD1006231989 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 1400 GMT 10 Jun 89

[From the "168 Hours" program; Eszter Raday interview with Reszo Nyers, Hungarian Socialist Worker's Party Politburo member and minister of state; date, place not given—recorded]

[Text] [Raday] To the simple reader, it is striking how there is lacking a logic in the events. There is no logic that in November of 1956, Janos Kadar made a promise of inculpability. In 1957, he promised that the number of political prisoners would be reduced, and this was realized in part. And the real reprisals came in 1958.

[Nyers] At the beginning of 1957, Imre Nagy was offered participation in the government. Thus, talks of reconciliation were initiated. Imre Nagy was not willing to do this, owing to the armed character of the events, that Janos Kadar's men came into the capital with the assistance of Soviet troops, and then he disputed the legitimacy of the government of the time. That is why he was not willing.

[Raday] We already know, or perhaps we, or they, knew at the time that there was reason for dispute, for disputing the legitimacy.

[Nyers] Well, very few people knew that. Rather, the historical documents reveal that this is how it was. However, the statement of Janos Kadar at the time was also published in the newspapers; in this he indicated the possibility that Imre Nagy could enter the government. Thus, these political accusations were not voiced in this manner. Later, it was 1958 already, when these political accusations were voiced; of course in 1957 already, at the party conference, Jozsef Revai represented vigorously the political accusation that Imre Nagy had distorted policy in the direction of revisionism, and at the time this was a very grave accusation. Then, in 1958 it gained strength, in connection with their—the Imre Nagy Government—having espoused leaving the Warsaw Pact.

[Raday] You say that it gained strength, but this process obviously did not take place on its own. Weren't there people behind it?

[Nyers] Behind it were people, disputes, within and outside the country as well. It has not been fully researched, yet, but we know that Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, Hungary, Romania, and China were the five countries which dealt most intensively with the Hungarian question from the end of October 1956 throughout, and who had a role in the Hungarian political events being viewed as an international issue, as well. However, the complete researching of this is still in progress.

[Raday] By the way, there is a series of entirely illogical things, here, which by all means raises the question of: If it was not the decision of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party [MSZMP], of the party, which played a role in the sentencing of Imre Nagy's men, as Karoly Grosz, for example, said not long ago, then what played a role in it? Is it possible that it was not the decision of the MSZMP which played a role in it?

[Nyers] Please, politically, the MSZMP leadership by all means had to play a role in making the role of Imre Nagy the subject of an accusation. Regarding what kind of decision was reached, I do not dare say that the MSZMP influenced this. I am not acquainted with the development of the trial. It is only now that I heard, from a tape-recording, the trial's very short closing ritual. I did not know anything about it.

[Raday] Are you serious, that, as a Central Committee member, you knew nothing?

[Nyers] Nothing. The Central Committee was not informed of anything. Nor the other Central Committee members. We knew nothing.

So, regarding the MSZMP, of course it can not be said that it was outside the MSZMP, but the party-state here did not mean that judicial action and party action were organically interconnected. No. Janos Kadar carefully watched over this, so we did not know anything.

[Raday] But if not directly, for all that it could have been indirectly connected.

[Nyers] It could have been indirectly connected.

The historians who now are (?dissecting) the matter, in its preresearched condition, would be better at saying this. Isn't it so, you are asking that there must be something and someone who staged it. I as well say that there must be someone who staged it. It either was X, in Hungary, or abroad. Hungarians or foreigners in Hungary, or both. Nor do we know the distribution of roles.

[Raday] I am certain that Janos Kadar is perhaps one of the last who could say something about this.

[Nyers] Janos Kadar is the one who could say the most about this. Please: the following people had a role in it: before Janos Kadar—Khrushchev, Tito, and only after them Kadar, then Zhou Enlai and Gheorghiu-Dej. I

regard these as the five people—of course other members of the Soviet leadership were also involved—but these symbolize the international factor, concerning who had a role. They agreed that the Imre Nagy government could not hold its own on 2 November 1956. There are many statistics on this; memoires on this subject have also been published. It could not hold its own, so a very strong, counterrevolutionary, right-wing, and anti-democratic danger was appearing which was sweeping away this government, with everything it had, and this was dangerous for the socialist countries, it was dangerous for European peace and for Hungary, as well. That was the original decision.

Then, in the reprisals, this unity certainly broke down, but it is a complete mystery to me, and to my knowledge it is so to others, as well, how these international factors played a role in the decision in 1958. What we know is that Tito had withdrawn at this point.

[Raday] If it is a mystery; while disconnecting the Hungary party, can a Hungarian court be given a decision requisition, or instruction?

[Nyers] In principle a Hungarian court can not be given an instruction, it cannot be given one officially. In my opinion, it was not even given one which was officially written down. That is dead certain. There were, and are, informal relations. I cannot say what informal relations might have played a role here.

[Raday] You said earlier that as a Central Committee member and as a government commissioner with ministerial rank, you did not know....

[Nyers, interrupting] I resigned my position as government commissioner in March of 1957. Only until then was I in that position.

[Raday] Did you resign because you did not agree with something, or because you had completed your task?

[Nyers] I had completed my task, and there was a conflict, as well....

[Raday, interrupting] Was it a political conflict?

[Nyers] It was not directly political; rather, it in part concerned economic policy and in part it was also political.

[Raday] Surely you have found out that some members of the Committee for Historical Justice have lodged objections to your presence at the funeral, not because of your person, but because you were a member of this revolutionary workers'-peasant government which can be held responsible for the reprisals.

[Nyers] I do not have accurate information, but I was not a member of the revolutionary workers'-peasant government; only from 1960....

[Raday, interrupting] But your having been a government commissioner, doesn't that mean....

[Nyers] Yes, that did not entail membership in the government. To my knowledge, it was not raised in this manner, but that I was a member of the party Central Committee—and I really was. Please, I say that the Committee for Historical Justice, which is staging the funeral, has the right to adopt all kinds of positions, since it is their business. I cannot take a stand in this.

What is a question which generally arises in current Hungarian politics—and it is not that—is the question of who is the credible figure? I believe that there is very great confusion in this. And I oppose every stand in which valuable party or national politicians are proclaimed to lack credibility, because of earlier political actions or earlier political stands. The Rakosiite political leadership committed this mistake, in Hungary, in a very heavy, criminal manner. To commit this mistake in the spirit of democracy is as anti-democratic as that of Rakosi's men. In vain does one wave the flag of democracy.

It is necessary to free ourselves from this uncultured and antidemocratic tradition—and Hungary has had a long-standing tradition of this.

Grosz, Party Members View 'Looming' Split
*LD1006202689 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 1200 GMT 10 Jun 89*

[Text] Let all the party houses display black and national flags on the day of the burial of Imre Nagy and his companions. This was proposed at the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party [MSZMP] Győr-Sopron county party conference. At the meeting, also attended by party general secretary Karoly Grosz, the delegates first approved draft standpoints on democratization in Hungary, on the talks to be begun with the opposition roundtable, and on **the condemnation of the bloody events in China.**

The standpoint in connection with the opposition roundtable highlights that, in the interests of the success of the talks, the MSZMP Central Committee should be more patient and responsible than before so that an agreement can be reached within a foreseeable time.

Laszlo Lakatos, first secretary of the MSZMP Győr-Sopron county committee, said that a party split is looming; public opinion is blaming the party and the party members are blaming the Central Committee and its leaders for this.

Those participating in the debate referred to the contradictory statements made by members of the Politburo, which unequivocally indicate that there is no unity in the leadership. The participants in the conference called on the Central Committee to take steps in the interests of solidarity and warding off a catastrophe. At the party conference,

they supported the convening of a congress. The delegates urged that at the congress an elected Central Committee be the center of the political reform of the MSZMP.

Grosz Interviewed 9 Jun on New Social Groupings
*LD0906195389 Budapest Television Service
in Hungarian 1730 GMT 9 Jun 89*

[Text] Experts of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party [MSZMP] and the opposition roundtable have agreed to commence substantive political negotiations. The document on commencing talks will be signed tomorrow. Three parties of equal standing will take part in these: the opposition roundtable, the MSZMP, as well as a joint delegation of the following organizations: the left-wing Alternative Association, the Patriotic People's Front, Hungarian Democratic Youth League, the Association of Hungarian Resistance-Fighters and Anti-Fascists, the National Council of Hungarian Women, the Ferenc Muennich Society and the National Trade Union Council. György Sebes asked the MSZMP general secretary about this:

[Begin recording] [Sebes] Without a doubt, the news of the day is that the supreme prosecutor has submitted a protest on legal grounds in the case of Imre Nagy and his associates. Since yesterday, we have known that a member of the Politburo—the prime minister—and a member of the Central Committee, speaker of the National Assembly, will, at the head of the delegation, place a wreath at the funeral of Imre Nagy next Friday [16 June]. How do you view these developments?

[Grosz] I consider this to be a natural and very important episode in the [word indistinct] reconciliation process, since Imre Nagy was president of the Hungarian National Assembly. Imre Nagy was also prime minister. Thus, it is natural that state leaders should pay tribute at the funeral. The paying of respects is an obligatory gesture on the part of all of us. We do it sincerely, from the depths of our hearts, and as we have become acquainted with the facts, we have had to recognize that all which we had believed for a long time was not proved and supported by objective facts. What has happened cannot be rendered into not having happened—but it is a moral and political (?duty) to give final respects.

[Sebes] The domestic political developments of the past days reflect the creation of new forums one after the other. On Wednesday, the Movement for a Democratic Hungary was founded. Tomorrow, the New March Front is preparing to turn into a free forum.

[Grosz] I did not know earlier that an endeavor like the Movement for a Democratic Hungary was being prepared, although it generally is an established practice in our country that if our party's political leaders take part in organizing such a grouping, the bodies are informed in advance. I, properly speaking, learned from the newspaper that this movement had been founded, and I do not know much about its objectives. From its appeal, I dare

Rainer Stefan, representative of the Austrian People's Party, and Janusz Rozek, representative of the Polish Peasant Solidarity, were foreign guests of the rally of the People's Party.

Pozsgay on 'Movement for Democratic Hungary'
*LD0806091389 Budapest Television Service
in Hungarian 1730 GMT 7 Jun 89*

[Text] [Announcer] The various forces of the order party dictatorship [as heard] and revenge are dangerously present and can become stronger. Among other things, this is what the draft appeal which was formulated today by the organizers of the Movement for a Democratic Hungary contains. This movement wishes to gather those people who undertake the national ascent, European progression, and the values of democratic socialism together. Laszlo Juszt reports from the founding session.

[Begin recording] [Juszt] What could this organization be called, to the founding of which you have just arrived?

[Pozsgay] I do not even know whether it is an organization or perhaps a movement, but the initiators have already given a name to it: Movement for a Democratic Hungary.

[Juszt] Who were the initiators? According to the news, you were the initiator.

[Pozsgay] I was also asked to take part in this movement but this was talked about first in Szeged, at the meeting of the reform circles.

[Juszt] Several people believe that this could be the core of a future party, too.

[Pozsgay] I do not necessarily believe that one always should think in the category of a party when gathering of political strength is carried out. Here, now, the force of reform are gathering regardless their party membership or ideological belonging.

[Juszt] So, do you reject the assumption that this is the basis of a future party?

[Pozsgay] I do not consider it impossible, but I do not think that this intention would have brought the participants of today's meeting together.

[Juszt] I read in MAI NAP [TODAY] that his new organization is to be founded for the democratic transformation.

[Szuros] That is right.

[Juszt] But there one such organization has already been founded, the New March Front. Do you not participate in that?

[Szuros] I take part in that as well, and also in this one.

[Juszt] So what is the difference?

[Szuros] Well, the situation is that I, as chairman of the National Assembly, have to exhibit unbiased behavior. I look and listen to this as well, I consider its objectives practical and correct. However, on Saturday, I will participate in the founding session of the New March Front, on Sunday, I am going to participate in the founding of the people's party, etc.

[Juszt] So, practically, you pay attention to everything.

[Szuros] The chairman of the National Assembly has to pay attention to everything.

[Juszt] Do you take part in any of these organizations as a member?

[Szuros] No, not as a member.

[Juszt] The appeal says that it is the founding of the Movement for a Democratic Hungary. Both you and Imre Pozsgay occupy a position in the government power in which, it is not only your possibility but, I think, it is also your duty to fight for democracy and for the constitutional statehood. In that position—that is, as minister of interior or as minister of state, do you not have the possibility?

[Szuros] Today, I think that the possibilities are increasingly better for this and the gates are opening forever wider. There was doubtless an earlier period, I was in similar position then too, when in a different structure, these possibilities were much more closed. [end recording]

Participant Views Discussions

*LD0806095689 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 1630 GMT 7 Jun*

[Text] Today those wanting a democratic Hungary convened in Budapest for a session to prepare its foundation. Imre Pozsgay gave the introductory speech and among other things he emphasized that the movement intends to pull together people who accept simultaneously the values of the rise of the nation, European progress and democratic socialism regardless of the participants' party affiliation or organizational membership. The discussion was chaired by university lecturer Ferenc Gazso. Andras Kerekes interviewed him.

[Begin recording] [Kerekes] What is the aim of such a movement?

[Gazso] The movement's objective is to open a road for people committed to social transformation and democratic change in society and to change in the social model of politics and participation in politics regardless of party affiliation. In other words, it is not a movement which is intent on becoming a party but it wants to ensure a platform and means for those groups and individuals belonging to any party or even independent

Demonstration Under Way

LD0806064289 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 1630 GMT 7 Jun 89

[Text] [Announcer] A demonstration is under way in Budapest. It was organized by the Federation of Young Democrats and started at 1700. Our reporter, Zsuzsa Kun, reports from in front of the Chinese Embassy building.

[Kun] An opening speech, a poem, the lighting of candles, and finally a petition to be submitted to the Chinese ambassador. This is the agenda of the demonstration. I have the text of the petition in my hand. Allow me to quote a few sentences from it:

We, the members of the Federation of Young Democrats, who have been following the peaceful but determined fight of the Chinese students for human rights with anxious confidence, we, who ourselves fight for constitutional democracy in a crumbling communist dictatorship, are profoundly shaken by the news that the conservative, militarist wing of your leadership, which has grabbed power for itself, pushing aside leaders who think more sensibly, and in the interest of their own narrow-minded purposes and guided by sheer fear for their position, has ordered the shooting of a peaceful, unarmed crowd.

The opening speech has just finished and it was received with enthusiastic applause. Several hundred, perhaps several thousands of people are present. But I will continue reading the text of the petition: The act committed by your faceless leadership is a crime. It is impossible to move in front of the building. Naturally, the building is protected by a police cordon. It is forbidden even to step on to the sidewalk. I have managed to speak to one of the embassy secretaries but he did not give any opinion about either the Beijing events the Hungarian demonstrations. The organizers do not know yet how the demonstration is going to proceed or when is it going to finish. I hope it will end just as peacefully as it started and as it is going on at the moment.

[Announcer] The Hungarian Government has expressed its deep worry in a communique regarding the events in China, emphasizing, however, that it has no intention of interfering in that country's internal affairs.

At the same time, the government confirms its position that respect for general and fundamental human rights is a mutual affair and the international responsibility of all of us. Therefore, it cannot be an exclusive internal affair of any country.

Our shock regarding the tragic events is only increased by the fact that they are happening in a friendly socialist country which has pledged itself to the modernization of society, to democratic development and reforms.

The Hungarian Government sincerely hopes that the Chinese crisis will finally be solved and that the continuing political reform will create the possibility for the further advancement of the country.

Pozsgay Anticipates Implementation of Change

AU0706121489 Hamburg DIE WELT
in German 7 Jun 89 p 10

[Carl G. Stroehm report: "Pozsgay: There Will Be a Change in Hungary in Any Event"]

[Excerpt] Budapest—The bloody events in Beijing have increased the concerns of the reformers among the Hungarian Communists and of the opposition groups that something similar might also happen in Hungary. Answering a question asked by the Budapest magazine KEPES of whether there is an impending danger from those forces "who are even ready to defend their privileges and the past with weapons in their hands," Politburo member and State Minister Imre Pozsgay stated: "This is conceivable."

"Hungary wants the change," Pozsgay continued. This change will either be brought about by peaceful means—that is, by a real national consensus—or without it. However, the country will also implement the change if the latter happens. But then it will come to "tragedies," Pozsgay stated. [passage omitted]

Grosz Meets With Israeli Bank Leumi Chairman

TA0706125089 Jerusalem Domestic Service
in Hebrew 1200 GMT 7 Jun 89

[Text] Moshe Zanbar, the chairman of Bank Leumi's Board of Directors, met with Karoly Grosz, the general secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party in Budapest.

The meeting was also attended by Ze'ev Ben-Tzur, the secretary of the Public Committee for the Preservation of the Heritage of Hungarian Jewry.

No information was given regarding the issues discussed during the meeting.

Military Industry Budget Cuts Cause Problems

AU0706131089 Budapest NEPSZAVA
in Hungarian 2 Jun 89 p 5

[Report by Correspondent Robert Gal: "Will There Be Further Manpower Cuts in the Military Industry? — Some 8,000 to 10,000 Jobs To Be Eliminated in the Country—State Orders Could Drop by Half—Large Stocks of Products Accumulated in Warehouses"]

[Text] Defense expenditures are to be further cut according to the package plan submitted by the government on 1 June. The National Assembly made a similar cut in December 1988. A total of 8,000 to 10,000 jobs will become redundant in some 20 to 25 enterprises in the Hungarian economy.

1ST STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.

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June 3, 1989, Saturday

SECTION: WEEKEND FT; Pg. X

LENGTH: 577 words

HEADLINE: Books;
Sweet And Sour

BYLINE: David Pryce-Jones

BODY:

Budapest 1900 by John Lukacs. Weidenfeld & Nicolson 16.95 Pounds (pds), 255 pages.

Hungarians today are likely to surrender to unrestrained nostalgia when recalling the Habsburg ancien regime. Those were the days! When will such independence and prosperity return? The important part played by Hungarian nationalism in destroying the old empire has been conveniently forgotten.

John Lukacs is a Hungarian who emigrated to the US after the last war. An outstanding historian, he knows Hungarian defects well and makes no defence of nationalistic attitudes towards German or other minorities, such as Croats and Jews. Magyars perhaps think (or thought) of other minorities as being that little bit less than their equal. Budapest in 1900 was nonetheless, a wonderful city in which to be alive and Lukacs does it justice, evoking a splendid and creative place and time.

Successful political arrangements with Vienna allowed the city to quadruple in size during the last quarter of the 19th century. A royal palace and a parliament, new bridges, the opera, a stock exchange and the handsome Andrassy Avenue (now once more recovering its name, having been Stalin Avenue in its day) gave a cosmopolitan grandeur which suited the spectacular natural setting on the Danube. Odon Lechner was an architect as formative in his designs for Budapest as Otto Wagner was in Vienna. Among the novelties were electric locomotives and subways.

The aristocracy dominated the city. It contained great men like Istvan Szechenyi, Deak and Baron Eotvos, as well as those who did little more than inherit estates. Nor should one omit to mention Count Karolyi, who so incompetently brought the whole structure down after the first war. Hungary also had its gentry, borrowing the term from England, and it included Endre Ady and Gyula Krudy, whom Lukacs values very highly as writers. Standards of education were astonishingly high, with Latin still a living language to those with claims to culture to make international reputations is also exceptional. Here are portraits of the painter, Munkacsy, composers Bartok and Kodaly and Ferenc Molnar, the playwright, amid a coffee-house throng of others.

The Jewish contribution to this intellectual and social ferment is crucial but has been somewhat underplayed. In every sphere Jews were assimilating fast, abandoning German or other languages in favour of the native Magyar. Liberalism in the 19th century allowed them this entry everywhere, and the energies

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released so suddenly in part caused the anti-Semitic backlash that ensued.

Round about 1900, Lukacs thinks, society began to polarise into Left and Right, in parliament and in intellectual outlook, as well as on the streets, in strikes, and between Jews and Magyars. By then, Budapest had become so dominant that its troubles would be those of the entire country, and provincial centres and other outside influences would be powerless. More ominous for the future, Germany and its spirit of nationalism came to be perceived as a model to be admired.

In addition to the experience of Nazism, Budapest has known two Communist takeovers; by Bela Kun in 1919 and the Soviets in 1948. The Hungarian heritage has become sadly skeletal in form but, if Lukacs is right, there is an enduring national spirit upon which to base independence. This book offers the insight that Hungarian nostalgia is a good deal more political in intention than it might seem.

2ND STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.

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January 27, 1989

SECTION: Vol. 41; No. 1; Pg. 60

LENGTH: 805 words

HEADLINE: Budapest 1900: A Historical Portrait of a City and Its Culture; Book reviews

BYLINE: Gottfried, Paul inch(s)

BODY:

Budapest 1900: A Historical Portrait of a City and Its Culture, by John Lukacs (Weidenfeld &

Nicolson, 255 pp., \$ 20.95)

IN A PUBLISHER'S advertisement for John Lukacs's newest book, we are told: "Not unlike Carl Schorske's *Finde-Siecle Vienna*, Budapest 1900 offers an intimate history of one of the great European capitals at its zenith." Now, it is true that Lukacs, like Schorske, deals with one of the political capitals of the Dual Monarchy: a constitutional creation set up in 1867, which provided for the internal autonomy of the Hungarian nation within the Austrian empire. Moreover, Lukacs, like Schorske, portrays the Central European bourgeoisie at the beginning of the century as beset by problems, amid a flowering of urban culture.

Even so, these two historians have produced dramatically different books. Schorske writes in a ponderous style, applying psycho-Marxist categories to a bourgeois society he plainly detests. Lukacs, by contrast, writes with verve and affection about his forefathers' world. Indeed, he draws on family memory when he recounts how his grandparents only rarely changed apartments in Budapest or how his grandparents and later his parents as newlyweds took rail trips to Venice from the elegant South Station in Buda. Lukacs scatters evidence (often in footnotes) of his own connections among the gentry, and he is effusively knowledgeable about the way Hungarians tended vineyards, rode horses, and flirted with women. Scenes of wine being made in the hills above Budapest and of pastry-eating and partygoing in the Inner City recall a compliment paid to the French historian Fernand Braudel: "One can taste the olives growing on the vines in his Mediterranean cities." Like Braudel in his reconstruction of medieval Mediterranean society, Lukacs is unstintingly generous with the details of urban life. From the composition of outhouses to the frequency of abortions to the popular reaction to civic monuments, he tells his reader all that he can possibly cram into a 255-page "historical portrait."

Though Lukacs cultivates what seems an impressionistic style, he is a serious historian, shaking his fist at today's pseudo-scientific historiography. We receive the same message from the opening scene—the funeral procession of the Hungarian muralist Mihaly Munkacsy on May 1, 1900—to the close of the book. For Lukacs, what is historically significant is what leaves its imprint on the minds of nations and of generations. History, he says in *Historical Consciousness*, is not a science but a means of remembering the past, which takes different forms

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at different times. The funerals of Munkacsy and (in 1894) of the patriot Lajos Kossuth were watersheds in the way Hungarians viewed, and still view, their past. They represented generational change taking place at the high noon of Hungary's political greatness. In describing the districts of Pest (the more populous of the twin cities forming the Hungarian capital), Lukacs pays more attention to where Franz Josef took his oath as Hungarian king than to the appearance of the workers' quarters. He quite deliberately stresses the development of peoples, not of changing forces of production. Workers, like others, belong to nations and share their memories and values.

The text that shaped this work is an impressive cultural study, *Three Generations*, by the Hungarian social historian Gyula Szekfu. Surveying Hungarian affairs in 1919, after a disastrous defeat in the First World War and a subsequent civil war, Szekfu ascribed his country's downfall to the deteriorating character of three successive generations of Hungarian leaders. It was the genius of the Hungarian Protestant statesman Ferenc Desk that had brought Hungary to the triumph of the Dual Monarchy, within two decades of the suppressed revolution of 1848. The lack of statesmanship among the largely Calvinist leadership of the dominant Liberal Party at the end of the century and Hungary's excessively rapid urbanization contributed to the unraveling of Desk's work.

Though Lukacs does not accept all the twists in Szekfu's interpretation, he praises him more than any other Hungarian social thinker. He gives us Szekfu's portrait of Istvan Tisza, the early-twentieth-century Hungarian prime minister, and, like Szekfu, he depicts Tisza as a morally rigid advocate of a sort of rural nationalism thrust into a position for which he was temperamentally unsuited. On balance, however, Lukacs is more appreciative than critical of those his mentor had chastised. It is not Szekfu's fire and brimstone but his stress on generational and national character that has marked Lukacs decisively. *Three Generations* helped make him what he remains in this book: our most profoundly philosophical contemporary historian.

TYPE: Review

SUBJECT: Books, reviews, etc.

LOAD-DATE-MDC: May 9, 1989

3RD STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.

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January 22, 1989, Sunday, Late City Final Edition

SECTION: Section 7; Page 13, Column 1; Book Review Desk

LENGTH: 1407 words

HEADLINE: BOOM TOWN ON THE DANUBE

BYLINE: By IVAN SANDERS; Ivan Sanders is preparing an English translation of 'Book of Memoirs,' a new work by the Hungarian novelist Peter Nadas.

BODY:

BUDAPEST 1900

A Historical Portrait of a City and Its Culture.

By John Lukacs.

Illustrated. 255 pp. New York:

Weidenfeld & Nicolson.

\$20.95.

It is one of the ironies of post-modern Europe that as its most prosperous capitals betray more and more signs of physical and spiritual uniformity, urbanists as well as tourists have begun to look toward the smaller, far less streamlined, faded and neglected cities of the Continent for a unique sense of history and continuity, for qualities still perceived as essentially European. Some of these cities lie hundreds of miles east of the more renowned urban centers, yet what they offer the curiosity seekers beyond quaint, old-world manners is a cultural and social legacy that has remained intact in spite of - and often because of - economic backwardness and political regimentation.

Of course such attractions are always suspect. Could it simply be our insatiable nostalgia for the belle epoque that draws us now even to the lesser cities of Europe? Are we down to glorifying the backwaters? Actually, by the turn of the century the center of gravity of European culture had shifted eastward. The critic George Steiner and the historian Carl Schorske have written illuminatingly in recent years about the seminal importance of fin de siecle Vienna. Now, in 'Budapest 1900,' the Hungarian-born urban historian and essayist John Lukacs has given us an admirably vivid portrait of the other capital of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

The junior partner in the Dual Monarchy, Hungary was in constant competition with Austria, but its young capital (the previously separate cities of Buda and Pest were unified in 1872), meant to be a superior copy of Vienna, turned out to be a very different kind of city, at once more provincial and more restlessly modern. And whereas Viennese culture in 1900 was already in its resplendent decline, Budapest in that year was enjoying its 'noon hour,' as Mr. Lukacs puts it. Caught up in a fever of growth and expansion, energized by its ethnic mix and a penchant for bigness, the new capital on the Danube was in fact more like an American boom town than anything staidly European.

The statistics cited by Mr. Lukacs are staggering indeed. Between 1867 (the year of Hungary's historic compromise with Austria, which virtually gave the Hungarians home rule) and 1914 the city's population trebled; the number of

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banks grew from 11 to 160; the volume of freight moved by Hungarian trains increased from 3 million tons a year to 275 million. In 1900 22 daily newspapers were published in Budapest, and this nascent center of culture was also, until overtaken by Minneapolis, the largest city of flour mills in the world. Overseeing the phenomenal growth was a progressive and farsighted municipal government that helped Budapest become, within just a few decades, a model European metropolis. Hungarians today like to point out that whatever is still impressive about their capital, whatever still works, dates from this period.

In a pivotal chapter, 'The Generation of 1900,' Mr. Lukacs discusses the luminaries of Budapest, concentrating not so much on writers, musicians and Nobel Prize-winning scientists who achieved fame after they left their native city, but on those who stayed and whose accomplishments, often because they were language-bound, didn't travel well either. What could have turned easily into just another roster of Budapest-born international greats thus becomes a searching look at the genius of a city. For instance, the author's own sensitive translations of passages from the works of Gyula Krudy, a master of Hungarian prose, suggest much about the earthiness and delicacy of a literary culture that is still little appreciated in the West.

Yet there is no denying that the sophistication of this city was essentially European and cosmopolitan, and for this very reason its detractors from the beginning labeled the capital an alien phenomenon, a rootless, frivolous, wicked place. To many a Hungarian nationalist Budapest was 'Judapest' - the achievements of world-famous Jewish Hungarians to them were not Hungarian achievements at all. It so happens that a high percentage of notable Budapesters discussed or mentioned in the book were Jewish-born, and though Mr. Lukacs doesn't make much of this, implicit in his story of Budapest in 1900 is the remarkably successful assimilation, or at least acculturation, of the Jews of Hungary. Statistics are once again telling: during the last third of the 19th century, 120 prominent Hungarian Jewish families were granted patents of nobility by the Emperor Franz Josef, and although Jews constituted not quite 5 percent of Hungary's population, in 1910 nearly half the country's doctors, lawyers and journalists were Jewish.

Perhaps nowhere else in Europe had Jews risen so high so fast; nowhere did they embrace the dominant culture so wholeheartedly. But after 1900, the author argues, the liberal alliance among the Hungarian aristocracy, the provincial gentry and the up-and-coming middle classes began to break down, and a new kind of intolerant nationalism, a far more virulent anti-Semitism, took hold. Jews were now seen as an aggressive, 'hard' minority imposing their values on a 'soft' majority. Mr. Lukacs's sober response to this often-voiced charge is worth quoting: 'What was - and still is - wrong with this view is the attribution of conspiracy behind it. . . . Many people of the 'soft' majority, surely in Budapest, had adopted some of the values and standards, and some of the language and tone, of that minority without that minority having foisted those upon them.'

John Lukacs is in many ways an old-fashioned chronicler, an 'impressionistic historian' as he himself says at one point, evoking with considerable artistry the vibrant colors, pungent smells and melancholy undercurrents of his native city. But he is also rather selective, revealing deeply conservative instincts. Not only does he have very little to say about urban poverty in turn-of-the-century Budapest; he is unrelentingly hostile to the radical social movements that sprang up in that city, and is especially dismissive of the

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Marxist philosopher Georg Lukacs ('no relation of mine,' he remarks dryly in a footnote). All the same, 'Budapest 1900' is a special book - an eloquent tribute to a city by an urbane man of letters.

EQUAL TIME FOR VIENNA'S NEIGHBOR

The obvious question for John Lukacs, born in Hungary in 1928 and writing about it for the first time in a 13-book career, is: Were you nostalgic, trying to recapture a lost past? No, he said, in a telephone conversation from his home outside Philadelphia. It was not nostalgia that moved him to write 'Budapest 1900,' but an interest, perhaps tinged by national pride, in creating a certain balance, giving Budapest back its importance to the history of the West.

'For some time,' he said, 'I thought there was an exaggerated and even neurotic interest devoted to Vienna at the turn of the century and, way in the back of my mind, I thought that somebody should do something about Budapest too, which also flourished at that time. It's true, many of the ideas current in Vienna fit the interests of the late 20th century, so Vienna is more important in that sense. And yet I felt that all this interest in Vienna was a bit of a mixed blessing.'

Mr. Lukacs, who has taught history at Chestnut Hill College in Philadelphia for 42 years, has written a portrait of that city from 1900 to 1950 and a 20th-century history of the United States. He previously avoided Eastern Europe, not wanting, he said, 'to be an Eastern European intellectual simply writing about his native country.' Now, particularly with the appearance in Hungary of new scholarship on the turn-of-the-century epoch, 'I thought the time had come to do a serious book on the subject.'

'My main interest - it sounds recondite but it really isn't - is the history of history,' he said. 'My most important but least known book is 'Historical Consciousness,' and all of my books are about historical consciousness. I start with a material description of the city and then a description of the people, then move on to politics, to intellectual life and, finally, to certain spiritual currents. This method is a reflection of a certain hierarchy that embodies my historical philosophy.'

RICHARD BERNSTEIN

GRAPHIC: Photo of Hungarian political figures, including Ferenc Kossuth, in ceremonial dress, about 1905

TYPE: Review

SUBJECT: BOOK REVIEWS

NAME: SANDERS, IVAN; LUKACS, JOHN (PROF)

TITLE: BUDAPEST 1900 (BOOK)

5TH STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.

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October 18, 1988, Tuesday, Home Edition

SECTION: Metro; Part 2; Page 7; Column 1; Op-Ed Desk

LENGTH: 835 words

HEADLINE: CORRUPT AND DIMINISHED, THE COMMUNIST PARTY HAS FINALLY MET ITS MATCH

BYLINE: By JOHN LUKACS, John Lukacs is a professor of history at Chestnut Hill College in Philadelphia. His latest book, Budapest 1900, will be published this winter by Weidenfeld & Nicolson.

BODY:

Mikhail S. Gorbachev's assumption of the presidency of the Soviet Union is a portent of many things whose meaning may not be clear for some time. But there is one matter whose meaning should be evident: It is the end of the supremacy of the Communist Party in the government of the Russian empire.

This requires explanation, of the kind that must issue from the perspective of history. All revolutions issue from a certain partisanship. But neither the American nor the French revolution and not even the March, 1917, revolution in Russia, were the makings of a particular political party. In November, 1917, it was Vladimir Lenin, as the leader of the Communist (Bolshevik) Party, who made his revolution. When he consolidated his power four years later, he made it clear that the party would rule the Soviet Union, including its administrative structure and its armed forces. The true leader of the Soviet Union would not be a titular president, or even the head of its government, but the general secretary of the Communist Party -- a hierarchy that continued for nearly 70 years. Until now.

Throughout the dim internal political history of the Soviet Union we may discern the presence of three enormous, shapeless forms incarnating power: the party, the government and the army. It was Lenin's idea -- and ideal -- that the government and the army should not merely be subordinated to the party; their leadership should be largely, and perhaps even wholly, congruous. To some extent -- but only to some extent -- this did come about.

For a long time, membership in the party was not only a matter of privilege; it was indispensable for the holding of important positions in the administration and the army. But gradually it appeared that a great country such as the Soviet Union needed all kinds of people in all kinds of fields whose participation in party affairs was less important than their expertise.

In many other ways, too, the interests and the security of the Soviet state became more important than the cause of communist ideology -- especially in foreign relations. Josef Stalin recognized this clearly. In 1941, even before the German invasion of the Soviet Union, this all-powerful general secretary of the Communist Party chose to make himself the head of the government, too; then, during the war, he assumed the headship of the army -- marshal and generalissimo.

(c) 1988 Los Angeles Times, October 18, 1988

After Stalin's death, during the regimes of Nikita S. Khrushchev and Leonid I. Brezhnev, the separation of the functions of party leader and government chairman was reinstated (except for a few transitory years). But this only masked a more important and massive evolution: that of the gradual rise of an administrative and a military hierarchy. Already 10 or 20 years ago, it began to appear that the relative supremacy of the party over that of the government and the army was diminishing -- even though, at the top of the state, the position of general secretary of the party remained the most important one.

In the meantime, what had become more and more obvious, especially in the Brezhnev years, was the corruption in the leading circles of the party. That corruption was, of course, the inevitable human consequence of power -- any power -- among monopolists. It was aggravated, and fatally, by another condition: by the fact that, 50 or 60 years after Lenin, the idea of communism ceased to have any attraction or even respect among the peoples and the leaders of the Soviet Union.

By 1982 when, for a short time, Yuri V. Andropov was the Soviet leader, the corruption and the inefficiency of the party had become matters of more-or-less open discussion -- not only among the inner circles of leadership but to many people among the vast masses of the Soviet Union. It is also of some interest to note that Andropov (whose protege was Gorbachev) had risen from the diplomatic service through headship of the secret police (which is a state, not a party, apparatus) to the leadership of the Soviet Union.

And now the constitutional changes initiated by Gorbachev truly mean the end of an era: the end of the unquestioned and unquestionable predominance of the party. This came about not only because of the internal rottenness of the party's former leadership, but also because of Gorbachev's recognition that the functioning of the Soviet Union must depend on the efficiency of a governmental structure and not on the apparatus of a party, the very composition and ideas of which have now proved to be corroded by the acid of human corruptibility and by history itself.

Similar, though not at all identical, developments have already occurred in other Eastern European states. But the historical development of Russia remains a unique matter -- and not only because of its power and size. In sum, the spectacle before us involves the rejection of both Stalin's and Lenin's ideas -- not to speak of the ideological heritage of Marx that was discarded, in everything but a few remnant phrases, long ago.

TYPE: Opinion

by aiding programs that have con-
sive feeding halls. It has, in other
n that is otherwise easy for a more
of hunger in Africa existed before
pport to aid the crisis, the problem
ese lines. But it did not gain visi-
es of the needy could be broadcast
ot only was it incorrect to predict
be sapped by surplus food distri-
n may have been a key ingredient
es have continued to enjoy.*

Dismounting The Tiger: Lessons from Four Liberalizations

Mark-
This an inciteful artful article
+ great for comparison purpose
(eg. Spain). See hi-lites.

CMM

JOHN ORME

The Carter administration's human rights policy had a number of successes to its credit of which the administration and the American public can be justly proud. But there was another side to the policy, which no evaluation can neglect. On two occasions the liberalization programs pressed on friendly authoritarian governments by the United States ran out of control, leading to the governments' overthrow and replacement by regimes hostile to the United States and even less solicitous about the human rights of their peoples.

The experience of the Carter years raises a crucial question for the proponents of a human rights policy: can a dictatorial regime loosen its grip over the population without losing control? I intend to explore that question here by examining four attempts by autocratic governments to liberalize, two of which succeeded and two of which did not. "Success" in this context can mean different things to different people. The leaders of these four regimes may have differed in their ultimate aims and their determination to stay in power, but none of them had any intention of stepping down in the near future. In each case liberalization was undertaken to stabilize authoritarian rule by making it less burdensome for the public, and was not originally intended to evolve into full democratization.¹ If democracy is the

¹ See Wayne Selcher, "Introduction," 4; Enrique Baloyra, "From Moment to Moment: The Political Transition in Brazil, 1977-1981," 17, 33, 36, 48, 50; Donald Share and Scott Mainwaring, "Transitions through Transaction: Democratization in Brazil and Spain," 201; all in Wayne Selcher, ed., *Political Liberalization in Brazil: Dynamics, Dilemmas, and Future Prospects* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986).

JOHN ORME is associate professor of political studies at Oglethorpe University of Atlanta, Georgia. He is author of a forthcoming book on United States foreign policy toward political instability in the Third World, from which this article is drawn.

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the final manuscript.

end result of the changes initiated by authoritarian leaders, as it was in one of the cases to be examined here, liberalization cannot exactly be called a success from the regime's standpoint, though such an outcome would be even better than a partial ameliorization of repression from the U.S. perspective. But what both the United States and the regime's rulers want to avoid above all else is a deterioration of the liberalization process into bloody revolution, leading to a victory of the most extreme elements of the opposition. Hence, I will define as a success here any serious liberalization that does not lead to violent upheaval of this sort, whether it leads all the way to democracy or not.²

The first case to consider is Francisco Franco's Spain. At the height of the repression after the civil war, some 270,000 opponents of the Nationalists were held in prison camps. The civil guard placed machine guns at important crossroads and pairs of armed guardsmen patrolled the highways, while the army remained garrisoned outside major cities. Spain, in the words of one historian, "resembled a conquered land."³ Beginning in 1945, Franco permitted a gradual amelioration of conditions over the next fifteen years. The civil guard's visibility throughout the countryside was reduced and amnesties were announced on nine occasions. A large number of exiles returned home, and by the 1960s the number of political prisoners had fallen to between 500 and 1,500.⁴ In all its formative period in the late 1930s, the regime had banned all political parties except the official *Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las JONS* as well as independent trade unions. The workers in theory received representation in the corporatist syndicates set up for each industry. In the 1950s and 1960s, Franco relaxed the strict controls over labor and allowed moderate opposition groups to carry on a few activities without hindrance, though strict limits on the freedom of public assembly remained in force.⁵ Finally, the minister of information eliminated prior censorship of printed materials in 1966. The Spanish media reacted cautiously at first; but by the 1970s opposition views were widely reported, and even Marxist literature was freely available in bookstores.⁶ In short, Franco succeeded in gradually easing his controls on Spanish life over a span of nearly thirty years without endangering his regime. In this sense

² This definition is thus neutral between the regime's definition of success and the United States's view. The definition I will use here differs from that of Robert Dahl, who concentrates on the first possibility—regime maintenance, not regime transformation—in the introduction he wrote to *Regimes and Oppositions* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1973), 16–17.

³ John Coverdale, *The Political Transformation of Spain after Franco* (New York: Praeger, 1979), 13; Richard Herr, *Spain* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971), 212–213.

⁴ Juan Linz, "Opposition to and under an Authoritarian Regime" in Dahl, ed., *Regimes and Oppositions*, 174.

⁵ Jose Amodia, *Franco's Political Legacy* (London: Penguin, 1977), 182; Coverdale, *Political Transformation of Spain*, 18.

⁶ Amodia, *Franco's Political Legacy*, 186; Linz, "Authoritarian Regime," 175, 211; Coverdale, *Political Transformation of Spain*, 9. Stanley Payne, *Franco's Spain* (New York: Crowell, 1967), 109–24, 44–45; Raymond Carr and Juan Pablo Fusi Aizpura, *Spain: Dictatorship to Democracy* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1979), 138–40, 167, 193.

the policy was successful, though for Franco's regime died with h

Liberalization was also attempted during the Stalinist period was perhaps to an abrupt end in 1953, when the Soviet Union came to power in Moscow that sought to cause in the Soviet Union and the Soviet leaders forced Matyas the Stalinist system that Rakosi had to upgrade living standards. The shift in the Kremlin and Rakosi prevented him from utilizing the momentum that built up in Hungary. Neither Rakosi nor his successor, Erő, intervened in the summer of that year. We would have to categorize as a

The third case is the shah of Iran. The shah proceeded on two tracks. The first was through the creation of a new party. Previously, effective participation had been limited. Though the Resurgence party managed to recruit some five to ten thousand members, the second track was a relaxation of controls on the press in 1977, which had the immediate effect of liberalizing the situation. The Shah was unable to control the situation, and it became more and more radicalized, developing into a full-fledged revolution.

Finally, there is Brazil, which can be categorized as a case of decompression. Geisel's first step was to allow the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB) to run for office in 1964. The MDB did surprisingly well in the 1964 election; and the MDB did surprisingly well in curbing violations of human rights. Geisel began to dismantle the legislative and Institutional Acts, in 1978. General Geisel died in January 1979 and continued the p

⁷ My sources on Hungary are Ferenc Vali, *The Revolution of 1956* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961); Paul Zinner, *Revolution in Hungary* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962); and Paul Kecskemeti, *The Unexpected Revolution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961). The shifts in Soviet policy in Hungary are discussed in Charles Gati, "Imre Nagy and Moscow, 1956–1957," *Journal of American Studies*, 1961.

⁸ John Stempel, *Inside the Iranian Revolution*

authoritarian leaders, as it was in one of them cannot exactly be called a success. An outcome would be even better than that in the U.S. perspective. But what both seem to avoid above all else is a deterioration, leading to a victory of the people. Hence, I will define as a success a policy that does not lead to violent upheaval of this sort, or not.²

Spain. At the height of the repression of the Nationalists were held in the hands of the army remained garrisons of one historian, "resembled a commitment to a gradual amelioration of the military guard's visibility throughout the country announced on nine occasions. A large number of political prisoners in the 1960s, its formative period in the late 1930s, except the official *Falange Español* independent trade unions. The workers' corporatist syndicates set up for each industry relaxed the strict controls over labor and industry on a few activities without hindrance, the assembly remained in force.⁵ Finally, the censorship of printed materials in the country at first; but by the 1970s opposition literature was freely available in bookshops, gradually easing his controls on Spanish and endangering his regime. In this sense

the definition of success and the United States's of Robert Dahl, who concentrates on the first information — in the introduction he wrote to *Repression* (University Press, 1973), 16–17.

Spain after Franco (New York: Praeger, 1979), 109–24; (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 212–213.

"Authoritarian Regime" in Dahl, ed., *Regimes and Oppo-*

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"Authoritarian Regime," 175, 211; Coverdale, *Political Trans-*
Spain (New York: Crowell, 1967), 109–24,
Spain: Dictatorship to Democracy (London:

the policy was successful, though it apparently did not win the loyalty of the public, for Franco's regime died with him.

Liberalization was also attempted in Communist Hungary in the 1950s. Here the Stalinist period was perhaps the grimmest in all of eastern Europe. It came to an abrupt end in 1953, when the death of Stalin brought a collective leadership to power in Moscow that sought to relieve some of the miseries the dictator had caused in the Soviet Union and then imposed on the satellites as well. In Hungary, the Soviet leaders forced Matyas Rakosi to step aside and let Imre Nagy modify the Stalinist system that Rakosi had erected. Nagy released the Communist political prisoners, permitted peasants to withdraw from collective farms, and attempted to upgrade living standards. Then, early in 1955 the balance of political forces shifted in the Kremlin and Rakosi was put back in control; but his sponsors prevented him from utilizing the harsh methods to which he was accustomed. Neither Rakosi nor his successor, Erno Gero, was able to break the revolutionary momentum that built up in Hungary in 1956, and the Russians were forced to intervene in the summer of that year to save the situation. Hungary, of course, we would have to categorize as a complete failure.⁷

The third case is the shah of Iran's ill-fated liberalization of the late 1970s. The shah proceeded on two tracks. The first was an expansion of political participation through the creation of a new political party, the *Rastakhiz* (Resurgence) party. Previously, effective participation had been limited to a small circle of 300 to 400. Though the Resurgence party made no effort to attract opposition elements, it did manage to recruit some five to six million members in two years. The second track was a relaxation of controls over freedoms of press, assembly, and expression in 1977, which had the immediate effect of stimulating the opposition to action. The Shah was unable to control or coopt this opposition, which expanded and radicalized, developing into a full-fledged revolutionary movement by 1978.⁸

Finally, there is Brazil, which can now be classified as a success. Brazil's liberalization was begun by General Ernesto Geisel in 1974 under the label *distensao*, or decompression. Geisel's first step was to permit an opposition party, the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB), to compete in congressional elections in that year; and the MDB did surprisingly well. In 1975 Geisel dismissed a general for abuses that had taken place under his command and made considerable progress in curbing violations of human rights. After a temporary reversal in 1977, Geisel began to dismantle the legislative underpinnings of the military dictatorship, the Institutional Acts, in 1978. General Joao Baptista Figueiredo succeeded Geisel in January 1979 and continued the policy of gradual liberalization. By 1980 the

⁷ My sources on Hungary are Ferenc Vali, *Rift and Revolt in Hungary* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961); Paul Zinner, *Revolution in Hungary* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962); and Paul Kecskemeti, *The Unexpected Revolution* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1961). The shifts in Soviet policy in Hungary are attributed to the political competition in the Kremlin in Charles Gati, "Imre Nagy and Moscow, 1953–56," *Problems of Communism* 35 (May–June 1986).

⁸ John Stempel, *Inside the Iranian Revolution* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981).

last of the political prisoners had been freed; direct municipal, congressional, and gubernatorial elections were held in 1982; and finally in 1985 Brazil's Electoral College ended the period of military rule when it chose a member of the opposition party as president.⁹

Thus, among these four cases we see two relatively successful liberalizations—Brazil and Spain—and two that ended in disaster—Hungary and Iran. What explains the difference? At least five factors come to mind: the nature of the opposition; the regime's past, that is the evils it has committed; the state of the economy as liberalization takes place; the role played by outside powers in the process; and the tactics used by the regime. I propose to take these up in turn.

THE OPPOSITION

From the government's standpoint, liberalization would probably be easiest if its opposition were weak and moderate, and most difficult if it were strong and radical. ("Moderate" here would imply that the opposition would be willing to settle for modest improvements, more willing to wait for the government to proceed to see what will develop, and less likely to resort to violence.) Any number of things could affect the disposition of the regime's opponents, but two would seem to be especially important. One would be the personal qualities of the opposition's leadership. Some people would be inclined, for personal reasons, to seek confrontation with the government, others to seek accommodation. One obvious case in point would be the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who lost a son in what he assumed was a government-sponsored assassination, and later stubbornly opposed any suggestion of compromise with the shah during the revolution. In addition, the leaders of some oppositions are able to overcome the differences between themselves, or at least paper them over for the time being, while others cannot stop quarreling and thereby reduce their effectiveness. The Spanish exiles, for example, were not able to overcome the divisions between Communists and non-Communists in the early years and failed to form a government in exile, which would have improved their chances of attracting foreign assistance considerably. The clash between the Communists and non-Communists (as well as other divisions) continued to bedevil the Spanish opposition's efforts later.¹⁰

The country's political culture probably also influences the mood of the opposition in an important way. Various observers have speculated that Iranians may still be influenced to an important extent by their Zoroastrian beginnings. It is possible that the Manichean belief in extremes of good and evil made it difficult

⁹ David Fleischer and Robert Wesson, *Brazil in Transition* (New York: Praeger, 1983), 39–40; Wayne Selcher, "Contradictions, Dilemmas, and Actors in Brazil's *Abertura* 1979–1985" in Selcher, ed., *Political Liberalization in Brazil*, 60.

¹⁰ Kenneth Medhurst, *Government in Spain* (New York: Pergamon, 1973), 35; David Gilmour, *The Transformation of Spain* (London: Quartet Books, 1985), 95, 100–1, 104; Herr, *Spain*, 231; Linz, "Authoritarian Regime," 222–3.

for Persians to conceive of their own compromise as having made compromise difficult.

The political culture of Brazil appears to be a mixture of political elites and the masses. Brazilian pragmatism and adaptability, so not necessarily pejorative in Brazil. Br recent study as remarkably patient interviewed by Janice Perlman in the intention of "doing its best to and seemed to possess "the aspirations, and the values of patriots." to go more smoothly in Brazil than

To some extent, then, the prospects of accidents of personality and political liberalizing leaders. But the opposition in a vacuum. The next question was of the regime, both in the past and of opposition that it has to deal with

THE SHAH

Let us consider first the question of and what effect this may have later. place on a massive scale. The victors Republicans in prison camps by 194 malnutrition, and of those released so additional liberty, a kind of political p activity.¹¹ But the victors in the civil wa Exactly how many victims the repres dispute. The most conservative estim states that 16,763 were shot in 1939 and as 200,000 may have died as a result war, in addition to the 200,000 execu

¹¹ Peter McDonough, *Power and Ideology* (1981), 14; Janice Perlman quoted in Riordan York: Praeger, 1978), 51; Marvin Zonis, *The Po* sity Press, 1971), 73–5; Cuyler Young, "Iran in Co

¹² The contributors to the Dahl, ed., *Regime* they provide somewhat different answers than

¹³ Linz, "Authoritarian Regime," 230–1; Her Jackson, *The Spanish Republic and the Civil Wa* 1965), 537.

¹⁴ Ramon Salas Larrazabal, *Perdidas de la Gu* 428–429. The higher estimates are from Elena c Random House, 1964), 250–252; and Jackson,

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for Persians to conceive of their opponents in less than satanic terms, and thus has made compromise difficult.

The political culture of Brazil appears to be much different, both among political elites and the masses. Brazilian elites have long prided themselves on their pragmatism and adaptability, so much so that the word "Machiavellian" is not necessarily pejorative in Brazil. Brazilians of the lower class emerged from one recent study as remarkably patient and longsuffering. The urban slum dwellers interviewed by Janice Perlman in the early 1970s credited the government with the intention of "doing its best to understand and help people like themselves" and seemed to possess "the aspirations of a bourgeoisie, the perseverance of pioneers, and the values of patriots." If this is so, one would expect liberalization to go more smoothly in Brazil than Iran, other things being equal.¹¹

To some extent, then, the prospects for political decompression are affected by accidents of personality and political culture that are beyond the control of the liberalizing leaders. But the opposition to autocratic governments does not evolve in a vacuum. The next question we must ask, then, is to what extent the actions of the regime, both in the past and as liberalization is underway, shape the sort of opposition that it has to deal with.¹²

THE SHADOW OF THE PAST

Let us consider first the question of how bad the dictatorship was at its height and what effect this may have later. In both Spain and Hungary, repression took place on a massive scale. The victors in the Spanish civil war placed about 270,000 Republicans in prison camps by 1940. Many of the prisoners died of disease or malnutrition, and of those released some 140,000 were assigned the status of conditional liberty, a kind of political parole that strictly circumscribed opposition activity.¹³ But the victors in the civil war were not content merely to jail the defeated. Exactly how many victims the repression eventually claimed is still a matter of dispute. The most conservative estimate is that of Ramón Salas Larrazabal, who states that 16,763 were shot in 1939 and 1940. Others have maintained that as many as 200,000 may have died as a result of the Nationalist repression after the civil war, in addition to the 200,000 executed during the conflict.¹⁴

¹¹ Peter McDonough, *Power and Ideology in Brazil* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981), 14; Janice Perlman quoted in Riordan Roett, *Brazil: Politics in a Patrimonial Society* (New York: Praeger, 1978), 51; Marvin Zonis, *The Political Elite of Iran* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971), 73-5; Cuyler Young, "Iran in Continuing Crisis," *Foreign Affairs* 2 (January 1962): 285-6.

¹² The contributors to the Dahl, ed., *Regimes and Oppositions* volume also raise this issue, though they provide somewhat different answers than I. See Linz, 221, 237, 257; and Dahl, 4, 13.

¹³ Linz, "Authoritarian Regime," 230-1; Herr, *Spain*, 212; Payne, *Franco's Spain*, 109-112; Gabriel Jackson, *The Spanish Republic and the Civil War 1931-39* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965), 537.

¹⁴ Ramon Salas Larrazabal, *Perdidas de la Guerra Civil* (Barcelona: Editorial Planeta, 1977), 387-338, 428-429. The higher estimates are from Elena de la Souchere, *An Explanation of Spain* (New York: Random House, 1964), 250-252; and Jackson, *Spanish Republic and Civil War*, 563-569.

In Rakosi's Hungary, the situation was equally grim. The regime's determination to expand industry at all costs led to a fall of living standards of 15-20 percent, as well as chronic shortages in urban areas. Nearly one-third of the farms were collectivized by 1953, precipitating a decline in food production, which along with the forced requisitions created conditions of near starvation in the countryside. Rakosi's rule was buttressed, as elsewhere, by secret police terror. His AVH (State Security Authority) not only employed 100,000 policemen directly, but also created a vast network of informers and spies. Between 150,000 and 200,000 people were held in forced labor camps at the nadir of the repression in the early 1950s. It is thought that about 2,000 victims were shot immediately; many more died under torture or in the camps, but the exact number is not known. As in the USSR, purges were employed against the Communist party itself. Rakosi purged 200,000 members of the Hungarian party, the most famous of whom was the former interior minister, Laszlo Rajk. Rajk was arrested in 1949 and put through a show trial reminiscent of Stalin's productions of the 1930s in which fabricated evidence was introduced linking the victim to a plot with "foreign imperialists" to restore capitalism in Hungary. Rajk and some others were hanged 15 October 1949, and a reign of terror against much of the Hungarian party followed.¹⁵

The shah of Iran's regime was somewhat less brutal than these, but still relied heavily on the mailed fist. Amnesty International (AI) reported in the mid-1970s that the shah held between 25,000 and 100,000 political prisoners. Torture was practiced "routinely" during interrogation, and political enemies were also executed frequently. (AI knew of fifteen in the first two months of 1976.) Further, the repression was directed even at nonviolent opposition.¹⁶ In particular, the regime had turned its attention toward the clergy in the early 1970s. In the years that followed, the secret police infiltrated mosque meetings; the clergy's lands were expropriated; and mullahs were arrested, imprisoned, and even executed "regularly," according to Iran specialist James Bill. This intensification of repression, Bill has concluded, gave Iran's Shi'ite clergy little choice but to fight back to insure their survival.¹⁷

Brazil is clearly the mildest dictatorship of the four. The Institutional Acts declared by the military in the early years of their rule allowed the government to suspend the political rights of those they considered dangerous and dismiss elected officials without replacing them. 1,577 Brazilians were punished in this way, including six senators and 110 deputies, which reduced the Congress to a rubber stamp by 1970. Like many of its neighbors, Brazil faced a growing threat from urban terrorists at this time, and the military dealt with it successfully by making a preemptive sweep in November 1970 in which 5,000 to 10,000 suspects were ar-

¹⁵ Vali, *Rift and Revolt*, 82-84, 87, 59-64; Kecskemeti, *Unexpected Revolution*, 41, 18. The figures on the AVH and the numbers killed and imprisoned are taken from David Pryce-Jones, *The Hungarian Revolution* (London: Ernest Benn Ltd, 1969), 41, 43.

¹⁶ Amnesty International, *International Report, 1975-1976*, 182-188.

¹⁷ James Bill, "Power and Religion in Revolutionary Iran," *Middle East Journal* 36 (Winter 1982): 24-28.

rested. The number of "disappeared" was thirty-five in 1971, nine in 1975. The foundations of the economic policy that reduced the minimum wage and sharply increased the inequality of income.

What, then, is the relationship between liberalization and repression? It would certainly seem that, in the case of Hungary, but succeeded to some extent. Liberalization worked best in Iran, where the abuses were not so severe. It is evidently more complicated than Machiavelli: "... one ought to be wary for the two to go together, it is not for the two has to be wanting."¹⁹

Brutality practiced on the scale of the shah, for the perpetrators, but it also seems that things may go reasonably well under a more liberal regime. It can be quite certain that the people will repeat the experiences of the civil war. That the most important explanation for this was the desire of most of the Shah's subjects to enjoy enthusiastic support at the expense of more one of apathy than seething discontent sympathetic to the 1956 revolution. Discontent until quite soon before the revolution.

In other words, large-scale terror is necessary.

¹⁸ Peter Flynn, *Brazil: A Political Analysis*, ed. Handelman and Thomas Sanders, eds., in *Latin America* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, March 1978). Brazil's population in 1966 was 99 million; and Spain's in 1939, 25.5 million. The figures are roughly accurate and that may be the case.) The shah, in contrast held no more than a few hundred political prisoners. The figures were miniscule in comparison with the figures taken from Arthur S. Banks, et al., *Assessing the Revolution* (MIT Press, 1971).

¹⁹ Machiavelli, *The Prince*, Luigi Ricciardi, trans.

²⁰ See Herbert Matthews, *The Yoke of Franco*, Fusi, *Spain*, 135-6, 47; Payne, *Franco's Spain*, Linz, "Authoritarian Regime," 181-182.

²¹ Kecskemeti, *Unexpected Revolution*.

rested. The number of "disappeared," however, was much less than elsewhere—thirty-five in 1971, nine in 1975, and none afterward. Also, it should be noted that the foundations of the economic miracle of the later 1960s were laid by an austerity policy that reduced the minimum wage 20 percent in real terms in the mid-1960s and sharply increased the inequality of income.¹⁸

What, then, is the relationship between a regime's past and its prospects for liberalization? It would certainly be plausible to assume that the worse the degree of repression, the more difficulty a government would have in letting up. But this seems not to be the case. Liberalization failed in an extremely harsh dictatorship, Hungary, but succeeded to some extent in Spain, which was scarcely any better. Liberalization worked best in the mildest dictatorship, Brazil, but broke down in Iran, where the abuses were not as great as in Hungary or Spain. The relationship is evidently more complicated than one would imagine. A partial answer is provided by Machiavelli: ". . . one ought to be both feared and loved, but as it is difficult for the two to go together, it is much safer to be feared than loved, if one of the two has to be wanting."¹⁹

Brutality practiced on the scale of a Rakosi or a Franco obviously creates hatred for the perpetrators, but it also creates fear. From the perspective of the tyrant, things may go reasonably well as long as the fear is greater than the hatred. We can be quite certain that the peoples of Spain and Hungary were in no hurry to repeat the experiences of the civil war and Stalinism. Writers on Spain have stressed that the most important explanation of the stability of the 1950s under Franco was the desire of most of the Spanish to avoid another civil war. Franco did not enjoy enthusiastic support at this time by any means, but the public mood was more one of apathy than seething discontent.²⁰ In Hungary, most scholars, though sympathetic to the 1956 revolution, admit that there was little evidence of popular discontent until quite soon before the revolution's outbreak.²¹

In other words, large-scale terror may create political stability by cowing the

¹⁸ Peter Flynn, *Brazil: A Political Analysis* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1978), 385–87; Howard Handelman and Thomas Sanders, eds., *Military Government and the Movement toward Democracy in Latin America* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981), 192, 196, 151; *New York Times*, 26 March 1978. Brazil's population in 1966 was 83 million; Iran's in 1980, 38 million; Hungary's in 1950, 9 million; and Spain's in 1939, 25.5 million. Hence, Rakosi jailed 1.5 percent of his country's population, while Franco jailed 1 percent and did away with perhaps .5 percent (assuming Elena de la Souhere's figures are roughly accurate and that many of the deaths above the 84,000 figure were caused by disease.) The shah, in contrast held no more than .3 percent of the population in prison, and in Brazil the figures were miniscule in comparison to the other cases, especially the first two. Population figures taken from Arthur S. Banks, et al., assemblers, *Cross-Polity Time-Series Data* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1971).

¹⁹ Machiavelli, *The Prince*, Luigi Ricci, trans. (New York: Random House, 1950), chap. 17.

²⁰ See Herbert Matthews, *The Yoke and the Arrows* (New York: Braziller, 1961), 120–1; Carr and Fusi, *Spain*, 135–6, 47; Payne, *Franco's Spain*, 117, 119; Gilmour, *Transformation of Spain*, 17, 24; Linz, "Authoritarian Regime," 181–182.

²¹ Kecskemeti, *Unexpected Revolution*, 117.

public for some time to come. It may also stabilize the situation by ~~eliminating~~ the potential leadership of the opposition. Franco's terror of the 1940s ~~drove many~~ of the surviving opposition leaders into exile, where they never managed to overcome their divisions. The repression that continued at home was extremely effective; in 1953 the entire leadership of the Socialist underground was arrested. And the opposition never regained a firm toehold within Spain.²²

The shah, on the other hand, harassed the Shi'ite clergy cruelly throughout the 1970s, but never eliminated the mosque network. The mosques remained, as one opposition leader recalled, "sanctuaries where we met, talked, prepared, organized, and grew."²³ Whatever the shah's intentions, Iran never became a totalitarian society. This brings to mind another admonition from Machiavelli:

enemies . . . must either be destroyed, or conciliated by benefits. Any other course will be useless; and above all, half measures should be avoided, these being most dangerous, as proved by the Samnites, who, when they hemmed the Romans in between the Caudine forks, disregarded the advice of an old man, who counselled them either to let the Romans depart honorably, or to kill them all. And by taking the middle course of disarming them and obliging them to pass under a yoke, they let them depart with shame and rage in their hearts.²⁴

The regime's past is important in one other respect. The ruler or rulers may inherit what we might call skeletons in the closet, that is, acts of which the public is unaware, which could be extremely damaging if they were to become known. In a creditable effort to make amends and serve justice, a government might unintentionally deal itself a mortal blow. In Hungary, Imre Nagy got Moscow's permission to release the remaining Communist political prisoners, though thousands of non-Communists still languished in jail. This was perhaps the most important single precipitant of the revolution. The tales told by those released evoked a strong sense of shame among many Hungarian intellectuals who had previously lent their services to the government in writing apologies for Rakosi's brutality. The intellectuals became the strongest defenders of Nagy's new course and the focus of the opposition once Rakosi returned to power. In addition, Moscow inadvertently created even greater problems for Rakosi later in forcing him to admit publicly that Rajk had been framed.²⁵

One solution to this problem, other than continuing to keep the skeleton in the closet, is to satisfy the public's demand for justice by conspicuously punishing someone who can be held accountable for the past abuses. Machiavelli gives a

²² Matthews, *Yoke and Arrows*, 120-1; Carr and Fusi, *Spain*, 135-136, 47; Payne, *Franco's Spain*, 117, 119; Gilmour, *Transformation of Spain*, 83-84.

²³ Sapehr Zabih, *Iran's Revolutionary Upheaval* (San Francisco: Alchemy Press, 1979), 20.

²⁴ Machiavelli, *Discourses*, Christian Detmold, trans. (New York: Random House, 1950), Book II, chap. 23; also Book III, chap. 40.

²⁵ Kecskemeti, *Unexpected Revolution*, 44-45; Vali, *Rift and Revolt*, 133, 143-150; Zinner, *Revolution in Hungary*, 170.

cynical account of this strategy in how Remirro de Orco was made to point, though, Machiavelli is less correct in 1978 by sacrificing General Nem but the tactic backfired, demoralizing the public. The reasons are not far removed from those of the 1940s, but responsible for what had happened a role must be more convincing.²⁶ Of course, the sacrifice of personnel takes place within a regime, the Russians, for example, had demonstrated that, if met with appropriate severity, they might w

How does the state of the economy there is an obvious and plausible hypothesis. The Spanish economy recovered smoothly during a time of prosperity in support to this notion. The Spanish economy after the civil war in the 1940s, and much of the 1950s, remained at a low subsistence level. Production remained low in the republic. The vivid memories of the war kept the lid on for many years. But after a general strike in Barcelona triggered by the regime, the economy began to recover. Prosperity for the rest of the decade. The economic climate had much to do with the recovery and may have given the regime the confidence to take the economic liberalization measures.²⁷

Prosperity has two possible disadvantages: tight labor markets that may tempt labor to wring more from management by striking temporarily in the mid-1950s when the regime's prohibition on strikes. That caused wage increases that led to serious inflation. The regime rested the inflation by imposing a strict policy of rationing for a sustained boom that lasted until industrial production tripled, and the economy rose from \$300 to \$2446 (1957-1974). Conditions of the Spanish working class. Strikes were organized, and in the 1970s Spain became a leader in Europe (measured in days lost), r

²⁶ Stempel, *Inside the Revolution*, 100-102.

²⁷ Herr, *Spain*, 221, 233-235, 242, 284.

abilize the situation by eliminating Franco's terror of the 1940s drove many where they never managed to over-continued at home was extremely effective. The underground was arrested. And within Spain.²²

Shi'ite clergy cruelly throughout the work. The mosques remained, as one we met, talked, prepared, organized, Iran never became a totalitarian son from Machiavelli:

ated by benefits. Any other course will be avoided, these being most dangerous, led the Romans in between the Caudine counselled them either to let the Romans the middle course of disarming them and let them depart with shame and rage in

er respect. The ruler or rulers may let, that is, acts of which the public might if they were to become known. justice, a government might unfairly, Imre Nagy got Moscow's political prisoners, though thousands was perhaps the most important and by those released evoked a strong actuals who had previously lent their for Rakosi's brutality. The intel- s new course and the focus of the addition, Moscow inadvertently in forcing him to admit publicly

continuing to keep the skeleton in the justice by conspicuously punishing the past abuses. Machiavelli gives a

Spain, 135-136, 47; Payne, *Franco's Spain*,

Francisco: Alchemy Press, 1979), 20. New York: Random House, 1950), Book II,

and *Revolt*, 133, 143-150; Zinner, *Revolu-*

cynical account of this strategy in chapter 7 of *The Prince*, where he describes how Remirro de Orco was made to serve as a fall guy for Cesare Borgia. On this point, though, Machiavelli is less convincing. The shah hoped to appease the public in 1978 by sacrificing General Nematollah Nassiri, the head of the secret police, but the tactic backfired, demoralizing the shah's supporters more than it satisfied the public. The reasons are not far to seek: Iranians held the shah, not Nassiri, responsible for what had happened. If a man is to play the role of fall guy, the role must be more convincing.²⁶ On the other hand, situations where a change of personnel takes place within a regime are at least potentially manageable. If the Russians, for example, had demanded that Nagy give Rakosi a punishment of appropriate severity, they might well have headed off the Hungarian revolution.

THE ECONOMY

How does the state of the economy affect the prospects for liberalization? Again there is an obvious and plausible hypothesis: liberalization is more likely to go smoothly during a time of prosperity. The experience of Spain lends some support to this notion. The Spanish economy did not recover from the ravages of the civil war in the 1940s, and much of the population continued to live at a subsistence level. Production remained only 70 percent of what it had been in the republic. The vivid memories of the civil war and fear of Franco's security forces kept the lid on for many years. But opposition finally broke out in 1951, when a general strike in Barcelona triggered a wave of protest elsewhere. Luckily for the regime, the economy began improving the next year, and Spain enjoyed prosperity for the rest of the decade. Most scholars think that the favorable economic climate had much to do with the apathetic mood of Spain in the 1950s and may have given the regime the confidence to undertake the mid-1960s liberalization measures.²⁷

Prosperity has two possible disadvantages, however. The first is that it brings tight labor markets that may tempt labor to take advantage of its increased leverage to wring more from management by the use of strikes. Franco did face some trouble temporarily in the mid-1950s when workers in a number of cities braved the regime's prohibition on strikes. That crisis was defused by the granting of enormous wage increases that led to serious inflation by the late 1950s. The government arrested the inflation by imposing a stiff austerity program in 1959, laying the foundation for a sustained boom that lasted till the early 1970s. In the next decade, industrial production tripled, and the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita rose from \$300 to \$2446 (1957-1974). Once again, prosperity increased the militance of the Spanish working class. Strikes for economic motives were eventually legalized, and in the 1970s Spain became one of the five most strike-prone nations in Europe (measured in days lost), ranking along with Britain and Italy.²⁸

²⁶ Stempel, *Inside the Revolution*, 100-102, 133.

²⁷ Herr, *Spain*, 221, 233-235, 242, 284.

THE ROLE OF OUTSIDE POWERS

A fourth possible explanation, and an important one, is the role played by foreign allies of the regime. The two most successful cases, Brazil and Spain, are instances where liberalization proceeded with relatively little outside interference; in Hungary and Iran, Moscow and Washington played a significant role in the events, much to their regret later.

Outside powers may affect the course of liberalization in two ways. They may alter the expectations of the public about what the government will tolerate, or they may constrain the government, either actively or unintentionally, and thus weaken its ability to deal with growing opposition. The Soviets in Hungary and the United States in Iran produced both effects.

One of the turning points in Hungary was Nikita Khrushchev's secret speech, in which he condemned Stalin's purges on the grounds that they had weakened the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Prior to the speech, Hungarian intellectuals had hesitated to attack Rakosi for fear of being branded "antiparty." The speech was interpreted in Hungary as a green light to speak freely about the abuses that had taken place under Hungary's version of Stalin. Criticism intensified in 1956 to the point where one writer was likening Rakosi to Judas, and the noted Marxist philosopher Gyorgy Lucacs was speaking of the "bankruptcy" of Hungarian Marxism.³²

By this time the intellectuals were beginning to attract a popular following, and Rakosi was becoming concerned. The one virtue of liberalization from the tyrant's perspective, as Mao Zedong showed in the "Hundred Flowers campaign," is that it encourages one's enemies to make themselves visible. In late June, Rakosi drew up an enemies list of four hundred names and proposed that they be arrested as soon as possible. But on 17 July, Anastas Mikoyan, Soviet leader, arrived in Budapest and bid Rakosi step down. Rakosi's successor, Gero, made a few concessions and did not deliver the crushing blow Rakosi had planned, presumably because of the Russians' objections. In the view of Paul Kecskemeti, Rakosi probably could have broken the revolutionary momentum if he had been allowed by the Russians to work his will. In staying his hand, the Russians created a crisis that only the Red Army could resolve to Soviet satisfaction.³³

Shaul Bakhash has reminded us that notwithstanding the polemics of certain critics of the Carter administration, the shah, not Jimmy Carter, lost Iran.³⁴ Bakhash is right, but the American role was still significant, if less important than the Soviet role in Hungary. First, the Carter human rights policies did encourage

³² Zinner, *Revolution in Hungary*, 203; Vali, *Rift and Revolt*, 224-225; Kecskemeti, *Unexpected Revolution*, 69-70.

³³ Vali, *Rift and Revolt*, 233-234, 244-245, 254-257; Zinner, *Revolution in Hungary*, 227; Kecskemeti, *Unexpected Revolution*, 76; Paul Kecskemeti, "Limits and Problems of Decompression," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, May 1958, 105.

³⁴ Shaul Bakhash, "Who Lost Iran?" *New York Review of Books*, 14 May 1981.

the shah's opposition. For evidence on this point, we need only consult the opposition members themselves. As Mehdi Bazargan, the puppet head of Khomeini's first government, has said, "[the revolution] was the result of 25 years of cruelty, oppression, and corruption. We did not believe the shah when he started the liberalization policy, but when Carter's human rights drive lifted the hope of the people, all the built up pressure exploded." Karim Sanjabi, a veteran National Front leader, told a journalist that "President Carter's words on human rights were what originally raised the people's hopes and gave them courage to defy the dictatorship." Richard Falk, a vocal critic of American foreign policy, reports that he was told on a visit to Iran that the religious opposition was also emboldened by the human rights policy.³⁵

The effects of President Carter's policy on the shah are somewhat more difficult to gauge. According to one account, the shah is said to have complained during the crisis in 1978, that "the Americans will not give me a free hand to settle this crisis in my own way." In his memoirs, he suggests that the United States "wanted me out" after a point.³⁶ On the basis of such statements, some critics of the Carter administration have contended that the United States demoralized the shah and prevented him from taking firm action to contain his opposition. On the other hand, former government officials have pointed out that President Carter praised the shah effusively during his January 1978 visit to Iran and made declarations of support so frequently during the revolution that the shah actually requested Washington to ease up at one juncture.³⁷ I will not attempt to resolve this dispute here. My own view is that Ambassador William Sullivan's inability to confirm the statements of support from Washington (because he had no clear instructions to do so) probably did shake the shah's confidence. But it is also true that the shah undertook liberalization largely on his own initiative, without any clear roadmap and without the willingness he had shown in 1963 to shed blood to save his throne. As Sullivan has explained, the shah's illness not only reduced his effectiveness as an executive, but also increased his inhibitions about the use of force. Facing death, the shah did not want to be remembered as a sanguinary tyrant and did not use force as freely as he had in 1963, when an estimated 1,000 supporters of Khomeini died in an unsuccessful revolt.³⁸

One effect of the human rights policy is indisputable, however. The Human Rights Bureau in the State Department embargoed riot control equipment to Iran for several months in 1978, and the equipment was missed. The Japanese ambassador

³⁵ *Christian Science Monitor*, 6 June 1978; *New York Times*, 9 July 1978; Sharif Arani, "Iran," *Dissent* 27 (Winter 1980): 14; Herman Nickel, "The US Failure in Iran," *Fortune*, 12 March 1979, 98; Zabih, *Iran's Revolutionary Upheaval*, 49.

³⁶ William Lewis and Michael Ledeen, *Debauch* (New York: Knopf, 1980), 143-144, 153; William Sullivan, *Mission to Iran* (New York: Norton, 1981), 168, 191-192, 204, 156-157; Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, *Answer to History* (New York: Stein & Day, 1981), 161, 164-165.

³⁷ Confidential interview with a Carter administration official.

³⁸ See the shah's own comments, *Answer to History*, 167; also Sullivan, *Mission to Iran*, 167-168, 188.

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Particularly in the case of Hungar the last and most important fact dealing with the risks it inevitably at least three dangers for the gov the opposition to operate more ef ther change at a faster rate than t for the government; and the publ regime and risk acts of defiance t before. The fundamental dilemma these dangers in check without da regime is too cautious, the people improvement; if the regime loosens of control. The ability of the gov to the success or failure of liberal These dangers are all too appa destalinization led to the alienation cutting edge of the revolution. In the changes introduced by the shah ment." Far from appeasing the oppo [it] to press for even more." ⁴⁰ In Br ingness to permit an opposition to defeat for the governing party.⁴¹ L ening of the opposition, at least in the government is going to have to Franco's solution was to permit si in others, and in general to err on th lifted on the press and unions, but freely until the 1970s. Originally, the F by creating syndicates where represen to achieve both justice and productiv nize independent unions under the tions on management's rights of dismi interests were not ignored totally, bu

³⁹ Stempel, *Inside Iranian Revolution*, 92.

⁴⁰ Stempel, *Inside Iranian Revolution*, 37-

⁴¹ Handelman and Sanders, *Military Gove*

remarked during the crisis that "the Tokyo riot squad could handle any disturbance in this country with their duty squad." Lacking such equipment and training, the shah's forces had a choice between firing on the demonstrators or firing over their heads.³⁹

TACTICS

Particularly in the case of Hungary, the influence of foreign powers is related to the last and most important factor — the judgment and skill of the leadership in dealing with the risks it inevitably runs in easing repression. Liberalization creates at least three dangers for the government: the slackening of controls may allow the opposition to operate more effectively; the people may begin to anticipate further change at a faster rate than the regime can deliver it or set higher standards for the government; and the public and the opposition may lose their fear of the regime and risk acts of defiance that would have been considered too dangerous before. The fundamental dilemma faced by liberalizing autocrats is how to hold these dangers in check without damaging the credibility of liberalization. If the regime is too cautious, the people may become cynical about the prospects for improvement; if the regime loosens the reins too quickly, the process may run out of control. The ability of the government to cope with this dilemma is the key to the success or failure of liberalization.

These dangers are all too apparent in the cases discussed here. In Hungary destalinization led to the alienation of most of the intellectuals, who became the cutting edge of the revolution. In the view of one American official in Teheran, the changes introduced by the shah "led to the rebirth of the revolutionary movement." Far from appeasing the opposition, "increased political leeway encouraged [it] to press for even more."⁴⁰ In Brazil, General Geisel was rewarded for his willingness to permit an opposition to run in the 1974 congressional elections by a defeat for the governing party.⁴¹ Liberalization, then, often leads to a strengthening of the opposition, at least in the short run. If liberalization is to continue, the government is going to have to develop some strategy for dealing with this.

Franco's solution was to permit significant liberalization in some areas but not in others, and in general to err on the side of caution. Specifically, controls were lifted on the press and unions, but the opposition was not permitted to operate freely until the 1970s. Originally, the Falangists had hoped to overcome class struggle by creating syndicates where representatives of labor and management would meet to achieve both justice and productivity. Labor gave up the right to strike or organize independent unions under the plan, but was to be compensated by restrictions on management's rights of dismissal. The Labor Ministry saw that the workers' interests were not ignored totally, but in practice the denial of the right to strike

³⁹ Stempel, *Inside Iranian Revolution*, 92, 133-134; Sullivan, *Mission to Iran*, 168.

⁴⁰ Stempel, *Inside Iranian Revolution*, 37-38; also 56, 288.

⁴¹ Handelman and Sanders, *Military Government*, 151, 153.

and the system of indirect elections meant that the system functioned more as a means of control than of representation for the workers. It did not win their confidence.⁴² In the late 1950s, two changes were made. Larger numbers of *enlaces*, the representatives directly elected by the workers, were created, and a form of collective bargaining was introduced at the local level. In the mid-1960s, the *enlaces* were instrumental in forming the independent worker's commissions that were the motive force behind the resumption of strike activity. The government declared the commissions illegal and arrested the leaders, but was unwilling or unable to suppress them and ended up with a great increase in the number of strikes. As I argued above, however, this may not have been an entirely bad thing from the regime's perspective, since the commissions' efforts went mostly into economic, not political protests.⁴³

Franco tried harder and was more successful in preventing the growth of overtly political opposition. *FET y de las JONS* continued to be the country's only legal political organization, and the ban on competing parties was enforced. However, the regime permitted opposition moderates to conduct political discussions in their homes, travel inside and outside the country, and publish abroad and eventually at home as well. Thus the moderates came to enjoy a sort of twilight existence that Juan Linz has characterized as "alegal." Far from endangering the regime, the limited toleration afforded the alegal opposition, in Linz's view, actually helped undercut support of the opposition. As he put it in 1973:

Their freedom permits their activity to be visible to the government but not necessarily to any large constituency, and this allows the government to co-opt and corrupt them, to know their weaknesses and failings. On the other hand, this freedom creates a subtle gratitude and dependence on those in power that limits their contestation activities. This in turn transforms them, in the view of many opponents of the system, into a sham opposition, [which] weakens their legitimacy as an alternative.⁴⁴

For the opposition that the regime considered more dangerous, there was still repression. In the regime's later stage, the methods were not extremely harsh, especially by the standards set earlier. By the 1960s, "only the most active and directly subversive political opponents were arrested; almost none were shot," as one observer explained. The mature dictatorship had a variety of other means at its disposal to keep opponents in line—revoking drivers licenses, interfering with careers, etc. So Franco could afford to forego some of the old brutality. In its immediate purpose, the repression was effective: the Socialist party, which was to play a leading role later, had virtually no organization inside of Spain at the time of the dic-

⁴² Medhurst, *Government in Spain*, 33-35; Amodia, *Franco's Political Legacy*, 147-149; Coverdale, *Political Transformation of Spain*, 17.

⁴³ Medhurst, *Government in Spain*, 36; Herr, *Spain*, 14-15. The regime did crack down on the Worker's Commissions after a large scale protest in 1967, however. The PCE had infiltrated the bodies by that time. Gilmour, *Transformation of Spain*, 93.

⁴⁴ Linz, "Authoritarian Regime," 220, 216-219.

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⁴⁵ Carr and Fusi, *Spain*, 165, 46, 181;

⁴⁶ Herr, *Spain*, 285-6; see also Medhurst

⁴⁷ Kecskemeti, "Limits and Problems of
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⁴⁸ Kecskemeti, *Unexpected Revolution*,

⁴⁹ Valli, *Rift and Revolt*, 268-269; Kecsk

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Political Legacy, 147-149; Coverdale,

regime did crack down on the Worker's CE had infiltrated the bodies by that

tator's death. But Franco's reliance on apathy and demobilization as a means of achieving stability also meant that the regime did not put down deeper roots.⁴⁵

In the late 1960s, two years after the most dramatic moves toward the liberalization the regime was to make, Spain began experiencing the same unrest as much of the rest of West Europe. Basque terrorists began a campaign of sabotage, armed robbery, and assassination in 1968. Franco responded by declaring a "state of exception" (exempting the authorities from the guarantees against arbitrary arrest promulgated in 1945) in the province of Guipuzcoa. At the same time, a number of opposition groups lodged protests over the remaining parts of Franco's repressive apparatus. 1,300 intellectuals signed a petition decrying the use of torture by the police, women relatives of the jailed leaders of the Workers Commissions held sit-ins in churches in the large cities, and lawyers' associations in Madrid and Barcelona called for the abolition of the special courts used for political cases. Finally, in January 1969 a severe wave of student protest broke out at the University of Madrid. On the 24th, Franco extended the state of exception to the entire country. The harsh measures contained the protest, but in one observer's words, "the state of exception was a catastrophic blow to the [regime's] long efforts to achieve legitimacy . . . Franco's government had proved far more dramatically than the opposition that the country was still a police dictatorship."⁴⁶

If Franco's liberalization failed to win over the public and build enough support to allow the regime to survive the death of its founder, at least it prevented the worst from happening from the regime's standpoint. In Hungary, Soviet policy was so poorly conceived that it transformed what may well have been a manageable situation into a revolution. The first mistake was in replacing Nagy at a time when his New Course seemed to be winning some support for the regime.⁴⁷ Next, having brought back to power a man many Hungarians perceived (quite correctly) as a murderer, the Russians failed to exploit the one asset Rakosi possessed — his ability to strike fear into the hearts of potential opponents. According to Paul Kecskemeti: "[The revolution] was a delayed reaction to all the negative experiences of the past, a reaction released when elements of weakness appeared in the image of the regime."⁴⁸ That the people of Hungary bore the Communist regime immense hatred is amply evident from the spontaneous attacks on all symbols of Communist authority that broke out in Budapest in the summer of 1956.⁴⁹ But the Hungarians dared to express this only after the Russians tied Rakosi's hands.

The Soviet constraining of Rakosi was important in a more specific sense. One thing a liberalizing government must guard against is the spread of disaffection from limited "elite" groups to a broader audience. The effects of the easing of

⁴⁵ Carr and Fusi, *Spain*, 165, 46, 181; Coverdale, *Political Transformation of Spain*, 18.

⁴⁶ Herr, *Spain*, 285-6; see also Medhurst, *Government in Spain*, 52.

⁴⁷ Kecskemeti, "Limits and Problems of Decompression," 105; also Kecskemeti, *Unexpected Revolution*, 117.

⁴⁸ Kecskemeti, *Unexpected Revolution*, 117.

⁴⁹ Vali, *Rift and Revolt*, 268-269; Kecskemeti, *Unexpected Revolution*, 111.

ensorship in Spain, for example, were offset by the regime's continued control over television, which reached a much wider audience than the print media. When controls were lifted on censorship of the press in Brazil in 1978, articles began appearing on torture and other abuses of power earlier. But as in Spain, television and radio remained under close government supervision, so the damage was contained.⁵⁰ In Hungary, the ferment began with the intellectuals at a time when the public was sullen but quiescent. The two major forums for the intellectuals became the Petofi Circle, a debating club that Rakosi permitted within the Federation of Working Youth, and *Irodalmi Ujsag*, the official literary journal. By the summer of 1956, the previously innocuous publication was selling out on the newsstands and the Petofi Circle was drawing crowds in the thousands to its meetings. Either Rakosi was slow to grasp the importance of these developments or the Russians again held him back. In any case, these two maverick Communist institutions played a key role in the transmission of ideas from the intellectuals to the people as a whole. By June a "revolutionary spirit" was taking hold of the entire country. As Khrushchev remarked later, "if ten or so Hungarian writers had been shot at the right moment, the revolution would never have occurred."⁵¹ Finally, Khrushchev's success in defusing an equally threatening situation in Poland suggests that the Soviets missed one last chance to stave off the tragedy of 1956 when they brought in Gero, a man closely associated with Rakosi, rather than returning Nagy to power.⁵²

Perhaps more than any other case, the shah's failure illustrates the difficulties a ruler faces in mixing concession and repression, for where some leaders might have alienated the opposition in trying to control their protests and others might have lost control in attempting to win them over, the shah managed to do both simultaneously. As of August 1977, Iran's future was still open.⁵³ Only the far left and a few extremists in the clergy ruled out compromise with the government. The moderate opposition was still suspicious, but had convinced the radicals to abstain from violence while they explored the possibilities for peaceful change. Unfortunately, the government took a number of steps in late 1977 that undercut the moderates. The first was the arrest of a Teheran ayatollah, Mahmoud Taleqani, in August. Taleqani was tried secretly, contradicting the earlier pledges that trials would now be held in public. Throughout the early fall, the dissidents succeeded in attracting growing numbers of people to their meetings. The regime's response was uneven. SAVAK monitored all the meetings, but sometimes broke them up, and sometimes did not. After some of the gatherings were vandalized, the police were told to "control" the meetings but not "disrupt" them. Finally, in

⁵⁰ Amodia, *Franco's Political Legacy*, 187; Robert Levine, "Brazil's Definition of Democracy," *Current History* 76 (February 1979), 83.

⁵¹ Zinner, *Revolution in Hungary*, 140, 205–210; Vali, *Rift and Revolt*, 220, 228–231. Khrushchev quote from the epigraph in Ned Barber, *Seven Days of Freedom* (New York: Stein & Day, 1974).

⁵² Kecskemeti, "Limits and Problems," 105; Kecskemeti, *Unexpected Revolution*, 117.

⁵³ I am adopting the interpretation of John Stempel, *Inside Iranian Revolution*, 38–39, 265, 99.

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⁵⁴ Zabih, *Iran's Revolutionary Upheaval*, 5

⁵⁵ Stempel, *Inside Iranian Revolution*, 110–11

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late November, 200 government goons arrived at a large gathering at the home of a moderate leader and roughed up the guests. According to John Stempel, "the attack helped to destroy the hope of moderate dissidents that there could be evolution to an acceptable political society." The last straw for many moderates was the massacre at Jaleh Square on 8 September 1978, when government forces fired on a large crowd that refused to disperse, killing approximately 300 to 400. After the massacre, several of the moderates began to say that the shah would have to go. Over the next two months the monarch offered the moderate opposition the opportunity to form a cabinet as long as it was done under his aegis. He found no takers.

While a number of the shah's acts offended the moderates, the shah managed at the same time to strengthen his most implacable enemies. One example of this was his release of political prisoners at the height of the crisis. Not only did the release, as in Hungary, lead to increased public awareness of past abuses, it also provided the extremists with new leadership. Included in the 1,500 that were set free were Tudeh union officials who played a key role in organizing the crippling strikes that were so important to the revolutionary cause and guerilla leaders who mobilized their forces for the decisive street fighting.⁵⁴

But the shah's cause was lost, more than for any other reason because the monarch was unable to use force effectively to curb the extreme opposition. During the summer of 1978, the regime practiced exactly the sort of half measures Machiavelli cautions all rulers to avoid. SAVAK and other security forces would crack down on rioters one day and free them the next, reinforcing their hatred of the regime without precluding them from venting it. At two decisive points later—the declaration of martial law in September and the formation of a military government in November—the opposition drew back to avoid a confrontation with the armed forces. Despite Khomeini's braggadocio, the opposition seemed in no hurry to lay down their lives. But on both occasions, the shah failed to respond firmly. After the disaster at Jaleh Square, the shah told his soldiers not to fire on demonstrators. In November the army was instructed to fire into the air and kill the opposition only in self-defense. The streets were quiet for a time in both cases, but once the army's orders became clear, the opposition lost its fear and began to resume its activities. By December the shah had lost what support he had in public opinion and the morale of the armed forces was cracking.⁵⁵

In Brazil the outcome was entirely different. Some might attribute this to the generals' promises of democratization.⁵⁶ It is reasonable to think that when the government claims to be undertaking liberalization to transform and not merely to mitigate the evils of an authoritarian government the public may exhibit greater

⁵⁴ Zabih, *Iran's Revolutionary Upheaval*, 56.

⁵⁵ Stempel, *Inside Iranian Revolution*, 110-111, 119-121, 134, 153; my own research confirms Stempel.

⁵⁶ This explanation was suggested to the author by William Perry and an anonymous reader of the manuscript.

patience and the process may proceed more smoothly. But these promises were not made in Brazil until after the economy reached its nadir in the early 1980s and cannot account for the success of liberalization up to that point.⁵⁷ A better explanation, in my view, is the tactics adopted by the Brazilian leadership.

Throughout 1975–1977, Geisel continued to use the Institutional Acts to deprive opposition figures of their political rights. The progress of decompression in Brazil was so uneven that critics said that the country moved two steps back for every one forward. But Geisel himself had warned that it would be so. The pace, he explained, would be “slow, gradual, and sane” in order to avoid “inconvenient, premature, or imprudent” changes. The use of repression would remain “widespread and flexible.”⁵⁸ According to David Fleischer and Robert Wesson, Figueiredo adopted a similar approach:

The process was consequently gradual and limited, subject to a delicate balance between pressures for fuller democracy and fears of a loss of control. Stronger demands, as the parties pushed for ever new concession, and radical speeches, as deputies tested the limits of official toleration, made the government hesitate to grip the reins more tightly. . . . President Figueiredo and his ministers continued their commitment to democratization as a necessity for the country; however, Figueiredo wanted to move at his own initiative, not that of Congress, and concessions were to be made on the government's terms.⁵⁹

The Brazilian strategy seemed to be designed to prevent expectations from rising too rapidly and to maintain the people's awe of the government. If the concessions were granted under pressure, the government would seem to be acting from weakness and that could encourage further demands. If the government were seen as acting on its own timetable and not being stampeded, the likelihood was less that the concessions would be destabilizing.

The one danger of this strategy was that the Brazilian public would lose patience with the slow pace of change or lose confidence in the intentions of the leadership. There was, however, one convincing reason for giving the government a chance: the most likely alternative seemed worse. As one opposition member told an American journalist in 1975, “maybe it's better to go along with Geisel's slow decompression than to provoke a new clampdown by the hardliners,” and that seemed to be the predominant mood in Brazil at that time.⁶⁰ In the 1960s,

⁵⁷ Wayne Selcher, “Contradictions, Dilemmas, and Actors in Brazil's Abertura 1975–1985” in Selcher, ed., *Political Liberalization in Brazil*, 57.

⁵⁸ Quotes from Handelman and Sanders, *Military Government*, 155, 172–173. Information above from Riordan Roett, *Brazil: Politics in a Patrimonial Society* (New York: Praeger, 1984), 147–148. Riordan Roett agrees, “The message was clear—if there was going to be liberalization, Geisel would orchestrate it.” See also, Selcher, “Introduction,” 1, 3; Baloyra, “From Moment to Moment,” 29–30; and Luciano Martins, “The ‘Liberalization’ of Authoritarian Rule in Brazil” in Guillermo O'Donnell, Phillippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Latin America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 83–84.

⁵⁹ Quote from Fleischer and Wesson, *Brazil in Transition*, 41. See also Martins, “The ‘Liberalization’ of Authoritarian Rule,” 85–7.

⁶⁰ Fleischer and Wesson, *Brazil in Transition*, 41; *New York Times*, 25 November 1973.

the military's hardliners had reacted to the threat from the opposition by demanding dictatorship by the more moderate military. It was still a force to be reckoned with in 1977, well aware of this. This division in the military led to decompression in that it allowed Geisel to maintain control without generalizing his intentions.

Obviously, the existence of a strong military was a blessing. The colonel's regime in Greece was canceled from its beginning in 1967 till 1973. In 1974, after canceled martial law in Athens, from 1974 to 1976 some further steps toward democracy were taken. An outbreak of violent protest since 1968 led to control of the Polytechnic University by the leadership of Demitrios Ioaniddes decided to be removed Papadopoulos.⁶¹

That this did not happen in Brazil was due to liberalizing generals. At times Geisel moderated the elements of his policies, taking command of the military or even putting them under protection. This occurred in October 1977 when the military was moved to Figueiredo, was dismissed in an attempt to quell the incident.⁶² On the other hand, Geisel was charged with charges of weakness. In 1977 he allowed electoral competition to the benefit of the Democratic Alliance. The promulgation of the Alliance led to a political protest in Brazil and was condemned by the military groups in Brazil.⁶³

Even so, the success of the Brazilian strategy was a chance. On 30 April 1981, an explosion occurred in Rio de Janeiro on the same day as a military army intelligence officer and several others were killed. Brazil that the hardliners in the military were involved in a terrorist attack during the concert and the military was investigated by Figueiredo. The president preferred to keep the investigation of the incident was unproductive. The military was never interviewed. The military decompression continued on course.

⁶¹ *New York Times*, 25 November 1973.

⁶² Roett, *Brazil*, 147; Levine, “Brazil's Definition,” 63.

⁶³ Levine, “Brazil's Definition,” 63.

⁶⁴ Robert Levine, “Brazil: The Dimensions of the Military,” in Roett, *Brazil*, 153.

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the military's hardliners had reacted to what they took to be an increase in the
 threat from the opposition by demanding and getting a severe tightening of the
 dictatorship by the more moderate President Castello Branco. The hardliners were
 still a force to be reckoned with in Brazil in the 1970s, and the opposition was
 well aware of this. This division in the armed forces, then, may have been a boon
 to decompression in that it allowed Geisel and Figueiredo to proceed slowly enough
 to maintain control without generating complete skepticism about their ultimate
 intentions.

Obviously, the existence of a strong threat from the far right is not an unmixed
 blessing. The colonel's regime in Greece experienced virtually no public dissent
 from its beginning in 1967 till 1973. In August of that year, Georgios Papadopoulos
 canceled martial law in Athens, freed several political prisoners, and promised
 some further steps toward democracy in the future. Three months later, the first
 outbreak of violent protest since 1967 occurred when students and workers seized
 control of the Polytechnic University in Athens. Hardline elements under the leader-
 ship of Demitrios Ioaniddes decided that liberalization had gone far enough and
 removed Papadopoulos.⁶¹

That this did not happen in Brazil was due in large part to the skill of the liber-
 alizing generals. At times Geisel moved aggressively to eliminate possible oppo-
 nents of his policies, taking commands away from those who opposed his policies
 or even putting them under protective arrest. A particularly important instance
 occurred in October 1977 when the minister of the army, a potential hardline rival
 to Figueiredo, was dismissed in an atmosphere of high tension, though without
 incident.⁶² On the other hand, Geisel was firm enough with the opposition to avoid
 charges of weakness. In 1977 he adopted the "April Package," which altered the
 electoral competition to the benefit of the pro-government National Renovating
 Alliance. The promulgation of the April Package touched off an upsurge in polit-
 ical protest in Brazil and was condemned by representatives from many leading
 groups in Brazil.⁶³

Even so, the success of the Brazilian liberalizers may ultimately have rested on
 chance. On 30 April 1981, an explosion took place outside a large convention center
 in Rio de Janeiro on the same day a popular music concert was scheduled, killing
 an army intelligence officer and severely wounding another. It was rumored in
 Brazil that the hardliners in the military had intended to stage an apparent ter-
 rorist attack during the concert and then use it as a pretext to seize power from
 Figueiredo. The president preferred not to provoke the hardliners, and no serious
 investigation of the incident was undertaken. The surviving participant, for ex-
 ample, was never interviewed. The moderate opposition rallied to Figueiredo, and
 decompression continued on course.⁶⁴

⁶¹ *New York Times*, 25 November 1973.

⁶² Roett, *Brazil*, 147; Levine, "Brazil's Definition of Democracy," 70.

⁶³ Levine, "Brazil's Definition," 63.

⁶⁴ Robert Levine, "Brazil: The Dimensions of Democratization," *Current History* 81 (February 1982),
 82; Roett, *Brazil*, 153.

CONCLUSION

Liberalization seems most likely to succeed when it is not undertaken under outside pressure, when the economic climate is favorable, when it aims at a transformation of the autocracy and not just its amelioration, and when the regime has avoided the half-measures that Machiavelli warned of. A regime is probably best off when it has as little to apologize about as possible, but rulers that are sufficiently ruthless may enhance the prospects for liberalization in the future by liquidating the opposition thoroughly and instilling terror in their publics. Regimes in which a perpetrator can be identified and punished may have an easier time satisfying their people's desire for justice than ones in which the ruler himself cannot evade responsibility.

All of the factors above, however, are less important than the tactics the government uses in dealing with the question of how to deter and contain protest without destroying the credibility of liberalization. In both Spain and Brazil, the regimes moved slowly and gradually, careful to preserve the image that they were dealing from a position of strength. The liberalizers in the Brazilian military may well have been aided by the visible division in their ranks, with the existence of the hardliners allowing Geisel to escape the blame for the slow pace of decompression.

The history of these four countries thus corroborates Tocqueville's admonition that "the most perilous time for a bad government is when it seeks to mend its ways." But there is also wisdom in John Locke's observation that ". . . Revolutions happen not upon every little mismanagement in public affairs. Great mistakes in the ruling part, many wrong and inconvenient laws, and all the slips of humane frailty will be born by the People, without mutiny or murmur."⁶⁵

It is still surprising how strong a case one can make that things could have been different in the two cases that I have classified as failures, Iran and Hungary. In both of these, it was only after the government's actions had caused the people to lose *both* their fear and their hope that the people took up arms against their rulers.

The implications of this for the United States and its foreign policy are not obvious. It would be difficult, of course, to interpret the record above as justification for an aggressive human rights policy of the kind advocated by some in the Carter administration. On the other hand, if the Hungarian and Iranian revolutions were brought about to an important extent (though certainly not entirely) by tactical mistakes, our conclusions need not be completely pessimistic about the possibilities of improving conditions in other countries without damaging American interests.

The United States, in my view, need not abandon all efforts to persuade friendly governments to liberalize, but must pursue this aim with a greater understanding of the dangers a bad government faces as it tries to change its ways. In particular,

⁶⁵ Alexis de Tocqueville, *The Old Regime and the French Revolution* (New York: Doubleday, 1955), 176-177; John Locke, *Second Treatise* (New York: New American Library, 1965), chap. xix, para. 225.

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Americans must remember that concessions that appear to be made from weakness are more likely to be destabilizing, and that successful liberalization may require some tactical retreats, as it did in Brazil.

It may be said in objection that bad governments deserve to fail and that justice is best served when they do. This is undoubtedly true in some cases. Some of the rulers discussed here probably did deserve to end their days on this earth swinging from a lamp post. But the major moral concern should not be seeing that the leaders get what is coming to them, but rather doing what one can to minimize the suffering of those living under oppressive rule. Here, I only want to remind the reader that revolution is and ought to be a desperate remedy, a means of the last resort. The toll taken in most revolutions in recent history is ample evidence of that. Moreover, history has often mocked those who have given their lives to the cause of freedom by replacing one tyrannical government with another that is no better, and frequently worse. How often has that happened in this century? Russia, China, Cuba, Vietnam, Iran, and now perhaps one or more countries in Central America—the record is not encouraging. In such cases, improvements will be best achieved by a policy of caution and flexibility, and not through a doctrinaire insistence on the immediate elimination of all existing evils.

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EASTERN EUROPE

A Freer, but Messier, Order

In Poland and Hungary, George Bush will confront Communism in flux

BY WALTER ISAACSON BUDAPEST

In the waning years of the 20th century, the greatest challenge posed by Communism will not be containing its spread but coping with its decline. From the bloodshed in Beijing to the political paralysis in Poland, efforts to shed hard-line systems are provoking agonial gasps that are at turns cheering and frightening.

When he begins his tour of Poland and Hungary this weekend, President George Bush will seek to certify a new era emerging from these convulsions. For Poland and Hungary are where the cold war began 42 years ago. And when historians write about the implosion of Communism in the late 1980s, they will note that it likewise began when those two satellites meandered from the Soviet orbit.

Back in 1947, as it became clear that Poland's Peasant Party would beat the Communists, Stalin's army cut off its phones and eventually sent the party's chieftain, Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, fleeing to the West. In Hungary that year, after the anti-Communist Smallholders Party won power, the Soviet army arrested its leader and forced a confession of subversion.

This time in Poland, the opposition movement Solidarity was able to reduce the Communist Party to the role of a supplicant, and may end up forcing the country's ruler, General Wojciech Jaruzelski, out of power. In Hungary, the Smallholders Party is back, feuding with itself and with the dozen or so other parties expected to take part in free elections scheduled for next year.

In both countries, Bush will find the disjuncture between economic and political progress that has, in very different ways, plagued Mikhail Gorbachev's *glasnost*-led revolution as well as Deng Xiaoping's marketplace-led revolt. Poland combines robust political competition with a downtrodden economy almost too far gone for reform. Hungary combines an explosion of private enterprise with a less vigorous attitude toward democracy. The message the U.S. and its West European allies can bring to both places is the truth that lies at the heart of democratic capitalism: economic and political freedoms work best in tandem.

The political reforms in Poland have the most dramatic flair of any in the Communist world, in part because they are being won under the inspiring banner of Solidarity. Roughhewn shipyard workers such as Lech Walesa and Bogdan Lis sur-


vived seven years of repression, forced the government into half-free elections, then humiliated it.

Walesa and his allies are discovering the cruelty of the ironic punishment that the Greek goddess Nemesis reserved for her cheekiest victims: granting their very desires. Solidarity's success at the polls exposes the fact that for all its popularity, it has no program or philosophy. Its leaders are dancing desperately to avoid being forced to share power with the Communists. It is as if the penalty one pays for losing an election in Poland is having to be in power.

Partly because of opposition from Solidarity, General Jaruzelski, the Communist Party leader who declared martial law in 1981, made a startling announcement last Friday that he would not be a candidate in this week's election by Parliament for the powerful new office of President. Instead, with Solidarity's approval, the party is expected to nominate

General Czeslaw Kiszczak, 63, the Interior Minister who won the confidence of the union as the government's main negotiator during the round-table talks that led to the democratic reforms. Moscow has invited Walesa to come for a visit to discuss the political situation.

After more than 40 years of Communism, Poland is an economic cripple. Inflation is running close to 100% a year, the zloty is not considered real money, and all important transactions are done in dollars. The wait for an apartment is 20 years, an almost inconceivable reality that dominates the personal planning of most Poles. The country's underlying problem is that it invested in all the wrong industries. The state has squandered foreign loans and subsidized shipyards, steel mills and coal mines. In an age when information and high technology are the driving force of economic growth, Poland is saddled with a string-and-can phone system and a work force that spends much of its time moon-





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lighting as middlemen for goods and services that no one is producing.

Hungary also struggles under a large foreign debt. But with an economic exuberance that matches Poland's political exhilaration, Budapest is making progress toward recovery. Western visitors who evince any interest in investing in Hungary are likely to find officials knocking at their hotel doors with lists of state enterprises for sale. Hungary now permits its citizens to start large-scale private businesses and hire up to 500 workers. A fledgling stock market has 147 listings. Within three years, half of Hungary's economy is expected to be in private hands. Consumer goods are expensive, but, unlike in Poland, they are plentiful. Hungarians proudly use the phrase "like an American movie" to describe their store shelves and dinner tables.

Reforms in Hungary were begun slowly in the early 1960s, with care taken not to aggravate the Soviet sensibilities that caused tanks to roll in 1956. Today the barbed wire of the Iron Curtain separating Hungary from Austria has been snipped into souvenirs, Russian is no longer required in school, the Karl Marx University of Economics in Budapest has stopped preaching Marxist economics, and there is open discussion about withdrawing from the Warsaw Pact.

Hungary has no parallel to Solidari-

ty's opposition, and what does exist is dominated by intellectuals. Instead, the push toward democracy is being led from within the Communist Party by members of its reform wing, most prominently by Politburo member Imre Pozsgay. At a meeting of the party's Central Committee last weekend, Pozsgay was nominated to become the country's new state President as soon as constitutional changes imbue that office with real power. The party's other leading reformer, Rezső Nyers, was tapped as party chairman. The moves diluted the power of General Secretary Károly Grósz, who until a few months ago was himself considered a reformer.

As Poland and Hungary succeed in charting a more independent course, Czechoslovakia may ultimately follow—once it outgrows the generation of leaders whose power stems from the crushing of the Prague Spring in 1968. Reforms in the other three Soviet satellites may take longer. East Germany, moderately prosperous, puts a premium on order and caution. Rumania, historically prone to repressive regimes, has been impoverished by Nicolae Ceaușescu's brutal combination of despotism and nepotism dubbed "socialism in one family." Bulgaria likewise remains an unrepentant police state.

The East bloc was always an unnatural construct: a collection of diverse nations and peoples consigned by fate to live with the occupying tanks of an increasingly insecure empire. To the extent that this subjugation is dissipating, the cold war is ending. Yet such progress will also bring challenges in a world no longer anchored by the stability of a superpower rivalry. The waning of Communist dominance in Eastern Europe may create a better world, but not necessarily a simpler one.

Nemesis may be at work again, granting the West's wish for a rollback of Soviet domination in Eastern Europe. And so as Bush gives two cheers for the changes in Poland and Hungary, the West would do well to pay heed to the difficulties and problems such an evolution could bring. Among them:

► Democracy can be messy. Eastern Europe has only limited experience with multiparty systems, and there are no signs so far that Poland or Hungary will evolve toward a Western-style, genteel competition between moderate right and left. Instead, nationalism, anti-Semitism, neo-Stalinism and other philosophies ripe for demagoguery may come to the fore.

► Nationalist passions have been the bane of Central Europe for centuries, sometimes spilling over to engulf the Continent in wars. The division of Europe into two blocs served to subdue the more parochial animosities. But as the Iron Curtain lifts, hatreds may be rekindled. Hungary's border with Rumania has been closed even as the one with Austria has opened. A dispute over Rumania's ethnic Hungarians has caused some Hungarians

to ask seriously whether they could defeat Rumania's disciplined army.

► An end to the division of Europe could create pressure for a reunited Germany. The history of European wars (and world wars) has been partly the story of nationalist rivalries and partly the story of German expansionism. As the cold war ends, Germany—formally reunited or not—will dominate middle Europe economically, politically and culturally.

► In time, there could be a backlash against capitalism. The excesses inherent in even a successful capitalist system will create resentments, and may give birth to the sort of extremist parties emerging in Western Europe.

► Democratic passions are not likely to resolve deep-seated economic problems. Solidarity's base of support, for example, is among workers in the shipyards, steel mills and coal mines. Solidarity is not likely to close down unproductive industries, or to impose the wage restraints and price rises the country needs.

► Without a Warsaw Pact threat, NATO may gradually dissolve. Likewise, the denuclearization of Europe could become nearly total. Appealing as this may sound, it could endanger the armed balance that has kept the peace since 1945. The cold war was also a cold peace: now in its 45th year, the era that historian John Lewis Gaddis calls the "long peace" is surpassing the stable stretches imposed by Metternich and then Bismarck in the 19th century. One reason is that nuclear weapons made localized wars and territorial disputes too dangerous to allow. They also made a direct confrontation between East and West or a Soviet invasion of Central Europe unthinkable.

Under the Brezhnev Doctrine, the Soviet Union declared that socialism was irreversible, which translated into a decree that its Warsaw Pact neighbors not be allowed to free themselves of Communist clutches. Hence the tanks of 1956 and 1968. Now comes the Gorbachev Doctrine, as articulated in his 1988 U.N. speech: "Freedom of choice is a universal principle that . . . applies both to the capitalist and the socialist system."

Does this mean that the Soviets will let Poland and Hungary drift as far as they want? Even Gorbachev might not know the answer to that question. What seems likely now is that Moscow may tolerate Poland's political pluralism and Hungary's economic experimentation, but it will be tempted to intervene if either seemed about to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact and expel Soviet troops.

A primary goal of the West must be to avoid such a crackdown. Thus the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have a common interest: defining the Soviet Union's proper security concerns and ensuring that they are respected. That is the notion behind Henry Kissinger's proposal that critics have dubbed Yalta II. If the Soviets felt assured




ILLUSTRATION FOR TIME BY DAVID SUTER

that the U.S. would not exploit the changes militarily, they could be expected to allow the reforms more leeway. Bush has indicated support for this approach; in a speech in West Germany in late May, he said he wanted to "let the Soviets know that our goal is not to undermine their legitimate security interests."

Bush—and the West as a whole—should go farther. Poland and Hungary are striving toward a societal ideal based on more than economic and democratic reforms. The components: a legal structure that guarantees individual rights and the existence of independent institutions—such as churches, trade unions, newspapers, political organizations, professional associations, private businesses—that prevent the state from exerting a dominating influence in everyday life. Mark Palmer, America's energetic Ambassador to Hungary, argues persuasively that the U.S. should follow Western Europe's example in shoring up this evolution by creating a web of social, political, business and economic links to the people of Eastern Europe.

During the postwar "Pax Americana," Washington's world role largely involved resisting Communism through a




ILLUSTRATION FOR TIME BY DAVID SUTER

network of military alliances. That period is passing, being replaced by what has been dubbed a "Fax Americana." America's influence will derive, in part, from its role as an exemplar of ideas and a purveyor of information. Ronald Reagan, in a speech in London last month, talked about how "electronic beams blow through the Iron Curtain as if it were lace." In Bratislava, Czechoslovak students sometimes drop by the city's new hotel, equipped for international television reception, where the maids let them

watch the music-video shows. Recently, the students have been tuning in to reports from China instead. George Orwell prophesied that advances in information technology would lead to Big Brother's total control. It is more likely that, as Reagan said, the "Goliath of totalitarianism will be brought down by the David of the microchip."

Understanding the challenges that will arise from the fracturing of the Soviet bloc will help the U.S. avoid the unseemly tendency to gloat. But it should not obscure the epochal nature of the change occurring. Poland and Hungary are abandoning the basic tenets that Lenin distorted after Marx and that Stalin distorted after Lenin: a rigidly centralized economy, a one-party political system and a suppression of personal freedoms. People are electing their representatives for the first time. They are reading independent newspapers and starting their own businesses. They are even tearing down the fences that have kept the world in an armed standoff for almost two generations. With help from the rest of the world, these freedoms could be savored long after the problems they may cause are relegated to a historical footnote. ■

SOVIET UNION

The Odd Case of M. Orlov

A defector who dies in Moscow turns out to be a spy

The obituary read like the opening page of a spy novel. Mikhail Yevgenyevich Orlov, alias Glenn Michael Souther, who had "made a large contribution" to Soviet state security, had "died suddenly" at 32. For the KGB leadership committee, which signed the article in the military newspaper *Red Star* last week, Orlov's death was a "huge loss." But could this Orlov really be Souther, a onetime U.S. Navy photographer who had defected to the Soviet Union more than a year ago? In calling Souther by a Russian name, the obituary seemed to suggest that the deceased had actually been a Soviet mole, sent to live in America at an early age and assigned to burrow into the U.S. military.

In a surprising show of *glasnost*, General Vladimir Kryuchkov, head of the KGB, hurried to correct that impression.

Yes, he told reporters in Moscow, Orlov was Souther, who first surfaced in the Soviet Union last July claiming that the FBI had been harassing him. "I lost my future," he said. But Souther acquired his Russian name only after he was granted asylum last year. What was news was that Souther, as *Izvestia* reported last week, had been spying for the Soviets "for a long time" and had acquired the rank of KGB major.

Souther had aroused suspicions before his defection. Graduating from high school in Cumberland, Me., in 1975, he enlisted in the Navy and was trained as a photographer. Based in Italy at Sixth Fleet headquarters from 1979 to 1982, he married an Italian woman. They later separated, and in 1986 his estranged wife approached a Navy officer to report Souther as a spy. Souther had too much extra money, she claimed, and took Government documents home in violation of regulations. Authorities initially dismissed her accusations as an ex-wife's spite, but now suspect that Souther was recruited by the KGB during that tour in



Glenn Souther

TASS/AFB

Italy. Kryuchkov refused to confirm that but said more details of Souther's career in espionage would be published. "We can be quite open about this," he said. "We have our spies, and you have yours."

Souther left the Navy in 1982 to study Russian literature at Virginia's Old Dominion University. He also worked as a reservist at the Atlantic fleet intelligence center in Norfolk. He was assigned to a laboratory processing satellite-reconnaissance photos and also might have been privy to sensitive communications intercepts. The investigation into his ex-wife's allegations was reopened in 1986, and after questioning by the FBI, Souther defected. In spite of his warm reception by the KGB, his marriage to a Russian and the birth of their daughter, he was not happy in Moscow. "I haven't found my niche exactly," Souther told Soviet television viewers last year, but he had decided "to live here or not to live." He apparently decided on the latter course: according to Kryuchkov, Souther had committed suicide "in a nervous state of mind." ■

A Voice From **Budapest**

Making Democracy: Stir Often, Do No

East Europe's lessons from its own Tiananmen Squares.

By MIKLOS HARASZTI

PRESIDENT BUSH will see an enormous leap forward on the way from Communism to democracy when he visits Poland and Hungary in a week or so. He will have the problem of deciding whom to congratulate for it. His other problem might well be whether he may come to regret those congratulations after he leaves. To avoid the kind of disappointment that he must be suffering now when he reflects on his visit to Beijing, he should not be too shy or too diplomatic about continuing to press for human rights.

The Hungarian developments over the last year surprise even me, the perpetual oppositionist. Only two and a half weeks ago, I came back to Budapest after spending the academic year at Bard College in New York. There, as a "dissident in residence," I tried to observe and understand the upheavals taking place in the Soviet-occupied part of Europe.

How could I not be optimistic at this time? I came back on the eve of June 16, when a crowd officially estimated at 250,000 gathered in Budapest for a ceremony marking the reburial of Imre Nagy, Prime Minister during the 1956 uprising against Soviet domination, and to commemorate executed freedom fighters whom Janos Kadar, the General Secretary and then President of the Communist Party, had fought to forget with a Macbethian obsession.

Exactly one year before, Mr. Kadar's successor, Karoly Grosz, had ordered the police to use truncheons and tear gas to break up a rally in Budapest by a thousand people, including myself, demanding just such a ceremony. "Never," Mr. Grosz said.

I received the invitation to Bard in spring 1988 when I was an editor of an underground paper and a writer

Miklos Haraszti, who returned to Budapest in June after a year in the United States, is a Hungarian writer and an editor of the journal *Beszelo*.



The coffin of Imre Nagy, Prime Minister during the 1956 uprising against Soviet domination, at reburial ceremony in Budapest last month.

whose work was banned. Today I wouldn't qualify for the position. Censorship has absolutely ceased to exist in Hungary. Our journal has become a regular weekly with public distribution. And the Communist Party has agreed to negotiate with the opposition. I am now a member of the opposition delegation meeting with Government authorities to prepare a new press law.

So why am I still worried?

If I think of Beijing it is not only because Mr. Grosz is still in power, even with the Communist Party's widening

sure is never counterproductive that would like to keep the West, such pressure to halt the worsening of op

Mr. Bush will address when he comes to Poland only as a guest of the Communist Party as a guest of the people of Hungary can send a strong message of human rights concessions

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Syga/Thierry Orban

during the 1956 uprising against Soviet domination last month.

Today I wouldn't qualify for the absolutely ceased to exist in become a regular weekly with the Communist Party has the opposition. I am now a delegation meeting with Government a new press law. ... is not only because Mr. Grosz is the Communist Party's widening

of its leadership to a four-man presidency. So too are those who ordered the crackdown against those whose protest a year ago forced the changes that the Government is now so eager to show Mr. Bush.

There should be no mistake. We have not yet reached a point of no return. There is no guarantee from the Soviet Union that, in spite of its declarations, it won't interfere. Nor have the Polish and Hungarian authorities at the negotiating table yet gotten rid of the guns in their pockets.

As Victor Orban, a speaker at the June 16 ceremony, told the assembled crowd: "We are not especially thankful that we are not being massacred like those students in Beijing, since we could be massacred if the authorities wished. We need to create a situation in which they cannot oppress us, even if they want to."

If there is hope, it doesn't come only from the growing realism of the Communist parties in Moscow, Warsaw and Budapest. Realism on the part of the West and realism on the part of us oppressed East Europeans provides much more hope than that.

There is also hope in the fact that Eastern Europe has had its Tiananmen Squares and has learned its lessons from them. Even though the democratic movements of East Europe today are stronger than ever, with the experiences of 1956, 1968 and 1981 in mind, we don't have to be warned that post-Communist democracy is best when cooked on a low flame.

Poland and Hungary are engaged in a conspiracy of caution. The democratic movements in both countries have decided to renounce the taking of revenge for earlier failures and to let the Communists retire from power step by step.

But to help the one-party rule to its painless collapse, we need from the West not only caution but also resolution.

Here are some truths that East Europeans have learned from their human rights battles; oppression never eases without pressure from foreign governments; external pressure is never counterproductive, and in the case of countries that would like to keep advantageous relations with the West, such pressure always helps, at the very least, to halt the worsening of oppression.

Mr. Bush will address these issues the right way if, when he comes to Poland and Hungary, he responds not only as a guest of the Communist governments but also as a guest of the people demanding democracy. Thus he can send a strong message that the West will not make human rights concessions on political grounds to anyone.

Bush and Beijing

Taking the Measure of A 'Measured Response'

By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN

WASHINGTON

EVERY time President Bush and Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d have spoken with the press in the last two weeks, they have been badgered with the same question, "Why aren't you saying and doing more about China?" Each time, with increasing exasperation, they have answered, "Look at all we have said and done."

Mr. Baker himself said: "We think a measured response is just that. It calls for a response which clearly expresses our outrage, but does not resort to an overly emotional response which involves inflammatory rhetoric."

But one person's inflammatory rhetoric is another person's poetry, and because the Administration's declarations on Tiananmen Square have contained no poetry, no memorable language, nothing seems to have stuck in the public's mind.

While the President seemed to find the perfect combination of words and deeds to express the nation's desire for progress with Moscow on arms control on his recent swing through Europe, his attempts to strike a similar balance in relation to Beijing have left many unsatisfied.

The Administration has been criticized as being neither forceful enough in its condemnation of what happened in Tiananmen Square nor convincing enough in its articulation of what it calls the "countervailing geopolitical considerations," which require a maintenance of ties with Beijing.

As a result, Congress put forth its own sanctions and declarations last week, which the Administration rejected as superfluous.

Presidents shape their policy environment through their words. "We often think of political rhetoric as a bad word, as pandering, as mere talk — it's action that counts," said Michel J. Sandel, a political theorist at Harvard University. "But that is a mistaken idea and one that the President seems to share. At the level of the Presidency, there is no sharp distinction between words and deeds. Talk is action. Words are deeds."

He added, "The President's measured policy response on China was very reasonable, but because he did not at the same time articulate the importance of the moment, give clear expression to the principles and ideals at stake, his deeds were lost."

Ronald Reagan's "genius," argued Mr. Sandel, was his ability to articulate a clear moral message vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. As a result, Mr. Sandel said, people were confident that they knew where he stood and therefore they were ready to accept a nuanced policy toward Moscow, including sweeping arms control agreements.

The Larger Themes

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Proprietary to the United Press International 1983

September 23, 1983, Friday, PM cycle

SECTION: Washington News

LENGTH: 440 words

BYLINE: By JIM ANDERSON

DATELINE: WASHINGTON

KEYWORD: Bush-React

BODY:

Hungary has politely turned down a U.S. invitation to move out of Moscow's orbit and suggested that it could play a role as a moderating influence in the dialogue between the super-powers.

The American invitation to Hungary, as well as Romania, to play a role more independent of the Kremlin was made publicly in Vienna Wednesday by Vice President George Bush at the conclusion of an eastern European tour.

He said the United States would respond positively to those eastern European nations who took a more western-oriented policy.

The Bush speech was described by a State Department spokesman as a restatement of the U.S. policy of "differentiation" -- treating Soviet allies differently, according to their behavior. In that policy, East Germany would be given less trade or credit benefits than Hungary, for example.

But the timing of Bush's remarks, in the aftermath of world reaction to the Soviet shooting down of the Korean airliner over Sakhalin island on Sept 1 -- made it a sensitive issue.

The approach for better relations was also made privately to Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter Varokyin, who happened to be in Washington on an official visit when Bush made the speech in Vienna.

A Hungarian official, who could not be further identified under the ground rules of the talk, told reporters that Hungary seeks better relations with the United States, but not at the expense of Hungary's close ties with the Soviet Union.

"We want to be partners (with the United States), but you have to accept us as we are. We are members of the Warsaw Pact and have a common foreign policy with the Soviet Union," he said.

However, the official expressed deep concern over the strained relations between Moscow and Washington and suggested that Hungary could play a different role than it does now:

"Translating from Russian to English is not only a language problem. If no effort is made to understand the nuances, it will be very difficult. In this period, countries such as Hungary can do much to damp emotions and to have a

translating role in order to create the conditions for a minimum of mutual trust."

The official said the airliner incident has magnified the lack of understanding.

"Since the Soviet Union was formed in 1917," he said, "It has not had ten years when it did not feel threatened and encircled from the outside. That feeling is so strong ... that they still feel threatened, and react."

He insisted the Soviets, like the United States, want a strategic balance at a lower level of armaments.

"If we are not going to blow up the world, we'll have to work together on our problems."

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The Associated Press

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September 20, 1983, Tuesday, PM cycle

SECTION: International News

LENGTH: 275 words

DATELINE: BUDAPEST, Hungary

KEYWORD: Bush

BODY:

Vice President George Bush today accused the Soviets of bargaining in bad faith at the intermediate-range missile talks, and said NATO would begin deploying new arms in December unless an accord is reached.

"We have two tracks, one is negotiating, one is deployment," Bush told reporters in Communist Hungary before flying to Vienna at the end of a tour of East bloc nations. He said if the Soviets and Americans fail to agree at the talks in Geneva, "that deployment track is firm," he said.

Bush indicated that talks on the weapons would likely continue beyond their Nov. 15 deadline, saying, "We'd be still willing to negotiate on the theory that what goes in can also come out."

The vice president, listing U.S. figures showing a progressive increase in the number of Soviet SS-20 intermediate-range missiles, said the Soviets at Geneva "keep saying there is a balance when their numbers are going up and the (Atlantic) Alliance's stay at zero."

NATO plans to begin deploying 572 U.S. cruise and Pershing 2 missiles at the end of the year to counter the Soviet threat.

Earlier, Bush met with Pal Losonczi, head of Hungary's Presidential Council, whose duties are largely ceremonial.

They discussed Hungarian-U.S. relations and "opportunities for the promotion of cooperation," the official news agency MTI reported of the closed meeting.

"Both parties stressed the importance of disarmament talks and confirmed their view that meetings that can contribute to the reduction of international tension were of paramount importance," the report said.

Bush laid a wreath at the Hungarian Heroes Monument in central Budapest this morning.



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September 20, 1983, Tuesday, Late City Final Edition

SECTION: Section A; Page 4, Column 3; Foreign Desk

LENGTH: 334 words

HEADLINE: BUSH PRAISES HUNGARY ON RIGHTS

BYLINE: UPI

DATELINE: BUDAPEST, Sept. 19

BODY:

Vice President Bush praised Budapest's human rights record today and said the United States wanted better relations with all East European countries.

But Mr. Bush also stressed that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, while seeking a "fair agreement" on arms control, would respond to Soviet threats to military stability in Europe.

In Rumania, before flying to Hungary, he said that even though Washington was willing to prolong the United States-Soviet arms control talks in Geneva beyond the November cut-off date, new United States Pershing 2 and cruise nuclear missiles would be deployed in Europe in December if no agreement was reached by then.

Mr. Bush arrived in Budapest on the sixth leg of a 10-day, 7-nation tour of North Africa and Eastern and Central Europe.

"We in the United States are heartened by Hungary's efforts to expand contacts, to foster tolerance and to meet the commitments that bind both our countries under the Helsinki final act," he said in a toast at a dinner at which Prime Minister Gyorgy Lazar was host.

"In the relations between our two nations, human rights and fundamental freedoms have not represented a point of discord, but instead brought us closer together," he said.

He called United States-Hungarian relations a model for the rest of the world and added, "The United States is deeply committed to the construction of a sounder, more cooperative and constructive relationship with all of the nations with which your country is aligned."

Mr. Bush, however, said that NATO "is responding and will continue to respond to threats to the military stability that has for nearly four decades kept the peace in Europe and much of the rest of the world."

"We seek agreements that are in the enlightened self-interest of both alliances and of all peoples," he said. "We look for signs of understanding, for a readiness to construct this new relationship and we will readily respond to the outstretched hand that seeks a fair agreement."

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September 20, 1983, Tuesday, AM cycle

SECTION: International News

LENGTH: 95 words

DATELINE: BUDAPEST, Sept 20

KEYWORD: Bush-Reagan

BODY:

Vice President George Bush predicted today that President Reagan would run for a second term next year and said his chances for victory were good.

Bush told a news conference at the end of a two-day visit to Hungary that he expected to be Reagan's running mate, as the president had made clear publicly he wanted him on the ticket.

"If the United States economy continues to recover as at present, President Reagan is going to be exceptionally difficult to beat," Bush said. "If the election were held today, he would beat anybody the democrats would put forward."

40TH STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.

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September 20, 1983, Tuesday, PM cycle

SECTION: International News

LENGTH: 470 words

BYLINE: By Ronald Farquhar

DATELINE: BUDAPEST, Sept 20

KEYWORD: Bush

BODY:

Vice President George Bush and Hungarian Communist Party chief Janos Kadar are believed to have exchanged widely diverging views on the dangers of new nuclear weapons in Europe in yesterday's talks in the Hungarian capital.

No details were disclosed of Bush's meeting with Kadar or of his talks with Prime Minister Gyoergy Lazar, but Lazar said in his toast at an official dinner for Bush that a new round of the arms race threatened Europe with the gravest consequences.

He said Hungary was against new nuclear missiles being based in countries at present without such weapons.

Lazar seemed clearly to be referring to NATO's plans to deploy new U.S. missiles in Western Europe and the likelihood Moscow would base new missiles in some Warsaw Pact countries if East-West arms control talks in Geneva fail.

In his reply Bush, who arrived yesterday on the last leg of a five-day tour through East Europe, said NATO would continue to respond to threats to military stability in Europe.

He said Washington wished to negotiate agreements "in the enlightened self-interest of both alliances."

Bush said he came away from his 1-3/4-hour talks with Kadar "convinced that it is possible for the members of our two alliances to talk soberly and responsibly in a mutual search for understanding and for peace."

He described the 71-year-old Hungarian leader as "a man of enormous capacity and leadership capability."

Lazar said the visit by Bush, the highest-ranking American official ever to come to Hungary, was "an important landmark."

He said that despite international tensions and differences between their countries there were possibilities of increasing trade and economic, scientific and cultural cooperation as well as human contacts.

U.S. diplomats in Budapest said the visit was intended as a mark of recognition of Hungary's comparatively relaxed social and cultural policies and continued commitment to economic reforms and cultural ties with the West.

Bush praised Hungary's human rights record and its efforts to foster tolerance and said there was no discord between the two countries on human rights and fundamental freedoms.

In a reference to Hungary's moves to honor its Western debts, Bush said Washington understood and admired Budapest's efforts to maintain fiscal solvency.

The United States was also impressed by Hungary's economic reforms and innovative policies giving opportunities for enterprising and creative citizens.

Economic relations between the countries were good and active and should become more regular and dynamic in future years, Bush said.

The Vice President winds up his visit tomorrow with a call on President Pal Losonczi before leaving for Vienna, the final stop on a seven-nation tour that has taken him also to Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Yugoslavia and Romania.

The Associated Press

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September 19, 1983, Monday, AM cycle

SECTION: International News

LENGTH: 686 words

HEADLINE: Bush and Western leaders vow continued efforts on arms reduction

BYLINE: By GEORGE JAHN, Associated Press Writer

DATELINE: BUDAPEST, Hungary

KEYWORD: NATO Missiles

BODY:

Vice President George Bush told the leaders of this Soviet-bloc country Monday that America would continue nuclear arms talks with the Soviets "in good faith" to reduce the threat of war.

Also on Monday, the United States received renewed expressions of support from British, West German and Italian leaders in the U.S.-Soviet negotiations in Geneva on medium-range missiles in Europe.

Bush, at a dinner given by Prime Minister Gyoergy Lazar, referred to the Geneva talks and said the United States has put forward proposals "to lower the levels of the most dangerous, destabilizing weapons now in Europe." The vice president, winding up a seven-nation tour, flies to Austria Tuesday and then returns to the United States.

Lazar, in his response, did not directly criticize the United States, but said Moscow's position in the Geneva negotiations "is fair and certainly suitable to serve as grounds for substantive negotiations."

The missile talks have entered their last scheduled phase, and if there is no progress, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization plans to begin deploying 572 U.S.-made Pershing 2 and cruise missiles in Western Europe later this year. Moscow has indicated it would react by placing more new SS-20 missiles in Eastern Europe.

Bush, in Romania Sunday, said deployment of the NATO missiles would go ahead as planned, but the Geneva talks could extend beyond the Nov. 15 cutoff date and the United States would negotiate for "as long as it takes."

Both Romania and Hungary are Soviet allies, but Romania has skirted the missile issue while Hungary supports the Soviet stand, accusing the United States of seeking arms superiority.

There were these other developments involving the Geneva talks:

In Washington, administration sources disclosed that President Reagan has written the heads of all the NATO governments telling them the United States was prepared to make limited changes in its negotiating position.

One source said, "The changes under consideration are by no means earthshaking. They are mostly at the edges." He declined to provide details, but said there would be no yielding in the basic U.S. stand.

West German government spokesman Peter Boenisch said in Bonn that Reagan had written to Chancellor Helmut Kohl "several days ago" describing "modified proposals" that the United States would offer in Geneva.

He said the contents of the letter were secret, and denied a report in the Bonn-based Die Welt newspaper that said Reagan was willing to reduce the number of new missiles to be deployed by NATO from 572 to 300.

"I have not read the letter," Boenisch said. "Those who have read the letter told me that number (300) is wrong, but they refused to name the number."

British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, visiting the Netherlands, told a news conference in the Hague that even if NATO begins deploying the new missiles, the Geneva negotiations should continue. The deployment could be halted at a later date if progress is made in the talks, she said.

In an interview with the British Broadcasting Corp., she said it was certain some NATO missiles would be installed before the end of the year, but again expressed hope the deployment wouldn't scuttle the Geneva negotiations.

Mrs. Thatcher will go to West Germany Tuesday and meet with Kohl, who said Saturday that it would be the beginning of the end of NATO if West Germany went back on its commitment to deploy some of the new missiles.

In Rome, Italian Premier Bettino Craxi also said the West should press for an agreement with the Soviets at Geneva even if NATO goes ahead with its deployment plans. Craxi's office said the premier was responding to a letter from Reagan last week asking for his "personal judgment" before the United States took a final position at the negotiations.

Craxi's office reported the socialist premier reaffirmed Italy's support of the NATO deployment plan if there is no Geneva agreement and said the Western allies should be prepared to state "their readiness to resume the negotiations with equal resolution even after a possible start of deployment."

The West's Challenge, as Communism Declines

By HENRY GRUNWALD

I once knew a man who thought the West was doomed, or very nearly so. That was in the 1950s and '60s. He believed that unless the decadent democracies made a heroic effort, communism would surely triumph. Communism, he wrote, "challenges man to prove by his acts that he is the masterwork of the creation. It is an intensely practical vision. The tools to turn it into reality are at hand—science and technology. . . . Its first commandment is found, not in the Communist Manifesto, but in the first sentences of the physics primer: 'All of the progress of mankind to date results from the making of careful measurements.'"

The author of these lines was Whittaker Chambers, one of the protagonists in the now largely forgotten Hiss case. I was a friend of Chambers—a complicated and troubling man, an ex-communist who saw it as his mission to warn the world against the communist danger. Many thought his view too apocalyptic. But except for his somewhat melodramatic style, his judgment did not really differ much from that of many others who also believed that communism was on a triumphal march. The threat in Western Europe—the prospect of France or Italy "going communist"—was taken very seriously.

Early Symptoms

Today, the idea seems quite fantastic. World-wide, people know that communism, in Chambers's phrase, cannot make "careful measurements"—that it has taken the wrong measure of history, of economics and of man himself. We now know that the failure of communism is one of the great events of our time.

It certainly did not happen suddenly. In hindsight, we can see many early symptoms: the persistent inability of the Soviet Union to produce enough food; the shoddiness of its industrial output, despite its achievements in armaments and space; the eruptions in the satellite countries; the emergence of Euro-communism. Finally, we saw the Soviet expansionist drive grind to a halt in Afghanistan. Above all, we saw the contrast between the Western and Asian economies forging ahead, and the Soviet economy falling further behind.

Soviet analysts offer various explanations for the failure of communism:

- *The devil theory.* The devil, of course, is Stalin, who, it is said, perverted the revolution and is now blamed for almost everything that went wrong since, in a sort of inverted cult of personality.

- *The smaller devil theory.* The smaller devils are Stalin's successors (notably Brezhnev), who are accused of greed, corruption and incompetence.

- *The mismanagement theory.* The no-

tion here is that a potentially splendid system was destroyed by management mistakes, especially over-centralization.

But the explanations aren't good enough. Stalin has been dead for 3½ decades. Besides, it was the system that made him possible and that tolerated a Brezhnev. Similarly, the errors of over-centralization and ineffective planning are not managerial accidents, but a consequence of the system's underlying philosophy.

The real causes must be traced to communism's conception of man and society. What it comes down to is that Marx, de-

Marx, despite his stress on the future, yearned for the past. There is in communism a desire for order and stability that has not existed since the Middle Ages.

spite his stress on the future, yearned for the past. There is in communism a desire for order and stability that has not existed since the Middle Ages.

Marx based much of his intellectual system on the forces of economics, yet he did not really understand economics. Neither did most other communist theorists. In a curious way, they remind one of the monarchs who, throughout the long, slow evolution of capitalism, failed to understand what was going on. Economic forces to them meant tribute, taxes and trade. If one needed more money, one raised taxes or borrowed. Or one might even resort to desperate measures—like Louis XIV, who melted down his silver furniture to help finance his endless wars. Most monarchs felt that economic forces could be commanded; their independent dynamism wasn't recognized. Much the same could be said of most communist rulers.

But the most serious misconception of communism has to do with psychology—the failure to understand what motivates people. Property was seen as a form of theft rather than the object of a seemingly universal instinct. Profit was seen merely as capitalist greed, not a necessary incentive. Equality was seen as a universal ideal, not an ambiguous value—ambiguous because, while most people want equality in certain respects, they resent the enforced equality that downgrades individual merit, effort or luck. And individual freedom was seen as a bourgeois vice, not a deep human need. In the classic communist trade-off, freedom was exchanged for equality—except that in communist practice, equality proved to be a sham.

Mr. Gorbachev has said that this is communism's last chance. The question is whether communism can be reformed, or whether it must be replaced. The answer seems increasingly obvious.

We are all fascinated by reformers' attempts to mix communism with enough economic and political freedom to make the system work. Some reformers now speak in praise of private property, profit, incentives and market forces as if they were magic—and, above all, as if they were compatible with communism. In effect, they reject the system's moral and intellectual legitimacy.

In the past, even in the West, political freedom was often regarded as an enemy of efficiency, and we certainly have seen great economic progress in unfree states.

Our pragmatism will ultimately serve both sides.

Decaying empires can be dangerous. In Eastern Europe, there is a particularly explosive situation. The constant question is how the Soviets would act if liberalization got out of hand and threatened to undo the Warsaw Pact. Even Mr. Gorbachev would not tolerate that. The hope that some day the pact would survive in name only, but that Eastern European countries would, in fact, be free and neutral, is very much worth cherishing, but it is far from clear how it could be achieved.

Communism will fight many harsh rear-guard actions. And a failed communism is not easily replaced by democracy and the free market; both are extremely hard to achieve and to maintain. At least as likely an alternative are right-wing, nationalist dictatorships. These could arise in response to reform attempts that have actually made the consumer's lot worse.

We must recognize that the failure of communism does not automatically ensure the West's success. We face a tremendous intellectual and political challenge of improving our own societies, and, at the same time, of helping fill the void left by communism. In effect, we must help build the post-Marxist world.

Anything but Secure

In the Third World, the decline of communism's appeal will make it somewhat easier for the West to deal with inept or corrupt regimes that in the past have been able to argue that they provided the only guarantees against a communist takeover. But in many Third World countries, communism is still seen by some as a potent weapon against intolerable social conditions, and by many as a means to power. The recent advances in democracy are anything but secure.

In what looks like a moment of triumph for democracy and the free market, it is important to remember what gave rise to communism in the first place. Despite the fact that it developed into unspeakable totalitarian regimes, it grew out of a humane idealism and a legitimate protest against the miseries of early capitalism. Long before the rise of communism, Rousseau denounced "men so odious as to dare to have more than enough, while other men are dying of hunger." That challenge remains, despite the miracles of prosperity we have since achieved, and it will not disappear with the decline or even disappearance of communism.

Mr. Grunwald, retired from Time Inc., is ambassador to Austria. This is excerpted from a May speech in Munich.

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