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BRITAIN

Where Is the Black Queen?

Police hope a chess code may unlock the riddle of a woman who vanished on a trip through Ireland

A missing body, a map, a code. British mystery fans and chess buffs alike are turning from P.D. James and Agatha Christie this summer to a real-life riddle that police have yet to solve. Was Theresa Terry murdered? If so, where is her body? The riddle has drawn in the chess columnist for the *London Times* as well as dozens of would-be Sherlock Holmeses.

The victim: Terry, 43, was a widely traveled computer programmer from Lancashire who had returned to England from Australia to investigate the disappearance of funds from her bank account. In January, after telephoning a friend to say that she was in Ireland with a man, she vanished. In June, Lancashire police arrested Terry's 30-year-old traveling companion and charged him with fraud related to her \$48,500 savings account.

The map: the unnamed suspect told the police that Terry had committed suicide and that he had buried her body, but he refused to say where. Instead he handed his interrogators two sheets of paper. One contained a crude map with three rough



Deadly gambits: grand master Keene with the suspect's diagram

drawings of what could be outlines of countries. They were marked by Roman numerals. The other listed what looked like obscure chess moves.

The code: detective chief superintendent Roy Fletcher in Preston, Lancashire, called on the *Times's* chess columnist, grand master Raymond Keene. At first, Keene was as befuddled as the police. Then he recalled that Lewis Carroll's *Through the Looking-Glass* is prefaced by a chess problem in which Alice wins in 11

moves after entering a reversed world on the other side.

Taking a map of the British Isles with mirror images of towns sketched on opposite sides of a blank, gridless chessboard, which he took to be Ireland. Turning to the code, he concluded that WK meant white king, representing the police, that BQ (black queen) was the missing woman, and that BK (black king) was the suspect. Using these clues, Keene deduced that Theresa Terry must be buried in the Irish town of Limerick. His theory tallied with police discoveries that the suspect had hired a car and used credit cards in Ireland. But Keene could not interpret the letters HG, which he thought might stand for "her grave" or be reverse code for "grievous harm." More important, police have yet to find the body; they refuse to say whether they even searched for it in Limerick.

For the past two weeks, Keene's readers have offered dozens of solutions. An Irish barrister suggested that HG referred to the Holy Ground public house in the St. John's area of Limerick, a desolate place ideally suited for the disposing of bodies. To complicate matters, William Hartston, the chess correspondent for the rival *Independent*, proposed that the map represented Continental Europe and that Terry's body had been thrown from a ferry in the Bay of Naples.

AUSTRIA

The Trojan Guest

Havel meets with Waldheim, then politely cuts him up

Czechoslovakia's Vaclav Havel was just an oppressed dissident playwright when he received an invitation last year to give the keynote address at the 1990 Salzburg music and drama festival. He accepted, figuring he would not be allowed to attend since the Communist government had not let him leave the country in many years. But now Havel is the government—and he had r.s.v.p.ed, after all. So off to Mozart's birthplace the Czechoslovak President went last week, even if it did mean meeting his Austrian counterpart, Kurt Waldheim, thus breaching the international isolation imposed on the Austrian leader because of his dubious wartime past.

But if Waldheim thought he would get a r.r. windfall from Havel's visit, he underestimated his man. Though a beaming Waldheim introduced Havel to the crowd in



Waldheim, Von Weizsäcker and Havel

glowing terms, the playwright President did not return the compliment. Instead, using language that was indirect but clear enough, he verbally lacerated his opposite number, who for years concealed his service as an officer in a German army unit linked to Nazi atrocities in the Balkans during World War II. Choosing the fear of history as his theme, Havel called "the expectation that one can glide through history unpunished and rewrite one's own biography" one of "the traditional Central European delusions." More pointedly, Havel declared, "Whoever fears to look his own past in the face must necessarily fear what is to come. Lies cannot save us from lies." Asked afterward whether Havel might have had him in mind, Waldheim was belliger-

ent. "Certainly not," he told Austrian TV. "I did not rewrite my biography."

Dénounced even by some of his staunchest followers for agreeing to associate with the ostracized Austrian, Havel plainly hoped his words would pacify his critics. He apparently saw to it that his friend Richard von Weizsäcker, the West German President, also attended the festival's opening, since Von Weizsäcker is widely respected in Europe for his blunt acknowledgments of Germany's blame for the Holocaust. Both leaders repeatedly emphasized that their visits were private, not official, and for added effect, they cut their stays short, leaving Austria within several hours of their arrival. Still, the visit enraged many Jews, four of whom, including American Rabbi Avi Weiss, were arrested for public disorder after they shouted at Waldheim before Havel spoke.

Since his election in 1986, Waldheim has wooed only one other Western head of state to Austria, Cypriot President George Vassiliou, who visited Vienna in early July. With two years left in his term and with the boycott against him broken, Waldheim might yet have other callers. But after his encounter with Havel, he just might prefer his solitude.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
London, England

For Immediate Release

July 8, 1990

FACT SHEET

Checklist of Key Initiatives in the
London Declaration

The London Declaration includes nineteen initiatives to set a new course for the North Atlantic Alliance and help shape the new Europe. They fall into four broad categories, as follows:

1. Reaching out to old adversaries
 - pledge "never in any circumstance" to be "the first to use force."
 - propose a joint declaration of NATO and Warsaw Pact member states making a commitment to non-aggression, open to other CSCE states.
 - invite Gorbachev and other Eastern leaders to address the North Atlantic Council.
 - invite Warsaw Pact member governments to establish regular diplomatic liaison with NATO.
 - intensify military-to-military contacts, including visits by NATO military commanders to Eastern capitals.
2. Change character of conventional defense
 - keep CFE in session until treaty is done.
 - pledge that follow-on talks will include measures to limit military manpower in Europe and, with this goal in mind, a commitment will be made at time of CFE signing concerning the manpower levels of forces of a united Germany.
 - look beyond CFE to a new conventional arms control negotiations which will seek "further far-reaching measures in the 1990s to limit the offensive capability of conventional armed forces in Europe, so as to prevent any nation from maintaining disproportionate military power on the continent."

- move away from 'forward defense' and field smaller and restructured active forces that are more flexible, scaling back readiness of active units, reducing number of exercises and relying more heavily on the ability to build up larger forces if and when they might be needed.
 - rely increasingly on multinational corps made up of national units.
3. Adopt a new NATO nuclear strategy
- Adopt a new nuclear strategy
 - propose to eliminate all NATO nuclear artillery shells from Europe, once SNF negotiations begin, if the Soviet Union will reciprocate.
 - modify 'flexible response' to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons and adopt a new strategy making nuclear forces truly weapons of last resort.
4. Help build a Europe whole and free through strengthening the CSCE
- agree that CSCE Summit should endorse new standards for free societies on free elections, the rule of law, economic cooperation, and environmental protection.
 - set up regular consultations at ministerial or head of government level at least once each year.
 - schedule major review conferences at least once every two years.
 - establish a secretariat to coordinate the meetings and conferences.
 - set up a mechanism to monitor elections.
 - create a center for the prevention of conflict.
 - form a CSCE parliament, the Assembly of Europe.

From Revolution to Democracy: Central and Eastern Europe in the New Europe



United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.

Following is Secretary Baker's prepared address at Charles University, Prague, Czechoslovakia, February 7, 1990.

On an autumn day in Washington, D.C., 72 years ago, a messenger brought an envelope to the White House. A clerk stamped the enclosed letter, "Received, October 18, 1918." The letter was sent by an elderly former professor from Prague to his friend, a former professor from Princeton. The letter was timely, for on that very day—October 18—the Princeton professor, Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States, was considering a recent proposal from the Austro-Hungarian Empire. That letter to the White House was the Declaration of Independence of the Czechoslovak nation. Thomas Masaryk had sent it.

As our 28th President read the document from the man who would be your first President, he must have been stirred by the words that recalled our own declaration of independence from an empire. He must have been moved by the closing passage:

The forces of darkness have served the victory of light—the longed-for age of humanity is dawning. We believe in democracy, we believe in liberty—and liberty ever more.

That same day, October 18, Woodrow Wilson sent his reply to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. He recognized the Czecho-Slovak National Council as a

"government clothed with proper authority." And he insisted that Czechs and Slovaks, not an emperor in Vienna, should be the judges of their own destiny.

But the wisdom of Masaryk and Wilson, the rationality of democracy and self-determination, did not last.

The days of reason of 1918 yielded to the unreasoning darkness of 1938 and 1948. Czechoslovakia witnessed—and endured—frightening totalitarian power and the breakdown of the European order. The United States returned to Europe, and America's young men died, resisting Nazi and Fascist aggression. Then America stayed in Europe to contain Stalinist expansionism.

Now the revolutions of 1989 have revived an age of reason for Czechoslovakia and Eastern and central Europe.

That is what brings us together in this special place. Twenty-two years ago, students just like you—students like Jan Palach—joined during a fateful Prague spring to restore the vibrant democratic society that once stood at the heart of Europe—only to be crushed by the twisted normality of "normalization," by the unreason of the era of stagnation. Now you—the students of this great university—have taken part, heroically and responsibly, in your velvet revolution.

So it is especially fitting for me to come here, to Czechoslovakia, to Prague, to this university, to talk with you about how we might promote, perpetuate, and

protect Europe's democratic revolutions. Never again should you—or any other people—have totalitarianism steal away your freedom. Never again should you be just the objects of history, unable to effect, much less shape, your own destiny, unable to do anything but cry out: "*o nas, bez nas, proti nam*"—about us, without us, against us.

From Revolution to Lasting Democracy

In December in Berlin, I discussed four key features of the new European architecture: NATO, the European Community (EC), the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and a continuing American role in Europe.

Here in Prague, I want to resume that discussion. I want to share my thoughts on how Czechoslovakia and its neighbors in central and Eastern Europe can move from revolutions to lasting democracies that draw strength from the new architecture.

The historic, democratic movements that we are witnessing across Europe—here in Prague and in Bratislava, in Warsaw and Budapest, in Berlin, Sofia, Belgrade, and Bucharest—hold great promise for all of us. They hold the promise that Europe can achieve what President Havel has called "the era of freedom;" what President Bush has called a "Europe whole and free."

We must work to fulfill that promise and to protect it. Indeed, we all know that initial impulses for democracy may not be enough. If 1989 was the year of sweeping away, 1990 must become the year of building anew.

Four challenges confront the newly emerging democracies of this region.

First, the spirit of revolution needs to move from the streets into the government. Transitional regimes need to give way to fair and free elections that establish open parliaments with a place for opposition. The new democratic political systems need to respect the rule of law and fundamental individual rights and liberties—including freedom of speech, assembly, religion, and the press. Majority rule must respect minority rights.

Second, the spirit of the new Europe needs to be reflected in security arrangements that remove the threat of military aggression or intimidation and promote the peaceful settlement of disputes. Elections and new security treaties will be mutually reinforcing, for only freely elected governments can legitimize the security arrangements the treaties will codify.

Third, the spirit of economic reform needs to move forward to allow free men and women to enjoy economic liberty—including the rights to private ownership and to work alone or collectively in markets where prices are set by individual choices, not centralized *diktat*. The improved performance and freedom of market economies will be necessary to help sustain popular support for the new democracies.

Following from these three challenges, I suggest there may also be a **fourth**: Some of the new democracies of the region may determine that they can better support and sustain their common effort if they do so in concert, perhaps through some form of regional cooperation.

In each of these efforts, the evolving institutions of a new Europe—NATO, the EC, CSCE—will play important roles. So will America. For as you make progress toward democratic ideals, so do we, for that is the essence of America. Both Wilson and Masaryk understood that.

None of us should underestimate the difficulty of the work ahead. But neither should we underestimate the great opportunity presented all of us by your courage.

As President Havel said on New Year's Day: "Let us teach both ourselves and others that politics does not have to be the art of the possible, especially if this means the art of speculating, calculating,

intrigues, secret agreements, and pragmatic maneuvering but that it also can be the art of the impossible, that is the art of making both ourselves and the world better."

Free Elections: The First Challenge

Two months ago in Berlin, I emphasized that governments based on the consent of the governed are the first requirement for an enduring peace in Europe. Americans value self-determination because we value the dignity and freedom of the individual. We value it, too, because the principle of self-determination is the only basis upon which legitimate governments can stand.

The steps you take are not just your own; they are also steps forward for all states that have a stake in a legitimate European order, including the United States and the Soviet Union. Only through the legitimacy of democracy will we achieve a resilient and lasting stability.

Governments accountable to their peoples—and more concerned with the livelihood of their citizens than with their *apparats*, armies, or secret police—will secure a Europe whole and free in a way armies of tanks never could. Democratic governments are far more likely to promote the well-being of their citizens than to pursue expansionist, aggressive aims.

President Gorbachev also appears to have understood this opportunity. By word and deed, this new Soviet leadership seems to agree that legitimacy, not force, is the only way to ensure European stability. As Foreign Minister Shevardnadze said just last month: "We are emerging from a difficult past. We are emerging from it, having learned well its main lesson: Only an advanced democracy can give guarantees against the abuse of power and can secure a nation against repression and violence."

Since self-determination through a free and fair election is the right that secures all others, President Bush has called for adding free elections to CSCE nations' human rights obligations. This proposal would commit all 35 CSCE participating states to hold periodic and genuine elections, permit free party activity, and require that elections be open to foreign observers. Between now and the Copenhagen CSCE conference [on the human dimension in June], the United States will propose new provisions to support, monitor, and carry out a free elections regime within the CSCE process.

Indeed, I propose that all CSCE member states join with the United States in sending observer delegations to

ensure that the people-power elections of 1990 genuinely represent the will of the people.

No proposal could be more timely. Last month Romania said it would invite UN observers to its elections. Now I hope Romania will give our CSCE observer proposal greater impetus by being the first nation to invite CSCE observers. Nineteen eighty-nine was the year the people took to the streets; 1990 should be the year the people move into their parliaments.

I would like to add one cautionary note. We are troubled by indications that some of the governments in the region have engaged in practices that will obstruct truly free and fair elections. Let me be clear: The peaceful transition to democracy now underway in central and Eastern Europe will not tolerate rear guard maneuvers from any quarter. As we have seen in the German Democratic Republic (G.D.R.) and Romania, such actions will only undercut the legitimacy of this vital process. And any steps that undercut the creation of legitimate governments will increase, not decrease, instability. That is in no one's interest.

We will proceed on the basis of a new democratic differentiation: Any backsliding in the movement to create legitimate governments will isolate a nation from the support we can provide.

Consolidating Changes in Europe's Security: The Second Challenge

The democratic imperative is the first and most basic challenge. But the second challenge is no less important. I want to state our objective as clearly as possible: We must leave behind not only the cold war but also the conflicts that preceded it.

After 1918 you built a strong democracy and a vibrant economy, but 1938 and 1948 proved the necessity for enduring, effective security.

The lesson is clear: Military changes must keep pace with political ones. And the conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE) talks are a critical step toward an agreed and codified security system. Last week President Bush made a new proposal that should bring an effective CFE treaty to a rapid conclusion.

The United States is confident that such an agreement will promote a stable strategic relationship in Europe. That relationship should minimize and deter the threat of any army of invasion and end the unjust presence of any army of occupation.

We also believe that enduring security necessitates a continued U.S. military

role on the continent—for as long as our allies desire it—to reassure the nations of Europe, large and small, that we will stand by them to resist invasion, intimidation, or coercion.

We can make the European strategic situation more predictable and perhaps less threatening by encouraging greater openness and transparency in military affairs. Next week, for example, Canada will host the "open skies" conference in Ottawa, where we hope to begin negotiations toward implementing President Bush's proposal to overcome the suspicions of secrecy through a system of overflights on short notice.

The negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures within CSCE offer a vehicle for ongoing efforts to reduce tensions on the continent. Yet our present proposals are oriented primarily

toward the danger of Eastern offensive action against the West. We also need to develop measures that would impede an assertion of military might by any European nation against any other.

So today I propose that we start exploring the expansion of the confidence- and security-building measures agenda. For example, we should consider new proposals to promote greater military transparency among neighboring states, especially along border areas, and to open the military budgets of all 35 CSCE nations to public scrutiny.

NATO will continue to play an important role in ensuring strategic stability and predictability in Europe—West and East—but NATO must also evolve to assume new missions. As a political alliance, NATO offers a cohesive structure that can help address old and new Euro-

pean animosities and fears—outside and inside NATO. As a security alliance among 16 like-minded democracies, NATO should consider how it might facilitate collective action against non-traditional threats—such as proliferation and regional conflicts. As a political and a security alliance, NATO can assist in the verification of arms control and security agreements to the benefit of all Europeans.

Economic Requirements for the New Democracies: The Third Challenge

Free elections and treaties on conventional forces and confidence-building measures will help advance and consolidate your people-power revolutions. But if steps are not taken to promote economic vitality, then the stability of Eu-

Czechoslovakia-A Profile



Geography

Area: 127,896 sq. km. (49,381 sq. mi.); about the size of New York. **Cities:** *Capital:* Prague (pop. 1.2 million). *Other cities—*Bratislava (413,000), Brno (385,000), Ostrava (327,000), Kosice (220,000), Plzen (Pilsen—175,000). **Terrain:** Rolling area in wet, low mountains to the north and south, hills in the center, rugged mountains in the east. **Climate:** Temperate.

People

Nationality: *Noun and adjective—*Czechoslovak(s). **Population (1988):** 15.6 million. **Annual growth rate:** 0.25%. **Ethnic**

groups: Czech (64%), Slovak (31%), Hungarian, Polish, Ukrainian, German. **Religions:** Roman Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, Jewish.

Languages: Czech, Slovak, Hungarian.

Education: *Literacy—*99%. **Health:** *Life expectancy—*males—67.5 yrs; females—75 yrs.

Work force (7.8 million): *Agriculture—*14%. *Industry, construction, and commerce—*64%. *Services and government—*22%.

Government

Type: Socialist republic. **Independence:** Czechoslovak state established 1918.

Constitution: July 11, 1960 (being redrafted during 1990).

Branches: *Executive—*president (chief of state), prime minister (head of government), cabinet. *Legislative—*bicameral Federal Assembly. *Judicial—*Supreme Court (1960), Constitutional Court (1968).

Political parties: With free parliamentary elections set for 1990, many new parties are emerging to challenge the Czechoslovak Communist Party for power. **Suffrage:** Universal over 18.

Administrative subdivisions: Two semiautonomous "republics"—Czech Socialist Republic (Bohemia, Moravia), Slovak Socialist Republic (Slovakia); 10 administrative districts and 2 city administrations.

Defense: 7% of 1987 state budget.

Flag: A blue triangle extending the length of the staff side, with its apex toward the center,

a white band on the upper half of the remaining space, and a red band on the lower half.

Economy

GNP (1987): \$107 billion. **Annual growth rate (1987 est.):** 2.6%. **Per capita income (1987):** \$6,900.

Natural resources: Coal, coke, timber, lignite, uranium, magnesite.

Agriculture (7% of GNP): *Products—*wheat, rye, oats, corn, barley, potatoes, sugar beets, hogs, cattle, horses.

Industry (60% of GNP): *Types—*iron and steel, machinery and equipment, cement, sheet glass, motor vehicles, armaments, chemicals, ceramics, wood, paper products.

Trade (1987): *Exports—*\$8.4 billion: machinery, iron and steel, chemicals, raw materials, consumer goods. *Imports—*\$8.4 billion: machinery, equipment, raw materials, consumer goods. **Partners—**Austria, Bulgaria, East Germany, West Germany, Hungary, Romania, Soviet Union, Yugoslavia.

Exchange rates (Jan. 1990): 38 crowns=U.S. \$1.

Membership in International Organizations

UN and its specialized agencies, Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA), Warsaw Pact.

rope may be threatened again. This is one of the painful lessons of the interwar years. The newly emancipated peoples of this region now face the long and trying labor of regenerating societies devastated by half a century of totalitarian rule.

A major part of this effort must clean up your rivers, lakes, forests, soil, and air—damaged just as badly by central planning as were your economies themselves.

Because the circumstances of each nation differ considerably, it would be a mistake to apply a mechanistic assistance formula. I believe, however, we can identify stages of economic reform to which the United States, the EC, and the other nations of the Group of 24 should tailor support.

First, some nations will need short-term emergency aid to cope with severe shortages of necessities—for example, food, medicine, and disaster relief. We will be there to break the fall. But we will seek to do so in a way that does not undercut the revitalization of homegrown solutions—especially in agriculture.

The private sector can play a key role here. For instance, the American organization, AmeriCares, has sent over \$80 million in medical supplies since 1982 to aid the people of this region. And their supplies are donated primarily from American pharmaceutical companies—over 800 of them.

Second, all the new democracies will need help in the transition from broken down Stalinist command economies to market systems driven by the engine of private enterprise. Your new Finance Minister, Vaclav Klaus, recently made a succinct statement at an international meeting that went to the heart of the problem: We don't need the old types of cooperation, he reminded an old thinking Eastern colleague, we need business!

Businesses need market prices and an opportunity to compete. It is up to you to provide a conducive legal environment, to turn over or sell factories to private owners, and to lift the heavy hand of excessive government intervention. It is up to us to help draw foreign investors, offering incentives where appropriate, and even at times to supply seed money for local private ventures. It is up to all of us to lend a hand—especially through multilateral financial support—to democratic economies struggling to manage such difficult transition problems as debt payments, stabilization of currency values, and currency convertibility.

That is exactly what we are doing for Poland and Hungary, where the United States alone has offered about \$1 billion in various assistance measures. And just

last week, President Bush asked Congress for \$300 million for assistance to Eastern Europe. While some of our assistance will be available to all, the progress a government makes in meeting the challenges I have outlined will influence the availability of the full range of aid.

Third, we must integrate the new market democracies into the international economic system. You need access to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank resources. You need barriers to trade removed bilaterally and through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) so potential investors will know they can export to other markets. You need access to high technology. To meet this need, the United States is considering with its allies adjustments in the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) system that could enable you to have access to technology, provided you will protect it and forego industrial espionage.

We have been pleased the European Community has assumed a major role in coordinating economic assistance, because the availability of the EC market for the nations of central and Eastern Europe is vital. We recognize, as well, that others—including the United States, Japan, and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) nations—should also play significant roles so the new market democracies can assume their proper independent place within the whole of Europe and the larger international system.

Czechoslovakia and other nations of Eastern Europe warrant special recognition at this historic time. Therefore, I am pleased to announce that we will support the offer of the Government of Czechoslovakia to locate the new European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) here in Prague, in the center and heart of Europe.

I also look forward to the Bonn CSCE economic conference as an opportunity to establish European-wide adherence to market principles. If CSCE is to fulfill its potential, it needs a better developed economic component that will aid the transition to market economies and promote ongoing respect for economic liberty and open markets.

CSCE Summit

Free elections. CFE and security. Dynamic market economies.

Standing alone, each of these is important. But together they are mutually reinforcing. Together they offer an agenda

for the United States and others that want to ensure that the revolutions of 1989 become the democracies of the 1990s. Together they can help build governments that answer to only one power: the people.

This agenda draws from and builds on the CSCE framework. It should be the agenda of a CSCE summit. Therefore, the United States stands ready to participate in a 35-nation CSCE summit this year if the summit addresses three points.

One, we need to make substantial progress on the U.S. and U.K. proposal to establish a CSCE commitment to hold periodic and genuine elections. Free elections should be a human right and are the baseline requirement for establishing a new, legitimate European political order.

Two, we must complete the CFE treaty—so it can be signed at the summit—establishing new, legitimate security arrangements.

Three, we should clearly define the summit agenda based on substantive progress and possible proposals in other areas as well, including economics. This way it can prepare for, not replace, the 1992 Helsinki review meeting and demonstrate CSCE's potential for advancing reform in a new Europe. For example, we might consider how CSCE can gradually develop institutions to support its work in the three baskets, as the Federal Republic of Germany (F.R.G.) has suggested.

U.S. Bilateral Programs for Czechoslovakia

Let me say a word about our bilateral assistance program for Czechoslovakia. Under the sure guidance of the Civic Forum and the Public Against Violence, Czechs and Slovaks together have shown that no change is too rapid when it is peaceful, consolidates democratic gains, and leads to a legitimate government. Our assistance can help you continue your revolution.

In recognition of your country's dramatically changed human rights situation, I am pleased to announce that the President will notify the Congress that he is waiving the Jackson-Vanik amendment. This waiver will open the way for most-favored-nation (MFN) status for Czechoslovakia after we negotiate a trade agreement. And when Czechoslovakia's parliament passes new, liberal legislation on free emigration, the United States will declare Czechoslovakia in full compliance with Jackson-Vanik, as we have done with Hungary, so that Czechoslovakia can enjoy MFN status without the requirement of an annual waiver.

The President will also request authority for the U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) to operate in Czechoslovakia to encourage and offer financial support to private U.S. investors. And we will support your recent request to rejoin the IMF.

The United States will also:

- Support you economically by making Czechoslovakia eligible for the export-credit guarantees of our Export-Import Bank and Commodity Credit Corporation; by seeking legislation to promote technical assistance; by negotiating a bilateral investment treaty; and by coordinating this assistance with the multilateral efforts of the Group of 24;

- Support you ecologically by proposing a joint U.S.-Czechoslovak study to determine the most cost-effective way to deal with your serious air pollution problems; by encouraging you to participate in the Budapest Regional Environment Center announced by President Bush last July; and by intensifying our dialogue on all transnational issues, including the environment, drug trafficking, and terrorism; and

- Support closer ties between our peoples by increasing cultural and educational exchange programs; by beginning a Peace Corps English-language program here; by establishing U.S. Information Agency (USIA) cultural centers in Bratislava and in Prague; and, above all, by reopening our consulate in Bratislava. These steps will go far toward reestablishing our historical ties with both the Slovak and Czech peoples.

I also have one more U.S. initiative to announce today—an idea specially suited to safeguarding your democracy and those of your neighbors. It starts from the assumption that just as you have won your own freedom, so too will well-informed citizens protect freedom by setting wrong to right. As Thomas Jefferson wrote almost 200 years ago, "Where the press is free, and every man able to read, all is safe." These were and are wise words.

The United States proposes, therefore, the establishment of a fund for independent broadcasting and a free press. Our goal is to support cooperative development of commercial and nonprofit radio and television broadcasting and free press in Czechoslovakia and the rest of central and Eastern Europe. The fund would solicit participation and contributions from Western private corporations and institutions. This fund's principal purpose would be to assist groups in the region that wish to start independent radio, television, and print enterprises. The fund

could provide seed money for startup costs as well as technical assistance. It would also provide training in the United States and other Western countries in the use of equipment and development of professional broadcast and print standards.

New Associations in the Region and Europe: The Fourth Challenge

In a region that has suffered so greatly from the distortion of national interest and from international isolation, I am encouraged by the first signs of coordination and possible new association among newly democratic states. President Havel and others have opened the discussion. We recognize that the growth of legitimate multilateral organizations that reflect the economic, political, and security interests of this region will develop as they are needed, but permit me, if you will, to think out loud for a few moments.

The United States has supported voluntary associations of independent nations in every other region in the world. As in Western Europe after World War II, we believe that the process of political and economic reconstruction may be strengthened by new forms of cooperation.

We believe voluntary associations follow naturally from democracy and are, in a sense, a natural way for democracies to build international civil society and overcome old animosities. Indeed, associations may also give you additional strength to build democratic institutions at home, because the lessons and success of one may assist another.

We welcome, for example, the recent discussions of mutually beneficial economic cooperation in the region by officials of the Governments of Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, including a possible free trade agreement, free flow of capital and labor, harmonized financial systems, and a convertible accounting unit. Economic integration can enhance efficiency and growth. Common infrastructure projects can assure compatible communications, transport, and energy networks.

The purpose of such closer ties should not be to isolate the countries in association from others. Indeed, your nations have every interest in overcoming the enforced associations of the past that actually discouraged your entry into the European and global economies. No longer should the circumstances of this continent subject you to characterization as "the lands between." You can, instead, establish a region of recognition and respect. Working together, you might strengthen

your position and fashion a special relationship with the EC, the nations of EFTA, or the United States.

If you do work together, we will respect your decision by providing our assistance in a way that supports your associations. The choice of whether to associate and in what form is, of course, entirely yours to make.

A Commonwealth of Free Nations

Today in Prague and 2 months ago in Berlin, I have elaborated upon the President's vision of a Europe whole and free. I have described America's vital role in building that new Europe together with you. By respecting the principles of self-determination and democratic choice, we believe that the old divisions of Europe can be overcome. The legacy of 1938 and 1948 can be left behind, and the hopes of 1918 and 1968 can be fulfilled.

Before I came to speak to you this morning, I visited the place where, 21 years ago, Jan Palach set himself on fire to protest fear and terror. There is little that an American official can tell this audience about his sacrifice. But I know that among the students of his old university gathered here today, the student Palach would not be a lonely man.

For in affirming your dignity as individuals, you have reclaimed more than the future of your generation. In recovering your independence as Czechs and Slovaks, you have begun more than your country's historic return to Europe. You have shown that, in the words of your President, freedom is indivisible.

When the "freedom trains" bearing East German citizens pulled out of Prague last year, hundreds of your countrymen stood and cheered. But the freedom train of 1989 did not stop at the East German border or the Czechoslovak border or the Hungarian border, just as it did not stop at the border of Poland or Bulgaria or Romania or Yugoslavia.

It is the great promise of our historical moment that the return to freedom and the return to a whole Europe are bound together—and can only succeed together. And I believe the day will come when any European can stand in any European city—in Prague or Paris, in Berlin or Budapest—and see only countries of free individuals, a continent of free parliaments, a commonwealth of free nations. For as more and more people today understand in more and more places, freedom's journey is one that should never end.

President Havel was right. Politics can be the art of the impossible. ■

A New Europe, A New Atlanticism: Architecture for a New Era



United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.

Following is the prepared address by Secretary Baker to the Berlin Press Club at the Steigenberger Hotel in Berlin, December 12, 1989.

It is a great honor for an American to speak at this time in this city. For me and for millions of my fellow citizens, Berlin is the crucible of half a century of history.

- Here we have seen clearly what elsewhere hid in shadows.
- Here the ambiguous disclosed its true nature.
- Here we made the choices and took the stands that shaped today's world.

In 1945, pictures of a bombed-out Berlin brought home to us the terrible cost of war.

In 1948, the Soviet Union stalked out of the Four Power Control Commission and blockaded Berlin—the clear declaration of cold war.

In 1953, Berliners staged the first popular revolt against Soviet tyranny in Eastern Europe.

In 1961, the Berlin Wall closed

the last escape hatch from the prison camp of nations which Eastern Europe had become.

In 1971, the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin epitomized the terrible dilemma of detente—the proposition that cooperation between East and West assumed the continued division of this continent.

Then in 1989, the most important event—certainly the most dramatic—of the postwar era occurred right here in Berlin.

On November 9, the wall became a gateway. Berliners celebrated history's largest, happiest family reunion. And all of us who watched these scenes felt, once again: We are all Berliners.

Once more, images from Berlin flashed around the world, images that again heralded a new reality. This new reality has its roots in those older Berlin scenes—the scenes of West Berlin's dramatic

postwar reconstruction; the scenes of Allied aircraft supplying a blockaded city; the scenes of American and Soviet tanks facing off at Checkpoint Charlie.

By standing together, in Berlin as elsewhere, Western nations created the essential preconditions for overcoming the division of this city, of this nation, and of this continent.

As these recent events have unfolded, the Soviet Union has shown a remarkable degree of realism. And President Gorbachev deserves credit for being the first Soviet leader to have the courage and foresight to permit the lifting of repression in Eastern Europe.

But the real impulse for change comes from an altogether different source: the peoples of Poland, of Hungary, of Czechoslovakia, of Bulgaria, and of East Germany. They have freed themselves.

From the Baltic to the Adriatic, an irresistible movement has gathered force—a movement of, by, and for the people. In their peaceful urgent multitude, the

peoples of Eastern Europe have held up a mirror to the West and have reflected the enduring power of our own best values. In the words of Thomas Jefferson, the first American Secretary of State:

"Nothing is more certainly written in the book of fate than that these people are to be free." The changes amount to nothing less than a peaceful revolution.

Now, as President Bush stated last week, "the task before us is to consolidate the fruits of this peaceful revolution and provide the architecture for continued peaceful change."

The first step is for free men and women to create free governments. The path may appear difficult, even confusing, but we must travel it with understanding. For true stability requires governments with legitimacy, governments that are based on the consent of the governed.

The peoples of Eastern Europe are trying to build such governments. Our view, as President Bush has told President Gorbachev, is that the political and economic reforms in the East can enhance both long-term stability in Europe and the prospects for *perestroika*. A legitimate and stable European order will help, not threaten, legitimate Soviet interests. An illegitimate order will provide no order at all.

Free men and free governments are the building blocks of a Europe whole and free. But hopes for a Europe whole and free are tinged with concern by some that a Europe undivided may not necessarily be a Europe peaceful and prosperous. Many of the guideposts that brought us securely through four sometimes tense and threatening decades are now coming down. Some of the divisive issues that once brought conflict to Europe are reemerging.

As Europe changes, the instruments for Western cooperation must adapt. Working together, we must design and gradually put into place a new architecture for a new era.

This new architecture must have a place for old foundations and structures that remain valuable—like NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization]—while recognizing that they can also serve new collective purposes. The new architecture must continue the construction of institutions—like the EC [European Community]—that can help draw together the West while also serving as an open door to the East. And the new architecture must build up frameworks—like the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] process—that can overcome the division of Europe and bridge the Atlantic Ocean.

This new structure must also accomplish two special purposes.

First, as a part of overcoming the division of Europe, there must be an opportunity to overcome, through peace and freedom, the division of Berlin and of Germany. The United States and NATO have stood for unification for 40 years, and we will not waver from that goal.

Second, the architecture should reflect that America's security—politically, militarily, and economically—remains linked to Europe's security. The United States and Canada share Europe's neighborhood.

As President Bush stated in May: "The United States is and will remain a European power." And as he added last week: "The U.S. will

maintain significant military forces in Europe as long as our Allies desire our presence as part of a common security effort." This is our commitment to a common future, a recognition of a need for an active U.S. role in Europe, a need even acknowledged by President Gorbachev.

The charge for us all, then, is to work together toward *the New Europe and the New Atlanticism*.

New Missions for NATO

In May of this year, President Bush suggested to his NATO colleagues that it was time to begin considering new missions for NATO.

For over 40 years, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has secured peace in Europe through both deterrence and dialogue with the East. Today, NATO is working in Vienna to build a new security structure for Europe, one in which the military component is reduced and the political is enhanced. This is NATO's first new mission.

A conventional forces agreement is the keystone of this new security structure. In May, NATO adopted President Bush's suggestion to seek such an agreement on an accelerated timetable. President Gorbachev has responded to this opportunity positively. And we have moved significantly closer to concluding an agreement limiting conventional armaments from the Atlantic to the Urals. In Malta, President Bush proposed a summit meeting to sign such an agreement in 1990.

Today, I further propose that the ministers of the 23 NATO and Warsaw Pact nations take advantage of our February meeting in Ottawa, where we will launch the "open skies" negotiations, to review the status and give a further push to the Vienna talks on conventional Forces.

As we construct a new security architecture that maintains the common defense, the nonmilitary

component of European security will grow. Arms control agreements, confidence-building measures, and other political consultative arrangements will become more important. In such a world, the role of NATO will evolve. NATO will become the forum where Western nations cooperate to negotiate, implement, verify, and extend agreements between East and West.

In this context, the implementation and verification monitoring of a conventional forces agreement will present a major challenge for enduring security. NATO must make an important contribution.

I, therefore, invite allied governments to consider establishing a NATO arms control verification staff. Verification will remain a national responsibility. But such a new staff would be able to assist member governments in monitoring compliance with arms control and confidence building measures in Europe. A NATO organization of this sort could be valuable in assisting all allies and coordinating the implementation of inspections. It could provide a clearinghouse for information contributed by national governments, perhaps joining with collective European efforts through the Western European Union.

As the East-West confrontation recedes, and as the prospects for East-West cooperation advance, other challenges for European and Atlantic security will arise. They point to NATO's second new mission. Regional conflicts—along with the proliferation of missiles and nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons—present growing dangers. Intensified NATO consultations on these issues can play an important role in forming common Western approaches to these various threats.

Third, NATO should also begin

considering further initiatives the West might take, through the CSCE process in particular, to build economic and political ties with the East, to promote respect for human rights, to help build democratic institutions, and to fashion, consistent with Western security interests, a more open environment for East-West trade and investment.

Finally, NATO may have its greatest and most lasting effect on the pattern of change by demonstrating to the nations of the East a fundamentally different approach to security. NATO's four decades offer a vision of cooperation, not coercion; of open borders, not iron curtains. The reconciliation of ancient enemies, which has taken place under the umbrella of NATO's collective security, offers the nations of Eastern Europe an appealing model of international relations.

Whatever security relationships the governments of Eastern Europe choose, NATO will continue to provide Western governments the optimal instrument to coordinate their efforts at defense and arms control and to build a durable European order of peace. The interests of Eastern Europe and, indeed, the interests of the Soviet Union will be served by the maintenance of a vigorous North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The Role of the European Community

The future development of the European Community will play a central role in shaping the new Europe.

The example of Western cooperation through the European Community has already had a

dramatic effect on Eastern attitudes toward economic liberty. The success of this great European experiment, perhaps more than any other factor, has caused Eastern Europeans to recognize that people as well as nations cooperate more productively when they are free to choose. The ballot box and the free market are the fundamental instruments of choice.

But the European experiment has succeeded not just because it has appealed to the enlightened self-interest of European producers and consumers. This experiment has succeeded because the vision of its founders encompassed and yet transcended the material. This experiment has succeeded because it also held out the higher goal of political as well as economic barriers overcome, of a Europe united.

This was the goal of Monnet and Schuman. This was the goal supported by the United States of Marshall and Acheson. This was the goal contained in the Treaty of Rome and more recently in the European Single Act. The United States supports this goal today with the same energy it did 40 years ago.

Naturally the United States seeks a European Community open to cooperation with others. We believe Americans will profit from access to a single European market, just as Europeans have long profited from their access to a single American market. However, it is vital to us all that both these markets remain open—indeed, that both become even more open.

As Europe moves toward its goal of a common internal market, and as its institutions for political and security cooperation evolve, the link between the United States and the European Community will become even more important. We want our transatlantic cooperation to keep pace with European integration and institutional reform.

To this end, we propose that the United States and the European Community work together to achieve, whether in treaty or some other form, a significantly strengthened set of institutional and consultative links. Working from shared ideals and common values, we face a set of mutual challenges—in economics, foreign policy, the environment, science, and a host of other fields. So it makes sense for us to seek to fashion our responses together as a matter of common course.

We suggest that our discussions about this idea proceed in parallel with Europe's efforts to achieve by 1992 a common internal market so that plans for U.S.-EC interaction would evolve with changes in the Community.

The United States also encourages the European Community to continue and expand cooperation with the nations of the East. The promotion of political and economic reforms in the East is a natural vocation for the European Community. That is why we were exceptionally pleased with the agreement at the Paris economic summit that the European Commission should assume a special role in the Group of 24 effort to promote reform in Poland and Hungary.

The United States has worked closely with the European Community in mobilizing economic and financial support for Hungary and Poland. Indeed, the United States has authorized almost \$1 billion of assistance to these two nations. This week, we look to the Group of 24 meeting to move as close as possible toward achieving the \$1 billion stabilization fund Poland requested to support its

major move toward currency convertibility and macroeconomic reform.

That should be just the start of our common labor. Poland and Hungary have 40 years of economic stagnation to overcome, and this will take time and our steady support. As Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and the German Democratic Republic undertake political and economic reforms comparable to those already under way in Poland and Hungary, we believe the activities of the Group of 24, centered around the EC, should be expanded to support peaceful change in these countries as well.

As the nations of Eastern Europe achieve more open political and economic systems, they may seek new relationships with the European Community, with the Council of Europe, and with other institutions serving both Europe and the broader international community. In fact, such ties could be fundamental to our strategy of rebuilding the economies of Eastern Europe through private capital and initiative: Private investors in Eastern Europe will want to know that they can sell their products in Western markets.

I am confident that creative new arrangements can be devised to encourage and sustain the process of political and economic reforms in the countries of Eastern Europe, while at the same time preserving the integrity and the vitality of existing institutions. We need to offer the nations of the East hope, opportunities that can be seized as they take steps toward democracy and economic liberty. Perhaps the recent work on an agreement between the EC and the six nations of the European Free Trade Association will set a pattern for improved ties with others.

We see no conflict between the process of European integration and

an expansion of cooperation between the European Community and its neighbors to the East and West. Indeed, we believe that the attraction of the European Community for the countries of the East depends most on its continued vitality. And the vitality of the economic community depends in turn on its continued commitment to the goal of a united Europe envisaged by its founders—free, democratic, and closely linked to its North American partners.

The Helsinki Process —The New Role of CSCE

The institution that brings all the nations of the East and West together in Europe, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, is in fact an ongoing process launched over 14 years ago in Helsinki. There have been different perceptions as to the functions of this CSCE process. Some saw the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 as a ratification of the *status quo*, the equivalent of a peace treaty concluding World War II, and thus the legitimization of Europe's permanent division. Others, however, saw this process as a device by which these divisions could be overcome.

The dynamic concept of the CSCE process has prevailed. In 1975, the governments of Eastern Europe may not have taken seriously their commitments to respect a wide range of fundamental human rights. Their populations did. The standards of conduct set by the Helsinki Final Act are increasingly being met through international pressure and

domestic ferment. Last month, here in Berlin, we witnessed one of the proudest achievements of the CSCE process as the G.D.R. [East Germany] fulfilled its commitment to allow its people to travel freely.

Now it's time for the CSCE process to advance further. We can look toward filling each of its three baskets with new substance.

First, we can give the security basket further content through the 35-nation negotiations on confidence-building measures currently underway in Vienna. The agreements under consideration there should help prevent force, or the threat of force, from being used again in an effort to intimidate any European nation. Apart from reducing further the risk of war, new confidence-building measures can create greater openness. They can institutionalize a predictable pattern of military interaction, a pattern that is difficult to reverse and that builds a new basis for trust.

Second, the relatively under-developed economic basket can assume new responsibilities. President Bush suggested to President Gorbachev at Malta that we could breathe new life into this CSCE forum by focusing it on the conceptual and practical questions involved in the transition from stalled, planned economies to free, competitive markets. When our nations meet in Bonn in May of next year to discuss economic cooperation, I suggest we concentrate on this issue.

Third, the CSCE process has made its most distinctive mark in the field of human rights. One fundamental right, however, has not yet been fully institutionalized. This is the right for people to choose, through regular, free, open, multiparty elections, those who will govern them.

This is the ultimate human right, the right that secures all others. Without free elections, no rights can be long guaranteed. With free elections, no rights can be long denied.

On May 31, in Mainz, President Bush announced a major new Helsinki initiative to help end the division of Europe. He called for free elections and political pluralism in all the countries of Europe. Now this is coming to pass.

In June, the United States and the United Kingdom cosponsored a free elections initiative at the CSCE human rights meeting in Paris. This proposal called on all 35 CSCE participating states to allow periodic, genuine, and contested elections based on universal and equal suffrage, by secret ballot, and with international observers. Individuals would be allowed to establish and maintain their own political parties in order to ensure fully democratic procedures.

Free elections should now become the highest priority in the CSCE process. In 1945, Joseph Stalin promised free elections and self-determination for the peoples of Eastern Europe. The fact that those elections were not free, and that those peoples were not allowed to determine their destiny, was a fundamental cause of the cold war.

Now this Stalinist legacy is being removed by people determined to reclaim their birthright to freedom. They should not be denied. They will not be denied.

As all or nearly all the CSCE states move toward fully functioning representative govern-

ments, I suggest we consider another step: We could involve parliamentarians more directly in CSCE processes, not only as observers as at present but perhaps through their own meetings. To sustain the movement toward democracy, we need to reinforce the institutions of democracy.

Germany and Berlin In a New Europe

A new Europe, whole and free, must include arrangements that satisfy the aspirations of the German people and meet the legitimate concerns of Germany's neighbors. Before the *Bundestag* on November 28, Chancellor Kohl laid out an approach designed to achieve German aspirations in peace and freedom. At last week's NATO Summit, President Bush reaffirmed America's longstanding support for the goal of German unification. He enunciated four principles that guide our policy, and I am pleased to note these ideas were incorporated into the statement issued last week by the leaders of the European Community nations at Strasbourg.

- One, self-determination must be pursued without prejudice to its outcome. We should not at this time endorse nor exclude any particular vision of unity.

- Two, unification should occur in the context of Germany's continued commitment to NATO and an increasingly integrated European Community and with due regard for the legal role and responsibilities of the Allied powers.

- Three, in the interests of general European stability, moves toward unification must be peaceful, gradual, and part of a step-by-step process.

- Four, on the question of borders, we should reiterate our support for the principles of the Helsinki Final Act.

President Bush concluded that "an end to the unnatural division of Europe, and of Germany, must proceed in accordance with and be based upon the values that are becoming universal ideals, as all the countries of Europe become part of a commonwealth of free nations."

As an American, I am proud of the role my nation has played and will continue to play standing with you. Yet this very positive course will not be easy, nor can it be rushed. It must be peaceful. It must be democratic. It must respect the legitimate concerns of all the participants in the new Europe.

As Berlin has stood at the center of a divided Europe, so it may stand at the center of a Europe whole and free—no longer the embattled bastion of freedom but instead a beacon of hope for a better life.

A New Europe, A New Atlanticism

My friends, the changes we see underway today in the East are a source of great hope. But a new era brings different concerns for all of us. Some are as old as Europe itself. Others are themselves the new products of change.

Were the West to abandon the patterns of cooperation that we have built up over four decades, these concerns could grow into problems. But the institutions we have created—NATO, the European Community, and the CSCE process—are alive. Rooted in democratic values, they fit well with

the people power that is shaping history's new course.

More important, these institutions are also flexible and capable of adapting to rapidly changing circumstances. As we adapt, as we update and expand our cooperation with each other and with the nations of the East, we will create a New Europe on the basis of a new Atlanticism.

NATO will remain North America's primary link with Europe. As arms control and political arrangements increasingly supplement the still vital military component of European security, NATO will take on new roles.

The European Community is already an economic pillar of the transatlantic relationship. It will also take on, perhaps in concert with other European institutions, increasingly important political roles. Indeed, it has already done so, as evidenced by the Community's coordination of a Western effort to support reform in Eastern Europe. And as it continues to do so, the link between the United States and the European Community should become stronger, the issues we discuss more diversified, and our common endeavors more important.

At the same time, the substantive overlap between NATO and European institutions will grow. This overlap must lead to synergy, not friction. Better communication among European and transatlantic institutions will become more urgent.

The CSCE process could become the most important forum of East-West cooperation. Its mandate will grow as this cooperation takes root.

As these changes proceed, as they overcome the division of Europe, so too will the divisions of Germany and Berlin be overcome in peace and freedom.

This fall, a powerful cry went up from the huge demonstrations in Leipzig, Dresden, and Berlin: "We are the people!" the crowds chanted at the party that ruled in their name. On the other side of the globe, Lech Walesa was addressing the U.S. Congress, thanking America for supporting Polish liberty. He began with words written 200 years ago, the words that open the U.S. Constitution: "We the people."

Between 1789 and 1989, between the expressions "We the people" and "We are the people," runs one of history's deepest currents. What the American Founding Fathers knew, the people of East Germany and Eastern Europe now also know—that freedom is a blessing but not a gift; that the work of freedom is never done, and it is never done alone. Between the America of "We the people" and the Europe of "We are the people," there can be no division. On this basis, a new Atlanticism will flourish, and a new Europe will be born. ■

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Vaclav Havel and the Politics of Hope

DISTURBING THE PEACE A Conversation with Karel Hvizdala

By Vaclav Havel
Translated from the Czech and with
an introduction by Paul Wilson
Knopf, 228 pp. \$19.95

By Jerzy Kosinski

AS THE 20th century veers into its last decade, it seems only natural that intellectuals stand at the helm of Central and Eastern Europe. After all, aren't they best equipped to articulate the notion of human beings as nature's most artful creation—and as its most endangered species?

In Hungary the interim president is Arpad

Novelist Jerzy Kosinski is a fellow at Timothy Dwight College at Yale University and a past president of PEN American Center.

Gomcz, an insightful novelist, essayist and translator who was jailed for six years in the aftermath of the 1956 uprising. In Poland Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki is a former Catholic publisher and Bronislaw Geremek, Solidarity parliamentary caucus leader, is a professor of medieval history. (Keep in mind that Polish intellectuals were the first to forge the alliance between dissident intelligentsia and worker activists by founding in 1976 KOR—the Workers' Defense Committee—without which there would be no Solidarity and no free elections in the Eastern Bloc.) And in Czechoslovakia, Vaclav Havel—the innovative master of the absurdist stage, to whom, in tribute, Samuel Beckett dedicated "Catastrophe," a play inspired by Havel's political stance and imprisonment—is president.

Disturbing the Peace is a collection of Havel's spontaneous and frank conversations with Karel Hvizdala, a Czechoslovak journal-



Vaclav Havel

ist. It was completed in 1986 and issued by Edice Expedice, Havel's own samizdat, then published in Czechoslovakia in 1989 as the first samizdat to appear there legally. Whether talking about his family background or himself in real life, the dramatis personae of his plays or the harsh impact of his imprisonments, Havel comes across as an intellectual par excellence, a parliamentarian of the politics of hope. Elected president in December, today Vaclav Havel charts a new chapter in Czechoslovak history. It is fitting tribute to a man who was one of the prime pensadores of Charter 77, the unprecedented political initiative that aimed, in Havel's words, at "saying goodbye forever to the principle of the leading role of the party." Charter 77 also, remarkably, united in a nonviolent, non-partisan and ultimately open and tolerant manner masses of people of diverse backgrounds, views and occupations.

Founded in 1977 —Continued on page 9

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Vaclav Havel

Continued from page 3

and incorporating the lesson of the 1968 Prague Spring of what is permitted and not permitted, the Manifesto of Charter 77 culminated in the Civic Forum, the nonviolent and nonpartisan alliance that Havel brought about in November. As he relates here, the manifesto sought the humanist tradition of a midpoint between protest and consensus, conformism and idiosyncrasy, participation and withdrawal. It was as grounded in the spiritual defiance of Jan Hus, the Czech religious reformer who was the antecedent of the Protestant Reformation, as in the Jeffersonian tenet that all men are created equal. It drew intellectual sustenance from Tomas Garrigue Masaryk, the philosopher and educator who was the first president of Czechoslovakia, and from the wisdom of Eduard Benes, sociologist and economist and Masaryk's enlightened foreign minister, who succeeded him as president of Czechoslovakia.

Motivated by Havel, who in these conversations acknowledges the role of many activists in its development, Charter 77 called for the creation of a brand-new direct counterpart to the hierarchical autocracy of communism and fascism. It was a new type of participatory democracy, "a free, informal, open community of people of different convictions, different faiths and different professions united by the will to strive individually and collectively for the respect of civil and human rights in our own country and through the world. Charter 77 is not an organization; it has no rules, permanent bodies or formal membership. It does not form the basis for any oppositional political activity."

In *Disturbing the Peace*, Havel reflects that, in the years that have elapsed since the making of that manifesto, as a political activist he has come to favor "an economic system based on the maximum possible plurality of many decentralized, structurally varied, and preferably small enterprises that respect the specific nature of different localities and different traditions and that resist the pressures of uniformity by maintaining a plurality of modes of ownership and economic decision-making, from private (indispensable in the area of crafts, trades, services, small business, and retail enterprises and areas of agriculture and, of course, in culture as well) through various types of cooperatives and shareholding ventures, collective ownerships (connected with self-management schemes), right up to state ownership."

It is perhaps worth noting here that the theoretical demolition of the myth of the Communist Party as the vanguard of the working class began in Eastern Europe with publication in 1957 of *The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System*, by another intellectual, Milovan Djilas, the communist leader who, until his imprisonment, was a vice president of Yugoslavia during the Tito regime. It is also worth contrasting Havel's hopes with Djilas's characterization of the communist system: "The Communist leaders handle national property as their own, but at the same time they waste it as if it were somebody else's. Such is the nature of ownership and government of the system."

If *Disturbing the Peace* merits our utmost attention, it is because these auto-reflective conversations conducted four years before Havel's unexpected presidency contain a truly Jeffersonian vision of massive social reforms. That vision, so respectful of human rights in Czechoslovakia today, could affect social change in any country that, putting up with a totalitarian establishment, is still more put off by the prospect of civil war.

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by Vaclav Havel

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