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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
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Series: Davis, Mark, Files
Subseries: Subject File, 1989-1991

OA/ID Number: 13870
Folder ID Number: 13870-013

Folder Title:
Foreign Policy-Strategic, ca. 1989-90

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Charles Krauthammer

Beware of Linkage

With the Soviets, it's a tool to use sparingly.

It seems that every American politician has his idea of linkage. In April, Sam Nunn urged that an INF Treaty be linked to reductions in the Soviet tank force. Jack Kemp wants INF linked to rectification of Soviet violations of previous treaties. Robert Byrd advised Mikhail Gorbachev that Senate ratification of the INF Treaty would be helped by a Soviet announcement of withdrawal from Afghanistan.

The problem with free-for-all linkage is that, given the number of things we want from the Soviets and the number of things they want from us, the number of possible permutations on linkage is infinite. And too much linkage yields none: the Soviets will never know which linkages we are really serious about. Instead, they are likely to conclude that linkage is simply the American way of sinking—and then blaming the Soviets for sinking—reachable agreements by tying them to unrelated and impossible demands.

Linkage is an important tool in dealing with the Soviets, but to be effective it must be used sparingly and logically. The cardinal rule must be: link like with like.

1. *Link arms control to arms control.* The president is now in a position to conclude a dramatic START agreement. The distance between his SDI position and the Soviets'—whether or not to permit testing in outer space during the next seven to 10 years—is small. Moreover, the Soviet position is the same as the Senate's. It is being imposed on the administration regardless.

Time to cash in the chip. But for what? For two things. First, a dramatic cut in Soviet land-based ballistic missiles, which pose the threat of surprise (first-strike)

attack. At the Washington summit, Reagan asked for that and didn't get it. In return for agreeing to live by the narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty for seven to 10 years, the United States should insist on a strict sublimit for warheads on land-based missiles.

Second, link the SDI/ABM concession to a new agenda for arms control—namely, no more nuclear talks until the major nonnuclear arms issues are resolved. Until we have settled the questions of chemical and biological weapons and the imbalance of tanks and artillery on the central front in Europe—no more talk about nukes. No talk of further reducing our strategic nuclear deterrent. And no talk of eliminating battlefield nuclear weapons in Europe.

Pressure is already building in West Germany to get rid of battlefield weapons. And it is a supreme Soviet objective to encourage the denuclearization of Germany in the hopes of neutralizing and detaching it from the Western alliance. Our price for SDI testing must be Soviet agreement to table all talk of further nuclear reductions.

2. *Link regional issues with regional issues.* The Soviets know they can no longer win in Afghanistan. What they have to show for their efforts is, in the words of one diplomat, "socialism in one city." They want out. The longer they wait to withdraw, the longer they bleed. They want a deal.

Why should we give it to them? We should say to Gorbachev: Afghanistan is your problem. You got in, you get out. You were no help to us in Vietnam, and we believe in reciprocity. It is in our interest to see you leave Afghanistan by helicopter

off the roof of the Soviet Embassy in Kabul. We want a rout, not a settlement.

You want our help to prevent a rout in your back yard? Then you help us in ours. You want a settlement rather than a defeat in Afghanistan. We want a settlement rather than a defeat in Nicaragua. We will use our leverage to guarantee a nonaligned, neutral Afghanistan if you use yours to help guarantee a noncommunist Nicaragua. Our opening demand: cut off military aid to the Sandinistas.

3. *Human rights.* On arms control and regional conflicts, there is some symmetry between the superpowers. On human rights there is none. We cannot link their human rights issues to ours because they deny their people freedom and we don't. Nor does it make sense to link human rights to arms control or to regional conflicts. No president will or should refuse an arms control treaty because of low emigration rates from the Soviet Union.

Our leverage on human rights must be nonmilitary and nonstrategic. Trade, for example. Fortunately, the necessary law, the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, is already on the books. It needs only to be guarded against those ready to deal it away for Gorbachev's sunny smile. If the Soviets show themselves more humane to their captive populations, we will reciprocate economically.

Linkage is a good idea but only if you don't mix linkages. Don't link arms control with human rights. Or regional conflicts with trade. And don't link INF with anything. That treaty is done. The time to think about linkage is before you sign, not after.



Henry Kissinger

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W/P

The Rearming of Japan—

While Washington has been preoccupied with the Iran-contra affair, an event has occurred in Asia that will have a far more profound effect on the future: Japan's decision to breach the budgetary ceiling of 1 percent of its gross national product on its defense expenditures. The removal of the tacit budgetary barrier coupled with the increase in defense spending produced by the growing Japanese GNP makes it inevitable that Japan will emerge as a major military power in the not-too-distant future. At the same time Chinese economic modernization is proceeding, if in fits and starts. All this imposes on the United States the need to undertake a long overdue reassessment of its security interests in Asia.

For more than a generation, the United States has sought to match Soviet power in Europe, but at the same time has accepted a steadily deteriorating regional balance in Asia. Soviet deployments in Asia are spreading along the coasts of Indochina and into the South Pacific, while American forces have been withdrawn from Southeast Asia and thinned out even in Korea and Japan. That America must not be militarily involved on the mainland of Asia has become an axiom of American foreign policy since the war in Vietnam.

It is a strange concept. By any rational calculation, the United States has as vital an interest in the equilibrium of Asia as in Europe. Hostile hegemony over Asia would have at least as grave consequences for America as the occupation of Western Europe. To be sure, Asian realities differ from those of Europe. In Europe, security begins with two opposing alliance systems. The Soviet Union is perceived as the potential aggressor. A large American military presence, an integrated military command and a NATO council of ambassadors underline America's determination to support its allies.

By contrast, the nations of Asia do not acknowledge a common threat. Some countries—for example, Japan and China—fear the Soviet Union; others—like Indonesia or Malaysia—worry about China; still others—like Korea or China—are concerned about a resurgent Japan. Some nations of Southeast Asia consider Vietnam the principal threat. India and Pakistan are obsessed with each other.

The alliances that exist are quite different from NATO. The U.S. alliance with Japan, not buttressed by formal machinery, is in the nature of a unilateral guarantee. The American military bases in the Philippines have not precluded that country from membership in the nonaligned group. Only in South Korea are the lines drawn as in Europe, though with a much greater reliance on indigenous conventional forces.

From a security point of view, the nations of Asia live in two different worlds. With respect to the global balance of power, they are in the nuclear age, and in the name of nonalignment they rely on an equilibrium maintained by the United States and the Soviet Union.

On regional issues, however, they are more ready to use force than the nations of Europe, which have been chastened by two world wars. Therefore, any increase in strength by one country produces almost automatic adjustments by all other nations in a position to see to their own security. In that regard, the conduct of international

relations among Asian nations is analogous to the conduct of the European balance of power in the 18th and 19th centuries.

As for Japan, American leaders seem to believe that growing military strength will ease America's defense burdens. They hold, too, that a larger Japanese defense effort will dull Japan's commercial competitive edge.

But enthusiasm for quick fixes is a dangerous guide for foreign policy. Japan, with a history of self-government nearly as long as China's, will rearm for its own purposes. Major rearmament would set in motion developments and temptations not deducible from contemporary pronouncements, and, far from leading to an economic slowdown, it could, on the contrary, spur new technologies and encourage

"Japan's increased military contribution is largely unnecessary to maintaining global equilibrium."


pressures for protected markets on the basis of national security. At a minimum it could lead to destabilizing compensations by other Asian nations. To be sure, the United States cannot stop a major ally from pursuing its national objectives, but it must be careful about forcing the pace.

Japan's increased military contribution is largely unnecessary to maintaining global equilibrium. Modest self-defense forces alone can make a Soviet attack on the Japanese homeland extremely costly, and such an attack would bring the American alliance into play. Japan could make a more significant contribution to global peace by increasing aid to developing nations than with a large military program. Japanese rearmament will therefore inevitably be driven by considerations of Japan's role in Asia. When Chinese and Indian modernizations are well advanced, Japan will properly insist on playing at least a regional role with its own military forces.

It will make a huge difference whether Japan increases its defense effort gradually or suddenly, whether it stresses defense as an outpouring of a new nationalism—political and mercantilistic—or as a contribution to a cooperative world order. Thus a key objective of American foreign policy should be to draw Japan into larger political relationships *before* its military might develops its own momentum.

The evolution of Japanese power will be watched nowhere more intensely than in China. For the greatest part of its history, that country *was* the Asian equilibrium. It would be reckless to forget that in an important sense, World War II started with the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1932.

BY BAS



-and the Rest of Asia

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Today, once again, the subjugation of China or even its humiliation would have consequences for the global balance difficult to distinguish from the collapse of Europe.

The proud Chinese leaders often proclaim that no such danger exists. But long-range planning must consider possibilities, not certainties. And one contingency is surely the Soviet reaction when China's modernization becomes self-sustaining and irreversible. The Kremlin may then conclude that it cannot allow the emergence of a major power along a disputed frontier where a billion Chinese face 40 million Soviets. It may seek to destroy China's industrialization and create a buffer along its Asian borders on the model of Outer Mongolia or the satellites of Eastern Europe.

Whether this is more or less likely than an attack on Europe is a matter of judgment. But in Europe the risk, however slight, of a Soviet attack has evoked the deployment of substantial armies. Is it too much for Western policy makers to reflect on their attitude in case of threats to China's territorial integrity and political freedom of action? American planners must understand that in such an event the United States cannot possibly remain aloof.

To be sure, the United States can have no interest in increasing Chinese perils by provocative acts or pronouncements. It is neither necessary nor desirable for either Washington or Beijing to agree on day-to-day policies. But in the end the policies of both Washington and Beijing must be constrained by the knowledge

their relations with Moscow they can both benefit from a relaxation of tensions. If either side permits itself to be lured into a race for Moscow's favor, all restraints by the other will be eroded; the security of both the United States and of China will be impaired.

Should China navigate the passage to modernization without Soviet aggression or domestic turmoil, a new situation will arise. Such a basic change in the balance of power is likely to bring about a substantial reassessment of Soviet policy. It will also transform the security problem of Southeast Asia. Vietnam would need such large forces on its Chinese border that it would be obliged to modify expansionist ambitions. Nations such as Indonesia, suspicious of Chinese designs, would look for additional reassurances. A triangular competition among Japan, India and China could well develop in Asia.

For by that time India, too, is likely to have made major progress toward modernization. It will then be tempted to pursue the old British policy east of Suez. Its major theme of preventing Russian domination over Iran and great-power hegemony over Southeast Asia is likely to be no different now that policy is made in New Delhi since it was always driven by the geopolitics of Indian, not British, security. This evolution is likely to improve India's relations with the United States. For it is not natural for India to treat the most remote superpower as the most immediate threat to the independence of South and Southeast Asia. In the long run Washington is more likely to appear as a counterweight to the expansionist tendencies of more nearby states.

Two conclusions follow:

■ With respect to aggression that threatens the global equilibrium, most Asian nations count on American support. They assume, however, that American assistance will flow from an as-

"It cannot be in America's interest to have one Asian power or group of powers so strong that it can dominate the rest."


essment of common interests, not formal commitments or troop deployments. Therefore, continuity and bipartisanship in the elaboration of American foreign policy are essential. Constant changes of position are dangerous enough in the Atlantic area, where there is the safety net of institutions elaborated over decades. They are even more demoralizing in Asia, where few formal commitments exist and nations must gear their policy to America's capacity to define its permanent interests.

A wise U.S. policy will understand that China achieved the longest uninterrupted history of self-government of any nation above all because of a sophisticated understanding of its national interest. China's leaders need no instruction on the proposition that a change in atmosphere or even limited agreements with Moscow will not shorten the common frontier with the Soviet Union. They will not lightly risk their American safety net by staking China's survival entirely on continued Soviet goodwill. So long as both Beijing and Washington understand the objective limits of each of

■ The United States in pursuit of the global equilibrium must be extremely sensitive to how individual Asian nations perceive the local balance of forces and their own role within it. It cannot be in America's interest to have one Asian power or group of powers so strong that it can dominate the rest. The U.S. weight should be on the weaker side, especially with respect to matters that can over time affect the global balance.

A great deal depends, therefore, on America's understanding of intangibles. No one has expressed this better than Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone when, in a conversation a few months ago, he contrasted European and Asian notions of security. "In a European painting every detail is filled in and very little is left to the imagination. In a Japanese painting the empty spaces define the design; perception is therefore decisive."

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2012

Henry Kissinger

1-19-88

Arms-Control Fever

When earlier this year, as part of a small private delegation, I met General Secretary Mikhail S. Gorbachev, he asked why I was so opposed to the Reykjavik formula—key parts of which are now embodied in the Intermediate Nuclear Forces agreement about to be examined by the Senate. I told him that some Americans want agreements virtually for their own sake regardless of content; others oppose any agreement regardless of content. I belong to a third group, I said, that wants agreements if they really make a difference. Gorbachev began to push me on what I thought did make a difference; but he soon decided that it was unwise to explore, before witnesses, alternatives to a formula so promising for Soviet strategy as Reykjavik, and he turned to other subjects.


■ "China's economic reforms will proportionately increase its military potential and its weight in international affairs.

■ "India, already the most powerful country in South Asia, will continue to grow. It has shown every readiness to use power to advance national interest.

■ "Western Europe will increase its cohesion in the political, economic and military areas—in part as a reaction to being a bystander while decisions about its security are being made by the two superpowers.

■ "The developing countries are certain to accelerate their pressures for a more important role in world affairs and for a greater share in global economic well-being.

"Never have so many changes occurred simultaneously in so many different parts of the world. In the past,



"It is a simple evasion for the democracies to permit themselves to be so mesmerized by the personality of a Soviet leader."

This article serves as a substitute for that aborted discussion about what makes a difference. If I had had the opportunity or the presence of mind, I might have said something like this:

The nuclear superpowers concentrate on their reciprocal nuclear arrangements, seemingly oblivious that new power centers are emerging which, by the next century, are certain to reduce superpower predominance. Historically such a process has always produced years, sometimes decades, of political tensions. And history leaves little doubt about two other propositions: 1) Almost all wars have been caused by the failure to solve central political issues, not by arms races. 2) Conventional deterrence rarely works. Unfortunately, Reykjavik devalued the nuclear deterrent by producing agreements on the zero option on medium-range missiles, and on the totally unrealistic objective to abolish all nuclear weapons with the destruction of strategic missiles as a first step. Thus, the resolution of political conflicts grows correspondingly more urgent because it is unlikely that they can be contained by conventional deterrence alone. True, lip service is being paid to the objective of a political dialogue. But it has yet to receive appropriate high-level attention or negotiating priority.

The outline of the world by the year 2000 is already apparent:

■ Japan will become an important military power as its formal military expenditures creep toward 2 percent of gross national product; and expenditures on matters relevant to military capacity such as space research will put Japan well above 2 percent.

the emergence of even one new power center has led to decades of turmoil as the balance of power was adjusted—usually by war—to the emerging reality. If the Soviet Union continues to fuel all conflicts—from the Persian Gulf to Angola, from Southeast Asia to Nicaragua—by weapons sales and intelligence and political support to its friends, some crisis inevitably will get out of control with cataclysmic consequences. A war between the United States and the Soviet Union would inevitably hasten the relative decline of both countries and the shift of the world's center of gravity to other areas.

I do not know how Gorbachev would have reacted to such a disquisition. I am convinced that arguments based on the balance of power would have more meaning for a leader whose entire career has been in the Communist Party with its emphasis on the decisive role of "objective factors" than do sentimental invocations of personal relationships or invitations to see the "realities" of American life, including back-yard swimming pools.

At any rate, such a dialogue has not occurred. The most conservative U.S. administration of the postwar era is preoccupied—almost obsessed—with arms control and personal appeals to the Soviet leadership. Agreements are called historic because they abolish two categories of nuclear weapons but are then schizophrenically justified as safe because all necessary military missions can be performed by the remaining nuclear arsenal. Agreement has become its own reward.

The euphoria of the Gorbachev visit may in retrospect appear as an escapism that dealt with symptoms,

not causes. The underlying political crisis may in fact be accelerated by the gradual deterioration of America's leadership role and the danger that the Soviet Union may be tempted by the West's yearning for tranquility, however temporary, to tip the global balance of power in its favor.

Technology was bound to reduce gradually America's nuclear superiority. Yet American decisions have accelerated the process before adjustments could be made. The combination of inferiority in conventional forces and—at best—parity in nuclear, destructive power, coupled with the de facto abandonment of the Strategic Defense Initiative, will sooner or later demoralize allies that have relied on American military protection. Unless a conventional balance is restored, either by buildup or negotiation, conditions for Soviet blackmail will have been created in equal parts by arms policies and arms-control policies dominated by short-term domestic considerations. But the Soviet knowledge that economic conditions are likely to prevent an expensive conventional buildup weakens the Western bargaining position in any negotiation to reestablish a conventional equilibrium.

Gorbachev may well be sincere in seeking a respite; the internal situation in the Soviet Union in fact gives him few other options. But it is expecting too much for him to offer concessions that have not been asked and to refuse to take advantage of opportunities presented on a silver platter. The careful planners in the Kremlin surely understand the process of historical change outlined earlier. But they cannot fail to recognize that almost all emerging power centers are located on the Soviet borders. If that process succeeds, containment of Soviet expansionism could come about not primarily as a projection of American power, but as a result of growing local strength and cohesion. The location of these new power centers makes them vulnerable to Soviet conventional strength; however, and current Western policy may tempt the Soviets to neutralize those burgeoning powers before they consolidate their strength.

Thus the Reykjavik proposals do make a difference. But rather than produce stability, they may over time wreck what has been built by bipartisan American efforts over 40 years. Whatever their stated purpose from

the Soviet point of view, these schemes have a corollary benefit: They enhance the European sense of impotence and may tempt separate deals with Moscow, especially by the Federal Republic of Germany. The Soviets can then seek to wrest concessions from China before that country's economic progress makes it too formidable; Gorbachev's invitation for a summit with Beijing may be the first step in this direction. Such an outcome, in turn, would leave Japan with little choice but to adjust to the region's dominant reality, relying on its unique social and political institutions to maintain its independence. Forcibly America—the dream of so many isolationists—would have turned into imprisoned America.

In short, the West's policies run the risk of increasing long-term perils while reducing its capacity to deal with them. All this will be compounded because too many in the democracies justify the present course by

"No further step should be taken toward nuclear arms control unless it is linked with measures that reduce Soviet preponderance in conventional weapons."

postulating a moral equivalence between East and West that removes any sense of danger or even perspective, especially from the younger generation. The ironic result is that it is Gorbachev, not Reagan, who gets credit for Western concessions.

Negotiations with the Soviet Union are important and necessary. Modern technology drives the superpowers toward coexistence; Gorbachev's personality, coupled with Soviet internal difficulties may provide opportunities approaching that goal. But the process is neither automatic nor can it be based on personal relationships. It should reflect a hard analysis of long-term interests, including the following:

a) Glasnost and perestroika represent attempts to modernize the Soviet state. That is an internal Soviet matter relevant to the democracies only if accompanied by a change in Soviet foreign policy.

b) Any foreign policy change must

be reflected in concrete negotiations on political issues. It should deal with areas of tensions and should address what measures are permissible and where. Under what conditions and where is the sending of arms or the conduct of intelligence activities to take place? More complex topics must also be included, such as how to prevent tensions before they occur. From that point of view, the potential Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan would be more significant than any other negotiation.

c) The current nuclear arms control negotiations are too one-sided. No further step should be taken toward nuclear arms control unless it is linked with measures that reduce Soviet preponderance in conventional weapons.

d) Immediate attention must be given to the conventional balance. The numbers game of measuring conventional deterrence by the equality in manpower and equipment must be abandoned. It violates the most elementary lesson of history: victories are won not by total numbers but by the ability to concentrate force at the decisive point. A thoughtful concept is even more essential for negotiations regarding conventional arms control—a much-neglected subject. If it is not dealt with soon, the upcoming negotiations will turn into another trap dominated by slogans and domestic politics. Soviet spokesmen are already promoting a trade of Soviet tanks for Western aircraft, another step along the road of leaving Europe under the nuclear gun while even further weak-

ening America's ability to retaliate from Europe. That would be another step, too, on the road toward separating America and Europe.

e) The highest priority for U.S. policy must be to construct—with its allies—a definition of vital interests, to determine what is necessary to defend those interests and the appropriate negotiating positions to adopt with the Soviet Union.

Devising such a strategy is a difficult, subtle but manageable task. Given the relative economic positions of the two sides, it must be easier for the democracies to preserve the global balance of power than it is for the Soviet Union to upset it. It is a simple evasion for the democracies to permit themselves to be so mesmerized by the personality of a Soviet leader, however able and charming. They have all the means to take charge of their own future.

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Bush Is Right About Lithuania

By Irvine Kristol

There are inherent ambiguities in the American approach to foreign affairs. We are being driven by a fear of four horses, each with a mind of its own, and it is no easy matter to prevent them from tearing the stagecoach apart. The four horses, representing four established modes of thought about our posture toward the world, are:

• Moralistic isolationism, in which the U.S. presents a shining example of popular government to the world, in the hope that the nations of the world will notice, be impressed, and eventually follow suit. We may be saddened if they fail to do so, but it is not our responsibility to guide them—along this path. At most, we may express approval or disapproval of their more extreme deviations.

• Liberal internationalism, a 70-year-old tradition that has taken tremendous root in the State Department, the media, academia, and even—though to a far lesser degree—among sections of the populace at large. This envisions a world in which all nations are obedient to the rules of international law, as laid down by the United Nations and the World Court—a "peace loving" world to be governed eventually by a "parliament of man" (now re-designated as a "parliament of persons"). Our State Department is much attached to the legalisms generated by such a perspective. Most of the other nations in today's world pay little or no attention to it.

• Conservative internationalism, which believes the U.S. has an original commitment to act unilaterally so as to make the world safe for "democratic capitalism."

• National-interest "realism," which generally prefers unilateral American action to any multilateral commitment, but asserts that we should be seriously concerned only about events abroad that affect us seriously, less seriously concerned by what affects us only indirectly or obliquely or remotely, and not at all concerned by what is likely to have no appreciable effect at all. This is a more complicated affair than many realists seem to realize, since the U.S. is a world power and

both its action and inaction can be equally influential. But it is the most venerable mode of thought about foreign policy, to which most nations, most of the time, pay obeisance. In the case of the U.S., it often is co-opted by one of the three other modes, since no one wants to assert that he is indifferent to something called "the national interest."

These four modes of thought are now thoroughly entangled in the case of Lithuania. Such entanglements are predictable. We discovered this in the case of Vietnam: Our moralistic isolationist—fewer than now—saw no reason for our becoming bloodily involved in this faraway land, and

pendence from the U.S.S.R. Then, he announced that he is working on some complicated scheme whereby the various ethnic regions of the Soviet Union would gain not only a large measure of autonomy, but also the right of secession after a complex legal process of at least five years' duration. This inevitably infuriated nationalist aspirations in the Ukraine, Georgia and elsewhere. Then—to no one's great surprise—the sent troops into Lithuania.

withdrawal of Russia into its ancient ethnic boundaries. Not even the more militant reformers within the Soviet Union contemplate such a possibility. In fact, these same reformers have been prudently silent about Lithuania, since they are well aware of the larger and more explosive issue of national disintegration. It poses. It is not imaginable that any Russian government, with or without Mr. Gorbachev, would move down this path.

Board of Contributors

Lithuania is not a lucky country. Perhaps in a future not yet foreseeable, it will gain the independence it desires and deserves. But it is not going to happen now.

would have been content with a few symbolic, diplomatic gestures. Our liberal internationalists got us into the war in order to affirm the illegality of aggression, direct or indirect, by one nation against another. Our conservative internationalists, along with our realists, were divided, depending on what they saw to be at stake. Some said that we should simply stay out, others that we should boldly confront North Vietnam (and perhaps China) to prevent a Communist takeover of Southeast Asia, and keep open the prospects for democracy there. None supported the limited war we did fight.

spelled out in some detail. For the world at large, this would have pretty much settled the matter. While nations may prattle loosely about the "right to self-determination," no nation has ever recognized a right of secession.

Vulnerable to Criticisms

In the case of Lithuania, it must be said, our confusion is more than matched by Mikhail Gorbachev's confused policies. Indeed, one has the right to wonder: Does Mr. Gorbachev know what he is doing? Is there any rational explanation, however tenuous, for his tumbling, irresolute, in the end bewildering and self-defeating approach to this issue?

True, the case of the three Baltic nations is special, since they were delivered to Soviet sovereignty by the noxious Hitler-Stalin pact. Even so, it is clear that were they to be liberated from Russian rule, the other Soviet gross national product—would probably demand a similar liberation, after several centuries of subordination. And so would Georgia, and Azerbaijan, and all the other constituent provinces of Russia.

Back in the 1960s, we heard much talk about "speaking truth to power." In the case of American foreign policy, it is clear that we have not yet learned how power can speak unambiguous truths about our national interest to the American people.

Mr. Gorbachev is the most popular foreign leader ever in West Germany, as was demonstrated in Bonn when he arrived yesterday. In contrast to the trip just two weeks ago by President Bush, who was generally ignored by citizens except for a few isolated protests, people flocked to see the Soviet leader.

Mr. Kristol, an American Enterprise Institute fellow, co-edits The Public Interest and publishes The National Interest.

should be torn down. Mr. Gorbachev, however, without directly mentioning Berlin, said "specific difficulties" in the Soviet-West German relationship shouldn't stand in the way of the common interests of the two nations and of Europe. Perhaps to reassure his allies, the Soviet leader also praised the contribution of the East German leadership to maintaining peace and stability in Europe.

Mr. Kohl's positive and concrete contribution to disarmament, saying that NATO for the first time has stopped dismissing Soviet initiatives out of hand. But he was scathing about the substance of President Bush's proposals, which U.S. and West German officials at the time hailed as an important compromise.

As he drove to the residence of West German President Richard von Weizsaecker for an official welcoming ceremony, several hundred pedestrians crowded by the front gate to catch a glimpse. Mr. Gorbachev responded with a wave from his black Zil limousine.

During his visit, Mr. Gorbachev will see more of the country than he usually does on his trips abroad. Following his political talks today, he is scheduled to address a group of leading German industrialists in Cologne.

However, his official program has been curtailed, leaving him with a considerable amount of free time. This has somewhat dampened the pre-summit euphoria in Bonn and prompted speculation that the Soviet leader needs to keep in close contact with events taking place back home.

In an editorial, the influential Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung newspaper concluded that domestic problems such as ethnic unrest and food shortages may make him vulnerable. "Measured by his successes so far, Gorbachev's chances aren't good," the conservative paper said. "The West can try to help, but it must always be prepared for the possibility that this bold experiment could end one day as suddenly as it began."

INTERNATIONAL

Gorbachev Criticizes Bush on Pace Of Nuclear-Arms Cuts in Europe

Soviet Leader Opens Visit To West Germany to Say Delays Aren't Fruitful

By PETER GUMBEL
And THOMAS F. O'BOYLE

Staff Reporters of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

Mr. Gorbachev's remarks, made in a member speech on the first day of his official visit to West Germany, were his first reaction to the recent NATO summit, at which Bonn and Washington papered over differences on nuclear forces in Europe.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization agreed at the summit in Brussels to delay negotiations on the reduction of short-range nuclear missiles until talks are concluded with the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact on cutting conventional forces in Europe. But Mr. Gorbachev, whose warm welcome in Bonn yesterday was a clear demonstration of his enormous popularity in Germany, sought to capitalize on continuing unease here about the concentration of nuclear weapons on German soil.

"The question of the complete elimination of tactical nuclear means must not be removed from the agenda," he told a grim-looking Chancellor Helmut Kohl. "We are convinced that there is no reason to postpone the negotiations."

Mr. Kohl, in his dinner speech preceding Mr. Gorbachev's, briefly touched on the issue, saying talks on short-range nuclear weapons should start "as soon as possible." He urged Mr. Gorbachev to speed the process by making further reductions in Soviet conventional forces in order to ease the "particularly threatening" superiority of the Warsaw Pact.

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tics as Mr. Kohl fights to retain his party's grip on power—and perhaps his own job—prior to European elections Sunday and national elections next year.

Mr. Gorbachev was careful to praise Mr. Kohl's positive and concrete contribution to disarmament, saying that NATO for the first time has stopped dismissing Soviet initiatives out of hand. But he was scathing about the substance of President Bush's proposals, which U.S. and West German officials at the time hailed as an important compromise.

"Both in the text and between the lines, [the NATO document] contains a lot of goal-setting and methods of approach that are inherited from the period of confrontation," he said. Although welcoming the U.S. decision to cut troops in Europe, he snidely qualified his praise by suggesting that the move was long overdue. And he dismissed the U.S.-German compromise formula linking the start of talks on short-range nuclear arms to the end of talks on conventional forces, saying parallel negotiations would be the quickest way to overcome "the anachronism" of military confrontation in Europe.

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During their first meeting, a 70-minute session in the chancellor's office that was attended only by interpreters and two aides, Mr. Gorbachev and Mr. Kohl both outlined in general terms their positions on a range of international and bilateral issues. Both sides termed the talks "friendly and constructive," but made clear that more substantive discussions will take place today. They are expected to issue a joint political declaration that is being touted as the highlight of Mr. Gorbachev's four-day stay in West Germany.

Despite the show of friendship and good will on the first day, the two leaders clearly remain at odds over one of the trickiest questions of their relationship: the status of Berlin and ties between the two German states. Mr. Kohl called the separation of East and West Germany "an open wound," and said the Berlin Wall



Mikhail Gorbachev

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America's Invulnerable Deterrent

By JOHN TRAIN

The film version of "Hunt for Red October" brings admirably to life the silent duel of undersea naval forces. In one way, though, it is misleading. The Soviets cannot now or for the foreseeable future locate U.S. missile submarines, or "boomers." For many years they will remain our one invulnerable deterrent.

When you go for a cruise on a Trident sub—the Michigan, in my case—you are supposed to be impressed by its size. However, on the surface, one sees only a sixth of it, like an iceberg, and of course underwater it's invisible. (The Russian sub in "Hunt for Red October" was lifted partly out of the water to overcome this problem.) Easy to grasp, however, are its length (two football fields), the sinister message of the double row of missile hatches running down the deck, and its cost (about \$1 billion).

In the center segment of the hull stand 24 orange Trident missile tubes, in two vertical rows of 12, like four-story-tall cans of tennis balls. When the time comes to fire, each tube's hatch, which weighs several tons, swings open, and the missile is flung out by the exhaust of a small on-board fixed rocket.

In addition to its missiles, a Trident can launch eight wire-guided torpedoes. The torpedo, when its acoustic sensor "acquires" the target, is turned loose to home in on its own. It's extremely hard for one submarine to torpedo another underwater, since a submerged submarine moves up and down as well as forward. When a target sub detects an attacker's torpedo in the water it pops out acoustic decoys to draw the torpedo off, and fires a return volley in the hope of forcing the attacker to maneuver so wildly in avoidance that the guide wire gets cut.

Russians Shake, Rattle and Roll

A Trident missile sub is so quiet that if you were out sailing you probably wouldn't notice it passing at slow speed 10 feet under your keel. While there are lots of ways of trying to detect a sub creeping slowly along way down deep, the Russians have had little success against ours. But particularly since a boomer on patrol cruises at random in an area the size of Montana, where do they start looking?

The U.S. is far more skillful than the Soviet Union at large, highly engineered specialty projects. Parts must be made to fine tolerances, and fittings can't rattle. As a result, U.S. subs have thousands of rubber liners and seals, flexible machinery mountings, insulation between the inner and outer hulls, and, in the future, pump-jet propulsion. Soviet sub crews, like Soviet hotel workers, are sloppy draftsmen. If Ivan stashes his tool box, or even a big wrench, out of sight somewhere on board so it won't be borrowed, it may create a "sound short." A few such rattles and security is compromised.

The Soviets often put two reactors, two propulsion systems, and two propellers on their subs, because they rightly distrust the reliability of their equipment. This, however, means that everything has to be that much bigger. So Soviet submarines frequently come larger than ours. (They also occasionally sport oversized names: one of the noblest is "Sixty Years of Support for the Young Communist League.") The reliability of the Soviets' subs is not improved by their habit of introducing constant new models, many more than we do. On the contrary, this proliferation creates a logistical mess.

A Job for Computers

Outfoxing an enemy attack submarine depends on more than silence: you have to hear him early, and decide quickly what to do. It's much harder to identify an enemy sub than you'd gather from "Hunt for Red October." It can take hours. First, you have to pick up his sound. To that end a Trident has a listening pod in its snout the size of a small house, containing over a

thousand hydrophones. The sub also tows a long passive array to detect hostile sonar. The problem then becomes magnifying, cleansing and analyzing what comes in, and determining, as fast as possible, how to react. That's a job for computers.


The Michigan carries a couple of ancient Sperry Univacs, but the new BSY-1 ("Busy-One"), made by IBM, is coming into service. The power of a highly classified system is hard to describe, but in any event it occupies 117 refrigerator-sized cabinets, and weighs 30 tons. That's a lot of thinking power, and is decisively ahead of what the Russians can deploy.

\$25 Million a Missile

The U.S. Navy has 34 boomers, 22 of which carry Trident missiles. The Trident I C-4 missile carries eight 800-kiloton MIRV'd warheads more than 4,000 miles. They have a celestial navigation system that maneuvers the re-entry vehicle to the

target after the third stage separates. The 44-foot Trident II D5, weighing twice as much and carrying 12 MIRV'd warheads, is being deployed this month in the Tennessee. It costs \$25 million a copy, is believed to have a 6,500-mile range, and is accurate enough to destroy enemy missiles in their silos. It will eventually be fitted into 24 submarines.

U.S.S. Michigan (SSBN 727)



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The whole Trident program was masterfully planned, beginning in the early 1970s, and adjusted for inflation, has stuck close to budget. The main base at Bangor, Wash., was built at the same time as the first Trident subs, which were designed to take both the Trident I missile and its much larger successor.

Each boomer has two crews: "blue" and "gold." When the sub comes in from its 70-day patrol, the 165-man "blue" crew—let's say—goes ashore, and the yard takes over for the next 18 days, working three shifts. All the machinery on board is renovated, or replaced according to a schedule, so that the ship goes out of service for a major refit only after about 15 years, when the reactor core is taken out. Thus, of the eight Tridents at Bangor, six or so are always at sea, with maybe two in port. (Two more are based at Kings Bay, Georgia.) When the ship puts to sea again, the "gold" crew takes over while the "blue" crew trains on the base's simulators. These can run exercises that would be too dangerous to try on board, such as repairing leaks as powerful and noisy as Niagara in pitch darkness.

Nuclear subs go on an 18-hour-day schedule: six hours to sleep, six hours on watch, six hours of work. One's body adapts easily. This proves to be more convenient than the four hours on-four hours off formula used in most surface ships to give everybody their share of daylight.

Communications

The ELF (Extremely Low Frequency) system, using antennas hundreds of miles

long in Michigan, transmits continuously at very slow speed to all our submarines. As needed, the sub, while staying submerged, floats up a communications buoy that sits a few feet below the surface, or trails a long wire antenna, which receives messages normally without providing a radar signature. There is also a backup airborne communications system, and a satellite laser network on the way.

Will They Shoot?

Will the crew actually fire the missiles if the president so commands? And might a missile be fired by mistake?

My answer to the first question is yes. Like the crew of a bomber, the officers and men on a Trident submarine are there because that's what they want to do. The officers rotate back and forth between attack subs and missile subs, so it's completely in their culture that these weapons can be used. And the firing routines are practiced

or target than Western Europe because of the range of the missiles." A Danish military spokesman adds: "Their range makes Western Europe their only target. Militarily, at least, the INF Treaty is hardly worth the paper it's written on."

On our side, with considerable hoopla we take a Poseidon boat out of service each time we launch a new Trident, in order to observe the limitations on strategic launchers. Some critics cite this as an example of military wastefulness: Why build a new sub only to give one up? But weapons, like cars, have a finite life. Subs last much longer than cars—a quarter century of continuous use, say—but not forever. Our first ballistic missile subs, the Polaris class, have all been taken out of service. And the 28 Poseidons, built from 1964 to 1969, are becoming impossibly expensive to maintain, and most of them carry obsolescent missiles. So here again, the treaty is mostly P.R.

constantly: sometimes with an exercise trigger and sometimes with the real trigger, which reposes in a tiny safe within the same compartment. The Navy's psychologists found that, if the firing officer practiced only on the exercise trigger, an inhibition arose against using the real one.

Furthermore, the elaborate and constantly repeated, multi-stage ritual of firing—a sort of Black Mass—relieves any one participant of responsibility. Would the Michigan captain, the executive officer and the chief petty officer who manages the men who push the buttons, and the firing officer who squeezes the trigger, all actually do it? The four of them are surprisingly different sorts of men—none could be a brother of any other—but my answer is, yes, they would: quit on it.

Could a missile be fired improperly, as contemplated in "Red October"? By mistake, no: too many steps. But could several fanatics with poison gas bombs that they smuggled on board somehow take over? It would have to be a whole band of experienced SSBN personnel, so I suppose that in practice, it's unimaginable; certainly not as shown in the film.

Strategic Considerations

The Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty was an example of P.R. diplomacy. The U.S. traded away state-of-the-art missiles, notably the Pershing, for obsolescent Soviet ones. And the same Western European targets are now covered by Soviet sub-borne missiles anyway.

Says a Norwegian defense spokesman in the Armed Forces Journal: "We have every reason to believe that the task formerly [assigned to Soviet] land-based nuclear weaponry in Europe is now [assigned to] the Norwegian Fleet. . . . [We see] a pattern of Yankee-class submarine patrols in the Norwegian and Northern Seas. These are refurbished to carry SS-21 ballistic missiles . . . [and] can have no other task

As to the Soviets, former Navy Secretary John Lehman Jr. observed of Mikhail Gorbachev's announced removal of Gulf submarines from the Baltic that they are "ancient, rickety machines that add almost nothing to the military equation and are very expensive to maintain."

We don't need the Strategic Defense Initiative to protect the sub deterrent. So do we need SDI at all? Few Pentagon insiders believe in the extreme SDI concept of the general population umbrella. Many, however, reason that it's illogical to have a deterrent that can be destroyed quickly, and that therefore we should at least protect our land missile silos. The latest developments in SDI indicate that it's becoming cheaper to defend a site than to attack it, so the argument that you can overwhelm any defense if you want to badly enough fails: Nobody commits limited resources ad infinitum to an unsuccessful strategy. We shouldn't leave our land missiles as sitting ducks, but rather, by erecting a strong defense, let the enemy expend his force against them instead of, for instance, our cities.

But why bother? One can also argue, once we have in place a deterrent that no enemy can find, let alone successfully attack: one that can be used to counter-attack his military hard targets as well as his cities; and one that can sort out an attack before having to respond or be destroyed?

Consider the numbers: We have 10 Trident subs, each with 24 missiles carrying eight MIRVs (12 with Trident II), or almost 2,000 warheads. When we reach 20 Trident subs, we'll have almost 4,000 warheads: Perhaps that will be enough, and perhaps the land-based deterrent can be phased out—and with it all but a "light" strategic defense sufficient to break up a missile launch from one of the dozen-odd secondary powers expected to have ICBMs by the year 2000.

A limited attack—from one enemy sub sitting in the Atlantic, say—could do a lot of damage. The risk of such a strike (from a Third World attacker, or perhaps in what the military terms the "mad captain" scenario) is the best argument for a limited form of SDI.

The most stable of all strategic worlds may be two invulnerable submarine missile fleets. Perhaps that's what the Soviets are telling us by not even trying to track our Tridents. However, the history of warfare is full of surprises, and for fear of a breakthrough in antisubmarine technology, a strong SDI research program, and a light version of SDI deployed, remains prudent.

Mr. Train, who writes on military and foreign affairs for the Journal, is president of Train, Smith Investment Counsel, New York.

Do Your Workers Really Merit a Raise?

The effort to control salaries has become a critical problem for companies competing in the global marketplace. Some are pursuing a solution that may seem extreme: severely paring or even abolishing the annual salary increase.

While to many this may appear hopelessly reactionary—or even downright un-American—the almost-automatic ratcheting up of employees' salaries every 12 months has been common practice only for the past 25 years or so, spurred on by cost-of-living adjustments built into union contracts. More important, the philosophy of the annual merit

year, after taxes, this represents more than 10% of net profit. In a poor year, much more.

Of course, some merit-increase programs work well. But these have become the exception. And once employees lose confidence in the process, it is extremely difficult to win them back.

How can companies extricate themselves from the merit-increase morass? There are several new approaches already

crease under the traditional program. Preliminary employee reactions have been positive, and profits continue to rise.

Such performance-based programs are not guaranteed to work magic, engender instant employee commitment, or turn around an ailing company. As when any other new ingredients are introduced into the management mix, groundwork and communication are vital.

For instance, in an environment where employees do not express trust in their management, most new compensation plans will fall flat—unless, of course, the company first works to change that per-

Manager's Journal

By John Train

Moscow's View: The Bush Proposal On European Arms

By Victor Karpov

After the Brussels publication of the NATO council in late May, many commentators adopted the following thesis: President Bush has taken the initiative in disarmament from Mikhail Gorbachev. It seems that such treatment of the matter reflects an approach to disarmament talks as a propaganda undertaking in which everyone is trying to score points, not for the benefit of specific results in the reduction of forces, armaments, nuclear warheads, etc., but for what is known in the U.S. as image building. The Soviet Union approaches the disarmament problem from a different standpoint. It does not make any difference to us who takes the palm of leadership in advancing some or other idea. The important thing is that this idea should work toward a final result of a reduction of mountains of arms and promote security.

It is from this standpoint that we appraise the initiative announced by President Bush in Brussels. We regard these initiatives as a response — a fuller one in some areas and a partial one in others — to the proposals set forth by the Soviet Union, notably by Mikhail Gorbachev in his speech in New York last December and during his meeting with Secretary of State Baker, and by the Warsaw Pact delegations at the Vienna meeting on conventional arms reductions. We see them also as the result of the analysis of military, strategic and politico-military problems carried out by the Bush Administration.

In view of this, we would like to hope for a similar response from the U.S. that might give impetus to the talks on questions of space weapons and compliance with the Treaty on Anti-Ballistic Missiles. In drafting an agreement for 50 percent cuts in strategic offensive arms, in working out an underground nuclear test verification system and in banning chemical weapons and eliminating their stockpiles.

As for conventional armaments, I would like to say the following: A unique situation is taking shape that enables the parties not only to bring their positions at the Vienna talks closer together but also to reach an agreement within a rather short time and commence the reduction of forces and armaments in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.

We stand for completing the talks without any delays. Six months sounds good; if not, let it be one year. However, it follows from the Brussels decisions that the ideas of the U.S. President will not be transformed into specific NATO proposals until next September, and will therefore not be put on the negotiating table in Vienna before then. This fact raises certain doubts concerning the deadline (of six to 12 months) offered by the U.S. President for completing the

But does this not create an opportunity for someone — those who do not want cuts in either conventional or tactical nuclear forces — to resort to a kind of dual diplomacy? Delaying the conclusion of agreements in Vienna would put off the beginning of talks on tactical nuclear systems. That in turn would allow time for the

We like to sign a treaty within six months but NATO won't be ready.

development of new tactical nuclear missiles. Not so long ago I heard an expression from members of the German media: "The shorter the range of weapons, the deadlier they are for the Germans." This idea evidently reflects sentiments in favor of limiting, reducing and eventually eliminating tactical nuclear systems. (This attitude is becoming more and more popular in West Germany and other European countries.) Ignoring such sentiments is hardly something sensible.

We stand for a parallel solution to both the problem of conventional armaments and the problem of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. It is the only possible way to attain the commonly affirmed goal of all parties to the talks in Vienna: to achieve a reduction of arms in Europe that would insure the restructuring of the armed forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact on a purely defensive basis that would preclude every possibility of conducting large-scale offensive operations.

I would like to hope that common sense will prevail in the sphere of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe the way it has prevailed in other spheres.

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And let us turn to the substance of the negotiations on conventional forces. Both the Warsaw Pact and President Bush suggest the same levels of reduction in tanks and armored personnel carriers, while levels of reduction in artillery systems and helicopters are fairly close. Thus, one can hope for an early agreement in these fields.

The matter is more complex as far as the reduction in aircraft is concerned. We consider it totally unjustified the inclusion by the U.S. of purely defensive weapons fighters, interceptor aircraft, into the category of aircraft slated for reduction. There is a common understanding that the offensive systems, systems ensuring a surprise attack capability, should be reduced. This means that we still need to find ways for bringing the positions closer together.

One can welcome the readiness expressed by the United States to discuss certain limits on the numerical strength of armed forces. However, the proposed limits are too narrow.

President Bush spoke only about cuts in American and Soviet forces stationed on the territory of foreign states in Europe. Establishing a ceiling of 275,000 troops for the U.S. and the Soviet Union outside their frontiers in Europe means ignoring the balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

In the Warsaw Pact, only the Soviet Union has troops outside its frontiers, whereas in NATO (in addition to the U.S.) Britain, France, Belgium and Canada have such troops. And their total numerical strength (in addition to those of the U.S.) stands at about 100,000 officers and men. Can this fact be ignored? It is possible to plan NATO superiority in advance.

We regard the absence in President Bush's statement of a positive official response to the Warsaw Pact proposal for immediate talks on short-range tactical nuclear weapons in Europe as a deficiency and a serious one. We heard that at present the U.S. does not object in principle to negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons, but only after the beginning of the implementation of agreements achieved at the Vienna talks on conventional armaments.

Victor Karpov is Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Soviet Union.

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The Great Delusion

By DAVID FRUM

As policy analysts and intellectuals worry over "The End of History" and congratulate each other about "The Obsolescence of Major War," it might be wise to temper all the giddy optimism with the recollection that we have been here before. In 1910, an English journalist named Norman Angell published one of the most influential books of the early 20th century, "The Great Illusion."

"The Great Illusion's" thesis will be familiar to any reader of op-ed pages; The ever more intimate connection between the leading economies, and the advent of modern telecommunications technology, had made war futile.

The complexity of modern finance makes New York dependent upon London, London upon Paris, Paris upon Berlin to a greater degree than has ever yet been the case in history. This interdependence is the result of the daily use of those contrivances of civilization which date from yesterday—the rapid post, the instantaneous dissemination of financial and commercial information by means of telegraphy, and generally, the incredible progress of rapidly in communication which has put the half-dozen chief cities of Christendom in closer contact; financially, and has rendered them more dependent the one upon the other than were the chief cities of Great Britain less than a hundred years ago.

In the tense international situation of 1910, this message was understandably a welcome one to many people. "The Great Illusion" was published in half a dozen languages simultaneously, and sold more than a million copies in the four years before the outbreak of the First World War. Angell's argument was essentially this: As the long and careful preparations they make for it suggest, nations don't make war out of enflamed passion. They fight because they think they can profit by it, principally by eliminating commercial or financial rivals.

It was this belief that Angell considered the great illusion of his time and he painstakingly took it apart. War, would rebound on the winner's head just as cruelly as on the loser's. In those days, Germany borrowed money for its expanding industry on the English capital markets. So what would happen if Germany beat England in war? The English economy would collapse, and German interest rates would therefore rise. The German Generalissimo in London might be no more civilized than Attila himself, but he would soon feel the difference between himself and Attila. Attila, luckily for him, did not have to worry about a bank rate and such like complications, but the German general, while trying to sack the Bank of England,

would find that his own balance in the Bank of Berlin would have vanished into thin air and the value of even the best of his investments dwindled as though by miracle.

Nor could Germany hope to eliminate England as a commercial rival. If it destroyed the commerce of 40 million people Germany would have to destroy their coal and iron mines, to destroy the energy, character, and resourcefulness of the population; to destroy, in short, the determination of 40 million people to make their living by the work of their hands.

After 1914, Angell passionately denied ever having said that war was impossible. He insisted that he had only claimed that it was pointless. Still, the frightened readers of "The Grand Illusion" can be excused for having understood Angell's demonstration of the instant financial disaster that would hit any modern economy in wartime as a guarantee that war could never come again; or that if it did come, it would be over within weeks. Few of us realize to what extent economic pressure has replaced physical force in human affairs, because while in very primitive conditions, robbery is a moderately profitable enterprise.

The instincts of the City man may be just as predatory as those of the cattle-lifter or the robber baron; but taking property by force has become one of the least profitable and the most speculative forms of enterprise in which he could engage.

To disagree, Angell wrote, "was to practice economics à la Tamerlane." Anxious readers in England and on the continent bought "The Grand Illusion," and even coined the term "Norman Angellism" to reassure themselves that technology and the interpenetration of capital markets could dispell the incomprehensible urge that large masses of people sometimes feel to kill other large masses of people. But war erupted anyway. Angell maintained that the 1914 war only confirmed his ideas, and others agreed. He was knighted in 1931, and won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1933. He lived until 1967, seeing another world war, even more terrible than the last, but also the creation of GATT, the IMF, and the European Community.

To the end, Angell maintained that events had vindicated him. But perhaps what the events of this century, not to mention all the others, have really proven is that so long as politics is to be conducted by human beings, it shouldn't be assumed that anything ghastly or evil is ever impossible or obsolete or that anything happy or good is permanent.

Mr. Frum is an assistant editorial features editor at the Journal.



Norman Angell

ESSAY | William Safire

Three Strong Leaders

WASHINGTON
America has a new house guest. He is the astrophysicist Fang Lizhi—pronounced Fong Lee Dzhi, the last syllable like the French je—the Most Wanted man on the enemies list of the Second Cultural Revolution. You can send him and his family a welcome note, care of the U.S. Embassy in Peking, where they are holed up under our protection. The asylum granted him has infuriated the Deng regime, already incensed at the way the Voice of America is undermining their Orwellian line that only soldiers, not unarmed students, were killed in the Tiananmen massacre.

No matter how it strains relations, we are not about to turn Mr. Fang over to this decade's version of the Red Guard. Under international law that diplomatic compound is American territory; if it were invaded, China would become an outcast nation, much like Khmeiml's Iran after the rape of the U.S. Embassy in Teheran.

We have extended our diplomatic hospitality at some length before, from persecuted Pentecostals and Jews in Moscow to Jozsef Cardinal Mindszenty in Budapest; the Hungarian prelate was freed from Communist prison during the 1956 Hungarian uprising and remained our guest—embarrassing the puppet regime—for 15 years.

We owe Mr. Fang a special welcome; he was the dissident invited to our embassy when President Bush visited Beijing in February. When Communist police harassed our invitee, Mr. Bush made his first foreign-policy mistake in refusing to protest publicly.

Other Chinese patriots, imprisoned for years or now being hunted, have a claim to leadership in martyrdom, and the man the world saw trying to stop a column of tanks will always be etched in memory. But Mr. Fang is now the dissident in the fishbowl, the new Mindszenty, the next Nobel winner, publicized by official denunciation and protected by us.

This makes him one of the trio of the world's most famous dissidents—individuals who come to personify and symbolize freedom.

Last week, one of the trio, Solidarity's Lech Walesa, rose in power from dissident to opposition leader. The hero of the Gdansk shipyard strike, his activity harassed and declared unlawful for a decade in Poland—but steadfastly supported by courageous Poles and by organized labor in America—reached a new level in his climb to the official leadership of his nation.

Central to world support, and to the local power and protection that come from international celebrity, is the willingness of a charismatic individ-

ual to suffer, to cry out, to lead. The Soviet citizen who continues to ennobles and annoy his people by his refusal to be corrupted by co-optation is Andrei Sakharov. He is today's Elijah, a man with the unpopular message of the truth.

In Washington last November, the physicist told a gathering of scientists "I am a poor orator," and proved it with a mind-numbing lecture on the instability of the proton. But in Moscow last week, attacking the aggressive obedience of the majority to the smooth dictation of Mr. Gorbachev,

Fang, Walesa & Sakharov

his non-Communist manifesto could be heard round the world.

If you float downstream singing lullabies to yourselves, he told all the smug deputies content with the trappings but not the reality of democracy, the growing tension may explode in our society, bringing about the most dramatic consequences.

Then the great physicist tried an experiment in free speech that tested the validity of glasnost: he started to urge an official expression of repugnance after the Tiananmen massacre, even to the recall of the Soviet Ambassador.

The results of the Sakharov experiment were revealing: Mr. Gorbachev, who captivates the West with his forbearance in the face of personal criticism, will not accept free speech in the Soviet Congress on matters touching on his new prerogatives.

Mightily displeased, the Soviet leader reached for the button that controls the microphones and cut Mr. Sakharov off. So much for glasnost; on substance, the mike belongs to Mikhail.

Future historians, examining the decline of Communism in the 1980's, will duly note names like Deng, Jaruzelski and Gorbachev as transitional figures, who provoked, delayed or sought to avoid the inevitable counterrevolution.

Our grandchildren will be studying the dramatic change of primacy in most of the world from the lust for order and security to the yearning for freedom and opportunity. They will pay greater attention to Fang, Walesa and Sakharov, as the real newsmakers and authentic heroes of these times. □

any real constituency in either group.

Why then, in this uncertain and fluid context, do we not support the people who favor the policies we want? And why do Western elites seem to be having such difficulty recognizing the powerful modern forces that are shaping and motivating these people? It is as if the reformers are

A Vote on the Item Veto

The line-item veto is an idea born out of such common sense that it resists every attempt to kill it. Last week the Senate Judiciary Committee voted 8 to 6 to approve two versions of a constitutional amendment that would give Presidents authority to veto individual spending items within bills. It is the first time the committee has approved an item-veto amendment since 1834.

If anyone needs further evidence that a line-item veto is needed to restore the integrity of the federal budget process, he has only to look at what just happened to the \$800 million aid package for Panama and Nicaragua. Congress stuffed it with more than \$1 billion in unrelated domestic spending. That's a good example of why after the committee vote Senator Paul Simon said, "It keeps our hopes alive of bringing some fiscal sanity into the budget process."

One of the two item-veto amendments approved by the Judiciary Committee is sponsored by liberal Democratic Senators Simon and Alan Dixon, both of Illinois. It would help bring back the impoundment power that Congress took away in the 1974 budget "reform" bill. Other Democrats, including Fritz Hollings, Joe Biden, David Boren and Howell Heflin have previously supported the concept. They all argue that 43 Governors have such veto power, and that Congress itself gave the item veto to the Governors of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. If it was a good idea for them, why not for the President?

The Simon-Dixon proposal would allow the President to reduce or eliminate individual spending items. Congress could override the veto with a simple majority in both houses. Another version by Senator Strom Thur-

mond would empower the President to kill items but not reduce them. A two-thirds vote of both Houses would be required to override.

No one claims that the line-item veto would be a budgetary cure-all. Much of the budget is in entitlements that few politicians support cutting. Its power is that it turns the President into a more active participant in the budget process. Right now the only way a budget is passed is by the Congressional leadership buying most of the Members off with a pork project or subsidy.

President Bush has been talking up the item veto recently. The President needs the power to make the tough calls on spending, take the heat, he said last week, and I'm perfectly prepared to do that.

More Members, disgusted with a budget process that resembles The Price Is Right, have come to agree. As the only elected official with a national constituency, a President should have some oversight power over the parochial interests.

Along with lawyer Stephen Glazier, we have argued that the Constitution already gives the President the power to veto every bill, order or resolution that Congress passes and that includes individual appropriations whether they are called "bills" or not. President Bush has said he is looking for just the right case to test the item veto in court.

A President equipped with the line-item veto would be the best insurance that the budget deficit would continue to glide downward. It also would enhance accountability in government. The Senate Judiciary Committee's favorable 8 to 6 vote indicates that opinion on Capitol Hill is beginning to move in that direction.

point attacking a liquor store and shouting, "Free beer! Free beer!" Police arrested about 110 students. Political demonstrations may be fading, but the return of the beer riot doesn't quite suggest that civilization is moving forward again on campus yet.

Student Asides

The times must really be a changin' if the student riot at California Polytechnic State University is any indication. Crowds attracted to the school's Poly Royal festival got carried away with their revelry, at one

power status by abandoning modernization programs for their strategic forces?

Do we really believe that our forbearance will drive internal economic reform forward, even now as Mr. Gorbachev postpones it?

Realpolitik has its uses, but doesn't it have to pay some heed to the real world?

before the age of one than a baby born in North Korea or Bulgaria. These shameful statistics persist despite the \$3 federal programs and \$7 billion a year that the country spends to keep children alive.

Most thinking about infant mortality focuses on ways to provide medical insurance for the one-sixth of all women who are both uninsured and ineligible for Medicaid or to deliver health care in their own neighborhoods to women who might be intimidated by hospitals or clinics.

But these proposals fail to address the most important reason for America's high infant mortality, the behavior and motivation of mothers themselves. The situation in the District of Columbia exemplifies the problem. Mayor Marion Barry has bragged that Washington's infant mortality campaign is "the most comprehensive anywhere in the country," and he is probably correct. In D.C. prenatal care is free to any woman whose family income is less than \$20,000. Eleven of the city's 16 health clinics provide prenatal care and are required to give a woman an appointment within two weeks (two months is the average in many states). Convenient evening hours make it even easier for women to reach a clinic, and child care is also available. At the clinic a woman can see an obstetrician, a nurse, a WIC (Special Supplemental Feeding Program for Women, Infants and Children) worker, social

workshops every day, finding pregnant women, reminding them of their appointments and getting them there if they have no transportation. Nor are private practitioners in short supply. Unlike many other areas of the country, D.C. has plenty of obstetrical care providers, many of whom cater to the Medicaid clientele and are conveniently located throughout the city. Altogether, D.C. spends \$105 million on its residents' health.

Despite all of this lavish attention, the District of Columbia has the nation's worst infant mortality rate, 27 per 1,000 in early 1989, or nearly three times the national rate. (In 1988, the most recent year for which there are data, 10,514 babies were born in D.C.)

Other cities with equally costly infant mortality programs are achieving equally dismal results. Infant mortality in Detroit is almost as bad as in D.C., even though the city employs, at considerable expense, teams of specially trained para-professional outreach workers to comb neighborhoods, find pregnant women and bring them into the public health system. Hartford, Conn., has offered similarly liberal prenatal care for poor women, yet only a third of its teen-age mothers sought care in their first trimester.

Why don't women in D.C. and other cities take advantage of the prenatal care offered to them? Clearly, neither lack of

Another explanation for high infant mortality rates lies in the staggeringly high number of babies born to substance-abusing women. Ethel Hawkins, director of social services at D.C. General Hospital, estimates that "well over 60% of the babies born here are born to women who used drugs or alcohol while they were pregnant." Another health care worker placed the toll closer to 70%.

Even when these women are identified and counseled early in the pregnancy, convincing them to stop destroying their children often proves impossible, as the Infant Mortality Research Program of the Department of Agriculture—which identifies pregnant women in D.C. by going door-to-door in half the city's wards and distributing information in grocery stores and laundromats—has found. According to the program's director, Lily Munroe-Lord, it's very difficult to get through to the women who are using crack while pregnant. They simply don't hear you. The ones who are casual users can be convinced to stop during the remainder of the pregnancy, but they usually go right back to it after the baby is born.

Dr. George Graham, professor of human nutrition at Johns Hopkins University, confirms these observations from the field: "I don't know how spending more on prenatal care is going to make any difference to the woman who uses crack. A recent study found that nearly 30% of the

social

The Anti-Communists Won't Concede Victory

By DAVID FRUM

Should some future historian ever want to mark a precise date at which neo-conservatism passed from the political scene, this past weekend would do as well as any. This was the weekend of the convention of the Committee for the Free World, an annual event that brings together in Washington a large number of the grand names of anti-communism: Jean-Francois Revel, Norman Podhoretz and Jeanne Kirkpatrick. It might have been expected that the first meeting of this group in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the communist regimes of Eastern Europe would have been a giddy celebration. But no.

Frank Gaffney, a former Reagan Defense Department official and now director of the Center for Security Studies, reported at the final session on Sunday morning, "Never since 1945 has the Soviet Union been so close to military pre-eminence in Europe as it is today. Grim news, but what really seemed to be depressing the conferees was not a frightened confidence that Mr. Gaffney is right, but the disturbing suspicion that he is wrong. And if he's wrong, what next?"

Irving Kristol expressed an unpopular minority view: "Communism is over. Collectivism isn't over, but communism is over. And that means that anti-communism is over too. The few under-30 guests applauded, but the great majority of the conferees, over 50 for the most part, shook their heads. They reserved their approbation for the remarks expressed at the Saturday session. NATO was still alive and still vital to the future of Europe; without support from the U.S., a unified Germany would be vulnerable to Soviet bullying; American culture was in decline. The closest anyone came to a bold vision of the fu-

ture was Mel Lasky, editor of Encounters. "We must be imaginative, innovative. We must do again what we did in 1945. It is no disparagement of what was done in 1945 to find repeating the past not an especially imaginative plan. Of course, what was accomplished between 1945 and 1955 was stupendous. It was in those years that the institutions that formed the modern West—the West that Eastern Europe is now begging to join—were created. If the Committee for the Free World does not represent the generation that devised those institutions, which is dead, it does at least represent that generation that argued for them when they were young and fragile. As such, that generation deserves immense credit; as such, it is understandably reluctant to concede that new institutions might be necessary.

Or new habits of thought. Mr. Kristol's warning that collectivism did not die when communism did was strikingly vindicated by the conference itself. Carl Gershman, the executive director of the National Endowment for Democracy, delivered an impassioned plea for U.S. government assistance to democratic forces in Eastern Europe.

Not everybody present agreed with Mr. Gershman, or with Mr. Lasky's even more ambitious demand for massive government-to-government assistance to Eastern Europe. But everybody who expressed an opinion on U.S. help for the East did seem to assume that the only assistance worth discussing is the sort of the assistance that governments can offer.

The Czech finance minister, Vaclav Klaus, has said repeatedly that Czechoslovakia needs investment, not aid. The best help that the West can give will come not from the NED or the Peace Corps or AID.

but from General Electric, Suzuki, News International, Oxford University, Medecins sans Frontieres, Deutschebank, the Smith Richardson Foundation and CNN. The best help Western governments can offer is an open international trading system.

The sharpest sign of generational clash at the conference was not the statism of the older generation, but its tone. In a question-and-answer session, one of the younger guests accused the panel of excessive pessimism: "You'd never know that six communist regimes had been toppled within the past six months. That replied one of the dour speakers, is why we are so worried."

Other speakers went beyond pessimism to downright bitterness. American culture is in decline, lamented Hilton Kramer, editor of the New Criterion; John O'Sullivan, editor of National Review, corrected him: "Decadence is a state of low vitality, and American culture was undeniably vital. Might it not be more accurate to describe American culture as poisonous rather than decadent? Gertrude Himmelfarb, a historian, gloomily complained, "The state of the universities has never been worse. And things are just as bad overseas. The president of Lithuania is a music teacher, and the president of Czechoslovakia is a playwright." Mr. Kramer scoffed: "Worse! Vaclav Havel is reported to have a poster of John Lennon on the wall of his Prague apartment."

All in all, a disappointing weekend. The definitive failure of a generation's work means that it is time for a new generation to take over. But so too, it turns out, does the definitive success.

Mr. Frum is an assistant features editor of the Journal's editorial page.

grams—it is usually caused by the behavior of the mother.

Teen pregnancy and illegitimacy are also important causes of low birthweight and infant mortality. American Enterprise Institute researcher Nicholas Eberstadt recently wrote in a nationally syndicated column on Nov. 3, "If viewed as a medical condition, illegitimacy would be one of the leading killers of children in America." Mr. Eberstadt's work suggests that a child born to poor, married parents has a better chance of survival than a child born to a middle-class single mother; infant mortality rates, according to one 1982 study, can be higher for children of unmarried white college graduates than for children of married white high school dropouts.

Not so coincidentally, D.C., which trails the nation in infant mortality, also has the nation's highest percentage of births to unmarried mothers. Fifty-eight percent of all babies in the city are born to unmarried women—nearly three times the national average.

Responsible maternal behavior may even compensate for comparatively poorer prenatal care. A Japanese woman is four times more likely to die during childbirth than an American woman because complex medical treatment is more likely to be available here. Yet Japan has the world's lowest rate of infant mortality—about half that of the U.S. In Japan, fewer than 1% of all mothers are either unmarried or teenagers.

America's high rate of infant mortality is more of a social than a medical problem. Spending more won't fix it.

Mrs. Smith is assistant editor of Policy Review. This is excerpted from the spring issue of that magazine.

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REVIEW & OUTLOOK

Realpolitik in an Information Age

The court of world opinion has accorded Mikhail Gorbachev a degree of individual responsibility for his nation's future perhaps not seen since the reign of the Sun King. Similarly, Mr. Gorbachev's persona may be blinding policy elites to the real course of events.

The Bush administration has spent the past several weeks wrestling with the question of Lithuanian sovereignty. There now is some prospect that the Lithuanians and Moscow will work out a compromise of sorts around the idea of "suspending" independence for two years. If this compromise is reached, it will be seen as validating the administration's desire not to do anything that would jeopardize Mr. Gorbachev and the reforms he

living in the age of telecommunications, while the politicians are living in the Age of Talleyrand.

Ever since the shipyard workers of Gdansk formed themselves into Solidarity, the words, actions and beliefs of democratic reformers in one part of the world have been transmitted via print, satellite feeds and fax machines to their counterparts elsewhere. We have seen Lech Walesa and Vaclav Havel describe the democratic spirit before the U.S. Congress and a Statue of Liberty erected in Tiananmen Square. We have read of a Czech brewery worker leaping onto a factory table to recite Jefferson's Declaration of Independence and of Latin Americans braving death threats to cast a free vote.

Gorbachev vs. Reform-I

The Lithuanians—as well as the Ukrainians in Lvov ready to sign economic agreements with Vilnius—see themselves as part of this same democratic force. Like it or not, the U.S. sits at the center of this maelstrom of courage and change as a moral anchor, an abiding symbol of what democracy is.

represents. But what about the next Lithuania, or the Lithuania after that?

Just within the last 48 hours, the Latvian Popular Front said it had enough support to declare independence when its parliament convenes this Thursday, the first Soviet congress of free-trade unions met Monday in Siberia to declare its opposition to state unions, and the newly formed Ukrainian Republican Party said it would form the republic's first non-communist party with the intention of seceding. The West may have to turn out the Kohl-Mitterand compromise as a form letter.

Perhaps it is time to consider the significance of these developments. Events are moving so rapidly in the Soviet Union that Mikhail Gorbachev, once a proponent of the policies favored by the West, may now be an obstacle to those policies. At the least, the U.S. ought to be committing itself to achieving a set of policies inside the Soviet Union, instead of committing to one man whether he follows those policies or not.

Mr. Gorbachev is a figure caught in a polarization between reformers and the old guard. For example, he recently gave a presidential cabinet appointment to Valentin Rasputin,

Yes, the practitioners of Realpolitik reply, but Mr. Gorbachev is the horse who is going to carry us to significant arms-control agreements, complete a Soviet troop pullout from Eastern Europe, allow Germany to unify, control still-dangerous Soviet hardliners, and create opportunities for the empire's real reformers. With so much headed our way, they say, why rock the boat?

The problem is that this forces us to deny repeatedly the damage real events are doing to our own political principles, such as the consent of the governed. We end up saying that everything's OK so long as Mr. Gorbachev doesn't use force, or too much force, while TV screens show him using force before our eyes. In an information age, how can the government supposedly supporting democracy publicly deny the obvious truth?

Do we believe that looking the other way while Mr. Gorbachev and the KGB's troops cut off Lithuania's economic lifelines will avoid civil war among a Soviet population that is a seething time bomb?

Do we really believe that any arms

By RICHARD PERLE

President Bush was right to stop pressing NATO plans for a new American short-range nuclear missile in Europe. Such a missile is militarily unnecessary and politically infeasible. But how the president and his NATO colleagues decide the more fundamental issue of the future of nuclear weapons in Europe is another matter.

American nuclear weapons in Europe, and specifically in West Germany, are crucial to the safety and stability of Europe. Without them, Germany would face the nuclear-armed Soviet Union with only non-nuclear forces. The result would be a dangerous imbalance in the center of Europe. And, whatever Germany may say or think today, this imbalance would in time lead Germany to seek nuclear weapons of its own.

The French and British understand the implications of this and have strongly supported a continuing American nuclear presence on German soil. The Germans, given as they are to romanticism, pacifism and self-absorption, aren't sure whether they will allow American nuclear weapons to remain in Germany much longer. Those Germans who don't want the missiles seem to believe one of two things: Either that no Soviet military threat exists any longer, or that even, if they send us and our weapons packing, the U.S. will continue to protect Germany with its American-based strategic weapons.

Wild Suggestions

The signs from Germany are disquieting. A typical statement is the one made by Count Otto Lambsdorff, the leader of the Free Democrats, Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher's party. Count Lambsdorff has said that Germany may have to honor East German "obligations" even after reunification. What this could mean is reimbursing Moscow for the cost of keeping Soviet troops in Germany. With the leading figure of a centrist party saying that, anything is possible!

When President Bush recently leaked the decision to reverse his earlier insistence on a missile to replace the aging Lance missile now deployed in Europe, he let it be known that a new arms-control policy was being readied to make the most of his unilateral change. After all, he reasoned, if the U.S. has got to give up short-range missiles in Europe because the Germans won't accept them, let's see if the Soviets can be made to give up theirs.

A treaty banning all short-range missiles would be a good thing. But only if it covers all of them. A treaty that allowed the Soviets to keep some limited number would be hopelessly unverifiable. If they chose to cheat, there isn't a prayer that we could know how many the Soviets had.

With a total ban on short-range missiles, however, we could have substantially more confidence in Soviet compliance. This is because the testing of short-range missiles and the training of troops to fire them would also be banned. Testing and training are much easier to verify than the actual number of weapons. Weapons are

Without U.S. nuclear forces in Europe, Germany would face the nuclear-armed Soviet Union alone. In time, Germany would seek nuclear weapons of its own.

easily hidden while test and training activities are not.

Properly negotiated, the elimination of the entire class of short-range missiles worldwide could have the added advantage of taking them from the likes of Syria and Iraq, both of whom possess Soviet missiles and the potential to use them with chemical weapons. A treaty banning the missiles should require the Soviets to retrieve any sent abroad.

Without any short-range nuclear missiles in Europe, the U.S. would still have a sizable number of nuclear weapons in Germany and elsewhere in Europe. These include bombs deliverable by European-based aircraft and artillery shells, some of which have been recently modernized. Moreover, the U.S. is developing improved weapons for tactical aircraft, the so-called "tactical air-to-surface missile."

There is a justifiable fear among British, French and some American policy makers that a treaty eliminating short-range missiles would intensify German pressure to remove the remaining nuclear weapons from German territory, especially the nuclear artillery. Presumably this is why President Bush supported a successor to the Lance when he first took office and why the administration has in the past argued—wrongly in my view—for an unverifiable limit on short-range missiles rather than a complete ban.

There is no doubt that the denuclearization of Western Europe, a dream of Soviet foreign policy since Stalin's day,

would give the Soviets the military predominance they consistently sought, but failed to achieve, during the long twilight of the Cold War. It would be ironic indeed if Western victory in the Cold War were to bring Moscow its most elusive Cold War goal.

Yet the unnamed sources who leaked the president's decision gave an argument which, more than any other, drives the Germans toward denuclearization: That short-range weapons can strike targets only on German territory. This idea, expressed in the pernicious slogan "the shorter the range, the deader the Ger-

mans," misses the central point: Nuclear weapons with small, controllable yields would be used only against invading forces (i.e. the Red Army) in the battlefield. Properly developed, deployed and controlled, tactical nuclear weapons would be used only against military targets and, even then, only in the most extreme circumstances. The probability of an invasion that would warrant their use has always been slight. With the Cold War now receding into history, it is smaller than ever. Thus the principal purpose of American nuclear weapons in Germany would be to deter the use of nuclear weapons against German territory.

Which should we suppose to be the greater threat? That a monopoly of theater nuclear weapons might one day tempt a Soviet leader or that maintaining a small number of American nuclear weapons in Germany might somehow lead to their unacceptable use on German territory?

President Bush should go no further down the path of changing American nuclear policy in Europe without an understanding with the German government that would provide for a continuing American nuclear presence there. This probably means waiting until after the German elections in December. A negotiation on these issues now would become caught up in the emotional Sturm und Drang of German electoral politics.

Even after the German elections, securing German approval for a continuing nu-

clear presence on German soil will not be easy. But the Germans can hardly expect the U.S. (or France or Britain) to assume the risks entailed in a nuclear guarantee for Germany if they opt for the illusory security of a nuclear-free zone.

Keep Nuclear Element

A continuing American nuclear guarantee for NATO would mean a continuing American troop presence. The number of troops could be substantially fewer than the 265,000 there now. Almost any of the numbers now being discussed, from a high of 225,000, to figures on the order of 100,000, should be considered. Whatever number of troops remain though, the U.S. should insist that they not face Soviet nuclear weapons without nuclear weapons of a similar nature close at hand. The issues of troops and weapons are inextricably bound up together. Both are in turn woven deep in the fabric of NATO strategy.

That strategy can and should adapt to the collapse of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe, and the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact. Reciprocal force reductions are part of the response. So is a reorientation of NATO's nuclear doctrine away from a readiness to use nuclear weapons early in a war to compensate for conventional weakness. But without a continuing nuclear presence, there is no NATO strategy at all.

The U.S. should take advantage of the movement toward NATO-Soviet parity in Europe by redeploying tactical nuclear weapons there. We should make the weapons more survivable by pulling them away from the front lines to more secure and flexible storage in the rear. This should go a long way toward resolving the dilemma of the early use of weapons deployed in spots where they would be overrun before their use could be ordered.

The future of NATO's nuclear force and strategy is the most sensitive issue to arise from the profound changes now sweeping Europe. The U.S. had better take its time and get it right. The Cold War was too important to be left to the generals. The way the world organizes for peace is too important to be left to the diplomats. And neither Cold War nor present peace should be left to the Germans.

Mr. Perle, a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, served its assistant secretary of defense in the Reagan administration.

The Right Kind of Missile Ban for Europe

To Lower Infant Mortality Rate, Get Mothers Off Drugs

By HARMEEET K.D. SINGH

It is a tragedy and a source of embarrassment that the U.S. ranks 20th in the world in preventing infant mortality. Singapore and Hong Kong, as well as Japan and most of Western Europe, all do better.

worker, even a dentist, and also be referred for drug treatment.

D.C. has marketed its services well. A highly visible media campaign, called "Better Babies," has posted ads on buses and posters, and broadcast them on television and radio around the city. The MOM

availability nor insufficient outreach is the answer. "Most of the women I come into contact with know they can get free care, but a lot of them don't really take prenatal care all that seriously. Some of them say they didn't even know they were pregnant until pretty late in the pregnancy," reports

babies born in New York hospitals were addicted to crack. Use of drugs, not poor nutrition, is the leading cause of low birthweight. You hear a lot about how nutritional deficiencies, lack of funds of WIC, etc., are responsible for low birthweight, but that's simply false. Low birthweight in

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**STATEMENT OF RICHARD B. CHENEY
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
JULY 13, 1989**

**Not for Release Prior to
10:00 a.m., July 13, 1989**

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss three of our most important strategic programs. First, I will review the Administration's proposal to provide mobility and survivability to the ICBM force through deployment of Peacekeeper Rail Garrison and Small ICBM. Then I will turn to the B-2 program, which is an essential addition to our strategic bomber force if we are to have confidence in our ability to penetrate improving Soviet air defenses in the late 1990s and beyond. Finally, I will discuss the Strategic Defense Initiative or SDI program that could, in the future, lead to a better balance of strategic offensive and defensive forces and enhanced national security.

Following my brief remarks on each program, I would welcome any questions you might have.

ICBM Modernization

Our recent review of national security policy reaffirmed the desirability, from the standpoint of deterrence and stability, of maintaining at least a portion of each Triad leg in a survivable posture. Alert bombers and SSBNs at sea meet this criterion; today there is no comparably survivable counterpart within the ICBM leg.

This Administration's ICBM Modernization Program is designed to make a portion of the ICBM force survivable and to do so in a way that is affordable, has minimal impact on the environment, and can achieve political consensus. I am encouraged that the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) has recommended approval of the funding requested in FY 1990 to carry out the

Administration's proposal. Under this plan, two mobile missiles will be deployed-- Peacekeeper Rail Garrison and Small ICBM.

Rebasing fifty Peacekeepers from Minuteman silos to rail garrison is the quickest way to correct the growing vulnerability of our ICBM force, which is now based exclusively in silos, and to provide a counterpart to the already deployed Soviet mobile ICBMs. Initial operational capability (IOC) for the rebased Peacekeepers is set for 1992; full operational capability (FOC) will be achieved two years thereafter. Peacekeeper in rail basing is also our least costly means for making a portion of our ICBM force mobile-- development and procurement for rail basing will require less than \$6 billion to complete.

The Small ICBM will make U.S. strategic forces more robust and viable under all conditions -- including an attack executed without strategic warning. Although such an attack is considered unlikely today, it may become more plausible in the future if the Soviets develop capabilities that would increase their confidence that a surprise attack could be successful.

The Small ICBM offers more than a hedge against a surprise attack that could threaten other ICBM systems, as well as nonalert strategic bombers and submarines in port. It also provides greater targeting flexibility and efficiency than highly MIRVed systems. It may be preferred over highly MIRVed systems for striking isolated targets or newly emergent targets that require retargeting. Small ICBMs thus will allow other U.S. strategic forces to be planned more efficiently.

In addition, the Small ICBM promotes strategic stability. It is an unattractive target for surprise attack because of the highly unfavorable exchange ratio to the attacker. Enduring strategic stability, and with it enhanced national security, is the primary goal of both our strategic modernization program and our arms control negotiations. The ICBM modernization plan--a two-phased deployment of Peacekeeper Rail Garrison and Small ICBM--strengthens our security with or without arms control. It also improves our START negotiating position and our chance of achieving meaningful arms reductions.

These two systems will be deployed sequentially, rather than simultaneously. For technical, strategic, and fiscal reasons, we have elected to deploy Peacekeeper Rail Garrison before the Small ICBM. Initial deployment of Peacekeeper Rail Garrison is planned for FY 1992 and initial deployment of the Small ICBM is planned for FY 1997. This two-phase approach makes the total program affordable since investment in Rail Garrison will be nearly complete before procurement begins for Small ICBM.

The President and I are committed to the two-missile ICBM Modernization program. We have underscored our commitment by pledging to increase requested funding for the Small ICBM by \$947 million in FY 1992-94 over what was initially proposed. With this addition, funding requested for the Small ICBM in the Five-Year Defense Program will support development of both the missile and its basing mode and provide for a 1997 IOC. However, decisions on how many to deploy, where they should be based and what their optimum payload should be need not be made now. We will be examining these issues to determine the most cost-effective means of deploying this system.

B-2 Program

Several months ago in testimony to the Congress, I said I would examine the total program cost and the technical status of the B-2. Since then I have taken a very close look at the program, including a visit to Northrop's engineering and manufacturing and aircraft final assembly plants. This visit enabled me to see firsthand the progress that has been made, as well as the remaining hurdles that need to be overcome. In addition to the visit, I have received the results of the Defense Acquisition Board review of the program, an updated report by the Defense Science Board, and a considerable amount of other information on cost and technical risk.

Now that I have had time to review all these inputs carefully, I would like to give you my views on why we need the B-2, how much it will cost, the potential implications of the HASC reductions in program funding, and what further risks remain.

The Triad of strategic forces has supported our national strategy of deterrence and maintained the peace for over 30 years. We continue to maintain the Triad consisting of diverse ICBM, SLBM, and bomber systems that provide a robust retaliatory capability and hedge against unforeseen vulnerabilities or failures in any one element of our strategic forces.

The bomber leg of the Triad is itself a diverse combination of systems, composed of penetrating bombers delivering gravity weapons and short-range attack missiles, bombers launching cruise missiles from standoff ranges, and shoot-and-penetrate bombers that combine a standoff cruise missile attack with a penetration mission. These various systems each have their own means

of defeating defenses. Additionally, they reinforce each other. For example, the large number of air launched cruise missiles can saturate and disrupt enemy air defenses, thereby increasing the likelihood that penetrating bombers will reach their targets.

Although modernization of the U.S. bomber force with the ALCM-B cruise missile and the B-1B bomber has kept pace with Soviet air defense developments to date, the systems we have in place will find it increasingly difficult to penetrate Soviet air defenses over the next decade. The effectiveness of the B-52 and, to a lesser extent, the B-1B as penetrating bombers is steadily eroding due to the proliferation of improved Soviet air defenses. The capabilities of those systems that do not fully exploit stealth technologies are projected eventually to erode to unacceptable levels as Soviet defenses continue to improve and proliferate.

The B-2 offers revolutionary low observable technology to offset the ongoing and expected air defense improvements. Its low radar cross section will shrink the engagement zones of radars to effectively nullify their capabilities. Unlike the B-52 and B-1B bombers, we assess that the effectiveness of the B-2 will be relatively insensitive to the extent to which Soviet air defenses are attrited by preceding ballistic missile attacks. Thus, the B-2 will reduce the dependence of bombers on the other legs of the Triad. Also, the B-2 does not rely on electronic countermeasures whose effectiveness against a changing threat is difficult to assess.

The B-2 remains the cornerstone of the two-bomber program started in 1981 to modernize the strategic bomber force. As you may recall, the

modernization program outlined an ambitious schedule for the production and deployment of the B-1B to address near-term shortfalls in bomber force capabilities. The deployment of the B-1B has provided time for the orderly development of stealth technologies necessary for the revolutionary B-2 design.

Let me turn now to the closely related subjects of program cost and technical risk. Assuming that the acquisition profile in President Bush's budget is not changed, our best estimate of the total acquisition cost of the B-2 program is \$43.8 billion in 1981 dollars (the program's base year), or \$70.2 billion in then-year dollars. The difference between these figures and the corresponding figures for the initial FY 1990 budget submission primarily reflects a one-year delay in the full rate production program, which I directed according to my general policy of proceeding slowly in the early stages of very high technology programs. The \$70.2 billion program cost equates to a total flyaway cost of \$315 million per aircraft. Total flyaway cost is the cost to put an aircraft on the flight line ready to be fueled, armed, and flown. It does not include support equipment and technical orders; nor does it include research and development costs, most of which are behind us.

In addition to the planned buy profile, the \$70.2 billion program cost estimate is based on key assumptions in three areas: protecting existing fixed-price options for certain subsystems, starting a multi-year procurement in FY 1993, and achieving planned cost-reduction initiatives. We examined all of these assumptions carefully and believe they are realistic. However, we will need your support on some items such as the multiyear funding. The

cost estimate we have now for the B-2 program is based largely on costs actually realized so far on the 11 aircraft (six research, development, test, and evaluation aircraft and five production aircraft) now in various stages of manufacture. This does not mean we know for certain the costs of the program, but it does mean we know a great deal more about B-2 costs than we did one or two years ago, particularly since these aircraft are being built on actual production-line tooling. Program risk and cost risk remain, of course, and I must emphasize that achieving the \$70.2 billion estimate depends to a large extent on the rate at which the B-2 is procured.

Let me briefly address the impact of the recent HASC reduction of the B-2 RDT&E funding by \$300 million and procurement funding by \$500 million from the Amended FY 1990/1991 Budget request. (The HASC will consider a request to reprogram \$300M from procurement funds to keep RDT&E fully funded.) Without a reprogramming of procurement funds into RDT&E, the change would drastically interfere with current production, staffing, and contractual plans. It would result in up to an 18-month stretch of the flight test program, a significant increase in development costs, and up to an 18 month delay in the production program (with a corresponding delay in IOC).

If, as the HASC suggested, we took the entire cut in procurement, the magnitude of the cost increase would depend on our ability to maintain the key program cost controlling strategies: the fixed-price options; cost-reduction initiatives; and multiyear procurement for the last four production years. The total \$800 million cut could affect our ability to realize the economies planned from both the fixed-price options and the cost-reduction

initiatives, but DoD would do everything possible to mitigate the possible cost increases. The reduction probably would not affect our ability to exercise a multiyear procurement in the latter B-2 production years.

Assuming that there were no increases from disruption of fixed-price options or curtailment of cost-reduction initiatives, the total increase in program cost is estimated to be about \$700 million to \$1.4 billion (then-year), accompanied by a slip in initial operational capability of about four months. Reduced savings from fixed-price options (\$2,800 million at risk) and cost-reduction initiatives (\$3,600 million at risk) could add substantially to that figure.

While cost risk underlies much of our mutual concern, I would also like to address the risk associated with the advanced technology applications. These technical considerations, like those in all development programs that challenge the state of the art, must be put in perspective. We have done much more in the way of risk reduction activities, including extensive wind tunnel and avionics testing, than is normally done prior to flight testing. We have demonstrated, in an inflight simulator, the flight control algorithms, and we have matured the radar and navigation subsystems in an avionics flying testbed. The Defense Acquisition Board recently completed an in-depth review of the B-2 program and concluded that the data available for the B-2 far exceeds that which other programs have available at this stage. I must emphasize that this is a critical time in this program. During the coming year, our understanding of both cost and risk will increase immensely. This was the reason, not any major technical difficulty, that led us to hold the production rate steady for another year. I recognize the delayed first

flight and cost increases have heightened your concerns about the program's technical health and affordability. Those of us who recently visited and toured the contractor's facility are led to a different conclusion. The components we have seen, the major subassemblies, and the assembled aircraft itself, all attest to a dedicated work force producing a quality product.

I firmly believe that both the cost and technical risks have been fully assessed, and that it is prudent for us to proceed. Given the lessons learned in other programs, the current and projected fiscal climate, and the degree to which the B-2 is pushing the state of technology, I believe we have reached a balance of both risk and cost which puts us in the correct position to move forward with this very important program. I will not mislead you by guaranteeing there will be no future cost increases, but I will do everything I can to avoid them. There are still some risks in this program, but I believe they have been reduced to a prudent level.

It is time, however, that we move this debate from the question of simple cost to one of strategic value. I fully support this program because the country needs it. The B-2 will be a cornerstone in our overall strategic deterrence well into the next century. Without it, we would be unable to maintain the effectiveness of the bomber leg of the Triad against rapidly improving Soviet air defenses.

The B-2 program has made great progress and the Department is ready to proceed as proposed. I look forward to your support and cooperation in helping me achieve the goals of this vitally important program.

Strategic Defense Initiative

As you know, I am a strong supporter of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). I am therefore deeply concerned that this committee cut the SDI program by \$1.1 billion and reallocated those funds to other programs. I would like to briefly review for the committee what the Bush Administration is trying to achieve in the proposed Five-Year Program for SDI, which requests \$4.6 billion in FY90 and calls for a total funding of \$33 billion in FY90-94.

When President Bush entered office he called for a comprehensive review of our national security strategy and objectives. In doing so, he pressed us to "challenge assumptions" concerning previous national security policies and programs, including SDI. We did and, based on that review, the President has concluded that the fundamental goal of the SDI program--to enhance deterrence by placing it on a more stable defensive foundation--is sound. If planned experiments yield the results that appear likely, the SDI Program should soon demonstrate its ability to contribute to deterrence--not only of Soviet aggression, but of countries that may develop their own missiles armed with nuclear and chemical warheads.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have provided requirements for an initial phase of strategic defense, which they consider would provide meaningful military capability. These initial defenses would increase an enemy's uncertainty that it could realize wartime objectives by disrupting its ballistic missile attack. The recommended SDI Five Year Program is structured to permit the President to make, within the next four years, an

informed decision on whether to recommend to the Congress and the people of this country that strategic defenses be deployed. The SDI program provides options for layered defenses composed of both space- and ground-based elements and would permit deployment on a schedule as close as possible to that envisioned in the previous FY 1990-94 Five-Year Defense Program submitted to Congress in January.

If SDI funding is reduced below the President's request to the level recommended by the HASC, then we will seriously delay a decision on deployment of an initial Strategic Defense System, and curtail advanced technology efforts. This could postpone indefinitely moving to a position where we could deploy defenses to meet the JCS Phase I requirements. In essence, this level of funding if sustained beyond FY90 would drive the SDI program toward a technology-only effort.

The proposed SDI program retains the important balance between research on an initial system and development of advanced technologies for follow-on systems. Budget reductions would require us either to sharply reduce directed energy and other advanced technology programs so as to maintain potential initial development and deployment schedules, or to forego a timely deployment decision by applying the reductions "across the board."

The first alternative would not permit timely development and deployment of follow-on systems to contain the evolving Soviet threat. The second alternative would create an unacceptable delay in making a deployment

decision, prevent demonstration and validation of advanced technologies, and increase program costs.

To accommodate the funding level recommended by this committee, we would have to reduce the scope of the program drastically by delaying or cancelling one or several of the following efforts: the Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) program, the High Endoatmospheric Defense Interceptor (HEDI) program, various directed energy programs, space-based defense concepts such as Brilliant Pebbles, and programs with our allies on theater missile defenses. The cuts would force us to cancel vital experiments and demonstration tests and result in the loss of up to 6,000 highly skilled workers. In short, we would waste much of the progress the SDI Program has achieved to date.

Moreover, the reduction would undermine our negotiators in arms control dealings with the Soviet Union.

This year, the proposed SDI cuts are particularly troubling because the funds in effect would be diverted to programs with less military utility such as the V-22 Osprey, new F-14 production, and even high definition television. I made particularly difficult choices in producing the Department's budget, and these programs competed unsuccessfully with the SDI Program for funding.

In conclusion, we have reached a key decision point with regard to the SDI program. The issue before the Congress with regard to the level of SDI funding is whether we are to protect the option for deployment of militarily significant defenses in the 1990s. I believe that we should not eliminate the possibility of deployment of defenses for our country in the 1990s by

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reducing the SDI program to a technology-only effort. Funding of \$4.6 billion is the minimum required to implement the President's program. The Committee's action of slashing funds requested for the SDI Program and reallocating them for other programs disregards the priorities of the Administration and the tough choices it made to provide Congress and the American people with a lean defense budget.

THE GORBACHEV PHENOMENON AND ARMS CONTROL
by Lord Chalfont

A paper prepared for the Board for International Broadcasting
Munich, Germany; 16th May 1989

The use or threat of force is a part of the human condition; it is not possible to organize national societies without the ultimate sanction of force to maintain order, to deal with criminals, to protect the weak against the strong. In a world composed of sovereign nation states, the same principle applies in the international context. The first essential duty of any government is to ensure the safety of its citizens; and to do that it has to maintain effective security forces and be prepared to use them in the last resort.

It is sometimes argued that all that would be irrelevant and unnecessary if only we had some kind of World Government ordering all our affairs from some grand headquarters in Brussels, or Geneva - or perhaps in Outer Space. But would it, really? How would the World Government ensure peace, order and stability? The simple fact is that no-one would have the first idea how to organize an orderly society at any level - national or international - without the sanction of force. War will not be abolished until sin is abolished - and I think that might reasonably be regarded as a fairly long-term perspective.

THE BACKGROUND TO GORBACHEV

The persistent desire for a world without war, or the threat of war, has, nevertheless, been powerfully reinforced by the Gorbachev phenomenon which it is my intention to analyse in this paper; it has led to fundamental and significant changes in western perceptions of the conduct and management of international relations.

The first term and the early part of the second term of Ronald Reagan's presidency were characterised by consistent denunciation of Soviet foreign policy; a commitment to the maintenance of strong defence and deterrent forces; and a marked scepticism about the value of arms control initiatives, especially those involving substantial reductions in the inventory of nuclear weapons. By contrast, the current thrust of American and western foreign policies in the area of east-west relations seems to be based on an increased willingness to accept the pacific nature of Soviet intentions and consequently to accord a lower priority to defence preparedness.

My purpose in this paper is to speculate on the causes and consequences of this significant change in the foreign policies of the West. It is not enough to suggest that President Reagan wanted to be remembered by historians as a great peacemaker, and that he could only achieve this by some dramatic nuclear weapons agreement with the Soviet Union before the end of his second term. It is difficult to believe that any American president, especially a Republican with Mr Reagan's distinctive record in foreign affairs, would gamble with national and alliance security unless he believed that other factors in the equation tended to minimise the risk and maximise the chance of success.

There are, of course, economic and political pressures in the United States which might create a desire for accommodation with the Soviet Union and consequential reductions in military expenditure; but the principal factor in the new calculus of international power is Mr Gorbachev. He has, undoubtedly, transformed the face of Soviet diplomacy. He is not only intelligent and knowledgeable; he has a genuinely attractive personality - so, incidentally, has his wife - and he appears to be ready to exchange ideas, whereas previous Soviet leaders have tended to communicate in slogans and the sterile dialectics of Marxism and Leninism. Even Mrs Thatcher, who is not easily susceptible to the exercise of personal charm, has described him as "a man with whom it is possible to do business".

Furthermore Mr Gorbachev understands the subtle techniques of diplomacy more thoroughly than his predecessors. He has grasped the central fact that in a negotiation, the most powerful instrument is communication - not only with the other parties to the negotiation, but also with those who can bring influence and pressure to bear on them. By the skilful use of public relations techniques, superimposed on the more traditional Soviet use of disinformation and propaganda, he has succeeded in exploiting those currents of opinion in the west, which, through irrational fear of nuclear weapons, envy and mistrust of the United States, or just plain ideological persuasion, are likely to be useful to his purposes.

GLASNOST AND PERESTROIKA

Mr Gorbachev's political strategy is generally perceived in the West - both by his sympathisers and his antagonists - as being reflected by two Russian words which have, in a remarkably short time, been absorbed into the language of international debate - perestroika and glasnost.

These are words now used by journalists, analysts, and assorted experts often without any idea of their literal meaning, much less of their political significance. They have come to have that positive emotional connotation which was mordantly satirised in 1066 and All That. Perestroika and glasnost are instinctively regarded as "good things", especially by those who regard the United States and nuclear deterrence as "bad things". It is, therefore, important to look a little more closely at these words and at what they signify, not just what they mean.

Perestroika is a fairly familiar Russian word deriving from the root stroit - to construct or build, together with the prefix pere, signifying change or development. In other words - reconstruction. But in the lexicon of Mr Gorbachev's political strategy it means much more than that, - or much less, depending on how you look at it. Gorbachev's own conception of perestroika implies a radical transformation of Soviet society. He sees it as a "mass initiative" designed to overcome stagnation, to revive and intensify the Soviet economy and to eliminate from society what he calls "distortions of socialist ethics". One of the most significant of his interpretations of perestroika, however, is that it is designed "to revive the Leninist concept of socialist construction both in theory and practice".

Whatever reconstruction, or perestroika, is to take place in Soviet society is therefore to take place within the strict limits laid down by the Party. It may be worth recalling that the two major state-controlled newspapers are called Pravda and Isvestia - meaning Truth and News. There is a sardonic comment among Soviet dissidents to the effect that there is no truth in Pravda and no news in Isvestia. It is tempting to comment that there is no reconstruction in perestroika; that it has become, like the words socialism, democracy and peace, a magic formula to describe whatever the Party wants it to describe; and that it would be foolish for anyone in the West to believe that it has any wider or deeper significance.

Similarly, it would be wise to look with a sceptical eye at the word glasnost. Even the literal translation of the word is uncertain - but generally speaking the West has tended to regard it as signifying something desirable - in English something like openness; in French transparence; in Italian apertura; a suggestion that the obsessive secrecy and manipulation of opinion associated with life in the Soviet Union is giving way to something like the freedom of information which is a characteristic of most western democratic societies.

This would be going much too far. The themes and assumptions of glasnost are still controlled and manipulated by the state. Gorbachev himself has set out the rules of the game. "Criticism" he says "must always be conducted in the spirit of the party". The Soviet press may now print comments and opinions which would have been unthinkable in the pre-Gorbachev era, but there are no doubts in the minds of editors and journalists about the limited nature of this aspect of glasnost; as Pravda has insisted, "the power of the press is exercised according to the direction of the party". The bewildered reaction of the Soviet press to the results of the recent Soviet elections made them incapable of comment until President Gorbachev had laid down the party line.

In spite of all this, the western media have proved predictably ready to take glasnost at its face value, some of its representatives in Moscow swallowing every rumour, sensation and revelation served up by the glasnost industry, with the result that coverage of the Soviet Union in the Western press, radio and television is now more liberally laced with disinformation than it was in the past.

I am not, of course, suggesting that glasnost and perestroika are concepts designed solely, or even principally, to deceive the West.

They have a much more immediate and uncomplicated purpose. When Mr Gorbachev came to power in the Soviet Union he inherited what can only be described as a disaster area. The agricultural and industrial infrastructures of the country were hopelessly inefficient; its bureaucracy was cumbersome and incurably corrupt; the people were wretched, demoralised, and lazy; a massive defence budget - at least 14% of the GDP - made it impossible to provide enough food, clothing and other consumer goods for the majority of its citizens. Only the nomenklatura, the governing elite, enjoyed anything remotely resembling an acceptable quality of life.

THE GORBACHEV STRATEGY

Mr Gorbachev recognised that the Soviet Union could not continue indefinitely along that road. He resolved to remove the stranglehold of the bureaucracy, especially in the regions; to improve the morale, productivity and efficiency of some of the people by raising their standard of living and lifting some of the relentless pressures of the police state which has, over more than half a century, crushed the spirit of the Russian people. These are, you may say, altogether praiseworthy objectives; and indeed, for the Soviet people, they are.

If Mr Gorbachev succeeds the Soviet Union will be a happier, more self-confident, more efficient and more prosperous society. Should not the West, therefore, wish him well and support him in his efforts?

Before answering that question too readily, it would be wise to look at the future of Soviet foreign policy. What role will this rejuvenated and dynamic society play on the world stage? Here it is vitally important not to allow hope to triumph over experience. We have had alleged transformations in Soviet society before. There have been changes of political emphasis and there has even been a degree of flexibility in the tactical direction of foreign policy; but one thing has been constant and unshakeable - the commitment to the guiding principles of Marxism-Leninism. Mr Gorbachev, both in his speeches to the Party Congress and in his book - aptly entitled PERESTROIKA - has made it clear that he has no intention of departing from these principles.

Soviet foreign policy, therefore, continues to be based on the assumption of a world divided into two camps - socialist and imperialist - with the Third World as a giant bone of contention between them. The United States is the principal enemy, and one of the central aims of foreign policy is to separate, or "decouple", the Americans from their principal allies the west Europeans. One of the decisive factors in this equation is military power - and especially the power of the nuclear weapon, which prevents the Soviet Union from employing its massive conventional forces against Nato.

To engage the United States in an arms race with the aim of achieving nuclear superiority as well as conventional superiority would have been a hopeless task, doomed to fail; and the attempt would have imposed even more intolerable strains on the precarious Soviet economy.

Mr Gorbachev's current diplomatic strategy is designed very elegantly to overcome these obstacles using the seductive language of arms control. The agreement on Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces - the INF Treaty - provides for the elimination of all medium and shorter range nuclear delivery systems based in Europe. This is to be followed by a 50% cut in long range, or intercontinental systems. The eventual aim, which President Reagan was persuaded to endorse at Reykjavik, is the "nuclear free world". At some stage in the process the elimination of the British and French nuclear deterrents will be demanded by the Soviet Union as the price for some new and superficially attractive arms control agreement.

The "peace" movements of western Europe will be activated by the Soviet disinformation apparatus to accelerate the process.

If this plan succeeds, many of the aims of Soviet foreign policy will have been achieved - the dismantling of Nato, the isolation of the United States, the Finlandization of Europe, the reduction of the Soviet defence budget and the removal of the principal effective deterrent to the employment by the Soviet Union of armed force as an option in its foreign policy operations. Furthermore they will have been achieved at a time when we do not even know whether or for how long Mr Gorbachev will survive. It is by no means out of the question that the newly confident and prosperous Soviet Union will pass back into the hands of the Stalinists just at the moment when the West has rendered itself most vulnerable to a revival of Soviet global expansionism.

THE WESTERN REACTION

If all this is attacked by Western observers as irredeemably hawkish, it is partly because many people are being conditioned by perestroika and glasnost to believe that the Soviet threat is a figment of the imagination of cold warriors and that powerful invention of the radical constituency - the "military-industrial complex".

It is important to maintain a degree of intellectual clarity about these matters. The division of the world into two camps is not a Marxist invention; nor is it the result of the "arms race", the intransigence of hawks, the devious manoeuvres of the CIA - or, for that matter, the activities of the KGB.

It is real, an objective phenomenon which cannot be evaporated by wishful thinking. On each side of the division lie two political and ideological systems which have little or nothing in common. In one the state, however imperfectly organized or managed, exists to serve the individual. In the other, the individual exists to serve the state.

It is, of course, possible to argue that these two systems are capable of existing side by side. Furthermore, that the worst excesses of totalitarian communism are being eliminated by Mr Gorbachev. There is, however, one important difference between the two systems. One of the central aims of Marxism-Leninism is, eventually, by whatever means may seem most expedient, to impose its system upon the free world and to bring about the destruction of capitalism.

Mr Gorbachev, a child of the Komsomol and a protege of Andropov and the KGB, has never given any evidence throughout his career of dissenting from these aims; nor does he now. Until he does, to believe that there can be any lasting reconciliation with the Soviet system is as great an illusion as perestroika and glasnost - and infinitely more dangerous. The greatest threat to liberal democracy is still totalitarian communism.

How, then, should the West react to President Gorbachev's diplomatic offensive?

From what I have said so far, it might be inferred that I regard the present global military confrontation as acceptable, and all attempts to change it as dangerous myths. This is very far from the truth; and before explaining why, I would like to refer briefly to a concept which is often much misunderstood. It is known in the jargon of strategic thinking as MAD, or Mutual Assured Destruction. What it means, in simple terms, is that, in the present nuclear confrontation, each side is deterred from attacking the other because the threatened side has the power, even after an attack, to destroy the cities, towns and population of the attacker.

This is the reality of the current strategic position. There is, today, no defence against nuclear weapons; that is why they are such a powerful deterrent. There is a belief, still cherished by some people, that this has to be accepted as a permanent, unchangeable fact of life. This is not so. Intelligent, realistic defence and arms control policies can transform this balance of terror and even eliminate it. Let us reflect for a moment on how this might be achieved; but first, let us remind ourselves of the aims of serious arms control.

THE ARMS CONTROL FACTOR

Arms control, in its current connotation, is a relatively new expression. In the years between the wars there was much talk about disarmament; and when, in the 1950s, negotiations on the subject began again in Geneva, they tended to fall into two categories, one known as GCD - General and Complete Disarmament; and the other as Partial Measures - signifying measures which fell short of GCD, such as demilitarization of the Antarctic or of outer space. Among the sometimes cynical delegates at Geneva they were privately referred to as "agreements not to do things which nations were incapable of doing or had no intention of doing anyway".

Gradually, however, there emerged a number of measures which seemed to offer some real prospect of constructive agreement among the great powers; and at the same time the phrase "arms control" came into use to describe them. The United States Government established in 1961 an organization called ACDA - the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency - to formulate policy and advise the State Department; and when I went to the British Foreign Office as Minister of State in 1964 (with the somewhat misleading but politically convenient title of Minister for Disarmament) one of my first acts was to set up an Arms Control and Disarmament Research Unit, to carry out the same functions as ACDA although on a more modest scale.

So what, precisely did, and does, Arms Control mean? In simple terms, I would define it as the search for international agreements designed to control and restrict the use of armed force at all levels, with two principal aims. The first, to make war less likely; and the second to make war, if it ever does happen, less destructive. Arms control agreements do not, necessarily, involve the removal or reduction of armed forces and weapons - they may be designed simply to prevent a further rise in the level of armaments, or, sometimes, to make sure that any rise in that level is controlled and limited.

In effect, therefore, arms control is a facet of military security policy, not, like disarmament, a perceived alternative to it. Yet this important truth has been forgotten as much political opinion has come to regard arms control as a desirable end in itself, to be pursued single-mindedly without much concern about whether it increases national or international security; and this is the first and perhaps most dangerous myth about arms control - the belief that any arms control agreement is a good thing, irrespective of whether or not it meets either of the two basic criteria - will it make war less likely or less destructive?

So how can we, by developing arms control policies as a facet of defence policy, make war less likely? The first requirement is to build a measure of confidence between the powers which still confront each other - to remove some of the more destabilising elements in weapons systems, force deployments and military activities. One of the most destabilising factors in any military confrontation is the fear of surprise attack - a fear which might at any time provoke what is known as a pre-emptive attack, when one side becomes so afraid that the other is about to mount a sudden assault, that it launches its own (what Welsh rugby coaches call "getting your retaliation in first").

It should be a cardinal aim of arms control to ensure that the balance of forces is such that neither side could contemplate a surprise attack with any realistic hope of success. And here I have to inject one of those notes of realism which are so unpopular in some quarters. It is this - the most effective way of ensuring that no potential enemy, however powerful, will ever launch a surprise attack, nuclear or conventional, is to possess a weapon which, after all the calculations have been made, will appear to him to be the ultimate deterrent. At present, whether we like it or not, that is the nuclear weapon; and to give it up before the possibility of sudden attack - from anyone, not just the Soviet Union - has been eliminated, would in my view be an act of gross irresponsibility.

But, if all the calculations go wrong, and war does come, how do we try to ensure that its destructive power is limited? This is, of course, partly a matter of technology and military engineering. Such developments as real-time intelligence and target acquisition, precision-guided weapons and enhanced radiation warheads will tend to confine operations to the battlefield and reduce what is known in the jargon as "collateral damage" - in simple English, death and destruction among innocent civilians. We must also take very seriously the possibility that modern technology will enable us to achieve at least a partial defence against nuclear attack, thus enabling us to move away from the familiar balance of terror, or mutual assured destruction.

A WESTERN STRATEGY

So let me move into the final section of my paper with the essentials of what I believe to be a practical, realistic political strategy for the West.

I repeat that arms control negotiations are complicated and intellectually demanding; and I can do no more in this brief paper than to sketch a broad outline - to set up some signposts, not to attempt a detailed blueprint. That is for governments and their professional advisers.

The first, essential principle is to advance simultaneously on all the arms control fronts. One of the most dangerous temptations is to deal with categories of weapons in isolation - nuclear weapons, so-called "offensive weapons", tanks or intermediate-range missiles. Arms control must be a seamless web, so that, at any stage in the process neither side has an advantage over the other, real or perceived, which would lead him to believe that he could embark on a military adventure with any chance of success.

Within that general context, there are a number of obviously essential elements, and I outline them now, not in any order of importance or precedence, because, I repeat, they must be elements of a coherent, across-the-board, arms control strategy.

We must, of course, reduce the level of nuclear stockpiles. At what level deterrence will remain effective is a matter for careful analysis. It is no good simply talking of a 50% cut. It is necessary to think seriously about categories of weapons - their mobility and vulnerability, their range, accuracy and ability to destroy "hardened" military targets. So long as the balance is preserved at all these levels, there is no reason why there should not be deep cuts in strategic nuclear systems.

At the same time, however, it will be necessary to continue the research and development of defence against missile attack - both land-based and space-based defence. This is what the Americans are trying to do with their Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) and the Russians with their own strategic defence research programme. If it proved possible both to reduce the numbers of strategic missiles on both sides and to provide an effective defence against those which remained, the danger of surprise nuclear attack would be substantially reduced, if not eliminated.

It is, however, essential, as I have said, to maintain a balance at all levels; and here I must express some doubts about the wisdom of the INF Treaty, removing all intermediate range land based nuclear missiles from Europe. I believe that it is essential, by going ahead with the modernization of short-range nuclear weapons in the Nato area, to demonstrate clearly that this is not a step towards a "nuclear free Europe".

Perhaps the most important of all the arms control negotiations will be those concerning the balance of conventional forces in the European area. One of the main threats to the security of the West for the last thirty years has been the enormous superiority of the Soviet forces facing Nato, especially on the central and northern fronts. The imbalance in favour of the Warsaw Pact has been especially great in weapon systems and troop formations capable of mounting large-scale offensive operations, and seizing and holding territory.

For 15 years, talks on mutual and balanced reduction of these forces have come to nothing. Now Mr Gorbachev has announced a unilateral reduction of 500,000 in the Soviet Armed Forces,

and the withdrawal by 1991 of six Russian tank divisions from East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. He has also, more significantly announced the withdrawal of assault landing troops and assault river crossing units. This is of special importance because of the association of this kind of unit with aggressive, as opposed to defensive, operations.

All this signals the need for new thinking and constructive reaction in the West. The Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks have now closed down after their 15 year existence and recently in Vienna a new set of negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) began, with a mandate to reduce conventional force levels "from the Atlantic to the Urals".

In the past, one of the main obstacles to agreement has been the question of "asymmetrical reductions". To explain this simply, let us take a single example of military equipment - main battle tanks. Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that between the Atlantic and the Urals the Warsaw Pact has about 53,000 main battle tanks and Nato has about 22,000 (2.4:1) (these are, in fact, close to the real figures). If you apply symmetrical reductions to these forces, it is obvious that the imbalance gets worse. If each side reduced by 10,000, the figure would be 43,000 to 12,000 (3.6:1); another 10,000 makes it 33,000 to 2,000 (16.5:1). What I am really saying is that in this way you would soon reach a position in which the Warsaw Pact had 31,000 main battle tanks and Nato had none.

NOTE
NEWS

What is essential, of course, is asymmetrical reductions so that eventually the numbers remaining are roughly equal - a process which the Soviet Union has so far resisted. There are now signs that their approach may be changing, and when the CFE talks opened in Vienna in March the West should have been proposing at once a number of clearly worked out proposals - an overall limit (at a balanced level) on the sort of armaments that are most destabilizing - tanks, artillery, armoured personnel carriers, for example; limits on forces stationed outside national boundaries (at present the Soviet Union has 500,000 ground troops in East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia, while the United States has only 200,000 in western Europe) and also a system of "glasnost" or openness, so that each side can always be confident that the other is not planning some unpleasant surprise.

I have left until last the one aspect of the problem of arms control which I believe it may be safe and even prudent to deal with in isolation - chemical weapons. A separate meeting on the subject began in Paris in March.

For the West this is a very important issue since, at present, the Soviet Union has a very powerful chemical weapons force deployed in Eastern Europe; Nato has none in western Europe.

Yet this may prove to be the most complicated negotiation of all. Certainly it highlights one of the indispensable ingredients of any effective arms control agreement - verification. Arms control agreements must be of a kind which can be properly monitored and inspected to guard against cheating by either side. Arms control agreements which cannot be thoroughly verified are more dangerous and destabilising than no agreements at all.

CONCLUSION

Let me, then, attempt to arrive at some kind of conclusion. As I said at the beginning I am no opponent of arms control - far from it; it is an essential facet of national and international security policy. Furthermore, I believe that President Gorbachev's recent initiatives call for a careful, positive and constructive response from the West.

Having said that, however, I cannot resist ending on a note of caution. It is essential to remember that the Soviet Union has the most powerful military apparatus in the world. It has over 5 million troops on active duty and over 55 million reserves - a military establishment roughly equal to the entire population of the United Kingdom. The Soviet Union has two hundred divisions of ground forces.

They have more than 50,000 main battle tanks; 48,000 pieces of artillery, mortars and multiple rocket launches. They have 1400 intercontinental ballistic missiles; and so on.

None of this is meant to suggest that the West is about to be attacked by these hordes; it is only to point out that the military power of the Soviet Union is enormous; and, whatever may be said about the intentions of Soviet leaders, that vast arsenal of men and weapons was built up for one purpose - to be an instrument of Soviet foreign policy.

Now, President Gorbachev has said that he will reduce that force by 500,000 men - 500,000 out of 5 million. It is not a sensational move but it is a start, and it cannot be ignored; however, when he has completed his reductions, the Soviet Union will still have armed forces larger than those of all the Nato armies put together. Furthermore, the Gorbachev experiment may not succeed; and if he goes, that immense military power may fall into the hands of someone with very different policies.

It is against that background that we have to analyse the problems of security in the Gorbachev era. It was Edmund Burke who said that "power is a dangerous thing to leave lying around".

I do not suggest that nothing of importance is happening in the Soviet Union or in the climate of East-West relations. The changes now taking place are the result partly of Mr Gorbachev's glasnost, in which he is appealing to all of Soviet society to be critical of past history and practices, and partly of substantial popular pressure from below - from the people - which is the result of persistent and dramatic Soviet failures. Economic failure is the most evident and probably of the most immediate concern to most citizens. Glasnost lifted the lid on the perception, widespread among the various peoples of the USSR, that Soviet society is in crisis. The result has been that, as the researchers of RFE/RL have pointed out, everyone has begun to talk openly and apparently without fear.

Thus we find workers and peasants castigating Mr Gorbachev himself publicly for the scarcity of food and of elementary essentials of life on shop shelves. We find intellectuals publicly exploring the extent of the Party's culpability in some of the worst crimes of modern times and the mendacity of past Soviet leaders, including even Lenin. We find turmoil in every corner of the Soviet empire, as non-Russians demand a new political contract with Moscow or, as some others are demanding, outright independence. In the past eighteen months virtually every sacred icon of the Soviet period has come under fire by one group or another.

More recently we have had the much-reported elections throughout the Soviet Union. Although it would be foolish to regard these as a serious move towards democratic pluralism (over 90% of the candidates were members of the Communist Party, and no election which does not allow the voters to change the way in which they are governed can be described as democratic) at least the citizens of the Soviet Union were able to choose between individual candidates.

This underlines the truth which needs to be borne in mind by those who are responsible for planning in the West. If Mr Gorbachev succeeds in making the Soviet Union more efficient, prosperous and self-confident without changing the political structure of the country or the nature of Soviet foreign policy, the world, for the West, is likely to be a more dangerous place; and so far there is no evidence to suggest that Russia under Gorbachev is any less totalitarian, expansionist and opportunist than it has been in the past.

I recognise that this is a very pessimistic analysis, but it is not intended to be entirely negative. If the dangers are clearly perceived, it is possible to identify a number of positive approaches and initiatives.

Critical problems now confront the Soviet leadership, faced with the familiar "pressure-cooker" effect inseparable from attempts to carry out limited measures of liberalization in a hitherto closed and oppressive society. These present the West with an opportunity to evolve imaginative new political strategies, which, if they are subtly but firmly pursued, might result in the peaceful unravelling of the Soviet Empire and a progressive move towards a more pluralist and co-operative Soviet Union, thus removing or, at least, diminishing the threat to international stability which it has represented for almost half a century.

(end)

Space Is Part of Our Security

Some Defense Functions Can Only Be Conducted From Above

By EDWARD L. ROWNY

The United States is destined to become the world's premier space-faring nation in much the same way—and for many of the same reasons—it came of age as a seafaring country during the last century. We are entering an era in which space will be looked on as a medium rather than a barrier to man's progress, just as the world's oceans provided mobility rather than obstacles to human development.

Civil and military operations are in space to stay. Space capability will greatly influence the relationships among nations by the end of the century. The ability to operate beyond the bounds of the atmosphere is rapidly becoming a major determinant of national power.

The United States, as leader of the Western democracies, should not hesitate to assume the mantle of being a "space power," just as it did not shrink from becoming a sea power. As a sea power, the United States continues to scrupulously uphold international law, established through custom and treaty, assuring freedom of the seas for all nations. Similarly, our support of space law such as the Outer Space Treaty recognizes the common interest of all mankind in the guaranteed right to explore and use space freely for peaceful purposes.

Space has captured the American imagination through programs such as the space station and the evolving plans for planetary exploration. Indeed, space has become a practical part of most of our lives. Its use as a place for basing navigation, communication, weather and Earth observation satellites has saved many lives, is providing

valuable environmental information and serves as a catalyst for world commerce.

Within the U.S. defense force structure, the space component has been designed to ensure uninhibited access to space for all such peaceful uses. Unthinking critics have labeled those portions of U.S. defense policy related to space as the "militarization" of space. The Soviets in particular have unfairly characterized both civilian and military programs like our space shuttle as moving the arms race into space.

We must not be misled by Soviet charges that we are contributing to a so-called arms race in space. Unlike our space activities, which are largely for non-military purposes, those of the Soviet Union are 90% military in nature. This situation reflects the Soviet Union's commitment to provide its armed forces with all the resources necessary to ensure maximum space-based military support for offensive and defensive combat systems on land and sea, in air and outer space. The Soviets launched five times as many military payloads into orbit between 1983 and 1987 as did the United States.

For the United States, space-based platforms provide a range of capabilities that underpin deterrence. U.S. forces depend on such systems for early-warning, communications, surveillance, navigation and arms-control treaty monitoring to such an extent that space is more than just a medium of choice; space has gradually become the only medium in which some important defense functions can be conducted efficiently on a global basis.

A clear, though controversial, example of the importance of space to U.S. national

security has moved back into the headlines. Even as our dependence on satellites increases in the 1990s, the world's only operational anti-satellite (ASAT) system—owned and operated by the Soviets—will have the capability to destroy vital U.S. and allied satellite systems. The Defense Department recently told Congress that our lack of a comparable capability is one of the most serious U.S. military deficiencies. We are unable to deter a Soviet ASAT attack by the threat of retaliating in kind.

This critical deficiency means that the United States is unable to protect our terrestrial forces, such as the U.S. Fleet, from Soviet radar and electronic targeting satellites—so-called gunsights in space. In view of the fundamental importance of U.S. and allied access to the seas in wartime, active means of holding the Soviet military space threat at risk must be developed. Doubters should take note: The case for a U.S. anti-satellite capability encompasses more than just deterrence theory; it is essential for protecting the men and women of our armed forces.

The human race is in the process of moving to space. As the United States adapts its national-security policy to this new reality, we must carefully define and integrate that part of our overall strategy that involves military space activity. The worth of assigning particular space missions to our military should be based on whether the operation contributes to national security, and not on the fact that the mission takes place in space.

Space will affect all aspects of our lives in the next century. Just as on the high seas,

TO NEXT CENT.
WHATSEA POWERS
WAS TO LAST.

space-related peaceful activities will only flourish if assured of the backing of an on-call military capability to protect our space assets. An American capability to operate beyond Earth's atmosphere without interference will help ensure peaceful use of space by all friendly nations.

Edward L. Rowny is arms-control adviser to the Bush Administration.

TO DEPLOY OR NOT TO
DEPLOY.
CONGRESS - GIVE
ME THE OPTION.

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EU, 2001 / SET LATER. GOOD than (cert. BATH?) *
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Thank you
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OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

Until delivery - approx. 12:00 PM, June 29, 1989

TEXT OF REMARKS BY THE VICE PRESIDENT

AMERICAN DEFENSE PREPAREDNESS ASSOCIATION

THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

Washington, D.C.

Thursday, June 29, 1989 - 12:00 PM

Two hundred years ago, George Washington advised our young nation that, "To be prepared for war is the best means of preserving peace." I am proud today to be addressing a group of distinguished Americans who have never forgotten George Washington's advice. I want to congratulate the members of this organization for everything you have done to increase our nation's defense preparedness. And I especially want to congratulate the winner of this year's ADPA Strategic Defense Award, Dr. Greg Canavan, of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, for his brilliant contributions to the technologies and architectures of strategic defense. It's a pleasure for me to be with those who have done so much to hasten the time when strategic defense will be a significant part of America's deterrent. You have truly lived up to the ADPA's motto: "PEACE WITH SECURITY THROUGH DEFENSE PREPAREDNESS," which is so compatible with the responsibility we assign ourselves in our Constitution's Preamble: "to provide for the common defense."

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I remember when even thinking about defending ourselves against ballistic missiles aimed at our country was regarded as heresy by the theologians of offensive deterrence and mutual assured destruction. Indeed, many of these MAD mullahs are still with us, still convinced that there is something fundamentally wrong with defending ourselves against ballistic missile attack. I am here today, however, to assure all of you that the Bush-Quayle Administration strongly rejects this view. We are committed to the development and deployment of strategic defenses when they are ready. We need to develop the means to defend against weapons that threaten us. That is what SDI is all about. SDI would defend not only against actual aggression but, also, by making the outcome of an attack more dubious, it would lessen the incentives for aggression, and thus enhance stability and deterrence.

The technical progress which the American Defense Preparedness Association recognizes each year at its gatherings could never have happened had we not first liberated our minds from the odd belief that American vulnerability was the key to strategic stability, and that the best way to deter nuclear war was to leave ourselves exposed to nuclear attack.

Since then, we have progressed further, technologically, even than many of us thought possible.

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Three months ago, I spoke to the Navy League of the United States and drew attention to a promising technology known as "Brilliant Pebbles." I've since learned how effectively the Livermore team of scientists that conceived Brilliant Pebbles has been collaborating with their counterparts in industry who are developing the Space Based Interceptor program. The two programs have learned a lot from each other, and their competitive and cooperative genius has been stimulated by some very creative management techniques. SDIO will continue to manage Brilliant Pebbles directly, and SBI through the Air Force, until a decision is made on how they fit together in a Phase I architecture.

We will also continue to confound our detractors. Not so long ago, a number of SDI's critics, including some of our more respected professional organizations, said that directed energy weapons were a distant, far-off vision. Well, it turns out they were wrong. A few months ago, SDI scientists in Capistrano, California successfully fired the large Alpha laser. This same laser is scheduled for launch in the mid-1990's as part of the impressive Zenith Star experiment. And later this summer, another group of SDI investigators will fire the BEAR neutral particle beam into space. Many believe that we can have advanced technologies of this type orbiting in space within five years.

No countermeasure I have heard of, whether it's

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"fast-burn boosters," multiple light-weight decoys, or merely multiple launchers, can effectively cope with the lightning speed or the variety of environments in which directed energy weapons can operate at great distances from their targets. Working in conjunction with kinetic kill vehicles, systems like these will one day alter the strategic equation between offense and defense.

Indeed, a devaluation in the strategic utility of ballistic missiles is precisely the goal we are seeking to achieve with our initial deployments of strategic defenses. I know that goal seems obvious to the members of this audience, but it is worth emphasizing because it would represent a major step toward stability -- the same goal we are seeking to achieve through offensive modernization and arms control.

As I'm sure everyone here recognizes, we are living in an era of transition. In many respects, our national security requirements in the 21st Century will be quite unlike those of today. So, I'd like to tell you how SDI, in the Bush Administration's view, fits into this new world -- a world which is likely to see fewer strategic nuclear offensive weapons in our own arsenals, but a substantial increase in the number of nations capable of launching ballistic-missiles. This new world requires "new thinking," as Mr. Gorbachev often points out. And this new

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thinking ~~strengthens~~ the case for SDI. Let me lay out the strategic case for SDI in the new context we face.

As you know, our negotiators returned to Geneva last week to continue the Nuclear and Space Talks, which began just over four years ago. The President has directed our negotiators to continue the quest for verifiable reductions in offensive arms that enhance strategic stability. He has also committed us to continue working with the Soviets to find the right formula for a cooperative transition to strategic defense.

We are seeking a more stable nuclear balance that relies increasingly on defense. We are urging the Soviets, for whom strategic defense has long been a central component of deterrence, to work with us to develop cooperative rules for making this transition, so that predictability and confidence can accompany the reintroduction of defenses into our own strategic forces as well. The President recognizes the increased importance of verification and the larger risks associated with cheating and breakout in an agreement to significantly reduce offensive arms. That's one reason why strategic defenses would contribute to the effectiveness of a START Treaty and facilitate its ratification by the Senate.

Why does strategic defense make such a valuable contribution to any agreement to reduce offensive arms?

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First, there is the problem of continued Soviet emphasis on destabilizing offensive weapons. With or without START, the Soviets will have enough large warheads deployed on their huge, land based ICBM force to place some of our most important strategic assets at risk. And the Soviets' modernization of these weapons, including a larger follow-on version of the SS-18, demonstrates that their strategy will continue to emphasize a first-strike force posture well into the 21st Century. A reasonably reliable first phase system of strategic defenses would diminish our anxiety over this ICBM threat and would therefore complement our efforts to achieve greater stability through arms control and strategic offensive modernization.

Second, there is the problem of mobile ICBMs, of which Soviet deployments already number in the hundreds. We are concerned that mobile missiles -- particularly MIRVed mobile missiles -- pose serious verification and breakout problems that we have not resolved.

Since the Soviets insist on their continued right to produce, modernize, and deploy mobile missile systems, even under START, they should also understand why we need an enhanced reliance on strategic defenses as insurance against the threat these systems pose against us.

Effective strategic defenses would not be affected by the mobility of ballistic launchers' platforms. In fact, the

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more widely the targeted missiles are dispersed, the more reliably a constellation of interceptors can cope with their multiple launch.

Third, there is the general problem of verification in a complex arms control agreement. The current draft treaty text for START is hundreds of pages long -- considerably longer than the unratified SALT II text, which was itself many times more complex than its SALT I predecessor. Under such conditions, traditional, or even nontraditional approaches to verification may well be insufficient, by themselves, to plug all the loopholes, and remove the inevitable uncertainties, that would threaten our security. In short, strategic defenses can help to bridge the chasm between the reality of a developing threat and the hope of a negotiated balance of forces.

For all these reasons, while the Bush Administration rejects the Soviet contention that progress on a START agreement should be held hostage to SDI, we do believe that there is a relationship between offensive and defensive arms. Not only do offensive reductions contribute to the effectiveness of defenses, but the more progress we make toward offensive reductions the more we will need to rely on SDI to help us deter, or deal with, possible Soviet cheating or breakout. In other words, SDI is an insurance policy for START. It is an insurance against breakout,

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against ~~testing~~, and against qualitative breakthroughs of various kinds. As we move toward the national security requirements of the 21st Century, we should recognize that responsible arms control will grow increasingly reliant on stable strategic defenses.

So the growing trend toward offensive force reductions complements the role of SDI. And the growing problem of ballistic missile proliferation also makes SDI more necessary than ever. I'd like to spend a few moments discussing this problem, because it's been a major concern of mine for many years now.

The Director of Central Intelligence, Bill Webster, testified recently that we can look for up to 15 developing nations to have ballistic launch capability by the turn of the century. Who are these emergent members of the missile club? In many cases, they are regional or "would be" regional powers; many are not signatories to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; some are actively engaged in chemical weapons research.

No doubt you've all thought about the various "accidental launch" and "madman" scenarios in which an erratic national leader acquires ballistic launchers and marries them with primitive nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons of mass destruction. Such concerns are anything but hypothetical. Iran and Iraq have already

engaged in ballistic missile conflict; Iraq made active and extensive use of chemical weapons in its war with Iran; and Libya, among others, is working energetically to develop chemical weapons. These developments force us to consider many difficult questions that we would prefer to ignore.

The frightening question of who controls nuclear weapons, for example, during periods of intense civil strife, and who has the authority to release them, are ones that we have not discussed in public very much during the nuclear age. What if civil war leads to an abrupt seizure of power by an unknown, unpredictable regime in a country that possesses an arsenal of ballistic missiles? Would we rest easily with the deterrent power of our current offense-only capability under these conditions? Or should the President have some other response at his disposal in case an irrational act were to arise out of such instability?

I raise this question because in many countries that are acquiring or seeking to acquire missile capability, instability is the rule rather than the exception. And because the problem of accidental, unauthorized, or simply miscalculated missile launches will grow increasingly troublesome as the number of politically immature but missile capable nation-states expands.

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There is much that can and should be done to curb this widening trend. Our own leadership role in the Missile Technology Control Regime is one example. Indeed, I have been actively committed to strengthening this regime since my years in the Senate, and I remain so.

I believe strongly that such existing and strengthened export controls are essential. They are high on this Administration's national security agenda, and we are relying heavily on them to retard the spread of missile technology -- on the supply side. But, like so many other problems we face in the international arena, this is a complex issue that cannot and will not be resolved by one-dimensional solutions. While multilateral measures are at work on the supply side, unilateral measures like a multi-layered, ground and spaced-based ballistic missile defense must accompany them by reducing the benefits of acquisition and deterring economic and technological investment -- on the demand side.

It is on this basis that I challenge many traditional opponents of strategic defense to keep an open mind as the technology continues to advance and the costs continue to decline. SDI is not the enemy of arms control and missile non-proliferation; on the contrary, it can be a crucial ally.

In short, strategic defense offers stabilizing

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solution to many of its critics' own most vexing concerns. Whether it is missile proliferation, ICBM and "C-cubed" vulnerability, deterring noncompliance, or providing insurance against clandestine breakout scenarios, SDI's technical and potential strategic payoffs vastly exceed the investment we are making. Some of these payoffs are directly evident in improved weapons technologies and in the enhanced leverage provided by near-term options for strategic defense; others, more subtle, take the form of "spinoffs" for a variety of advanced medical, industrial, and environmental technologies.

That is why the recommendation by the majority of the members of the House Armed Services Committee to cut the SDI budget by over a billion dollars is so misguided.

I'm sure all the members of the House Armed Services Committee appreciate the need to curb missile proliferation; and as advocates of arms control, they should welcome efforts to guard against Soviet non-compliance, against breakout, and against qualitative improvements of all kinds not covered in a START agreement. Well, SDI can help us achieve these objectives -- objectives that the Administration and the Congress both share. In addition, SDI provides the American people with much-needed insurance against an accidental or inadvertent attack or against a deliberate launch by an irrational

Armed Legion

Then books balance / 80% process industries / forestry / ^{rest} income tax.

GOBBANK - LOAN - DEFICIT / PRINTING MONEY /
MORE MONEY CHASING FUEL PRODUCTS / SERVICE ETC. /
DEFICIT / HUGE AMT. DEFENSE

18-25%

KRAYS. STILL AN ISSUE - They say, "if you
do this, we will take it down" Implicit
worth in system.

12

governm. Most importantly, SDI would dramatically reduce the risk of nuclear war by denying an aggressor the ability to execute a successful first-strike. I strongly urge the Congress to restore SDI's budget to the level of the President's request. Cuts in SDI of this magnitude are extremely short-sighted and harmful.

Of course, SDI is not the only answer to the problem of missile proliferation. Nor is SDI capable by itself of redressing all threats to strategic stability. In fact, there is no single, simple answer to the multi-dimensional challenges we face. But there are answers. And strategic defense is one of them. For these reasons, the Bush Administration remains committed to the development and deployment of a robust strategic defense system. We continue to believe that strategic defense is technologically feasible, strategically necessary and morally imperative. And we intend to work hard to ensure that Congress shares this understanding too. For it remains true today, as it was 200 years ago, that "to be prepared for war is the best means of preserving peace."

Thank you.

Amb Rowny: PRESSURE CFE / CRUX / NATO-BRUSSELS
main emph - From NATO to WARSAW PACT /

Vienna / OUTLINED

PRESSURE - NEED TO REDUCE / lower levels / troops -
tanks - six months to a year.

ROUGHLY TWICE AS MUCH - U.S. + SOVIET 275,000
30,000 U.S. RED
300,000 SOVIET

EQUIPMENT DESTROYED

Other ^{Vienna} NEGOTIATION CSBM - 40 NATIONS, OUTGROWTH
THE
SEP. + AUTONOMOUS NEG.

GENEVA - 3 NEG. / (1) START (ongoing) DOWN TO
TOUGH BASIC DIFF / VERIFICATION of mobile missiles /
CRUISE MISSILES / SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE
WORRY on tech on Soviets part - SDI BREAKTHROUGHS -
(2) C.D. Conf. DISARMAMENT - CONFINED TO CHEMICAL
WEAPONS - SOME DISTANCE.
(3) TTIB -

BRIT WANT TO SAFE GUARD DUAL CAPABLE AIRCRAFT)
SCORPION TANKS (good in IRELAND) - HARDCORE LINE -
EXCEPT FOR THESE TECH. PROBLEMS, OK.

FRENCH - USUAL, one foot in the camp, one foot out,
MORE REALISTIC -

WISH G well / Perestroika long way to go /
ENTREPRENEUR

Mark Davis

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 3, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR WHITE HOUSE STAFF

FROM: James W. Cicconi *JWC*
SUBJECT: Lunch with Frank Fukuyama

Frank Fukuyama of the State Department Policy Planning Staff will come to the Mess for lunch on Thursday, November 9, at noon. We have invited him to discuss his recent article, "The End of History"? (attached), which, as you know, has excited a great deal of public controversy.

If you are interested in attending this discussion, please respond to my office (x2702). First call, first served.

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The End of History?

Francis Fukuyama

IN WATCHING the flow of events over the past decade or so, it is hard to avoid the feeling that something very fundamental has happened in world history. The past year has seen a flood of articles commemorating the end of the Cold War, and the fact that "peace" seems to be breaking out in many regions of the world. Most of these analyses lack any larger conceptual framework for distinguishing between what is essential and what is contingent or accidental in world history, and are predictably superficial. If Mr. Gorbachev were ousted from the Kremlin or a new Ayatollah proclaimed the millennium from a desolate Middle Eastern capital, these same commentators would scramble to announce the rebirth of a new era of conflict.

And yet, all of these people sense dimly that there is some larger process at work, a

Francis Fukuyama is deputy director of the State Department's policy planning staff and former analyst at the RAND Corporation. This article is based on a lecture presented at the University of Chicago's John M. Olin Center for Inquiry Into the Theory and Practice of Democracy. The author would like to pay special thanks to the Olin Center and to Nathan Tarcov and Allan Bloom for their support in this and many earlier endeavors. The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect those of the RAND Corporation or of any agency of the U.S. government.

process that gives coherence and order to the daily headlines. The twentieth century saw the developed world descend into a paroxysm of ideological violence, as liberalism contended first with the remnants of absolutism, then bolshevism and fascism, and finally an updated Marxism that threatened to lead to the ultimate apocalypse of nuclear war. But the century that began full of self-confidence in the ultimate triumph of Western liberal democracy seems at its close to be returning full circle to where it started: not to an "end of ideology" or a convergence between capitalism and socialism, as earlier predicted, but to an unabashed victory of economic and political liberalism.

The triumph of the West, of the Western *idea*, is evident first of all in the total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western liberalism. In the past decade, there have been unmistakable changes in the intellectual climate of the world's two largest communist countries, and the beginnings of significant reform movements in both. But this phenomenon extends beyond high politics and it can be seen also in the ineluctable spread of consumerist Western culture in such diverse contexts as the peasants' markets and color television sets now omnipresent throughout China, the cooperative restaurants and clothing stores opened in the past year in Moscow, the Beethoven piped into Japanese department stores, and the rock music enjoyed alike in Prague, Rangoon, and Tehran.

What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government. This is not to say that there will no longer be events to fill the pages of *Foreign Affairs's* yearly summaries of international relations, for the victory of liberalism has occurred primarily in the realm of ideas or consciousness and is as yet incomplete in the real or material world. But there are powerful reasons for believing that it is the ideal that will govern the material world in the long run. To understand how this is so, we must first consider some theoretical issues concerning the nature of historical change.

I

THE NOTION of the end of history is not an original one. Its best known propagator was Karl Marx, who believed that the direction of historical development was a purposeful one determined by the interplay of material forces, and would come to an end only with the achievement of a communist utopia that would finally resolve all prior contradictions. But the concept of history as a dialectical process with a beginning, a middle, and an end was borrowed by Marx from his great German predecessor, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.

For better or worse, much of Hegel's historicism has become part of our contemporary intellectual baggage. The notion that mankind has progressed through a series of primitive stages of consciousness on his path to the present, and that these stages corresponded to concrete forms of social organization, such as tribal, slave-owning, theocratic, and finally democratic-egalitarian societies, has become inseparable from the modern understanding of man. Hegel was the first philosopher to speak the language of modern social science, insofar as man for him was the product of his concrete historical and social environment

and not, as earlier natural right theorists would have it, a collection of more or less fixed "natural" attributes. The mastery and transformation of man's natural environment through the application of science and technology was originally not a Marxist concept, but a Hegelian one. Unlike later historicists whose historical relativism degenerated into relativism *tout court*, however, Hegel believed that history culminated in an absolute moment—a moment in which a final, rational form of society and state became victorious.

It is Hegel's misfortune to be known now primarily as Marx's precursor, and it is our misfortune that few of us are familiar with Hegel's work from direct study, but only as it has been filtered through the distorting lens of Marxism. In France, however, there has been an effort to save Hegel from his Marxist interpreters and to resurrect him as the philosopher who most correctly speaks to our time. Among those modern French interpreters of Hegel, the greatest was certainly Alexandre Kojève, a brilliant Russian emigre who taught a highly influential series of seminars in Paris in the 1930s at the *Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes*.¹ While largely unknown in the United States, Kojève had a major impact on the intellectual life of the continent. Among his students ranged such future luminaries as Jean-Paul Sartre on the Left and Raymond Aron on the Right; postwar existentialism borrowed many of its basic categories from Hegel via Kojève.

Kojève sought to resurrect the Hegel of the *Phenomenology of Mind*, the Hegel who proclaimed history to be at an end in 1806. For as early as this Hegel saw in Napoleon's defeat of the Prussian monarchy at the Battle of Jena the victory of the ideals of the French Rev-

¹Kojève's best-known work is his *Introduction à la lecture de Hegel* (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1947), which is a transcript of the *Ecole Pratique* lectures from the 1930s. This book is available in English entitled *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel* arranged by Raymond Queneau, edited by Allan Bloom, and translated by James Nichols (New York: Basic Books, 1969).

olution, and the imminent universalization of the state incorporating the principles of liberty and equality. Kojève, far from rejecting Hegel in light of the turbulent events of the next century and a half, insisted that the latter had been essentially correct.² The Battle of Jena marked the end of history because it was at that point that the *vanguard* of humanity (a term quite familiar to Marxists) actualized the principles of the French Revolution. While there was considerable work to be done after 1806—abolishing slavery and the slave trade, extending the franchise to workers, women, blacks, and other racial minorities, etc.—the basic principles of the liberal democratic state could not be improved upon. The two world wars in this century and their attendant revolutions and upheavals simply had the effect of extending those principles spatially, such that the various provinces of human civilization were brought up to the level of its most advanced outposts, and of forcing those societies in Europe and North America at the vanguard of civilization to implement their liberalism more fully.

The state that emerges at the end of history is liberal insofar as it recognizes and protects through a system of law man's universal right to freedom, and democratic insofar as it exists only with the consent of the governed. For Kojève, this so-called "universal homogeneous state" found real-life embodiment in the countries of postwar Western Europe—precisely those flabby, prosperous, self-satisfied, inward-looking, weak-willed states whose grandest project was nothing more heroic than the creation of the Common Market.³ But this was only to be expected. For human history and the conflict that characterized it was based on the existence of "contradictions": primitive man's quest for mutual recognition, the dialectic of the master and slave, the transformation and mastery of nature, the struggle for the universal recognition of rights, and the dichotomy between proletarian and capitalist. But in the universal homogeneous state, all prior contradictions are resolved and all human needs are satisfied. There is no struggle or conflict over "large"

issues, and consequently no need for generals or statesmen; what remains is primarily economic activity. And indeed, Kojève's life was consistent with his teaching. Believing that there was no more work for philosophers as well, since Hegel (correctly understood) had already achieved absolute knowledge, Kojève left teaching after the war and spent the remainder of his life working as a bureaucrat in the European Economic Community, until his death in 1968.

To his contemporaries at mid-century, Kojève's proclamation of the end of history must have seemed like the typical eccentric solipsism of a French intellectual, coming as it did on the heels of World War II and at the very height of the Cold War. To comprehend how Kojève could have been so audacious as to assert that history has ended, we must first of all understand the meaning of Hegelian idealism.

II

FOR HEGEL, the contradictions that drive history exist first of all in the realm of human consciousness, i.e. on the level of ideas⁴—not the trivial election year proposals of American politicians, but ideas in the sense of large unifying world views that might best be understood under the rubric of ideology. Ideology in this sense is not restricted to the secular and explicit political doctrines we usually associate with the term, but can include religion, culture, and the complex

²In this respect Kojève stands in sharp contrast to contemporary German interpreters of Hegel like Herbert Marcuse who, being more sympathetic to Marx, regarded Hegel ultimately as an historically bound and incomplete philosopher.

³Kojève alternatively identified the end of history with the postwar "American way of life," toward which he thought the Soviet Union was moving as well.

⁴This notion was expressed in the famous aphorism from the preface to the *Philosophy of History* to the effect that "everything that is rational is real, and everything that is real is rational."

of moral values underlying any society as well.

Hegel's view of the relationship between the ideal and the real or material worlds was an extremely complicated one, beginning with the fact that for him the distinction between the two was only apparent.⁵ He did not believe that the real world conformed or could be made to conform to ideological preconceptions of philosophy professors in any simple-minded way, or that the "material" world could not impinge on the ideal. Indeed, Hegel the professor was temporarily thrown out of work as a result of a very material event, the Battle of Jena. But while Hegel's writing and thinking could be stopped by a bullet from the material world, the hand on the trigger of the gun was motivated in turn by the ideas of liberty and equality that had driven the French Revolution.

For Hegel, all human behavior in the material world, and hence all human history, is rooted in a prior state of consciousness—an idea similar to the one expressed by John Maynard Keynes when he said that the views of men of affairs were usually derived from defunct economists and academic scribblers of earlier generations. This consciousness may not be explicit and self-aware, as are modern political doctrines, but may rather take the form of religion or simple cultural or moral habits. And yet this realm of consciousness *in the long run* necessarily becomes manifest in the material world, indeed creates the material world in its own image. Consciousness is cause and not effect, and can develop autonomously from the material world; hence the real subtext underlying the apparent jumble of current events is the history of ideology.

Hegel's idealism has fared poorly at the hands of later thinkers. Marx reversed the priority of the real and the ideal completely, relegating the entire realm of consciousness—religion, art, culture, philosophy itself—to a "superstructure" that was determined entirely by the prevailing material mode of production. Yet another unfortunate legacy of Marxism is our tendency to retreat into materialist or utilitarian explanations of political

or historical phenomena, and our disinclination to believe in the autonomous power of ideas. A recent example of this is Paul Kennedy's hugely successful *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, which ascribes the decline of great powers to simple economic overextension. Obviously, this is true on some level: an empire whose economy is barely above the level of subsistence cannot bankrupt its treasury indefinitely. But whether a highly productive modern industrial society chooses to spend 3 or 7 percent of its GNP on defense rather than consumption is entirely a matter of that society's political priorities, which are in turn determined in the realm of consciousness.

The materialist bias of modern thought is characteristic not only of people on the Left who may be sympathetic to Marxism, but of many passionate anti-Marxists as well. Indeed, there is on the Right what one might label the *Wall Street Journal* school of deterministic materialism that discounts the importance of ideology and culture and sees man as essentially a rational, profit-maximizing individual. It is precisely this kind of individual and his pursuit of material incentives that is posited as the basis for economic life as such in economic textbooks.⁶ One small example will illustrate the problematic character of such materialist views.

Max Weber begins his famous book, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, by noting the different economic performance of

⁵Indeed, for Hegel the very dichotomy between the ideal and material worlds was itself only an apparent one that was ultimately overcome by the self-conscious subject; in his system, the material world is itself only an aspect of mind.

⁶In fact, modern economists, recognizing that man does not always behave as a profit-maximizer, posit a "utility" function, utility being either income or some other good that can be maximized: leisure, sexual satisfaction, or the pleasure of philosophizing. That profit must be replaced with a value like utility indicates the cogency of the idealist perspective.

Protestant and Catholic communities throughout Europe and America, summed up in the proverb that Protestants eat well while Catholics sleep well. Weber notes that according to any economic theory that posited man as a rational profit-maximizer, raising the piece-work rate should increase labor productivity. But in fact, in many traditional peasant communities, raising the piece-work rate actually had the opposite effect of lowering labor productivity: at the higher rate, a peasant accustomed to earning two and one-half marks per day found he could earn the same amount by working less, and did so because he valued leisure more than income. The choices of leisure over income, or of the militaristic life of the Spartan hoplite over the wealth of the Athenian trader, or even the ascetic life of the early capitalist entrepreneur over that of a traditional leisured aristocrat, cannot possibly be explained by the impersonal working of material forces, but come preeminently out of the sphere of consciousness—what we have labeled here broadly as ideology. And indeed, a central theme of Weber's work was to prove that contrary to Marx, the material mode of production, far from being the "base," was itself a "superstructure" with roots in religion and culture, and that to understand the emergence of modern capitalism and the profit motive one had to study their antecedents in the realm of the spirit.

As we look around the contemporary world, the poverty of materialist theories of economic development is all too apparent. The *Wall Street Journal* school of deterministic materialism habitually points to the stunning economic success of Asia in the past few decades as evidence of the viability of free market economics, with the implication that all societies would see similar development were they simply to allow their populations to pursue their material self-interest freely. Surely free markets and stable political systems are a necessary precondition to capitalist economic growth. But just as surely the cultural heritage of those Far Eastern societies, the ethic of work and saving and family, a religious heritage that does not, like Islam, place re-

strictions on certain forms of economic behavior, and other deeply ingrained moral qualities, are equally important in explaining their economic performance.⁷ And yet the intellectual weight of materialism is such that not a single respectable contemporary theory of economic development addresses consciousness and culture seriously as the matrix within which economic behavior is formed.

FAILURE to understand that the roots of economic behavior lie in the realm of consciousness and culture leads to the common mistake of attributing material causes to phenomena that are essentially ideal in nature. For example, it is commonplace in the West to interpret the reform movements first in China and most recently in the Soviet Union as the victory of the material over the ideal—that is, a recognition that ideological incentives could not replace material ones in stimulating a highly productive modern economy, and that if one wanted to prosper one had to appeal to baser forms of self-interest. But the deep defects of socialist economies were evident thirty or forty years ago to anyone who chose to look. Why was it that these countries moved away from central planning only in the 1980s? The answer must be found in the consciousness of the elites and leaders ruling them, who decided to opt for the "Protestant" life of wealth and risk over the "Catholic" path of poverty and security.⁸ That

⁷One need look no further than the recent performance of Vietnamese immigrants in the U.S. school system when compared to their black or Hispanic classmates to realize that culture and consciousness are absolutely crucial to explain not only economic behavior but virtually every other important aspect of life as well.

⁸I understand that a full explanation of the origins of the reform movements in China and Russia is a good deal more complicated than this simple formula would suggest. The Soviet reform, for example, was motivated in good measure by Moscow's sense of *insecurity* in the tech-

change was in no way made inevitable by the material conditions in which either country found itself on the eve of the reform, but instead came about as the result of the victory of one idea over another.⁹

For Kojève, as for all good Hegelians, understanding the underlying processes of history requires understanding developments in the realm of consciousness or ideas, since consciousness will ultimately remake the material world in its own image. To say that history ended in 1806 meant that mankind's ideological evolution ended in the ideals of the French or American Revolutions: while particular regimes in the real world might not implement these ideals fully, their theoretical truth is absolute and could not be improved upon. Hence it did not matter to Kojève that the consciousness of the postwar generation of Europeans had not been universalized throughout the world; if ideological development had in fact ended, the homogenous state would eventually become victorious throughout the material world.

I have neither the space nor, frankly, the ability to defend in depth Hegel's radical idealist perspective. The issue is not whether Hegel's system was right, but whether his perspective might uncover the problematic nature of many materialist explanations we often take for granted. This is not to deny the role of material factors as such. To a literal-minded idealist, human society can be built around any arbitrary set of principles regardless of their relationship to the material world. And in fact men have proven themselves able to endure the most extreme material hardships in the name of ideas that exist in the realm of the spirit alone, be it the divinity of cows or the nature of the Holy Trinity.¹⁰

But while man's very perception of the material world is shaped by his historical consciousness of it, the material world can clearly affect in return the viability of a particular state of consciousness. In particular, the spectacular abundance of advanced liberal economies and the infinitely diverse consumer culture made possible by them seem to both foster and preserve liberalism in the political

sphere. I want to avoid the materialist determinism that says that liberal economics inevitably produces liberal politics, because I believe that both economics and politics presuppose an autonomous prior state of consciousness that makes them possible. But that state of consciousness that permits the growth of liberalism seems to stabilize in the way one would expect at the end of history if it is underwritten by the abundance of a modern free market economy. We might summarize the content of the universal homogenous state as liberal democracy in the political sphere combined with easy access to VCRs and stereos in the economic.

III

HAVE WE in fact reached the end of history? Are there, in other words, any fundamental "contradictions" in human life that cannot be resolved in the context of modern liberalism, that would be resolvable by an alternative political-economic structure? If we accept the idealist premises

nological-military realm. Nonetheless, neither country on the eve of its reforms was in such a state of *material* crisis that one could have predicted the surprising reform paths ultimately taken.

⁹It is still not clear whether the Soviet peoples are as "Protestant" as Gorbachev and will follow him down that path.

¹⁰The internal politics of the Byzantine Empire at the time of Justinian revolved around a conflict between the so-called monophysites and monothelites, who believed that the unity of the Holy Trinity was alternatively one of nature or of will. This conflict corresponded to some extent to one between proponents of different racing teams in the Hippodrome in Byzantium and led to a not insignificant level of political violence. Modern historians would tend to seek the roots of such conflicts in antagonisms between social classes or some other modern economic category, being unwilling to believe that men would kill each other over the nature of the Trinity.

laid out above, we must seek an answer to this question in the realm of ideology and consciousness. Our task is not to answer exhaustively the challenges to liberalism promoted by every crackpot messiah around the world, but only those that are embodied in important social or political forces and movements, and which are therefore part of world history. For our purposes, it matters very little what strange thoughts occur to people in Albania or Burkina Faso, for we are interested in what one could in some sense call the common ideological heritage of mankind.

In the past century, there have been two major challenges to liberalism, those of fascism and of communism. The former¹¹ saw the political weakness, materialism, anomie, and lack of community of the West as fundamental contradictions in liberal societies that could only be resolved by a strong state that forged a new "people" on the basis of national exclusiveness. Fascism was destroyed as a living ideology by World War II. This was a defeat, of course, on a very material level, but it amounted to a defeat of the idea as well. What destroyed fascism as an idea was not universal moral revulsion against it, since plenty of people were willing to endorse the idea as long as it seemed the wave of the future, but its lack of success. After the war, it seemed to most people that German fascism as well as its other European and Asian variants were bound to self-destruct. There was no material reason why new fascist movements could not have sprung up again after the war in other locales, but for the fact that expansionist ultranationalism, with its promise of unending conflict leading to disastrous military defeat, had completely lost its appeal. The ruins of the Reich chancellorship as well as the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki killed this ideology on the level of consciousness as well as materially, and all of the proto-fascist movements spawned by the German and Japanese examples like the Peronist movement in Argentina or Subhas Chandra Bose's Indian National Army withered after the war.

The ideological challenge mounted by the

other great alternative to liberalism, communism, was far more serious. Marx, speaking Hegel's language, asserted that liberal society contained a fundamental contradiction that could not be resolved within its context, that between capital and labor, and this contradiction has constituted the chief accusation against liberalism ever since. But surely, the class issue has actually been successfully resolved in the West. As Kojève (among others) noted, the egalitarianism of modern America represents the essential achievement of the classless society envisioned by Marx. This is not to say that there are not rich people and poor people in the United States, or that the gap between them has not grown in recent years. But the root causes of economic inequality do not have to do with the underlying legal and social structure of our society, which remains fundamentally egalitarian and moderately redistributionist, so much as with the cultural and social characteristics of the groups that make it up, which are in turn the historical legacy of premodern conditions. Thus black poverty in the United States is not the inherent product of liberalism, but is rather the "legacy of slavery and racism" which persisted long after the formal abolition of slavery.

As a result of the receding of the class issue, the appeal of communism in the developed Western world, it is safe to say, is lower

¹¹I am not using the term "fascism" here in its most precise sense, fully aware of the frequent misuse of this term to denounce anyone to the right of the user. "Fascism" here denotes any organized ultra-nationalist movement with universalistic pretensions—not universalistic with regard to its nationalism, of course, since the latter is exclusive by definition, but with regard to the movement's belief in its right to rule over other people. Hence Imperial Japan would qualify as fascist while former strongman Stoessner's Paraguay or Pinochet's Chile would not. Obviously fascist ideologies cannot be universalistic in the sense of Marxism or liberalism, but the structure of the doctrine can be transferred from country to country.

today than any time since the end of the First World War. This can be measured in any number of ways: in the declining membership and electoral pull of the major European communist parties, and their overtly revisionist programs; in the corresponding electoral success of conservative parties from Britain and Germany to the United States and Japan, which are unabashedly pro-market and anti-statist; and in an intellectual climate whose most "advanced" members no longer believe that bourgeois society is something that ultimately needs to be overcome. This is not to say that the opinions of progressive intellectuals in Western countries are not deeply pathological in any number of ways. But those who believe that the future must inevitably be socialist tend to be very old, or very marginal to the real political discourse of their societies.

ONE MAY argue that the socialist alternative was never terribly plausible for the North Atlantic world, and was sustained for the last several decades primarily by its success outside of this region. But it is precisely in the non-European world that one is most struck by the occurrence of major ideological transformations. Surely the most remarkable changes have occurred in Asia. Due to the strength and adaptability of the indigenous cultures there, Asia became a battleground for a variety of imported Western ideologies early in this century. Liberalism in Asia was a very weak reed in the period after World War I; it is easy today to forget how gloomy Asia's political future looked as recently as ten or fifteen years ago. It is easy to forget as well how momentous the outcome of Asian ideological struggles seemed for world political development as a whole.

The first Asian alternative to liberalism to be decisively defeated was the fascist one represented by Imperial Japan. Japanese fascism (like its German version) was defeated by the force of American arms in the Pacific war, and liberal democracy was imposed on Japan by a victorious United States. Western capitalism and political liberalism when trans-

planted to Japan were adapted and transformed by the Japanese in such a way as to be scarcely recognizable.¹¹ Many Americans are now aware that Japanese industrial organization is very different from that prevailing in the United States or Europe, and it is questionable what relationship the factional maneuvering that takes place with the governing Liberal Democratic Party bears to democracy. Nonetheless, the very fact that the essential elements of economic and political liberalism have been so successfully grafted onto uniquely Japanese traditions and institutions guarantees their survival in the long run. More important is the contribution that Japan has made in turn to world history by following in the footsteps of the United States to create a truly universal consumer culture that has become both a symbol and an underpinning of the universal homogenous state. V.S. Naipaul travelling in Khomeini's Iran shortly after the revolution noted the omnipresent signs advertising the products of Sony, Hitachi, and JVC, whose appeal remained virtually irresistible and gave the lie to the regime's pretensions of restoring a state based on the rule of the *Shariah*. Desire for access to the consumer culture, created in large measure by Japan, has played a crucial role in fostering the spread of economic liberalism throughout Asia, and hence in promoting political liberalism as well.

The economic success of the other newly industrializing countries (NICs) in Asia following on the example of Japan is by now a familiar story. What is important from a Hegelian standpoint is that political liberalism has been following economic liberalism, more slowly than many had hoped but with seeming inevitability. Here again we see the vic-

¹¹I use the example of Japan with some caution, since Kojève late in his life came to conclude that Japan, with its culture based on purely formal arts, proved that the universal homogenous state was not victorious and that history had perhaps not ended. See the long note at the end of the second edition of *Introduction à la Lecture de Hegel*, 462-3.

tory of the idea of the universal homogenous state. South Korea had developed into a modern, urbanized society with an increasingly large and well-educated middle class, that could not possibly be isolated from the larger democratic trends around them. Under these circumstances it seemed intolerable to a large part of this population that it should be ruled by an anachronistic military regime while Japan, only a decade or so ahead in economic terms, had parliamentary institutions for over forty years. Even the former socialist regime in Burma, which for so many decades existed in dismal isolation from the larger trends dominating Asia, was buffeted in the past year by pressures to liberalize both its economy and political system. It is said that unhappiness with strongman Ne Win began when a senior Burmese officer went to Singapore for medical treatment and broke down crying when he saw how far socialist Burma had been left behind by its ASEAN neighbors.

BUT THE power of the liberal idea would seem much less impressive if it had not infected the largest and oldest culture in Asia, China. The simple existence of communist China created an alternative pole of ideological attraction, and as such constituted a threat to liberalism. But the past fifteen years have seen an almost total discrediting of Marxism-Leninism as an economic system. Beginning with the famous third plenum of the Tenth Central Committee in 1978, the Chinese Communist party set about decollectivizing agriculture for the 800 million Chinese who still lived in the countryside. The role of the state in agriculture was reduced to that of a tax collector, while production of consumer goods was sharply increased in order to give peasants a taste of the universal homogenous state and thereby an incentive to work. The reform doubled Chinese grain output in only five years, and in the process created for Deng Xiao-ping a solid political base from which he was able to extend the reform to other parts of the economy. Economic statistics do not begin to de-

scribe the dynamism, initiative, and openness evident in China since the reform began.

China could not now be described in any way as a liberal democracy. At present, no more than 20 percent of its economy has been marketized, and most importantly it continues to be ruled by a self-appointed Communist party which has given no hint of wanting to devolve power. Deng has made none of Gorbachev's promises regarding democratization of the political system and there is no Chinese equivalent of *glasnost*. The Chinese leadership has in fact been much more circumspect in criticizing Mao and Maoism than Gorbachev with respect to Brezhnev and Stalin, and the regime continues to pay lip service to Marxism-Leninism as its ideological underpinning. But anyone familiar with the outlook and behavior of the new technocratic elite now governing China knows that Marxism and ideological principle have become virtually irrelevant as guides to policy, and that bourgeois consumerism has a real meaning in that country for the first time since the revolution. The various slowdowns in the pace of reform, the campaigns against "spiritual pollution" and crackdowns on political dissent are more properly seen as tactical adjustments made in the process of managing what is an extraordinarily difficult political transition. By ducking the question of political reform while putting the economy on a new footing, Deng has managed to avoid the breakdown of authority that has accompanied Gorbachev's *perestroika*. Yet the pull of the liberal idea continues to be very strong as economic power devolves and the economy becomes more open to the outside world. There are currently over 20,000 Chinese students studying in the U.S. and other Western countries, almost all of them the children of the Chinese elite. It is hard to believe that when they return home to run the country they will be content for China to be the only country in Asia unaffected by the larger democratizing trend. The student demonstrations in Beijing that broke out first in December 1986 and recurred recently on the occasion of Hu Yao-bang's death were only the beginning of what will inev-

ably be mounting pressure for change in the political system as well.

What is important about China from the standpoint of world history is not the present state of the reform or even its future prospects. The central issue is the fact that the People's Republic of China can no longer act as a beacon for illiberal forces around the world, whether they be guerrillas in some Asian jungle or middle class students in Paris. Maoism, rather than being the pattern for Asia's future, became an anachronism, and it was the mainland Chinese who in fact were decisively influenced by the prosperity and dynamism of their overseas co-ethnics—the ironic ultimate victory of Taiwan.

Important as these changes in China have been, however, it is developments in the Soviet Union—the original “homeland of the world proletariat”—that have put the final nail in the coffin of the Marxist-Leninist alternative to liberal democracy. It should be clear that in terms of formal institutions, not much has changed in the four years since Gorbachev has come to power: free markets and the cooperative movement represent only a small part of the Soviet economy, which remains centrally planned; the political system is still dominated by the Communist party, which has only begun to democratize internally and to share power with other groups; the regime continues to assert that it is seeking only to modernize socialism and that its ideological basis remains Marxism-Leninism; and, finally, Gorbachev faces a potentially powerful conservative opposition that could undo many of the changes that have taken place to date. Moreover, it is hard to be too sanguine about the chances for success of Gorbachev's proposed reforms, either in the sphere of economics or politics. But my purpose here is not to analyze events in the short-term, or to make predictions for policy purposes, but to look at underlying trends in the sphere of ideology and consciousness. And in that respect, it is clear that an astounding transformation has occurred.

Emigres from the Soviet Union have been departing for at least the last generation now

that virtually nobody in that country truly believed in Marxism-Leninism any longer, and that this was nowhere more true than in the Soviet elite, which continued to mouth Marxist slogans out of sheer cynicism. The corruption and decadence of the late Brezhnev-era Soviet state seemed to matter little, however, for as long as the state itself refused to throw into question any of the fundamental principles underlying Soviet society, the system was capable of functioning adequately out of sheer inertia and could even muster some dynamism in the realm of foreign and defense policy. Marxism-Leninism was like a magical incantation which, however absurd and devoid of meaning, was the only common basis on which the elite could agree to rule Soviet society.

WHAT HAS happened in the four years since Gorbachev's coming to power is a revolutionary assault on the most fundamental institutions and principles of Stalinism, and their replacement by other principles which do not amount to liberalism *per se* but whose only connecting thread is liberalism. This is most evident in the economic sphere, where the reform economists around Gorbachev have become steadily more radical in their support for free markets, to the point where some like Nikolai Shmelev do not mind being compared in public to Milton Friedman. There is a virtual consensus among the currently dominant school of Soviet economists now that central planning and the command system of allocation are the root cause of economic inefficiency, and that if the Soviet system is ever to heal itself, it must permit free and decentralized decision-making with respect to investment, labor, and prices. After a couple of initial years of ideological confusion, these principles have finally been incorporated into policy with the promulgation of new laws on enterprise autonomy, cooperatives, and finally in 1988 on lease arrangements and family farming. There are, of course, a number of fatal flaws in the current implementation of the reform, most notably the absence of a thoroughgoing price

reform. But the problem is no longer a *conceptual* one: Gorbachev and his lieutenants seem to understand the economic logic of marketization well enough, but like the leaders of a Third World country facing the IMF, are afraid of the social consequences of ending consumer subsidies and other forms of dependence on the state sector.

In the political sphere, the proposed changes to the Soviet constitution, legal system, and party rules amount to much less than the establishment of a liberal state. Gorbachev has spoken of democratization primarily in the sphere of internal party affairs, and has shown little intention of ending the Communist party's monopoly of power; indeed, the political reform seeks to legitimize and therefore strengthen the CPSU's rule.¹¹ Nonetheless, the general principles underlying many of the reforms—that the “people” should be truly responsible for their own affairs, that higher political bodies should be answerable to lower ones, and not vice versa, that the rule of law should prevail over arbitrary police actions, with separation of powers and an independent judiciary, that there should be legal protection for property rights, the need for open discussion of public issues and the right of public dissent, the empowering of the Soviets as a forum in which the whole Soviet people can participate, and of a political culture that is more tolerant and pluralistic—come from a source fundamentally alien to the USSR's Marxist-Leninist tradition, even if they are incompletely articulated and poorly implemented in practice.

Gorbachev's repeated assertions that he is doing no more than trying to restore the original meaning of Leninism are themselves a kind of Orwellian doublespeak. Gorbachev and his allies have consistently maintained that intraparty democracy was somehow the essence of Leninism, and that the various liberal practices of open debate, secret ballot elections, and rule of law were all part of the Leninist heritage, corrupted only later by Stalin. While almost anyone would look good compared to Stalin, drawing so sharp a line between Lenin and his successor is question-

able. The essence of Lenin's democratic centralism was centralism, not democracy; that is, the absolutely rigid, monolithic, and disciplined dictatorship of a hierarchically organized vanguard Communist party, speaking in the name of the *demos*. All of Lenin's vicious polemics against Karl Kautsky, Rosa Luxemburg, and various other Menshevik and Social Democratic rivals, not to mention his contempt for “bourgeois legality” and freedoms, centered around his profound conviction that a revolution could not be successfully made by a democratically run organization.

Gorbachev's claim that he is seeking to return to the true Lenin is perfectly easy to understand: having fostered a thorough denunciation of Stalinism and Brezhnevism as the root of the USSR's present predicament, he needs some point in Soviet history on which to anchor the legitimacy of the CPSU's continued rule. But Gorbachev's tactical requirements should not blind us to the fact that the democratizing and decentralizing principles which he has enunciated in both the economic and political spheres are highly subversive of some of the most fundamental precepts of both Marxism and Leninism. Indeed, if the bulk of the present economic reform proposals were put into effect, it is hard to know how the Soviet economy would be more socialist than those of other Western countries with large public sectors.

The Soviet Union could in no way be described as a liberal or democratic country now, nor do I think that it is terribly likely that *perestroika* will succeed such that the label will be thinkable any time in the near future. But at the end of history it is not necessary that all societies become successful liberal societies, merely that they end their ideological pretensions of representing different and higher forms of human society. And in this respect I believe that something very important has happened in the Soviet Union in the past few years: the criticisms of the Soviet

¹¹This is not true in Poland and Hungary, however, whose Communist parties have taken moves toward true power-sharing and pluralism.

system sanctioned by Gorbachev have been so thorough and devastating that there is very little chance of going back to either Stalinism or Brezhnevism in any simple way. Gorbachev has finally permitted people to say what they had privately understood for many years, namely, that the magical incantations of Marxism-Leninism were nonsense, that Soviet socialism was not superior to the West in any respect but was in fact a monumental failure. The conservative opposition in the USSR, consisting both of simple workers afraid of unemployment and inflation and of party officials fearful of losing their jobs and privileges, is outspoken and may be strong enough to force Gorbachev's ouster in the next few years. But what both groups desire is tradition, order, and authority; they manifest no deep commitment to Marxism-Leninism, except insofar as they have invested much of their own lives in it.¹⁴ For authority to be restored in the Soviet Union after Gorbachev's demolition work, it must be on the basis of some new and vigorous ideology which has not yet appeared on the horizon.

of the good life, could not provide even the minimal preconditions of peace and stability. In the contemporary world only Islam has offered a theocratic state as a political alternative to both liberalism and communism. But the doctrine has little appeal for non-Muslims, and it is hard to believe that the movement will take on any universal significance. Other less organized religious impulses have been successfully satisfied within the sphere of personal life that is permitted in liberal societies.

The other major "contradiction" potentially unresolvable by liberalism is the one posed by nationalism and other forms of racial and ethnic consciousness. It is certainly true that a very large degree of conflict since the Battle of Jena has had its roots in nationalism. Two cataclysmic world wars in this century have been spawned by the nationalism of the developed world in various guises, and if those passions have been muted to a certain extent in postwar Europe, they are still extremely powerful in the Third World. Nationalism has been a threat to liberalism historically in Germany, and continues to be one in isolated parts of "post-historical" Europe like Northern Ireland.

But it is not clear that nationalism represents an irreconcilable contradiction in the heart of liberalism. In the first place, nationalism is not one single phenomenon but several, ranging from mild cultural nostalgia to the highly organized and elaborately articulated doctrine of National Socialism. Only systematic nationalisms of the latter sort can qualify as a formal ideology on the level of liberalism or communism. The vast majority

¹⁴This is particularly true of the leading Soviet conservative, former Second Secretary Yegor Ligachev, who has publicly recognized many of the deep defects of the Brezhnev period.

¹⁵I am thinking particularly of Rousseau and the Western philosophical tradition that flows from him that was highly critical of Lockean or Hobbesian liberalism, though one could criticize liberalism from the standpoint of classical political philosophy as well.

of the world's nationalist movements do not have a political program beyond the negative desire of independence from some other group or people, and do not offer anything like a comprehensive agenda for socio-economic organization. As such, they are compatible with doctrines and ideologies that do offer such agendas. While they may constitute a source of conflict for liberal societies, this conflict does not arise from liberalism itself so much as from the fact that the liberalism in question is incomplete. Certainly a great deal of the world's ethnic and nationalist tension can be explained in terms of peoples who are forced to live in unrepresentative political systems that they have not chosen.

While it is impossible to rule out the sudden appearance of new ideologies or previously unrecognized contradictions in liberal societies, then, the present world seems to confirm that the fundamental principles of socio-political organization have not advanced terribly far since 1806. Many of the wars and revolutions fought since that time have been undertaken in the name of ideologies which claimed to be more advanced than liberalism, but whose pretensions were ultimately unmasked by history. In the meantime, they have helped to spread the universal homogeneous state to the point where it could have a significant effect on the overall character of international relations.

IV

WHAT ARE the implications of the end of history for international relations? Clearly, the vast bulk of the Third World remains very much mired in history, and will be a terrain of conflict for many years to come. But let us focus for the time being on the larger and more developed states of the world who after all account for the greater part of world politics. Russia and China are not likely to join the developed nations of the West as liberal societies any time in the foreseeable future, but suppose for a moment that Marxism-Leninism ceases to be a factor driving the foreign policies of these states—a pros-

pect which, if not yet here, the last few years have made a real possibility. How will the overall characteristics of a de-ideologized world differ from those of the one with which we are familiar at such a hypothetical juncture?

The most common answer is—not very much. For there is a very widespread belief among many observers of international relations that underneath the skin of ideology is a hard core of great power national interest that guarantees a fairly high level of competition and conflict between nations. Indeed, according to one academically popular school of international relations theory, conflict inheres in the international system as such, and to understand the prospects for conflict one must look at the shape of the system—for example, whether it is bipolar or multipolar—rather than at the specific character of the nations and regimes that constitute it. This school in effect applies a Hobbesian view of politics to international relations, and assumes that aggression and insecurity are universal characteristics of human societies rather than the product of specific historical circumstances.

Believers in this line of thought take the relations that existed between the participants in the classical nineteenth century European balance of power as a model for what a de-ideologized contemporary world would look like. Charles Krauthammer, for example, recently explained that if as a result of Gorbachev's reforms the USSR is shorn of Marxist-Leninist ideology, its behavior will revert to that of nineteenth century imperial Russia.¹⁶ While he finds this more reassuring than the threat posed by a communist Russia, he implies that there will still be a substantial degree of competition and conflict in the international system, just as there was say between Russia and Britain or Wilhelmine Germany in the last century. This is, of course, a convenient point of view for people who want to admit that something major is chang-

¹⁶See his article, "Beyond the Cold War," *New Republic*, December 19, 1988.

ing in the Soviet Union, but do not want to accept responsibility for recommending the radical policy redirection implicit in such a view. But is it true?

In fact, the notion that ideology is a superstructure imposed on a substratum of permanent great power interest is a highly questionable proposition. For the way in which any state defines its national interest is not universal but rests on some kind of prior ideological basis, just as we saw that economic behavior is determined by a prior state of consciousness. In this century, states have adopted highly articulated doctrines with explicit foreign policy agendas legitimizing expansionism, like Marxism-Leninism or National Socialism.

THE EXPANSIONIST and competitive behavior of nineteenth-century European states rested on no less ideal a basis; it just so happened that the ideology driving it was less explicit than the doctrines of the twentieth century. For one thing, most "liberal" European societies were illiberal insofar as they believed in the legitimacy of imperialism, that is, the right of one nation to rule over other nations without regard for the wishes of the ruled. The justifications for imperialism varied from nation to nation, from a crude belief in the legitimacy of force, particularly when applied to non-Europeans, to the White Man's Burden and Europe's Christianizing mission, to the desire to give people of color access to the culture of Rabelais and Molière. But whatever the particular ideological basis, every "developed" country believed in the acceptability of higher civilizations ruling lower ones—including, incidentally, the United States with regard to the Philippines. This led to a drive for pure territorial aggrandizement in the latter half of the century and played no small role in causing the Great War.

The radical and deformed outgrowth of nineteenth-century imperialism was German fascism, an ideology which justified Germany's right not only to rule over non-European peoples, but over *all* non-German ones. But

in retrospect it seems that Hitler represented a diseased bypath in the general course of European development, and since his fiery defeat, the legitimacy of any kind of territorial aggrandizement has been thoroughly discredited.¹⁷ Since the Second World War, European nationalism has been defanged and shorn of any real relevance to foreign policy, with the consequence that the nineteenth-century model of great power behavior has become a serious anachronism. The most extreme form of nationalism that any Western European state has mustered since 1945 has been Gaullism, whose self-assertion has been confined largely to the realm of nuisance politics and culture. International life for the part of the world that has reached the end of history is far more preoccupied with economics than with politics or strategy.

The developed states of the West do maintain defense establishments and in the post-war period have competed vigorously for influence to meet a worldwide communist threat. This behavior has been driven, however, by an external threat from states that possess overtly expansionist ideologies, and would not exist in their absence. To take the "neo-realist" theory seriously, one would have to believe that "natural" competitive behavior would reassert itself among the OECD states were Russia and China to disappear from the face of the earth. That is, West Germany and France would arm themselves against each other as they did in the 1930s, Australia and New Zealand would send military advisers to block each others' advances in Africa, and the U.S.-Canadian border would become fortified. Such a prospect is, of course, ludicrous: minus Marxist-Leninist ideology, we are far more likely to see the "Common Marketization" of world politics than the disintegration of the EEC into nineteenth-century competitiveness.

¹⁷It took European colonial powers like France several years after the war to admit the illegitimacy of their empires, but decolonialization was an inevitable consequence of the Allied victory which had been based on the promise of a restoration of democratic freedoms.

Indeed, as our experience in dealing with Europe on matters such as terrorism or Libya prove, they are much further gone than we down the road that denies the legitimacy of the use of force in international politics, even in self-defense.

The automatic assumption that Russia shorn of its expansionist communist ideology should pick up where the czars left off just prior to the Bolshevik Revolution is therefore a curious one. It assumes that the evolution of human consciousness has stood still in the meantime, and that the Soviets, while picking up currently fashionable ideas in the realm of economics, will return to foreign policy views a century out of date in the rest of Europe. This is certainly not what happened to China after it began its reform process. Chinese competitiveness and expansionism on the world scene have virtually disappeared: Beijing no longer sponsors Maoist insurgencies or tries to cultivate influence in distant African countries as it did in the 1960s. This is not to say that there are not troublesome aspects to contemporary Chinese foreign policy, such as the reckless sale of ballistic missile technology in the Middle East; and the PRC continues to manifest traditional great power behavior in its sponsorship of the Khmer Rouge against Vietnam. But the former is explained by commercial motives and the latter is a vestige of earlier ideologically-based rivalries. The new China far more resembles Gaullist France than pre-World War I Germany.

The real question for the future, however, is the degree to which Soviet elites have assimilated the consciousness of the universal homogenous state that is post-Hitler Europe. From their writings and from my own personal contacts with them, there is no question in my mind that the liberal Soviet intelligentsia rallying around Gorbachev has arrived at the end-of-history view in a remarkably short time, due in no small measure to the contacts they have had since the Brezhnev era with the larger European civilization around them. "New political thinking," the general rubric for their views, describes a world dominated by economic concerns, in

which there are no ideological grounds for major conflict between nations, and in which, consequently, the use of military force becomes less legitimate. As Foreign Minister Shevardnadze put it in mid-1988:

The struggle between two opposing systems is no longer a determining tendency of the present-day era. At the modern stage, the ability to build up material wealth at an accelerated rate on the basis of front-ranking science and high-level techniques and technology, and to distribute it fairly, and through joint efforts to restore and protect the resources necessary for mankind's survival acquires decisive importance.¹⁸

The post-historical consciousness represented by "new thinking" is only one possible future for the Soviet Union, however. There has always been a very strong current of great Russian chauvinism in the Soviet Union, which has found freer expression since the advent of *glasnost*. It may be possible to return to traditional Marxism-Leninism for a while as a simple rallying point for those who want to restore the authority that Gorbachev has dissipated. But as in Poland, Marxism-Leninism is dead as a mobilizing ideology: under its banner people cannot be made to work harder, and its adherents have lost confidence in themselves. Unlike the propagators of traditional Marxism-Leninism, however, ultranationalists in the USSR believe in their Slavophile cause passionately, and one gets the sense that the fascist alternative is not one that has played itself out entirely there.

The Soviet Union, then, is at a fork in the road: it can start down the path that was staked out by Western Europe forty-five years ago, a path that most of Asia has followed, or it can realize its own uniqueness and remain stuck in history. The choice it makes will be highly important for us, given the Soviet

¹⁸*Vestnik Ministerstva Inostrannikh Del SSSR* no. 15 (August 1988), 27-46. "New thinking" does of course serve a propagandistic purpose in persuading Western audiences of Soviet good intentions. But the fact that it is good propaganda does not mean that its formulators do not take many of its ideas seriously. in

Union's size and military strength, for that power will continue to preoccupy us and slow our realization that we have already emerged on the other side of history.

V

THE PASSING of Marxism-Leninism first from China and then from the Soviet Union will mean its death as a living ideology of world historical significance. For while there may be some isolated true believers left in places like Managua, Pyongyang, or Cambridge, Massachusetts, the fact that there is not a single large state in which it is a going concern undermines completely its pretensions to being in the vanguard of human history. And the death of this ideology means the growing "Common Marketization" of international relations, and the diminution of the likelihood of large-scale conflict between states.

This does not by any means imply the end of international conflict *per se*. For the world at that point would be divided between a part that was historical and a part that was post-historical. Conflict between states still in history, and between those states and those at the end of history, would still be possible. There would still be a high and perhaps rising level of ethnic and nationalist violence, since those are impulses incompletely played out, even in parts of the post-historical world. Palestinians and Kurds, Sikhs and Tamils, Irish

Catholics and Walloons, Armenians and Azeris, will continue to have their unresolved grievances. This implies that terrorism and wars of national liberation will continue to be an important item on the international agenda. But large-scale conflict must involve large states still caught in the grip of history, and they are what appear to be passing from the scene.

The end of history will be a very sad time.

The struggle for recognition, the willingness to risk one's life for a purely abstract goal, the worldwide ideological struggle that called forth daring, courage, imagination, and idealism, will be replaced by economic calculation, the endless solving of technical problems, environmental concerns, and the satisfaction of sophisticated consumer demands. In the post-historical period there will be neither art nor philosophy, just the perpetual caretaking of the museum of human history. I can feel in myself, and see in others around me, a powerful nostalgia for the time when history existed. Such nostalgia, in fact, will continue to fuel competition and conflict even in the post-historical world for some time to come. Even though I recognize its inevitability, I have the most ambivalent feelings for the civilization that has been created in Europe since 1945, with its north Atlantic and Asian offshoots. Perhaps this very prospect of centuries of boredom at the end of history will serve to get history started once again.

Responses to Fukuyama

The editors invited six comments, representing diverse disciplines and viewpoints, on "The End of History?" Robert Tucker's *Quarterly* at the end of the issue also bears on the subject.

Allan Bloom

FUKUYAMA'S BOLD and brilliant article, which he surely does not present as the last word, is the first word in a discussion imperative for us, we faithful defenders of the Western Alliance. Now that it appears that we have won, what are we and what are we to do? This glorious victory, if victory it really is, is the noblest achievement of democracy, a miracle of steadfastness on the part of an alliance of popular governments, with divided authorities and changing leaderships, over a fifty year period. What is more, this victory is the victory of justice, of freedom over tyranny, the rallying of all good and reasonable men and women. Never has theory so dominated practice in the history of human affairs, relieving the monotony of the meaningless rise and fall of great powers. As Fukuyama underlines, it is the *ideas* of freedom and equality that have animated the West and have won by convincing almost all nations that they are true, by destroying the intellectual and political foundations of alternative understandings of justice. The challenges to the West from fascism and communism were also *ideas*, formulated to oppose the success of the historical embodiments of Enlightenment principles which swept the world after the American and French Revolutions. Both fascism and communism constituted themselves as the enemies of the *bourgeois*, the unflattering description of the citizen

of modern liberal democracy. Fukuyama's rejection of the various reductionist accounts, such as those of economic determinism or power politics, of the struggle against these twin threats is certainly fully justified. It is not that accounts of the kind are ignoble and take away the gloriousness and freedom from human deeds. It is simply that they cannot accurately describe or explain the phenomena and must distort them to fit their rigid molds.

This fifty years of opposition to fascism and communism provided us with clear moral and political goals, but they were negative. We took our orientation from the evil we faced, and it brought out the best in us. The threat from outside disciplined us inside while protecting us from too much depressing reflection on ourselves. The global nature of the conflicts we were engaged in imposed an unprecedented uniformity on the world. It has been liberalism—or else. The practical disaster of the anti-liberal Right and Left has in general been taken to be a refutation of the theories which supported or justified them.

Now, however, all bets are off. The glance back towards ourselves, as Fukuyama indicates, is likely to be not entirely satisfying. It appears that the world has been made safe for reason as understood by the market, and we are moving toward a global common market the only goal of which is to minister to men's bodily needs and whims. The world has been demystified, and at the end of history all the struggles and all the higher dedications and

myths turn out to have served only to satisfy the demands of man's original animality. Moreover, with the loss of our negative pole of orientation, one can expect a profuse flowering of positive demands, liberated from Cold War sobriety and reflecting the non-rationalized residue of human longing. There will be movements agitating for the completion of the project of equality in all possible, and impossible, ways. Religion and nationalism will also be heard from in the name of higher callings.

Kojève's decision to spend the hours when he was not philosophizing as a bureaucrat preparing the ground for the Common Market was his response to the atmosphere of existential despair so fashionable in France after the war. He said he wanted to re-establish the Roman Empire, but this time its goal would be a multi-national soccer team. A serious man, he implied, would adapt himself to the vulgarities which would necessarily accompany the dull business of providing for all equally and the suppression of the anomalies of nation, class, sex, and religion. The existence of the Soviet Union which, according to Kojève, professed that its intention was to establish the universal homogenous state, was forcing the West to actualize the like promise contained in its principles. All snobisms—which is how he described the various reactions against equality—were being extinguished. This is a universal movement. The science, natural and political, of the West has won in the non-Western world, and it is largely Western nostalgia that wants those old, rooted cultures to be preserved when those who belong to them no longer really want them and their grounds have disappeared in the light of reason.

And it must be underlined that for Kojève and Kojève's Hegel we are at the end of history because reason has won, the real has become rational. Socrates' dialectic has come to an historic end (in both senses of end, final and perfect), because the last contradictions have been resolved. Everything that stood in the way of the reciprocal recognition of men's dignity as men always and everywhere has

been refuted and buried by history, i.e. the supra rational claims of religion, nation, family, class, and race. For the first time there are no essential contradictions between our reason and our duties or loyalties. Thus the world is now a feast for reason, replacing piety. What was a project of Enlightenment has, through history, become a part of being. The historicist who is also a rationalist must hold that there is an end of history, for otherwise there could be no knowledge and every principle, every frame of reference, would be impermanent and changing, even historicism itself. The end of history is both a philosophic necessity and a political fulfillment, each supporting and enhancing the other. The goal of philosophy, wisdom, is attained, and that of politics, freedom and equality, is simultaneously reached.

There are elements of Kojève's thought about the end of history to which Fukuyama does not give sufficient weight. The goodness of the end of history, and for Kojève it is good, consists in the possibility of unconstrained philosophizing and in the moral recognition of all human beings as ends in themselves. Fukuyama's presentation emphasizes the gray uniformity of life in "the post-historical" world. He says, "The end of history will be a very sad time," and almost predicts that he will rebel against it in order to get history started all over again. He finds the satisfactions presented by Kojève paltry, so paltry he does not mention them. However, rebellion against history is not criminal, Kojève would say, but foolish. To do so would be to rebel against reason, which no sensible man can do.

Of course, Fukuyama doubts that these satisfactions are as real as Kojève says they are. If wisdom, the owl of Minerva, flies at dusk, as Hegel says it does, is it not evident that the end of history is a night? Does the attainment of wisdom not mean the end of philosophizing? And is the peace and reciprocity of the market really moral or is it herd-like calm? Does not, finally, Kojève's thinking through of Hegel and Marx, the profoundest thinking through of that position, amount to a refutation of the claim that the end is a peak

and of the possibility that reality can ever be rational?

Kojève himself is the source of Fukuyama's doubts about the goodness of the end of history. In his later writings there is much to suggest that he began to believe that we are witnessing the ultimate trivialization of man and his reentry into the merely animal order. These writings were very witty, but one wonders whether he quite had the right to them. The note on Japan inserted in the second edition of *Introduction to Reading Hegel* to which Fukuyama refers is a case in point. I disagree with his interpretation of it. Kojève did not mean that in Japan history had not ended, but rather that there they had invented, centuries ago during a long peaceful period, an interesting way of spending the end of history: a pure snobism of forms, like the tea ceremony, flower arrangement, and the No play, which provide graceful empty activity. The alternative to the Japanese formalist is the American consumer—stereos, power tools, etc. This he suggested would be the post-historical contest for the taste of the universal homogenous state: the Japanization of America vs. the Americanization of Japan. Nothing is at stake.

It would seem that Kojève had moved, or had always been, closer to Nietzsche's interpretation of modern man as the "last man" than to Hegel's description of him. The "last man" is such a degraded being that he necessarily evokes nausea and revolt. And if, as Nietzsche believed, the "last man" is the ultimate product of reason, then reason is bad and we must look more closely to unreason for hope of salvation. God is dead, and we need new gods. The consequences of this analysis are earth-shaking, and this is the thought of the most modern modernity. Certainly Fukuyama points in this direction.

These issues were addressed in a stunning debate between Kojève and Leo Strauss contained in Strauss's *On Tyranny*. This may well

be the profoundest public confrontation between two philosophers in this century, and the most important task of these remarks is to point the readers to it, as Fukuyama has pointed us to Kojève. They were friends, at the peak of their powers, differing completely about the answers while agreeing about the questions, and able to discuss the weightiest matters with levity. In it Strauss depicts the irrational culmination of Kojève's reason and asks whether the fate of reason is simply identical to that of Hegel. Must reading for today. Their clarity about the problems enabled them to see thirty-five years ago what we feel now.

To conclude, liberalism has won, but it may be decisively unsatisfactory. Communism was a mad extension of liberal rationalism, and everyone has seen that it neither works nor is desirable. And, although fascism was defeated on the battlefield, its dark possibilities were not seen through to the end. If an alternative is sought there is nowhere else to seek it. I would suggest that fascism has a future, if not *the* future. Much that Fukuyama says points in that direction. The facts do too. The African and Near Eastern nations, which for some reason do not succeed easily at modernity, have temptations to find meaning and self-assertion in varieties of obscurantism. The European nations, which can find no rational ground for the exclusion of countless potential immigrants from their homelands, look back to their national myths. And the American Left has enthusiastically embraced the fascist arguments against modernity and Eurocentrism—understood as rationalism. However this may be, Fukuyama has introduced practical men to the necessity of philosophy, now that ideology is dead or dying, for those who want to interpret our very new situation.

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Pierre Hassner

MUCH OF the seductive charm of Fukuyama's article lies in its audacity—in the almost reckless vigor with which he cuts through the maze of political and philosophical complexities to affirm an outrageously provocative thesis. In this (more perhaps than in the substance of his analysis) he appears a worthy heir of Alexandre Kojève, of his intellectual daring and of his irrefragable urge to *épater le bourgeois*. One is almost ashamed, then, to approach his text with one's panoply of "ifs" and "buts," of "on the one hand" and "on the other."

So let me preface my comments with a statement: I have come to praise him, not to bury him. I think his article is not only brilliant and stimulating, but also more right than wrong. I agree with Fukuyama that the current wave of decline in inter-state conflicts and in revolutionary ideologies, particularly in the developed world, is more than an illusion or a temporary fluke. I also agree that it calls for more than a purely political, military, or economic analysis, that it raises fundamental questions about the meaning of war and peace, of revolution and legitimacy. Finally, I think that there is no better way to examine these questions than to take a broader perspective and confront the experience of our time both with the expectations of earlier periods, in particular of the nineteenth century, and with the traditions of political philosophy.

Raymond Aron, in *War and Industrial Society*, examined the prophecies of Comte, Spencer, and Marx. It is certainly a good idea to go beyond, and to look at the great German philosophers of the nineteenth century—in particular at Kant, Hegel, and Nietzsche—if one wants to relate a judgment about the experience of twentieth-century wars and revolutions, and their possible obsolescence, to a judgment on the meaning of history.

What seems surprising are the choices Fukuyama makes within the twentieth-century political evidence and among the nineteenth-century philosophical perspectives.

The experiences of Auschwitz and totalitarianism, and the vision of mankind achieving its own self-destruction through technology, have led many to question the validity of nineteenth-century philosophies of history. Some, like Dieter Henrich, have even come to question the validity of Kantian ethics, in the absence of cosmological or (as a substitute) historical confirmation. Others, like Michael Doyle, have used the same kind of evidence as Fukuyama to argue that eighteenth-century optimism (culminating with Kant) about the possibility of peace through the growth of republican governments and the substitution of trade for war was justified: Even in the twentieth century, prosperous liberal states, while prone to mismanage their relations with non-liberal states, never made war on each other. Characteristically, Raymond Aron was sensitive to both lines of thought and historical perspectives—to the hopes raised by technological progress which promised to solve the economic problem and make war irrelevant as a means to wealth; and to the threat of total war and total cruelty, made possible by the permanence of human nature. He hesitated to choose between the ultimate validity of Thucydides and Kant. But he had no hesitations about the decline of ideology in the West or about the impossibility of extrapolating this trend indefinitely and achieving a final political solution of the human problem.

Fukuyama's own approach is somewhat unusual. On the one hand, he reduces twentieth-century experience to the victory of liberal democracy and consumer society. On the other, he uses Hegel as a philosophical basis for a description which most of the time seems to have more to do with eighteenth-century Enlightenment, with Locke or Kant, but which in its concluding twist seems to conjure the ghost of Nietzsche's "last man."

Two factors seem to have contributed so far to the "long peace" rightly emphasized by Fukuyama. One, which he hardly mentions at all, is nuclear deterrence. But the nuclear factor entails two dangers to the very peace it has helped to create. The first is the pos-

sibility of an irrational war which would be the most destructive in history, or could even end it in a more radical sense than he envisages. The second is the growing allergy to nuclear weapons, entailing the possibility of the decline of deterrence by the denuclearization of crucial regions like Central Europe. This in turn creates the risk of making the world (or at least Europe) safe for conventional war and, ultimately, for nuclear war through uncontrolled escalation.

The second factor, emphasized by Fukuyama, is the one predicted by the apologists of possessive individualism, of enlightened self-interest, of republican government, of democratic equality, of the mellowing power of trade, of industrial society, of work replacing war and the conquest of nature replacing that of man, etc. It is profoundly ambiguous, as one can stress the bourgeois mentality, democracy, prosperity, or bureaucratic rationality as its basic dimension.

But in any case, it appears much more fragile than Fukuyama indicates. It is threatened from outside, for, as Arrigo Levi maintains, while all the ideological challenges to the West have failed, neither the communist world nor the Third World is likely to succeed in emulating its democratic freedom or its capitalistic prosperity even though they recognize their desirability (*Corriere della Sera*, October 15, 1988). Failing to achieve them at home, their citizens increasingly try to find them in the West, which is as incapable of integrating the hundreds of millions of potential immigrants as it is of creating the conditions, in their home countries, which would make them want to stay there.

Fukuyama recognizes the persistence of war and poverty outside the West but tends to dismiss them as irrelevant since they do not concern the great developed nations which are stepping out of history. But can the latter remain unaffected? Or, rather, do we not have growing evidence of the increasing intolerance caused by the shock of cultures and the overcrowding of the planet? And are these conflicts not linked to internal stresses: at the economic level, in times of crisis; at the po-

litical one, if overpopulation and the competition for space make a strong, possibly an authoritarian state more likely; and, above all, within the soul of individuals, where the thirst for absolutes and for community, for violence and for hierarchy, may reassert itself?

Are not the homeless refugee and the homeless drug addict the inseparable companions of the materialistic consumer? Is it really impossible that the search for action in a prosaic society, or the search for scapegoats in a bewildered one confronted with sudden social or natural catastrophe, should produce not the rebirth of systematic ideological doctrines but a primitive form of fascism based on resentment, fear, hatred, and hysteria?

Perhaps passions have given way to interests for good. Perhaps moods without ideas are powerless. Perhaps modern society, by providing material goods, can dispense with public participation. But these were the arguments of the Enlightenment and of liberal critics of the French Revolution and Napoleon, like Benjamin Constant. They would force us to see the totalitarian movements and the wars of the twentieth century in the way Constant or Auguste Comte saw Napoleon, as huge parentheses or aberrations contrary to the spirit of modern times. It seems surprising to base this view on Hegel who saw in Napoleon and his citizen-soldiers the synthesis of state and society, of the ancient virtues and of modern rationality, and who decried the Kantian dream of perpetual peace.

Of course, if one adopts the interpretation of Kojève (himself an admirer of Stalin and a believer in the power of the rational state), war and revolution do seem ultimately to wither away, and man seems to lose the negativity which was the driving force of history. But this has little to do with the very general and rather one-dimensional case for the influence of ideas developed by Fukuyama. While in an ultimate sense history *is* the development of *The Idea*, it is through work and war that it progresses, and consciousness is essentially retrospective.

On the other hand if, indeed, history has ended, this does not mean, for Kojève, that

art and philosophy are impossible. It means that new contents are impossible, but that everybody becomes a sage or an artist. (The note on Japan does not mean that Japan enters history but that it shows the way to the only creation possible at the end of history: form without content.) What is impossible, except through individual assassination and palace revolution, is meaningful violence and political action.

Fukuyama's last paragraph, by contrast, seems to raise with great literary *maestria* but less philosophical consistency the perspective of history being born again out of boredom. This looks more like Nietzsche than Hegel, more like a phase in a cycle than the end of history. One is reminded of Weber's phrase: "historical materialism is not like a carriage which one can board or abandon at will." With his spectacular pirouette, Fukuyama is giving away the game: he does not really believe either in history or in its end.

But the question he raises loses nothing of its relevance and of its importance. He is certainly right about the dominant trend of international politics: the decline of traditional communities, the progress of a moral sensitivity based on permissiveness and compassion, the prevalence of individualism (both spiritual and economic) over collective (particularly military) efforts and sacrifices, and of economic calculations over grand politics—and all likely to continue for years to come.

What is in doubt is whether they represent a fundamental change in world history or the end of a cycle, à la Spengler (a reference I use as loosely as Fukuyama does Hegel) with its familiar components of the role of money, the growth of big cities and of the lawlessness associated with them, the proliferation of superstitions and the frantic search for escapist distractions—traditionally connected with the decline of great civilizations.

In the latter case, it would be followed, one day, by new Caesars and new prophets, by a new age of heroism, austerity and religion, and possibly of conquest and fanaticism.

For the long run, a belief in the complexity of human nature and in the notion

that fundamental dimensions of the human soul can be repressed for whole periods but not eradicated forever, makes me lean towards this second interpretation. But I welcome it even less than Fukuyama does his version of the end of history. This is not the time to draw the Tocquevillian balance between a decline in individual nobility and a decline in suffering and injustice. But it is always the time to remember what our century has taught us about the possibilities of modern technology in the service of man's perennial potential for fanaticism and cruelty. There may or may not be an end to history. But there should never be an end to vigilance.

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Gertrude Himmelfarb

IT IS NOT often that one has the opportunity to argue about Hegel in *The National Interest* (or anywhere else, for that matter). One must take advantage of it.

One is even tempted to revive the old argument about the "early" Hegel and the "late" Hegel. It was the early Hegel (not quite a "young" Hegel—he was thirty-six at the time) who experienced that epiphany upon seeing Napoleon, the "world-soul," riding through the town on horseback, on the eve, as it soon appeared, of the Battle of Jena. And it was a heady thought to know that the battle itself, fought in Hegel's own university town, was a "world-historical" event ushering in the final stage of history; Hegel may well have felt that the burning of his house by the French and the loss of his job when the university was closed were a small price to pay for the realization of Reason and Freedom.

But the later Hegel had sobering thoughts about the French Revolution. It was too abstract and individualistic, he decided, to "actualize" the principles of the Enlightenment; hence the Terror which sought to impose those principles arbitrarily, in defiance of history and without benefit of the state. And hence the downfall of Napoleon.

And hence all of subsequent history. In one reading of Hegel, all of post-revolutionary (indeed post-Reformation) history was a matter of detail, the working out of principles which had already been realized in consciousness, the objectifying of Freedom in the State and Reason in History. In another reading of Hegel, however, all of history is a constant—and constantly unfulfilled—attempt to realize and actualize those principles. The dialectic does not consist, as Mr. Fukuyama says, in "a beginning, a middle, and an end," but in "a thesis, an antithesis, and a synthesis," in which the synthesis of the preceding stage is the thesis of the present, thus setting in motion an endless dialectical cycle—and thus preserving the drama of history.

Hegel was an Idealist, not a utopian. It was Marx, having defined history as the history of class struggle and socialism as the abolition of classes, who had to contemplate a final, classless state of history—although even he was enough of a Hegelian to be uncomfortable with that end, avoiding any discussion of it except for a few hilarious sentences in *The German Ideology* (very early Marx) about the completely fulfilled, de-alienated man who would hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, and "criticize" (philosophize) in the evening.

As it happened, history did not come to an end either with the French Revolution or, as Marxists once believed, with the Russian Revolution. A good deal of history transpired between and since those revolutions—not only the humdrum "panorama" of ordinary history (as Hegel called it) but momentous, world-historical events. Even the most ardent Hegelian would be hard put to dismiss communism or nazism as minor set-backs in the relentless march of history; he might even be moved to see in them dimensions of human consciousness, potentialities for evil, which bode ill for the progress of Spirit or Reason. At the very least, he might be inclined to put off the end of history to infinity, making it an Absolute by which to judge the present, a star by which to steer our course, but with no expectation of reaching that final destination.

I entirely agree with Mr. Fukuyama's opening sentence, that "something very fundamental has happened in world history." My only problem is with the rest of the paper, in which liberal democracy is universalized and eternalized, bringing history to an end. Would that it were so. I myself have been too traumatized by communism and nazism to have any confidence in the eternal realities of history—except the reality of contingency and change, of the imponderable and the unanticipated (and, as often as not, the undesired and undesirable).

Russia will never be the same in the post-Gorbachev era, any more than France was in the post-Napoleonic era. Communism is as dead as the Old Regime. But that does not mean that liberal democracy, of the Western variety, is the only alternative available to Russia or the rest of the non-Western world. In Russia one can foresee the possibility of some form of nativist or populist or traditionalist authoritarianism. Even if Gorbachev succeeds in ushering in something akin to liberal democracy, a Hegelian might expect that to contain within itself the seeds of conflict—of nationalist, religious, even, in a form we cannot now anticipate, ideological conflict.

This is even more true of other countries which have less in their history and culture to sustain liberal democracy. Post-Shah Iran has not exactly confirmed the sanguine expectations of most Western liberals (not that most liberals gave this question much thought when they urged the overthrow of the Shah—or even now, post-Rushdie, give it any serious thought). Mr. Fukuyama comes rather late in his paper to the possibility that religion, nationalism, race, and ethnicity might emerge as "ideological competitors" to liberal democracy, only to dismiss them as not serious competitors because they have no "universal significance." But this is just the point. Hitler, it might be argued, had no "universal significance"; indeed the enormity of the Holocaust was precisely the fact that it was a "unique" event. But it was nonetheless significant for that—significant not only in itself but in signifying the possibility of other such unprec-

edented, unthinkable events.

The future of liberal democracy is assured, we are told, because it has succeeded in resolving the "class issue." The social problems that remain are not a function of liberalism but the "historical legacy of premodern conditions"; black poverty, for example, is the "legacy of slavery and racism." But even if this were so, the problems continue to plague us and the solutions continue to evade us. History has a habit of bequeathing to us disastrous legacies, bombs that can explode at any time and any place.

In fact one might argue that black poverty, and the poverty of the underclass in general, is not the relic of an old problem but an entirely new problem, qualitatively and quantitatively (qualitatively because quantitatively, a Hegelian would say) different from the old. I agree with Mr. Fukuyama that black poverty does not fit the old "class" model, the kind familiar to classical economists and Marxists. But it may be nonetheless subversive of liberal democracy; perhaps even more so because liberal democracy does not understand it, let alone know how to cope with it.

Nor can nationalism be dismissed as a problem only for an "incomplete" liberalism, to be resolved once liberalism is completed. I remember a lecture by an eminent historian (a refugee, as it happened, from Nazi Germany), who assured a class of freshmen in the fall of 1939 that nationalism was a phenomenon of the nineteenth century, that such vestiges as remained were only that, vestiges which would soon happily disappear. That was the most salutary lesson in history one freshman in that class ever learned.

So far from seeing the end of history in the "Germanic" (i.e., Western) culture of his own time, Hegel entertained the possibility that a new history might be in the making in the new world. Hegel discovered America even before Tocqueville did.

America is therefore the land of the future, where, in the ages that lie before us, the burden of the World's History shall reveal itself—perhaps in a contest between North and South America. It is a land of desire for all those who

are weary of the historical lumber-room of old Europe. Napoleon is reported to have said: 'Cette vieille Europe m'ennuie.' It is for America to abandon the ground on which hitherto the History of the World has developed itself.

Yesterday's America, the "land of the future," may be today's Europe, the "lumber-room" of the past. But there is surely, just over the horizon, another America, possibly a less benign one, whose contours we cannot make out but of whose existence we can be fairly certain.

Hegel is not famous for his modesty. Yet his most celebrated dictum is a lesson in humility. "The owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with the falling of dusk." We know, at best, only what was, not what will be. The optimists among us may take comfort in that adage; the pessimists may find it cause for anxiety. But both must take cognizance of a future of which we know only that it is unknowable.

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Irving Kristol

I AM DELIGHTED to welcome G.W.F. Hegel to Washington. He will certainly help raise the intellectual level of the place. This is especially useful if, as seems to be the case, our universities are determined to exile the great thinkers of Western civilization from their curriculum. Perhaps the term "think tank" is about to assume a larger and deeper meaning. And it's time too. In a city full of lawyers and politicians very few of whom have ever read Montesquieu, Locke, or the authors of *The Federalist*—the great thinkers who originated our own American political tradition—the tone of political discourse could certainly benefit from some elevation, the infusion of a dash of intellectual complexity into the dominant banalities.

But not too much! Some Hegel, yes—but Heidegger, no. The minds of our most powerful philosophers are capable of mischievous

enchantment, as the case of Karl Marx clearly indicates. (Marx himself, of course, never recovered from *his* original bewitchment by Hegel.) It is so easy to confuse brilliant ideas with the mundane political and human realities, even to subordinate those realities to such ideas. So I would hope we would stop short of elevating the intellectual life of Washington to the exalted level of Paris—surely the most exciting city in the world, but one in which common sense, especially political common sense, has to fight for survival. It might not even be such a bad idea to contemplate a modest protectionist tariff against ideas imported from Paris, so that they don't flood our political marketplace, as they have already flooded our academic marketplace.

Hegel is unquestionably a genius—along with Kant, the greatest philosopher of modernity. In a sense, all of us have to decide whether we are *pro* Hegel or *contra*, even if we have never read him, as not many of us have. (He is, beyond a doubt, the most unreadable of our great philosophers.) What makes any such decision extraordinarily difficult is the fact that his mode of thinking about history—itsself only an aspect of his thinking about the cosmos—has already so infiltrated our own minds that we don't even know when we are being Hegelian. When Jesse Jackson is quoted in the *Washington Post* as saying, "We have to determine which side of history we are on," he is unwittingly speaking pure Hegelianese (as transmitted by Marx, one can assume).

That the history of Western civilization can plausibly be read as an evolution from the more simple to the more complex, from the more naive to the more "sophisticated," as man gains greater control over nature and as his social organization involves larger numbers in a multitude of differentiated roles—all this was familiar to the eighteenth century under the rubric of Progress. But it was Hegel who read this evolution as expressing a destiny, determined by an inner logic—an inner dialectic, to be more precise—of which the historical actors were themselves ignorant, and which it was Hegel's privilege now to

reveal. From a metaphysical point of view, this accession of self-consciousness by a German professor represented an achievement of the universe itself, of which humanity is the thinking, self-conscious vehicle. All philosophy after Hegel had therefore to be, of necessity, neo-Hegelian. The history of philosophy, in turn, previously regarded as a timeless conversation among thoughtful men, now had to be seen as a species of "cultural evolution" whose inner dialectic aimed always at increments of enlightenment—an evolution which we, from the privileged heights of modernity, can comprehend as never before. (That is the way courses in the history of philosophy are now routinely taught in our universities.) And all history, after Hegel, had to be viewed through the same deterministic spectacles. The mechanism of such determinism could be so complex as to give rise to many varieties of scholarship and schools of thought. But that history was History, a biography of the human race that was now, after Hegel, an autobiography, a self-scrutiny of a process whereby events gradually and inevitably matured into modernity—this is the premise of most historical inquiry today, which takes it for granted that we have the intellectual authority to understand the past as the past failed to understand itself.

Such an immense aggrandizement of human self-understanding could not leave politics untouched. After Hegel, all politics too becomes neo-Hegelian. He saw the modern constitutional state and its liberal social order as having accomplished the end (i.e., the inner purpose) of History. He realized that this accomplishment, however, remained at the level of theory and much political work remained to be done before it could achieve incarnation in the real world. Now, Mr. Fukuyama arrives to tell us that, after almost two centuries, the job has been done and that the United States of America is the incarnation we have all been waiting for.

I don't believe a word of it, but we are all neo-Hegelians now to such a degree that his quite brilliant analysis is not easy to reject or refute. In truth, it is quite persuasive. To

reject Hegel out of hand means to cut oneself loose from one's intellectual moorings, and to feel lost at sea. Everything certainly appears to be going Mr. Fukuyama's (and Hegel's) way. Our American civilization does indeed seem to be "the wave of the future" while the various forms of anti-liberalism and anti-capitalism (whether Marxist or neo-Marxist, fascist or neo-fascist) do indeed look passé. I agree that they are in fact passé. What I cannot believe is that we represent "the wave of the future," as distinct from a temporary hegemony. I put no stock in "waves of the future," which I take to be mirages provoked by a neo-Hegelian fever of the political imagination.

The only way I know to liberate oneself from the Hegelian sensibility and mode of thought is to go back to Aristotle, and to his understanding that all forms of government—democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, monarchy, tyranny—are inherently unstable, that all political regimes are inherently transitional, that the stability of all regimes is corrupted by the corrosive power of time. It is no accident—and here Aristotelian rhetoric is in accord with Hegelian—that the twentieth century has witnessed a whole series of rebellions against secular-liberal-capitalist democracy. These rebellions have failed, but the sources that feed such rebellions remain. Which is to say that our American democracy, though seemingly triumphant, is at risk, and it is at risk precisely because it is the kind of democracy it is, with all the problematics—as distinct from mere problems—that fester within such a democracy. Among such problematics are the longing for community, for spirituality, a growing distrust of technology, the confusion of liberty with license, and many others besides.

We may have won the Cold War, which is nice—it's more than nice, it's wonderful. But this means that now the enemy is us, not them.

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Daniel Patrick Moynihan

I TAKE Francis Fukuyama's rousing essay to refer to "the end of history" in two senses. There is first the Hegelian usage in which an historical dialectic reaches its necessary and foreseeable conclusion. The second refers to the end of postwar history, in the sense in which we ask, Is the Cold War Over?

I am not equal to any useful comment on the first question, although I will exercise a kind of one man-one vote right to declare myself skeptical about any proposition asserting there is now to be nothing new in human experience.

In a different world I might be more at home with Hegel. As it was, as a youth, it seemed too difficult, and besides, I never learned German. (Come to think, it wasn't taught.) In middle years I came upon Dahrendorf, whose lecture "On the Origin of Inequality among Men" given at Tübingen in 1961 seemed to relieve one, or so I felt, of any need to bother. The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Europe were much given over to speculation on this subject. Much of it turned on the explanation of inequality in terms of private property. Rousseau and Marx being "unrivaled in their insistence on property as the sole cause of social inequality." The "concealed romanticism of a revolutionary utopia." All hopeless. Societies establish norms. That is what it means to be a society. In any setting some are more successful than others in abiding by or excelling at particular norms, *whatever* those norms might be. One, say, of being kinder and gentler. Hence, inequality.

Human society always means that people's behavior is being removed from the randomness of chance and regulated by established and inescapable expectations. The compulsory character of these expectations or norms is based on the operation of sanctions, i.e., of rewards and punishments for conformist or deviant behavior. If

¹Ralf Dahrendorf, *Essays in the Theory of Society* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968), 159.

every society is in this sense a moral community, it follows that there must always be at least that inequality of rank which results from the necessity of sanctioning behavior according to whether it does or does not conform to established norms. Under whatever aspect given historical societies may introduce additional distinctions between their members, whatever symbols they may declare to be outward signs of inequality, and whatever may be the precise content of their social norms, the hard core of social inequality can always be found in the fact that men as the incumbents of social roles are subject, according to how their roles relate to the dominant expectational principles of society, to sanctions designed to enforce these principles.

To pretend otherwise is to invite considerable grief.

Wherever political programs promise societies without class or strata, a harmonious community of comrades who are all equals in rank, the reduction of all inequalities to functional differences, and the like, we have reason to be suspicious, if only because political promises are often merely a thin veil for the threat of terror and constraint. Wherever ruling groups or their ideologists try to tell us that in their society all men are equal, we can rely on George Orwell's suspicion that "some are more equal than others."

That grief has been so abundantly clear for so long now, that the utopias are quite discredited. We observe, Fukuyama asserts, "the triumph of the West . . . the total exhaustion of viable systemic alternatives to western liberalism." Fair enough. But are we truly witnessing

the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government[?]

Here I find myself mumbling on about the Second Law of Thermodynamics and the prospective "heat death of the universe," when there will be an absence anywhere of energy in a form that can be converted into work. This is hardly an immediate prospect among the present peoples of the earth. Again, Dahrendorf:

Since the "value system" of a society is universal

only in the sense that it applies to everyone (it is in fact merely dominant), and since, therefore, the system of social stratification is only a measure of conformity in the behavior of social groups, inequality becomes the dynamic impulse that serves to keep social structures alive. Inequality always implies the gain of one group at the expense of others; thus every system of social stratification generates protest against its principles and bears the seeds of its own suppression. Since human society without inequality is not realistically possible and the complete abolition of inequality is therefore ruled out, the intrinsic explosiveness of every system of social stratification confirms the general view that there cannot be an ideal, perfectly just, and therefore non-historical human society.²

Does Fukuyama disagree here? I am not sure. He writes that "it is impossible to rule out the sudden appearance of new ideologies or previously unrecognized contradictions in liberal societies." Let me assure him that it is not at all impossible! In his closing paragraph, he even notes:

I can feel in myself, and see in others around me, a powerful nostalgia for the time when history existed.

I fear he will survive to live once again "in interesting times!"

As regards the end of *postwar* history, it appears to me that Fukuyama has it right. This is perhaps too casual a way to treat a thesis that not that long ago would have been greeted with incredulity, in many circles at least.

Nathan Glazer and I have had a similar experience. For some thirty years now we have argued that the increasing salience of ethnicity in industrial or post-industrial societies was incompatible with Marxist analysis and a fundamental contradiction, if you like, of communist societies almost everywhere. We were not paid a great deal of attention, one way or the other. Ethnicity (as a category of social stratification) just couldn't break through the spell of Marxism on the one hand, liberalism on the other. In 1977 when the *Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought*

²Dahrendorf, 177-8.

appeared in Britain, there was no entry on the subject. We noticed this and were asked to provide one for a second edition, which appeared in 1988. It included this passage:

In the *Communist Manifesto*, Marx and Engels forecast that all preindustrial distinctions of an ethnic character would disappear with the emergence of a world-wide industrial PROLETARIAT united by a perceived common condition and shared interest. The Workers of the World belief, central to MARXISM, is increasingly presented as central to the falsification of Marxist prediction.¹

I would think that thirty years ago an Oxford-based publication would have rejected out of hand any assertion that Marxism had been falsified. (That itself being a play on the "scientific socialism" scam.) Fifteen years ago, considerable editing. In 1986, however, the entry was accepted without comment and printed without change.

Here I do have a difference with Fukuyama. He seems to want to be one of the company of "good Hegelians." He describes the ascent of Protestant capitalism as "the result of the victory of one idea over another." Deep stuff. (By the way, do not the Italians have a higher standard of living than the British these days?) And probably wrong in the way in which he uses the construct to account for the latest conversion of the Slavs. Marxism failed because its predictions failed. The Workers of the World *did not unite*. Social production *did not prove more efficient*. It was in 1982 that Murray Feshbach (formerly of our Bureau of the Census) reported that life expectancy for males in the Soviet Union was declining.² To be sure, such a fact can quickly become a metaphor and hence, a sort of idea. But the fact came first. So much for standing people back on their heads.

Even so, the fact of Soviet economic decline is palpable. Talk to officials in Moscow or Leningrad. Two years ago they were speaking of the "widening gulf between the Soviet Union and the advanced capitalist nations." They were not talking of the Netherlands. Peter the Great figured out the Netherlands. They were talking of Korea, Taiwan, Singa-

pore. Coolie labor. Asian hordes. Of a sudden flooding world markets with micro-circuitry whilst Soviet Russia was left peddling fish eggs and furs, the trading goods of a hunter/gatherer economy. As for ideology, it appears that the regular Party man in Moscow got 11 percent of the vote in the momentous elections of March 1989.³

What I need to know is whether the United States is going to absorb all this at the level of foreign policy. It surely did not in the 1980s. To the contrary, the Reagan Doctrine held that we had entered a third phase in the expansion of the Soviet empire. The first followed World War I with modest annexations in the Baltic and a general consolidation of the heartland. Considerable expansion took place after World War II, both in Europe and the Far East. Soon, however, the heartland was encircled by adversary capitalist regimes. In phase three this inner circle is attacked from the rear, by pre-positioned insurgencies in the Third World. In an address given at the Naval Academy in the spring of 1984, Robert C. McFarlane, then National Security Adviser, asserted that this has made "obsolescent" the earlier policy of containment. Because the Soviets were now "militarily strong and adventurous enough to leapfrog the buffer states and jump anywhere in the world that suits their own strategies," it was necessary to go "beyond containment."⁴

¹Alan Bullock, et. al. *The Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought*, rev. ed. (London: Collins, 1988), 285.

²Murray Feshbach, "Issues in Soviet Health Problems," in *Soviet Economy in the 1980's: Problems and Prospects*, Selected Papers submitted to the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, December 31, 1982 (Washington: GPO, 1983).

³Bill Keller, "Soviet Voters Deal a Mortifying Blow to Party Officials," *New York Times*, March 28, 1989, A10.

⁴Barnard L. Collier, "McFarlane Says Hill Knew About Mining," *Washington Times*, April 13, 1984, 1.

Mr. McFarlane was on that occasion justifying the mining of Nicaraguan harbors and describing the resistance there which gave the particular élan to the new doctrine. In a 1986 article in *Strategic Review*, a State Department official put it that

[The] "Reagan Doctrine" has evolved in pace with a remarkable phenomenon of global dimensions: the spontaneous combustion of resistance to direct and surrogate prongs of the Soviet Union's expansion in such disparate regions as Asia, Africa and Central America. The doctrine, as an expression of American moral values, calls for support, in various forms, to those forces of resistance. On a global scale, it seeks not only to fend against the time-honored and recently accelerating Soviet strategy in the developing world, aimed at outflanking the centers of capitalist power, but to exploit the vulnerabilities opening in the Soviet strategy in order to turn the offensive back. As such, the doctrine leans on the strategic principles of objective, offensive, economy of force and maneuver.⁵

Economy of force meant, *inter alia*, getting the Ayatollah Khomeini on our side.

Some of these people were berserk. In the process, they all but brought on a crisis of the regime. I cite Theodore Draper on the Iran-*contra* events:

If ever the constitutional democracy of the United States is overthrown, we now have a better idea of how this is likely to be done.⁶

Just as ominously—for it carries over after them—they brought on our own "period of stagnation." In eight years they increased the national debt by an amount almost equivalent to the debt incurred during World War II. But in this instance, the United States ended up in debt to the rest of the world, with an economy that itself was having difficulty keeping up with the "advanced capitalist nations."⁷

It would be small consolation to find at the end of history, or at least at the end of the twentieth century, "the basic principles of the liberal democratic state could not be improved upon" if in the process the principal liberal democratic state finds itself exhausted

from the struggle, depleted, demoralized. The metaphor of American decline—"imperial overstretch," "twin deficits"—everywhere in evidence. And with no electoral break with the administration that brought this on.

This presents the central challenge and great opportunity of the new presidency of George Bush. He is free to change American policy toward the Soviets as much as he wishes, without risk of being said to have subverted it. Indeed, the later Reagan years provide a transition. It was he, after all, who defended his friendship with the new leader of the Kremlin in rather unusual terms.

... [H]e is the first leader that has come along who has gone back before Stalin and ... is trying to do what Lenin was teaching ... I've known a little bit about Lenin and what he was advocating, and I think that this, in *glasnost* and *perestroika* and all that, this is much more smacking of Lenin than of Stalin.⁸

I have written elsewhere of a "return to normalcy" in the American presidency, and there is every indication that this will now be possible with Soviet Russia. And surely we can sort out the distinctions that will have to be understood in order for there to be such a shift in foreign policy. In essence, it is now to be understood that the Russian leadership has foregone the claim that its social and economic system represents the foreordained next stage in history. In consequence of which it is now bound by the rules of the present stage in history. Indeed not bound by any rules, being a mere instrument of a historical process which it did not commence, and over which it has no more control than did the bourgeois powers, or even the feudal ones.

This does not mean relations with Russia

⁵William R. Bode, "The Reagan Doctrine," *Strategic Review* 14, no. 1 (Winter 1986), 21.

⁶Theodore Draper, "The Rise of the American Junta," *New York Review of Books*, October 8, 1987, 47.

⁷Lou Cannon, "Text of Interview with President Reagan," *Washington Post*, February 26, 1988, A31.

will be friendly, or even cooperative. There is the phenomenon Westerners describe as a "gut shot grizzly." But they will be fundamentally different from seven decades of revolutionary expectations.

All this came together in an extraordinary appearance of George F. Kennan before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in the spring of 1989. At age eighty-five, the man who had sent the "long telegram" from Moscow in 1946 told the Committee that it was all over. The end of the Russian Revolution had come. There can have been few such moments in our Committee's history. (At the close the entire room rose in standing ovation.) With impeccable clarity and reserve he walked us through from beginning to end, and from a perspective that transformed almost every subject he touched upon.

First of all, subtly, simply by the use of words, we were asked to think of *Russia*, not some agitprop abstraction called the Soviet Union. (For two centuries, Russian regimes have had a good many soldiers. On the other hand, they wait to be attacked. The military are not Caesarist; civil rulers seem safe there, etc.) Next, and just as important, we were asked to consider the centrality of nationalism (Glazer and I would add ethnicity) to the modern experience. There is nothing else of remotely comparable significance. Marxism? "[S]omething that took account, if you will, only of the tragedies of class differences in the early period of the industrial revolution . . ." ¹⁰ Not exactly absurd, but hardly of any relevance as you enter the twenty-first century.

Ambassador Kennan's summation needs to be published soon. Let us then have it for *The National Interest!*

... [I]t appears to me that whatever reasons there may once have been for regarding the Soviet Union primarily as a possible, if not probable, military opponent, the time for that sort of thing has clearly passed. That country should now be regarded essentially as another great power like other great powers—one, that is, whose aspirations and policies are conditioned outstandingly by its own geographic situation, history, and tra-

dition, and are therefore not identical with our own but are also not so seriously in conflict with ours as to justify any assumption that the outstanding differences could not be adjusted by the normal means of compromise and accommodation. It ought now to be our purpose, I consider, while not neglecting the needs of our general security, to eliminate as soon as possible, by amicable negotiation the elements of abnormal military tension that have recently dominated Soviet-American relations, and to turn our attention, instead, to the development of the positive possibilities of this relationship, which are far from insignificant.

Daniel Patrick Moynihan is senior Senator from New York.

Stephen Sestanovich

THE END of history, in Frank Fukuyama's excellent essay, can easily begin to sound like the political equivalent of global warming. Each theory has some of the same conceptual advantages and difficulties, and for better or worse these will probably affect the response of many readers. The principal advantage: a couple of extremely hot summers in a row predispose people to believe a permanent change has occurred. Contrary evidence can be dismissed as reflecting an insufficiently long view. The principal difficulty: audiences want to know whether the new forecast has any practical application. They are not entirely satisfied to hear that the glaciers will melt sometime between the last decade of the twentieth century (that is, very soon) and the last decade of the twenty-first (too far in the future to affect most vacation plans).

Long lags between the initial ascendancy of liberal ideas and their eventual embodiment in social and political institutions are a problem not merely for predicting the future, but for interpreting the past as well. There was, after all, quite a delay between the Battle of

¹⁰George F. Kennan, Testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *The Future of U.S.-Soviet Relations: Overview*, April 4, 1989.

Jena and the founding of the Weimar Republic, not to speak of VE Day. One way to test theories of history is to put them to work explaining these gaps between idea and reality. About nations that have come late to constitutionalism and consumerism, it doesn't seem quite enough to say that the clash between liberalism and opposing ideologies can simply take a century or two to resolve itself. Of course it can, but it doesn't do so everywhere. Not every nation has to be "forced to be free."

Precisely to explain such differences in development (why, for example, was there no serious fascist movement in Britain?), political theorists introduce other variables—political institutions, the means of production, and so forth. This was the most important amendment Marx made to Hegel; he said that the ideas that appear to govern human society become relevant only when someone is actually ready to make material use of them. Fukuyama updates Hegel in a similar way when he defines the "universal homogeneous state" as liberal democracy plus consumer electronics. History clicks off when the VCR clicks on? Marx would surely argue that this formulation is closer to his own view of history's dynamic than to Hegel's. Its assumptions are Marxian even if its conclusion—that history culminates in capitalist pluralism instead of communism—is not.

The Soviet Union is today the place where it matters most whether, and when, history will in fact come to rest in a liberal result. Recent events have for the first time made a positive answer thinkable. As Fukuyama points out, the crucial "conceptual" hurdle has been overcome. Gorbachev and his lieutenants now endorse economic reforms whose only "unifying thread" is liberalism; they advocate political innovations whose origins are "alien" to Marxism-Leninism. As a result of such ideological "demolition work," even if there is no further progress for now, it will be difficult to restore the *status quo ante*.

This is an extremely persuasive analysis, which makes clear why Gorbachev represents

a watershed in Soviet history. Advocates of a fundamental break with the past are suddenly in positions of power, and many of them appear to see that the problems the Soviet Union faces would be better managed in a system of markets (political and economic) than in one of monopolies. Yet the gap between victorious liberal idea and future liberal reality remains, and the more one thinks about the Soviet case, the more it seems that the problem liberalism is least effective at handling is that of establishing itself in the first place.

Consider the issue of nationalism. Fukuyama concludes that it is not "an irreconcilable contradiction in the heart of liberalism." Certainly ethnic and racial conflicts are not normally an insoluble problem within a functioning pluralist order; to the contrary, they are most acute where liberalism has not yet been fully implemented. But the fact that liberal outcomes are stable once reached does not establish what the process of reaching them is like. Unfortunately, it can be tumultuous. For groups whose animosities have festered in an illiberal setting, the freedom to speak up, organize, and assemble may present itself primarily as a long-sought opportunity to fight things out. In the Soviet Union, this dilemma has now become very clear. To be a liberal is in effect to encourage the escalation of conflicts that could before long tear the USSR apart. A liberal program, in other words, may only prepare the ground for an illiberal outcome.

National divisions and loyalties are one obstacle to peaceful reform in the Soviet Union. Another is the residual anti-liberal sentiment of Stalinist ideology. Fukuyama is doubtless right that the authority of communism is too badly tattered to be restored. But it is perhaps still strong enough to affect the fate and shape of reform. Something of Gorbachev's problem is suggested by his inability to call his program by its proper name. He too cowers in fear of the "L-word," not so much to protect the stability of the system but because, for all the implicit support it probably enjoys, liberalism publicly remains a bourgeois ideology without respectability.

Searching for slogans with popular appeal, the Stalinist elite now in fact seeks refuge in the claim that liberalism's unbridled worship of money and success will divide Soviet society. One of their spokesmen, Yuri Bondarev, has called the reformist outlook "a poison offered as a cure." As he told last summer's Party conference:

We are against our society becoming a crowd of solitary people, a voluntary captive in the trap of commercialist consumerism that promises the luxurious life of alien, all-pervasive advertising.

This theme is obviously meant to reach beyond socialist true believers. There is a growing affinity in the Soviet Union between the Stalinist Left and the ultra-nationalist Right, and the strongest link between them is a common dislike of liberal individualism and the social order that goes with it. Such a union of extremes would of course hardly be unique to Russia. Let us suppose the weakened remnants of Stalinism tip the outcome in favor of a fascist alternative because they think anything is better than liberalism. If so, we would witness a near-exact replay of the dynamic that helped to crush Weimar and bring the Nazis to power.

It is sometimes said that Gorbachev has begun to understand a liberal reformer's special vulnerability in the Soviet setting, and that he has accelerated the pace of political change (especially his recent experiment with elections) so as to give himself new weapons for the struggle ahead. To put it slightly differently, he may now suspect that the Soviet Union will not make the uneasy passage between liberal idea and liberalized reality except by way of a certain amount of disorder. He and his allies surely hope to be able to control this process, but the popular anger revealed by this spring's balloting should make them wonder.

In the light of Soviet history, it would be astonishing if an upheaval on the scale sketched out by Gorbachev could be accomplished without loosening the moorings of the system at least a little. Liberal institutions have rarely been created in the incremental,

indirect style that Fukuyama seems to envision for the end of history. His is an accurate description of liberalism in place, less so of liberalism in the making. In his truly admirable analysis of the foundations of a free society, and the eroding bases of unfree ones, an important word is all but missing; that word is revolution.

Whatever form it may take at home—violent or not—the Soviet Union's deep ferment has already been accompanied by changes in its thinking about the outside world. Liberalizing impulses, resource stringency, an apparent loss of confidence in the benefits that have flowed from past policy—these influences seem to be eating away slowly at Soviet aspirations to hegemony.

The removal of what has for decades been the main source of Western insecurity would obviously reshape international politics. But would ideological antagonism and military competition really give way to "Common Marketization"—to a world in which governments were guided by the same economic calculus, in which war was a senseless interruption of commerce and bureaucratic accommodation resolved all conflicts?

It is easy to make Fukuyama's analysis sound a little outlandish, even utopian. Yet much of it is really beyond dispute. The internal evolution of the major powers does focus them increasingly on economic goals that are unlikely to be advanced by a resort to force. It is hard to imagine that the gradual disappearance of the Soviet threat will lead the states of the West to uncover new enemies within their own circle rather than to become less military-minded in general.

Violence and coercion may play a less pervasive role in world politics, and this is a major change. Yet it is equally important to understand how much will remain the same. International relations will surely continue to be relations among the strong and the weak, among ascending and declining states. And the meaning of inequality will be much what it has been in the past. Those who are powerful will stamp the system with their own preferences; those who are less powerful will

have correspondingly less freedom to select their own national goals. In this environment, a state whose economic vitality is in decline will do just what one would predict today of a state whose military potential is slipping: tend to its own affairs, take fewer chances. By contrast, growing economic weight will lead a national leadership—of Japan, say, or China—to think that its writ should run further, that others should pay it greater heed.

Liberalism is not the end of politics in the world at large any more than it is the end

of politics at home. A liberal international order may be less violent, may look less like the state of nature. But just because power takes on new forms, it will not cease to exist or cease to define a hierarchy of those who count and those who do not. As a result, the strong will (still) do what they can; the weak will (still) do what they must.

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