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Debts Paid, Romania Says

Ceausescu Announces Austerity's Result

By A. D. Horne
Washington Post Foreign Service

Romanian leader Nicolae Ceausescu announced this week that his country, despite an economy that a recent U.S. congressional report called the second poorest in Europe, has paid off all of its foreign debts ahead of schedule.

The costs of this accelerated repayment program have been massive. In a recent report on Romanian human rights violations, congressional Helsinki Commission chairmen Rep. Steny H. Hoyer (D-Md.) and Sen. Dennis DeConcini (D-Ariz.) wrote:

"Fuel and electricity have been rationed for years. Staple foods, including milk, bread and flour, are rationed, and in many localities even these are unavailable. Meat is a rarity; soup bones only occasionally appear in stores. Decades of financial misplanning and inefficient industrial development have led to the dire condition of the Romanian economy, making it the poorest in Europe after Albania."

Ceausescu made his announcement on Wednesday to a Communist Party Central Committee meeting in Bucharest, the Romanian news agency Agerpres reported. Ceausescu rules Romania both as president and as the party's general secretary; his wife, Elena, is deputy premier; a son, Nicu, is a regional party secretary, and a younger brother, Ilie, is deputy defense minister.

See ROMANIA, A24, Col. 1

Photo Copy Preservation

Romanian Austerity Ends Foreign Debt

ROMANIA, From A21

According to Agerpres, Ceausescu announced that "at the end of March Romania fully paid back its foreign debt. This is the outstanding result of our people's work," he said, and it proves the might of the Romanian socialist economy."

Spokesmen for international financial institutions confirmed that Romania has completed paying back its World Bank and International Monetary Fund loans as well as virtually all of its commercial bank debts ahead of schedule. But Radio Free Europe quoted financial sources as saying that Romania still owes about $1.5 billion to governments and international institutions.

Under Ceausescu's one-man rule, Romania halted all foreign borrowing in 1981, when its international debt stood at about $10.5 billion. By restricting imports, exporting food and rationing food and fuel, Ceausescu has been able to accumulate foreign exchange funds to repay debts ahead of schedule.

At the same time, Ceausescu has launched vast redevelopment programs in which historic sections of Bucharest and other cities have been razed and their residents evicted on short notice to make way for broad avenues and planned new apartment buildings.

Ceausescu declared last year that this "modernization" program would extend to the countryside, eliminating half of Romania's 13,000 villages and moving their residents to new "agro-industrial centers." The plan has prompted international protests, culminating in last month's vote by the U.N. Human Rights Commission to appoint a special investigator.

Romania has rejected the U.N. investigation as "brutal interference" in its affairs. In a similar move in January, Romania sought to exempt itself from the human rights provisions of the final agreement signed by a 35-nation Vienna conference reviewing the 1975 Helsinki accords. And in February 1988, Ceausescu, angry over increasingly close U.S. congressional scrutiny of Romania's human rights record, unilaterally renounced his nation's most-favored-nation trading status before Congress could act to revoke it.



BY CLARICE BORIO—THE WASHINGTON POST

According to Agerpres, however, Ceausescu now has raised the most-favored-nation issue for the first time since last year's renunciation. In meetings on Tuesday and Wednesday with a group of U.S. businessmen visiting Bucharest, the official news agency said, the Romanian president called most-favored-nation status the "only problem awaiting an appropriate solution." Without most-favored-nation status, some Romanian exports to the United States are subject to prohibitively high tariffs.

In an open letter to Ceausescu this winter, six former officials, including two ex-members of the party Politburo, a former foreign minister and a former ambassador to Washington, listed the loss of most-favored-nation status among their concerns. "We have lost the American clause for trade," they wrote, "and as a result some of our textile factories have no orders."

The ex-officials' letter deplored Romania's international isolation, noting that Norway, Denmark and Portugal have closed their embassies in Bucharest, that the European Community is unwilling to extend its trade agreement with Romania," and that "all the leaders of the non-communist nations of Europe refuse to meet with" Ceausescu.

The six former officials also appealed to Ceausescu to halt the destruction of Romanian villages, which they called unconstitutional. "Why urbanize villages," their letter asked, "when you cannot ensure decent conditions of urban life in the cities, namely heating, lighting, transportation, not to mention food?"

When the letter became public last month, Ceausescu's response was to arrest one signer's stepson as "an agent of a foreign espionage service." This month, West Germany recalled its ambassador after he was prevented from taking a message from Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher to another of the letter's signers, former foreign minister Cornel Manescu.

Since November 1987, when workers in the city of Brasov demonstrated against a plan to cut their pay if their factories failed to meet production targets, there has been little open dissent in Romania.

The State Department's latest annual human rights report noted that free speech is "severely restricted," that "all citizens are required to have residence permits and may not legally move from one town to another" and that "serial numbers and typeface samples of all typewriters must be registered with the authorities, and the use of duplicating machines is strictly regulated."

AMERICA ABROAD


Strobe Talbott

THE FEAR OF WEIMAR RUSSIA

MOSCOW

The most contentious issue of this week's summit may also be the most important foreign policy challenge facing the U.S. in the '90s: how to keep the peace in Europe now that the cold war is over. George Bush not only wants to preserve NATO, with a united Germany as a full member and U.S. troops on its soil; he also wants the Soviet Union to like the idea. In his TIME interview, Mikhail Gorbachev dismissed as "not serious" (a scathing put-down in the lexicon of Soviet diplomacy) the notion that a strengthened NATO will replace a disintegrating Warsaw Pact as the guarantor of the U.S.S.R.'s security.

Gorbachev was rebutting an argument that American officials dare not make in public and are circumspect about making even in private. Their winks and nods, euphemisms and disclaimers can be translated into one stark sentence that summarizes the only truly strategic thought the U.S. Government has about the 21st century: a Germany "anchored" in NATO is less likely to cause trouble than one that is neutral and nonaligned. Note the verb, with its metaphorical suggestion not only of safety from rough seas but also of a heavy chain and benevolent captivity.



ALAIN MORVAN—GAMMA LIAISON

West Germany's Genscher and the U.S.S.R.'s Shevardnadze discussing the role of a new Germany in a new Europe

Even in their most confidential communications with the Kremlin, U.S. policymakers and diplomats have been careful not to make this pitch too explicit. They are afraid the KGB may make mischief between Washington and Bonn by leaking any cable or memorandum that reveals Americans to be exploiting Soviet anxiety about Germany. There is nothing cryptic about the apprehension of the British, French, Czechoslovaks and Poles as they watch the juggernaut of German unification. The Bush Administration keeps hoping the Kremlin will therefore not object too strenuously as the U.S. helps sponsor the emergence of a new Germany at the center of a new NATO.

At the beginning of the year, the Administration was counting on the summit to help advance its German policy. The meeting, predicted one presidential adviser, was going to be "Christmas in spring," with Bush in the role of Santa Claus. Gorbachev would go home in triumph, laden with so many honors and agreements that his countrymen would barely notice he had let the U.S. have its way on Germany.

Then the Lithuanian crisis complicated the work of Santa's helpers in Washington and steeled resistance in Moscow. The top brass of the military was already upset about "losing" Eastern Europe. Now it looked as though Soviet power might be humiliated even within the borders of the U.S.S.R. Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, Gorbachev's personal military adviser, bluntly said that no setback would be more galling than "seeing our East German allies defect to NATO." Yevgeni Primakov, one of Gorbachev's closest associates on the Presidential Council, agreed in a conversation a few weeks ago: "A united Germany in NATO is something we just can't swallow."

A high Foreign Ministry official explains why. "Having East Germany leave the Warsaw Pact—that's one thing. It means we've lost the cold war. Okay. We can accept that, although it's not so easy. But having our enemies of the '40s, the Germans, join our enemies of the '50s, '60s and '70s in an alliance whose whole reason for being is anti-Soviet—that makes us feel as though we lost World War II."


Then comes a telling reference, frequently echoed in Moscow, to the aftermath of World War I: "The U.S. and the West must not rub our noses too much in our defeat; it must not impose on us at the end of the 20th century a version of the Treaty of Versailles that caused so much trouble at the beginning. We don't want to feel like Weimar Germany. And you shouldn't want us to." Not even in private will a patriotic Soviet finish that thought: the Weimar Republic gave way to Hitler's Third Reich. Yet that is what some Soviets seem to have in mind. They fear not only the worst from Germany's past but also something just as bad that may lurk in their own future. These twin dreads interact powerfully, if not quite logically. As Gorbachev at least tacitly acknowledges, in his country rationality is as scarce as soap these days. The outside world is a mirror into which Soviets look and wince.

What can they do to stop the U.S. from ramming its own answer to the German question down their throats? "Nothing," admits a close Gorbachev adviser. "But the outcome will influence our approach on many other matters. If the old German Democratic Republic joins NATO, the Soviet military will be harder for all of us, including Gorbachev, to deal with on a variety of other issues." That presumably refers to the many issues of nuclear and conventional arms control that will not be resolved at the summit this week.

Washington's response is predictable: Oh, that's just Gorbachev letting his marshals and generals play the bad cops. But George Bush may find that on this subject there are no good cops in the Soviet Union. ■

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♦ **Geneva, July 18-23, 1955. Soviet Chairman of the Council of Ministers Nikolai Bulganin, British Prime Minister Anthony Eden, President Dwight Eisenhower, and French Premier Edgar Faure.**

Issues:

1) German reunification.

2) Withdrawal of U.S. and Soviet troops from Europe.

3) Nuclear and conventional disarmament.

4) An "Open Skies" proposal by the U.S. to allow spy flights over the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

♦ **Camp David, Maryland, September 25-27, 1959. Dwight Eisenhower and Soviet Communist Party First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev.**

Issues:

1) The status of Berlin.

2) A future "Big Four" summit of Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and the United States to discuss lowering tensions in East-West relations.

♦ **Paris, May 16-17, 1960. French President Charles de Gaulle, Dwight Eisenhower, Nikita Khrushchev, and British Prime Minister Harold MacMillan.**

Issue:

Intended as a discussion of ways to reduce East-West tensions, the conference broke up when Khrushchev walked out after Eisenhower refused to "apologize" for sending a U-2 spy plane into Soviet airspace. It had been shot down by the Soviets on May 1, 1960.

♦ **Vienna, June 3-4, 1961. President John Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev.**

Issue:

The status of Berlin.

♦ **Glassboro, New Jersey, June 23-25, 1967. President Lyndon Johnson and Soviet Chairman of the Council of Ministers Aleksei Kosygin.**

Issues:

1) The Arab-Israeli conflict.

2) Soviet support for the communist insurgency in South Vietnam.

The road to the Washington summit of 1990 has been a long one. The Bush-Gorbachev meeting in Washington is the nineteenth since President Franklin Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin first met in 1943 to chart the post-World War II international order. The milestones of U.S.-Soviet summits over the past 47 years are:

♦ **Tehran, November 28 - December 1, 1943. Winston Churchill, Franklin Roosevelt, and Joseph Stalin.**

Issues:

1) Agreement on the invasion of Nazi-occupied France by Britain, Canada, and the U.S. The date was set for May 1944 and later moved to June 1944.

2) The post-war Polish-German and Soviet-Polish borders.

♦ **Yalta, February 4-11, 1945. Winston Churchill, Franklin Roosevelt, and Joseph Stalin.**

Issues:

1) Allied administration of a defeated Germany, including zones of occupation.

2) Agreement on Poland's new eastern borders.

3) The "Declaration on Liberated Europe," which called for free elections in Eastern Europe.

4) The Soviet Union's entry into the war against Japan ninety days after Germany's surrender.

5) Creation of the United Nations.

♦ **Potsdam, Germany, July 17 - August 2, 1945. Winston Churchill, President Harry Truman and Joseph Stalin** (Midway through the summit, Churchill was replaced by Clement Atlee, the Labor leader who defeated Churchill in the July 25, 1945, British elections).

Issues:

1) The administration of occupation zones in Germany.

2) A new German-Polish border.

3) German war reparations.

4) The surrender ultimatum to Japan.

5) Forms of government in Eastern Europe.

Gelb account

If Winston Churchill had not already called Russia a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma, many Soviets might be tempted today to use the phrase to describe their view of the United States. In any event, they are striving mightily to penetrate this veil of mystery to learn how America works. This is a remarkable turn-around from the days when Soviet officials claimed to know exactly how we operated -- the ruling circles and the military-industrial complex squeezed profits out of the hapless worker and that was that. Like a dead mackerel in the moonlight, they said, capitalism shines and stinks.

While these canards are probably still quacking lustily over some parts of the Soviet Union, I did not hear them from a wide and diverse group of Soviet government and party officials, intellectuals and cultural figures that I met with on my recent trip. In fact, I heard the opposite.

First, that America "works." It works in the economic sense -- the standard of living is high, the stores are filled with goods, there are no orchards in Central Park but somehow the millions of people who live and work in Manhattan get orange juice every morning. America also works in the political and social sense. One Soviet put it this way:

There are things in America which you take for granted which are burning issues for us. You have lobbyists and powerful interest groups in your country and yet the voice of the people can always be heard. How do you do that? You have a constitution that has lasted more than two centuries with just a handful of amendments. We're working on our fourth constitution in 72 years. How do you do that?

Second, although Soviets may always have had an abundance of facts and figures about us at their fingertips, they have not understood what makes it all hang together; they have not seen the soul in the American body politic.

I have been impressed in my meetings, official and unofficial, here and in Moscow and in Tbilisi, with Soviet willingness, even eagerness, to do business with the United States. Whether the field is educational exchange, agriculture, the working of parliamentary commissions or the nuances of constitutional law -- almost no American proposal is rejected out of hand. Soviets are ready to talk, to discuss and very often to act in surprisingly open ways.

Two threads run through all of the conversations and requests -- one is the need for information, the other is the need for "know-how." Like people after a drought, Soviets thirst for facts, data, figures -- for information -- about what is going on in the world around them. Soviets want to know how we do what we do. They ask for pamphlets, books, speakers, seminars, exhibits, satellite television programs, radio programs -- every possible means of communication -- to explain the basic mechanisms and values of American society and politics. Many of the most urgent calls are for assistance with "gut" issues -- food, housing, medicine. The Soviet Union has the same basic resources we do -- they have arable land, they have timber for houses, they have concrete factories without end, they have physicians and scientists the equal of any. But Soviets look at the end product and see in America a much higher standard of living -- better housing, a better and more varied diet, better and more sophisticated health care. Clearly, something different is going on. It is this "something different" that Soviets want to learn.

These trends -- openness to discussion, desire for information, eagerness to learn -- are certainly positive. The sheer volume of such requests, the eloquence with which they are stated and the historical implications for Soviet society should not, however, deafen us to several troubling notes that sound throughout this dialogue.

First, of course, is that we have no interest in helping Soviet authorities to merely modernize or streamline their control. Our interest is and can only be in honest, permanent, systemic change toward freedom, democracy and the rule of law. Second, the danger continues of equating information with understanding. The new, more accurate information ushered in by glasnost still does not guarantee understanding or respect for the American system, nor the variety of news and independence of thought that identifies a healthy society.

I believe that many Soviets think that "how-to" information will somehow magically make their troubles go away. As we Americans know all too well, there is no magic wand. Americans have not had it "easy," and American history is not a smooth, uninterrupted procession of a nation from one triumph to another and to ever higher levels of prosperity for all. It is not enough for the people of the USSR to have the tools, they must also understand the spirit that animates the craftsman and the artist.

Without asking or expecting the Soviets to abandon their values or traditions -- we must, nonetheless, ask and expect them to

begin to foster and appreciate the values of individuality, freedom and entrepreneurship. In short -- the spirit of America is what they must grasp.

We don't plan to sell them the legendary rope with which they will hang us and we have no magic wand to wave over their troubles and so dispel them -- what we can and are offering now is our hand.

STRATEGIC REVIEW, Spring 1989
(Pre-publication copy)
5-2-89

A "COMMON EUROPEAN HOUSE" — OR A NEW DESIGN FOR SOVIET HEGEMONY?

SOL W. SANDERS

THE AUTHOR: Sol Sanders was Senior Editor for *Business Week* from 1979 to 1986, following journalistic assignments that included coverage of the Vietnam war for *U.S. News & World Report* (1962–1970). His articles on a broad range of international and economic topics have appeared regularly in such publications as the *Wall Street Journal* and *Christian Science Monitor*. His book, *Mexico: Chaos on Our Doorstep*, was published by Madison Books in 1986. He is currently working on a book on the subject of Soviet economic dependence on the West.

IN BRIEF

A report-card on Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms in the Soviet Union thus far reveals the enormity of the problems confronting the regime and the lack of headway being made against them. Gorbachev has acquitted himself as a supreme tactician in the Lenin mold, but tactics alone are not likely to bring about solutions nor to sustain him in power. Implicit in Gorbachev's "new thinking" are the outlines of a larger strategy designed to secure for the Soviet Union the steady flow of technological "transfusions" imperative for a rescue of the system. The target of that strategy is Western Europe; it is to be achieved through a political-economic process in which the satellite nations of Eastern and Central Europe are assigned a leading role.

Noncommunist Western elites have deceived themselves about the fundamental nature of the Soviet regime, with consequences ranging from deleterious to disastrous, in at least four historical periods: immediately after the Russian October Revolution, in the "Popular Front" phase of Stalin's foreign policy in the 1930s, during the Soviet Union's cobelligerency with the West in World War II, and in the detente of the 1970s.[1] Historical analogies are odious, we are told. Nevertheless, especially when experience — and frustrated hope — trace a recurrent historical pattern, we have to look in all prudence to that history as an illuminant of the contemporary Soviet stage, or at least the parts of that stage visible to us.

It may, indeed, be that we are witnessing an entirely new departure in Soviet — and Russian — history. Certainly spectacular, in some instances unprecedented, events are unfolding. A young, dynamic leadership has taken over in Moscow. A new openness has taken hold of the Soviet media. Unprecedented criticism of

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5/12/89

Mark –

per our telephone conversation –

hope to see you to talk one day soon –

SWS

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the past has appeared.[2] Communist Party Chief Mikhail Gorbachev has acknowledged an economic crisis of well-nigh catastrophic proportions in the Soviet Union, and promised a revolutionary approach to its resolution. He has gone beyond the traditional denunciation of "class enemies" in identifying systemic stagnation and pervasive public lethargy as the core of that crisis.

Foreigners have been welcomed in the Soviet Union as at no time since World War II, perhaps not since the period of Lenin's New Economic Policy (NEP) in the 1920s. Soviet spokesmen have admitted backwardness in political as well as economic sectors and invited Western cooperation in mutually beneficial programs to improve their benighted society. On the foreign policy front, Gorbachev not only has opened a new detente vis-a-vis the West, but dramatized it with a dazzling campaign of personal diplomacy and unilateral concessions in disarmament that have been enthusiastically received by Western publics, particularly in Western Europe.

To many Western intellectuals, Gorbachev's drive for reforms and his "new thinking" in foreign policy beckon with the fulfillment of a hope that has endured virtually since the Bolshevik takeover in 1917 — namely, that the system imposed by Lenin might at last be assuming a "human face," and that its regime is shedding age-old revolutionary aims enroute to becoming a "responsible" member of the international community. For these observers, and they range from historian-diplomat George F. Kennan[3] to journalists like the economics columnist Hobart Rowen of the *Washington Post*,[4] the message for the West is that it must "help" Gorbachev in his excrutiatingly difficult reform experiment. Not to do so, we are told, could result in the failure of Gorbachev's "revolution from above"[5] and a return to the Soviet system of tryanny at home and belligerence abroad.

If this is, indeed, an option for Western policy — and there is increasing pressure on U.S. leadership to adopt it — how do we go about assaying both its validity and prudence amid the avalanche of reports from the Soviet Union? Is the fundamental nature of the Soviet regime really changing? Is history repeating itself: may these not be like previous "reforms" which turned out to be only adjustments in internal totalitarian controls and efforts to "shake life" into a lumbering system, along with merely tactical adaptations in the global Soviet offensive?[6] Should we help Gorbachev? Indeed, how might we do so, were that desirable?

Framework for Analysis

Our speculation can be reduced basically to four categories:

1. Who is Gorbachev, and what can we deduce about his motivations? Given the still highly centralized power structure in the USSR, the leadership personality factor remains a significant one.

2. What are Gorbachev's possibilities? That is, after defining *perestroika* and *glasnost* in Soviet terms, what are the odds for success or failure of his reforms?

3. Most important for the "help Gorbachev" option, what is behind his "new thinking" offensive vis-a-vis the West? Is it a desperate cry for assistance in propping up a degenerating system? Is it a genuine retrenchment of Soviet global power and objectives in behest of "building socialism [however redefined from Stalin's days] in one country"? Or does it reflect a strategy designed to bridge the Soviet Union's weaknesses with its historic objectives in the world-at-large?

4. Finally, if Gorbachev personally were to "fail," what would be the likely options for those who succeeded him in Soviet leadership? Failure, of course, would have to be defined in Soviet, not Western, terms. Hence we have completed the circle back to the questions of the leadership's motivations as well as Gorbachev's actions.

There is some prior "homework" that any such assessment requires. We need to invoke two basic sets of historical memories. The most obvious, perhaps, but the one most often lost sight of in the optimism generated by present events, concerns the past nature of the Soviet regime. John Dziak has perhaps put it best when he characterized the Soviet Union and its regime as "the counter-intelligence state."[7] The communists, building on Tsarist traditions, have devoted more time, energy and resources than any other regime in history to presenting a false reality to their own people and to the outside world. *Glasnost* notwithstanding, there is little evidence that deception as an ingrained method of rulership and its outward projection has been seriously eroded.[8]

That is not to consign everything that is said or observed in Gorbachev's Soviet Union to conspiracy, disinformation or the "Potemkin Village" syndrome, nor to minimize the genuine confusion in the wake of his reform drive. But we must never lose sight of the fact that Gorbachev springs from the heart of the Soviet security apparatus, and as such expresses its sophisticated view of the inadequacies of the system at the same time that he defends its basic premises.

A second and admittedly more ambiguous assignment of historical "homework" concerns the Soviet system's economic relations with the West. Unless we view all new economic data emanating from Moscow as disinformation, much of what has been assumed in the past concerning the Soviet economy must now be reevaluated.[9] One clear implication is that conventional wisdom has long underestimated the extent to which the Soviets have been economically dependent on the West — not only on imported Western technology, but Western trade[10] and capital transfers.[11]

Current data aside, empirical hindsight to the dismal record of Soviet attempts to graft their economic system onto other societies, many of them more developed than had been Tsarist Russia, confirms that stagnation is endemic to the Soviet system.[12] One can argue that the Soviet Union, ever since 1917, has limped through cyclical economic crises which were obscured behind the high walls around the system. Indeed, a strong case can be lodged for the proposition that the Soviet economy has survived thus far thanks largely to recurrent "transfusions" from the West.

The effect of these "transfusions" has been underestimated in large part because Western observers have been beguiled by another part of the "Potemkin Village" — in this case, Moscow's steady propaganda regarding the autarchic nature of the Soviet economy. If Stalin contended that he was "building socialism in one country," if the sacrifices were enormous but the results substantial, was one not to conclude that the task had been mastered by the Soviets alone? Furthermore, with no empirical evidence except "cooked" Soviet statistics,[13] it was difficult to gain a picture of the true magnitude of the contributions of Western technology, trade and even finance to the system.[14]

As Antony C. Sutton has demonstrated, the "transfusion" of technology during Lenin's NEP undoubtedly saved the Soviet regime from early collapse.[15] Then in the early 1930s, American machine tools shipments — at times 75 per cent of U.S. exports — and engineers were essential in helping Stalin build "socialism in one country." German-Soviet economic exchanges during the brief period of the Hitler-Stalin Pact helped sustain the Soviets' "forced march to industrialization." The $13 billion (a minimal estimate) of American Lend-Lease and other wartime and postwar deliveries were critical to the rebuilding of the postwar USSR. The boon of dismantled German industry, added to the bounty from the now captive nations of Eastern Europe — particularly Czechoslovakia as a then world-class industrial power — played a crucial role in Soviet economic growth in the 1950s. And shipments of Western equipment during the detente of the 1970s helped the Soviets through another crisis, particularly in ground transport.[16]

Yet to come is the enormous task of winnowing out much of the new information flowing from Moscow.[17] It seems certain to produce a revisionist macroeconomic picture of the Soviet Union as important as the recent recasting of past estimates concerning Soviet resources going into the military.[18]

Roots of the Crisis

The present Soviet economic crisis can thus be seen as only the latest in a series of crises, albeit as the most complex and perhaps deepest in that series. It is clear that arranging the necessary Western transfers of resources is Gorbachev's highest strategic priority, animating much of what he says and does. These two guidelines — the continued play of Soviet traditional arts of deception, and the high priority given to desperately needed transfers from the West — are the framework on which to hang an analysis of *perestroika*.

It may be, as British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher has contended, that "Gorbachev is a man one can do business with." But that "business" could be meaningful only if the West recognizes that we are not dealing with a Western-style reformer or one in the Russian religious tradition. There is no evidence in Gorbachev's background to suggest anything but the apotheosis of a Party *aparatchik* in the Brezhnev era which he so bitterly criticizes.[19] Nor is there any evidence to suggest that we

are dealing with that rare individual who has experienced a "Saul-on-the-road-to-Damascus" conversion.[20] "It cannot be entirely precluded that he is a type of Soviet 'closet liberal,' at least in economics and foreign policy. Human history abounds in oddities, and Gorbachev's 'closet liberalism' could conceivably be one of them" write two Soviet analysts. "[But] ... what we have seen so far is most probably what we are likely to get in the future. Gorbachev is a problem solver, a tenacious competitor and, in the Soviet context, a pragmatist."[21]

That "pragmatism" reflects the knowledge, shared by perhaps a minority of the elite when he took power, that if the trends of the Brezhnev years were to continue, certain catastrophe lies ahead. For, despite whatever advances the Soviets managed in the "global correlation of forces" during the two Brezhnev decades, the long-term outlook for the Soviet economy was grim. Growth was declining. Hidden inflation was rising along with a runaway budget. The technological gap with the West was widening. Food production and distribution were worsening. Moscow was forced to borrow in the West to cover the growing Soviet balance-of-payments deficit. There was little to sell abroad except oil and gold, and both commodities were under international price-pressures.

But the root of this crisis is deeper: it lies in the growing failure of that very systemic anomaly that, paradoxically, had enabled the Soviet Union to ascend to superpower status in the global arena. That structure is Moscow's two-compartment economic system, in which the bulk of resources has gone to the military, while the civilian sector has been kept in permanent austerity. Increasingly the Moscow planners have been finding cracks in the bulkhead that was supposed to separate these two economies in a Stalinist model. A telling example is in the degeneration of health facilities in the Soviet Union to a dangerous level, with the consequence of lowered longevity for men and rising infant mortality. Public health affects the entire manpower pool and thus breaks down the theoretical separation of the military and civilian sectors, even in a totalitarian society.[22] More generally, over time it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to insulate the military establishment from rampant malaise in the civilian sector — from shortages in consumer goods paralleling those in the worst years after World War II, a plunging standard of living, increased corruption in every aspect of the society, and growing disparities and frictions among regional and ethnic populations.

Especially since the Soviets have been so remarkably successful in masking defects and failures in the military, one can only speculate about the extent to which the corrosives of public lethargy, corruption and other societal ills have seeped into the Soviet military-industrial machine itself, notwithstanding its privileged status. What does seem clear is that this military-industrial machine, with or without those debilitations, confronts the daunting challenge of what is acknowledged as a technological "revolution in military affairs." Probably uppermost in that challenge, literally as well as figuratively, is the dimension of space warfare. James M. McConnell has made the persuasive, if circumstantial, case that the internal debate in Moscow that culminated in Gorbachev's *perestroika* was triggered by President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative, which directly confronted the men in the Kremlin not only with a new round of technological competition with the United States, but also with a foreboding picture of the technological demands on superpower into the Twenty-First Century.[23]

All of these and other factors account for an unprecedented Party debate over "revolutionary" economic changes, probably the most intense and fundamental since the 1920s. Perhaps it is precisely this parallel that prompts Gorbachev to speak often about a return to "Leninist principles." Gorbachev has other motives for invoking the ghost of Lenin, including the obvious ritual imperative of conferring legitimacy on his regime. Yet, there may be as well some more specific and personal reasons why Gorbachev would want to identify with the founder of the Soviet state. More than any of the other figures in the iconography of communism, Lenin symbolizes the risk-taker, the gambler prepared to wager everything on wresting and preserving power — the ultimate tactician willing to execute 180-degree turns in order to maintain the system and that power. It is significant that Gorbachev has referred specifically to Lenin's advocacy of a separate peace with Imperial Germany in World War I, which was opposed by virtually all the other Bolshevik leaders, "because he was guided by vital, not immediate, interest, the interest of the working class as a whole, of the revolution,

and the future of socialism."[24] And it was Lenin who, near death, sanctioned a swing away from what was later to be labeled, apologetically, "war communism" — in reality, the application of utopian socialist concepts to what remained of the Tsarist economy.

Cultural Barriers to Success

It has become almost a cliche to posit that the barriers to Gorbachev's *perestroika* are enormous. Some aspects of the problem would be difficult to delineate even in a Western context where detailed information is readily available and where there is no deliberate disinformation.

Not the least of these barriers springs from a Russian economic history which antedates the Soviet experiment — a history marked by the dearth of an entrepreneurial tradition. Capitalism came to Russia — if, indeed, it came at all in its West European forms — very late and under the dominance of foreign merchants and investors. On the eve of the Revolution a third of Russia's industrial investment and a half of the bank capital were of foreign origin.[25] Richard Pipes writes: "The result of technological innovation was a peculiar blend of modern technology imported from the West and servile labor inherited from Muscovy, a mixture which contradicted the 19th Century belief that industrialism and bondage were incompatible."[26] That cultural heritage, which 70 years of communism have only intensified, is what Gorbachev must overcome.

There are other legacies. Nowhere do the dilemmas confronting Gorbachev's reforms appear more acute than in agriculture — not only because the food shortage has grown more critical in Soviet cities but also because grain imports are an increasing burden on the already overtaxed ability to earn foreign exchange. The U.S. Department of Agriculture predicts that the Soviets will purchase some 23 million tons of corn and other coarse grains in the year ending July 1989, making up for a smaller-than-usual grain harvest in 1987–1988.

The "agro-conundrum" has proved intractable for generations of communist leadership. Western experts have seen the problem as primarily one of science and ideology — scientific in the need for new seed varieties, fertilizers, insecticides, mechanization, etc., all products of capital-intensive research and development, and ideological in the sense that the huge state farms do not perform adequately and should be abandoned.[27] But even if Gorbachev wins the ideological battle, it is increasingly apparent that the rural population is far from eager to take up the cudgels for a self-supporting and risk-taking agriculture.

Increasingly Western observers believe that there is another cultural problem more difficult of solution: the legacy of the incredible slaughter of Russian and Ukrainian peasantry — first during the Civil War of the 1920s, then in the famines before and after Stalin's anti-kulak campaign and forced collectivization, followed by the killings during the German invasion of World War II and the guerrilla combat that accompanied it. The demoralization of rural society is nowhere more in evidence than in the black soil belt of Soviet Europe, where agricultural productivity should be at its highest.[28]

There are myriad additional cultural factors equally difficult to quantify. Thus, for example, the lower birthrate and labor shortages in European Russia, as opposed to the higher birthrates and abundance of manpower in Moslem Central Asia, present a continuing dilemma. Central Asians, often without the Russian language, are largely unwilling to emigrate to areas where industry is located, but they are providing an increasing percentage of soldiers for the Soviet Armed Forces.[29] Migration from Siberia, where most untapped natural resources are located, may no longer be greater than migration into the region, as it was during most of the post-World War II period.[30] But older communities in Siberia are still losing population. And the continuing rapid turnover of able-bodied workers who absorb the costly subsidies to Siberia, but remain only two or three years before returning to Soviet Europe, is expensive and inefficient.

Squaring the Circle

Gorbachev's answer — and it must be noted that his announced specific goals and targets have fluctuated widely since he first publicly unveiled *perestroika* in 1985[31] — appears to be what some braver communist ideologues have called "market socialism." As Vadim Medvedev put it, shortly after he was promoted last fall to chief ideologue in the Politburo replacing Gorbachev's arch-competitor Ligachev: "The market in our present day circumstances is an

indispensable means of flexibly regulating production with growing and ever-changing social need. Until recent times, the entire complexity and multidimensional nature of the processes of socialist construction were reduced to the idea of developing socialist property — with a simultaneous artificial restriction on cooperative and personal ownership."[33]

But there is a basic contradiction so long as planning in the communist state remains an apparatus for allocating physical resources — as, for example, the Hungarians, under much better conditions, have found out in the past decade.[34] An emigre agronomist writes: "The planning system inherited by Mikhail Gorbachev at the time of his accession to power in March 1985 is the same basic two-tiered system with two main functional subsystems — one to plan output and the other to distribute productive resources — that had existed for decades."[35]

When more radical reformers associated with Gorbachev propose to abolish the whole system, they are met with the firm opposition of the bureaucracy and the conservative ideologues. In 1987 the plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union accepted a much more compromised line of "reform." Professor Nikolai Petrakov, Deputy Director of the Soviet Institute of Economics and Mathematics, told a recent Moscow meeting of the International Economic Association that the proposed price reforms were simply a repetition of "the old management," and that supply and demand still would not be allowed to determine prices.[36]

A Perestroika *Report-Card*

In assaying Gorbachev's possibilities of success from the welter of contradictory statements and various decrees, we can infer some broad objectives. The following is a report-card on *perestroika* thus far in the light of those objectives:

1. Light and consumer industry was to be given relative freedom to determine what it would produce, how it would produce it and how it would be distributed. Four years later in 1989, the lines are longer, there is rationing of meat and dairy products in a third of the Russian Republic (more than 50 per cent of the population), sugar rationing has been imposed in Moscow and inflation is rising. The population is promised no relief until at least 1994.[38]

2. An effort has been made to harness the notoriously successful activities of the black market, labeling them "cooperatives" in order to remove their stigma. Not only has Gorbachev met resistance from the Party orthodox, but the marginal success of these new "cooperatives" has largely had the consequence of enhancing the higher living standards enjoyed by the *nomenklatura* in restaurants, coffee shops, automobile repairs, etc., adding to the general public resentment.

3. An anti-corruption campaign was launched to increase efficiency. In reality, it has been used successfully to replace large numbers of Brezhnev-era bureaucrats. This purge has been the most rapid since Stalin's day, but it has already included some Gorbachev appointees as well. Still, the campaign particularly against income from "moonlighting" almost brought peasant markets to a virtual standstill by mid-1986 and had to be toned down,[37] as was the anti-vodka campaign, which reaped bitter resentment among the populace, along with a sharp rise in illicit liquor-production and a sugar shortage.

4. Self-financing for enterprises *(khozraschet)* is perhaps the most ambitious of Gorbachev's attempted innovations: it sets out to end the virtual unlimited funding deficits of the state-owned enterprises, which have spurred runaway inflation. According to all indications, this reform has thus far been a total failure: managers continue blithely to produce what they deem "necessary for balancing the economy." That failure is, at least in part, the inevitable result of the postponement into the indefinite future of a real price-reform, the elimination of subsidies, etc.[39]

5. Although the Western press has reported that industrial capacity and resources from the Soviet military-industrial sector are being diverted to consumer goods, there is little evidence to substantiate such a shift.[39] Soviet military factories have produced consumer products in the past, and continue to do so.[40] Yet, any reallocation of resources from military to civilian production runs up against the very inflexibilities of the Soviet system that *perestroika* is supposed to redress.

Those are some of the salient entries in a report-card on *perestroika* thus far. More generally, one must go along with the conclusion reached by two analysts after an exhaustive study of the Gorbachev years: "In the light of

Gorbachev's performance in power, his biography, and the nature of the Soviet political system, the overwhelming evidence argues that he has no desire to change the system through any fundamental reform and that he is merely seeking ways of making the existing system work more effectively."[41] Or, as *The Economist* put it recently: "Each change of course makes it that much harder for Mr. Gorbachev to persuade Russians to take his policies seriously. It also becomes harder to detect a coherent set of ideas behind the economic reforms, let alone to know quite where they are heading."[42]

Is There a Strategy Behind the Confusion?

Looking at Gorbachev, his background, his ascent to power and the report-card on his *perestroika* thus far, it is tempting to draw a one-dimensional portrait of the complete pragmatist and tactician. That portrait would show a man who has reached the top without the benefit of the power base that in the past insured victory in the ruthless struggles for leadership succession, from Khrushchev to Andropov. Zbigniew Brzezinski has described Gorbachev as the "consensus candidate" of a younger generation of *aparatchiki* sensitive to the failings of the system and chafing under the weight of the "old guard" who refused to pass power and responsibilities downward in the system.[43]

Having thus scaled the pinnacle, the "consensus candidate" must cast about in establishing and consolidating his position. He institutes the drive for reforms in the system demanded by the "generation" that provides his only real support. Yet, he knows that it will take years for these reforms to make an appreciable impact on the system — if indeed, they will succeed at all. In the meantime, his all-absorbing concern is to preserve himself in power. Therefore, he manipulates his reform drive in two principal ways: First, he uses it, in the tradition of all previous successors to power, to weaken, discredit and eliminate real and potential enemies, particularly the privileged holdovers from the previous regime — ergo, the "anti-corruption" campaign aimed at the "Brezhnevites." Beyond that, he exploits "reform" to sow general confusion, shifting his position this way and that way — in the analogy of a "broken-field runner" in American football shaking off would-be tacklers — while consolidating his personal power.

There is a more ennobling image of "Gorbachev, the ultimate tactician" — one probably more widespread among Western observers. This shows Gorbachev as a man who has recognized the desperate ills of the Soviet system, has discerned the solutions to those ills, and will spare no tactics or risks (including his personal survival in power) in bringing those solutions about.

Either one of those portraits of Gorbachev as the ultimate pragmatist and tactician may be persuasive and/or attractive — to the extent that they describe a politician in the Western mold. But that is precisely the point: the images contradict everything we know about the Soviet system and its leadership selection.

First of all, it is difficult at best to conceive of a "consensus candidate" for the position of Soviet dictator, implying as this does some sort of silent poll of "electors." Candidates for that position climb the rungs of power, and they survive by dint of power. Secondly, Soviet history shows clearly that competitors for that highest rung may, indeed, employ the full gamut of tactics and flexible positions to reach it. Once having reached the pinnacle, however, the task of the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is to establish a programmatic strategy — in keeping with the time-honored goals of the communist system.

In this crucial respect, what contradicts the image of Gorbachev as the "ultimate pragmatist and tactician" may be not so much his domestic reforms as the dazzling sweep of his "new thinking" in Soviet defense and foreign policy. Unless we revamp completely our view of the interactions of the "constituencies" in Soviet defense and foreign policy, we have to assume that there is a larger strategic design — one that has persuaded key elements to fall in line with Gorbachev's sweeping innovations in the foreign and defense realm.

What could be the outline of such a Gorbachev strategy that has gained the support of major elements in the Soviet power-structure, including the military? The critical requirement for the sagging Soviet economy — its military sectors included — is to harness a steady source of technological transfusions from abroad. The logical target is the area that has always been the prized target of Russian, and then Soviet, hegemonial aspirations: namely,

Western Europe. What seems to lie behind Gorbachev's propagated theme of a "common European house" is a revised hegemonial design that looks not to conquest, nor to the direct assertion of intimidating power (although that may ultimately come into play), but to a political-economic offensive with the objective of turning Europe into an economic tributary of the Soviet Union. That objective is to be pursued at the cost of other global Soviet commitments and with all the political and psychological means available, including sweeping schemes for disarmament.

More specifically, building a series of concentric circles of "reform" and "limited freedom" in the Soviet empire from its heartland toward Western Europe, Gorbachev hopes to exploit the yield of whatever economic progress can be stimulated in that region, while reducing the costs of empire. But the ultimate aim is to use the region as a key to unlock fully the gates of the West European Economic Community as it moves away from tight military-political alliance with the United States toward a more autarkical political-economic entity.

The Role of the Baltic Republics

If we postulate such a Gorbachev grand design, current developments in the Baltic Republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania can be seen in a new light. In examining events there, the question immediately arises: How can Moscow tolerate the level of dissidence that has risen in that area? Are not the widely publicized demands in the Baltic Republics, not only for autonomy but in some instances for outright independence, stoking the fires of nationalist unrest elsewhere in the Soviet Union? Could not those flames leap, for example, into the huge Ukraine, with its history of explosive nationalism? Why does Moscow permit it?

Weight must be given to the very real economic difference between the Baltic region and most of the rest of the Soviet Union. Standards of living and productivity remain higher, even after the depredations of mass deportations and post-World War II emigration. The five million people in the three former independent states have sophisticated traditions of agriculture and trading going back to Medieval times — traditions rarely encountered elsewhere in the Soviet empire.

Gorbachev needs to harness the creative energy that exists in the Baltics at whatever levels for his *perestroika*. Only political concessions to Baltic nationalism can hope to produce that result. In a recent Estonian article on economic problems, the writers contend: "A competent opinion on this topic *[perestroika]* of the recently elected Secretary of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee, sociologist Mikk Titma: 'For Western entrepreneurs, the Estonian market is of no interest. For them, entering the capacious all-union market with us as intermediaries is lucrative. The time is near when all nations in our country will become aware even more profoundly that only within the Union of Socialist Republics do we represent a superpower with which it is profitable for other countries to do business.'"[44] To motivate Baltic workers and stimulate entrepreneurs — but also in order to provide the atmosphere necessary for Finnish, Swedish and German investors to join a Soviet effort for greater productivity, Gorbachev must make concessions to Baltic nationalism, notwithstanding the dangerous implications.[45]

Nor is this effort without historical precedent. When Lenin turned toward foreign private initiative during the NEP, "the emphasis was on concessions to Western entrepreneurs," writes Antony C. Sutton in his monumental work on Western technology transfer. "The penetration of early Soviet industry by Western companies and individuals was remarkable. Western technical directors, consulting engineers, and independent entrepreneurs were commmon in the Soviet Union."[46] Those concessions relied disproportionately on the then-newly independent Baltic states, either as sites for industrial activity or as intermediaries in transferring Western goods and technology.

Another way of expressing the configuration of this problem is that the Soviets have decided to make the Baltic Republics their version of the Communist Chinese "foreign economic zones." Those areas are adjacent to ports where socialist economics are abandoned in favor of foreign entrepreneurs using Chinese labor and partners, operating much as they would in so-called free ports around the world. Foreign investors and their technology can be attracted by special incentives, not the least among them skilled labor forces more resembling those of the West. In order to effect a similar development, however, Moscow must

lend authenticity to the rhetoric of decentralization and, at least to some extent, meet nationalist demands.

"A Common European House"

The postulated strategic design of Gorbachev, extended into Eastern and Central Europe, would feature a belt of states still "socialist" and with strong economic and military-political ties to Moscow, but with graduations of "liberalization." These "reformed communist" states would be used in "bait-and-switch" tactics to enlist Western economic aid and help in the drawing down of NATO's defenses against a still substantial Soviet military superiority.

One fulcrum of the new strategy is in the legacy of the Hapsburg Empire. In the summer of 1988, the Austrians, after three decades of nervously ultracorrect adherence to the neutrality provisions of the 1955 Austrian State Treaty, began to debate the possibility of entry into the European Common Market. Austrian politicans, with their healthy fear of Soviet power and their long-standing economic ties to the Eastern Bloc, scarcely would have ventured into such deep waters without at least tacit Soviet permission.[47] Meanwhile, everything but gypsies and violins are being brought out to fan the embers of the centuries-old Vienna-Budapest connection. After more than a decade of its own "goulash communism," and despite heavy borrowing from Western banks and shifting almost half of its trade to the West, Budapest has failed at economic takeoff. The much publicized Hungarian miracle reflects only a comparative prosperity relative to its communist neighbors. Hungary now desperately needs Austria (and Western financial resources through Vienna) to underwrite undertakings like a Danube hydroelectric project, and a joint 1995 world's fair — along with the constant swarms of Austrian tourists — to sustain its relatively higher Bloc living standards.

Meanwhile, an Austria inside the EEC would be a pipeline for Hungary (and the Soviet Union) to Western Europe's markets. On the political-military plane, a neutral Austria would add its voice to existing forces within the EEC to block any future effort to provide the Economic Community with a defense and security dimension.

The recent tenuous agreement between Solidarity and the Polish regime bodes to open for Moscow another indirect funnel to the West, while easing the burden of empire. And although the period of Soviet gross drain on Poland and the other European satellites may be over, a Poland refinanced by Western capital — and that is exactly what the Bush Administration appears to be considering[48] — could become an important asset in revamping trading within COMECON, a significant announced goal of Soviet *perestroika*.

While the German Democratic Republic seems to be holding out against Gorbachev's *glasnost* reforms, East German Communist Party chieftain Erich Honecker could well make the argument that he has already incorporated elements of *perestroika* in the relatively efficient East German vertical monopolies. Furthermore, Honecker has advantages no other communist state enjoys: the "intra-German" trade provides Pankow not only with West German financing but also backdoor-access to the Common Market. West German payments — ranging from buying the exit of elderly East German pensioners and "ecological subsidies" to financing and building a new autobahn from Hamburg and a new railroad from Hanover to Berlin — give the Pankow regime an enormous cushion in foreign exchange and revenue. Yet despite all this, the technological gap between the East Germans and their West German neighbors is widening, and their terms of trade with the West are worsening.[49] All this suggests that Honecker, too, or his successor will be forced to try to find a way around the Wall in seeking an even greater transfer of Western technology, capital and trade.

Western Responses

The concept of an Eastern and Central Europe still communist and basically still a part of the Soviet system, but with economic resuscitation from the West, already is being met halfway by elite opinion in the West. A new mood seems to have overtaken even conservative Western strategists and commentators, expressed in urgings that we "help" Gorbachev's ostensible goals in Eastern and Central Europe as well as his *perestroika* in the Soviet Union. For it is in Eastern and Central Europe, it is argued, where the greatest threat to peace and stability lies as Soviet control weakens. Thus, a Czech emigre has written: "The West must

successfully address the new divide in Central Europe and help reformers prove that democracy and a free market are preconditions for a functioning economy and productive relations with the West. This will make traditional communism virtually irrelevant. Otherwise, it is reformers, opposition forces and the West who will suffer a loss of prestige and influence, while conservative communists regroup and fight back with vigor."[80]

In West Germany, a chorus of important voices is advocating economic aid for Gorbachev's *perestroika* in order to purchase an improvement in relations between the two Germanies and a purported new stability and neutrality in Central Europe.[81] There was the remarkable spectacle in 1987 of Franz Josef Strauss, the late Bavarian conservative leader, successfully negotiating a major loan to the East German regime to finance West German exports, with the *quid pro quo* of an easing of the situation on the intra-German border (already betrayed in a spate of shootings and killings along the Berlin Wall in March 1989).

In April 1989 a Trilateral Commission report by Valery Giscard d'Estaing, Yasuhiro Nakasone and Henry A. Kissinger argued: "... [A] posture of delayed and uncoordinated reaction to Soviet initiatives would enable the Kremlin to define the East-West agenda and serve primarily Soviet interests."[82] The report continued: "Mr. Gorbachev's phrase, 'a common European house,' ignores the fundamental differences between Western Europe, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.... The countries of Central and Eastern Europe have a special character.... For these countries, it is therefore important *to devise a category of association with the European Community based on Article 238 of the Treaty of Rome* [emphasis added]. This kind of association should be regarded as a new type of relationship adapted to the special circumstances of the countries concerned."

In a parallel proposal made directly to those conducting the Bush Administration's review of foreign policy strategies, according to the *New York Times*, Kissinger's "basic concept of the new arrangement would be for Moscow to loosen its hold over the region in exchange for a pledge by the United States and its Western allies not to exploit the new environment in a way that threatens the Soviet Union."[83] This leak of Dr. Kissinger's proposal was reinforced immediately by the newly installed Hungarian Communist Party chief (on his return from an interview with Gorbachev in Moscow): "Analyzing the historical lessons of 1956 [the invasion of Hungary by Soviet troops] and 1968 [the invasion of Czechoslovakia] Mikhail Gorbachev said that there must be maximum guarantees today that outside force should not be used to resolve the internal affairs of socialist countries."[84]

Gorbachev is exploiting these Western hopes with a marriage of economic necessity and geopolitical guile. The Soviet regime is using its own refurbished image as moderate and reformist to enlist Western aid to *perestroika* and to the unsettled satellite empire. Beyond that, through the deceptive construction of a "common European house" the Soviets would take a long stride toward the dismantling of NATO's defenses, Western Europe's progressive separation from the United States, and its ultimate transformation into an economic tributary of the Soviet Union.

If Gorbachev Fails

Our opening framework for analysis included a final question: If Gorbachev were to fail, what would be the likely options for those who succeeded him in Soviet leadership? That question can be given short shrift because it takes us into an immense morass of speculation that even the most incisive — and prescient — observer of the Soviet scene cannot hope to divine with any degree of confidence.

Perhaps the most remarkable accomplishment of Gorbachev — which already ensures him a place in history — is his illumination of a profound systemic crisis in the Soviet Union. Discretion tells us that the longer-range ramifications of that crisis can be exaggerated, especially in Western perceptions. The highest defector to leave the Soviet Union since World War II has given us the following warning:

> There is no doubt that the USSR is experiencing serious domestic and other difficulties, but it has overcome worse troubles in the past. It has both tremendous natural wealth and vast human resources. In their ability to withstand centuries — not decades — of hardship and privation and yet persevere, the Soviet people are unmatched by any nation on earth, with the possible ex-

ception of the Chinese. The West, therefore, should not delude itself by focusing its attention exclusively on Soviet flaws and shortcomings.... The Soviet Union neither will reshape itself into a free-enterprise society nor will it soon disintegrate.[55]

Still, if there is a minimal consensus behind Gorbachev in the *aparat*, it is in the recognition of the existence of that crisis. The (ostensible) opposition — from the "left" and from the "right" — appears to target the nature of his reforms, their speed and his tactics. That opposition might yet overcome him. "Alas, the new gloom about Mr. Gorbachev goes further," writes *The Economist*. "Russia's economic mess may be too deep to scramble out of. The sorts of reforms that are needed are unacceptable, if not yet to Mr. Gorbachev and his narrow circle of close supporters, then increasingly to a skeptical near-majority in the Communist Party's Politburo and a (probably overwhelming) majority in the Party as a whole.... The deeper he gets into reform, the stiffer the opposition and the greater chance that he will wake up one morning out of a job — or else throw up his hands and resign."[56]

Yet, if that transpires, given the reality of the crisis, would or could a successor regime undertake a radical change in direction? That question applies particularly to the unfolding Gorbachev strategic design described above and to a solution of the fundamental problem: a Soviet technological base that, without replenishment from the outside, can sustain neither a functioning economy nor, in the longer run, a credible claim to world power.

What all this suggests is that there should be less concern in the West about what would happen if Gorbachev were to fail, and more concern — especially in Western Europe — about the implications of his succeeding.

NOTES

1. Space does not permit a discussion of the enormously complex background that dictated Western attitudes in each of these rather arbitrary demarcations I have chosen. However, briefly said: The initial revolution by social democrats and then their Bolshevik successors in imperial Russia found many nonsocialist Western sympathizers, among them President Woodrow Wilson of the U.S. See Lloyd C. Gardner, *A Covenant with Power: American and World Order from Wilson to Reagan* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984). The growing menace of Hitler's Germany, the promise of a new era in the promulgation (ironically, virtually as Stalin's Trials began) of the ultra-liberal 1936 (Stalin) Soviet Constitution convinced the public, particularly left-of-center intellectuals in Europe and America, that common cause could be made with the Soviets against the growing Nazi-fascist threat. See, for example, the interview with Stalin by H.G. Wells, noted 1930s British historian and novelist: "I have never met a man more candid, fair and honest.... No one is afraid of him and everybody trusts him." H.G. Wells, *Marxism and Liberty, an interview* (New York: International Publishing Co., 1935). "Good Old Uncle Joe" was more than a slightly sarcastic slogan in World War II with U.S. leaders as well as the general American public. Eugene Lyons, *Red Decade: The Stalinist Penetration of America*, 1941 (reprinted by Revisionist Press, 1980). And, finally, no one summed up the disappointments of detente so well as Henry A. Kissinger, one of its principal authors: "Under the doctrine of assured destruction, nuclear war became not a military problem but one of engineering. It depended on the theoretical calculations of the amount of economic and industrial damage that one needed to inflict on the other side.... It was a general theory that suffered two drawbacks. One was that the Soviets did not believe it, and the other is that we have not yet bred a race of supermen that can implement it. While we were building assured destruction capabilities, the Soviet Union was building forces for traditional military missions capable of destroying the military forces of the United States." Remarks by the Honorable Henry A. Kissinger, "NATO — the Next Thirty Years," Palais d'Egmont, Brussels, Belgium, September 1, 1979.

2. See for instance a recent interview with S. Bovin, political commentator with *Izvestiya*, entitled "The Basis of the Program is Life Experience" in the Soviet publication *Argumenty I Fakty*, No. 11, March 18-24, 1989. "...I meet with increasing frequency people who already in kindergarten unmasked Stalin's 'personality cult' and revealed 'Khrushchev's voluntarism' when still in first grades at school, and then Brezhnev's and Chernenko's labels when they were in senior grades. Such people, of course, decisively refuse to regard themselves as responsible for the state of the society in which they lived and still do live."

3. "Such differences as remain [between the Soviet Union and the U.S.] are not such that preclude a normal relationship, particularly when leadership on the Russian side is in the hands of a man such as Gorbachev.... What could we, from our side, do to promote the normalization of this [Soviet-U.S.] relationship and to shape its future in a manner commensurate with its positive possibilities? It would seem obvious, to this writer at least, that our first concern should be to remove, insofar as it lies within our power to do so, those features of American policy and practice that have their origins and their continuing rationale in outdated cold war assumptions and lack serious current justification." George F. Kennan, "After the Cold War," *New York Times Magazine*, February 5, 1989.

NOTES *(Continued)*

4. "The real question is whether the Western world is willing to extend a helpful hand in a timely way to Gorbachev in the hope that he means what he says on disarmament and can stay in power.... Let us face it: for the West to respond affirmatively to Gorbachev's initiative is a gamble. He might take the aid he seeks and not deliver on his promises. Or he might want to deliver on his promises and be frustrated by the Red Army generals. Or he might take the help offered by the West, as Pepsico's Donald Kendall has suggested, and still face Herculean problems that will take two generations to solve." Hobart Rowen, "Giving Gorbachev a Hand," *Washington Post*, December 29, 1988.

5. Gorbachev has specifically rejected this term, arguing: "It may seem that our current *perestroika* could be called a 'revolution from above'. True, the *perestroika* drive started on the Communist Party's initiative, and the Party leads it.... It is a distinctive feature and strength of *perestroika* that it is simultaneously a revolution 'from above' and 'from below'." But earlier he wrote: "... the restructuring effort started with the Party and its leadership. We began at the top of the pyramid and went down to its base, as it were." Mikhail Gorbachev, *Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World*, updated edition (New York: Harper & Row, 1988), pp. 41–42.

6. See Seymour Weiss, "U.S.-Soviet Detente: The Collision of Hope and Experience," *Strategic Review*, Winter 1989, pp. 16–24, for an insightful comparison of present events to the Khrushchev period.

7. John J. Dziak, *Chekisty: A History of the KGB* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1988).

8. We have a vast literature, if sometimes forgotten even by many anticommunists over the years, and much of it unknown to younger noncommunists less schooled in the experience of dealing with communist history as it unfolded. In the 1930s and 1940s such men as Eugene Lyons, Isaac Don Levine, Victor Serge, Max Eastman, Arthur Koestler and dozens of others in the West often at great cost to their reputations, and *samizdat* writers in the East often at the risk of their lives, exposed the real conditions inside the Soviet Union. Most of the current "revelations" of the Soviet press add little to that body of fact and opinion. In fact, we have the travesty of the officially permitted Soviet "dissident" press borrowing sometimes whole-hog from such writings. And we have the testament of defectors and emigres that the Soviet people, themselves, always believed far less of the official history than might be imagined by those outside.

9. Vasily Selyunin and Grigory Khanin, "Cunning Figures," *Novyy Mir*, February 1987, pp. 181–201. In this article on statistical methodology the two Russian economists wrote: "The distortion of the product volumes has spread to estimates of productivity and capital and from them to all the accounts figures." The authors conclude on the pessimistic note that a reconstruction of all statistics is inevitable, for without it the "revolutionary" changes in the Soviet economy now being called for by Gorbachev will not be possible.

10. Valdimir Treml, "External Relations of CEMA Countries," *The NATO Colloquium: Soviet Dependence on Foreign Trade* (Brussels: 1983).

11. Judy Shelton, *The Coming Soviet Crash: Gorbachev's Desperate Pursuit of Credit in Western Financial Markets* (New York: The Free Press, 1989).

12. "The Soviet leaders' attempt to reform the system is not inspired by some noble realization that the system is universally poorly regarded abroad, but by strict necessity. They have come to realize what other communists in Yugoslavia, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and China realized earlier — namely, that communism does not work. It would not work at the economic level nor at the level of satisfying ... human needs and liberties. Put all these factors side by side with the rapid growth of technological advance of the Western and modern worlds and you cannot help realizing that communism is a 19th Century relic and a prescription for disaster.... They [the Soviet rulers] realize that Stalinism, the 'command economy' and the conservative bureaucracy have made the system a permanent loser *vis-a-vis* the variously mixed economies of the world." Milovan Djilas, "Djilas on Gorbachev," *Encounter*, November 1988.

13. "Since central planning has allowed the Soviet Union only one factory that makes condoms...poorer working women in Russia's unequal society probably average between four and six abortions in their lives. All of these unnecessary abortions are then counted as part of doctors' gross production, and therefore swell Russia's reported national income. Most Western attempts to translate fictitious communist growth figures into real ones, including one by America's Central Intelligence Agency, have been far too kind to the communists. That has long been known by readers of the mainly mimeographed papers from some fine economists still in Hungary and Poland." *The Economist*, June 25, 1988.

14. "Estimates of total Soviet indebtedness to the West were roughly doubled overnight in May 1984.... The joint report issued by the OECD and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) for loans outstanding as of the end of June 1983 showed that the Soviet Union ranked as the third largest hard-currency debtor in the world, excluding the 16 industrial countries plus Liechtenstein who report to the OECD.... The most astonishing aspect of the report, though, was that the Soviet Union ranked *first* in the world in loans subsidized by Western governments." Shelton, op. cit., p. 121.

15. Antony C. Sutton, *Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development*, 1917–1930, Vol. 1 (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1968).

16. The invasion of Afghanistan was accomplished in part with the use of trucks built at the famous Kama River Truck Factory, a dramatic instance of U.S.-German technological transfer to the Soviets.

17. For example, Selyunin and Kanin, op. cit., referring to the current five-year plan, argue that the basic flaws in Soviet estimates of production, are enormous: "...Upon inspection, industry will not have produced one-fourth of the scheduled additions in physical reality. This is not an assumption. For example, in the last Five-Year Plan, the planned increase in coal production was 54–56 million tons; the actual increase constituted 10 million tons. It was anticipated that the production of rolled ferrous metal would increase 14–17 million tons; in practice, the addition was 5 million tons."

NOTES *(Continued)*

18. Anders Aslund, "How Small is the Soviet National Income?" Hoover-Rand Conference on the Defense Sector in the Soviet Economy (Stanford University, Stanford, CA, March 1988).

19. Indeed, the gossip among emigres and defectors is that Gorbachev, with obviously demonstrable talent and energy, rose to power through the classic route with the security apparatus and by currying favor with Party leaders. He might well be regarded not only as a typical Party *apparatchik* but a quintessential product of the late Stalinist and Brezhnev eras of corruption and stagnation even among the Party cadre. See Vladimir Solovyov and Elena Klepikova, *Behind the High Kremlin Walls* (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1986). "Gorbachev was fortunate to hold office in an area of productive land and kind climate, which made his job that much easier. More important, however, was the fact that his territory enjoyed special care and generous funding from Moscow because of the famous Caucasian mineral springs, around which developed resort towns favored by the elite. The mineral springs became not only an aid to the health of many high-ranking Party and government members but also a foundation of Gorbachev's rising career. Kosygin, Andropov and other Soviet leaders were there periodically for medical treatments and rest. As the local Party boss, Gorbachev had the opportunity to meet them many times and, as the Russians say, *pokazat tovar litsom* — to show himself at his best." Arkady N. Schevchenko, *Breaking with Moscow* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), p. 185.

20. George F. Keenan, in answer to the question of how the Soviet system "which has put such a premium on conformity, on safety, could produce a Gorbachev?" says: "You know, I really cannot explain it. Numbers of us who have known that country for a long time simply stand without an explanation as to how a man with these qualities could have emerged from a provincial party apparatus in the North Caucasus. I have asked that question of people in the Soviet Union. One thing that they said was that you must remember that he was a student of law at Moscow University, and they told me to my surprise, because I had never known it, that the law school had retained certain types of teaching and training, and training also in mannerisms of the law which existed in almost no other place of legal instruction in Russia, and that may have had something to do with it.... I think it is rather a miracle." "MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour," WNET New York, December 21, 1989. Solovyov and Klepikova, op. cit., as well as other sources, suggest the Moscow University Law Faculty in the late Stalin years was a recruiting ground for the security organs. From one of those Communist leaders who did have a real conversion at the cost of power and almost his life, Milovan Djilas of Yugoslavia: "Perhaps in his heart of hearts Gorbachev realizes that the Marxist conception of socialism is a museum piece. We do not know. What we do know is that he behaves as though he believes in the basic soundness of the Soviet system and its reformability through technology, renewed dedication, and the introduction of selective freedoms." Djilas, op. cit.

21. Ilya Zemtsov and John Farrar, *Gorbachev: The Man and the System* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1989), p. 366.

22. See Murray Feshbach, "Soviet Military Health Issues," *Gorbachev's Economic Plans, Study Papers*, U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1987).

23. See James M. McConnell, "SDI, the Soviet Investment Debate and Soviet Military Policy," *Strategic Review*, Winter 1988, pp. 47–62.

24. Gorbachev, *Perestroika*, op. cit., p. 39.

25. Richard Pipes, "The Missing Bourgeoisie," *Russia Under the Old Regime* (New York: Scribner, 1976), Chapter 8, p. 219.

26. Ibid., p. 215.

27. That experience is true in noncommunist societies as well as within the Bloc. See Sol W. Sanders, *Mexico: Chaos on Our Doorstep* (Lanham, MD: Madison Press, Second Edition, 1989).

28. A French intelligence source who claims to have visited 200 kolkozes in recent years told me in a private interview: "The pattern of peasant agriculture has been broken in the Soviet Union. It cannot be reestablished in less than a generation at best. Communist policy has rewarded the worst elements in the rural area. You cannot imagine the backwardness, the moral degradation in the countryside. We have not seen anything like that in Western Europe for hundreds of years." For a view of rural squalor in the 1950s — and it has probably not improved significantly — as seen through the eyes of a young Moscovite, a child of the *nomenklatura*, see Vladimir Sakharov and Umberto Tosi, *High Treason* (New York: Putnam Publishing Group, 1980).

29. See Murray Feshbach, "The Age Structure of Soviet Population: Preliminary Analysis of Unpublished Data," *Soviet Economy*, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1985, pp. 177–193.

30. Zalanskaya, Kalmuk, Khakhulina, "Problemy Sotsial'nogo Razvitiya Sibri I Tuti Resheniya," *Izvestia Sibiriskogo Otdelaniya Academii Nauk SSR, Seriya Ekonomiki Pridkladnoy Sotsiologi*, Vol. 1, No. 1, January 1986.

31. For example, the Central Committee plenum on agriculture in March 1989 abolished the superministry, GOSAGROPROM, which Gorbachev himself had set up only in 1985 as a showcase for *perestroika*.

32. *The Financial Times*, October 6, 1988; *Washington Post*, October 6, 1988.

33. In May 1987 in Moscow, I asked Abel G. Aganbegyan, the famous Gorbachev intimate and the best known of the Novosibirsk revisionist economists, a principal propagandist for *perestroika* abroad, with what mechanism resources would be allocated between the civilian and military economies under *perestroika*. He looked pensive for a moment or two, and then threw his arm up toward the ceiling with: "It would have to be decided above."

34. Valentin Litvin, "On *Perestroika*: Reforming Economic Management," *Problems of Communism*, July-August 1987, pp. 87–98.

35. "Soviet Battle Over Price Changes," *The Financial Times*, March 30, 1989.

36. David Remnick, "Soviet Economic Forecast: Be Patient," *Washington Post*, January 26, 1989.

37. "Go, Go Back, Go Gorbachev," *The Economist*, March 25, 1989.

38. Ibid.

NOTES *(Continued)*

39. "For the next several years the benefits of arms control for Gorbachev, particularly with respect to strategic weapons, are primarily strategic and political, not economic. In terms of potential savings, strategic offensive weapons account for only about 10 per cent of the Soviet military budget and the Soviets already have made the investment necessary for production of their strategic weapons force through the mid-1990s. Only through significant conventional force reductions could Gorbachev begin to realize any major economic benefit and, to a great extent, this would be years in the future." From a talk by Robert M. Gates, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, CIA, before the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Colloquium on Science, Arms Control and National Security, Washington, DC, October 14, 1988.

40. Julian Cooper, "The Civilian Production of the Soviet Defense Industry," a paper presented at the Symposium on Soviet Sciences and Technology, Centre for Russian and East European Studies, Department of Extramural Studies, University of Birmingham, September 24–25, 1984.

41. Zemtsov and Farrar, op. cit., p. 84.

42. *The Economist*, March 25, 1989.

43. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The U.S.-Soviet Relationship: Paradoxes and Prospects," *Strategic Review*, Spring 1987, pp. 11–18.

44. Valeriy Badov and Viktor Shirokov, "Does Narva Need a Customs Checkpoint?" *Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya*, March 2, 1989, English translation in *FBIS Daily Report*, FBIS-SOV-89-052.

45. In Finland in the fall of 1988, I spoke to an official of a Finnish subsidiary of a multinational corporation which had only recently made an investment in a Soviet joint venture. The spokesman said that, frankly, had they had to choose any other place in the Soviet Union than Estonia to make the investment, it would not have been made. I asked if that were because of the affinity of the Finnish and Estonian languages and the geographic proximity and the facility that provided. He said that was a partial answer. But more important, he said, was that they had worked with their partner, a Soviet Estonian government firm, for 30 years and knew their abilities as contrasted with bureaucratic operations in other parts of the Soviet Union.

46. Sutton, op. cit., pp. 168, 171.

47. During a visit to Vienna last October, I found most observers believed that the Russians did, in fact, encourage the proposal.

48. Peter Riddell, "Bush Review Urges Caution on Gorbachev," *The Financial Times*, April 13, 1989.

49. Jan Winiecki, *The Distorted World of Soviet-type Economies* (London: Routledge, 1988). Also *Economic Bulletin, German Institute for Economic Research (DIW)*, April 1989, Vol. 26, No. 2 (English language edition).

50. Milan Svec, "Communist Reformers Need Our Help," *Washington Post*, April 10, 1989.

51. See Sol W. Sanders, "Trying to Understand West Germany's Sovi-Euphoria," *Christian Science Monitor*, November 29, 1988. Horst Empke, *fraktionfuhrer* of the Social Democratic Party in the Bundestag in Bonn, told me in October 1988 during a conversation about his party's position on the Soviet problem: "Yes, you can say there is an alliance between some of the enterprise heads in the private sector and our party's policy on aid to the Soviets. They would like to see government subsidies as a way to renovate and convert to other product lines. We would like to see them [as an instrument of government policy] to help Gorbachev and *perestroika*."

52. "East-West Relations: A Draft Report to the Trilateral Commission," April 1989.

53. Thomas L. Friedman, "Baker, Outlining World View, Assesses Plan for Soviet Bloc," *New York Times*, March 28, 1989.

54. James Blitz (London) and Quentin Peel (Moscow), "Gorbachev Pledges No Interference in East Bloc Countries' Affairs," *The Financial Times*, March 30, 1989.

55. Schevchenko, op. cit., p. 368.

56. *The Economist*, March 11, 1989.

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OPINION

Trying to understand West Germany's Sovi-euphoria

By Sol W. Sanders

THE atavistic fascination with Russia that over the centuries has pulled the Germans into so many misadventures in Eastern Europe is tugging hard at the Federal Republic.

Chancellor Helmut Kohl's recent state visit to Moscow is only the first in a series of tests in the next months of how far Bonn will go to find a new relationship with the Kremlin. At stake is the delicate balance of the Western alliance, caught in the vise of a growing European hope that a new and permanently peaceful relationship can be built with the East and doubts about the ability of the United States to continue to lead the alliance.

A curious phenomenon exists all over Germany: At the working echelons of both government and the private sector, there is great skepticism of Soviet Communist Party boss Mikhail Gorbachev's motivations, pessimism about his chances to succeed, and great caution about any initiatives toward the Soviet Union. But as one mounts in the bureaucracy or toward the board rooms of the corporations, optimism grows, flowering into euphoria.

From F. Wilhelm Christians, former cochairman of the powerful Deutschebank, which led the push for $1.6 billion in new credits for the Soviets: "We have lost our markets in Latin America. We must and can develop new markets in the Soviet Union."

From a prominent Swiss bank economist: "I do not believe my bank should lend to the Soviets for tactical and strategic reasons. But we will. We are a small country, and when the German banks begin to twist our arm, what can we do?"

From a sitting member of the Bundestag for West Berlin: "Maybe there is something that Moscow can do for us on Berlin, if we meet them halfway."

From a working-level employee of one of the largest German companies facing bankruptcy in the Ruhr, "The Soviets cannot pay, and I do not see the possibility of government credits."

In a think tank in Munich, an analyst who has worked on the USSR for most of his career paints a grim picture of the Soviet political economy but sounds optimistic about possible German-Soviet collaboration.

In the Ministry of Defense, a longtime observer acknowledges that despite no evidence that the Soviets have made major cutbacks or changes in military strategy, his new minister went to Moscow with Dr. Kohl ready to make unilateral concessions in disarmament negotiations.

Perhaps it is the little social and grace notes in conversations that are the most disturbing for a visiting American: At a very fashionable cocktail party in Frankfurt, the just retired head of the local branch of one of Germany's largest banks announces he is off to Leningrad for three months. "I want to brush up on my Russian. I was a prisoner of war there during World War II." Then, with unconcealed glee, "When the Russians asked me what I did as a U-boat captain, I told them I sank British and American ships. And they said: 'Good!' And that was when they were supposed to have been your allies!"

One tires of hearing German after German describe how well the two countries know and admire each other, how Lenin said (a retired general tells you) socialism should run like the German railroads, how (from an Austrian businessman) "you Americans have always overestimated them." When this American, following one of these conversations, pointed out that the two peoples had almost destroyed each other in the last two generations, a friend replies, "Ah! but you Americans don't understand that there would not have been a modern German state if the czar hadn't protected Prussia from Napoleon."



TOM HUGHES – STAFF

Helmut Kohl

The inevitable conclusion is that – contrary to the logic of the horrendous Soviet economic problems, which make any expansion of normal trade with the West impossible, and the intensely enigmatic politics of the communist state, which defy any attempt "to help Gorbachev" – Bonn is moving toward a massive new aid program to Moscow.

Even more distressing is the lack of a strategy or even a set of tactics in Western Europe for dealing with the Soviets in this new era of *perestroika* and *glasnost*. As the Germans quietly worry about a Soviet-American negotiation over their heads, there is little to reassure them.

The NATO headquarters in Brussels, led by its first German secrtary-general, has become a citadel of golf and bureaucratic retreat from reality. Washington is paralyzed in the rosy haze of the Reagan sunset. Neither of the US presidential candidates responded in more than clichés to the conundrum of maintaining the sword of deterrence in a Western Europe moving rapidly toward nuclear disarmament yet faced with the Soviets' continuing massive conventional threat. Most believe that the 1992 goal of economic integration of the European Common Market is unrealistic. And it is not only Margaret Thatcher who, while opposing supranationality for the European Community, has no alternative rallying cry for the West Europeans.

Sol W. Sanders, a New York-based free-lance journalist, has just completed a six-week tour of Germany, Scandinavia and Finland, Switzerland and Austria, researching a book on Soviet economic dependence on the West.

How Finland Deals With the Russian Bear

By Sol W. Sanders

FINLAND'S trade with the Soviet Union is dropping sharply – despite the country's post-World War II role as one of Russia's main suppliers in the West.

The decline in trade comes at a time when Finland's burgeoning hi-tech exports would seem to be just what *perestroika* needs. The reasons offer an interesting vignette on the USSR's economic troubles – and a cautionary tale for those optimists in the West who ogle potentially rich Soviet markets.

The Finns, by all accounts, know more about trading with the Soviets than anyone. In the aftermath of World War II – during which Finland had joined Germany as a co-belligerent against the Soviets following their own short and catastrophic winter war to stave off Soviet aggression – Moscow saddled its little northern neighbor with an enormous reparations burden. Helsinki had to come up with $300 million gold dollars worth of goods.

Not only did the Finns pay the bill, but they developed out of it a booming barter trade with Moscow. At its height, this trade constituted 27 percent of Finland's total business abroad.

Today it's another story. The Finns, only 5 million strong with a largely rural and agrarian past, have moved into the big time. Finnish companies include a half dozen world-class multinationals. And Finland's booming (if slightly overheated) economy provides one of the highest living standards in Europe. It is a developmental model – the envy of its Scandinavian neighbors who marvel at its ability to keep the lid on welfare statism. Today Soviet trade is less than 12 percent of Finland's total. The overwhelming bulk of her international trade is with West Germany and other Western nations.

But it is not all peaches and cream. The Finns still depend heavily on exports to the Soviets. Some 70,000 Finns still owe their jobs to these exports, which tend to be labor-intensive. That's down from 140,000 just a few years ago.

But the big problem is that Finland can't find anything to buy in the Soviet Union, other than petroleum, to pay for its exports. A Soviet Lada, a quasi-1950s-Fiat, sells for half the price of a Japanese equivalent in Helsinki. (Joke: "Buy a Lada; you'll have a Fiat in a year when all the parts are replaced.")

Even the creation of a joint refining company with the Soviets, which might have been used to ship petroleum products off to third countries, hasn't helped. And Helsinki is now predicting $14 per barrel oil prices next year, which would drive Soviet exports down by as much as 25 percent from 1988.

Finland can't find anything to buy in the USSR, other than petroleum, to pay for its exports.

But the Soviets will buy almost anything the Finns can sell them – or did, as long as it was on a barter basis that built up huge de facto credits.

The situation came to a head last spring when Finland's tough-minded central bank called a halt to Soviet barter exports. Moscow had run up nearly a $1 billion debt against the Finns, mostly interest-free. The Bank of Finland, obviously, didn't think Finland should finance *perestroika.*

It took most of last year to get a settlement. Under new arrangements, the Finns now will get interest when the permanent trade imbalance goes beyond 100 million in Soviet rubles. And when it goes over 200 million rubles, Helsinki can convert part of it into other currencies. In fact, some of the trade theoretically can now be carried on in FinnMarks, a convertible currency. And the Finns have taken the precaution, just in case there is something to the rumor of a convertible ruble, of insuring themselves against a possible Soviet devaluation.

Still, it won't be easy. The Soviets have failed to respect past limits on the barter imbalance. Only the central bank's blocking of $350 million in back orders forced the Russians into the new settlement after months. The agreement doesn't take effect until 1990, and it isn't entirely clear, in the government announcements, what happens to the accumulated debt.

Nor do the Finns yet know how they are going to balance the trade. Finnish businessmen will tell you, confidentially, that so far *perestroika* has been a disaster. Those I talked with last fall were virtually unanimous in their pessimism. They did not see a solution to Soviet economic problems and the myriad frustrations of doing business there.

One businessman said that his company, in order to preserve its market, would enter into a joint company arrangement. But – and he made a gesture of brushing off his hands – "We will capitalize it at the lowest possible level so that we can walk away from it at any moment."

Over the years, the Finns have taken a bum rap from many Western anticommunists for their relations with the Soviets. The truth is, abandoned by Western allies twice during the winter war in 1939 and again in 1945, they have made the best of living next to the Great Bear, including their commercial relations. "Finlandization" has been bandied about for years as a term for knuckling under to Moscow. But it is a misnomer.

It has been a grueling relationship, one that the Finns did not willingly enter, but they had little option. Entrepreneurs and their chancelleries in the West, on the other hand, do have a choice about how far they get into the bear's den.

■ *Sol W. Sanders, a free-lance writer based in New York, recently toured northern Europe as part of research for a forthcoming book on Soviet dependence on the West.*

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HEADLINE: Secret Weapon At the NSC;
Condoleezza Rice, Breaking Barriers on Bush's Team

BYLINE: Phil McCombs, Washington Post Staff Writer

BODY:

"I'm a nice Southern girl," she says. There's a simplicity in her smile, her trim gray suit, the way her short hair is pulled back and tied behind. But Condoleezza Rice has come a long way from Birmingham, from the parents who cherished her dreams, the segregated school where her teachers chipped in to buy textbooks, the restaurant that suddenly fell silent when her family entered one night to test the 1964 Civil Rights Act.

Now, at 34, Rice has been named director for Soviet and East European affairs on Brent Scowcroft's National Security Council staff. A professor of political science at Stanford, she's considered one of the nation's leading young Sovietologists, respected by many elder statesmen of that specialized calling.

" Condi brings prodigious expertise, both academic and practical, to her position," Scowcroft said in a statement yesterday. "She has a broad intellectual conception of the problems and realities of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe."

Her rise is an American success story with classic elements of pluck, luck and hard work, and also marked by the special perils -- or, in some cases, subtle advantages -- of being a beautiful woman making her professional way in the predominantly male world of superpower politics, nuclear weapons and arms control.

"This is still a very macho game," she says. "It's the last bastion -- right? -- military power?" She smiles and concedes, "I don't mind the shock value at all. You walk into a room -- you get it either here or in the Soviet Union -- and people just don't understand, it doesn't compute somehow. But in the United States, people are getting more accustomed to it. There are more and more women out there on strategic policy issues today."

When sexism surfaces, "it's usually an unintentional comment about women and whether there's enough fiber in them to believe in the use of force. Haven't they heard of Margaret Thatcher, Indira Gandhi, or Cleopatra for that matter?"

Rice knows from a throw-weight. She made an academic specialty of the Soviet military, and has studied the Moscow press -- particularly military journals -- for 15 years. Yet somehow, she rarely fails to surprise.

When Marshall I. Goldman of Harvard's Russian Research Center once attended one of her lectures there on the Soviet military, he was stunned. "I said,

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'Wow, where did she learn all that?' This was very technical stuff, it was stuff I didn't know ... I was very taken with her competence, because she was a female. That's maybe a sexist statement. Military stuff is arcane to begin with -- I don't know of any other woman who's a specialist on that."

After she appeared on ABC News' "Nightline" to analyze Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's arms cuts, two marriage proposals arrived in the mail.

It wasn't unusual.

And after she spoke on nuclear strategy -- in Russian -- to Soviet officials in Moscow last spring, the official Moscow News reported that "men [were] wondering" why, when she "should be busy cooking and driving her admirers mad ... instead she aptly juggles numbers of missiles."

Says Rice diplomatically: "They just have no context for somebody like me."

Her dad, John W. Rice, a retired university administrator, remembers family automobile trips north in the early '60s when there wasn't a hotel between Birmingham and Washington that would accept blacks. One time, when he took a picture of 9-year-old Condoleezza in front of the White House, she told him, "I'm standing in front of the White House now, but one day I'm going to be in it!"

"I was lucky," she says. "I grew up in a nice middle-class black neighborhood where everybody was given piano and ballet lessons, and we had clubs. I actually was in a cotillion."

But she also remembers "the marches, and I remember the church being bombed in Birmingham -- a little girl I'd gone to kindergarten with was killed. I grew up in absolutely segregated schools until I was through the ninth grade ... You don't ever want to forget that there were days in America when you couldn't stay in a hotel, or that my mother, who was absolutely beautiful, had no poll tax imposed on her, while my father had a devil of a time voting."

She remains determinedly upbeat:

"I do believe that in part you shape your sense of well-being, you have control over whether or not you think you have control. Will plays an important part ... I can see pain and suffering, and it makes me unhappy and sad, but I try not to let it be debilitating."

Her parents doted on her. She read music before she read words, and played the piano. Her name was derived from the musical notation con dolcezza -- sweetly. "It was nothing to hear Condi playing Beethoven or Bach at 3 or 4 in the morning," says her father. "It woke us up, but she was an only child. She could do no wrong."

Both parents were educators. Her mother, herself a pianist, was an elementary school teacher, and her father -- who had been a Presbyterian minister -- was named dean of students at Stillman College in Tuscaloosa, Ala. Fascinated by politics and history, he had become a Republican in the late '50s after seeing that "the Democrats weren't anxious for blacks to be part of their party."

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He was a strong influence on his daughter, who, like him, remains a moderate Republican, deeply religious, and hooked on politics and football. "We watched the Kennedy-Nixon debates when I was a 6-year-old," she recalls, "and the coverage of the Cuban missile crisis." Because of the proximity of Cuba, this "had an immediacy for people living in the Southeast ... We were living in the middle of political times, and my father really wanted me to think that politics and history were dramatic and interesting.

"He bought me comic books that were historical ... We discussed everything openly. As a child in the South, to be told you can't go in this or that restaurant without context would have been damaging to your self-concept. My parents wanted me to have a historical context for that, that there's nothing wrong with you, this is a long historical process that's playing out."

And football?

"She knows more about it than any four guys I ever met," says a colonel who worked with her in 1986 when she was studying nuclear strategy for the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a Council on Foreign Relations fellow. "It was awesome. She talked plays, how things went in the games. It was definitely not cocktail conversation."

(Rumors flew around the Pentagon at that time that a bunch of Denver Broncos had pursued her. Rice, who has never been married, confirms she once dated a professional football player, but declines to discuss her social life further.)

Her early education in Birmingham, she says, was thorough even though her school ranked low "on anybody's scale of academic assets. I had extraordinary teachers, all of whom were black, and who spent Tuesday and Thursday nights at my father's church tutoring to make up for what you couldn't learn in school."

By the time the family moved to Denver when she was 15, she had "no trouble" entering a highly regarded white Catholic prep school. "My background had been excellent," she says, "and that was an eye-opener. It can be done in the poorest of schools."

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was a turning point for the family.

"We'd been prepared for it for a long time," she remembers. "There was a real sense of a coming legacy. Two days after the act went through, we went to a restaurant to test it out, and I'll never forget going in and having the whole restaurant kind of stop eating -- and then pausing for a minute, and then going back and eating again, and saying, 'Yeah, that's that!' They managed to serve us, and serve us politely."

Though another time, at a drive-in hamburger joint, they got burgers with no meat -- onions only.

"Progress came in fits and starts."

When she ran into Lynda Johnson Robb at a recent Aspen Institute seminar in Jamaica, Rice told her, " 'I'm part of your father's legacy.' I think she was moved by it."

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John Rice had always assured his daughter that things would be different for her generation. "And as it turned out," she says, "things were different for him, too! He moved to a big, largely white university [the University of Denver, where he was a vice chancellor], and my mother taught in integrated schools."

Her mother Angelena died of cancer in 1985, and only their faith kept father and daughter intact. "I was a little angry at God," says John Rice. But he moved to California to be near Condoleezza, got into community work in the poor area of East Palo Alto and began rebuilding his life. His daughter believes "that you are given talents and instinct and direction through faith, and then you try to use them for the common good if you possibly can."

In her work, this means "issues of war and peace and human values -- what we think of as political issues -- they're bigger than politics. They're about human beings ... Politics is the playing out of human aspirations through governmental structures."

Though Soviet ideologues may never quite grasp it, Rice is "not apologetic" about her patriotism.

"Maybe that's where historical perspective and knowing other political systems helps," she says. "... I don't have rose-colored glasses about the United States or what it still has to achieve. We have to be sure that there isn't another 9-year-old in Birmingham who doesn't have full access ... But I was part of a generation of black people who, at least in their early years, had every expectation that we'd grow up to be half-citizens ... I do see tremendous improvement.

"If you travel abroad, you really do appreciate -- not in an arrogant or chauvinistic way -- what a remarkable place America is. I can see why America is a beacon for people around the world."

Her career as a Sovietologist almost didn't happen.

She'd been a music major until her junior year at the University of Denver, planning to become a concert pianist. But one day, when an adviser was talking about the great musician she would become, she had an epiphany -- realizing it just wasn't in her.

"I started looking around for a major, and I needed one that I could finish quick," she remembers. "I liked politics. I wasn't quite clear on what 'political science' was, but it sounded interesting."

She graduated cum laude at age 19.

Her principal inspiration there was the late Joseph Korbel, a Czechoslovakian-born author and diplomat who was ambassador to Yugoslavia at the time of the Communist coup in 1948. Korbel fled to freedom, and Rice "was so moved and intrigued by the personalization of that experience. The story of leaving everything, making that choice, his foresight in seeing what was going to happen to Czechoslovakia -- he brought politics and history alive for me."

Korbel also had "an encyclopedic knowledge" of Russian and Eastern European affairs, and Rice found that the Soviet Union "just held my attention like nothing else had."

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She read "Darkness at Noon" and her interest deepened. "I think it's the mystery of the system. I've always been attracted to things that were hard to divine, where you had to be part detective, and it was something of a puzzle. I like mystery in stories, and when you're studying the Soviet Union, you're operating a lot in the dark."

She liked the Russian language, too -- its musicality and complexity, the fact that "you can communicate a much wider range of nuance and emotion than in English." Her father remembers how German, French and Spanish were all dull for her, "but as soon as she got into Russian she ... loved it and it became a second language immediately."

After Korbel died in 1977, Rice took a seminar at Denver on security issues in Western Europe from Catherine Kelleher, now head of the Center for International Security Studies at the University of Maryland. Kelleher "captured my imagination because she was so articulate and clear. It's what I try to do in my own teaching -- communicate your own sense of excitement, that you're reading the material because you like it."

Her likes are reflected in her recreational reading, which has a strong focus on World War II and other conflicts -- "what great general made what mistake."

Under Kelleher's guidance, Rice decided to combine her interests in the Soviet Union and security problems, and began studying the Soviet military. Although her initial interest was on the "soft side" -- civilian-military politics -- she soon sharpened her focus.

"I quickly realized," she says, "that it was hard to understand those things without understanding the 'hard' side -- doctrine, strategy and force posture -- and I got to like military-technical details -- ranges and characteristics of missiles, the tactics as well as the strategy of warfare, the types and uses of different kinds of aircraft, the significance of throw-weights."

"She's very respected as a scholar," says Kelleher today. "She has enormous poise and this ability to move very quickly into a new area and to make it her own."

Within a few years, Rice was producing what one academic calls "path-breaking work" on the Soviet military, in particular its organization and the subtleties of the political alliances and infighting among its general officers. Her book, "Uncertain Allegiance: The Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak Army," and scholarly articles such as "The Problem of Elite Cohesion in the Warsaw Pact" and "The Military-Technical Revolution and the General Staff in the Soviet Union" have won her a reputation as someone uniquely positioned to evaluate Soviet progress -- or lack of it -- in implementing Gorbachev's announced changes in military posture.

After getting her PhD from Denver in 1981, Rice signed on with Stanford as an assistant professor and became a popular lecturer whose classes were often oversubscribed.

She also began moving in the fast lane with other academics who tend to rotate in and out of government, making connections at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Aspen Institute and elsewhere.

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One of her new friends was Scowcroft, a national security specialist who had advised presidents Ford, Nixon, Carter and Reagan and who had become codirector of the Aspen Strategy Group, a prestigious 20-member think tank that Rice was invited to join.

She quickly became known, and admired.

If conservatives are apprehensive about her -- and they are -- it's because she's moved in more moderate circles. "Aspen is liberal to moderate," says one conservative political analyst. "She and Scowcroft, they're happy with the international security people at Harvard, at Rand. There's a feeling she's not part of the conservative network."

Rice is regarded by knowledgeable Sovietologists as a cool-headed analyst rather than a "hard-liner" or "soft-liner," terms that tend to fuzz in the era of missile deals and glasnost. "The great division now," says Hoover's Robert Conquest, himself considered to be about as hard-line as you can get, "is between those who have a reasonable understanding of the motivations of the Soviets and those who don't."

Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the Brookings Institution, one of the giants in the field and Rice's tennis buddy at many a far-flung seminar site, thinks she's "on the conservative side in judging Soviet behavior. She doesn't seem to have illusions about the Soviets. On the other hand, she's open to acknowledging changes based on her study of the facts. I don't think she's particularly ideological, so she fits into the general pattern of this administration."

Peter Reddaway, a professor of political science at George Washington University and an expert on Soviet politics, puts it this way: "She hasn't suffered from Gorbophoria, which is an occupational danger among Sovietologists."

When George Bush ran for president, Rice worked occasionally in his campaign critiquing position papers on foreign policy, and she spent a good deal of time working in the successful congressional campaign of Stanford law professor Tom Campbell, also a Republican. Rice has what she calls "an acute sense of the dangers of being isolated in one party in a strong two-party system," and wants to help the Republicans become "a party with a heart" in civil rights matters. But she notes that "it has to be done on both sides -- black America has to be ready to listen." She's not interested in running for office herself, however. When Republican kingmakers in Palo Alto pressed her to run for Congress in 1986, she decided that, as a "strong executive-prerogatives person," she'd feel uncomfortable in Congress.

So when Bush was elected, Rice was ready.

Scowcroft called, and she said yes.

"It wasn't an easy decision," she says, "because I really loved what I was doing as a teacher and I was very happy in California, but I wanted to work for him at what I think is a very critical time."

Actually, she had her choice of jobs in the new administration.

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During a whirlwind visit here in January she saw Scowcroft and was courted by Secretary of State James A. Baker III and then defense secretary-designate John Tower. She put a deposit on an apartment in Northwest Washington, returned to Stanford to pack, and started at the NSC early last month.

"I'm just overwhelmed ... I'm actually buried!" she pronounces cheerfully by phone from her new digs in the West Wing of the White House. " ... Right in the middle of a staff meeting the phone rang and my boss said, ' Condi, it's your mover, he's at a truck stop in Houston.' "

A colleague took her to the president's diplomatic reception her first week in town. She loves the vitality, the politics, the people in fast-track Washington. But the city's murders, the drugs, the torment of young street kids -- these all horrify her. "An educator, that's what I've been," she says. "The answers lie in going back to first principles with our kids."

She doesn't come to Washington pretending to fully understand the momentous changes taking place in East-West relations.

"I think the Soviets are in a lot of uncharted territory, too," she says. "One thing that's clear about the leadership is that it wants the Soviet Union to be as powerful as it possibly can. What's interesting for us is that Gorbachev is very adroit at extending influence through mechanisms that we're not accustomed to seeing."

She's ready for him:

"I am temperamentally conservative, meaning I'm cautious. You don't start unraveling any of the principal strengths of the United States that have gotten us to this point."

As for sexism, she'll undoubtedly continue to wow roomfuls of men.

"I was giving a briefing for the Air Force planners last year in the Pentagon -- one- and two-star generals from all over the country," she recalls, her smile broadening, "and I suddenly looked out at them and thought, 'You know, this is really strange, I am the only woman in this room.' "

She laughs.

"Then I thought, 'Well, that's life!' "

GRAPHIC: PHOTO, SOVIETOLOGIST CONDOLEEZZA RICE READING PRAVDA IN HER WEST WING OFFICE YESTERDAY. LUCIAN PERKINS; PHOTO

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NAMED-PERSONS:
CONDOLEEZZA RICE

ENHANCEMENT:
AGE

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BEWARE A SOVIET COLLAPSE

BY HENRY A. KISSINGER

THAT the crisis of Soviet communism has ended the Cold War is by now axiomatic, but what kind of world is to follow is far from clear.

The dominant view in the West seems to be that the upheavals in the communist world have been caused by and must be managed by Mikhail S. Gorbachev. The presumed conversion of the West's erstwhile adversaries to pluralism and market economics is believed by many to have ended not only the Cold War but history itself.

Such views will leave the democracies — at the moment of their greatest triumph — dangerously irrelevant in the emerging new world.

For the deeper the upheaval of the old order, the more urgent is the task of constructing a new one.

And in the end, the outcome of Gorbachev's revolution is far from clear; it may produce, rather than a linear progression toward democracy, chaos, the replacement of one-party rule by one-man rule and repression, or all three in succession.

■

THE West diminishes both Gorbachev and itself by giving him all the credit for what is happening in the communist world.

Gorbachev's policies did not arise from a blinding flash of insight; like all serious political leaders, he has had to respond to necessity.

Gorbachev is a remarkable personality who deserves great credit for acting courageously to overcome the crisis of his society. But it is the steadfastness of the democracies in resisting communist expansionism over the course of four decades that created the international environment in which he finds himself.

And, internally, three realities have driven the changes in the Soviet Union: the collapse of the economy; the difficulty that mature communist systems have in achieving political legitimacy, and the nationalities problem.

Like the popular Russian dolls, each of these is ensconced within the other. Gorbachev's dilemma is that the ideal solution for each one is to a considerable extent incompatible with the best solution for the others.

The crisis in the Soviet economy is by now familiar, and so are the necessary solutions. Yet no centrally planned economy has ever managed the transition to market economics.

The Soviet Union has so far taken only the most tentative steps in the direction of price reform and the ending of subsidies, two preconditions for the establishment of market economics. China came closest to taking these steps but suffered the catastrophe of Tiananmen Square **largely because economic reform outgrew the Chinese political institutions' tolerance for it.**

To avoid this outcome, Gorbachev is giving top priority to political reform.

He is in a better position than anyone to gauge two heretofore insuperable political obstacles, which are that the Communist Party is institutionally committed to central planning, and that the longer a communist system governs, the more surely it deprives its leadership of the moral authority **to ask sacrifices of its people.**

■

NO Soviet leader has ever retired voluntarily. Nor has the reputation of any Soviet leader other than Lenin survived his own death. A society incapable of generating heroes or even continuity is also not in a position to demand sacrifice.

Gorbachev's political reforms seek to weaken the resistance of the communist bureaucracy by giving him a popular legitimacy. But in Eastern Europe opening up **the Communist Party has proved to be its death knell.**

Democracy requires a belief that the contest of ideas will produce something close to the truth.

By contrast, communists, regarding themselves as the

[redacted]

West must allow Moscow time to get its domestic house in order

repositories of historical truth, consider the very idea of compromise a bourgeois evasion that deflects them from seizing and holding power.

Deprived of the instruments of state power, East European Communist parties, not designed for democratic contest, are disintegrating at the first whiff of open politics.

Because the countries in Eastern Europe had the advantage of a national tradition, the collapse of unpopular Communist parties spurred political cohesion. But disintegration of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is unlikely to have the same result.

For the Soviet Union is an empire, not a national state. Only slightly more than half its population is Russian; *glasnost* has not produced even the hint of an all-Soviet non-Communist party.

The real political contests are being waged inside the Politburo and inside the constituent republics. *Glasnost* tempts the Communist Party in the various republics to become independent of Moscow, a process accelerated by opposing non-Communist parties even more stridently nationalistic.

■

GORBACHEV has shown breathtaking skill in neutralizing potential opposition. But it remains to be seen whether it is possible to carry out a program of reform on the basis of the disarray of the opposition.

Doing somersaults on a high wire inspires more awe than a sense of direction. I believe — unhappily — that the least likely outcome is the linear evolution to pluralistic democracy and market economics on which the West places so much hope.

The relative pluralism now emerging in the Soviet Union may have as its ultimate result a virulent nationalism in the constituent republics and, on the all-Soviet level, the replacement of one-party rule by one-man rule, in effect making Gorbachev the czar.

Once in the possession of the trappings of state power, his course, and even more that of his successor, becomes unpredictable. It could be stagnation, chaos and repression.

There is a need to consider more deeply Gorbachev's role and the West's relationship to him. History will always remember him for having stood aside while Eastern Europe freed itself and for having started the transformation of the Soviet state.

If the Soviet Union continues to reduce the percentage of its gross national product devoted to defense and continues its retreat from far-flung outposts such as Cuba, assistance in speeding the supply of consumer goods and technical help as sketched by Secretary of State James A. Baker and proposed by the Czechoslovakian President Vaclav Havel is surely appropriate.

But in the end Gorbachev's most intractable problems will be beyond the reach of outside powers. Like all revolutionaries, Gorbachev could well be consumed by the process he has started.

Gearing Western policies largely to the desire to "help" Gorbachev would create three points of vulnerability for the West:

- It would tempt Gorbachev to turn his tenure into the principal quid pro quo of diplomacy.
- It would create paralysis in the democracies if he is engulfed by the consequences of his own achievements.
- It would damage the credibility of leaders who have staked too much on a single Soviet personality, however meritorious.

The most worrisome outcomes of the crisis of communism are two sides of the same coin: on the one hand, a return to traditional Great Russian repression of the nationalities; on the other, the disintegration of the Russian empire built up in the 400 years since Ivan the Terrible.

A nationalistic Russia could in time resume the pressures to which imperial Russia subjected all contiguous areas in Europe and Asia for more than 200 years.

A disintegrating Russia could tempt neighboring countries to restore historic ties with their kinsmen or simply to carve up the Soviet Union on the basis of traditional expansionism.

The world has suffered so much at the hands of communist ideology that it has nearly forgotten how uncomfortable a neighbor czarist Russia had been.

Often invaded across a flat plain without natural frontiers, Russia, it is understandable, grew to identify security with pushing out its frontiers as far as possible.

But however understandable, it caused the Russian empire throughout its history to seek to dismantle every power center within its reach: Poland, Turkey, Sweden, the Austro-Hungarian empire, China, India.

Moreover, Russian foreign policy has had a strong missionary streak.

Russia was the driving force first behind the Holy Alliance, among Russia, Prussia and Austria in 1815, and then behind Pan-Slavism, in both cases claiming rights of intervention long before the Brezhnev Doctrine arrived on the scene.

It may turn out to be one of history's jokes that the successors of Lenin will end up holding the Russian state together by the practices of the heirs of Peter the Great.

The nationalism of the smaller Soviet republics has already stimulated a virulent counterpart in the Russian Republic itself, which contains more than half the population. But Russian nationalism has always been repressive and expansionist.

If Gorbachev or his successors choose or are driven to that course they will almost surely collide with the human-rights conviction of the democracies. This in

The dangers of failure: A return to repression at home, aggression abroad

turn will be perceived in Moscow as a threat to the cohesion of the state, rekindling distrust and tension.

■

THE challenge to the foreign policy of the democracies is to use the hiatus in which Moscow has to give priority to its domestic problems and put in place a security system seeking to transcend the historic Russian quest for absolute security, which has meant absolute insecurity for everyone else.

In Europe such a security system should return Soviet armies to national territory as quickly as possible.

The intricate balance of arms-control negotiations along existing military dividing lines obscures the real problem of establishing a realistic political dividing line.

But once Soviet troops are returned to Soviet territory such a system must then also strive for an arrangement that genuinely reduces the Soviet fears of military attack from Europe.

All this must be accomplished while keeping in mind a diametrically opposite danger to the peace of the world: the possibility of a breakup of the Soviet state. The West can have no more of an interest in the disintegration of the Soviet Union than in its expansion.

I would except the Baltic republics. Their annexation, never having been recognized by the West in the heyday of Soviet power, cannot now be accepted in the period of *glasnost* and *perestroika*.

But for the rest, the West must take great care to avoid steps with unforeseeable consequences.

The collapse of authority in a country that possesses tens of thousands of nuclear weapons and scores of nuclear-power plants must be of greatest concern to all humanity.

The problem is so terrifying and so contrary to traditional notions of sovereignty that it has received no systematic attention and requires cogent study.

The nuclear problem aside, the breakup of the Soviet Union would be bound to produce an extraordinary cycle of violence. Like a movie run in reverse, it could play back a brutal two centuries and in the end draw in all surrounding countries whose competition provided the temptation for Soviet expansion in the first place.

■

TO be sure, if Moscow is unable to preserve the Russian state, neither Washington nor the other democracies are in a position to do so.

But the West can practice circumspection, though experience must have taught Moscow that there is a level of repression which jeopardizes the democracies' domestic support for a policy of detente.

Coming to grips with such contradictory prospects will force America to examine categories of thought it has historically rejected: to act not with missionary zeal but as custodian of an equilibrium, and to adjust policies to the fluctuating requirements of a balance of power rather than to fixed legal principles or a doctrine of collective security.

In that sense, the ultimate challenge to U.S. foreign policy is philosophical.

Henry A. Kissinger's analyses of world events appear monthly in The Post.

Center for Strategic & International Studies Conference
The 1990s: Critical Change
1 April 1989

Robert M. Gates
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Gorbachev and Critical Change in the Soviet Union: Implications for the West

It is an honor to speak to this distinguished audience examining critical change in the 1990s. I can think of no more appropriate or timely topic, for we are in a truly extraordinary period. Europe is moving steadily toward greater economic and political integration in 1992. Authoritarian governments from the Philippines and the Republic of Korea in the East to Latin America in the West are giving way to democracy. China is in the midst of a momentous reform program, and, in the Soviet Union, a revolution from above has been launched, albeit with no assurance it will succeed. Capitalism and democracy are ascendant; economic statism and political despotism are in retreat.

There has been a remarkable change in the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union over the past two years, including the signing of the Treaty on Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces. The Soviets have announced a first and important step toward reducing their overwhelming conventional force advantage in Europe. Conventional force reduction negotiations opened last month and negotiations on strategic force reductions will resume in the near future. A Sino-Soviet Summit is scheduled for mid-May. The Soviets have withdrawn from Afghanistan, the Vietnamese may be leaving Cambodia, and a settlement getting the Cubans and South Africans out of Angola has been negotiated. Exhausted, Iraq and Iran have agreed to and are, in the main, observing a ceasefire. Structural change is reshaping international economic relationships in dramatic ways.

Accordingly, critical change in the 1990s is a most appropriate subject. It certainly is a subject with which the Bush Administration has been preoccupied for the last two months. Resisting the siren song of the quick fix and the big headline, we actually are trying to think about the 1990s -- to absorb and understand the many

changes that have taken place in recent years, those that are still underway, and those that are only just above the horizon of the future. Our task, then, is to devise policies that look to the end of the century and beyond. We are working to develop economic, political, military and arms control strategies that are grounded in reality and yet build upon opportunities for constructive, stabilizing change. We see opportunities to expand freedom, to strengthen both peace and security at lower levels of military forces, to enhance economic growth and extend it, and to promote international cooperation on such common problems as terrorism, drugs, the environment, and the spread of chemical and biological weapons and the means to deliver them.

Seizing such opportunities requires preparation and planning. Too often the energies and time of senior officials are consumed day in and day out by the crisis of the moment -- a diplomatic demarche, a newspaper story, a Congressional hearing, a bureaucratic dispute or a multitude of other short-term preoccupations. We in government, as a rule, spend too little time thinking about and planning for the future. We spend too little time reflecting on history and experience; we neglect strategy for tactics.

The Bush Administration is trying to resist this. Accordingly, our reviews of the international setting and our policies are focused on the development of long range strategy. Failure to take stock, to understand, to look ahead, and to plan would ensure failure to seize the opportunities we see now and discern in the future.

This brings me to the Soviet Union. On this subject, more than on any other, there has been speculation about the views of the new administration and directions the President will take. We have heard such nuanced and sophisticated questions as "Should we help Gorbachev" -- and we have resisted the temptation of monosyllabic answers. I expect our Soviet review to be complete very soon. This afternoon, rather than focus prematurely on possible outcomes or specific policies, I want to share with you the framework within which we approach the Soviet-American relationship.

We do live in a time of dramatic change -- change that now has spread to the Soviet Union. The failure of a system of government -- economic, political, social and moral failure -- is a powerful inducement to dramatic departures from the past, to

unprecedented distancing from many of the precepts that have guided the system for so long. It is the self-evident failure of the Soviet system, and the absolute imperative to change it, that form Gorbachev's mandate, are his primary sources of political support, shape his radicalism, and cause us all to wonder if the wheel of history is at last about to turn for that vast empire. Regardless of the substantial odds against him, we take seriously Gorbachev's determination to modernize the Soviet economy. We applaud the measures he has taken to increase openness in the press, to ease restrictions on religion, to take the first faltering steps toward democratization, and to contribute constructively to settling certain international disputes. We welcome his commitment to reduce Soviet conventional forces and to pursue a further relaxation of tensions and arms control. These are all positive steps, and they have led to widespread hope and optimism. We, too, are hopeful.

At the same time, long term policy must not be based on hopes, but on past experience, present realities and future probabilities -- as well as possibilities. Just as I believe we must try to look well into to the future in developing foreign policy, I also advocate looking to the past -- examining the historical record for

insights pertinent to the future. This is especially true with respect to the Soviet Union, where Western views too often are shaped by the latest leadership change, pronouncement or enticing proposal.

Looking back over one's shoulder with respect to the USSR is not for the faint hearted. What we see, above all, is a system of rule that over a seventy year period has brought to the peoples of the old Russian empire suffering on a scale previously unknown in human history. Mentioning this often elicits a reaction similar to a display of bad manners at a dinner party or a dismissive gesture suggesting the irrelevance of this past to our future. Commonly, the horrors of Soviet history are blamed on Stalin, both within and outside of the Soviet Union. Yet, I believe it essential for us today to understand that this record is not confined to the Stalin era alone, was not the doing of a single demented leader, but covers the entirety of Soviet history, and is the product of the very nature of the system itself.

Soviet history did not begin in the Spring of 1985. A brief reminder of the record and of the cycles in that record are useful, even for an audience as well informed as this one.

-- Under Lenin, 10 million people were killed in the civil war from 1918 to 1920, and another 5 million died in the War Communism famine of 1921-22. In 1921, in the midst of catastrophe, Lenin set a precedent for his successors by retreating, falling back to tried and true methods of economic growth -- private markets, small private business, denationalization, and legalization of private trade. By 1923, 83 percent of retail trade had been privatized. Whether the New Economic Policy and associated measures would have endured had Lenin lived is one of those finally unanswerable questions. Regardless, Lenin himself admitted, "We showed quite clearly that we cannot run the economy." Truer and more prophetic words were never spoken. While economic policy might have turned out rather differently, I believe Lenin contemplated no such flexibility in terms of politics -- the controlling monopoly of the Communist party.

Meanwhile, in another precedent important for the future, as early as 1920-21, facing disastrous internal problems, Lenin turned to the West for help, signing trade treaties with Britain,

Norway, Italy and Sweden and obtaining a major loan from France. By 1921, the American Relief Administration was feeding nearly 10 million Soviet citizens.

-- Under Stalin, another 14 million people died from 1928 to 1937 -- the war against the peasants. Countless more were killed in the Great Terror, as Stalin first purged the Party and then the military to eliminate opposition, both real and imagined. By the late 1930s, some 12 million people were in forced labor camps. Constant terror and periodic purges were characteristic of the Soviet regime to the very end of Stalin's life in 1953.

At the same time, Stalin eagerly and successfully sought foreign assistance for the Soviet regime from the United States, Britain, Germany, Italy and France. The majority of the largest Soviet power plants before the war were built by the British firm Metropolitan-Vickers; western companies designed, built and equipped the industrial complexes at Magnitogorsk and Kuznetsk as well as the Urals Machine Works, and many more. The great Dnepr dam was built by the firm of Colonel Hugh

Cooper, an American hydraulic engineer. And, yet, during the period before the war the Soviet Union intervened in the Spanish Civil War, invaded Finland, and with Hitler's blessing seized the Baltic States and carved up Poland. I need hardly mention Soviet expansionism in Europe, Southwest Asia and East Asia in the immediate post-war period.

-- Khrushchev, as described by the emigre historians Heller and Nekrich, demonstrated that the system could forego mass terror without altering the Stalinist socialist state. This more selective terror stopped at the doors of the Central Committee as Khrushchev released millions from Stalin's camps but soon began refilling them. The means of intimidation became more sophisticated with the use of psychiatric incarcerations and other punishments.

Domestic reform again became the order of the day as Khrushchev moved to decentralize and modernize the economy, made management more flexible and eased pressures on the rural population. Under Khrushchev, the Soviet authorities declared their intention to increase

production of consumer goods and food. They again turned to private plots in agriculture and espoused the need for material relief of the people. He launched an anti-corruption campaign, sought to have senior party officials elected by secret ballot to limited terms of office, and tried to limit the privileges of senior officials. And in 1962, the Liberman economic reforms were begun with the central theme that profitability would be the main criterion for gauging the economic performance of enterprises.

Remember the "Thaw" of the 1950s -- the first and last time to this day that a work of Alexander Solzenitsyn has been published in the USSR? A new openness emerged as the central newspapers published thousands of complaints about the arbitrariness of local leaders and demands for legality. And, of course, Khrushchev exposed many of the crimes of the Stalin period.

Meanwhile the new Soviet leaders moved immediately to normalize relations -- to establish a detente -- with the United States and the West. The Korean Armistice was signed in July

1953, a cease fire was quickly agreed in Indochina and in 1955, Soviet forces left Austria. Eisenhower and Khrushchev met in Geneva and the Soviet leader visited the United States. Khrushchev unilaterally reduced conventional military forces by 1.8 million men between 1955 and 1957. There was much talk of the end of the cold war. Yet, during this period the Soviets crushed revolts in East Germany and Hungary, built and deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles for the first time, sent some of those missiles to Cuba, precipitated several dangerous crises in Berlin and built the Berlin Wall.

-- The popular impression of the Brezhnev period, reinforced by Gorbachev, is one of doddering old men presiding ineffectively and incompetently over a stagnating economy while pursuing detente and arms control with the West. This is Western historical amnesia and Soviet selectivity, if not disinformation.

In 1965, the Soviet leaders already knew their economy was in serious difficulty. They ratified many of Khrushchev's economic reforms, with the Liberman concepts at the core. The leadership turned again to the law of supply and demand,

material incentives and broad autonomy. Premier Kosygin tried to implement significant reforms, but plainly Brezhnev and the rest of the Politburo had little interest in paying any political, economic or social price to pursue reform. Then, as now, they tried to reconcile the irreconcilable: to enlarge the rights of individual enterprises and also restore the power of the central economic ministries.

By the late sixties, twin crises enveloped the USSR -- a political crisis reflecting the nationalities problem, and an economic crisis as growth decreased sharply. Brezhnev needed a breathing spell and, as so often in Soviet history, outside assistance. The West was happy to oblige. Relationships with Europe and the United States blossomed. Tensions relaxed, warmer relationships were cultivated with European countries, the Quadripartite Treaty on Berlin was concluded, the first SALT Treaty and many narrower technical agreements were signed with the US, and Western trade, credits and technology flowed.

Yet, consider what Brezhnev was up to elsewhere during this

same period. His was the regime that invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968 and crushed the Prague Spring. The Western reaction? President Johnson said, "We hope -- and we shall strive -- to make this setback a temporary one." The then French Foreign Minister said it was "an unpleasant incident along the road." The next year, the Soviets attacked China along the Ussuri River and dropped heavy hints, including in Washington, that a nuclear attack against China was under consideration. Recklessly or intentionally, the Soviets helped provoke the 1967 Middle East War. In the mid-1970s, they supported Cuban surrogate forces in Angola and Ethiopia. The same leaders toasted in the West provided the wherewithal for North Vietnam's final conquest of the South, underwrote the Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua, and sold $12 billion worth of weapons to Libya. In 1979, Brezhnev ordered the invasion of Afghanistan. In 1980-81, this leadership forced the imposition of martial law in Poland and the suppression of Solidarity. And, all of this took place against the backdrop of the greatest peacetime military buildup in history.

We also have too easily forgotten the wave of internal

repression inside the Soviet Union during this period. In 1965, there were mass arrests of those involved in nationalist movements in the Ukraine, Lithuania and the Transcaucasus. The first show trials since Stalin convicted Sinyavsky and Daniel in 1966 for slandering the Soviet state. Political trials all over the USSR followed -- in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Lvov, Gorky, Riga, Tashkent and Omsk. Remember Aleksandr Ginzburg, Pavel Litvinov, Yuri Galanskov and all the others? By the late 1970s, the KGB had destroyed the dissident and human rights movements.

-- Finally, Andropov, as head of the KGB architect of the suppression of dissent. His contribution as General Secretary to solving the Soviet crisis? Tighter discipline, a call to arms against "consumer instincts," squeezing the fat out of the economy -- but not a single substantial reform. During his fifteen months in the top job, we saw wide scale arrests of dissidents, Baptists, Jews and many others.

I offer this thumbnail sketch of Soviet history to underscore that our view of the Soviet Union cannot be based on the

personality of one or another leader, but must be based on the nature of the Soviet system itself. We face a deeply entrenched philosophy and system of government that to date has depended upon repression at home and promoted aggression beyond its borders. It is the Soviet system itself, and the 70 year continuity we see from leader to leader, from Lenin to Chernenko, and even Gorbachev, that shapes our view of the USSR. Gorbachev is challenging some aspects of this system but even he acknowledges he has not yet significantly changed it. We cannot ignore Soviet history or the apparent strength and durability of the system that produced it. Nor can we ignore the cyclical turn to reform, "detente" and foreign assistance each time the system has hovered on the brink of catastrophe or fallen into it.

Le Monde has said, "One cannot minimize the scope of this reform. By every available measure, it is without doubt of the first importance.... It will have major consequences if it runs its course. Gradually, the entire Soviet system of planning will be overturned." Regrettably, those words were published in December 1964.

In important respects, Gorbachev has made quite clear he has

no intention of dismantling fundamental features of the system. There will be no political party but the Communist Party, as demonstrated by the prompt crushing of the Democratic Union. The economy is, and will remain, governed by political decisions. Rights are granted by the Party to the people. Glasnost is a grant, possibly temporary, from Gorbachev to the Soviet people suited to his own political needs and purposes. Indeed, it seems clear that Gorbachev turned to political reform only because he concluded that it had become necessary to achieve his economic objectives.

Moreover, we cannot make long-term decisions and devise strategies affecting freedom and the future that depend on the continued political (or even physical) survival of one man. Indeed, not a leader in the West goes to bed unaware that he or she could wake up to a new Soviet counterpart. Unlike any Western or other modern state, politics at the highest level in the Kremlin today are as hidden from public view as in generations past. Much has changed, but more that is fundamental remains the same.

In sum, we proceed with care and prudence because we are dealing with a system where the roots of oppression, aggression,

and secrecy are deep, because for seventy years we repeatedly have seen a system in crisis proclaim reform and turn to the West for help while the essential features of that system at the end of the day remained unchanged.

Prudence, however, is not synonymous with inaction. Nor is wariness to be equated with pessimism and cynicism. It would be the worst sort of myopia not to recognize that profound changes are underway in the Soviet Union. There is a degree of openness and vigor of political debate in the USSR unknown since the days of the first (or February) revolution in 1917. Indeed, we need only reflect on the openness of debate at the Party Conference last summer or the elections this last week. (Who could not be amazed at the defeat of the Leningrad Party Chief, who ran unopposed, or the demonstration of support for Boris Yeltsin?) In a number of areas -- Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, conventional force reductions, various aspects of arms control, China -- we are seeing the Soviets change their policies, abandon old positions, and remove themselves from longstanding dead-ends. We do see "new thinking" in some areas, although in others -- as in Central America and the Middle East -- the old ways of thinking and behavior remain.

We are generally encouraged by what we see. Maybe this time things will be different. The changes plainly offer opportunities -- opportunities for further reducing tensions, for enhancing strategic stability, for promoting human rights and democracy, for arms control, and for cooperation on transnational issues such as the environment, narcotics trafficking, and stopping the proliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.

Ironically, given Gorbachev's priorities, the pace of some aspects of political change is far outstripping economic modernization and performance. Indeed, what Gorbachev has set in motion represents a political earthquake. He is pulling all of the levers of change in a society and culture that historically has resisted change -- and where change usually has been violent and wrenching. He is a figure of enormous historical importance. The forces he has unleashed are powerful but so are the people and institutions he has antagonized -- thus setting in motion a tremendous power struggle and purge no less dramatic for the absence of show trials and terror. The outcome is by no means clear, and prolonged turbulence seems certain.

Gorbachev seeks a system in which some -- though certainly not all -- elements of the Stalinist economic structure and bureaucracy are eliminated thus opening the way to greater flexibility and innovation and thereby to modernization and improved performance. However, elections notwithstanding, Gorbachev's Leninism still means the continued political monopoly of the Communist Party. Gorbachev's dictatorship of the Communist Party remains untouched and untouchable. He seeks still a system based on the same Leninist political principles that guided his predecessors. As he said in 1987, "We will not retreat an inch from the path of socialism, of Marxism-Leninism."

Westerners for centuries have hoped repeatedly that Russian economic modernization and political reform -- even revolution -- signaled an end to despotism. Repeatedly since 1917, the West has hoped that domestic changes in the USSR would lead to changes in Communist coercive rule at home and aggressiveness abroad. These hopes, dashed time and again, have been revived by Gorbachev's radical domestic agenda, innovative foreign policy and personal style.

Enduring characteristics of Soviet governance at home and policy abroad make it clear that -- while the changes underway offer opportunities for a relaxation of tensions and for cooperation in many areas -- Gorbachev intends improved Soviet economic performance, greater political vitality at home, and more dynamic diplomacy to make the USSR a more competitive and stronger adversary in the years ahead.

What we seek is a Soviet Union that is pluralistic internally, non-interventionist externally, observes basic human rights, contributes to international stability and tranquility, and a Soviet Union where these changes are more than an edict from the top and are independent of the views, power and durability of a single individual. We can hope for such change but all of Russian and Soviet history tells us to be skeptical and cautious.

We cannot -- and should not -- close our eyes to momentous developments in the USSR. But we should not make concessions based on hope and popular enthusiasms in the West or attractive personalities in the USSR. We should, however, take advantage of

opportunities where the terms are favorable to us, where we can solve problems to mutual advantage, or where we can bring about desirable changes in Soviet policies -- whether to promote human rights, freer emigration, solutions to Soviet generated problems such as Afghanistan, reduce the military threat or even to expand business ties (if there is no transfer of sensitive technology). Above all, we must establish realistic criteria by which we can judge in the coming months and years whether political or economic change in the Soviet Union genuinely is reshaping the foundations of the system -- or whether the historically oppressive structure of the Soviet Union, including the instruments of central control and repression, endures discreetly in the shadows, available at the beckon of Gorbachev's successor, or even for Gorbachev.

Gorbachev has spoken of a European home, from the Atlantic to the Urals. But "Europe" and "the West" are not just geographic terms. They represent a community and continuity of values, a common historical experience reflected in this year's bicentennial celebration of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the inauguration of our First President under the Constitution. The principles set forth in these two documents compared to the central

tenets of Leninism still held dear by Gorbachev mark the distance that remains between us.

For all the changes underway, the Soviet Union philosophically and politically still embodies the primacy of the State over the individual. Because of this unbridgeable difference in values and beliefs, whether Gorbachev succeeds, fails, or just survives, a still long competition and struggle with the Soviet Union lie before us. Preserving the peace and fostering an enduring relaxation of tensions even as the competition continues depends upon seeing this reality clearly. Keeping this long range perspective -- with keen awareness of perhaps unprecedented opportunities as well as the dangers -- will be an extraordinary challenge for the United States and the Western democracies.

[Sec. Cavazos
200]

Hispanic / Mostly Mex-Am
May 5, 1862 - Puebla under Benito Juarez
dancing children -

a preview of the hurly-burly life that now awaited us.

Lusia and I were almost buried under the load of the first few months in Moscow. I spent time preparing written responses for almost all major interviews. People passed through the house endlessly. Lusia cooked for a whole crowd. Long after midnight, it was not uncommon to find her, despite her heart attacks and her bypasses, mopping the landing—our building is self-service—and me still at work on a statement.

Gorbachev: A Cry for Help


One subject that came up in every interview was my attitude toward Gorbachev and *perestroika.* In 1985, while still confined in Semashko Hospital, I watched one of Gorbachev's early television appearances, and I told my roommates, "It looks as if our country's lucky. We've got an intelligent leader." My initial, positive reaction has remained basically unchanged. Gorbachev, like Khrushchev, is an extraordinary personality who has managed to break free of the limits customarily respected by the party bureaucracy. What explains the inconsistencies and half measures of the new course? The main stumbling block is the inertia of a gigantic system, the resistance, passive and active, of the innumerable bureaucratic and ideological windbags. Most of them will be out of a job if there is a real *perestroika.* Gorbachev has spoken of this bureaucratic resistance in some speeches, and it sounds like a cry for help.

But there's more to it than that. The old system, for all its drawbacks, worked. And people had grown used to the old system, which at least guaranteed a certain minimal standard of living. Who knows what the new one will bring? And lastly, Gorbachev and his close associates themselves may still not be completely free of the prejudices and dogmas of the system they wish to reform.

Restructuring the command-type economic system in our country is an extremely complex matter. Without market relations and elements of competition, we are bound to see serious shortages, inflation and other negative phenomena. Our country is already experiencing economic difficulties; everywhere, food and other necessities are in short supply. Another thing troubles me greatly: the zigzags on the road to democracy. Gorbachev is trying to gain control of the political situation and strengthen his personal power by compromising with the forces opposed to *perestroika* instead of relying on democratic reforms. That's extremely dangerous. Only a nationwide swell of initiative can give substance to democracy, and our "chiefs" have shown they're not ready for this.

The gradual replacement of key personnel, the country's objective need for *perestroika,* and the fact that "the new always beats the old" (to quote Stalin's famous phrase) should all work in Gorbachev's favor. He has four levers he can use to move the country forward: *glasnost* (this is proceeding under its own steam); the new personnel policies; the new international policies aimed at slowing the arms race; and democratization.

My positive attitude toward *perestroika* is not accepted by everyone: it especially upsets some dissidents in the U.S.S.R. and some émigrés in the West. One Russian-language newspaper in New York City printed an article with the headline THE PARDONED SLAVE HELPS HIS MASTER, or something of the sort.



ALAIN NOGUES—SYGMA

BATTLING EACH DAY FOR LIFE AND FREEDOM

On Feb. 5, 1987, a delegation organized by the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations came to see me. I stressed the West's vital interest in having the U.S.S.R. become an open, democratic society. Henry Kissinger posed a blunt question: "Is there a danger that the U.S.S.R. will first effect a democratic transformation, accelerating its scientific and technological progress and improving its economy, and then revert to expansionist policies and pose an even greater threat to peace?"

I replied that what people should fear is not the development of an open, stable society with a powerful peacetime economy in the U.S.S.R. but a disruption of the world's equilibrium and the single-minded military buildup of an internally closed and externally expansionist society. I believe the West should actively support the process of *perestroika,* cooperating with the U.S.S.R. on disarmament and on economic, scientific and cultural issues. But this support should be given with eyes wide open, not unconditionally. Opponents of *perestroika* should understand that a retreat from reform would mean immediate termination of Western assistance.

In a futurological article I wrote in 1974, "The World After 50 Years," I concluded, "I hope that mankind will be able to put an end to the dangers threatening us and to continue its progress while preserving everything that makes us human." I would like to conclude this book too with those words. Today, as I approach the eighth decade of my life, my personal aspirations and my entire existence center on my beloved wife, my children and grandchildren, and all those who are dear to me.

This volume of memoirs is dedicated to my beloved Lusia. What matters most is that she and I are together.

On the night of Dec. 14, 1989, Andrei Sakharov returned to his Moscow apartment from a heated meeting of radical parliamentarians where he had called for the formation of an alternative party to oppose the Communists, lay down for a nap and never awoke. He was 68 when a heart attack felled him. He had been a free man for less than three years. ■



TOTAL RECALL Schwarzenegger showing his tenacity in a sci-fi fantasy from Tri-Star/Carolco

Business

$ 50+ million

Shooting The Works

Lights! Camera! Money! Hollywood is on a spree!

By JOHN GREENWALD

The script called for blizzard scenes at a major airport. To film it, the entire cast and crew of this summer's *Die Hard 2* embarked on a multimillion-dollar odyssey last December that led them to normally snowy Denver and northern Michigan. But relentlessly mild weather in both places forced 20th Century Fox to abandon its costly snow chase and shoot the sequel to the 1988 Bruce Willis thriller on a Los Angeles sound stage. As if that humiliation was not enough, the delays and moving expenses helped push the film's original $40 million budget to as high as $60 million.

While the ornery weather may turn *Die Hard 2* into the most expensive film Hollywood will release this summer, the episode was merely part of a runaway spending spree that has made movies more costly—and risky—than ever. With an eye toward lucrative video and foreign revenues, studios are lavishing breathtaking sums on everything from stars to scripts to scenery. Hollywood now spends an average of $23.5 million to produce a major movie, up 40% from 1985. (The Consumer Price Index rose just 14.5% over the same period.) "Studios just keep piling on the cost, thinking that they will get it back somewhere," says Jerome Gold, director of the media and entertainment division of the Ernst & Young accounting firm.

The moguls throw their biggest bucks at films released during the summer months. "Kids can see three pictures in a week," notes Roger Birnbaum, Fox's president of production. "There are no school nights." Summer hits accounted for 40% of the record $5 billion that films raked in at U.S. box offices last year. Worldwide theatrical, TV and video revenues boosted that take to more than $10 billion. In hopes of luring even larger audiences, studios are spending $30 million or more apiece on as many as a dozen films set for release between late May and Labor Day.



DICK TRACY Disney, Beatty and Madonna too

$ 30 million

The lineup is once again heavy with sequels and action flicks. Among them: Universal's $40 million *Back to the Future III;* Disney's $30 million *Dick Tracy,* starring Warren Beatty and Madonna; Warner Bros.' $32 million *Gremlins 2;* and Paramount's $45 million *Another 48 Hrs.* "This is the summer of the blockbuster," says Sidney Ganis, president of the Paramount Motion Picture Group. "If one or more of them fail, next summer there won't be nearly as many rolling."

The cost of such movies largely reflects the price that studios pay for the handful of megastars whose presence is expected to guarantee a hit. The top guns include Tom Cruise, who reportedly will earn some $9 million for playing a race-car driver and coproducing Paramount's *Days of Thunder.* For reprising his role as Nick Nolte's




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patible with the image he wished to convey of a Soviet Union committed to glasnost *and* perestroika.

In February 1986 I wrote a letter to Gorbachev quoting his own words in an interview with the French Communist newspaper *L'Humanité:* "About political prisoners, we don't have any. Likewise, our citizens are not prosecuted for their beliefs. We don't try people for their opinions." In my letter, I argued that prosecutions under various articles of the criminal code are in fact prosecutions for beliefs, including religious beliefs. I also mentioned persons confined in psychiatric hospitals for political reasons, and others imprisoned on trumped-up criminal charges. I gave brief accounts of 14 I knew personally—Anatoly Marchenko, the writer, headed the list—and called for the unconditional release of all prisoners of conscience.

In early October 1986 I was summoned to the regional Procurator's Office to see U.S.S.R. Deputy Procurator General Vladimir Andreyev "in connection with your statement." But Andreyev evaded the real issues. He told me that all the prisoners on my list had been properly sentenced. I told him that I was disappointed in our meeting.

I wrote another letter to the General Secretary and mailed it on Oct. 23. I wrote that I'd been banished illegally, without a court decision. I'd never broken the law or disclosed state secrets. My wife and I were being held in unprecedented isolation. Her sentence and the slanders printed about her in the press were actually attempts to shift responsibility for my actions onto her. I mentioned our health problems, and I felt it necessary to say that I would "make no more public statements, apart from exceptional cases when, in the words of Tolstoy, 'I cannot remain silent.' " I concluded, "I hope that you will find it possible to end my isolation and my wife's exile." Once I'd sent off the letter, I forgot about it for the next seven weeks.

Lusia was twirling the radio dial on Dec. 9. The jamming was intense, but through the crackle we both made out the name Marchenko. For a few moments we thought he had been released. Since Aug. 4 he had been on a hunger strike at Chistopol Prison, demanding better conditions for political prisoners and an end to repression. He hadn't been allowed visitors for 32 months and had spent long periods in punishment cells.

We soon realized that the broadcast was not a report of Marchenko's release. The evening before, he'd asked for a doctor. By the time he was brought to the hospital his condition was hopeless. A cerebral hemorrhage was listed as the immediate cause of death. Marchenko was 48. His death ended an era for the human rights movement, which he had helped to shape.

Dec. 15, 1986, was the 25th anniversary of my father's death. Shortly after 10 p.m. the doorbell rang. A search? Two electricians and a KGB agent entered the apartment. They had orders to install a phone. The KGB man said, "You'll get a call around 10 tomorrow morning."

On Dec. 16 we waited for the call until 3 p.m., when the phone rang and I answered. A woman's voice: "Mikhail Sergeyevich will speak with you."

"I'm listening." I told Lusia, "It's Gorbachev." She opened the door to the hallway, where the usual chatter was going on around the policeman on duty, and shouted, "Quiet! Gorbachev's on the phone." There was an immediate silence.

"Hello, this is Gorbachev speaking."



SERGEI GUNEYEV—NOVOSTI

IS HE REALLY FREE OF THE SYSTEM?

"Hello, I'm listening."

"I received your letter. We've reviewed it and discussed it. You can return to Moscow. The Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet will be rescinded. A decision has also been made about Elena Bonnaire."

I broke in: "That's my wife!" It was an emotional reaction, not so much to his mispronunciation of her name as to his tone.

Gorbachev continued: "You can return to Moscow together. You have an apartment there. Go back to your patriotic work!"

I said, "Thank you. But I must tell you that a few days ago, my friend Marchenko was killed in prison. He was the first person I mentioned in my letter to you, requesting the release of prisoners of conscience—people prosecuted for their beliefs."

Gorbachev: "Yes, I received your letter early this year. We've released many, and improved the situation of others. But there are all sorts of people on your list."

I said, "Everyone sentenced under those articles has been sentenced illegally, unjustly. They ought to be freed!"

Gorbachev: "I don't agree with you."

I said, "I implore you to look one more time at the question of releasing people convicted for their beliefs. It's a matter of justice. It's vitally important for our country, for international trust, for peace and for you and the success of your program."

Gorbachev made a noncommittal reply. I said, "Thank you again. Goodbye." (Contrary to the demands of protocol, I brought the conversation to a close, not Gorbachev. I must have felt under stress and perhaps subconsciously feared that I might say too much.) Gorbachev had little choice, so he said, "Goodbye."

On the morning of Dec. 23 we stepped off the train at Moscow's Yaroslavl Station onto a platform teeming with reporters. It took me 40 minutes to make my way through the crowd. Hundreds of flashbulbs blinded me and microphones were continually thrust into my face as I tried to respond to the barrage of questions. The whole scene offered

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had made invaluable contributions to the Motherland and world science. The KGB was concentrating its energies on her, and she was by now seriously ill.

Lusia was detained at the Gorky airport on May 2, 1984, which ended for 17 months her visits to Moscow, our principal means of contact with the outside world. She was put on trial, convicted in August of "slandering the Soviet system" and sentenced to five years' internal exile, in Gorky.

In April 1985, against Lusia's wishes, I conducted a hunger strike demanding that she be allowed to go abroad to visit her mother, children and grandchildren and to receive medical treatment. I was forcibly confined in Gorky's Semashko Hospital from April 25 and subjected to painful forced feeding until July 11, when I decided to end that hunger strike. But two weeks later, I resumed it, and on July 27 I was taken back to Semashko by force. My normal weight is around 175 lbs., but it dropped to 138 by Aug. 13. That day, they began subcutaneous (into both thighs) and intravenous drips to supplement the forced feedings. Each subcutaneous feeding took several hours, my legs would swell painfully, and I would be unable to walk for a day or two.

"You Can Return to Moscow"

In March 1985 Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the Soviet Union. Though he at first defended the treatment of Sakharov, he soon decided that keeping him in exile was incom-


"Mankind Cannot Do Without Nuclear Power"

After the Chernobyl nuclear-reactor catastrophe of April 26, 1986, the reports in the Soviet press led me to adopt far too sanguine an approach. One clue that should have alerted me to a possible cover-up was a mid-May report that several fire fighters had perished; if radiation levels in the vicinity of the Chernobyl plant did not exceed 10 to 15 milliroentgens an hour, what could have caused their deaths?

In fact, the radiation levels published in the Soviet press were 1% or less of the true figures. But there were other, subjective reasons for my complacency: my preconceptions, my mental inertia and sheer wishful thinking.

When Lusia returned from a visit to the West, her information on Chernobyl shook me. Czechoslovakia, Sweden, Poland and Hungary had demanded an explanation from Soviet authorities for the high levels of radiation throughout Europe. Poles were given iodine tablets to speed the elimination of radioactive iodine from their systems—which raised the question of what was being done in the U.S.S.R., where the level of radioactivity was much greater. In the Ukraine and Belorussia, pregnant women were advised to have abortions. My initial optimism was completely dispelled. It was important to decide in my own mind what should be done about nuclear power.

Plainly, mankind cannot renounce nuclear power, so we must find technical means to guarantee its absolute safety and exclude the possibility of another Chernobyl. The best way is international legislation requiring that all new nuclear reactors be sited deep enough underground so that even a worst-case accident would not discharge radioactive substances into the atmosphere. Existing aboveground reactors should be protected by reliable containment structures. The first priority should be to safeguard atomic plants that supply power and heat to large cities, reactors with graphite moderators like the one that malfunctioned at Chernobyl, and fast-neutron breeder reactors.



NOVOSTI—SIPA

CHERNOBYL AFTER THE TRAGEDY

I also became interested in the possibility of reducing earthquake damage by burying thermonuclear charges deep underground in seismologically active areas and detonating them to relieve the buildup of tension when strains in the earth's core approach the critical level. If this proves feasible, we could control at least the timing of earthquakes; people and property could be evacuated in orderly fashion. To preclude the escape of any radiation, the explosion would probably have to be two or more miles beneath the earth's surface.

On Feb. 15, 1987, addressing the Moscow Forum for a Non-Nuclear World for the Survival of Mankind, I had this to say on the peaceful use of atomic energy:

"Nuclear weapons divide and threaten mankind. But there are peaceful uses of nuclear energy that should promote the unity of mankind. Chernobyl was an example of the tragic interaction of equipment failure and human error. Nevertheless, the aversion people rightly feel for military applications must not spill over to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Mankind cannot do without nuclear power. We must find a solution to the safety problem that will rule out another Chernobyl resulting from human error, failure to follow instructions, design defects or technical malfunction."

I concluded, "People concerned about the potential harmful consequences of the peaceful use of nuclear energy should concentrate their efforts not on attempts to ban nuclear power, but instead on demands to assure its complete safety." ■

ment. "We have to hospitalize you. We've received a great many letters from citizens, from your children."

We realized that resistance was useless and, in any case, we no longer had the strength. The KGB agents went outside. We kissed. Tears came to my eyes. Lusia said bitterly, "And on Tanya's anniversary . . ."

Out on the street, they began pushing us into two separate ambulances. I was taken to Semashko Hospital, the medical center for the Gorky region, while Lusia was taken to Hospital No. 10, a run-down facility on the Oka's left bank. But until I actually saw Lusia again, I was under the illusion we were in the same hospital. I was put in a semiprivate room. My roommate introduced himself as secretary of a district party committee. A third bed and patient had been placed in the entry leading into our room. These men were both genuinely ill.

A few minutes after I got to the room, the attending physician, Dr. Rulev, appeared, and I allowed him to take my pulse and blood pressure. I refused to submit to any other procedures and asked to be reunited with Lusia. Separation was difficult to bear. The KGB was apparently counting on that to break us. They were also hoping that the news that the Sakharovs were in the hospital receiving medical care would pacify our friends around the world.

I spent part of the first night reading Nabokov's *Speak, Memory.* In the morning I wrote a statement to the doctor in charge declaring that my wife and I had been separated by force, and that I would refuse all medical procedures until we were reunited, and would not end my hunger strike until I was certain that Liza would be granted permission to emigrate.


The nurses would bring meals for me even though I asked them not to. I would leave the untouched trays in the hall. The other patients were kind enough to eat in the entry, keeping the door to the room closed.

A well-known consultant, Dr. Vagralik, would visit me two or three times a day, accompanied by Rulev and sometimes by a doctor who was introduced as a neurologist but was, I suspect, a psychiatrist. Vagralik warned me that I was not a young man, that I could slip into a terminal state at any moment, and that he had already noticed irreversible changes whose progress would accelerate. The neurologist (or psychiatrist) suggested that I was becoming confused and losing my faculties. As he put it, I already had one foot in the grave, and I ought to let the doctors obey the Hippocratic oath and help me.

To all these statements and to Rulev's attempts to take my blood pressure, I responded with a single, set phrase: "I refuse to be examined until I'm reunited with my wife." On the morning of Dec. 8, Rulev said, "You have only a few hours to think it over. You must end your hunger strike."

A few hours after Rulev's visit, a man entered my room. He was from the KGB. "We've met before," he said. It was in 1980, after Lusia surprised the KGB searching our apartment. "My name is Ryabinin. I'm authorized to inform you that your request can now be reconsidered in a positive light, but you must first end your hunger strike." I said that I took the KGB's promises seriously, but that my wife and I could decide to end the hunger strike only when we were together. He said, "You'll be seeing me again."

That same morning, apparatus for forced feeding was brought into Lusia's room. She warned the doctors that she would resist forced feeding with all her strength, even if she died in the struggle. A few hours after this last attempt to break her will, Lusia was driven to Semashko Hospital. In the chief physician's office, after four days of painful separation, we embraced. We insisted that Ryabinin speak in our presence with Academy President Anatoli Alexandrov, as an earnest of the KGB's promise; only then would we end our hunger strike. After 17 days, the strike was over, and Liza was free to join Alexei in the U.S.



RETURNING TO MOSCOW AFTER ALMOST SEVEN YEARS OF EXILE

Mentally Unstable?

In April 1983 in Gorky, Lusia had what was apparently her second heart attack. The weeks that followed brought two additional cardiac events. She was offered a bed in the Academy of Sciences hospital, but refused to be admitted without me.

The academy soon dispatched a team of specialists to examine me. The head of the team said hospitalization was advisable in my case, as I had received no treatment for a chronic prostate condition since arriving in Gorky, was plagued by angina and borderline hypertension and apparently had suffered several heart attacks—microinfarcts in 1970 and 1975 and three attacks in Gorky—as well as a bout of thrombophlebitis. My condition was not nearly so critical as Lusia's, but there was still ample reason for me to be admitted. But I was only kidding myself that my hospitalization was being given serious consideration.

During the summer of 1983 Yuri Andropov, then the Soviet leader, told a group of visiting American Senators who had asked about my situation that I was mentally unstable. Did these remarks indicate a new KGB strategy for dealing with "the Sakharov problem"? The authorities clearly were reluctant or unable to banish me from the country, and hesitated to imprison either of us. There is evidence that the KGB intended to portray my public activities as a delusion produced by the influence of Lusia, who would be presented as a corrupt, self-serving, loose-living, egotistical, depraved and immoral Jew prostitute, an agent of international Zionism. I would be transformed back into a distinguished Soviet (Russian, of course) scientist who

alized it was the landlady. Whenever I went out, I took irreplaceable notes, documents and books with me.

The KGB never gave up its pursuit of my bag of documents. In March 1981, I visited a dental clinic where I was having some work done. The dental technician insisted that because this was a surgical office, I'd have to leave my bag outside. When I went to reclaim the bag, it was gone. The KGB had struck a powerful blow: I lost notes on scientific matters and current events, personal documents and letters, my diary for the past 14 months and three thick notebooks containing the manuscript of these memoirs.

I began to reconstruct the book from memory. Once or twice a month, Lusia would take what I'd written to Moscow and send it on to Efrem and Tanya in the U.S. How she accomplished this is a story that cannot yet be told. By April 1982, I had finished another rough draft. But on Oct. 11, 1982, the entire manuscript—500 typewritten pages Lusia had brought back from Moscow and 900 handwritten pages I had recently completed—was again stolen, this time by what can only be called gangster methods.

We had driven into town, and Lusia went off on an errand while I waited in the car, the bag on the floor behind the front seat. A man walked over and asked through my half-open window, "Are you headed for Moscow?" I told him no. My memory of what happened next is blank. I recall someone pulling the bag through a window. I tried to get out of the car but couldn't find the door handle, something that usually comes automatically. I finally extricated myself and saw three women standing nearby, one holding what looked like a doctor's kit. "They jumped over the railing," one woman told me. "Did you know they smashed your window?" The left rear window had been smashed, but *I hadn't heard a thing.* I believe I'd been momentarily stunned by some narcotic. I have no direct evidence, but there *was* a strange odor, like that of rotting fruit.

"We called the police," one said. "They're coming." One of the women must have been a doctor, the other two were probably nurses assigned to treat me if I suffered any ill effects from the narcotic. They'd lied about calling the police. They didn't want me to go straight to the precinct station; maybe they were afraid I'd pass out along the way. They walked off before I could ask them to serve as witnesses.

Beginning in March 1980, a policeman was stationed in front of our apartment door around the clock. Anyone who came to see me was given a hard time, and those from other cities were usually forced to leave Gorky. Some found themselves in serious trouble: at least three persons who attempted to visit spent several months in psychiatric confinement.

A Visa for Liza

In 1981 the Sakharovs began their first hunger strike while in Gorky (earlier they had conducted others in support of various dissidents). The issue was the KGB's refusal to permit Liza to join her fiancé, Elena Bonner's son Alexei, in the U.S. Some Soviet dissidents strongly criticized the strike, fearing Sakharov might die over a relatively "trivial" family issue.

Our two-year campaign had made Liza's case widely known, so we could count on sympathy and support. Most people would understand that a hunger strike was not a bizarre extravagance but our one remaining option.

At first, Lusia and I exchanged written notes about our plans, so that the KGB couldn't eavesdrop on us. Once we had made our decision, there was no reason to conceal it. On the contrary, by declaring our intentions, we gave the KGB an opportunity to let Liza go quietly and save face. So, in October, we sent out appeals for support.

Lusia traveled to Moscow with letters announcing our hunger strike, also notebooks containing the work I had done on these memoirs. I didn't want the KGB to get any of this. A week later, she returned with 100 bottles of Borzhomi mineral water, which helps maintain the body's electrolyte balance while fasting. On Oct. 21 I sent telegrams to Brezhnev and the head of the Academy of Sciences, announcing that our hunger strike would begin on Nov. 22.

Many dissidents held Liza responsible for not preventing the hunger strike. It should have been obvious to them that Liza had no way of influencing our decision. The refusal to let her rejoin Alexei may have been the immediate cause of the strike. But in a broader sense, it was the consequence of all that had happened to us, including exile in Gorky and a continuation of my struggle for human rights and the freedom to choose one's country of residence. There had been virtually no objection when I declared a hunger strike in 1974 on behalf of the dissident Vladimir Bukovsky and other political prisoners. This time I was honoring a more compelling and personal obligation.

The strike began on Nov. 22. After nearly two weeks, Sakharov and his wife were steadily growing weaker.

Dec. 4 was Tanya and Efrem's anniversary, and we looked forward to clinking glasses with Mark Kovner when he stopped by later in the day: mineral water in our glasses, vodka in his. While we were taking our 1 o'clock walk on the terrace, we caught sight of a man inside our apartment—a KGB agent whose face was familiar. We hurried in from the terrace and saw that eight people had invaded the living room and entry hall. At least some, if not all, were from the KGB. Most were wearing white coats. Lusia said, "They've come to kill us."

The door chain had been ripped off—not for the first time—and the key was lying on a table. One of the intruders announced he was from the Municipal Health Depart-

The Wallenberg Mystery

One of the items in the bag stolen from the dental clinic in Gorky was a letter about Raoul Wallenberg, the Swedish diplomat who rescued thousands of Hungarian Jews during World War II, then vanished when the Soviets occupied Budapest. Soviet authorities have maintained that Wallenberg died in prison in 1947 and the file of his case was destroyed. The latter assertion most assuredly is untrue: NKVD and KGB investigation files are stamped TO BE PRESERVED FOREVER; pages may be removed on instructions from the top, but a file is never completely eradicated.

At the Installation I learned how all this works from a KGB officer who'd had the job of sorting files. In every case, the first page of a file was retained. If a person had been executed, an affidavit that the death sentence had been carried out had to be included, along with the serial number of the pistol used.

Complete files of cases involving foreigners almost certainly were preserved. Diplomats should continue to press Soviet authorities to clear up the Wallenberg mystery. ■

except for public attacks on me.

Lusia, who was still permitted to travel, left Gorky for Moscow on Jan. 27. The next day, at a press conference held in our Chkalov Street apartment, she read a statement I had written describing the circumstances of my exile and my thoughts on current issues. She also visited the Procurator's Office to determine the official grounds for my exile and to resolve the visa problem of her son's fiancée Liza (Alexei had immigrated to the U.S. in May 1978, but Liza had not received permission to join him).

Several Gorky residents visited me while Lusia was absent. Felix Krasavin, an old friend of the Bonner family, paid a call. So did the refusenik physicist Mark Kovner, whom I'd met at a seminar in Moscow. I made new acquaintances, among them Sergei Ponomarev, who had served five years in a labor camp for "anti-Soviet activity."

Each visitor, upon leaving the building, was taken by the police to a nearby site designated "post for the maintenance of public order." They would be held for hours while their papers were checked, and attempts would be made to intimidate them. Many suffered unpleasant repercussions. After a few weeks the authorities allowed only people sent or approved by the KGB to pass through their blockade. A few months later, the flow of visitors stopped altogether.

On Jan. 28 I was ordered to report to MVD headquarters. There, two KGB men introduced themselves as Major Chuprov and Captain Shuvalov. They complained that I had violated the terms of my regimen by phoning Moscow and writing a postscript to a Helsinki Group document.

"They're mistaken," I said.

"Will you put that in writing?"

"Of course." I took a sheet of paper and wrote that I had not called Moscow (my attempts to telephone had all been illegally cut off). I had added my signature to the document about Afghanistan but had not made any changes in it, since I was not a member of the Helsinki Group.

I asked Chuprov to write down several requests and pass them on. I asked that Liza be granted a visa to join Alexei, that young scientists from FIAN be permitted to visit me, that I have access to my regular doctors from the academy clinic, that the telephone be reconnected in the Moscow apartment of Lusia's mother Ruth (essential because of her age, 79, and her health) and that phone service be installed in the Gorky apartment—members of the academy are entitled to a private telephone.

Chuprov suggested that I order the telephone myself. I said that no one would speak with me at the telephone office since I was officially still a resident of Moscow.


"You can register as a resident of Gorky."

"Under no circumstances will I do that: I was sent here illegally."

That same evening, I answered the doorbell. Two men—drunk or pretending to be drunk—entered, declaring that they wanted to "get a look at this Sakharov guy."

"I'm Sakharov."

"Why do you want the Olympics boycotted?"



ASSOCIATED PRESS

BARRED FROM THE COURTROOM DURING YURI ORLOV'S 1978 TRIAL

"Because the U.S.S.R. is conducting military operations in Afghanistan."

Suddenly, one pulled a pistol from his pocket; he began playing with it and waving it around. I asked whether it was a real pistol or just a cigarette lighter. One of them replied, "A cigarette lighter that drills holes in people."

The second man kept assuring me that his friend really was a first-class marksman. Then the man with the gun started to shout, "I'll show you what Afghanistan's really like! I'll turn this apartment into an Afghanistan!"

While this was going on, Lusia's friend Natasha Gesse, who was looking after me while Lusia was gone, caught sight of the pistol and told the landlady, "Pretend you're taking out the garbage and go tell the policeman that drunks are in the apartment and that they've got a pistol."

The landlady was gone a good while, but when she returned, she pretended she'd misunderstood Natasha. She had to be sent a second time. At last, several policemen appeared and led the "drunks" away.

A Theft in Gorky

The KGB never let things settle into a stable pattern; from time to time, they would commit a new outrage.

Whenever I left the building, my KGB tails would shadow me. I came to know many by sight. When I walked in the woods, I more than once flushed an observer hiding behind a tree, who would then dash away. We were prevented from making long-distance calls; whenever we went to a post office to do so, the phones were "out of order"—KGB shadows had been there ahead of us. Once I managed to make a call by carrying out a trash can, dropping it off and continuing to a post office. From that day on, a policeman accompanied us when we took out the garbage.


The KGB did more than supervise my quarantine. From the first days, we detected signs that strangers were entering our apartment. We would find our tape recorders, radios and typewriter damaged and had to repair them many times. At first, we assumed that some of the policemen were letting the KGB agents into our apartment; then we re-

The Dodge Shadow and Spirit ES took on the Honda Civic DX and Accord EX.††

The results?

ADVANTAGE: DODGE


In a side-by-side comparison, 100 car owners rated the cars in 33 different categories. From legroom and driving ease, from interior and exterior styling to pick-up and passing ability. When it was all over 76 out of 100 car owners preferred Dodge Shadow and Spirit ES overall to Honda Civic DX and Accord EX.††



SHADOW
Shadow ES sedan shown (without turbo) $11,038† – payments will be higher.

Base 2-door Price	20% Down Payment	Total Financed		
$8,785†	**$1,757**	**$7,028**	4.9% APR for 60 Mos. **$132** Mo.	1.9% APR for 36 Mos. **$201** Mo.
			2.9% APR for 48 Mos. **$155** Mo.	0.0% APR for 24 Mos. **$293** Mo.

Dodge Shadow was preferred overall to a comparably equipped Honda Civic DX by 37 out of 50 people surveyed†† And that's even before they knew they could get **$1000** CASH BACK OR 0.0% APR* or about package savings they could get of up to **$790****



SPIRIT
Spirit ES shown $13,205† – payments will be higher.

Base Price	20% Down Payment	Total Financed		
$10,495†	**$2,099**	**$8,396**	4.9% APR for 60 Mos. **$158** Mo.	1.9% APR for 36 Mos. **$240** Mo.
			2.9% APR for 48 Mos. **$185** Mo.	0.0% APR for 24 Mos. **$350** Mo.

Dodge Spirit ES (with the available V-6) was preferred overall to a comparably equipped Honda Accord EX by 39 of 50 people surveyed†† And they didn't even know they could get **$1000** CASH BACK OR 0.0% APR* or about package savings they could get of up to **$847****

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*Until May 31, get guaranteed cash back or 0% APR financing, or longer term rates, (for qualified buyers through Chrysler Credit) on selected '90 models in stock. See dealer for guaranteed cash back details & guarantee claim form. †Sticker prices exclude tax & destination charges. Actual dealer prices may vary. **Package savings on select models depend on model & package and are based on sticker prices of items if sold separately. ††U.S. Testing Company Market Research, Inc. (not affiliated with U.S. government) survey of two panels, each consisting of 50 GM and Ford owners who said they would consider purchasing a Japanese car, rating comparably equipped vehicles in 33 categories and then overall. Sticker prices of compared models, excluding tax & destination charge: $16,432—Spirit ES, $10,861—Shadow.

Advantage: Dodge.

Dodge

en and bathroom. The landlady told Lusia she was the widow of a KGB officer. (It took us six months to discover what her real duties were: to make sure that the window in her room was left unbolted to allow KGB agents access to the apartment from the street, bypassing the police manning a watch post.) As I appeared, she retired to her room.

At last Lusia and I were alone together.* She'd had the foresight to pack our transistor radio, and on the evening news my exile was the lead story, along with Afghanistan. For the next two weeks foreign broadcasts featured protests by writers, public personalities and—of particular weight—scientists, including the U.S. scientists Sidney Drell and Jeremy Stone. The intervention of U.S. National Academy of Sciences President Philip Handler and other prominent scientists might have forestalled further steps against me. My Soviet colleagues, regrettably, kept silent—

*_Alone Together_ is the title of Elena Bonner's 1986 account of her life in exile with Sakharov.

Who Murdered Lake Baikal?

The planet's oldest, deepest and largest lake, Baikal is about the size of Belgium and accounts for a fifth of the world's freshwater reserves. The threat to this unique ecosystem, home to more than 1,000 species of plants and animals unknown anywhere else, stimulated a vociferous Soviet environmental movement. Baikal, says Siberian activist Valentin Rasputin, contains "such pulchritude as to be unimaginable this side of paradise."

It is a precious resource, an area of surpassing natural beauty, a source of national pride and, to some extent, the very symbol of our nation. For several years, newspapers had been publishing alarming reports on threats to Baikal from industrial construction along its shores, the felling and rafting of timber and pulp mills' discharge of chemical wastes.

Early in 1967 a student at the Moscow Institute of Energy invited me to attend meetings of the Komsomol [Communist Party youth wing] Committee to Save Baikal. I learned that in the late 1950s, Orlov, the minister in charge of the paper industry, had ordered construction of a large cellulose complex on the lake's shores to produce a particularly durable viscose rayon cord for airplane tires. It was assumed that the pure Baikal water would facilitate polymerization [a chemical process in which many small molecules combine to build much larger molecules called polymers] and the resulting fibers would be stronger.

The plant's output showed that this hypothesis was unfounded. More important, the aviation industry switched from rayon cord to metallic cord. Whatever rationale the Baikal complex may once have had—and it never offset the potential harm to the lake—vanished. Construction nevertheless went ahead, with whole armies of officials defending their decision and saving face by insisting on the complex's importance for the defense of the country, the usual clinching argument.



SOVFOTO

A PRECIOUS RESOURCE: SYMBOL OF THE NATION

The story goes that Orlov had chosen the site by simply pointing to a place on the shoreline while cruising in a motorboat with cronies. Building was already under way when someone discovered that this was the precise spot where the famous Verninsky earthquake had caused the lake to swallow up 35 acres of shoreline in the 19th century; it was a seismically active region. But instead of canceling the project, the authorities transferred responsibility to the Ministry of Medium Machine Building. One scientist taunted me: "Do you know who's in charge of the murder of Baikal? Your own Slavsky!" New plans were drawn up for earthquake-resistant aluminum-and-glass buildings supported by steel piles. But the buildings are still vulnerable to the major earthquakes that have occurred there once or twice a century.

The big problem now was treatment of toxic waste. The pollution caused by floating logs down the rivers that empty into the lake kills the spawn of most fish, including the Baikal *omul,* which a century ago rivaled beef as a source of food for all Russia. The accidental discharge of effluents, deforestation and fire also threatened the fragile ecological balance of the region. We proposed that the lakeshores be closed to new industry and existing enterprises be moved.

At a meeting of the Council of Ministers, Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin, who was handling the Baikal project, asked Mstislav Keldysh, president of the Academy of Sciences, "What does the academy recommend? If the safeguards aren't reliable, we'll stop construction." Keldysh quoted a report that the water-purification system and other safeguards were completely reliable. He may have been acting in good faith. Still, my feeling is that his stand was greatly influenced by the academy's dependence on the bureaucratic machine, and that he was predisposed to respect the wishes of this machine and to ignore the warnings of whistle blowers.

Only a couple of years after these events, a Komsomol expedition brought back photographs showing the massive destruction of Baikal's fish and plankton caused by toxic wastes. No accidental discharges had been logged. As always, everything was fine on paper. ■

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


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


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
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


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I accompanied them to their car. I was surprised by the number of KGB agents in the area and by something peculiar in the air—a mixture of hostility and gloating.

I said, "Well, here they are."

"Yes, here we are!" a KGB agent echoed derisively. I suppose they'd already learned of the decision to exile me. But the Americans were allowed to drive off.

Our phone rang at 1 a.m. on Jan. 22. A friend, very excited, said he had heard that a decision had been made to deprive me of my awards and exile me from Moscow. I remarked, "A month ago, I wouldn't have taken it seriously, but now, with Afghanistan, anything's possible."

Jan. 22 was a Tuesday, the day the theoretical-physics seminar met at FIAN [the physics institute where Sakharov still worked]. I followed my customary routine, ordering a car from the academy's motor pool and leaving home at 1:30. At the Krasnokholmsky Bridge, a traffic-patrol car forced us to stop. From the front seat I saw two men get in the rear, flashing red IDs marked MVD [for Interior Ministry]. They were actually KGB.

They ordered the driver to follow the patrol car to the Procurator's Office on Pushkin Street. KGB agents escorted me to the fourth floor, where "chats" about my activities had taken place in 1973 and 1977. I asked Alexander Rekunkov, the deputy procurator-general, "Why didn't you send a summons instead of shanghaiing me?"

Rekunkov replied, "I gave orders to have you brought here due to the extraordinary circumstances and the great urgency involved. I have been instructed to read you a decree passed by the Presidium:

"In view of A.D. Sakharov's systematic actions, which discredit him as a recipient of State awards, and in response to many suggestions made by the Soviet public, the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet has decided to deprive Andrei Dmitrievich Sakharov of the title Hero of Socialist Labor and all his State awards."

Rekunkov continued, "It has been decided to banish A.D. Sakharov from Moscow to a place that will put an end to his contacts with foreigners." The official looked up and added, "The place that has been selected is Gorky, which is off limits to foreigners. Please sign here to acknowledge that you have been informed of the decree's contents."

He handed me a typewritten sheet of paper. I saw the typed—not signed—name of Leonid Brezhnev. The decree was undated and made no mention of banishment.

As I studied the paper, Rekunkov said, "The regulations require that persons deprived of awards return them." I refused, since the awards had been given in recognition of services rendered.

I asked why the decree was undated and why Brezhnev had not personally signed it. Rekunkov said something about "technicalities." I failed to ask who had made the decision to banish me and on what authority. I considered the entire proceeding completely illegal and thought it pointless to argue fine points of jurisprudence with those who obviously had no respect for the law. By maintaining this attitude all through my first weeks in Gorky, I may have created the inadvertent impression that I accepted their right to proceed in this totally unlawful manner.

"You're to leave for Gorky at once," Rekunkov said. "Your wife may accompany you."

I phoned Lusia. "I'm calling from the Procurator's Office. They picked me up on the street."

"Whaaat?"



SIPA

ALONE TOGETHER IN GORKY IN 1985

"Police stopped our car; KGB agents got in and ordered us to drive here. I've been stripped of my awards, and I'm being banished to Gorky—it's off limits to foreigners."

"Will you be coming back to the house?"

"No, I'm supposed to leave straight from here, but it's my understanding that you can accompany me." I hung up and mumbled to myself, "So this is it . . ."

Downstairs, I climbed into the backseat of a minibus with curtained windows, flanked by KGB agents. We were preceded by a police car with a flashing light and siren and followed by another car. Lusia arrived at Domodedovo Airport more than two hours later. She told me that as soon as she hung up after my call, our phone went dead (service wasn't restored until December 1986). Soon afterward, police and KGB cordoned off our building and stopped correspondents and friends from entering.

Five minutes after Lusia arrived, an officer announced that our plane, a Tu-154, was ready. A dozen KGB agents accompanied us on our special flight. We were too relieved at being reunited to worry about where we were headed—we didn't care if it was to the ends of the earth. In Gorky we were loaded into another minibus. "Where are we going?" Lusia asked our anonymous escorts.

"Home," answered one, grinning.

Visit from a Gunman

After a long journey, we were deposited at a twelve-story building off what we later learned was Gagarin Avenue and taken to an apartment on the first floor. In a large room a man seated behind a desk said, "I'm Perelygin, deputy procurator for the Gorky district. I've been instructed to inform you of your regimen: you are forbidden to go beyond the city limits of Gorky. You'll be kept under surveillance, and you are forbidden to meet with or contact foreigners or criminal elements. The MVD will let you know when you're required to check in at their headquarters. If you have any questions, call the KGB, either Major Yuri Chuprov or Captain Nikolai Shuvalov." Perelygin left.

Lusia, meanwhile, had been talking with our "landlady" and had taken a look around the apartment, which had four rooms (one reserved for the landlady), plus kitch-

On Sept. 5, Solzhenitsyn dispatched his article "Peace and Violence" for publication abroad, warning the West about the nature and extent of state violence in the U.S.S.R. Just before its publication, he added the proposal that I be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for "indefatigable, devoted (and personally dangerous) opposition to systematic state violence."

On Oct. 9, 1975, Lusia and I—she in Italy after a hard-fought battle to permit her to leave the country to treat her glaucoma; I in Moscow—heard the news that I had been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. The official reaction in the U.S.S.R. was one of intense irritation tinged with nervousness. I was denied permission to go to Norway for the Nobel award ceremonies on the grounds that I was "an individual possessing knowledge of state secrets." Lusia accepted the award for me in Oslo in December.

Shanghaied and Banished

Sakharov was able to continue his cat-and-mouse game with the authorities through the 1970s at least partly because of his world stature as a human rights activist and because his arrest would have strained Soviet-U.S. relations. But with the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, those relations deteriorated catastrophically, and the state soon moved against Sakharov.

As 1980 began, Afghanistan cast a long shadow. Increased latitude was granted to the KGB because of the war and possibly in anticipation of the forthcoming Olympics, as evidenced in a series of arrests.

On Jan. 17, Charles Bierbauer, an ABC television correspondent, and his crew arrived for an interview. Afterward

destroying itself in the smoke and fumes of its cities and the din of hysterical music.

Certainly there is much bitter truth in Solzhenitsyn's complaints. I too have called attention to the West's lack of concerted action, its dangerous illusions, the factional gamesmanship, shortsightedness, selfishness and cowardice displayed by some of its politicians. Yet I believe that Western society is fundamentally healthy and dynamic, capable of meeting the challenges life continually brings.

The West's lack of unity is the price it pays for the pluralism, freedom and respect for the individual that are the sources of strength and flexibility for any society. It makes no sense to sacrifice them for a mechanical, barracks unity that may have a certain utility if one's goal is aggressive expansion but has otherwise proved to be a failure. Solzhenitsyn's mistrust of the West, of progress in general, of science and democracy incline him to romanticize a patriarchal way of life and craftsmanship, to expect too much from the Russian Orthodox Church.

Solzhenitsyn suggests that there are already clear signs of a national and religious renaissance, that Russians have always been hostile to the socialist system and even that they harbored defeatist sentiments during World War II. These ideas, which I may have oversimplified somewhat, are little short of myths. If our people and our leaders ever succumb to such notions, the results could be tragic.

Unlike Solzhenitsyn, I see faults and sound principles in both the socialist and the Western systems. I believe that their convergence is possible, and I welcome that prospect as a chance to save humanity from the confrontation that threatens it with destruction.



ED STREEKY

BANISHED NOBEL LAUREATE IN THE U.S. IN 1975

I do not share Solzhenitsyn's antipathy toward progress. If mankind is the healthy organism I believe it to be, then progress, science and the constructive application of intelligence will enable us to cope with the dangers facing us. Having set out on the path of progress several millenniums ago, mankind cannot halt now—nor should it.

Solzhenitsyn and I differ most sharply over the defense of civil rights—freedom of conscience, freedom of expression, freedom to choose one's country of residence, the openness of society. I have no doubt whatsoever as to the value of defending specific individuals. He assigns only a secondary importance to human rights and fears that concentration on them may divert attention from more important matters.

In *The Oak and the Calf,* Solzhenitsyn makes a great deal of my supposed naiveté, my impracticality and especially my susceptibility to "pernicious" influences. Among those who (in his view) have hitched themselves to "this strange, huge, conspicuous balloon, which was soaring to the heights without engine or petrol"—me—Solzhenitsyn's sharpest, if covert, thrusts are aimed at my wife. Her "deleterious" influence, he suggests, led me to harp on emigration by Jewish refuseniks—people "who did not feel that Russia was their *own* country."

It's a shame that Solzhenitsyn understood so little about me, my thoughts on emigration, human rights and other matters, and about the real Lusia and her true role in my life. Late in 1974 a German correspondent brought me a gift from Solzhenitsyn, a copy of *The Oak and the Calf,* with a warm and complimentary inscription from the author. I already knew what was in it, and when I saw the inscription, I couldn't help exclaiming, "Solzhenitsyn really offended me in this book!"

The correspondent grinned, "Yes, of course, but he doesn't realize it." ■

educational system. The main charge was that we were enemies of détente, working against peace.

This grave accusation had an insidious plausibility to believers in Soviet foreign policy's pacific aims, the selflessness of our aid to national liberation movements and the treachery of the imperialists who surrounded us with military installations. If we stand for peace, then the more missiles, nuclear warheads and nerve gas we stockpile, the safer everyone will be. Our Western opponents employ exactly the same line of argument.

In response to the press campaign against me, Valentin Turchin of the Institute of Applied Mathematics issued an open letter in my support. His defense was made at a heavy cost: he was denounced at a staff meeting, demoted and finally fired. Turchin later supported himself by tutoring private students until his immigration to the U.S. in 1977.

On Sept. 16 the physicist Yuri Orlov wrote an open letter to Brezhnev suggesting economic and political reforms and offering a spirited defense of me; like Turchin, he soon found himself out of a job. In 1976 he helped organize the Moscow Helsinki Watch Group, part of an organization set up by Soviet dissidents to monitor human rights violations, but two years later he was sentenced to seven years in a labor camp and five of internal exile for anti-Soviet activities. He suffered extremely harsh treatment. At the end of Orlov's trial, a scuffle broke out when his friends were barred from entering the courtroom to hear the verdict. I hit one KGB agent; Lusia, receiving a sharp blow to the neck from another, smacked him back, but as she was being shoved into a police car, she accidentally punched the local police chief. She said later, "I was right to hit the KGB agent and don't regret it, but I struck the police chief by mistake, and I'd like to apologize to him."

Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn: a Difference in Principle

Despite their common struggle against the arbitrariness of the Soviet system, Sakharov and fellow Nobel laureate and dissident Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn stood far apart on fundamental questions of Soviet life.

We first met at the apartment of a friend of mine on Aug. 26, 1968. With his lively blue eyes and ruddy beard, his tongue-twistingly fast speech delivered in an unexpected treble and his deliberate, precise gestures, he seemed an animated concentration of purposeful energy.

He voiced his disagreements with me in incisive fashion. Any kind of convergence is out of the question. The West is caught up in materialism and permissiveness. Socialism may turn out to be its final ruin. Our leaders are soulless robots who have latched onto power and the good life and won't let go until forced to do so.

Solzhenitsyn claimed that I had understated Stalin's crimes. According to one estimate, 60 million people had died as a result of terror, famine and associated disease. My figure of 10 million deaths in labor camps was too low. I was also wrong to differentiate Stalin from Lenin: corruption and destruction began the day the Bolsheviks seized power, and have continued ever since. It's a mistake to seek a multiparty system; what we need is a nonparty system.

I felt enormous respect for him, since reinforced by publication of his epic work *The Gulag Archipelago.* Real life is never simple, however, and our relations are now difficult—perhaps unavoidably so, since we are not at all alike and differ markedly on questions of principle.

The two continued meeting into the early 1970s, not always amicably. Once, Solzhenitsyn's first wife scolded Sakharov for harping on the issue of Jewish emigration and fretting about the harassment of his wife's children, pointing out that the Russian people faced greater worries. As Sakharov writes, Lusia was "outraged by the lecturing tone" and burst out, "Don't give me that 'Russian people' s___ ! You make breakfast for your own children, not for the whole Russian people!" Still, the Sakharovs were soon rallying to Solzhenitsyn's defense.

The West's lack of unity is the price it pays for pluralism, freedom and respect for the individual

Right after New Year 1974, Solzhenitsyn's 13-year-old stepson visited our apartment, disappeared into the bathroom and returned with a book that had been concealed under his clothing: *The Gulag Archipelago.* The book was a shattering experience, evoking a somber world of gray camps surrounded by barbed wire, investigators' offices and torture chambers, icy mines in Kolyma and Norilsk.

On Feb. 12, 1974, Solzhenitsyn was taken from his home and placed under arrest. The next day a group gathered in our apartment and drafted the "Moscow Appeal" demanding Solzhenitsyn's release and an investigation of the crimes described in *The Gulag Archipelago.* But Solzhenitsyn was expelled from the country and flown to West Germany.

Before discussing the issues that divide us, I wish to emphasize my profound respect for him, for his talent as a writer and for his historic achievement in uncovering the state's crimes. I agree with a great deal of what he says. But even where I share Solzhenitsyn's general thesis, I often find troubling the peremptory nature of his judgments, the absence of nuance and his lack of tolerance for the opinions of others. He displays a marked anti-Western and isolationist bias, at times lapsing into an exaggerated Russian nationalism.

In Solzhenitsyn's view, the West is losing its battle against totalitarianism, which is on the offensive everywhere. Inconsistent, disunited, lacking firm religious or moral guidelines, it is wallowing in the pleasures of the consumer society, in permissiveness. It is heedlessly

hopes inspired by the Prague Spring collapsed. And "real socialism" displayed its true colors, its stagnation, its inability to tolerate pluralistic or democratic tendencies, not just in the Soviet Union but even in neighboring countries. The abolition of censorship and free elections were regarded as too risky and contagious.

The international repercussions of the invasion were enormous. For millions of former supporters, it destroyed their faith in the Soviet system and its potential for reform.

On Aug. 25, to protest the invasion, seven activists sat for a minute near the spot in Red Square where prisoners had been executed in prerevolutionary Russia. Then KGB agents began beating them. All were arrested (they were quickly sent to labor camps, into exile or, in one case, to a prison psychiatric hospital). Minutes later, cars carrying Alexander Dubcek and other Czechoslovak leaders who had been brought to Moscow by force shot out of the Kremlin's Spassky Gate and raced across Red Square.

Acts of "Hooliganism"

Sakharov's wife Klava died in 1969 of stomach cancer. After a while he found himself working closely with Elena Bonner ("Lusia"), a vigorous human rights activist of Jewish and Armenian origin. "Since August 1971," he writes, "Lusia and I have followed a common path." In January 1972 they were married, and attending the ceremony were half a dozen KGB men in identical black suits. "I'd guess that they were demonstrating their disapproval," notes Sakharov. Soon the authorities were stepping up the pressure on him and Bonner to cease speaking out.

After the massacre of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics, I joined a silent protest in front of the Lebanese embassy in Moscow. Lusia was ill, but her son Alexei, her daughter Tanya and Tanya's husband Efrem Yankelevich were with me. We were all carted to a drunk tank by the KGB. A month later, Tanya was expelled from Moscow University. Lusia's children had now become hostages to my public activity. Their access to education and jobs would be restricted or blocked. Threats of arrest, imprisonment, physical violence and even murder became a genuine menace. Eventually, the children were forced to emigrate.

On Oct. 26, 1973, the trial of Cronid Lubarsky, an astrophysicist charged with distributing the *Chronicle of Human Events,* the underground publication, began in Noginsk, a town near Moscow. A dozen of us tried to enter the courtroom but were shoved back outside by a wedge of KGB agents. Arms were twisted; some people were trampled. Lusia marched up to the senior KGB officer and slapped his face.

Two weeks later, Lusia was summoned before the Moscow party committee. Could she explain her acts of "hooliganism" in Noginsk? Such behavior, she was told, raised doubts about her continued membership in the party. The threat of expulsion was meant to intimidate her. Instead, Lusia placed her party card on the table, along with a statement she had prepared asking to be removed from the ranks of the party. It was an enormously effective stroke.

"Why are you so hostile to the Soviet system?" a committee member asked. "It's given you everything."

"No one *gave* me anything. I fought in the war, nearly lost my sight; I worked night and day." Lusia had broken with the party for good.

Not long afterward, her son Alexei was rejected by Moscow University. He was an excellent student, winning a prize in the math Olympics and graduating first in his class. But during his junior year at a new school he refused to attend the standard "Lenin class" that led to automatic Komsomol [Communist Party youth organization] membership. I urged him not to jeopardize his future for a minor formality. Alexei answered, "Andrei Dmitrievich, you allow yourself to be honest. Why do you advise me to behave differently?"

We later learned that one Moscow University examiner had received a direct order to flunk him: "He won't be accepted anyway, and you'd just be fired." Alexei's story is not unusual. Anti-Semitic discrimination in university admissions is part of a deliberate policy of squeezing Jews out of the country's intellectual establishment. The Central Committee is said to have asked Mstislav Keldysh, then president of the Academy of Sciences, when its Jewish membership would fall to zero. It would take about 20 years to solve the "problem," he replied. I must note that Keldysh did *not* reduce the number of Jews in the institutes he directed and was not anti-Semitic.

Notoriety at Home and a Nobel in Oslo

On Aug. 15, 1973, Mikhail Malyarov, the Soviet Deputy Procurator-General, telephoned and asked me to come see him. At his office on Pushkin Street, Malyarov said that meeting with the foreign press, as I had been doing in behalf of dissidents, could be regarded as a violation of my obligation not to disclose state secrets. To make it clear that I was determined to go on speaking out, I decided to hold a major press conference.

Some 30 Western correspondents crowded into our apartment on Aug. 21. I said I supported détente, since it reduced the risk of war, but added that caution, unity and firmness of purpose were necessary on the part of the West as it embarked on a new and more complex relationship with the U.S.S.R. The Soviet Union, I said, is a country "behind a mask," a closed, totalitarian society capable of dangerously unpredictable actions. Détente would promote international security only if the West avoided letting the U.S.S.R. achieve military superiority and at the same time tried to promote a more open Soviet society. I reminded my listeners that the ingrained conservatism and inertia of the Soviet system militated against any rapid change. A few hours after the conference, Western radio stations and newspapers began carrying reports.

On Aug. 28, newspapers carried a letter signed by 40 academicians denouncing me for actions that "discredit the good name of Soviet science." It marked the beginning of a press campaign against me that included the obligatory letters from scientific research institutes, writers' and artists' unions, individual scientists, authors, physicians, war veterans, steelworkers, miners and milkmaids.

The writer Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn was also included in many of these attacks. The vital truths expressed in his extraordinary literary works and keen polemics had made him the object of virulent party and KGB hatred for several years; now there were claims that I alone, or the two of us, were engaged in a slanderous assault on Soviet society and its guarantees of work, free medical care and an unrivaled

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
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
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WITH LUSIA, AND HER SON ALEXEI, ON THE DAY OF THEIR MARRIAGE

Early in June I traveled with Khariton to the Installation in his personal railroad car. After supper Khariton said, "[KGB chief Yuri] Andropov called me in. His agents have been finding copies of your essay all over the place—it's circulating illegally, and it will cause a lot of harm if it gets abroad. Andropov asked me to talk to you. You ought to withdraw it from circulation."

"Why don't you take a look at it?" I suggested. Khariton retired to his compartment to do so.

"Well, what do you think?" I inquired the next day.

"It's awful."

"The style?"

Khariton grimaced. "No, not the style. It's the content that's awful!"

"The contents reflect my beliefs. It's too late to withdraw it."

In mid-June Andrei Amalrik, who wrote *Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?* and as a result was imprisoned for five years for defaming the Soviet state, gave a copy of *Reflections* to a Dutch correspondent. On July 10, a few days after returning to the Installation and exactly seven years after my clash with Khrushchev over nuclear testing, I turned on the BBC or VOA and heard my name. The announcer reported that on July 6 the Dutch newspaper *Het Parool* had published my article.

The die was cast. That evening I had the most profound feeling of satisfaction. The following day I was due to fly to Moscow but stopped at my office at 9 a.m. and told Khariton, "My article's been published abroad."

"I knew it would happen" was all Khariton could say. He looked crushed. Two hours later, I left for the airfield. I was never to set foot in my office again.

A Dangerous Muddle

Toward the end of July, Slavsky summoned me to the ministry. "Party secretaries have been calling from all over the country," he said, "demanding firm measures to put a stop to counterrevolutionary propaganda in my ministry." Of *Reflections,* he said, "It's a dangerous muddle. You criticize the leaders' privileges—you've enjoyed the same privileges. Those who bear immense responsibilities, difficult burdens, deserve *some* advantages. It's for the cause.

"What you wrote about convergence is utopian nonsense. Capitalism can't be made humane. Their social programs and employee stock plans aren't steps toward socialism. And there's no trace of state capitalism in the U.S.S.R. We'll never give up the advantages of our system, and capitalists aren't interested in your convergence either.

"Without a strong hand, we could never have rebuilt our economy after the war or broken the American atomic monopoly—you yourself helped do that. You have no moral right to judge our generation—Stalin's generation—for its mistakes, for its brutality; you're now enjoying the fruits of our labor and our sacrifices.

"Convergence is a dream. We've got to be strong, stronger than the capitalists—then there'll be peace. If the imperialists use nuclear weapons, we'll retaliate at once with everything we've got and destroy every target necessary to ensure victory."

So our response would be an immediate, all-out nuclear attack on enemy cities and industry as well as on military targets! Most alarming, Slavsky ignored the question of what, other than military force, might prevent war. I pointed out that *Reflections* warned against exactly the kind of approach he was taking, in which life-and-death decisions are made by people who have usurped power (and privilege) without accepting the checks of free opinion and open debate. I raised the issue of Czechoslovakia: Was there any guarantee against Soviet intervention? Slavsky said that had been ruled out by the Central Committee, provided there was no overt counterrevolutionary violence, as occurred in Hungary.

A couple of weeks after this, Khariton told me that Slavsky opposed my return to the Installation. "You're to remain in Moscow for the time being," he said. This was tantamount to being fired.

On July 22 *Reflections* was published in the New York *Times* and later was widely reprinted. The International Publishers Association said that in 1968-69 more than 18 million copies were published around the world, putting me in third place after Mao Zedong and Lenin and ahead of Georges Simenon and Agatha Christie.

Reflections was well received by liberal intellectuals abroad. A kindred voice had reached them from behind the Iron Curtain—and from a member of a profession that in America was dominated by "hawks." On the other hand, my criticism of Soviet society appealed to conservatives, and everyone seemed pleased by my comments on the environment, my humanitarian concerns and my scenarios for the future.

The essay was widely read in the U.S.S.R. as well—samizdat was flourishing—but many people were punished for circulating *Reflections.* A driver from Dushanbe who had mailed my essay to a friend was sentenced to three years in a labor camp for defaming the Soviet system.

On Aug. 21 newspapers reported that Warsaw Pact troops had entered Czechoslovakia and were "fulfilling their international duty." The invasion had begun. The

defending against them. I wrote about the crimes of Stalinism and the need to expose them fully and the vital importance of freedom of opinion and democracy. I stressed the value of progress but warned that it must be scientifically managed and not left to chance. I outlined a program for mankind's future; my vision was somewhat Utopian, but I remain convinced that the exercise was worthwhile.

Later on, life—and Lusia [Elena Bonner, his second wife]—would teach me to pay more attention to individual victims of injustice, and a further step followed: recognition that human rights and an open society are fundamental to international confidence, security and progress.

I prefaced *Reflections* with an epigraph taken from Goethe's *Faust:*

Of freedom and of life he only is deserving
Who every day must conquer them anew.

The heroic romanticism of these lines echoes my own sense of life as both wonderful and tragic. Another aspect of the truth that complements Goethe's metaphor is contained in these lines by the postwar poet Alexander Mezhirov,

I lie in a trench under fire.
A man enters his home, from the cold.

Mezhirov understands that heroic exploits are not ends in themselves but are worthwhile only insofar as they enable other people to lead normal, peaceful lives. Not everyone need spend time in the trenches. The meaning of life is life itself: the daily routine that demands its own unobtrusive heroism. Goethe's lines are often read as an imperative call to revolutionary struggle, but there is nothing peremptory or fanatical in them once they are stripped of their poetic imagery. *Reflections* rejected all extremes, the intransigence of revolutionaries and reactionaries alike. It called for compromise and for progress moderated by enlightened conservatism and caution. Marx notwithstanding, evolution is a better "locomotive of history" than revolution: the "battle" I had in mind was nonviolent.

"For God's Sake, Don't Do That"

I flew to Moscow on April 1, bringing a typed copy of the essay. Historian Roy Medvedev came to see me that evening, and I exchanged it for the final chapters of his book on Stalin. Medvedev showed my essay to friends (which I had given him permission to do), and he passed on their comments. After making a few changes, I gave the manuscript back to Medvedev. He was going to produce a dozen or more carbon copies. Some, he warned me, might end up abroad. I replied that I had taken that into account. (We were communicating in writing to foil eavesdroppers.)

On May 18, I paid a call on Yuli Khariton, scientific director of the Installation. I mentioned that I was writing an essay on war and peace, ecology and freedom of expression. Khariton asked what I intended to do with it. "I'll give it to samizdat," I answered, referring to the underground network that had sprung up for circulating dissident writing. "For God's sake, don't do that," he said. "It's too late to stop it now," I confessed.



IVAN SIMON

NEAR PRAGUE, 1968: "REAL SOCIALISM" SHOWS ITS TRUE COLORS

As the 1960s drew on, Andrei Sakharov inched toward a break with the regime he had served so ably as the master builder of its thermonuclear-weapons program. His convictions and the growing repression in the U.S.S.R. during the Brezhnev years moved him to identify ever more closely with dissent in his own country and abroad. In 1966 he took part in his first human rights demonstration, a one-minute silent protest in Pushkin Square. In 1967 he wrote a letter to Communist Party leader Leonid Brezhnev defending imprisoned dissidents. That prompted an angry reaction from Efim Slavsky, head of the Ministry of Medium Machine Building, which supervised the Soviet nuclear program. "Sakharov is a good scientist," said Slavsky. "But as a politician he's muddleheaded, and we'll be taking measures." Those included a pay cut of nearly 50% and a demotion at the Installation, the secret "atomic city" east of Moscow, where he was then working on the peaceful uses of nuclear explosions. But in the following year, 1968, Sakharov definitively broke with the Soviet system, and far harsher measures were soon to come.



JURI ROST

AT HOME IN MOSCOW IN THE LAST YEAR OF HIS LIFE

Years in Exile

By ANDREI SAKHAROV

By the beginning of 1968, I felt a growing compulsion to speak out on the fundamental issues of our age. I was influenced by my life experience and a feeling of personal responsibility, reinforced by the part I'd played in the development of the hydrogen bomb, the special knowledge I'd gained about thermonuclear warfare, my bitter struggle to ban nuclear testing and my familiarity with the Soviet system. I hoped that such notions as an open society, convergence of the capitalist and communist systems, and world government might ease the tragic crisis of our age. In 1968 I took my decisive step by publishing *Reflections on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence, and Intellectual Freedom*.

My work on *Reflections* happened to coincide with the Prague Spring. What so many of us in the socialist countries had been dreaming of finally seemed to be coming to pass in Czechoslovakia: democracy, including freedom of expression and abolition of censorship; reform of the economic and social systems; curbs on the security forces; and full disclosure of the crimes of the Stalin era (the "Gottwald era" in Czechoslovakia). Even from afar, we were caught up in all the hopes of the catchwords "Prague Spring" and "socialism with a human face."

Events in the Soviet Union echoed those in Prague but on a much reduced scale. In the campaign for the dissidents Alexander Ginzburg, Yuri Galanskov and Vera Lashkova (who were tried in January 1968), more than 1,000 signatures—an extraordinary number under Soviet conditions—were collected, mainly from the intelligentsia. A few years earlier, no one would have dreamed of publicly defending such "hostile elements." That and other efforts were a sort of Prague Spring in miniature. They frightened the KGB into taking tough countermeasures: firing, blacklisting, public reprimand, expulsion from the party. After 1968, when everyone understood the consequences, people refused to lend their names to such initiatives.

To my shame, I must admit that the campaign simply passed me by, just as had the 1964 banishment of poet Joseph Brodsky from Leningrad and the 1965 arrests of the dissident writers Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel.

Around the end of January 1968, a friend suggested that I write an article on the role of the intelligentsia in today's world. The idea appealed to me, and soon I was writing at the Installation from 7 p.m. to midnight. My wife Klava was ambivalent: she knew full well the potential consequences for us and our three children, but she allowed me complete freedom of action. By this time her health was beginning to deteriorate.

My essay laid a theoretical foundation for virtually the entire range of my future public activities. I wanted to alert readers to the grave perils threatening the human race—thermonuclear extinction, ecological catastrophe, famine, an uncontrolled population explosion, alienation and dogmatic distortion of our conception of reality.

I argued for convergence, for a rapprochement of the socialist and capitalist systems that could eliminate or substantially reduce these dangers. Economic, social and ideological convergence should bring about a scientifically governed, democratic, pluralistic society free of intolerance and dogmatism, a humanitarian society that would care for the earth and its future and would embody the positive features of both systems.

I wrote about thermonuclear missiles—their enormous destructive power, their relatively low cost, the difficulty of

From *Memoirs*. ©1990 by Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. Translated by Richard Lourie

Milestones

BORN. To **Ivan Lendl,** 30, the world's top-ranked professional tennis player, and **Samantha Frankel Lendl,** 22: their first child, a daughter; in Greenwich, Conn. Name: Marika Lee Lendl. Weight: 8 lbs. 3 oz.

BORN. To **Caroline Kennedy Schlossberg,** 32, lawyer, and **Edwin Schlossberg,** 44, author and designer of museum exhibits: their second child, second daughter; in New York City. Name: Tatiana Celia Kennedy Schlossberg. Weight: 7 lbs. 10 oz.

BORN. To **Amy Irving,** 36, actress *(Crossing Delancey),* and Brazilian film director **Bruno Barreto,** 35 *(Dona Flor and Her Two Husbands):* their first child, a son; in Santa Monica, Calif. Name: Gabriel Davis Barreto. Weight: 9 lbs. 2 oz.

INDICTED. Marion S. Barry Jr., 54, mayor of Washington; on six counts of misdemeanor drug offenses (cocaine possession, conspiracy to possess cocaine), less than four weeks before he is to go on trial on eight counts (including three felony charges of lying) handed up after his arrest in January in an FBI sting operation; by a federal grand jury in Washington. Despite his legal problems and treatment for alcoholism and prescription-drug addiction, he has been acting as though he will run for a fourth term; a felony conviction would make him ineligible to hold the office.

DIED. Carl R. ("Spitz") **Channell,** 44, the first person to plead guilty in the Iran-*contra* scandal; of injuries suffered on March 15 when he was hit by a car; in Washington. Public relations man Channell admitted in 1987 to conspiring to defraud the Government by using a tax-exempt foundation to raise millions for *contra* supplies.

DIED. Walker Percy, 73, pre-eminent Southern novelist and essayist whose first published novel, *The Moviegoer,* won a National Book Award for fiction for 1961; of cancer; in Covington, La. His six novels, among them *Love in the Ruins* and *Lancelot,* dramatized his chosen theme, "the dislocation of man in the modern age." Alabama-born, Percy forsook his medical training and Protestantism and turned to writing and Roman Catholicism. He spun his existential view of humans into muscular and compelling stories that place him in the Southern pantheon of writers including William Faulkner, Thomas Wolfe and Eudora Welty.

DIED. Pauline Frederick, 84, a pioneer female star in broadcasting; in Lake Forest, Ill. Known for her brisk, cogent analysis of world events, she served from 1953 to 1974 as NBC's U.N. correspondent. In 1976 she was the first woman journalist to moderate a presidential debate.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

EMBARGOED FOR RELEASE
UNTIL 9:00 P.M. EST
WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 31, 1990

FACT SHEET

The President's CFE Initiative on U.S. and Soviet Manpower

After initial discussions with NATO Allies, the President concluded that changes which have taken place in Europe over the last three months have made it possible to propose lower levels in the area of greatest concentration of forces -- Central and Eastern Europe. However, the United States will maintain significant military forces in Europe as long as our Allies desire our presence as part of a common security effort.

Therefore, in his State of the Union address to Congress on January 31, President Bush proposed to revise NATO's current position in the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Negotiations to lower substantially the levels of U.S. and Soviet ground and air force manpower in Central and Eastern Europe to 195,000 on each side. Forces withdrawn will be demobilized. There would be approximately 225,000 U.S. ground and air force personnel in Europe after CFE reductions are completed. The proposal responds to rapid changes in Eastern Europe and is designed to help propel the CFE negotiations to an early conclusion in 1990.

The President's initiative would supersede an earlier proposal establishing a level of 275,000 each on U.S. and Soviet ground and air force manpower stationed outside of their respective national territories in the Atlantic to the Urals region.

The President has concluded that this proposal reflects the minimum level of U.S. forces needed in Europe to protect American interests and to sustain NATO's strategy of forward defense and flexible response. Even if -- as we expect -- Soviet forces in this region are reduced even further, the United States does not envision the further reduction of its forces in Europe below this new level.

* * *

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Copy Greg Peterson Chris W.

speechwriters

DATE: 2-2-90

TO: David Demarest

FROM: ANDY CARD Andy

F.Y.I.

On the trip today, Lamar Alexander mentioned to the President that UT's black basketball coach, Wade Houston (?), would be an excellent role-model to highlight. The President said he would "keep him in mind" and "make sure the staff did too."

[redacted]

90 FEB 6 A9:44

Henry A. Kissinger

Old Fears and the New Germany

If the West links German unification with European integration, it will defeat both.

As it has been since the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, the future of Germany is again at the core of the revolutionary changes rippling across Europe. And the reaction of the Western democracies seems to prove George Bernard Shaw's aphorism that "there are two tragedies in life. One is to lose your heart's desire. The other is to gain it."

Having deplored the division of Europe for nearly half a century, the Western democracies cannot decide how to relate the eruption of freedom in Eastern Europe to the traditional policies of Atlantic cohesion and European integration. Trying to pour new wine into old bottles, they seek to reconcile their proclamations of the past with their premonitions of the future by formulae so ambiguous that they can be interpreted to support incompatible objectives.

For years, conventional wisdom denied the existence of any problem. The Soviet grip on Eastern Europe and especially on the German Democratic Republic seemed unshakable. It was therefore expected that West European integration would move much more rapidly than German unification.

Events both unforeseen and unsettling now belie these assumptions. Soviet power in Eastern Europe has collapsed. The Brezhnev doctrine, which committed the Red Army's support to Communist regimes, has been abandoned. These events have exposed a gap between the West's declaratory policy and its actions which, if not bridged, could wreck the achievements of four decades of Western statesmanship.

To be sure, Western leaders continue to reaffirm their commitment to German self-determination. But they all hedge their pronouncements with conditions that amount to turning the Atlantic Alliance and European integration into obstacles to German unification and, in the long term, barriers to the pro-Western orientation of the German state.


British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, for instance, has placed German unification at the end of a process of democratization of Eastern Europe that includes the Soviet Union and that by implication preserves the East German state as a separate sovereign entity for a period expected to last 10 to 15 years. At a recent press conference, French President Francois Mitterrand declared that European integration should precede German unification, which should take the form of a special position of the German Democratic Republic within the European Community.

The American stand has been more complex. President Bush and Secretary of State James A. Baker III have put forward four principles that seek to reconcile German national aspirations with allaying historic European fears: that the principle of self-determination be preserved without prejudice to its outcome; that German unification take place within the framework of NATO and the European Community; that unification be part of a step-by-step process and that Germany reiterate its support for the principles of the Helsinki Act regarding its borders.

Statesmen forget at their peril that arcane language is not in itself reality. The gradualism being preached is not tied to any specific program, nor has any Western leader defined German self-determination or a procedure for achieving it. As a result, the Western democracies run a huge risk of turning into partners of the Soviet Union in defending the status quo and in sharing in German eyes the opprobrium for the division of Germany heretofore borne solely by the Soviet Union.

For decades the West has suspected Moscow of having a German card up its sleeve. It would be ironic if the West now handed that card to the Soviets just as democracy is prevailing in Eastern Europe.

The danger of making the Kremlin and the East German Communists the key to German national aspirations results not only from Western pronouncements but also from Western actions. When President Mitterrand and Secretary Baker recently visited East Germany and met with leaders with whom contact had been shunned for 40 years, who have been all but repudiated by the East German public and who even now are making it difficult for democratic parties to organize. And the four Allied commanders jumped at a Soviet proposal to hold for the first time since 1971 a meeting of the so-called *Kommandatura*, the four-power control commission for Berlin. These gestures, by treating the East German state as the moral and political equivalent of the national states of Eastern Europe, imply a Western interest in the status quo in Germany. Over time this will generate a sense that German national aspirations are incompatible with the Western orientation of the Federal Republic.



ASSOCIATED PRESS

"For the 200 years prior to German unification, as many wars were sparked by Germany's division as by its subsequent unity."

Article 7 of the treaty that laid the basis for German rearmament pledged the three Western powers to cooperate in working toward German unification. In the stormy debate that followed, the advocates of German integration into NATO were accused by their opponents of jeopardizing the ultimate unity of the German nation. A similar—if less passionate—debate took place over the issue of European integration. After an initial period of hesitation, all German democratic parties committed themselves to Atlantic as well as European institutions, and they have carried out their commitments for 40 years.

Germany's democratic allies should think twice before they risk the Western connection of the Federal Republic by forcing German leaders to choose between their allies and their national goals. They must not create a German problem in the name of avoiding it. Right now the West German political campaign obscures these dangers, because the opposition parties have chosen to blame Chancellor Helmut Kohl's alleged heavy-handedness for the Federal Republic's frustrations. But this internal quarrel is bound to be temporary. For Kohl represents the part of the German political spectrum most committed to the Western connection. The alternative policy on both the left and the right is likely to be far more assertive.

In particular, the question of how to treat East Germany internationally brooks no delay. In Eastern Europe democratic institutions are likely to enhance domestic stability. In the German Democratic Republic, the opposite is certain to occur; free elections will generate pressures for unification. No formula can alter the fact that the principal reason for the existence of the East German state has been as a Communist outpost of the Soviet Union.

Of course, if the East German population desires a separate state, no country in the world would object—probably not even the Federal Republic. But the Western nations would be taking a fateful step if they were to incite such an evolution by their own policies.

Whatever the time scale for German unification or its nature, the direction of it must be established within the next year. Once two German states—especially democratic ones—become fixtures of the European equilibrium, German unification can be pursued only at the cost of an international crisis. European politics will revert to the patterns of the 18th and 19th centuries. Outside powers—especially the Soviet Union—will be given an opportunity to manipulate inter-German rivalry. For the 200 years prior to German unification, as many wars were sparked by Germany's division as by its subsequent unity.

In truth, the choice of the Western democracies is not so great as their public pronouncements suggest. For any attempt to make progress toward German unification conditional on progress toward European integration will defeat both—this is the weakness of the American principles. It will sooner or later turn German nationalism against European integration and Atlantic unity. And it will probably prove counterproductive with respect to European integration by giving those who fear German unity and are not enthusiastic about European integration the opportunity to kill two birds with one stone.

Policy cannot invent reality; it can only use it. The time frames for German unification and European integration are simply not the same. The former is driven by fundamental emotions fueled by established democratic procedures, while the latter reflects prudent calculations driven by technical bureaucratic procedures.

The real choice before the Western allies is whether they fear German unity more than they prize European integration and Atlantic cohesion. The way to avoid German preponderance is not to ascribe to it motives contrary to 40 years of responsible German policy, even less to divide that country. Should Germany, against all present indications and common sense, seek the road of hegemony, Britain and France always have the option of increasing their cooperation within the framework of European and Atlantic institutions. And the United States would surely use its influence to prevent an outcome that it opposed in two wars.

Several factors drive German unification. The dissolution of Germany's internal frontiers will force the Federal Republic to move rapidly toward the equalization of living conditions in the two parts of Germany. Otherwise, a mass exodus of the East German population is probable, exceeding the capacities of the Federal Republic to sustain. Common economic policies are inevitable; a common currency cannot be far behind.

Another impetus will be supplied by the elections scheduled for the two parts of Germany later this year: in the East in May, in the Federal Republic in December. After initially declaring a hands-off policy, the West German political parties are apparently ready to make a major effort in the East German elections, because the outcome might give the winner a leg up in the West German election campaign. Thus the same parties will likely prevail in East Germany as in the Federal Republic, if perhaps in different combinations. It is highly improbable that the policies toward unification will—being essentially nonpartisan—vary on either side of the dividing line.

Therefore the appeals of Germany's allies for gradualism are curiously irrelevant, and assurances to the Soviet Union that no effort will be made to accelerate the process could be dangerous. In fact, the victors of World War II have no realistic method to implement their misgivings. The Western allies are reduced to exhortations or to threats of a Soviet option—as Mitterrand has been hinting. But the threat is not very plausible, since in a race to Moscow, Germany is probably better placed than its neighbors.

As for the Soviet Union, it surely has the physical power to prevent German unification. But to do so by force would wreck the "Gorbachev fever" in the Federal Republic on which Moscow has staked so much and which it has worked hard to foster. The Kremlin can also offer unification in return for Germany's loosening its Western ties. The least Germany's allies can do is to avoid providing incentives to Germany for such a course.

The only realistic way to moderate the pace of events and to keep Germany in the Western community is to come to an agreement on the desired outcome and then to plan together the precise step to reach the goals. Like many contemporaries who experienced the Hitler regime and World War II, I would have suffered no sense of deprivation had the issue of German unification remained in limbo for a while longer. Now that it has arisen, we no longer have the option of deferring it to a more convenient moment. A faster pace of European integration is highly desirable. But paradoxically it is most likely in the context of a Western plan on German unification. This is the best way of ensuring that European integration and the Atlantic Alliance are not perceived in Germany as a subterfuge for delaying unification. Particular steps can be staged over a reasonable time period, so long as the process moves toward an acceptable objective.

For all these reasons, the confederation proposal of Kohl—greeted so lukewarmly by his allies—represents the minimum compatible with German aspirations and international necessities. Overcoming their misgivings, the allies should develop a long-range program in four stages:

- As a first step, the elaboration of a timetable for German confederation to be completed within a two-year period. The Confederation should have a common foreign policy as its goal.
- The implementation of another major step toward European political integration beyond what is envisaged for 1992 should be completed within a fixed time period after the establishment of the German confederation. An important component of this process should be a specific program to enable the countries of Eastern Europe to enter into association with the European community.
- Concurrent negotiation of a new European security system as a step toward full unification.
- The development of a program to move from confederation to whatever form of German unity a process of self-determination generates.

The discussion of a European security system must await another article. For present purposes it is enough to stress that the opportunity to build a truly new international system must not be lost in a maze of bureaucratic formulae masking old fears. It requires a clear vision of what lies ahead and above all an initiative equal to the challenge before us.

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Charles Krauthammer

Declare Victory In Vienna

And then go to the opera.

What on Earth are we doing still at the conventional arms talks in Vienna? Negotiations continue over how many Soviet and American troops may remain in Europe—in his State of the Union address, the president proposed yet another number, 195,000 each—at a time when Europe has made it abundantly clear that it wants a Soviet troop level of zero.

The CFE (Conventional Forces in Europe) talks in Vienna have been superseded by events. When they began there was a Warsaw Pact. There were satellite governments in Eastern Europe. It made sense to negotiate a reduction of the Soviet troop advantage down to a level of equality with ours.

But now everything has changed. There is no Warsaw Pact. By summer there may be no East Germany. Next year there may not even be a U.S.S.R. The president's new proposal seems to be a response to the revolution of '89, but because it cannot shake the American obsession with arms control, it is in fact a step backward.

Once again, arms control proves not just irrelevant but counterproductive. Why, after all, are we legitimizing the presence of 195,000 Soviet troops in the "Central Zone" of Eastern Europe? The people of that zone—Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary—are quite clear as to how many Soviet troops they want. Czechoslovakia and Hungary have officially asked the Soviets for a troop level of zero. Lech Walesa just three weeks ago demanded the same for Poland. (General Wojciech Jaruzelski disagrees, but he is yesterday's man.) And in East Germany, even the Communists have now called for German reunification—and a reunified Germany, whether neutral or NATO, cannot be home to Soviet troops.

Yet here comes the United States saying that it is quite prepared to see 195,000 Soviet troops in countries where they are not wanted.

This legitimation of the Soviet presence undermines the brave East European democrats who demand an immediate Soviet evacuation. They are desperate to get rid of their Soviet occupiers now while the going is good, i.e., while Gorbachev is in control. They fear that if they wait, some calamity might intervene and cost them their historic opportunity for independence.

CFE delays the process. We and the Soviets are now engaged in months of arduous negotiation about verification procedures, counting rules and similar niceties. This week's breakthrough is a Western agreement to accept separate limits for combat planes and "air defense interceptors," a category of plane that until last Monday we said did not exist.

This is all quite surreal. If, as the East Europeans demand and as eventually must happen, the Soviets leave Eastern Europe completely, who needs all these negotiated categories and compromises? Zero is zero. The CFE process is simply prolonging the Soviet stay in Eastern Europe at a time when every other force, natural and political, is demanding their departure.

Bush's 195,000 proposal has a second effect just as pernicious. It perpetuates the CFE symmetry between the level of American and Soviet troops. The symmetry is false morally and mischievous politically. The Soviet troops are occupiers. American troops are there by invitation of freely elected governments.

Politically the symmetry is just as noxious. The Soviet presence in East Europe is headed to zero. Therefore, as long as we keep proposing equal troop levels for the United States and the U.S.S.R., we imply that the Soviet evacuation of Europe should be accompanied by an American evacuation.

This is a bad idea. First, because our allies want an American presence. Some, like the British, are quite fearful that we may indeed be packing our bags. As in Asia, the presence of American troops is almost universally felt by the locals to be not a threat but a kind of insurance against instability.

Second, a mutual Soviet and American evacuation of Europe is not a truly symmetrical act. Russia is a Eurasian land power. Evacuation means pulling back a few hundred miles behind the Polish border. For the Soviets to return to Europe in a crisis means crashing through a few toll booths at the Polish frontier. For the United States to return means crossing the Atlantic, a 3,000-mile wide submarine lair.

It is true that Americans might at some point decide to leave Europe regardless. Fine. By all means, let us have a debate at home and with our allies about the appropriate level, if any, of American troops in a post-Communist Europe. But that level should be determined by Western needs, not by arbitrary numbers chosen to produce CFE symmetry and State of the Union applause.

What to do? Declare that the CFE negotiations in Vienna have succeeded grandly. That we and the Soviets are now agreed in principle to reduce our forces to a ceiling of 195,000 on either side. That we believe further reductions might be in order and should immediately be negotiated bilaterally between the concerned countries.

Such a declaration would allow events to follow nature. The Warsaw Pact countries would then proceed to ask the Soviets to reduce their troops to zero. And we could then conduct a conversation with ourselves and our allies as to how many Americans should remain on the continent.

We don't need a CFE treaty or formal signing ceremony, however useful a photo opportunity it offers a president. We should declare victory at Vienna, shake hands with the Soviets, compliment them on their vision and forthrightness and wish them well in their negotiations with their Warsaw Pact friends. Then we all go to the opera.

Never will an arms control negotiation have ended more successfully.

Charles Krauthammer

What Should We Defend?

"Tactics is what you do when there is something to do. Strategy is what you do when there is nothing to do."

—Chess Grandmaster Savielly Tartakower

There is little for the United States to do in the world. Things are going our way so splendidly abroad that wisely we dare not interfere. Accordingly, a great hue and cry has arisen over the Potomac demanding a Grand Strategy of the future. Richard Gephardt and other strategic thinkers are deeply dismayed that such a vision is not forthcoming from the White House.

Great strategic visions, however, require some clear idea of what the future is going to look like. We have no idea what the world is going to look like next year, let alone next decade. How many states will inhabit the U.S.S.R. in the year 2000, for example? Very sober Sovietologists have offered me estimates ranging from eight to 14.

And we know from history what happens when you devise grand strategy on a misapprehension of the future. Toward the end of World War II the Roosevelt administration thought that in the postwar world the United Nations would play a central if not decisive role in international relations. Accordingly, at Yalta, Roosevelt bargained away Poland in return for Stalin's acceding to American demands regarding . . . voting procedures in the U.N.! Sometimes it is best to wait for the future before trying to shape it.

There are, however, some very real tactical items that ought to be on the American agenda and that have been getting lost in the cries for grand strategy. Our immediate tasks are three.

1) Stay in Europe. That means resisting domestic isolationists (and European, especially German, neutralists, who would have us out. There is no need to stay in Europe at current force levels, but leaving it entirely would be disastrous. The reunification of Germany is a seismic threat to European stability. The United States is the one Atlantic power not viscerally afraid of Germany. It is also the only one that all of Europe trusts. A strategist should always be a pessimist. The best insurance against an outbreak of European instability is a continued American presence on the continent.

2) Keep trade open. The difference in prosperity between the post-World War II and the post-World War I era is due in large part to the openness of the world's trading system. The immediate task for the United States is to avoid a trade war with Japan, regardless of how attractive that prospect is to American politicians hungry for a new—preferably nonwhite—enemy now that the Soviets have retired from the scene.

3) Bankroll democracy. It is absurd for a country with a $5 trillion economy to plead poverty when asked for contributions of a billion dollars or less from countries as important as Panama, Nicaragua, and Poland. President Bush's proposal of a "Fund for Democracy"—$300 million for Nicaragua, $500 million for Panama drawn from the defense budget—is the right idea, but still too miserly. With the Soviets in eclipse and with new democracies on the financial brink, our best foreign policy investment is to bail out the potential allies that have fallen into our lap in Central America and Central Europe. We have correctly invested $300 billion a year in defense as a way of securing our position in the world. Why not redirect 5 percent of defense dollars into a $15 billion democracy fund that could be moved around to shore up friends in distress?

Where to take the money from? Here is where one has to make some strategic guesses about the future. They are guesses. Because we don't know where future threats will come from, we might begin to reshape our defenses to conform with our geography. At a time when history is of little help—we have as little idea what is going to happen in the next six months as we had of what has happened over the last six—geography is the best guide. We are an island continent.

The worst thing we could do is fund the past.

Our commercial republic requires free passage for its success. That means control of the seas, skies and space.

Congress, however, would prefer to cut bases overseas, research on space defenses, naval deployments (as well as a few sexy big-ticket items like the MX) and keep afloat politically popular military bases in the American interior that have absolutely no military utility. At a time when the country is starved for new airports and prisons, maintaining make-work domestic military bases that could otherwise be usefully employed is a particularly stupid idea.

True, there is no need for immediate deployment of a space defense against the possibility of Soviet attack. But now that even Iraq has launched a three-stage intercontinental rocket (and shown adeptness at chemical warfare), it would be folly to slacken the pace of research for some future space defense.

We have inherited from Britain, another island nation, the role of defender of the seas. It takes no great imagination to see that in the next century space will play the role that the high seas have today. Forget grand strategy. Whatever the shape of the world of the future, American destiny will be tied to its control of space and the seas. The very worst thing we could do would be to fund the past, represented by redundant military bases at home, by robbing our space and naval forces of the future.

Upheaval in the East: Baker's Prediction

Arms Control

Baker Cautions Soviets On Bidding Over Troops

By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN
Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, Feb. 7 — Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d said today that he would not be surprised if the Soviet President, Mikhail S. Gorbachev, proposed to cut American and Soviet troop levels in Europe to even deeper levels than those suggested last week by President Bush.

Mr. Baker, in what appeared to be a signal to the Soviets, made clear that Washington was not inviting such a proposal and, in fact, would find it most unwelcome, because the Bush Administration does not want to slash its troop levels more deeply at this time.

At the same time that Mr. Baker was cautioning Moscow not to start a bidding war over troop cuts in Europe, the Soviet Government newspaper Izvestia was warning the Secretary of State not to try to take advantage of Mr. Gorbachev at this time of tremendous domestic turmoil in the Soviet Union.

The Secretary of State flew into Moscow today from Prague for three days of talks with Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze and President Gorbachev. The meetings were scheduled two months ago, after President Bush and Mr. Gorbachev agreed at Malta to speed up the negotiations for completion of a treaty limiting long-range nuclear missiles so that it might be signed by the time of their next summit meeting in June.

Arrives at End of Party Talks

Mr. Baker, however, found his arrival coinciding with the close of a critical gathering of the Communist Party leadership, which has decided to give up its monopoly on power. Mr. Shevardnadze had to leave the meeting while it was still in progress to greet Mr. Baker and go over the agenda for their talks, which will begin in earnest on Thursday.

Speaking to reporters before his one-on-one meeting with the Secretary, Mr. Shevardnadze said, "The Soviet Union is living through a very interesting period of renewal, and everybody will be able to ascertain this soon."

Baker aides said that given the raucuos nature of the Communist Party talks, they had no idea how well the Soviet leadership would be able to focus on the substance of the Secretary's visit, which will include discussions about German unification, new American ideas for resolving the Afghan conflict and ways to advance the conventional arms talks in Vienna.

Speaking to reporters on the flight into Moscow, Mr. Baker said he anticipated an answer from the Soviet leadership to President Bush's proposal, made in his State of the Union address on Jan. 31, that the United States and the Soviet Union reduce their troop levels in Central Europe to 195,000 men each — which would be a cut of about 60,000 men for the United States and 370,000 for the Soviet Union.

Ceiling for Soviet Union

Brent Scowcroft, President Bush's national security adviser, said at a NATO defense meeting in Munich on Saturday that Washington viewed the 195,000 figure as a ceiling for the Soviet Union and a floor for the United States.


Asked if Mr. Gorbachev might try to outbid Mr. Bush and press for even lower mutual reductions, especially since Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia have indicated that they want Soviet troops out now, Mr. Baker said:

"I don't know what the Soviets might or might not have in mind. I would only say that I should not be, and will not be, surprised if we see such a proposal. That is not to say that we are inviting one in any way."

Mr. Baker continued, "We think that the President's proposal is the right one — that it stands on its own two feet and represents what should be the state of play at this time."

Asked to explain why the Administration would not invite deeper cuts on both sides, Mr. Baker said: "Well, because we have just made a proposal of our own which we think is the correct proposal and it is not up to us to go to the Soviet Union inviting amendments to the President's proposal."

Mr. Baker's remarks would seem to have a personal, political and strategic dimension. Personally, the last time he visited Moscow in May 1989, Mr. Gorbachev appeared to catch him off guard by proposing a unilateral withdrawal of 500 nuclear weapons from



Associated Press

Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d, left, said it would not surprise him if the Soviet Union sought troop cutbacks in Europe greater than those suggested by President Bush. Mr. Baker and Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze began three days of talks in Moscow.

NATO Chief Says He Accepted Cuts On Bush's Urging

By MICHAEL R. GORDON
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 7 — The commander of NATO forces in Europe told Congress today that he had recommended against President Bush's proposal to cut American and Soviet troops in central Europe to 195,000, but has been later persuaded that such a

Czechoslovakia

Prague Reclaiming Its Position at Center of Europe


By HENRY KAMM
Special to The New York Times

PRAGUE, Feb. 7 — For Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier and other Czechoslovak officials seeing off Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d at the airport today, the visit was a significant success not only for the material assistance Mr. Baker offered.

Together with President Vaclav Havel's trip to the United States beginning Feb. 20, Mr. Baker's 26 hours here represented a major step toward a principal objective in what Mr. Havel has called the "velvet revolution," a phrase borrowed by Mr. Baker in his speech at Charles University. The goal is to return this Slavic nation of distinctly Western civilization and culture to its central position in Europe, open to East and West.

"First of all, the visit ended a long period of frozen, nearly nonexistent contact between America and Czechoslovakia," said Zdenek Vanicek, political director of the Foreign Ministry department dealing with the United States and other Western nations. "We hope, and will do our best to see to it, that the time of merely formal, superficial contacts without contents is over."

How Vaclav Havel and other Czechoslovak writers have viewed the role of literature in an authoritarian society. The Arts, page C17.



Mr. Vanicek said that in line with Czechoslovakia's policy of ending isolation from countries not in the Eastern bloc, Foreign Minister Moshe Arens of Israel was due here on Thursday to establish full diplomatic ties. Before Prague severed ties during the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, the two nations did not have relations at the ambassadorial level.

Czechoslovakia will be the second formerly Communist nation to normalize relations with Israel. Hungary did so last year.

Ties With Vatican Improve

Mr. Vanicek said Czechoslovakia ended a working visit to Switzerland and was continuing his series of talks with Western Government ministers and bankers in West Germany.

Two major ambassadorial appointments of recent days are further signals of the sharp turn in Prague's international stance.

Rita Klimova, a dissident economist who spent seven years in the United States as a Jewish refugee from the German occupation regime, has been named Ambassador to Washington.

The appointment of Rudolf Slansky, also a dissident, as Ambassador to the Soviet Union will soon be announced. Mr. Slansky is the son and namesake of the former general secretary of the Communist Party who was hanged as a "bourgeois Jewish nationalist" in 1952 after a Soviet-inspired show trial.

Havel to Address Congress

WASHINGTON, Feb. 7 (Reuters) —

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Photo Copy Preservation

By MICHAEL R. GORDON
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 7 — The commander of NATO forces in Europe told Congress today that he had recommended against President Bush's proposal for a mutual troop cut, American and Soviet troops in central Europe to 195,000, but had been later persuaded that such a cut was acceptable.

"I don't think it is talking out of school to say that my recommendations were higher," Gen. John R. Galvin, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, told the Senate Armed Services Committee.

In announcing Mr. Bush's troop-cut proposal, the White House said the plan was the product of thorough consultation among senior American leaders and within NATO, giving no hint of reservations on the part of American military officials.

But a Pentagon official, who asked not to be identified, said the proposal was devised by a small group of officials and that General Galvin was consulted very late in the process.

General Galvin told reporters after testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee that he was consulted by Gen. Colin L. Powell, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "days" before President Bush's State of the Union speech announcing the troop-cut proposal.

Even though his recommendation for higher troop levels were rejected, General Galvin said that he was pleased by Mr. Bush's proposal. He had been persuaded, he said, by General Powell that he "had not given enough credit to the situation that would exist when the Soviet Union moved forces out of Eastern Europe as a result of various arrangements with the Warsaw Pact," referring to the call by leaders in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland for the withdrawal of Soviet troops.

General Galvin said in his testimony that implementating Mr. Bush's proposal would lead to the closing of 50 American installations in Europe. He later said a reduction to 195,000 troops would lead NATO to put emphasis on highly maneuverable units to carry out its defense plans.

proposal and it is not up to us to go to the Soviet Union inviting amendments to the President's proposal."

Mr. Baker's remarks would seem to have a personal, political and strategic dimension. Personally, the last time he visited Moscow in May 1989, Mr. Gorbachev appeared to catch him off guard by proposing a unilateral withdrawal of 500 nuclear weapons from Eastern Europe and by making a far-reaching conventional arms reduction offer.

Mr. Baker found himself showered with articles depicting him as novice who was outmaneuvered and taken by surprise by Mr. Gorbachev. He and his staff have made it clear that there is virtually nothing the Soviet leader could propose this time around that they have not anticipated, including further troop cuts.

Politically, the Bush Administration is in the middle of a campaign to stop the Democrat-dominated Congress from slashing the proposed defense budget for fiscal 1991. Any headline-grabbing proposal by Mr. Gorbachev would only add to the arguments of those favoring spending less on defense.

Seen as a Minimum

Strategically, the Bush Administration is convinced that 195,000 men is the minimum number of troops the United States needs in Europe at this time, both to deter any potential threat that could arise from an increasingly unstable Soviet Union and, in order to reassure America's allies that Washington is not abandoning them just at the moment when a resurgent, reunfied Germany appears to be a real possibility in the heart of the Continent.

But if Mr. Baker is worried about being upstaged by Mr. Gorbachev, it appears the Soviet leaders are no less worried about what the Americans might be carrying in their briefcases. Aleksandr Bovin, a prominent Soviet political commentator, wrote today in Izvestia that the Americans are well aware that the transformation in the east of Europe, and conflicts and difficulties within the U.S.S.R., weaken the positions and narrow the room for maneuver of the Soviet leadership.



Associated Press

History for Sale in Berlin

A street vendor in West Berlin near the Brandenburg Gate selling uniforms and decorations of the East German Army to passers-by. He also offered pieces of the Berlin wall.

Prague severed ties during the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, the two nations did not have relations at the ambassadorial level.

Czechoslovakia will be the second formerly Communist nation to normalize relations with Israel. Hungary did so last year.

Ties With Vatican Improve

Mr. Vanicek said Czechoslovakia also was pleased by a rapid improvement in its notoriously bad relations with the Vatican. In a sign of the improvement after decades of repression of the Roman Catholic Church here, the Rev. Roberto Tucci, a senior Vatican official, arrived in Prague on the same day as Mr. Baker to organize an April visit by Pope John Paul II.

Mr. Vanicek disclosed that the Government had informed Mr. Baker that it was removing a long-festering irritant in relations with the United States. On May 6, Mr. Baker was told, celebrations will be held in the industrial city of Pilsen and elsewhere to mark the 45th anniversary of the liberation of western Bohemia by the United States Army.

To maintain a fiction that only the Soviet Union had freed Czechoslovakia from German occupation, the Communists since they seized power in 1948 had forbidden such tributes to the United States and removed plaques of gratitude that had been mounted in various places. Many have been hidden by citizens and are to be replaced.

The urgency that Czechoslovakia attaches to creating normal relations with the West was put into sharp focus for Mr. Baker as he arrived here Tuesday morning. His official host, Mr. Dienstbier, was not at the airport to welcome him but was himself arriving in Stockholm for a day's visit to restore good relations. Until the overthrow of the Communist regime here, Sweden took a hard line against Czechoslovakia to protest its persecution and imprisonment of dissidents like Mr. Havel and Mr. Dienstbier.

Next week, the Foreign Minister will visit New York as guest of the Council on Foreign Relations.

It was also announced today that Finance Minister Vaclav Klaus had also a dissident, as Ambassador to the Soviet Union will soon be announced. Mr. Slansky is the son and namesake of the former general secretary of the Communist Party who was hanged as a "bourgeois Jewish nationalist" in 1952 after a Soviet-inspired show trial.

Havel to Address Congress

WASHINGTON, Feb. 7 (Reuters) — President Havel is to address a joint meeting of Congress on Feb. 21 during his trip to the United States, Speaker of the House Thomas S. Foley and the Senate Democratic leader, George J. Mitchell, said today. In November, the Polish Solidarity leader, Lech Walesa, addressed a joint meeting of Congress and received an ecstatic reception.

Soviets Ask Czechs To Extend the Time To Pull Out Troops

MOSCOW, Feb. 7 (Reuters) — The Soviet Union told Czechoslovakia today that it needed more time to withdraw the 75,000 Soviet troops in in that country, East European diplomats said.

They said the Soviet side made its stand clear when a second round of talks on the withdrawal issue opened in Moscow between delegations headed by deputy foreign ministers of the two countries.

In a first round of talks in Prague last month, Czechoslovakia's new Government told Soviet negotiators it wanted the troops, which have been in the country since the Warsaw Pact invasion of 1968, to leave this year.

Czechoslovak officials say they have no doubt the Soviet leadership has made the political decision to withdraw the troops.

But according to the East European diplomats, Moscow argues that it needs more time to provide housing and social services for the returning officers and men and their families, whose numbers will be swollen by others to be withdrawn from Hungary.

Czechoslovak officials declined to comment on the first day of the talks, but one Czechoslovak source indicated Prague's Deputy Foreign Minister, Evzen Vacek, was insisting the one-year timetable be observed.

"That is the Czechoslovak stand and there seems to be no reason to change it," the source said. "The Soviet Union is losing time by delaying a decision to start the withdrawal."

The Czechoslovak sources said they feared public feeling over the withdrawal issue could be increased after the explosion by Soviet forces of an ammunition dump in the southeast Tuesday, causing a forest fire.

Prague's Defense Ministry said the Soviet action was a violation of regulations.

A Freudian Dream Come True

PRIBOR, Czechoslovakia, Feb. 7 (Reuters) — A square in Pribor that once honored Stalin is to be renamed after the Czechoslovak town's most famous son, Sigmund Freud. The state press agency said an opinion poll in the north Moravian town showed most of its inhabitants wanted Stalin Square to be named after the founder of psychoanalysis. Freud, born in Pribor in 1856, moved to Vienna where he pioneered analysis of the subconscious mind. He fled when Hitler annexed Austria in 1938. He died in London in 1939.

State Dept. Dismisses Besieged Envoy, Telling Him He Is a Security Risk

Continued From Page A1

would then have the option of taking the matter to Federal court. It was unclear today what Mr. Bloch would do.

Mr. Bloch's lawyer, John M. Bray, said his client had no comment. Mr. Bloch did not answer the telephone at his home near downtown Washington.

Trail Growing Cold

The State Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation said today that the inquiry into allegations of espionage by Mr. Bloch remains active. Government officials have conceded, however, that they so far lack the evidence to make a court case against their target and that his trail grows colder each day.

Federal officials said they were not dismissing Mr. Bloch in the hope that the move would produce additional evidence of wrongdoing through administrative hearings, court battles, or other steps he might take to contest the action. Dismissal is the strongest action short of filing criminal charges, which the available evidence does not support, law enforcement officials say.

For the State Department, Mr. Bloch's dismissal was also dictated by financial considerations. Officials noted that Mr. Bloch receives an $80,000-a-year salary for a job he is barred from performing.

An Eerie Composure

Through it all, the balding, 54-year-old bureaucrat has maintained an eerie composure, repeatedly declining opportunities to deny that he was a Soviet spy and challenging Federal investigators to find enough evidence to prove otherwise.

A State Department spokesman, Richard Boucher, today refused to describe the specific allegations of wrongdoing that led to the decision to dismiss Mr. Bloch, saying those charges are confidential under Federal privacy laws. He said the agency had notified the Justice Department and Congress of its decision.

The Federal law covering Mr. Bloch's case allows the removal of employees "in the interests of national security." An Administration official said today that the State Department had not previously used the law, and that its last known use, in 1983, was by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

The department removes Felix Bloch from its payroll.

State Department lawyers have been studying the agency's options under the law since at least last autumn, an Administration official said today.

'A Complicated Issue'

"It's a pretty complicated legal issue because it involves balancing the national security and due process," the official said. "We do feel like we moved promptly in terms of the work that had to be done, but cautiously."

Mr. Baker decided last week to invoke the Federal law, and the agency's under secretary for management, Ivan Selin, ordered the dismissal in the last few days.

If Mr. Bloch is dismissed next month, the State Department would consider taking action under another law to reduce or eliminate his pension, the Administration official said.

Mr. Bloch was the second-ranking American diplomat in Vienna during much of the Reagan Administration. In that job, he effectively ran day-to-day embassy affairs in a city that is a center for sensitive arms negotiations and other strategic matters.

Charges Go Back to 70's

Since 1988, he had worked in a Washington office that deals with European economic relations and restrictions on the export of technology to the old Soviet bloc nations.

American officials have said they believe that Mr. Bloch began spying for Moscow in the 1970's, when he was an officer at American embassies in West and East Berlin. But officials said he came under scrutiny by the Federal Bureau of Investigation only last spring, when he turned up in a secret videotape of a known Soviet agent whose European movements were being followed.

Mr. Bloch was immediately placed under heavy Federal surveillance, and his automobile and telephone were wiretapped. Government officials said the automobile wiretap later recorded Mr. Bloch telling his wife, Lucille, that he had accepted money from the Soviet Union.

Numerous press and television reports said the inquiry also turned up evidence that Mr. Bloch had spent large sums of money, well beyond the normal means of a mid-level diplomat, for the services of a prostitute during much of his stay in Vienna.

The Soviet agent appears to have cryptically told Mr. Bloch in a telephone conversation last May that he was under surveillance by the F.B.I. Shortly after the tip, the State Department suspended Mr. Bloch, took away his diplomatic passport and barred him from the agency's headquarters.

Last July, reporters detected the heavy surveillance, and a horde of writers and photographers joined Federal agents in a round-the-clock siege of Mr. Bloch's home.

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Upheaval in the East: Bush's Wariness

The President

Striking a Defensive Tone, Bush Sees Virtue in Caution

By ANDREW ROSENTHAL
Special to The New York Times

SAN FRANCISCO, Feb. 7 — Deliberately avoiding any comment on the events in the Soviet Union, President Bush struck a remarkably defensive tone toward his policy on Eastern Europe today, saying "the world is moving too fast" for him to know what will happen next and make firm decisions about how to respond.

"We must not let impatience born of euphoria jeopardize all we hope to achieve," Mr. Bush said in a speech here. He traced his own world view from the policy of containment and the "realism born of bloody experience" that he said framed the policies of Presidents "from Harry Truman to Ronald Reagan."

"We are taking the first steps across a bridge begun by others long ago, and it is a bridge that can lead us from seemingly endless conflict to the promise of a lasting peace," Mr. Bush said. "But no matter how great the promise, we must be certain the bridge is secure."

In the speech to the Commonwealth Club, a civic organization, Mr. Bush sought to rebut critics who have suggested that his Administration has been a mere onlooker as the events the United States has sought for four decades unfold in Eastern Europe.

> 'I would rather be called cautious than I would be called reckless.'

The Avalanche of Headlines

But his remarks were shot through with the sense of a President who has found himself under siege as each day's headlines threaten to outstrip not only longstanding policy, but even the arms control proposals and political initiatives that the White House has been struggling to produce to keep pace with events in Europe.

In a sign of the urgency of those events, the White House announced today that Mr. Bush would meet this weekend at Camp David with Manfred Wörner, secretary general of NATO, and on Feb. 24-25 with the West German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl. Mr. Kohl and the West German Foreign tion and its impact on the military balance.

"Every morning, I receive an intelligence briefing, and I receive the best information available to any world leader today," Mr. Bush said in his speech. "And yet, the morning news is often overtaken by the news that very same evening."

"The world is moving too fast to forecast with absolute certainty what will happen next," he said.

As outlined in the speech, Mr. Bush's vision of his role in what he likes to call "the revolution of '89" is not as a leader of the charge, but a custodian tasked with holding together the old mechanisms of international security until a new order clearly emerges.

Better Cautious Than Reckless

"Our challenge is to manage this period of transition from the world of today to the world of tomorrow," he said. "When it comes to the security of this country I would rather be called cautious than I would be called reckless."

Mr. Bush added: "The President of the United States is the Commander in Chief, bound by the Constitution to defend and protect the United States of America. Now, some would have me predicate the defense of our people on promising, but as yet unfulfilled, hopes for the future."

He paused and said, "I will not do that."

The tentative, sometimes even hesitant, nature of Mr. Bush's comments was perhaps most evident in his handling of the Communist Party Central Committee meeting in Moscow that today endorsed President Mikhail S. Gorbachev's proposal to end the party's constitutional monopoly on power. At first, White House officials said Mr. Bush would comment on the dramatic events in his speech, but the President later decided to omit any reference to the Moscow meeting, alluding only to "the march of freedom and democracy in Eastern Europe, even in the Soviet Union itself."

Asked why Mr. Bush would not mention this week's events in a speech that discusses the history of Soviet-American relations in great detail, the White House spokesman, Marlin Fitzwater, said the President wanted "to be careful not to involve ourselves in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union."

Avoiding 'Dumb Things'

Asked by a member of the audience how the United States could help Mr.

Earlier Views on the Party



LENIN
10th party congress, 1921
"Our party is the governmental party, and the resolution which the party congress adopts will be obligatory for the entire republic."




MOLOTOV
10th party congress, 1921
"Liquidation of petit bourgeois parties was one of the basic conditions of socialist construction; their roots reach down to the bourgeois classes of the country, and with the those roots they become involved with the ruling classes who dominated in the past."



STALIN
From his writings in 1926
"In our country not a single important political or organizational question is decided by our Soviet and other mass organizations without guiding directions from the party."



BREZHNEV
November 1967, the 50th anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution
"We do not and cannot have any political organization other than the C.P.S.U. that would take into account the interests and specific features of the classes and social groups in our country of all nations and nationalities, and of all generations, and that would combine these interests in its policy."



GORBACHEV
Party meeting, Sept. 28,

History

A Victory for a Faction Silenced 70 Years Ago

By CONSTANCE L. HAYS

On a visit to the United States in 1959, the Soviet party leader, Nikita S. Khrushchev, was asked about the Mensheviks, the minority faction of Russian revolutionaries who broke with Lenin largely because they thought the new order they were plotting should countenance other parties and some democratic dissent.

"Mensheviks? They're like the buffalo," the Soviet leader said, referring to a species he thought extinct.

Indeed, after the split in 1903, members of this group were gradually pushed from revolutionary circles, and after Lenin and the Bolsheviks prevailed they were sent into exile. The last known Menshevik, Boris Sapir, died late last year in Amsterdam. And the role of these people has been expunged from Soviet history books for decades.

But the three-day debate just completed by the Central Committee in Moscow had uncanny echoes of the argument between the Mensheviks and Bolsheviks over how much democracy Communists can accept.

A Minority Was Silenced

The Mensheviks — their name means minority, while Bolshevik means majority — came into being after 1903 as the faction opposite Lenin in the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party. They cooperated with the Bolsheviks during the unsuccessful 1905 revolution, but Bolshevik efforts to wrest party control away from them strained relations between the two groups.

After the Bolsheviks seized power in 1917, the Mensheviks tried to function as the legal opposition. But they were outlawed in 1922. Many party members fled the Soviet Union, but others remained to work in Soviet institutions.

"Everything they argued for in 1919 is finally being debated today," said Vladimir N. Brovkin, a scholar specializing in Menshevism at the George F. Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies in Washington. "They were destroyed, but their ideals live on. If I start reading to you their program of 1919, you would think it was written in Moscow last week."

Yuli Martov, a Menshevik leader before World War I, described the group's position on pluralism when he wrote soon after the split, "As before, the Central Committee regards the people's sovereignty, unlimited democracy, as the only political form in which the social emancipation of the proletariat can be prepared and realized."

On Monday, the Soviet President, Mikhail S. Gorbachev, said: "The party in temporary political figure to consult about the Mensheviks' ideals. "When I talk to my Soviet colleagues, most of them have no idea what the Mensheviks were saying," Professor Brovkin said. "It's a remarkable example of how the memory was manipulated and the entire political history of Soviet Russia was wiped out."

Walter Sablinsky, an associate professor of Russian history at the University of Virginia, said the Mensheviks would have approved of the latest changes in Moscow. "This is exactly what they wanted," he said. "They did not have the kind of party Lenin did. Lenin wanted a party subordinate to one person."

When the Mensheviks became the opposition party and began gaining on the Bolsheviks, they were outlawed, Professor Sablinsky said.

"Certainly the Mensheviks could have worked within the system now," he said. "They would have been rehabilitated."

Still, some scholars say there are distinct differences between what Mr. Gorbachev has defined and what the Mensheviks believed.

"In a way, Gorbachev is way ahead of them in terms of being unideological in the rhetoric he uses," said Alexander Dallin, a professor of history at Stanford University whose father, David, was a leading Menshevik. "In 1918, they thought they were good Marxists. Gorbachev has been able to depart from that."

Albanian-Americans Rally at White House

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 7 — A group of Albanian-Americans began three days of demonstrations today in front of the White House urging the Bush Administration to ask the Government of Yugoslavia to stop the killing of ethnic Albanians in the Kosovo region.

According to reports from Yugoslavia, 29 ethnic Albanians have been killed in the last two weeks in clashes in Kosovo between ethnic Albanians and Yugoslav security forces. A year ago 28 ethnic Albanians were killed in Kosovo in similar clashes.

Ethnic Albanians make up 90 percent of the population of Kosovo, which is an autonomous province in the republic of Serbia. Since 1981, the ethnic Albanians have been demanding either a separate republic in Yugoslavia or the right to

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and on Feb. 24-25 with the West German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl. Mr. Kohl and the West German Foreign Minister, Han-Dietrich Genscher, are traveling to Moscow this weekend to reassure Soviet leaders about the accelerating pace of German reunifica-



Associated Press

President Bush holding a model of a satellite given to him yesterday as he toured the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, Calif.

Avoiding 'Dumb Things'

Asked by a member of the audience how the United States could help Mr. Gorbachev's efforts to reform his country, Mr. Bush said, "I think we can avoid doing dumb things."

"The last thing I think any U.S. citizen needs to do when you have the Central Committee meeting is to try to fine-tune it from San Francisco or from Washington," he said. "I want to be very careful about picking winners or losers or saying how they should do things."

Outlining his national security policy, Mr. Bush hotly criticized Democrats in Congress who advocate deeper reductions than he has proposed in American troops in Western Europe. America's allies, Mr. Bush said, "don't want to see the United States pull back into what would be perceived worldwide as some kind of neo-isolationist decoupling."

Mr. Bush reaffirmed his commitment to the "Star Wars" program to develop a space-based anti-missile shield.


He spoke of "new threats" that go "beyond the traditional East-West antagonism of the past 45 years," including "Libyan and Iranian terrorism" and "the narco-gangsters, already a threat to our national health and spirit."

Mr. Bush offered a strong defense of the Pentagon's proposal to consider closing dozens of military bases around the country, an idea that has touched off a political storm in Congress.

Criticism of Congress

"I ask the Congress to join me in a spirit of fairness," he said. "Long-standing critics of defense spending should not turn around and block the closing of a base in their home district. There is something a little ironic about certain members of Congress whose philosophy seems to be 'make deep cuts, but cut somewhere else.'"

Mr. Bush was asked by a member of his audience why he felt it necessary to hold a four-nation conference on drug trafficking in Colombia on Feb. 15, despite concerns about security.



GORBACHEV

Party meeting, Sept. 29, 1989

"The party was and remains the main organizing and coordinating force capable of leading the people along the path of in-depth socialist changes, of playing an integrating and rallying role in society and let us be blunt about it, of preventing an undesirable, dramatic turn of events."

The New York Times/Feb. 8, 1990

racy, as the only political form in which the social emancipation of the proletariat can be prepared and realized."

On Monday, the Soviet President, Mikhail S. Gorbachev, said: "The party in a renewing society can exist and play its role as vanguard only as a democratically recognized force."

The Communist Party, Mr. Gorbachev added, "intends to struggle for the status of the ruling party, but it will do so strictly within the framework of the democratic process by giving up any legal and political advantages, offering its program and defending it in discussions, cooperating with other social and political forces, always working among the masses, living by their interests and their needs."

There is virtually no historical record in the Soviet Union for a con-

of the population of Kosovo, which is an autonomous province in the republic of Serbia. Since 1981, the ethnic Albanians have been demanding either a separate republic in Yugoslavia or the right to join neighboring Albania.

The demonstrators in Lafayette Park, mostly from the Detroit area, gathered under the auspices of the Albanian-American National Council, a recently formed group, which also addressed a letter to President Bush asking him "to use the prestige of your office to stave off impending catastophe."

Djok Martini, head of the council, said, "We are here for the salvation of our people." The handful of demonstrators, carrying Albanian and American flags, shouted slogans denouncing the President of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic, as "a madman."

China

Chinese Press Is Silent on Gorbachev Plans to End Party Monopoly

By SHERYL WuDUNN
Special to The New York Times

BEIJING, Feb. 7 — Chinese readers discovered today that a Soviet organization had awarded a medal to a famous Chinese writer for fostering cultural relations, but they did not learn a word about President Mikhail S. Gorbachev's plan to abolish the Communist Party's monopoly on power in the Soviet Union.

The official Chinese-language press has also been silent on recent news about demonstrations in Moscow for a multiparty system, and the closest that Chinese leaders came to hinting that there was great change next door was an announcement on television tonight about efforts by Chinese leaders to improve China's system of "multiparty cooperation," involving several very small parties that are under the leadership of the Communist Party.

A solemn-faced newscaster, against a stark-gray background, read the long text of a Communist Party document issued internally on Dec. 30 that praised China's multiparty cooperation, as it is known here, and called for democratic party members to assume more leading posts in the Government.

Late tonight, the official New China News Agency issued a summary of an editorial comment on the document that will appear in People's Daily on Thursday. The editorial calls on Communist Party members to carefully study the document, which it says was the result of a combined effort between the Communist and democratic parties.

The release of the internal document, which may not originally have been intended for publication at this time, appeared to be an indirect attempt by Chinese leaders to highlight a relative openness in China's political system. Along with the absence of any news reporting about events in Moscow, the timing of the document's release also seemed to indicate a concern over the situation in the Soviet Union. News about Eastern Europe also has been selectively reported.

"The system of multiparty cooperation under the leadership of the Communist Party as practiced in China is a characteristic and strong point of the country's political system," the document said, according to a paraphrase by the New China News Agency.

The document, however, was cautious about any similarities that might be drawn between China's political system and those of other countries. "It is fundamentally different from the multiparty system or bipartisan system in the Western capitalist countries, and also differs from the one-party system practiced in some socialist countries," the document said.

China has eight tiny democratic parties, whose combined members total about 300,000, compared with the Communist Party's membership of 48 million. Although those parties relish greater influence, they disavow any thought of competing with the Communists.

Communist leaders have called for a greater role for democratic parties, but the increase in influence, if any, has been significantly limited, and such parties have no real power. The leaders envision continued firm control by the Communist Party, with the friendly assistance of other political parties.

Caution Toward Gorbachev

The document pointed out that the democratic parties are not only under Communist Party leadership, but also are "in favor of socialism" and must work "for the cause of socialism." Political parties that "endanger the state power are absolutely not allowed to exist," the document said.

Chinese officials privately admit that the leadership has indicated a cautious attitude toward Mr. Gorbachev and his changes.

"We can't condemn him right away, but we can't support him either," said a Chinese official who was aware of recent events in the Soviet Union. "This news must be spread very slowly and carefully. Otherwise it might cause instability, and that would not be good for China."

Although China has not officially reported on Mr. Gorbachev's proposal, Chinese officials have learned about it through internal documents issued by the Chinese Government. Those documents disclosed the text in translation of Mr. Gorbachev's speech on the opening day of the session of the party's Central Committee on Monday. They also included translations of foreign news reports and analyses of the situation in the Soviet Union and the possibility that Mr. Gorbachev would resign.

Ordinary Chinese, without access to such documents, also may learn about events in the Soviet Union by listening to "Voice of America" or the British Broadcasting Corporation, as well as Moscow's own radio broadcasts translated into Chinese.

Trade

Negotiations Are to Begin on Ending Restrictions Against Soviet Imports

By CLYDE H. FARNSWORTH
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 7 — The first round of talks on a trade agreement that could end nearly a half-century of American discrimination against Soviet imports will start on Monday in Washington, the United States trade representative, Carla A. Hills, announced today.

Both Governments hope to conclude the talks before President Bush meets with President Mikhail S. Gorbachev of the Soviet Union in June.

Moscow would like an end to the restrictions under the Jackson-Vanik law of 1974, which prevents the Soviet Union from receiving most favored nation status, or normal tariff treatment on imports from it, until it adopts an open emigration policy. Most favored nation status gives countries the benefits of tariff reductions that have been adopted since the 1930's.

American trade officials said the United States would also have some demands, seeking commitments by the Soviets on protection of patents, copyrights and other intellectual property, mechanics for settling commercial disputes, safeguards for preventing surges of cheap imports, and the right to have offices for American representatives in the Soviet Union.

Mrs. Hills announced the talks during testimony on trade matters before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. She said Yuriy N. Chumakov, a Soviet deputy foreign trade minister, would lead the Soviet delegation.

Mrs. Hills said she intended to keep pressure on Japan, South Korea and other trading partners to open markets to American exports, but apart from the Soviet trade announcement she made no major disclosures.

Through the negotiations, she stressed, the United States hopes to "encourage economic reform" within the Soviet Union as it moves toward a more market-driven economy.

A successful agreement, she also noted, will "create opportunities" for American business in the Soviet Union.

Congressional sensitivity over contents of the agreement and the process by which Congress will review it was evidenced by particularly close questioning of Mrs. Hills by Senator Lloyd Bentsen, Democrat of Texas and chairman of the Senate Finance Committee.

Noting the importance of maintaining close consultations with Congress, he said that if the Nixon Administration had kept Congress better informed in the early 1970's while it was negotiating a trade agreement with Moscow, the Bush Administration would not now have to deal with the existing limitations on Soviet trade.

This was a reference to the Jackson-Vanik curbs, which Congress wrote into the Trade Act of 1974. The linkage to Soviet emigration policies caused Moscow in early 1975 to abort that trade pact, which had been under negotiation for two years.

Under Jackson-Vanik, tariffs on imports from the Soviet Union are as much as 10 times higher than they would be from most other countries. For American consumers, ending the curbs would mean, for example, $1.25 off the retail price of a bottle of vodka, which is one of the big Soviet exports to the United States.

The United States is considering granting Jackson-Vanik waivers on imports from Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria and East Germany. Hungary recently obtained a waiver. The curbs against Poland were lifted in 1987.

Senator Bentsen, the 1988 Democratic Vice-Presidential candidate, said he understood that "there are those within the Administration who really want to limit consultations with this committee or Congress" and "I want to see the consultation requirement lived up to."

Mrs. Hills insisted that "there is no question in my mind that this Administration wants to consult."

One problem is how the Congress is going to review the trade agreement following the so-called Chadha decision of the Supreme Court in 1983, which declared a legislative veto illegal.

Under Jackson-Vanik, approval of a trade agreement that restores most favored nation treatment would require a concurrent resolution — an act of Congress that is not signed by the President. The resolution would be subject to the approval of the Senate and the House.

But under Chadha, lawyers say, this procedure is probably unconstitutional because it could amount to a legislative veto.

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Upheaval in the East: Moscow's Cynics, Washington's Hopefulness

Moscow

Skepticism in the Street And No Excited Crowd

By ESTHER B. FEIN
Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, Feb. 7 — On the day the Communist Party's leaders voted with near unanimity to forswear the political monopoly their party has held for more than 70 years, Red Square was void of anxious, interested citizens waiting for a sign of democracy to rise from behind the towering brick walls of the Kremlin.

There were none of the crowds that swarmed outside Government buildings in Czechoslovakia and Poland and East Germany, as the leaders within listened to the sounds of reality and voted to end Communist domination in those countries. Here there were no placards, no banners, no hands clasped in unified defiance.

"What should I stand here and wait for?" said Zinaida Zaslavskaya, a bakery worker from the northern outskirts of Moscow, as she trudged across the cobbled square at dusk. "You think this pluralism is going to be somehow visible today, or tomorrow, or any time soon? You think this is Eastern Europe? I can tell you, it is not."

> 'You think this is Eastern Europe? I can tell you, it is not.'

She shrugged at the imposing Spasky tower of the Kremlin, at the uniformed guards saluting the flurry of official black limousines whizzing out the gate, their comfortable back seats filled by the very people who had voted away their own guarantee of power.

A History of Dictators

"There is nobody in this country, nobody, who has ever experienced true democracy — not those powerful men inside and not any of us out here," said Mrs. Zaslavskaya, offering an opinion that seemed widely held by the people of this city. "This country has always been ruled by a dictator of some sort, and now the dictator is telling us there will be democracy. Maybe there will be, but if people believed it would be soon, they would be here right now. And you don't see anybody, do you?"

On Sunday, nearly 100,000 people [illegible] and ordinary Muscovites cutting through the center of town.

Most of these people, and others interviewed at bus stops, a bakery, the central farmer's market and on the city's streets, shared Mrs. Zaslavskaya's skepticism about the effect that the decision today would have on their lives.

'Robbed of Our Belief'

"Some apparatchik might lose his office and his car, maybe, but I won't get them," said Roman Myasnikov, who was buying mandarin oranges at the central market. "Maybe I am to blame, after all. I am not out there demonstrating and demanding change the way people did in Prague. But after 70 years of Communism, we have been robbed of our belief that we can bring about change."

The aging Georgian woman selling Mr. Myasnikov his precious fruit, long absent from state-run stores and available at the market only for a steep price, chastised her customer for his dour pessimism.

"Do you think the party changed its mind about holding power because it wanted to?" she challenged him. "They understand that it's the people's will, and they hear our voices even if they're not very loud. After Romania, their hearing improved."

There were many people, like the orange seller, who approved and even applauded the Communist leadership's vote today. A woman waiting in the slush on the main ring road that encircles the city said that "opposition was the only way to achieve movement." Abolishing the Communist Party's special status, she said, was the only way to begin a serious and widespread opposition movement here.

But she echoed the thoughts of many who questioned the motivation behind the party's change of heart. Was it a trick?

"The only reason the Communist Party is doing this now is because the economy is so bad and they don't want to be responsible any more for making it better," said a man from the Ukrainian city of Zaporozhye, who was visiting relatives in the capital. "And as long as the economy stays the way it is, or God help us, gets worse, people here are going to care very little who's pulling the levers."

Overhearing the Ukrainian man's comments in a bakery on the city's hectic Kalinin Prospekt, Pavel Litvosky interrupted, and through the



Associated Press

Demonstrators gathered outside the offices of the Soviet press agency Tass to protest its coverage of the demonstration for reform held Sunday.

Washington

A Sense of Wonder Among the Mere Bystanders

By MAUREEN DOWD
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 7 — Some people were thunderstruck. Others were numb, unable to absorb one more remarkable blow to Communism. Many were wary, waiting to see if Mikhail S. Gorbachev could "stay one step ahead of the sheriff," as the conservative columnist Robert Novak put it.

There was skepticism from the right, money-making schemes from the Fortune 500 crowd, and a reluctant and cautious response from the President, who always frets that any appearance of gloating on the part of America will tip the precarious balance in the Soviet Union away from Mr. Gorbachev.

The political experts in Washington had felt it was inevitable that the power of the Soviet Communist Party would diminish ever since the Soviets did not roll into Eastern Europe with tanks to stop the rush of democracy this fall and winter. They were just watching to see, as the Democratic [illegible] axes to the Berlin Wall as East German guards smiled for the camera," said Peggy Noonan, the speechwriter for Ronald Reagan who wrote many of the former President's most biting Evil Empire denunciations.

The day symbolized, for many people in this self-absorbed capital, the sense that Washington is more and more a bystander to world events rather than a player.

"We're not part of history in Washington," said Representative Charles E. Schumer, the Brooklyn Democrat. "We're just watching history."

Mr. Novak noted that the events in

> 'The whole Soviet world is going down the drainpipe with astonishing speed.'

might be a healthy turn of events. "The imperial city of Washington has been taken aback by history because it thinks that it must help the world turn on its axis," she said. "Perhaps it's salutory to know that the world can change without our permission or encouragement."

A top Soviet analyst in the Government, who not long ago was predicting Mr. Gorbachev's removal and a police-state crackdown, echoed the sense that the world seemed to be spinning out of America's control.

"The whole Soviet world is going down the drainpipe with astonishing speed," he said. "There's very little we can do to affect it. The future will be determined largely by internal, domestic considerations.

"It's mind boggling."

In political circles, where strategists are accustomed to promoting the notion of good versus evil, the news was discombobulating. The Soviets, the terrifying presence in all those James Bond films and Ronald Reagan speeches, seemed to be trying to kick the traces of their Evil

The Democrats tried to take credit, pointing to the assessment of Strobe Talbot, a Time editor, that the crumbling of Communism proved that "the doves in the Great Debate of the past 10 years were right all along."

Weinberger 'Gratified'

But Caspar W. Weinberger, the former Reagan Defense Secretary who pushed to build up American military forces to counteract the Soviet threat, said he felt personally gratified and was astonished that anyone would have the chance to say such things in Moscow "without being shot."

He cautioned against declaring democracy the champion this early, arguing that "it's perfectly possible and within the capability of the Soviets militarily and morally to stop all this."

President Bush took the low-key approach today. Originally, his advisers were going to insert a reaction to the Kremlin events in one of his California speeches promoting the "Star Wars" missile defense system and a strong defense. But that idea was canceled when the President decided he

you don't see anybody, do you?

On Sunday, nearly 100,000 people marched through Moscow to the edge of the Kremlin, giving unexpected voice to a variety of fears, concerns and demands, including a call for the Communist Party to relinquish its hold on life here. That rally was sponsored by an array of organizations, with goals as diverse as monarchism and anarchism, united only, it seemed, by the desire to change the status quo.

But today, the only people walking in Red Square were tourists who had come to ogle the gay domes of St. Basil's Cathedral and to watch the stiff soldiers guarding Lenin's tomb,

hectic Kalinin Prospekt, Pavel Litvosky interrupted, and through the graying hairs of his sweeping moustache argued that the economy would improve only through free competition.

"And the only path to economic competition," he said, "is political competition."

"We do not have a political culture in this country," Mr. Litovsky said. "Yes, there are intellectuals who are well read and understand competitive politics and who have theories and ideas. But it takes a long time for those thoughts to be understood by ordinary people like me."

tanks to stop the rush of democracy this fall and winter. They were just watching to see, as the Democratic analyst Robert G. Beckel put it, "if Gorbachev could pull off a six-cushion pool shot and survive."

So today the reaction was mostly muted wonder at the events in Moscow, while everyone still kept watching to see what the Soviet leader's next shot would be.

Just a Bystander

"We may have exhausted our capacity for surprise and delight when we watched children in Tiananmen Square quoting Jefferson and children in East Germany taking pick-

drainpipe with astonishing speed.'

the Soviet Union come "at a critically dull time in Washington."

"There's a great feeling of passivity associated with this President and the last year," he marveled. "I've been in Washington 33 years and I've never seen a time where all the fascination was focused on something 8,000 miles away."

'Perhaps It's Salutory'

Ms. Noonan suggested that this

those James Bond films and Ronald Reagan speeches, seemed to be trying to kick the traces of their Evil Empire image.

"It's disorientating," Ms. Noonan said, "because it's hard to know who to assign the evil role to."

In Washington, where everything is cast in terms of winning and losing, the debate was raging today over which party could get bragging rights to the end of the cold war.

"We can't revel in the glory of what's going on," said John Buckley, a Republican consultant, "because we're too busy trying to claim credit."

the Kremlin events in one of his California speeches promoting the "Star Wars" missile defense system and a strong defense. But that idea was canceled when the President decided he did not want to look like he was gloating. In a question and answer session after his speech at the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco, Mr Bush said he could best help the beleaguered Soviet leader by avoiding "doing dumb things — and that's my cautious approach."

The President reiterated his support for perestroika and praised Mr. Gorbachev for his "restraint and finesse," adding that "he's a man who you can talk to."

A Soviet Union Without a Communist Monopoly: The Academics' View

Richard Pipes

Baird Professor of History at Harvard University:



I believe this is a revolutionary decision which completely reverses Lenin's policy adopted in October 1917, calling for the "dictatorship of the proletariat," Lenin understood this to be a complete monopoly by his party, not only of all political processes, but of all organized life in the country, the economy included. All other parties were to be barred from this process on the alleged grounds that they were either counterrevolutionary or did not express the true interests of the working class. Gorbachev seems to call for an abandonment of this policy. He is essentially jettisoning the Communist Party as the ruling organ in the country, casting it adrift and asking it to draw its strength from popular support, such as it can obtain. It is to compete with other parties for a role in the Soviet state.

My impression is that the Communist Party would receive no more than 5 percent or 10 percent of the popular vote, which would mean that it would become a relatively small minority party in the political spectrum. I believe that in free elections, if such are to take place, the majority of the Russian voters would cast ballots for one of three new parties. One of these I would tentatively call a Social Democratic party, which might absorb a considerable portion of the present Communist Party membership. This party would combine appeals for democracy with a program of socialism, such as we know from England under Labor, or Sweden. The other party would presumably be what I would tentatively call Christian Democratic, which would probably combine democracy with appeals to free enterprise and a strong pro-Western platform. The third major party would be a Russian nationalist party, which would stand on a platform of Russia for Russians and assume a strong anti-Western stance. This sort of party would probably demand very powerful centralized authority of the state. And then in additon there would be nationalist parties in most of the border lands, which would either espouse separatism or demand extensive regional autonomy. And finally my impression is, from what Gorbachev said, that he plans to shift the base of his power from the party to the state and, I believe, to run for President. A model for this could be the recent events in Hungary and Poland, which I think he orchestrated. Then the question remains whether he would really win office in a democratic election, because he is not popular in the country and he gains support from the street primarily when he is assailing the entrenched Communists. Whether he would obtain the same kind of support to carry out a broader program on his own, I am not certain, because there are people who are more popular than he, in whom the citizenry has greater confidence. So, to conclude, this is a historic event, but given the country's lack of experience with democracy, and the existing internal tensions, the future is murky and unpredictable.

Stephen F. Cohen

Professor of politics and director of Russian studies at Princeton University:



The abolition of Article 6 is a step forward, but it's not a decisive development.

First, Article 6 only appeared in the Constitution in 1977, decades after Communist Party dictatorship was well established.

The second reason is that there has been de facto multiparty politics in the Soviet Union for the last three years anyway — politics, though not a multiparty system.

Third, even in a multiparty system the Communist Party is going to retain enormous advantages, much in the way for example that party machines dominated what were in effect various one-party cities and states in America for many years.

Fourth, the focus of a Soviet multiparty system would be the thousands of local soviets — or councils, or local assemblies — all across the country. Though Gorbachev has promised to shift "all power to the soviets," those soviets remain powerless, in the fullest sense of the word, without their own authority and even revenue.

And fifth, more generally, dictatorships can be born in one night but durable multiparty democracies take a generation, if not more.

Ellen Mickiewicz

Alben W. Barkley Professor of Political Science at Emory University:



The Party Congress this spring will ratify the decision of the Central Committee plenum introducing a multiparty system. It has no choice; a number of parties have already come into existence. Besides, the Communist Party is facing rising defections in its ranks: large numbers of Communists, young and old, are turning in their party cards. Exposés of malfeasance, corruption, and incompetence are leading to ousters of party chieftains, as in Volgograd, where the main square was filled with people arguing, "Down with everybody and everything."

The Soviet party has to try to earn the leadership it can no longer take for granted. There isn't even a single Communist Party any more: the impetus for drastic political change has been generated for the most part by elements within the party itself. And the parties of the republics will be increasingly diverse.

Can the Communist Party retain its leadership in a system with genuine competition? It has the edge in resources, media control, and organization, but that won't be enough, in my view. The move to a genuine parliamentary system is under way.

Roman Szporluk

Professor of history and director of the Center for Russian and East European Studies at the University of Michigan:

I believe that the renunciation of the party's monopoly of power literally means the end of Communism as a distinct current on the left. Lenin's most original contribution to Marxism was his concept of the party. Lenin made the right of the party to rule independent of an actual popular mandate. In Lenin's point of view, a majority vote was not enough to have the right to rule. What really mattered was to be right, and one was right by knowing what was good for the worker and what was good for the peasant without getting their formal approval through competitive elections. So the real, momentous significance of the declaration that the party requires the people's approval through elections in order to remain in power is that it is a repudiation of Leninism. It means that the party does not have a right to rule automatically, as the party. Such a declaration, coming from Moscow, is comprable in its importance for the Communists to a declaration, coming from the Pope in Rome, that there is no God. From now on, Soviet politics will increasingly become an ethnic politics, and people like Gorbachev and others will increasingly present themselves as Russian leaders.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

Former national security adviser, under President Carter:



Just as Khrushchev's secret speech before the 20th party congress in 1956 marked the beginning of the end of Stalinism, Gorbachev's reform at the just-concluded plenum marks the beginning of the formal break with Leninism. Gorbachev in effect is embracing the prescriptions of Lenin's old ideological rival, Martov, and his Mensheviks. It took years for the struggle against Stalinism to be successfully concluded. It will take years to dismantle the remnants of Leninism, but the battle has now been joined.

However, it would be a mistake to see the recent decisions as marking a breakthrough to democracy. Much more likely is a prolonged period of democratizing chaos. One will see the rise in the Soviet Union of increasingly irreconcilable conflicts between varying national political and social aspirations, all united by a shared hatred for the existing Communist nomenklatura. One is also likely to see a flashback of a nationalist type among the Great Russians, fearful of the prospective breakup of the existing Great Russian empire.

The recent developments are the consequence of the progressive polarization of the situation in the Soviet Union. Gorbachev has come to realize that zigzagging increasingly meant a stalemate, and he thus had a choice of either moving dramatically towards democracy or towards repression. He chose the former, because he knew that repression would mean political violence and social stagnation. But the depth of the existing economic crisis in the Soviet Union and the intensity of rising national aprirations is such that the plunge towards democracy is likely to produce not an operating democracy, but a prolonged internal crisis, marked by turbulence, some chaos and fragmentation. Gorbachev nonetheless should be admired for his historical boldness.

Adam Ulam

Gurney Professor of History and Political Science at Harvard University:



I think that the present change in a sense is more symbolical rather than realistic. We don't have currently parties in our sense of the word in the Soviet Union, but what we do have is that the Communist Party itself is split into many factions, and in a sense that poses a greater danger to the survival of the Soviet system than the appearance of other parties, I think. The threat of secession by various national republics from the Soviet Union is a much greater threat than the threat posed by the still theoretical possibility of another party. It's much smaller than the threat being actually posed by the threat of secession by the Baltic republics or other republics of the Soviet Union. Of course, on the face of it, it's a welcome change, but it also opens the way, to be realistic about it, to the rise let's say of a right-wing party, let us say which could combine, say, intense Russian naitonalism, with the stress on russian, with what might be called elements of neo-Stalinism. So, like in any political situation, this kind of reform opens the door not only, from the democratic point of view, to favorable but also to somewhat dangerous developments.

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Upheaval in the East: Gorbachev's Moment

Soviet Union

Soviet Leadership Agrees to Surrender the Communist Party Monopoly on Power

Continued From Page A1

the critical party congress, to be held this summer.

The meeting also appeared to hedge on a crucial economic issue and reject proposals from some of the more radical delegates for a clear repeal of the party's standing opposition to private property.

With Mr. Gorbachev once again displaying whiphand success in having his way with the badly demoralized and increasingly unpopular party, the meeting ended today with no purge of Mr. Gorbachev's remaining critics from the hierarchy.

Amid the party's general anxiety, these hard-liners were warning that there was no guarantee of success in these latest proposals in Mr. Gorbachev's rapid-fire attempts to ignite national renewal. But Mr. Yakovlev portrayed the Central Committee's solid center majority as being firmly with Mr. Gorbachev, for all the anger and contention at the meeting.

Some of the speakers warned that chaos and anarchy awaited the nation should the party fight the peoples' wish for pluralism. "Either we prove able to lead a rapid but controlled process of transformation or it will become an uncontrolled deluge," Vadim A. Medvedev, the party's ideology chief, told the meeting.

"It was not just a series of friendly embraces," Mr. Yakovlev said of the meeting that marked the party leaders' concession that they had best retreat from their guaranteed power monopoly, seized by the Bolsheviks seven decades ago and first encoded in the Constitution of 1936.

"It would be very strange if after 70 years of silence all of us would begin talking in a single voice," he said of the impassioned session.

While the meeting was a dramatic measure of the party hierarchy's search for a way to avoid the sort of public confrontation and rout that precipitated the fall of East European Communism, its recommendation carried no immediate guarantee of enactment.

Party Congress Moved Up

The proposals, including the still vaguely explained endorsement of a new presidential system, will next go to the 5,000-member national party congress that Mr. Gorbachev, in stepping up his timetable, succeeded in moving to late June or early July, several months sooner than originally scheduled.

The party congress, whose members seem likely to be selected by way of additional innovations expected from the Gorbachev leadership, would provide the ultimate party view of the changes by its 19 million members.

Even so, the national Parliament, the Congress of People's Deputies, presently would have the final governmental say over the proposal to end the Constitution's guarantee of supreme powers to the party, enshrined in Article 6, as well as to create a new presidential system.

Of the latter, Mr. Yakovlev was vague on details, talking of such a revised presidency's being approved "by the people," but not directly suggesting direct competitive elections. Mr. Gorbachev is commonly referred to as the President, although technically he is Chairman of the Supreme Soviet and roughly comparable to a parliamentary prime minister.

In No Hurry for New Parties

Party leaders who hailed the meeting's change of position on power monopoly were in no obvious rush to predict how soon or in what form true opposition parties might ever emerge, again insisting that this, too, should be up the Parliament to decide.

"The party should not be organizing an opposition for itself," Mr. Yakovlev said, smiling. "This should be a natural course."

But he indicated that the party was already expecting a more competitive outlook, stressing, "We will struggle to remain the governing party, but by political means."

Parliament underwent its own qualified democratization through partial competitive elections last March. In its two ensuing sessions, a minority of members have displayed a willingness to criticize and dissent, but here, too, Mmr. Gorbachev has thus far shown his ability to command the agenda and basically get what he wants approved.

Even before the meeting's formal endorsement of Mr. Gorbachev's wishes was announced, the mood surounding the Kremlin session was rich with signals. Delegates, who in previous regimes were absolutely secretive about committee meetings, this time were willing to discuss each day's doings. They even began adapting to the clutch of news reporters and camera crews that began staking out the Kremlin's Spassky Gate, precisely as they do the West Wing driveway of the White House. Here, too, certain delegates could not resist this odd oasis of limelight gleaming through the wintry dullness in Red Square.

"If we have 20 parties, it will be okay," said Svyatoslav N. Fyodorov, Moscow's garrulous celebrity eye surgeon and man about the party, stepping up to the microphone.

"We all agreed the country needs a president who will be able to solve problems quickly," he said, only guessing at what might be the enlarged role of such a post. "His functions will be to handle such cases as earthquakes, armed clashes, matters of war and peace. There should be a man who will keep his finger on the button."

While delegates at the meeting were hailing the proposals as dramatic cures for some of the nation's ills, the dissident voices who have been fighting for the right to opposition politics stressed that enormous struggles would probably remain even should pluralistic changes be adopted in Parliament.

A crucial question is how easily the party's vast entrenched machine might ever yield its control over countless jobs across all major institutions in all communities of the land — a nationwide patronage machine by diktat in effect, that is rooted seven decades deep in Soviet history.

No Effect From Allies, He Says

In accounting for the party's change of heart toward its power monopoly, Mr. Yakovlev tried to contend that the turmoil that gripped the Soviet allies in East Europe was not a major factor.

"It cannot be based on those events taking place in the countries of Eastern Europe," he said, adding that in accounting for democratization, "any process should ripen in each and every individual country."

Even as Mr. Gorbachev was attempting fresh emergency domestic repairs through the party meeting, an announcement was being made that Chancellor Helmut Kohl of West Germany would arrive Saturday for a sudden Kremlin visit to deal with an international issue of rapidly growing concern here, the possible reunification of the two Germanys.

The issue was the subject of some sharply worded cautions at the Central Committee meeting not to forget the millions who died in the war against Nazi Germany.

'A European Germany'

Mr. Yakovlev said the Gorbachev Government understood modern Germans' hopes for unity, but he added, "We are in favor of a European Germany, not a German Europe."

Left unsettled thus far in the early summary of the meeting's activities is how the 5,000 delegates to the party congress will be selected. Mr. Yakovlev said the plenum proposed a "large-scale election campaign from top to bottom," but he did not say whether delegates would be elected in competitive secret-ballot elections by party members, as younger, more liberal-minded Communists want.

Of the Lithuanian breakaway party, Vice President Anatoly I. Lukyanov said it had "yet another chance" to return to the fold, an unlikely event even with the step announced today of a cut-off of central party financing. The local Communist insurgents have begun raising funds independent of Moscow.

"We do not think any single party should pretend to have a monopoly," Mr. Yakovlev said of the meeting's willingness to retreat. "This party is ready to share its prerogatives."



Reuters

As he left the Central Committee meeting, Algirzas Brazauskas, Lithuanian party leader, gestured to reporters outside the Kremlin.



The Party Is Not Over

Photo Copy Preservation



Reuters

Muscovites gathered around a display outside a newspaper office to read accounts of the meeting of the Soviet Communist Party leadership.

Excerpts From Remarks by Soviet Ambassador

Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, Feb. 7 — Following are excerpts from remarks by Vladimir I. Brovikov, Soviet Ambassador to Poland, at the meeting of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee Tuesday, as distributed by Tass, the official Soviet press agency, and translated by The New York Times:

I share the opinion of those who spoke before me who said that the document being discussed by us is hardly acceptable in the form presented to us and needs to be seriously revised. Its excessive slogan mongering and even somewhat shrill tone, the inaccuracy of the assessments of the past and especially of the present contained in it, ideological eclecticism and lack of theoretical clarity do not as yet allow it to claim the role of the program document of our party. The impression is created that the document has a utilitarian function and is intended to satisfy the immediate requirements of our policy.

In the platform there is much extolling of perestroika and criticism of the distant past and plenty of generous promises about the future, but there is barely any assessment of the present and of the mistakes committed not at some time in the past but during the period of perestroika.

In recent times we have somehow begun to value not our own assessments of our work but those of gentlemen in the West.

The heck with them. Bush is Bush, and the people are the people. We somehow are trying to prove that the people are for perestroika, but permit me to ask, for what kind? Not for the kind which in almost five years has thrown the country into the vortex of crisis and led it to the line where we have come face to face with an orgy of anarchy and the breakdown of the economy, with the grimace of all-out collapse and the decline of morals. To assert in this situation that the people are for, that everything pleases them, is at a minimum politically dishonest.

Discipline and Democracy

The people are against and are speaking out about this increasingly vocally. Comrades, you know this very well, there's no need for me to tell you.

It is for this reason, apparently, that for our leadership it is more pleasant to meet with smiling crowds on the streets of Western capitals than with our own despondent countrymen who might, in keeping with the laws of glasnost, say something unpleasant.

. . .

Was it not a mistake to proclaim the total democratization of society and forget about the other side of the coin — the establishment of order and discipline in the country?

Anyone who is in the least bit familiar with theory and politics knows that discipline without democracy will survive, but democracy without discipline is inconceivable, for it inevitably grows into sociopolitical chaos.

This point is well understood by the Western leaders who so fervently praise us. At home they act brutally and decisively when even the slightest threat emerges to their state or class interests. And in doing so, Bush and Thatcher don't pay attention to what others think of them. Panama, the suppression of the strike movement in England and much, much more provide illustration of this.

. . .

Laws and Mistakes

Comrades, was not the enactment of hasty, inadequately considered laws a mistake? To some people it seemed that everything was all right, and they immediately praised the new drafts. But then it turned out that they were not all right, and, as a matter of fact, quite the opposite.

That's the way it was, for instance, with the anti-alcohol legislation. At the time we said that it would be once and for all, and now our foreign-trade officials are scouring the entire world to buy hundreds of thousands of decaliters of vodka for the overly sober Soviet consumer.

We are still running around looking for panaceas for all evils and hoping that democracy, which we have turned into an absolute, will put everything in its place in the political sphere and the market will set things straight in the economic sphere. But since everything has turned out just the opposite, it is not the leaders in the center who are to blame, you see, but local officials. Or the excuse is made that they didn't think it would turn out like this. Putting it frankly, this is a strange position for such high-ranking officials.

But more than anything else, it has become fashionable to blame all our disasters on the "accursed past."

. . .

I believe that all our tragedy today stems from our not being able as before to move away from one-man rule in the Government and the party. We often conduct matters instinctively, incompetently and without looking into the future, worrying less about the welfare of the country than about personal ambitions.

The Party Is Not Over For Soviet Communism

Continued From Page A1

runs deep, there is no sense of solidarity among the opposition.

The Soviet Union is an assembly of self-absorbed factions, each with its own grievances — ethnic, economic, ideological. There is no unifying force comparable to the nationalism of Germans or the Catholic Church in Poland, no cohesive umbrella group comparable to the Civic Forum in Czechoslovakia.

When 100,000 people massed in the center of Moscow on Sunday to press the Communist leadership for change, the show of common purpose seemed reminiscent of scenes in Prague or Leipzig. But in the ranks, the crowd lacked any unifying passion or sense of its own power. It was one-day alliance of convenience, the blue and yellow flag of Ukrainian nationalists flying alongside the black flag of the anarchists, Jews fearful of mounting anti-Semitism marching with young Communists demanding intra-party democracy.

The Baltic republics, waging an aloof campaign for liberty, find little common purpose with the Armenians and Azerbaijanis, living in their own world of murderous recriminations. And none of those places wants to tie its fate to Russia, the largest republic, which is itself split into regions as disparate as separate countries.

Mr. Gorbachev's main enemy is not any political rival inside the party or outside it. It is chaos, disintegration.

"We depend on Gorbachev because this country cannot be Czechoslovakia," said one marcher in the parade Sunday, alluding wistfully to the orderly change of power in Prague. "The most we can hope for is to be Romania, and there has already been enough blood."

A Nation Sick of Parties

Another reason the party can expect to be around awhile is the lack of a political culture here.

Even in the Baltics, the most European of the Soviet republics, organizers of newly legalized parties like the Social Democrats and Christian Democrats say many people are reluctant to join any party, because they are alienated by the concept of organized politics.

"The habit of democracy has been bred out of us," said a leader of the new Social Democratic Party in Lithuania.

In Russia and Central Asia, even more remote from the law-based democratic traditions of Europe, political groups splinter as soon as they are formed.

Svyatoslav Fyodorov, a Moscow eye surgeon and champion of free enterprise who attended the party meeting, said another major obstacle is that politics must be based on economic interests, but so far the economy is a state monopoly.

He predicted that innumerable small and ineffectual parties would spring up quickly, but that serious contenders for power would come only when the current economic arrangements change.

"We are children, because the Russian people have never had any property," he said.

"Parties will be revived in parallel with people acquiring new forms of property," he said. "Peasants will get land as their own, and establish their own party."

Don't Underestimate Gorbachev

Another reason not to write off the party yet is its leader, Mr. Gorbachev, who may yet succeed in making Communism a capable competitor in a multiparty world.

Today, Mr. Gorbachev's first priority is to create stable government institutions — the Parliament, a more powerful presidency, soon-to-be-elected local governments — that have enough public credibility to stand on their own and govern.

> The Communists have big advantages; not so their rivals.

Gradually, Mr. Gorbachev and his party have accepted that the price of credible democracy is forcing the Communists to stand the test of competition.

The early experience of the Baltic republics, where the Communists have already begun to face competition, suggests that even if the party remakes itself almost beyond recognition it will have trouble holding its own.

But Mr. Gorbachev insists the party can be taught the new tricks of democracy.

"I think that we can," said Gennadi I. Gerasimov, the main Soviet spokesman. "Gorbachev certainly believes that we can. But we must move with the tide, must move with the people, and not be left behind by events."

"There are countries where one party may stay in power for years," he added. "In Sweden, Social Democrats were for how many — 20? 25? Why? Because they were good enough to keep the power. So his hope is that his party will be in power for 20 or 30 more years."

New Chief for the Navy

SAN FRANCISCO, Feb. 7 (AP) — President Bush will nominate Adm. Frank B. Kelso 2d to be the new Chief of Naval Operations, the White House announced today in San Francisco, where the President was traveling. Admiral Kelso, now commander in chief of the Navy's Atlantic Command and supreme Allied commander for the Atlantic, would succeed Adm. Carlisle A. H. Trost, whose term expires June 30. Admiral Kelso is 56 years old, a native of Fayetteville, Tenn., and a 1956 graduate of the Naval Academy.

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"All the News That's Fit to Print"

The New York Times

New York: Today, mostly sunny, breezy. High near 60. Tonight, clear, windy, mild. Low near 50. Tomorrow, sun then clouds. High near 60. Yesterday: High 53, low 41. Details, page B12.

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50 cents beyond 75 miles from New York City, except on Long Island. 40 CENTS

SOVIET LEADERS AGREE TO SURRENDER COMMUNIST PARTY MONOPOLY ON POWER

Drug for Babies' Seizures Is Found Ineffective and Perhaps Harmful

By GINA KOLATA

A drug that is being taken for long periods by tens of thousands of infants and young children to prevent convulsions is ineffective and inhibits intellectual performance, at least temporarily, researchers have found.

The drug, phenobarbital, has been a mainstay of pediatricians and pediatric neurologists, who have used it for decades to try to suppress seizures that can occur when a baby or child has a fever.

An estimated 130,000 of the four million children born each year in the United States will have at least one such febrile seizure, said Dr. Jonas H. Ellenberg, a statistician at the National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke who is an author of the new study. As many as 40,000 of the children end up taking phenobarbital for the seizures, he estimated. The children usually take the drug, an anticonvulsant that has been used for decades to treat epilepsy, every day for two years.

The Epilepsy Foundation of America urged parents not to react to the study by suddenly discontinuing their children's use of the drug. "Sudden withdrawal of anticonvulsant drugs such as phenobarbital can trigger seizures, including seizures that are harder than usual to control, or which occur in series," said Dr. W. Edwin Dodson, a member of the foundation's board who is professor of pediatrics and neurology at St. Louis Children's Hospital and Washington University.

Edward West, a spokesman for Eli Lilly & Company, a maker of phenobarbital, said company officials had not seen the article. Efforts to reach officials of other companies that make the drug were unavailing.

A Sort of Electrical Storm

Doubts have been raised in the last decade about whether it is useful to treat such a seizure, a sort of electrical storm in the brain that seems to be set off in some children when their temperatures rise in an illness. But many doctors prescribed phenobarbital because they wanted to reassure parents anxious about preventing another seizure and because of concerns that the seizures could be dangerous. Such concerns were raised by anecdotal accounts that the seizures could lead to neurological problems.

In the new study, being published today in The New England Journal of Medicine, researchers report that children who took the drug for as long as two years had just as many febrile seizures as those who did not take it and that the children who took it had signif- [illegible] lower I.Q. scores than the

Judge Nullifies Law Mandating Use of English

By FELICITY BARRINGER
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 7 — A Federal district judge in Phoenix has declared that the state's constitutional amendment making English the language "of all government functions and actions" in Arizona is a violation of federally protected free speech rights.

The decision on Tuesday was the first legal setback for the official-English movement, which gathered momentum in the latter part of the 1980's, particularly in the South and Southwest as those areas experienced a large influx of Asian and Hispanic [illegible]

Communism by Decree . . . or by Choice

THE LEADING AND GUIDING FORCE OF Soviet society and the nucleus of its political system, of all state organizations and public organizations, is the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The C.P.S.U. exists for the people and serves the people.

The Communist Party, armed with Marxism-Leninism, determines the general perspectives of the development of society and the course of the domestic and foreign policy of the U.S.S.R., directs the great constructive work of the Soviet people, and imparts a planned, systematic and theoretically substantiated character to their struggle for the victory of Communism.

All party organizations shall function within the framework of the Constitution of the U.S.S.R.

ARTICLE 6 OF THE SOVIET CONSTITUTION
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Associated Press

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But it is hard to find anyone here, Communist or anti-Communist, who really believes the party is over.

and beset by a public disenchanted not just by 70 years of admitted misrule, but also by five years of unfulfilled promises.

But for several reasons, the party here seems likely to prove more tenacious than its offspring in Eastern Europe.

In contrast to the overnight democracies of Eastern Europe is the Soviet Union, in which the Communist Party has deeper roots, a fractured opposition and the strategic prowess of President Mikhail S. Gorbachev.

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methodical extermination of dissent. In the older generation, Communism is intertwined with the patriotic emotions of World War II and the building of an industrial state.

Moreover, every factory boss, collective farm director, newspaper editor, high school principal, K.G.B. colonel and army officer owes his place in large part to the party's pervasive patronage machine.

Mr. Gorbachev has tried for two years to wean factories and farms from directives of local party bosses. He has discovered that many of them lost the habit of deciding things for [illegible]

GORBACHEV BACKED

A Western-Style System of Government Urged as Meeting Ends

By FRANCIS X. CLINES
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Central Committee leaders, summarizing what they conceded was a storm of questions, doubts and complaints, said the hierarchy had finally agreed to end more than seven decades of party dictatorship by accepting the possibility of political pluralism and by making "no claim for any particular role to be encoded in the Constitution" for the Communists.

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"Society itself will decide whether it wishes to adopt our politics," said Aleksandr N. Yakovlev, the Politburo member and Gorbachev confidant who is one of the main architects of the latest Kremlin proposals to deal with the wave of unrest that has pushed world Communism into retreat and reform.

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The researchers, at the National In-

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The decision on Tuesday was the first legal setback for the official-English movement, which gathered momentum in the latter part of the 1980's, particularly in the South and Southwest as those areas experienced a large influx of Asian and Hispanic immigrants.

The judge, Paul G. Rosenblatt, ruled that the Arizona amendment "is a prohibition on the use of any language other than English by all officers and employees of all political subdivisions in Arizona while performing their official duties." As such, Judge Rosenblatt said, it could inhibit legislators from talking to their constituents or judges from performing marriages in a language other than English.

Mofford Approves of Ruling

Gov. Rose Mofford, a Democrat who strongly opposed the 1988 campaign to amend the state constitution with the language provision, said she would not appeal the judge's ruling. "I am happy the courts ruled it unconstitutional," she said, adding that the law was "flawed from the beginning."

In the absence of an appeal, Judge Rosenblatt's ruling sets a legal principle that is binding only in Arizona. Other lawsuits dealing with the language issue around the country either

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True, the Soviet Communist Party is rapidly polarizing into the camps of revision and resistance. More and more, it is torn by ethnic divisions, paralyzed by its diminishing authority and beset by a public disenchanted not just by 70 years of admitted misrule, but also by five years of unfulfilled promises.

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The roots of Communism run into the national psychology and the system of power.

Bolshevism was indigenous rather than imposed by an imperious neighbor, and it has been reinforced by seven decades of indoctrination and methodical extermination of dissent. In the older generation, Communism is intertwined with the patriotic emotions of World War II and the building of an industrial state.

Moreover, every factory boss, collective farm director, newspaper editor, high school principal, K.G.B. colonel and army officer owes his place in large part to the party's pervasive patronage machine.

Mr. Gorbachev has tried for two years to wean factories and farms from directives of local party bosses. He has discovered that many of them lost the habit of deciding things for themselves.

If the time does come to compete, the party starts with the advantages of a rich political infrastructure, from bank accounts and printing presses to tactical experience and personnel files.

When a group of Communist insurgents met recently in Moscow to consider organizing their own party, one leader, Sergei B. Stankevich, said it would be better to work from within.


"We are not going to walk away from the party with empty hands and bare bottoms," he said.

Although discontent with the party

Continued on Page A10, Column 5

The View From the West

In Washington, there was muted wonder at the Soviet Communist Party's actions, and anticipation over President Mikhail S. Gorbachev's next move, while academic experts were divided on the significance of the events in Moscow. Page A11.



A Western-Style System of Government Urged as Meeting Ends

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Central Committee members repeatedly stressed that they were only recommending, not dictating, changes for possible enactment by the national Parliament, thereby underlining their own shrinking role in the state's executive affairs.

These proposals would thus continue Mr. Gorbachev's attempt to channel power from the party to the Government. They would, if enacted, enhance his role as President, but how fully competitive party or presidential rivals might arise, if ever, was in no way clear from the early proposal sketched after the meeting.

No Action Against Lithuania

The 250-member committee also acceded to the view of the Gorbachev leadership that no immediate sanctions be attempted against the Lithuanian Communist Party, which has declared independence from the Soviet party in a pioneer attempt to force political pluralism onto the land.

Instead, the committee members opted for a conciliatory approach, urging the Lithuanian insurgents to reconsider their action in the face of "top to bottom" changes that are promised for

Continued on Page A10, Column 1

A Single Bullet

By MARK HELPRIN

Most leaders who decide upon war do so amid what they report to have been the ineluctable compulsion of events with a life of their own. And when things get out of hand, it is usually after a period of euphoria has masked the small signals of danger that in later sobriety stand out with such melancholy force.

The lamps of Europe are burning brilliantly but out of control. Far too much rides upon Mikhail Gorbachev, for real power in the Soviet Bloc is still centralized in him, and he alone holds back the perfectly intact mechanisms of repression. The facts suggest a major Soviet *revanche* with unpredictable consequences in and among the blocs. Not since Sarajevo or Munich has so grave a peril been so unappreciated by so many.

Though the press, intelligence agencies and shallow think tanks proffer triumphalist analyses, this is only because institutional needs take precedence over the blaze of individual genius and the simple light of the truth. Institutional analysis tells us that the shah rules the Iran that conquered the Iraq that invaded the Saudi Arabia that owns the America that, in the depression before the nuclear war, ran out of resources just as President Dukakis visited Argentina, victor of the Falklands. And it tells us that Europe is safe.

Consider nonetheless a short list of fundamentals: the dissolution of the Soviet Bloc, the centrifugality of the Soviet republics, and the demise of the Soviet economy.

A Red Line

Vadim Medvedev, the Soviet Communist Party's chief of ideology, believes that divisiveness in Soviet society and secessionist trends in the republics are enough in themselves to cause "the end of *perestroika*" and "our new role in the international community." This is obviously a red line, and yet the country continues to break apart not merely in protest of the forced unity of natural differences but because opportunity generates its own momentum.

The Soviets are attempting to restructure a failed centralized economy by means of a centralized design—a strategy that needs no further comment—and they have no room for mistakes, no political or economic elasticity save their legendary ability to suffer. If Western economies stumble in the near future, the privations of economic transition in the East will be impossible to bear; in that the model for which the East has undertaken to suffer will appear, justifiably or not, to have been an illusion. Keep in mind that in the Soviet economy full employment comes first, and that the national unemployment rate is (unofficially) 17%. Mr. Gorbachev can overcome all difficulties if he can deliver the economy, but he cannot deliver the economy.

The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact is more acutely damaging to Mr. Gorbachev's chances of survival than even the worsening consumer ice age over which he presides. He was not helped when West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, on a trip ostensibly to reassure the Poles, refused to accept the immutability of the Polish-German border. Fundamental Soviet interests guarantee that the rise of Germany will force a reassessment of the disintegration of the pact and the loss of buffer states, and with reassessment may come a change of personnel.

Nonetheless, conventional wisdom in the West—"now that Soviet threat no longer exists . . ."—accepts Mr. Gorbachev's probity and permanence. American intelligence appears to believe that he has replaced hostile elements of the armed forces, but the word on the street in Moscow is the opposite, and a noted Soviet parliamentarian told this newspaper in September that "all the officers who support perestroika have been discharged." In this autumn of Eastern Europe, the Red Army continued to speak its ancient language, detaining American military observers and bayoneting tires, as if to signal that it is not to be dismissed as an independent actor, and it is not. The KGB and the party, bent out of shape by Mr. Gorbachev, can snap back.

The Soviet president will not magically rid the military, the KGB and the party of institutional memory, because his infallibility is a wishful creation of the Western press: Though Mr. Gorbachev originally called for the dissolution of the blocs, he reversed himself when he saw what he had wrought. Still, he says with baseless assurance that "the 1990s promise to become the most fruitful period in the history of civilization," and I say that one must always question the probity and permanence of anyone whose stability depends upon increasing his velocity.

The Stalinists whom Mr. Gorbachev has stuffed into deep and unpleasant buckets may burst from them as if shot from a cannon.

The Stalinists whom Mr. Gorbachev has stuffed into deep and unpleasant buckets may burst from them as if shot from a cannon. The smallest part of recent events in East Europe would have been, a short time ago, *casus belli* for the Soviet Union, justifying a full-scale invasion. Moreover, the Soviets do not and cannot view German reunification with America's careless indifference.

Though the Franco-Prussian War and two world wars were the result of heartfelt German ideals, slipshod European statesmanship, and unintended consequences, the Germans still believe that purity of intention can remake the world. The concert of Europe that they wish to inspire is not impossible, but it is improbable, and efforts to achieve it more often than not put disruptive strain upon the international system. This does not and will not matter to them, for their ethos is not to understand that the perfect is the enemy of the good, but, rather, to pursue an ideal so tensely that it shatters.

They are at it again, having virtually unified, as daily reportage attests. The Schengen talks on European Community open borders serve to query Bonn about reunification; and in refusing to control the inter-German border, Bonn has stated its position unequivocally. If the counter-revolution fails in the Soviet Union, either from lack of boldness or too much of it, the counter-counter-revolutionaries may be obsessed with German ascendancy and take the plunge to reclaim strategic depth. The Brezhnev Doctrine did not die with Brezhnev, just as it was not invented by him. Should a Soviet revanche include the recapture and repression of an East Germany locked in de facto unification with the Federal Republic, hell could break loose as the NATO Germans suddenly discover something for which they will lay down their lives.

America faces these dangers with slogans. Though "the end of history" and "the peace dividend" make no more sense than "tennis balls cause cancer" and "the Arabian resuscitation," they are the intellectual foundation for habitual capitulationists who resent having to receive concessions, because they are happy only when they are making them.

With no inkling of why Mr. Gorbachev may fall, they refuse to look closely at his crumbling economy, affronted military, slighted party and disintegrating empire, and seem to believe that the U.S., prostrate before the South Bronx, can pull these chestnuts from the fire with some beltocentric puffery. Are these not the same people who call the U.S. an impotent giant, who shrink at the thunder of Daniel Ortega, and dare not set foot in Beirut? El Salvador is too big a bite and should be left to the locals, but the U.S.S.R. you do in the afternoon.

Vision is the word used by those who do not comprehend what it is they do not have to offer. Critics of President Bush's instinctive caution, citing vision, have forced him to compromise with negligence. One of the "Wise Men" validating with his resume America's insatiable desire to throw off its burdens is Robert McNamara, once a burden himself. Despite nearly undiminished Soviet military capacity, he wants to cut the U.S. defense budget in half. His recklessness is allowed the front page, as perhaps it should be, for as one of the chief architects of both our gratuitous involvement in and unnecessary defeat by Vietnam, Mr. McNamara should be closely watched so that the public may safely seek the opposite of what he recommends.

Gradually and Steadily


Reduction of forces should be conceived to take some strain off the Soviet economy while neither imperiling Western defense (which a 50% cut obviously would) nor requiring a change in the political structures it serves, for the preservation of NATO is essential not so much to meet contingencies as to deter them. The dissolution of empire in the East, the re-integration of Central with Western Europe, the diminution of orders of battle, and the shifting of alignments must occur gradually and steadily if they are to last and not turn shockingly bitter.

If perestroika succeeds too well, a classic power rivalry will come into play, and if it fails, ideological confrontation will return. What appears to some to be the concert of Europe is merely a moment of relief within a moment of hesitation. Because half the continent is in thrall, the other half should seek gravity, stability and continuity. This means, among other things, rejection of the premise and spur driving Mikhail Gorbachev, who, to continue, must accelerate. It means awakening to the fallacies of hope. It means that the policy of great nations and the fate of the West must not be allowed to depend on the fortunes of one man alone, no matter how positive his effect, for if the fate of the West rests upon one man, it rests upon a single bullet.

Mr. Helprin is a novelist and political commentator. This is the latest of four articles that began in 1988 with "War in Europe: Thinking the Unthinkable."

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OUTLOOK
Commentary and Opinion



PETER ALSBERG—THE WASHINGTON POST

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If Gorbachev Keeps Moving, America Should Help Out

By Zbigniew Brzezinski

THE REUNIFICATION of Germany is the obsessive topic of conversation in Moscow these days—just as it is in Europe is at stake—and with it the postwar division of Europe. The central issue is whether the inevitable further changes will be peaceful or violent.

The Soviets hope they can get the situation under control eventually by opening the social safety valves. But I am not sure they understand the extent to which East Germany is an artifical entity. They do not seem to recognize that the liberalization of the East German regime will, before long,

This Is No Time for Talk Of German Reunification

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The first is the short-term problem: that of preserving sufficient stability throughout the Central and Eastern European region over the coming weeks and months to give everyone time to address themselves in a careful and orderly way to the second and long-term problem, which will require much more time for its successful treatment and should not be approached in haste or under pressure

FALLS

PETER ALSBERG—THE WASHINGTON POST

If Gorbachev Keeps Moving, America Should Help Out

By Zbigniew Brzezinski

THE REUNIFICATION of Germany is the obsessive topic of conversation in Moscow these days—just as it is in Warsaw and Paris. When I left Moscow 10 days ago, everyone was talking about the German problem, but nobody—at least officially—seemed to know what to do about it.

The Soviets simply do not know how to contain the situation in East Germany. They are giving ground to each new development, including Thursday's announcement that East Germany will open its borders. But beneath this calm public response, there is grave concern about the scope of the German crisis and the degree to which it could become explosive.

That crisis has now reopened the German question. In turn, that means that the future of Central Europe is at stake—and with it the postwar division of Europe. The central issue is whether the inevitable further changes will be peaceful or violent.

The Soviets hope they can get the situation under control eventually by opening the social safety valves. But I am not sure they understand the extent to which East Germany is an artifical entity. They do not seem to recognize that the liberalization of the East German regime will, before long, undermine the existence of that regime. Yet they had no response when the argument was made that the termination of the division of Europe has to be followed, even if not instantly accompanied, by the termination of the division of Germany.

What worries Moscow is how fluid the situation is: First the East German demand was for travel; then it became *freiheit*—freedom. The day after tomorrow, it may be *einheit*—unity. While I was in Moscow, I noted to one Soviet leader that the name German Democratic Republic is outdated. The GDR is not very democratic, it is becoming less and less German and at some point soon it will cease to be a separate republic. He smiled sadly.

The Soviets have been shocked by the realization of how unpopular and unstable the communist regimes in Eastern Europe have become. As a consequence they are prepared to accept some new formula for Hungary and Poland—and even Czech-

See MOSCOW, D2, Col. 1

Zbigniew Brzezinski was national security adviser in the Carter administration. This article is based on a trip report he prepared after visiting the Soviet Union from Oct. 26 to Nov. 2.

This Is No Time for Talk Of German Reunification

By George F. Kennan

THE CHANGES now sweeping over Central and Eastern Europe are momentous, irreversible and truly epoch-making. They mark the end of a status quo that has existed in most of this region for four decades, and in Russia for a full seven. Whatever else may be said of them, it is safe to say that Europe will never again look as it has looked in all these years since the end of World War II. And how this future Europe will look is going to depend upon the quality of statesmanship—of thoughtfulness, of insight, of the balance of prudence and courage—that the many governments prominently involved, including our own, are able to bring to the shaping of it.

For ourselves, and for the other major powers of both the NATO and the Warsaw Pacts, this situation presents two great and complex problems, and it is of utmost importance for the solution of both of them that they not be confused.

The first is the short-term problem: that of preserving sufficient stability throughout the Central and Eastern European region over the coming weeks and months to give everyone time to address themselves in a careful and orderly way to the second and long-term problem, which will require much more time for its successful treatment and should not be approached in haste or under pressure.

This second problem cannot be described in a single sentence; it is too vast and too many-sided. In essence, it involves not just the designing of a new status quo for the part of Europe mentioned above but also the working out of a new political, economic and security framework for much of the remainder of the European continent, to replace the old one, so deeply impregnated with Cold War concepts and assumptions that are no longer applicable.

This, as former German prime minister Helmut Schmidt recently observed, is primarily a problem for the Europeans themselves. They are the ones who will have to live with the solution of it. We cannot replace them in this primary responsibility; nor should we wish to. But a central component of this long-term problem will be the future of the North Atlantic alliance; and we, as the leading

See GERMANY, D2, Col. 1

George Kennan is a retired professor at the Institute for Advanced Study and author of "Sketches From a Life."

MARY McGRORY

The Ordeal of Kitty Dukakis

THE DISTRESSFUL news about Kitty Dukakis, who was rushed to the hospital after she drank rubbing alcohol, is another sad chapter in the post-election saga of the Dukakis family. Last February, Kitty Dukakis got institutional care for alcoholism.

She's coming out of her latest difficulty amid a clamor of public speculation. The most harrowing rumor—that her husband would resign—was put down. Was she trying to end a thirst or end her life? The only certainty is that she wanted the world to know how unhappy she is.

Her misery may baffle other women. She is pretty, talented, charming, adored by her husband, surrounded by eminently satisfactory children. Her days are full. She makes speeches, travels, is fussed over, applauded. It is in a way an extension of the campaign, which she loved.

All the aspects of her life add up to quite a bit for those viewing it from the

See McGRORY, D5, Col. 4

Mary McGrory is a Washington Post columnist.

'Little Miss Smith,' You're Not Alone

Perhaps We Who've Been Homeless Too Can Help Save the Boarder Babies

By Pia McKay

ON FRIDAYS, for most of this summer and fall, I traveled by Metro to D.C. General Hospital. I volunteered there with the boarder babies, those infants, who, if they could talk, would call the hospital "home." Some of them have never been outdoors, never seen the sky. They have known no mother. All they know is that a series of people come and go, picking them up, talking to them, feeding and dressing them and then putting them back in their cribs to cry to no avail.

The babies' highly distinctive personalities are already emerging. With their tiny hands and arms, they reach out—often only to meet the empty air. They get bored, frustrated and, cruelest of all, lonely.

An eerie feeling creeps over me. "Here are the youngest of the homeless," I say to myself.

Will they be a fate like mine? I see inanimate, unfeeling thing, in one foster home after another? Will they shift from school to school, constantly losing friends until they lose the knack of friendship? Will they, growing bigger, wind up as I did in huge, understaffed institutions where, instead of talking with their mothers, they will make appointments with social workers; where their errant parents will casually "get in touch" only to disappear heartbreakingly again? And then, at last, will they, as I did, "graduate" into the world, never having known love, never having been needed for the love they had to give; not knowing they are worth anything at all?

I shake these thoughts away. The babies are all beautiful. They look out curiously, like prisoners, from between the slats of their cribs.

McFadden is crying. Eight months old, he



is stocky, like a little football player, and surprisingly strong. A young man comes in and swoops the ecstatic McFadden into his arms, whisking him out for a tour of the corridors. When the man brings him back, McFadden weeps unconsolably. "Oh, he just likes to be held," snorts the young man, leaving, as if a baby's desire to be held were of small account.

There is Smitty, sweet and gentle. He is crying, too. The moment I pick him up, he gives me a big, gummy smile. There is little Miss Smith, propped up on her elbows, a beauty with her big, brown eyes. The small card attached to her crib reads: HIV positive.

Each 3-by-5 crib card tells a grim story. The boarder babies have no first names. Most have been born to drug-addicted mothers; usually crack. Each time the mother got high, heart pounding, blood rushing to her head, her baby got high. Her high lasted about half an hour; her baby's about 72 hours. And seldom is merely one

Inside Najibullah's Regime

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them can be solved, or usefully treated, independently of the remainder of them. Their solution will require a great deal of study, of preliminary discussion and ultimately of negotiation. The questions at hand are ones of great historical depth. Whoever undertakes the study of them (and that means all of us) is going to find himself confronting situations to which better answers should have been found, but weren't, at the end of the last world war, and even some (arising from the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire) left unresolved in 1918 and 1919.

So complex, and so profound in its implications is the task of designing this new Europe that it will not be accomplished at any one time, or subsumed in any single document or settlement. We are talking here of an edifice that will have to rest on many foundations. The erection of it will take years, not months. We will be lucky if the task is substantially accomplished before the end of the century.

and particularly with other groups of powers organized in the two alliances. The Germans could not unilaterally disarm these forces or cause them to disappear even in the physical sense. Even less could they unilaterally disregard, nor would they want to disregard, the contractual framework by which the presence of those forces is supported. Beyond which, the very profiles of these great armies, in East as in West, are now under negotiation among some 28 countries. No German unification would be even thinkable without widespread agreement among all these parties, individually or collectively as members of one or another of the alliances, about the disposition and political control of these forces.

Few would deny that the system of alliances on which European security has rested in these last three and a half decades, rooted as it is in Cold War assumptions which most of us would recognize today as extensively undermined, is rapidly becoming obsolescent. This implies



PHOTO BY ROBERT LUNOW FOR THE WASHINGTON POST

the necessity of an alternative framework of security for the entire continent. At the center of the search for this alternative must stand—Germany. That country is now the gathering point of by far the greater part of the armed strength of the continent. Its geographic position and its economic capacities will give it the central position in any new framework of security that may be devised. The problems that present themselves in the relationships of the two parts of Germany to each other and to their neighbors are not ones that can be solved other than in relation to that new, and presumably wider, security framework.

The principle by which most of us were guided when we found ourselves faced, 40 years ago, with the problem of Germany's future was this: that there must not again be a united Germany, and particularly a militarized one, standing alone in Europe, and not firmly embraced in some wider international structure—some structure that would absorb its energies and, by doing so, give reassurance to Germany's neighbors. But if Germany is to be embraced in some wider structure (and the possibilities of this seem greater today than they did four decades ago), there then arises the question: Should Germany enter this larger structure as a united entity? Or would it not be better, and even more reassuring to others, if the two parts of that country, while culturally and economically united, were to enter it as separate political entities as they are today?

It is precisely these questions, the answers to which will depend upon the nature of the wider security arrangements for Europe, that will have to be worked out; and the one process must not precede the other.

lishments have to be kept in existence until they can be examined under a wider focus than the conditions of this day permit, there is no reason why the forces they now have deployed in the center of Europe, already grossly exhorbitant in relation to any demonstrable need, should not be greatly reduced. That in itself would improve the atmosphere for the more wide-ranging explorations of the requirements for Europe's future security that await our attention.

A major requirement for progress in this direction would be, however, a departure by Washington and its leading NATO allies from the silly belief that NATO's most urgent task is to frustrate an attack on Western Europe by a militant Soviet Union, accompanied by its supposedly faithful and equally militant Warsaw Pact allies. We must prepare instead for a searching examination of the ways in which Europe's security is to be achieved in an age where the great enemy is not the Soviet Union but the rapid deterioration of our planet as a supporting structure for civilized life.

Should America Help?

MOSCOW, From D1

oslovakia. I gave a speech at the Diplomatic Academy in Moscow and said that Czechoslovakia has at the very most a year or so before it goes the way of Hungary and Poland. I got no disagreement.

On Eastern Europe, the Soviet attitude seems to be that any kind of internal change is acceptable in Poland and Hungary (and perhaps East Germany)—so long as these countries remain within the Warsaw Pact. I suspect that the Soviets do not at this stage want the reforms in Poland or Hungary to fail, because this could have a very negative impact on *perestroika*. This gives the West a great deal of latitude in what it can do to help the Hungarians and the Poles.

The Soviets, in fact, would probably like Western help to be extended to *them*, too. One could sense a pleading tone in their repeated inquiries about my views on perestroika and whether, in some fashion, the West could help. Their major concern is stability and the preservation of some sort of East bloc alliance system—with unlimited toleration for internal change—unless it assumes explicitly "anti-Russian" manifestations. Some Soviet officials even spoke explicitly of the need to get rid of the empire and of the costly commitment to traditional messianism.

But there was a sense, too, of a leadership overcome by problems, pressed down by inertia.

The Soviets are reeling these days, as much from their own internal economic problems as from the political revolution that is sweeping Eastern Europe. I had a sense of a leadership overcome by problems and of a pervasive social atmosphere of fatigue and even despair. What struck me especially was the gap between political ferment and political change on one hand and economic stagnation and decay on the other. These trends seem to be moving in opposite directions.

Politically, I think a breakthrough of sorts has occurred. Everyone talks very openly and nothing is taboo; the discussion is focused on how to democratize the Soviet Union. Even a multiparty system is no longer excluded—though it certainly is not imminent. At the same time, the predominant reality is that of economic deterioration, of a massive and appalling backwardness and even poverty. Socio-economically, the Soviet Union gives one the overwhelming impression of a stagnant Third World country.

This contrast between a political situation which is becoming more dynamic—though its dynamism is still uninstitutionalized and a basic commitment to genuine democracy has not been made—and the worsening of the economic situation makes me expect a deepening crisis of the system.

The dominant impression I took from my conversations with Soviet officials, intellectuals and a few average citizens was of a growing sense of anxiety. They eagerly accepted any criticism of the Soviet Union, its current reality or its past. Only once or twice did I hear some defense of Leninism. Everyone seemed worried about the future, some even spoke about an approaching catastrophe. Explicit analogies were drawn by one or two interlocutors with "the time of troubles" in the early 17th century.

In discussing the nationalities problem, the predominant attitude among my Soviet hosts was "give us time." In other words, give us a chance for reforms, and maybe the national issue will somehow dissipate. I also sensed an intensification of Russian nationalism, a reaffirmation of traditional Russian values—and sensitivity to any criticism directed at Russia itself. Gorbachev's key foreign policy adviser, Alexander Yakovlev, particularly reflected that in his discussion with me of the national problem and in his evident resentment of Polish demands for reparations for Stalinist crimes.

Russian nationalism seemed in evidence everywhere. It surfaced in the poems being read on the Arbat. It emerged in my conversations with Russian officials on the subject of Gorbachev's "common European house." When I remarked that the Soviets, with their Third World living standards, might not have much to offer the rest of Europe, some responded: Ah, yes, but we can share our ancient Russian spiritual values!

Ideologically, I sensed a total demoralization. No ideological tenet is sacred. Leninism is given lip service, largely because that still provides some degree of legitimacy for the system. In fact, the substance of most political ideas being discussed these days is closer to social democracy, or Menshevism.

The Western pluralist system is acknowledged implicitly as the superior system. There is still some pensive talk of "socialism," and the habit of thinking in such rigidly conceptual terms is deeply ingrained. But the substance is clearly being diluted. One Soviet adviser to Gorbachev even referred, for example, to the possibility that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union soon might even be changing its name.

One surprising change is that the Soviet mass media are now competitive, in a style somewhat reminiscent of the American press. When a "celebrity" appears in Moscow, they all chase him and compete for interviews. I was repeatedly told by different Soviet newspapers how many more readers they had than their rivals and why I should therefore give them an interview first. There is great fascination with "enemy" views, including mine. People were citing my previous writings—pointing out, for example, that I had predicted years ago that the national problem in the Soviet Union would become acute. To my surprise, Soviet TV even gave extensive coverage to my visit to the Katyn Forest, where more than 4,000 Polish officers were slaughtered by Stalin's secret police in 1940.

The real danger to perestroika, I think, is that it will simply drown in the morass of Soviet incompetence and Russian tradition—or degenerate into chaos. When I was asked for advice, I said that the Gorbachev leadership needs to accelerate the process of change and to define more explicitly its direction, so that the Soviet people will have some vision of a more constructive future—a vision more concretely defined.

To be specific: The time is approaching when the Soviet leadership must state explicitly that its objective is to transform the Soviet Union into a multiparty democracy, based on the market system and organized as a confederation. Anything less than that is likely to simply perpetuate the present state of confusion, and make the resolution of ongoing problems more difficult.

The time may also be coming when we in the United States should begin to think about how we might help perestroika, in a way that will not damage us if Gorbachev is overthrown.

The problem with perestroika has been that it begs the question: perestroika *of* what *to* what? If Gorbachev continues to talk about revitalizing "socialism," he will not inspire enthusiasm at home or trust abroad. But we should encourage the Soviets to believe that if they make fundamental changes, they too will be part of the new alignment that is taking shape in Europe. We have to say to the Russians: If you bite the bullet, we will be ready to help you.

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John Kiser runs a company that acquires rights to Eastern bloc high technology. He is the author of "Communist Entrepreneurs," published by Franklin Watts, from which this article is adapted.

perience of World War II. Struggle of the most existential nature began in 1942 when a 17-year-old Kabaidze went into the infantry to fight the Germans. Kabaidze, three times wounded, was one of two soldiers to survive in a unit that fought a center of light industry, Ivanovo had a reputation in the postwar Soviet Union as a "city of women." The men were off elsewhere, working in heavy industry.

The plant that Kabaidze had been asked to direct had been marked for light, simple nored the nostrums of the planning system. He refused to make products specified by the plan unless they were needed by his customers. Nor would he accept Soviet-supplied equipment if it was not up to world standards. He was even accused of being

"The customer is God," says Kabaidze. "My success came because I thought horizontally, not vertically. I worked to make my customers satisfied, not my bureaucratic bosses. In the end, it was my customers who protected me."

Reunification? Not Yet

GERMANY, From D1

power in that grouping, cannot avoid a measure of involvement. To meet that responsibility is going to take a great deal more, in the way of thought and discussion—discussion among ourselves, but also with the Europeans, including the Russians—than we have given it to date.

What this problem involves is tremendous in scope and difficulty. It involves the relationship of Eastern Europe, economically and politically, to the European Community. It involves the future of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. It involves the military arrangements now pertaining in the center of the European continent. It involves the various negotiations now in progress over the conventional arms balance in Europe. It involves the relationship between the two parts of Germany, and the attitudes to be taken toward the possibility, and desirability, of their unification.

These problems are all of a part. None of them can be solved, or usefully treated, independently of the remainder of them. Their solution will require a great deal of study, of preliminary discussion and ultimately of negotiation. The questions at hand are ones of great historical depth. Whoever undertakes the study of them (and that means all of us) is going to find himself confronting situations to which better answers should have been found, but weren't, at the end of the last world war, and even some (arising from the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire) left unresolved in 1918 and 1919.

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It is none too early to start the thinking that will have to go into this great effort. But it is important, at the same time, that the excitements of the moment do not rush us into hasty and unthought-through decisions, or even discussions, that could prejudice an ultimately sound resolution of any of the major questions involved.

The best example of this danger will be found in the loose talk that has marked the discussion of recent days about German reunification. Many people talk about this as if it were something that would or could easily and naturally flow from any extensive liberalization of conditions in East Germany. This view takes little account of the true depths of the problem. There must now be something well over a million armed men on German territory, with all their elaborate modern equipment and, in the case of ourselves and the Russians, with nuclear as well as conventional weapons. These forces are there not by the will of the German authorities alone but by elaborate and long-standing agreements with other powers, and particularly with other groups of powers organized in the two alliances. The Germans could not unilaterally disarm these forces or cause them to disappear even in the physical sense. Even less could they unilaterally disregard, nor would they want to disregard, the contractual framework by which the presence of those forces is supported. Beyond which, the very profiles of these great armies, in East as in West, are now under negotiation among some 28 countries. No German unification would be even thinkable without widespread agreement among all these parties, individually or collectively as members of one or another of the alliances, about the disposition and political control of these forces.

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


PHOTO BY ROBERT LLEWOW FOR THE WASHINGTON POST

the necessity of an alternative framework of security for the entire continent. At the center of the search for this alternative must stand—Germany. That country is now the gathering point of by far the greater part of the armed strength of the continent. Its geographic position and its economic capacities will give it the central position in any new framework of security that may be devised. The problems that present themselves in the relationships of the two parts of Germany to each other and to their neighbors are not ones that can be solved other than in relation to that new, and presumably wider, security framework.

The principle by which most of us were guided when we found ourselves faced, 40 years ago, with the problem of Germany's future was this: that there must not again be a united Germany, and particularly a militarized one, standing alone in Europe, and not firmly embraced in some wider international structure—some structure that would absorb its energies and, by doing so, give reassurance to Germany's neighbors. But if Germany is to be embraced in some wider structure (and the possibilities of this seem greater today than they did four decades ago), there then arises the question: Should Germany enter this larger structure as a united entity? Or would it not be better, and even more reassuring to others, if the two parts of that country, while culturally and economically united, were to enter it as separate political entities as they are today?

It is precisely these questions, the answers to which will depend upon the nature of the wider security arrangements for Europe, that will have to be worked out; and the one process must not precede the other. Anything else could create complications that no one would wish to invite but that no one might see the way to avoid. It is for this reason that even if the liberalization of political conditions in Eastern Europe were to progress in the near future to a point where they were little different from the conditions prevailing in the German Federal Republic, this would of itself be no reason for an immediate German unification; and this is, therefore, not the time to raise the subject.

Our immediate problem is to see how the process of change now overtaking the countries of the eastern part of Europe, and the adjustment of their relations with Russia which these changes involve, can be eased in a manner conducive to the peace and security of the continent in the immediately forthcoming period—so that time can be won for the far more arduous and lengthy process of finding a new European order. The best contribution this country and its leading NATO allies can make to this immediate task will be to intensify their efforts to achieve far-reaching reductions of conventional arms in Europe. If, pending wider agreements, the two alliances and their respective military establishments have to be kept in existence until they can be examined under a wider focus than the conditions of this day permit, there is no reason why the forces they now have deployed in the center of Europe, already grossly exhorbitant in relation to any demonstrable need, should not be greatly reduced. That in itself would improve the atmosphere for the more wide-ranging explorations of the requirements for Europe's future security that await our attention.

A major requirement for progress in this direction would be, however, a departure by Washington and its leading NATO allies from the silly belief that NATO's most urgent task is to frustrate an attack on Western Europe by a militant Soviet Union, accompanied by its supposedly faithful and equally militant Warsaw Pact allies. We must prepare instead for a searching examination of the ways in which Europe's security is to be achieved in an age where the great enemy is not the Soviet Union but the rapid deterioration of our planet as a supporting structure for civilized life.

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MOSCOW, From D1

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Steps to German Unity: Bonn as a Power

Accord on Europe

Anatomy of a Decision

A special report

By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN
with MICHAEL R. GORDON
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 15 — Early Tuesday morning, as foreign ministers from the 23 NATO and Warsaw Pact nations milled around the main hall of the Ottawa Congress Center, the Soviet Foreign Minister, Eduard A. Shevardnadze and Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d stood off in a corner, whispering to one another through a Russian translator.

Mr. Shevardnadze reported that the Soviet Union would back down and accept President Bush's proposal for troop cuts in Europe, which would leave the United States with a 30,000-man advantage.

This conversation was the culmination of several days of behind-the-scenes diplomacy that was kept secret not only from the public but from many allied governments as well. The talks resulted in a new United States-Soviet understanding on troop levels in Europe.

But probably more important, they also resulted in an arrangement for how the four World War II Allies — Britain, France, the United States and the Soviet Union — would deal with the other major development on the continent: negotiations for a seemingly inevitable reunification of Germany.

In these latter negotiations, the Big Four, once the undisputed overseers of Germany, late found themselves having to negotiate with Bonn as a real equal. West Germany used its weight in world affairs, as well as the political momentum of change within its borders and in East Germany, to help shape many of the terms of the Ottawa framework for determining how a united Germany will fit into a post-cold war European order.

How It Happened


A reconstruction of the negotiations, based on dozens of interviews today and in recent weeks, found these steps:

¶Bush Administration officials worked behind the scenes to consult separately with British, French and West German leaders to forge a consensus on dealing with German unification, before discussing the matter with Moscow.

¶Britain, France and the Soviet Union initially preferred that the four Allied powers discuss the future of Germany among themselves — and not, at first, with the Germans — but Washington talked them into bringing the Germans in from the start.

¶Once the Germans were brought into the process, Bonn insisted on excluding the other nations of the 16-member North Atlantic Treaty Organization from these discussions. The West Germans, in a bit of muscle flexing, wanted to make it clear that they would deal only with those Allied

Continued on Page A9, Column 1



Novosti via Associated Press

...sign in Troubled Soviet Republic

...nbe, the capital of the ... Party and government leaders, the press agency ...oviet troops on Wednes- ... Tass said, submitted their resignations after nearly a ...of the Communist Party. ... week of violence that left at least 18 dead. Page A8.

...l From Reagan Iran-Contra Testimony

...Federal ...ews or- ...m being ...resident ...d under ...s role in ...ie judge ...d video- ...irold H. ...ON WOOD- ...ing complete

Greene, came on the same day that the Bush Administration joined Mr. Reagan's efforts to try to shield Mr. Reagan's diaries from public scrutiny. The Administration asserted executive privilege, as Mr. Reagan had already done, to prevent the disclosure of the former President's White House diaries that might be related to the case. Presidents have cited the privilege in an effort to keep private documents secret, saying that overwhelming need for them must be demonstrated.

The Justice Department said the information in the diary entries was available elsewhere, "most specifically from the oral testimony of the former President himself," an apparent reference to Mr. Reagan's deposition that is to come Friday.

Judge Greene ruled two weeks ago that Mr. Reagan must turn over some diary excerpts, but said he is reconsidering because Mr. Reagan's lawyers evoked executive privilege in refusing to comply. Judge Greene said later that Mr. Reagan's claim of executive privi-

Continued on Page A18, Column 4

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...final document issued by the conference included few specific economic, military or law-enforcement agreements. And as expected, Mr. Bush left Colombia after the nine-and-a-half-hour visit without offering any increase in the $2.4 billion five-year regional aid program he has already sent to Congress.

The final document did not discuss that aid program, which is already under attack by Democrats in Congress. Senator Joseph R. Biden Jr., chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, has offered his own program, which would shift Mr. Bush's emphasis on military and law-enforcement programs to economic aid.

Lunch at Naval Academy

The four leaders met for nearly three hours and then ate lunch together under heavy guard in the Naval Academy of Cartagena, a coastal city that was flooded with the most intensive security ever mounted for a trip by Mr. Bush. Thousands of Colombian soldiers guarded the streets of Cartagena and stood guard in the trees on the edge of the airport runways in this city 60 miles to the southwest, where Mr. Bush landed and took off.

The President roared into the meeting site in a fleet of three Marine Corps helicopters, which skimmed the treetops and conducted a series of high-speed maneuvers to foil any possible attack. Colombian and United States warships patrolled offshore while United States counterterrorist units and frogmen guarded the land and sea approaches to the meeting site.

In between meetings, Mr. Bush and

Continued on Page A12, Column 1

In Bonn's Parliament, Insults Fly in Debate on Unification

By SERGE SCHMEMANN
Special to The New York Times

BONN, Feb. 15 — Catcalls and charges echoed through the West German Parliament today as it gave a rowdy and heated foretaste of the domestic political struggle shaping over German unity.

Among many exchanges of insults, opposition Social Democrats called Chancellor Helmut Kohl a rabble-rouser and accused him of handling reunification as his private business.

The Christian Democrats retaliated with salvos aimed at the former relations between the Social Democrats and the East German Communist party, focusing on a declaration of joint goals the two parties signed two years ago.

'Brutal Party Fight for Power'

Alfred Dregger, the Christian Democrats' floor leader, shouted at the opposition that "for a long time you were at peace with the wall and barbed wire." He said the Social Democrats' leader, Hans-Jochen Vogel, was behaving "with the sourness of a petty bookkeeper to the historical successes for the future of Germany."

From the environmentalist Greens, Willi Hoss accused both the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats of burying German unity under a "brutal party fight for power."

The exchanges were as fierce as any seen on the Parliament's floor, and the Speaker, Rita Süssmuth, was often hard pressed to restore order. She appealed to the members of Parliament "to give a model for democracy to the people of East Germany."

The formal agenda of the session was to hear Mr. Kohl's report on progress toward unification. "We have never been so close to our goal, the unity of all Germans in freedom, as we are today," the Chancellor said.

He hailed President Mikhail S. Gorbachev, the Soviet leader, for opening the door to reunification by declaring last Saturday that it was for the Germans to decide their future, and he thanked West Germany's Western allies for standing by it through the years of the cold war.

Mr. Kohl sought to reassure East

Continued on Page A8, Column 1

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mentary vote that ended its 20 years of independence brought the republic into

ence, the Latvian Parliament's decision to demand an independent state

In a visit to Lithuania last month, President Mikhail S. Gorbachev said

decision on secession not to an individual republic but to the Soviet legislature.

German aggression will be understood and supported, for other reasons, by Germany's other European neighbors, which remember what such aggression

last week to give up the party's constitutional monopoly on political power. Criticism of the party has become surprisingly open.

"I think the C.P.S.U. is unable to break with its past," Mikhail Chulaki, a non-Communist, wrote in the weekly Moscow News this week, using the initials for the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. "Was there ever a 'vanguard role?' When? Under Stalin? under Khrushchev, under Brezhnev? I.e., under regimes that either dripped with blood or were more liberal but always totalitarian."

Now, with the economy in a shambles, the Communist Party's authority rapidly vanishing, separatism growing in at least 6 of the 15 constituent republics and Soviet military might irrelevant to any conceivable solution, Mr. Gorbachev has apparently decided that he cannot save the system that held the country together by force for 70 years.

Economic Bid to West

The question, in many minds, is whether he can even get it to survive long enough to replace it with a freer economic and political system capable of being integrated with the Western economy. Prime Minister Nikolai I. Ryzhkov, on a visit to Australia this week, said that he hoped that the Soviet Union could be ready by 1995, but that full integration might take 10 to 15 years.

"They can't force it," a Western diplomat said. "They can only get it through cooperation."

Thus, he explained, Moscow has one more reason not to stand in the way of unification of the two Germanys, which together constitute a little less than one-sixth of total Soviet foreign trade.

"Would they rather have 77 million Germans with them or against them?" this diplomat asked rhetorically.

But Soviet officials concede, privately, that they lost control over events in Germany in October, when Erich Honecker lost control to the demonstrators in the streets in Leipzig and East Berlin.

Threat of 'the Streets'

The streets here have begun to be trouble, too. On Feb. 4, as many as half a million people took to the squares of Moscow in support of various causes, including faster change. On Feb. 26, the masses are expected to converge on the capital again, and some Communist officials fear that eventually "the streets" will go out of control.

In Azerbaijan, Tadzhikistan and Armenia, they already have, and the results are ethnic strife and bloodshed. The Communist parties there are under attack and collapsing almost as fast as their equivalents did in Eastern Europe last fall, and perhaps for the same reason: They were artificial Russian implants.

Now, as the streets deteriorate, oil production falls, feed grain runs out and meat disappears from the stores in the Ukraine, in Russia, all over the country, the worry is that all state authority may soon be in danger.

Few diplomats here think Mr. Gorbachev has much time to think up devious strategies to hoodwink the West into giving up its own interests in Western Europe. He is just hoping to salvage what he can of his own.

The Germans

In Bonn's Parliament, Insults Fly in Debate on Unification

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Germans that they will not be swallowed up in the drive toward reunification, and West Germans that the costs involved will not affect their social benefits.

"Our compatriots in the G.D.R. can be sure of our solidarity," he said. "And to fellow citizens in West Germany, I want to say that our social net will be tightly knit in the future."

High Stakes, Aggressive Race

But during Mr. Kohl's address the catcalls began, demonstrating how inextricably the process toward reunification has become enmeshed in the heated election campaigns of both East and West Germany.

Both the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats have effectively usurped the campaign toward the East German elections on March 18, fielding surrogate parties and campaigning ardently for them. Mr. Kohl plans the first of six campaign appearances next Tuesday in Erfurt, and all leaders of the Social Democrats will be crisscrossing East Germany on the stump.

After March 18, the race will shift to the West German elections on Dec. 2. The winner will probably be the first chancellor of a reunited Germany.

Such high stakes have insured a highly aggressive race, made all the more so by the fact that the major parties are now essentially agreed on the need for rapid unity. The exchanges in Parliament indicate that both parties will try to take credit for unity and to depict the other as soft on unity and as a fellow traveler of the old Government.

Implications for West Germany

West German officials are also talking about the possibility that the timing of unification could have important repercussions on West German politics. If unification is achieved by this fall, it is possible that East Germans might be permitted to vote in West Germany's elections, thereby affecting the outcome. But the details of unification are still to be worked out, and included in the unanswered questions are the type of government to emerge from unification, and whether East Germany would just be absorbed into the existing West German political map or a new system created.

Since Feb. 6, when Mr. Kohl first proposed quick progress toward monetary union, he has made clear that he intends to position himself as the Chancellor of all Germans and their guide to rapid union.

The prospect of the economic union of the Germanys has shaken bond markets, pushing interest rates higher. Business Day, page D1.

That stance drew heated attacks in Parliament today from the opposition. "What is at stake here is not the absorption of the G.D.R. or a territory without government," Mr. Vogel declared, intimating that this was Mr. Kohl's goal. "What we face here is uniting with a people that has won its freedom by itself."

Opposition legislators also interrupted with jeers that Mr. Kohl had been "too friendly" with the now-disgraced East German leader, Erich Honecker, who visited Bonn two years ago.

The Heavy Part of History

Mr. Kohl yelled back: "Do you want me to read out your joint statement? Only a few weeks ago you were against unity."

To this, Mr. Vogel shot back that the Christian Democrats were the only party supporting a "former block party." The East German Christian Democrats, a party which the West German Christian Democrats support, was for the past 40 years one of the small political organizations maintained as window dressing by the Communists.

As in the past, the only speaker to win the applause of the full house was Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who has earned general respect for consistently predicting that Mr. Gorbachev would be the key to German unity, and for shaping the agreements with the World War II Allies that have cleared the way for reunification.

"The unity of the two Germanys is reachable only on the basis of total equality," Mr. Genscher said, drawing a burst of applause.

"West Germany must offer freedom, unity, democracy and social justice. But the G.D.R. does not come this way with empty hands. The people there carried the heavy portion of German history."

The applause seemed to reflect in part the universal awareness that Mr. Genscher comes from East Germany, a fact that is believed to have shaped much of his work as Foreign Minister. The Foreign Minister will visit his home city of Halle in East Germany tomorrow to deliver his first speech there.

Your Money: Saturday, In Business Day



Agence France-Presse



Reuters

Chancellor Helmut Kohl of West Germany, left, was at the center of a stormy Parliament discussion on reunification. Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the only speaker to win the applause of the full house, said unity of the two Germanys "is reachable only on the basis of total equality."

Honecker Says He Takes Blame for '89 Vote Fraud

Responsibility but no criminal intent, East German says.

By FERDINAND PROTZMAN
Special to The New York Times

BONN, Feb. 15 — Erich Honecker, the former East German leader, took political responsibility today for vote fraud in local elections last year as well as the nation's current crisis, but denied any criminal guilt.

Mr. Honecker's admission was read on national television this evening by Rainer Eppelmann, a pastor and leading figure in the opposition group Democratic Awakening. He said Mr. Honecker had issued the statement from another pastor's home, where he is staying while awaiting trial on charges of treason, misrule and corruption.

After reiterating his admission of political responsibility for East Germany's troubles, Mr. Honecker said, "This also applies to the circumstances that led to vote fraud on May 7, 1989.

"At the same time I want to emphasize that I never made a political decision for egoistic motives, and that I feel free from any guilt in the criminal sense," Mr. Honecker said.

Inquiry Into Party Role

After living through decades of elections with preordained results, East Germans became irate last May when returns in local elections failed to register an anti-Communist protest of organized abstention and the casting of blank ballots by some voters.

Mr. Eppelmann, a Protestant minister and the best-known member of Democratic Awakening, has assisted public prosecutors in the widening inquiry into vote manipulation in those elections by the East German Communist Party.

Lothar Reuter, the Deputy Prosecutor in charge of the inquiry, said in the same television broadcast that officials were investigating whether local election boards were forced to manipulate vote totals under pressure from the East German Communist Party. He said that 47 people were under investigation, including two former Communist mayors of major cities.

Dissatisfaction with the election result contributed to the exodus of East Germans via Hungary last summer and became a rallying point for opposition groups. The issue dogged Mr. Honecker even after his fall from power in late October.

Mr. Honecker's successor, Egon Krenz, chaired the election commission that validated the May elections. Mr. Krenz was ousted from office later last year.

The concern about voting fraud is being fed by an increase in political tensions ahead of East Germany's first free elections, scheduled for March 18. The voters, who previously could only cast ballots for candidates from the Communist Party or the four small parties that were its docile allies, will be confronted by an array of parties.

The March elections will be overshadowed by a single dominating issue, reunification of the two Germanys. Chancellor Helmut Kohl, who welcomed Mr. Honecker on the East German leader's trip to West Germany in 1986, said today that East Germany's next government would seek unification as quickly as possible.

Mr. Honecker's political standing and physical health have declined steadily. After he was deposed, the 77-year-old former General Secretary of the Communist Party was forced to leave his luxurious villa in the East Berlin suburb of Wandlitz. With nowhere to turn, he and his wife, Margaret, sought refuge with a minister.

Mr. Honecker's statement appeared in part to refute comments by East German officials with whom he has had contact that he is unable to comprehend the events that have swept East Germany in recent months.

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Upheaval in the East: The Gamble of Diplomats

Diplomacy

How German Unity Advanced: A Muscular Bonn Prevails on the Big Four

Continued From Page A1

powers that had postwar legal rights in Berlin.

Setting the Stage

The Wall Falls, The Allies Respond

After the opening of the Berlin wall on Nov. 10, Administration officials assumed that the unification process would unfold gradually, and that no serious moves on their part would be required until the East German elections, then scheduled for May.

But on Jan. 28, with thousands of East Germans still flocking to the West every day, East German authorities announced that they were advancing the election date to March 18. They simply could not hold the country together until May. Since pro-unification parties were expected to sweep the elections, Administration officials realized that a unified Germany was no longer a possibility — it was all but a certainty.

So the Administration decided to come up with its own plan to manage reunification. President Bush consulted with his national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, and the deputy adviser, Robert M. Gates, and Mr. Baker with his key aides — Robert Zoellick, State Department counselor; Dennis B. Ross, the department's Director of Policy Planning, and Raymond G. H. Seitz, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs. Mr. Seitz eventually produced a version of the plan adopted at Ottawa. It became known as the "two-plus-four" concept.

Under this formula, after the East German elections were over the two Germanys would get together and discuss their economic, political and legal unification. After that, the United States, Britain, France and the Soviet Union would sit down with the two Germanys and discuss the size of the army their unified state might have, its relationship to NATO and security guarantees for its neighbors.

Mr. Baker and President Bush decided that they would keep the two-plus-four idea closely held and begin secretly polling the three other Allies, one by one. They would not tell the other members of NATO, until and unless there was an agreement among the four, plus the two Germanys.

The first serious discussion of the idea took place on Jan. 29, when the British Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, met with Mr. Baker in Washington. Mr. Hurd, who had been thinking along similar lines, indicated that his Government's preference would be

On Feb. 5, Mr. Baker began a trip to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. At the last minute, his schedulers added a stop in Shannon, Ireland, at 5 A.M. for a meeting with the French Foreign Minister, Roland Dumas. During the one-hour talk, Mr. Dumas also signed on to the "two-plus-four" concept, but only after saying that his first preference was also "four plus zero."

As the reunification negotiations progressed, pressure was building in the United States and in Europe for Mr. Bush to propose a deeper cut in Soviet and American conventional forces in Europe than he had presented to NATO leaders in May. At the urging of Mr. Scowcroft, Gen. Colin L. Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, developed the plan to cut American and Soviet troops in Central Europe to 195,000, with the United States keeping 30,000 soldiers elsewhere in the region.

Meetings in Moscow

Visit by Baker A Turning Point

On Feb. 7, Mr. Baker flew into Moscow. That night, he had a private meeting with Mr. Shevardnadze and tried to bring up Germany, but the Soviet official said that topic would have to be taken up with President Mikhail S. Gorbachev himself. The next morning, Mr. Baker presented the two-plus-four concept to the Soviet leader as they sat around a huge table in the Kremlin's Catherine Hall. Mr. Gorbachev was intrigued by the two-plus-four idea, but noncommittal. He too made it clear that he shared the British and French preference for "four plus zero."

"One of the things that is very striking about dealing with Shevardnadze and Gorbachev right now is that they will listen to your arguments," a senior State Department official said. "These are not stylized discussions. They tend to be very relaxed. When you make a case that they think is reasonable, they will come right back and tell you: 'Well, you know, that's reasonable.' And there was quite a bit of that in the discussion on the Germanys."

But the German question was not the only issue Mr. Baker had to discuss with the Soviets. There was also the question of how they would respond to President Bush's troop proposal, with its insistence on American troop superiority in Europe. This was to drive home the point that the Soviets, who were in Europe as occupiers, might have to leave at the behest of their allies, but that the Americans were there by invitation and would not be leaving entirely.

Mr. Gorbachev accepted the basic principle of lower troop levels, but gave

out the British and the French — decid[e]d. A Baker aide mused that if anyone



Canadian Press

Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d and Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze of the Soviet Union, right, conferring on Tuesday at closing session of meeting in Ottawa of NATO and Warsaw Pact ministers.

Dizzying Speed

German Disunity, Other Loose Ends

It was at this juncture that Mr. Shevardnadze also informed Mr. Baker that Mr. Gorbachev was ready to accept Mr. Bush's original troop offer.

Mr. Baker was pleased but somewhat taken aback. No one had really expected Mr. Gorbachev to come around so soon. The Soviet leader was apparently playing from a much weaker hand than anyone thought. Mr. Baker walked out of the hall and telephoned President Bush with the news. Mr. Shevardnadze phoned President Gorbachev to get his reaction to the two-plus-four language.

Meanwhile, the President had been conducting his own telephone diplomacy on Tuesday morning, speaking twice with Chancellor Kohl. Mr. Bush — knowing that Mr. Genscher and Mr. Kohl, political allies of necessity in Bonn's governing coalition, dislike each other and often do not even tell each other what they are doing — decided that he had to personally make certain that Mr. Kohl approved of the two-plus-four deal that Mr. Genscher was striking with Mr. Baker. Mr. Kohl told the President that he was willing, and the President gave Mr. Baker his green light.

Two hours later, Mr. Shevardnadze and Mr. Baker met again in a private conference room. Mr. Shevardnadze said that Mr. Gorbachev supported the idea but that he needed some changes in the text. First, it could not mention the March 18 East German election date, or suggest that this was the event that would trigger the two-plus-four meeting. This was done to mollify his East German allies and to avoid treating unification, or the dissolution of East Germany, as a foregone conclusion.

Mr. Shevardnadze also insisted, apparently on behalf of the Poles, that the statement contain a line saying that the two-plus-four discussions would deal with "issues of security of the neighboring states."

Once this language was approved, news photographers were summoned for pictures of the two German Foreign Ministers and those of the four Allied countries standing together. No one was told why. Moments later, their two-plus-four announcement was released. Members of the press got it before most other NATO ministers. The Dutch, Italians and Belgians were incensed and began asking for some changes in the text, particularly for some reference not only to the security of states neighboring Germany, but also in the rest of Europe.

"They were told in no uncertain

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Canadian Press

Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d and Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze of the Soviet Union, right, conferring on Tuesday at closing session of meeting in Ottawa of NATO and Warsaw Pact ministers.

Hurd, met with Mr. Baker in Washington. Mr. Hurd, who had been thinking along similar lines, indicated that his Government's preference would be "four plus zero" — that is, the four Allied powers getting together to discuss the fate of Germany, at first without the Germans. Nevertheless, he gave London's backing to two plus four.

Four days later, the West German Foreign Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, flew to Washington for a private chat with Mr. Baker, during which the Secretary first laid out the two-plus-four idea to him. Mr. Genscher liked it, but he wanted to make certain that it was two plus four, and not four plus two. That is, he wanted to make sure that the two Germanys would first determine the nature of their unification on their own, and then deal with the other powers on external security issues.

Mr. Genscher also told Mr. Baker that his Government would have nothing to do with a "2-plus-15" arrangment — the two Germanys and the 15 other members of NATO deciding the German future. Nor would he accept "four plus zero." He also said that West Germany would not put its future in the hands of the 35 members of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Two plus four, he said, was just right.

allies, but that the Americans were there by invitation and would not be leaving entirely.

Mr. Gorbachev accepted the basic principle of lower troop levels, but gave Mr. Baker a counterproposal: both sides would go down to either 195,000 men or 225,000 men, but not 195,000 for the Soviets and 225,000 for the Americans. Administration officials say they believe that this idea may have been generated by the Soviet arms-control bureaucracy and that Mr. Gorbachev decided he had nothing to lose by seeing if he could bluff the Americans into accepting it.

Success in Ottawa

A Deal Is Struck On Troop Cuts

Mr. Baker left Moscow without a Soviet answer to the German question, and with the troop proposal in limbo. Just as Mr. Baker was packing to leave, the West German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, and his Foreign Minister, Mr. Genscher, were arriving for their own meeting with Mr. Gorbachev.

Mr. Baker decided that in order to avoid creating any impression of the United States and the Soviets — without the British and the French — deciding the fate of Germany, he would avoid any personal contact with Mr. Kohl in Moscow.

Instead, Mr. Baker sent Mr. Kohl a three-page, for-your-eyes-only note, laying out Mr. Gorbachev's reactions to the two-plus-four idea. Mr. Baker then took off for Bulgaria and Romania on his way to a conference in Ottawa on the "open skies" proposal for air missions over other nations' territories.

While in Ottawa, Mr. Baker, Mr. Genscher, Mr. Hurd, Mr. Dumas and Mr. Shevardnadze, who were supposed to be dealing with "open skies," were in fact simply going from one meeting with each other, to another. Most of the other NATO and Warsaw Pact foreign ministers did not have a clue as to what they were talking about.

Mr. Baker's private secretary, Karen Jackson, carried around the schedules of each of the other ministers, which were constantly being updated. For instance, the Soviets would call to say that Mr. Shevardnadze was going to be at his embassy for 30 minutes, and then in his suite for an hour, and after that back in the conference hall, so that Mr. Baker could track him down at any moment.

A Baker aide mused that if anyone was tapping the phone calls between the ministers, they would have heard some of the most momentous issues in postwar politics being discussed with stunning frankness. At several points, Mr. Baker was jogging back and forth between meetings with Mr. Genscher and Mr. Shevardnadze.

On Tuesday morning, Mr. Baker, Mr. Hurd, Mr. Dumas and Mr. Genscher had breakfast at the West German Embassy in Ottawa and hammered out the proposed language of the two-plus-four arrangement. They decided then that if they could get Mr. Shevardnadze to sign on to it now, they should do it. Events in Germany were moving too fast, they reasoned, and if they broke up in Ottawa without an understanding, it would be that much more difficult later.

From that breakfast, Mr. Baker drove back to a full session of the open-skies conference. As ministers milled around the oval meeting table, Mr. Baker walked over to Mr. Shevardnadze with a scrap of paper in his hand. With Mr. Shevardnadze's translator standing between them, Mr. Baker, reading from the paper written in his own handwriting, whispered to the Soviet Foreign Minister the proposed language the Western Allies were suggesting for two plus four. Mr. Shevardnadze's translator wrote it all down in Russian, and Mr. Shevardnadze said he would have to call Mr. Gorbachev.

Dutch, Italians and Belgians were incensed and began asking for some changes in the text, particularly for some reference not only to the security of states neighboring Germany, but also in the rest of Europe.

"They were told in no uncertain terms that this was a matter for the Allied powers with legal rights in Germany and nobody else," an Administration official said. "That is why the deal was cut this way, we told them, and if you don't like it, I'm sorry, but you have no legal rights."

Shevardnadze Calls for Meeting This Year on German Unification

By PAUL LEWIS
Special to The New York Times

OTTAWA, Feb. 15 — Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze of the Soviet Union called today on the 35 nations taking part in an East-West conference on security in Europe to begin working on a meeting later this year to prepare for German unification.

Addressing the External Affairs and Defense Committees of the Canadian Parliament, Mr. Shevardnadze accepted German reunification as inevitable, but voiced unease at the prospect. He said Europe must move quickly to demilitarize itself and lock a greater Germany into a new "Pan-European" political structure for its own safety.

"No one doubts the right of Germans to self-determination," Mr. Shevardnadze said. "But Germany's neighbors, the European states, are entitled to guarantees that a united Germany, if and when it is established, will not be a threat to them, that it will not seek to revise European borders and that it will not see a rebirth of Nazism and Fascism."

The Soviet Foreign Minister admitted that a new generation has come to power in Germany since World War II. But, he asked: "Are there no new Nazis today? Does not the Republican Party enjoy some support today?" The far right West German Republican Party has revived claims to Pomerania, Silesia and parts of East Prussia now in Poland and the Soviet Union.

New Talks Proposed

The 35 nations of the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe, Mr. Shevardnadze said, should prepare for German reunification by signing a new conventional arms reduction accord in November. They should also begin further disarmament talks and seek "to devise political approaches to the new trends in Europe," he said. The members are the 16 NATO nations, the 7 Warsaw Pact nations and 12 neutral countries.

"We think it is important to begin shaping a system of common European spaces, including legal and humanitarian space," he said. The phrase he used, borrowed from French, is applied to the idea of a series of new pacts committing European nations to democracy, respect for existing frontiers and human rights.

The Soviet Foreign Minister stressed that German unification is occurring at a delicate moment in history, when the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are going through profound change.

He warned against rushing German reunification, saying it should not be "a political game of rapid chess with a five-minute time limit" for each move. He also called on Europeans, Americans and Canadians to voice their concerns about German unification through "a referendum" based on public opinion surveys that would measure popular anxiety.

He made no mention of a greater Germany's role in NATO, which the West insists on but Moscow has opposed in the past.

New Security Arrangement

The Soviet Foreign Minister's call for a meeting of the 35 nations in the security conference next winter to discuss a united Germany echoes an idea many foreign ministers supported at talks here between NATO and the Warsaw Pact this week.

The idea is that as East Europe breaks free from the Soviet Union and the two Germanys coalesce, Europe needs a new all-embracing security arrangement based on a strengthening of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, by which the 35 nations countries promised to respect existing frontiers and observe human rights.

This week, the British Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, said: "As the Warsaw Pact disintegrates the East Europeans need somewhere to go. NATO and the European Community are not suitable, but a strengthened C.S.C.E. seems right."

The West German Foreign Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, called for the creation of "Pan-European institutions to foster the coalescence of Europe within the C.S.C.E. framework," including bodies to guarantee human rights, protect the environment and resolve conflicts.

A Proposal by Italy

The Italian Foreign Minister, Gianni De Michelis, circulated proposals at the meeting for a "second Helsinki Act" that would create a single European security system with provisions that would gradually become legally binding on the nations that signed.

Under the Italian proposal all 35 nations in the security conference would agree to respect each other's sovereignty and observe human rights. Under this plan the East European countries would gradually move away from Moscow and closer to the 12 European Community nations, strengthening their economic ties with Western Europe and agreeing to accept the jurisdiction of the European Human Rights Court in Strasbourg.

Prague Says Soviet Pullout Starts Next Week

PRAGUE, Feb. 15 (AP) — The Soviet Army will begin withdrawing from Czechoslovakia next week and an agreement on complete Soviet withdrawal from Hungary may come within a month, Czechoslovak and Hungarian officials said today.

Gen. Anton Slimak, the Czechoslovak Chief of Staff, was quoted by the official press agency C.T.K. as saying that the withdrawal would begin next week in Bruntal, 160 miles east of Prague.

Czechoslovakia had sought total withdrawal by the end of this year, but General Slimak said that would not be accomplished. Moscow wants to keep forces there until the end of 1991, and sources in Prague said this week that June 1991 was a likely compromise.

President Vaclav Havel said Tuesday he had received a letter from Mikhail S. Gorbachev, the Soviet leader. He hinted that it might help resolve the question of how soon all 73,500 Soviet soldiers in Czechoslovakia would leave.

In Budapest, a senior Hungarian official was quoted as predicting an agreement within a month on the departure of Soviet troops.

Magyar Nemzet, a Hungarian daily, quoted Ferenc Somogyi, Secretary of State in the Foreign Ministry, as saying that Hungary could "count on working out the agreement within a month."

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Charles Krauthammer

Kennan: Cold Realist

"Since roughly the time of the increased troop movements into Czechoslovakia in 1968, Soviet political hegemony over the other Warsaw Pact countries has been slackening."
-- George Kennan, April 4, 1989

What is wrong with this sentence? Its main point is unexceptionable. If its author were not George Kennan—ambassador, statesman, historian, feted now (see the cover of The Atlantic) as America's "Last Wise Man"—it would not warrant three readings to make sure that our eyes do not deceive us. But there it is, in his testimony last week to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: "increased troop movements into Czechoslovakia in 1968."

Increased troop movements? He means the invasion of Czechoslovakia. The overthrow of "socialism with a human face." The crushing of the Prague Spring. The declaration of the Brezhnev Doctrine. The transformation of Alexander Dubcek from social reformer into forest ranger. The beginning of two decades of unrelieved repression and misery for Czechoslovakia.

"Increased troop movements?" This grotesque euphemism is not a slip of the tongue. It is not an oversight. It is a window onto George Kennan's political philosophy.

The window is important because, in this the season of Kennan's canonization, his philosophy is being conveniently distorted. True, Kennan first enunciated the notion of "containment," the overarching theory of postwar American foreign policy. True, Kennan says that the Soviet Union "should now be regarded essentially as another great power, like other great powers." True, as The New York Times summarized his testimony, "The father of 'containment' says Russia is no longer a threat."

But it is not true that Kennan is an old Cold Warrior who has now renounced the creed because of Gorbachev's benignity. As Kennan would be the first to say, he has never been a Cold Warrior. He was the author of containment, yes, but a very cool, detached and abstract form of containment it was.

The essence of Kennan's political philosophy has *always* been that we should treat the Soviet Union as a great power, looking only to our national interest, not to anticommunist ideology, to guide us. Kennan was acute in identifying the ideological origins of Soviet foreign policy. But he never lapsed into advocacy of a counter-ideological response by the United States.

Liberals, wanting to claim Kennan, may like to say that he was once a conservative. Neither word really applies. Kennan was then, and remains now, the foremost American "realist," meaning a believer in *Realpolitik*, in foreign policy as power politics, in dealing dispassionately and without moralism with the other side. As he put it bluntly in a 1985 antimoralist tract in Foreign Affairs, the primary obligation of foreign policy is to "the interests of the national society" and not its "moral impulses."

For Kennan, national interest is all. Once you understand Kennan's uncompromising, antisentimental realism, you then understand why his moral vocabulary is so impoverished. Why the most he can say about apartheid is that "certain of the procedures of the South African police have been no less odious to me than to many others." Why the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a mere "action" and a "mistake." Why the 1968 Czech invasion is now "increased troop movements."

Kennan has been a consistent "realist" for 40 years. He believes that the United States ought not involve itself in any great anti-Soviet crusade. He believes that under Gorbachev. He believed it under Brezhnev. He believed it under Stalin.

In 1947, a few weeks before publication of Kennan's famous Foreign Affairs article outlining containment, Truman declared American support for Greece and Turkey, then under severe communist pressure. How did Kennan react to containment *in practice*? A few days before Truman's dramatic address to Congress, Kennan was shown a draft text. "To say that he found objections to it is to put it mildly," writes Joseph Jones, who drafted the Truman Doctrine speech. "He was in favor of economic aid to Greece, but he had hoped that military aid to Greece would be kept small, and he was opposed to aid of any kind to Turkey. It was nevertheless to the tone and ideological content of the message, the portraying of two opposing ways of life, and the open-end commitment to aid free peoples that he objected most."

There is a question now as to whether the Cold War is over, whether it is time to call off our ideological crusade against the Soviet Union. The question is a fair one. But Kennan's answer, now so celebrated, is hardly news. Kennan was for calling it off in March 1947.

Before you conscript Kennan to one side or the other of today's ideological debates, be clear who he is and who he was. He has long thought that hard-liners, from Truman on, distorted his notion of containment out of all recognition. He does indeed call for an end to containment, as generally (mis)understood. But that is not Kennan responding to Gorbachev. That is Kennan responding to Kennan. He has been saying that for a very long time. As far back as that August 1968 day when the Soviets beefed up their troops in Prague and before.

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