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Folder Title:
National Guard Convention 9/15/92 [OA 7580]

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

OFFICE OF PRESIDENTIAL SPEECHWRITING

FACSIMILE TRANSMITTAL SHEET

Number of Pages (Including Cover) 4

To Steve Provost

Fax Number 801-531-3839

Date 9.15.92

From Carol Aarhus

Office Number x7750

****** COMMENTS ******

Here are some quotes. I'm having a hard time finding what you want. I'm still looking, though.

C—

92 SEP 15 A8:03

AMERICAN QUOTATIONS

Originally published as *The Harper Book of American Quotations*

GORTON CARRUTH and EUGENE EHRLICH

A Hudson Group Book

WINGS BOOKS
NEW YORK
AVENEL, NEW JERSEY

11 The courage of the tiger is one, and of the horse another.

RALPH WALDO EMERSON, "Courage," *Society and Solitude,* 1870.

12 Show me a hero and I will write you a tragedy.

F. SCOTT FITZGERALD, "Notebooks," in *The Crack-Up,* 1945.

13 Grace under pressure.

ERNEST HEMINGWAY, defining "guts," in the *New Yorker,* November 30, 1929.

14 Courage without conscience is a wild beast.

ROBERT G. INGERSOLL, speech in New York, May 29, 1882.

15 The next year, the next decade, in all likelihood the next generation, will require more bravery and wisdom on our part than any period in our history. We will be face to face, every day, in every part of our lives and times, with the real issue of our age—the issue of survival.

JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY, speech in Milwaukee, March 11, 1959, quoted in James MacGregor Burns, *John Kennedy, A Political Profile,* 1960.

16 It was involuntary. They sank my boat.

JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY, on being asked how he became a hero, quoted in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days,* 1965.

17 They are slaves who fear to speak
For the fallen and the weak.

JAMES RUSSELL LOWELL, "Stanzas on Freedom," 1843.

18 Familiarity with danger makes a brave man braver, but less daring. Thus with seamen: he who goes the oftenest round Cape Horn goes the most circumspectly.

HERMAN MELVILLE, *White-Jacket,* 1850.

19 Few men's courage is proof against protracted meditation unrelieved by action.

HERMAN MELVILLE, *Moby-Dick,* 1851.

20 That man is not truly brave who is afraid either to seem or to be, when it suits him, a coward.

EDGAR ALLAN POE, *Marginalia,* 1844–1849.

21 We cannot afford to accumulate a deficit in the books of human fortitude.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, acceptance speech at the Democratic National Convention in Philadelphia, June 27, 1936.

22 It takes far less courage to kill yourself than it takes to make yourself wake up one more time. It's harder to stay where you are than to get out.

JUDITH ROSSNER, *Nine Months in the Life of an Old Maid,* 1969.

23 The enemy say that Americans are good at a long shot, but cannot stand the cold iron. I call upon you instantly to give a lie to the slander. Charge!

GEN. WINFIELD SCOTT, address to the 11th Infantry Regiment before the U.S. victory over British forces at Chippawa, Canada, July 5, 1814.

24 I would define true courage to be a perfect sensibility of the measure of danger, and a mental willingness to endure it.

WILLIAM TECUMSEH SHERMAN, *Memoirs,* 1875.

25 If you're scared, just holler and you'll find it ain't so lonesome out there.

JOE SUGDEN, quoted in Joe Garagiola, *Baseball Is a Funny Game,* 1960.

26 I am less affected by their heroism who stood up for half an hour in the front line at Buena Vista, than by the steady and cheerful valor of the men who inhabit the snowplow for their winter quarters; who have not merely the three-o'-clock-in-the-morning courage, which Bonaparte thought was the rarest, but whose courage does not go to rest so early, who go to sleep only when the storm sleeps or the sinews of their iron steed are frozen.

HENRY DAVID THOREAU, *Walden,* 1854.

27 Courage is resistance to fear, mastery of fear—not absence of fear. Except a creature be part coward it is not a compliment to say it is brave; it is merely a loose misapplication of the word. Consider the flea!—incomparably the bravest of all the creatures of God, if ignorance of fear were courage. Whether you are asleep or awake he will attack you, caring nothing for the fact that in bulk and strength you are to him as are the massed armies of the earth to a sucking

THE GREAT THOUGHTS

COMPILED BY

GEORGE SELDES

Foreword by Henry Steele Commager

BALLANTINE BOOKS
NEW YORK

"Ode to a Nightingale" (1820)

Darkling I listen; and for many a time
I have been half in love with easeful Death.
St. VI

Perhaps the self-same song that found a path
Through the sad heart of Ruth, when, sick for home,
She stood in tears amid the alien corn;
The same that oft-times hath
Charm'd magic casements, opening on the foam
Of perilous seas, in faery lands forlorn.
St. VII

"On First Looking Into Chapman's Homer" (1817)

Then felt I like some watcher of the skies
When a new planet swims into his ken;
Or like stout Cortez, when with eagle eyes
He star'd at the Pacific—and all his men
Look'd at each other with a wild surmise—
Silent, upon a peak in Darien.

This grave contains all that was mortal of a young English poet, who, on his deathbed, in the bitterness of his heart at the malicious power of his enemies, desired these words to be graven on his tombstone, "Here lies one whose name was writ in water."
Epitaph (on his tombstone, Rome)

HELEN KELLER
(1880–1968)
American writer, Socialist, member IWW

The Story of My Life (1902)

There is no king who has not had a slave among his ancestors, and no slave who has not had a king among his.*

Let Us Have Faith (1940)

No nation is wise enough to rule another.

The Open Door (1957)

Security is mostly a superstition. It does not exist in nature. . . . Life is either a daring adventure or nothing.

The country is governed for the richest, for the corporations, the bankers, the land speculators, and for the exploiters.
Letter, 1911

---

*"Every king springs from a race of slaves, and every slave has had kings among his ancestors."—Plato.

KEMPIS, *see* Thomas à Kempis

KENKŌ HOSHI
(fl. 14th century A.D.)
Japanese Buddhist

The Harvest of Leisure (c. 1330)

If life were eternal all interest and anticipation would vanish. It is uncertainty which lends it satisfaction.

So long as people, being ill-governed, suffer from hunger, criminals will never disappear. It is extremely unkind to punish those who, being sufferers from hunger, are compelled to violate laws.
Quoted in Sinclair, *The Cry for Justice*

JOHN F(itzgerald) KENNEDY*
(1917–assassinated 1963)
35th President of the United States

Profiles in Courage (1956)

Compromise does not mean cowardice.

Speeches and Addresses

I believe in an America where the separation of Church and State is absolute.
Houston Ministerial Association, September 12, 1960

We stand today on the edge of a new frontier. . . .
Nomination Acceptance Speech, 1960

The world is very different now. For man holds in his mortal hands the power to abolish all forms of human poverty and all forms of human life.

Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty.

Let us never negotiate out of fear; but let us never fear to negotiate.

---

*Following Wilson, most Presidents have employed ghost writers; three of Kennedy's were Theodore Sorenson, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., and John K. Galbraith, who wrote the best-known lines of the inaugural.



TREASURY OF PRESIDENTIAL QUOTATIONS

Compiled and edited by
CAROLINE THOMAS HARNSBERGER

FOLLETT PUBLISHING COMPANY
CHICAGO

Courage

1. Without belittling the courage with which men have died, we should not forget those acts of courage with which men . . . have lived. The courage of life is often a less dramatic spectacle than the courage of a final moment; but it is no less a magnificent mixture of triumph and tragedy. A man does what he must—in spite of personal consequences, in spite of obstacles and dangers and pressures—and that is the basis of all human morality. . . . In whatever arena of life one may meet the challenge of courage, whatever may be the sacrifices he faces if he follows his conscience—the loss of his friends, his fortune, his contentment, even the esteem of his fellow men—each man must decide for himself the courage he will follow. The stories of past courage can define that ingredient—they can teach, they can offer hope, they can provide inspiration. But they cannot supply courage itself. For this each man must look into his own soul.

JOHN F. KENNEDY
1956; *Profiles,* p. 209

See also Class, Majorities 6, Peace 59, People 25, Political Parties 9, Preparedness 19, Presidency (The) 76, Revolutions 8, Space 2, Success 9, War 3

Courts

1. The national courts are for the most part in the power of Congress. Even the Supreme Court is not beyond its control; for it is the legislative privilege to increase, whenever the legislative will so pleases, the number of the judges upon the supreme bench—to "dilute the Constitution," as Webster once put it, "by creating a court which shall construe away its provisions."

WOODROW WILSON
1885; *Congressional Government,* p. 38

Cowardice

See Fear 3

Creeds

1. My creed had been formed on unsheathing the sword at Lexington.

THOMAS JEFFERSON
To Virginia delegates to Congress, August, 1774; *Writings, I,* 183

2. Our political creed is . . . that the will of the people is the source, and the happiness of the people the end of all legitimate government upon earth.

JOHN QUINCY ADAMS
Inaugural Address, Mar. 4, 1825

See also Conduct 3, Faith 6, Political Philosophy 1, Religion 12, 20, 25, Tolerance 1

FDR bio re: WWII

quote

(001
531-
3839

Carol:
→ fax Kennedy quote to Steve from Prof. Los
9:10

I did it for you.

→ Dear McGrath 9:10
- call back

-JC



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OFFICE NUMBER _____

Bill Kristol

x 7044 fax
x 6605 ofc

Call Fran

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

9-15-92

TO: BILL KRISTOL

FROM: DAN MCGROARTY

For your eyes only.

single man, woman, and child is a partner in the most tremendous undertaking of our American history. We must share together the bad news and the good news, the defeats and the victories — the changing fortunes of war.

So far, the news has been all bad. We have suffered a serious set-back in Hawaii. Our forces in the Philippines, which include the brave people of that Commonwealth, are taking punishment, but are defending themselves vigorously. The reports from Guam and Wake and Midway islands are still confused, but we must be prepared for the announcement that all these three outposts have been seized.

The casualty lists of these first few days will undoubtedly be large. I deeply feel the anxiety of all of the families of the men in our armed forces and the relatives of people in cities which have been bombed. I can only give them my solemn promise that they will get news just as quickly as possible.

This Government will put its trust in the stamina of the American people, and will give the facts to the public just as soon as two conditions have been fulfilled: first, that the information has been definitely and officially confirmed; and, second, that the release of the information at the time it is received will not prove valuable to the enemy directly or indirectly.

Most earnestly I urge my countrymen to reject all rumors. These ugly little hints of complete disaster fly thick and fast in wartime. They have to be examined and appraised.

As an example, I can tell you frankly that until further surveys are made, I have not sufficient information to state the exact damage which has been done to our naval vessels at Pearl Harbor. Admittedly the damage is serious. But no one can say how serious, until we know how much of this damage can be repaired and how quickly the necessary repairs can be made.

I cite as another example a statement made on Sunday night that a Japanese carrier had been located and sunk off the Canal Zone. And when you hear statements that are attributed to what they call "an authoritative source," you can be reasonably sure

I have been working today on the subject of production. Your Government has decided on two broad policies.

The first is to speed up all existing production by working on a seven-day-week basis in every war industry, including the production of essential raw materials.

The second policy, now being put into form, is to rush additions to the capacity of production by building more new plants, by adding to old plants, and by using the many smaller plants for war needs.

Over the hard road of the past months, we have at times met obstacles and difficulties, divisions and disputes, indifference and callousness. That is now all past—and, I am sure, forgotten.

The fact is that the country now has an organization in Washington built around men and women who are recognized experts in their own fields. I think the country knows that the people who are actually responsible in each and every one of these many fields are pulling together with a teamwork that has never before been excelled.

On the road ahead there lies hard work—grueling work—day and night, every hour and every minute.

I was about to add that ahead there lies sacrifice for all of us.

But it is not correct to use that word. The United States does not consider it a sacrifice to do all one can, to give one's best to our Nation, when the Nation is fighting for its existence and its future life.

It is not a sacrifice for any man, old or young, to be in the Army or the Navy of the United States. Rather is it a privilege.

It is not a sacrifice for the industrialist or the wage earner, the farmer or the shopkeeper, the trainman or the doctor, to pay more taxes, to buy more bonds, to forego extra profits, to work longer or harder at the task for which he is best fitted. Rather is it a privilege.

It is not a sacrifice to do without many things to which we are accustomed if the national defense calls for doing without.

A review this morning leads me to the conclusion that at present we shall not have to curtail the normal use of articles of food.

TO: STEVE PROVOST

the visit of Commodore Perry to Japan 88 years ago. It ends with the visit of two Japanese emissaries to the Secretary of State last Sunday, an hour after Japanese forces had loosed their bombs and machine guns against our flag, our forces, and our citizens.

I can say with utmost confidence that no Americans, today or a thousand years hence, need feel anything but pride in our patience and in our efforts through all the years toward achieving a peace in the Pacific which would be fair and honorable to every Nation, large or small. And no honest person, today or a thousand years hence, will be able to suppress a sense of indignation and horror at the treachery committed by the military dictators of Japan, under the very shadow of the flag of peace borne by their special envoys in our midst.

The course that Japan has followed for the past ten years in Asia has paralleled the course of Hitler and Mussolini in Europe and in Africa. Today, it has become far more than a parallel. It is actual collaboration so well calculated that all the continents of the world, and all the oceans, are now considered by the Axis strategists as one gigantic battlefield.

In 1931, ten years ago, Japan invaded Manchukuo — without warning.

In 1935, Italy invaded Ethiopia — without warning.

In 1938, Hitler occupied Austria — without warning.

In 1939, Hitler invaded Czechoslovakia — without warning.

Later in 1939, Hitler invaded Poland — without warning.

In 1940, Hitler invaded Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg — without warning.

In 1940, Italy attacked France and later Greece — without warning.

And this year, in 1941, the Axis powers attacked Yugoslavia and Greece and they dominated the Balkans — without warning.

In 1941, also, Hitler invaded Russia — without warning.

And now Japan has attacked Malaya and Thailand — and the United States — without warning.

It is all of one pattern.

We are now in this war. We are all in it — all the way. Every

Lt. Kondratick
703 756-4603
historian

Total Force Concept

Col. Shaw (Army Guard)
695-3778

Media — re: hurricanes
695-3454

FL Nat'l Guard: (PAffairs)

(904) 823-0168
Msgt. Rich Harnage

→ [illegible]

→ Lafayette → protecting property, food dist., other relief, removing debris

John Hoffman

5049 Air Guardsman were mobilized w/in seperate weeks.

nearly ~~4000~~

w/in days over 4000 (4382) → from allover the country from CA to CT.

p. 2

→ and hrs. later brought in 30,000 MREs

British Info Service
212-752-5747
Library → Justin Pike

Philadelphia Inquirer
8-28-92

[redacted]

(215) 854-2000

[redacted] "B" (news dept.)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Specialist Brian
"Scott"
Merrick

Co. B
2nd BTN
124th Inf.
FL Nat Guard

activated 8/23
been w/ guard for 3yrs.

from Oak Hill

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Lt Cmdr Kondrachuk on 01

---

215 tons in 24 hrs.

BUSH
QUAYLE
92

Issues Fax Transmittal

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FYI

BUSH QUAYLE 92

September 3, 1992

Colonel Reid K. Beveridge, DelARNG
Editor
National Guard
1 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, D.C. 20001

Dear Colonel Beveridge:

Attached is the President's response to your questionnaire of August 13. When the questionnaire answers are published, please send a tear sheet to the attention of Mr. Joel Starr.

Thank you for your interest in the President's position. If you have any further questions, please feel free to call.

Sincerely,

Will Feltus/MA

Will Feltus
Director of Communications

14 SEPT 92 12:30

ROBERT,

HEADS UP: YOU MAY WANT TO MAKE SURE THE SPEECH FOR SALT LAKE CITY TUESDAY AM MATCHES. W/ THIS ARTICLE → I KNOW THEY'VE SEEN THE ARTICLE (PRE-PUBLICATION) AT THE GUARD CONVENTION. BEST DAVE

DANIEL CROSS
336-7231

The Way Ahead

By George Bush

For more than three centuries, the National Guard has helped keep America safe and strong. In war and peace -- from the colonial militia to Hurricane Andrew -- volunteer patriots have embodied "America at its best."

Think of citizen-soldiers at Lexington and Concord -- or in the jungles of Bataan and Guadalcanal. Their valor is a metaphor for the American character. Recall how the Guard fights forest fires, gives comfort to flood victims, or led recent food missions to Sarajevo. Its heroism lives as history -- passed from one generation to another.

The Founding Fathers knew that America needed a strong National Guard. Times have changed, but not the Guard's mission: To protect life and liberty at home and abroad. Today, its members -- more than half-a-million strong -- stand ready to define a new era which seemed inconceivable as recently as 1988.

During the last 3 and 1/2 years, the reserve forces of the United States have formed a crucial part of the finest fighting force this Nation has ever known. They have led our fight against illegal drugs, and met other peacetime challenges. They were vital to restoring democracy to Panama, and to a victory for the ages: The Cold War is over -- and freedom won.

Last year, the National Guard also helped forge our triumph over tyranny in the sands of the Gulf. Saddam Hussein learned that the Rockies would crumble before our Guardsman did. Years

from now books will chronicle the bravery of the National Guard and Reserve forces in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. As Commander-in-Chief and as a fellow veteran, I learned from their example and success.

As President I could not have acted decisively in the Gulf without full confidence in American armed troops -- both active and reserve. Each day of the Gulf conflict I heard countless instances of their gallantry.

Even now, I marvel at heroes like the 167th Tactical Airlift Group -- a C-130 unit from West Virginia. Late one evening the unit was asked for 40 aerial port personnel to deploy in support of air cargo operations. More than 100 quickly volunteered. Another Guardsman, Arizona Captain Debra Clark, drove her transportation unit 27 straight hours deep into Iraq. Tennessee Captain Terry Saltsman and his company were among the first U.S. ground troops to cross the Iraqi border. Unbelievably, Guard postal units in Saudi Arabia handled nearly 300 tons of mail in a three-day period. They had a half-day off only on Thanksgiving and Christmas -- their only time off in the entire mobilization.

The Persian Gulf showed America at her best. Yet the Twenty-First Century will present different challenges. Future risks to our security will be marked by ambiguity and rapid change -- not the relative certainty of the past. One asset of experience is an appreciation of history: Both teach, as Lincoln said, the need to "think and act anew." His words explain why we must realign the size and shape of the Guard and Reserve to meet

the needs of our new national security requirements in a world far different from the 1980s.

Several important principles will guide the design of our Guard and Reserve Forces. First and foremost is a principle I detailed in my August 1991 statement of the National Security Strategy of the United States:

> "In a world less driven by an immediate, massive threat to Europe or the danger of global war, the need to support a smaller but still crucial forward presence and to deal with regional contingencies -- including possibly a limited, conventional threat to Europe -- will shape how we organize, equip, train, deploy, and employ our active and reserve forces . . Today we must reshape our Guard and Reserve forces so that they can continue their important contributions in new circumstances."

The end of the Cold War and the demise of that single, monolithic threat that defined our security requirements for four decades requires a careful study of our future military capability. Compounding the problem are the reckless cries for additional cuts in defense spending. Let me be blunt: What those who propose to gut the defense budget while devoting more dollars to big government spending really want are massive reductions in the size of U.S. active and reserve forces. They won't do it as long as I am President. The Soviet bear may be dead -- but wolves still stalk the world. I will reduce the size of our military defense -- but never our capacity to defend our

citizens, interests, and allies. Nor will I ever reduce America's commitment to vigilance.

The second principle of a restructured military is a major reliance upon reserve forces, as well as active forces. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recently testified that "maintaining strong, capable Reserve and Guard forces will remain essential to our military strategy" -- and that as the size of the total force falls, "we can move certain units or functions into the reserves to avoid the costs associated with keeping them in the active force structure." We will do this fairly -- based on merit and need -- without discriminating against any part of the Armed Forces.

The third principle guiding our force structure involves concern for the demands placed on individual National Guardsmen, Reservists, and their families. Our "citizen-soldiers" devote time to their families, civilian occupations, or education. If we intrude upon them for every minor skirmish or trouble spot, we may soon face retention problems involving the same high-quality reserve personnel that we most need. On the other hand, reserve units and individuals will provide critical support in large or protracted conflicts, or in other crises that require the use of the armed forces -- and in increasing numbers as the confrontation evolves. We will also rely on National Guard and Reserve combat units to reinforce and augment active forces.

Thus, the reserves will continue to be vital to our total force in the years ahead -- but plans for the use of the total

force will change. In the Cold War, the threat to our national security was clear -- and specific roles and missions could be assigned to specific forces and units. In the ambiguous security environment ahead, detailed planning for every contingency or crisis will be less likely. Thus, flexibility will matter more -- as will the variables that influence decisions about which forces are required. Among them are the nature of the missions to be performed, and the capabilities, readiness, immediate availability and geographical location of specific active or reserve units. Our goal is a troop structure that gives peace a chance -- but never takes a chance with peace.

I believe most Guardsmen share this view -- know that when it comes to national security, finishing second means finishing last. My support of a strong defense spans a lifetime. I am no election-year convert to keeping America Number One. As a veteran, I know we must keep our armed forces ready and capable: The Cold War victory we won based on <u>strength</u> must not be lost because of <u>weakness</u>. That is why I reject those who advocate deep budget cuts that jeopardize our nation's safety. Our defense budget involves more than needed weapons systems -- or ensuring American forces are the best-equipped military in the world with world-class technology. It means we must <u>also</u> spend the necessary time and effort training our active and reserve forces. This is especially true as we reshape our forces to meet our defense strategy in the 1990s and beyond.

We cannot afford to return to the hollow-forces military of the late 1970s -- where capability was low and morale lower. Yes, we have cut defense as a result of the changes that have occurred -- but I will never permit cutting the muscle of our defense. Instead, I will reshape the U.S. military in a way that keeps it strong and capable, worthy of respect and admiration at home and abroad.

Like most Guardsmen, I know what it means to raise a family, build a life, go to battle, and see friends die. I was on a three-man bombing crew -- and learned of teamwork and sacrifice. I learned, too, about a cause larger than ourselves. I remember spending a month aboard the submarine Finback after being shot down -- and at night standing watch on the bridge and looking out at the dark. The sky was clear. There was calm, inner peace -- a time to thank God for one's many blessings.

Given that, I will never forget those who endured war so that liberty might live. I stand with those who time and again have shown that they are ready -- whether in a major armed conflict like Desert Storm, the fight against drug traffickers, or other peacetime operations. Fifty years ago, the National Guard provided the first army units to go into offensive combat in World War II. This year, it again helped our nation stand tall -- sending to hurricane-ravaged areas troops who proved that Americans pull together to repair what nature has torn apart.

In the hurricane's wake, Guardsman Scott Merrick of Oak Hill, Florida, placed an American flag between a twisted traffic

light and a storm gutter. He put it there because "it says a wh lot about what's happening." Scott knew that victims of Hurricane Andrew might be physically beaten -- but they would not be defeated. How could they? They were Americans.

Against the winds of tyranny or a hurricane, National Guardsmen have helped America triumph on the wings of hope. They have helped lead us in the past -- and will too in the future. "Always ready, always there" -- always the best that is America.

Utah Republican Party

637 EAST 400 SOUTH SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84102
PHONE: (801)533-9777
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[illegible]

BUSH/QUAYLE

FAX TRANSMITTAL SHEET

TO: Carol

FAX: (202) 456-6218

FROM: Jeanne Blanchi

DATE: 9/14/92

PAGES INCLUDING COVER: 3

UTAH STATE FAIR

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 15
UTAH WOOL GROWERS DAY

er entries arrive for 3rd Show (7:00 am till 10:00 am)

MORNING

6:00 am Receiving 2nd Show Rabbits (4-H/FFA, Pet Show & 2nd Open Show)
8:00 am Receiving Poultry (till 1:00 pm)
9:00 am Open Horse Show Performance Classes (Horse Arena)
4-H/FFA Dairy Judging (Livestock Showring)
10:00 am Wasatch Humane presents "4-H Guide Dog Demo!" (Fountain Tent)
11:00 am Utah Opera presents "The Emperors New Clothes" (Bandstand Stage)
11:30 am Moo To You, Utah Dairy Commission (Fountain Tent)

AFTERNOON

12 noon "Sweet Creations - Making Hard Candies" (Home Arts)
1:00 pm Open Horse Show Performance Classes (Horse Arena)
1:30 pm "4-H Winners - Fun with Food" (Home Arts)
3:00 pm Angus Beef Cattle Judging (Livestock Showring)
3:30 pm Utah Beef Council presents "Cutting Your Own Meat - Large Pieces to Small" with Pete Funaro, Diamond Lil's (Home Arts)
Sheepshearing (South Plaza Stage)
4:00 pm Fun With Ronald McDonald (Fountain Tent)
Timp Valley Cloggers (Bandstand Stage)
4:30 pm "A Taste on the Wild Side" with Utah Wildlife Resources, cooking wild game (Home Arts)
Wilkinson Family Singers (South Plaza Stage)
5:00 pm MAX AIR PRODUCTIONS SKI AND TRAMPOLINE SHOW (west end near Bandstand Stage)
Woolgrowers Dutch Oven Mystery Cookoff Judging at 8:00 pm (Specialty Tent)
T-Shirt Autograph Party with KKAT Crew and Karen Rae from Karen's Kountry! (by Grandstand Entrance)
5:30 pm Fun With Ronald McDonald! (Fountain Tent)
Sheepshearing (South Plaza Stage)

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 15
UTAH WOOL GROWERS DAY

CONTINUED:

EVENING

6:00 pm "Cooking with Gastronomy" (Home Arts)
Pigtail Contest (Fountain Contest)
Swanee Singers - mens chorus (Bandstand Stage)
6:30 pm **KATHY MATTEA - featured act (Grandstand)**
Open Horse Show Performance Classes (Horse Arena)
Shorthorn Beef Cattle Judging (Livestock Judging Ring)
Silverados - country music (South Plaza Stage)
6:40 pm MAX AIR PRODUCTIONS SKI AND TRAMPOLINE SHOW
(west end near Bandstand Stage)
7:00 pm Granite High School Madrigal Choir (Fountain Tent)
Music Competition Winners - till 9:00 pm (Bandstand Stage)
7:30 pm Kearns High School Madrigal Choir (Fountain Tent)
Utah Beef Council presents "Cutting Your Own Meat- Large Pieces to Small" with Peter Funaro, Diamond Lil's (Home Arts)
Corps Esprit Dance Group (South Plaza Stage)
8:30 pm Crosstown Quartet (South Plaza Stage)
9:30 pm Dale Myrberg - Yo Yo (South Plaza Stage)
9:00 pm Release of 4-H/FFA Dairy Cattle
9:15 pm **KATHY MATTEA - featured act (Grandstand)**
9:30 pm MAX AIR PRODUCTIONS SKI AND TRAMPOLINE SHOW
(west end near Bandstand Stage)
10:00 pm The Osbornes (Bandstand Stage)

ing ground acts & clowns:

Freed Band Organ 5-9 pm
Country Dancers 6-7 pm
Philip Jackson 7-8 pm
Mr Manakin 7-10 pm
Salt Lake Scots Band 7:30-8:30 pm
Neon 4-7 pm
Jazzy 6-8 pm
Jack Whitaker 6-7 pm
Clark Combo Band 7-8:30 pm
Square Dancers 7-9 pm
Shannon Ingleby 8-9 pm
S Frank Stringham 8-9 pm
Tootsie 5-9 pm
Jelly Bean 7-9 pm

21ST STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.

Copyright 1983 Newsweek
Newsweek

February 21, 1983, UNITED STATES EDITION

SECTION: INTERNATIONAL; Pg. 46

LENGTH: 570 words

HEADLINE: BRITAN;
To Fight For Queen And Country

BYLINE: MARK WITAKER with RONALD HENKOFF in Oxford

BODY:

It as a complacent time, and they were the princes of intellectual arrogance. On Feb. 9, 1933, the members of the Oxford Union Society, the anointed elite of their generation, filed into their august hall on the Oxford campus to debate a momentous motion: "This House will in no circumstances fight for its King and Country." Only 10 days earlier an upstart Austrian, Adolf Hitler, had come to power in Germany; but the artful debaters of the union society were thinking further backward, to the 750,000 Britons who died on the bloody battlefields of World War I. The motion carried: 275 to 153. And the young men who had so confidently voted "aye" lived to see their idealism overtaken by the unchecked rise of Hitler's armies, the ruin of Europe and the slaughter of 400,000 more of their countrymen.

Last week, 50 years after its notorious debate, the Oxford Union Society gave its members a chance to apologize to history. Hundreds of students crowded onto the long wooden benches of the hall and under its soaring rafters for a debate on the same motion, slightly amended: "This House would not fight for Queen and Country." A hush fell over the hall as Lord Beloff, 69, who, as a first-year Oxford student had been one of the bright young thinkers who voted for the original motion, rose to address the union. "I wish to apologize to the memory of those who died," Beloff said, and "to warn against the kind of foolish arrogance that led us to make statements that were factually and morally untrue." Beloff is Jewish. He recalled how his own personal belief in unconditional nonviolence had fallen apart in the dark shadow of the Nazi death camps "and the murder of 6 million of my coreligionists who were not practicing violence."

Agonizing Doubts: Others held that the present still offered arguments for pacifism. Not just the stain of history, but some agonizing doubts about today's nuclear arms race hung over the debate. Members of Britain's burgeoning antinuclear movement turned out to plead their cause. Helen John, one of a group of women who have been holding a protest vigil at a planned site for U.S. cruise missiles outside Oxford, warned that Britain was becoming "an American-occupied country." That proposition drew loud jeers and some eloquent reminders of America's role in saving Europe in two world wars. But Lord Soper, a Methodist minister, captured a worried spirit in the hall with his own impassioned plea for disarmament. "It would be a colossal risk if we were prepared to disarm," he said. "But isn't the other risk incomprehensibly higher?"

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In the end the lessons of the past echoed back. Some of the elder statesmen who had lived through the dark night of the '30s pointed out that the world was faced with a a Soviet threat that rivaled the Nazi menace. Historians have argued that the original union vote signaled a lack of British will to Hitler, and debaters warned against sending a similar message to the Kremlin. "The only chance of preventing evil men from starting war is a show of strength and the readiness to repel an attack," warned Lord Home, who had been at Neville Chamberlain's side during the appeasement years. Beloff, recalling his own vote 50 years before, said, his voice near breaking, "I beseech this House not to make the same mistake, and vote against this motion." This time, under the weight of history, the motion went down: 416 to 187.

GRAPHIC: Picture, Beloff: Beware of 'foolish arrogance', Homer Sykes -- Woodfin Camp & Associates

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1991 Times Newspapers Limited, November 14, 1991

MEMORIES of the Oxford Union's King-and- country debate in 1933 will be revived in the same chamber on Monday, when Norman Tebbit and Edward Heath clash on European union. The debate is only 48 hours before the Commons two-day debate and vote on Europe, in which Heath and Tebbit will be key antagonists. A thousand students will pack the debating chamber for the showdown, which will also feature Dr Garret Fitzgerald, the former Irish prime minister, and Peter Shore, Labour's veteran anti-marketeer.

Such importance is attached to the debate that BBC's Newsnight is considering going live to capture the result of the motion ''This House believes that the proposed European union has little of value to the UK''. ITN, BSkyB and BBC radio crews will also be there. The thousand tickets sold out weeks ago. Hundreds are expected to stand outside the chamber, and video links are being set up around the university.

The 1933 motion, ''That this house will in no circumstances fight for its King and country' ', was carried by 275 votes to 133, and is supposed to have influenced Hitler into thinking the British would not go to war.

While the union does not expect Monday's debate to have such an impact, its reverberations will be felt in the Commons. Nicholas Edgar, president of the Union, says: ''I have never known anything like it. It's all people are

LEVEL 1 - 10 OF 31 STORIES

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FEBRUARY 24, 1987, TUESDAY, AM CYCLE

LENGTH: 318 words

HEADLINE: OXFORD STUDENTS CAUSE ROW BY INVITATION TO IRISH MILITANT

DATELINE: OXFORD, ENGLAND, FEB 23

KEYWORD: IRISH- OXFORD

BODY:

OXFORD UNIVERSITY'S DEBATING SOCIETY - FAMOUS FOR A FURORE IT CAUSED IN THE 1930S WITH A RESOLUTION SAYING THE STUDENTS WOULD NOT FIGHT FOR KING AND COUNTRY - IS CURRENTLY LOCKED IN A NEW CONTROVERSY.

THIS TIME IT INVOLVES NORTHERN IRELAND. THE PRESTIGE DEBATING GROUP HAS INVITED THE LEADER OF SINN FEIN, POLITICAL WING OF THE IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY (IRA) WHICH IS FIGHTING TO END BRITISH RULE IN THE TROUBLED TERRITORY, TORN BY SECTARIAN STRIFE.

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treated more kindly than principal speakers at the evening debates, which made the union famous.

Old Oxfords hands say the debates and lectures do not generate the attention or wit they used to. Certainly nothing for the last 40 years has detonated the notoriety of the debate of Feb. 9, 1933, when - with the Great War carnage of 1914-18 still in mind - 275 members approved and 153 voted against the motion: "That this House will in no circumstances fight for its King and Country."

The union was lighthearted about it, but Winston Churchill, fearful of the effect upon Hitler and Mussolini, denounced the motion as "shattering" to British prestige. His son Randolph, then an Oxford student, tried unsuccessfully to expunge the motion from the minutes.

It is the union custom to treat main speakers at debates with calculated impudence - in words. Some have not been so lucky.

Exploding firecrackers greeted businessman George Ward, who turned up this year for a debate on labor unions after beating a long-running and much-publicized strike in his London factory.

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3RD STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.

Copyright 1991 Times Newspapers Limited
The Times

November 14, 1991, Thursday

SECTION: Features

LENGTH: 322 words

HEADLINE: Sovereign and sovereignty

BODY:

MEMORIES of the Oxford Union's King-and- country debate in 1933 will be revived in the same chamber on Monday, when Norman Tebbit and Edward Heath clash on European union. The debate is only 48 hours before the Commons two-day debate and vote on Europe, in which Heath and Tebbit will be key antagonists. A thousand students will pack the debating chamber for the showdown, which will also feature Dr Garret Fitzgerald, the former Irish prime minister, and Peter Shore, Labour's veteran anti-marketeer.

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The 1933 motion, ''That this house will in no circumstances fight for its King and country' ', was carried by 275 votes to 133, and is supposed to have influenced Hitler into thinking the British would not go to war.

While the union does not expect Monday's debate to have such an impact, its reverberations will be felt in the Commons. Nicholas Edgar, president of the Union, says: ''I have never known anything like it. It's all people are talking about. The result is too close to call.''

It will be a perfect dress rehearsal for Heath, a former president of the Union, who to the fury of Mrs Thatcher's supporters has bagged the prize of speaking first from the backbenches on the second day of the debate. Mrs Thatcher was also expected to speak on Thursday, the day of the vote, but she is unlikely to relish the prospect of following her old adversary, who has precedence because he has been a privy counsellor longer. But if she speaks on the first day, Heath will have the last word.

TERMS:
Diary

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Remarks:

As requested, I hope this is what you are looking for. If not, call me immediately.

Cover + 2 pages

Col. Shaw
703-695-3778

(CORRECTED COPY)

INFORMATION PAPER - ARNG PROJECTED UNIT LOSSES FY 91 - FY 95

* Under the proposed Department of Defense force reductions planned for the Army National Guard during Fiscal Years 1991 thru Fiscal Year 1995, the following losses will occur in the Army National Guard (ARNG) force structure:

Combat Structure being lost (includes aviation, armor, infantry, field artillery, air defense artillery and engineer units):

by end of FY 95: 284 units inactivated, 86,900 troop spaces eliminated.

Combat Support and Combat Service Support (CS/CSS) (includes military police, military intelligence, signal corps, chemical corps, adjutant general corps, finance, medical, medical service corps, ordnance, quartermaster and transportation units):

by end of FY 95: 254 units inactivated/consolidated, 51,000 troop spaces eliminated.

Total ARNG losses by end of FY 95:

538 units, 137,900 troop spaces eliminated.

FLORIDA ARMY NATIONAL GUARD - Proposed Unit Inactivations/Personnel cuts:

Florida currently has 61 ARNG units assigned, with a troop strength of about 12,300 soldiers. For Hurricane Andrew, they called to State Active Duty about 74 percent of their units, and 6,120 Army Guardsmen. The programmed end strength for the Florida ARNG by FY 95 is 39 units (loss of 22 units) and 6,300 soldiers (loss of 6,000 troops). Most of these losses will occur from the inactivation of their Theater Defense Brigade (53rd Infantry Brigade, with its combat support and service support elements). IF HURRICANE ANDREW HAD HAPPENED IN FY 95, WITH THESE PROJECTED UNIT/PERSONNEL LOSSES, THE FLORIDA ARNG COULD NOT HAVE HANDLED THE SITUATION.

LOUISIANA ARMY NATIONAL GUARD: Proposed Unit Inactivations /Personnel cuts:

Louisiana currently has 44 ARNG units currently assigned, with a troop strength of about 10,800 soldiers. For Hurricane Andrew

they called to State Active Duty about 61 percent (27 units) of their total units, and about 1,350 soldiers. The programmed end strength for the Louisiana ARNG by FY 95 is 38 units (loss of 6 units) and 10,000 soldiers (loss of 800 troops). While these reduction numbers are not as large as those for the Florida ARNG, the six units scheduled for inactivation in Louisiana are all critical for disaster assistance missions such as Hurricane Andrew. These units scheduled for inactivation include: an engineer headquarters; an engineer company; an Area Support Group Headquarters [provides command and control for numerous smaller support units]; a cavalry troop (reconnaissance of disaster-stricken areas); a Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (provides medical support to disaster victims); and a military police company (area security and prevention of looting). DURING HURRICANE ANDREW, FIVE OF THESE SIX UNITS WERE CALLED TO STATE ACTIVE DUTY TO ASSIST LOUISIANA RESIDENTS. BY FY 95, THESE UNITS WILL BE GONE.

* * *

Mike Biddle
703-695-0421 ok ✓
→ Chief of Community Rel.

Col. Shaw ok ✓
General Reese's exec.
Exec. Ofcr. for Army Nat'l Guard

7

As all of you know, our Cold War victory means a down-sizing in our national defenses -- active, Reserve and Guard alike. But we remain committed to our Total Force concept: the <u>smallest</u> standing army consistent with our national security -- and yet <u>large enough</u> to deal with any likely threat. And for

that Total Force policy to be effective -- a strong Army and Air National Guard are essential.

Yes, the new National Guard will be smaller. But it will be well-trained and well-equipped. As Commander-in-Chief I can assure you: We will never short-change the National Guard. //

John McConnell

Re National Guard speech

The National Guard Association will award the Harry S Truman award to Senator Jake Garn the day before the VP addresses them.

The 1989 winner of that award was President Bush (sorry, Margaret) and the presentation was made at the White House.

Might be a way to work that into the speech.

Jeff McKitrick

JM
JD
JC
GT

Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney
General Colin Powell, Chairman, JCS
Briefing on Reserve Forces Downsizing
Thursday, March 26, 1992 - Noon

Mr. Williams: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you for coming.

The Secretary will have a statement, followed by a statement from the Chairman. The Secretary will then have some wrap-up comments, and then they'll both be pleased to take your questions.

Secretary Cheney: Thank you very much, Pete.

One of the pleasures of being Secretary of Defense over these last three years, of course, has been the opportunity to meet and work with literally hundreds of thousands of outstanding young men and women who are volunteers who serve in the United States military. No one can spend time with them without coming away tremendously impressed with their professionalism and their patriotism and their dedication. That's true not only of our active duty people, but of our reserves as well.

During the war in the Gulf, the National Guard and Reserve once again proved that they're an absolutely indispensable part of America's military force. More than 231,000 guardsmen and reservists were called up to serve around the world during that conflict. They made up nearly 20 percent of the forces that we had deployed in the Gulf. And even before the first call-up, we had some 11,000 report voluntarily for duty before the end of August 1990.

That Gulf conflict, of course, was the first sustained test of our Guard and Reserve contribution to the total force. They served magnificently as I'm sure they will again when called upon to do so.

But with our victories in the Gulf and with the end of the Cold War and the dramatic reductions in defense spending, it's vital that we make the kinds of adjustments in our forces that are required -- not only in the active force, but also in the reserve as well.

What's crucial here is that the Department be allowed to do the job right -- to have the flexibility to get smaller if we're going to, in fact, have less money. That's the only way we can preserve a quality force. We have to get smaller if we're going to have sufficient resources to train, equip, and lead the highly-capable forces that will be necessary in the future.

(Chart)

The President's new strategy that he enunciated in August of 1990 and that's been elaborated on since by the Chairman and myself, of course, still focuses on a fairly dramatically changed world. We no longer assume that we'll have to fight that all-out global conflict that would begin with a Soviet-led Warsaw Pact in Europe. Now we emphasize the notion of regional conflicts such as we've just been through in the Gulf; a strong emphasis on alliances; emphasis on joint operations; and we continue to emphasize the concept of the total force -- the mixture of active and reserve components.

The strategy continues to rely upon four key elements that we've talked about repeatedly in our testimony and presentations to the Congress: emphasis upon deterrence, the ability to deter a strategic attack against the United States; on forward presence, fewer forces forward deployed than before, but we'll still be forward deployed; upon the ability to respond to a crisis; and upon the ability to reconstitute forces. Those are the basic elements of our new national security strategy.

The National Guard and Reserve will play an absolutely vital part of that new base force that we designed to implement that strategy. I want to emphasize, before I focus on the reductions that we have planned, that after the reductions in the base force, when we've completed the build-down by the mid-'90s, there will still be 920,000 strong personnel in terms of the base force. In the Army that will mean six National Guard divisions; two cadre divisions; roundout brigades; and the combat support and service support that are an essential part of the force today. It means, obviously, significant Marine reserve components; significant naval components; and an air component that will include the equivalent of more than 11 tactical fighter wings. The Guard and Reserve will continue to be an absolutely vital part of the base force to which we are currently building.

(Chart)

This is one of my favorite charts. Actually, I stole it from the Chairman. It demonstrates a vital point. In return for General Powell's agreeing to let me use this chart today, I had to promise the next time we got to the Hill, he gets to use the pitchfork, which we'll come to in a minute. (Laughter)

What this captures is the essential structure that we had in Europe throughout the Cold War. Above the line you see active duty personnel, active component in a full-up corps in Europe. Below the line you see the reserve component that supported it. Above the line, Headquarters, VII Corps, Germany; 2nd Armored Division; 8th Mechanized Division; the 3rd Armored Division; and the 9th Motorized Division. The 8th and the 3rd were forward deployed in Europe; the 2nd Armored Division had a brigade forward deployed in Europe, the rest was at Fort Hood, Texas; the 9th, of course, was out of Fort Lewis, Washington.

Below that you had artillery battalions, aviation brigades, armored cavalry regiments. You had the kind of extensive support, total, altogether 100,000 active duty personnel that made up the VII Corps in Europe. And behind that, the 140,000 reserve components.

The active duty component is gone. It no longer exists. The 2nd Armored Division, the 8th Mech, the 3rd Armored, and the 9th Infantry have all been retired from the force and their flags deactivated. This month we stand down VII Corps Headquarters. This active force is basically no longer needed because it was deployed in Europe to fight that all-out, Soviet-led assault across the central plains of Germany.

If we don't need the active component, we don't need the reserve component either. This is the reserve component that was intended to augment the VII Corps that would be mobilized in wartime and deployed to support those units in Europe. It is vital that, as we take out and draw down the active force, that we be allowed, as well, to take out the Reserve and Guard component that no longer has a mission. It makes absolutely no sense for us to retain structure that we are not prepared to support, and the exercise we're engaged in today, the package we're sending forward to the Hill, is specifically to identify those units of the National Guard and Reserve that we want to recommend taking out.

In 1992, the Congress directed that, in drawing down the Guard and Reserve, that we should specifically look at those units that were slated for that European mission, that were there to fight that Cold War conflict. Eighty percent of the Reserve and Guard units that are being taken out on the list we're presenting to Congress today, specifically were part of that force that was intended to go to Europe in wartime and to support the active force. Those active units are out. Now we've identified the reserve components that support them, and we're recommending they come out as well.

The other 20 percent of the reductions that we're recommending today are units that had specific missions that related to that old Cold War scenario and no longer are required.

The key, of course, in terms of the kinds of choices that we're now making as we taken down the force, and as we implement the savings that everybody seems too eager to have out of the defense budget, is that we be allowed to do it properly. If we have to pay for Guard and Reserve units that no longer have a mission, if we have to continue to finance units that are not required in the force, then something else has to give. If we've got a fixed top line for defense spending, which we do, and we end up paying for reserve component capability we don't need, then something else gets hit. What gets hit, of course, are those key elements that give us the kind of quality force that allowed us to perform so ably in the Gulf last year.

If we cannot cut the reserve component, then we end up having to cut down the active force even more than we've already planned. Remember, we're taking out over half a million active duty personnel during this same period of time. We end up, if we don't cut the reserves component enough, we end up having to cut on operations and maintenance, and that affects training, and that affects readiness, and that affects the quality of life for the troops. If we don't cut the reserve component, then we end up having to reduce modernization, our procurement, the extent to which we buy new equipment and maintain the kind of quality infrastructure that's essential with respect to a quality force. Those are the things that have to give if we're not allowed to cut the reserve component.

Quickly, to give you some fix on the overall numbers, the force structure reductions that we're talking about, 1992-1997, are a total of 270,000 slots. I want to emphasize that's force structure. Those are identified slots in units that we are recommending be taken down. You'll see at the end of 1997, after we've completed the reduction, we'll still have a force structure equivalent to some 920,000 reserve component forces.

(Chart)

This shows it another way. This, of course, relates to end-strength. Again, you'll see at the outside there, we go down to 920,000 end strength by 1997.

The noteworthy thing here is to look at the 1980 column, which shows that in 1980 our Guard and Reserve end-strength was 869,000. After we complete the reduction in the Guard and Reserve end-strength that we are recommending, you still are going to have 50,000 more guardsmen and reservists than we had in 1980 at the beginning of the Reagan buildup.

The fact is that once we get to 1993, the end of 1993 with the package we're recommending here, we'll have 16 percent more Guard and Reserve end-strength than we had in 1980 and 13 percent fewer active duty forces than we had in 1980. So there has been a fundamental change here. But the notion that somehow we are decimating the Guard and Reserve simply isn't accurate. We'll have more in the force in 1997 than we had at the beginning of the Reagan buildup in 1980.

The savings, of course, are a very important part of this whole proposition. To get down to the levels that we've recommended in the President's budget, we have to be allowed to make these kinds of reductions. You'll see here, the total savings in the bottom line, cumulative, over the next period of time, '92 through '97, that we can save if we're allowed to take out this force structure. We save over $20 billion over the next six years if we're allowed to reduce the Guard and Reserve force structure to the extent that we wish to do so.

Before I turn it over to the Chairman, let me point out the relative mix of active and reserve components. In 1980, the active components constituted 70 percent of a force of nearly three million military personnel, and the reserve component was only 30 percent. Today the active component has fallen to 64 percent; the reserve component has increased to 36 percent; and we're going to retain that same basic ratio, that same mix between active and reserve, in the out years.

By '92 when we complete the build-down, when we're down to about 2.5 million base force, 36 percent of that base force will be reserve component -- the same percentage that we've got in the force today.

With that, I'd like to call on my colleague, Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

General Powell: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Let me begin by reinforcing a point the Secretary made, that we are not out to decimate the reserve components as we go down to the base force. In fact, we believe--I and my colleagues in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and all of the commanders of the unified and specified commands of the armed forces of the United States--believe that the reserves will play an even more vital role than they have played in the past. But as you reshape the force to an entirely new strategic environment, you have to reshape the total force. You cannot leave a major component of that force untouched, off to the side, because it's too hard to do a proper reshaping of them.

What we are determined to do now is to reshape the total force, to include the reserve component part of the total force, down to what the nation needs for a solid military capability to face the new world that we see.

Cases can be made, and a case has been made recently, that the reserves should be even smaller, can go below 920,000. In fact if you looked at the illustrative scenario suggested by the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, those scenarios take the reserve components down much, much lower than the President's program does. We don't advocate that. We think at the 920,000 level we have a solid program, Guard and Reserve, each service, and it will fit very nicely with the other components of the base force.

What I would like to do for a moment or two is to show you how we make judgments with respect to something being in the active force, being in the reserve force, or not being in the structure at all.

For an active force unit, you should only have things in the active force where you need them every day, all day -- either here in the United States or deployed overseas. It has a full-time, 365 day-a-year mission when you put it into the active force. It has a 365 day-a-year mission, and you require its presence all the time. Drilling one weekend a month and two weeks during the course of the summer is not enough for that unit to do, in order to provide the mission that you have put it in the structure for.

We also need active forces when we are talking about combined arms forces--mechanized divisions, armored divisions, the most sophisticated kinds of units that go in harm's way, with the greatest likelihood of sustaining casualties. For that kind of proficiency, for that kind of ability to integrate all the armed forces, you need active units that are able to train at this day in, day out, all year long. That should be in the active force.

Where you have an active and reserve training requirement, where you have to keep the training base intact to train both active forces and reserve forces, that generally has to be an active duty.

When you go to the reserve side of the column, where you have units that have readily transferrable civilian skills associated with those units -- stevedore units, transportation units, where it's not difficult to bring them up on active duty and then send them somewhere, and you don't need that kind of capability during normal peacetime activity, that's a prime candidate to put in the reserve force.

Where required capabilities are needed in time of war but not in time of peace, then it's better to put that unit in the reserves so as not to waste active duty money, not to waste the taxpayer money. Medical units, mortuary units, stevedore units, transportation units, ammunition hauling units, where you only need that function to be performed when you're in an ongoing combat operation, put that kind of capability in the reserves. You have enough time to call it up. It doesn't require the same kind of training as a combined arms combat units does, and it's a better candidate to be in the reserves.

Since you do need the ability to expand your combat base in times of crisis, or when you have to reconstitute the force, you want to retain some combat units in the reserves, but they have to have enough time to get ready after mobilization in order to be prepared to fight in a high-intensity kind of conflict. You can't just call them up from day one and expect them to reach the proficiency of the units you have in the active force.

So these are the sorts of considerations that we go through as we determine whether a unit should be in the active component or in the reserve component to perform a particular mission.

If it doesn't meet any of these criteria, if there is no mission for the unit, or no function that needs to be performed to deal with the new strategy, it should not be in the structure at all -- neither active nor reserve. That money should be given back to the taxpayers for whatever purpose they wish to put it to. We should not keep active or reserve structure that is no longer needed or is no longer aligned to a specific strategic requirement.

Let me show you how we did it, and how it looks for each of the individual services. Let me start with the Air Force, because it's an interesting story.

The active Air Force is going down over the period--you can see its grown during the decade of the '80s--and from where we are now down to the end of the base force period, '97, they're going from their Cold War high of about 608,000 down to 430,000. The active Air Force is going from 24 fighter wing equivalents down to 15 fighter wing equivalents. Just looking at the tanker fleet, from 503 to 302 tankers down to their 430,000 level.

Reserve components, increasingly, will grow for the Air Force during this period slightly. Why? Because within the Air Force Reserve and within the Air National Guard, you have pilots who in their normal work are flying airplanes. So it is very easy to transfer those skills over to a tanker plane or a cargo plane or into regular military functions directly from their civilian function. So as we take this capacity out of the active component because we no longer need it in the active component, and place it over in the reserves, note the increase in tankers in the reserve from 148 to 262. In this case, the Air Force Reserve, Air Guard, stays relatively constant, and in fact, grows slightly. A sensible judgment made based on the unique capabilities of the Air Force and the Air Force Reserve.

When you turn to the Naval Reserve, you will see that the active structure is coming down considerably. The number of ships in the active structure is dropping significantly. The number of aircraft squadrons are dropping as they go down to their base force configuration. In the reserves, there will be a somewhat modest reduction. Why? Because the number of ships in the reserves is decreasing, and the number of aircraft squadrons in the reserves will be decreasing as well because there is less need for them. I think it is very reasonable and proper that if you're taking the ships out and if you're taking the aircraft out, you should take out the crews for the ships and the crews for the aircraft. That's what we have done in this case.

The Marine Corps Reduction in end-strength from a high of 199,000. They will get to their base force configuration last. They're taking more time than the other services because we want to watch carefully the decline in end-strength of the Marine Corps down to 159,000. They have a much more integrated structure between their active and reserve, and this is a logical track between reserve and active. As you know, there is the 4th Marine Division which is a reserve division /wing combination -- easy transition for the Marine Corps Reserve.

It's within the Army that we have the major problem, where the bulk of the reduction takes place, and where the greatest part of the controversy, I should say, also exists.

Let me explain it this way: the Army active component is going from its figure of about 769,000 down by six active divisions to 536,000 -- close to a one-quarter million man and woman reduction. For many years, throughout the decade of the buildup, the active Army has stayed at a constant end-strength to build up their combat power. For what? For war in Europe. Against whom? Against the Red Army. They had made significant increases in the size of the reserves to give us the staying power for this army that had been expected for all these years. That army is not coming. The Red Army is gone. The likelihood of a global war, and especially a major war in Europe, has disappeared before our eyes. Therefore, it is prudent to reduce the active Army by this size, and it is irresponsible not to bring the reserves down in some relative position with respect to the active Army.

So what we have done is planned to bring the active Army down,along the blue line as you see it, to 536,000; and what we were planning to do was to take out this growth that occurred in the Army National Guard and Army Reserve during the period of the Reagan buildup, bring it back down to somewhere around the level of 1980, and to match it to its corresponding active component unit.

What the Congress has been doing for the last several years, has been denying us the opportunity to bring the reserve components down. So what you see here is, while the active has started to come down, the reserves have remained high--structure wise, the solid line is structure or allowances, rather, the amount of end-strength that Congress authorized every year has remained high. This dotted green line shows that they haven't been able to recruit as much of the end strength as Congress has authorized during that period.

The President's program is for the purpose of bringing this green line down to a relative match with respect to the active component. What Congress has been doing for the last several years, has been insisting that the reserves remain at this red line level. In other words, no reductions. We, frankly, believe that is inconsistent with the strategy, not responsible use of the taxpayers' funds. So what we have done for the last two years is request the Congress to allow us to bring the Army Reserve down to its base force level so that it matches the rest of the force. This is what the whole debate has been about for the last two years.

We've been making this case for the better part of the last year. What is unique today is now we are going to identify the specific units associated with the draw-down over the next several years.

The draw-down will look like this. Cumulatively, over time, we took out over a few thousand, 17,000 in FY90. Notice that, cumulatively, it dropped in '91 because the Congress added back some of the cuts. We got 51,000, or a total of 51,000, an additional increment on top of this in '92, so the cut went up to 51,000 cumulatively by '92. For '93, '94, and '95, we are trying to get back on our original glide path. These reductions would not seem as steep as they are if we had been allowed to begin shaping the force properly a year or two earlier. But avoiding this issue because it is a difficult political issue, or because there are strong feelings, or because there are strong pressures to avoid this issue, will not serve the nation well; will not serve the total force well over time.

I think it's a good plan. It's been very well thought out. It's been coordinated widely within the Department. It enjoys the support of the Chiefs. It enjoys the support of the commanders of the unified and specified commands. I hope the Congress understands what we're trying to do for

the nation with this base force, and I hope it will enjoy congressional support. I'll turn this back over to the Secretary.

Secretary Cheney: Thank you, General Powell.

A brief wrap-up statement, and then we'll be happy to respond to your questions.

Let me emphasize something that General Powell said in his remarks. This is not a new proposal today. We've been working on this base force plan for a long time. The reductions in the Guard and Reserve component have been a part of that plan for a long time. Thirty-one thousand of the slots that we're identifying today that we want to eliminate, the Congress has already agreed to because they relate specifically to force structure we want to take out in this fiscal year, FY92. When they passed the '92 authorization, they agreed to allow us to take down some of that, so 31,000 come out in '92. The remaining 114,000 are slots that would come out in '93 under the proposal that's now pending on Capitol Hill.

A brief reminder, this is what I've referred to before. It's the pitchfork. This is what's driving budgetary considerations. The green line shows the actual reduction, 1985 until 1990, in defense spending. The yellow line represents what the budget agreement was, agreed to just some 18 months ago in October of '90. The red line is what we proposed this year.

Some in Congress have already announced that they don't like the package we're about to send forward. Members of Congress have been briefed today on it. My good friend, General Montgomery, a Congressman from Mississippi and a man who's noted for being an ardent advocate of the Guard and Reserve, and properly so, has suggested that this won't be well received by the Congress.

But let me remind everybody, that to get down to the level of defense spending that we've recommended to the President and that he sent forward to the Congress, you have to buy that recision package that's already on Capitol Hill. You have to agree to cancel the Seawolf submarine. You have to agree that we don't have to buy the MRE's that are in excess of our requirements or the combat boots we don't need or fund all the museums and other proposals that Congress put into the appropriations bill last year. You have to buy that recision package to get down to the President's level. You have to buy this reduction in the Guard and Reserve component to get down to the President's spending level.

Some in Congress have suggested they want to go even deeper, that taking out $5 billion below the existing budget agreement in '93 isn't enough. Chairman Aspin has recommended that we take out an additional $5 billion in budget spending on defense in FY93 and suggested that that could be done without cutting personnel, without doing anything that would affect the readiness of the force. I don't think it can. I'm still waiting to see his plan.

But the point is, that if Congress doesn't like this set of reductions, it is totally irresponsible for them to suggest they want to go even deeper in defense spending because it is these kinds of very tough, hard choices that have to be made if, in fact, we're going to take down the force and preserve its quality.

The final chart. This just emphasizes the point that shows by state the number of slots or billets that we are recommending taking out. Every single state is affected, the District of Columbia, the territories, everybody is affected by this -- I guess with the exception of Guam and the Virgin Islands. All have significant impact as a result of the cuts we've got here. It was a package that was put together, as General Powell mentioned, after careful consideration and in accordance with the directions we received from the Congress in our '92 statute. I think it's a good package, and I am hopeful that Congress will approve it.

We'd be happy to respond to your questions.

Q: Mr. Secretary, those that have been saying that your package is dead on arrival on the Hill make the argument, that in a time of tight budgets, you don't need to keep such a large, expensive, active duty Army, that it's better to rely on a cheaper reserve force. Can you respond to those criticisms, and also to the argument that basically, by making these cuts, you're tearing the heart out of some communities, that they really depend on that armory for the center of their lives?

Cheney: Congress cannot have it both ways, Susanne. They cannot tell us we have to cut the defense budget and then object every time we move to cut the defense budget. Some up there, I think, would like to have it both ways. They'd like to go home and say to their Guard units, or tell the folks that are affected by shutting down production lines of weapon systems, that they've got great sympathy for them and they oppose that. But then they come back and vote for budget resolutions to take down the top line of the defense budget.

These are not easy choices to make. I wish it were not necessary. I wish we did not have to preside over the Department at a time when we've got to make these kinds of changes. But the policy has been set. Congress signed off on the budget agreements. The world has changed dramatically. We can, indeed, make some fundamental changes and save the taxpayers a lot of money in the process. That's what we're doing here.

The question of the reserve/active mix, I thought, was addressed well by General Powell. The point is, we've looked very carefully when we put together the base force, to make judgments about what kinds of missions have to be performed by active duty personnel and what kinds of missions are best performed by reserve personnel. That's what's led to the set of decisions that are embodied in this and our recommendations to the Congress for the size active and size reserve forces we think we'll need.

The notion that this is tough on communities -- of course it's tough on communities. It's tough when you close down a base. It's tough when you deactivate an active division. It's tough when you shut down a production line. But we're closing over 700 bases worldwide. I've cancelled over 100 different weapon systems. We're getting rid of one million people, roughly, out of the Department of Defense over a five-year period of time. A lot more active people are leaving than reserve people, and this is just the reserve component. If we don't take out the reserve component, if we protect that part of the force against any cuts, then we will end up with the kind of hollow forces we had in the late 1970's when, frankly, we lacked the military capability to do the kind of thing we just did in the Persian Gulf in Desert Storm.

Q: Mr. Secretary, do you foresee a diminished combat role for the Guard and Reserve in the future? If so, doesn't that mark something of a retreat from the post-Vietnam total force concept which sought to guarantee political support for wars, essentially, by involving reservists as well as active duty forces?

Cheney: I do not see a diminished role for the Guard and Reserve at all. As General Powell made clear, with respect to the Air Force, it's actually going to increase slightly. What's different now...one of the lessons we derived out of Desert Storm was that we had unrealistic expectations as a department about how rapidly we could bring the maneuver brigades of the National Guard on-line so they were ready to go.

It turned out that it takes longer to take a National Guard brigade, an armored brigade, for example, a roundout brigade, to get them trained up and ready to deploy. We had to make some changes in personnel at the top. They needed more training and more preparation. But that's simply a matter of adjusting the program; that doesn't fundamentally change the program.

The Guard and Reserve are a vital part of the force today. They will continue to be a vital part of the force. Not only do they play a very important military role, but they also, as you've touched on I think, John, play a role in terms of helping us mobilize public opinion when it is time to go to war. I can trace support for the President's policies in the Persian Gulf against Saddam Hussein to that point in time when we called up a large number of guardsmen and reservists, and people all across the country, every community, was affected, every state was affected. They came to understand how important it was.

Powell: Keep in mind, we're keeping six National Guard divisions. The roundout concept remains intact. We're going to have two cadre divisions, meaning that we will keep the leadership structure and keep the equipment there, but because the likelihood of a global war has receded so much, we are able to not fill it with troops at this time because it is unnecessary. So the premise of your question isn't there. We're keeping a pretty solid, combined arms component to the National Guard base force structure.

Q: General Powell, the point many others make on the Hill is that you're breaking faith not just with the Guard and Reserve, but with the active duty force by cutting so deeply, so quickly, when you could keep them on or stretch out this downturn if you didn't have a B-1 bomber, B-2 bomber that you don't need; if you didn't stay with some of the modern weapon systems; and you saved some money on modernization; and not break faith with the Guard and Reserve or the active duty forces. Is that not a valid point?

Powell: No, I don't think it's a valid point. I think you have to look at the total force and make sure that the total force, to include the procurement part, the acquisition part, the R&D part, fits into a national military strategy that is related to the new world we are facing. If you start to unbalance that and protect things at the expense of something else, you will not be pleased with the result at the end of the day.

Now I would be the happiest Chairman in the world, and I would be working for the happiest Secretary of Defense in the world, if we could have kept every single GI who served in Desert Storm last year, if we could keep every single guardsman and reservist. I used to command the Army

Reserve in my FORSCOM hat, and monitor the Army National Guard. I'd like to keep every single one of them. But I can't make that case. The geo-strategic situation has changed in the world and the fiscal situation has changed in the world.

What we must resist is unbalancing the force by protecting capability that legitimately no longer has a proper place in the national military strategy. We're going to try to do everything we can not to break faith with the people we have contracts with, but it may be necessary.

Q: Just a followup. If the new world order is new, why do you need a strategic system like the B-2 bomber, which would keep, if you cut that, would keep many of these active duty and reserve...

Powell: Because we have still a world that is in a period of transition. The B-2...if you want to get into the B-2, we can talk about that at some length.

Q: It's money.

Powell: Lots of things, everything is money. But the B-2 still has a legitimate strategic and conventional mission. We have brought the program to conclusion with the purchase of an additional four bombers to have a total fleet of 20, which will give us some capability out of the investment we made in that strategic and conventional mode. I think that is a wise choice that was made by the Administration. But we could get into individual programs.

What we've tried to do is shape and balance the total program to give the nation a solid military force in a period that is still a very iffy period of instability, uncertainty, and we don't know it's the end of the road yet.

Cheney: Let me touch on that just a second, Fred, because it's a question that will come up on the Hill, this notion that somehow we ought to protect the Guard and Reserve and take it out of something else. There's not much else left. When you look at the cuts that we have made over the course of the last three years, the B-2 program ends in FY93. The Seawolf submarine, cancelled. M1 Abrams tank, cancelled. F-15, cancelled. F-16, cancelled. A-12, cancelled. There is a long list of programs that we've terminated and brought to an end. The procurement budget now is half of what it was in 1985. The active force, coming down dramatically.

There are very few places left to go in the Defense Department budget to take savings out. You've got to remember that 46 percent of everything we spend goes for manpower and manpower-related costs. You cannot cut the defense budget very much at all any more, especially in the early years, in '93, without taking out people. That's just a basic, fundamental fact of life.

Q: What happens to the financial commitment that many of these people have to pay the government back for an education that they got in return for serving for so many years? Are they alleviated of that commitment?

Cheney: Those who have contracts will be given the opportunity to sign on with other units that are in the area that have vacancies. There are places where we've got Guard and Reserve units that are being kept in the force structure that are not fully manned. So where they can find slots

within a reasonable geographical area, those with contracts will be required to sign up to those units. Obviously, there will be many who will not have that opportunity, and in effect, their contract will be terminated. They no longer will receive any pay and benefits for serving, but they no longer will be a part of the force.

Q: General Powell, advocates of the Guard and Reserve say that you really don't need, from the evidentiary standpoint, the burden of proof that you established for yourself in that Desert Storm showed it takes several months simply to transport two or three heavy divisions into combat. There's no way in the foreseeable future that you're going to be able to bring six, seven, eight, nine, ten, 12 divisions of active duty forces to combat in any one or any several places on the globe within a period of many, many months, by which time any reserve unit could be activated, brought up to full speed, and gotten into combat. Therefore, since it only costs about 25 or 30 percent to maintain a Guard unit, that you're actually wasting money for something that you can't, in fact, use.

Powell: That's utter nonsense. It will take about a year to bring one of those Guard divisions up to any reasonable level of combat readiness to put against a force, the kind of which we were facing in Operation Desert Storm. Further, recognizing that we have some deficiencies with respect to lift, we have made a major investment in the '93 budget of an additional billion dollars to solve some of our lift problems.

We recognize in the future we have to be able to get forces to a crisis area quickly and ready to fight when they arrive, without long periods of mobilization. It's that kind of regional environment we're going into. So we may not always have the opportunity of waiting for four or five or six months. We didn't know we were going to have four or five or six months, I can assure you, in early August of 1990 when we began the buildup. We moved as quickly as we could, and it did not take six months to get some heavy capability there. The 1st Cav arrived in the early fall.

Q: Did you say that it takes a year to bring a reserve combat...

Powell: If you've been following it, that was the testimony the Chief of Staff of the Army gave before the House and Senate Armed Services Committee earlier in the season, about two weeks ago. He said it takes about a year for one of the full divisions to be brought up to combat readiness standards.

Q: If it takes a year to get these reservists up to combat speed...

Powell: National Guard.

Q: National Guard. Why even bother to put them in that proposition? Why even bother to train them for that if it takes a year to get them ready to actually fight?

Powell: There are lots of reasons. One, the Guard performs other very, very important functions for the nation besides just getting ready to go fight. The governors who own these Guard divisions have many, many useful functions for those units and those capabilities to perform within the state.

Secondly, in this new environment that we're in, as we look at warning time and how long it would take for a potential force, let's say in Europe, to be regenerated that would start to approach the size of that that the Red Army used to present to us, you might well have that amount of time to do it. So I don't know that a year is unreasonable. I think it's always been about a year. We may have thought it was shorter, but General Sullivan has spoken to that issue.

Q: I believe the testimony was that it would take a year because you did not have the training areas and the training spaces for these Guard divisions, and that you had to train them at NTC or JRTC to make sure that they're qualified, and had to train them independently, brigade by brigade, as opposed to by division. If that was the case, sir, it would take 15 years to train up the National Guard, the six divisions and two cadre, to be ready for a war. Are you saying that these Guard divisions are not ready at all?

Powell: I didn't say they're not ready at all, and I'm not saying they have to get in queue and take 15 years to get ready. I'm just saying that some of the statements that have been made that somehow these units just require a little bit of training after they have been mobilized -- these are divisions themselves, now. The brigades only take two to three or four months, something in that range, as we learned last year, with the National Guard brigades that were mobilized in the south. But for the large formations, a division, to get filled out, to be brought on active duty, to go through the necessary training, to meet the standards required of a combined arms team that is going into war -- they're not going just to fly airplanes like the Air Force Reserve or to run a transportation company. These young men and women are going into war in the front lines. We have to assure ourselves that they reach the right level of capability. Our judgment is it would take about a year.

Now if you were calling up the whole thing and we were in a state of total mobilization, I'm not sure we would be terribly concerned about which training areas might be available. We would start to find additional training areas in order to conduct the necessary training. But with respect to filling out the manning, training, qualifications to go into combat, all the other things it takes to get a unit ready, the Army's best judgment, as testified to by General Sullivan, is about a year for that kind of a division.

Q: Mr. Secretary, also one of the criticisms on Capitol Hill is that there might be some political involvement in drawing up the list. For instance, some might suggest that it might be a sort of in-your-face list to someone like Les Aspin who wants to cut the defense budget, and his state is one of those that will actually be getting some tough hits. How would you respond to those who say there are some political thoughts in drawing up this list?

Cheney: We did not make the choices of the units based on any kind of political consideration at all. The fact of the matter is, the process was one in which we followed the guidance given to us by the Congress. In the '92 authorization bill that they passed last fall, they indicated that they wanted me to take out units based upon the fact that the active units that the reserve units were supporting were no longer there. They wanted linkage between the reserve components we decided to take out and the active units already coming out. That's why VII Corps with 2nd Armored, the 8th Mech, 3rd Armored and so forth we used as an example, and it's the supporting units for those European divisions that have, in fact, been identified.

The process of actually selecting the units involved the services involved the National Guard Bureau, for example, here in the building. They produced a list which came up to me through the Chairman, which I signed off on. But I did not look to see whether we were hitting Republican districts or Democratic districts. I did not look to see whether or not any one particular member of Congress was being adversely affected.

The point we've tried to make over and over and over again is those kinds of considerations have got no place in these decisions. The decisions we're making are not about jobs in some congressman's district. It's not about political pork. Those are important considerations to members of Congress. They cannot be allowed to color the decisions we're making here.

The decisions we're making here have to do specifically with doing what we've never done right before, and that is taking down the force in an intelligent fashion so that when we get through we've got the kind of quality force that will satisfy requirements. Always before when we've done it, we've blown it, we've gotten it wrong. These decisions are preparation for the next time we go to war.

If we spend money on force structure, Guard and Reserve force structure or active force structure that no longer has a mission, it's money that's wasted. It's money that's not going to be available to us to spend on more important priorities.

Q: Mr. Secretary, I'd like to talk to you about the timing of this announcement. The concept, we know, is not new. Does the Administration feel the time is right that Congress may be a bit wounded and may have to respond in answer to the public as the Defense Department asks for these cuts that show savings of money?

Cheney: No, it's guided more than anything else by, this is how long it took to get the package ready. Again, to remind everybody that a number of these units have to come out in this fiscal year, before the end of October.

Q: Congress has resisted your attempts to pare down the forces.

Cheney: They've resisted. Initially, in '89 when we asked, they said no. In '90 when we asked they said no. In '91 when we asked, they said okay, "you can have half of what you asked for." We're coming back again. Just because Congress said no doesn't mean it's a bad idea. It is, in fact, an essential part of our overall plan. It's a good plan. It's tied into our military strategy. It moves us to the base force. It hangs together. Nobody's suggested a better strategy. All I hear from my friends on the Hill, basically, are saying, "not in my backyard. Don't close down my armory, don't shut down my production line." We can't operate on that basis.

We have to make decisions that are based on what's in the national interest, on what's essential in terms of protecting and preserving our capacity to defend the nation. Those considerations are more important than any parochial political considerations of any member of Congress.

Q: Mr. Secretary and General Powell, you just said that we may well have that kind of time, being a year, to train the combat reserve roundout brigades and the like. Can you talk about the

kinds of circumstances, the kinds of scenarios you see that would justify, under which you would call them up and pose the disruption, the economic and social disruption, of putting them on active duty for as much as a year?

Powell: In some cases, brigade-sized organizations in the Army National Guard are affiliated with some of the active units. We're keeping the roundout concept. If those active units are called up to reinforce in a particular part of the world, we now have a better handle on how long it takes that roundout brigade to truly get ready. And they may well be called up at the same time we alerted that active unit and, in a period of two or three months, they may have to go overseas and perform a mission.

It's a risk that everybody in uniform has to be ready to accept. Being in the active Army or being in the Guard or Reserve means that, when the whistle blows, you go and you go for however long is required to accomplish the mission. That's what service means.

The wonderful thing about our guardsmen and our reservists is that they do such a great job of it. They understand that. When they were called up for Desert Shield and Desert Storm, we had a fantastic response, a fantastic turnout. Nobody wanted to leave home for an extended period of time, but they did, and they would have stayed longer if they'd had to.

I can't give you a specific scenario that would tell you how much disruption would be caused to a community. We hope we will never see the kind of disruption that would have been caused by the equivalent of a major war in Europe. That's not the kind of environment we see for the future. We see regional crises where active components with some reserve sustainment should be able to handle it. It might grow bigger, where a larger part of the reserves have to be called up. But we can't forget the fourth principle that we're building our structure on, and that's reconstitution. We guessed wrong. Things are not going as well as we thought they were going. Things have not turned out as well as we had hoped in the land of 11 time zones and we have to reconstitute a larger force than we have now. We've got to hedge against that possibility.

The revolution is not over. It's still continuing. I don't wish it any ill in the future, but our responsibility is to be prudent. I'm asked to make judgments, the Secretary is asked to make judgments, and the Chiefs are, about the nation's security. I don't like to make bad judgments about the nation's security.

Q: What about the great mission? Why are you eliminating important units, for instance the 276th Engineer Battalion in Virginia, when they play such a vital role to the state's ability to handle...

Powell: I, obviously, have to yield to the Army to tell the story as to why that particular unit. I don't know how many engineer battalions there are in the state of Virginia...

Q: There's only one.

Powell: I'd really have to turn that over. I cannot go into the many hundreds of individual units.

Q: For instance, Massachusetts getting cut by almost 60 percent, where states with large Guards such as Alabama, Texas, are left somewhat unscathed, at least percentage-wise.

Powell: There is no state that is unscathed in this. Every single state...

Q: But some states are much...

Powell: One of the complaints I've had from some of my friends who are Governors and Senators, well, we know we have to take it down, but as long as I am equal percentage to somebody else, I might be able to live with it. It won't work out that way because it wasn't designed that way. The structure wasn't created that way.

In the early days, a large number of units were put up in the northeast corridor, and the northeast corridor no longer has the demographics to support some of the force structure that was put up there years ago. So there's going to be a significant draw-down of some of the National Guard combat elements up there, because the demographics won't support it. You're not getting enough people to support those formations.

Q: That's true, but what about the missions that are needed to be taken care of, from an engineer battalion?

Powell: I can't talk about a specific engineer battalion.

Q: The Guard is assigned to the states by the Constitution. So...

Powell: I can't talk about a specific, discreet unit. I believe, however, that in a force of 920,000 National Guardsmen and Reservists, there will be more than enough capacity to deal with any national disaster that comes along to the nation or to any individual state.

Q: Mr. Secretary, there's been a (inaudible) on the Hill already today that if you made deeper cuts in the forces remaining in Europe beyond 150,000 that you've projected, that that could save an additional number of reserves. Why not make deeper cuts say, in Europe, for instance?

Cheney: That's just a faulty analysis on the part of those who suggest it. The fact is, we are dramatically reducing our presence in Europe. We're cutting from about 320,000 down to about 150,000. We're bringing it out as rapidly as we can without destroying that capability. We've had a number of weeks where we've had 500 people a day coming home from Europe. It is a very, very complex management task to move all of those personnel, all of that equipment, close all of those facilities in Europe, relocate people back here, relocate families, find schools for the kids, find billets for those people who are going to stay in the force and others out, find adequate housing on bases here in the United States. We are doing that just as rapidly as we can.

We don't get down to the level of 150,000 in Europe until the end of '94. There is no way I can move any more rapidly to take more out of Europe in '93 to relieve us of the need to take down this force structure as well.

Powell: I have to make a point on that. There's this feeling on the Hill that if you cut more active that gives you money to keep more reserves that you don't need in the first place. If you're going to cut more active, and if over time we find the opportunity to cut more active, as we did in our strategic forces over the last year or so, and if we don't need additional capability in the reserve, we ought to give that money back to the taxpayer.

So the proposal that we ought to cut the active some more in order to keep the reserve at a much higher level than we're planning to is a false analogy. If you don't need it in the active, and there's no mission for it in the reserves, give the money back to the taxpayers.

Q: You may have heard reports that some five dozen Gulf veterans from Indiana Army Reserve units have reported a variety of medical ailments that some of them attribute to service in the Gulf. What can you tell us? The Army has confirmed that there's an investigation underway. What can you tell us about that situation, about the nationwide situation among reservists and active duty Gulf veterans, and what the Pentagon is doing about it?

Cheney: I am unaware of any special problems on a national basis affecting our Desert Storm veterans. I am aware that there's been this report out of Indiana where we have a number who have various ailments, that, some of them have suggested might be attributed to their Gulf service. Our medical people are looking into it, trying to find out whether or not there's any substance to it. So far we have not been able to identify anything that they came in contact with during the course of their service in the Gulf that would account for their ailments. It's not all the same ailments. It's a variety of concerns. But any time something like that comes up, obviously we'll look at it very carefully. At this point, though, I cannot confirm at all the notion that somehow because they served in the Gulf they're now having physical problems. We simply can't...

Q: Mr. Secretary, the Defense Ministry in Moscow has reported some sort of submarine incident off their coast once again. Can you tell us if the United States was involved in that?

Cheney: I don't, at this point, have any additional information I can give you. I've seen a press report which, as I understand it, alleges that Soviet vessels saw or encountered a submarine in waters off the coast of the northern part of the former Soviet Union. But I don't have any way of knowing at this point whether or not that's a valid report, whether or not it was one of our submarines.

We continue to operate our submarines as we have in the past, but we're careful not to operate in a way that's going to create problems. I need more information at this point before I can say anything about the specific allegation.

Q: Going back to the politics of this, from your perspective, how much of the resistance on the Hill is rooted, or comes from members who see the Reserve and Guard as a cherished jobs program?

Cheney: I don't doubt but what there are members of Congress who think of the Guard and Reserve in their home communities in those terms. It can have a significant impact on a small town. It does bring a payroll there, and does supplement other kinds of activity. I don't have any doubt but what there will be economic consequences of the kinds of decisions that we've made here.

But it's important for us to remember that what we are asked to do here in the Department of Defense is to defend the nation. The only reason we exist is to be prepared to fight and win wars. We're not a social welfare agency. We're not an employment agency. We're not an agency that's operated on the basis of what makes sense for some member of Congress concern back home in the district. This is a military organization. Decisions we make have to be taken based upon those kinds of considerations and only those kinds of considerations.

I wish it were possible to alleviate some of the economic impact that automatically comes from these kinds of decisions, but that cannot be our number one consideration. We have to focus specifically upon how we maintain the capacity to defend the nation with less money, and that means we've got to get smaller.

Q: But my question, how much of the resistance you're facing, though, is rooted in members simply trying to protect jobs versus DoD strategy and...

Cheney: I'm going to give the members of Congress the benefit of the doubt, and decline to answer that question. (Laughter)

Q: Mr. Secretary, two detail questions. First, about what plans have you made to notify the individual reservists that this is going to happen to them. Second, what will happen to the real estate, to the armories themselves, in these communities?

Cheney: The notification process is that we are informing Congress today. Packages will be mailed out to all the Governors as well, so they're aware of it. I would expect the individual guardsmen and reservists to be notified through their units, that their units have, in fact, been selected.

With respect to the facilities that are involved. In some cases where you've got Army Reserve units, they may be using leased space which will revert back to whoever owns it at present. When we're talking about things like National Guard Armories, that really will depend upon the local circumstances. Governors own most of those armories. In many cases, they don't have enough capacity in the armories for all of the forces that they've got in the area, so I would expect you won't necessarily see armories closed. You may see the states rejigger their alignment so that they can make better utilization of the facilities they'll retain.

Q: Moving around the country in the last five or six weeks, I've never seen morale so low. Soldiers saying a year ago we were sky high, and now we're not just looking from year to year, we're actually looking from month to month about our careers. What do you say to the soldiers -- not to this audience, not to the Congress -- but to the soldiers, both of you, both the Chairman and yourself, who really have no future right now, who are literally living from either month to month, or their careers are year to year?

Cheney: I spend as much time when I get out on the road as I can talking to the troops. I recently spent a couple of days down in the Caribbean on the Saratoga and with some of our ships down there. I've been to the Marine Corps Recruit Depot in San Diego, and recently in Panama with a combined group of forces down there. I get out every chance I can.

It is a time of great uncertainty for those who are serving in the United States military. I wished we could avoid that uncertainty. As General Powell eloquently stated earlier, neither one of us enjoys having to ask young men and women, every single one of them a volunteer, people who badly want to serve the United States in uniform, and hundreds of thousands out there who will never get the opportunity because we won't need them. We're going to be smaller in the future than we would have otherwise been. We wish there were some other way to proceed.

But what I tell them when I have the chance to talk with them is that we are deeply appreciative of their service. That there is still going to be a military organization in all of the services, it will be absolutely vital to the future security of the nation, that we will continue to depend upon young Americans willing to wear the uniform and go in harm's way to defend our freedom in the future, just as we have in the past, and that the tough decisions we're making now are designed specifically to get us through this period of uncertainty as quickly as possible so everyone knows what their future will be with the military.

And most of all, to create the kind of force that they can be proud to be a part of in the future, just as they've been proud to be part of that one in the past, and avoid the kinds of disasters that have befallen the nation every time before in this century when we've taken the force down too fast, when we've made bad decisions about what we keep and what we get rid of, when we've ended up creating forces that were, in fact, provocative because they conveyed an impression of weakness to our adversaries. We always end up, again, in a conflict. It always happens. We always have to recommit the force. If we get the decisions wrong this time around, the next time we do it we'll be in a world of hurt, as we have been all too many times in our history.

We're trying to avoid that. We ask them to bear with us through this difficult period, and we'll do our level best to get it wrapped up as quickly as possible so we can give them some degree of certainty about their future.

Powell: The only thing I'd add, Fred, is that as I travel around I see high morale, but high anxiety. Troops are very uneasy about what's happening, and they watch all the debates that take place here.

What I tell them is we're going to get smaller. We have to get smaller. The world situation requires us to get smaller. The American people want us to spend less on defense. The American people also love this force. They showed that to us last summer during the parades. They want to make sure we do this right, so that at the end of the process we'll have as good a force as we had at the beginning of the process, if not even better. That's why it has to be done in a careful, balanced way.

I tell those young men and women, trust your leaders -- your leaders in uniform, your civilian leaders, and trust the Congress to do what is right and not break the force apart. They get anxious, however, when they see all of these statements flying around, mostly this town, saying we've got to cut more. We've got problems. Every problem in this nation can be solved if we take it out on those wonderful young men and women that we thought so much of last year. That's what makes them anxious. That's what makes them uneasy. That's what the Secretary and I and the Chiefs are going to fight against and resist.

Press: Thank you.

Mr. Williams: If I can just have your attention briefly for a moment.

The military departments, their public affairs offices, are prepared to answer your specific questions about what these units are and how they were chosen and so forth.

The second thing is, in response to Joe's question on timing, the committee report in the appropriations bill last year specified that the Department shall send this list up in March of 1992. Now in fact it says March 15th, so we missed it by a couple of days, but that's a matter of getting the whole thing pulled together. I think you've seen this package, you realize how complicated it is. But the committee report said the Department shall provide a list of all units being reduced, realigned, or inactivated in FY92. The listing should include the designation of the unit, location, personnel, and so forth. Then it said a similar listing for '93. So that accounts for the timing.

Thank you.

(END)

— LTC Gene Ott -
NGB, Historical
756-4603

The National Guard Since WWII

— Dan Donahue/Kathy Powell
695-0421(O)
690-5931(H)
789-2000 -Nevada

WORLD WAR II

--18 National Guard Infantry Divisions mobilized 1940-41; 1/2 fought in Europe, 1/2 fought in Pacific. Also in Pacific was Americal, made up of Guard units.

--When war started, 2 armor and 2 artillery units from the National Guard already in Philippines - fought to defend Bataan.

--34th ID first to deploy to Europe, in Feb 42; this division spent more actual days in combat than any other in the US Army.

--164th Infantry (ND), part of Americal Div, first US Army unit to fight offensively in WWII, on Guadalcanal

--32d ID first US unit to defeat the Japanese, in New Guinea.

KOREA

--First Guard units alerted for active duty within days of North Korean attack; first increment mobilized 14 August 50.

--First Army Guard units (primarily Engineer and Field Artillery) begin arriving in South Korea Jan 51.

--2 Guard FA battalions win Navy PUCs fighting with the Marines during the Chinese Army's spring counteroffensive .

--2 Guard infantry divisions arrive in Korea, Nov 51.

--almost 100% of Air Guard called up for Korea (versus approx. 1/3 of Army Guard); 25 units deploy overseas.

--Texas' 136th Ftr-Bomber Wing arrives in Korea Nov 51; two of its squadrons have been based there since Sep 51. Two other ANG squadrons based in Japan also fly combat missions over North Korea

BERLIN

--in response to building of Berlin Wall in summer of 1962, 44,371 Army Guardsmen in 107 units and 21,067 Air Guardsmen from 145 units mobilized for one year.

--99% of those alerted with their units went on active duty

VIETNAM

--Decision not to mobilize Reserve Components in 1965, at time first US ground combat units sent, was a political one, made by Lyndon Johnson and his political advisors; Johnson's military advisors, the Joint Chiefs, argued privately for Reserve Component mobilization.

--Air Guard units begin flying mission to Southeast Asia in summer of 64; between Dec 65 and July 66, MAC-gained units flew an average of 75 missions a month to Vietnam.

--After Jan 68's Tet Offensive and Saigon's call for more troops, Johnson authorizes limited reserve callup.

--12,234 Army Guardsmen in 34 units report for active duty on 13 May 68.

--2,729 Army Guardsmen in eight units deploy to Vietnam; another 4,500 go as individual replacements in other units.

--The only Guard infantry unit in Vietnam (and the only Indiana Guard unit to be called up in 68*) was Indiana's Co D (Ranger), 151st Infantry. Arriving in-country in Nov 68, they amassed 510 awards for valor and service before their 26 Nov 69 demobilization

Most highly decorated combat unit in VN

* 890 Trans Co, USAR, called from IN

--9,178 Air Guardsmen were mobilized in Jan 68 as a response to North Korea's seizing of USS Pueblo; the May call-up adds 1,133 more.

--Four Air Guard fighter squadrons deploy to Vietnam; a fifth squadron is made up almost entirely of Air Guard volunteers.

GRENADA

--Arkansas' 154th Air Refueling Sqdn flies missions to support this US operation

LIBYA

--KC-135 tankers from Washington's 141st Air Refueling Wing and N. Hampshire's 157th Air Refueling Group refuel USAF fighters during the raid.

PANAMA ('JUST CAUSE')

--ANG has had long-standing, regularly-scheduled deployments to Panama of airlift ('Volant Oak') and fighter ('Coronet Cove') aircraft.

-- When Just Cause began, all regularly scheduled Volant Oak missions were cancelled and the 4 ANG MAC-gained (136th TAW, TX; 166th TAG, DE; 139th TAG, MO; and 146th TAW, CA) units were used to provide intratheater tactical airlift. In just 5 days, these 4 Air Guard units flew 182 sorties in support of the operation.

--2 fighter units (180th TFG, OH; 114th TFG, SD) already in Panama as part of Coronet Cove flew 34 sorties

--172d MAG, MS, flew 266 hours in support of Just Cause between 20 Dec and 12 Jan. Total cargo carried came to 403.6 tons; passengers equalled 1,274.

INFORMATION PAPER

SUBJECT: National Guard Participation in OPERATION JUST CAUSE (Panama)

*Army National Guard (ARNG):

-1138th Military Police Company, Missouri ARNG, was conducting annual training (A-T) at the start of the operation (20 December 1989).

--Were only P-O-W processing-capable MP unit in Panama.

--SOUTHCOM requested their tour be extended for two weeks to help guard and process detainees.

--Governor of Missouri approved extension in less than 24 hours.

--MP Company comprised of 33 people.

--Unit replaced in Panama by 1138th MP Co, also from the Missouri ARNG.

-125th Public Affairs Detachment, Minnesota ARNG, was conducting A-T at start of operation.

--The 13-person PAD provided support to SOUTHCOM/PA to include coverage of the operation and swearing in of President Endara.

*Air National Guard (ANG):

-180th Tactical Fighter Group, Toledo, Ohio, was on a regularly scheduled CORONET COVE rotation to Howard AFB with five (5) of their A-7 aircraft.

--CORONET COVE was a year-round ANG commitment to the defense of the Panama Canal as part of our Canal Treaty obligations.

--Air Guard A-7 units had continuously performed this mission since December 1978, until it was terminated 1 February 1990.

-MORE-

--The 180th TFG flew 22 close-air-support sorties in support of JUST CAUSE ground troops.

--56 Ohio Air Guardsmen participated.

--On December 23, the 180th was replaced by the 114th TFG, Sioux Falls, South Dakota.

--Together, these A-7 units flew 76 C-A-S JUST CAUSE missions and expended 2,715 rounds of ammunition; all takeoffs were on-time.

-At the start of JUST CAUSE, seven ANG units had C-130 aircraft and/or people at Howard AFB supporting Exercise VOLANT OAK, providing tactical airlift support to SOUTHCOM throughout Central and South America.

--The ANG has flown VOLANT OAK rotations every year since October 1977.

--Guard C-130 units alternate this real-world responsibility with the Air Force Reserve (AFRES) every six months.

--The following units provided aircraft and people:

---136th Tactical Airlift Wing, Dallas, Texas;

---139th Tactical Airlift Group, St. Joseph, Missouri;

---166th TAG, Wilmington, Delaware; and

---146th TAW, Channel Islands ANG Base, California (Point Mugu).

--The following units provided people to support VOLANT OAK:

---118th TAW, Nashville, Tennessee;

---137th TAW, Oklahoma City; and

---153d TAG, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

--Nearly 120 people were part of the VOLANT OAK mission.

--During JUST CAUSE, ANG C-130 units flew 178 sorties in 85.4 hours, and airlifted 551.3 tons of cargo (1.1 million pounds) and 3,087 people, including aeromedical evacuation flights to the U.S.

-The 172d Military Airlift Group, Mississippi ANG, flew 266.2 flying hours during 87 C-141 Starlifter sorties from its home station in Jackson, and transported 1,274 people and 403.6 tons of cargo (807,000 pounds) to Howard AFB.

-The 105th MAG, Stewart ANGB, New York, flew 14 C-5 Galaxy sorties in support of JUST CAUSE, airlifting 637 pax and more than 1,000 tons of cargo (2 million pounds), both in the U.S. and to Panama.

--One of the unit's C-5s was "loaned" to 22d Air Force at Travis AFB, California, to help the active Air Force fulfill their taskings.

-Elements of the 193d Special Operations Group, Pennsylvania ANG, Harrisburg, flew 19 missions in support of JUST CAUSE for a total of 137 flying hours without a single cancellation.

-Using only ground transportation, the 145th TAG, Charlotte, North Carolina, delivered needed aircraft deicing materials to Pope AFB.

-The 165th Mobile Aerial Port Squadron, Georgia ANG, Savannah, helped the active Army and Air Force load and dispatch aircraft from Hunter Army Airfield, GA, to Panama.

-The 109th TAG, Schenectady, New York, was asked to provide ANG aeromedical evacuation teams.

--13 Aeromed crews were assembled but not used in JUST CAUSE.

-Four Air Guard units were each asked to assemble a ten-person Airlift Control Element (ALCE) team for possible support of the operation.

--The 133d TAW, Minneapolis; 136th TAW; 137th TAW; and 146th TAW alerted their people, but the assets were not used.

-Additionally, several individual ARNG and ANG people are assigned in Panama with liaison duties at many of the active Army and Air Force units in country.

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(Compiled by NGB-PA/Lt Col Ragan/53454 and Maj Ott/756-1981, Revised 24 Apr 90.)

NGB HISTORICAL SERVICES
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REMARKS see pages 18 + 29

KOREA 1950

Enemy prisoners are brought in after Operation Killer which was launched along sixty miles of the central Korean front to re-establish the U.N. line east of Wonju.

U.S. Army photo

It has been called this nation's first *come-as-you-are war* and the allusion is well-chosen. The first blow was struck suddenly, unexpectedly, against the fledgling Republic of Korea, and the U.S. armed forces, sent to the rescue, were compelled to fight the early battles with whatever they could scrape together in the way of trained manpower and combat equipment.

Korea—the war, not the geographic locale—boasts of several distinctions. It was the first limited conventional war of the nuclear age. Both sides fought for limited goals, without recourse to nuclear weapons, and both major contenders, China and the United States, applied far less than their total resources to the contest.

Also, it was the first outright military clash, on a large scale, between the United States and its partners in the so-called Free World—on the one hand—and the Soviet-led communist alignment on the other.

Korea also has been labeled, with some justification, the "forgotten war." Who still remembers such scenes of bloody struggle as Heartbreak Ridge and the Punchbowl? Pork Chop Hill and the Iron Triangle? How many can recall the tense days of the "Pusan Perimeter"—the dramatic amphibious end run to Inchon—or the helter-skelter dash to the Yalu, followed by the cold shock of China's entry into the fray? Whose memories still carry back to the military convoys on American highways, hauling National Guardsmen off to another round of active duty and war, and headlines proclaiming "Company A Mobilizes—Again!"

Korean refugees file toward Kangnung in January 1951, blocking the withdrawal of the ROK I Corps.

U.S. Army photo

President Harry S Truman was determined from the start to avoid turning the Korean affair into a "great power" confrontation and referred to the conflict, from the start, as a "police action," not a war. War or police action, it holds more than ordinary significance for the

years of World War II service, had attained a strength of 354,000 by early 1950, but was ordered to cut back for lack of funds. By June 1950, by halting all recruiting, it had been driven down to less than 325,000, only enough to man its units at fifty percent of wartime tables, on the average. Air Guard manning stood at 44,728, in a structure that required 64,000. In addition, it had just begun to convert its 12 Guard-type administrative "wings" into 27 combat wings on the new Air Force pattern.

The Army Reserve and Air Force Reserve carried nearly a million names on their combined rolls but most were mere entries on cards filled out at World War II separation centers. Work had just started on identifying those no longer qualified or available for active duty. In the event, the two components eventually were able to recall a total of 392,000 Reservists, Army and Air.

***

As they penetrated more deeply into South Korea, the North Koreans left their ever-lengthening supply lines vulnerable to interdiction. MacArthur soon took advantage of their glaring weakness. The U.S. Air Force hammered at every bottleneck, employing even the lumbering B-29 bombers for close-in support of ground operations. In mid-September, MacArthur scraped the bottom of his manpower barrel to send a two-division force ashore at Inchon, far to the North Korean rear. Many who clambered up the Inchon seawall with the 1st Marine Division were reservists a scant six weeks removed from civilian life. At the same time, Eighth Army forces attacked out of the beleaguered Pusan area. The North Koreans, fearful of being cut off, began a precipitous withdrawal with the American and South Korean fighters nipping at their heels. The latter had crossed the 28th Parallel, taken shaky control of much of North Korea, and reached the Yalu River which borders China in several places, when a new and greater crisis exploded. China sent some 300,000 troops across the Yalu, to aid the North Koreans, creating what MacArthur called "an entirely new war."

Once more, the U.N. troops were compelled to fall back, to the vicinity of the 38th Parallel, where it all had started. Cease-fire talks began in July 1951 after a full year of fighting, but the conflict dragged on for another two years, until July 27, 1953, before the negotiators finally came up with a formula both sides would accept.



A truck from the 185th Battalion, 45th Division, grinds up the muddy MSR from Smoke Alley on the Eastern Front in December 1952. U.S. Army

1LT R. W. Porter looks over 76mm heads in a caisson captured by South Korea troops near Osan. U.S. Army photo

There was doubt at first that a Guard mobilization would be necessary. Early in July, after two weeks of fighting, GEN J. Lawton (Lightning Joe) Collins told a group of Guard leaders that Korea could be regarded as "a regular Army responsibility." The Guard might have to relinquish some of its equipment for use in the Far East, no more. In a matter of days, however, MacArthur made a request for major reinforcements, pointing to the aggressiveness and professional competence of the North Korean army, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff did an about-face. Guard elements were needed after all.

M-Day for the first increment to be mobilized was August 14. By the end of August, 92 Guard battalions and companies had been called, with 10,000 Guardsmen. In addition, thousands of reservists of all services had gotten their summons to active duty. The first two Guard divisions reported on September 1, along with two regimental combat teams (RCT). Two more divisions followed five days later, and another two went in January 1951, along with a third RCT. By the time a final two divisions were mobilized, in the early weeks of 1952, the Army Guard's mobilized force encompassed 1,698 company-size units and 138,600 Guardsmen, including eight infantry divisions, three RCTs, 43 anti-aircraft artillery battalions, and hundreds of engineer, signal, field artillery, transportation and other special units.

It was October 10 before the first Air Guardsmen were summoned. Congress had imposed a 48-group ceiling on Air Force structure the previous year, and it was September, weeks into war, before the legislators got around to lifting that restriction. Probably of greater significance, Air Force leaders much preferred to activate new tactical units and fill them with individual reservists and volunteers instead of mobilizing existing reserve component units. They made no secret of their indifference toward the Air Force Reserve, and their outright hostility toward the Air Guard. The latter arose from a prolonged and bitter controversy over the issue of peacetime state control over Guard units. By mid-September, it had become apparent that both units and individuals would have to be mobilized, at least as a short-term measure.

Five Air Guard wings made up that first October increment, including the only two that would fight as such in the

Far East. Other wings and numerous support elements were mobilized as the months went by, eventually totaling 22 wings and scores of separate groups and squadrons. By the time the final unit reported, late in 1951, some 486 units had been mobilized, along with 45,594 Air Guardsmen. The latter statistic warrants special mention for it was nearly a thousand greater than the Air Guard's total on-board strength on the day the North Koreans launched their attack. Vigorous recruiting had produced a steady flow of new members, even into units already alerted for call-up.

***

From first to last, some of the most serious problems that faced military leaders were those associated with keeping the forces manned for war. Again, the problems were most acute in the Army. For Korea, trained troops were needed by the thousands during the first weeks of war. However, mobilization plans had been based on a different kind of scenario, an all-out war and slow-paced buildup. Consequently, mobilization guidelines and procedures had to be revised repeatedly, on an ad hoc basis, giving rise to numerous flaws and inequities. Compounding the problem at the outset, most Army units had been manned at far less than wartime levels before the June attack. Thus, it had to strip CONUS-based units of trained men, even officers and NCOs, to flesh out units in or bound for Korea. In addition, thousands of reservists had to be recalled for the same purpose. Thus, with all available reservists absorbed elsewhere, mobilized Guard divisions each had to accept and train approximately 7,000 Selective Service inductees from scratch. Then, in the spring and summer of 1951, with the training well along, those divisions were "levied" for thousands of men they had just trained, and the process had to start all over again.

"Rotation," designed to bring soldiers out of the Korean fighting after a specified period and replace them with others, aggravated the manpower problem and hit the mobilized Guard divisions especially hard. Four of those divisions remained in the United States throughout their tour of duty. Although tabbed as key combat elements in the strategic reserve, their real function soon came to resemble that of replacement training centers, training men then feeding them into the pipeline to take the place of the 15,000 to 20,000 men who were being rotated out of Korea each month by the winter of 1951-52. At first, only draftees were sent. Later, the divisions began to lose officers and NCOs since leaders, too, were being rotated. One Guard battalion lost all but five of its original officers and most of its NCOs to the rotation process.

Inequity was a prominent feature of the Korean mobilization. In the words of one authority, "In calling up the reserves, military necessity overrode considerations of equity and justice." Many of those called had been totally inactive since World War II and had expected to be among the last called in any crisis. Out of some 900,000 Guardsmen and Reservists mobilized, more than 600,000 were veterans of World War II. While performing their second tour of wartime duty, in Korea, they saw thousands of young men of military age escaping service altogether, the end product of overlenient Selective Service laws and deferment policies. Responding to the torrent of protests, Congress passed wartime legislation dictating the release of nonunit recalled reservists no later than 17 months after their call-up. That sharply increased the need for replacements by early 1952, with a corresponding increase in levies on the last mobilized Guard divisions.

Guardsmen fell into a different category than the unhappy reservists. There was no question as to their obligation to serve when called, and they knew they were in the most vulnerable group. Some even saw wry humor in their situation, as with the California lieutenant who told a newsman while waiting to board a Far East-bound troopship with the 40th Division: "I thought I was signing up to fight Oregon! The governor didn't tell us he was mad at Mao Tse Tung!"

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Southern California's 40th Infantry Division and Oklahoma's 45th Division "Thunderbirds" were the first divisions mobilized, the first sent overseas and the only two that fought in Korea. However, they were preceded in every instance by many of the first-mobilized Army Guard groups and battalions that had been rushed to the Far East in the first months of 1951 to serve as "special troops" for the Eighth Army and its three combat corps—I, IX and X. To cite a few examples among many:

Arkansas' 937th Armored Field Artillery Battalion reached Pusan in January 1951, five months after being mobilized. By May, it had been cited for demonstrating "such gallantry, determination, and esprit de corps in accomplishing (its) difficult and hazardous mission as to set it apart and above other units participating in similar operations." Utah's 213th Armored Field Artillery broke up a large Chinese attack with point-blank 105mm fire then grabbed rifles to root some of the surviving Chinese out of a box canyon where they had holed up. Guard engineers battled the raging waters of spring floods to install battlefield bridges. Three artillery battalions from Tennessee, Utah and Kentucky—the 196th, 204th and 623d, respectively—earned Presidential Unit Citations, awarded by the Navy for their heroic support of the outnumbered Marines at Hwachon Reservoir in May.

The two divisions were sent first to Japan, to provide security for that critical logistics base while completing their training, then sent on to Korea, months later, the 45th in December 1951, the 40th three weeks later. For the 40th, it was a homecoming of sorts. It had been one of the divisions that occupied Korea in the weeks after the Japanese surrender in 1945.

GEN Matthew B. Ridgway, who had stepped into MacArthur's shoes after the famous wartime leader was relieved by Truman for insubordination, had several times requested authority to use the two Guard divisions as sources of replacements for his frontline divisions. Each time, his request had been denied. In November, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that the 40th and 45th be sent to Korea without delay to take advantage of the six-to-seven months still remaining on the tour of duty of the Guardsmen. Use of the divisions as a mere source of replacements, Collins told Ridgway, would provoke "a storm of protests" from Congress and bring down "the justifiable wrath of the National Guard Association" on the Army.

By the time the 40th and 45th reached the battlefield, the war had settled down into a dull but deadly routine. The negotiations were creeping along at Panmunjom and neither side wanted to risk the heavy casualties that a major effort would entail. Patrols were sent out at night, one or more by each regiment on line, to capture prisoners or ambush enemy patrols. Occasionally, one side or the other would launch a localized attack of platoon up to battalion strength, to influence the negotiations.

(Continued on Page 29)

(Continued from Page 18)

Typical was a mid-March attack on the 45th Division's Outpost Eerie, responsibility of Company K, 179th Infantry, commanded by COL Frederick A. Daugherty. Twenty-six K Company men were manning the outpost at 2330 hours, located 1.5 miles in front of the main line of resistance (MLR), when a large Chinese force launched its attack. Eerie was composed of nine mutually supporting, sandbag-and-log bunkers, positioned on the nose of a long ridge to intercept enemy infiltrators coming down from the higher elevations. When the Chinese group approached the outpost wire, there was initial confusion over the red flares that soon shot up. Were they the enemy's or had they been fired as a signal from 179th patrols, then prowling the Chinese approach route?

Soon, machine guns from opposing forces began a spectacular duel, their tracers crisscrossing over the ridgeline. Enemy scouts sought to blow holes in the protective wire. Every mortar round or rifle shot fired by the defenders brought retaliation from the attacking force. One by one, the Eerie defenders were hit by enemy fire. LT Omer Manley, outpost commander, called out: "Get up and fight or we'll be wiped out. This isn't a movie!"

They responded magnificently, even the wounded, as the attacking Chinese pushed into rock-throwing range, CPL Herman Godwin, one of the heroes, fired his rifle until his ammunition was gone then threw his rifle at the nearest Chinese. He saw the butt hit the enemy soldier's face and watched him tumble back down the slope. Finally, protective artillery fire was placed directly upon the outpost and Daugherty ordered the remainder of Company K forward to take over the position. The Chinese quickly withdrew, leaving 31 dead behind in addition to those they carried away. Of the defenders, eight had been killed, four wounded.

On a larger scale was the 40th Division's first major action, involving Company L, 224th Infantry. Love Company had been in the line a scant three weeks when it was reinforced with tanks, medics, engineers and quad-fifty half tracks, and sent to raid a Chinese-held hill near Kumsong. The company crossing the intervening valley in darkness to launch its attack at first light with the regimental commander, COL James Richardson, along as an observer.

As they moved up the steep hillside toward the enemy bunkers the Chinese opened up with mortars, machine guns and small arms, and began rolling hand grenades down the hill, into the midst of the attackers. Heroism became commonplace. MSG William Cathcart won the Distinguished Service Cross for his performance that day, six times making his way up that deadly slope, in the face of heavy enemy fire, to bring down a wounded soldier. LT James Inglesby was wounded by a bursting mortar shell but continued to lead his platoon up the hill until he was killed by another shell burst. Richardson, later to become a three-star deputy chief of staff (personnel) for the entire Army, carried his mortally wounded radio operator down the hill and out to a first aid station even though he himself was wounded. One man suffered a second wound while lying on a stretcher in the first aid station. Well before noon, Company L withdrew, leaving more than 200 Chinese dead and wounded behind them against less than 50 of their own casualties.

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Only two Air Guard wings flew, as such, in the deadly skies over Korea, Texas' 136th Fighter Bomber Wing, supplemented by an Arkansas fighter squadron, and the Georgia/Florida 116th Fighter Bomber Wing, with a California squadron added after mobilization. However, additional thousands of the mobilized Air Guardsmen were sent to Korea as individual replacements, as in the case of the Army Guard.

When Air Force statistics were assembled, after the war, they showed that Air Guard pilots had flown 39,530 combat missions, dropped 44,000 bombs and hundreds of tons of napalm, fired 31,000 rockets and more than 16 million rounds of .50-caliber ammunition. For their feats, performed mostly in dangerous low-level attacks on bridges, rail lines and other well-defended ground installations, they had earned some 1,800 awards and citations. Some 101 Guard pilots were killed or captured, their heavy casualty rate due to the nature of the targets they customarily were assigned.

One Air Guard combat anecdote deserves relating. Four planes and pilots from the 136th's Arkansas squadron were enroute back to Taegu after a rail-cutting mission when Capt. John L. Paladino's F-84 went into a series of wild gyrations—diving, zigzagging crazily, then climbing straight up, almost to the stalling point. He wouldn't respond to radio calls from his fellow pilots. Finally, one of the others worked it out—Paladino was suffering from lack of oxygen or anoxia.

Repeated radio calls finally penetrated Paldino's subconscious mind, enough that he shakily leveled off. Then, Capt. Jack R. Miller and Lt. Wood S. McArthur slipped the wingtips of their own F-84s under those on Paladino's aircraft and "carried" him back to the vicinity of the base. Each time his plane started to fall off, Wood or McArthur very cautiously leveled it off again, with their wingtips. When they neared the base and dropped to a lower altitude, the heavier concentration of oxygen brought Paladino around and he landed his aircraft without further incident.

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The Korean War was by no means a "little" war although it sometimes is treated as such. It was small only in comparison with the worldwide conflagration that preceded it. It lasted 37 months and involved troops from 19 nations. By the time it ended, casualties totaled more than two million, 1.5 million on the communist side, and more than 550,000 among the U.N. forces, including 95,000 U.N. dead. For the United States, the toll was 33,629 killed in action, 103,284 wounded and more than 5,000 missing or captured.

Among the 5,750,000 Americans who served in uniform during the three years of hostilities, more than 900,000 were Guardsmen and Reservists. This to a certain degree is often overlooked, it had the aspects of a National Guard/Reserve war, particularly during its first two years. The first reservists commenced to reach Korea in significant numbers by October-November 1950, and the initial trickle soon became a solid stream. The first Guard units landed at Pusan in January 1951 and by midsummer a sizeable share of the Army Corps special troops were Guard units. As for the Air Force, an official report disclosed that by late 1951, 80 percent of the 5th Air Force in Korea were recalled Guardsmen and Reservists, as were 70 percent of the officers in the Far East Air Force.

As the wartime secretary of the Army, Frank Pace Jr., later emphasized; "During the first critical months of the Korean emergency, we turned to the Organized Reserve Corps and the National Guard, not only as our only source of trained soldiers but as our sole immediate source of manpower."

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PART II

HISTORY, ORGANIZATION, UNITS, PROMOTIONS, CALL-UPS & STRENGTH

HISTORY

Origins of the National Guard's 356 years of service rest with four Massachusetts Army National Guard units. The oldest units in the National Guard and U.S. Army are the 181st Infantry, the 182nd Infantry, 101st Field Artillery and the 101st Engineer Battalion. These units were organized on December 13, 1636, by authority of the General Court at Boston, as the North, South and East Regiments. The East, North, and South Regiments were designated as the Essex, Middlesex and Suffolk Regiments. The 181st and 182d Infantry Regiments perpetuate the North Regiment. The 101st Engineer Battalion perpetuates the East Regiment and the 101st Field Artillery Regiment perpetuates the South Regiment. These units are among the world's oldest military units.

In the English Colonies the militia's mission was to defend the settlement and colony in case of attack. Each militiaman was required to drill several times a month and to provide his own arms and equipment. As the threat of attack diminished, English colonial authorities began to use militiamen to augment regular troops in campaigns against French colonial possessions. During the French and Indian War several hundred militia officers gained valuable experience for serving in the Continental Army.

During the Revolutionary War that began at Lexington and Concord on April 19, 1775, more than 164,000 militiamen from the 13 colonies served under the command of the former Virginia militia colonel, George Washington. Without the militia, American independence could not have been won. While the Continental Army, with militia support, fought the main battles of the Revolutionary War, other militia regiments kept British forces in check by harassing, foraging and raiding parties and limiting the royal troops to the cities.

The battles of Bunker Hill, King's Mountain, Cowpens and Guilford Court House were fought primarily by the militia. The American militia won grudging respect from British regulars. Lord Cornwallis officially reported in 1781, "I will not say much in praise of the Militia of the Southern colonies, but the list of British Officers & Soldiers killed & wounded by them since last June proves that they are not wholly contemptible."

On October 19, 1781, when Lord Cornwallis surrendered at Yorktown, former militiamen of the Maryland, Delaware Lines and Virginia were there. Today, these regiments are perpetuated by the 116th Infantry, Virginia ARNG; 175th Infantry, Maryland ARNG; and the 198th Signal Battalion, Delaware ARNG. Thirty-one of today's Army National Guard units carry battle streamers on their colors embroidered with the names of the battles of the Revolutionary War: Lexington, Boston, Trenton, Princeton, Brandywine, Cowpens, Monmouth, Guilford Court House and Yorktown.

After the war, the militia was governed by the Militia Act of 1792. States were required to enroll men between the ages of 18 and 45 into companies, regiments and brigades. Each state appointed an adjutant general and brigade inspectors. As the enrolled militia declined in importance, the volunteer companies of the organized militia grew in strength. These uniformed, trained and equipped units, grew to a strength of 25,000 by 1804.

The term "National Guard" was first used in America by a New York militia unit on August 25, 1824. The name came about as the result of a visit to New York by the famous veteran of the Continental Army, the Marquis de Lafayette. The honor guard for the French hero, who had made great contributions to America's winning her independence, was made up of men from the 2d Battalion, 11th Regiment of Artillery. The battalion had voted to rename itself the "Battalion of National Guards" in tribute to Lafayette's command of the Paris militia "Garde Nationale." The Battalion later became the famous 7th Regiment, one of the nation's most distinguished militia organizations. It was after the Civil War that many states renamed their militia "National Guard" and the National Defense Act of 1916 made the term mandatory.

With the start of the War of 1812, the U.S. Army consisted of only 10,000 men. The militia of the states was called into federal service 489,173 militiamen responded. The most famous militia commander during the War of 1812 was Maj. Gen. Andrew Jackson, whose backwoods sharpshooters defeated the British regulars in the Battle of New Orleans in 1815.

Following the admission of Texas into the Union in December 1845, a dispute rose between Texas and Mexico over the southern border of the new state. This resulted in the Mexican War of 1846–1848, with more than 73,000 militiamen called into federal service. On February 23, 1847, a regiment of Mississippi militiamen, the famed "Mississippi Rifles," (today the 155th Infantry, Mississippi ARNG) led by their commander, Col. Jefferson Davis, defeated a much larger Mexican force in hand-to-hand combat in the mountains near Buena Vista, Mexico. The defeat of the Mexicans at Buena Vista enabled the U.S. forces to continue their assault, resulting in the capture of Vera Cruz in March 1847 by General Winfield Scott and his 12,000 troops, two-thirds of whom were militiamen.

Most states recognized the volunteer militia companies—uniformed units that drilled on a regular basis—as the State Organized Militia. These units responded to President Lincoln's call in April 1861 for 75,000 militia to form the bulk of the Union Army for the first several months of the Civil War.

No accurate figure can be determined as to the number of militiamen in the Civil War. The figure of 1,933,779 is used for the number of all volunteers who served in the Union Army. Many militia regiments that responded to the call of 1861 remained in service for the duration of the war. Other regiments returned to state status and served as cadres for the many volunteer regiments the states furnished to the federal forces. The initial bulk of the Confederate Army was made up of volunteer militia regiments.

After the war, the National Guard reorganized and grew to 90,000 men largely commanded by officers who were Civil War veterans. Summer encampments became a regular feature while the Regular Army began assigning advisers to each state.

With the outbreak of the Spanish-American War in 1898, close to 165,000 National Guardsmen volunteered for active duty. Although only a few National Guard regiments were sent to Cuba, many Guardsmen were shipped to the Philippines to fight in the Philippine Insurrection. One of the most famous regiments of the war was the Rough Riders who, under the command of Lt. Col. Theodore Roosevelt, assaulted San Juan Hill.

The modern image of today's National Guard began to emerge in 1903, when congressional legislation (the Dick Act) thrust the federal government into the picture by establishing procedures for a more direct and active role in organizing, training and equipping the National Guard in line with the standards established for the regular Army.

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The Guard's involvement in aviation began in 1911, when New York's First Company, Signal Corps, became the first National Guard unit to get a plane off the ground. Soon, Guardsmen in Missouri and California established flying units of their own. It was not until 1915 that the National Guard's first federally recognized aviation unit, the 1st Aero Company of New York, came into being. A year later, the new aviation unit was called to active duty along with the rest of the National Guard.

As the result of raids by Pancho Villa on Columbus, NM, and two Texas towns in 1916, President Wilson called the National Guard into service for patrol the Mexican-American border where more than 158,000 Guardsmen served. Although the National Guard did not see any combat action, the training received was invaluable when the U.S. entered World War I.

Many of the Guardsmen returned from their Mexican border duty only to be called again into federal service in 1917 for World War I, with more than 379,000 Guardsmen being ordered to active duty. During the war, National Guard units throughout the country were organized into combat divisions of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF), and soon afterwards departed for France to enter combat during World War I.

During World War I, the National Guard supplied 17 combat divisions, or about 40 percent of the entire American Expeditionary Forces. The Guard also provided three black infantry regiments, the 369th, 370th, and 372d to the all-black 93d Division. National Guardsmen from the 26th, 27th, 28th, 29th, 30th, 31st, 32d, 33d, 34th, 35th, 36th, 37th, 38th, 39th, 40th and 41st and 42d Divisions saw World War I service. Eleven of these divisions were noted to have spent more days in actual combat than did the regular Army divisions.

World War I accomplishments of the Guard units were highly lauded. National Guardsmen are credited with piercing the Hindenburg line, for helping crush the St. Mihiel salient and smashing to victory through the Meuse-Argonne. The records of the German High Command, which were released after the war, noted that of the eight American divisions considered excellent or superior, six were National Guard divisions.

After the end of World War I, following a rapid and haphazard demobilization, it was necessary for many states to rebuild their National Guard units. The National Guard began the difficult process of reorganizing into companies, regiments and divisions. The National Guard was reorganized to consist of four Cavalry divisions and eighteen Infantry divisions.

The National Defense Act of 1920 established the Army of the United States, to consist of the Regular Army, the Organized Reserve Corps and the National Guard, when called into federal service. Under this act, the Guard remained a state force, commanded by state authorities. The new act also provided for increased federal assistance for the Guard. When the units reached established Army standards with relation to strength, equipment and skill, they were federally recognized and eligible for federal support.

The Congressional Act of June 15, 1933, created a new Army component, the National Guard of the United States. This component, while identical in personnel and organization to the National Guard of the states, was a part of the Army at all times, and could be ordered into active federal service by the president whenever Congress declared a national emergency. Thus it became possible for the National Guard to be given an Army mission without having to wait for a "call" to be issued by the various state governors.

In August 1940, President Roosevelt ordered the National Guard of the United States into active service. Between September 16, 1940, and October 6, 1941, the National Guard brought into federal service more than 300,000

men, in 18 combat divisions, as well as numerous non-divisional units, including 4,800 men from the 29 National Guard observation squadrons. The number of Guardsmen federalized doubled the strength of the active Army, and the National Guard observation squadrons, due to their high state of training helped to expand the U.S. Army Air Forces.

Not only did the Guard provide the Army with an experienced source of manpower, it also provided the expanding Army with leaders as over 75,000 National Guard enlisted men became commissioned officers during World War II, either through OCS programs or by battlefield commissions.

During World War II, National Guard units participated in 34 separate campaigns and numerous assault landings in the European and Pacific Theaters of Operation. Of the first five U.S. Army divisions to enter offensive combat, four of them, the 32nd, 34th, 37th and Americal Divisions, were Guard divisions. Only one Guard division, the 29th, participated in the Normandy Omaha Beach D-Day landings on the 6th of June 1944. Again the Guard units served well, with 148 presidential citations awarded to National Guard units for outstanding performance of duty, or for conspicuous valor or heroism. Individual Guardsmen received 20 Medals of Honor, 50 Distinguished Service Crosses, 48 Distinguished Flying Crosses and over 500 Silver Star Medals. Casualties for National Guard divisions totaled about 185,561.

With the end of World War II in 1945, National Guard units were demobilized and personnel were returned directly to civilian life through Army separation centers. For a short period during the winter of 1945-46, there was no National Guard.

The Secretary of War approved plans on October 13, 1945, calling for the reorganization of the National Guard. Under those "approved policies" the Guard was established with a dual status and mission. The *National Guard of the United States (NGUS)*, as a reserve component of the Army of the United States (AUS), was to be an "M-day" (Mobilization Day) force, thoroughly trained, equipped and ready for immediate service to the nation in case of enemy aggression or a national emergency. The *National Guard of the several states* was to provide organizations and personnel for the Reserve (federal) Component, and to preserve peace, order and public safety in their states and during local emergencies. The Secretary of War's policies provided that the federal government was to supervise military instruction, furnish field training facilities, pay, uniforms, equipment and ammunition, and contribute a fair portion of the expenses for construction of National Guard armories. The federal assistance in armory construction marked a new development in the history of the Guard.

The first four post-World War II Guard units were granted federal recognition on June 30, 1946, as was the nation's first Air National Guard unit, the 120th Fighter Squadron of Colorado. On September 18, 1947, with the establishment of the U.S. Air Force, a new reserve component was established, the Air National Guard, and since that date the National Guard structure has consisted of the Army and Air National Guard.

The Korean War brought more than 183,000 Army and Air Guardsmen to active duty. Army Guard units included eight infantry divisions and three regimental combat teams. The Air Guard call up included 22 wings and 66 tactical squadrons. Of the 22 wings activated, 19 were fighter wings, two were light bomber and one was a tactical reconnaissance wing.

During the Korean War, two Army Guard infantry divisions, the 28th of PA, and the 43d of CT, RI, and VT, and four Air Guard wings were sent to Europe; four divisions and 17 wings remained in the United States; and

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two infantry divisions, the 40th of CA, and the 45th of OK, and two air wings, the 116th and the 136th, fought in Korea. Each Guard division was credited with four campaigns, and four 36 jet aces of the Korean War were Air Guard pilots.

In 1956, the various federal laws relating to the Armed Forces and the National Guard were codified in Title 10 and Title 32 of the United States Code (USC). As a result, all members of the Army National Guard of the United States (ARNGUS), and the Air National Guard of the United States (ANGUS) are members of the Ready Reserve.

During the Berlin Crisis of 1961-62, two Army Guard divisions, the 32d Infantry Division of Wisconsin and the 49th Armored Division of Texas were mobilized on October 15, 1961, along with 104 other non-divisional units, for a total ARNG call-up of more than 45,115. None of the Army Guard units was sent overseas. With the Air Guard call-up for the Berlin Crisis on October 1, 1961, units activated included 17 TAC fighter squadrons, 4 TAC recon squadrons, 6 C-97 air transport squadrons, one TAC control group and supporting elements. On November 1, 1961, 3 Air Guard fighter-interceptor units were mobilized as TAC fighter units, bringing the total number of Air Guardsmen mobilized to about 22,000. Within one month after mobilization, 216 Air National Guard jet fighters with supporting elements were deployed to Europe, and assumed operational missions immediately upon arrival.

During the Vietnam War, no massive call-ups of National Guard and Reserve units were made to raise military manpower. However, on January 26, 1968, 11 Air National Guard units, comprising eight F-100 TAC fighters and three RF-101 recon units, were ordered to active duty following the seizure of the Pueblo and the Lunar New Year (Tet) communist attacks on South Vietnam. The call-up involved 10,511 Air Guardsmen, including 560 pilots. The Air Guardsmen were given only 36 hours to report for active duty, and of the 9,178 only 34 Guardsmen, who, because of extenuating circumstances, were unable to report within the 36-hour alert period. On May 13, 1968, two additional TAC fighter units and one aeromedical airlift unit, involving an additional 1,333 Air Guardsmen, were mobilized.

Also ordered to active duty on May 13, 1968, were 20 units of the Army National Guard, to include the Hawaii Army National Guard's 29th Infantry Brigade (Separate) and its brigade aviation company in the California Guard; the Kansas Army Guard's 69th Infantry Brigade, which included the 2d Battalion, 133d Infantry, Iowa ARNG; 1st Battalion, 211th Artillery, Massachuetts ARNG; 2d Battalion, 138th Artillery, Kentucky ARNG; 3d Battalion, 197th Artillery, New Hampshire ARNG; 116th Engineer Battalion, Idaho ARNG; Company D (Ranger), 151st Infantry, Indiana ARNG; and 12 combat support and combat service support units.

Of the 10,511 Air Guardsmen activated for the Vietnam War, more than 2,000 were deployed to the combat zone, providing four of the Air Force's 13th F-100 TAC fighter squadrons. Flying nearly 30,000 combat sorties and completing 50,000 hours of combat flying in Vietnam, they became the first Air Guardsmen involved in combat in 16 years. Four thousand Air Guardsmen were also deployed to Korea and Japan, providing 60% of the total air power in Korea. All Air Guard units were demobilized by June 18, 1969.

In the Army Guard, of the 12,234 mobilized, 2,729 reported to Vietnam with their units. Of the 9,505 initially remaining in the states, 4,311 subsequently were assigned to Vietnam, bringing the total number of mobilized Army Guardsmen in the Republic of Vietnam to 7,040. All Army Guard units

were released from active duty by December 12, 1969. Included among the 4,000 awards earned by Army Guardsmen in Vietnam were: 55 Silver Stars; 681 Purple Hearts, one Distinguished Flying Cross, 16 Distinguished Service Medals, six Legions of Merit and over 1,000 Bronze Stars.

During the 1970s, as America entered the "all-volunteer era," and the Total Force Policy came into being, the Army and Air National Guard began to receive more modern equipment in larger quantities than it had in decades. Following the Army's "Steadfast" reorganization in 1972-73, nine Army Readiness Regions were set up throughout the USA, with Readiness Groups and sub-groups established for each region. Under this program the Army greatly increased the manpower available to assist the Army Guard in advisory and training missions. The Army's "affiliation" program also came into being, whereby Army Guard battalions and brigades were affiliated with active Army combat units with whom they would mobilize and deploy. Newer helicopters and fixed wing aircraft were received by the Army Guard in addition to upgraded tanks and artillery pieces, while infantry units replaced their recoilless rifles with TOW and Dragon anti-tank missiles.

During the 1970s the Air National Guard also underwent major changes in missions and aircraft. Phased out of the Air Guard inventory during the 1970s were the C-124 "Globemaster" and C-121 "Constellation" cargo aircraft, the KC-97 aerial refuelers and numerous F-100 fighter units. Replacing these were first-line C130 "Hercules" cargo airlift, KC-135 jet tankers and A-7D and A-10 tactical fighter units. Upon being assigned the KC-135 jet tankers, Air Guard aerial refueling units were assigned the mission of supporting year-round aerial refueling missions.

With more modern equipment and communications capabilities, the Guard was used more for State missions in the 1980s than ever in the Guard's history. Floods, forest fires, tornadoes, snow emergencies and energy shortages resulted in hundreds of call-ups during the 80s. Civil disturbances, police and firemen's strikes and walk-outs by state prison employees resulted in other call-ups for domestic emergencies to maintain safety and law and order.

As the Army and Air National Guard operate in the 1990s, they are better trained and equipped to respond to a state or national emergency than at any time in their history. By the end of the 1980s, 82 percent of the Army National Guard units reported they were combat-ready, a 37 percent improvement in combat readiness since 1985.

During the 1980s, both elements of the Guard received replacements for aging equipment in their inventories. The newest addition to the Air Guard flightline is the MH-60G Pave Hawk helicopter, now flown by special operations and combat rescue forces. The Pave Hawk is flown by the 210th Air Rescue Squadron, Kulis ANGB, AK; 106th Air Rescue and Recovery Group, Suffolk, NY; and the 129th Air Rescue and Recovery Group, Moffett Field, CA; Air Guard fighter units fly state-of-the-art F-15 Eagles, F-16 Fighting Falcons, and A-10 Thunderbolt IIs, in addition to the F-4 Phantom, OA-37 Dragonfly and A-7 Corsair II. Airlift units began flying strategic airlift missions in the 1980s, and, for the first time, received unit-assigned aircraft. New York's 105th Military Airlift Group is the only Air Guard unit flying the C-5, and Mississippi's 172nd Military Airlift Group flies the C-141B. Tennessee's 164th Tactical Group, now flying C-130s, is scheduled to convert to C-141s in FY 1991. Other Air Guard units fly the C-130 Hercules tactical aircraft, KC-135 Stratotanker, and the C-26A Fairchild and C-21A Learjet operational support aircraft.

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In the 1980s the Army Guard embarked on the most ambitious modernization program in its history with a goal to be fully equipped with the Army's best equipment by FY 1991. By 1991, the Army National Guard armor force is fully equipped with the M1 and M1A1 Abrams, and the M60A3 TTS (Tank Thermal Sight) tanks. By FY 1991, the Guard received 315 Bradley Fighting Vehicles and 557 Improved TOW Vehicles. By the end of the decade, the Guard had 77 percent of its "go to war" equipment on hand, but needs to purchase an additional $7 billion worth of equipment to be fully combat-ready.

The Guard opened two new training sites to train its 3,000 tank crews. The first, at Gowan Field, ID, opened in 1985, the second, at Camp Shelby, MS, in 1986. The multi-purpose facilities are the first of the modern Remote Electronic Target System (RETS) ranges built for Guard armor training. Other expansion included a Hi-Tech Regional training Center at Fort Dix, NJ; a new winter training range at Camp Ripley, MN; multi-purpose range complexes to support combined live fire exercises; and the upgrade of aviation and armor maintenance facilities to support new equipment.

In aviation, fielding of the UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter started in FY 1983 with the delivery of the first four aircraft to Guard units in Ohio and Kentucky. By FY 1991, the Army Guard has 91 Blackhawks in its inventory. It is also expanding its attack helicopter capability, replacing its Vietnam-era Cobra gunships with AH-64 Apaches. The North Carolina Guard received the first Apaches in FY 1987. The Guard's medium-lift helicopter capability was enhanced by the addition of 11 CH-47 C Chinook aircraft.

In 1985, the Texas 49th Armored Division's signal battalion was the first Army National Guard divisional signal battalion to receive the new multi-channel Army Tactical Area Communications System (ATACS). The Army Guard is now fully equipped with the new system.

During the 1980s, the Army and Air National Guard expanded their roles to both new and existing missions. Civil Engineering and Services were two of the growing missions of the Air National Guard. More than 200 units in these categories deployed annually for training during the last decade, demonstrating first-hand why the Air Guard's Prime RIBS (Readiness in Base Services) are filling 40 percent of the Air Force's need for deployable food service and base services. The Air Guard embarked on an ambitious expansion of its medical role, and will add 2,600 medical service personnel to its rosters by FY 1992.

For the first time, the National Guard was asked to take active roles in the nation's war against illegal drugs. From 1983 to 1988, the National Guard conducted more than 3,100 missions that included the eradication of domestically grown marijuana, the interdiction of illegal drugs entering the United States, and, as shown in the following table, its involvement has increased each year.

Fiscal Year	Number of States	Support Missions
1983	4	4
1984	14	14
1985	20	209
1986	21	222
1987	25	376
1988	32	456
1989	53	1811
1990	54	5155
1991	54	5815

Twenty-one states are taking part in *Operation Guardian*, a program that inspects cargo at ports of entry. National Guard troops helped to stop the import of nearly 28,000 pounds of marijuana, 10 pounds of cocaine and lesser amounts of heroin. The program seized 18 vehicles, 105 weapons and more than half a million dollars in cash, in addition to the illegal drugs.

The National Guard is also participating in *Border Ranger II*, a program in conjunction with 23 federal, state and local law enforcement agencies to interdict narcotics, develop intelligence, validate trafficking and test new technology. Operations include observing border and clandestine airstrip observation, commercial air and sea ports of entry inspections, radar surveillance and sea vessel surveillance.

In FY 1989, anti-drug operations in which the Guard participated eradicated more than 4 million marijuana plants, and seized 46,917 pounds of processed marijuana, 10,887 pounds of cocaine, and 39.5 pounds of heroin. During the raids, 915 arrests were made, and law enforcement agencies seized assets that included $1.7 million in cash, 95 vehicles, and 111 weapons. The estimated street value of the drugs exceeded $1.5 billion.

In December 1989, the Secretary of Defense approved plans from 53 state and territorial governors that significantly increased Army and Air National Guard support to civilian law enforcement agencies in the nationwide crusade against illegal drugs. Support will include federally funded state active duty participation that will include missions over and above those that had been done incidental to normal unit training.

Congress authorized $450 million in anti-drug funds for DoD to spend in fiscal year 1990; of that, $70 million dollars was spent to fund plans submitted by the states and territories. An additional $6 million was earmarked for ANG radar operations. The funding priorities were developed by the DoD in coordination with federal law enforcement agencies, and are based on the President's National Drug Control Strategy.

Both the Air and Army National Guard were active participants during *Operation Just Cause*, the United States' invasion of Panama.

Ohio's 180th Tactical Fighter Group flew 76 close air support sorties in support of *Just Cause* ground troops. More than 50 members were on a regularly scheduled Coronet Cove rotation at Howard Air Base with five of its A-7 Corsair II fighters when the invasion began. Coronet Cove is a year-round Air National Guard commitment to defense of the Panama Canal that has been continuously performed since December 1978.

At the start of *Just Cause*, seven Air National Guard units were at Howard AB supporting Volant Oak, which provides tactical airlift support to Southern Command throughout Central and South America. The Air Guard has flown Volant Oak missions every year since 1978, and alternates the flights each six months with the Air Force Reserve.

Air Guard C-130 units flew 97 sorties totalling 159.3 hours, and airlifted 416.4 tons of cargo and 2,395 people, including aeromedical evacuation flights to the United States. Providing aircraft and people were the 136th TAW, Dallas, TX; 139th TAG, St. Joseph, MO; 166th TAG, Wilmington, DE; and 146th TAW, Point Mugu, CA. Also taking part were people assigned to the 118th TAW, Nashville, TN; 137th TAW, Oklahoma City, OK; and 153rd TAG, Cheyenne, WY.

The Air Guard's strategic airlift capability was also tasked. The 172nd Military Airlift Group flew 87 C-141 Starlifter sorties from its home station in Jackson, MS, transporting 931 people and 319.7 tons of cargo to Panama.

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New York's 105th Military Airlift Group flew 49 C-5 Galaxy sorties, airlifting 637 passengers and more than 1,000 tons of cargo, both in the United States and to Panama. The unit provided one of its aircraft to the 22nd Air Force at Travis AFB, CA, to help the active-duty Air Force fulfill its taskings.

Other Air National Guard units and individuals were involved. The 145th TAG delivered aircraft deicing equipment from its base at Charlotte, NC, to Fope AFB, NC, and the 165th Mobile Aerial Port Squadron at Savannah, GA, helped active-duty Army and Air Force units load and dispatch aircraft from Hunter Army Air Field, GA. More ANG units were placed on alert.

Missouri's 1138th Military Police Company and Minnesota's 125th Public Affairs Detachment were both in Panama for annual training at the start of Just Cause. The 1138th MP Co. was, at the time, the only military police unit in Panama trained to process prisoners of war. The tours of the unit's 33 people were extended at the request of the U.S. Southern Command. The 125th PA Det. helped Southern Command's Public Affairs Office provide coverage of the operation and the swearing-in of Panama's new president.

In addition, several individual Army and Air Guard members were assigned to Panama liaison duties with active Army and Air Force units.

On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. Saudi Arabia asked for immediate military support to prevent further aggression from Iraqi troops into the sovereign nation of Saudi Arabia. On August 8, the 82d Airborne Division began movement to the Middle East as directed by the President of the United States. Air National Guard volunteers became leaders in the transport of troops and their equipment to the Southwest Asian region of the world. Later in the month the President announced the National Guard was an integral part of Operation Desert Shield and to implement the Total Force Policy.

The mobilization of the National Guard affected units in 51 of the 54 states and territories. The first two Air Guard units to respond before a mobilization order was called were the 137th Military Airlift Squadron, 105th Military Airlift Group, New York Air National Guard, that flies the C-5 Galaxy and the 183d Military Airlift Squadron, 172d Military Airlift Group, Mississippi Air National Guard, that flies the C-141. However, more Air Guard individuals, and even whole units, volunteered to perform the missions needed to support Operation Desert Shield than units activated.

One of the first Air Guard units to be activated was the 136th Mobile Aerial Port Squadron, Texas Air National Guard. Its mission is to support airlift operations at main or forward operating bases for the purpose of deploying/receiving combat and combat support forces and resupply into and within the theater of operation.

The Army National Guard activated more than 398 units nationwide. At the outset, no combat units were called to active duty, however, as part of the Total Force Policy the 48th Infantry Brigade, Georgia National Guard, the 155th Armored Brigade, Mississippi Army National Guard,, and the 256th Infantry Brigade, Louisiana Army National Guard were activated in November for mobilization in support of Operation Desert Shield. Also in November the 142d Field Artillery Brigade, Arkansas Army National Guard and 1st Battalion, 158th Field Artillery Brigade, Oklahoma Army National Guard were activated by providing their fire support and MLRS operations. Since then, units of the Mississippi Army National Guard were activated on December 7, to include the 134th Combat Engineer Company; Troop A, 98th Armored Cavalry; 2nd Battalion, 114th Field Artillery; 1st Battalion, 155th Infantry (Mech); and two battalions of the 198th Armor.

Operation Desert Shield became Desert Storm with the onset of offensive air action January 16, 1991. The 157th Tactical Fighter Squadron, South Carolina ANG and 138th Tactical Fighter Squadron, New York ANG participated in the initial air attack. ANG fighter and support units took an integral part in the air bombardment of Iraqi forces during the conflict. Prior to the ground offensive, the 212th Engineer Company, Tennessee ARNG crossed the Saudi Arabia-Iraq border in advance of units of the XVIII Airborne Corps.

On February 23, 1991, the coalition forces launched their ground offensive. Air and Army National Guard units, fully integrated into the coalition forces, supported the plan of action. The 142nd Field Artillery Brigade, Arkansas ARNG fired missions in support of the British 1st Armored Division, and the 1st Battalion, 201st Field Artillery, West Virginia ARNG supported the French 6th Light Armored Division. The 1st Battalion, 158th Field Artillery, an MLRS unit, had the highest rate of fire of any field artillery battalion in VII Corps or Third Army.

The campaign's successful conclusion did not end the work of the ARNG units in the theater. ARNG maintenance units engaged in battlefield recovery of coalition and Iraqi equipment. Medical units continued their work with allied and Iraqi sick and wounded. Many units and individual guardsmen initiated civic action work with Kuwaiti and Iraqi civilians. America's pride in her National Guardsmen was shown by the many parades and celebrations upon the return of units from Saudi Arabia.

THE NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU

The National Guard Bureau was created on February 12, 1908 as the Division of Militia Affairs, Office of the Secretary of War. In 1916, it was redesignated the Militia Bureau and in 1933 finally became the National Guard Bureau. The Chief, National Guard Bureau, reports to the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force through each of their chiefs of staff and is the Army's and Air Force's principal adviser on National Guard affairs.

The National Guard Bureau formulates and administers programs to ensure development and maintenance of Army and Air National Guard units. The National Guard Bureau is the channel of communications between the states and the Departments of the Army and Air Force.

The National Guard Bureau staff is directed by the Chief and Vice Chief, NGB; and the director and deputy director of the Army and Air National Guard, respectively. These positions are filled by National Guard general officers serving on statutory tours.

The Chief, National Guard Bureau, is nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. By law the authorized rank for this position is major general, but the past three chiefs have served as lieutenant generals. By law the position must be filled by a National Guardsman. The Chief, NGB, may succeed himself for a second four-year term. The Vice Chief and the Army and Air National Guard directors hold ranks of major general.

The National Guard Bureau consists of the office of the Chief and Vice Chief; which is supported by a special staff of four offices and a joint staff of ten offices. The special and joint staffs also support the ARNG and ANG directorates. Additionally, the Army Guard Directorate has 15 specialized offices and divisions, and the Air Guard Directorate has 15.

NGB HISTORICAL SERVICES
FAX HEADER SHEET

FROM	OFFICE SYMBOL	PHONE NUMBER
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TO	OFFICE	PHONE
Ms Nix	White House Communications Office	
NO. PAGES	PRECEDENCE	CLASSIFICATION
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AUTHORIZED RELEASER'S SIGNATURE

LTC Kondratick

REMARKS

Fact Sheet

The National Guard in World War II

1940-41 MOBILIZATION

Beginning in September 1940, the first of 300,034 National Guard troops reported for active duty "for one year of training." This doubled the size of the U.S. Army, adding 18 infantry divisions, 80 separate regiments, and 29 Army Air Forces flying squadrons to the nation's active-duty forces. Along with the Guard's mobilization came the nation's first peacetime conscription, which put another million men in Army uniform.

In August 1941, Congress extended by one additional year the term of service for draftees and mobilized Guardsmen. Thus the entire National Guard was already on active duty when the United States entered World War II.

GUARD ALREADY OVERSEAS AS WAR BEGINS

When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7, 1941, California's 251st Coast Artillery had already been stationed in Hawaii for a year. Like the Guardsmen of Hawaii's 298th Infantry Regiment, they took part in the defense of Oahu.

When Japanese troops invaded the Philippine Islands three days later, U.S. troops there included the New Mexico National Guard's 200th Coast Artillery, and two tank battalions made up of National Guard units from various states. Half of these men died as prisoners of the Japanese.

Three other Guard field artillery units were in mid-ocean as the war broke out. The 147th (South Dakota), 148th (Idaho), and 2nd Battalion, 131st (Texas) were diverted from the Philippines to Australia, the first of thousands of U.S. troops to arrive "Down Under." The 131st was sent to Java, where it surrendered with the Dutch garrison to the Japanese.

FIRST TO SHIP OUT; FIRST TO FIGHT

North Dakota's 164th Infantry, sent to reinforce the Marines on Guadalcanal in October 1942, was the first U.S. Army regiment to fight offensively in World War II. They were soon joined by their sister infantry regiments in the newly-formed Americal Division, the 132nd (Illinois) and 182nd (Massachusetts).

On New Guinea, the 32nd and 41st Infantry Divisions became the first Army divisions to engage and defeat the Japanese, in late 1942 and early 1943.

The 34th Infantry Division was the first U.S. Army division to sail overseas. In North Africa, it became one of the first two U.S. infantry divisions to fight in the European theatre, and by the end of the war had spent more actual days in combat than any other U.S. Army division.

National Guard flying squadrons were also among the first to reach the combat zone. Three Observation Squadrons, the 111th (Texas), 122nd (La.), and 154th (Ark.), arrived in North Africa in the fall of 1942. In July 1944, Michigan's 107th Tactical Reconnaissance Group, which had flown pre-invasion missions over the Normandy beaches, became the first Army Air Forces unit to operate from the continent of Europe.

WORLD WAR II CAMPAIGNS
NATIONAL GUARD INFANTRY DIVISIONS

European Theater

26th Infantry Division (Mass.)
N. France, Rhineland, Ardennes-Alsace, Central Europe

28th Infantry Division (Pa.)
Normandy, N.France, Rhineland, Ardennes-Alsace, Central Europe

29th Infantry Division
(Va., Md.,D.C.)
Normandy*, N France, Rhineland, Central Europe

30th Infantry Division
(N.C., S.C., Tenn.)
Normandy, N. France, Rhineland, Central Europe, Ardennes-Alsace

34th Infantry Division
(N.D., S.D.,Minn., Iowa)
Tunisia*, Naples-Foggia, Anzio, Rome-Arno, N. Apennines, Po Valley

35th Infantry Division
(Kansas, Mo., Neb.)
Normandy, N. France, Rhineland, Central Europe, Ardennes-Alsace

36th Infantry Division
(Texas)
Naples-Foggia*, Anzio Rome-Arno, S. France*, Rhineland, Central Europe, Ardennes-Alsace

44th Infantry Division
(N.J., N.Y.)
N. France, Rhineland, Central Europe, Ardennes-Alsace

45th Infantry Division
(Ariz., Colo.,N.M., Okla.)
Sicily*, Naples-Foggia, Anzio, Rome-Arno, S. France*, Rhineland, Ardennes-Alsace, Central Europe

Pacific Theater

27th Infantry Division
(N.Y.)
Central Pacific, Western Pacific Ryukyus

31st Infantry Division
(Fla., Ala., La., Miss.)
New Guinea*, S. Philippines, Western Pacific

32nd Infantry Division
(Mich., Wisc.)
New Guinea, S. Philippines, Luzon

33rd Infantry Division
(Ill.)
New Guinea, Luzon

37th Infantry Division
(Ohio)
Northern Solomons, Luzon*

38th Infantry Division
(Ind., Kentucky, W.Va.)
New Guinea, S. Philippines, Luzon

40th Infantry Division
(Calif., Utah, Nev.)
Bismarck Archipelago, S. Philippines, Luzon*

41st Infantry Division
(Wash., Ore., Idaho,Mont., Wyo.)
New Guinea, Luzon, S. Philippines

43d Infantry Division
(Conn., Maine,Vermont, R.I.)
Guadalcanal, Northern Solomons, New Guinea, Luzon

Americal Division
(org. May 1942, primarily from Ill., Mass., N.D. *Guard units)*
Guadalcanal, Northern Solomons, Leyte, S. Philippines*

* *assault landing*

50th Anniversary of World War II Commemoration Committee
HQDA, SACC; Pentagon, Room 3E524
Washington D.C. 20310-0107 (703) 697-4664

First U.S. Army Divisions to enter combat

Division	Component	Date	Area
32nd Infantry Division	National Guard	September 1942	New Guinea
Americal	National Guard	October 1942	Guadalcanal
34th Infantry Division	National Guard	November 1942	North Africa
1st Armored Division	Regular Army	November 1942	North Africa
2nd Armored Division	Regular Army	November 1942	North Africa
1st Infantry Division	Regular Army	November 1942	North Africa
3rd Infantry Division	Regular Army	November 1942	North Africa
9th Infantry Division	Regular Army	November 1942	North Africa
25th Infantry Division	Regular Army	November 1942	North Africa
41st Infantry Division	Regular Army*	January 1943	Guadalcanal
43nd Infantry Division	National Guard	January 1943	New Guinea
7th Infantry Division	National Guard	February 1943	Guadalcanal
37th Infantry Division	Regular Army*	May 1943	Alaska
45th Infantry Division	National Guard	June 1943	N. Solomons
82nd Airborn Division	National Guard	July 1943	Italy
3rd Infantry Division	Reserve	July 1943	Italy
36th Infantry Division	Regular Army	July 1943	Italy
27th Infantry Division	National Guard	September 1943	Italy
40th Infantry Division	National Guard	November 1943	Central Pacific
		December1943	Guadalcanal

* *Contained one National Guard regiment*



First Divisions to deploy overseas

Division	Component	Date
34th Infantry Division	National Guard	1942
Americal Division	National Guard	1942
27th Infantry Division	National Guard	1942
41st Infantry Division	National Guard	1942
32nd Infantry Division	National Guard	1942
5th Infantry Division	Regular Army	1942
1st Armored Division	Regular Army	1942
40th Infantry Division	National Guard	1942
1st Infantry Division	Regular Army	1942
43rd Infantry Division	National Guard	1942
29th Infantry Division	National Guard	1942
3rd Infantry Division	Regular Army	1942
9th Infantry Division	Regular Army	1942
25th Infantry Division	Regular Army	1942

National Guard Observation Squadrons, World War II

Current Designation	1945 Designation	Theater
101st Observation Squadron (Mass.)	39th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron	European Theater
102nd Observation Squadron (N.Y.)	102nd Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron	Zone of Interior
103nd Observation Squadron (Pa.)	103rd Photo Reconnaissance Squadron	China/Burma/India
104th Observation Squadron (Md.)	12th Antisub Squadron (disbanded September 1943)	Zone of Interior
105th Observation Squadron (Tenn.)	105th Reconnaissance Squadron (Bomb) (disbanded August 1943)	Zone of Interior
106th Observation Squadron (Ala.)	100th Bomb Squadron (Med)	Pacific Theater
107th Observation Squadron (Miss.)	107th Tactical Reconnaissance Group	European Theater
108th Observation Squadron (Ill.)	108th Observation Squadron (disbanded November 1943)	Canal Zone
109th Observation Squadron (Minn.)	109th Reconnaissance Squadron	European Theater
110th Observation Squadron (Mo.)	110th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron	Pacific Theater
111th Observation Squadron (Texas)	111th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron	Mediterranean Theater
112th Observation Squadron (Ohio)	112th Liaison Squadron	European Theater
113th Observation Squadron (Ind.)	113th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron	Zone of Interior
115th Observation Squadron (Calif.)	115th Liaison Squadron	China/Burma/India
116th Observation Squadron (Wash.)	116th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron (disbanded December 1943)	Zone of Interior
118th Observation Squadron (Conn.)	118th Reconnaissance Squadron (Fighter)	China/Burma/India
119th Observation Squadron (N.J.)	490th Fighter Squadron (disbanded May 1944)	Zone of Interior
120th Observation Squadron (Colo.)	120th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron (disbanded November 1943)	Zone of Interior
121st Observation Squadron (D.C.)	121st Liaison Squadron	Mediterranean and European Theaters
122 Observation Squadron (La.)	885 Bomb Squadron (Heavy)	Mediterranean Theater
123 Observation Squadron (Ore.)	35th Photo Reconnaissance Squadron	China/Burma/India
124 Observation Squadron (Iowa)	124 Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron (disbanded May 1944)	Zone of Interior
125 Observation Squadron (Okla.)	125 Liaison Squadron	European Theater
126 Observation Squadron (Wisc.)	34 Photo Reconnaissance Squadron	European Theater
127 Observation Squadron (Kansas)	127 Liaison Squadron	China/Burma/India
128 Observation Squadron (Ga.)	840 Bomb Squadron	Mediterranean Theater
152 Observation Squadron (R.I.)	37 Photo Reconnaissance Squadron	Mediterranean Theater
153 Observation Squadron (Miss.)	153 Liaison Squadron	European Theater
154 Observation Squadron (Ark.)	154 Weather Reconnaissance Squadron	Mediterranean Theater

Highest battle casualties, U.S. Army Divisions

Division	Component	Casualties
3rd Infantry Division	Regular Army	24,324
4th Infantry Division	Regular Army	22,225
9th Infantry Division	Regular Army	21,920
29th Infantry Division	National Guard	20,327
1st Infantry Division	Regular Army	19,488
45th Infantry Division	National Guard	18,521
90th Infantry Division	Reserve	18,316
30th Infantry Division	National Guard	16,892
36th Infantry Division	National Guard	16,828
2nd Infantry Division	Regular Army	16,273
80th Infantry Division	Reserve	15,484
83rd Infantry Division	Reserve	15,427
34th Infantry Division	National Guard	14,895
35th Infantry Division	National Guard	14,473
8th Infantry Division	Regular Army	12,877
28th Infantry Division	National Guard	12,292
5th Infantry Division	Regular Army	12,205
88th Infantry Division	Reserve	11,781
26th Infantry Division	National Guard	9,998
7th Infantry Division	Regular Army	9,592



INFORMATION PAPER

NGB-PAH
17 September 1991

SUBJECT: The National Guard at the Time of the Attack on Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941

1. When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, the entire National Guard - 300,034 men - was in active Federal service. Originally mobilized "for one year of training" beginning in September 1940, the term of federal service for mobilized Guardsmen and draftees was extended by Congress for an additional year in August 1941.

2. At the time of the surprise attack, the Hawaii National Guard, consisting of the 298th (Oahu) and 299th (other islands) Infantry Regiments (mobilized 15 Oct 40) were stationed on Oahu. On the morning of 7 December, elements of the 298th, on coastal duty near Makapuu Lighthouse on Oahu's eastern shore, disabled a Japanese midget submarine and took its pilot prisoner, the first Japanese POW of the war.

3. Also on active duty in Hawaii was California's 251st Coast Artillery (Antiaircraft), the first National Guard unit to deploy overseas in WWII, which had been stationed at Ft. Shafter since November 1940. The 251st engaged Japanese planes on 7 December.

4. Other National Guard units were deployed in various parts of the Pacific at the moment of the Japanese attack.

a. New Mexico's 200th Coast Artillery and the multi-state 192d (WI, IL, OH, KY) and 194th (MN, MO, CA) Tank Battalions were in the Philippines. They had arrived in the fall of 1941 as part of the reinforcement of the islands' defenses; all three units took part in the defense of Bataan, surrendering to the Japanese there in April 1942.

b. On 7 December three other National Guard units were in mid-ocean, enroute to the Philippines. But the Pensacola convoy in which they were travelling was diverted to Australia after the outbreak of war. The 147th Field Artillery (SD), 148th Field Artillery (ID), and 2d Bn, 131st Field Artillery (TX), landed in Brisbane on 22 December 1941, the first of many thousands of U.S. troops to stage there. The 131st was sent almost immediately to reinforce the Dutch garrison on Java, where they surrendered with the garrison on 8 March 1942.

Mrs. Hylton-Greene/756-1980

THE NATIONAL GUARD AT BATAAN

Units of the National Guard Guard were on duty in the Philippines on the first day of World War II.

Present for duty on that day were the;
192nd Tank Battalion (WI, IL, OH, KY)
194th Tank Battalion (MN, MO, CA) and the
200th Coast Artillery Regiment (Anti-Aircraft) (NM)

The 200th Coast Artillery(anti-aircraft) made up of New Mexico National Guardsmen. The 200th fired some of the first American shots of the war. The effect of their fire, however, was minimal, since a high proportion of the ten-year-old shells were duds.

Later in the campaign, the Tanks from "C" Company 194th Tank Battalion, while braving anti-tank fire, literally burst through a Japanese log road block, and crushed a Japanese 75mm gun.

The National Guard units, the 200th, the 192nd and the 194th surrendered to the Japanese 9 April 1942.

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Cover + 4 **pages**

INFORMATION PAPER - HURRICANE ANDREW NATIONAL GUARD SUCCESSES

FLORIDA NATIONAL GUARD:

* Immediate Joint Task Force Capabilities (ANG C-130 aircraft helped evacuate 25 patients from a Key West hospital on 24 Aug 92,the day before the hurricane)

* Actions initiated prior to hurricane reaching Florida (more than 3,700 troops had been alerted, 1,700 assisted in evacuation and area security missions prior to Hurricane Andrew striking Florida)

* Experienced, organized Task Force organization (State and ARNG/ANG units divided into five Area Commands, North, South, Central, West and State Area Command)

* Senior Florida Guard leadership was well experienced in hurricane disaster assistance missions (senior officers and NCOs involved in previous hurricane missions: Betsy; Camille,[Aug 69]; Hugo, etc.)

* Personnel and equipment "forward located" in State Armory facilities throughout the state, available for immediate response (vice Federal Task Force which needs 3-5 days after declaration of a federal disaster to reach the scene with equipment and personnel)

* ARNG Troop structure ideally suited for mass disaster assistance missions (53rd Infantry Brigade - evacuation and area security missions; 53rd Signal Brigade - establish communications in disaster area; 202nd Medical Group - Surgical Hospital [131st MASH], air ambulance and numerous medical companies and detachments; 50th Area Support Group - numerous maintenance and support units with dump trucks, wreckers, transportation companies and detachments; 419th Combat Aviation Group - numerous helicopters for low-level disaster reconnaissance missions

* Quick response by Florida National Guard troops: 1,300 troops on duty prior to Hurricane Andrew striking Florida (by 1635 hrs, on Sunday, 23 Aug 92); 3,117 on State Active Duty by 0530 hrs on 25 Aug [day after Hurricane struck); 4,284 troops on duty by 0500 hrs on 27 Aug [3 days after hurricane]; 5,703 on duty by 0300 hrs on 29 Aug [5 days]; In contrast, President Bush declares Federal Disaster area on 24 Aug [Monday], Federal Troops authorized for mission on 27 Aug, [three days advanced warning for planning and preparation] and first elements don't arrive until 29 Aug [6 days after disaster].

INFORMATION PAPER - HURRICANE ANDREW NATIONAL GUARD SUCCESSES:

LOUISIANA:

* Immediate Joint Task Force capabilities (ARNG has engineer group, military police companies, MASH hospital and medical units, Area Support Group with support and maintenance battalions and companies; ANG has flying units, communications, support and engineer units, with numerous large generators and mobile communications capabilities)

* Staff well-experienced in hurricane disaster assistance missions (senior leaders worked Hurricane Betsy and Camille recovery operations)

* Personnel and equipment "forward located" in communities throughout the state (many Louisiana armories were initially used during the hurricane evacuation phase as "mass care facilities," then were readily available to house and feed LA ARNG troops in the disaster area when they arrived for State Active Duty)

* Unit-level commanders experienced in knowing and working with local law enforcement and disaster assistance personnel during mock disaster training and civil disturbance exercises.

* Quick response time for call to State Active Duty: 572 troops on State Active Duty before Hurricane Andrew struck; 1,100 troops on duty by midnight on date hurricane struck (26 Aug 92).

* Senior State Leadership (Gov. Edwards, State TAG [MG Stroud], State Police Commissioner, State Emergency Management Agency Director) well experienced in working together for disaster exercises and actual emergencies.

* Presence of armed Louisiana National Guard troops securing homes and damaged businesses immediately after storm prevented looting and provided much reassurance and confidence in security of the area to those disaster-stricken residents.

INFORMATION PAPER

NGB-ARO-OM
14 August 1992

SUBJECT: Operation SUDDEN RESPONSE (LA RIOTS)

1. Purpose. To provide information to the CNGB in preparation for his address to the NGAUS conference.

2. Facts.

a. On 29 Apr 92, demonstrations related to the acquittal verdicts in the Rodney King case turned violent with full scale riots.

b. With no notice, the CAARNG commenced mobilization at approximately 2100 hours, 29 Apr 92. CA law enforcement officials stated that they wouldn't need National Guard support for at least 18 hours.

c. Within six (6) hours of mobilization, over 2000 Guardsmen had reported to home station armories. By H+18, one (1) fully equipped MP Company was on the streets performing missions. At H+24, over 4000 Guardsmen were in staging areas around Los Angeles, with another 1000 on the streets.

d. Before active component military forces arrived, order was restored and crime rates dropped by 70%.

e. DOD national reaction plan for civil disturbance operations (GARDEN PLOT) establishes thirty-six (36) hour reaction time before tactical deployment. The National Guard exceeded this standard.

f. On 1 May 92, President Bush announced plans to Federalize the CAARNG, and initiated deployment of Federal law enforcement agents and active component military units to Los Angeles.

g. The following military units took part in Operation SUDDEN RESPONSE:

(1)	CAARNG - 40th ID & 49th MP Bde	- 10,348
(2)	2d Bde, 7th ID (L), Ft. Ord	- 1,995
(3)	I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF)	- 1,543
(4)	Misc. LNO & support personnel	- 239

h. Currently one (1) CAARNG soldier remains on state active duty and two (2) CAARNG soldiers are on federal active duty finalizing after action reports.

MAJ BRYSON/692-2601

INFORMATION PAPER

NGB-ARO-OM
4 September 1992

SUBJECT: Hurricane Andrew - FL/LA ARNG

1. Purpose. To provide information to PAO on the FL/LA ARNG participation in Hurricane Andrew.

2. Facts.

a. Hurricane Andrew hit the southeast coast of Florida with Category 5 winds at approximately 240600RAUG92.

b. Initial call-up of FLARNG soldiers amounted to 3410 alerted and another 1624 staged at their Armories awaiting orders. Other FLARNG units remained on telephonic alert.

c. Initial unit call-up included combat units, transportation units and selected units from the 50th Area Support Group (ASG). These units were alerted because of the anticipated security missions and the requirement to transport Infantry units to the Miami area. Other missions include traffic control, augmentation of local law enforcement agencies, food/water hauls and medical support.

d. As of 4 Sep 92, 6062 FLARNG troops were activated. Missions completed were 81 and 60 missions continue.

e. Landfall in LA was approximately 260100RAUG92 at a Category 3 strength.

f. On 25 Aug, 35 LAARNG soldiers were activated to assist in transport of civilians from low lying areas. By 26 Aug, 563 soldiers were on state active duty (SAD). As of 4 Sep 92, 1295 LAARNG troops are on state active duty.

g. A total of 116 missions have been completed and 34 are ongoing. These missions include evacuation, security, shelter, water distribution and debris clean-up.

MAJ BRYSON/692-2601

AIR NATIONAL GUARD PARTICIPATION

IN

OPERATION DESERT STORM

Air National Guard (ANG) participation in operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm provided visible proof of the readiness, professionalism, and combat capability of this nation's Air Guard forces while at the same time validating the Total Force policy, a policy of integrating active duty and reserve component forces in operations, training, equipment, and tasking. From the moment the decision was made to deploy United States forces to the Persian Gulf in support of Desert Shield, the Air National Guard was there. The first U.S. aircraft to respond to this crisis was an Air National Guard C-141 flown by volunteers from the 172th Military Airlift Group, from Mississippi. Both this unit and the Air National Guard unit equipped with C-5 aircraft, the 105th Military Airlift Group from New York, responded almost immediately with an all volunteer force and every unit aircraft -- all before a single unit was activated.

This volunteer effort was pervasive throughout the Air National Guard and allowed an immediate total force effort of Air Guard, reserve, and active duty assets to meet the tremendous airlift requirement. In the first month of Desert Shield the total airlifted tonnage was twice the amount airlifted during the peak months of Vietnam and over triple the distance required for Operation Just Cause in Panama. Early in this effort the Air National Guard responded with 24 C-130 tactical airlift aircraft, 54 KC-135 aerial refueling aircraft, 6 RF-4 reconnaissance aircraft, and 2 EC-130 special operations aircraft. These aircraft, along with the required aircrew and maintenance personnel, were deployed to the theater of operations. The Air Guard was quickly a vital part of the air campaign, performing daily fighter, reconnaissance, air refueling, and airlift missions -- all flown and maintained in the desert with Air National Guard volunteers.

Each time the call went out for volunteers, the Air National Guard responded. A typical example from the initial days of the operation involved a request to the 167th Tactical Airlift Group, a C-130 unit from Martinsburg, West Virginia. A late evening call to the unit for forty aerial port personnel to voluntarily deploy in support of air cargo operations was answered in a few hours with over 100 volunteers -- all ready, trained, equipped, and motivated to respond immediately to their nation's call. By the time the Presidential 200,000 personnel call-up was taking place, well over 2,700 Air National Guard men and women were voluntarily serving in critical mission areas in support of Desert Shield.

After the Presidential call-up in August, Air Guard participation increased to practically every mission area involved in the operation. The Air Guard strategic airlift units from New York and Mississippi were the first called-up in order to provide the airlift required to move millions of tons of cargo and thousands

of personnel to the desert. These initial call-ups were quickly followed by other Air National Guard units and support elements from around the country.

Two Air National Guard tactical fighters units equipped with F-16 aircraft were deployed to the desert; the 169th Tactical Fighter Group from South Carolina and the 174th Tactical Fighter Wing from New York. These two units flew over 3,550 missions and 7,930 hours of which more than 3,100 missions and 7,350 hours were in combat. They dropped over 7 million pounds of bombs on a variety of targets around the Kuwait-Iraqi border, on numerous Republican Guard positions, and other targets throughout Iraqi territory. These missions were supported by tactical reconnaissance missions flown by Air National Guard RF-4 aircraft from the 117th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing from Alabama during the early stages of the operation and later by the 152nd Tactical Reconnaissance Group from Nevada. These aircraft flew over 1,045 missions and 2,480 hours in support of theater operations; of these, over 350 missions and 800 hours were in combat.

The Air National Guard air refueling force of KC-135 aircraft had similarly impressive results. After heavy initial volunteer participation, 12 of the 13 KC-135 equipped units in the Air Guard were mobilized. Of this force, close to half or 63 aircraft were deployed to the desert to support theater operations while the remaining force was tasked with alert commitments in the United States. The deployed KC-135 aircraft flew some 5,000 missions, over 22,000 hours, and while airborne offloaded more than 240 million tons of fuel to approximently 18,000 receiving aircraft.

The airlift force from the Air National Guard followed the early volunteer response with truly impressive statistics. The two strategic airlift units flew over 28,000 hours airlifting more than 37,000 passengers and 108,000 tons of cargo between the United States and the desert. The entire Air Guard tactical airlift force was involved in support of this operation in one form or another. Most units had volunteers in the theater. The first two units mobilized for deployment to the theater were the 130th Tactical Airlift Group from West Virginia and the 136th Tactical Airlift Wing from Texas. These two units were joined by the 139th Tactical Airlift Group from Missouri and the 166th Tactical Airlift Group from Delaware. The 143rd Tactical Airlift Group from Rhode Island was mobilized initially for operations in the United States and was subsequently deployed to Europe to support airlift requirements. The four C-130 airlift units in the theater of operations flew more than 2,000 missions, logging 8,000 hours, airlifting some 20,000 passengers and 18,000 tons of cargo. All other Air Guard C-130 units performed in support of Desert Storm with missions in the United States and Europe. In total they flew 1,250 missions, 10,000 hours, airlifting 11,400 passengers, and 1,800 tons of cargo.

Over 800 personnel were mobilized from 10 Air Guard aeromedical evacuation units. These doctors, nurses, and technicians, specially trained in the air transportation and care of patients, treated and transported over 2,500 litter patients and 2,800 ambulatory patients. Also providing medical expertise and support were more than 1,200 personnel from 44 Air Guard medical units.

All deployed Air Guard personnel were integrated into a total force of Guard, Reserve, and active forces. Due to drastic limitations in the infrastructure and facilities in the deployed locations, few units were able to deploy their compliment of support equipment and personnel. To function under these limitations meant combining forces to the maximum extent possible in order to limit the number of personnel deployed. These provisional unit structures combined Guard, Reserve, and active duty personnel from command levels down to individual support functions. That this combination of forces worked smoothly and without problem testifies not only to the professionalism of the forces involved but to the value of training, exercising, equipping, and manning as a total force.

The Air National Guard effort was not limited to the desert theater of operations. Mobilized and volunteer Air Guard personnel also performed duties in support of Desert Storm throughout the United States and Europe. Air National Guard aircrews and aeromedical personnel flew worldwide aeromedical evacuation missions, maintenance personnel worked around the clock to insure planes and equipment were always ready, security police were deployed throughout the theater and across the United States to protect vital national assets, and groups of other specialists like firefighters, ordinance experts, engineers, combat communications, and tactical air controllers were deployed both operationally in the desert and as required worldwide.

In all, over 250 Air National Guard units or portions of units were mobilized and over 12,500 Air Guard personnel, representing almost every state in the union, were serving at the time hostilities ceased. Every unit mobilized responded faster than regulations specify, with all required personnel and equipment, and professionally performed their mission along side and with their reserve and active duty counter parts. Throughout this period the Air National Guard continued to support a number of peacetime commitments around the globe. These continuing commitments include air defense and strategic alert aircraft and crews in the United States, airlift and fighter aircraft and crews in Panama, counter-drug operations in the Caribbean, specialized airlift support to both the Arctic and Antarctic, and scheduled and short notice airlift support for the Military Airlift Command throughout the world. The Air National Guard was and remains a highly trained, motivated, and professional force ready to respond to the nation's call.

Talking Paper

On

Air National Guard Participation in Operation Desert Storm

- This is an overview and update on the participation of the Air National Guard (ANG) in Operation Desert Storm.

- When the decision was made to deploy United States military forces to Southwest Asia in support of Operation Desert Shield, the first aircraft flown into theater was an Air National Guard C-141 from the 172nd Military Airlift Group (MAG) Jackson, Mississippi.

-- This volunteer effort was pervasive throughout the ANG and allowed an immediate total force effort to meet massive airlift requirements. In the first month total airlift was twice the amount tasked during the peak month of the Vietnam war and three times as much, and over triple the distance, as Operation Just Cause in Panama.

-- Before a single unit was activated, ANG volunteers were flying strategic airlift C-5s and C-141s into theater. Soon there were 16 C-130 tactical aircraft, 16 KC-135 aircraft, 6 RF-4 reconnaissance aircraft and 2 EC-130 Special Operations aircraft in-theater, being flown and maintained by ANG volunteers.

- With the Presidential partial-mobilization of Guard and Reserve forces, the participation of the ANG shifted to a mobilized force, with the majority of members supporting operations in-theater.

- With the Presidential suspension of offensive operations all Air Guard members remained fully capable for future tasking in the AOR.

-- The ANG units or major portions of units that have volunteered or been mobilized include:

2	F-16 Tactical Fighter Units	169 TFG, 174 TFW
2	RF-4 Tactical Reconnaissance Unit	152 TRG
1	C-5 Strategic Airlift Unit	105 MAG
1	C-141 Strategic Airlift Unit	172 MAG
5	C-130 Tactical Airlift Units	MAC Gained ANG Units
1	EC-130 Special Operations Unit	193 SOG
13	KC-135 Strategic Refueling Units	SAC Gained ANG Units
13	Combat Communications Units	TAC Gained ANG Units
25	Security Police Units	Unified Command ANG Units
37	Firefighting Units	Unified Command ANG Units
56	Medical Units (10 AEF/60 Clinics)	Unified Command ANG Units
9	Mobile Aerial Port Units	MAC Gained ANG Units

-- Smaller numbers of support personnel from numerous units that volunteered or were mobilized include:

67 Air Liaison Officers
631 Services Personnel
18 Disaster Preparedness Personnel
27 Logistics Personnel
248 Engineering Personnel
46 Transportation Personnel
15 EOD Personnel

--- Additionally, the ANG provided approximately 1,145 volunteers in support of Desert Storm for grand totals of:

1,145	Volunteers
5,118	Mobilized in-theater
5,315	Mobilized in CONUS
692	Mobilized in other than Theater or CONUS
12,270	ANG totals in direct support of Desert Storm

ANG mission data summary for Operation Desert Storm as of 12 Jun 91 is as follows:

-- Strategic airlift: 38,769 hours; 133,583 tons of cargo; 66,915 passengers

-- Tactical airlift in-theater: 1,529 missions; 21,032 tons of cargo; 39,396 passengers

-- Support airlift outside of theater: 1,372 missions; 2,371.2 tons of cargo; 12,745 passengers

-- Organic airlift from SAC units

-- Air refueling in theater: 3,519 missions; 14,141 receivers; 118 million pounds of fuel off loaded.

-- Tactical reconnaissance in theater: 367 missions totaling 912 hours

-- Tactical fighter/bombers in theater: 3,645 missions totaling 8,593 hours
-- Aeromedical activity supported 979 litter patients and 1,659 ambulatory patients.

- Over 12,000 members of the Air National Guard from all walks of life, were tasked in direct support of Operation Desert Storm. The ANG worked side-by-side with active duty counterparts proving, on a daily basis, in difficult conditions, the successful application of the Total Force policy.

Prepared by NGB/CSS as of 13 Jun 91

AIR NATIONAL GUARD DESERT STORM FACTS

The Air National Guard played a vital role in the success of the Desert Storm Air Campaign and the ultimate success of Operation Desert Storm. Our operations were conducted in three vital areas: Fighter/Reccee, Tankers, and Airlift.

Fighter/Reccee

ANG Fighter/Reccee assets (three units) flew 2,700 sorties and over 5,700 hours - *the equivalent of one unit's yearly flying time in only five weeks.*

Seven million pounds of ordnance were dropped by ANG fighters - *enough to fill 160 B-52 Bombers.*

Airlift

ANG Airlifters flew over 17,000 hours - *the equivalent of six units flying time in one five week period.*

55,000 tons of cargo or 110,000,000 pounds were moved in five weeks. *That's enough to fill 3,700 B-727's.*

The ANG moved people also - 24,000 passengers - *that's a small airline in addition to cargo.*

Each week during Desert Storm the Air National Guard moved the equivalent of 500 tractor/trailer loads of food, ammo, and equipment.

Tankers

ANG Tankers offloaded 24 million gallons of fuel to over 12,000 aircraft during Desert Storm. *That's like pulling up to two ocean going tankers and saying, "Fill'er Up!"*

Daily, they offloaded 460,000 gallons - *that's enough to drive around the world 460 times, or keep 760 American cars running for one year.*

During the entire five week Desert Storm Campaign, ANG Tankers offloaded enough fuel to:

drive around the world 22,000 times,
drive coast to coast and back - 120,000 times,
keep an American town (34,000 vehicles) running for one year and,
fill 440,000 barrels and stack them somewhere.

AIR NATIONAL GUARD PARTICIPATION

Riots in California
Forest Fires in California, Oregon, and, Idaho
Hurricane Relief in Florida
European Airlift Relief

RIOTS IN CALIFORNIA

The CA Air National Guard responded immediately by airlifting state security personnel and equipment from various locations within the state to the Los Angeles area. The 146AW conducted around-the-clock missions in support of this effort. The National Guard Bureau responded to requests for additonal missions transporting security personnel and needed equipment from various locations outside of California to augment the security needs of California.

FOREST FIRES IN OREGON, CALIFORNIA, AND, IDAHO

The National Guard Bureau responded to requests for assistance to aid in firefighting efforts in Oregon, Idaho, and, California. Specially-equipped C-130's from California, Wyoming, and, North Carolina supplied aircraft to assist in firefighting efforts.

HURRICANE RELIEF IN FLORIDA

The National Guard Bureau responded to requests for air movement of much needed food, equipment, personnel, and, supplies to assist in the relief effort left in the wake of the destructive forces from Hurrican Andrew. Numerous Airlift units deployed to fill the critical needs of the state of Florida. The National Guard continues to respond to requests for support of manpower and equipment as well as other relief aid.

EUROPEAN AIRLIFT RELIEF

The Air National Guard continues to provide airlift support conducting relief missions into Sarajevo, Yugoslavia. Air National Guard airplanes and crews , flying from Rhein Main Air Base , Germany are currently conducting relief missions as directed to assist in the relief effort.

INFORMATION PAPER

SUBJECT: Drawdown of the Force Structure of the National Guard

1. Background: The Army National Guard (ARNG) is in the process of drawing down its forces to a level of 338K force structure allowance (FSA) by FY95. Total programmed losses in ARNG FSA for FY 91-95 equals approximately 138K spaces.

	FY90	FY91	FY92	FY93	FY94	FY95
FSA*	476K	465K	442K	387K	346K	338K
Losses		-11K	-23K	-55K	-41K	-8K

*indicates FSA at the end of the FY

2. Losses of major units:

ORGANIZATION	AS OF FY90		FY95 PROGRAMMED		DELTA
Divisions	10	4 Heavy 5 Standard Inf 1 LID	8	5 Heavy 1 LID 2 Cadre Heavy	-2
Roundup Bdes	3	3 Heavy	3	3 Heavy	0
Roundout Bdes	4	3 Heavy 1 Light	3	3 Heavy	-1
Separate Bdes	14	6 Heavy 5 Sep IN 3 Theater Def	3	2 Heavy 1 Sep In	-11
Ar Cav Regt	2	107th & 278th ACR	1	278th ACR	-1
Scout Groups	1	207th Inf	1	207th Inf (-)	0
SF Groups	2	19th&20th SF	2	19th&20th SF(-)	0

INFORMATION PAPER - ARNG PROJECTED UNIT LOSSES FY 91 - FY 95

* Under the proposed Department of Defense force reductions planned for the Army National Guard during Fiscal Years 1991 thru Fiscal Year 1995, the following losses will occur in the Army National Guard (ARNG) force structure:

Combat Structure being lost (includes aviation, armor, infantry, field artillery, air defense artillery and engineer units):

by end of FY 95: 284 units inactivated, 86,900 troop spaces eliminated.

Combat Support and Combat Service Support (CS/CSS) (includes military police, military intelligence, signal corps, chemical corps, adjutant general corps, finance, medical, medical service corps, ordnance, quartermaster and transportation units):

by end of FY 95: 254 units inactivated/consolidated, 51,000 troop spaces eliminated.

Total ARNG losses by end of FY 95:

538 units, 137,900 troop spaces eliminated.

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Force Structure Trends
(By Army Component)



Sources: 1980-1990
AC+USAR - DA Program, Analysis + Evaluation
ARNG - RC Troop Basis of the Army, Annex 1

1991-1995
DOD Directed Reductions

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FORCE STRUCTURE TRENDS
(BY ARMY COMPONENT)

FY YR	ACTIVE	ARNG	USAR
80	672	417	259
81	674	424	260
82	676	430	264
83	675	432	269
84	681	434	277
85	678	438	280
86	677	443	285
87	677	460	295
88	672	466	295
89	673	470	306
90	677	476	319
91	656	465	304
92	628	442	304
93	584	387	254
94	563	346	234
95	535	338	229

Sources:

1980-1990
AC+USAR - DA Program, Analysis, + Evaluation
ARNG - RC Troop Basis of the Army, Annex 1

1991-1995
DOD Directed Reductions

Authorized In Thousands

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Force Structure Reductions
(By Army Component)



Sources: 1991-1995
DOD Directed Reductions

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FORCE STRUCTURE REDUCTIONS
(BY ARMY COMPONENT)

FY YR	ACTIVE	ARNG	USAR
90	677	476	319
91	656	465	304
92	628	442	304
93	584	387	254
94	563	346	234
95	535	338	229

Source: DOD Directed Reductions

Authorized In Thousands

ANG Facts and Figures

Programs and Support Forces Branch

ANG/AFRES PERCENTAGES OF THE TOTAL FORCE

	ANG FY91	ANG FY92	ANG FY93	AFR FY91	AFR FY92	AFR FY93	AF FY91	AF FY92	AF FY93	TOTAL A/C - ARC % FY91	TOTAL A/C - ARC % FY92	TOTAL A/C - ARC % FY93
FIGHTERS	634 26.0%	648 31.1%	612 30.8%	222 9.9%	222 10.7%	219 11.0%	1548	1212	1158	2394 35.3%	2082 41.8%	1989 41.8%
INTERCEPTORS	216 92.8%	216 100.0%	216 100.0%				18	0	0	234 92.8%	216 100.0%	216 100.0%
RECONNAISSANCE	108 85.7%	72 100.0%	72 100.0%				18	0	0	126 85.7%	72 100.0%	72 100.0%
TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT	54 48.6%	24 30.8%	30 27.8%	0	0	18 16.7%	57	54	60	111 48.6%	78 30.8%	108 44.5%
TACTICAL AIRLIFT	176 97.8%	173 88.8%	172 89.8%	120 25.7%	116 25.8%	100 23.2%	170	160	160	466 63.5%	449 64.4%	432 63.0%
RESCUE	24 84.8%	24 82.4%	24 25.8%	28 40.6%	24 82.4%	25 30.9%	17	26	32	69 75.4%	74 64.8%	81 60.5%
SUPPORT AIRCRAFT	48 24.6%	53 26.5%	53 26.5%				147	147	147	195 24.6%	200 26.5%	200 26.5%
WEATHER				8 100.0%	8 100.0%	8 100.0%				8 100.0%	8 100.0%	8 100.0%
STRATEGIC AIRLIFT	19 5.5%	23 6.7%	27 8.2%	36 10.5%	40 11.6%	60 18.2%	288	282	243	343 16.0%	345 16.2%	330 28.4%
STRATGIC AIRLIFT (ASSOC)				50.0%	50.0%	50.0%				50.0%	50.0%	50.0%
MEDICAL AIRLIFT (ASSOC)				30.0%	30.0%	30.0%	18	18	18	18 30.0%	18 30.0%	18 30.0%
AIR REFUELING (KC-135)	128 21.5%	158 27.9%	172 31.9%	80 5.1%	90 5.3%	50 9.3%	496	379	317	594 26.6%	627 33.2%	539 41.2%
AIR REFUELING (KC-10)							57	57	57	57	57	57
TOTAL	1397	1391	1378	444	440	480	2774	2335	2192	4615	4166	4050
MEMO: TRAINING AIRCRAFT	144	144	126									
EC-130E	6	6	6									
AATC	6	6	6									
TOTAL ANG AIRCRAFT	1553	1547	1516									

* NOTE: Percentages based on PAA of like missions as of 4th quarter each FY.

SUBJECT: Dolly Vinsant Flight Nurse Of The Year Award

- Presented by the Confederate Air Force to Captain Marion F. Myron, 139th Aeromedical Flight, New York Air National Guard, for acts performed during Operation Desert Storm. Copy of nomination package attached.

- Award established to pay tribute to Lieutenant Wilma (Dolly) Roland Vinsant, who was killed in action over Germany during an aeromedical evacuation mission on 14 August 1945.

- Criteria: "...an aggressive person who puts patient care above self; who will volunteer at great personal risk to fly missions in order to bring caring help to ill or injured military personnel."

- Awarded annually to a flight nurse, active duty, Air Force Reserve, or Air National Guard, who is engaged in live aeromedical evacuation missions. (The requirement for live A/E missions traditionally has rendered the ANG ineligible to compete in the past. Based on experiences with live A/E missions during Operation Desert Storm, two ANG nurses were nominated for the first time.)

STAFF SUMMARY SHEET

TO	ACTION	SIGNATURE (Surname), GRADE AND DATE		TO	ACTION	SIGNATURE (Surname), GRADE AND DATE
NGB/SG	Coord	[signature] 1Nov91	6			
ANGRC/CC	Coord	[signature] 5Nov91	7			
NGB/CF	Sign	[signature] 5Nov91	8			
			9			
			10			

NAME OF ACTION OFFICER AND GRADE	SYMBOL	PHONE	TYPIST'S INITIALS	SUSPENSE DATE
Lt Col Margaret Woods	ANGRC/SGN	981-8558		8 Nov 91

SUBJECT	DATE
Dolly Vinsant Flight Nurse of the Year Award - Congratulatory Letter	31 Oct 91

SUMMARY

1. Award established by the Confederate Air Force to pay tribute to Lt Wilma (Dolly) R. Vinsant, who was killed in action over Germany during an aeromedical evacuation mission in 1945.

2. Awarded annually to a flight nurse, active duty, Air Force Reserve or Air National Guard, who is engaged in live A/E missions; contributed significantly to inflight patient care, i.e., specifice patient or specific flight/event within past year.

3. Due to requirement for live A/E missions the ANG has not been eligible to compete in the past. Based on experiences with live A/E missions during Operation Desert Storm, two nurses were nominated from the Air National Guard for the first time.

4. Capt Marion F. Myron, 139 Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron, NY was selected. A first for the ANG.

5. Views of others - N/A.

RECOMMENDATION

6. Sign letter of congratulations at Tab A.

Margaret A. Woods

MARGARET A. WOODS, Lt Col, USAF, NC
Chief, Nursing Services
Office of the Air Surgeon

4 Atch
1. HQ USAF/SGN ltr
2. Award criteria
3. NGB/SGN ltr
4. Nominee pkg.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON DC

REPLY TO ATTN OF: SGN

3 October 1991

SUBJECT: Dolly Vinsant Award

TO: Lieutenant Colonel Margaret A Woods, USAF, NC
Chief Nurse
NGB/SGN
Mail Stop 18
Andrews AFB, Maryland 20331-6008

1. It is my pleasure to inform you that Captain Marian F Myron of the 139th Aeromedical Evacuation Flight has been selected for the Dolly Vinsant Award.

2. Captain Myron earned this prestigious award because of her outstanding leadership, superior officership and dedication to quality patient care. She was selected from a highly competitive group of top-notch nurses from major Air Force commands. She excelled above the nominees.

3. I know you are proud to have Captain Myron as part of your medical command.

BARBARA A GOODWIN, Brig Gen, USAF, NC
Chief, Air Force Nurse Corps
Office of the Surgeon General

DOLLY VINSANT FLIGHT NURSE OF THE YEAR AWARD

The Dolly Vinsant Flight Nurse of the Year Award was established by the Confederate Air Force to pay tribute to Lieutenant Wilma (Dolly) Roland Vinsant, who was killed in action over Germany during an aeromedical evacuation mission on 14 August 1945.

Lieutenant Vinsant graduated from the first Flight Nurse class of the Army Air Force School of Air Evacuation at Bowman Field, Kentucky, in 1943. She served as a member of the Air Evacuation Nurse Corps in England, flying with the wounded from the battle-fields to hospitals. Frequently these flights were from the front lines near Munich and Frankfurt. The courage and selflessness of Lieutenant Vinsant earned her an Air Medal, Purple Heart, Red Cross Medal and Special Presidential Citation.

CRITERIA

Criteria as stated by the Confederate Air Force, "...the type of person we should be seeking for the award would be an aggressive person who puts patient care above self; who will volunteer at great personal risk to fly missions in order to bring caring help to ill or injured military personnel."

ELIGIBILITY

Flight Nurse 9761/9766, Active Duty, Air Force Reserve, Air National Guard, who is engaged in live air evacuation missions.

Contributed significantly to in-flight patient care, i.e., specific patient or specific flight/event, within the past year.

Demonstrates highest military and professional standards.

SUBMISSION

Provide a narrative description, no more than two double-spaced pages, of nominee's qualification and specific examples of how the individual improved in-flight care, or provided unusual support during flight. Include individual's name and job title.

Submit six copies of nomination to Colonel Elizabeth A Hinze, USAF, NC, Chairman, Department of Nursing, Air University Regional Hospital/SGHN, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6304.

SELECTION PROCESS

A selection committee will consist of three members of the Confederate Air Force and three members of the Air Force Nurse Corps, including a Flight Nurse Instructor from the School of Aerospace Medicine at Brooks Air Force Base, Texas.

DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMY AND THE AIR FORCE
NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU
ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE DC 20331-6008

REPLY TO ATTN OF: NGB/SGN

15 April 1991

SUBJECT: Dolly Vinsant Flight Nurse of the Year Award

TO: ANG Aeromedical Evacuation Chief Nurses

1. Attached is a letter from HQ USAF/SGN requesting nominations for the Confederate Air Force Dolly Vinsant Flight Nurse of the Year Award. Nomination criteria and procedures are included.

2. In the past we have not met the criteria due to the lack of live air evacuation missions. As a result of the Air National Guard AE participation in Operation Desert Shield/Storm, I'm certain that there is someone in your unit that would qualify for this prestigious award. I urge you to submit a nomination to the addressee listed along with a copy to this office. This might be the only time we have a chance to win this award.

FOR THE CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU

Margaret A. Woods

MARGARET A. WOODS, Lt Col, USAF, NC
Chief, Nursing Services
Office of the Air Surgeon

1 Atch a/s

NOMINATION

1991 DOLLY VINSANT FLIGHT NURSE OF THE YEAR AWARD

CAPTAIN MARIAN F. MYRON, NYANG, NC

Capt Marian F. Myron brought distinction upon herself and upon the 139th Aeromedical Evacuation Flight during Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm while assigned to the 1611 Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron (Provisional), Bateem Air Base, United Arab Emerites. During her six months in the Area of Responsibility (AOR), Capt Myron flew 15 missions, transporting patients from the forward area of operations to rear area contingency hospitals. Many of those patients were battlefield casualties.

On 18 Jan 91, the first combat Aeromedical mission of Operation Desert Storm was flown. The MCD of this mission was Capt Myron. Flying armed, wearing flak vest, survival vest, helmet and chemical protective overgarments, Capt Myron and her aeromedical crew, flew 59 patients, many in very serious condition, some less than 18 hours post operative and others with unstable cardiac conditions and severe head injuries, from the battlefield to hospitals in the rear area. Although such serious and unstable patients would not be airlifted under normal conditions, the anticipated number of

battle injuries necessitated evacuating battle casualties immediately. While working under these conditions, Capt Myron distinguished herself by responding to two concurrent medical emergencies that resulted in saving the patients' lives.

On the last sortie of this crowded day long mission, with 38 litter and 21 ambulatory patients, Capt Myron, still in battle dress and chemical protection overgarments, recognized a patient, who was located in an upper litter tier, having a seizure and shortness of breath. She proceeded to intubate and start an IV. While coordinating the care of this patient and further evaluating the situation, a second patient, diagnosed with unstable angina, suffered severe chest pain, shortness of breath and weakness that developed in to a stroke. Quickly assessing the situation, Capt Myron directed the flight nurse to give the patient nitro-glycerine. Although the first patient proceeded to have three seizures during the flight. Capt Myron's quick, decisive inflight care of these two patients proved to be life saving interventions.

Capt Myron's heroic actions in providing patient care demonstrates her worthiness to be 1991 recipient of the Lt. Dolly Vinsant Award.

INFORMATION PAPER

ON

USAF/ANG OUTSTANDING AIRMEN OF THE YEAR PROGRAMS

PURPOSE

- To provide information concerning the Outstanding Airmen of the Year program and the ANG's selection as one of the USAF 12 Outstanding Airmen of the Year.

- The USAF Outstanding Airmen of the Year program was created in 1956 to provide recognition to one member from each of the gaining major commands (MAJCOMs). As the number of MAJCOMs increased, the cost of providing this recognition also increased, and in 1973 it was determined that only the top 12 Airmen should be recognized. The title of the program became the USAF 12 Outstanding Airmen of the Year, and the top 12, regardless of MAJCOM, were selected as the best the Air Force had to offer. Since its inception in 1956, and continuing to the present, this program has been sponsored by the Air Force Association.

- The number of ANG recipients that go forward to compete in the USAF 12 Outstanding Airmen of the Year (OAY) program is based on ANG strength figures

  -- Currently, and for the past several years, the ANG has been able to forward 8 nominations

  -- These 8 nominees are also recognized as the ANG Outstanding Airmen of the Year, at ceremonies held in Washington, D.C.

- MAJCOM level (to include ANG/AFRES) nominees for the USAF 12 OAY are entitled to wear of the Outstanding Airman of the Year Ribbon

- Those members selected as one of the USAF 12 OAY are also entitled to wear the bronze star device on the OAY Ribbon

- The ANG has had a member selected to be recognized as one of the USAF 12 OAY as follows:

  -- 1992 - MSgt Sharon B. Page, 224JCSS, GA

  --- MSgt Page was selected from a field of 116 Air National Guard competitors as one of our 8 nominees to the USAF 12 OAY program

  --- She was then selected from a field of 84 competitors from all MAJCOMs (to include the AFRES) as one of the USAF 12 OAY

  -- 1991 - Sgt (then SrA) Joe A. Dessenberger, 184CAMS, KS

  -- 1990 - SMSgt (then MSgt) David M. Orange, Sr., 123TAW, KY

-- 1989 - SMSgt (then MSgt) Stephen C. Woodard, 124CAMS, ID

-- 1988 - SMSgt (then MSgt) Forrest D. Earley, 145CES, NC

-- 1985 - CMSgt (then SMSgt) Donald L. Carlock, 124CAMS, ID

-- 1983 - SrA Christopher Menna, NY ANG

-- 1979 - TSgt Spencer T. Hayes, AL ANG

-- 1978 - Sgt Karen M. Kyritz, CO ANG

-- 1975 - MSgt Stanley E. Brown, AZ ANG

-- 1973 - MSgt Joe F. Todd, (Unknown)

MSgt Baggstrom
ANGRC/DPMAA
3 Sep 92

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01. Fax	Re: Master Sergeant Sharon B. Page; Social Security number redacted. (1 pp.)	09/04/92	P-6, (b)(6)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Speechwriting, White House Office of
Series: Speech File, Backup
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: National Guard Convention 9/15/92

Date Closed: 12/8/2004	**OA/ID Number:** 07580
FOIA/SYS Case #:	
Re-review Case #: 2004-2265-S	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	
MR Case #:	**Appeal Case #:**
MR Disposition:	**Appeal Disposition:**
Disposition Date:	**Disposition Date:**

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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P-5 Release would disclose confidential advise between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

MASTER SERGEANT SHARON B. PAGE [redacted]

AFSC: 30594, NCOIC ELECTRONIC COMPUTER AND SWITCHING SYSTEMS MAINTENANCE

Master Sergeant Sharon B. Page is the NCOIC of the Electronic Computer and Switching Systems Maintenance Section for the 224th Joint Communications Support Squadron, Georgia Air National Guard, Brunswick, Georgia. She is 49 years old.

Sergeant Page was born in Sayre, Pennsylvania on November 17, 1942. She graduated from Williamson High School at Tioga, Pennsylvania, in 1960. She is currently enrolled at Brunswick College pursuing an Associate Degree in Data Processing, and the Community College of the Air Force degree program in Electronic Systems Technology.

Sergeant Page's civilian employment began in 1963 with Strongberg-Carlson Corporation in Rochester, New York, where she worked with telephone switching components. Upon moving to Brunswick, Georgia in 1972, she obtained her Georgia Real Estate license and was actively engaged in the business for 16 years. In November 1975, Sergeant Page entered the Georgia Air National Guard (ANG) in the Communications Operations career field as a traditional guardsman. In October 1984, she transferred to the newly formed Electronic Computer and Switching Systems Maintenance Section. She subsequently attended the Electronic Computer and Switching Systems course in Biloxi, Mississippi where she graduated with a 92 percent course average. In September 1986, Sergeant Page assumed the position of NCOIC of Electronic Computer and Switching Systems Maintenance.

In February 1988, Sergeant Page became a full time employee with the Georgia Air National Guard in an Active Guard Reserve (AGR) position. Her responsibilities include organizing the newly formed section and training personnel under her supervision. Under her guidance and expertise the Career Development Course (CDC) pass rate has been a consistent 100 percent. Sergeant Page has participated in several exercises including Brave Shield, Gallant Knight, European Exercise Planning (received AF Achievement Medal) Display Determination, Night Train, and Brim Frost. In October 1988, Sergeant Page was selected as Outstanding NCO of the Quarter for the third quarter, and subsequently as the Outstanding NCO of the Year for the 224th Joint Communication Support Squadron. She was later selected as the Georgia NCO of the Year, representing her state at the National Guard Bureau. In December 1990, Sergeant Page was activated and served in the Area Of Responsibility in support of Desert Shield/Desert Storm. For this service, she received the Bronze Star Medal for exceptionally meritorious achievement as Superintendent, Electronic Switching Maintenance, Joint Communications Support Element, United States Central Command. In August 1991, she was selected as Outstanding Senior NCO of the Quarter for the second quarter, and subsequently as the Outstanding Senior NCO of the Year.

Since completing her initial technical training, she has attended several equipment schools and increased her knowledge and skills. In an effort to increase her management skills, she has completed several self-improvement courses; such as the ANG Command NCO Academy at McGhee Tyson ANG Station, graduating 8th in a class of 90 (Distinguished Graduate, June 88); the Joint Tactical Communications Systems Operations Supervisors course at Fort Gordon (Honor Graduate, December 1989); and the Senior NCO Academy CDC (February 1990).

Sergeant Page is very active in several military associations including the Enlisted Association of the National Guard of Georgia (Area V Director), the NCO Academy Graduate Association, and the Air Force Association. She received the Georgia State Recruiting Ribbon for bringing five new recruits into the unit. Sergeant Page has two children, a son who is a Second Lieutenant in the Georgia Air National Guard, and a daughter who was recently married. She currently holds a Georgia Real Estate Brokers License. Her community involvement includes supporting the Salvation Army, the Arthritis Foundation, the United Way, the Island Players, and the Veterans of Foreign Wars.

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AWARD: Outstanding Airmen of the Year
CATEGORY: Senior NCO
NOMINEE(Grade/Name): Master Sergeant Sharon B. Page
SSN: [redacted]
MAJCOM: Air National Guard
AFSC/DUTY TITLE: 30594, NCOIC Electronic Computer & Switching Systems Maintenance
UNIT/BASE: 224 JCSS, Brunswick, GA

JUSTIFICATION

MSgt Page is a highly motivated individual with an impeccable reputation of excellence. Her extraordinary accomplishments, together with her dedication to duty, motivates others to do their best. Her dynamic management style is the catalyst for the continual high level of maintenance efficiency and effectiveness found in her workcenter. MSgt Page is an superb representative of the nation's guardsmen. She has done an outstanding job for her unit, the Georgia Air National Guard, and the United States Air Force. She is truly deserving of this award.

SPECIFIC ACCOMPLISHMENTS(USE BULLET FORMAT)

1- **LEADERSHIP AND JOB PERFORMANCE IN PRIMARY DUTY**
- Federally activated for OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/STORM.
- NCOIC of the Electronic Telephone Switches supporting CENTCOM in the AOR.
  - Continually revised and redesigned the voice network structure.
    - The tactical AN/TTC-39(V)1 Automatic Telephone Switches maintained an unprecedented reliability rate of 96.8 percent.
    - Consistent and reliable secure telephone service provided for the CINC and combat commanders throughout the seven month deployment.
  - Perfected manual reassignment of message switches.
    - Reduced message BACKLOG from 900 to 60 per day.
    - Speedy delivery of message traffic to component commanders.
  - Acted as liaison with civilian contractor to correct switch problems.
  - Developed software and corrected anomalies which limited communications.
    - Improved switching service between component headquarters.
  - Devised and implemented the replacement of an on-line tactical switch.
    - Expert planning kept outage time to only 48 minutes, while increasing the systems capacity by 300 subscribers.
  - Performed as Data Base Manager for four Automatic Telephone Switches.
  - Coordinated operation of 58 other switches in theater as central node.
    - Processed more than 56,000 calls a day.
    - Ensured operation of the largest network of Digital Secure Voice Terminals in theater.
  - Devised and implemented new operator interface procedures and corrected software problems that caused COMSEC equipment failure.
    - Increased reliability of secure switching circuits and reduced error message build-up by 83 percent.

2- **SIGNIFICANT SELF IMPROVEMENT**
- Enrolled in CCAF

3- **LEADERSHIP QUALITIES**
- Area V Director of Enlisted Association of National Guard of Georgia
- Developed software program to increase ENNGUS membership by 150 percent.
- Served as a Delegate to the National Convention of the Enlisted Association.
- Active member of Maintenance Communications-Computer Review Board.
- Chairperson for neighborhood fund raiser for Arthritis Foundation.

4- **OTHER ACCOMPLISHMENTS**
- Guest Speaker for Daughters of American Revolution

5- **AIR FORCE OR CIVILIAN AWARDS, PRIZES, TITLES**
- Outstanding Senior NCO of the Year, State of Georgia
- Awarded State of GA Special Operations Ribbon
- Awarded Bronze Star in Oct 1991 for service in AOR during Desert Shield/Storm

6- **ARTICULATE AND POSITIVE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE AIR FORCE**
- Represented Unit in the National Welcome Home Parade in Washington D.C.
- Volunteer for Salvation Army.

SELECTED SPECIAL TROPHIES & AWARDS

1. 1992 Air Force Organizational Excellence Award:

   a. State Headquarters California
   b. State Headquarters Hawaii
   c. State Headquarters Louisiana
   d. State Headquarters Tennessee
   e. 200th Airlift Squadron (formerly Det 1, OLBB, Colorado)
   f. ANG/AFRES Test Center

2. 1992 Hennessey Trophy Awards:

   a. ANG Large Dining Facility Category: 193rd Services Flight, Pennsylvania
   b. ANG Small Dining Facility Category: 200th RED HORSE Civil Engineering Squadron, Ohio

3. 1991 Air Force Flight Safety Plaque:

   a. 102d Fighter Wing, Massachusetts
   b. 187th Fighter Group, Alabama
   c. 107th Fighter Group, New York
   d. 138th Fighter Group, Oklahoma
   e. 136th Airlift Wing, Texas
   f. 141st Air Refueling Wing, Washington
   g. 157th Air Refueling Group, New Hampshire

4. 1991 Air Force Explosive Safety Plaque:

   a. 132d Fighter Wing, Iowa
   b. 154th Composite Group, Hawaii

5. 1991 Air Force Missile Safety Plaque:

   a. 102d Fighter Wing, Massachusetts
   b. 107th Fighter Group, New York

6. 1991 System of Cooperation Among the Air Forces of the Americas Flight Safety Award: 101st Air Refueling Wing, Maine

7. 1991 USAF Outstanding Security Police Unit Awards (ANG category): 147th Security Police Flight, Texas

8. 1991 Gerrit D. Foster, Jr. Outstanding Consolidated Base Personnel Office Achievement Award: 102d Consolidated Base Personnel Office, Massachusetts

9. 1991 Air Force Supply Effectiveness Award (satellite category): 151st Resource Management Squadron, Utah

SUBJECT: "Good Neighbor Sam"

At 0700, October 31, 1991, the 210th Air Rescue Squadron of the Alaska Air National Guard received a call from the Elmendorf AFB Rescue Coordination Center initiating a rescue unique to ANG and Air Force history in terms of distance traveled, location, difficulty, and international significance. A Canadian forces C-130 with 18 people on board had crashed several hours earlier while resupplying their base at Alert, Northwest Territory, the northernmost settlement in the world, only 380 miles from the north pole. The 210th's assistance was requested in a four-nation rescue effort.

Immediately, squadron personnel started planning for launching two of the unit's four MH-60G Pavehawk helicopters and one of its two HC-130 tankers for a non-stop flight from Anchorage, Alaska, to Alert, 1800 nautical miles away.

A Travis AFB-based active Air Force C-5 was located at Elmendorf, and it and the crew were made available for the rescue mission. After downloading 90,000 pounds of cargo, the C-5 flew to Achorage International Airport to pick up the two helicopters for a flight to Thule, Greenland, 365 miles from the crash site.

Although not on mobility, and rated only C-3 due to its recent activation, the 210th and the entire base were essentially mobilized to support this deployment of aircraft and crews. At 1600L, less than nine hours after receiving word of the crash, the C-5 was enroute to Thule with two MH-60G helicopters, three crews, seven maintenance personnel, and a mission commander.

Each MH-60G made two round trips from the crash site to Alert, where Canadian C-130s were used for evacuation. All totalled, the 210th's two helicopters and a Canadian helicopter airlifted 13 survivors, 24 Canadian rescuers, and 5 deceased from the crash site.

The teamwork and motivation shown by everyone involved--active, Guard, and reserve--despite huge obstacles, led to the success of this unique mission, living up to their motto, "These things we do that others may live."

WARRIOR BRIEFING
16 January 1992
The Pentagon

L1, R1

Maj Parkhouse, MH-60G Flight Leader:

AT 0700 LOCAL, OCT 31,1991, THE 210th AIR RESCUE SQUADRON L2 OF THE ALASKA AIR NATIONAL GUARD RECEIVED A CALL FROM THE ELMENDORF RESCUE COORDINATION CENTER, INITIATING A RESCUE UNIQUE TO AIR FORCE HISTORY, IN TERMS OF DISTANCE L3 TRAVELED, LOCATION, DIFFICULTY, AND INTERNATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE. A CANADIAN FORCES C-130, WITH 18 PEOPLE ON BOARD HAD CRASHED SEVERAL HOURS EARLIER WHILE RESUPPLYING THEIR BASE AT ALERT, NWT, THE NORTHERNMOST SETTLEMENT IN THE WORLD, ONLY 360 MILES FROM THE NORTH POLE. THE ASSISTANCE BY THE 210TH WAS REQUESTED IN A 4 NATION RESCUE EFFORT.

IMMEDIATELY SQUADRON PERSONNEL STARTED THE MISSION PLANNING PROCESS FOR LAUNCHING TWO OF OUR L4 4 MH-60G PAVEHAWK HELICOPTERS AND ONE OF OUR 2 HC-130 TANKERS FOR A NON-STOP FLIGHT FROM ANCHORAGE TO ALERT, 1800 NM AWAY.

DURING THIS PLANNING PERIOD AN ACTIVE DUTY C-5 FROM TRAVIS WAS LOCATED AT ELMENDORF. THE C-5 CREW AND AIRCRAFT WERE MADE AVAILABLE FOR THE RESCUE MISSION AND AFTER DOWNLOADING L5 90,000 POUNDS OF CARGO, FLEW FROM ELMENDORF TO ANCHORAGE INTERNATIONAL TO PICK-UP THE L6 TWO MH-60'S FOR A FLIGHT TO THULE, GREENLAND, 365 MILES FROM THE CRASH SITE.

L7
ALTHOUGH NOT ON MOBILITY; AND ONLY RATED C-5 DUE TO ITS RECENT ACTIVATION, THE 210TH AND THE ENTIRE BASE WERE ESSENTIALLY MOBILIZED TO SUPPORT THIS DEPLOYMENT OF AIRCRAFT AND CREWS. AT 1600L, LESS THAN 8 HOURS AFTER RECEIVING WORD OF THE CRASH, THE R2 C-5 WAS ENROUTE TO THULE, WITH THE MH-60'S, 3 HELICOPTER CREWS, 7 MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL, AND A MISSION COMMANDER.

Capt Kvamplassen, HC-130 Aircraft Commander:

I FOUND OUT ABOUT THE CANADIAN PLANE CRASH WHEN I CAME IN L8 FOR WORK AT 0730. THE HC-130 CREW BEGAN FLIGHT PLANNING AND CHECKING ALTERNATIVES TO SEE IF THE MISSION WAS WITHIN OUR ABILITIES. L9 (BLANK) WE GAVE OUR INPUT TO THE MISSION COMMANDER AND AT 1030 WERE INFORMED THE MISSION WAS A GO. I WAS TOLD THE HELICOPTERS WOULD BE AIRLIFTED TO THULE GREENLAND R3 AND AFTER COMPLETING OUR INITIAL AIRDROP MISSION AT THE CRASH SITE WE WOULD PROCEED TO THULE AND REFUEL THE H-60'S BACK TO ALERT.

THE PARARESCUE TEAM BEGAN ASSEMBLING ALL THE RESCUE AND SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT THEY WOULD NEED TO CARE FOR 18 PATIENTS IN THE EXTREME WINTER CONDITIONS FORECAST. SGT DRUMMOND SELECTED ARCTIC TENTS, HEATERS, SLEEPING BAGS, COLD WEATHER CLOTHING, FOOD, MEDICAL EQUIPMENT, AND PARACHUTES SO THEY COULD EXECUTE THE MISSION IN VARYING WEATHER AND WIND CONDITIONS. I WAS GIVEN AN AUGMENTED CREW THAT WOULD ALLOW A 22 HOUR CREW DAY. I ASKED FOR 16 HOURS WORTH OF FUEL ON BOARD WHICH WOULD PUT US OVER OUR NORMAL 155,000 GROSS WEIGHT OPERATING LIMIT. I GOT A GROSS WEIGHT TAKE OFF WAIVER FOR 173,000 POUNDS, 2000 FOUNDS UNDER OUR MAXIMUM EMERGENCY\WAR PLANNINING LIMIT OF 175,000 POUNDS.

AT ABOUT 1245L, I TOOK L10 OFF FROM KULIS AIR NATIONAL GUARD BASE, JUST 5 1/2 HOURS AFTER INITIAL NOTIFICATION. I HAD A TOTAL CREW OF 18 ON BOARD AND AN 1800 MILE TREK ACROSS THE CANADIAN ARCTIC AHEAD OF ME. L11 OUR FLIGHT WOULD TAKE US NORTH OF THE MAGNETIC NORTH POLE SO, WE FLEW THE ROUTE USING GRID NAVIGATION. WE

KNEW THERE WAS SEVERE WEATHER AT THE CRASH SITE, BUT IT WAS SUPPOSED TO CLEAR SOME AROUND OUR ARRIVAL TIME AND I REPEATEDLY DISCUSSED WITH THE CREW OR OPTIONS GETTING BELOW THE WEATHER, AS WE ONLY HAD ONE APPROACH FOR ALERT ON BOARD-AN NDB/DME APPROACH WHICH WAS IN TRUE. AT THE SAME TIME THE PARARESCUEMEN WERE RIGGING THE SURVIVAL AND MEDICAL GEAR FOR A JUMP.

L12 L13

WE HAD LIMITED INFORMATION WHEN WE TOOK OFF AND ENROUTE MY CREW KEPT IN CONTACT WITH EDMONTON MILITARY USING HF RADIO. I LEARNED THERE WAS A CANADIAN FORCES C-130 OVER THE CRASH SITE AS WELL AS A CANADIAN GROUND RESCUE PARTY IN TRACKED VEHICLES ATTEMPTING TO REACH THE SITE. AS WE GOT CLOSER, I L13 (BLANK) FOUND THAT ALERT HAD A GCA RADAR THAT GAVE PAR'S IN GRID, AS WELL AS A TACAN, ORIENTED TO GRID, WHICH GREATLY ALLEVIATED MY FEARS ABOUT GETTING BELOW THE WEATHER. ABOUT 30 MILES FROM THE CRASH, I BEGAN SEEING A GLOW IN THE CLOUD DECK ON THE HORIZON, THIS WAS THE RESULT OF THE CANADIAN C-130 DROPPING FLARES TO LEAD THE GROUND PARTY TO THE CRASH SITE. I MADE CONTACT WITH THE CANADIAN FORCES C-130 AND TOLD HIM I HAD A 6 MAN PARARESCUE TEAM ON BOARD AND THAT WE WOULD ASSIST IN ANY WAY WE COULD, BUT OUR INITIAL PLAN WAS TO TAKE A LOOK AT THE CRASH SITE AND, IF POSSIBLE, JUMP OUR PARARESCUEMEN TO THE SURVIVORS. THE CANADIANS ADVISED ME THEY HAD 12 SARTECHS, SEARCH AND RESCUE TECHNICIANS, ON BOARD. THEY ASKED US TO DROP ILLUMINATION FLARES FOR THEM WHILE THEY TRIED TO DROP THEIR SARTECHS TO THE SITE. BUT, THEY BEGAN HAVING COMPASS

PROBLEMS AND ASKED US TO TAKE THEIR PLACE AT DROPPING FLARES TO LEAD THE GROUND PARTY IN. I DROPPED DOWN TO 3000 FEET INTO THE CLOUD DECK AND BEGAN DROPPING FLARES OVER THE CRASH SITE AT 10.3 DME ON THE 205 GRID RADIAL. I MADE LEFT TURNS IN MY FLARE ORBIT BECAUSE THE HIGH TERRAIN WOULD BE TO THE RIGHT. AT ONE POINT THE GROUND PARTY ASKED WHY THE FLARES WERE BEHIND THEM BUT SOON REALIZED THAT IN THE BLIZZARD CONDITIONS THEY HAD BECOME TURNED AROUND AND WERE HEADING BACK TOWARDS ALERT. I LATER LEARNED THE FLARES WERE ALSO VERY IMPORTANT FOR SURVIVOR MORALE. ONCE THE CANADIAN FORCES C-130 HAD THEIR COMPASS PROBLEM CORRECTED, THEY ADVISED US THAT THEY WOULD ATTEMPT TO DROP THEIR SARTECHS ON THEIR OWN, AND SAID WHAT THEY REALLY NEEDED AT THE SITE WAS HELICOPTER SUPPORT. AT THIS TIME I KNEW OUR HELICOPTERS WERE ARRIVING AT THULE SO I GOT OUT OF THE CANADIAN'S WAY AND TOLD THEM I WOULD BE BACK WITH OUR HELICOPTERS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THE CANADIANS DROPPED THEIR SARTECHS SHORTLY AFTER WE LEFT AND AN HOUR AND A HALF LATER WE LANDED AT L14 THULE, 9 1/2 HOURS AFTER LEAVING KULIS.

I FOUND OUR MISSION COMMANDER AT THULE, DEBRIEFED, AND WENT INTO CREWREST.

4e] Paxhouse:

IN R4 THE C-5, 30 MINUTES OUT FROM THULE, WE COORDINATED THE NECESSARY ASSISTANCE REQUIRED FROM THE BASE.

THROUGH THE OUTSTANDING SUPPORT RECEIVED, MAINTENANCE HAD THE MH-60'S READY 4 HOURS AFTER ARRIVAL AT THE END OF A 27 HOUR DAY, AND AN AUXILIARY CREW PREFLIGHTED THE AIRCRAFT WHILE THE MISSION CREWS ENTERED CREWREST. IN ADDITION TO THE ALASKA HC-130, AN AFRES HC-130 FROM PORTLAND ON ROTATION TO KEFLAVIK ARRIVED AT THULE. THE PLAN WAS TO USE THE KEFLAVIK BIRD TO TAKEOFF 30 MINUTES AHEAD TO RECON THE WEATHER ENROUTE, TO PROVIDE A COMMUNICATIONS RELAY, AND AS A SPARE TANKER. THE HELICOPTERS WERE THEN TO TAKEOFF WITH OUR HC-130 AND FLY ON ITS WING FOR THE 3 HOUR FLIGHT TO ALERT DUE TO THE DIFFICULTY IN FINDING HELICOPTERS FOR AIR REFUELING IN POOR WEATHER AS WELL AS PROVIDING GRID NAVIGATION ASSISTANCE DUE TO THE EXTREME MAGNETIC VARIATION OF 80 DEGREES WEST. APPROXIMATELY 12 HOURS AFTER ARRIVAL IN THULE THE MH-60'S LIFTED OFF AND THE NEXT 8 HOURS, SPENT ENTIRELY IN POOPY SUITS, WOULD PROVE TO BE THE MOST DIFFICULT RESCUE MISSION OF OUR CAREERS.

R5, L15

1 HOUR AFTER TAKEOFF OUR HC-130 RENDEZVOUSED FOR THE FIRST AIR REFUELING. WITH OUR INTERNAL FUEL TANK CONFIGURATION, L16 THIS ALLOWED FOR ENOUGH FUEL TO REACH ALERT SHOULD SUBSEQUENT AIR REFUELINGS FAIL AND IF THIS AIR REFUELING FAILED WE WOULD HAVE ENOUGH FUEL TO RETURN TO THULE. R6 DUE TO THE RELATIVELY SHORT LEGS OF THE MH-60 (ONLY 3 HOURS EVEN WITH AUX TANKS), AND WITH ABSOLUTELY NOTHING BETWEEN THULE AND ALERT, GOOD FUEL PLANNING WAS CRITICAL NOT LONG AFTER THIS FIRST AIR REFUELING, WE ENTERED THE LONG 22 HOUR ARCTIC NIGHT, AT WHICH TIME THE HELICOPTER CREWS L17 DONNED ANVIS-6 NIGHT VISION

L18
GOGGLES, AND THIS WAS THE MOST WE SAW FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE MISSION.

ABOUT 15 MINUTES OUT OF ALERT, ANOTHER AIR REFUELING WAS ACCOMPLISHED, SO WE COULD SPEND ALL OF OUR TIME EXTRACTING SURVIVORS. WE WERE ALSO ADVISED THAT THE CANADIANS WERE ABLE TO GET A UH-1 HUEY HELICOPTER AIRBORNE AND IT WAS FLYING OUT THE ORIGINAL SURVIVORS OF THE CRASH. WE WERE STILL NEEDED TO EXTRACT THE CANADIAN RESCUE FORCES BECAUSE VERY POOR WEATHER WAS PUTTING THEM IN A CRITICAL SURVIVAL SITUATION AND THE UH-1 WAS TERMINATING DUE TO MECHANICAL PROBLEMS.

L19
UPON ARRIVAL AT ALERT, THE HC-130 STARTED A DESCENT THROUGH THE WEATHER, AND THOUGH FLYING ON THE WING THROUGH CLOUDS IS SOMETHING NOT NORMALLY DONE IN HELICOPTERS, WE NEEDED THE NAVIGATIONAL CAPABILITIES OF THE TANKER. WITH THE AID OF THE NVG'S, WE WERE ABLE TO STAY WITH HIM AS WE PASSED THRU THE THICK CLOUDS. THE RUNWAY LIGHTS OF ALERT WERE SOON SIGHTED AND WE BROKE AWAY FROM THE TANKER FOR A RAPID DESCENT INTO THE AIRFIELD. AT THIS POINT I CONTACTED THE CANADIAN HELICOPTER AND RECEIVED INFORMATION ON THE EXACT LOCATION AND CONDITIONS AT THE CRASH SITE SINCE WE WERE WORKING FROM THIS XEROX MAP PROVIDED BY THE CANADIANS.

THE 20 MILE ROUND TRIP FROM ALERT TO THE CRASH SITE AND BACK WAS WITHOUT A DOUBT THE MOST TRYING OF MY CAREER. IT WAS UNREAL. LIKE WE WERE ON ANOTHER PLANET. WE WERE AT THE TOP OF THE WORLD, IT WAS PITCH BLACK OUTSIDE, WITH LOW CEILINGS AND 6000 FOOT PEAKS IN THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY, WITH ALERT AT SEA LEVEL AND THE CRASH AT 900' MSL. TO COMPLICATE MATTERS, WE WERE IN A SNOWSTORM, AND OUR FLIGHT WAS OVER GLACIATED TERRAIN, MAKING DEPTH PERCEPTION AND FORWARD VISIBILITY IMPOSSIBLE. TO GIVE MYSELF

SOME OPTIONS, IN CASE I HAD TO MAKE ANY ABRUPT CHANGES. I HAD #2 DROP BACK TO A MILE IN TRAIL, WHILE I SLOWED TO 20-30 KNOTS AND USED THE ALTITUDE SUGGESTED BY THE CANADIAN HELICOPTER PILOT, MY RADAR, RADAR ALTIMETER, AND SCANNERS FOR TERRAIN AVOIDANCE. AFTER 15 MINUTES OF QUIETLY WISHING I WAS IN ANOTHER LINE OF WORK, I FINALLY SPOTTED A DIM LIGHT R7 FROM THE CRASH SITE AND MADE A CHALLENGING NVG WHITE-OUT LANDING, LIKE TRYING TO LAND INSIDE OF A GREEN PING-PONG BALL, NEXT TO THE CRASHED C-130.

Sgt Drummond, Pararescue Team Leader:

WE LANDED ABOUT 50 FEET FROM THE WRECKAGE AND AFTER THE POWER WAS REDUCED ON THE HELO I GOT OUT AND HEADED TOWARD THE TAIL SECTION OF THE C-130. IT WAS THE ONLY PART OF THE AIRCRAFT THAT I COULD IDENTIFY. THE SAR TECHS HAD DRAPED A CARGO CHUTE OVER THE OPENING TO KEEP OUT THE ELEMENTS, AND WERE USING IT AS A MAKESHIFT SHELTER. AS I WALKED I COULD SMELL A STRONG ODOR OF FUMES AND I NOTICED THAT THE SNOW AROUND THE SITE WAS SATURATED WITH FUEL FROM THE AIRCRAFT AND DIESEL FUEL THAT WAS PART OF THE CARGO BOUND FOR ALERT. AS I GOT CLOSER TO THE TAIL SECTION THE TEAM LEADER OF THE CANADIAN SAR TECHS CAME OUT FROM BEHIND THE PARACHUTE AND MET ME PART WAY. I TALKED WITH HIM BRIEFLY AND COORDINATED THE EXTRACTION OF ALL THE PEOPLE AT THE SITE. WITHIN MINUTES THE TWO H-60S WERE LOADED WITH PASSENGERS AND WE WERE ON OUR WAY TO ALERT. THE CONDITIONS AT THE SITE WERE TYPICAL OF THE ARCTIC COAST IN WINTER; HARD WIND PACKED SNOW WITH SMALL DRIFTS. THE TEMP WAS -15 DEGREES F WITH HIGH WINDS, THIS DROVE THE TEMP DOWN PAST THE -45 DEGREE MARK. THE SIGHT DIDN'T SEEM REAL, THERE WAS NOTHING VISIBLE BEYOND THE GLOW OF OUR LANDING AND SEARCH LIGHTS, THE OUTER EDGES WERE BLURRED AND THE PEOPLE WERE JUST FAINT SHADOWS IN THE BLOWING SNOW. BEING EXPOSED TO THIS INCIDENT HAS CHANGED ME, NOW WHEN I GO FLY ON C-130S I TIE MY SURVIVAL GEAR AFT OF THE WHEEL WELLS BECAUSE THE PEOPLE WHO SURVIVED THIS CRASH ONLY HAD THE CLOTHS ON THERE BACKS AND THE THINGS TIED IN THE BACK OF THE AIRPLANE.

] Paddock:

ACH MH-60 MADE 2 ROUND TRIPS FROM THE CRASH SITE TO ALERT, WHERE CANADIAN-130'S WERE USED FOR EVACUATION. ALL TOLD, BETWEEN THE CANADIAN UH-1 AND Y FLIGHT OF MH-60'S, 13 CRASH SURVIVORS, 24 CANADIAN RESCUERS, ND 5 DECEASED WERE AIRLIFTED FROM THE CRASH SITE. NO ONE WAS LEFT AT THE ITE BECAUSE ANOTHER RAPIDLY APPROACHING STORM WAS TO BRING A RETURN TO THE 55 DEGREE WIND CHILLS AND SEVERE GROUND BLIZZARDS THE CRASH SURVIVORS NDURED FOR 50 HOURS.

RIOR TO DEPARTING ALERT, I HAD THE KEFLAVIK HC-130 CONFIRM THE WEATHER ORECAST FOR THULE, SINCE THE WEATHER AT ALERT WAS DETERIORATING RAPIDLY ND I DID NOT WANT TO GET TRAPPED IN "NO MAN'S LAND" BETWEEN ALERT AND HULE. RB FOR THIS SAME REASON, PRIOR TO TAKEOFF I HAD THE KEFLAVIK BIRD GET HEIR REFUELING HOSES OUT AND FUNCTIONING BECAUSE PRIOR EXPERIENCE HAS AUGHT US THAT THE HOSES SOMETIMES DO NOT WORK PROPERLY IN EXTREMELY COLD ONDITIONS. ONCE THE HOSES WERE CHECKED, L20 I DID AN IFR CLIMBOUT TO ENDEZVOUS WITH THE TANKER, WITH #2 FOLLOWING 5 MINUTES LATER. THE RETURN RIP TO THULE WAS UNEVENTFUL, EXCEPT FOR DETERMINING OUR MAPS INDICATED HE TERRAIN WAS 4000 FEET LOWER THAN THE MOUNTAINS ACTUALLY WERE, SO WE



L21
FLEW OVER THE OCEAN. AFTER ATTENDING A WILD "DEBRIEF" SPONSORED BY THE VERY APPRECIATIVE CANADIANS AT THULE'S TOP OF THE WORLD CLUB, WE ARRIVED BACK AT ANCHORAGE, ONLY 40 HOURS AFTER DEPARTURE.

R9
CRITICAL TO THE SUCCESS OF THE MISSION WERE:

L22
-THE C-5. ALTHOUGH IT WAS FEASIBLE TO DO THE MISSION WITHOUT A C-5, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN CONSIDERABLY MORE DIFFICULT. THE PROBABILITY OF ENCOUNTERING BAD WEATHER WHILE FLYING DIRECT FROM ANCHORAGE THRU THE CANADIAN ARCTIC TO ALERT WAS SIGNIFICANT AND WOULD HAVE DELAYED THE RESCUE. ALSO, THE MH-60 FITS QUITE EASILY INTO A C-5, LESSENING THE MAINTENANCE REQUIRED ON EACH END.

L23
-THE ANVIS-6 NIGHT VISION GOGGLES. THE MISSION WOULD HAVE BEEN NEARLY IMPOSSIBLE WITHOUT THIS LATEST GENERATION OF NIGHT VISION AMPLIFICATION.

L24
-THE HC-130/MH-60 TEAM. WITHOUT THE HC-130, THE MH-60'S WOULD NOT HAVE HAD THE FUEL NOR NAVIGATIONAL CAPABILITY TO EXECUTE THIS MISSION.

L25
-FINALLY THE FORWARD OPERATING BASE AT THULE. THE AVAILABILITY OF AN FOB AT THULE WHICH COULD HANDLE A C-5, HANGAR OUR MH-60'S FOR MAINTENANCE, AND HAD CREW REST FACILITIES NOT ONLY EXPEDITED THE MISSION, BUT INCREASED THE SAFETY MARGIN.

R10
THE TEAMWORK AND MOTIVATION SHOWN BY EVERYONE INVOLVED, ACTIVE, GUARD, AND RESERVE, DESPITE HUGE OBSTACLES, LED TO THE GREAT SUCCESS OF THIS MISSION, 26
-IVING UP TO OUR MOTTO, "THESE THINGS WE DO THAT OTHERS MAY LIVE".

27

157 TFS SCANG
17 JAN 1991
DAY 1 : AM CC

1. The 157 TFS was tasked by CENTAF HQ to provide Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) in support of a package tasked to strike Ahmed Al Jaber and Ali Al Salem, two airfields in Kuwait. The 401st TFW was the package commander for the mission and was tasked for the airfield strikes with 16 F-16s and 12 French Jaguar Fighter Bombers. Eight of the F-16s were to attack Al Salem, with the Jaguars and the other Eight F-16s attacking AL Jaber.

2. The mission was planned with EW support consisting of 2 EF-111 and 10 F-4G for threat suppression. Intell had identified approximately 25-30 active SAM sites operating in Kuwait prior to the start of hostilities. The U.S. Navy was tasked for predawn cruise missile attacks against these sites. Intell indicated that not all sites, particularly the mobile SA-6 sites, had been identified.

3. The 157 TFS was originally tasked for 20 F-16s to destroy five of the SAM sites which were considered to have the most impact on the 401st attack profile. The 4 ship Flight Leads for the mission coordinated this target set during a face to face briefing and mission planning session at CENTAF HQ. The rational was to task 4 F-16s against each site to increase PK and allow for aborts and threat reactions.

4. CENTAF HQ changed the 157 TFS tasking at 1600L on 16 Jan 91 from five SAM Sites to ten SAM Sites. Tasking was for two F-16s to attack each site using Mk-84 2000lb bombs with FMU-113 air burst fuses. The 157 TFS requested to drop three of the sites which were assessed to have no impact on the 401st attack profile. Request denied.

5. Timing, altitude, and route deconfliction were planned for the package. The EF-111s were to orbit 30 nautical miles south of the Kuwait border and be on station prior to arrival of the F-40s. The SEAD assets were to fly a two pronged attack consisting of a Southwest to Northeast attack against the western and northern Sam Sites, and a South to North attack against the sites in southern Kuwait and around Kuwait City. The F-40s were planning to flow into the area 2 to 3 minutes before the 157 TFS F-16s. They were to inform reaction flights of any active sites they detected, and suppress sites using their antiradiation missiles.

6. The weather in Kuwait was broken to overcast with tops at 7,000 feet in the west and 7,000 to 10,000 broken and a cirrus deck above in the east. It was clear above the tops with 40NM visibility.

7. The 157 TFS attack profile consisted of a 28,000 MSL medium altitude ingress at .9 mach or greater. Two 4 ships were to flow from Southwest to Northeast and destroy three SA-2 sites and one SA-3. The other three 4 ships were to enter Kuwait from South of Al Jaber Airfield and flow North to Kuwait City. They were to destroy three SA-3s, two SA-2s, and one SA-6.

8. After a relatively sleepless night and a predawn brief, the 20 mission pilots went through preflight and engine start procedures. There were no aircraft aborts and all aircraft taxied on time. Takeoff procedures were 20 aircraft on the runway with 1000 foot spacing between 4 ships and 20 second interval between individual aircraft. Takeoff, joinup, and other enroute procedures were normal.

9. Contact with AWACS on strike frequency was established. AWACS stated that one EF-111 had aborted and only 2 F-4Gs were airborne. Weather was as briefed. The 157 TFS had built a timing leg into the flight plan which went from Al Khari to Hafar Al Bahin Airfield to a pre-ip/split point. Due to on time takeoff and TOT deconfliction the timing leg was flown as planned.

10. The loss of the EW support assets planned for the mission, while of grave concern, was considered insufficient cause for a mission abort. The 401st package required SAM suppression for mission accomplishment and the 157 TFS was commited to provide it.

11. Approaching the split point, a fence check was called. ECM Pods, Master Arm switches and other appropriate items were set in each cockpit. At the split point, 4 ships descended from 28,000 to 25,000 MSL and accelerated to they arrived. No sites were to be overflown until that particular site was under attack, resulting in a well back flow plan.

12. The F-4Gs had not reported indications of SAM activity and as the border was crossed Radar Warning Receivers (RWR) gave no indication of SAMs. The eight 157 TFS F-16s to the west and the 12 in the east began to split to four ships and then two ships as individual attack profiles progressed. The first site to be attacked was an SA-6 four miles north of Al Jaber. The site was obscured by weather so the 2 ship rolled in on the maintenance complex at Al Jaber, which was listed as a package target for the follow on flights from the 401st. The other 157 TFS aircraft were now split into 8 ship flights and well inside the threat rings of several SAM systems.

13. As if on cue, when the MK-84s impacted (and severely damaged) the Al Jaber maintenance complex, all SAM sites in Kuwait became active. RWR indicated SAM activity from multiple locations and directions. The activity indications were followed by indications of SAM launches, with many pilots receiving multiple launch warnings. Due to the weather, most of the launches were visually obscured, and the missiles had to be acquired as they broke through the layer of clouds below. Most of the SAMs were SA-2s, SA-3s, and SA-6s. Due to the relatively long boost of these systems, the smoke trails assisted pilots in visual acquisition as missiles came through the cloud deck. There were several SA-2 launch indications. No missiles were visually sighted, however, possibly due to booster burn out below cloud level.

14. Individual flights who were under attack began defensive reactions using beaming maneuvers, S turns, and chaff. Comm was surprisingly good. While voices were a few octives higher than normal, calls were timely and explicit. Flights not immediately engaged by SAMs continued with their attack profiles.

15. The Iraqi shot discipline was relatively poor with several missiles launched out of range or ballistically fired. In many instances, however, the missiles were fired in range and they guided on individual aircraft. Many missiles would maintain proper intercept geometry until within 1 NM, and then would start to drift aft on the pilots canopy. The assumption is the ALQ-119-15 ECM Pod caused the missile to improperly calculate target position. There were a couple of instances where the pilot had to perform a last ditch roll into the missile to avoid impact.

16. The two ship that had attacked Al Jaber was engaged by 6 to 10 SAMs. They negated the missiles and egressed the area to the south. The other two from that four ship attacked an SA-2 site in the Southeast corner of Kuwait. On egress they received SAM launch warning from their RWR, and observed several SAM smoke trails, but none appeared to be guiding on their aircraft. The four ship tasked to attack the SA-2 and the SA-3 at Kuwait International Airport proceeded up the coast and attacked the two sites. The SA-3 was destroyed and the SA-2 was damaged. They egressed east over water and were not engaged by any SAM launches. The four ship attacking the Two SA-3 sites just east of Al Salem Airfield were engaged by multiple SAM launches and were occupied with defense of their aircraft. Film review from one of these aircraft showed 7 SAMs in the air during 10 seconds of video! During their defensive reactions the pilots noted that the target area was obscured by clouds so at the first available opportunity they turned south and began searching for viable targets. An opening in the clouds revealed a large convoy of military vehicles and occupied revetments along a north/south road. They rolled in and released bombs at 10,000 MSL. Bombs impacted on target. Damage assessment was unknown however due to additional threat reactions performed after weapons release.

17. The Lead four ship for the 157 TFS was tasked to destroy the two south-western most SA-2s in Kuwait. The lead two ship took the western most site and tasked the second two ship to destroy a site 8 NM to the east. After the attack the second two ship was to egress to the south. The second two ship was rolling in with a visual on the site when several SAMs launched from that site, some apparently at them. Their bombs appeared to impact the site and seemed to adversely affect the guidance capability of the missiles. They began egress to the south, but were delayed due to threat reactions. The lead two ship released bombs (with unknown results due to weather-suspect target missed) and came off to the north. The plan called for the lead two ship to flew north in an attempt to dope the SA-3 site 2 NM northwest of Al Salem, possibly allowing the following two ship to attack undetected. The effectiveness of the plan broke down a bit when the two ship assigned to attack the site was launched on by multiple SA-6s, which were not previously reported in that location. After negating a pair of particularly persistent missiles, they proceeded to release their bombs. Results unknown due to weather. The final two ship was tasked to destroy an SA-2 site 24 NM north of Al Salem. The Lead two ship, after flewing past the SA-3, turned northeast towards the SA-2 site to see if any RWR indications were present and to decoy the radar. Additionaly the Lead two ship was to provide cover and mutual support of the trailers as they egressed the target area. As the Lead two ship got within 10-12 NM of the SA-2 site, multiple SA-6 launches were indicated by the RWR and missiles were observed inflight. A drag was initiated and the missiles were defeated. The trail two ship was directed to egress that area and to attack the SA-2 site that Lead had originally attacked. This was accomplished with unknown results.

18. During egress several additional SAMs were fired at the flights, but "g" manuevers, egress altitudes in excess of 25,000 plus, and speeds above the mach enabled all flights to successfully egress the area.

19. After accomplishing a "fence out" check a head count was taken to determine any losses. All 20 aircraft reported in with no battle damage. An introspective RTB concluded with a twenty ship ladder, two by two, to initial full stop.

20. Post flight analysis of video tape and pilot debrief confirmed visual acquisition of over 40 SAMs. RWR indicated more, particularly SA-6s, of which none were sighted. AAA was reported as very heavy in several target areas, particularly along the coast and around Kuwait International Airport.

21. The 401st successfully attacked the two airfields and post mission debrief with the package commander indicated that other than receiving a bit of RWR, no SAM launches were encountered. The 157 TFS had apparently destroyed the SAMs or caused them to deplete their missile supply. The primary mission had been accomplished.

22. Reflecting on the results of day one, conclusions are that the training programs of the 157 TFS, which have stressed proper comm, formation discipline, mutual support, and proper employment of maneuvers with chaff have been very effective. Additionally, No fighter aircraft should ever be tasked in a radar missile environment without an operational ECM Pod. The essential element required for SEAD is adequate EW support. The EF-111 that failed to show had weather aborted. The F-4Gs had, for an unknown reason, been retasked by CENTAF. SEAD requires a concerted effort for maximum effectiveness. The 157 TFS concluded we could have used a few more assets on Day 1.

23. There was some concern, for those of us that lost our virginity on this Day One/AM Go, that all combat missions were as intense and frightening as the one we had just experienced. We were comforted when our Squadron Commander, with 236 combat missions in Viet Nam, concluded the mission debrief by stating "Of my 237 combat missions ..... this one was definitely one of the top five scariest"! And so the adventure began.....

[redacted]
Mission Commander, Day 1, AM Go

THE LINEUP

1. JERNIGAN	5. PENNINGTON	9. RICHARDSON	13. PATRICK	17. JEFFERSON
2. MARSHALL	6. FINKE	10. EDWARDS	14. NOTTOLI	18. SPRATT
3. COLN	7. PLUNKETT	11. BALL	15. GURNEY	19. AMBROSE
4. JOHNSON	8. MONNEYHAN	12. CAIN	16. BUDDIN	20. SISEMORE

WAR STATS
for the
157 TFS
SCANG

TOTAL COMBAT SORTIES : 1750

TOTAL COMBAT HOURS : 4446

(air-to-ground combat missions = 1359)
(air-to-air combat missions = 351)

157 Fighter Squadron dropped 3,958,888 pounds of munitions on enemy targets

The unit maintained an average Mission Capable Rate (for aircraft) of 95%

From 1 Jan 91 through 31 Mar 91 there were only 3 days the unit started the day with less than 23 of 24 aircraft Mission Capable.



INFORMATION PAPER

7 Feb 1992

SUBJECT: 1992 Reserve Components Handbook: Part II -- Reserve Contributions to the Persian Gulf War (Army National Guard)

During Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM the Army National Guard clearly demonstrated its ability to alert, federalize and rapidly deploy combat-ready units to a theater of operation. In addition to the strategic deployment to Southwest Asia, the Army National Guard also deployed units to Europe and to military installations within the United States.

The Department of the Army federalized 398 ARNG units with 62,411 soldiers for Operation DESERT STORM from 48 states, the District of Columbia, Guam, and Puerto Rico. 297 ARNG units (37,848 soldiers) were validated and deployed to SWA. 16 units (3,378 soldiers) deployed to Europe. 57 units (5,993 soldiers) were trained as Roundout Units or employed as continental United States support. Two other units were validated for deployment but remained at their mobilization stations because the ground war ended in 100 hours.

Guard soldiers were ready, available and deployable. When called, 99.99% of Army National Guard unit members reported for active duty. Of these, 94% were deployable. The remaining six percent (3,974 of 62,411) were not eligible for deployment under provisions of U.S.C. 673b and Department of Defense guidelines because they either had not completed Initial Entry Training, were high school students, were officer candidates, or were on medical hold.

Army National Guard units arrived at their respective mobilization stations on schedule within 72 hours of federalization. This enabled their timely use as part of the Total Force.

The presidential callup of ARNG units bolstered the support of the populace for Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM in communities throughout America. To further promote grass roots support and assist the soldier and his family, the National Guard established 466 Family Support Centers throughout the United States. These centers assisted over 200,000 family members from all the armed services.

Sixty-seven percent (67%) of all Army National Guard units deployed within 45 days of being federalized, 41% deployed within 30 days, and 28% deployed within 20 days of federalization. All Roundout Brigades and Battalions met the readiness deployability criteria established by the Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System (AMOPS) on the first day of federalization.

During the first days of the crisis in August 1990, governors and adjutants general sent messages to the Chief of the National Guard Bureau pledging volunteers and resources for deployment to the Persian Gulf.

In early August, volunteers from the 228th Signal Brigade, South Carolina ARNG, deployed to Southwest Asia with equipment to support Army Central Command Headquarters, the first two arriving on 9 August 1990, within hours of arrival of the lead elements of the 82d Airborne Division. Over 1,200 Army Guard volunteers served in support of Operations DESERT STORM and DESERT SHIELD.

Three Roundout Brigades, three Roundout Tenth Battalions, and an Aviation Attack Battalion mobilized and trained to the highest levels of combat readiness. This included establishing new standards through successful National Training Center brigade rotations of four battalion task forces and daylight defensive live-fire target 'kills' of up to 93%.

The Army Guard was successful in rapidly deploying 63 Colonel or Lieutenant Colonel level commands to the Central Command area of operations. The 23 Colonel level commands consisting of two field artillery brigades, ten group headquarters, and eleven hospitals. The 40 Lieutenant Colonel level commands consisted of 33 battalions and seven rear area operations centers (RAOC).

The Army National Guard's major successes include the deployment of combat field artillery brigades and combat engineer groups.

In January 1991, the 142d Field Artillery Brigade, Arkansas ARNG, joined VII Corps (US). It provided general support/reinforcing fires for the 1st Infantry Division, firing 48 missions and a total of 692 rounds and rockets in preparation for the ground offensive. The 142d later fired artillery preparation in support of the 1st Infantry Division's breaching operation, and then fired field artillery reinforcing missions for the British 1st Armoured Division. The brigade would eventually fire a total of 41 missions and 682 rounds and rockets during the ground offensive. Brigadier Hammerbeck, Commander 4th Armoured Brigade (UK) said: "To support this I arranged with CO 2 Field Regiment RA for us to have a large and impressive artillery bombardment. I was given effectively two brigades of Arty. from the U.S. Army, we got the National Guard 142nd Artillery Brigade with two batteries each of MLRS and M110. By golly, they were good."

One of the 142d's units, the 1st Battalion, 158th Artillery, OK ARNG, a Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) unit, fired over 900 rockets in support of the British 1st Armoured Division's 4th Armoured Brigade. This was the highest rate of fire of any field artillery unit in support of VII Corps (US) and Third US Army

operations. The Oklahoma cannoneers executed their first fire mission just 48 hours after arrival in theater.

The 196th Field Artillery Brigade, TN ARNG deployed to SWA with the 1-181st FA (8" SP) (TN), 1-623d FA (8" SP) (KY) and the 1-201st FA (155 SP) (WV). The brigade supported the XVIII Airborne Corps (US), moving 110 miles into Iraq without stopping for rest.

The 1st Battalion, 201st Field Artillery (155mm Self Propelled) from West Virginia, was attached to the 196th FA Brigade, Tennessee ARNG. Arriving in Saudi Arabia on 2 Feb 91, the battalion fired its first fire mission (521 rounds) on 18 Feb 91 in direct support of the 6th Light Armored Division (French). During the ground offensive the 1-201 FA drove 362 miles into Iraq while attached to the 18th FA Brigade in support of the French.

The 265th Engineer Group from Georgia commanded four battalions, (3 active and 1 USAR) and provided support to the XVIII Airborne Corps. The 212th Engineer Company from TNARNG, was the first ground unit to attack enemy positions inside Iraq. Given the mission to be lead company to construct Main Supply Route (MSR) MONTANA, the 212th, on 18 February 1991, attacked across the Iraqi border, and cleared two blockhouses of Iraqi soldiers. They then secured the area while they built 6.5 miles of MSR inside Iraq in the 101st Air Assault Division's sector. On the day before the ground offensive started, the 212th Engineer Company breached the berm in front of the 24th Infantry Division. The company, 67 percent of whom are Vietnam veterans, worked 24 hours a day, seven days a week for the entire five months and seven days they were in Southwest Asia.

ARNG Defense Movement Coordinators approved over 9,300 military convoy requests from all armed services.

Army National Guard units supplied the Active Army with 283 heavy expanded mobility tactical trucks, 50 heavy equipment transporters, and 52 electronic maintenance shops in support of Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

Additionally, 4,300 ARNG soldiers volunteered to fill 14 units deployed to SWA that have been identified to remain in-country for up to one year as Residual Force units. This willingness to serve is clear evidence of the patriotic spirit of individual soldiers and units of the Army National Guard of the United States.

Over 1,500 Army Guardsmen have volunteered to assist demobilization stations with equipment reconstitution.

These accomplishments clearly demonstrate that the Army National Guard is an integral part of the Army's warfighting capability and strategic force. Contingency plans and force

lists should include Army National Guard commands based on their successful mobilization and deployment for Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

STRENGTHENING THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE: FULL PARTNERS IN THE TOTAL FORCE

During the post-Cold War era, America must have a strong military to deter war, defend vital U.S. interests and stand up for American values. At the same time, America also must meet important domestic needs and build a strong economy. In keeping with the traditional dual-role of citizen-soldiers, the National Guard and Reserve can play a key part in maintaining a strong national defense and meeting important domestic needs.

Importance of the Guard in War and Peace. As the Governor of Arkansas, I know and understand the importance of the National Guard in both war and peace. I supported the use of force and a strong role for the Guard in Operation Desert Storm. During that operation, the Arkansas National Guard mobilized 3000 personnel and sent 2200 overseas -- the second highest of any state. Arkansas was particularly proud of the 142nd Field Artillery Brigade, which saw combat serving with both American and British troops in the liberation of Kuwait. Since the Revolutionary War, American citizen-soldiers have left their families and homes to defend our freedom and security. Desert Storm added another proud chapter to this tradition of courage and sacrifice.

From first-hand experience, I also understand and value the Guard's vital role in responding to natural disasters and in meeting domestic needs. I have called on the Guard for a wide variety of missions from emergency relief like assistance during spring floods to domestic action projects like improving rural roads to drug eradication efforts like destroying vacant buildings used by drug dealers. In every case, the Guard has responded quickly and effectively.

Post-Cold War Role of Guard and Reserve. This will be the first election since the end of the Cold War. To better meet post-Cold War threats we should re-structure our military forces away from defending against a short-warning, Soviet-style attack in Europe toward the mission of projecting forces to counter regional threats to U.S. interests. I have disagreed with the administration about the nature of the restructuring. The administration would maintain a large force -- 150,000 troops -- in Europe and would stress a risky space-based SDI program. In contrast, I would maintain a strong commitment to NATO with a smaller force -- 75,000-100,000 troops -- while developing our capability to respond to regional contingencies. I would also concentrate on developing defenses against short-range missiles like SCUDs and limited ICBM threats against the United States itself.

Another of the key judgments in the post-Cold War security environment is the role of the National Guard and Reserve. Here too, I have a fundamental disagreement with the

administration. It believes that the National Guard and Reserve forces should play a lesser role. I believe in a greater role for the Guard and Reserve in the aftermath of the Cold War.

Full Partners in the Total Force. The National Guard should be a full partner in all areas of our Total Force: combat forces, combat support forces and combat service support forces. We should expand the domestic role of the National Guard as we approach the 21st century. The National Guard has served us well in war and in peace, and we need to protect the force structure and readiness of these citizen soldier forces so that they can continue to serve us well in the future.

We will always need a strong active duty component -- one that's able to deploy on a moment's notice and act decisively in the first days of a conflict. But, after satisfying our need for an early deploying crisis force, we should look closely at placing additional forces and missions in the National Guard and Reserve components. Guard and Reserve units proved during Desert Storm that they could get the job done and get it done right. We learned a great deal from this experience and should apply the lessons learned from this conflict to further improve readiness and training so that the National Guard can play an even larger role in the Total Force of the future and be a full partner with the active duty force.

Need for Guard and Reserve. Therefore, I disagree with the current Administration's plans to reduce drastically National Guard force structure and personnel. I also disagree with the current Administration's plan to eliminate the historic combat role of the Army National Guard. The National Guard makes more sense than ever in the new post-Cold War world for several reasons.

Unforeseen Contingencies: The National Guard gives us an affordable reinforcement and surge capability that we might need in the future if world circumstances radically change. The current administration does not seem to accept this point and, instead, seeks to eliminate large numbers of National Guard units. We need to maintain strong Guard and Reserve forces today so that they can serve us tomorrow if we need to once again build a large-scale military.

Economics: Dollar for dollar, the Guard and Reserve are the most cost effective way to preserve combat capability in an era of declining defense budgets. National Guard units typically cost only 25-75 percent of active units.

Value of Citizen Soldiers: The President must have the support of the American people for any future large scale or lengthy conflict that risks large numbers of American lives. The National Guard -- through its citizen soldiers -- is an institution through which the American people are involved with the monumental decisions affecting war and peace.

State Missions: The National Guard plays a vital domestic role, including helping to stop the flow of illegal drugs into our country, assisting with natural disaster relief -- such as we see now in Florida -- and restoring order in riot-torn areas -- such as we saw in Los Angeles. The current Administration has not taken the state mission into account in its force structure plan. In fact, the Base Force -- as this plan is called -- would render some State Guard forces incapable of meeting state missions relating to natural disaster relief and urban unrest. This is

a short-sighted approach and, as President, I would not let it stand. I believe that we should strengthen and expand the role of the National Guard at the state level. The National Guard is a wonderful role model for youth and could be utilized in a host of new capacities, including in our schools and in drug rehabilitation, as well as in the traditional areas they have served us well.

Hard Choices. But, just as we must appreciate the central strategic significance of the Guard and Reserve in the post-Cold War world, we must also recognize that the entire force -- both active and reserve -- will be down-sized. As President, I would step up to these hard choices. My plan for reductions would differ from the administration's in several fundamental ways. First, I would reject the deep, across-the-board cuts proposed by the administration. Second, any reductions in National Guard units must take account of the vital role these units play in their own states. We should distribute any reductions in a way that ensures the Guard is still able to perform its state functions. Third, we must assist the transition of any Guard members who are released. There is a generous transition package of incentives and assistance for active duty personnel, but the administration has not extended it to the Guard and Reserve. I would. We should treat all of the heroes who won the Cold War fairly and with compassion.

The bottom line is that the National Guard is an effective military force for international and national missions; its forces cost less than active duty troops; and it keeps our citizenry involved with the decision affecting war and peace. The Founding Fathers were right about the vital role of the citizen-soldier in our national security and I would work to strengthen this role in the post-Cold War world.

NEWS RELEASE

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IMMEDIATE RELEASE March 26, 1992

DOD SPECIFIES GUARD AND RESERVE UNITS TO ELIMINATE

Defense Secretary Dick Cheney today sent Congress a list of 830 National Guard and Reserve units to be reduced or inactivated during the next two years, as the Defense Department continues to draw down the size of the military in line with changing national security requirements and reduced defense budgets.

"The National Guard and Reserve are invaluable national assets, but we are cutting the size of the entire military force, both active duty and reserve. If we're allowed to do it right, we will have smaller armed forces, but they will be well trained, well equipped, and highly capable," Cheney said.

Nearly 80 percent of the Guard and Reserve units to be inactivated were intended to support active duty units, also being eliminated, that were assigned to the defense of Europe in the event of a major attack from the now-defunct Warsaw Pact. The rest of the active and reserve units to be eliminated are no longer needed in light of other changes in the world security picture and reduced defense budgets. The Department's base force plan calls for reducing active duty, reserve, and civilian personnel by nearly one million between 1990 and 1995.

"We cannot simply reduce the active force and replace what we take out with more reserves. Some missions are appropriate for the reserves; others are not. Under the total force plan, both have essential roles to play in providing for the nation's security.

"But if we do as some have suggested -- cut the active force and don't touch the reserves -- that would result in an unbalanced force, incapable of meeting our requirements," Cheney said.

The plan calls for closing down units in all fifty states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico, ending military service for more than 140,000 guardsmen and reservists, some of whom served in the Persian Gulf war.

(more)

Most of the reductions come from reserve units in the Army -- 80,000 from the Army National Guard and 45,000 from the Army Reserve. The Navy Reserve will shrink by about 10,500, and the Marine Corps Reserve will lose about 2,700. The Air Force Reserve faces the smallest number of cuts, about 740, because its mission is worldwide, not tied to a specific theater of operation. All the cuts would be made over two years, during fiscal years 1992 and 1993.

The number of personnel on active duty has been dropping steadily since 1987. Today's US active duty force of about 1.94 million is the smallest since before the Korean War. By 1997, it will drop further to about 1.63 million. But parallel reductions in the reserve component are behind schedule, because Congress has blocked planned reductions in the reserve, despite changing national security demands and declining defense spending.

From a current reserve component end strength of about 1.15 million, the Department's plan would cut about 35,000 in the first year and 113,000 in the second year, leaving just over one million in the Guard and Reserve at the end of FY 1993. The reductions will save $2.1 billion in personnel, operations, and equipment costs in FY 1993, with cumulative FY 92-97 savings of over $20 billion.

The size of the active duty Army stayed flat through the 1980's, but the Army reserve component grew as the Army shifted more of the European contingency mission to the reserves. The active duty force will be 13 percent smaller in 1993, compared to 1980. But even after the FY 92 and 93 reductions, the reserve component will be 16 percent larger than in 1980. Today's Army has a larger reserve component than active duty force, with 755,776 in the Guard and Reserve and 710,821 in the active force.

"If we have to pay to keep reserve units that no longer have a mission, we will be forced to cut spending in other critical areas. That will reduce the resources we can devote to training, maintenance, and modernization. And we'll end up with the same kind of hollow forces we had in the 1970's," Cheney said.

Even with the reductions planned for the National Guard and Reserve, total reserve component end strength will still be nearly 50,000 larger by 1995 than it was before the defense buildup of the 1980's. The Department's base force plan calls for a reserve component of about 920,000 by FY 1995, compared to about 870,000 in 1980. Despite the reductions related to reduced missions, the Guard and Reserve would constitute about 36 percent of the total base force, nearly the same as the level today.

- end -

RESERVE COMPONENT FORCE STRUCTURE REDUCTIONS

	FY92					FY93					TOTAL
STATE	USAR	ARNG	USNR	USMCR	USAFR	USAR	ARNG	USNR	USMCR	USAFR	
Alabama		553				925	1,430	11			2,919
Alaska		328									328
Arizona		469				336					805
Arkansas						64	735	40			839
California		2,905	1,915	320		3,221	3,614	249		551	12,775
Colorado			87			4	150	106			347
Connecticut		909				123	1,764	40			2,836
Delaware						351	172				523
Florida			584			676	1,126	220			2,606
Georgia		687	94			1,263	537	40			2,621
Hawaii								7			7
Idaho		99				138					237
Illinois		1,195	263			3,519	489	413			5,879
Indiana			80			1,013	28	39			1,160
Iowa		488				960	138	37			1,623
Kansas		814	44			740	2,026				3,624
Kentucky		162				667	522				1,351
Louisiana		814	217			1,137	236	22			2,426
Maine			385				758				1,143
Maryland			39			1,051	425	40			1,555
Massachusetts		1,856		122		1,164	5,030	301			9,473
Michigan		705	91		191	1,783	3,857	585			7,212
Minnesota		2,155	54			1,595	84				3,888
Mississippi						639	680	74			1,393
Missouri			327			1,334	1,941	104			3,706
Montana		450	66				16				532
Nebraska							1,385				1,385
Nevada		118					4				122
New Hampshire		463				767	560				1,790
New Jersey						3,028	1,657	40			4,725
New Mexico						239	117				356

	FY92					FY93					TOTAL
STATE	USAR	ARNG	USNR	USMCR	USAFR	USAR	ARNG	USNR	USMCR	USAFR	
New York		1,754				2,502	5,426	183			9,865
North Carolina			34			334	1,562	137			2,067
North Dakota			30				794				824
Ohio		1,255	220			2,437	4,083	46			8,041
Oklahoma		529				480	3,399	32			4,440
Oregon		741				105	68	39			953
Pennsylvania			39			4,005	238	365			4,647
Rhode Island			1,105			206	325	60			1,696
South Carolina		212	166				810	19			1,207
South Dakota							154				154
Tennessee		288	72	76		486	259	365			1,546
Texas		2,383	33			1,240	28	40			3,724
Utah						334	304				638
Vermont		68				522	677				1,267
Virginia		578	389			173	200				1,340
Washington		58	69			638	801	181	170		1,917
West Virginia		134				222	917				1,273
Wisconsin		570	181			1,277	4,518				6,546
Wyoming		225									225
Puerto Rico		688				261	274				1,223
Guam											0
DC			156				16				172
Virgin Islands											0
Germany						96					96
US		*667				*1898	*735		**1986		5,286
Korea						1,155					1,155
TOTALS	0	25,320	6,740	518	191	45,108	55,069	3,835	2,156	551	139,488

Notes: No reductions are planned in the Air National Guard for FY92 and 93
*Units programmed for activation, but cancelled
** Spaces to be deactivated, locations not yet specified

Draft

Thank you _____ for that kind introduction. And thank you General Ensslin for the invitation.

You may recall that I was scheduled to address this organization two years ago, but I was forced to cancel at the last minute because of an unscheduled meeting with the President. So it is great to finally be here in person.

I would also like to recognize Major General Robert Moorehead, who is here today. For many years, General Moorehead served as the Commanding General of the 38th Division of the Indiana National Guard.

You know, I recall a summer day 23 years ago when I raised my right hand and swore an oath to defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic.

When I became a member of the National Guard that day, I joined millions of Americans before me and since -- Americans like President Harry Truman, General Jack Galvin, General Bob Moorehead, and all of you.

Like you, I have a deep and abiding love for my country. Like you, I view service in the National Guard as honorable.

I wore the uniform of the U.S. Army for six years. I chose to serve, and I am proud of it.

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

Jeff McKitrick x4213

DATE: 9/11/92

TO: Dennis Ross

FROM: Karl Jackson
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs x4213

Attached to the latest draft of the National Guard talk. I have also attached addition materials we gathered on the Guard. Call if you need help Karl

I would like to read you a portion of a speech I gave more than two years ago to the National League of POW/MIA Families:

"As you know, during the Vietnam era, I served in the Indiana National Guard. Some members of the Indiana National Guard were called to duty in Vietnam, and four of them made the ultimate sacrifice. I did not serve in Vietnam. And while I have not apologized, and never will, for my National Guard service, I recognize that the members of my generation who served in Vietnam made a sacrifice for their country that was far, far greater than mine.

The men and women who served in Vietnam were heros -- not just because of their deeds of valor -- but because they served at a time when words like duty, honor, and country had lost their meaning for many. For the rest of my life, I will live in admiration of their courage."

Well, I want you to know this. I meant every one of those words then. And I still mean every on of them today.

Growing out of the Massachusetts and Virginia militias in colonial America, the National Guard's citizen-soldiers have served our nation well in foreign wars and domestic disorders.

National Guard units have served with distinction in every major war we have fought.

-- The National Guard's 34th Infantry Division spent more actual days in combat during World War II than any other Army unit.

-- Nearly 100% of the Air National Guard was called up for Korea and 25 units deployed overseas.

-- I recall that when I enlisted, "D Company" (Rangers) of the Indiana National Guard was serving with distinction in Vietnam and on its way to being one of the most highly decorated units in that conflict.

-- Within hours of President Bush's decision to deploy forces in to the Persian Gulf, more than 2000 volunteers from Air National Guard units in states such as Texas and Mississippi had been placed on active duty and were airborne in support of Operation Desert Storm.

-- During Operation Desert Storm, more than 500 National Guard units and over 70,000 personnel were called up.

-- I visited our forces in the Gulf two weeks before the war started. And I was impressed with the Guardsmen and women I saw in action there.

-- I saw the National Guard all over Saudi Arabia. A postal unit deployed only miles from the Kuwait border. Logisticians at the base at Dhahran - where I ran into Lieutenant Colonel Sam Graves, my former commander in the Indiana National Guard.

-- Everywhere I went, they were ready to go. And when the war started, they once again proved that the American soldier is the best in the world!

The National Guard also plays a critical role in domestic disturbances and disasters.

When riots erupted in Los Angeles, the initial call for more than 2,000 Guardsmen was met within 12 hours.

-- By the time it was over, nearly 10,000 Guardsmen and women had been called up, most from the 40th Infantry Division based in Long Beach.

-- As Major Patricia Antosh of the 40th Infantry Division put it, "It was a fast transition from a citizen to soldier, both physically and mentally."

-- And the sense of community the Guard fosters is evident in Captain Alan Skidmore's words. Skidmore, a resident of Los Angeles said, "Many of these guys grew up in LA. Many of us felt like we were protecting our neighbors. I'm proud of them all."

On August 24 when Hurricane Andrew hit Florida, the National Guard sprang into action. Within 24 hours, Guardsmen delivered over 12 tons of food and two tankers of water to Miami.

By August 28, more than 5,000 members of the Florida National Guard had been activated. I would say to General Ensslin that he and all those who served in the Florida National Guard have a great deal to be proud of.

And when Andrew hit Louisiana two days later, the Louisiana National Guard was equally up to the task. About 900 Guardsman were immediately activated and sent out to help clear evacuation routes and provide generators to hospitals, cots to shelters, and security to all.

So let me say to the California, Florida and the Louisiana National Guard on behalf of the President -- job well done!

I am confident that the Guard will continue its magnificent support to the nation as we move into the 21st Century.

Our Total Force policy integrates the Active, Guard and Reserve forces into a homogenous whole to produce the most combat capable, military force consistent with economic and political realities. Conceived by a Republican Administration, the goal of this policy is as our Founding Fathers urged: to maintain the smallest standing army consistent with national security. Threats, as we all know, can arise with lightning speed. We seek a Total Force, active Reserve and Guard, large enough to deal with any likely threat to national security. To settle any possible doubts, I hereby reiterate this Administration's continued adherence to the Total Force Policy and the essential role played by the Army and the Air National Guard in that policy.

Now I know that some of you are concerned about the reductions the Guard will take over the next several years. But stringent cuts are being imposed on active forces as well. And you should know that with the proposed cuts, the National Guard in 1997 will be about the same size as it was in 1980, before the big Reagan defense build-up.

Perhaps more important than the absolute size of the guard will be its quality and preparedness. The new National Guard, while smaller, will be better equipped (cite specific modernization improvements).

The new National Guard will be better trained through new, innovative training programs such as Bold Shift. No one is doing away with the Guard or reducing its role in defending the nation.

The new National Guard will be an absolutely vital part of a new base force that was designed to implement to the new national security strategy--and that includes maintaining <u>combat</u> forces.

Now there are some who advocate an increased use of the Guard for regional contingencies. That is, whenever, some tin-horn dictator like Noriega threatens American lives and property, these critics would have us immediately call to active duty the local teachers, businessmen, doctors, and mechanics who compose our National Guard and throw them into battle.

But a major principle in our force restructuring effort is based on what you and I both know: The Guard and Reserve forces are not an economic and military panacea. There are many missions which they cannot fully perform, short of a federal mobilization. Since the greatest number of Guardsmen and Reservists are full-time civilians and part-time military

professionals, they cannot be given peacetime missions which require them to leave their jobs, schools and families frequently and for extended periods of time with little prior notice. If we intrude into their lives for every minor skirmish or trouble spot, we will rapidly have a problem retaining the high-quality Guardsmen and Reservists that the Total Force Requires.

Nor can we assign them missions which require them to immediately drop their civilian pursuits and apply themselves full-time to developing new military skills. They must be given sufficient time within the context of the normal training schedule to prepare themselves to assume new missions.

But within these constraints, I know that the National Guard can achieve the combat readiness the national security requires of them. Units and individuals of the National Guard and the other Reserve components will be relied upon to provide combat forces and critical support not only in large scale or protracted conflicts but also in major contingencies and other crises --and in increasing numbers as military confrontations evolve.

As we always have, we will continue to rely on the National Guard and the other Reserve units and individuals to augment the Active forces in peace and war. When the need is great and the interests are vital, this President knows he can call on the National Guard.

I know some of these changes do not sit well with you, as a fellow guardsman I sympathize. But from where I sit, at the elbow of the Commander-in-Chief of all U.S. forces, I think these changes -- painful as they are -- are the right decisions for America in the last decade of the 20th century. And I know, as loyal soldiers and patriots, Guardsmen are tough enough to face the new orders and keep marching.

Every member of the Guard knows -- as a result of actual military service -- that you can only cut so much before armed forces begin to lose their ability to function. Therefore I would ask you to maintain your skepticism about people who claim that they can easily cut another $60 billion from the U.S. defense budget by simply doing more with less. The last time we tried this approach to budgeting we got the Desert One catastrophe, rather than the victory of Desert Storm.

The President's defense program is designed to respond to the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union. His program calls for a 25% reduction in our armed forces, so that we can cut defense spending by $400 billion by 1997.

The President is proposing that defense spending be reduced to only 3.4% of GNP -- the lowest level since Pearl Harbor. And

let me tell you something. Former Navy pilot George Bush sure understands the strategic significance of that date!

Those who propose cuts even deeper than these are not being prudent. Some critics, for example, are calling for additional cuts in defense totalling $60 billion over the next five years. And they claim that their cut is really small -- almost insignificant. What they don't realize is that the present U.S. Army budget is $63 billion, approximately the size of the proposed cut. Sure it would be spread over five years but it still means that at the end of five years the equivalent of the entire U.S. Army budget will have disappeared.

You know the President has called for reducing our Armed Forces by 500,000 men and women. This number was based on the minimum end strength necessary to support our interests world wide. Some of our critics are calling for additional cuts of 200,000. That is the equivalent of 40% of the U.S. Army! Is this motivated by far sighted and prudent appreciation of defensive needs of someone simply using DOD as a cash-cow.

Well, the Soviet bear may be dead, but there are still wolves out there in the world. And cutting the equivalent of more than half our Army does not sound like a good idea to me!

In Europe, the military situation has changed significantly. As a result, we are able to reduce our forces drastically. The President has proposed to do just that, cutting our forces there by half. Our critics would cut the remaining forces by another third, while at the same time claiming they are maintaining a credible force.

Well, go ask our European allies whether they think such a force would be credible. They will tell you -- no. And they would be right.

The President has called for minimizing the cuts in military research and development spending. He wants to make sure that the men and women of our armed forces -- active, reserve, and Guard -- always will have the best military equipment in the world.

Our critics, however, have called for reconfiguring the Air Force's new Advanced Tactical Fighter and the Army's main battle tank into low-technology, less-capable systems. They ignore the fact that many non-Soviet, non-Russian countries are armed with state-of-the-art military technology. In Desert Storm we went to war with the very best weapons that could be developed and it paid off. Maybe those who advocate doing it on the cheap haven't considered the real costs -- the lives of American servicemen and women.

Well, I've got news for those critics. This President will never send our sons and daughters into combat with second-rate tanks and second-class fighters!

Our Armed Forces have come a long way from Jimmy Carter's "hollow army". But the path from Desert One to Desert Storm was not easy. We had to fight the Democratic Congress every step of the way. Before we could defeat the Iraqi Army, we had to throw back assaults from the Democratic Congress.

Well, we won that battle, which allowed us to win an even more important battle against Saddam Hussein. And I don't think the American people are ready for "Jimmy Carter II."

I think the American people want a proven leader, strong on defense, experienced in foreign policy, and I don't think it hurts one bit to have a person who has served in military uniform to be in the White House. The American people want a leader with character. A leader known and respected around the world.

A leader who knows the importance of keeping faith with the men and women of our Armed Forces. Soldiers he has had to send into harm's way and, God forbid, may have to again.

A leader who has shared the crucible of experience with all the men and women who have proudly worn the uniform of the United States Armed Forces. The American people want George Bush.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
(Englewood, Colorado)

For Immediate Release September 15, 1992

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT
TO 114TH GENERAL CONFERENCE OF THE
NATIONAL GUARD ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES

Salt Palace Convention Center
Salt Lake City, Utah

9:03 A.M. MDT

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you all so much. And may I first thank General Ensslin, for being my host here today, and all of you for that wonderful reception. And, of course, I want to single out Utah's Governor, Norm Bangerter, who's just done a superb job for this -- (applause) -- I see we have some Utah Guard folks here. And while you're clapping, Jim Hanson, a member of the United States Congress, doing a great job for our country. (Applause.)

And may I salute all the leaders of the National Guard.

I understand -- with some embarrassment, I understand that some of you may have had to go through room changes to -- (laughter) -- sorry about that. I really feel badly about that. And I apologize for any inconvenience. But I really am very, very pleased to be here with you.

I was thinking of giving a political speech, a real stemwinder with catchy sound bites, the usual biting insults. Then I got to thinking -- I'm not going to do that -- you've already sacrificed enough for your country. (Laughter and applause.)

Instead, I'd like to talk about a more serious subject -- America's national defense and really our place in the world. I firmly believe that just because we face stiff challenges at home -- and we do -- it doesn't mean that America can pull in its wings and ignore the world outside our borders. Think of the world of change that we've seen the past few years. Today, the Berlin Wall, the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union itself -- Soviet empire -- all are gone, swept away by the most powerful idea known to man: the undeniable desire of every individual to be free. Remember the communists' claims that history was on their side? Well, today, the "dominoes" all fall in democracy's way.

We must recognize these events for what they were: a vindication of our ideals -- but also, a victory for the men and women who fought for freedom. (Applause.) Because this triumph didn't just happen. Imperial communism didn't just fall -- it was pushed. And the National Guard was pushing every inch of the way. (Applause.)

From Concord and Lexington Green to the sands of Desert Storm, Guardsmen or their forefathers have served with distinction in every major war that America ever fought.

In August of 1990, within days of my decision to draw a line in the sand -- more than 4,000 volunteers from National Guard units all across America were activated, airborne and on the way to the Persian Gulf -- the first of 767 National

Guard units called up during Desert Storm. And when American troops rolled across the Iraqi border -- and I'll never forget that day -- the National Guard was among the very first to cross.

Here at home, when riots ripped South Central, ripped Los Angeles, the California Guard answered the call -- 2,000 in just the first six hours. You went into the streets to protect the innocent against the outlaws, to restore the peace.

Late last month, when Hurricane Andrew roared in -- again, the National Guard answered the call -- delivering 215 tons of food, water, and supplies to Miami in the first 24 hours alone, helping bring hot meals and comfort to people who had lost their homes. And Guardsmen are working right now to bring comfort to the island of Kauai.

You've all seen the pictures of people hugging the Guardsmen in their fatigues. You know one thing for sure, it wasn't to thank them for their cooking. But nevertheless -- (laughter) -- what the Guard is doing in Homestead and Hawaii and in Lafayette Parish is a God-send. It shows us the true meaning of service, of leadership, of love of country.

This is an important task for which the Guard has, and will continue to have, the primary responsibility -- and where we only turn to our active forces for back-up. Indeed, that happened in the Miami situation, as you know. It's happening now out in Kauai as well.

We need to know that the Guard is there. There for the crises at home -- there for the challenges abroad. There when a nation in need looks to you to protect life and liberty.

As all of you know, our Cold War victory means a downsizing in our national defenses -- active, Reserve and Guard alike. But we remain committed to our total force concept: the smallest standing army consistent with our national security, and yet large enough to deal with any likely threat. And for that total force policy to be effective a strong Army and Air National Guard are essential. (Applause.)

Let me be clear -- maintaining strong, capable Reserve and Guard forces will remain essential to our military strategy. You are part of the flexible forces we will need to meet our new military challenges. In fact, we can move certain units or functions from active forces to the reserves to lower costs. And at the same time, we recognize the need to be sensitive to the demands placed on individual National Guardsmen, Reservists and really to their families. As true citizen-soldiers, our Guardsmen must devote time to their families, civilian occupations or education. If we intrude upon you for every trouble, we may find it hard to keep the very best soldiers that characterize the Guard today.

I know that my opponent will be following me today. So you can expect to hear stories about my administration's cutback of the Guard. Of course, the new National Guard will be smaller -- just as our active forces are being reduced. Anyone who tells you different is simply not leveling with you. But as long as I am President of the United States, the National Guard will be well-trained and well-equipped. And as Commander-in-Chief I can assure you, we will never short-change the National Guard. (Applause.)

Yes, I'm cutting back defense spending with the end of the Cold War -- through orderly and deliberate downsizing. But don't forget the facts. My opponent proposes to cut nearly $60 billion -- beyond which my civilian and military experts believe is responsible -- $60 billion more than the cuts that I have proposed. Now, let me say this: You cannot cut $60 billion more from defense and not touch the armed forces. You simply cannot do it.

We have to be very careful with our defense downsizing. At other times in our history, political leaders rushed to carve apart our military -- we remember that -- leaving only a hollow shell. And then other Americans paid a big price -- paid even with their lives for those mistakes.

The defense budget is more than a piggy bank for folks who want to get busy beating the swords into pork barrels. (Applause.) The President has got to stand up for an America second to none. And he must be able to say: America is safe -- as long as America stays strong.

I learned the value of military strength the hard way -- and some of you might identify with this -- commanders of the Guard units. I learned it the hard way -- by sending our troops into battle. And I am proud of our accomplishments -- thankful that I've been able to give the order so many Presidents longed to give, for many of our nuclear forces to "stand down" from alert. Proud to be the first President in 50 years to lead an America that's not at war, hot or cold. But the fact is: For all the great gains we've made for freedom; for all the peace of mind that we've secured for the young people in this country -- the world remains a dangerous place.

The Soviet bear may be extinct -- but there are still plenty of wolves in the world. Dictators with missiles narco terrorists trying to take over whole countries. Ethnic wars. Regional flashpoints. Madmen we can't allow to get a finger on the nuclear trigger. And you have my word on this: I will never allow a lone wolf to endanger American security. We must remain strong. (Applause.)

No, our work in the world did not end with our victory in the Cold War. Our task is to guard against the crises that haven't caught fire, the wars that are waiting to happen, the threats that will come with little or no warning. I make this promise: As long as I am President, our services will remain the best trained, the best equipped, the best led fighting forces in the world. This is the way we guarantee the peace. (Applause.)

And let me add something else that's really close to my heart. Even as we respond to the new challenges, we must never forget those who flew and fought in face of the old. The one hero we must never forget, is the hero who has never come home. And I pledge to every American family awaiting word of a loved one: We will continue to demand the fullest possible accounting for every POW and MIA. (Applause.) And we will not have normal relations with Hanoi until we are satisfied on that account. (Applause.)

I speak of these matters this morning to this very special group because they are important -- they're important to America, they're important to the world.

Like every nation, America today is challenged by a global economic transition. I have outlined my Agenda For American Renewal -- it's a comprehensive series of actions that we must take to match our military supremacy -- by remaining the world's leading export superpower and economic superpower.

Yet I hope that in our zeal to concentrate on these problems here at home, we do not forget America's unique role abroad. Other nations still look to us for leadership -- military leadership, moral leadership, and economic leadership.

And as one who has held this office for four years -- I hope that when evaluating the two men who want this job -- Americans will not ignore the President's role as Commander-In-Chief.

There's been a lot of controversy swirling around about service to country, about using influence to avoid the military. And I've read a great deal of speculation saying that I was going to come out here and use this forum to attack Governor Clinton. I want to tell you, I do feel very strongly about certain aspects of the controversy swirling around Governor Clinton, but I didn't come here to attack him. I came to defend and support the National Guard and those who serve in it. (Applause.)

Four years ago, Dan Quayle was savagely attacked and ridiculed by the national press for going into the National Guard. His critics attacked the guard as a haven for draft dodgers.

Those critics are wrong. Dan Quayle spent six years in the Indiana National Guard. (Applause.) He was not sent to Vietnam, but some of his fellow Guardsmen were -- and four of them never came back.

No candidate has ever been attacked more unmercifully than Vice President Quayle, but he stood his ground, and he answered every question calmly and with candor. He told the truth. This is service to country, and I am very proud of the Vice President, and I am very proud of the National Guard. (Applause.)

But why do these questions even matter? Why are they part of our national debate? They matter, because despite all our problems at home, we can never forget, that we ask our Presidents to lead the military -- to bear the awful authority of deciding to send your sons or daughters in harm's way.

I remember the night of Desert Storm. Barbara and I had Dr. Billy Graham over for dinner there in the White House. And our family -- we still say the blessing at night. So we said a little prayer together, enjoyed some conversation -- but my mind, I will confess, was thousands of miles away.

And after dinner -- I don't know if you can picture the White House Complex -- I went down the elevator in the White House and then walked across by the Rose Garden over to the Oval Office, waiting to hear the results of the initial strike. And I remember walking along the Rose Garden -- and thinking. I wondered -- I was wondering if our military estimates were really accurate, General McPeak having briefed me in detail -- an amazing briefing of what he was confident the Air Force could do -- wondering if it was accurate -- if our smart bombs were as smart as Tony McPeak and other experts told me they were. But mostly, I wondered how our young men and women in the sands of Kuwait felt -- and about their parents back home.

And in the months after that fateful night, I received letters from proud parents, and I tried to read as many as I could. But I lingered longest on the occasional note from the parent whose son or daughter had not returned.

This summer, I got a letter from a woman in Illinois. And her son had been lost in a helicopter accident, no body ever discovered. And on the day she received word, she received a letter from her son. And he said: "Mom and Dad, don't worry about me -- I love the Marines and I love my country." And this July, the mother wrote to me: "As a Gold Star mother it is difficult to accept my son's death, but he is alive in my heart. And I could be bitter with the military and God, but my son would never want me to." (Applause.)

I know the commanders here know I feel a little emotional about this. But you get letters like these -- and you can almost see the faces -- faces of youth and innocence. And you feel the weight of the job. Sending a son or daughter into combat, believe me, is the toughest part of the presidency.

Most Presidents never learn that lesson because, thank God, most don't have to ask others to put their lives on the line. But every President might.

And does this mean that if you have never seen the awful horror of battle -- that you can never be Commander-In-Chief? Of course not. Not at all. But it does mean, that we must hold our Presidents to the highest standard, because they might have to decide -- if our sons and daughters -- should knock early on death's door.

I hope that I am reelected President this November. And like my opponent, I believe I'm best qualified. But I wish for something else -- even more. I hope that whomever is elected to this office, at whatever time in the future, he doesn't have to face the awful decision that I had to face twice. And I hope that the next four years will pass -- indeed, I hope that the next four decades will pass -- without the blood of young Americans being shed on foreign shores.

And today, we can say this future is possible, but no one can say for sure it will happen. And so I commit to you, the proud members and families of the National Guard -- that as long as I am fortunate to hold this office, I will fight for a strong defense, for a strong America, for an America that -- despite our troubles at home -- remains the last beacon of hope and strength around the world.

The Guard has always been part of America's world leadership, and I know you'll continue to help us lead -- in this new world that we have forged together.

Thank you all, and may God bless the United States of America. Thank you very, very much. (Applause.)

END 9:23 A.M. MDT

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HEADLINE: Clinton: GOP whining paid off // Bias charge resulted in 'tough press'

BYLINE: Adam Nagourney

DATELINE: INDEPENDENCE, Mo.

KEYWORD: PRESS COVERAGE:PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE:ELECTION ISSUE: DRAFT DEFERMENT:BILL CLINTON

BODY:

Combative and confident on the eve of the Labor Day campaign kickoff, Bill Clinton assailed President Bush's tactics, defended his own recent harsh attacks and suggested, as Bush has, that the media have been too kind to his opponent.

In a wide-ranging interview, the Democratic presidential candidate seemed jubilant and almost serene as he approached the final 60 days of a candidacy he launched 12 months ago.

He grew agitated only when discussing questions about his draft record - a subject he returned to twice and that his advisers view as perhaps the only serious threat to Clinton's campaign.

Clinton said the new interest in how he handled the draft in 1969 was fueled by reporters overreacting to Republican ''whining'' that media coverage was favoring the Democrats.

He said he was hit much harder on the draft story than Bush was on his role in the Iran-contra affair: ''It's just to try to keep it alive and look like you're being fair,'' he said of new draft allegations. ''I think the Republicans whining about me getting good press probably had some impact on it.

''I thought that was ridiculous. Nobody's had a tougher press than I have. No candidate in history has. It's only gotten good recently because we've gotten good crowds and we're running a good campaign.''

Still, the Arkansas governor, wearing a cap from the Darlington Speedway and waving to supporters as his car sped through South Carolina on Sunday, seemed more at ease and relaxed than at virtually any other time during this turblent campaign.

And despite the recent attention to how he avoided going to Vietnam - including a plane carrying a banner calling him a ''draft dodger'' at several rallies this weekend - he said he felt ''very good about where we are now.''

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He said, ''there are a lot of things to be determined'' before the election. ''It takes courage for the American people to vote for change. And I expect the Republicans to continue the Bush-Quayle line: You know, don't take a chance on change and we'll decline painlessly.''

Clinton made these points:

- He left little doubt about the fierceness of the campaign ahead. Republicans, he predicted, will drop ''an avalanche'' of charges against him that would produce a ''very close'' election.

''It's no accident that these folks have had a lock on the White House all these years: They basically tried to turn their opponents into aliens to the American people,'' Clinton said.

But while Clinton criticized Republican tactics, he defended the tone of his own attacks on Bush last week, in which he suggested to elderly voters that Bush would slash Social Security and Medicare benefits.

Clinton made the high-profile charges at a time when he was struggling to escape a barrage of Republicans questions about his own record.

Bush, in fact, has not expressly proposed cutting Social Security and Medicare, and Clinton's own aides said they thought it was, as a matter of pure politics, unthinkable for a president to actually do that.

Clinton said he was not ''needlessly alarming'' voters. He said his claim was based on the administration's midyear budget review, which includes options, and Bush's promise of both a new tax cut and a balanced budget:

''He's going to have to make even deeper cuts, which takes you into Social Security, or devastate Medicare, or he's not going to do the tax cuts. He has set up - as every serious person knows - a totally unrealistic set of alternatives, in which he can not come close to doing what he said he is going to do.''

Asked whether elderly voters whom he spoke to understood that Bush was not actually making that proposal, Clinton said: ''They absolutely did. I'm not needlessly alarming them. I'm telling them what the president said.''

- Clinton said he expected the three debates proposed by a bipartisan commission - which Bush has yet to agree to - to be turning points. He cited a survey after the Georgia, Maryland and Colorado Democratic primaries, ''which said that of the people that watched the debate, I won handily in all those states. So I think they can matter.''

Clinton recalled Bush's own history of debates with the ease of someone who had spent time studying the subject: Bush ''will likely be effective as he's always been in these debates.''

Clinton said he would wage what he called an ''aggressive'' campaign that combined the bus trips he's done with substantial speeches. He said he believed he had largely succeeded in blunting the kind of Republican cultural attacks that have been so damaging to Democrats in the past decade, but difficulties still lay ahead.

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Voters, he said, ''had been conditioned to believe that (Democrats) don't believe in family, they don't believe in God, they don't believe in America.''

Republicans, Clinton said, ''have a lot of cards to play yet.''

INTERVIEW EXCERPTS

''I expect the Republicans to continue the Bush-Quayle line: You know, don't take a chance on change and we'll decline painlessly.''

''Nobody's had a tougher press than I have. No candidate in history has.''

''I still believe that it's no accident that these folks (Republicans) have had a lock on the White House all these years. They basically tried to turn their opponents into aliens to the American people.''

GRAPHIC: PHOTO; b/w, Jim Bourg, Reuters

CUTLINE: OUTPOURING OF SUPPORT: A rain-soaked Bill Clinton greets the crowd Monday after a speech in Independence, Mo. If elected, he said, he'd provide 'more opportunity, more responsibility, an America strong at home as well as strong abroad.'

SUBJECT: REPUBLICAN PARTY; MEDIA; CANDIDATE; DEMOCRATIC PARTY

NOTES: CAMPAIGN '92; See info box at end of text

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