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Persian Gulf Contribution

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Daniel,

DETAILS AS PROMISED - AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE
COMMITMENT TO THE COMBATED FORCES

DESERT SHIELD: 2 x FRIGATES 1 x OILER/TANKER
HMAS ADRELANE AND DARWIN HMAS SUCCESS
2 x 10 MAN SURGICAL TEAMS IN USS MERCY

DESERT STORM: 1 x DDG 1 x FRIGATE 1 x OILER/TANKER
HMAS BRISBANE HMAS SYDNEY HMAS WESTRALIA
4 x 10 MAN SURGICAL TEAMS IN USS MERCY
23 x MAN RESEARCH DIVING TEAM

10 x MAN DEFENCE INTEL TEAM (EMO/RMSTA)
EXCHANGE PERSONNEL SERVING WITH US AND BRITISH
POST DESERT STORM: 1 NAVY SHIP BLOCKADE DUTIES FORCE
: UN INSPECTOR TEAM MEMBERS.

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Operation DAMASK

The RAN Contribution to the Gulf War

By Lieutenant Commander David Stevens, RAN

In the first half of 1990 few Australians would have thought their defence forces would soon become involved in an armed conflict in the Middle East. However, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait which began on 2 August of that year demonstrated how rapidly international events can affect our own interests. The deployment of Australian naval ships to the Gulf (codenamed Operation DAMASK) eventually resulted in their participation in the largest grouping of warships seen since the end of the Second World War. Indeed, it was the most powerful and complex naval force ever assembled.


The invasion of Kuwait was followed by unprecedented international condemnation and implementation by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) of a series of sanctions banning the trade of all goods to and from Iraq. Soon after the sanctions were in place, and with the primary backing of the USA, a multinational naval force (MNF) was formed to enforce and support the trade embargo. Though never formally instituted the MNF eventually comprised ships from fifteen nations ranging in size from minesweepers through to aircraft-carriers. All the vessels involved worked together with a remarkable degree of integration and all crews felt united in a common cause.

On 10 August 1990 the Prime Minister announced that the guided missile frigates HMAS *Darwin* and HMAS *Adelaide* and replenishment tanker HMAS *Success* were to join the forces assembling in the Middle East.

The first deployment of RAN ships departed Sydney only three days after the official announcement. Having little real idea of what to expect, but aware of the size of the Iraqi threat, a comprehensive program of exercises was conducted enroute. This ensured that by arrival in area men and equipment would be in the highest state of readiness. In early September the three ships had arrived in the Gulf of Oman and immediately began patrol operations in loose association with the international forces already there.

While the RAN ships were on passage to the Gulf, a small logistic support element (LSE) was set up in Oman (see article 'Our man in Oman'). The LSE provided essential ashore support and liaison with Australia for the deployed ships. Following soon after, an Australian defence medical team was sent to join the US Hospital ship *Comfort* (see article 'The Medical Team in the Gulf'), further strengthening the Australian presence.


In maintaining the trade embargo Australian ships were initially limited to operations outside the Arabian Gulf and were at first only allowed to identify, contact, interrogate and warn relevant



THE GULF WAR

vessels. Later though, as additional resolutions clarified UN support, RAN ships were authorised to halt, board, search and, if necessary, seize vessels to ensure effective enforcement of UN sanctions.

Though much of the time on station involved routine patrolling and interrogation, the presence of an Australian Task Group provided an important demonstration of the multinational nature of the coalition forces. During their deployment *Adelaide* and *Darwin* were directly involved in the boarding of six Iraqi merchant ships.



Army Personnel from the 16th Air Defence Regiment, Woodside, Adelaide, manning the RBS-70 missile system onboard HMAS Success flag deck.


Photo: LSPH Kym Dagner

The resolve of Iraqi ships to resist the boardings varied as the interception operations continued. At times warning shots and close manoeuvring were required to force reluctant vessels to halt, but direct fire was never used. In terms of enforcement the embargo was probably the most successful ever instituted and, after putting in place, no significant quantity of goods were able to enter Iraq from sea or air. Unfortunately however, the embargo, while demonstrating international resolve, did not achieve its primary purpose of forcing Iraq to leave Kuwait.


As the crisis continued it became necessary to relieve the units already on station. The destroyer HMAS *Brisbane* and frigate HMAS *Sydney* were the next ships to depart Australia. With more time to prepare than the first DAMASK units and a greater awareness of future requirements, the opportunity

was taken to complete a significant number of enhancements to *Brisbane* and *Sydney* (see article 'Strengthen the Shield'). These enhancements were designed to increase capabilities in communications, surveillance, anti-ship missile defence and damage control. Again a demanding workup program was initiated to prepare the two ships, with particular attention being paid to anti-air warfare and boarding operations.


Brisbane and *Sydney* arrived in the Gulf of Oman in early December relieving *Darwin* and *Adelaide* in sufficient time for the two earlier units to return to Australia in time for Christmas. Success remained on station to provide Australian and international logistics support until the Navy's other replenishment ship HMAS *Westralia* could be made ready.



HMAS Sydney. Dawn in the northern Arabian Gulf
Photo: LCDR Mike MacNeill, RAN



The last time the three ships of the Second Task Group were together. Shortly after this replenishment in the Gulf of Oman Brisbane and Sydney sailed for Singapore while Westralia remained in the Gulf.
Photo: LCDR Mike MacNeill, RAN



RMAS Sydney's Seahawk onboard the US carrier Midway.


Photo: SBLT Andrew Rushbrook, RAN

On 30 November 1990 a message was received that the UNSC had adopted Resolution 678, authorising the use of force against Iraq unless it withdrew from Kuwait by 15 January. In support of this resolution the Australian ships received Government approval to pass through the Strait of Hormuz and enter the Arabian Gulf. This passage was completed for the first time on 16 December. The Task Groups' roles were now expanded to allow preparation for possible future maritime operations in support of MNF military action against Iraq.

Notwithstanding these changes the embargo remained in place and *Brisbane* and *Sydney* initially carried on with the same roles as their predecessors. Though Iraqi merchant ships had virtually ceased to sail, the many merchant ships transiting the area still required to be identified and cleared. However, *Sydney* did manage to take part in the interception of the last two Iraqi vessels to enter the Gulf prior to the war. One of these boardings involved the known sanction-breaker *Ibn Khaldoun* and called for particularly sensitive handling (see article "Boarding the *Ibn Khaldoun*").

In a bid to embarrass the multinational forces the Libyan sponsored *Ibn Khaldoun* had embarked over 240 women and children (and a contingent) of journalists. However, the professional manner in which the Multi-national Naval Forces handled themselves prevented any propaganda value being gained by Iraq and despite attempts to force a confrontation no major incidents occurred. The cargo onboard was declared to be prohibited goods and the ship was forced to divert until it had been unloaded.

As the crisis continued tension and expectation increased within the allied fleet. Vigilance could never be relaxed. The likelihood of an Iraqi pre-



The threat of gas or chemical attack was always present.

Photo: LSPH Kym DeGanen

emptive attack was felt to be high and this was reinforced by several feints by Iraqi combat aircraft into the Gulf. A high level of combat training was maintained that included preparations for chemical warfare defence, further serving to underline the seriousness of developments. In late December the Iraqis continued to escalate events by commencing the deliberate releasing of contact mines into the Gulf. These floating mines posed a threat to all Gulf shipping and continued to be found well after the end of the conflict. It was only through constant lookout that no damage was caused.

As the crisis approached its peak and the UN deadline of 15 January drew closer, tactical control of the Australian Task Group was passed to Rear Admiral Daniel P. March USN embarked on the carrier *USS Midway*. As modern missile armed ships, *Brisbane* and *Sydney* were welcome additions to the anti-air and anti-surface screen around the Gulf carriers, *Midway* and *Ranger*. Success continued to fulfil the indispensable role of replenishment ship, acting as a very useful component of the overall allied logistics force. The RAN ships thus became an integral part of the Arabian Gulf naval strike force now titled, Battle Force Zulu.

THE BOTTOM LINE

The War began on 17 January 1991 at 0145 local time with the launch of Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles and air-strikes from the carriers. All coalition forces intently watched the weight of allied strike power and braced themselves for the expected Iraqi retaliation. To many, the actual start of the war after the many months of tension came with a certain amount of relief and also a quiet confidence in final victory. In the event the expected Iraqi response was muted by the overwhelming force of coalition assets. These included at the height of the conflict: six aircraft-carriers; two battleships; fifteen cruisers, sixty-seven destroyers and frigates; and numerous logistics, amphibious and smaller craft. Despite several attempts, no Iraqi aircraft were ever able to penetrate the defensive screen. The Iraqi Navy consisting primarily of missile-armed patrol-boats was also unable to achieve results and suffered severe losses throughout the campaign. In contrast, the allied naval losses were remarkably light though several carrier aircraft were lost to enemy fire.


RAN ships escorted high-value units and patrolled the Battle Force screen. The confidence placed by the USN in the two RAN combatants was demonstrated by the fact that they were generally stationed up-threat (see diagram 1 and 2). This employment included, when the actions of Iraqi aircraft in Iran were still unclear, being stationed

only some 15 miles off and within sight of the Iranian coast.

Success departed the Gulf at the end of January, bringing to a close a highly successful deployment that had been favourably commented upon by several allied commanders.

The replacement for *Success*, the *Westralia*, arrived a few days later. Arriving at the same time was Clearance Diving Team Three (CDT 3) which was sent to assist in the disposal of the very real and increasing mine threat. *Westralia* was soon employed in replenishment duties, and had already refuelled a Danish and a Norwegian ship, by the time she first replenished *Brisbane* and *Sydney*. CDT 3, meanwhile, began a heavy period of familiarisation training in preparation for the dangerous task of ordnance disposal.

In mid-February, *Sydney* was ordered to commence duties as part of the combat search-and-rescue (CSAR) organisation. The CSAR units were positioned close off the Kuwaiti coast and put in place to recover allied pilots forced to eject over enemy-controlled water. During this period *Sydney* was often within earshot of battle and while *Sydney*'s Seahawk helicopter was not required to rescue any pilots, it was first on the scene, and ready to offer assistance, when the cruiser USS *Princeton* suffered a mine-strike.



As the end of the war approached the tasking of the RAN units in no way decreased. One of the busiest periods for *Brisbane* came as the ground offensive got underway. Two additional carriers *Theodore Roosevelt* and *America* had by this stage joined Battle Force Zulu and *Brisbane* was at times providing control for more than eight fighter strikes and tanker aircraft (these provided air cover for Battle Force Zulu).

Though the rapid allied victory and the announcement of the cease-fire on 28 February 1991 brought some relief to the ships, the threat of floating mines continued. During post cease-fire escort operations in the northern Gulf, *Brisbane* was required to remain within visual distance of a mine until a disposal team could be flown in to destroy it. The cease-fire also allowed CDT 3 to move into action where they were very soon employed clearing Kuwaiti ports of unexploded ordnance and Iraqi booby-

traps (see article 'The work of CDT 3'). Working in atrocious conditions caused by oil-spills and burning oil-wells, CDT3 had played a primary role in clearing four ports before returning to Australia in May. The medical support team aboard *Comfort* also performed valuable service and became the first Australian contingent to return home when they left the area on 11 March 1991.

Brisbane and *Sydney* continued escort operations for replenishment units and carriers until the end of March. Initially left in place, the LSE ashore gradually wound down as the Australian presence slowly reduced.

Although the war officially ended on 12 April 1991, sanctions against Iraq continue to remain in force to date. To demonstrate Australian support for a continuing international presence *Westralia* remained in the Gulf until she was replaced by *HMAS Darwin* in June. Current planning is for a RAN ship to remain while there is still a need to enforce sanctions.

The period of Operation DAMASK marked the first involvement by RAN ships in a conflict for almost twenty years. Admiral Charles Larson USN, the Commander-in-Chief Pacific told the US Senate Armed Services Committee after the conflict that, 'Australia quickly and easily integrated its naval and medical units with US units in the Gulf, proving the value of our relationship and inter-operability.' The high level of inter-operability combined with the validation of the RAN's training as well as its ships and helicopters are the hallmarks of Operation DAMASK.

Lieutenant Commander Street served as a staff officer to the Commander of the RAN Task Group onboard HMAS Brisbane. He is currently a staff officer in Force Development (Sea) of Headquarters Australian Defence Force.

The Work of Clearance Diving Team 3 in the Gulf

By Lieutenant Commander John Griffiths, RAN


During the period 27 January to 9 May 1991 Clearance Diving Team Three (CDT 3) deployed to the Middle East in support of Operations DAMASK and DESERT STORM. The team under my command consisted of twenty-three clearance divers and we had at our disposal 50 tonnes of equipment and explosives. CDT 3 was initially based in Bahrain where it was involved in preparations by US Marines for the potential amphibious invasion of Iraq-occupied Kuwait. As Operation DESERT STORM progressed, this requirement, for various reasons, was negated. The team's primary mission as a consequence became the explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) clearance of the ports of Kuwait, in support of the coalition's coastal warfare and port recovery operations.


CDT 3 entered Kuwait by land in support of these operations on 5 March 1991. The team commenced clearance operations with British and US forces. Our first objective was to clear the vital Kuwaiti port of Mina ash Shuaibah, 30 kilometres

south of Kuwait City. Shuaibah was Kuwait's main port and the only one able to be used by the deep draught vessels required to bring food and water to the devastated country. Speed, therefore, was of the utmost importance to allow humanitarian relief efforts to begin. Combining with almost fifty divers from the US and Royal Navies, CDT 3 began the dangerous task of first clearing the wharves and warehouses of unexploded ordnance and booby traps. Then we entered the black waters of the harbour itself which were made treacherous by thick crude oil and war wrecks. Our task here was to search for and dispose of sea mines.

During the next seven days CDT 3 cleared over 450 000 square metres of seabed, searching for

CDT3 in Ash Shuaibah. The Commander RAN Task Group, Commodore Chris Oxenbould, RAN is in the centre of the picture and the OIC CDT3 Lieutenant Commander John Griffiths, RAN is in (L) front row.






Iraqi Silkworm missiles in Ash Shuaybah—Port Kuwait. CDT3 shared this warehouse with the silkworms for part of March 1991.

Photo: LCDR Mike MacNeill, RAN


Chief Petty Officer Maxwell rendering safe an Iraqi LUGM 145 Buoyant mine at Ras al Qialah. Note the narrow path probed through the land minefield.




buoyant contact and influence ground mines. This effort represented 70 per cent of the harbour area cleared by coalition forces at the time the port was opened to shipping again on 12 March 1991. During this same period, CDT 3 also rendered safe three indigenous Iraqi sea mines washed up on the beaches north of the port. Unexploded ordnance and booby trap clearances of a nearby oil refinery and a supertanker were also carried out, as well as several smaller vessels. Team members also assisted USN personnel recover six Chinese-made Silkworm anti-ship missiles from the nearby Kuwaiti Girls' Science High School.

Upon completion of operations in Shuaybah, the Team switched operations to the south and were tasked with a single force clearance of the Kuwaiti Naval Base of Ras al Qialah and surrounding beaches. Over the next ten days, CDT 3 cleared the heavily bombed naval facility of unexploded ordnance and booby traps, a task requiring four days before it was safe to move all equipment and personnel into the port to commence diving operations. CDT 3 cleared 41,000 square metres of harbour bottom and rendered safe or destroyed an additional thirty-one sea mines.

THE GULF WAR



CDT 3 setting out for a seabed mine search of Port Ras al Shuwaiik.



First dive at Ras al Shuwaiik. It was a combined dive with USN (using MK16), RN (using CDBA) and RAN (using FGT1A diving equipment).

On completion of operations at Ras al Qualai'ah, CDT 3 redeployed north into Kuwait City itself to rejoin British, American and recently arrived French divers to conduct the last phase of port recovery operations. After surviving on ration packs and bottled water in the field it was a welcome change to move into an American compound complete with field kitchen, camp showers and latrines at the port of Ras al Shuwaiik. Here the Team cleared over a million square metres of harbour bottom, conducted ordnance disposal and recovery of ordnance and small arms (including a Silkworm missile) for intelligence purposes. The boat harbour at South al Ahmadi (near Shuaibah) was also cleared and a channel leading out to a safe area surveyed as well.

Coastal Warfare and Port Recovery operations were completed 22 April 1991. The Team returned to Bahrain for a well-earned rest and equipment maintenance and preparations for return to Australia on 11 May 1991, after three and a half months deployed. CDT 3 was disbanded on that date and members returned to their parent teams.

CDT 3 had clearly distinguished itself in Kuwait and earned the RAN Clearance Diving Branch the highest international reputation for its skill and professionalism. Sea mines and ordnance recovered by CDT 3 are now on public display in some naval establishments and the Australian War Memorial.

Lieutenant Commander Griffiths was the Officer-in-Charge of CDT 3. He has since returned to his former appointment as CMC CDT 4 based in WA.

ACHIEVEMENTS OF CDT 3

Ports cleared	4
Total seabed area searched	2 157 200 sq m
Total jacksay laid	155 kms
Total jacksay laid for other nation use	51 kms
Total number of wrecks surveyed	32
Total number of sea mines dealt with	60
Total pieces of ordnance cleared	334 986
Total number of ships cleared	7
Total number of enemy demolition charges rendered safe	30
Total number of buildings port and oil refinery facilities cleared of ordnance and booby traps	Lost count!

Five Months in Defence Watches

By Lieutenant Mack Shelvey RAN, HMAS Brisbane

'Sir, wake up Sir, nearly time to go on watch.'

Oh no, so soon!

Lifeless limbs carry me to the shower. My eyes are a dead give-away; very slightly sunken over gray bags, always a little bloodshot, the old sparkle missing except when I get angry. I must try to keep that temper in check. Boots, overalls with legs rucked into socks, lifejacket on, torch, knife, battle dressing and anti-flash (a fire protective hood and gloves) in the pouch, gas mask in hand: the well dressed man at war. Twenty minutes to spare before I have to relieve Tas (the Anti-Submarine Officer). Down to the Wardroom for a cup of soup, a strong black coffee, two cigarettes and the favourite dog-reared copy of *Wheels* or *Playboy*.

'At last! You're a sight for sore eyes!' The handover is brief because weapons status, sensor status, the program and the tactical situation are already committed to memory. Tas advises me of any changes, messages requiring action, and the Captain's requirements for the next six hours. Then he is gone. In less than two minutes he has transferred a tremendous responsibility to my shoulders, and then disappeared without a backward glance. I now settle into the routine that will take me through the next six hours as Principal Warfare Officer.

Headset on with radio in one ear, internal lines to the other operators and the Officer of the Watch in the other, a third ear listening out for the Captain's call, a fourth for the ORS (Operations Room Supervisor) normally a Petty Officer) and so on. There are nine microphones at the console and over a dozen speakers, telephones, earphones, buzzers and alarms to listen out for. It can be a nightmare!

Check the radar.


Brief the ship's company on the main broadcast.

Check the radar, supervise the radar plotters.

Answer a call on the circuit from an Allied vessel.

Check the radar.

The carrier is on the move now, launching aircraft and steering into wind at 25 knots.



'OOW PWO, come left 340 increase 25.'

Keep the Captain informed.

Check the radar, supervise the radar plotters.

Read the last messages and take action where required. Organise rendezvous for replenishment with a US Navy tanker at 1100.

Check the radar . . . and so on.

Six hours after closing up: 'Hey Hey! Took your time didn't you?' Revenge is sweet. Quickly handover the watch and then down to the mess for a hearty breakfast followed by a relaxing cup of tea and a smoke. Now my alternatives are to write a letter home and get three-and-a-half hours of sleep, or watch a movie and get two-and-a-half hours of sleep. Either way, only five hours after coming off watch it will be:

'Sir, wake up Sir,


established from the ground up as a fully self-supported organisation. An office and a limited storage facility was established in Mina Qaboos, the main port for Muscat, and the only port with alongside berths available to the Task Group during the initial period. A shipping agent was appointed to clear stores arriving by commercial air from Australia, and provided storage until transfer to the Task Group could be arranged. A secure communications link with Australia was eventually established, some forty-five kilometres from the main LSE office, in a discrete portable office within a secure compound staffed by the Omani Air Force. Unclassified communication was provided by ISD telephone and facsimile at the main office. Accommodation and domestic support for the LSE was provided by a local hotel. Rental vehicles were used as required to meet transport needs. For personal security reasons LSE staff generally wore plain clothes.

Every three weeks at least one ship conducted a port visit. Every week a Task Group helicopter visited the air base. In the interim either the *HMAS Success* visited Fujairah, in the United Arab Emirates, to replenish stocks of provisions or one of the ships anchored off the Omani coast, during daylight hours for stand down and recreation. Each of these visits presented an opportunity for transfer of stores, mail and personnel. Careful planning and some innovative ideas generally helped achieve the delivery of stores to ships in reasonable time.

Apart from one shipment of dangerous cargo carried by RAAF aircraft, all stores, mail and personnel from Australia were moved into the Gulf by commercial aircraft. All stores arriving were subject to a three to four-day delay in clearing customs. Apart from a problem with the first shipment, all mail was cleared immediately on arrival. Personnel moving directly to take up postings in the Task Group could transit the airport without delay on a special seaman's visa.

The local infrastructure was sufficient to meet the Task Group's demand for provisions, minor equipment repair, consumable stores and lubricants, limited sport and recreation during ship visits, and specialist medical care and hospitalisation.


The LSE was small during this period. The RAN Liaison Officer had responsibility for planning and coordinating all aspects of RAN logistic support ashore in the area. A large part of this responsibility involved adopting a quasi-diplomatic role to ensure the LSE could conduct its activities in the most effective manner and to represent other significant



*HMAS Success takes onboard beer for the Task Group
Photo: GPOSV 'Fingers' Klau.*

operational and administrative matters to local authorities. A Lieutenant Commander supervised the day-to-day activities of the LSE, arranged ship visits and maintained the cash account which was based on a substantial overdraft maintained at a local bank. A Petty Officer Writer maintained other accounts and did other administration. Communications were handled initially by a Chief Petty Officer Electronic Technical Communications although the load quickly proved too great and a Petty Officer Signals Yeoman was added to the LSE's complement. Technical assistance and repair coordination was the responsibility of a Chief Petty Officer Electronic Technical Systems. Airfreight of stores and mail, and local purchasing of stores and provisions were handled by a Naval Stores Chief Petty Officer and Petty Officer.

Although each member of the team had a primary responsibility related to his category skill, all were required to undertake a variety of other tasks such as handling sailhand mail and general mail, acting as ship visit liaison officer, arranging sporting and recreational activities, arranging medical treatment, negotiating with locals for provision of various services, and representing the RAN and Australia at various levels in the military and the bureaucracy. In a short time a wide corporate-skill base was established as the basis for successful operation of the LSE.



THE GULF WAR

When the RAN Task Group entered the Arabian Gulf the resources of the LSE were greatly stretched. To achieve an effective logistic support over this extended area, small Logistic Support Detachments (LSD) were established at the principal sea ports/airheads of Bahrain and Dubai. This necessitated expanding the LSE complement with a Lieutenant, a Chief Petty Officer Marine Technical Propulsion and a second Petty Officer Writer. The LSDs were bolstered by other LSE personnel as the workload demanded. Transfers of stores and mail were achieved during port visits by ships, by helicopter despatched inshore from the Task Group and by barge transfer to the *Success* off Dubai.

With the imminent approach of the deadline for withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, and the ships taking up their war stations the Australian Task Group Commander no longer had the same flexibility as before to despatch ships or aircraft inshore to collect stores and mail, and there was no certainty that the Australian support ship would operate in the same group as the combatants.

*Mail: Six of the 926 bags handled through the LSE.
Photo: LSPH Kym Degener*

When hostilities commenced all commercial air services in the region ceased, and with it the LSE primary means of stores transfer from Australia. Some services recommenced soon after the declaration. Emirates Air resumed flying into Dubai from Asia and Gulf Air resumed flights to Muscat from the subcontinent. However, these services were not regular and departed only when there were sufficient passengers to break-even financially. Freight was not given any priority or guarantee of delivery. The air link from Australia was re-established using RAAF aircraft. Once in theatre there was scope to move freight either by road, between Muscat and Dubai, or by using other allied nations transport aircraft. Unloading freight from RAAF aircraft put a further strain on the LSE to do a task not normally required for commercial airfreight. This resulted in a specialist movement and transport RAAF non-commissioned officer being added to the LSE's strength.

A variety of methods were used to transfer stores and mail to the Task Group during hostilities. The preferred option, of using *Success* and then *Westralia* to shuttle stores from the LSE to the combatants, was used only when Combined Logistic Force activities permitted. For provisions and urgent stores items, the two ships attached to the carrier battle group used a USN support ship operating from Jebel Ali, near Dubai. LSD Dubai would consign stores in the ship in addition to the standard USN load list of provisions available to the RAN ships.

Mail was handled carefully and only consigned out of Australian hands in special circumstances. Often it was moved to Bahrain by RAF transport (but loaded and unloaded by LSE staff) for collection by a ship's helicopter when the ship was operating within aircraft range. Alternatively it was held at Dubai for the support ship.

Despite the more difficult circumstances during the war, an acceptable level of supply support was provided by close co-operation with allied logistics forces ashore and afloat. Regrettably the LSE had no aircraft at its disposal to provide a shore-based delivery service, so had to be reactive to any opportunity for transferring stores.

In addition to coordinating logistic support for the ships of the Task Group, the LSE provided support for Clearance Diving Team 3, and administrative support for the two medical teams on board the US hospital ship *Comfort*. In addition it assisted visiting ADF personnel and aircraft. Other activities of interest included coordinating a great part of the movement of Australian accredited media representatives into and within the Gulf region, and helped with contingencies for protection and evacuation of Australian citizens from the area.

Survival of the RAN Task Group depended on each ship maintaining a high degree of readiness. This in turn meant there was little room for error in providing timely and effective logistic support. For the LSE staff this was a real challenge and a great incentive to do their job to the best of their ability.

LOGISTICS SUPPORT ELEMENT STATISTICS

(up to 17 February 1991)

Individual ship visits	30
Support ships reprovisioning visits	15
Days with ships alongside	92
Fixed-wing aircraft visits (from Australia)	9
Helicopter visits (from the Task Group)	35
Bags of mail handled	926
Weight of mail handled (kgs)	19748
Boxes of stores handled (from Australia)	1672
Weight of stores handled (kgs)	47657
Assistance for visiting personnel	
• VIPs (including accompanying staff officers)	18
• Technical representatives for onboard repairs	11
• Accredited correspondents	10
Personnel requiring travel to Australia	55
Visa applications processed	122
Money spent by LSE on goods and services	\$950 000
Money issued for ships for money change	\$3.25m
Signal messages processed	3952

Commander Robinson is a supply officer who was RAN. Liaison Officer Murrell and, as such, was in charge of the LSR. For his work in Operation DAMASK he was made a Member of the Order of Australia. He is currently Officer-in-Charge of the Navy Supply School.

The Chance of a Life Time

By Able Seaman Wren Radio Operator Natalie Collis

Ever since I joined the Navy my aim was to go to sea. As a female the outlook was grim as many females were aiming for the same goal, with only a limited amount of billets available. I have a high respect for my profession, and thoroughly enjoy my work as a radio operator. As a radio operator you never really see the whole picture until you've been to sea because the work differs greatly.

I certainly reached my goal, receiving a posting to the Gulf bound HMAS *Westralia*. This would be the experience of a lifetime: to learn new skills and join the Task Group of what was to become a historical voyage.


Leaving my family and loved ones was extremely hard. It was especially for them, with the notion that *Westralia* was enroute to a possible war zone. The support from the people of Australia overwhelmed me, in both Perth and Geelong where we received an official farewell. It left me with a good feeling; a feeling of security and of excitement.

Slipping into the ship's routine was all so new. Getting to know the ship and how it operates was a challenge in itself. Participating in line handling during the unberthing party as of the ship was very amusing deciphering the language of the Port Officer Quartermaster Gunner, although he was very helpful in explaining the orders given. It is great to learn some seamanship skills, adding further knowledge of the different aspects of life at sea.

The vigorous workup was extremely challenging: extra hours, heavier working conditions, which became physically and mentally exhausting. Although we all pulled through with no dramas, I thought at times I just wouldn't make it. I imagine we all felt a huge sense of achievement when the workup was completed. I certainly did. I had passed my own personal level of expectation.

At times I felt very homesick, but there was always someone there for support and someone to make you laugh again.

At the commencement of hostilities we were nearing the Gulf of Oman, preparing for what might lie ahead. At this stage it didn't seem quite real.



Able Seaman Wren Collis with mother Mrs Cheryl Collis after HMAS Westralia arrived back from the Gulf

Photo: LSPH Scout Connolly, RAN

War itself seemed unreal to me, like something that only happens in books or on television. But it certainly was real. It especially hit home when Commander Moore addressed the ship's company, explaining that people were dying around us and this situation certainly was real.

When the cease-fire came into force and our return to Australia was planned, I certainly felt more settled and relaxed.

I'm certain I've gained a great lifelong experience. It is something I will never forget. I now understand more about the Navy in general and its organisation.

I am happy to be a part of *Westralia's* team, and also to have achieved qualification for the Australian Active Service Medal, which I can be eternally proud of.

Able Seaman Wren Collis joined the RAN in 1968.

A Tactical Reconnaissance of Jaz Kubbar Island

By Lieutenant Mark Campbell, RAN

During operations in the northern Arabian Gulf in support of Operation DESERT STORM, HMAS Sydney's Seahawk flight was tasked with conducting a tactical reconnaissance of Jaz Kubbar Island twenty five kilometres off the Iraqi-occupied coast of Kuwait. Two sorties were flown on consecutive days in the early morning. This is an account of the second sortie, flown 0700-1000, 21 February 1991.


With the previous day's successful sortie, the pressure of the first reconnaissance by allied forces in more than a week was removed, but this pressure was replaced by stories of obvious signs of recent Iraqi presence: a bunker, and a destroyed wharf. With these stories fresh in our minds, and the thought that the Iraqis had twenty-four hours to re-occupy the island, we departed HMAS Sydney with mixed feelings.

We had briefed the route into Jaz Kubbar, the evasive manoeuvres to be employed at any sign of trouble, the escape route to the east, and each crew member's responsibilities during the mission. These areas were reviewed enroute and updated where necessary.

As the island was so close to the coast of Kuwait, the area was subject to close scrutiny by the allied forces, and in order to prevent any friendly fighter aircraft engaging us, we called the area co-ordinator on board USS Tripoli and informed him of our mission, and received clearance to proceed with the investigation.

At about 15 kilometres from the island we imposed radio silence and descended to 30 metres. Visibility was very poor due to the proximity of Kuwait's burning oilfields and there was a strong wind blowing from the south-east creating a sudden, choppy sea. All our senses were alert and the tension was plain in the short, clipped use of the intercom, rather than the usual continuous banter. We used a reed and a marine light boat on a rock to both guide and disguise our approach.

We had the island visual at about 5 kilometres by which time we had descended to 20 metres and our



speed reduced to 70 knots. At 1 1/2 kilometres we could clearly make out the breakers on the beach, a lighthouse, and a jetty. After a careful search of the area both visually and by radar, we continued in at only 10 metres above the waves with our infra-red homing missile decoy system primed and ready to go in the event of a sudden attack.

We made a circuit of the small island at about a kilometre, taking great care to ensure that the island's deserted appearance was not illusory. Another circuit was made on the breaker line, to confirm that Jaz Kubbar had been abandoned before we flew overhead for a close inspection.

There were many signs of the Iraqi occupation of the island, including tents, fireplaces, military equipment, and the obviously sabotaged jetty. Several sweeps were then made over the low flat island. A landing was out of the question due to the likelihood of mines. Our proximity to enemy-held coastline ensured that we did not 'outstay our welcome'; so after about ten minutes we beat a hasty retreat to the south-east back to the relative safety of the Sydney, cruising behind the Houot Oilfields 50 kilometres off the coast, a much relieved and wiser crew for the experience.

Lieutenant Campbell was an Observer serving on HMAS Sydney's helicopter flight. He is currently attached to the Seahawk Introduction and Transition Unit at Nowra.

THE GULF WAR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
(DECL:OADR)

ADDRESS TO JOINT SESSION OF PARLIAMENT

SCENESETTER

1
176
148
224
8
212

PURPOSE

Your address to the Joint Session of Parliament is an opportunity to publicly (1) reaffirm the importance of the alliance; (2) emphasize the economic benefits of the relationship while recognizing our differences on certain trade issues; (3) praise Australia's constructive international role; and (4) promote greater interchange in non-defense-related areas.

SETTING

This is a special honor as it will be the first time that a foreign Head of State addresses the Australian Parliament (Hawke addressed a joint meeting of our Congress during his June, 1988 working visit). The session will be convened in the House of Representatives; there are 76 Senators and 148 members of the House.

The cost of convening this special session of Parliament sparked some controversy (Parliament ordinarily is recessed for the holidays at this time of the year). Eight Senators of the small Australian Democrats Party plan to boycott the session to protest its estimated US \$1-2 million cost to Australian taxpayers.

Under Australia's parliamentary system, the Government is determined by the apportionment of political parties in the House of Representatives which is considered the dominant chamber. The Senate has equal legislative powers, with the important exception of the introduction and amendment of money bills.

Australia's impressive New Parliament House is three years old and was designed by an American firm (Mitchell/Giurgola and Thorp). The U.S. Congress gifted the granite benches in the building.

Leo McLeay, M.P., is Speaker of the House; Senator Kerry W. Sibraa is President of the Senate. Sibraa met with Vice President Quayle when he visited Australia in 1989.

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), July 21, 1997
By ik NARA, Date 06/06/23

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~for C. Montini~~
~~for J. D. [unclear]~~

Outline for Speech to Australian Parliament

1. Introductory formalities

2. We share ancient traditions, common ancestors and language, respect for the rule of law. We have a dynamic friendship today. We share a commitment to work together for peace, prosperity and security in the future.

This building in Canberra is home to one of the few extant original copies of the Magna Carta. Washington's National Archives has one of the other copies.

Anecdote about 18th century Australian-American exchange if appropriate.

3. We each developed frontier territories and became great trading and seafaring nations in the 19th century.

Anecdote from 19th century if appropriate -- perhaps a story about Mark Twain's visit to Australia.

4. During the 20th century Australians and Americans fought side by side for freedom and democracy WWI, WWII, Korea, Vietnam, Persian Gulf.

5. Today we remain strong ~~partners~~ partners in trade, security and culture.

Trade issues: bilateral, APEC, GATT -- including assurance that NAFTA is consistent with GATT and would be beneficial to the Pacific Rim.

Security issues: Attaboys for our allies. Attaboy for Australia's good works on Cambodia, in chemical and missile tech arms control, etc. Promise to keep US engaged in Pacific security.

Cultural issues: End on a high note of our common concerns for carrying on as healthy societies in the next century. There is some affinity with America 2000; for example, Australia has had educational choice for years. I'm getting Lamar Alexander's book Six Months Off and will look for a good closing, upbeat, forward-looking anecdote about his six months in Australia.

Throughout the speech I'll look for ways to keep the message palatable to the American audience at home. I.e. not get too deep into globaloney.

UNCLASSIFIED

December 13, 1991

In addition to participating in the Gulf War (Australia had three frigates participating in the naval effort), Australia continues to be a part of the Multinational Interdiction Force operating in the region. Specifically, the Royal Australian Navy frigate HMAS Sydney continues to take part in naval interdiction activities in the area.

Australia also has contributed a total of A\$ 5 million (US\$ 4 million) for emergency relief and refugee assistance arising from the Gulf Crisis. This has been distributed through the following organizations (figures in US\$):

UNDRO - \$1 million
IOM - \$1 million
UNICEF - \$200,000
ICRC/Red Crescent - \$1.2 million
Australian NGOs - \$200,000
UNWRA (for aid to Palestinians) - \$400,000

This does not include in-kind assistance to Egypt and IBRD commitments.

In Operation Provide Comfort (last May), Australia sent a team of 70 Australian Defence Force personnel to provide medical and water purification services for the relief of Kurds and other Iraqi refugees in Turkey.

Let us know if you need anything further.

Brian.

Austral. publ -

Owen Harris
National Interest


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Jamar Alexander's
time in Australia -
on Australia

Rich Fisher

~~has had~~
a year or
so whatever -


Six months
or so
Australia



Calf

Owen

Harris



November 1, 1991

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR DAVID GAGE

FROM: JIM KEITH *JK*

SUBJECT: Australian Participation in the Gulf War

I have attached an Australian release and a State summary of Australia's contribution to the Gulf War.

Australia continues to be a part of the Multinational Interdiction Force operating in the Gulf. Specifically, the Royal Australian Navy frigate HMAS Sydney continues to participate in naval interdiction in the Persian Gulf.

Australia has contributed a total of A\$ 5 million (US\$ 4 million) for emergency relief and refugee assistance arising from the Gulf war. This has been distributed through the following organizations (US\$):

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UNWRA (for aid to Palestinians) - \$400,000

In addition, Australia provided assistance in kind to Egypt and made IBRD commitments.

Last May, Australia sent a team of 70 Australian Defense Force personnel as part of Operation Provide Comfort to supply medical and water purification services for Kurds and other Iraqi refugees in Turkey.

The attached two pages outline Australia's commitments in military, trade, and humanitarian areas.

SUBJECT: Australian Contribution to Middle East Military Force

In a press conference announcing Australia's contribution of ships to the multinational forces in the Gulf, Prime Minister Hawke made the following points:

- (Australia) joins the rest of the world in saying that it will not tolerate, will not stand idly by, while any member of the international community purports to break the rules of civilized conduct in this way.
- After speaking with President Bush, Hawke agreed that Australia would contribute to a multinational task force in the gulf. (In follow-up Q&A Hawke said the matter was raised initially by the US side, and the decision taken to provide frigates was made after Bush called Hawke.)
- The primary purpose of the naval task force is to enforce the blockade on Iraq and Kuwait and keep open other free trade. However, the very nature of the force will contribute to the deterrence of further aggression by Iraq.
- Australia will contribute two guided missile frigates, the Adelaide and the Darwin, supported by the replenishment tanker, Success.
- The ships will be able to leave Australia within five days (on Monday) and will be on station within twenty two days.
- In follow-up Qs&As, Hawke said the frigates would remain in the region as long as necessary to enforce the blockade. He didn't anticipate any requests for Australian air and land units. If any such requests were made in the future, Australia would consider it. Hawke added he doubted such requests will be made.

Aug 10, 1990



AUSTRALIAN Issues

Australia's Response to the Gulf Crisis

1. ~~THE~~
2. ~~PA/~~PREL
Mid East

September 14, 1990

On 10 August 1990 the Australian Prime Minister, Mr Bob Hawke, said the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq was entirely unacceptable to the Australian Government and Australia was prepared to play a responsible part in seeking to ensure that "this aggression is deterred and that the blockade that has been decided upon and the embargoes that have been imposed should be effective".

Australia's part has included:

- **MILITARY.** Two guided missile frigates, FFG's the ADELAIDE and DARWIN supported by the replenishment tanker SUCCESS have been on station in the Gulf of Oman since September 3 and are expected to be replaced by three other Royal Australian Navy ships within three months.
 - . Two surgical teams of 20 people have left Australia to serve in a US Navy hospital ship in the Gulf region.
- **TRADE.** The imposition of a total embargo on trade with Iraq. Iraq and Kuwait have been large consumers of Australian primary products and Iraq's total outstanding debt is US\$465 million (A\$613 million), of which US\$388 million (A\$490 million) is guaranteed by the Australian Government. Total sales to Iraq and Kuwait -- mainly wheat, meat and live sheep -- were worth A\$422 in 1989.
- **HUMANITARIAN.** \$2 million to assist foreign nationals stranded as a result of the Gulf crisis. This assistance is made up of:
 - . \$1 million to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), an International agency assisting with the coordination of repatriation of south and south east Asian nationals, which had launched a \$US50 million appeal
 - . \$500,000 to the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent societies through the Australian Red Cross
 - . \$250,000 to UNICEF to help with the relief needs of woman and children
 - . \$250,000 to various other Australian non-government organizations contributing to the emergency relief activities in the area.

Opinion polls in Australia show strong support for the government's actions. A poll published in The Sydney Morning Herald on September 10 said 89 percent of those polled supported the UN trade embargo on Iraq, 85 percent supported Australia's decision to suspend trade with Iraq, 67 percent supported Australia joining the naval blockade (with 27 percent opposed) and 73 percent supported the sending of US and other military forces to Saudi Arabia.

"Any settlement of the Gulf crisis should demonstrate by its terms that naked aggression does not pay. It should visibly enforce the newfound strength of the UN and show the effectiveness of a genuinely internationalist approach to crisis management." The Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Senator Gareth Evans. August 31, 1990.

THEMES FOR ASIA TRIP

Overall

- America is an Asia-Pacific partner for the long haul (America will not retreat into isolationism/protectionism)
 - Economically
 - Politically
 - Security

- As outlined in the President's Asia Society speech, there are six keys to America's long-term vision for the Asia Pacific. The trip will highlight each of these:

I. PROGRESSIVE TRADE LIBERALIZATION

- Aggressively pursue Uruguay Round Settlement (if still pending) (Japan, Korea, Australia)
- Promote APEC (All countries)
- Push access for American products and services (Japan, Korea)
- Encourage American investment in the region (Singapore, Japan, Korea)

II. SECURITY COOPERATION

- Maintain pressure on DPRK nuclear program. Stress need for united action against DPRK nuclear program (all countries; encourage Singapore to get ASEAN action during upcoming ASEAN Summit)
- U.S. will restructure, but remain engaged
 - Continued air and naval presence at current levels in Japan for the foreseeable future
 - Korea presence dependent on progress for lasting peace on the peninsula; however, envision long-term air presence for regional deterrence into the future
 - Singapore agreement as model for access arrangements of the future in other parts of the region

III. A SHARED COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

- Continue pressure on ROK (last visit by Pres. Bush made a difference)
- Lay out position on Vietnam (Singapore)
- Highlight China if necessary

IV EDUCATIONAL AND SCIENTIFIC INNOVATION

- Show link between domestic agenda and foreign policy
- Highlight S&T progress (all countries)
- Examine educational differences that we can learn from (Japan, Korea)

V RESPECT FOR THE ENVIRONMENT

- Note progress made and areas for improvement (Japan, Korea)
- Announce SE Asia initiative (if ready)

VI APPRECIATION OF DISTINCT CULTURAL HERITAGES

- Announce various cultural exchange initiatives (all countries)