authority. He naturally was dissatisfied with the arrangement and pointed out that at the same time his authority in the company ended, the Dole name first appeared on every can produced by the company.

In 1933 Dole served briefly in Washington as chief of the Food Products Section of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA). Disillusioned with New Deal attempts to manage the economy, he resigned in January 1934, and in a series of articles condemned the inefficiency and conflicting authority he had found in the AAA.

Dole then moved to San Francisco, keeping his home in Hawaii primarily for vacations. He launched a series of successful new business endeavors with various partners. In 1936 he organized the Chemical Process Company to manufacture ion exchange materials for improved sugar purification. This company became a leader in its field and merged profitably into the Diamond Shamrock Company. Two years later Dole acquired the Schwarz Engineering Company, later renamed the James Dole Corporation, to develop food-processing equipment and techniques. A joint venture of this company and S&W Fine Foods resulted in a new product called Liquid Apple.

Dole resigned as chairman of the board of the Hawaiian Pineapple Company in 1948. He continued, however, to receive remuneration for the use of his name.

On Nov. 22, 1906, Dole married Belle Dickey; they had five children. He died in Honolulu. By the time of his death, pineapple was contributing $116 million a year to the Hawaiian economy and the islands were producing 72 percent of the world's supply.

[The largest collection of Dole papers is in the offices of Castle and Cooke, Honolulu. A few scrapbooks containing letters and articles are in the possession of Mrs. Hebden Porteus, Honolulu. George F. Nellist, ed., *Men of Hawaii,* V (1935); "James D. Dole," a summary prepared by the Honolulu Newspaper Agency (Sept. 25, 1956); and both the "Twenty-fifth . . . " (1924) and "Fiftieth Anniversary Report of the Harvard Class of 1899" (1949) contain important biographical information. The best brief biographical sketches are obituaries in the *New York Times,* May 16, 1958; and *Newsweek,* May 26, 1958. The most detailed are Henry A. White, *James D. Dole: Industrial Pioneer of the Pacific* (1957); and Frank J. Taylor, Earl M. Welty, and David W. Eyre, *From Land and Sea, the Story of Castle and Cooke of Hawaii* (1976). In "The Ripening of Pineapples," *Nation,* Nov. 16, 1911, Dole described the growing and canning of pineapples. Other articles on the pineapple industry include Tom White, "Pioneering in 'Pines,' " *Sunset,* Oct. 1927; "Hawaiian Island Transformed Into a Vast Pineapple Farm," *New York Times,* Apr. 12, 1931; "Pineapples Straight," *Time,* Oct. 28, 1935; Ernest R. May, "Hawaii's Man-Made Paradise," *Travel,* May 1945; and Frank J. Taylor, "The Billion-Dollar Rainbow," *Reader's Digest,* Dec. 1954. Earl C. May, *The Canning Clan, a Pageant of Pioneering Americans* (1938); and Sterling G. Slappey, ed., *Pioneers of American Business* (1973), both contain sections on Dole. For the Dole-sponsored air race, see *New York Times,* May 26–Sept. 18, 1927, and Lesley Ford, *Glory Gamblers* (1961). On Dole's government service, see his "Impressions of Five Months in Washington, August, 1933, to January, 1934," *New York Times,* Apr. 1934.]

MELBA PORTER HAY

DONOVAN, WILLIAM JOSEPH (Jan. 1, 1883–Feb. 8, 1959), lawyer, soldier, and diplomat, was born in Buffalo, N.Y., the son of Timothy Patrick Donovan, a railroad yard superintendent, and Anna Letitia Lennon. He entered Niagara University in 1901 to prepare for the priesthood, but transferred to Columbia University in 1904 to study law. After receiving the B.A. in 1905 and the LL.B. in 1907, Donovan returned to Buffalo to practice law; in 1912 he merged his firm, Donovan and Goodyear, with the leading law firm in Buffalo, O'Brian and Hamlin. On July 15, 1914, Donovan married Ruth Rumsey; they had two children.

After serving with the New York National Guard on the Mexican border in 1916, Donovan became a battalion major and subsequently a colonel in the New York 69th Regiment, one of the first American units to see action in France during World War I. He was wounded three times in combat and won the Distinguished Service Cross, the Distinguished Service Medal, and the Congressional Medal of Honor. After several special assignments both overseas and in Washington, Donovan returned to his law practice as a national war hero.

In 1922 Donovan became United States attorney for western New York, and later that year he accepted the Republican nomination for lieutenant governor. Victory went to the Democratic ticket headed by Alfred E. Smith, but Donovan ran far ahead of the other Republican candidates. Attorney General Harlan Fiske Stone, Donovan's former professor, appointed him chief of the Criminal Division in 1924; the next year, Donovan rose to assistant to the attorney general

for the Antitrust Division. During four years in this post, he endeavored to avoid needless antitrust litigation by previewing, and offering his opinion on, proposed mergers. Donovan thus helped to implement the Coolidge-Hoover policy of cooperating with big business and deemphasizing antitrust actions.

In 1928 Donovan worked on behalf of Herbert Hoover, whom he had met during World War I, by helping in the Republican party's effort to line up votes among Catholics. When Hoover did not name him attorney general, the disappointed Donovan opened a law practice in New York City. Still politically ambitious, he unsuccessfully opposed Herbert H. Lehman for governor of New York in 1932. Throughout the 1930's Donovan practiced corporation law and was a sharp critic of the New Deal.

Donovan also spoke in favor of military preparedness. Several of his trips overseas, after which he reported to American officials, attracted much publicity because of their air of mystery and called attention to his ability to obtain and analyze intelligence data. In 1935 Donovan persuaded Benito Mussolini to let him observe Italian forces in Libya and Ethiopia; in 1938 he visited Spain. Two years later, after the outbreak of World War II, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox asked Donovan to assess the British war effort firsthand, and upon his return Donovan published a number of influential newspaper articles on German subversion. He made a secret mission to southeastern Europe and the eastern Mediterranean in late 1940 and early 1941; on this trip he appraised British strengths and needs, and encouraged local officials to resist the Germans.

As American involvement in the war approached, Donovan, who had become convinced of the power of propaganda and the need for counterpropaganda and subversion during war, advocated the creation of a central American intelligence agency. President Franklin D. Roosevelt asked him to head an agency that would collect and analyze strategic intelligence as well as engage in counterpropaganda and clandestine operations; Donovan became coordinator of information on July 11, 1941. He and the staff that he assembled quietly began gathering information, studying everything from the economic structure of Germany to the personalities of world leaders, shaping American propaganda, monitoring foreign radio broadcasts, and—in a limited way at first—directing "special operations" (subversion, sabotage, and counterintelligence) overseas. These activities greatly expanded between 1941 and 1945, until the organization had 30,000 employees and a nearly unlimited (and secret) budget.

Donovan

When President Roosevelt restructured intelligence functions on June 13, 1942, Donovan became head of the new Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which was charged with conducting nonmilitary action against the enemy as well as with gathering and analyzing strategic information. OSS specialists (including many scholars) collected and evaluated a massive body of data that formed the foundation for decisions of policy and tactics. The public, though, was more interested in the glamorous covert activities of OSS agents abroad, mainly in occupied Europe: espionage, guerrilla warfare, assistance to underground groups, and the rescue of Allied soldiers. The OSS also operated in neutral countries, where it fought shadowy battles with Axis agents. It was less active in the Pacific Theater of Operations, in part because General Douglas A. MacArthur did not welcome OSS activities.

Donovan guided the OSS through the jealousy of other American (and Allied) intelligence agencies; the skepticism of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to whom the OSS reported; occasional inappropriate use of OSS agents in the field; attempts to undermine the independence of the OSS; the ridicule of Americans who regarded a "spy agency" as unnecessary or inconsistent with American ideals; and some resentment of his personal domination of the OSS. Opposition even to military rank for Donovan prevailed until 1943, when he was made a brigadier general.

Late in 1944, Donovan recommended to Roosevelt that a peacetime intelligence agency modeled on the OSS be established. On Aug. 25, 1945, Donovan (now a major general) resigned in order to demonstrate that his recommendation, which had been leaked to the press, was not motivated by ambition to head such an agency. On September 20, President Harry S. Truman dissolved the OSS. From his New York law office Donovan continued to advocate a permanent intelligence agency. When the Central Intelligence Agency was created, he was regarded as a possible director, especially after Dwight D. Eisenhower—whom Donovan had supported for the Republican nomination in 1952—became president. Donovan wanted the position, but Allen W. Dulles was the new president's choice. Eisenhower did ask Donovan, a vocal foe of communism, to become ambassador to Thailand,

where he served in 1953–1954. He then returned to his law practice, but ill health increasingly limited his activities until his death in Washington, D.C.

Although Donovan's nickname, "Wild Bill," bespoke his colorful public reputation, he actually was a gentle, unassuming, intensely private man who gave the appearance of aloofness. He had few close friends. His most striking qualities were his inexhaustible energy, iron discipline, and self-control in any crisis.

[Donovan's papers are privately held. The articles that he wrote with Edgar A. Mowrer after his trip to England were published as *Fifth Column Lessons for America* (1940). The only biography is Corey Ford, *Donovan of OSS* (1970), by a former OSS staff member; it is neither critical nor particularly penetrating. See also Corey Ford, *Cloak and Dagger: The Secret Story of OSS* (1946), a semiofficial account; and R. Harris Smith, *OSS* (1972), a more scholarly account. Other works of value are Stewart Alsop and Thomas Braden, *Sub Rosa* (1964); and William Stevenson, *A Man Called Intrepid* (1976). Articles on Donovan include Henry F. Pringle, "Exit 'Wild Bill'," *Outlook*, Jan. 9, 1929; William G. Shepherd, "Today's Trust Busters," *Collier's*, Feb. 23, 1929; Elizabeth R. Valentine, "Fact-Finder and Fighting Man," *New York Times Magazine*, May 4, 1941; and Frederic Sondern, Jr., "Our Wartime Spymaster Carries On," *Reader's Digest*, Oct. 1947. Donovan appears in many oral history memoirs in the Columbia University collection, particularly in those of Justice Robert H. Jackson and of Sidney Alderman.]

DONN C. NEAL

DORAN, GEORGE HENRY (Dec. 19, 1869–Jan. 7, 1956), publisher, was born in Toronto, Canada, of Irish Presbyterian parents. Reared in a staunchly Calvinist atmosphere, he began his publishing career at fourteen, when he left school to work for the Willard Tract Depository of Toronto. Under the tutelage of S. R. Briggs, the firm's smug but commercially adept founder, Doran became familiar with every aspect of the religious book trade during the next seven years. In 1892 he decided that publishing opportunities were too circumscribed in Canada and moved to Chicago, where he joined Fleming H. Revell and Company, a house that catered to the publishing needs of the lesser evangelical denominations.

Doran's energetic salesmanship and personal charm soon brought new accounts to the company, and at the age of twenty-four he became a vice-president. Like other religious publishers of the late nineteenth century, Revell was cautiously expanding its lists to include more general offerings. This secularizing trend met with Doran's enthusiastic approval, and he was instrumental in adding such popular authors as Roswell Field and Charles W. Gordon ("Ralph Connor") to Revell's list. But despite these changes, the company remained essentially a publisher of religious books, and Doran grew progressively disenchanted with its inhibiting conservatism. In 1908 he returned to Toronto to establish his own firm, George H. Doran Company, Limited, in partnership with Hodder and Stoughton, English religious publishers who agreed to supply him with their extensive list of fiction, art, and children's books for distribution in the United States and Canada.

The following year he moved his headquarters to New York City, as he had planned from the start. He had become a naturalized American citizen in October 1896, and his American attachments had been further strengthened by his marriage in 1895 to Mary Noble McConnell of Evanston, Ill. Doran's intuitive grasp of the public taste and his willingness to take chances on new authors enabled him immediately to make relatively large profits. His first widely popular publication was Ralph Connor's novel, *The Foreigner*, which sold 125,000 copies in 1909. That same year Doran also gambled successfully on an obscure English novelist, Arnold Bennett, whose *Old Wives' Tale* he brought out at the urging of his wife. The publication of this work established Bennett's vogue in America and led to an enduring friendship between the author and Doran, who became Bennett's exclusive American publisher. Bennett also helped him to obtain contracts from such rising English literary figures as Hugh Walpole and Frank Swinnerton.

Doran's transatlantic connections were further enlarged through his purchase in 1910 of A. C. Armstrong and Son, a New York firm that was the American distributor of Hodder and Stoughton's religious titles. To keep abreast of literary fashions abroad, he made frequent trips to England, where his rooms at London's Hotel Savoy became a favorite meeting place for writers and agents. His British sympathies during World War I led him to publish propaganda for the British Ministry of Information, along with the writings of Theodore Roosevelt, Mary Roberts Rinehart, and other advocates of American intervention. Besides adding another popular

PRESS RELEASE

THE VICE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Wednesday, May 6, 1987

CONTACT: 202/456-6772

STATEMENT BY THE VICE PRESIDENT

"Those who knew Bill Casey will remember him for his service to his country in both war and peace. He was a man with high ideals and high energy; a patriot with warrior-like commitment to public service and to the strength and security of the United States. His service in the OSS guided him in later years as he worked zealously to strengthen the national intelligence community. Barbara and I extend our personal condolences to his family.

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Guerrilla Warfare, Insurrection, Partisan Warfare.)

Insurrection

. . . the ugly form of base and bloody insurrection.
Shakespeare: II King Henry IV, i, 1, 1597

In a national insurrection the center of gravity to be destroyed lies in the person of the chief leader and in public opinion; against these points the blow must be directed.
Clausewitz: On War, 1832

Insurrection is an art as much as war . . . and subject to certain rules . . . First, never play with insurrection unless you are fully prepared to face the consequences of your play . . . Second, act with the greatest determination and on the offensive. The defensive is the death of every armed rising . . . Surprise your antagonist . . . Keep up the moral ascendancy which the first successful rising has give you.
V.I. Lenin: Letters from Finland To the Bolsheviks in Petrograd, 1917

Intelligence

If I am able to determine the enemy's dispositions while at the same time I conceal my own, then I can concentrate and he must divide.
Sun Tzu, 400–320 B.C., The Art of War

Therefore, determine the enemy's plans and you will know which strategy will be successful and which will not.
Sun Tzu, 400–320 B.C., The Art of War, vi

War, as the saying goes, is full of false alarms.
Aristotle: Nichomachean Ethic, iii, c. 340 B.C.

It is essential to know the character of the enemy and of their principal officers—whether they be rash or cautious, enterprising or timid, whether they fight on principle or from chance.
Vegetius: De Re Militari, iii, 378

tions are made respecting the degree of difficulty of the enemy's land; the directness and deviousness of its roads; the number of his troops; the quantity of his war equipment and the state of his morale. Calculations are made to see if the enemy can be attacked and only after this is the populace mobilized and troops raised.
Ho Yen-Hsi, c. 1000

Nothing is more worthy of the attention of a good general than the endeavor to penetrate the designs of the enemy.
Niccolo Machiavelli: Discorsi, xviii, 1531

Intelligence is the Soul of all Publick business.
Daniel Defoe: To Robert Harley, 1704

One should know one's enemies, their alliances, their resources and nature of their country, in order to plan a campaign. One should know what to expect of one's friends, what resources one has, and foresee the future effects to determine what one has to fear or hope from political maneuvers.
Frederick The Great: Instructions for His Generals, 1747

Knowledge of the country is to a general what a musket is to an infantryman and what the rules of arithmetic are to a geometrician. If he does not know the country he will do nothing but make gross mistakes . . . Therefore study the country where you are going to act.
Frederick The Great: Instructions for His Generals, iv, 1747

The necessity of procuring good Intelligence is apparent & need not be further urged. All that remains for me to add, is, that you keep all the whole matter as secret as possible. For upon Secrecy, Success depends in most Enterprizes of the kind, and for want of it, they are generally defeated, however well planned & promising a favourable issue.
George Washington: Letter to Colonel Elias Dayton, 26 Jule 1777

Great part of the information obtained in war is contradictory, a still greater part is false, and by far the greatest part is of a doubtful character.
Clausewitz: On War, 1832

Nothing should be neglected in acquiring a knowledge of the geography and military statistics of other states, so as to know their material and moral capacity for attack and defense as well as the strategic advantages of the two parties. Distinguished officers should be employed in these scientific labors and should be rewarded when they demonstrate marked ability.
Jomini: Précis de l'Art de la Guerre, 1838

How can any man say what he should do himself if he is ignorant what his adversary is about?
Jomini: Précis de l'Art de la Guerre, 1838

I have been passing my life in guessing what I might meet with beyond the next hill, or round the next corner.
Wellington: To J.W. Croker, 1845 (There are many versions of this celebrated remark, all differing in detail; conceivably Wellington repeated himself on different occasions.)

The unknown is the governing condition of war.
Ferdinand Foch: Principles of War, 1920

When I took a decision, or adopted an alternative, it was after studying every relevant—and many an irrelevant—factor. Geography, tribal structure, religion, social customs, language, appetites, standards—all were at my finger-ends. The enemy I knew almost like my own side. I risked myself among them a hundred times, to *learn*.
T.E. Lawrence: Letter to Liddell Hart, 26 June 1933

The great thing is to get the true picture, whatever it is.
Winston Churchill: Note to Chief of the Imperial General Staff, 24 November 1940

In a battle nothing is ever as good or as bad as the first reports of excited men would have it.
Sir William Slim: Unofficial History, vi, 1959

To lack intelligence is to be in the ring blindfolded.
General D. M. Shoup, USMC: Remarks to the staff, Marine Corps Headquarters, 2 January 1960

Intelligence is the decisive factor in planning guerrilla operations . . . Because of superior information, guerrillas always engage under conditions of their own choosing; because of superior knowledge of terrain, they are able to use it to their advantage and the enemy's discomfiture.
Brigadier General S. B. Griffith, USMC: Introduction to Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare, 1961

Nothing helps a fighting force more than correct information. Moreover it should be in perfect order, and done well by capable personnel.
Ché Guevara: Memorandum, 1963

(*See also* Enemy Capabilities, Espionage, Reconnaissance.)

Interior Lines

The unquestionable advantages of the interior line of operations are valid only as long as you retain enough space to advance against one enemy . . . gaining time to beat and pursue him, and then to turn against the other . . . If this space, however, is narrowed down to the extent that you cannot attack one enemy without running the risk of meeting the other who attacks you from the flank or rear, then the strategic advantage of interior lines turns into the tactical disadvantage of encirclement.
Helmuth von Moltke ("The Elder"), 1800–1891

Interior lines are lines shorter in time than those the enemy can use.
Mahan: Naval Strategy, 1911

Interior lines at night are the general's delight.
Sir A.P. Wavell: Lecture at Aldershot, 1930

Intervention

The ideal intervention is smartly executed.
John Paton Davies: In New York Times, 23 May 1965

Invasion

Thus far into the bowels of the land
Have we marched on without impediment.
Shakespeare: King Richard II, v, 2, 1592

mament reconvenes in June.

We are just as prepared to move forward in negotiating reductions in nuclear forces. But the Soviet Union still refuses to return to the START and INF negotiations which it left last fall. I repeat what I have said on many occasions: We are prepared to resume those negotiations at any time and without preconditions. We again invite the Soviet Union to return to the negotiating table to resume the serious work of reducing nuclear arsenals and the risks of nuclear war.

Remarks at Groundbreaking Ceremonies for an Addition to the Central Intelligence Agency Headquarters Complex
May 24, 1984

When President Eisenhower came to this place a quarter of a century ago to dedicate the cornerstone of this building, he spoke of undecorated and unsung heroes. And when I was with you here 2 years ago, I mentioned those words and noted the heroes President Eisenhower spoke about were you, the men and women of the Central Intelligence Agency.

I return to the CIA today with exactly the same thought in mind. Without you, our nation's safety would be more vulnerable and our security fragile and endangered. The work you do each day is essential to the survival and to the spread of human freedom. You remain the eyes and ears of the free world. You are the "trip wire" over which the totalitarian rule must stumble in their quest for global domination.

Though it's sometimes forgotten here in Washington, the American people know full well the importance of vital and energetic intelligence operations. From Nathan Hale's first covert operation in the Revolutionary War to the breaking of the Japanese code at Midway in World War II, America's security and safety have relied directly on the courage and collective efforts of her intelligence personnel.

Today I want to stress to you again that the American people are thankful for your professionalism, for your dedication, and for the personal sacrifice each of you makes in carrying on your work. You're carrying a great and noble tradition. And I believe that you're adding a brilliant new chapter to the annals of American intelligence services.

In 3½ years, significant changes have occurred at this Agency. New and vitally important missions are being performed that a few years ago many would have said were impractical or unachievable. Funding and personnel have grown substantially. The operations and analysis sections have seen increases in productivity and product. Morale has steadily improved. Recruiting is highly successful with the continuing growth in the number of talented, young Americans who want to work at CIA. Individual employees are gaining greater recognition for their work, and throughout this Agency, as well as in the Congress and our nation itself, there is a new recognition of the urgent importance of the mission of the CIA.

There are many quantitative measures of what you're achieving. You've increased the number of national intelligence estimates from 19 in 1980 to 55 in 1983, and in addition, completed 800 other special research projects. Though the specifics are classified, new stations have been opened abroad, and work with friendly intelligence and security services have been greatly expanded.

As most of you know, Bill Casey recently reported to me on all of this. And, frankly, it's a bit breathtaking. Something else equally dramatic has happened here recently. In two separate reports to you during the past 6 months, your Director has outlined an exciting new process of management reform and renewal. Your guidelines in this process are the techniques of modern management used at America's top companies, including many of the concepts outlined in the remarkable management and best seller, "In Pursuit of Excellence."

There has been a new emphasis on lean management staffs and, above all, establishing a consensus on the mission and the role of the agency. Underlying all this is a central insight: that, even more than material rewards, a chance to create, to build, and to put into action the shared values of an institution is the strongest inducement to human excellence.

Memoranda and suggestions have been asked for from all of you, suggestions and memos that have been read by the Director personally. Now, all this has meant not only a stimulating period of discussion and analysis leading to many specific reforms, but also the adoption of a new Agency credo, written by you, the personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency. I've had a chance to read the credo of CIA. It's everything such a credo should be—practical, yet idealistic; careful, but inspiring; specific, yet general enough to explain not only what it means to be a member of the CIA but what it means to be an American serving the cause of freedom in a dangerous and difficult world.

On this point, I want to stress: An intelligence agency cannot operate effectively unless its necessary secrets are maintained even in this, the most open and free country on Earth. We cannot expect you or your informants to endanger life and work because of carelessness, sensationalism, or unnecessary exposure to risk. Hostile intelligence activities conducted in this country and directed at U.S. interests abroad threaten not only our legitimate secrets and our technological advantages but also our privacy and, ultimately, our freedom. To the danger of espionage is added active measures designed to subvert and deceive, to disinform the public opinion upon which our democracies are built.

One of the greater dangers facing you is also the loss of necessary secrets through unauthorized and illegal disclosures of classified information. As I said in my memorandum last summer to all Federal employees, the unauthorized disclosure of our nation's classified information by those entrusted with its protection is improper, unethical, and plain wrong. I cite for emulation by the rest of the Government another phrase from the CIA credo: "We subordinate our desire for public recognition to the need for confidentiality. We give unfailing loyalty to each other and to our common purpose."

Well, let me conclude by adding that the changes you have underway at CIA are a reflection of a larger renewal among the forces of freedom throughout the world. I think many of you realize that the days of defeatism and weakness are over for America and that in contrast to previous times the objectives of our foreign policy are being met.

Our economic recovery has strengthened the hand of the democracies, even as it has widened the economic and technological gap between ourselves and totalitarian nations. Our defense buildup has been a signal to the world that the American people remain ready to make the sacrifices necessary for the protection of human freedom.

Our alliances have been renewed and revitalized. Our support, both direct and indirect, for people whose countries are the victims of totalitarian aggression has blunted the Communist drive for power in the Third World.

The tide of the future is a freedom tide. American foreign policy has a new coherence and moral purpose. We have proposed the most extensive series of arms reduction proposals in history, and we have made it clear that we will negotiate without preconditions for as long as it takes.

We're now in a period of readjustment. Some of our adversaries who had grown used to disunity or weakness from the democracies are not enthusiastic about the success of our policies or the brightening trend in the fortunes of freedom. What is needed now is steadiness and calm and above all a quiet resolve to advance the cause of freedom as we continue to press our program for arms reductions and many other peace initiatives.

When historians look back at all of this, I'm sure they will conclude that no one has played a more important role in this exciting new era than all of you here at CIA. Your work, the work of your Director, the other top officials have been an inspiration to your fellow Americans and to people everywhere.

I wanted to come here today not only to dedicate this new building, which will assist greatly in better coordinating and consolidating CIA activities, but to pledge to you my continued support and bring to each and every one of you the heartfelt thanks of the American people.

God bless you all.

Note: The President spoke at 11:34 a.m. at the site of the new addition near Langley, VA. He then joined other officials in breaking ground for the building.

Proclamation 5199—National Farm Safety Week, 1984
May 24, 1984

By the President of the United States of America

A Proclamation

Agriculture has always been one of our most important industries. Although our ancestors were bound to the land in order to survive, the remarkable advances of science and technology have overcome most limitations that dictated scarcity. American agriculture has emerged as a marvel of efficiency and productivity. Now, fewer than five percent of our people are able to supply an abundance of high-quality but low-cost food, freeing most others for the task of providing the incredible array of goods and services we enjoy.

Unfortunately, the accident rate for people engaged in agriculture is unacceptably high. Many thousands of farm and ranch residents and workers suffer disabling, crippling, or fatal injuries each year. This unhappy toll is further compounded by many job-related illnesses. The direct economic costs of these problems exceed $5 billion annually, and there is no way to measure the pain, despair and family disruption that also result.

This regrettable situation need not continue. The waste of life, limb, property and financial resources can be sharply reduced if rural people take a decisive stand for better safety and health. Accidents and job-related illnesses can be averted by safe and proper methods, control of hazards, and use of protective equipment when appropriate. In addition, guidance in safety and health is readily available to all from the Extension Service, safety councils, volunteer safety leaders and the manufacturers of the products we use.

Now, Therefore, I, Ronald Reagan, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim the week of September 16 through September 22, 1984, as National Farm Safety Week. I urge every man and woman engaged in farming and ranching to make basic safety a priority in every activity and task—on the job, in the home and on the highway. I also urge those who serve and supply farmers and ranchers to encourage and support personal and community safety and health efforts in every possible way.

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my hand this twenty-fourth day of May, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and eighty-four, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and eighth.

RONALD REAGAN

[*Filed with the Office of the Federal Register, 4:46 p.m., May 24, 1984*]

276 ¶ Remarks at the Cornerstone-Laying Ceremony for the Central Intelligence Agency Building, Langley, Virginia. *November* 3, 1959

Mr. Dulles, Secretary McElroy, Ladies and Gentlemen of the Central Intelligence Agency:

America's fundamental aspiration is the preservation of peace. To this end we seek to develop policies and arrangements to make the peace both permanent and just. This can be done only on the basis of comprehensive and appropriate information.

In war nothing is more important to a commander than the facts concerning the strength, dispositions, and intentions of his opponent, and the proper interpretation of those facts. In peacetime the necessary facts are of a different nature. They deal with conditions, resources, requirements, and attitudes prevailing in the world. They and their correct interpretation are essential to the development of policy to further our long term national security and best interests. To provide information of this kind is the task of the organization of which you are a part.

No task could be more important.

Upon the quality of your work depends in large measure the success of our effort to further the Nation's position in the international scene.

By its very nature the work of this agency demands of its members the highest order of dedication, ability, trustworthiness, and selflessness—to say nothing of the finest type of courage, whenever needed. Success cannot be advertised: failure cannot be explained. In the work of Intelligence, heroes are undecorated and unsung, often even among their own fraternity. Their inspiration is rooted in patriotism—their reward can be little except the conviction that they are performing a unique and indispensable service for their country, and the knowledge that America needs and appreciates their efforts. I assure you this is indeed true.

The reputation of your organization for quality and excellence of performance, under the leadership of your Director, Mr. Allen Dulles, is a proud one.

Because I deeply believe these things, I deem it a great privilege to participate in this ceremony of cornerstone laying for the national headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency. On this spot will rise a beautiful and a useful structure. May it long endure, to serve the cause of America, and of peace.

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GEORGE BUSH

A BIOGRAPHY

Nicholas King

DODD, MEAD & COMPANY
NEW YORK

Bush returned to Washington after his mission to China to take charge of the Central Intelligence Agency, then under constant attack from Congress and the press. Here he meets with members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. From left, John C. Danforth, R-Mo.; James B. Pearson, R-Kan.; Chairman John Sparkman, D-Ala.; Bush; Claiborne Pell, D-R.I.; Dick Clark, D-Iowa; and Edward Zorinsky, D-Neb. (*Wide World Photos*)

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The CIA

Bush had agreed to become director of Central Intelligence before he left China in December 1975. He realized he was going to be facing his biggest challenge in government service so far. The CIA has had such a history of controversy in recent years that many of its professionals feel fortunate to have remained intact and functioning. When Bush became director, the controversy was at its height.

When the agency was formed out of the bowels of the Office of Strategic Services in the aftermath of the Second World War, it was a tightly knit fraternity. Its staff was recruited largely from the Ivy League colleges and their old-boy networks, which is not to say it did not function effectively. But it had the overtones of a club, and that aura persisted for many years. President Kennedy's attempt to overthrow Castro in the early 1960s, which culminated in the Bay of Pigs fiasco, first brought the agency

to public attention. The American tradition has never been at ease with the idea of official secret services, international spies, or the tactics of terrorism as accepted instruments of policy. Suddenly there were tales of the most hair-raising sort, and not only about Cuba. The CIA's hand began to be seen, rightly or wrongly, in every upheaval involving American interests throughout the world.

As originally chartered, the CIA was placed within a framework of checks and balances involving congressional supervision, but in effect functioned as an instrument of the executive branch alone. When it was discovered that President Nixon had attempted to use it as a pawn in the Watergate drama, the fear that it might fall prey to any unscrupulous political purpose arose. At the same time, national security could not very well forego the immensely valuable information and assessment services the agency was providing, even if on the operational side its covert activities were the subject of raging debate, both as to its means and its ends.

In December 1974, a story broke in the press to the effect that the CIA had been investigating antiwar groups in the United States, tapping their telephones, intercepting their mail, and keeping some of their members under surveillance. This led to the appointment of a commission set up by Vice-president Nelson Rockefeller. When the appointment was first proposed to Bush, the agency had been going through the agony of this commission's investigation. CIA Director William Colby was like a bureaucratic St. Sebastian, bleeding from a hundred wounds inflicted from every side, especially by the press, which gleefully headlined blunders and peccadillos alike.

Congress then took up the investigation on its own, shuffling through charges of alleged CIA miscreance, including assassinations, real or attempted. The Senate and

the House each set up its own select committee, known as the Church Committee and the Pike Committee, respectively, after their chairmen. A new executive statute was also negotiated to reorder the agency's chain of administration, and in short, the Intelligence community found itself in disarray, unable to defend itself properly for fear of revealing still more of its legitimate secrets and at the same time unable to protect what it did reveal from immediate publicity.

Bush came to the agency with three advantages—his reputation for handling tough jobs successfully, his proven loyalty to his superiors, and the confidence of President Ford. Still, any candidate for the directorship would have to run the gauntlet of criticism and suspicion during his congressional confirmation, and Bush did not escape. "The UN confirmation hearings were a love feast by comparison," he said.

One particularly galling condition, ironic in the context of today, was a guarantee President Ford had to make, in order to avoid giving too political a cast to the appointment, that he would not seek to promote Bush as a vice-presidential candidate in the forthcoming election. Bush considered this promise a surrender of his political birthright; he had already suffered a disappointment on that score when Ford passed him over for the office in favor of Rockefeller. He reconciled himself to it by reasoning that if it was the president who wanted it that way, he was bound to accept it.

Bush was regarded as "political" by the CIA professionals, and his first task was to convince them that he was willing and able to leave his politics aside when he took over. The CIA was groggy from a loss of confidence in itself, and from what it regarded as a public rebuff on one side and manipulation by politicians in Congress and the White House on the other. It needed a healer, but a

healer who could provide it with effective leadership at the same time, who could recover lost respect on the outside and restore self-respect within. As an immediate goal, it was hoped he would clear up the committee work hanging over the agency's head and put a lid on any further exposure of affairs the agency ought properly to keep to itself.

"We were anxious to have our house put in order," says Hank Knoche, who was to become Bush's deputy director. "And we wanted a new definition, new guidelines, new policies, new procedures to adjust to. What he brought to us were those things. He was close enough to the Ford administration so that he had a kind of access and power that could help us make that kind of adjustment. But more important, he looked around and decided that we were a pretty good outfit, that we were pretty good people to deal with."

Bush was circumspect about giving the appearance of being a political pusher and kept away from the agency's headquarters at Langley, Virginia, until he was confirmed toward the end of January 1975. He impressed the staff at the outset with a quick, almost intuitive grasp of difficult administrative problems. Accustomed to being a hard and careful worker, he lived his job there and was soon accepted on his merits. Bush calls it "the most exciting facet" of his, up to that point, ten years of public service.

"How do you run a place that complicated?" Bush asks. "You get well briefed on a specific aspect and go to the White House—depending on how technical it is. Or, you brief the National Security Council on something highly sensitive in Africa. You'd brief yourself, get people out there to brief you, country experts, area experts, maps, pictures. I couldn't pose as an expert on every one of those subjects. Sometimes the president asked me a question I couldn't answer. I'd go back and get the answer and it

would be a good one. I couldn't have done any of it if I hadn't had his [the president's] confidence. And I had supreme confidence in my backup. This is a side of the CIA no one knows. There was fantastic staff support. I can't say enough for the thoroughness of the staff. Most of the publicity is on the negative side—the "spooks." The CIA never gets the acclaim other services like the State Department do. The promotion lists don't come out.

"A typical day began when a driver would come to the house with a security person who had an Intelligence brief and other special messages which had come in overnight. I'd have these read by the time I went to the office. My weekly meeting with the president would be at seven forty-five, and on those days I would go straight to the White House. But usually I'd go directly to my office on the seventh floor. There I would read a cable summary and then have a daily nine o'clock, half-hour staff meeting—flaps, tensions, law suits, analysis—so each of the top people was informed and I was given a chance to comment and give direction. Occasionally, there was a laugh over an obscene phone call or some press attacks.

"I was busy with testimony on the Hill, National Security Council subcommittees, and occasionally cabinet meetings if they had to do with foreign affairs. It was suggested that I have an office in the Executive Office Building next door to the White House. I concluded that I shouldn't. I should be removed from policy making.

"Once in a while I ate lunch in the staff cafeteria or the dining room on the seventh floor, or I'd go for a job at noon on a basement track indoors if the weather was bad. It got kind of smelly along that narrow, long hallway made into a track. Sometimes, in cold weather, I'd run outside. I'd try to run daily or several times a week. Afternoons it would be the same.

"I traveled around the country to various components

of the Intelligence community, went to installations, showed an interest. It all contributed to the learning process; kicking the tires and looking at the hardware was often a better education than a briefing. There was some foreign travel—I went to Europe once. I wanted to do more, but I didn't have the time.

"We had visitors. There was an FBI briefing on counterterrorism, for example, having to do with Cuban problems, the Cuban community. I also saw U.S. ambassadors who would come for a briefing before taking up their posts, sometimes members of the press. Time flew by. I was kept on a very tight schedule. It was the director who always had to testify on the Hill, and I had an awful lot of briefings on sensitive matters. Interspersed would be mail and dictation. I would meet with both my assistants at the end of the day and get brought up-to-date. There was an awful lot of coping with paperwork and decision making for the running of the CIA. In no job I held before did I make so many decisions about the organization.

"Sometimes Barbara and I would go out to dinner. I was tired and had much less of a social life then. I didn't want to bring my work home. I elected on this job to keep all the information to myself. It didn't make it any easier for Barbara. In China our lives were together, but in the CIA it wasn't that way at all."

Of the agency's reputation, Bush said, "Many things I had seen put forward about the CIA were not true, totally untrue, such as its unwillingness to respond to Congress or the executive. I didn't believe these charges anyway. I wanted the agency to respond to the kind of leadership that was required, but once I got there I had no doubt about its ability to respond. The idea of the CIA being a rogue elephant out of control wasn't so. But that was the public perception."

All this was going on during the election campaign in

the summer of 1976, when Gerald Ford was fighting the insurgent candidacy of Jimmy Carter. Many people thought that since Bush was doing such a good job at the CIA he would stay on, and might even do so even if Ford lost and Carter were elected. Hank Knoche tells what happened: "I would like to describe the day George put in shortly after the November elections, when we were scheduled for a session at Plains to brief the president-elect and Mondale and one or two of their staffers at Carter's home. We were going to talk about world trouble spots.

"We had to catch an early-morning flight to get down there, and before we took off from Washington, George had a meeting with Bob Lynn, who was then the head of the Bureau of the Budget. We'd had a real serious budgetary crunch and we needed George to talk directly to Lynn. George tracked Lynn down in the men's room in the Executive Office Building; he got his budget business taken up with Lynn, and favorably.

"Then he went over to see Vice-president Rockefeller for a one-to-one meeting for ten or fifteen minutes, and then went on to the Oval Office and met with President Ford for fifteen or twenty minutes. I thought it was probably Intelligence business Bush was taking up with them, but on the plane he told us that he had decided to resign, and was going to tell the president-elect when he got to Plains that he thought it in everybody's best interest that he step aside.

"Well, I guess I had figured that was coming, but it really cast a pall over the flight down there. We tried to suggest to him that maybe there was a different way of looking at things, but his mind was made up. He asked for a few minutes alone with Carter and Mondale when we first got there, and he told them what his plans were. Then he came in and went through a six-hour briefing. We flew

back to Washington and didn't get in until about ten-thirty or eleven that night.

"Secretary of State Kissinger was to leave early the next morning to fly down to Plains for a long session with both Carter and Mondale on foreign policy problems, and obviously it would be useful both to Carter and Kissinger for Kissinger to know what we'd discussed in Plains that day. At midnight George stopped off at Kissinger's home and spent an hour or so with him, having taken the time on the flight back to Washington to write a memorandum of what it was he wanted Kissinger to know.

"When I think back on that day when George met the budget director, the president of the United States, the vice-president, the president-elect, the secretary of state —through it all there was true professional continuity and gracefulness, even though it was a very serious time for him. I was terribly impressed. As a matter of fact, the next day we were so impressed that at our nine-thirty staff meeting I gave him one of the highest awards the agency has to give [the Intelligence Medal of Merit], and told the staff what George had done the previous day. It was a very touching day."

Some press reports said later that Bush had hoped Carter would ask him to stay on the job and was disappointed when he did not. But it was hard to see how, with a complete change of administration, when it concerned such an important post, he could have expected it.

484 Letter to the Secretary Concerning Monetary Silver. *November* 28, 1961

Dear Mr. Secretary:

On the basis of your recommendations and the studies conducted by the Treasury and other Departments, I have reached the decision that silver metal should gradually be withdrawn from our monetary reserves.

Simultaneously with the publication of this letter, you are directed to suspend further sales of free silver, and to suspend use of free silver held by the Treasury for coinage. In this way, the remaining stock and any subsequently acquired can be used, at your discretion, to contribute to the maintenance of an orderly market in silver and for such other special purposes as you may determine. In order to meet coinage needs, the amount of silver required for this purpose should be obtained by retirement from circulation of a sufficient number of five-dollar and ten-dollar silver certificates.

Pursuant to this general determination, I intend to recommend to Congress, when it reconvenes, that it repeal the acts relating to silver of June 19, 1934, July 6, 1939, and July 31, 1946. The existing tax on transfers of interest in silver bullion has been necessary only to provide reinforcement for this legislation. I will therefore simultaneously propose that the relevant portion of the Internal Revenue Code also be repealed.

These actions will permit the establishment of a broad market for trading in silver on a current and forward basis comparable to the markets in which other commodities are traded. Our new policy will in effect provide for the eventual demonetization of silver except for its use in subsidiary coinage.

Although the potential supply of silver now embodied in the outstanding five-dollar and ten-dollar certificates will be sufficient to cover coinage requirements for a number of years, I believe this is an appropriate time to provide for the gradual release of the silver now required as backing for one-dollar and two-dollar silver certificates. I shall therefore also recommend that legislation be enacted to accomplish this purpose and authorize the Federal Reserve Banks to include these denominations in the range of notes they are permitted to issue.

Sincerely,

JOHN F. KENNEDY

NOTE: A letter from Secretary Dillon, dated November 27, was also released. The Secretary summarized the changes that had taken place in the world position of silver, and proposed measures to deal with the problems created by the large and growing industrial demand.

JFK

485 Remarks Upon Presenting an Award to Allen W. Dulles. *November* 28, 1961

Mr. Dulles, Mr. McCone, General Cabell, members of the Central Intelligence Agency:

I want, first of all, to express my appreciation to you all for the opportunity that this ceremony gives to tell you how grateful we are in the government and in the country for the services that the personnel of this Agency render to the country.

It is not always easy. Your successes are unheralded—your failures are trumpeted. I sometimes have that feeling myself. But I am sure you realize how important is your

work, how essential it is—and how, in the long sweep of history, how significant your efforts will be judged.

So I do want to express my appreciation to you now, and I'm confident that in the future you will continue to merit the appreciation of our country, as you have in the past.

I'm also particularly grateful because this ceremony gives us all an opportunity to pay tribute to an outstanding public servant. Allen Dulles' career as a citizen of this country—and as one who has made his vast personal resources available to the country—stretches all the way back to the administration of President Woodrow Wilson. I know of no other American in the history of this country who has served in seven administrations of seven Presidents—varying from party to party, from point of view to point of view, from problem to problem, and yet at the end of each administration each President of the United States has paid tribute to his service—and also has counted Allen Dulles as their friend.

This is an extraordinary record, and I know that all of you who have worked with him understand why this record has been made. I regard Allen Dulles as an almost unique figure in our country. I know of no man who brings a greater sense of personal commitment to his work—who has less pride in office—than he has. And therefore I was most gratified when we were permitted today to come out to the Agency to present this award to him in your presence.

I'd like to read the citation.

"Allen Welsh Dulles is hereby awarded the National Security Medal.

"As principal intelligence adviser to the President of the United States, Mr. Dulles has fulfilled the responsibilities of his office with unswerving purpose and high dedication. His ten years of service in the Central Intelligence Agency have been the climax of a lifetime of unprecedented and devoted public service beginning in the First World War, and stretching through the administrations of seven Presidents.

"The outstanding contributions Mr. Dulles has made to the security of the United States have been based upon a profound knowledge of the role of the intelligence office, a broad understanding of international relations, and a naturally keen judgment of men and affairs. The zestful energy and undaunted integrity of his service to his country will be an enduring example to the profession he has done so much to create."

NOTE: The President presented the National Security Medal to Mr. Dulles at the CIA Building in Langley, Va. In his opening words the President referred to John A. McCone, successor to Mr. Dulles, and Gen. C. P. Cabell, Deputy Director of CIA.

Mr. Dulles served as Director of CIA from February 23, 1953, to November 29, 1961. His letter of resignation was released by the White House on November 29.

486 Remarks Upon Presenting the Harmon Trophy to Three Test Pilots of the X–15 Rocket Plane. *November* 28, 1961

I WANT to express my great pleasure at having an opportunity, as President, to participate in this ceremony which presents this very famous and celebrated award, which is held by some of our most distinguished aviators, to these three fliers who I think in the year 1960 have done what earlier winners of this award have done in their time and generation.

Among the winners of this award are I

stantly expanding. America has done it before in more trying times. And with your help, we can do it again. We can keep the miracle alive, not only for America but for the world.

Well, thank you, and God bless you all.

Note: The President spoke at 11:33 a.m. in the Grand Ballroom at the J.W. Marriott Hotel. Clayton Yeutter was the United States Trade Representative.

Remarks at a Dinner for Former Members of the Office of Strategic Services

May 29, 1986

Well, I'm delighted to be here tonight, and of course I'm greatly honored. I appreciated it very much—the one note that you did read. I happen to be in complete agreement with one citizen of the United Kingdom who approached me—we didn't know each other at the time of the economic summit in London—and he said to me, "Margaret Thatcher is the greatest man in England." [*Laughter*] By the way, I asked if this dinner was going to be black tie and was told, "No, trenchcoat." [*Laughter*] And then I asked Bill Casey where the dinner was going to be. And he said, "Leave the White House, go to 17th and K, and wait for the phone to ring." [*Laughter*]

we could do a variation of this joke

But seriously, it is a great honor to receive this award from all of you. But it seems to me we have this award-giving a little backward tonight. I can't think of a more distinguished gathering than this one, nor can I think of any group whose accomplishments and devotion to country makes them more worthy of accolades and praise. And yet it's precisely that praise and those accolades that you decided to forgo when you chose a twilight war, a secret profession, a profession where praise and thanks can only come from history and not from your contemporaries. And it's because secrecy has been your business that you all know how vital it is to your nation's safety and freedom's survival.

"The necessity of procuring good intelligence is apparent and need not be further urged," General Washington wrote to one of his colonels in 1777. "All that remains for me to add is that you keep the whole matter as secret as possible. For upon secrecy success depends in most enterprises of the kind, and for want of it they are generally defeated, however well planned and promising." Well, even then, Washington seems to sense that this business of secrecy does not come easily to us Americans. We're rightly regarded as a candid and open people who pride ourselves on our free society. And yet our secret services, our spies and intelligence agencies—from Nathan Hale to Midway, from OSS to CIA—have not written just a striking, stirring chapter in our history but have often provided the key to victory in war and the preservation of our freedom during an uneasy peace.

And that's why I'm delighted to be here tonight. None of America's intelligence agents have inspired and protected their nation more than the men and women of the OSS. I cannot attempt to recount tonight the individual deeds. Bill Donovan, for example, what a remarkable man he was—a member of the "Fighting 69th" in the First World War, a winner of the Congressional Medal of Honor, a one-man intelligence service in the thirties and forties, an American legend. And then there was the dedication and heroism of so many other OSS officers, from guerrilla leaders like Jim Kellis, Joe Alsop, and Carl Eifler to the strategists and planners like Dick Helms, Ned Putzel, and Bill Casey. All of this has been spoken of now in the many volumes about the secret war you waged 40 years ago.

So, tonight I join you to honor the memory of Bill Donovan and all the veterans of OSS, those who heard no bugles and

received no medals, but who struggled and sacrificed so that freedom might endure. Let me say to each of you tonight what the American people would have said 40 years ago had they known your story. Let me say to each of you tonight what every living American would say if he or she had the chance: We honor you. We salute you. We thank you for a job well done. And yet it's not enough just to thank or salute you for the past, because Bill Donovan's and the OSS's contributions have continued in the postwar era. For more than half of the CIA's existence, that agency's leadership has been in the hands of OSS veterans—the names are Dulles, Helms, Colby, and Casey. And so, too, I know each of you has continued to work for the cause of freedom since the end of World War II and especially the preservation of America's intelligence capability. You know better than most how important that capability is.

I think all of us can feel grateful that in the last few years that capability has seen a renaissance; indeed, the revitalization of an intelligence community is among the things we celebrate here tonight. And, yes, it's true this administration has given unstinting support to that effort. And let me assure you, that will continue. And while there are many who have made a vital contribution to that effort, I think all of you know who the linchpin is. A few years ago in his book, "Piercing the Reich," Joseph Persico described a young OSS officer. "A man," he said, "with boundless energy and competence. A man with an analytical mind, tenacious will, and a capacity to generate high morale among his staff. He delegated authority easily to trusted subordinates and set a simple standard—results." In every job he's held in government ever since, as Under Secretary of State, Chairman of the SEC, and now as DCI, that OSS officer has, by the end of his tenure, left even his harshest critics singing his praises. His name is Bill Casey. He has been your leader, he's our leader and good friend and surely one of the heroes of America's fight for freedom in the postwar era.

So, tonight, Bill Casey, your President and the veterans of the OSS salute you. And in saluting Bill Casey, we salute all those past and present who carry on the twilight war against totalitarianism. In your citation you speak of this administration's commitment to a forward strategy for freedom. And sometimes the question has been asked: What do we mean by this? Is this a return to John Foster Dulles? Are we preaching rollbacks? So the evidence—got ahead of myself there. I would say to you, the phrasing of the question itself is wrong, for it contains an assumption there that the march of communism is something unavoidable, that those who stand in its way are trying to throw back the forces of history.

Well, look around the world today. More than 90 percent of the people of Latin America are living in democratic nations or nations moving toward democracy—a striking change from only a few years ago. Many Asian and European countries are rejecting statism, moving toward the free market and democratic institutions. And then there is the revolution among the intellectuals, where statist and totalitarian ideology is now passé. And we're seeing anti-Communist insurgencies in many parts of the world. So the evidence is there; freedom is on the march. Our forward strategy for freedom means simply that we recognize this: that freedom today is a gathering tide, one that will soon engulf even the driest desert patches of totalitarian rule.

The truth is this: "The march of providence is so slow and our desire so impassioned," Robert E. Lee said once, "the work of progress so immense and our means of aiding it so feeble, the life of humanity is so long, that of the individual so brief, that we often see only the ebb of the advancing wave and are thus discouraged. It is history that teaches us to hope." Well, as we look at secret events in the light of postwar history, we can see that hope everywhere we look and turn. And it's not just us alone. Think how those must feel who only a few years ago despised us for what they saw as our weakness and staked their fortune on our doom. I think in particular of one man who is a symbol of much that was wrong with our world. How uneasy must be the Moscow nights of Kim Philby as he sees the new will, vigor, and energy of the West, and especially the renaissance of our intelligence services. How he and others like him

must realize that it was those they betrayed who are on the winning side after all.

We pray God that it will be so, that the struggle against totalitarianism will end in freedom's triumph, perhaps even in our own lifetime. But whether we see that day or not, we're confident that it will come. And when it does arrive, historians will look back to moments like this and to people like you, to the veterans of the OSS, and say as the ancients said of their heroes: Here were the brave, and here their place of honor.

Thank you, and God bless you.

Note: The President spoke at 6:50 p.m. in the International Ballroom at the Washington Hilton Hotel after receiving the William Donovan Award in recognition of his service to the country. William J. Casey was Director of Central Intelligence.

Remarks on Greeting the National Spelling Bee Finalists
May 30, 1986

The President. It's a pleasure to have all of you here today. And before anything else, I'd like to say how proud I am of each of you for reaching the National Spelling Bee finals. Getting this far required intelligence, concentration, and preparation. And that last word is spelled h-o-m-e-w-o-r-k. [*Laughter*]

I especially would like to congratulate Jon Pennington for being this year's National Spelling Bee champion and to Andy Larson and Rachel Henderson for being runners-up. I understand the winning word was odontalgia. Odontalgia?

Mr. Pennington. Odontalgia.

The President. I'm having trouble pronouncing it, let alone spelling it. Anybody who can get that right has either done their homework or spent a lot of time at the dentist. [*Laughter*]

And while we're offering our congratulations, let's not forget two young people who have had to overcome even greater odds in order to be here today, Terra Syslo and Monica Van Doren. Your achievement—I'm talking about everyone here today—sets a fine example for young people across our country. Spelling, like mathematics and reading, is a skill to be mastered, a skill that will open the door of the future.

Being successful, as all of you are aware, takes much more than luck and much more than raw talent. Thomas Edison once said that genius is 1 percent inspiration and 99 percent perspiration. When I was your age—now, some of you may think that was back in the time of the dinosaurs, but it wasn't quite that long ago—I remember struggling over my spelling. My mother would go through the drill of asking me to spell this word or that word. Our family wasn't well-to-do at all, and yet my mother knew that in America everything was possible, including the hope that one day a son of hers would get a hundred percent on a spelling test.

Seriously, though, I think that much of our country's progress can be traced back to parents who made certain their kids learned the fundamentals. For many of you, this may be your first visit to the Nation's Capital. Well, all the people you see working in government are doing their best to turn over to you, the next generation of Americans, an opportunity-filled land, a country where you can go as far as your hard work and your natural talents will carry you. And every time a group of bright young people like yourselves comes here, it makes everything seem worthwhile.

Legend tells us that early in the last century, a young man from Illinois taught himself how to write, scratching out words on a wooden shovel. He was poor, he couldn't afford paper and pen. He later went on to be a lawyer, a Congressman, and then President of the United States. He was a true champion of freedom. And his name, of course, was Abraham Lincoln. Had he not put forth that effort, studied there by the fireplace, our country would have been

by G. Bush

Dear George,
What you have been through before will look like a cakewalk compared to what you will now be confronted with. I only have one bit of advice: You will be tempted greatly to "give away the store" in assuring members of the Senate Committee that everything the CIA does in the future will be an open book. This, of course, is the surest way for you to be confirmed and to reduce the number who will vote against you. It will also be the surest way to destroy an agency that has already been terribly weakened by the irresponsible attacks that have been made upon it by both the Senate and House investigating committees.

Richard Nixon

Nixon's mention of giving away the store was an oblique reference to the policy of the man I'd replace at the CIA, Bill Colby. As CIA director, Colby had been criticized by agency professionals and others in government for what they perceived as his "open book" candor whenever he testified before a Congressional committee. Colby quoted Kissinger as once having told him, "Bill, you know what you do when you go to the Hill? You go to confession."

But Colby was walking the same tightrope I'd have to walk as CIA director. The question is where does Congress's and the public's right to know end and the need for secrecy in intelligence operations begin? Under the best of circumstances it's the question that troubles all intelligence operations in a free society and it defies any single, arbitrary answer. In the large, undefined gray area known as "national security interests," one government official's idea of TOP SECRET may be another government official's idea of UNCLASSIFIED.

In Colby's case, he was serving as CIA director in a period when the agency's credibility on Capitol Hill—and since Congress controls the government purse strings, that meant the agency's ability to function—was at an all-time low. The Vietnam and

Watergate years had seen the term "national security" both abused and overused. When reaction set in, the Central Intelligence Agency—by the nature of its work, the most secretive of government agencies—was especially hard hit.

Colby was like a general with an army disorganized and in retreat. He was trying to hold it together so that it could fight another battle, another day. The last thing the CIA needed in the early 1970s, thought Colby, was a director who might be charged with stonewalling Congress and the public.

Not that Colby's "open door" policy fully satisfied the agency's outside critics. Just as there were closed-minded government officials who wanted everything, down to the last memo, stamped TOP SECRET or CLASSIFIED, there were opportunists on Capitol Hill and in the media who viewed CIA bashing as a vehicle for their own ambitions. What the country's intelligence community faced in the 1970s wasn't just the loss of public confidence in government institutions. There was also the loss of restraint on the part of some politicians and journalists—a failure to recognize that while the term can be misused, real "national security" interests do exist and have to be protected in today's world.

Nixon's letter to me dealt with this problem:

In any period of détente, the danger of war goes down but the danger of conquest without war goes up geometrically. We can expect that the covert activities of those who oppose us and our friends around the world will be enormously stepped up in the months and years ahead. The United States must not adopt the philosophy of our communist opponents, particularly those in the Soviet Union, of using any means to an end. On the other hand, we must find an effective way to combat and thwart the communists if they start to use a period of détente for purposes of conquest.

Enclosed with the letter from San Clemente was a list of "Meditations from Sun Tzu," the Chinese von Clausewitz, who

lived around 500 B.C. Nixon had circled one particular maxim that summed up the point of his letter: "The acme of excellence," wrote Sun in his meditations on war, "is not the winning of a hundred victories in a hundred battles, but rather to subdue the armies of the enemy without fighting."

December 1975 wasn't the best of times for a Republican to come up for Senate confirmation as Director of the CIA. President Ford's honeymoon period with Congress had long since passed, and it seemed as if one out of every three Democratic senators was running for President. The other two were jockeying for either Vice President or a Cabinet position in the next administration.

But partisan jockeying was only part of the problem the Ford White House faced in trying to put the CIA's house in order. As the year drew to a close, the controversy surrounding the agency grew more heated each day.

On November 20 Senator Church's select committee had released a report charging that during the 1960s the CIA instigated assassination plots against Fidel Castro in Cuba and Patrice Lumumba of the Congo.

On December 4, Church alleged that the CIA was involved in the overthrow of President Salvador Allende of Chile two years before, in 1973.

Eleven days later, the House select committee, chaired by Congressman Otis Pike of New York, demanded that the Ford administration explain covert United States involvement in the civil war in Angola. Seventy-two hours later the Senate cut off funds for all military supplies to the pro-Western side in that war.

It was a signal, if any were needed, that Congress was no longer deferring to White House leadership in foreign affairs. We read the signal in Washington. Unfortunately they also read it in other capitals of the world. Overseas, in friendly capitals, the question was whether President Ford was really in charge of U.S. foreign policy. In Washington, the question was whether he could get a controversial nomination through the Senate.

Two days before Christmas, on December 23, Richard S. Welch, the CIA station chief in Greece, was assassinated after his name and job description had appeared in a letter to the English-language Athens *News*. He was murdered as he stepped out of the door of his home in Athens.

It was a sobering tragedy, one that pointed up the constant danger that agency personnel face overseas. But given the mood of Washington, that wasn't the lesson some people drew from Richard Welch's death. Instead, Senator Gary Hart of Colorado, a member of the Church committee, told of a lunatic letter he had received accusing the committee of causing Welch's death. Hart, in the spirit of the times, publicly speculated that the CIA was behind the letter.

All this set the tone for my two days of hearings before the Senate Armed Services committee. Bryce N. Harlow, a Republican specialist in Congressional affairs going back to the Eisenhower years, had been called in by the Ford White House to round up votes for my confirmation. Bryce was one of the most astute head counters on Capitol Hill. After a quick reading of the mood of the committee, he came back with word that the Democratic majority planned to make an issue not only of my political past but my political future.

"They want a blood oath you won't be on the ticket next fall," he said. "Otherwise I don't think we've got the votes."

Reflecting on it even a decade later, the request was odd. A Sherman-like statement about the *vice* presidency? Something like "I will not run if put on the ticket, I will not preside over the Senate if elected?" It was also pointless. The CIA, I reiterated to Bryce, was no springboard to high office.

He nodded in agreement. "They still want it," he said.

"I won't do it," I replied. Enough was enough. Being at the service of the President was one thing, but catering to partisan demands to be confirmed was asking too much.

And that's where matters stood, until a compromise was suggested: no blood oath on my part, but a statement from the White House.

> Ambassador Bush and I agree, that the nation's immediate foreign intelligence needs must take precedence over other considerations and there should be a continuity in the CIA leadership. Therefore, if Ambassador Bush is confirmed by the Senate as director of Central Intelligence, I will not consider him as my vice presidential running mate in 1976.
>
> Gerald Ford

That satisfied the committee, which then voted 12–4 in my favor. After Christmas recess the full Senate approved the nomination by a 64–27 vote, and three days later my friend and neighbor, Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart, swore me in as CIA director at the agency's headquarters in Langley, Virginia, just across the Potomac from Washington.

It was January 1976, the beginning of a presidential election year. President Ford and Governor Reagan were already going head to head in the New Hampshire primary. But coverage in the Washington press was also being given to two new, unheard-of phenomena on the national political scene: the Iowa caucuses and Governor Jimmy Carter of Georgia.

One of the lessons I'd learned in two diplomatic assignments, at the United Nations and in China, was never to underestimate the importance of symbolism. Not image—that's something else entirely. Image has to do with appearance, how you look to the world. Symbolism has to do with messages, what you want to tell the world.

On taking over as DCI—Director of Central Intelligence—the first message I had to send was to the agency's employees, not only at Langley headquarters but overseas. How I looked on Capitol Hill was important; how I came through in the media was important; but my number one priority was to head America's intelligence operations, and popularity on the Hill or with the press was

secondary to gaining the confidence of the people who worked for the CIA and the intelligence community.

In the mid-1970s, the morale of U.S. intelligence employees was at an all-time low. Some were risking their lives; all were applying their skills to jobs they saw as vital to their country's interests, even its survival. But there had been laws broken and excesses committed by some CIA personnel. Mistakes had been made, some far-fetched and aborted plots exposed. As a result the entire agency had been put into the dock and all its employees and projects placed under suspicion. When agency employees weren't being pounded in the press, they were being pilloried by the politicians.

That was the way most CIA employees viewed the situation facing their agency in January 1976. And now Bill Colby, a professional in the intelligence field, was being replaced by a nonprofessional outsider—and a politician to boot.

I needed to send a message that would tell CIA employees they hadn't been given a new director who, in former President Nixon's words, would give away the store. The message had to say, "I'm on your side, we're in this together."

My chance to do that came with the first decision I had to make as DCI. On its face it wasn't too important—just a matter of logistics.

"Where do you want to locate your main office?" I was asked. "At the Old EOB or Langley?"

The Old EOB is the Executive Office Building, a huge, gray, turn-of-the-century structure on Pennsylvania Avenue that once housed the State and War departments but since the end of World War Two has served as a White House annex. The Vice President, the OMB, and other top-level executive agencies have offices there. If I was located in the Old EOB, I'd have convenient access to the White House west wing and the Oval Office. That was on the plus side. Going through the southwest gate of West Executive Avenue every morning, with a reserved White House parking place, would be good for the image. But it would also send a mes-

sage that the new director was a politician more interested in playing the Washington power game than running the agency.

So locating in Langley, on the seventh floor of the CIA building, would be my first message. It was a decision made easier because I'd already made sure that wherever I located, I'd have direct access to the President.

That was one of two conditions I set in accepting the job of DCI. After replying to Kissinger's cable, I got in touch with Brent Scowcroft, the President's national security adviser, to make sure that along with the responsibility of my new assignment, I also had the means to carry it out. First I'd need to be able to reach the President directly, without having to go through anyone else in the west wing bureaucracy; second I wanted to name my own deputy and staff.

Scowcroft cabled back word of top-level approval on both points, which meant I wouldn't have to be near the Oval Office in order to get through to the President.

Locating in Langley also reflected my view that the CIA director should go out of his way to avoid even the appearance of getting involved in policy making. The agency's sole duty, outlined in its 1947 charter, is to furnish intelligence data to the President and other policy makers. I was determined to operate the agency within its charter, not only regarding policy but politics. As DCI, I would turn down invitations to all partisan events, including the 1976 Republican Convention in Kansas City.

The second important message I sent to agency personnel came through my choice of deputy director, a job being vacated by my friend, General Vernon Walters. To replace Walters, I named E. Henry Knoche. A former college athlete who stood about six-four, Hank Knoche was a well-known presence around the seventh-floor corridors at Langley, widely respected by his colleagues as a professional with hands-on knowledge of how the CIA operated.

There was a third message to send, one that wouldn't be as popular in certain parts of the agency as my first two. Some career officers in key positions didn't impress me as much as Hank Knoche did. They'd have to go.

Within six months, eleven of fourteen top administrators had been changed. Some were promoted. Others retired, resigned, or were discharged—but in every case, by direct personal contact, not by impersonal notices or pink slips.

No school or instructor can teach anyone how to be a congressman or a Cabinet officer—or a President—because each of these jobs makes unique demands. Experience in other jobs can be helpful, but it's no guarantee you'll succeed. There are things you can't know until you've been there. Taking over as DCI was that kind of challenge.

I'd come to the CIA with some general knowledge of how it operated. My diplomatic experience had made me aware of the role intelligence operations play in the conduct of foreign affairs, such as: You're negotiating with another ambassador regarding his country's position on an issue. He tells you something about political conditions in his country which, if true, means he doesn't have much bargaining room. Be reasonable, he asks. But you've been given an intelligence briefing just before the meeting and know that the situation in his home country isn't the way he describes it. You hold firm. He reports back to his government for further instructions and discovers he has more bargaining room than he originally stated. You resolve your differences in line with the original U.S. proposal.

Then, a few days later, you pick up the morning paper and read a scathing report on some alleged CIA foul-up, complete with demands from congressional critics that the agency clean up its act. You'd like to call the reporter and the critics and let them know about at least one CIA success, but that's out of the question; where intelligence work is concerned, talking about past achievements precludes future ones. As President Kennedy said when he dedicated the new CIA headquarters in 1961: "Your successes are unheralded; your failures are trumpeted."

One of the first things I discovered as part of my education as DCI was that press coverage of the CIA was almost universally

negative. After a round of press interviews that kept me on the defensive with questions coming out of the Church and Pike committee hearings, I asked my public affairs assistant, Angus Thuermer, if he could develop a list of CIA successes that *could* be heralded.

Angus came up with a lengthy report, beginning with the CIA's role in bringing off the Kennedy administration's finest moment.

Ask most people what they know about the CIA's involvement in Cuba during the Kennedy administration and the answer generally is "They fouled up at the Bay of Pigs." But how many remember that it was CIA aerial surveillance of Cuba that uncovered Soviet missile bases there eighteen months later? When President Kennedy told the American people and the world that the Soviets had "lied" about not having bases in Cuba, he had the proof in hand because of advanced U.S. intelligence capabilities. And eight years after that, when the Russians made still another run at covert base building in Cuba—constructing facilities for missile-firing submarines at Cienfuegos—it was a CIA analysis of aerial photographs that enabled President Nixon to pressure the Kremlin into stopping the project.

The failure at the Bay of Pigs became the CIA's failure, but resolving the missile crisis of 1962—which wouldn't have been possible without CIA intelligence efforts—became Kennedy's success.

I was beginning to understand why Hank Knoche and his colleagues at Langley had adopted a stoic, hunker-down philosophy about the agency's public image. And why some of my friends on Capitol Hill were against my becoming CIA director; they saw it as a no-win job for an agency with a no-win image.

My day as CIA director would begin when a gray Chevrolet arrived in front of our home in Northwest Washington promptly at 7:30 A.M. In addition to the driver there was an agency security officer whose primary mission wasn't so much to protect me as the

classified papers we carried on our fifteen-minute drive across the Potomac to CIA headquarters at Langley.

When the weather was bad, the driver would drop me off at a private elevator that shot directly to the director's office on the seventh floor. But most days I'd go to the front entrance, show my laminated plastic badge to the security guard, and head through the main lobby, past marble walls with rows of stars—one for every CIA employee killed in the line of duty.

The director's office was long, narrow, blandly furnished, a dark wood desk at one end, a rectangular conference table at the other, with a panoramic window view of a northern Virginia countryside that became spectacular in the autumn months.

I'd usually be at my desk around seven-fifty and spend the next half hour or so reviewing a summary of overnight cable traffic from CIA stations around the world. Hank Knoche, whose office adjoined mine, would join me with other executive assistants for a brief conference before the heads of various agency directorates began arriving for our regular nine A.M. meeting.

These meetings, informal but fast-paced, usually involved going around the table for an update on agency affairs. On days when I was scheduled to go before a congressional committee—I made fifty-one appearances on Capitol Hill in less than a year—we'd take time to go over some aspect of my upcoming testimony.

Once a week, either Thursday or Friday, I'd report to the White House for an early-morning briefing session with President Ford. NSC chief Brent Scowcroft would sit in at these meetings. When highly technical subjects were on the agenda, I'd bring along one or two CIA specialists, in case the President wanted additional data.

It was about this time, having passed age fifty, that I got into regular jogging. Some lunch hours I'd be joined by one or two other fitness types from the agency on a three-mile run along nearby sideroads. On bad-weather days we'd use an indoor track set up in the basement corridor.

My office day would generally end around seven P.M., winding down with informal staff meetings and signing papers. Only when

there was a presidential briefing or important Congressional hearing the next day did I take the office home.

There were two aspects to my term as CIA director that made it different from our previous stays in Washington, however. The first was that there were fewer social events to attend, since I regarded anything that had political overtones as off-limits. The second was that Barbara and I spent a lot more time at home talking about family, friends, and personal matters: for the first time in our married life, we couldn't speak freely about how things were going at the office.

Like most outsiders—although I'd served in government and should have known better—whenever the CIA came up in conversation, I automatically thought in terms of spying, counterspying, and covert actions. But I quickly learned that very few CIA personnel are in the Directorate of Operations—the division responsible for foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, and carrying out covert actions.

Most CIA employees work for one of three other directorates —either Administration, Science and Technology, or Intelligence.

Administration is the housekeeping division. It pays the checks, maintains employee records, and, among other things, handles personnel recruitment.

Science and Technology is the James Bond/"Mission Impossible" division involved in developing electronic and other devices for advanced intelligence work. This is the branch that captures the imagination of outsiders, to the extent that some people have seriously suggested technology may replace humans in foreign intelligence work one day in the not-too-distant future.

The flaw in this theory is that nobody has yet invented a machine to assess human intentions thousands of miles away. Science and technology can give us an accurate assessment of how many warships a particular country has and where they're located; but whether that country's leaders intend to use those warships is something only human judgment can gauge.

That's where the Directorate of Intelligence comes into play. In the CIA, an intelligence officer isn't a "spy" in the popular cloak-and-dagger image, but an analyst in some special area—foreign politics, economics, military affairs, agriculture, to name a few. At the time I was director, the CIA had over 1,400 employees with master's and doctoral degrees. When specialists at that level got together around my office conference table, the conversation sounded more like a university seminar than a chapter out of Ian Fleming.

One morning about three months after I became DCI, a meeting was held in my office to discuss the upcoming 1976 Italian elections. I don't know what I expected when the topic appeared on the agenda, but what I didn't anticipate was a heated academic debate, with four different analyses going around the table.

That particular argument was resolved, but when intelligence officers couldn't reach a consensus on an issue, it was up to me as DCI to decide what to tell the President and his National Security Council.

The most important intelligence estimate I ever brought before the President and the NSC concerned the situation in Beirut in the summer of 1976. On June 16 of that year, Francis E. Meloy, Jr., the U.S. ambassador to Lebanon, was assassinated while going to a meeting with Lebanese President-elect Elias Sarkis. Two other Americans, the embassy's economic counselor and the driver of the car, were killed with him.

President Ford called an emergency meeting of the NSC in the White House Situation Room, located on the ground floor of the west wing. The question before the group was whether the crisis was serious enough to evacuate Americans living in Lebanon.

The answer looked simple on the surface. Wasn't the murder of an ambassador proof enough that events were getting out of control?

Not necessarily. The ambassador's murder could have been an isolated act. There was also the possibility that the purpose of the assassination was to undercut the new Lebanese Government. If

that were the case, would an evacuation play into the terrorists' hands?

As DCI, my job was to furnish an up-to-the-minute intelligence estimate on what was happening and likely to happen in Beirut. No frills, just the data coming in from CIA personnel and other segments of the U.S. intelligence community.*

Seated around the rectangular table in the small room were the President, Secretary of State Kissinger, Deputy Defense Secretary Bill Clements, and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft. There was also a chair for the CIA director, though I spent most of the meeting on my feet, going through charts—including intelligence aerial photos showing overland escape routes—and answering questions.

It isn't the job of the Director of Central Intelligence to get involved in policy-making, but the data made it clear that the Meloy assassination signaled a new, more dangerous level of terrorist activity in Beirut—enough to warrant instructing the U.S. embassy there to advise all American nationals in Lebanon to leave the country. The President also ordered a Navy task force sent in to aid the evacuation. Hundreds of Americans and citizens of other countries boarded the ships, while others left Beirut in three convoys headed toward Damascus, Syria.

Other Americans, for their own reasons, chose to stay in Beirut, playing the odds that the violence and terrorism they saw around them wouldn't touch their lives directly, that the warfare between Christians and Muslims would soon come to an end and Beirut would again become one of the most beautiful, civilized cities in the world.

It was—and more than a decade later remains—a dangerous gamble, not only for themselves but for their country.

* Contrary to widespread impression, the CIA and the U.S. "intelligence community" aren't the same thing. The "community," as it's called, is made up of all the various intelligence services in the U.S. Government—e.g., Defense, State, Treasury, Army, NSA, Navy, Air Force. Following a 1975 recommendation made by an investigative commission headed by Vice President Rockefeller, President Ford gave the CIA director budgetary control over all segments of the "community," minimizing the risk of bureaucratic in-fighting among U.S. intelligence agencies.

• • •

It was during the 1976 Lebanese crisis that I was able to observe at close range the way Brent Scowcroft carried out his duties as the President's national security adviser. A tall, scholarly Air Force lieutenant general, Scowcroft possessed not only the experience but the even temperament needed for the job. Little more than a decade later, millions of television viewers would get to know him as a member of the three-man Tower Commission looking into the Iran-Contra affair.

As chief of the Ford White House NSC, Scowcroft operated under the same law that created the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947. His job, under the original NSC congressional charter, was to "advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security."

Like the CIA, the NSC was never intended to be in the policy-making loop of government—much less the operational end of American foreign policy. Scowcroft understood that. As a Tower Commission member, he reflected that understanding when he made the point that it wasn't the NSC process that failed during the Iran-Contra affair but the way some members of the NSC staff abused that process.

I agreed with Scowcroft. For years the NSC, by slow degrees, had been inching away from the intent of its original charter to advise on and integrate policy.

Under Presidents Truman and Eisenhower, the original charter was scrupulously followed. With strong personalities like Dean Acheson and John Foster Dulles heading the State Department—two secretaries with close ties to the Presidents they served—it wasn't likely that an NSC head could stretch the limits of his mandate in the foreign-policy field.

That changed under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, however. Kennedy, according to Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., was still President-elect when he announced he wanted to use the NSC "more flexibly than in the past. "When Kennedy's national security chief, McGeorge Bundy—and later Lyndon Johnson's NSC chief Walter

Rostow—began exercising the power that came from easy access to the Oval Office, it didn't take long for the Council to begin influencing rather than simply advising on foreign policy.

What Kennedy had created, along with a more flexible NSC, were the conditions for a policy rivalry between his Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, and his NSC adviser, Bundy. That institutional rivalry continued between Rusk and Rostow. Then, during the Nixon years, came Henry Kissinger to contend with William Rogers (until he replaced Rogers at State). The fight to control foreign policy also went on during the Carter years, with only the names changed: Zbigniew Brzezinski vs. Cyrus Vance.

The Reagan years saw a continuation of the fight in a different form. President Reagan has had five NSC heads, from Richard Allen to Frank Carlucci. None had the kind of power and influence exercised by Kissinger or Brzezinski. But an NSC staff apparatus was in place, operating far outside the agency's original charter. In 1985–86, it took the ultimate step of not only shaping but operating an independent covert action in the foreign-policy area.

This couldn't and wouldn't have happened under Brent Scowcroft. His conduct as NSC chief was a model that every future American President ought to follow in choosing and properly using a national security adviser. Scowcroft scrupulously adhered to the NSC charter, seeing to it that the views of all Council members were accurately and objectively reported to the President. He didn't try to make the NSC into a policy-making agency. He knew that the United States didn't need two secretaries of State and two secretaries of Defense.

When I took over as DCI, there were daily messages from CIA stations on my desk every morning, reporting that we were losing valuable sources of information as a result of worldwide publicity caused by leaks from irresponsible investigators on Capitol Hill. Some examples:

- The intelligence services of four Latin American countries drastically reduced their contact with the CIA, citing press leaks.
- A ranking East European official and U.S. secret agent since 1972 stopped cooperating with us, out of fear of publicity and exposure.
- A Communist-bloc diplomat who had agreed to provide information about his government broke off all contact after saying he couldn't risk working with an intelligence agency whose internal affairs were in the news every day.

Still new on the job, I read these reports with growing frustration as demands came in from Capitol Hill and the press for even greater exposure of CIA operations. I believed in cooperating with Congress and the press, but unless CIA sources were protected, the agency couldn't carry out its national security assignment.

My biggest fight to protect CIA sources came during the final days of the Ford administration, however, and it wasn't with a hostile Congressional committee or the press. It was with the Justice Department and involved the bizarre case of Edwin Gibbons Moore.

Moore was a former CIA employee who left the agency in 1973. Three years later, at about eleven P.M. on December 21, 1976, he threw a package over the fence of the Soviet embassy's residential complex in northwest Washington. The Soviet guards thought it was a bomb and called in the U.S. Secret Service. What the U.S. authorities discovered were copies of CIA documents dating from Moore's days with the agency, plus a note promising more material for $200,000. The exchange was to be made the next evening.

At this point the Federal Bureau of Investigation stepped in. Moore, the Inspector Clouseau of volunteer spying, had pinpointed his own neighborhood as the site of the exchange. The FBI drove past the spot and dropped a package. Adding to the absurdity, a child ran over to pick it up. But Moore, who had been raking his yard a short distance away, charged across the street, chased the kid off, and grabbed the package. He expected $200,000. What he got was an indictment for espionage.

At that point, the Justice Department entered the act. To prove their case, Justice attorneys wanted the papers Moore had tossed over the Soviet embassy fence. The CIA cooperated by furnishing some, but not all the papers. The papers withheld included the names of undercover agency personnel and the identity of private citizens who had aided the CIA while traveling overseas.

From Langley, we pointed out that if Justice used these papers as evidence in an open trial, it would be giving the Soviets, free of charge, what Moore wanted to charge $200,000 for. We wanted Moore convicted, but we couldn't risk releasing those undercover names. What's more, we told Justice, there was enough material already furnished to make a strong case.

Justice didn't agree. Attorney General Edward H. Levi insisted on not just some, but all the papers. We refused. CIA and Justice were stalemated, and the issue still wasn't resolved going into the last month of the Ford administration. It would come down to a confrontation between the Attorney General and the CIA director in the Oval Office, with the President making the final decision.

Levi and I were in Brent Scowcroft's office, waiting to see the President. We started talking about the case, coolly at first, until the Attorney General tried to drive his point home by arguing that the CIA's refusal to turn over all the documents, "smacked of a Watergate cover-up."

Blame it on the fact that we were both putting in overtime, winding up our work as we got ready to leave office, or the fact that Levi hadn't been in Washington during the Watergate years and didn't know how deeply his words cut. But after a year of hearing "Watergate cover-up" used by every cub reporter in town and every junior staff investigator on Capitol Hill, my patience snapped.

"We'll be talking to the President in a few minutes," I said, my voice rising. "Why don't you tell *him* that—*in just those words.*"

At this point, Scowcroft broke in to bring the temperature down a notch before we went into the Oval Office. Levi and I had always been friendly, and he now realized he'd hit a raw nerve. Perhaps, he said, there wasn't any need to bother the President in

these last hours of his administration. There might be some way we could settle our differences.

There was. Levi cooled down, I cooled down, and our lawyers worked the problem out. In December 1977 Edwin Gibbons Moore was convicted and sentenced to a twenty-five-year prison term—without use of the documents the CIA didn't want to release.

For the second presidential campaign in a row I was watching a race for the White House as a close but outside observer. During the 1972 Nixon-McGovern race I was serving as ambassador to the United Nations. Now, from my seventh-floor office at Langley, I watched the Ford-Carter campaign as a strictly nonpartisan (though not dispassionate) public official.

There were two roles I had to play in the campaign, however —one minor, the other functional. The minor role was to serve as as a one-day target for Jimmy Carter in a speech he made to the American Bar Association in the summer of 1976. Carter told the ABA that both Presidents Nixon and Ford had used important government posts as "dumping grounds for unsuccessful candidates, faithful political partisans, out-of-favor White House aides, and representatives of special interests." He specifically named me, citing my U.N. appointment in 1971.

All of which didn't make my second, functional role any easier. As CIA director I was expected to give intelligence briefings to the candidates. That meant flying to Plains, Georgia, several times, accompanied by agency officials who could fill the Democratic nominee in on specialized subjects.

We would meet Carter in the living room of his home in Plains, he the courteous but distant host, we the courteous but slightly ill-at-ease guests. After the campaign, Carter would call the briefings "professional, competent, and most helpful." That was good to know, because in the time I spent with him, I wasn't able to gauge his reaction too well. It wasn't the ABA speech that threw me off. I pegged that for what Wendell Willkie once called "mere campaign rhetoric." It was only a one-time shot.

Carter's attacks on the Central Intelligence Agency, on the other hand, were frequent and vituperative. He called the agency one of Nixon's two scandals—Watergate being the other. Whatever Carter's reason—because he didn't really understand the agency, its expertise, or the dedication of its people—I felt that beneath his surface cool, he harbored a deep antipathy toward the CIA.

At the briefings, however, he was all concentration, soaking up data. Sitting in a straight-back chair, he would listen for long stretches without asking any questions, only perfunctorily saying "okay" or "I understand" when he thought he'd heard enough on a particular topic. He seemed to have an index-card mind, filing everything away for recall whenever he might need it.

What really came through about Carter, however, was that he was a loner, suspicious of strangers and their motives. Someone would say something, and he'd react with a look that conveyed, "I hear you, but think you've got some angle you're hiding."

He was a man, in short, who always seemed to have his guard up. Jimmy Carter might have been the European foreign minister who, on hearing that Prince Metternich had just died, asked, "I wonder what he meant by that?"

My last visit to Plains came in mid-November, 1976, not long after the election. This time I'd be briefing not candidate Carter but President-elect Carter, and his running mate, Vice President-elect Mondale. It would be one of my last official acts as DCI. Before leaving on an early morning flight, I'd visited President Ford and Vice President Rockefeller, to tell them I was headed for Plains. On the trip down I told Hank Knoche that before the briefing started I planned to tell the President-elect I was resigning so that he could name his own DCI on taking office.

The session lasted five full hours. Halfway through the briefing, one of my deputies, Dan Murphy, began outlining long-range national security problems facing the country. He mentioned a particular problem, due to come to a head around 1985—at which point the President-elect, who'd been quietly listening, held up his hand.

"I don't need to worry about that," he said, half smiling. "By then George will be President and he can take care of it." Then, nodding toward the Vice President-elect sitting across the room, Carter added, "Either George or Fritz Mondale there."

George will be President? It was an odd statement, coming from Jimmy Carter. I wondered what he meant by that.

REMARKS BY

GEORGE BUSH

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

BEFORE

THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE

PASADENA, TEXAS

JANUARY 14, 1977

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, DURING THE PAST YEAR, AS DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, I HAVE HAD THE PRIVILEGE OF SPEAKING IN MANY PARTS OF THE COUNTRY, BEFORE MANY GROUPS SUCH AS THIS -- PEOPLE WHO ARE INTERESTED IN WHAT THEIR GOVERNMENT DOES, AND WHY AND HOW WELL IT DOES WHAT IT DOES.

ONE OF MY CONTINUING CONCERNS HAS BEEN THAT WITH THE PREVAILING SENSATIONALISM IN STORIES ABOUT THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY MUCH OF THE ESSENTIAL WORK OF THAT AGENCY -- WORK THAT IS VITAL TO OUR NATIONAL DEFENSE AND OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS -- HAS BEEN LARGELY IGNORED. I HAVE BEEN CONCERNED THAT THE NEED FOR FIRST-RATE INTELLIGENCE IN THE CONDUCT OF OUR NATION'S FOREIGN POLICY AND FOR THE PROTECTION OF OUR VITAL NATIONAL INTERESTS IS INADEQUATELY UNDERSTOOD.

FOR EXAMPLE, WHEN PEOPLE THINK OF OUR NATION'S INTELLIGENCE AGENCY THEY STILL TEND TO THINK PRIMARILY OF ESPIONAGE, OF COVERT ACTION AND CLANDESTINE COLLECTION OF INFORMATION. IT'S TRUE THAT THESE ARE IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF INTELLIGENCE WORK -- THEY ALWAYS HAVE BEEN AND NO DOUBT WILL CONTINUE TO BE. BUT MODERN INTELLIGENCE ALSO INVOLVES THE IMPORTANT PROCESSES OF ANALYSIS AND PROVIDING THE RESULTS OF THIS EFFORT -- WHICH WE CALL FINISHED INTELLIGENCE -- TO THE POLICYMAKERS OF THE GOVERNMENT TO GIVE THEM THE COLLATED INFORMATION THEY NEED TO MAKE

OUR ANALYTICAL REPORTS ARE EVALUATED BY NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS WHO ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR PRODUCING THE BEST INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES WE CAN POSSIBLY MAKE -- WHICH IN TURN GO TO OUR POLICYMAKERS.

THE GUIDANCE AND DIRECTION FOR THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY COME FROM THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL -- THE PRESIDENT, VICE PRESIDENT, SECRETARY OF STATE AND SECRETARY OF DEFENSE. THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL CONDUCTS REVIEWS OF INTELLIGENCE POLICIES TO MAKE CERTAIN THAT WE ARE PROPERLY RESPONDING TO THE NEEDS OF THOSE OFFICIALS WHO FORMULATE AND EXECUTE OUR FOREIGN POLICY.

ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE, FOR EXAMPLE, IS AN INDICATION OF THE KIND OF THINGS CIA AND THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MUST BE CONCERNED WITH. UNTIL RECENTLY NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES WERE OVERWHELMINGLY POLITICAL AND MILITARY IN NATURE -- TODAY, HOWEVER, WHILE WE CONTINUE TO DEVOTE A LARGE PORTION OF OUR RESOURCES TO ASSESSING THE POTENTIAL OF POTENTIAL ADVERSARIES FOR MAKING WAR, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS -- MANY OF WHICH HAVE NO DIRECT RELATIONSHIP TO THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES -- ARE OF GREAT CONCERN TO US. TO SUPPORT SUCH CONSUMERS OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AS THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS, THE COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY, AND THE ECONOMIC POLICY BOARD, CIA HAS MORE THAN 200 GRADUATE ECONOMISTS AND INDUSTRY SPECIALISTS, FOR INSTANCE, PARTICIPATING IN SOME OF THE ANALYTICAL WORK ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS.

NOW VERY MUCH A FUNCTION OF OUR TIMES -- AND THREATENS TO BECOME EVEN MORE A PROBLEM AS TIME GOES ON. WE ARE, AS SOME HAVE SAID, ENTERING A KIND OF "ERA OF TERRORISM." ADVANCES IN TECHNOLOGY AND THE GROWING WORLD INTER-DEPENDENCE HAVE GIVEN TERRORISTS GREATER MOBILITY, NEW TARGETS, NEW WEAPONRY, AND THE CERTAINTY THAT THEIR MORE DRAMATIC ACTIVITIES WILL RECEIVE PROMPT AND WORLDWIDE PUBLICITY.

JUST TO REFRESH YOUR MEMORY OF A FEW SUCH INCIDENTS:

+ IN SEPTEMBER 1974 A TWA PLANE IN THE MIDDLE EAST WAS BOMBED WHILE IN FLIGHT, WITH ALMOST A HUNDRED KILLED. AN ARAB YOUTH ORGANIZATION TOOK CREDIT FOR THAT ONE.

+ IN MAY 1972 TWENTY-FIVE PUERTO RICAN PILGRIMS IN THE HOLY LAND WERE SHOT DOWN BY MEMBERS OF THE SO-CALLED "JAPANESE RED ARMY" -- A SMALL, ULTRA LEFTWING GROUP WHICH FIRED INTO A CROWD AT AN ISRAELI AIR TERMINAL.

+ IN DECEMBER 1973 ARAB TERRORISTS FIRED PHOSPHORUS GRENADES AT A PAN AMERICAN JETLINER AT THE ROME AIRPORT; 29 PERSONS DIED.

+ KIDNAPPINGS HAVE BEEN RAMPANT -- OFTEN IN DEMAND FOR THE RELEASE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS. IN DECEMBER 1973 AN AMERICAN EXXON EXECUTIVE WAS KIDNAPPED IN SOUTH AFRICA FOR 14 MILLION DOLLARS RANSOM -- AND IN 1975 THE MONTONEROS ORGANIZATION ASKED 60 MILLION DOLLARS RANSOM IN A KIDNAPPING.

+ WHO CAN FORGET THE KILLINGS AT THE OLYMPICS IN MUNICH

OF PALESTINE (PFLP) AND THE SO-CALLED JAPANESE RED ARMY TEAMED UP IN A NUMBER OF ATTACKS, BOTH ORGANIZATIONS HAVE RECEIVED ASSISTANCE FROM A NUMBER OF TERRORIST GROUPS IN VARIOUS PARTS OF THE WORLD.

THE IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY HAS LINKS WITH A NUMBER OF TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS OUTSIDE THE UNITED KINGDOM AND NORTHERN IRELAND.

THEN THERE IS A VENEZUELAN WHO USES THE NAME OF "CARLOS" -- LINKED WITH A NUMBER OF HEADLINE INCIDENTS SUCH AS THE JAPANESE RED ARMY SEIZURE OF THE FRENCH EMBASSY IN THE HAGUE IN 1974, ATTACKS ON EL AL AIRCRAFT AT ORLY AIRPORT IN FRANCE IN 1975, AND AN ATTACK ON THE OPEC MINISTERIAL-LEVEL CONFERENCE IN VIENNA IN DECEMBER 1975. THE GROUP HE USED IN THE VIENNA ATTACK INCLUDED TWO GERMANS AND THREE PALESTINIANS -- WHICH AGAIN SHOWS THE INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION AMONG TERRORISTS.

AND THE LATIN AMERICAN TERRORISTS OF ARGENTINA, URUGUAY AND BOLIVIA -- ACTIONS DIRECTED LARGELY AGAINST MILITARY LEADERS AND FOREIGN BUSINESSMEN.

CLEARLY, WITH THIS KIND OF CHALLENGE FACING OUR GOVERNMENT AS WELL AS OTHER GOVERNMENTS, WITH AMERICAN LIVES AND PROPERTY ENDANGERED BECAUSE OF SUCH ACTIVITIES, THERE IS AN IMPORTANT ROLE FOR INTELLIGENCE. WHO ARE THE TERRORISTS? WHERE WILL THEY STRIKE? WHAT ARE THEIR MOTIVES? WHAT ARE THEIR LOGISTICAL SOURCES? THESE ARE THE KINDS OF QUESTIONS THAT MUST BE ANSWERED. ONCE THE TERRORISTS STRIKE

WILL NOT YIELD TO EXTORTION OR BLACKMAIL IN WHATEVER FORM, ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT OPPOSE EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE. BUT PRIVATE COMPANIES AND MANY GOVERNMENTS FIND IT DIFFICULT TO TAKE A FIRM POSITION WHEN CONFRONTED BY KIDNAPPING AND RANSOM DEMANDS. CLEARLY IT IS NOT AN EASY PROBLEM.

FINALLY, AND I DON'T WANT TO OVEREMPHASIZE THE DANGER, THERE IS THE POSSIBILITY OF NEW WEAPONRY IN THE HANDS OF TERRORISTS. OBVIOUSLY THERE IS ALWAYS THE DANGER OF SOME FANATICAL GROUP SEEKING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION OR AT LEAST TRYING TO POSE SUCH A THREAT. THE SYMBOLIC VALUE OF AMERICAN TARGETS WILL LIKELY CONTINUE TO MAKE AMERICANS AND AMERICAN FACILITIES ATTRACTIVE AS A MEANS OF GAINING PUBLICITY FOR TERRORIST CAUSES. INDEED, IN THE PAST EIGHT YEARS U.S. CITIZENS OR U.S. FACILITIES HAVE BEEN VICTIMIZED IN AT LEAST ONE-THIRD OF ALL TERRORIST INCIDENTS OVERSEAS.

I HAVE TAKEN THE TIME TO DISCUSS THE SUBJECT OF MODERN TERRORISM TO INDICATE TO YOU ONE OF THE IMPORTANT ROLES INTELLIGENCE PLAYS FOR OUR GOVERNMENT -- AND OUR PEOPLE. I AM CERTAINLY NOT TRYING TO ALARM YOU -- BUT I THINK WE LEARNED MANY YEARS AGO THAT THE UNITED STATES CANNOT SIMPLY IGNORE THE REST OF THE WORLD -- THAT WE MUST BE ALERT TO INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS WHETHER WE ARE TALKING ABOUT POLITICS, ECONOMICS, MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS -- OR NEW

First, I would say that the Central Intelligence Agency is different than you probably think it is. It is different than I thought it was when I went there. The Agency through the furor of the hearings of something over a year ago took an enormous pounding. A handful of abuses proved to be an enormous barrelful of false allegations resulting in a denigration of the Agency and a downgrading of the support from the American people. But I can certify to you as I have to the President of the United States and to seven oversight committees of the United States Congress that this Agency is living within the law. We are fully complying with the most sweeping reform of intelligence since 1947 which is the President's Executive Order of February 1976. We are totally cooperating. Mr. Gambitts, when he was on one of these oversight committees and I hope maybe he will be, can tell you as I am telling you now, that the American people thinks that the budget of the CIA is not reported to anybody, it's reported every single penny in total detail to elected representatives of the people and as long as I am Director, which is three days more, and as long as I can speak out, I would urge the budget of the CIA be reported in this great detail to the Congress but not revealed in detail to the American people because the people that would

benefit from that would be the KGB, the Soviet arm of intelligence, and we must protect the vital sources and methods and the vital national security secrets and there are some critics to the contrary, notwithstanding. So, I would say the Agency is doing pretty well. Our recruitment is up, our morale is in pretty good shape, the quality of applicants is up, and the institution, in spite of the risks that some of our people take abroad, risks to come mainly from this irresponsible disclosure of their names, our people are willing to serve abroad. One of the things that got me the most was just when I was about to come and assume my job, and one of these leftwing organizations, Counterspy Magazine, published the names of CIA agents; two weeks later our station chief was killed in Athens. Classical Greek scholar, graduate of honors from Harvard University, linguist of pronounced ability, family man, decent man, gunned down by assassins in Athens two weeks after his name was made public. Our laws totally incapable of protecting my people who serve abroad with an unselfish, unparallel in war time or in peace time. I have nothing but contempt for those who disclose the names of our people. I would say at the end that I've been a very lucky guy since I first went to the Congress ten years ago, almost ten years ago to the day from Southwestern part of Houston,

I was lucky before then because I believe so firmly in our free enterprise system and benefited from it and I hope that as I drove downtown today and I saw that the (unintelligible) tower building, that black thing that comes to a point and I could not help but reminisce that I had been I guess the first president of that company long before we could afford a black building that comes to a point. I noticed that (unintelligible but not substantive paragraph) I thought to myself, what a miraculous thing when you start something and others come along and do a better job at it, but anyway we are producing something, we're making jobs so my experience in business has been very rewarding. My experiences involved with Congress was a fantastic one and I know that you will agree with me that your colleagues' image of Congress at the time, contrary notwithstanding, or with people of quality, they are there for a reason, they've got to go home and face the people, and I love that experience. I found my two years with the United Nations a fascinating assignment as anybody could ever have as Ambassador there. I met people there that are Chiefs of State, now Chiefs of State, foreign ministers from all over the world and I think I have, and I know Barb does too, a better concept of what the world is really like. Then in troubled times I was Chairman of the Republican National Committee in a very hectic and difficult time, and people said, oh, that's a thankless job but it wasn't because I have never been ashamed

of politics to participate and give it all I had in a partisan fashion. Then I went to China in a totally non-partisan job and hopefully as in the United Nations I participated in a non-partisan fashion and there we saw the country of 850 million (unintelligible) and I can't begin to say we understand it but I know what it is like to live in a totalitarian system, and that was an unusual experience. Having said all that, nothing compares with the privilege of being head of the CIA. I'll tell you, people say it's a thankless job and my answer to that is, you don't know what you're talking about if you say that is a thankless job. Yes, we have problems, yes we have public misconceptions. The importance of our mission, the importance of guaranteeing to our kids and grandchildren that this country will have the information necessary to have our policymakers make the right decisions, how strong this country needs to be, what we can do in terms of economic moves against cartels of this type. The importance of the mission plus the uplift one gets from being surrounded with at CIA, makes it not a thankless job but in my view one of, I've had the greatest privilege of any American to be Director of Central Intelligence and head the CIA.

Thank you.

INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE

DONOVAN IN PERSPECTIVE *

William M. Henhoeffer

*OSS was the most wonderful place to be young! We young ones had everything—belief, enthusiasm, opportunity, victory. Life rushed on in excitement and in confidence that we were a special group of colleagues with an important mission for our country.**

By 1 January 1983, centenary of the birth of the Agency's founder and chief of the OSS, the interested reader would find four full-length books about him. Corey Ford's *Donovan of OSS* was published in Boston in 1970 and London the following year. Thomas F. Troy's *Donovan and the CIA* was issued in 1981 by the Agency's Center for the Study of Intelligence and later that year by a commercial publisher in Frederick, Maryland. Two more works appeared in 1982: Richard Dunlop's *Donovan:—America's Master Spy* and Anthony Cave Brown's *The Last Hero:—Wild Bill Donovan*, published by Rand McNally and Times Books, respectively. With over 2,100 pages of text and four points of view at hand, it is possible for a reader not only to be caught in a maze of intelligence specialists' arguments, complex yet almost always interesting, but also, more broadly, to begin to measure the man's place within the context of American and twentieth century history. This essay is cast mainly on that general level.

Leadership: Positive and Negative Aspects

All four authors emphasize Donovan's leadership qualities, and particularly what they regard as positive results of that leadership. They praise his ability to evoke strong loyalty from his subordinates. They tell us he could inspire an employee with the feeling of working for him personally at a vital task. This message has been amply supported in several recollections of people directly associated with Donovan: Lawrence R. Houston's review of the Dunlop book published in the Washington *Times* in November 1982 was a case in point; so were the vigorously stated, upbeat comments of three OSS veterans—Louise Bushnell, Virginia Stewart, and Elizabeth McIntosh—to Headquarters personnel last spring; and Ernest Cuneo's more recent presentation to Agency military reservists added other interesting atmospherics.

* Former OSS member Caroline Bland, quoted in Dunlop, p. 307.

Excerpted from Winter 1983 issue of Studies in Intelligence

These encomia to Donovan's qualities of leadership are liable to arouse in today's Agency employees a sense of relative deprivation. Some of the informal standards he set are still observed: the willingness of Agency managers to work on occasion without full financial compensation, and their tendency to shun some of the "perks" routinely demanded by their counterparts elsewhere in the federal government, reflect Donovan's own professional lifestyle. But in other ways we have changed greatly since the OSS period, and although changes were bound to occur, they have not all been improvements. The layers of bureaucracy within the organization are more numerous and less permeable. We sense the need for conferences on ethics and intelligence, and perhaps even for an ethical code for our profession, whereas his character seemed to imbue the entire OSS with something approaching an ethical consensus. The Donovan style also encouraged among the rank and file of his organization an exceptionally strong concern for the welfare of other employees. OSS under him seemed to have been a true company of colleagues.

Before lamenting too long on the golden days of the past, we should reflect on certain negative consequences of this imposing personality. All four books on Donovan show that his leadership sometimes had an adverse impact on the internal management of OSS. All four allude to a brief "palace revolution" that came to a head in February 1944, in which some of his subordinates demanded that he either travel less, or delegate more authority to his immediate subordinates, or both. Donovan, we are told, angrily rejected their recommendations and continued to rule as before.

The second negative consequence of Donovan's charismatic personality was that it sharpened the bureaucratic rivalries in which OSS (and its predecessor group the Coordinator of Information) inevitably found itself. As one of his aides recorded privately, Donovan, with all his honesty and expertise, was also "so aggressive, so scattered, so provocative" that "he excites anger." According to Ernie Cuneo, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt encouraged bureaucratic competition throughout his administration by setting up organizations with overlapping responsibilities. Donovan relished this type of challenge, and although the four authors tend to blame his rivals more than him for the use of unfair tactics, it is clear that he was eager and resourceful in "conducting ungentlemanly warfare" (Dunlop's term).

J. Edgar Hoover of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, for example, emerges from these four books as a villain, whose enduring enmity toward Donovan seemed greater than his dedication to the national interest. But Donovan sometimes crossed into territory clearly Hoover's responsibility, and not by accident. It is difficult to justify Donovan's authorization for his agency to break into an embassy on US territory, without even consulting the Bureau. Moreover, as long as the Bureau was assigned responsibility for collecting intelligence in Latin America, Donovan should have respected that demarcation if only to preserve the quality of what purported to be intelligence. From today's vantage point, one concludes that the national interest would have been better served if Donovan had vetted with the FBI, for its evaluation, the "top secret" information his people had obtained from Mexican communist and left-wing labor leaders on the possible presence of "one thousand" or more

Japanese agents and covert Japanese "bases" on the Baja Peninsula. To do so, however, would have alerted Hoover to Donovan's bureaucratic transgression, and so Donovan passed the report directly to FDR.

In his relations with the US military establishment Donovan sometimes chose confrontation where a more prudent official would have sought cooperation. He decided, evidently on his own initiative, to make a top secret film report on the Pearl Harbor attack in order to find out who had been at fault. According to Dunlop he "ignored the Army and Navy's opposition" in the matter. The field photo team he sent to Hawaii was, in various ways, "brash and arrogant." Moreover, despite Secretary of War Stimson's insistence that he see the film before it was released, the head of Donovan's photographic unit tried to smuggle a large portion of the film to Donovan to be shown to FDR. The Navy managed to confiscate the film and lock it up in a vault. In retrospect, who can blame the Navy?

Pranks and Provocations

Donovan's shenanigans (the word is used advisedly) against his military rivals were sometimes provoked by them, and sometimes by him. Dunlop recounts the story of a dinner party where an admiral remarked that Donovan's organization was "a Tinker Toy outfit, spying on spies." We have Donovan's word for it, presumably, that the admiral actually did bait him that way; it is hard to imagine the admiral himself confessing to such a tactless comment, or to the aftermath. In any case Donovan rose to the bait by suggesting that his outfit "could get your secret files and blow up your ammunition dump." The admiral, of course, laughed at the suggestion. A few minutes later, Dunlop records,

> Donovan excused himself from the table, presumably to go to the washroom. He telephoned his headquarters and within an hour several high-ranking Navy officers showed up at the Navy Building demanding to see the admiral. The sentry saluted and said the admiral was not in.
>
> "Then," said one, "we'll wait in his office."
>
> Once inside the officers went to work.
>
> One, a safecracker, opened the safe and removed its top secret contents. Then the party left and drove to the ammunition dump, where they dressed down the officer of the day for not demanding their security clearances at the gate. When the OD left in relief, they planted dummy dynamite tubes. They sent the admiral's top secret files and a report on their activities to Donovan at the dinner party. As the party was breaking up, Donovan handed the admiral his files without comment, and explained where he could find the dummy charges at the ammunition dump. (p. 348)

Donovan was not above using meetings with the Joint Chiefs of Staff to impress the military in unusually creative ways. Dunlop tells us of the "Hedy Lamarr" fireworks device, contrived by Stanley Lovell, the chief of OSS

Research and Development, to create a distraction for an OSS spy trying to avoid capture. All the spy had to do was pull a tiny wire loop and the device initiated the roar of a falling bomb. Donovan took Lovell to a JCS meeting, mentioned the device to his audience and moved on to other subjects. Lovell, as prearranged, pulled the ring and dropped Hedy into a metal wastebasket. "Two- and three-star generals rushed for the door as a mighty roar ended Hedy's performance."

Dunlop's book is replete with anecdotes like these, and the other three authors provide several more. Many of Donovan's pranks led to more serious consequences, but the basic point is the same: if you happened to be on Donovan's side in these episodes, or can assume that allegiance vicariously now, Donovan emerges as an exceptionally brave and clever man who deserved your loyalty. No wonder the morale in OSS was high. Yet it also should be possible to understand the resentment Donovan's peers came to feel toward him, and the seriousness of his aide's observation that "he excites anger."

Moreover, from the vantage point of a contemporary historian, there is much to be lamented in these stories. In his review of the Troy book, Notre Dame history professor Bernard Norling summarizes the bureaucratic rivalries affecting Donovan in this way:

> Some forty different agencies, all of them involved in intelligence gathering in *some* way, defended their turf from the threat of encroachment with remarkable imagination and a tenacity that would have excited a bulldog. There were endless hearings, innumerable drafts and redrafts of proposals, interminable squabbles about the definitions of words, continuous efforts to either reduce or scatter the functions of OSS, endless rumors, "inspired" leaks to friendly newspapers, fierce infighting about who should be directed by whom, and resort to that final refuge of the badgered bureaucrat, additional studies.

Norling finds the bureaucratic wrangling with Donovan at the center to have been "squalid" and "appalling"—one of those aspects of World War II which should cause one to wonder what the other side was like if our side was winning. Norling has a point.

OSS Achievements, Positive and Negative

Bureaucratic wrangling notwithstanding, Donovan and the OSS did contribute to the winning of World War II, but historians are by no means certain how much. OSS intelligence activities as such are outside the scope of Troy's book. Corey Ford and Dunlop let the British provide the bottom line. Ford records that in 1966 Admiral Louis Mountbatten told OSS veterans that he doubted "whether any one person contributed more to the ultimate victory of the Allies than Bill Donovan." In the foreword to Dunlop's biography the wartime head of British intelligence in the US, Sir William Stephenson ("Intrepid"), pronounces Donovan "one of the most signficant men of our century" but shows polite reservation about the organization he headed. He

salutes the fact that by the end of the war "Donovan's OSS was comparable quantitatively with the combined efforts of British Intelligence and Special Operations Executive" and then adds that "qualitatively too, much of OSS's work was without doubt of first-class importance by any standard." That is not damning the OSS with faint praise, but the praise is cautious.

Stephenson's verdict on OSS, nevertheless, is considerably more flattering than the one offered by David Kahn in his review of the Troy, Dunlop, and Cave Brown books (Washington 19 December 1982). Kahn is of course entitled to his opinion, but he greatly confuses anyone who has read the books (he confused this reader anyway) by claiming that two of the authors support that opinion. Kahn puts it this way:

> Neither Cave Brown nor Dunlop assesses the overall contribution of OSS to the war effort. The reason may be that it could not have been very great. OSS had only a handful of agents in Germany, as Joseph Persico made clear in *Piercing the Reich*, and they reported mainly low-level intelligence; neither Cave Brown nor Dunlop go into this. OSS had no agents in Japan or her captured areas.

The trouble is that Cave Brown devotes an entire chapter to an overall assessment—"Farewell the Tranquil Mind"—in which the language, in this reader's judgment, is as thoughtfully chosen and gracefully expressed as the title. Dunlop, true enough, does not offer an assessment but, as indicated above, Stephenson's preface provides a kind of summation. Regarding the "handful of agents" in Germany, whatever Persico may have thought about their number and effectiveness, it is clear that Cave Brown and Dunlop did not ignore the subject or trivialize the effort. Dunlop records that Donovan "sent more than 200 agents into Germany between September 1944 and VE Day" (p. 454). Cave Brown describes OSS penetration operations in Germany as "very large scale" and, as his treatment of Allen Dulles' efforts indicates, he considers that some were high-level. OSS, as Dunlop in particular illustrates, had numerous agents operating behind Japanese lines.

Kahn's definition of "significant" seems to be limited to the achievements in cryptanalysis which contributed to major naval and air victories such as Midway. No doubt Donovan would have accomplished more had he succeeded in adding that to his organization's capabilities. But Cave Brown surely does not dismiss OSS accomplishments as trivial. Whereas Kahn states that "the spy was of no more importance in intelligence than the foot soldier was in combat during the battle of technologies that was World War II," Cave Brown implies in his "Farewell the Tranquil Mind" chapter that (a) World War II was more than a "battle of technologies" and (b) the spy was no *less* important in intelligence than the foot soldier was in combat. Cave Brown declares that the number of decorations earned by OSS personnel for gallantry and proficiency—on the average of one for every eight employees—constitutes in itself "a tangible, remarkable achievement to the OSS's performance," and goes on to pay a special tribute to Donovan for accomplishing so much at so little cost in casualties:

> Despite the magnitude of the worldwide effort engaged in by the OSS, Donovan lost fewer men killed, wounded, and captured in its

> five years than he had lost on an average week in the trenches during the campaign season of 1918. In all, 143 men and women, excluding subagents, were killed in action, and about 300 men and women were wounded or captured while on active service. Yet the damage Donovan did to the enemy in World War II was far greater than that in World War I. And here was another important demonstration of Donovan's theories: An outpouring of blood was not always necessary in order to cause the enemy severe damage. Two examples will suffice to show what is meant: The OGs who took part in Noah's Ark in Greece suffered no more than 25 dead and wounded (and none was captured). On the other hand, they paralyzed large formations of the Wehrmacht for more than eighteen months and killed or wounded at least 1,400 of the enemy. In Switzerland Dulles's information that the Germans' missile experiments had reached an advanced stage produced a devastating attack by the Royal Air Force. In turn, that attack delayed German production of operational missiles, thereby saving hundreds, if not thousands, of lives and many acres of human dwellings.

Cave Brown and Dunlop list several other OSS successes, only a few of which are acknowledged by Kahn (and those are belittled). OSS operations in France achieved more than the disruption of the rail movement of one SS division and more than the provision of fine and detailed positive intelligence on southern France; they helped to ignite the uprisings coinciding with the Allied invasion of France. Kahn also disputes Cave Brown's case for OSS's indirect role in ensuring the success of D-Day. Cave Brown's argument, spelled out at considerable length, is that OSS operations in Hungary and the Balkans tied down German divisions there long enough to prevent timely reinforcement of German defenses in Normandy. If the argument is accepted as valid then OSS must be considered to have played a role fairly comparable in its strategic consequences to the role of cryptanalysis cited by Kahn in the Battle of Midway. Kahn will have none of this. He disputes Cave Brown's contention that an OSS operation in Hungary helped to persuade Hitler of the need to occupy that country. The OSS team sent to Hungary parachuted in on 13 March 1944 and, according to Kahn, the war diary of the German high command shows that the order to occupy was issued the day before. But he misses the main elements in the story; what Cave Brown says is that the whole process of secret negotiations of several months duration between OSS and representatives of the Hungarian, Romanian, and Bulgarian governments, designed to remove those countries from the Axis camp, became known to Hitler well before the initiation of the tactical phases of the operations (e.g. parachuting of an OSS team into Hungary). Cave Brown contends that these OSS intelligence defeats—and collectively, in his judgment, they constituted OSS's greatest failure of the war—nevertheless served to convince Hitler that the Allies intended to invade Europe from the south. "Once that idea was implanted," says Cave Brown, "there was nothing any of Hitler's military advisers could do to eradicate it."

To Win by Losing

The lesson continues to be relevant to our profession in helping us to judge what we do in its proper context. What can be considered in strict, narrow terms as an operational failure may in the long run help to produce a strategic triumph. This may occur not only in clandestine or covert operations but also in other aspects of intelligence, especially intelligence analysis. The kindest fate of certain intelligence estimates may be that they are ultimately proven wrong because the dire message reached an intelligence consumer in time for policy action which otherwise would not have occurred. It is not always possible, of course, for those who exerted themselves to make the operation succeed, or the estimate correct, to understand matters that way. It is not always true that their superiors are wise enough to do so either.

Returning to our reflections on the Hungarian/Balkan operational failure, one wonders how wise Donovan and others were in judging it. The thought arises that perhaps he might have realized well in advance that the operations had been compromised but allowed them to go forward precisely in order to further the broader, strategic objective. He had some warnings, Cave Brown tells us, through Allen Dulles in Bern, that the Nazis might be aware of the operations, and he might also have been alerted by sources outside OSS (e.g. the so-called ISOS material). At one point Cave Brown expresses bewilderment that Donovan put the Hungarian project—Project Sparrow—on hold in view of these warnings and then, for reasons that do not immediately seem compelling, allowed it to proceed.

In the fictional world of John LeCarre the hypothesis that Donovan, in effect, intended the operation to fail but deliberately refrained from communicating as much to the OSS men directly involved would be plausible. In the real world, the reader would need far more evidence than these books on Donovan provide that such duplicity actually occurred. More likely Donovan himself became personally committed to carrying out the operation no matter what the odds. As Peter Wyden demonstrates in his *The Bay of Pigs*, it becomes increasingly difficult psychologically to halt an important operation once it is set in train, and increasingly easy to ignore positive intelligence pointing toward the likelihood that the operation will fail. If that is the way it happened in Donovan's case, he would not be the last high-ranking Western intelligence official to be caught in such a net.

Just as an intelligence failure can sometimes help produce a policy success, an apparent intelligence success can sometimes help induce adverse consequences later. The testimony that Cave Brown and to some extent Corey Ford and Dunlop provide concerning OSS relations with the Soviet intelligence services is worth some reflection. At one stage of the war, for example, FDR authorized Donovan to make direct contact with Fitin of the NKVD, and largely through the impact of Donovan's forceful personality, Fitin tentatively agreed to Donovan's terms for intelligence collaboration. Score one for US intelligence. But the very success of Donovan's approach permitted J. Edgar Hoover to warn FDR of the danger of Soviet penetration, and aroused the suspicions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well. Donovan was thereupon ordered to break off the negotiations. The effect of this abrupt change of direction can

only have greatly increased Soviet suspicions about their putative ally, and thereby further strained an already uneasy partnership.

Nearer the end of the war OSS began to target the Soviets. One such effort, as described by Cave Brown, was Casey Jones, which Donovan planned in August 1944 and executed early the next spring. Paired with another operation, Ground Hog, and carried out jointly with the British, it was designed to "use the postwar confusion to get photo coverage of all Central and Western Europe, Scandinavia, and North Africa." Ground Hog was aimed at collecting "geological data of military interest." The questionable aspects arise from the fact that this project was begun *during* the war; that it gave priority to those areas occupied by US and British forces that were scheduled to be turned over to the Soviets; that parts of Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria, and all Soviet-occupied parts of Germany were photomapped; that Casey Jones involved about 16 squadrons of US and British heavy bombers modified for aerial photography; that while some of these aircraft carried their true markings, others apparently were unmarked; and that the purpose of this project was not candidly discussed with the Soviets.

All of this must have gone down well in Washington at the time. It could be portrayed as a successful large-scale operation with no casualties. It would serve as a resolute rebuff to those who were always ready to accuse OSS of being soft on the commies. It would also serve as a good start on a postwar national intelligence service. After all, with all this important data in hand bearing on likely problems of strategic policy interest, who could doubt that a centralized organization ought to be established to preside over this vast body of newly acquired material? Zbigniew Brzezinski once remarked in *Encounter* magazine that "power not only serves policy, it tempts it." A demonstrated intelligence capability like Casey Jones becomes an argument for perpetuating that capability.

But what were the Soviets supposed to think about all this? As Cave Brown points out, they were eventually privy to some cryptic State Department requests for permission to photomap Berlin, Vienna, and Prague—but nothing about Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria nor the rest of Soviet-occupied parts of Germany. Their own spies in Britain and the US may have ferreted out some of the unadvertised goals of Casey Jones. But how were they to dismiss the likelihood that these overflights represented contingency planning for military operations against them, and the possibility that among this vast assemblage of aircraft there might be some capable of a nuclear attack—a capability the Soviets already knew that the US and Britain possessed? Cave Brown details how the Soviets both protested these encroachments of their air space and ordered their fighters on occasion to shoot at the US and British intruders. Several shooting incidents occurred prior to VE Day.

He concludes that "there can be little doubt that these operations were among the factors that caused great tensions between the Russian and Western Allies during the last weeks of the war." The judgment seems almost too mild. Let us step back a bit. In the 1950s, those of us being academically trained in international relations were told by our professors and read in our textbooks

that all the duplicity and double dealing among the Allies during World War II and the early postwar period were the fault of the Soviet Union. Our side played it straight. Finally, in belated response to these repeated Soviet unilateral, unprovoked acts of bellicosity and espionage we began to bolster our military strength, and direct our intelligence capabilities against the Soviets. It has been hard to shake that version of history from our minds. The revisionist explanations in the late 1960s and 1970s did not make much impression because they all seemed too strident and ill-informed. Now, after reading Cave Brown's testimony presented as part of a sophisticated, thoroughly researched appraisal of the foundation of the modern American espionage establishment, we are finally compelled to revise somewhat that comfortable assumption about the origins of the Cold War.

Cave Brown's relatively calm verdict on Casey Jones contrasts with his appraisal of two examples of unilateral OSS activity within areas of British jurisdiction. Both occurred in 1945. One involved the initiation of positive intelligence collection in countries due to receive their independence, notably India and Burma. Cave Brown describes this program as "palpably the committing of espionage against a friendly power." The other required attaching to the court of King Peter II of Yugoslavia, who was benefitting from British financial support and protection in London, an OSS agent who would report independently on Peter's steadily dimming prospects for regaining his throne. Cave Brown terms this operation a "clear breach" of Anglo-American agreements not to "spy on each other." Moreover, the fact that "an act of espionage against America's leading ally" had been "sanctioned in Washington" meant that "the Grand Alliance had disintegrated and that the brilliant American comradeship of arms . . . was now at an end. Whether it was to be revived or not would remain to be seen."

Arguably Cave Brown has made too much of these two operations. They were rather modest in scale—no squadrons of bombers on photomapping missions—and were not directed at Britain itself. Moreover, the British intelligence authorities knew that the US government had looked on with generally benign neglect when the British unilaterally gathered intelligence and conducted various operations on US territory. No one should get excited about it now, but does anyone believe that the apparatus Stephenson admits to having administered in this country—"the British secret and covert organizations, all nine of them," the communications division "handling more than a million message groups a day," and so forth—was concerned solely with liaison or joint Anglo-US operations? Yet the sensitivity shown by Cave Brown, loyal subject of the Commonwealth, to the two unilateral OSS operations in the British sphere of influence is useful in underscoring how even any Soviet officials who were inclined to be friendly toward the US and Britain in 1945 must have regarded Casey Jones. Casey Jones, this writer therefore argues, was an intelligence success that contributed something to the makings of a serious strategic failure.

Representative of the Opposition

Donovan exercises controlling influence over Knox, strong influence over Stimson, friendly advisory influence over President and

> Hull. . . . Being a Republican, a Catholic and of Irish descent, he has a following of the strongest opposition to the Administration. . . . There is no doubt that we can achieve infinitely more through Donovan than through any other individual. (Quoted in Corey Ford, p.99)

So wrote the Director of British Naval Intelligence to the Commander-in-Chief, UK Mediterranean Fleet in 1940. He was urging the British admiral to welcome the man sent by FDR to see if the British could hold out against a German attack and whether, therefore, the US should begin to shed its professed neutrality and begin to supply material aid. Donovan concluded that the answer to both questions ought to be yes, thereby contradicting the view strongly advocated by the US Ambassador in London, Joseph Kennedy. As a result the British obtained 50 destroyers from the US through Lend-Lease, and the US moved inexorably toward war against Germany on the side of Britain.

Professor John Lukacs of LaSalle College used to tell his history classes that the most important single fact of the first half of the Twentieth Century was that the Americans and British spoke English. He would then remind his students that great consequences can ensue from the presence of a single individual. The vote taken in the United States shortly after the Revolution to make German the official language—the country contained nearly as many of German stock as of British Isles descent at that time and the sentiment ran strong to divorce the new nation from the old master culturally as well as politically—failed by one vote. Suppose that voter had not been there. . . .

Similarly, if Donovan had not been on the scene, who else could have provided testimony of sufficient weight to override our own Ambassador's opposition to Anglo-American military partnership against Hitler? For the crucial element in Kennedy's disdainful attitude was based not on an objective assessment of British military capabilities, but on the emotional bias of an Irish Catholic American against all things English.*

Under those circumstances it was important that an equally prominent Irish Catholic American was available to speak up for the Englishmen, and contradict the Kennedy counsel. Moreover, as a Republican he was able to help neutralize the isolationist wing of that party. Other prominent Republicans were sympathetic to the British (Wendell Wilkie, for example, pledged not to oppose FDR on this issue in the 1940 presidential campaign), so that in this regard Donovan did not stand alone. But in being able and willing to contest the strong isolationist currents within two parallel constituencies, the Irish Catholic (overwhelmingly Democratic) and the Republican (overwhelmingly Protestant), Donovan was unique.

Lawrence Houston, in his Washington *Times* review of the Dunlop book, is troubled by the "impression" conveyed by Dunlop that "Donovan, almost single-handed, turned the American public from isolation to intervention

* "I hate all of those goddamned Englishmen from Churchill down," he told an American while he was still Ambassador. Quoted in David E. Koskoff, *Joseph F. Kennedy: A Life and Times* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc. 1974).

against the Germans in World War II." Houston counters this by citing a 1952 book coauthored by William Langer, Donovan's head of Research and Analysis, *The Challenge to Isolation*, which contains only four references to Donovan, "none of them showing him in a major role."

To this objection one must respond that Houston is correct in understanding Dunlop's message, but then Corey Ford conveys the same "impression," and it is supported by influential British spokesmen such as the above quoted Lord Louis Mountbatten, the Director of British Naval Intelligence, and Stephenson. Secondly, the Langer book concerns mainly Republican Party isolationism, and does not take seriously the importance of anti-British sentiment within ethnic groups. Langer's strength—one of the reasons he was so useful as head of Research and Analysis—was his ability to interpret the broad currents of world history as understood in traditional terms. The 1952 work appeared when US history was also being told in rather traditional terms, which tended to slight the role of minorities. The role of Irish Catholicism in complicating the course of US history was not addressed by mainstream historians of that period; to them one's Irish Catholic heritage was something to be outgrown, like acne.

Corey Ford, Dunlop, and Cave Brown have thus provided a needed corrective in emphasizing that Donovan did not outgrow it, and that at a crucial juncture of US and world history Donovan's role was enhanced by it. Corey Ford and Dunlop show, moreover, that Donovan suffered discrimination in his occasional forays into politics from those who were anti-Irish and anti-Catholic, and also, ironically, from Irish Catholics who accused him of selling out that heritage. Some Irish Catholics spread rumors that Donovan was not a good Catholic. These rumors have proved sufficiently pervasive over the years to have been transformed into the assertion (e.g. in Joseph O'Grady's *How the Irish Became Americans*) book that Donovan was Protestant.

On occasions other than the Lend Lease episode Donovan tried to use his Irish Catholic background to help the British. Dunlop tells us of Donovan's March 1941 trip to Dublin undertaken "at the request of Roosevelt and Churchill." At that time the threat of German invasion of the British Isles, possibly preceded by invasion of Ireland, had receded, but it still seemed critical, from the British point of view, that the Irish Free State allow Great Britain to use its ports to counter German submarines. Donovan tried unsuccessfully to induce the Taoiseach (Prime Minister) Eamon de Valera to make that commitment to the Allied cause. The luncheon meeting attended by Donovan, de Valera, and the head of the Catholic Church in Ireland did not pass pleasantly. As Dunlop put it: "Donovan was incensed when the prelate remarked that he did not see much difference between a Nazi victory and British dominion, and he blistered the churchmen with his opinion of the anti-British myopia shown by some Irish."

Only a distinguished Irish Catholic American could have delivered such a dressing down. Dunlop records that Churchill was pleased with Donovan's trip to Dublin and well he should have been. For at a minumum Donovan's position must have shaken de Valera's certainty that the vast Irish American

hinterland was behind his aggressively anti-British neutrality. For the rest of the war de Valera's neutrality tilted toward the Allies—for example, downed German fliers were interned for the duration of the war, whereas downed US and British fliers were promptly released. Had the Irish cardinal's view of neutrality gone unrefuted, the story might have ended differently.

Dunlop also illustrates how Donovan and the OSS suffered in the Washington bureaucratic infighting from accusations that they were too pro-British. When Donovan's proposal to continue the OSS function after the war was leaked to the media, the "leakees", principally the Chicago *Tribune*, were those who consistently pandered to anti-British sentiments among their consumers.

Roots

Cave Brown offers a perspective on Donovan's Irish Catholic background that differs markedly from what is said in Corey Ford and Dunlop, though he agrees with them that it forms an important part of Donovan's political biography. On this aspect of Donovan, Cave Brown's judgments seem to have been formed with a carelessness quite untypical of the rest of his book. To wit:

Item: He underplays the fact that Donovan's grandparents came from one of the areas of Ireland hardest hit by the Famine. Joseph Kennedy's grandparents came from Ireland at the same time. The perceived legacy of that experience was very strong and long lasting; a high ranking US officer of recent memory was known to remark to friends that he had bad teeth because the British had starved his grandfather in the Famine. The passage across the Atlantic in "coffin ships" intensified the bitter memory. Cave Brown is ludicrously inaccurate in suggesting that because the Donovans traveled on ships of British registry their accommodations must have been superior to those provided by other countries. Terry Coleman *(Passage to America)* is only one of several historians who have compared those accommodations, unfavorably, to those afforded African slaves.

Item: Having failed to appreciate how strong feelings about the Famine would persist in any family that survived it, Cave Brown lurches to the opposite extreme by professing to find a "Fenian" element in the Donovan household when Donovan was growing up. "Fenian" properly connotes an active participant in a conspiracy to destroy British rule in Ireland by armed force. It is surely stretching that term to apply it to the Donovan family. True, young Donovan recited poems by James Clarence Mangan, who longed to lead "the brilliant Irish hosts" into battle, and the enemy Mangan envisioned was the "old Saxon foe." It is likely, also, that the newly arrived Irish immigrants who visited the Donovan household in the 1880s and 1890s found that enmity toward England was not discouraged by the country of their adoption. (British Isles immigrants were, in fact, required to swear on their preprinted citizenship certificates that they renounced allegiance to not only every foreign potentate, but especially the "QUEEN OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND"—an oath to which this writer's County Derry grandfather, for example, subscribed with evident joy.) But Donovan's brother Vincent, as

quoted by Corey Ford, surely had it right in suggesting that his brother's "dream of leading an Irish regiment into battle" had been fulfilled when he would "command the bravest of them all, the Fighting Irish of New York's 69"—for the US, not for Ireland, and as Britain's ally, not her enemy.*

Item: Having ascribed a "Fenian" family environment to Donovan, Cave Brown is somewhat at a loss to explain how Donovan and the British got along so well together when they first met during World War I. Cave Brown's solution has been to offer as a plausible scenario (on pp. 30-35 of his book and in remarks made in January 1983 on a local TV station) that British intelligence recruited Donovan to spy on the Germans during World War I and then essentially put his name in the files until Stephenson re-activated him, so to speak, in 1940. Troy has taken out after Cave Brown in his newsletter (*Foreign Intelligence Literary Scene*, February 1983), arguing that Cave Brown has greatly misconstrued a passage in Troy's book. Troy says the absolute minimum about Donovan's Irish Catholic background in that book, no doubt because he does not consider it germane to his story of bureaucratic warfare—though arguably some of the vigor with which Donovan pursued these battles, and perhaps much of the protectiveness and personal attention he displayed toward his own rank-and-file, were typical of what one might expect of a latter-day Celtic chieftain. In any case Troy realizes that to label Donovan as a British spy, without conclusive proof, is to slander Donovan as an American and as an Irish Catholic.

Item: Having allowed for the strong possibility that Donovan had worked for British intelligence prior to World War II, Cave Brown seems surprised at Donovan's lack of docility toward the British during the war. He invokes the authority of certain unnamed British officials that Donovan continued to display certain "Fenian" tendencies during the war. Cave Brown presumably is referring to those occasions when Donovan objected to attempts by the British to control all OSS intelligence activities in the European Theater of Operations. Ed Sayle, curator of the CIA Historical Intelligence Collection, called to this writer's attention a memorandum from Donovan to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in which he observed, *inter alia*, that the British had developed "the habit of control" over other countries' intelligence services in physical proximity to theirs "through their relations with refugee governments and refugee intelligence services." But, as Donovan stressed, "we are not a refugee government." Sayle's comment is that Donovan's argument was not the emotional outpouring of one's ethnic ancestral juices, but the properly reasoned statement of an American patriot. Perhaps; but this writer would wager that some Britons at the time might have judged otherwise, and that the Irish Catholic in Donovan made his pencil bite into the paper as he drafted those words. In any case, Donovan showed himself here and on other occasions to be anything but a British agent. He was at most what some Russians refer to

* Even as a boy, Dunlop records, Donovan was willing to side with a "narrow back" if he thought that boy was being unfairly bullied. "Narrow back"—still used in some Irish Catholic neighborhoods—neatly encapsulates a set of ethnic, religious, and class distinctions, referring primarily to a Protestant of British Isles descent who has inherited affluence. Donovan, in other words, had learned at an early age to judge situations objectively and act on those convictions.

as a *doveritel'naya svyaz'*—an influential person in one country who has come to believe that the national interests of his or her country usually coincide with those of another country, and therefore might be counted on to give favorable consideration to a request for assistance. Donovan's relationship with the British was of that kind. And the argument itself—"we are not a refugee government"—was worth making, not just to deal with the immediate problem, but for the longer term good relationship between the intelligence services of the US and Britain.

The Last Hero?

Except for the foregoing, Cave Brown is generous to Donovan in his overall evaluation of the man himself and the organization he created. It is as appropriate for him to quote Eisenhower's tribute to Donovan as "the last hero" as it is petty for David Kahn to dispute the appellation. One would hope that more Americans might achieve as much for their country as Donovan did, but one comes away from these four books with doubts about that. The world has become so complex and compartmentalized that it is difficult for any one individual to distinguish oneself as much as Donovan, in personal bravery, intellectual advancement, and broad political and military influence, or to have such achievements as widely acclaimed in positive terms. As a nation, moreover, we have grown more suspicious of would-be heroes, even though sometimes we regret that we are so cynical. In some sense, then, the epitaph in the old language of Donovan's grandparents does apply: *Ni bheidh a leitheidi aris ann.* "We shall not look upon their like again."

REMARKS

BY

WILLIAM H. WEBSTER

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

AT THE

DEDICATION OF A STATUE

OF GENERAL WILLIAM J. DONOVAN

CIA HEADQUARTERS BUILDING

OCTOBER 26, 1988

Former Director Helms, former Director Colby, Mrs. Casey, members of the Donovan family, our friends here for this occasion: I have to tell you that about 50 years ago I received an autographed copy of Father Duffy's book about the "Fighting Sixty-Ninth." It was an inspiration to me then, and I can hardly believe that, half a century later, I have the privilege of participating in this ceremony.

Today we recognize General William J. Donovan for the central place he holds in our profession.

We recognize General Donovan as an able and inspiring leader -- a quality that earned him the lifelong respect of the unit he commanded in World War I, the "Fighting Sixty-Ninth." It has also earned him the respect and admiration of all of us in intelligence. We understand what a strong leader he had to be to establish the Office of Strategic Services in the midst of strong resistance, to lead the O.S.S. in some of World War II's finest intelligence successes, and to establish the foundations of modern American intelligence -- foundations that we in the Central Intelligence Agency build upon today.

The statue we dedicate this afternoon is a symbol of the man -- a man of personal bravery, vision, and broad political and military understanding. A man who, according to Bill Casey, was "curious about everything and everyone." He was unusual, Casey felt, for he "realized, earlier and better than most, that 'stranded' information was not much good. It had to be analyzed, dissected, and fitted into the larger whole that modern warfare required."

General Donovan was also a man who inspired great loyalty and great deeds. General Maxwell D. Taylor once asked an old soldier to give him a brief definition of leadership. The man replied, "Leadership is when your leader tells you he is going to take you to hell and back and you find yourself looking forward to the trip."

Under General Donovan's leadership, the O.S.S. achieved much. It helped attain many Allied goals during World War II -- working with the French resistance, facilitating the U.S. invasion of North Africa, and infiltrating Hitler's reich. In these efforts and in others, General Donovan never stopped trying to persuade the leaders of this country that intelligence, combined with covert action, could help our nation achieve its strategic goals without all the bloodshed he had witnessed in both World Wars.

To those of us here today, this is General Donovan's greatest legacy. He realized that a modern intelligence organization must not only provide today's tactical intelligence, it must provide tomorrow's long-term assessments. He recognized that an effective intelligence organization must not allow political pressures to influence its counsel. And, finally, he knew that no intelligence organization can succeed without recognizing the importance of people -- people with discretion, ingenuity, loyalty, and a deep sense of responsibility to protect and promote American values.

Bill Casey commissioned Lawrence M. Ludtke to create a statue of General Donovan that would be a monument to all that he means to us and to our organization. It was also Bill Casey's idea to place the statue here in our

main entrance hall across from the stars that represent Agency officers who have given their lives in the line of duty. Both Bill Donovan and Bill Casey deeply mourned the sacrifice of our people -- even in the cause of freedom and democracy.

It is said that President Eisenhower paid tribute to William Donovan as "the last hero." We pay tribute to him today because, as Bill Casey realized, he is our own. Let this statue remind us daily of the enormous contributions that General Donovan made to American intelligence. And let his life continue to be an inspiration to us all.

Cong. Medal of Honor

DONOVAN, WILLIAM JOSEPH

Rank and organization: Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, 165th Infantry, 42d Division. *Place and date:* Near Landres-et-St. Georges, France, 14–15 October 1918. *Entered service at:* Buffalo, N.Y. *Born:* 1 January 1883, Buffalo, N.Y. *G.O., No.:* 56, W.D., 1922. *Citation:* Lt. Col. Donovan personally led the assaulting wave in an attack upon a very strongly organized position, and when our troops were suffering heavy casualties he encouraged all near him by his example, moving among his men in exposed positions, reorganizing decimated platoons, and accompanying them forward in attacks. When he was wounded in the leg by machine-gun bullets, he refused to be evacuated and continued with his unit until it withdrew to a less exposed position.

DOZIER, JAMES C.

Rank and organization: First Lieutenant, U.S. Army, Company G, 118th Infantry, 30th Division. *Place and date:* Near Montbrehain, France, 8 October 1918. *Entered service at:* Rock Hill, S.C. *Born:* 17 February 1885, Galivants Ferry, N.C. *G.O. No.:* 16, W.D., 1919. *Citation:* In command of 2 platoons, 1st. Lt. Dozier was painfully wounded in the shoulder early in the attack, but he continued to lead his men, displaying the highest bravery and skill. When his command was held up by heavy machinegun fire, he disposed his men in the best cover available and with a soldier continued forward to attack a machinegun nest. Creeping up to the position in the face of intense fire, he killed the entire crew with handgrenades and his pistol and a little later captured a number of Germans who had taken refuge in a dugout nearby.

*DUNN, PARKER F.

Rank and organization: Private First Class, U.S. Army, Company A, 312th Infantry, 78th Division. *Place and date:* Near Grand-Pre, France, 23 October 1918. *Entered service at:* Albany, N.Y. *Birth:* Albany, N.Y. *G.O. No.:* 49, W.D., 1922. *Citation:* When his battalion commander found it necessary to send a message to a company in the attacking line and hesitated to order a runner to make the trip because of the extreme danger involved, Pfc. Dunn, a member of the intelligence section, volunteered for the mission. After advancing but a short distance across a field swept by artillery and machinegun fire, he was wounded, but continued on and fell wounded a second time. Still undaunted, he persistently attempted to carry out his mission until he was killed by a machinegun bullet before reaching the advance line.

EDWARDS, DANIEL R.

Rank and organization: Private First Class, U.S. Army, Company C, 3d Machine Gun Battalion, 1st Division. *Place and date:* Near Soissons, France, 18 July 1918. *Entered service at:* Bruceville, Tex. *Born:* 9 April 1897, Moorville, Tex. *G.O. No.:* 14, W.D., 1923. *Citation:* Reporting for duty from hospital where he had been for several weeks under treatment for numerous and serious wounds and although suffering intense pain from a shattered arm, he crawled alone into an enemy trench for the purpose of capturing or killing enemy soldiers known to be concealed therein. He killed 4 of the men and took the remaining 4

E

Ensign

Ay, tear her tattered ensign down!
Long has it waved on high,
And many an eye has danced to see
That banner in the sky.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr.: Old Ironsides, 1830

And there, while thread will hang to thread,
Oh, let that ensign fly!
The noblest constellation set
Against the Northern sky.
George Henry Boker, The Cumberland, 1862 (USS Cumberland, *wooden sloop-of-war, was sunk with all guns in action and colors flying, by the Confederate ironclad,* Virginia, *8 March 1862.)*

(*See also* Colors, Flag.)

Entrenchments

When I hear talk of lines, I always think I am hearing talk of the walls of China. The good ones are those that nature has made, and the good entrenchments are good dispositions and brave soldiers.
Maurice de Saxe: Mes Rêveries, xxv, 1732

To bury an army in entrenchments, where it may be outflanked and surrounded or forced in front even if secure from a flank attack, is manifest folly.
Jomini: Précis de l'Art de la Guerre, 1838

Entrench, entrench, entrench...
Sir Henry Lawrence: Dying instructions, 4 July 1857, during the defense of Lucknow

(*See also* Fortifications, Foxholes.)

Envelopment

The deep envelopment based on surprise, which severs the enemy's supply lines, is and always has been the most decisive maneuver of war. A short envelopment which fails to envelop and leaves the enemy's supply system intact, merely divides your own forces and can lead to heavy loss and even jeopardy.
Douglas MacArthur: Conference before Inchon, 23 August 1950

Equipment

The fate of an army may depend on a buckle.
Major General George H. Thomas, 1816–1870

(*See also* Maintenance, Logistics.)

Escape

To a surrounded enemy you must leave a way of escape.
Sun Tzu, 400–320 B. C., The Art of War

Espionage

See the land, what it is; and the people that dwelleth therein, whether they be strong or weak, few or many.
Numbers, XIII, 18

And Joshua, the son of Nun, sent out of Shittim two men to spy secretly, saying Go view the land, even Jericho. And they went, and came into a harlot's house, named Rahab, and lodged there.
Joshua, II, i

Every kind of service, necessary to the public good, becomes honorable by being necessary.
Nathan Hale: Letter to Captain William Hull, 10 September, 1775 (Hull had objected to Hale's entering the British lines as an American spy.)

It is one of the dangerous characteristics of the sort of information supplied by secret agents that it becomes rare and less explicit as the peril increases and the need for information becomes greater.
Alexis de Tocqueville, 1805–1859

(*See also* Intelligence, Spies.)

Esprit de Corps

To insure victory the troops must have confidence in themselves as well as in their commanders.
Niccolo Machiavelli: Discorsi, xxxiii, 1531

We would not die in that man's company
That fears his fellowship to die with us.
Shakespeare: King Henry V, iv, 3,

Speed is one of the characteristics of Strategic Marches . . . in this one quality lie all the advantages that a fortunate initiative may have procured . . . By rapidity of movement we can, like the Romans, make war feed war.
Dennis Hart Mahan: Out Post, 1847. (Professor Mahan was the father of Alfred Thayer Mahan.)

Speed is the essential requisite for a first-class ship of war—but essential only to go into action, not out of it.
John A. Dahlgren, 1809–1870

The greatest kindness in war is to bring it to a speedy conclusion.
Helmuth von Moltke ("The Elder"): Letter to Professor J.K. Bluntschli, 11 December 1880

The true speed of war is not headlong precipitancy, but the unremitting energy which wastes no time.
Mahan: Lessons of the War with Spain, 1899

It is of no use to get there first unless, when the enemy arrives, you have also the most men.
Mahan: Lessons of the War with Spain, 1899

In war, to strike quickly is the first step toward striking hard.
Gabriel Darrieus: War on the Sea, 1908

Swiftness in war comes from slow preparations.
Sir Ian Hamilton: Gallipoli Diary, I, 1920

In small operations, as in large, speed is the essential element of success. If the difference between two possible flanks is so small that it requires thought, the time wasted in thought is not well used.
George S. Patton, Jr.: War As I Knew It, 1947

(*See also* Expedition, Rapidity.)

Spit and Polish

Make ye my buckler's sheen outshine the radiant sun . . .
Plautus: The Braggart Captain, 3d century B.C.

Spy

. . . sent to spy out the land.
Numbers, XIII, 16

A sovereign should always regard an ambassador as a spy.
The Hitopadesa, iii, c. 500

As living spies we must recruit men who are intelligent but appear to be stupid; who seem to be dull but are strong in heart; men who are agile, vigorous, hardy, and brave; well-versed in lowly matters and able to endure hunger, cold, filth, and humiliation.
Sun Tzu, 400–320 B.C., The Art of War, xiii

An army without secret agents is exactly like a man without eyes or ears.
Chia Lin, fl. 700 A.D.

The life of spies is to know, not to be known.
George Herbert: Outlandish Proverbs, 1640

In general it is necessary to pay spies well and not be miserly in that respect. A man who risks being hanged in your service merits being well paid.
Frederick The Great: Instructions for His Generals, ix, 1747

I only regret that I have but one life to lose for my country.
Nathan Hale: Before being hanged by the British as a spy, Long Island, 22 September 1776

The fear of spies seems to be endemic in every crisis in every military campaign.
Alan Moorhead: Gallipoli, 1956

(*See also* Espionage, Intelligence.)

Stable Call

Oh, go to the stable,
All ye who are able,
And give your poor horses some hay and some corn.
For if you don't do it,
The Captain will know it,
And you'll catch the devil as sure as you're born.
Traditional words to Stable Call, c. 1870

(*See also* Cavalry.)

EXCERPTS FROM REMARKS

BY

GEORGE BUSH

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

BEFORE

THE WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL

HARTFORD, CONN.

12 OCTOBER 1976

(FOR RELEASE AT 5 P.M.)

George Bush, Director of Central Intelligence, said today that the United States has an intelligence capability and warning system "second to none in the world" but that there is a continuing concern about "senseless disclosures" that jeopardize the American intelligence effort.

In a talk prepared for delivery before the World Affairs Council at Hartford, Conn., Mr. Bush said: "I can assure you we have an intelligence capability second to none in the world. We have an alert and warning system that will prevent any 'Pearl Harbor' surprises." But he added that protection of "genuine intelligence secrets" is vital to the security of America.

Mr. Bush spoke of the need for a "realistic appreciation by all Americans of the complex nature of secrecy in a free and open society, where in the absence of legal sanctions it is the responsibility of the individual -- whether government official, journalist or concerned citizen -- to balance carefully the legitimate demands of national defense with the exercise of first amendment rights."

Mr. Bush said that when sensitive intelligence information is disclosed the lives of Americans may be jeopardized. He added: "Foreign governments may wonder whether we will ever be able to hold on to intelligence secrets and are reluctant to share their own protected information which is often needed to supplement our knowledge."

The Central Intelligence Director, speaking after almost nine months in office, said that the Executive Order on the intelligence community issued by President Ford in February 1976 had "already proved significant" in improving the management of the government's intelligence agencies. He said it was a "remarkable document" in that it set down "rules, openly and publicly, by which the United States conducts a vital, difficult and necessarily partially secret function" and at the same time expressed "the determination of Americans to permit no governmental function to extend beyond the limits of established national interest." Mr. Bush said the CIA is abiding by the directives of the President and by its own administrative regulations and "we will not abuse our authority."

Mr. Bush said one of his continuing concerns is the lack of knowledge about what the CIA does and its important role in ensuring national security. He mentioned the Agency's work in combating international terrorism and international narcotics trafficking as among the kinds of things on which modern intelligence must report.

"I certainly do not disagree with the need for effective oversight by Congress of intelligence activities," he said, "nor do I take issue with responsible comment in the media. Bu I certainly take issue with those who take an irresponsible attitude and who, under the guise of news reporting, circulate misinformation which degrades the work of loyal and dedicated intelligence officers and analysts. I believe the American

public deserves more than this kind of superficial treatment."

Mr. Bush said he was against "overclassification" and is working to make certain that "secret stamps are never used to obscure failures, disguise mistakes, or cover up abuses." But, he emphasized, "genuine intelligence secrets" must be protected. He stressed: "The purpose of secrecy is not to keep knowledge from the people but to protect our security."

OFF THE RECORD SPEECH BY MR. GEORGE BUSH, DCI BEFORE THE WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL, HARTFORD, CONN. 12 OCT 76.

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FILE. NO OTHER COPIES TO BE MADE.

Bucky tells me the ground rules are that these remarks that I'll make and the responses to your questions that I have to make are off the record. Not that the CIA has any secrets any more but it is rather relaxing to have those ground rules established and I would be glad to, after making some general comments, and conscious of your time constraints, be glad to try to respond to questions you may have.

But before doing so I would like this afternnon to discuss some of the things that we are doing in intelligence, particularly at the CIA. I have two hats; one as Director of Central Intelligence itself, which connotes community responsibilities to NSA, DIA and other elements in the Intelligence Community and then the directorship of the Central Intelligence Agency itself. But I want to talk about some of the changes that have taken place at the direction of the President, which I believe has strengthened our Intelligence Community and finally some of the concerns that are still with us.

Intelligence as we know it today goes far beyond the traditional concepts and the traditional impressions. What we are concerned with now are all aspects of the capability, the intentions, and the activities of foreign powers, and of organizations related to these foreign powers, the impacts of political, economic, sociological technilogical and other trends and developments--very different than what people think of as the role of the CIA. To provide the kinds of accurate evaluation we need, information is gathered

from a wide variety of sources, some perfectly open and some quite confidential. This information is collated by intelligence analysts, a corp of scholarly experts who are responsible for the best intelligence estimate that we can possibly make. The President and the National Security Council need the most accurate and the most informed judgments possible, an essential ingredient for decision-making in the fields of national defense and foreign policy.

In February the President issued an Order an Executive Order which defines several organizational changes that I think have already proved significant and will do much to provide cohesiveness in our overall foreign intelligence effort. Without tracing the mechanical provisions of the Executive Order, let me say that this Order, 11905, is a remarkable document for all the modesty of its dry language of administrative instructions. In the most open society in the world, it sets down rules, openly and publicly, by which the US conducts a vital, difficult and necessarily partially secret function. These rules document the determination of Americans to permit no governmental function to extend beyond the limits of the established national interest and to allow no interest to be higher than the rights of individuals, and I can assure you that the CIA is abiding by the directives of the President and by our own administrative regulations. We are not going to abuse our authority and at the same time we are going to continue to produce intelligence, the analyses and estimates that our national leaders simply must have if they are going to conduct any kind of meaningful foreign policy.

One of my continuing concerns is the lack of knowledge that exists about what the CIA does and the kinds of things that CIA is giving attention to which are important to all of us in terms of national security. Very different is what we actually do compared to the James Bond image that we have inherited through the recent turmoils of the recent past.

There are, for example, our concerns about Soviet power. We have the responsibility to keep the President, the National Security Council, and other elements of government advised on such matters as what the Soviets can do, what their military capabilities are, and what they intend to do. The last requires human intelligence. How far and how fast can their bombers go? What's their missile strength? Where do we stand on Soviet compliance with SALT -- that is, what are the Soviets actually doing in terms of the things that have been agreed upon by the policymakers? Much of the work involved in this is the responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Then there is the question that we all are concerned about, or should be I believe, nuclear proliferation. You don't need to have grandchildren to be concerned about what nuclear proliferation means to the coming generations. We must know the best we can where nuclear weapons might be produced and what nations are doing in this respect. I read in the New York Times an article by one of my Washington colleagues, Deputy Secretary of Defense Ellsworth, talking about nuclear weapons that can fit into a brief case.

Now this is the technology of the future, and the awesome implications of that really need no elaboration.

Then there is the question of international terrorism itself. A subject of growing concern to nations throughout the world. And the CIA has got to keep track of what terrorist groups overseas are up to and their planning, particularly as it might impact on American citizens and the property of American citizens. We work very closely on this by providing foreign intelligence to an inter-agency task force, and also by cooperating very closely with intelligence to an interagency task force, and also by cooperating very closely with intelligence liaison services abroad.

There is world traffic in narcotics, and we are the ones that have to try to identify the major source countries for the narcotics and the predominant routes for transporting narcotics. Although CIA is not in the law enforcement business, we have got to collect foreign intelligence that impacts on how we combat the flow of narcotics into this country. And we are doing it -- a fair job -- not as good as I would like to see, but we are doing a pretty fair job for the policymakers in this respect.

In recent years economic intelligence--most of you are in business-- and economic intelligence has become even more important joining political, military, scientific and sociological intelligence as areas where the CIA has got to provide special attention. One of the questions that is on everybody's mind and

policymaking--economic policymaking--is the question of OPEC. Suppose OPEC plans to raise its prices? What are the impacts on our allies abroad, what are the impacts on the lesser developed countries? These are questions, just some of them that our Agency must try to answer.

Then we have got to be looking less specifically at what are the overall long-range political trends in the world. While much of our work is devoted to analyzing spot developments, producing current intelligence to give a daily briefing--Presidential daily brief, and briefing for other policymakers through our Office of Current Intelligence, we also have an office that devotes itself largely to the longer-term political trends in foreign countries. So I can assure you that these questions that we are addressing ourselves to are receiving the proper attention. We have in CIA, and in the Intelligence Community, an enormous capability in terms of highly educated individuals, and you never read about them in the newspapers, but that asset which is an important asset of the United States Government is intact, it is strong, our recruitment is up and the CIA is alive and well in these important analytical ways.

I can assure you with confidence that we have an intelligence capability second to none in the world. It can be better. We have an alert and warning system that should prevent any "Pearl Harbor" in the future. I think the great majority of the American people know and understand this. I think they give credit to the

Intelligence Community for this, they want us to be competent --to do our job, and to do it well, within the constitutional restraints of the American system. But I think sometimes they are confused by what they read in the press, what they hear and see on television -- reports which do little to explain the true role of the Central Intelligence Agency in the government. I know that my conception, personally, of what CIA is, is very very different than the conception I had when I was riding my bicycle in Peking and received word from the President of the United States that he wanted me to come back and head the CIA.

Sensationalism in some of the media -- sensationalism masquerading as investigative journalism -- has served to distract the attention of the American people from what intelligence really is and what it really does -- and that is to promote our national security. This kind of sensationalism ignores what has been done to provide both the executive and congressional oversight on U.S. intelligence activities. And some of the allegations in the media seem to us simply to have come from the whole cloth. I can give you plenty of examples -- but let me give just a couple. A magazine printed a story recently saying that the CIA gave Tom Dewey a million dollars in the year 1948 for his campaign. Totally false, printed in a magazine, and then picked up and printed as news in news columns across the country. An adventurer, discredited, living abroad, fugitive from justice in the United States, claims to have committed all sorts of excesses in the name of CIA. He

claims to have committed all sorts of excesses in the name of CIA. He denies this under oath, but the story--the phony story--reverberates in the press, radio, and television. The denials somehow don't seem to get heard-- but he is put under oath when they could get him. Why did he deny all this stuff? Then under cover from some foreign country, or under the cloak of escaping from American laws in a foreign country, the story appeared in one of the leading magazines the other day and was repeated and repeated, picked up by AP and UP, not the wire services verifying this story but repeating it all across the country. CIA has been made into an easy headline. Sensation-seekers like to play on the minds of people, to promote the James Bond kind of fantasy.

I certainly agree with the need for effective oversight by Congress of the intelligence activities. We must have responsible comment and we must have responsible debate in the media and of course I really firmly believe as one who has been in public service, elected to public service, that we must have investigative journalism. But I decidedly take issue with those who take an irresponsible attitude and who under the guise of news reporting circulate misinformation which degrades the work of our loyal and dedicated intelligence officers and analysts. I believe that the American people deserve more than this kind of superficial treatment, and yet I would have to quickly say that we would welcome and have cooperated with investigative journalism of integrity.

Let me address the matter of secrecy with regard to CIA activities. It would seem self-evident to most people that secrecy is essential to an intelligence service. But unfortunately this remains one of our major concerns.

George Washington pointed out in a letter to one of his intelligence officers in 1777 that success in intelligence operations depends on secrecy, and for lack of it such operations are usually defeated. It has been a part of our republic since its inception, secrecy. And it certainly is true today as it was at the time George Washington made this and many other statements about secrecy and the need for it. By the same token, the leaking of a classified document can tell the adversary all he needs to know to tighten up his security and to make our collection efforts, some of which are fantastically complicated as some in this room know, from a scientific standpoint, make our collection effort much more difficult. Furthermore such revelations present danger for foreign sources who cooperate with us and to the effectiveness and lives of our own CIA people overseas.

I don't think any thing has made a more dramatic impact on me than the death of Richard Welch--the agent that was gunned down in Athens, coincidentally or not, just a few weeks after his name was made public in one of the left wing journals in the United States. He is a beautiful man, classical great scholar, Harvard studied under the great historians up there and devoted his life to the Central Intelligence Agency; unsung, no medals,out of the limelight

doing his job in country after country and serving with great distinction in this country. His name is published, and he is gunned down by terrorists in Athens. It just had a ghastly effect on me and much more important I think on the country as a whole.

But as we talk about being exposed, we have got to remember that nothing can dry up our sources faster and cause consternation among our friends abroad, both individuals and governments, than the leakage of secret information -- in the media, in books, or other ways. Andrew Falkiewicz is with me today. On the plane coming up here he handed me a telegram from a top official of a friendly government and the telegram is classified but I just want to read you a direct quotation from it. This man who has cooperated fully with the United States in exchanging information now about to have some committee--it has already happened--some disclosure of intelligence affecting his cooperation. This is a direct quote from this brand new telegram: "How can I carry on sensitive discussions with most senior levels of the United States Government if I cannot be certain that the integrity of their confidentiality will not be compromised by some functionary down the line who has been subverted or wants to make money at his country's expense or is simply seeking publicity?" Here is a chief of state, asking this question, as our people ask him to continue in the face of disclosure, the cooperation of his government, friendly government with the United States, and you know this side of it is lost; this side of it is lost as we have gone about correcting the handful of actual abuses

and the Congress in a sense have asked us to correct many alleged abuses, but this part that is fundamental to our national security in a world--that is, believe me, is a troubled world--is simply not being focused on by those who seem to condone the excesses I have just discussed in terms of disclosures and the excesses in terms of irresponsible investigative reporting.

It is a very delicate point I am trying to make, because we are very proud of the fact that ours is an open society, and yet there are secrets in our society, both government and private, which we do accept and have accepted culturally over the years. The ballot boxes are secret, the grand jury proceedings are secret, congressional committees have executive sessions, our journalists keep secret their sources of information, the supreme court justices meet and exchange ideas to come up with an opinion. They are not asked to reveal all the discussions that go on in the chambers. The lawyer, the physician, and the priest have the right to draw the veil of secrecy over their dealings with individuals whom they counsel, and so legitimate secrecy can and does play a positive role in protecting our freedoms.

The right to personal privacy is the right to keep secret certain aspects of an individual, life at home and elsewhere. In its international dealings, and in assuring its own security, our country, too, is entitled to have some privacy. In diplomacy confidentiality protects the integrity of negotiation between

nations at peace and makes communication possible between adversaries, sometimes between belligerents. In the military sphere total openness would be tantamount to an absence of security. The need for secrecy in the collection of intelligence or in maintaining a capability for covert action partakes of both the nature of diplomacy and the requirements of military operations--not surprisingly, because intelligence--the product--is the stuff that the policymaker and the diplomatic negotiator must have, and covert action capability provides the President with an option far short of military action when diplomacy has been rendered impossible. In an open society individual privacy is protected by law and is ultimately governed by conscience; in intelligence, secrecy is defined by law and is limited by accountability.

Always, we, in and out of government, must bear in mind that the purpose of secrecy is not to keep knowledge from us, the people, but to protect our security by locking the door and closing the drawer to any adversary who might be tempted. This is why I am against irresponsible or thoughtless secrecy, or, in bureaucratic jargon, "overclassification." "SECRET" stamps really should never be used to obscure failures, to disguise mistakes or cover up abuses. There is overclassification today. In the intelligence community we are continually in the process of assuring that only genuine intelligence secrets are protected. It is very difficult culturally, it is difficult to declassify, but we are now in the midst of a major intelligence community study to lower the level

of classification or eliminate classification where it is not essential to national security.

But as we are concerned about this, I am concerned about the senseless intelligence disclosures, whatever there are of them. As a result of these disclosures, as I have indicated, foreign governments wonder whether we are ever going to be able to hold on to intelligence secrets, and therefore, are reluctant to share their own protected information which is often much needed to supplement our knowledge.

There is a special kind of disclosure, perpetrated by the individual who applies the infamous trade of naming names and blowing cover, not only damaging the good name of the United States, but bringing mortal danger to to the lives of loyal and dedicated Americans and often innocent victims. The CIA is now fair game, now as a result of some of the excesses of the investigation, a target all around the world, subjected daily to the kind of risks that I have just talked about here. There has to be a realistic appreciation by Americans of the complex nature of secrecy in a free and open society, where in the absence of legal sanctions it is the responsibility of the individual--whether government official, journalists, or concerned citizen--to balance carefully the legitimate demands of national defense with the exercise of first amendment rights.

For the past 30 years the Director of Central Intelligence

has been charged under the law with protection of foreign intelligence sources and methods. So long as I am in this position I am going to do what the law requires.

If we are going to keep secrecy in intelligence, we also recognize the need for accountability. Not only have we issued the internal directive -- you know people always say to me, how do you know there is not stuff going on in that place that you don't know about? I might ask the head of the Hartford companies here how he knows everything that is going on, and I guess he would give me the same answer I would give--that we have issued internal directives to make certain there is no abuse of authority.

The CIA is making certain that the oversight bodies created in the executive branch--the IOB, Intelligence Oversight Board--and in the Congress--we have seven oversight committees in Congress that I report to now--have all the information and support they need to discharge their responsibilities. And we have an expanded Legal Counsel, General Counsel, and we have an expanded internal Inspector General system. It is in the interests of the intelligence community as well as Congress and the people to make certain that all of our intelligence activities are in compliance with the law and properly approved.

Since I became Director of Central Intelligence I have made 40 -- been there less than nine months -- I have made 40 official appearances before one of seven -- and others too -- seven oversight committees. That does not count the negotiations

that goes on when you go up there to talk to the Chairman or the ranking member. I would like to see -- perhaps in the next Congress -- consolidated Congressional oversight. Instead of these seven committees to which I now report, I would hope to see a joint intelligence committee with representation from both House and Senate with full and exclusive oversight responsibility. Something along the lines of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee, whose security procedures incidentally are unexcelled in any committee on either side of the United States Congress. In the meantime, of course, until Congress acts, they will have my full cooperation as Director in terms of cooperating with the seven oversight committees that are now in business.

Finally, in terms of accountability, we of the intelligence community, we have an obligation to be as open as we can legitimately be with the American people, to explain publicly what intelligence is and what it is not, to separate if you will the myth from the reality and make clear the reasons we consider protection of intelligence sources and methods so vital. By helping the American people to understand, meetings like this around the country, to understand more about intelligence, we hope that they will appreciate to an even greater extent its vital role in promoting national security, and in this sense assume a share of the responsibility for effective foreign intelligence.

As I conclude, and try to answer your questions, I want to

make one personal observation. I have been in many different jobs in public life and had a long fascinating life in business and I have been at CIA long enough to make this observation without fear of contradiction: Based on rather diversified personal experiences in the past I have never been associated with more quality, with a more dedicated unselfish, patriotic, if you will excuse that shopworn expression, patriotic group of individuals than I am now associated with at CIA and other elements of the Intelligence Community. It is an inspiration, because here people, as I indicated earlier, who serve without the glory, without the attention in the public arena that some are stimulated by in public life -- they serve unselfishly and they are PH. D.'s or M.A.'s often -- some of course are dedicated and disciplined intelligence officers operating abroad in hazardous conditions, but there is a commonality among our four directorates, and the commonality is dedication, unselfish dedication because they believe.

This Agency went through hell -- a handful of things that were wrong deserved the scrutiny the Agency got, the corrective action was taken -- a good thing. Guarantees that the constitutional rights of America are protected, but the denigration, the tearing down of the institution of intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the challenging of morality of intelligence at a time when we were up against the most awesome threat from the Soviet Union and from other (Passage not recorded).

Speech

by

George Bush

Director of Central Intelligence

before the

Los Angeles World Affairs Council

30 November 1976

Thank you Dr. Getting. Let me say at first how pleased I am to be reinvited to appear before this prestigious audience. I remember in 1972 I was Ambassador at the United Nations and was to appear out here, I think on a Monday, and we had a rather hectic meeting of the Security Council, and the subject was the Middle East, a subject that the United Nations still is, the Middle East for years later but nevertheless I came out here dead tired and was accorded a very warm spontaneous reception and I've never really forgotten it. Dr. Getting, I appreciate your warm introduction. I think when I look at the head table here I am impressed. Some of you may have read in the paper that -- maybe you thought when you invited me, let's start with it this way, that you were going to have a fellow that was going to be the Director of Central Intelligence for some time to come. Between the time I was invited and the time I appeared something happened. I'm not the only person unemployed. (joke)

I think that tells you of the seven oversight committees I report to in the U.S. Congress as Director of Central Intelligence and maybe it's not so bad after all. What I want to do today is go through just a few formal remarks and try to respond or dodge depending on what the question is as best I can in the time that remains. But I am deeply con-

concerned about the security of our country. I'm deeply concerned with all the respect in the world for constitutional constraints that must be on any government agency, I nevertheless am concerned about how one conducts an all important national foreign intelligence business in the open, if you will. The risk of disappointing those of you in this audience who have classic notions about romantic and secretive spies, I want to start by divulging my mission here. I don't propose merely to inform you although I hope to do that to the extent I can. I hope to persuade you, persuade you not to any direction of policy because that in the job as Director of Central Intelligence I can't do, and I won't do it. I take very seriously that the constraints on the Director to provide intelligence to the President and have the policy makers shape the policy. But persuade you to resolve to bring to public awareness and understanding to replace sensationalism, exaggeration, and rehashing of the past in the discussion of our foreign intelligence activities. In our time it is cliche to speak of the communications explosion and the vast amount of information that flows around the globe. We know how difficult it is to collect and analyze and select and distill information into knowledge and how important that knowledge is to the rational process of decision making. To put it bluntly, whether in personal life or in business or in the arena of international relations, the side with superior intelligence, the superior knowledge, the more accurate

analysis, and consequently the sounder decision has the edge. More specifically our defense strategy is fundamentally dependent on the availability of political warning and that means on excellent intelligence. Dr. Getting referred to our technological ability to tell the policymakers what's going on. It's our function to say not only how many missiles the Soviet Union has but what they are capable of doing and we better be the best at that. In the last few years or so, we have witnessed an astounding amount of sensation-oriented publicity given to a limited amount of information which has had the following effects: it's caused our friends and our allies to call into serious question the ability of America to keep important secret our secrets or their secrets. It's created serious concern among nations which rely on our support and which are led into doubt as to our ability to give that support and finally, it is provided our declared and determined adversaries with information which otherwise they would have had to expend a substantial amount of effort to obtain if indeed they'd been able to obtain it at all. And at the very least this kind of publicity provided grist for the propaganda mills of our adversaries. Soviet wire services hummed with the stories, CIA having caused the so-called American legion disease, a juicy tidbit which they could probably claim to be citing as they did this from American press sources. Castro accused the CIA

of bombing a Cuban airline. The CIA was not involved but when an outraged Secretary of State on behalf of the U.S. Government, categorically and completely denied this faceless charge, Castro's allegations continued to reverberate after Kissinger's statement on some of the editorial pages in this country. A rather shop-worn accusation in the Soviet publication last May that three American newsmen were spies, you may remember it, was received by many in this country with a measure of credence. Promptly CIA was accused of hanging a dark cloud of suspicion over the entire professional profession of journalism. Only a few in this country pointed out what the Russians were about in trying to name these innocent American reporters as spying for the CIA. Recently I saw a commentary from Pravda reporting on a Soviet book full of distortions and lies that is written based largely on Senate Committee hearings that ended early this year. They took these hearings, they distorted them, and they sent them all around the world. The Soviet Union has done this. On November 25, just the other day, just before I started on this trip, a press office handed me a clipping from Tass, a head byline that a federation for peace and freedom, Soviet propaganda going out into Asia, distorting the CIA involvement is developed in these hearings. Our adversaries, the KGB, the Cuban service, have capitalized on the excesses and used it to damage this country all around the world. I

have recognized that the concept of secrecy is one that presents very special and real problems in a democratic and open society. Many in our country still imperfectly understand the important role that secrecy must play in any professional foreign intelligence service. Sometimes the confusion is procedural. I find a great deal of misunderstanding about our refusal to disclose sources and methods of intelligence. Many people including some journalists have the lingering impression or at least suspicion that somehow this refusal is in vague reliance on a spuriously invoked concept of national security and there had been a handful of cases where national security was used as a shield over something that clearly should not have been so classified. These people don't seem to realize that such refusal is properly based on the law of the land. By law, by the National Security Act of 1947 the Director of Central Intelligence is charged with the protection of sources and methods of foreign intelligence and substantively the rationale for the protection of sources and methods is a sound one. In many instances our ability to monitor vital information would be jeopardized and perhaps destroyed if the other side were aware of the methods that we employed to collect that information. Finally, the concept of secrecy itself is frequently presented and perceived as one that is alien to our free society. I submit to you that that simply is not

so. Secrecy is present in our system. Indeed, I would suggest that it's necessary and frequently that it is fundamental. There are many secrets that we have set and protect as essential to the conduct of our society -- the secret of the ballot box, secret of grand jury proceedings, secrecy of court deliberations, the confidentiality of the relationship of attorney and client, or doctor and patient or priest and confession. Besides we know that individual privacy, for instance, is essential to our concept of freedom. One might make the point that our country in its international dealings is entitled to some privacy and in fact the concept of diplomatic confidentiality is one that is widely observed around the world, and universally accepted. Occasionally, diplomatic confidentiality emerges with the needs of intelligence secrecy. It's interesting to observe in this connection that the consequences of official admission or denial of an intelligence operation are not automatic or automatically predictable. For instance, traditionally spies caught by the other side were disowned and yet, recently there have been various approaches to the question. In 1960 President Eisenhower assumed public responsibility, as you all remember, for the U-2 mission. The result, in that case, was direct confrontation with Mr. Khrushchev. On the other hand, we've had cases where news accounts of intelligence operations based on leaks were published and the government declined any

official comment, in which cases international confrontation was avoided; and there's another consequence, a particularly painful one of disclosure that is sometimes overlooked and frequently ignored. The name, for instance, of Richard Welch, the distinguished, and respected senior CIA officer in Athens was published in an American publication and now I can't tell you whether this was new information to the KGB for instance but what it did do was to finger Richard Welch for whoever it was that brought about his assassination two weeks later. His death surely brought no advantage and enhancement of credibility to those who are determined to pursue disclosure simply for the sake of disclosure. It's not secrecy if we should deny ourselves, keeping in mind always that it is designed to protect our legitimate and vital secrets not from ourselves but from our adversaries. And it is because we have an open society and because our adversaries can reach into our society, into our institutions and a free press, open government, that we must have the criteria of need to know. That we must have rational and responsible standards for security classification. That we must have effective individual protection of government secrets and that I believe that we should also have adequate laws providing enforceable sanctions for improper breach of legitimate confidentiality. These laws at this time we simply do not have. The direction by the President and our

faithful reporting to seven committees of the United States Congress, and our adherence to the Executive Order promulgated by the President this winter and are faithfully reporting to the Operations Advisory Group which is responsible for covert action, that part of the controversial part of the Intelligence Community that accounts for less than 2% of the CIA budget. This direction and this reporting minimizes, if not eliminates, the risk of the CIA conducting covert action without direction and without approval from the highest levels of our government. It is not a realistic fear that this kind of "rogue elephant" or uncontrolled action that people are concerned about can take place given the restrictions we have and given the determination we have in the Intelligence Community to follow these guidelines. I am convinced that the interest of the United States in a world in which we face powerful, determined, and often unscrupulous adversaries demands that we retain a capability for covert action. It should be properly used, used with restraint but no President should be denied -- in my judgment and this judgment was apparently backed by the Committees and Senate and House when they refused to eliminate this capability -- no President should be denied having covert action as a possible tool for his use. In it's essence this capability gives us the option of protecting vital interests at times and places where diplomatic negotiation is no longer feasible and military action unjustified. Are we to stand by and

watch friendly governments be toppled by actions of those who are hostile in the United States and to our system of government? And if we unilaterally and arbitrarily reject the option of covert action as a legitimate means of defending ourselves and our allies, we would be reducing our choice of means in some dangerous situations to either rely on another diplomatic demarche, some note, or taking undeniable armed action. Covert action is a middle ground, an activity that can be undertaken quietly and intelligently to modify circumstances in the best interests of the United States. While retaining this capacity which already stated should be used sparingly, our existing foreign intelligence mechanism makes sure that such an activity if needed by the President would be prudently conceived, properly approved, and effectively supervised. Let me conclude on a very personal note. When I came to Langley just last January to be sworn in as Director of Central Intelligence, I wasn't a stranger to the intelligence product. In Peking and at the United Nations I have used the product of intelligence and found it very good. For the last ten months I have worked day-in and day-out in a close and intensive fashion with the professionals of the United States Intelligence Community, particularly those of the Central Intelligence Agency. When I went out there as Director from a varied past, I'm sure the professionals of the Intelligence Community were asking themselves, you know,

what kind of new Director are we getting in a rather controversial and critical time in history at this Agency. I was telling Mr. Thornton the great thing about this institution is its discipline, and its willingness to support whoever is constitutionally placed by the President at its head. I was in China; I was in the United Nations; I was in the private sector of business, exciting business that I love very much; I was in the U.S. Congress for four years, and headed one of the great political parties, too. I've been in many diversified allocations of jobs, but I can tell you in conclusion, that public controversy to the contrary notwithstanding, I have never been associated in anything I've done with more people who are blessed with the true sense of patriotism who are willing to serve their country with no claim whatsoever. I have never been associated with more unselfish dedication than I have been privileged to be associated with as Director of Central Intelligence. Thank you very much.

L1 George Bush

L1
Address to Houston YMCA

L1 May 7, 1976

L2 Address, [illegible]

L3

GEORGE BUSH: Thank you, Ed, for that very warm introduction, and I really can't tell you how pleased Barbara and I are to be home in Houston. It's not that I'm -- it's not just that I'm glad to be out of Washington. I'm delighted, really, to be back, the first time that we've had a chance to be in our hometown since we left for Peking in the fall of 1974.

I feel at home here. I believe in the work of the YMCA. I was active in Midland, Texas in the founding of the Y out there, I've participated here. I can attest that what Ed told you is true about Carl Walker. Riding along, minding my own business in the Forbidden City in downtown Peking, and the messenger hands you a note: "Your a month behind payment for the Century Club in the South-central Branch of the Houston YMCA." I think that's going a little far. But we've got a place for Carl in our organization, I think.

~~[Laughter]~~

It's kind of like the guy -- when Barbara and I were up and living in splendor as your representative at the United Nations, living high atop the Waldorf Hotel in 42A, which is the Embassy of the United States to the United Nations. Came out, saw this guy dragging a mongrel dog along, right across from 50th Street there, heading over towards Madison Square Garden.

I said, "Where you going with the dog?"

He said, "Well, I'm taking him over to enter him in the pet show in Madison Square Garden."

I said, "Well, that's the world champion show. Do you think he's going to win anything?"

He said, "No, I don't expect he's going to win anything, but he's going to be in some damn fine company."

~~[Laughter]~~

And that's the way I feel about being here tonight. A lot of people from the Y, a lot of people from the Breakfast Club that I used to attend with great regularity and affection, and I do feel at home here. And somebody at a press conference, you know, asked me the inevitable question this evening about: "Well, what'll you do if the President or the next President or the present President doesn't want you to continue in what you're doing?"

I said, "Well, I'll do what anybody else does that's appointed to serve at the pleasure of the President. Whether this

President's elected or another President's elected, I'll submit my resignation; and if he accepts it, I'll be very happy, 'cause I'll move back here to Sage Road and go to work for Carl Walker, and I think we'll have a good -- good -- good life." And I really mean that.

And so, I am very pleased to be here tonight. I want to talk to you a little bit about the Central Intelligence Agency. It's not altogether unrelated to YMCA work, and I'll try to make that point later. But I'd like to talk to you about it as it is, not as people sometimes think it is. I real all kinds of stories about stuff that the Central Intelligence Agency is involved in, and I immediately go to my office, a very efficient one: "Please check this out."

Now, with me tonight is one of our press officers, and he gets many more of these stories than I get, and he was telling me about one that is really true -- the story is true; the facts are not -- about what we were blamed for. He got a frantic call from the West, and they said, "We would like you to verify this story about the Central Intelligence Agency. We're very upset about it."

And our man said, "Well, yes, sir. What can I do for you?"

He said, "Well, we understand that three humanoids landed in the desert in Nevada and that they were met there by a CIA agent who took them to Elgin [sic] Air Force Base, where they were frozen and put on ice. And they got unfrozen three days later and died.

"Now, did you or did you not do this?"

Mr. Perrin said, "No, we did not freeze three humanoids."

But then the question is, you know, "Well, did they land in the desert?" And we end up going through all kinds of peculiar things.

There was another guy -- and these are true stories -- that was making $150 a lecture, lecturing on the West Coast, advertising himself as a former hired killer for the CIA. And he went on to tell about a real weird tale of how he'd been hired to kill people in the Soviet Union. And somebody from the crowd held up his hand and said, "How did you get out of the Soviet Union?"

He said, "Well, I didn't have dollars; I used my American Express card," left the Soviet Union, and then was telling his tales on the West Coast.

And it's one darn story like that after another. And so

tonight I want to talk to you in a reasonably brief period of time, you'll be happy to know, about the Central Intelligence Agency, as I've found it in the period of time that I've been there.

In the first place, we're in an age-old business. Perhaps -- I say perhaps -- the oldest profession in the world. Some have suggested the second-oldest profession, but perhaps the oldest profession in the world.

Kung Chiu writing in China in 500 B.C., a book called "The Art of War," which is small enough to recommend it to friends, talked about an army without secret agents is like a man without eyes and ears. And he went on to say that the supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting. And it goes on to describe in considerable detail methodology of intelligence, that could have been written within the last few years.

So, first, were in an age-old business.

Secondly, we're an agency that, let's face it, has taken a tremendous battering. Tonight I want to give you just a few examples of damage to the intelligence community. I present them not to discourage you from -- or, make you feel that the CIA is on the ropes, but I'm continually asked, "Has all this publicity really hurt our necessary intelligence capability?"

And the answer has got to be, in all fairness, "Yes, it's hurt us somewhat.

While the extent of deterioration in relationships with foreign intelligence organizations is -- it's hard to assess it, U.S. officers are convinced that foreign intelligence agencies with which we've had close relationships in the past are holding back on certain sensitive information rather than risk its exposure in the United States.

Another example: A senior African security service officer told a CIA representative that allegations about CIA involvement in coup conspiracies were convincing officials in his own government that the CIA was behind every coup attempt in the world.

Liaison services in four Latin American countries have cited leaks about the CIA as an excuse for offering less cooperation with our government than in the past.

In the Middle East and Southeast Asia there have been explicit reflections in recent months from four intelligence services with which we have liaison relationships of deep concern about whether the CIA adequately can protect the fact that these covert relationships exist.

And so, the full-trust nature of these relationships,

hopefully temporarily, has indeed been adversely affected.

And the fifth one: A ranking East European, Iron Country, East European official who's been a secret agent since 1972 has refused to continue his collaboration on the grounds of excessive publicity about the Central Intelligence Agency.

An African service refused to initiate a joint operation with CIA as a direct result of leaks and disclosures of activities.

And the seventh example: Exposures naming companies and business leaders who have cooperated with the CIA have created an unwillingness on the part of those individuals to assist the agency confidentially, for fear such association will be exposed in the press.

And then, two companies who've been providing material for the CIA over the years, business people coming back from trips debriefing CIA, recently advised the agency that they no longer care to do business with the Central Intelligence Agency.

These are just a few examples of where, perhaps, our capability, which I happen to think is vital to our national security, where our capability has been damaged.

Thirdly, we're an agency that, in spite of this, has had some amazing successes. And you hear about, over the last 18 months, the failures, but you don't hear about the intelligence successes. Some of it is because I am charged, under the 1947 act, with the protection of sources and methods of intelligence, and some of it is because it's kind of like reading about all the banks that weren't robbed today. You read about the ones that were robbed, you read about the sensationalism, you read about the stuff that's gone wrong, but you don't read about the quiet successes; and I do want to mention just a few to put in balance the damage versus the ongoing mission of the agency.

I wish we could list the most spectacular successes, but we simply can't do it, because disclosure would give away sources and methods. But just a couple of examples.

We have closely followed the Soviet ICBM design and development activities over the past two decades. There have been several new ICBMs developed during the past decade, and we've been able to detect the development of each about three years before it became operational. And moreover, well before they became operational, the principal technical characteristics of these weapons were established and the information was provided to the policymakers in our government.

Technical selection devices have enabled us not only to monitor development of these ICBMs, but also to keep track of

Soviet missile deployment with great accuracy and to predict when various sites would become operational and to predict the size of the force one or two years in advance.

We identified and followed the development of the Soviet ABM, anti-ballistic missile system, at Moscow before it became operational, and individual ABM radars were identified in the early phase of their construction several years before they became operational.

At least one foreign leader, no particular friend of the United States, alive today because the CIA warned him of a plot against his life.

A number of hijackings and other terrorist actions abroad have been thwarted because we were able to give timely and accurate intelligence to local authorities. And we've been able to bring about the arrest of narcotics traffickers abroad and the seizure of major narcotics shipments.

Trade [unintelligible]. Giving early warning long before the fact of what OPEC planned to do in terms of economic boycott and in terms of price increases that would damage the Free World in some way.

And the pendulum of public opinion now seems to be swinging back, fortunately, on the Central Intelligence Agency and there seems to be a fundamental recognition in this country that we've got to have a capability that is second to none.

You know, many people in our country really have no concept about what our mission is. People are frightened, because of some of the things that were clearly wrong in the past, about our agency. Everybody that calls me up on the telephone to play tennis, have lunch, the perfectly normal things -- CIA people do these kinds of things -- work in Little Leagues, work in the YMCA. People call up and they always keep saying to me, "Who's on the phone with us?" You know, "How many people are listening in?" And I'm getting tired of it. I've never seen such a decent group of people as I work with. And you're an agency with a vitally important mission.

Let me just tick off a few of the past, and you ask yourselves, as I tell you, did you know that this agency was involved in this kind of thing? I know you know we were involved in making Fidel Castro's beard drop off, or some kind of a peculiar aberration that was wrong and that's been corrected, a few examples of things that went wrong over a long, long period of time.

I don't know whether you think nuclear proliferation is important. I'm scared to death about it. I think it's terrible. The CIA has a tremendous, tremendously vital role in letting our President, the Congress, the policymakers know what's happening in

terms of nuclear proliferation in the world.

Political change: sometimes our business, sometimes not our business, particularly, but something that our policymakers must know about.

Terrorism I mentioned.

What branch of the U.S. Government concerns itself about hijackings abroad? Maybe you feel we shouldn't be. I think we should. I think we should help our fellow man try to abort this move towards anarchy when a terrorist takes the law into his own hands, and CIA has a vital role in trying to contain terrorism.

The same thing for the international movement of drugs. The same thing about averting war through early knowledge, so that the policymakers can take some statistics and take some information and use it to confront governments with, not to further the interest of the United States, necessarily, but to protect the peace.

In the recent troubles in the Middle East, and they're not over by a long shot, the intelligence on how many Syrian troops crossed into Lebanon came from my agency, and we did a first class job on it, and we could tell the President of the United States, almost to the hour, of what the presence was in another country of troops from Syria.

An overt -- an overt capability: We've got the best cartologists in the United States Government and in the United States. Cartologists, they make maps, for those of you who didn't know what that means. And it's an overt capa -- if you want to get a good map and you've got a buck-and-a-half on you, write to CIA, and it'll say CIA, and they're the best. And our cartologists have been recognized by people in that business as the very tops in the field.

Economic intelligence: The grain crops in the Soviet Union. Our intelligence is fundamental to what the economic pressures are going to be, what the demands from other countries on this country are going to be.

Factual questions: How many Cubans are operating in Angola today? Where are they going to go when they leave Angola? Are they going back to Cuba, or are they going over into Mozambique and to Somalia and to Guinea and some other place in Africa? I think it's a very important question, and it's a question that our agency is charged with answering to the best of our ability.

The change in China that took place over the last month. Vitally important, not only to the security, eventually, of the United States, but to the security of our NATO allies. Where is

China going to go? Are they going to get back in bed with the Soviet Union? And if they do, what does that mean to Japan, for example? What does that mean to our NATO allies, if the Soviet Union doesn't have to concern itself about the Chinese-Russia border, it can shift its intention to NATO?

These are fundamental questions and they're questions that affect the life of every American, if not today, tomorrow, if the answer comes out wrong. And our agency is involved in getting this kind of information to present to the policymakers.

So, we're an agency with a vitally important mission. We're an agency with great human assets. We have several hundred Ph.D.s -- many hundreds, I'd say, Ph.D.s and M.A.s, space scientists, aerodynamic engineers, psychologists, political scientists, economists, agronomists, linguists, historians. We've even got a barbershop, got a cafeteria -- I think I need to go there -- we've got a barbershop, cafeteria, and, as I mentioned, we've just got plain citizens that kind of go about their daily lives. They're not sneaking around, spying on people, and they do a first class job.

And we've got some brave people there, brave men and women. Our operations people abroad, given the unreal climate in which they've been asked to operate, they stay steadfast.

And Barbara and I took a recent trip to Europe and we saw some of them, talked to the families, talked to the wives. And I came back and I asked myself this question: What can I do to make the American people understand and appreciate the sacrifice and the patriotism of these people. As this vicious practice of exposing names goes on, the lives of these decent Americans is in jeopardy. And yet they don't complain, and they and their families have this deep inner feeling that they're giving something vital to the Free World. They don't get any medals, they don't take any bows, and their motivation, just like the motivation we saw here tonight, is service and dedication to country, dedication to country and to the principle of freedom as the matrix that joins all these people together.

And so what do we do about it all? In the first place, we conduct our business recognizing that we are operating in changed circumstances. We consult, in the last quarter century, much more closely with the Congress of the United States, and thus with the people. We will cooperate with Congress, but Congress has got to recognize that it must protect the agency's intelligence secrets.

In addition, we operate within the laws of the United States. We stay in the foreign intelligence business and we go about the surveilling domestically and the things that got this agency into trouble in the past. If we find a mess in our house, we clean it up and we report it, under the President's Executive

Order.

We've got to change our way of dealing with the public. We've got to be more open in helping people understand what CIA does.

But having said these things, we've got to do some other things, too.

We protect the lives of our people by fighting to keep secret those things that must be kept secret. I am not going to reveal the name of our agents, the names of people that have helped us in the past, or the names of people who are helping us in the present or in the future.

When I came to CIA, because of my concern about First Amendment rights, I made a decision that we would not use U.S. journalists on a paid or contractual basis -- freedom of the press, the Constitution. I made a decision that we would not use church people, on a similiar basis -- freedom of religion, constitutional problem. The policy was changed and the cloud removed for now and for the future.

And yet some people are now insisting that I give them the names of those who helped CIA in the past. Well, they're simply not going to get those names.

We are, at times, in a tough and dangerous business, and the people with whom we deal, past, present or future, must know that we're not going to expose them to danger and that we are not going to betray a trust, and that we will, in short, keep our word.

Let me end on a personal note. A couple of weeks ago I was talking to the daughter of a friend of ours who had -- this girl had just graduated from college, and she was job hunting, and she was talking to me about the CIA.

Incidentally, our recruitment is up. Some cynics say, "Well, of course, anybody's recruitment is up when you've got 7.5% unemployment. Of course you're going to have more applicants." It's more than that, though, because our people have a way of comparing quality, through certain kinds of testing, today with what it was, say, 10 years ago, and the quality, as measured in these so hopefully scientific fashion, is clearly up.

But anyway, as sensitive and bright kids do, this young girl raised the question to me of the morality of the business that I'm involved in. And all of you who have teenaged kids in this place that works, and dedicated staff that spends so much of your lives devoted to shaping the lives of young kids, you know what I am talking about when I talk about how this younger generation compels us older people to address ourselves to the question

of morality.

And indeed, I told her that, given the emotions of the past year, this question of morality is a question that clearly I had to wrestle with when I was riding my bicycle peacefully along on a Sunday morning, having come from a church -- and they do have Christian churches in -- a Christian church in Peking. Barbara and I will never forget it. We were riding back, and one of our couriers or messengers stopped us and asked us to ride on down to the Liaison Office, and gave me this telegram saying that the President of the United States wanted me to come back and head the Central Intelligence Agency.

And I -- as I talked to this young kid, having told her that I had wrestled with this question of the morality of it all, I found that it wasn't too easy a question to handle. I have it sorted out in my mind, but I found myself somewhat inarticulate in expressing it to her. Because there are some grubby things in this business, not many, not near as many as you'd think from reading the sensationalism of the past, but there are some. And there's something less than lovely for Americans about having to do certain things in secret, having to deceive, having to spy.

But to me -- and I tried to explain this to her -- this unloveliness is all over -- in the first place, it's a small part of our mission, the operational side, a tiny part of the great asset that is CIA. But it's all overridden, for me, by my total conviction that if freedom is to survive in a world where our adversaries, dedicated to world socialism, dedicated to world communism, where they're penetrating every country in the world, large and small, we better have a strong intelligence capability.

And I quoted to her Horace Mann: "Be ashamed to die until you have won some victory for humanity."

Now, I know that some, in the climate of the past, would question whether working in intelligence is indeed a -- could be considered a victory for humanity. I am convinced that it can be. I feel dedicated to being sure we operate within the law, but I also feel dedicated to keeping our capability second to none.

I spent a fantastic 14 months with Bar in the Peoples Republic of China, and now I'm back. And I loved every minute of our time there. And though I give them enormous....

[End of recording]

ARIO

16 Septembar 1976

FINAL TYPING. (Romeria)

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(ARIO) Association of Area Intelligence Officers

ARIO
16 Sep 76

I would like to thank Lyman Kirkpatrick for that warm introduction. What I didn't tell Lyman was that when I received this cable that told somebody about it in Peking. This was in November, suggesting that I was going to be nominated for this job. I frantically tried to find things to read and sent off cables that got no responses but from Bill Colby who is here today. I am very pleased to say, some what inhibited I might say, standing as his successor is never easy because he did a spectacular job, but Bill sent out some reading primers, you know, to bring me along, and of course there were two books, I belive, by Lyman in there which proved enormously helpful.

So I am privileged to be introduced by him, and I know his interest in this organization. I expect I would be presumptious to speak for Dave Phillips whom I admire enormously but I expect I can when I say that having Lyman Kirkpatrick as actively involved in this as he is is an enormously good thing for the Retired Intelligence Officers Association, and I of course am honored to be at -- we don't have head tables at ARIO I am told -- but I am honored to be at this round one up here anyway with Mr. Griswold, whom I have admired for many, many years.

Let Me just make a few comments about the Intelligence Community and where we stand right now. There have been some

changes. I have been in this job since the first of February. We have had many changes in personnel at the top levels in the Agency. There has been one particularly important substantive change, in terms of controlling and running the community, intelligence community and that is the concept of the two deputies. Hank Knoche, who is the deputy DCI confirmed by the Senate, unanimously, is doing a first class job with his responsibility for day-to-day management of the Central Intelligence Agency. I learned early in life in this professional incarnation that the Director of Central Intelligence must, if his objectivity is going to be beyond question, (have ?) strong support from the CIA part of the intelligence community, and Hank and I sat down and talked about it.

We are both feeling our way along under a new arrangement, and talk about delegation of authority, you can take charge guys, running of the day-to-day management very well indeed, but he is also a very sensitive and thoughtful individual and the problems, the major problems that confront the Agency and the problems that properly should be brought to the attention of the Director are just very carefully thought out by him, and I'm satisfied that this new arrangement in terms of CIA can work very well. (sic).

There is another major change in a sense and that is that the other deputy, Dan Murphy, now a Four-Star Admiral, runs the Intelligence Community Staff. There has always been somebody

running the Intelligence Community Staff, but this will now be elevated through legislation to a second confirmed by the Senate position. I can say with the same degree of enthusiasm that I hope I've conveyed to you that I have for Hank in the job he is doing, I have, I have had that same degree of enthusiasm about Admiral Murphy in his work. It is not easy to get the attention on behalf of the Director of people whose fitness reports you don't sign or salary you don't set or who you don't hire and fire, that kind of thing, and yet Admiral Murphy is tenacious. We think we know what the executive order promulgated by the President says, and we think we know what it means and are working very hard to implement it not only in the spirit but in the letter.

I can tell you that there is a growing feeling, that for the first time the Director has been given the tools with which to make budgetary decisions and hopefully have them stick. The Executive order has been the main paper that has changed this. It hasn't been at this juncture, because very little legislation has resulted from the Senate or House inquiry. More legislation may be forthcoming. I'll touch on that in a minute. But the Executive Order, I can report to you, and I hope I won't bore you to death.

As I travel some around the country and talk about the implementation of the Executive Order, it's normally the place where everybody yawns. But this group is so much better informed, having devoted so much of your lives to intelligence, and this ord

created the Committee on Foreign Intelligence, and I serve as its Chairman. Bob Ellsworth, the Deputy Secretary for Defense, serves as a member and Bill Hyland, Brent Scrowcroft's assistant on the NSC (unintelligible) serves as the other member.

This Committee on Foreign Intelligence has had many meetings. and in these meetings the program manager should come through, the CFI presented their budgets, we have made preliminary recommendations, and for the first time, as I indicated, and I think Bill Colby would agree, the process appears to be going forward in a way that the DCI, through this Committee on Foreign Intelligence, will be able to make budgetary decisions and thus set certain kinds of priorities.

The Community Staff is doing an awful lot of studies and work in terms of priorities for the future. Hopefully management (is the?) priority for the present. We are concerned about the community positions on things like security of information, and we are concerned about over-classification, and we go from there to different ways of collection for the future. I think if we do our business properly, if we are persuasive enough in this Committee on Foreign Intelligence, that the DCI will have more control over the entire National Foreign Intelligence program.

I should say a word about Congress. Lyman mentioned that in my eight and a half months in this job I have made some 37 official appearances before Congress, not counting the times when you go up

and do negotiating with individual members. That's a lot, and it is too much.

Not that we want to stave off oversight but there is duplication and I have great confidence that the Senate Intelligence Committee which at this juncture as things work on the hill is a seventh reporting committee. It indeed proved to be the lead-in toward more consolidation to oversight. I happen to think consolidated oversight will not mean less but more through oversight, or as through oversight, and there won't be this duplication of saying the same thing to seven different committees. An so much of Senate Committee headed by Chairman Inouye and minority ranking member Howard Baker, I think is off to a promising start. They're serious. They ask for and insist on a lot of material and insist on getting it. But the adversary things, the idea that when we come out there, we are going to tear i out corruption, seems to be giving way to a more serious, I think, how can we make intelligence better. Oversight, yes; if they find something wrong, they are going to bring it out. They are going to make changes. They'll see that that kind of thing is corrected, but it is more serious than just that one thing. How can we help the legislative branch in strengthening the intelligence process, s when their investigators, or their subcommittees come out there is a changing reception for them in the Central Intelligence Agency and in other elements of the Community. They're coming

to find out the facts and hopefully this will resolve in legislation that benefits rather than tears down the intelligence process.

One thing that has been somewhat complicated for me as head of the Intelligence Community as DCI, is sorting out a proper balance between the low profile of Director and public appearances. I have tried to, on the advise of my Special Assistant and the advise of the top people of CIA and in the Community, tried to achieve a reasonable balance on this. My concept is that the Director of Central Intelligence, from time to time, must be available to the public. We can't sit back and complain about our treatment if we are not willing to respond to public inquiries and public attention.

On the other hand, there would be nothing worse than to take a foreign intelligence business or take the intelligence community and appear to be putting a gloss on it for public relations purposes that really is a thin veneer. To the degree that one can convey, the convictions I feel about the dedication in our organization, to the degree that I can tell people enthusiastically about the excellence that I find in CIA and other elements, I think perhaps that's a useful thing for the Director to do.

But it appears sometimes a television extravaganca, not only would it be detrimental to us in the intelligence business here at home, but it would be extremely difficult for those with whom we cooperate abroad to understand.

Both achieving this balance between being responsive and yet respecting the need for secrecy, and the need to keep certain things from being discussed, has not been easy. I have gotten some excellent advice on it and I hope that it is working reasonably well. Let me make just a few personal observations; very few before responding to questions.

I have been I was terribly concerned about a few stories that appear relating to a very sensitive study that CIA was doing. (sic). The allegation most recently in Aviation Week being that under direction of one of the policy makers, the Secretary Of State, CIA was changing from intelligence of some form to some kind of policy objective. Not true. It was salander, an outrage to the professionals with whom I am privileged to work in CIA. Nobody had brought pressure on the Director or on my predecessor to do this kind of thing regarding the study. Nobody would, in my view, and I am appalled that that kind of story is giving (unintelligible) because it is a slap at the Secretary of State in this instance. But I'm the Director of Central Intelligence and I see it as an enormous slap at the integrity of process and if national foreign intelligence is to mean anything it must be unfettered by policy constraints. It must get to the President unfiltered and I think it is. I'm on his schedule on a very regular basis and I feel totally free to say, here is the way the Intelligence Community feels about something.

Now you all figure out what the policy implications are, so when I see stories that challenge the basic integrity of my colleagues at CIA I feel inclined to compel them to speak out in opposition to this kind of shoddy reporting.

One of the problems we are having is in terms of secrecy. This is something that Bill Colby and other predecessors, and other heading other agencies in the Community, have to wrestle with. Secrecy legislation is a very sensitive thing; there is overclassification, and getting that in proper form is another very delicate fact. On one hand you have people saying don't do anything in the way of declassification because that is going to make it easier to give , to get access (sic) and on the other you have the kind of secrecy legislatiion.

As Director I feel upheld and mandated under the order to address myself only to declassification but to doing something sensible and reasonable, and certainly constitutional about the promulgation of legislation that will indeed protect the sources and methods. So this, or to support that kind of legislation on the hill, so I just wanted you to know, most of you see something different as intelligence officers, that this Director is not unminduful about the probjems we have on both of these very sensitive areas. (sic).

I selected only a few random topics before answering or dodging them depending on what the questions may be. (sic) Laughter

I say to those of you who have devoted so much of your lives to this profession, which is so new to me: I have been involved in Congress, involved in politics, involved in the United Nations, involved in China, I have never been associated, now there is the military honor, (unintelligible) of intelligence or whether it's in the Central Intelligence Agency or whaterver component of the entire Community, I have never been associated with more selfless dedication and at the same time more quality than I am right now, as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. (sic)