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President Havel of Czechoslovakia 10/22/91 [OA 8330][3]

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
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Czechoslovakia



United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs

June 1987



Official Name: Czechoslovak Socialist Republic

PROFILE

Geography

Area: 127,896 sq. km. (49,351 sq. mi.); about the size of New York. **Cities:** *Capital*--Prague (pop. 1.2 million). *Other cities*--Bratislava (413,000), Brno (385,000), Ostrava (327,000), Kosice (220,000), Plzen (Pilsen--175,000). **Terrain:** Rolling area in wet, low mountains to the north and south, hills in the center, rugged mountains in the east. **Climate:** Temperate.

People

Nationality: *Noun and adjective*--Czechoslovak(s). **Population** (1986): 15.5 million. **Annual growth rate:** 0.28%. **Ethnic groups:** Czech (64%), Slovak (31%), Hungarian, Polish, Ukrainian, German. **Religions:** Roman Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, Jewish. **Languages:** Czech, Slovak, Hungarian. **Education:** *Literacy*--99%. **Health:** *Life expectancy*--70 yrs. **Work force** (7.5 million): *Agriculture*--14%. *Industry, construction, and commerce*--64%. *Services and government*--22%.

Government

Type: Communist state (socialist republic). **Independence:** Czechoslovak state established 1918. **Constitution:** July 11, 1960.

Branches: *Executive*--president (chief of state), prime minister (head of government), Cabinet. *Legislative*--bicameral Federal Assembly. *Judicial*--Supreme Court (1960), Constitutional Court (1968).

Political parties: Czechoslovak Communist Party, Slovak Communist Party, Czechoslovak Socialist Party, Czechoslovak People's Party, Slovak Freedom Party, Slovak Revival Party. **Suffrage:** Universal over 18.

Administrative subdivisions: Two semiautonomous "republics"--Czech Socialist Republic (Bohemia, Moravia), Slovak Socialist Republic (Slovakia); 10 administrative districts and 2 city administrations.

Defense: 7.5% of 1986 state budget.

Flag: A blue triangle extending the length of the staff side, with its apex toward the center, a white band on the upper half of the remaining space, and a red band on the lower half.

Economy

GNP (1984): \$128 billion. **Annual growth rate** (1984 est.): 2.3%. **Per capita income** (1984): \$3,300.

Natural resources: Coal, coke, timber, lignite, uranium, magnesite.

Agriculture (12% of GNP): *Products*--wheat, rye, oats, corn, barley, potatoes, sugar beets, hogs, cattle, horses.

Industry (45% of GNP): *Types*--iron and steel, machinery and equipment, cement, sheet glass, motor vehicles, armaments, chemicals, ceramics, wood, paper products.

Trade (1985): *Exports*--\$18 billion; machinery, iron and steel, chemicals, raw materials, consumer goods. *Imports*--\$18.1 billion; machinery, equipment, raw materials, consumer goods. *Partners*--USSR, GDR, Poland, Hungary, FRG, Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria, Austria.

Exchange rates (1985): *Official*--5.8 crowns = US\$1. *Tourist*--10.5 crowns = US\$1.

Membership in International Organizations

UN and its specialized agencies, Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), Warsaw Pact.

GEOGRAPHY

Czechoslovakia's three principal regions are Bohemia, Moravia, and Slovakia. Bohemia, the westernmost region, is politically and economically the most important part of the country, and its largest city, Prague, is Czechoslovakia's capital. Its landscape consists of rolling plains, hills, and plateaus surrounded by low mountains to the north, west, and south. Moravia, the central region, has important coal and steel industries in the north and agricultural areas in the south. It is bordered on the north by mountains and generally has more hills than Bohemia. Bohemia and Moravia make up the historic Czech lands, now forming the Czech Republic. Slovakia, in the east, has rugged mountains in the central and northern part and lowlands in the south that are important for agriculture. Traditionally less developed politically, economically, and culturally, Slovakia has become more important since Czechoslovakia's independence; it now forms the country's second republic. Prior to World War II, Czechoslovakia encompassed a fourth region, Ruthenia, in the Transcarpathian Ukraine, which was annexed by the Soviet Union following the war according to a treaty between Prague and Moscow.

Czechoslovakia borders on Poland and the German Democratic Republic to the north, the Soviet Union to the east, Hungary and Austria to the south, and the Federal Republic of Germany to the west.

The climate in most of Bohemia and Moravia is temperate. Lush springs and pleasant autumns alternate with cool summers (average July highs and lows: 74 °F to 58 °F) and cold, overcast winters (average January highs and lows: 34 °F to 25 °F). Slovakia is characterized by wider extremes—warmer summers in the south and colder, more severe winters in the mountains in the north. Total precipitation in Prague is low—about 51 centimeters (20 in.) annually.

PEOPLE

The 15.5 million people of Czechoslovakia include about 65% Czechs and 30% Slovaks. Although the Slovaks are a group distinct from the Czechs, most favor working with the Czechs in a common federal state with extensive autonomy for Slovakia.

Other ethnic groups include about 600,000 Hungarians in Slovakia, smaller

numbers of Ukrainians, Germans, and Poles, and about 250,000 gypsies, the fastest growing ethnic element in the population, who live mainly in Slovakia.

Religious activity is tolerated in Czechoslovakia but is rigorously regulated and limited by the state. All religious organizations must be approved by the government, and the clergy are licensed and paid by the state. Likewise, the government provides and controls the theological training received by all clergymen.

Eighteen religious organizations are permitted to operate in Czechoslovakia. The major denominations and estimated memberships are the Roman Catholic Church (10.5 million), the Czechoslovak Hussite Church (400,000), the Slovak Lutheran (Evangelical) Church (400,000), the Evangelical Church of the Czech Brethren (265,000), the Greek Catholic Church (450,000), and the Eastern Orthodox Church (150,000). About 18,000 Jews remain of the 360,000 prewar population. Several religious groups are discouraged by the government, and the Jehovah's Witnesses are specifically prohibited by Czechoslovak law.

HISTORY

The Czechs lost their national independence to Austria in 1620 at the Battle of White Mountain and, for the following 300 years, were ruled by the Austrian monarchy. With the collapse of the monarchy at the end of World War I, an independent state of Czechoslovakia was formed with the assistance of U.S. President Woodrow Wilson. The Slovaks, ruled by the Hungarians for 1,000 years, joined in the common state with the Czechs. The Slovaks were not at the same level of economic and technological development as the Czechs,

but the freedom and opportunity found in the new Czechoslovak Republic enabled them to make rapid strides toward overcoming these differences.

Although Czechoslovakia was the only East European state that remained an effective parliamentary democracy throughout the 1918-38 period, it was plagued with minority problems, the most important stemming from the country's large German population. Constituting more than 22% of the population and largely concentrated in the Bohemian and Moravian border regions (the Sudetenland), this minority was encouraged to reject Czech-German reconciliation in the new Czechoslovak state by nationalistic elements urged on in large part by German Nazis and Adolf Hitler. Internal and external pressures culminated in September 1938, when, at Munich, France, Italy, and Great Britain acceded to Nazi pressure and agreed to force the Czechoslovak Government to cede the Sudetenland to Germany. Fulfilling Hitler's aggressive designs on all of Czechoslovakia, Nazi Germany invaded what remained of Bohemia and Moravia in March 1939, established a German "protectorate," and created a puppet state out of Slovakia.

Slovak democratic forces, with the support of Slovak communists, engineered a revolt in the summer of 1944. It failed because of decisive German military intervention and the Soviet forces' refusal either to intervene or to permit more than token U.S. and British intervention (including a U.S. Air Force airlift of supplies and an Office of Strategic Services mission) in support of the insurgents. All of Slovakia and Moravia and much of Bohemia, including Prague, were liberated in the winter and spring of 1944-45 by Soviet Armed Forces. U.S. forces liberated the city of Plzen and most of western Bohemia in May 1945. Because of prior agreements



The High Tatras Mountains in eastern Slovakia.

with the Soviets as to which areas in central Europe Soviet and U.S. armies would liberate, U.S. forces did not advance further. In Prague, a civilian uprising against the German garrison had taken place in early May 1945. Following the defeat of Nazi Germany, some 2.5 million ethnic Germans were expelled from Czechoslovakia.

From May 1945 until the spring elections of 1946, the country was ruled by a coalition government that included Communist Party members. The democratic elements, led by President Eduard Benes, hoped the Soviet Union would allow Czechoslovakia freedom to choose its own form of government and aspired to a Czechoslovakia that would act as a bridge between East and West. This objective was sustained by Czechoslovakia's highly developed economy, its strong democratic traditions, and its readiness to accept considerable socialization of the economic system. The Communist Party, however, which won 38% of the vote in the 1946 election, held most of the key positions and gradually managed to neutralize or silence anticommunist forces. Although the Benes government initially hoped to participate in the Marshall Plan, it was forced by Moscow to back out. Under the cover of superficial legality, the communists seized power in February 1948.

After a period of extensive purges modeled on the Stalinist pattern in other East European states, the Communist Party tried 14 of its former leaders in November 1952 and sentenced 11 to death. For more than a decade thereafter, the Czechoslovak communist leadership was characterized by its stability of tenure under the leadership of party chief Antonin Novotny.

The 1968 Soviet Invasion


Although some relaxation was allowed under the orthodox communist leadership during the early- and mid-1960s, it was slight and rigidly controlled. However, in the mid-1960s, discontent arose within the ranks of the Communist Party Central Committee because of the slow pace of economic reform, resistance to cultural liberalization, and the desire of Slovaks within the leadership for a larger share of the country's investment resources. This discontent culminated with the removal of Novotny from party leadership in January 1968 and from the presidency of the republic the following March. He was replaced as party leader by a Soviet-educated, longtime party activist of Slovak origin, Alexander Dubcek, and as president by Gen. Ludvik Svoboda, a military hero of both World

Wars. In addition to Novotny, many other orthodox communists were subsequently forced from party and government positions.

After January 1968, the Dubcek leadership began practical steps toward political, economic, and social reforms that promised a better life for the Czechoslovak people. In addition, it called for politicomilitary changes in the Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact and Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). The leadership affirmed its loyalty to socialism and the Warsaw Pact but expressed also the desire to improve relations with all countries regardless of their social systems.

A program adopted in April 1968 set guidelines for a modern, humanistic-socialist democracy that would guarantee freedom of religion, speech, press, assembly, and travel; insulate the government from the Communist Party; create independent courts; introduce multiple-choice, secret-ballot elections; and effect economic reforms. After 20 years of little participation, the public began gradually to take an interest in the government and leadership. Dubcek became a popular national figure and the first Czechoslovak communist leader to enjoy broad public support.

Internal reforms and foreign policy statements of the Dubcek leadership created great concern among some of the other Warsaw Pact communist governments and parties. On the night of August 20, 1968, Soviet, Bulgarian, Hungarian, Polish, and East German troops invaded and occupied Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak Party and Government immediately declared that the invading troops had not been invited into the country and that their invasion was in violation of socialist principles, international law, and the UN Charter. The principal Czechoslovak leaders were forcibly and secretly taken to the Soviet Union. Under obvious Soviet duress, the Czechoslovaks engaged in a series of negotiations at Moscow on August 23-26, again on October 2-3, and finally at Prague on October 16. On that day, Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin, acting on behalf of all the invading countries, and Czechoslovak Premier Oldrich Cernik signed a treaty that provided for the "temporary" stationing of an unspecified number of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia. In November, the troops of the other countries and some of the Soviet troops were withdrawn. In addition to accepting the "legalization" of stationing Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia, the Czechoslovak leadership was forced to apply strict censorship to all public media and to curb virtually all of the reforms that Dubcek had promoted.



Alexander Dubcek was removed from the position of party First Secretary on April 17, 1969, and was replaced by another Slovak, Gustav Husak. Later, Dubcek and many allies within the party were stripped of their other party positions in a massive purge of the Communist Party that lasted until 1971 and that reduced party membership by almost one-third.

By October 27, 1969, the Soviets had achieved their basic objectives: the Czechoslovak liberalization movement was dismantled; elements of the orthodox Communist Party were back in con-

the Soviet Union. This relationship was further formalized in a 20-year Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance signed on May 6, 1970. In May 1975, Gustav Husak replaced the ailing Svoboda as president, retaining at the same time his position as Communist Party General Secretary.

GOVERNMENT

In Czechoslovakia, as in other countries with communist regimes, the Communist Party controls virtually all organized activity, including that of the government in all branches and at all levels.

The present constitution was promulgated on July 11, 1960. Sections were revised by a 1968 law that attempted to establish more equitable representation between Czechs and Slovaks in federal bodies and in economic development. The law canceled the historic preferential treatment of Czech lands by increasing the autonomy of national (Czech and Slovak) organizations in the formation, administration, and operation of the economy. In practice, however, exercise of political power resembles a unitary system more than a federal one.

In Czechoslovakia a distinction is made between the federal government and the national government. Czechoslovakia has two national governments—the Czech and the Slovak—and one federal government for the entire country.

The bicameral Federal Assembly, which was reconstituted from a unicameral legislature on January 1, 1969, is nominally the highest organ of state authority. The Chamber of the People consists of 200 deputies elected by districts based on population; the Chamber of the Nations consists of 150 deputies, of whom 75 are elected by the Czech National Council and 75 by the Slovak National Council. The two bodies are bridged by the chairperson of the Federal Assembly and two deputies who chair the chambers. The consent of both chambers is required for passing of a law. The number of majority votes needed to pass a bill depends on the kind of bill under consideration and on the chamber voting.

The new election law of July 1971 lengthened the terms of the deputies from 4 to 5 years to coincide with the Communist Party Congress, which convenes every 5 years. (The 17th Party Congress met in March 1986.) The candidates for election to the Chamber of the People are nominated by the National Front, a coalition of political parties and mass organizations controlled by the

Communist Party. Apart from the Czechoslovak and the Slovak communist parties, four others are, in theory, non-communist. Members of the Chamber of Nations are selected by the National Councils, the legislative bodies of the Czech and Slovak Republics.

Administrative and executive powers are vested in the Cabinet and the president of the republic. The president is elected by the Federal Assembly for a 5-year term. With the approval of the Federal Assembly, the president appoints a Cabinet including a prime minister as head of government.

The country's highest court is the Supreme Court, elected by and responsible to the Federal Assembly. The lower courts are elected by the districts and counties. Czechoslovakia has no trial by jury.

Principal Government Officials

President; General Secretary,
Czechoslovak Communist
Party—Gustav Husak
Prime Minister—Lubomir Strougal
First Deputy Prime Minister—Rudolf
Rohlicek
Deputy Prime Ministers
Ladislav Adamec
Peter Colotka
Ladislav Gerle
Karol Laco
Matej Lucan
Pavel Hrivnak
Jaromir Obzina
Svatopluk Potac
Miroslav Toman

Ministers

Foreign Affairs—Bohuslav Chnoupek
National Defense—Lt. Gen. Milan
Vaclavik
Finance—Jaromir Zak
Foreign Trade—Bohumil Urban
Interior—Jaromir Obzina
Premier, Czech Socialist Republic—
Ladislav Adamec
Premier, Slovak Socialist Republic—
Peter Colotka
Ambassador to the United States—
Miroslav Housteky

Czechoslovakia maintains an embassy in the United States at 3900 Linnean Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20008 (tel. 202-368-6815).

POLITICAL CONDITIONS

After assuming power in April 1969, Gustav Husak embarked on a difficult campaign to consolidate his position internally and to satisfy the require-



Karlštejn Castle was built by Emperor Charles IV in the 12th century.

ment; and Soviet troops remained stationed in Czechoslovakia. On that date, General Secretary Husak, Prime Minister Cernik, and President Svoboda signed a joint communique with the Soviets at Moscow that justified the invasion, accepted the Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty, avowed that stationing Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia was essential to the security of Czechoslovakia's western borders, and opened the way for the further integration of Czechoslovakia's economy with that of

ments of the Prague-Moscow relationship. Under the circumstances, this policy enjoyed minimal public support. Travel to the West, relatively easy in 1968 and early 1969, was sharply curtailed. Priority was given to removing those reformers who had supported Dubcek from positions of power and influence and to bringing Czechoslovak domestic and foreign policies into line with Soviet policies. Party rolls were reduced by almost 300,000 between late 1969 and early 1971. Another 200,000 party members had resigned of their own accord in the months following the Soviet invasion. Party and government officials, educators, and journalists, among others associated with the reform movement, were replaced by individuals who were pro-Soviet in foreign affairs and orthodox in internal matters. No leading figures of the Dubcek leadership were arrested, however, due perhaps to Husak's own long imprisonment as a victim of the Stalinist period in the 1950s. Strict controls over the media were reinforced on the principle that their role was to support uncritically all regime policies and actions. Emphasis on centralized economic controls reduced

Travel Notes

Climate and clothing: The climate is most pleasant May-August; smog and dampness prevail November-March. Bring rainwear and lightweight or heavy woolens depending on the season.

Customs and currency: US citizens must have visas. Tourist visas, valid for one entry, can usually be obtained within 2 weeks. Former Czechoslovak citizens sometimes have difficulty obtaining Czechoslovak visas. Visas require the tourist, upon entry, to purchase 30 West German marks (about \$18 at the exchange rate of early 1987) per day in Czechoslovak crowns. Crowns may not be imported or exported.

Health: No unusual health precautions need be taken in Prague; however, visitors coming from areas where yellow fever or cholera are endemic must have proper inoculations. Tap-water is usually safe. Bring any needed medications.

Telecommunications: Telephone and cable service is adequate. Czechoslovakia is six standard time zones ahead of eastern standard time. Due to substantially higher Czechoslovak rates, phone calls to the US should be made collect, if possible.

Transportation: The country has a wide network of bus, rail, and air services. Prague has a subway, and streetcars and trolley buses serve both cities and suburbs. Taxis and rental cars are available. Main roads are adequate.

gradually some of the authority that the Slovak national government had gained in constitutional reform.

Although multiple candidacies for the Federal Assembly had been under consideration in 1968, the election law of July 1971 reinforced the exclusive power of the National Front to nominate a single list of candidates for elective office—a procedure intended to ensure that the elected officials would support regime policies unanimously. When National Front candidates received 99% of the vote in 1971 elections, Czechoslovak leaders claimed that these results confirmed that their efforts since the ouster of Dubcek to "consolidate" the position of the Communist Party had been successful.

Nevertheless, in 1972 a series of subversion trials in connection with the elections resulted in sentences ranging from 9 months to 6½ years' imprisonment for 38 individuals, mostly members of the intelligentsia associated with the Dubcek reforms. Furthermore, a subsequent resurgence of protests from 1968 leaders such as Dubcek and then-Chairman of the National Assembly Josef Smrkovsky and increased activity among some dissident intellectuals led to strong condemnations by Husak and other government leaders as well as a spate of house searches and manuscript confiscations.

On January 1, 1977, more than 250 people signed a manifesto called "Charter 77" criticizing the Czechoslovak Government for failure to implement human rights provisions of documents it has signed, among which are the Czechoslovak Constitution, the International Covenants on Political and Civil and Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, and the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. By early 1987, the charter had obtained over 1,200 signatures, and, although not organized in any real sense, does constitute something of a citizens' initiative. Its goal has been to induce the Czechoslovak Government to observe its formal obligations to respect the human rights of Czechoslovak citizens.

Charter 77 signatories have been subjected to periods of government harassment, disruption, and persecution. The Husak regime has used various measures, both judicial and nonjudicial—most notably loss of job, denial of educational opportunities for children, suspension of drivers' license, detention, trial, and imprisonment—to discourage the "dissident activity" of movement adherents. It has also induced or forced human rights activists into exile abroad

and deprived them of their Czechoslovak citizenship. In October 1979, hoping to suppress further dissidence, the Czechoslovak Government staged a "subversion" trial of six leading activists of the Committee for the Defense of the Unjustly Persecuted as a warning to other "dissidents." As political tension in neighboring Poland mounted during 1980-81, the government, perhaps fearing a "spillover" effect, became increasingly repressive in its treatment of Charter 77 and other human rights activists. Later, government repression of religious activists—those involved with the charter and those outside the more prominent "dissident" circles—was increased. In March 1987, regime efforts to neutralize the Jazz Section of the Czech Musicians' Union, which sought to promote freedom of cultural expression, resulted in the trial of several of the section's leaders after months of detention.

DEFENSE

Czechoslovak regular armed forces total about 204,000 members and are subdivided into the following:

- The army, with 147,000 members organized into 5 tank divisions, 5 motorized rifle divisions, 1 airborne regiment, and 1 artillery division; and
- The air force, with 57,000 members organized into 2 air armies, 2 air divisions, and 2 air defense divisions.

There are also the border and interior guards, with 35,000 members, and the people's militia, with 120,000 members. Compulsory military training for men requires service of 2 years in the army, 3 years in the air force, or 27 months in the border and interior guards.

As a charter member of the Warsaw Pact (May 1955), Czechoslovak forces are subject to the command and direction of the Warsaw Pact commander, always a Soviet officer. The Soviet Union stations about 80,000 ground troops and 5,000 air force personnel in Czechoslovakia.

ECONOMY

Czechoslovakia has a highly developed, industrialized economy. Its strong industrial tradition dates to the period when Bohemia and Moravia were the industrial heartland of the Austro-Hungarian empire. Today, this heritage is both an asset and a liability. Czechoslovakia has a well-educated population and a developed transport system, but much of its plant and equip-

ment, inadequately modernized in nearly 40 years of communist rule, is among the oldest in Europe. The country's centrally planned economy is tightly linked with the Soviet Union and other East European countries and is characterized by low growth, low technological sophistication, and structural imbalances caused by inappropriate investment decisions over the last 40 years.

Czechoslovakia is deficient in energy resources and many raw materials. Its major natural resources are coal (brown and hard), timber, and uranium. Its main agricultural products include sugar beets, fodder roots, potatoes, wheat, and hops.

Principal industries are heavy and general machine-building, iron and steel production, metalworking, chemicals, electronics, transport equipment, textiles, glass, beer brewing, china, ceramics, and pharmaceuticals.

The gross national product (GNP) was approximately \$128 billion in 1984, amounting to about \$8,800 per capita. GNP grew steadily during the early and mid-1970s, stagnated during the years 1978-82, and resumed modest growth of about 2.5%-3% per year in 1983.

At the time of the 1948 communist takeover, Czechoslovakia had a balanced economy and one of the highest levels of industrialization in Europe. In 1948, the government began to stress heavy industry over agriculture and consumer goods and services. Many basic industries and foreign trade, as well as all domestic wholesale trade, had been nationalized before the communists took power. Nationalization of most retail trade was completed in 1950-51. Exceptions to private ownership in these sectors are now negligible and involve mainly a few artisans. Collectivization of agriculture began in 1949. Today, all but about 7%-8% of the agricultural land is "in the socialist sector," either in state farms or in state-run cooperatives.

Heavy industry received major economic support during the 1950s, but waste and inefficient use of resources resulted from the adaptation of centralized planning techniques to the complex industrial sector. Although the labor force was traditionally skilled and efficient, inadequate incentives for labor and management contributed to a high labor turnover, low productivity, and unsatisfactory quality. Economic failures reached a critical stage in 1963.

A period of de-Stalinization and economic reform was launched during 1963-67. Proposed reforms involved decentralized decisionmaking, including greater freedom for managers to set prices, production levels, investments, and wages. The new mechanisms were


invoked without enough preparation and did not receive support from some important elements in the Communist Party and from many economic officials and planners. Inflationary pressures began to develop, and wholesale prices were permitted to rise rapidly in 1967. Firms found they could make windfall profits and undertake new investments without having to improve productivity or quality of output.

Hope for more wide-ranging economic reform came with the replacement of Novotny by Dubcek in January 1968. However, under Dubcek's leadership, Czechoslovakia could not immediately come to grips with inflationary forces, much less begin the immense task of correcting the economy's basic problems—overconcentration on heavy industry, low productivity, failure to modernize, and inferior quality of goods.

Any opportunity the Dubcek leadership might have had to place economic reform on a sounder footing was cut short by the 1968 invasion, which brought renewed strains on the balance of payments. Although industrial production improved during the immediate post-invasion period, inflationary panic-buying continued, and worker productivity fell as demoralization spread.

A series of price increases and wage controls implemented under Husak's leadership reduced inflationary pressures and, to some extent, increased productivity. Problems such as unfulfilled targets in housing construction and inadequate supplies of fuels and power continued, and an excess of new investments and tighter government supervision of enterprise production levels did not significantly reduce the problems. In addition, relatively high rates of absenteeism continued to reveal the attitudes of the labor force.

The economy grew steadily during the 1970s but stagnated between 1978 and 1982. The Czechoslovak approach to its economic problems has been to continue to uphold central planning. After a 3-year (1978-80) experiment involving about 15% of the economy, in January 1981 the regime introduced a "Set of Measures" to improve management of the production process. Its general goals were to improve export performance and the quality of production, with particular emphasis on economizing on labor, materials, and energy. The new measures, in addition to reinforcing central planning and controls, included a system of rewards and penalties intended to distinguish the performance of individual enterprises and individual workers within them. Ideological campaigns were also kept up in an attempt



The Smetana Theater in Prague presents operas and ballets.

to diminish workers' apathy and aversion to the incentive system. The leadership acknowledges that the "Set of Measures" has failed to stimulate improved export of efficiency or more rapid application of technological innovation to production.

Despite the ineffectual nature of the "Set of Measures," the economy managed to pick up after 1982, achieving annual average output growth of over 3% in 1983-85. Imports from the West were curtailed, exports boosted, and Czechoslovakia's hard-currency debt reduced substantially. Major new investments were made in electronics, chemicals, and pharmaceuticals, and these sectors were industry leaders by 1986. However, the economy remains troubled by serious sectoral imbalances, overbureaucratization and overcentralization, low export competitiveness, low productivity growth, and overreliance on the Soviet Union and other CMEA countries not only as sources of raw materials but also as markets for goods not saleable elsewhere.

An increasing proportion of Czechoslovakia's foreign trade—approaching 80%—is with other communist countries. The Soviet Union alone accounts for about 45% of Czechoslovak trade and supplies the country with almost all of its oil, natural gas, and iron ore, as well as many other key raw materials. To secure these resources, Czechoslovakia is investing large amounts in natural gas and iron-ore extraction projects in the U.S.S.R. In return, Czechoslovakia supplies machines and other industrial products to the U.S.S.R. After the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia's major trading partners are the German Democratic Republic, Poland, and Hungary. Among

Western countries, the Federal Republic of Germany, Austria, and Switzerland account for the largest share. In 1985, U.S. imports from Czechoslovakia totaled \$84 million, and U.S. exports to Czechoslovakia totaled \$68 million.

The Czechoslovak regime has justified itself and its activities largely by its efforts to improve the material welfare of the population. The standard of living is difficult to measure, but it is certainly one of the communist world's highest. Virtually no unemployment exists; about 7.5 million people are employed—roughly one-half of the population. There is high employment among women, who make up about 47% of the labor force. Workers enjoy ample fringe benefits and an extensive social security program. Food and consumer goods, although by no means abundant, are in good supply, and the level of automobile ownership is the highest in Eastern Europe.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

The foreign policy of Czechoslovakia closely follows that of the Soviet Union. This is attributable to the outlook of the current leadership and foreign policy apparatus, the Soviet presence in Czechoslovakia, and the country's economic and military ties—CMEA and Warsaw Pact—to the Soviet bloc.

Czechoslovakia is a member of the United Nations and participates in its specialized agencies. It is also a member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Czechoslovakia maintains diplomatic relations with more than 100 nations, of which 68 have permanent representation in Prague.

U.S.-CZECHOSLOVAK RELATIONS

President Woodrow Wilson and the U.S. Government played a major role in the establishment of the state of Czechoslovakia on October 28, 1918. President Wilson's 14 Points, including the right of ethnic groups to form their own states, were the basis for the Czechs and Slovaks joining to form the Czechoslovak state. Tomas Masaryk, the father of the country and its first president, spent some months in the United States during World War I and worked closely with U.S. officials in developing the basis of the new state. He used the U.S. Constitution as a model for the first Czechoslovak Constitution.

Since before the founding of the Czechoslovak state, the U.S. Government and people have maintained a

friendly and sympathetic attitude toward the Czech and Slovak people. Millions of Americans have their roots in Czech lands and Slovakia, and a large community in the United States has strong cultural and family ties with Czechoslovakia.

After World War II and the return of the Czechoslovak Government-in-exile, normal relations were continued until 1948, when the communists took over the Czechoslovak Government. Since then, relations between the United States and Czechoslovakia have been marked by persistent problems.

The Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 further complicated U.S.-Czechoslovak relations. At the time of the invasion, the United States promptly referred the matter to the UN Security Council as a violation of the UN Charter. Later, in a foreign policy report to Congress, Secretary of State William P. Rogers condemned the invasion as an infringement of Czechoslovakia's sovereignty and stressed that improvements in East-West relations must be based on respect for the principles of sovereign equality, political independence, and the territorial integrity of each European state, regardless of its political or social system.

Despite this overall coolness in U.S.-Czechoslovak relations, both sides decided in the fall of 1972 to undertake certain limited steps aimed at solving outstanding problems. Negotiations were begun on a consular convention, a trade agreement, an agreement on financial issues dating back to World War II, an exchanges agreement, and an agreement to open consulates in Bratislava and Chicago. For various reasons, these discussions failed to produce results.

The 1980s saw modest improvement in U.S.-Czechoslovak relations at the official level. In 1982, agreement was reached to resolve outstanding financial issues relating to compensation from Czechoslovakia for the U.S. citizens and corporations whose properties were nationalized after the end of World War II and the delivery to Czechoslovakia of its share of the gold recovered from Germany and other countries by the Allies at the close of the war. The gold was in the custody of a tripartite (U.S., U.K., and French) commission established by international agreement to allocate the pool of recovered gold among the countries from which gold was looted by the Nazis. The United States blocked the gold identified by the commission for delivery to Czechoslovakia pending a settlement of the nationalization claims.

Another lengthy negotiation was brought to a conclusion in 1986 when the United States and Czechoslovakia signed the first exchanges agreement between the two countries. The agreement provides for exchanges in culture, education, science, technology, and other fields.

U.S.-Czechoslovak trade, hindered by Czechoslovakia's failure to qualify for most-favored-nation tariff status and its trade orientation toward the Soviet Union and other CMEA countries, has stagnated in recent years. Of \$68 million in U.S. exports to Czechoslovakia in 1985, cattle hides, fertilizers, and superphosphates accounted for more than half, or \$38 million. The United States purchased \$11.2 million in steel products from Czechoslovakia in 1985, as well as leather footwear (\$9 million), hops and beer (\$5.3 million), small tractors (\$3.5 million), and hams (\$8 million).

The United States has sought to secure Czechoslovak exit permission for Czechoslovak citizens (mostly minor children) who wish to emigrate to the United States to join close relatives. Lists of such cases have been presented to the Czechoslovak Government, and a number of cases have been resolved.

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A SURVEY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL VALUES AND ATTITUDES

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SECTION IV EASTERN EUROPE

In the aftermath of the revolutions of 1989 Eastern Europe has become a discordant mosaic of contradictions, ambiguities and animosities.

Assessed most ominously, our results at first blush give rise to fears of "impending chaos"(an expression used by a member of Times Mirror Board of Advisors) among these largely slavic nations stretching thinly from the Baltic to the Black Seas. The failed Communist Party coup in Moscow in August may, for a time, foster more cohesion to their approach to Western Europe, and perhaps even give new impetus toward inter-regional cooperation. But we found that the peoples of Eastern Europe, simply put, do not like their neighbors. Their ethnic divisions are so sharp, and their national hostilities so deep, that radical improvement of relations probably must wait on new generations to come. "What I call the cemetery problem," a Pole in Bialystok says only half jokingly; "those who suffered grievances will have to be buried before we see any improvement."

All of these peoples have unique histories, from their arrival from the Asian steppes through the communist period, which shape their attitudes toward the new freedoms. Their current national borders, for example, seldom coincide with ethnic and religious boundaries. Blood cousins live just across the river or road that make up the frontiers. It is not surprising that nationalist forces, long suppressed by communist rulers, have erupted into

violent demands for independence or greater political autonomy, as in Yugoslavia. Our findings indicate that more ethnic conflicts of this kind are likely.

On top of such nationalism has come the cataclysmic political, economic, social and security changes of the past two years, which have brought confusion and disorientation to these peoples. East Europe in effect is simultaneously undergoing the French and Industrial Revolution. Or in American terms, the region is experiencing our Great Economic Depression, pre-Civil War fear of conflict, and the Vietnam War-Watergate crisis of political legitimacy all at one and the same time.

We found unrealistic expectations that the turmoil will work itself out within a few years, and impatience with the pace of change. Both attitudes could become fertile ground for political demagogues. In Sophia, a Bulgarian sociologist complains about "hysterical super-expectations." And in Debrecen, a Hungarian chemistry professor worries that "there is a real danger that people will become more and more apolitical or, out of ignorance, turn to extremist groups."

We found a great appetite for foreign investment throughout the region but also a high level of suspicion of foreign investors, as if they intended to annex any land they bought to their own countries. The conflicting attitudes, particularly where they coincide with revived ethnic and religious prejudices, make some East European nations considerably less attractive as recipients of Western dollars. "Minorities, who make up only 2%, at most 5%,

of the Polish population, constitute a moral problem, a litmus paper of the moral fitness of the nation," muses a Polish writer. "Like this strange phenomenon called anti-semitism when there are practically no Jews here. But their treatment also has political significance, because it affects Poland's chances to get into Europe."

In every country we heard complaints that entrepreneurs were only trading, not producing; that they were only transferring rather than creating wealth, including jobs. We heard strong differences on whether political change should take priority over economic restructuring, and vice versa. But we also found heartening indicators that democracy is taking root and free market instincts have not perished under the weight of 45 years of communism.

So while there is the potential for calamity, there are also exciting signs of renewal among the former Soviet bloc as these small nations seek their place in the new Europe. "History," observes a shop manager in Prague, "proceeds here."

Personal Life

East Europeans rate their personal life today an average of one-third below West Europeans (6.1 vs 4.4 on 10-point scale). All West Europeans feel they have made progress in their daily lives over the past five years, but all East Europeans have experienced demoralizing decline. "What is still happening is the process of atomization in all areas, the destruction of various relationships

and ties," says a Polish priest.

But East and West, on both sides of the former Iron Curtain, came together as optimistic about their personal future, with the exception of Hungarians (in whom pessimism is culturally endemic, as we will show). Remarkable is the extreme optimism shown by Bulgarians and East Germans. While the German justification for hope is their recent unification, the Bulgarians appear to be basking in a honeymoon period like the dawn when the horizon is brightly lit but the intervening ground is still shrouded in darkness, hiding -- in Bulgaria's case -- the harsh economic realities ahead.

Czechs are also optimistic about their personal futures, which is probably tied to trust in the highly popular president of Czechoslovakia, Vaclav Havel. Optimists who approve of Havel rate their country's situation significantly better than those who, although also optimistic, disapprove of Havel; he appears to give them heart. In sharp contrast are the Slovaks, the poorer third of Czechoslovakia, who are as pessimistic about their personal future as Hungarians. The "velvet revolution" of 1989 in Czechoslovakia has left those two peoples even more separate, and hostile toward each other, than before. "Czechs behave in a very arrogant way at present," complains a biologist in Kosice; "they plainly don't like us very much." "And they don't want to understand us, that we want our own identity," adds a Slovakian pediatrician.

Czechs rate their personal lives today higher than do any other peoples of East Europe, higher than the former East Germans and

comparable to nations of West Europe. Materially, there is no reason for this euphoria, no recent unification with a richer and stronger relation like the East Germans, no high living standards like Europe's better half. But by various measures they are a feisty people, whose pre-war living standards rivaled that of the Swiss, and who emerge from our survey as more Western in most respects than the other East European nations. They and the Hungarians both lead in preferring to be paid by incentive scales rather than fixed salaries (Czechs - 73%; Hungarians - 75%), but they, unlike the Hungarians, are optimistic that they can make it personally.

Slovaks, their unhappy partners in the Czechoslovak federation, feel their lives have declined drastically -- more than any other peoples of the region -- as a result of the political and economic changes (Slovaks - 64%; Czechs - 41%; Others - 42%). Their pessimism appears to be due to their role as, in their eyes, second-class citizens in the partnership as much as to objective economic difficulties. These difficulties, however, are considerably worse than the Czechs are experiencing. By various measures, the gulf between these two peoples has widened in the past two years.

"When I look at football or hockey teams and there are more Czechs on it than Slovaks," says a taxi dispatcher in Kosice, "I am not interested, absolutely not, in watching any more. I want a separate Slovak team and a separate Czech team, regardless of their success."

His wife goes one step further: "If there is one team, it should have equal numbers of Czechs and Slovaks on it."

Hungarians stand out for their pessimism, and for rating their fellow countrymen very low. Unique in East Europe and the Soviet republics surveyed, they say most people in their society are not trustworthy. The margin was not merely a majority but more than two to one (68% vs. 27%). This attitude is not considered particularly fertile ground by political scientists for democracy to take root.

Hungarians, the only non-Slavic people in our survey, have always stood out as the gloomiest of East European peoples. Among other distinctions, Hungary has one of the world's highest suicide rates. Its Magyar peoples are Europe's newest arrivals from Asia even though they have lived in the Danube Basin for a millennium. There is almost pride in Hungarian pessimism. "A Hungarian will always see the worst. It comes from a peasant mentality, which will never predict a good harvest," explains Prime Minister Jozsef Antall (NY Times, June 24, page 7). Unlike the United States where optimism "is the motor of American life," he says, "even our anthem is pessimistic."

Are Hungarians pessimistic for realistic or cultural reasons? Is their depression based on the objective evaluation of their condition or just part of being Hungarian? We concluded that Hungarian pessimism is culturally based after examining East Europeans who are satisfied (or not) with their financial situations and who then profess themselves to be optimists or pessimists. Of those Hungarians who feel things are going well

financially for them at present, half said they were optimistic, half pessimistic. In contrast, of those doing well financially in other countries than Hungary, optimists considerably outnumbered pessimists. Even among Poles and Czechs who are doing poorly in money terms, we found more optimism than pessimism. Our conclusion is that Hungarians doing well financially are not optimists, and when things go poorly, Hungarians become not just depressed but despairing.

Poles are unexceptional in their personal assessments, compared to others in the region, although as we will see below, they are remarkably different in assessing their country's status.

Bulgarians, in contrast, have a very low opinion of where they are now, with three out of five reporting personal decline compared to five years ago, but with the same number, two in three, professing optimism for five years hence. We feel that these Slavs at the southern tip of Europe do not realize yet how bad things will get before they get better.

National Situation

East Europeans rate their nations's standing today as significantly lower than West Europeans. What is striking is how low. On a 10-point scale, Bulgarians (and Russians and Ukrainians) lead in negative assessment of just over 2. The average for the rest of East Europe is about 4. West Europeans' average 5, with West Germany at the top of the pack at 6.6.

Most nations, east and west, believe their country has declined

over the past five years, but also, significantly, three nations -- Poland, East Germany and Spain -- believe they have advanced. Spain registers progress because of entry into the Common Market, East Germany because of unification. Poles alone in East Europe give a positive assessment, despite lower living standards.

Remarkable, too, is the optimism in East Europe for their countries. It is much more pronounced than in Western Europe. About 4 in 10 of West Europeans are optimistic. Among East Europeans, 6 in 10 are optimistic, led by Bulgarians among whom 8 in 10 looked to a better future for their country. East Germans and Czechoslaks are close behind (76% and 69% respectively). Even the Hungarians, pessimistic in personal terms, were significantly more optimistic than pessimistic about their country's prospects by a margin of 3 to 1.

Such optimism for the future among East Europeans, as well as those in the Soviet republics, flies in the face of economic conditions that will likely worsen before they get better. It indicates an impatience among populations for rapid improvement, particularly in living standards, which the new governments in the region will be unable to fulfill. Their "hyper-expectations," as it was called, can be exploited by populists and demagogues.

Bulgaria is the most obvious and most extreme cause for concern. Bulgarians are optimistic about their nation's future by more than 13 to 1, optimistic about their personal future more than 2 to 1, both without much justification.

After economic difficulties arose, the former communist regime instituted a vicious campaign against the Turkish minority, who make up about 10% of the population. Turkish citizens were forced to take Slavic names, fined for speaking Turkish in public, harassed to drive them out of the country. Animosity toward Turks runs very high today. Four out of ten Bulgarians expressed unfavorable views toward Turks; among Christian Bulgarians, the hostile attitude reaches 46%.

Bulgarians are also very hostile to Turkey, which often subjugated them in the past. They say the greatest threat to their country comes first from Turkey (41%) and secondly from Yugoslavia. Unlike the rest of East Europe surveyed, they do not fear the Soviet Union very much (6%). They worry more about a military attack from a neighboring country (29%), ie., Turkey, than about economic domination by the west, floods of refugees or a Soviet economic collapse (13%). Like all other East European states (except the former East Germany), a majority of Bulgarians (52%) feels that parts of neighboring nations really belong to them, dating back to their "Greater Bulgaria" period. "Many Bulgarians live in neighboring countries," says a Plovdiv surgeon. "We say Bulgaria borders on itself." As Yugoslavia falls apart, its southernmost republic of Macedonia includes many ethnic Bulgarians who could, under difficult circumstances there, seek Bulgarian refuge and protection.

Hungary, among all the countries of Europe, East or West, has the largest majority claiming that pieces of neighboring

territories belong to them: 68%, or more than two out of three. Poland is next with 60%, after which Bulgaria reports 52%. Even a thin plurality of Czechoslovaks identify neighboring regions as their own (39%).

More than Bulgaria or Poland, Hungary is surrounded by Hungarians. Dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian empire after World War I ceded lands to virtually all bordering states: Yugoslavia, Romania, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Ukraine. As Yugoslavia disintegrates, Hungarian officials have pointed out that Vojvodina -- the Yugoslav region in the Danube bend that holds 500,000 Hungarians -- was ceded to Yugoslavia as an entity. If that nation breaks apart, they note, Vojvodina does not automatically belong to Serbia or any other surviving piece of Yugoslavia. By implication, Hungary would want a voice in Vojvodina's disposition. (It should be noted that the intensification of the ethnic war in Yugoslavia has already resulted in a surge of ethnic Hungarians crossing the Croatian border into Hungary, where the government had established temporary camps to house civilian refugees from the Yugoslav conflict.) The same appears likely if Slovakia separates from Czechoslovakia. The former Hungarian uplands, which stretch across the entire southern border of Slovakia, would apparently not be recognized by Hungary as part of that nation if the federation disintegrated. Hostility toward Hungarians is very strong in Slovakia (65% unfavorability rating), making it likely that ethnic Hungarians there would appeal for protection from Budapest and even seek refuge in Hungary itself if Slovakia separates.

Poland, overrun for centuries by Germany and Russia, also has former lands distributed among its neighbors (although it too gained territory that was once held by its neighbors). Three out of five Poles believe neighboring lands still belong to them. Our survey found that Poles are the most xenophobic and militaristic peoples in the region. They rate the foreign threat higher than any other country, East or West (28%). More than two out of five fear Soviet troops will not withdraw fully from their country, and three out of five fear that Soviet troops transuding Poland from Germany to return home will create problems for Poland. More than any others in the region, Poles say not enough money is spent on national defense (27%). Almost one in two Poles (45%) would sell weapons to Third World nations for economic reasons; only in Slovakia, with large factories producing outdated Soviet-designed weapons, do a higher proportion of the populace (58%) support such sales.

Finally, a greater proportion of Poles (28%), more than citizens of any other country, say they have no dependable allies. (Russia is next at 22%). Czechoslovakia, as indicated above, is really two countries and becoming more so. Czechs and Slovaks both rate the standing of their "country" (the word used in the questionnaire) about equal today, at about the same level as the other East Europeans. But while the Czechs see a modest national decline (43%) over the past five years, the Slovaks said a severe decline (68%) has occurred. Both were very optimistic for their country's future, but here, too, the Czechs were considerably more optimistic than

the Slovaks.

Czechs and Slovaks agree, by margins of eight to one or better, that relations between the two peoples have suffered since the revolution. Slovaks were more than twice as concerned (37% to 14%) about jobs than Czechs. Almost twice as many Slovaks as Czechs (59 to 35%) disapprove the present power-sharing arrangement. Two out of three Slovaks believe the arrangement unfair; more than half the Czechs believe it fair (52%).

Slovak resentment probably derives from two factors. First, until Havel, communist Czechoslovakia was ruled by Slovaks for more than two decades. (Even Alexander Dubcek, author of the ill-fated "Prague Spring" that was crushed by Russian tanks in 1968, was a Slovak although he was always more popular among Czechs than his compatriots.) And under the communists, Slovakia advanced as a nation -- in education, industrialization, and public health -- rather than having their development slowed, if not reversed, like the Czechs who had a Western living standard before World War II.

Slovaks and Bulgarians, as the two peoples who benefited most, or at least suffered least, under communism, show the most sympathy toward the Soviet Union and socialism. In many respects, they would have preferred to remain a communist/socialist state, as other indicators show. In fact, there are hints that the nationalist-separatist sentiment in Slovakia represents in part a nostalgia for its authoritarian past. We found support for state-owned farms (rather than private farms) greater among those who were most anti-Czech and pro-Slovak -- those who object to the

current power sharing arrangement (45% vs. 33%), oppose the present federation, believe the federation is unfair, and support the Slovak National Party (47%).

For Czechoslovakia, the stage is set for the two nations to separate if the economy worsens and if Slovenia and Croatia successfully point the way to independence. One of the few ties that still bind them is their approval of Havel. For he is popular even in Slovakia. More than four in 10 (42%) Slovaks approve of the way he is doing his job, which is a higher rating than Hungarian Prime Minister Antall gets for his entire country. This data indicates that if Havel should leave office, separatist sentiment would rise.

Personal Hopes And Fears, And National Concerns And Priorities

"I'm more aggressive, more exacting toward others, more demanding of myself now," says a Krakow haberdashery clerk. "I've started to fight for my just rights. I have started to look for work that could really satisfy me."

East European fears are linked overwhelmingly to economic problems, including unemployment; this is also true in West Europe where several countries -- notably France, Britain and Spain-- show greater or comparable levels of economic concern of one kind or another. We found that individuals in Eastern Europe tie their future much closer to the future of their country than do West Europeans. Those East Europeans optimistic about their country are twice as likely to be also optimistic about their own future as are

West Europeans.

Jobs are the most dominant economic concern in East Europe, although the issue rated higher in some West European nations. Frenchmen (64%) and Spaniards (60%), for example, expressed this specific worry more than twice as often as Poles (29%), Hungarians (28%) and Czechoslovaks (27%). Another surprise was that Russian and Ukrainian concerns about jobs did not register among their top 10 worries, and only 2% of Lithuanians cited this issue. Much as Lithuanians are primarily worried about independence, Russians and Ukrainians, as we shall see, are worried about major cataclysms like civil war.

Hungarians, on the other hand, are most angry about prices. More than one in three volunteer complaints about prices, inflation, and the cost of living. Prices there rose 35% in the first half of 1991, more than twice the rate of 1990 inflation, 29%. "I am constantly trembling for fear of new price rises," says a pensioner in Debrecen. "One week they raise the price of sugar, then flour, lard, meat, and so on. It's not that we are afraid; we are terrified."

Poles cited improvement of provisions and accessibility of goods as the single thing they liked most about the political and economic changes of recent years. Says Grazyna, a middle aged school librarian: "The stores are all full, a visible and physical proof that something has changed. We could all talk a lot about the ration cards we had before and standing in line day and night. So this is a fantastic result. The fact that all this costs a lot,

that's another matter. But this is a good road to follow."

Moreover, Russians (59%) and Ukrainians (51%) also favor price rises in order to get a larger selection and higher quality of goods. Clearly, they do not yet have well-stocked stores. So the Hungarian reason for keeping prices low (62%) was not immediately obvious. Perhaps Hungarians are simply more skeptical that higher prices will mean more and better goods. They have experienced more free market

concepts, for longer, than any other nation in East Europe.

In general, political concerns did not rate high when we asked about important problems facing the nation, except in Bulgaria. There, when we asked what would make them personally happy, 23% mentioned political stability. No other nation, east or west, cite this as a reason for personal happiness. Another 19% of Bulgarians express worry about destabilization of the country, and a further 12% about a prolonged crisis period. All told, over half of Bulgarians express deep political fears, reflecting their perception of a fragile state. Also unique -- no other nation mentioned it -- is the 10% of Bulgarians who cite the need to preserve and develop the state's social policy, another sign of Bulgaria's continued affinity for socialism even as it vocally embraces free markets.

The fear of war was down, as expected, throughout all of Europe in May, although surprisingly, somewhat lower in East Europe compared to the West. Before the coup attempt in Moscow, most of these nations struggled with their special specters: famine and

civil war in Russia and the Ukraine; military intervention in Lithuania; a return to its authoritarian past in Bulgaria.

But when asked which among four threats they view as the greatest to their countries, only Bulgaria cited a military attack by a neighbor as its first concern (29%). For the rest, economic issues had highest priority. Hungarians (42%) and Czechoslovaks (37%) fear a flood of refugees from the Soviet Union, which in view of recent liberalising Soviet immigration measures is probably the most realistic concern for the region even if the coup attempt has no impact on emigration.

Hungarians (23%) and Czechoslovaks (19%) also fear Soviet economic collapse, which would not only both heighten the flow of refugees but also worsen the economic condition of their industries which sold mostly to Russia and the Ukraine. Poles most feared economic domination by the West (29%).

The hopes and fears of East Europeans differ markedly from those of West Europeans and the Soviet republics when divided up among three categories: material, societal and personal. Material concerns include general economic conditions, shortages of food, and lack of financial security. Societal concerns include civil war, loss of freedom, and political crisis. Personal concerns include loss of family, poor health, and children's future.

In Western Europe, fear and worry are distributed evenly among these categories. In Eastern Europe, material concerns dominate; societal fears are second and personal concerns a distant third -- only one-third as important, on average, of material fears. In the

three Soviet republics, precedence is given to societal fears, then material fears, and lastly personal fears. Clearly, the peoples of the Soviet republics are concerned about far graver issues, including civil strife, than the more materialistic worries of Eastern Europe and the more egocentric concerns of the West. Citizens of the former West Germany are closer to citizens of the Soviet republics than to either West or East Europe in their fears.

The hopes and aspirations clustered into these three groups are somewhat different. Among "material" concerns are old age security as well as general and personal economic conditions. Societal mentions by respondents include freedom, peace and political stability. Personal mentions include family well-being, good health, children's health and happiness.

In the West, material and personal hopes are equally paramount, with societal hopes far behind. In East Europe, material hopes dominate, with personal and then societal hopes far behind. In the Soviet republics, material hopes are also first, although far below those in East Europe, and societal and personal aspirations considerably behind. In their hopes, West Germans are more like the other Western Europeans.

Finally, hopes differ strikingly by gender. Women's hopes deal primarily with personal matters in every country surveyed. On societal matters, women are more engaged than men in nine of the 12 countries surveyed -- in all five Western European nations, and in most of the Eastern countries. Only on material issues are men,

in all countries, east and west, more concerned than women.

Leadership Support

The most popular leader in Eastern Europe, and the man most important for the future of his country, is Vaclav Havel. More than two out of three people (68%) in Czechoslovakia approve his handling of the presidency despite the fact that he was a novice at politics -- a dissident playwright before the revolution -- whose grasp of foreign affairs was relatively low. His popularity tops 80% in the Czech lands, and while only 43% in Slovakia, he obviously enjoys the trust of a very significant minority of Slovaks. His strength probably reflects a greater strength than any other Czech could probably expect in the present situation. And his status casts other institutions in a favorable light. Says a 50-year-old medical lecturer: "I have confidence in Mr. Havel, and since he is ultimately responsible for the army, I put trust in the army, too."

His popularity and that of the changes reinforce each other. Of those who approve of Havel, an overwhelming majority also approves of the changes to democracy and free markets. The obverse is also true: of those approving of the changes, huge majorities approved of Havel. His popularity, even among those opposed to change, indicates that his ratings are to some extent independent of support for democracy and free markets. Among Czechs opposed to political changes, for example, 66% liked Havel; among those opposed to free markets, 39% still approved of Havel. Even in

Slovakia, one in four of those who disapprove of democracy still approve of Havel. The data also suggests that Havel's popularity increases the support of Czechoslovaks for the changes; as noted earlier, optimists who approve of Havel rate their country significantly higher (74% high and average) than those who disapprove of him (50% high and average).

Majorities disapprove of both President Lech Walesa in Poland and Prime Minister Jozef Antall in Hungary, but for quite different reasons.

Antall is less popular than his own political party, 34 and 40% respectively, and his party is less popular than any of the three main opposition parties. The FIDESZ Youth Party is far ahead in the favorability ratings with 73%; even the ex-communists, now called Socialists, get 39%, essentially equal to Antall's Democratic Forum.

Hungary appears to be suffering a profound disenchantment with the new political process as it has developed, probably due to the quagmire over long-running disputes over privatization, even though now partially settled. "I've never heard about a privatization that wasn't criticized, let it be a hotel, or Tungsran (light bulb manufacturer) or anything. They say we're trying to give away the country. No matter whether it's a slow process or fast one, it's never right. People only concentrate on the disadvantages," complains Istvan, 60, a biological research manager in Debrecen.

Poland's Walesa rates higher than Antall, at 42% favorability, but it is a far cry from his election victory margin of over 70%.

Scoring higher is Zbigniew Brzezinski, the Polish-born American academic and former presidential security advisor, with 49%. Last winter's bruising election campaign and bitter squabbles with Parliament clearly eroded Walesa's standing. The Catholic Church, with which Walesa is associated in the public mind, is in even greater trouble with Poles than Walesa (see below). Opposition to Walesa is correlated with opposition toward the Church; of those disapproving of the Church, fully half (51%) also disapproved of Walesa. In contrast, of Czechoslovaks disapproving of the church, only 24% disapproved of Havel.

Walesa is also linked to the Central Alliance, the political party which encompasses most of the Solidarity trade union movement. The Alliance's popularity stands at a mere 29%, significantly below the opposition Democratic Union (at 37%). This low Alliance rating reflects the reduced popularity of trade unions in the country as they have become political forces. "I have changed my opinion about Solidarity, which I've been a member of since its very beginning in 1981," says a Krakow worker. "I believed it to be a union of the most upright people, but now my view is that it's just another clique wanting power." "The unions are not interested in workers enough, more in politics and political contests now," adds Ryzard, 48, a teacher in Krakow.

Walesa seems highly dependent on union support; more Walesa supporters are found among those with a favorable view of unions (37%), while among those critical of unions, there is proportionately less support for Walesa (26%).

A final problem for Walesa is that he has driven away the intellectuals who, with the workers, put together the remarkably successful Solidarity movement a decade ago. He is being accused of authoritarian instincts, of being responsible for the emergence of Tyminski because of the quality of his campaign against Mazowiecki, while his champions call him the Polish de Gaulle. In short, Walesa has few of the features that make Havel popular and effective.

The huge level of Bulgarian support (69%) for Prime Minister Dimitur Popov is considered a passing phenomenon. He is a caretaker figure, a compromise non-politician chosen by the political parties after street rioting forced out the Bulgarian Socialists, formerly the communists, despite their victory in free elections in June, 1990. Attempts at coalition governments under different men failed until the non-partisan Popov was chosen as prime minister. But this impasse has meant that fundamental restructuring of the system has not yet begun in Bulgaria. In fact, because of the severe strait jacket imposed by the communist rulers, Bulgaria has never really tinkered with reform in the way of other East European states.

Views Of Change

"The changes have brought a sense of freedom, of liberation, because now we have the opportunity to use our creativity, without paralyzing restrictions," says a Calvinist theologian in Hungary. "But I worry we may fail to make use of this freedom, and that people will use it only for their own enrichment."

The peoples of Eastern Europe approve the revolutions of 1989 but dislike many of their effects on themselves or their societies. Approval of the political and economic changes of the past two years ranges from overwhelmingly positive to luke warm. Enthusiasm is generally higher for economic restructuring than for political reform in Eastern Europe. But even where changes are greeted warmly, the effects of the changes are considered overwhelmingly negative.

Most positive about the revolutions are the former East Germans, with 9 out of 10 approving the changes. Czechs and Lithuanians are also very enthusiastic, with almost 8 out of 10 positive. Poland and Bulgaria are solidly positive, with over 6 out of 10 for the changes. But the Slovaks are dubious (49% pro, 42% con), as are the Hungarians (47% to 39%). In effect, the jury is still out in Hungary and Slovakia on whether the revolution was good or bad.

In material terms, some East Europeans are elated by the changes. "Everything is in the stores. There is no waiting in line. I can buy my child a banana if I can afford it. At one time one couldn't even buy a stupid orange for a sick child in the

hospital," says a middle-aged weaver in Krakow.

But all of these nations, however supportive of change writ large, see more negative than positive effects from the revolutions.

Asked about their views on 11 measures of society's well being -- such as how hard people worked, how well they got along with each other, whether their spiritual and family values had improved -- only Lithuanians said 8 of the 11 effects were good. At the other end of the scale, Hungarians and Bulgarians found 10 of the 11 effects bad.

"Hungarian folk dances are of two types," muses a Hungarian engineer. "One is lively and cheerful, the other sad, mournful, melancholy. If we were to dance now, we'd dance the second type."

Hungarians believe the only good effect of the revolution is that people work harder now. The Bulgarians believe the single positive effect is the new way they "think about things." Virtually all of the other nations surveyed also believe that they "think about things" more positively now. "This is most important to me, to change the thinking of people, more than the economic effect, that they recognize their responsibility to society," says an institute director in Prague.

Hungarians and East Germans were negative about the "new way of thinking" however. Slovaks and East Germans felt marginally more effects were bad than good; Poles and Czechs felt marginally more effects were good than bad.

The worst effect of the changes was on law and order, and on

interpersonal and interethnic relations. All nations but one feel that law and order has suffered (Poland). All except two peoples believe people care less about each other now (Czechoslovakia and Lithuania).

"People are irritated, uncertain," says a Slovak economist in her mid-20s. "Before, when two friends met, they asked: 'how are you?' Now they ask: 'Do you still have a job?' Before we were closer to each other." All except one feel relations among people have worsened. All without exception reported that relations with other ethnic groups had deteriorated.

Political Pluralism And A Free Market Economy

"There are so many changes that one has no confidence in the new system either," complains a 19-year old student in Budapest. Democracy and free market economy do not always go together. Spain, under Franco, was largely a free market system under an authoritarian ruler; South Korea under various leaders has been that way until very recently. On the other hand, many democracies in Western Europe, such as those in Scandinavia, are so highly regulated that they are significantly less "free" than those of Japan or the United States.

All of the nations of Eastern Europe like the change to free markets more than to democracy, except Bulgaria (and Lithuania) where both are approved equally. (In contrast, Russian and Ukrainians prefer democracy more than free markets.) This preference for free markets is accompanied by overwhelming

approval of democracy, however. Of those for market economies, seven out of eight are also for political pluralism. Even those against market economies showed healthy support for democracy, ie., 30 to 60% for pluralism. In short, we found a heartening support for democracy even among those who oppose -- and probably are being harmed by -- the market changes.

The implication is that East Europeans, more sensitive to economic than political events, are likely to tolerate political disarray more than economic dislocations in their national lives. Put another way, they could become so impatient for "economic miracles" that they will blame free markets for the crime and sharp dealings that accompany any economic upheavals, let alone revolutions like those of the past two years.

But which should be pushed fastest, politics or economics? Instead of politics controlling the economy as in the past, economic considerations will now rival, if not take precedence, over politics. Yet there are disputes in each country and throughout the region about which should take priority.

A Prague woman maintains that "the economy won't be reformed by old politicians, only by new ones." And a Bulgarian lawyer argues that "most important for this country now is political stability as a condition for economic reform."

The interdependence of politics and economics is not in doubt; neither can lag much behind the other without grave consequences to both. But as in other matters, timing is most important on which takes precedence. Circumstances will decide each country's pace.

East Europeans, accustomed to statism even before the communists arrived, are strongly in favor of a social democratic form of capitalism -- margins of up to 5 to 1 for a "Garden of Sweden," as it were -- rather than the free market capitalism of the United States and Japan. Despite their overall enthusiasm for free markets, they are at least as determined to be protected from capitalists and entrepreneurs as they are anxious to attract foreign money and expertise. They want the state to retain a dominant role in industry and transportation, but even though majorities want retail outlets to be private (except Bulgaria), significant minorities want both the state and private individuals to own restaurants and shops. There is no reason in principle why state and private ownership cannot exist side by side, but the political, economic and social compromises necessary to make it work -- to permit a healthy market economy to emerge -- are daunting, particularly for nations new to democratic traditions.

Specifically, huge majorities favor state ownership of mining, heavy industry, phones, and trains and buses. Large majorities favor the state-run banks, health care, and radio and television stations. For newspapers and farms, returns are mixed. A majority of Slovaks, Hungarians and Bulgarians want newspapers state-run rather than private. Narrow majorities in all countries favor private ownership of the manufacture of consumer goods (except Bulgaria), and overwhelming majorities favor private ownership of shops (except in Bulgaria where a majority prefers

state ownership). Restaurants should be privately owned, according to majorities in all countries. But significant minorities in all countries also want state or cooperative ownership of all industries and services in our questionnaire.

East Europeans who are optimists about their personal future are much more approving of efforts to establish a free market economy than are pessimists, by as much as 20 to 1 in East Germany, as low as 3 to 1 in Hungary.

Democratic sentiment may be eroding in Poland and Hungary because of difficulties in converting to free markets. Privatization squabbles in the parliaments certainly have made the political process appear squalid and ineffective. The privatization dispute has also hampered the conversion to a market economy. All peoples say the pace of market changes is too slow, except for the Slovaks. At the same time, parliament is criticized by majorities in all East European countries except in Bulgaria. Wide-spread apathy is seen, particularly in local elections. Only in Czechoslovakia does a clear majority say it retains its interest in politics (65%).

Signs of disaffection with the political process in Hungary are particularly noteworthy. Hungarians are most critical of their parliament (47%) and among the most dissatisfied with the pace toward free markets (46% say "too slow"). So few vote in local elections -- in one recent case, only 17% -- that the election had to be held again to get the required 50% turnout to be valid. Signs of political polarization, particularly among the elite, are

strong. Of all the changes of the past two years, for example, Hungarians say they like least (after price rises) the political changes, including the multiparty system, democracy and pluralism (16%). But the opposite view gets even more support: a larger proportion says what they liked best about the changes are political freedom (18%) and the multiparty system (14%). Diametrically opposed groups appear to be responding. More significantly, both of these opposing groups are overly represented with the best educated and best paid Hungarians, i.e., the upper echelons of its society.

Bulgarians seem most innocent and appreciative of the political change. Alone among East Europeans, they give majority approval to parliament (42%). And what they liked best about the changes, they said, is their "restored civil rights" (23%). Bulgarians were arguably the most repressed nation in East Europe (although Romanians may have been as bad off) prior to the 1989 revolutions. The Turkish minority especially suffered wide-spread human rights violations. Bitterness among Bulgarian Turks remains despite the overthrow of the communists. Says a 33 year old Turkish engineer: "The only change is they don't give me a ticket any more for speaking in Turkish; that's all."

The breakdown of support for democracy and free markets by gender, age, education, and community size shows striking patterns. Men, significantly more than women, back both the change to the multi-party system and to a free market economy in all countries.

For democracy, almost twice as many men than women on average (40/26%) strongly approved the change. And many more men than women on average (35/25%) strongly approved change to a free market.

Young people under 40 years of age, the more highly educated, and city dwellers most favor the reforms. These same young, male, educated urbanites, in all eight East European states or Soviet republics, supported unlimited profits for entrepreneurs.

Institutions

"Trust in social institutions is lacking," says a Bulgarian lawyer and member of parliament, "-- in legislative, executive and legal power. And this is a common problem for the whole of Eastern Europe. It is connected with the exaggerated expectations created last year. A new social contract is needed, a new elite that will make people believe in state institutions. All the rest is in second place. Without trust in the state institutions, it is hard to hope that we will develop democracy."

Most of the social institutions in Eastern Europe get votes of confidence in most of the countries, in the form of majorities or pluralities. But they also get disturbingly large unfavorable ratings and sometimes huge number of "no opinion" for such agencies as the courts and the army. Some institutions, like the courts, were never pillars of independence in these nations. Certainly they have not been part of the democratic societies for very long.

The institution of the church has survived the communist period best. Least approval goes to the parliaments. The level of support

for trade unions is the most surprising in view of the fact that they were totally coopted by the communists -- the "transmission belt" for Party orders -- when in power and might have remained more suspect than they are.

UNIONS

"Those who win the trust of trade unions, they will win the war," claims a Bulgarian professor, "because the trade unions appear to have a more significant role in our reality, they fit the mentality of the nation much better than parliament."

The largest majorities approving trade unions are found in East Germany (68%) and Bulgaria (53%); in Slovakia, while only 42% expressed support, the ratio was 6 to 1 for the unions among those giving either approval or disapproval. Poland gives unions a slim majority (33% vs. 28%), while Czechs and Hungarians are roughly split on the organizations (Czechs - 24% vs. 24%; Hungary - 30% vs. 33%). Overall, however, unions had the lowest negatives of all the institutions in the region.

Unions, more than any other institution, deal in the nitty gritty of what matters most now in that region -- jobs and living standards -- which explains the support we found in practical terms. In some countries, like Bulgaria, the trade union movement has been visible in fighting for price restraints and welfare for unemployed. Says the secretary in an industrial firm: "If we can expect real help from somewhere, it's the trade unions." "Employees must be protected against entrepreneurs," echoes a Slovak

technician, "and the unions are the only one backing the working man."

Poland's Solidarity, when it emerged a decade ago, justified Moscow's demands that unions be kept under a tight rein throughout Eastern Europe. It was the first independent union in the Soviet bloc whose major task was to protect the rights of the workers that succeeded, despite the imposition of martial law, to change Polish history. The Polish experience undoubtedly contributed to the more sympathetic attitude in East Europe toward unions which is shown in our findings.

The region as a whole experienced rapid industrialization and urbanization during the communist period, particularly Bulgaria and Slovakia which had been the most agrarian states there. (One measure of this is that in 1939, less than 20% of Bulgarians lived in cities; in 1989, over 60% did.) Bulgarians and Slovaks, who show most support for unions, favor socialist values more than the other peoples of the region. In Bulgaria, where the intelligentsia was more leftist than in the other East European countries, the greatest union supporters are among the best educated, the middle aged and the better paid. In Slovakia, most union support came from middle aged men in big cities -- presumably peasants converted to workers after World War II. These workers are apparently a conservative force in the country now, in so far as those who approve of unions are somewhat more hostile to President Havel.

Czech antipathy toward unions, in contrast to Slovak approval (Czechs - 24%; Slovaks - 42%), reflects the high level of support

communists enjoyed among trade unionists, both in the late 1940s when the communists were voted into office, and following the Soviet military invasion in 1968. Unions were considered a brake on the 1989 revolution for some time and may today as well. Says a Prague worker: "Before November, as a joke, we said unions were the 'B' team of the Communist Party.

Now they should be protecting the people, but they don't seem to be working that way."

Hungarians, for their part, are hostile toward collective activities in society; to them, the family is the basic unit of activity and solidarity. (In a 1982 European value survey, when asked if you would sacrifice for anyone outside your family, West Europeans answered no by margins of 38% to 64%; Hungarians stood out with 85%. But asked if they preferred to spend their leisure time with family, Hungarians answered yes almost twice as often as West Europeans. Cited in Elemér Hankiss, "In Search of a Paradigm," *Daedalus*, Winter, 1990, p. 183-211.)

Polish support for unions is minimal -- at 33% vs. 28%, it is barely significant statistically -- which is surprising since the Solidarity movement was in the forefront of the successful effort to oust the communists and eventually brought Walesa to the presidency. Strikes for higher wages in recent years have cut into support for industrial unions, as has Solidarity's political activism and support for Walesa's dubious campaign to bring down the former Mazowiecki government by arguing that reforms could go faster. "Our trade unions are more political parties now, but they

play that role badly," complains a computer specialist in Krakow. "They don't know which place in society to occupy."

All East Europeans were positive about the influence of "the Church," as it was put in our survey. The phrase was used generically, and allowed to mean Roman Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, or whatever the respondent chose. In one country, Poland, where religion has been a particularly powerful political force in recent years and where the population is largely homogeneous, "the Church" clearly meant the Roman Catholic Church and the responses were remarkable.

In Poland, the Catholic Church is in trouble, even more than unions. The Church, identified with the anti-communist, independence movement, played a decisive role in the bloodless revolution of the past decade and has become the foremost power-broker in the land. Politicians vie for its support, but a backlash has developed. "Like the trade unions, the Church has found itself in a completely new situation," admits a Polish priest. "They are not doing what they ought to be doing, and they both must change." And again, more than with Solidarity, the unpopularity of the Church has hurt Walesa who is closely associated in the public mind with it. Of those disapproving of church influence, over half also disapproved of Walesa (51%).

The Church receives the lowest approval rating from Poles of any East European peoples -- 46% favorable to 39% unfavorable, a barely significant majority. Poles listed the Church's role in public life as the third worst effect of the political and economic

changes of the last few years, immediately after high prices and unemployment. In no other nation was such censure given, let alone volunteered. When asked specifically if the church plays too large or small a role in society, 70% said too large. This was more than twice the anti-church margin of any other country. (Czechoslovakia was next, with 31%.)

"The church teaches only backwardness and narrow thinking," says a woman student teacher. "Recently I attended an obligatory course in premarital education, every week. I wasted a whole month. It was completely useless. I cannot repeat a single reasonable sentence from what we were told."

This level of antagonism is all the more striking because Poland is the most religious nation of the region. The explanation appears to be that Poles saw the Church during the communist period in a vastly different role than now. With independence, Poles want the Church to leave politics and social policy-making.

Fully 67% of Poles favor abortion, which is only slightly lower than all of East Europe (80%+), including Lithuania where 75% approve of abortion. The Church, of course, adamantly opposes it. But the Church has antagonized Poles in other ways, too. It wants religious classes in schools that would de facto be compulsory, and it has sought to eliminate from the Polish constitution the clause that separates church from state.

Poland aside, the church as a social institution appears to have weathered the communist period in East Europe. It has not disintegrated under the twin pressures of ideology and corruption.

In all nations of East Europe, majorities of up to 6 to 1 (Bulgaria) approve the influence of the church on society. But there are also signs that the level of religious profession has dropped over the past 40 years; at least, it is now lower than in Western Europe, as we will discuss later. Suffice to state here that East Europeans apparently want the church to remain in the background. Everywhere in the region except in Poland, majorities say the Church plays just about the right role now in the country's political life -- which is relatively small.

Bulgaria, where the Orthodox church is dominant, is different. "The authorities in this institution (the church) in our country are nomenklatura as well," observes a Sofia sociologist. "It's a pity."

In attitudes toward capitalism, which constitutes another of the institutions scrutinized, East Europeans are hungry for but wary of foreign investment. And they are critical of state-run institutions although, as noted earlier, they want a strong state-run sector as a hedge against private entrepreneurs.

At the extremes, Hungarians are by far the most enthusiastic for private businesses and businessmen, big and small. People who run their own firms are favored by a 6 to 1 margin. Slovaks and East Germans are most dubious. Hungarians are also most positive toward investors from other countries (65%), with Slovaks least positive (27%). Hungarians most favor large private companies (61%), Slovaks least (30%).

We found considerable misunderstanding of foreign investment in

our discussions in Eastern Europe. A Polish pensioner complains that foreign purchases of land could mean "Poland might fall into foreign hands."

"That reminds me that Poles are like the dog which can't eat the bone but won't let anyone else eat it either," responds a computer expert in Krakow. "We have nothing here, no technology, no normally functioning economic life, but we fear foreigners. What do we fear they'd deprive us of? Our debts?" Poles are not the most hostile people to foreign investors. But of four foreign threats, Poles most fear economic domination by the west -- more than a Soviet military invasion, Soviet economic collapse, or a flood of refugees. The potential for unscrupulous politicians to exploit Polish bigotry -- and Walesa made a thinly-veiled anti-semitic appeal during the presidential elections, for which he later apologized -- could well dim the attraction of doing business with Poland.

"No one will be investing in a country which is practically a volcano, and no one knows when this volcano might erupt," complains a Bialystok lawyer.

The parliaments of East Europe fared worst among social institutions, as noted earlier. Only the Bulgarian legislature got modest approval (42%), while elsewhere, disapproval ran as high as 5 to 1 in Slovakia.

"They have bandages over their eyes, solving problems in the dark, without a program, a definite goal," complains a university librarian in Debrecen. "It's like a circus."

East Europeans obviously are disappointed with the bickering and partisan squabbling that these national parliaments have often exhibited. They complain about the theatrical quality of some legislative sessions when they are televised, and about the time spent on peripheral issues, such as national symbols: whether the Polish eagle should again wear a crown, and whether the Hungarian emblem should be topped by the crown of St. Stephen. But the difficulties in writing new constitutions as well as laws to govern the first truly civil society for most of these nations is a difficult, laborious process that requires more understanding and patience than most of these peoples seem prepared to give.

Television and newspapers are given strong votes of support for providing information, at least during the revolution. Now they are far less appreciated. In every country are heard such critical words as dislike and distrust, disturbingly nasty, sensationalism, partisan, unaware of their responsibility, and calls to punish journalists for untrue information. The sentiment for state ownership of media is disturbing, for it raises doubts as to whether East Europeans really understand and distinguish between a "free press" which may be irresponsible and a "fair press" in which a censor decides what is "fair" (Newspapers - 22% of Czechoslovaks favor state ownership, 30% of Hungarians, 19% of Poles and 38% of Bulgarians. Radio and TV - 40% of Czechoslovaks favor state ownership, 47% of Hungarians, 35% of Poles and 55% of Bulgarians).

The inclination toward censorship is significant, with

majorities favoring banning some books and political parties if offensive to them (Over 50% in all the East European nations surveyed favor banning of books with dangerous ideas with as many as 71% in Hungary; 57% of Hungarians also favor outlawing some political parties compared to 34% in Poland, 36% in Bulgaria and 39% in Czechoslovakia). A mixed state and private ownership system is preferred in most nations. But such an arrangement is difficult to balance even in very well established democracies (such as Britain). It would be particularly so in Eastern Europe as the media seek to change their economic base from reliance on state subsidies to earning revenues based on advertisements, circulation and viewer ratings.

Local authorities who collect garbage and fill potholes get approval in Hungary (46%) and Czechoslovakia (36%), but marginally negative notices in Bulgaria (38% disapprove) and Poland (39%). Majorities in all countries claim they continue to be concerned about news of local events but as mentioned earlier stet; majorities also admit they are losing interest in politics (except in Czechoslovakia where 65% disagree). Local government is usually first to suffer such apathy.

Police get positive ratings overall -- very positive in Poland, by almost five to two -- 50% vs. 20% -- with Czechs making the only negative judgment (23% positive vs. 33% negative). The publics are torn between conflicting fears -- of crime and domestic spying. Says a Prague student: "I'm still afraid of the secret police; I still get an unpleasant feeling, I don't know why..." And a woman

doctor adds "Yes, I trust normal, ordinary police. They are very important to insure public order." Rising crime, in some countries up 50% in the first half of 1991, makes police protection far more important than previously, and probably is taking precedence now over memories of ordinary police being used by secret police for surveillance and other political jobs.

The armies of these countries were all given positive assessments. The military is especially highly regarded in Poland (60%) and Bulgaria (66%) where the populations are most apprehensive about foreign threats.

In Poland, where militarism and nationalism runs strong (as we shall see in Section C), the army figures particularly highly in that nation's romantic image of itself as the defender of Western Christianity against Tatar and Turk, and more recently as its ultimate guardian against the Russians (60% approve, 6% disapprove). Rightly or wrongly, it was always expected to refuse communist orders, if ever issued, to fire on Polish citizens. Now, whether warranted or not, trust in it remains strong; "You can always rely on the army." an older Polish woman says simply.

Courts were also judged more positively than negatively, but the margins were often small with a large number of "don't know" registered. Courts in Eastern Europe never had power and influence approaching the judiciary in the West, particularly in the United States. Under the communist regimes as well as in pre-war days, courts largely did the bidding of the rulers in political matters, including meting out punishment to dissidents. In civil and

criminal actions that did not impinge on ideology, the courts were viewed as fair if not wise, and law as a profession has been experiencing new respect in some countries such as Hungary as communist rule eased.

"It is safer to subject oneself to justice now than it was before," a Polish priest says. But a Polish entrepreneur, warns: "In Poland, the judicial branch (of government) has never been fully independent, and it still is not strong enough to be independent. As long as such a situation exists, and our law is not strict, there is a danger that certain special regulations might be declared to bypass the law by someone in power, such as Lech Walesa."

Internal Conflicts And Instabilities

Most dangerous of the internal conflicts and instabilities of the region will be the ethnic and nationality disputes within borders, as in Yugoslavia today, as well as those that could easily spill across frontiers.

Standing out in this respect is Czechoslovakia, which (as related earlier) is even more two nations today than before the "velvet revolution." Slovaks by two to one are angry at how power is shared with the Czechs, and by four to one believe the new Federal relationship is unfair. As its economic difficulties grow, Slovakia could become a separate state in Eastern Europe, perhaps with Russian or Ukrainian protection. Few expect such adventurous behavior from the former Soviet Union in the near future. But small

concessions such as favorable terms for purchasing oil could go far toward persuading Slovaks, who are already more sympathetic to socialism than most others in the region, that such independence would be preferable to continued federation with the Czechs.

The level of ethnic nationalism and hostility we found within all countries is disturbingly high. They reinforce arguments that the international community, which has shown itself largely impotent to stop the violence in Yugoslavia, should take steps to prevent new conflicts. One way would be to intensify pressure on the new democracies of the region to build strong civil and human rights guarantees in the constitutions and monitor their implementation. Majorities which do not respect minority rights seem certain to suffer violent outbursts.

Self-determination is already a well-established principle in international affairs to which large, already defined ethnic entities can appeal. But smaller and more diffuse groups, most of which will never reach the size or influence necessary to create a separate nation, need to be guaranteed greater cultural, social and perhaps political autonomy by the majorities in East European countries.

Some ethnic and religious groups which are too small to be a threat to the majority are nonetheless the targets of resurrected animosities of Eastern Europe. Over history, they have been used as scapegoats. Gypsies are one. All nations surveyed are overwhelmingly hostile to these largely nomadic peoples (Bulgaria - 71%, Czechoslovakia - 72%, Hungary - 79%; GDR - 57%). Another

are Jews, and although the hostility is much lower, the world's sensibilities to anti-semitism is far greater because of the Holocaust by Nazi Germany (Bulgaria - 9%; Czechoslovakia - 20%, Hungary - 12%, GDR - 12%, Poland - 34%).

Poles and Slovaks are considerably more anti-semitic than the other nations of the region. One in three say they don't like Jews, with unusually large percentages of "don't know" (Poland - 26%, Slovaks - 24%). "The contemporary "Jewish Question" is how the Poles and Slovaks can be anti-semitic without Jews. "We are such terrible racists!," a middle-aged Polish librarian explodes. "We cannot say that anti-semitism doesn't exist here." "No," an industrial nurse sadly replies, "because it does."

About 10,000 Jews still live in Poland, among some 30 million Poles, which is about three-hundredths of one percent. The percentage cannot be much greater in Slovakia where a puppet regime also helped Nazis kill Jews during World War II. Arguments have been made, most recently by Adam Michnik, a former dissident and distinguished newspaper editor who is a Polish Jew living in Warsaw, to view anti-semitism as a manifestation of anti-democratic sentiment. Our results do not support this theory. Poles are not more or less in favor of democracy than other peoples, and we found no statistically significant correlation between anti-semitism and opposition specifically to free markets (ie., those who may be pained by the economic changes and turn on Jews) or with opposition specifically to democracy. However, among those opposed to "change" in its broadest context -- to both political and economic changes

-- our data find somewhat more people unfavorable to Jews (Czechs - 29%, Slovaks - 41%, Poles - 44%, Hungarians - 14%).

The conclusion is that malcontents, including those often lowest in education and social place, are most anti-semitic.

Anti-semitism correlates with opposition to change in eight of the nine peoples (including Czechs and Slovaks, but not Bulgarians) of Eastern Europe. In the overall survey, anti-semites were predominant among the poorest educated in most nations, including in France; the exceptions were Russia and the Ukraine where those with average education were most hostile to Jews (Russia - 35%, the Ukraine - 30%). Not only older people (60 and above) were unfavorable to Jews. In Poland, anti-semitism was found in all age groups, with the young (under 25) almost as hostile as the very old (Polish youth - 39%; 60+ - 41%). In Russia and the Ukraine, the young (under 25) were more anti-semitic than the old (Russian youth vs. 60+ - 31% vs. 23%; the Ukraine - 29% vs. 14%) In Slovakia, the middle-aged, from 25 to 59, were the most hostile to Jews (age 25-39 - 34%; age 40-59 - 36%).

Anti-semitism also goes with those professing strong religious beliefs in most European countries, we found. This relationship will be described in the subsequent section on religion.

Hostility toward gypsies, on the other hand, shows no correlation with religious profession. In East Europe, dislike runs as high as 18 to 1 against gypsies among those Czechoslovaks who answered positively to the religious questions; in Hungary, it was 5 to 1 against gypsies. In Spain, gypsies fared best in our survey,

with equal numbers favorable and unfavorable.

The virulent hatred of gypsies in East Europe follows no other defined pattern, either. It is just as strong among supporters and opponents of recent changes. In some countries, like Hungary, anti-gypsy sentiment was stronger among supporters of change (84% vs. 77%) and among those with higher (82%) and average (80%) levels of education.

Bigotry by age was also unsystematic. Slovak youths under 25 were 100% hostile toward gypsies, whereas in Czech lands, the prejudice was concentrated among the 60 year olds and older (96%). [In Poland, where a near-pogrom against gypsies occurred in July, the attitude toward gypsies was not asked in our survey.]

"People automatically consider a gypsy a criminal," admits a well-educated manager in Prague. Skinheads go out on weekends intending to kill gypsies, he adds.

"We, the whites, are very angry at gypsies," says a Slovak driver. "They are given flats (apartments) and I heard that they sold things out of them, or had open fires right inside the flats. I won't give them a job. I hate them."

Individuals And Society

As they rush into the future with baggage from the past, East European society and its members today are fragmented and disoriented, even demoralized, by the changes of the past two years. The "social contract" that existed between the Communist rulers and the people has disintegrated, with no new one in place.

"There are so many changes that one has no confidence in the new system either," says a Budapest university student; "I hear speeches in parliament, prices are going up, but the state is incapable of presenting a comprehensive program."

Totalitarian structures have collapsed much faster than totalitarian consciousness. The peoples lag in learning new meanings of old words like private property, profits, and even democracy. They are all pleased to be rid of their previous communist regimes, yet they remain attached to key features of communist societies and "socialist" values. Cut loose from their Marxist moorings, social tensions are rising swiftly as they seek a place in their new democratic worlds.

But these societies were not blank pages in history before the communist takeovers. They were not strangers to despotic rule, and in fact, obedience in quasi-feudal relationships was encouraged by state and church before World War II. Authoritarian behavior by individuals in Eastern Europe was accepted and even desirable in the region. (Ivan Volgyes, "Politics in Eastern Europe," p118).

These societies also reflected the attitudes of the dominant religions and the cultures they fostered. Roman Catholics put a higher premium on obedience, for example, than Protestants who permit greater individualism. Western Christianity, for its part, permits more challenges to political authorities than Orthodox churches like those in Bulgaria (and Russia). Orthodox lands never experienced the Renaissance, Reformation and Enlightenment and as a result, they have sufficiently different values,

particularly in relationship to the state. A map of the region separating Western and Eastern Christianity would divide Eastern Europe roughly north from south. Such a line separates the Baltic States from Russia, splits the Ukraine, passes along Hungary's southern border, and separates Croatia from Serbia before reaching the Adriatic Sea.

"Left value systems are present in the mentality of our people," says a Bulgarian sociologist. "In Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Slovenia, the complex of ideas and values which we call socialist or communist, left values, had very serious opponents, in liberal and Christian values which in our country were never as explicitly present."

Had the communists never come, the larger effects of industrialization, urbanization and secularization on Eastern Europe after World War II would probably have moved these nations toward political pluralism. What happened instead was that onto the hierarchial foundations of largely agrarian societies of the region, the communists attempted to build a "new communist individual" living in a "new communist society." Socialist values were implanted through the many socializing tools (media, unions) at their disposal. Certain values were emphasized more in some countries than others.

"Socialist patriotism," for example, converged with traditional state and ethnic nationalism, which explains in part why it has resurfaced with such strength and virulence throughout the region. Anti-imperialism never caught on, as seen by the highly favorable

ratings the United States (as high as 77% in Poland) and Germany (as high as 78% in Hungary) receive in the region. In political life, the communists reinforced the earlier reluctance of East Europeans to take part in politics except in limited and sanctioned circumstances. But the turnout at the first free elections, at least, indicated that the people were anxious to express themselves after centuries of being ignored.

On the other hand, communist attitudes toward religion may have left their mark on these societies. The level of support for abortion suggests that pre-war attitudes toward church teachings and societal pressure in Eastern Europe have changed more than the world-wide trend toward secularization would explain (Bulgaria - 73%, Czechoslovakia - 80%, Hungary - 81%, Poland - 67%). The relatively lower level of religious profession in East Europe, compared to Western Europe, is another indicator of this effect.

Contemporary Western values such as consumerism and privatism (which conflict to some degree with the puritan ethic, of course) have gained a great deal of acceptance, beginning in the 1970s when communist rule began to ease. But it's not certain that these new features in East European societies are capable of sufficiently motivating and regulating a dynamic economic renewal.

In sum, East Europeans manifest an intriguing mixture of individual and societal values today. Some originate in distant identities, others from their recent socialist past, and still others reflect what they hope or fear will be the features of their new world. Precisely what these new values may be is not known, of

course. But there is no doubt that these values are being scrutinized by these peoples now. Our survey found that one of the greatest impacts of the political and economic changes on these peoples is how they "think about things" (Bulgaria - 49%, Czechoslovakia - 51%, Hungary - 38%, Poland - 43%).

"The change of the system means spiritual renaissance," says a Bulgarian ex-communist.

Family And State

Nothing will change until we do away with the Homo Sovieticus that lives in each one of us," says Jerzy, a Polish lawyer in Bialystok. East Europeans expect the state to do much more for them than West Europeans, who in turn expect more from their states than Americans. Most East Europeans would prefer the state to ensure that nobody in society is in need, rather than allow everyone to be free to pursue life's goals without interference; (Bulgaria - 60 % vs. 31 %; Czechoslovakia - 40% vs. 49%; Hungary - 64% vs. 28%; Poland - 73% vs. 23%) except the Czechs, who preferred freedom. All overwhelmingly expect society via the state to do what's necessary to ensure equal opportunity for all citizens, to take care of the poor, and to guarantee every citizen food and shelter. The West has these same sentiments.

Yet East Europeans are more cynical about the effectiveness and purpose of state activities. A majority in every East European nation believes that any state-run enterprise is usually inefficient. They have differing views about whether the state

controls too much or too little of their lives, and whether the state is run for the benefit of the people. Most Poles feel the state controls too little (64%), while most Hungarians believe it controls too much (57%). Most Czechoslovaks and Bulgarians agree the state benefits the people (65% and 53% respectively); Hungarians (56%) and Poles (55%), Russians (66%) and Ukrainians (72%), do not.

Majorities of 90% in all of East Europe and the Soviet republics say they retain "traditional values about family and marriage," but most feel family values have suffered from the changes. Remarkably, most East Europeans (unlike West Europeans) want marriages where the husband works and the wife stays home, except in Bulgaria where a majority (54%) opts for modern marriages. The explanation is that the people in these states now want the opposite of what was encouraged of them by the former rules. In most of Eastern Europe, the communists wanted both husband and wife to work; so now in reaction, these peoples want the wife to stay home. In Bulgaria, the rulers strongly encouraged traditional marriages, so now, Bulgarians prefer women to work (54%).

Even Bulgarian Turkish women who live in villages want to work if they have a higher education. "I would never give up my occupation," says a middle-aged woman physician. "I will never stay at home if I start working in my specialty," insists a young unemployed woman electronic technician. "I cannot imagine spending my whole life at home," declares a woman medical student; "a part-

time job at least, but I would prefer to work."

Asked what occupation they would like for their children, a significant number in all East European societies mention physician -- highest in Poland (22%), and in Spain (21%), -- among the top 10 vocations volunteered in each country. A surprising number of middle Europeans -- East Germans, Czechoslovaks and Hungarians -- mention skilled workman (by 28%, 20%, and 15%, respectively), which suggests that pre-World War II values still survive to a considerable degree.

Virtually no one, east or west, want their children to be farmers except in Bulgaria and the Soviet republics -- and even there, it was not many (in Bulgaria, 6%; Ukrainians were highest with 8%, Russians lowest with 4%). Only in Poland and Lithuania did parents want priests in the family (5% and 3%, respectively). Only in Hungary did parents cite computer programming as a job they would like for their children, and only in Hungary did parents say they wanted "anything the child wants to be."

Education

A goodly portion of East Europeans are snobs, but they are not alone in this. One out of four Poles and Hungarians believe they do not have much in common with their less educated fellows, which is about the same level as in the United States. The rest of East Europe and the Soviet republics deny such elitism, perhaps reflecting the decades of communist rule when workers were lauded over, and paid more than, professionals.

Religious education was not specifically mentioned in our survey, but comments in our interviews indicate it will increasingly become a political issue. The churches in countries such as Hungary are aching to reclaim secular schools that were confiscated by the previous communist regimes, and the Catholic Church in Poland has pushed for religious observances in schools.

"The situation at my son's school is that the headmaster has to obey the priest who teaches there," complains a Krakow secretary; "to me it was a great scandal last year when the minister of education said she had to introduce religion into schools; what does she mean she had to? She could have resigned."

Environment

All East Europeans, and West Europeans, and Americans, are overwhelmingly sure (90% and above) the world should have stricter laws to protect the environment. But asked if they are willing to pay higher taxes to carry out such laws, the approval rate drops to about 60% on average. There is clearly a green vote in East Europe, although how successful green legislators will be in taking practical steps to clean up the region is uncertain.

Some fear is also expressed that western investors will take a callous attitude toward the environments of these nations. But the ecological consciousness of East Europeans is suffused with the Chernobyl nuclear power plant disaster. "If what we read about the Kouzluduy nuclear power plant (i.e., its dangerous condition), the ecological problem may turn out to be the most urgent one facing

the country," says a Bulgarian economist.

Religion

Poles and Slovaks are the most religious as well as the most Catholic peoples in East Europe. Strong belief among Poles is spread across all ages: 3 out of 4 Poles under 25 years of age never doubted God's existence as did 92% who are 60 or over. Bulgarians, who are mainly Orthodox, are third highest in religious beliefs, with Hungarians and Czechoslovaks least religious (Bulgarinas - 50% never doubt God's existence; Hungary - 49%; Czechoslovakia - 45%). Both of these nations are the most pluralistic in East Europe, with larger numbers of Protestants and other religions in their populations.

East Germans are the most atheistic of all, with only 8% of young people under 25, and 50% of those 60 or over, saying they never doubted God's existence. But predictions by Marxists at how fast the "opium of the people" would wither have clearly been wrong in East Germany. (By 2000, the number of believers was supposed to be down to 10% of the population, according to 'Der Spiegel'. We find 27% of East Germans, overall, who do not doubt He exists.)

In the other nations, pluralities deny that prayer is important. Some peoples, like the Czechs and Russians, register majorities that doubt God's existence. Hungarians are evenly split on God's existence, but this masks a striking gender difference most pronounced among Hungarians: 55% of men doubt, but only 41% of women doubt. Over 60% of Hungarians under 40 years of age also

doubt. Finally, doubters are more numerous among opposition parties (60%) than among the governing party (30%), which indicates that political parties there have begun to divide along West European lines of Christian democrats and social democrats.

Despite the strong religious professions of the Poles and Slovaks, those two peoples are also most critical of the church (as mentioned earlier). Fully 70% of the Poles and 50% of Slovaks believe the church plays too great a role in the political life of the country. (Russians and Ukrainians believe the role is too small.) The more pluralistic countries are less critical of the church, probably because the churches there are weaker.

It is striking that the most religious people in this region are most hostile to Jews. This is particularly true in Poland and Slovakia. Poles who have a very unfavorable view of Jews say, by margins of 9 to 1, that prayer is an important part of their daily life, that God plays an important role in their lives, and that they never doubted God's existence. With Slovaks, the correlation of anti-semitism and religion is somewhat less gross; those who don't like Jews say, 7 to 1, that they never doubt God's existence. Another correlation is that among Poles who say God's role is important and that His existence is never doubted, fully 1 out of 2 express dislike of Jews; among Slovaks, the prejudice was only a little less blatant.

Lithuania and Hungary, in contrast, showed the least correlation between religious profession and anti-semitism. Lithuania is nearly as Catholic as Poland but considerably less

religious, by our measures, than Poland and Slovakia. Of those for whom God's role was important and never doubted, fewer than 1 in 7 Lithuanians showed hostility to Jews; the figure was about 1 in 6 for Hungarians. The level was slightly greater in France (i.e., about 1 in 5) and rose to about 1 out of 3 in West Germany and Russia.

Women

"An intelligent woman is the enemy of men," says a Slovak pediatrician; "Societies are men's on principle," echoes a Bulgarian journalist.

Women have a worse life than men, according to majorities in East Europe, the Soviet republics and Western Europe. But the farther east, the worse it gets for them. Another way to put the results: women live best in the west, not as well in East Europe, and far less well in the Soviet Union. In Western Europe, about 4 in 10 say men have the better lives; in East Europe it is 5 in 10; and in the Soviet Union, almost 7 in 10. Similarly, East Europeans say women have fewer rights than men, except in Hungary where fully 37% maintain that women have more rights than men.

Gender differences are surprisingly large on several questions. As noted earlier women are significantly less enthusiastic for the changes than men. On hopes and fears, women aspirations focus overwhelmingly on personal matters and slightly less on societal issues. In every country in East Europe and in the Soviet republics, women are losing interest in politics faster than men.

This is most striking in Russia, where 60% of women say they are less politically motivated now, compared to 44% of the men, but it extends throughout the region. This may reflect the scarcity of women candidates in last year's elections; one study found that in Moscow, whereas one in three candidates were women when the communists ruled, one in six were candidates in the first free elections. The same may be true of recent democratic elections in the other nations. On another issue, on whether the state should provide food and shelter for the poor, considerably more women than men in the region said yes. But in all nations except East Germany, significantly more men than women complained that the state controls too much of their lives. And the men in all nations without exception felt stronger that the political and economic changes had a good influence on how they think about things.

WORK

"I'm more aggressive, more exacting toward others, more demanding of myself. I've started to fight for my just rights," says a Krakow woman haberdasher. "I have started to look for work that could really satisfy me."

In Prague, a lab technician puts it this way: "I like most the idea that if I wanted to start a business, I could do so, that it depends only on myself. I don't have to become part of a big factory, a small cog."

Slim pluralities in East Europe say people, some presumably fearing unemployment, now work harder than they did before the

changes, except in Bulgaria where they feel the changes had a bad effect on work (77%). All of these peoples show that the enterprising spirit has not been killed. Overwhelmingly, by margins of at least 2 to 1, these people prefer to be paid on an incentive basis, allowing them to earn more or less, depending on how hard they work, rather than on a fixed salary basis. In the west, the preference is reversed, with the same overwhelming majority preferring safe, fixed salaries.

But in interview comments to us, the people complain that those who get rich will be suspected of working "in the shadows," as a Bulgarian lawyer puts it; and that the present elite are beholden to the former leadership in a "you-scratch-my-back" exchange of favors. And there is bitterness toward incompetent management and corrupt city officials still in power.

Says a doctor in Slovakia: "in our teaching hospital, two of the three top positions are held by very, very heavy alcoholics, absolutely incompetent. I am terrified at the thought of the chief physician looking at one of my patients. Conditions like this can't exist even in Bangladesh. Why are they still in charge? Because the Mafia (network of old boys) is so powerful, even nowadays."

People are more dissatisfied with the organization they work for than with the kind of work they did, and those unhappy with their place of work are, perhaps surprisingly, more likely to want to be paid on an incentive basis rather than by fixed salary. Job satisfaction falls off rapidly going west to east. From 93% in the United States, it drops to the 80 percentiles in Germany,

Czechoslovakia and Hungary, the 70s for Poland and Bulgaria, and the 60s or lower in Russia and the Ukraine. Satisfaction with employers is at a lower level throughout, from 84% in the United States to 58% in the Ukraine.

Emigration

Dissatisfaction with jobs correlates with desire to emigrate. The younger and best educated are more anxious to emigrate, which if realized would have an adverse affect on economic recovery in these nations. Emigration is not only a future problem. Estimates are more than 1.5 million persons have left their countries in Eastern Europe over the past two years, an emigration that constitutes a continental drift of individuals. In Bulgaria, over 400,000 have departed, "greater than the number of all men killed in all the wars Bulgaria has ever had," says a Sofia economist. Half were Turks, most of whom worked in agriculture, but the rest were skilled persons "connected with the intelligentsia" and will seriously impede national recovery unless they can be persuaded to return, the economist adds.

Personal Morality

Whether the communists have robbed East Europeans of confidence in themselves is not certain. East Europeans believe in themselves enough to choose incentive pay rather than fixed salaries. But all are depressingly self-doubters about how much they control their fate. Significantly more East than West Europeans believe hard work

offers little guarantee of success (Bulgaria - 47%, Czechoslovakia - 50%, Hungary - 81%, Poland - 63%, GDR - 57%, UK - 52%, France - 50%, Spain - 42%, Italy - 44%, FGR - 57%) and that success in life is determined by forces beyond our control. (Bulgaria - 73%, Czechoslovakia - 55%, Hungary - 67%, Poland - 66%, GDR - 52%, UK - 51%, France - 57%, Spain - 56%, Italy - 54%, FRG - 61%) And huge majorities, often well into the 90 percentiles, believe the rich get richer, the poor get poorer, which is significantly higher than the West European majorities on this question.

East Europeans, however, admire people who get rich by working hard. Hungarians are the most cynical on these matters; more than one in four say, perversely, that they do not admire people who get rich by working hard. But to a marked degree, Hungarians also appear more liberated, even exhilarated by the changes of recent years; 66% of the better educated favor both the political and economic revolutions in their lives.

The Czechs also stand out, and not only in comparison to the Slovaks, although that relationship helps make the point. Czechs, to a marked degree, are already part of Western Europe; Slovaks remain one of the most distant parts of East Europe. Slovaks are less politically mature, more alienated from democratic processes, feeling far more victimized by the revolution, more fearful of capitalism and foreigners, more prejudiced.

East Europeans are also less tolerant of deviant behavior and politics than the west. All nations registered majorities saying they would bar homosexuals from teaching in schools; the same

majorities in the west would permit such teachers. All East European states would bar free speech to fascists by two to one margins; Western Europe (except for West Germany) and the United States would not limit free speech.

East Europeans are more in line with western attitudes about "dangerous" books and nudity. All nations in the region would ban books containing "ideas dangerous to society" from public libraries; so would all western publics, including the United States. And East Europeans agree that nude magazines and sexually explicit movies are harmless, including the Catholic Poles but excluding the prudish Russians (51% against). The American and Italian publics also don't consider such entertainment to be harmless. Finally, East Europeans do not consider AIDS to be God's punishment (nor does any Western nation in the survey), although Lithuanians and Ukrainians think it might be.

Overall, East Europeans take more seriously the modern world's extremists -- perhaps because they've had less exposure to them, perhaps because they have suffered more at the hands of extremists. But Poland among them was most moralistic in believing there are clear lines about what's good and evil in the world. Czechoslovaks, East Germans and Hungarians are least sure that absolutes exist.

Militarism, Patriotism And Nationalism

All East Europeans are patriotic, although at levels below the American high of 88%. Most would again impose restrictions on entry into their countries, except for the Bulgarians (as well as

Russians and Ukrainians). All believe that parts of neighboring territory belong to them, except for those peoples whose nations include large parts of their neighbors. Slovaks, for example, are evenly split on the question and have a very large Hungarian minority. Russia and the Ukraine are content with their borders, which include large minorities annexed after World War II. Poles believe peace comes through strength; in this they are unlike the other East Europeans but like Americans. Poles and Bulgarians (like Americans and Britons) believe they should fight for their country, "right or wrong."

Poles dislike all other peoples by the largest amounts among any country. They are the only nation in the survey, east or west, in which 3 out of 4 persons said they had little in common with people from other ethnic groups or races. In all other countries, majorities rejected this premise, often by huge margins. In Poland's eastern region, anti-semitism was significantly higher than in the nation as a whole (one in 2 were hostile to Jews, vs. one in three nationally), but the Poles there dislike Ukrainians (47%) as much as Jews, and hostility to Lithuanians (22%) and Byelorussians (15%) is also at significant levels (at least one in 4 were unfavorable). Only distaste for Germans (53%) was higher in this most xenophobic region where Poles allude to Vilnius and Lvov as Polish cities.

These results indicate a high degree of militarism in some states, particularly Poland, whose people are xenophobic as well as nationalistic. This is a concern to well-educated Poles.

"Nationalism can be very dangerous to our future," says a Polish businessman. "Here nationalism means a romantic, mystical way of thinking about Poland. It shows a non-European way of thinking."

Militarism also runs high in Bulgaria, which approves of its army even more than Poland. Slovakia is nationalistic, with the two political parties using the Slovak nation's name to attract majority (69% and 55%) support. The separatist movement there, while perhaps masking Slovak yearning for the old command communist system, is a major force in the country.

The belief that national lands lie in neighboring countries is most widespread in Hungary (68%). The present government insists it does not seek recovery of these lands and their ethnic Hungarian peoples, but few in the volatile Balkans would bet on what tomorrow might bring as refugees threaten to stream across borders.

NEW DIRECTIONS AND THE COMMUNIST LEGACY

POLITICAL

The greatest hope for the region is the budding political pluralism, even more than efforts to create a free market. Democracies seldom if ever have been first to attack another country, and if they become well established in Eastern Europe, the dangers posed by militarism and nationalism, and by the barely hidden desire to recover former lands, should be mitigated.

These new democracies, while still fragile, shows healthy signs through much of the region. Populations are impatient for results and growing skeptical of the political process, but large

majorities say they support politicians who are willing to compromise. Huge majorities say they want to keep up with national affairs, and most even want to keep current with local affairs. Most would allow even fascist parties in their democracies, and all by large majorities would oppose greater constraints (like censorship) on newspapers. Finally, majorities or large pluralities in all countries would vote in parliamentary elections if held next week. All are losing interest in politics, but East Europeans retain greater interest in politics than their Western cousins.

East Europeans are more skeptical of the democracy they have newly embraced than are Westerners. More than in the west, they complain that people like themselves have no say in what the government does (Bulgaria - 89%, Czechoslovakia - 76%, Hungary - 85%, Poland - 88%). But they are not much different than the West in the levels of dissatisfactions with politicians, i.e., elected officials quickly lose touch with them (Bulgaria - 77%, Czechoslovakia - 85%, Hungary - 82%, Poland - 88%) and don't care what people like them think (Bulgaria - 21%, Czechoslovakia - 30%, Hungary - 32%, Poland - 23%). But, much as in the west, they largely believe voting gives them some say in how the government runs things, although this generality masks major differences between peoples in the region. Czechs, Hungarians and Bulgarians believe voting gives them a say, Poles adamantly do not, and Slovaks are on the fence.

Majorities in Poland and Bulgaria say their fellow citizens are mostly trustworthy although Czechs and Slovaks were not so sure,

and Hungarians strongly disagreed (2 to 1). Distrust is not a social characteristic consistent with democracy, political scientists say, but in this indicator, the French, Spaniards and Italians are distrustful like the Hungarians. In fact, Hungary is probably the farthest advanced toward democracy, with fairly well defined political parties that were first to stand in free elections (compared to Czechoslovakia where political parties are just forming and Poland where the first parliamentary elections are set for this fall, and Bulgaria where, after the first elections were won by former communists, the results were overturned by popular outcry). This tempts the conclusion that trustworthiness is a value that divides Europe's north from south, more than west from east. Moreover, we found no correlation between trustworthiness and attitudes toward political or economic changes; those believing their compatriots were trustworthy did not support democracy or free markets any more or less than the skeptics.

Nonetheless, the minority problems in all of these nations require caution in predicting that democracy will survive. Until majorities set insure rights to minorities, the danger of clashes and the potential for authoritarian rule will remain high. "If we don't sort out this problem of minority rights," says a Polish professor, "we will be making our way forward to Europe with a xenophobic ball and chain dragging us back."

Authoritarianism

"Totalitarianism can always be a threat, but especially in a

time of transition, as now," says a priest, adding "Liberty for us has always been the forbidden fruit. The paradox of freedom is that once it is achieved, it's a great burden, which everybody would like to shed. One of the forms of escape from liberty is to long for what we had before, authoritarianism."

The pre-communist disposition toward authoritarianism among the northern three states of East Europe -- Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary -- has already appeared in Tyminski's challenge to Walesa in the final round of presidential elections. He is the shadow on Poland's successful fight for independence. With dubious credentials, the unknown Tyminski received about one-quarter of the vote after a campaign which had earmarks of early stages of fascist movements. Some authorities fear that this will be the direction that social frustration in the region will turn if economic recovery is not achieved soon.

"There exists in our country a clientele for totalitarianism; the case of Tyminski was proof of this," says a historian in Krakow.

Longing for authoritarianism appeared in the willingness of majorities in almost every East European country to circumscribe their freedoms for material guarantees. Asked whether everyone should be free to pursue life's goal without state interference, or whether the state should play an active role in society to guarantee that no one is in need, only among Czech people is the preference for freedom. The others are willing to have their rights impinged upon. Moreover, huge majorities in all nations are willing

to ban fascist political parties, and all are also prepared to ban dangerous books.

While East Europeans are not very much different from westerners in book banning, the absence of checks and balances in their new democracies, particularly in established and respected judiciary systems to insure civil rights, makes this finding also disturbing.

Finally, the preoccupation with symbols of previous imperial reigns in Poland and Hungary, as well as the open support for the former king (tsar) of Bulgaria to return, suggests a sympathy for authoritarianism also. "I see Bulgaria as a monarchy," says a Sofia drama specialist; "the chaos will bring us to a situation where we will need the tsar to guarantee our boundaries."

HISTORY SHAPES THE FUTURE; LOOKING WEST

Germany And The US

"In which time do we live?" asks the East European satirist. "If we constantly look into the past, will we dive back into the past? Do we live in the present or look to the future?"

"Which past?" responds a dramatist. "The closer past or the farther one?"

Domestically, East European nations are not reconciled with their own communist past, which has already become a major factor in their present politics. On the broader map of Europe, they cannot escape their geography. Both their military and economic security are hostage to their position between a strong Western Europe and an unpredictable, fragmenting Soviet Union. And

globally, the East Europeans want American and German economic aid and support, but recognize the reality that the remnants of what was once the USSR will always exert the strongest of tugs and pulls stet in whatever direction history determines for the once mighty Communist empire.

Revenge And The Old Regime

The nations of the region are split on whether to identify and punish those people who were responsible for injustices of the old regimes. More than two out of three East Germans and a majority of Poles, Czechs and Bulgarians want blood. But Slovaks by a 2 to 1 margin, and Hungarians by a bare majority, would look to the future and forget. These two peoples may take similar views for different reasons, however. Slovaks have residual empathy with the old regime, while for Hungarians, their most repressed days are most distant of all in East Europe.

But when it comes down to the issue of justice vs. efficiency, all East Europeans chose efficiency. All agree that top level people from the old regime should be kept on, rather than replaced, if they are doing a good job (Bulgaria - 58%, Czechoslovakia - 62%, Hungary - 79%, Poland - 79%). "Top level people" in smaller cities and villages probably include local mayors, who needed communist support (or at least neutrality) to get the jobs initially and who, in many cases, now have already been voted back into those positions. "Party shadow doesn't bother me," says a Bulgarian member of parliament, "as long as the man or woman is a

professional, competent, and not criminal."

In Hungary, where this issue has been wrestled with for somewhat longer, there is even a pugnacious attitude among former communists who feel they are being badly treated and should be accepted as liberals in the new democracy. Says a socialist who, with his family, has been physically threatened because of his past Communist Party membership: "Wherever I go I'm identified with things I had nothing to do with. I'm not willing to take responsibilities for all of those mistakes (of the communists), not even out of a sense of party loyalty. The country must now recognize that a left-wing politician can be as valuable as a politician belonging to other parties."

More than any other, this issue of assessing blame for the old regimes may be "the cemetery problem" in which only the death of those with personal grievances will lay the issue to rest.

National And Economic Security And The USSR

None of the nations of Eastern Europe cited a Soviet military attack as their biggest fear, even though they were all concerned about a Soviet move on them following the January 1991 crackdown in Lithuania and Latvia. Whatever the outcome of Moscow's present convulsions, the threat from beyond the River Bug will always be a dangerous fact of life in Eastern Europe.

East Europeans had mixed views before the aborted coup in Moscow on how best to protect their national security. Three possibilities were offered in our survey: NATO membership, regional defense pact,

or individual treaties with a neighbor. Most sentiment was for individual defense treaties (Bulgaria - 27%, Czechoslovakia - 32%, Hungary - 23%, Poland - 33%), with regional pacts next (Bulgaria - 27%, Czechoslovakia - 28%, Hungary - 37%, Poland -13%). Poland expressed the most sentiment for NATO association (30%), and least for a regional pact.

East Europe has no security assurances from the all-encompassing Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the Yugoslavian civil conflict and Albanian refugee panic have dramatized the self-imposed impotence of the European Community to mediate such explosive issues.

None of the East Europeans like each other. Each feels threatened by all of their neighbors. East European peoples in our survey don't often identify themselves beyond their own nationality as also being "European." More than half of Bulgarians say they never think of themselves as European, and a plurality of Czechs, Slovaks and Poles say the same. Whether this self-perception will be a major problem in integrating the former Soviet bloc nations into the West is not certain, but the responses appear to be another manifestation of insularity and ethnic nationalism that most authorities believe will impede the process.

On the other hand, perhaps "Poland's road to Europe leads through the east," as a Pole in Bialystok says. "History convinced me that we are dependent on the Russian market, on the eastern market. The tragedy is that it will be ten years before there will be someone over there to negotiate with. Our only option is to

become imperialists in the East, to put it jokingly."

Friends, Enemies, Strangers

Despite their past hatred toward Moscow, these states are not uniformly hostile to the Soviet Union nor critical of its influence today. Poles, Hungarians and Czechs are most antagonistic. But Bulgaria and East Germany think the Soviets have a good influence in their country. Almost one in two Bulgarians (46%) believe the Soviets have a positive effect on their country, and more than one in three (38%) feel the Soviets would be a dependable ally. One out of four Slovaks (24%) also feel the Soviets are having a positive influence on them and 15% feel the Soviets would be good allies. Perhaps, a Slovak woman suggests, this lack of hatred arises because "we got rid of them without a single man dead. And in the end, if they hadn't started (with reforms), we'd still be silent; if not for them, we'd have stayed where we were."

Poles are most hostile toward Moscow of all East Europeans. Their dislike is spread equally between Germans and Russians. In fact, these two countries, which have invaded and carved up Poland for a millennium, virtually exhaust Poles in their first responses to which nations constitute the greatest threat. Fully 33% of Poles consider the Soviets the biggest enemy, another 32% see the Germans as most threatening, and 31% don't know or can't name any; Romania and Czechoslovakia share the remaining 4% of Polish dislike. The story

is told that in the early 1980's, when the Poles felt in danger of

invasions from both the Soviets and the East Germans, they had to decide who they would fight first. "Germany," said one Pole; "business before pleasure."

Czechs see the Soviet Union as their main enemy (37%), followed by the Germans (15%); Slovaks, in yet another indication of their difference from Czechs, see Moscow as significantly less hostile (27%), and see the Hungarians as almost as much their enemy (22%), four times more than the Czechs do. But 9% of Czechs and 13% of Slovaks also fear the Poles. Hungarians, for their part, see their main enemy in the Romanians (42%), more than twice the number who view the Russians as the principal threat (20%).

They also give Yugoslavs and Czechoslovaks enemy status (16% and 8%, respectively). And as noted earlier, Czechs and Slovaks not only differ on practically everything of importance; they are also hostile to each other.

Much as East European states believe everyone around them is hostile, so they see few allies nearby. The United States rates uniformly high -- between two-thirds and three fourths of all populations consider its influence to be positive. Germany scored next best: highest in Hungary (78%), almost double the Polish rating (41%). Some surprising findings were the popularity of France throughout the region, particularly in Poland (26%); but France was not mentioned in Hungary. Similarly, Austria got high marks in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and Japan was rated relatively high in Hungary (72%), (and in Russia (37%) and the Ukraine (44%) as well).