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Communist Party, a criminal organization if ever there was one, which cast its shadow over half of the world and almost an entire century, and was responsible for the death of scores of millions of people, the only thing that Cohen worries about, at least on television, is that Yeltsin is not playing according to democratic rules, that in his bold and peremptory blow against the Party he does not follow the rules of the democratic textbook—as if democracy in the Soviet Union could be born in any other way, as if democracy is a Platonic thing that is indifferent to the circumstances in which it finds itself and must follow clear and ideal formulas.

A man who watches a wolf devouring his child does not begin a discussion of animal rights. And if he does, he is doing the wolf's work. I can understand, in a way, the hypocrisy of a man like A. Shalnyev, a correspondent for *Izvestia* who deplores the undemocratic closing of *Pravda*, who says that he would prefer that *Pravda* compete with the democratic press in a free market, which is a bit like proposing that a beggar compete with Donald Trump in a free market. Shalnyev was a faithful servant of communism even before perestroika. I expect nothing else from him. But the homemade leftism of those who were lucky enough to be born in a free

society is another matter. It is not less foul because it is so familiar.

I am grateful to Stephen F. Cohen for reminding us of the danger of what he called the "mob." I share these anxieties. I insist, however, that the historian's erudition is glib and misapplied, that the people who surrounded the White House in Moscow and brought the first stirrings of real democracy to Russia do not deserve to be called a mob. This time the crowd was not the mob. This time the crowd was the people. It was one of those rare moments when the crowd is transformed, by truth and by danger, into something higher, not something lower. Every one of the men and women who assembled outside the Russian Parliament building left his or her home alone, and headed in the rainy night toward the danger without any certainty that they were joining anything larger or safer than themselves.

It is amazing, this sweet and shared sensation of the road to freedom, this sudden smashing of the prison doors, this deep intake of oxygen after decades of foul vapors. My phone rings endlessly. American Russians are calling, Russian Russians are calling. They call to congratulate all of us, and to laugh with joy. Never in my life did I expect to hear so much Russian laughter. •

The unleashing of Soviet nationalisms.

THE EMPIRE STRIKES OUT

By Walter Laqueur

How great a matter a little fire kindleth! When Gennadi Yanayev informed the world on August 19 of Mikhail Gorbachev's sudden illness, he and his fellow plotters could not possibly have foreseen the consequences of their action: the burial of communism in Russia and the disintegration of the Soviet Union as we have known it in our time.

Rumors about an impending coup had been rampant for a long time. Even dates had been hazarded in September and October last year, and again in December. Eduard Shevardnadze had warned in his resignation speech of a coup. Aleksandr Yakovlev, once Gorbachev's closest ally, had mentioned this threat on August 1, and again a few days before the tanks began to roll, when he resigned. On July 22 an open letter had been published in *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, the mouthpiece of

both the Communist diehards and the nationalist party: "How could it have come to pass that we left in power people who do not love this country, who behave like lackeys vis-à-vis their well-wishers from overseas?" The appeal stated that there were more patriotic leaders to be found in Russia, and that the armed forces would support them in accordance with their sacred obligations. The manifesto was signed not only by several leading publicists of the right, but by the commander of the Soviet army, General Valentin Varennikov, and the deputy minister of the interior, General Boris Gromov (of Afghanistan fame). They, too, had been appointed by Gorbachev, who left soon afterward for a well-deserved holiday in the Crimea.

After the coup Yakovlev related a conversation with Gorbachev in which the president had dismissed the warnings: "They are cowards, they won't dare..." In fact, the eight members of the "Emergency Committee" were neither adventurists nor right-wing extremists. They were cautious, middle-of-the-road apparatchiks

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who made the decision, without apparent enthusiasm, to depose the man who had appointed them. They assumed that a stand had to be made in defense of their power and the privileges of their caste. Marx once noted that ruling classes seldom if ever surrender their positions voluntarily, and Russia was no exception.

The plotters were also convinced, not without reason, that the policies pursued by Gorbachev had failed, that Gorbachev was utterly discredited, that order had to be re-established ("no more experiments") to prevent general chaos and economic ruin. As far as they were concerned, their own interests and those of their country coincided. They also thought that a mere show of force would be sufficient to defeat the liberals and the separatists.

Hence the curious halfheartedness in the execution of the coup. It goes without saying that if it had been executed by the obvious candidates (the black colonels of the nationalist Soyuz faction), or if the leading figures of the old regime had been assassinated or merely arrested, or if the Russian Parliament had been stormed by a few tanks and communications had been cut, the insurgents would have stayed in power for the next five or ten years. Of course, they would have failed in the end; but the years between would have been exceedingly uncomfortable ones for the Soviet Union and the rest of the world.

Myths spread fast, and it is now widely believed that the coup, carried out by a group of adventurers of the extreme right, was defeated by the people's power. But the gang of eight was not defeated by the people of Moscow. The Soviet capital is a city of some 10 million inhabitants. (Nobody knows the exact figure, because there are many hundreds of thousands of *limitchiki*, illegal residents over and above the official limit imposed.) Of these, according to a poll carried out on the second day of the coup, some 73 percent were opposed to it. But these 73 percenters did not take to the street. They were anxious, they were grumbling, but they thought it was no good to argue with tanks. Most of them also went to work. It was owing to Boris Yeltsin and his supporters—several thousand determined men and women defending the Russian Parliament during the critical hours of Monday and Tuesday—that Russia's honor was saved.

There was more opposition in Leningrad than in Moscow, and there was resistance in the Kuzbas region of Siberia and even in the Far East. But the first reaction from the republics was either favorable to the coup, or very cautious (the Ukraine, Kazakhstan). Not a single republican leader outside the Baltic countries condemned the coup. Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan welcomed it as "vital for the restoration of discipline." Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan, the cleverest and most progressive of the Central Asian leaders, carefully refrained from denouncing the coup until it became clear that it had failed. By Wednesday Karimov and Nazarbayev announced that they had left the Communist Party in protest and that they had banned Party cells in government. Sviad Gamsakhurdia of Geor-

gia, living up to his reputation as an eccentric, did not condemn the plotters either, albeit for different reasons. As he saw it, Gorbachev himself had engineered the coup, and he stuck to this version even after the coup had failed.

The Orthodox Church leaders did not respond for many hours to Yeltsin's appeal to condemn the coup. Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, the foreign minister, announced that he was running a temperature, and went fishing: an old Russian anti-pyretic. The Soviet envoy to Japan declared that the coup was absolutely necessary, and forty-eight hours later said that he was truly relieved that Gorbachev was back as the stabilizer. Guerman Gventsadze, the Soviet chargé in Dublin, called the coup constitutional, and observed that the emergency committee had wide popular support. (Two days later he made it known that his original statement had been misinterpreted.) There were countless such cases, and even more cases of fence-sitting. Mass support for Yeltsin materialized only on Tuesday night. By Thursday, however, hundreds of thousands demonstrated, and on Saturday a million people paid their last respects to the victims of the coup.

Why did the committee fail, if there was so little resistance? The answer is that there may not have been much active opposition to the plot, but there was not much public support for it either. The conspirators did not seem to have a majority of votes for convoking the Central Committee, which would have given their action at least an aura of legality. Worse, there was no unanimity in the army and the KGB. Some key commanders, such as the head of the air force, but also some naval, KGB, and parachute commanders, refused to cooperate. These were not great liberal reformers; they simply did not want to become involved in party politics. Among the army commanders, there was apparently a majority in favor of a military show of strength—but not in favor of bloodshed.

The plotters could still have proceeded with their plans, using some reliable elite units to storm the Russian Parliament and to arrest the main oppositionists. They could have called for mass demonstrations against Gorbachev; and it is quite likely that they would have had a big crowd in the streets of Moscow, for Gorbachev's unpopularity is legendary. But this went against their grain. The conspirators were not populist rabble-rousers, and their hands were trembling. At this stage, in the late hours of Tuesday afternoon and into the early hours on Wednesday, their resolve faltered. There was no obvious leader among them to stiffen their backbone, and the first defections took place: Valentin Pavlov suddenly developed high blood pressure, and Anatoly Lukyanov simply kept in the background. The old Bolsheviks had known the golden rule of insurgency: to press ahead relentlessly once the decision to act had been taken. But the plotters of 1991 were not of the caliber of Lenin and Trotsky. They were bureaucrats, not professional revolutionaries. They ignored a rule that any self-respecting nineteenth-

century insurgent would have regarded as rudimentary.

The coup was in considerable part the result of Gorbachev's long-standing failure to act decisively. In the early years he had been a major liberating force. Perhaps he even knew, back then, what he wanted to achieve. But he never had a clear, consistent course of action. He veered left and swerved right. He pushed through all kinds of half-baked projects. He did not defend his democratic allies, and he made many disastrous appointments. He postponed for too long action on the status of the non-Russian republics. And thus, in the end, he found himself virtually isolated. Yeltsin, on the other hand, showed not only courage but a faultless sense of timing. His choice of advisers and assistants, moreover, was infinitely superior to Gorbachev's. He deserved to emerge as the hero and the victor of the August revolution.

And yet, in the final analysis, is it fair to put all the blame on Gorbachev for the failure of reforms? He had no power base other than the Party, the KGB, and the army, and they did not want radical change. He inherited an economy and a social system that no longer functioned. He faced political apathy among the masses, a lack of initiative and creativity, an absence of a civic spirit and a democratic tradition. Thus he lost, within two years, all political credit. But even a political genius might not have succeeded in these conditions. Surely it was unrealistic to hope that the consequences of seventy-four years of Soviet rule could be overcome within a few years. And a well-meaning compromiser was certainly not the right candidate for the demolition job.

Then, almost miraculously, the movement for radical reform was given a second chance as the result of a bungled coup carried out by the wrong plotters at the wrong time. The opportunity was seized by Yeltsin, not by Gorbachev. He, Gorbachev, failed to understand that within three days a revolution had taken place. The results of that revolution are known: the breakdown of the Union and the passing of the Communist Party as the ruling force in the country. It is the most important political change in the Soviet Union since 1917. But it is also a giant step into the unknown. The components of the Soviet Union are now as close to chaos and to ruin as they were before the gang of eight made its move.

The breakdown of the Union was probably inevitable under the circumstances, but it is still a disaster. For it is a retrograde development. At a time when all over Europe the general trend is toward unification, the tendency among these newly independent states is toward separatism. Much worse, since none of the new independent republics is ethnically homogeneous, and since the new rulers will not be primarily concerned with the rights of minorities, all the preconditions will now exist for national strife on a massive scale. Some of the minorities may leave: it is unlikely, for instance, that many Russians will stay in Central Asia. But their return to Russia, embittered and without means, will only add

to the social and political ferment.

In the Caucasus, a civil war has been raging for the last two years, and it is impossible to see what force will now prevent open warfare between Armenia and Azerbaijan and between Georgia and the Ossetians. The predominantly Russian inhabitants of the eastern Ukraine have not much in common with the Ukrainian-speaking (and Uniate Catholic) western Ukrainians, and the willingness on both sides to make compromises cannot be taken for granted. Westerners often talk about Muslim Central Asia as if it were an entity, but the only common feature among its inhabitants is their hatred of the Russians. National tensions there are running deep, and once the Russians are gone, the situation may well turn into a brutal free-for-all. Even inside the Russian republic there are strong separatist movements: the Tatars in the Kazan region have insisted on autonomy for a long time, Siberians want their own republic, and there is trouble in the Crimea and elsewhere.

Although Yeltsin has been generous vis-à-vis the other republics, he certainly has no wish to liquidate the RSFSR. In the short run, the Russian federation, Azerbaijan, as well as the five Central Asian republics might sign a new Union treaty, and White Russia and the Ukraine can perhaps be persuaded to enter into a close relationship with the new confederation. From the Russian point of view, close cooperation with the Ukraine is infinitely more important (for historical and political reasons as well as economic ones) than the link with the Central Asian republics and Azerbaijan, the most backward and the most corrupt parts of the former Soviet empire. Their interest in perestroika and glasnost is strictly limited; they wish to maintain the link with Moscow because they vitally need Russian economic support. But sooner or later they will break away, and Russia will be considerably better off without them.

The new political map of the former Soviet Union will not be firmly established for years to come. Perhaps there will be greater willingness to cooperate once the euphoria of independence-at-any-price gives way to a sober confrontation with economic realities. Most of the newly independent republics will lose their traditional markets and will be saddled with industries (more often than not geared to work for the defense sector) for whose output there is no demand. Once the Ukraine was a major food exporter, but Western Europe produces much more food now than it can consume, and the last thing it needs is the import of steel and similar commodities. Illusions about speedy integration into a common European market are bound to fade very soon in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

The Russian republic is the only force that counts in terms of world politics. Yeltsin's position seems unassailable at this moment; he boldly seized the initiative, and the old Communists are on the run. But there is a mass of discontented people, and as the domestic situation deteriorates they will gain new courage. The bungled coup makes a repeat performance in the very near future

unlikely, but in a year or two there could well be another attempt to turn back the clock, carried out by men whose hands may not tremble. Indeed, since the present honeymoon will not last many months, even a legal constitutional challenge to the reformers cannot be excluded.

Although communism is widely detested, the democratic movement in the Soviet Union has not yet put down deep roots. Outside Moscow, Leningrad, Sverdlovsk (Yeltsin's erstwhile power base), and a few other major cities, old-style Communists are still in power and the majority of the population has been apathetic. White Russia is still known as the Soviet Vendée (a reference to the most counterrevolutionary region in France at the time of the revolution), even if its head of government had to resign. As Christ stopped at Eboli, glasnost and perestroika never really transformed Odessa and Rostov, Baku and Saratov, Perm and Gorki, Novorossisk and Chabarovsk. Whoever has visited the cities of Central Russia not that far from Moscow, places such as Vologda and Yaroslavl, Tula and Tambov, Tver and Kaluga, knows that virtually all the key positions of power, in politics as in the economy, are in Communist hands.

It is comparatively easy to make changes in Moscow and Leningrad. Who will replace the local bureaucrats, the police chiefs, and factory managers elsewhere? After 1917 it took the Bolsheviks four years to prevail outside Moscow and Leningrad. Today the Communists are more deeply entrenched in these places than the czarist bureaucracy was (and there are many more of them), and it is doubtful whether Yeltsin has four years at his disposal. Lenin and Trotsky sent the Red Army to suppress local uprisings: Yeltsin will probably not be able to do the same.

Many millions of Party and state bureaucrats will now lose their jobs, not to mention the army and state security officers. Unlike after 1917, however, there will not be a mass exodus of the losers. The Russian nationalists were caught off balance by the coup of the gang of eight, and by Yeltsin's decisive action. Still, sooner or later they will rally again to their cause. There are millions of them. They are firmly convinced that the loss of empire was brought about by an act of high treason. They are anti-Western, anti-Semitic, populist opponents of the liberalization of the economy. They believe in a united, indivisible Greater Russia. Some elements of the old Communist Party will transform themselves into Social Democrats, but others will join forces with the extreme nationalists, and this may pave the way for a second coming of National Bolshevism. This will be abetted by the existence of a considerable *Lumpenproletariat*: in the recent RSFSR elections, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, a rabble-rouser who was almost certainly sponsored by either the Party apparatus or the KGB, polled some 8 million votes on a platform whose most prominent plank was the lowering of the price of vodka.

The new Russian federation, in sum, will be a giant cave of Adulam in which the great mass of discontented will gather. If they find a charismatic leader, and if the

shortages should become even more acute, a new bid for power is almost a foregone conclusion.

How long will Yeltsin and his supporters be able to maintain the momentum of their campaign, and what can we do to help?

After a recent visit to Germany, I returned with the clear impression that East Germany is about to turn the corner. There is still much discontent, and it will probably take another two years until significant sections of the population will enjoy the fruits of the recovery. To achieve this, West Germany had to invest sums much greater than originally planned: up to the end of next year, the total may well amount to about \$150 billion. And East Germany was a country of less than 17 million. The Soviet Union, by contrast, counts some 295 million inhabitants. The sums needed for the rebuilding of the Soviet economy ought to be measured in trillions. The fact that the East German work force was of a higher caliber, and that the old Soviet Union (with its division of labor of sorts) is now dissolved, does not help either.

The United States' capacity to help is limited by its enormous domestic problems. The Japanese are reluctant, Germany has given more than the rest, and the other Europeans talk of hundreds of millions when hundreds of billions are needed. It has been argued by some misguided spirits in the West that Gorbachev fell because the West refused to give him the economic help he needed. But no amount of Western loans and credits would have made the difference, because under Gorbachev the preconditions for improvement, that is to say, structural change, did not exist. They do exist, however, under Yeltsin.

Help, urgently and on a massive scale, is now needed—not so much in money, but in kind (for example, food to alleviate critical shortages). Above all, it is necessary to modernize the Soviet communications system, which is, at the present time, the essential precondition for economic progress. Such first aid cannot come from the private sector; Soviet foreign reserves are down to between \$6 billion and \$7 billion. Its debt repayment bill will be more than twice that much toward the end of the year. The prospect of these enormous quantities of assistance may not be a very tempting proposition for the West, but the alternative is even less inviting. It will certainly be more expensive to contain Yeltsin's successors.

The shock waves of the Russian earthquake will continue, and the ultimate outcome of the present struggle for power in Moscow will not be certain for a long time. Yeltsin and his opponents might be challenged in the capital. Almost certainly there will be open and passive resistance on the local level. It is not at all clear that the cause of freedom and radical reform will prevail in the near future. And it will be a near miracle if it triumphs peacefully, without the application of force. With some luck, Russia might escape another ruinous civil war. But there are no certainties, except that the country has now entered, at long last, the post-Communist stage of its history. •

FROM JOHN BOLTON
ASSISTANT SECRETARY
President's Speech to the UN
OF STATE

I am happy to be here before you today. Indeed, I can not think of a single General Assembly in the history of the U.N. which I would have addressed with greater pleasure and pride.

The world has changed immensely in the three years since I was inaugurated president of the United States -- and most of those changes have been to the good. There is a new wave of freedom sweeping over the world. In virtually every corner of the world, repressive governments have been swept aside by this tide. In their place have sprung up democracies -- fragile democracies, admittedly, which must be nurtured in order to withstand the daunting difficulties they confront. But democracies nonetheless, affirming the rights of the individual, while truly responding to the collective will of the people.

The changes of the past three years have also brought to an end the superpower rivalry which had poisoned the international scene for generations. The elimination of this rivalry has in turn made it possible for the United Nations to assume its proper role on the world stage -- the role envisaged by its founders over 45 years ago. At that time, the founding nations set out a series of goals for the new organization:

- saving mankind from the scourge of war;
- reaffirming faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person;
- promoting respect for international law; and
- contributing to mankind's social progress and material prosperity in freedom.

These are lofty goals, but goals which the U.N. has worked constructively towards in recent months.

A little over a year ago, all the progress which had been made in constructing a safer, more peaceful world was threatened -- threatened by a megalomaniac who ruthlessly invaded and occupied a smaller neighbor. In times past, the U.N.'s response to such a provocation likely would have been tentative and indecisive. This time, however, the response was clear and unequivocal -- the U.N. would not let naked aggression go unpunished. This message will doubtless be remembered by future dictators who covet the territory of others -- as well as by those who seek the rule of international law.

Even after suffering an enormous military rout, Saddam Hussein continues to act as if he believes he can outlast the

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will of the international community expressed in Security Council Resolution 687. This mandatory resolution, among other things requires Iraq to divulge all aspects of its programs to develop and produce nuclear, chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction, and that these weapons, along with ballistic missiles capable of delivering them on innocent civilian populations throughout the Middle East, be destroyed. Iraq must understand that it is required to do this and that the international community will insist that it is done.

We are entering a period of unprecedented hope for the future of mankind. The material progress which the world has seen throughout this century is finally being matched by spiritual progress. The shadow of totalitarianism is being lifted from large portions of the globe. In this regard, I must pay special tribute to the brave people of the Soviet Union and their legitimate leaders. By defeating an isolated gang of coup makers who would have plunged their great nation back into the darkness of Stalinism, the Soviet people brought hope to oppressed people everywhere.

If the promise of this moment is to be fulfilled, however, the U.N. must play an active and constructive role. From the sands of the Sahara to the jungles of Central America, the U.N. has shown itself willing to shoulder its appropriate share of the burden in building a safer, saner world.

To translate this willingness into solid accomplishments will, however, be difficult. We will have to broaden and strengthen the spirit of cooperation which allowed the U.N. to respond so effectively to Saddam's invasion of Kuwait and to the suffering of Iraqi Kurds and Shiites after the war. We will have to continue our efforts to reform and streamline the U.N. bureaucracy, eliminating the waste and duplication which have hamstrung this great organization's efforts. We will have to weed out the anachronistic, confrontational attitudes which continue to be common in much of the committee work of the General Assembly and in the Specialized Agencies. Perhaps most important, we will have to find the most capable, dedicated individual possible to replace my good friend and respected colleague, Mr. Javier Perez de Cuellar.

Before I turn to some of the more specific challenges facing the U.N, I would like to discuss two of the more important functions which the U.N can fulfill in helping us all to build a safer and more just world -- peacekeeping and electoral assistance.

PEACEKEEPING

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The world in the last few years has seen the increasing value of United Nations peacekeeping operations. The number of peacekeeping missions has grown tremendously and many of the missions have fulfilled their mandate with startling success.

Still, not every conflict situation is amenable to UN intervention. In most instances, regional organizations should take the lead in trying to resolve local conflicts. In this regard, I pay tribute to the efforts of the EC and the CSCE to help the Yugoslavs work out their problems. More generally, the UN cannot become involved without the full agreement of the parties concerned, and their unreserved commitment to a peaceful situation.

Unfortunately, we still see conflicts in which these basic conditions for a UN role are not met.

DEMOCRACY AND UN ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE

In recent years we have witnessed the resurgence and strengthening of democracy on all continents. As an expression of UN Charter values, as well as the fundamental freedoms set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, these transitions renew our hopes for a peaceful world. Authoritarian governments, history shows us, are more likely to be aggressive than democratic ones.

With sensitivity toward local needs and conditions, the UN has demonstrated its expertise in observing elections in various countries. Electoral assistance to Haiti made possible an historic peaceful and democratic transfer of power.

Now we have reached a critical juncture. The United Nations has the opportunity to further worldwide democratization. I proposed at the 45th General Assembly to structure more formally the UN role with respect to electoral assistance; many share our view that electoral assistance activities--at the request of the Member State--will become a new UN priority.

We look forward to receiving the Secretary-General's report on suitable approaches which will permit the organization to respond to requests from member states for assistance in the conduct of free and fair elections.

I would now like to turn to some of the specific issues confronting the U.N.:

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MIDDLE EAST:

We are encouraged by the growing acceptance of the idea of an international Middle East peace conference. We hope that all parties can come to an agreement, based on UNSC resolutions 242 and 338, that will bring peace to this strife-torn region.

IRAQ:

We are justly proud of the massive and successful response by the U.N. to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and, later, to the dire need of Iraqis fleeing the brutality of Saddam Hussein's regime. I salute all those who participated in Operation Provide Comfort. I congratulate the Secretary General and his executive delegate Sadruddin Aga Khan for their tireless efforts to bring relief and comfort to all vulnerable groups in Iraq. We remind Iraq that it must comply with the resolutions of the UNSC, and with all of its freely undertaken obligations. Saddam Hussein should stop his efforts to deceive and mislead his people and the UNSC. He should comply fully and completely with the letter and spirit of UNSC res 687, and surrender all of his weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles.

The task of establishing a stable peace in the Gulf region is, however, not yet complete. Iraq still holds Kuwaiti citizens and it has blatantly violated the provisions of UNSC Resolutions 687, cynically attempting to conceal and preserve its capability to produce weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. These violations alone affirm the need to maintain strict sanctions against the Iraqi regime. Iraq's treatment of the Shia in the South, its failure to come to agreement with the Kurds in the North and its willful diversion of food from vulnerable groups throughout Iraq attest to the need for tight UN control over any new humanitarian assistance reaching Iraq. This control is indispensable if help is to reach the truly needy.

In the aftermath of the Gulf crisis, the states in the region are beginning the work of building their own arrangements to assure the future peace and stability of their region. We applaud their efforts and pledge to assist at their request.

DISARMAMENT:

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Iraq's blatant attempts to conceal from the Security Council the true nature and extent of its programs to build weapons of mass destruction highlight the need for stronger measures in all areas of arms control. Both the UNSC and IAEA need to ponder and act on the lessons from Iraq's willful violations of its obligations under NPT and IAEA safeguards agreement. The US supports the proposal made by UK PM Major and Japan PM Kaifu for the creation of an international conventional arms transfer registry, patterned after the annual reports now made by member states to the UN of defense budgets. We also set great store by the efforts of the UNGA-endorsed, Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament as it seeks to bring to a rapid conclusion the draft comprehensive Chemical Weapons Convention.

CYPRUS:

Under UN mediation, talks to bring about political stability and reunify the divided island and nation of Cyprus are beginning to bear fruit.

ASIA:

It's time for the Cambodians to end their 16 year war. The P5 plan provides a workable framework for progress. The establishment of a viable Supreme National Council (SNC) in Cambodia is a significant step on the path to the establishment of a representative government. We seek continued adherence to the framework agreed to by the Perm five.

We heartily welcome both Koreas to this Assembly. We also welcome the Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of the Marshall Islands. We are proud that the U.S. administration of these two former UN Trust Territories helped them to now become member states of the UN.

LATIN AMERICA:

ONUSAL, created to oversee the forthcoming cease-fire and monitor human rights in El Salvador, has begun its deployment. We are confident that the UN-monitored talks between the GOES and the FMLN will resume shortly. We salute the commitment by the Secretary General to become personally involved in these difficult -- but important -- negotiations. We urge both sides to rapidly conclude work on a cease-fire agreement and on guidelines for the reintegration of the FMLN into Salvadoran society.

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AFRICA:

UNAVEM has begun monitoring the ceasefire in Angola as that country prepares for free and fair elections. If UNAVEM successfully carries out its mandate, it will have helped end a bitter civil war which has brought untold suffering to an entire generation of Angolans.

Regarding the Western Sahara, the US has, along with the other permanent members of the Security Council as well as other UN members, agreed to participate in MINURSO, where the UN will prepare and conduct the referendum that will determine, peacefully, the status of the Western Sahara. This is yet another example where the UN has responded to a call for a peaceful alternative to international conflict.

Having eliminated the legal basis for apartheid, South Africa is looking to rejoin the community of nations. A strong example of this new inclination is Pretoria's signing of the NPT. By so doing, South Africa foreswore the possibility of developing or owning nuclear weapons, an important step towards the creation of a genuinely nuclear weapons free Africa. We also welcome the progress made by all parties in South Africa to establish a climate for negotiations leading to a democratic, non-racial government. The UN should recognize and encourage this process.

FOURTH COMMITTEE:

We hope that the committee on decolonization and non-self-governing territories will along with the rest of the UN system reject rhetoric in favor of constructive dialog and action. We note with particular dismay that, in contravention of previous General Assembly resolutions, the Committee continues to raise the issue of Puerto Rico.



A) Memories

3 days (a)

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A) Post half center

1) a world defined by emotions, ideologies

2) while people engaged in the work of

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 2. all offices - 1st Dec 1964 - 31st Dec 1964

struggles for/has views

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~~III) What now?~~

~~A) Premist of a~~

III) Early sign of old order's demise: Iraq

A) Raise V.N.

B) Raise Gorb

C) any rec. insert long re: Saddam

IV) What now?

A) A future of promise - vague ideals, ~ concrete struggles

~~B) New struggles, new terrain~~

~~Nationalism~~

~~3.1.~~

I) First time - pass of existing VN ideals

C) The grounds: new nationalisms
regionalisms
trade



info cons

Boj on SLC tower

capital temple


pol: Richmond/Kramer

mt/w/5 aircraft: ~~Richie~~ Richies on St. Helen in bleed

lost - go 7000, computer, vehicle to control door
W. Knuffe v. -

Protesters in front - enter @ road

bus blockade



WAGA - a class of people

concepts

Also -

and rights

identity

Borders a by peaceful means

foster sense of nationalism
w/out tearing apart fabric of
unity society



ABOARD AIR FORCE ONE

UNGA - focus on strengthening
core values - rebuild institutions

Association is a world linked by
ties of interest // GATT

Example
America at as always has

U.S. - What's our role?

Resumption of history

ASOARD AIR FORCE ONE



ABOARD AIR FORCE ONE



Seeking identity after having of blood
out by 1/2 C of Commission



Pd Geller

Universal, biological, comprehensive,
final
moral, and to all nations

ABOARD AIR FORCE ONE





ABOARD AIR FORCE ONE

Inevitable Internationalism - domestic
ongoing efforts - Cyprus, etc.

Guido de Marco

Sanir Shikabi

Two China, Pak/India, M East

Lies: effect on credibility

On top of the world?

WHAT America wrought in the Gulf takes time to sink in. It fought the war with fearsome efficiency, shattering its enemy at a tiny cost in American and allied lives. It held together an unlikely alliance of countries with skilful diplomacy in the United Nations. Its president won support among his own people for a war many of them had called unwise at the start. It righted a blatant wrong. America did not fight Iraq to restore its own self-confidence, but these achievements are bound to have that effect. They have lifted the shadow of Vietnam and expunged the memory of Jimmy Carter's impotence in the face of Iranian blackmail. Even the mood of economic defeatism that spread at the end of the 1980s may have gone for a while. America feels on top of the world. On top to do what?

For America to stand high is not new. For 45 years the United States has been top nation, and for the past two years its only plausible rival has been on sick leave. But that is partly what makes its present position so unexpected. Last year, the sudden retirement of the Soviet Union seemed set to reduce America's influence by stressing economic rather than military power, and by removing the widespread fear of communism that had kept America out in the world. For being a superpower involves more than owning nuclear weapons: it requires a state of mind that has the will to project power.

Now, quite suddenly, it is again clear that economic power does not always outrank military power; and that the value of military clout did not vanish with the ending of the cold war. To be a great power, economic strength is necessary but not sufficient, as Japan and Germany have amply demonstrated in recent months. America has proved—and the world has noticed—that it can project its military might abroad to secure its (and other people's) economic and other interests.

Americans, meanwhile, have been reminded that not all foreign entanglements end in disaster. Not all allies are perfidious, not all enemies are resilient, not all weapons misfire. Television pictures do not always lose wars, and the Soviet Union does not always stand in the way of what needs doing. Such reminders will dispel some of the temptation to drop the tiresome burden of superpowerdom.

Some are attracted, others frightened, by a caricature of the new world order this might lead to. America thumps any country that gets out of line, shakes down its rich friends to pay for the mugging, gets a meek go-ahead from the cops in the UN and tells the Soviet Union to butt out. Some such hubris is predictable. Already there are mutterings about a unipolar world, a new American century, and how Japan and



Germany can be bossed around. Such unilateralists do not buy talk of coalitions: 85% of the troops in the Gulf, they point out, were American; the decision to go to war was Mr Bush's; left to itself the UN would have tried to resolve the consequences of Iraq's aggression by sanctions alone; the Europeans are incapable of speaking with a common voice, the Japanese of making up their minds. However many allies join in, it is America that will have to do the confronting and disarming of outlaw states. Better that it believes in its

own rightness and gets on with it.

The unilateralists will add a military argument. The proven accuracy and invulnerability of laser-guided bombs, stealth fighters and map-reading cruise missiles, and the relatively few civilian casualties they seem to cause, seem to make the world safe for surgical war. Generals will now argue that they can pre-emptively knock out a Ruritanian mischief-maker's nuclear reactors and missile sites without killing civilians or losing public support. Raids like the one on Libya will be less troublesome to arrange than UN resolutions.

Lead, but not alone

These are rash generalisations from such a particular lesson. Few of the world's villains will wear hats as black as Mr Hussein's, or so obviously break international laws and standards of common humanity. America is unlikely to find a war better suited to its fighting abilities: one on a desert plain offering no refuge to the enemy, against feeble air defences. And in any case the idea that war can be altogether surgical and painless lies shattered on the road to Basra.

America must reject unilateralism just as it must reject its cousin, isolationism. Both are essentially suspicious of foreigners. The truer lesson of the Gulf war is that America could not possibly have blockaded Iraq, let alone fought it, without the wide support of allies. It could not have won the support of its own Senate without the sanction of the UN Security Council. That sanction could not have been won without the assent of the Soviet Union. The United States could barely have afforded the battle without plentiful free oil, yen and D-marks. To defeat a country with the national product of Portugal took 75% of America's tactical aircraft and 40% of its tanks. Some unipolar gunboat.

Nor are laser-guided bombs much use as engines of economic growth. Those who argued before the war that America was in relative decline never claimed that it was losing its military edge. The defence build-up of the 1980s and the attention to high-technology weapons were always going to pro-

duce results. What the "declinists" argued was that such military prowess came at a price to the economy that would grow harder to pay unless the country reversed its decline in economic competitiveness. Even opponents of "decline" conceded that it could happen unless the self-inflicted wounds of the budget and trade deficits were healed. They have not been healed by this war, however good victory makes Americans feel. The country is still in recession and its government is still borrowing nearly 6% of GNP to fund its budget. In such conditions, illusions of omnipotence will not persist.

The lesson of the Gulf war is not that the world is America's plaything, but that America needs to build alliances abroad in order to do desirable things in the world. By persuasion, not instruction, is how the superpower must lead. Fortunately, this is to preach to the apparently converted. Even before the invasion of Kuwait, George Bush and James Baker were alliance-builders by preference, leading only if others were prepared to follow. Their approach to European security stressed that American troops would stay only if invited to.

When their friend, Mikhail Gorbachev, fell into bad company, they chose to coax him back rather than drop him.

In the same way, Mr Bush's "new world order" is to be one in which collective security (preferably with UN blessing) is the goal, and America will consult its allies before acting. That does not mean asking their permission. It means trying to persuade them that America's course of action is right by their own standards. Mr Bush—who doubted his power to persuade—now has ample evidence of his ability to change the minds both of allies abroad and of his public at home.

Four times in this conflict (sending troops in August, doubling troops in November, starting an air war in January and rejecting the Soviet half-deal in February) he did the unpopular thing and saw it turn quickly popular. He could try it elsewhere, strongly shaping a world not of might-is-right but of interdependence. A nationally painful success for the GATT talks, achieved by a judicious mixture of American arm-twisting and concession, would round off his first term just fine. And the world would smile at the eagle's new confidence.

Britain's one-handed budget

With the Treasury's monetary hand held tight by the ERM, its fiscal one can adopt a lighter touch

THE war is over; politics is back. In Britain that means some familiar old stuff—inflation, unemployment, poll tax—but with one big difference. When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait last August, Margaret Thatcher was in Downing Street and the Conservatives were 15 points behind Labour in the opinion polls. Now John Major is there, and the Tories are ahead by three points. The man, more than the war, has made the difference. What will he do with his lead?

The answer should be a little clearer after the budget on March 19th, and a lot clearer after the local elections on May 2nd. By then this government will have been in office for almost four years; under the unsatisfactory British system which gives the prime minister near-total power to choose when the people will vote, it becomes legitimate for him to use that power any time in the final year of a parliament. What is much less legitimate, and much more damaging, is to use the budget to tart up the economy for polling day.

It has been done often enough, heaven knows. In the old days, under Conservative and Labour alike, it was a penny off the pint and threepence off the income tax. Even in the 1980s, when Mrs Thatcher went once to the country with unemployment rising and once with it falling, she took care to ensure that, on both occasions, inflation was a (temporarily) virtuous 4% or so. But note the subtle change. She fixed her election dates to coincide with economic cheer. Her predecessors were more inclined, and more able, to produce such cheer to suit the election timetable.

That old freedom has not disappeared, but it has shrunk a lot. And it was Mr Major, as chancellor, who did the shrinking. By taking the pound into Europe's exchange-rate mechanism last October, he did the thing that made Mrs Thatcher most dislike the ERM: he diminished Britain's sovereignty.

The ERM will be the unseen hand behind this month's budget. It will also be more helpful than this newspaper would have dared to hope just a few weeks ago. Norman Lamont, the new chancellor, has been admirably firm in his insistence that sterling will not be devalued within the ERM. Because the currency markets have started to believe him, he has been able to cut interest rates twice, each time by half a point, without weakening the pound. There, though still only in his outline, is the ERM's prize: a credible anti-inflationary policy that brings cheaper money. Eventually, provided the pound holds its value against the D-mark, Britain will boast a Germanic inflation record and German interest rates. This state of grace is a long way off—the French are still not quite there after 12 years—but progress so far has been gratifying. With luck, the bloodcurdling predictions of slump from ERM opponents will soon be remembered as just a clique's pique.

Virtue's rewards

To repeat: with luck. Though ERM membership brings the promise of low inflation in the long term, in the short term it makes it harder to manage the economy. It requires that monetary policy be devoted to holding the exchange rate. Temporary shifts in interest rates will sometimes help to keep nominal GDP growing by the 4-6% that is desirable, but that will be largely by coincidence. Fiscal policy therefore ought to play a bigger role; but the effects of changes in taxes and public spending are hard to predict and slow to come through.

Until a month ago it seemed that pound-protective monetary policy was being kept so tight that nominal GDP would slow too much. Without a big fiscal boost, a slump seemed inevitable. Now, barely ten days before the budget, things look kinder. If interest rates can safely be cut by another half



that would be required to improve the lives and expand the liberties of the people of the area. The choices are frequently unattractive.

The second step toward a more adequate policy is to assess realistically the impact of various alternatives on the security of the United States and on the safety and autonomy of the other nations of the hemisphere.

The third step is to abandon the globalist approach which denies the realities of culture, character, geography, economics, and history in favor of a vague, abstract universalism "stripped," in Edmund Burke's words, "of every relation," standing "in all the nakedness and solitude of metaphysical abstraction." What must replace it is a foreign policy that builds (again Burke) on the "concrete circumstances" which "give . . . to every political principle its distinguishing color and discriminating effect."

Once the intellectual debris has been cleared away, it should become possible to construct a Latin American policy that will protect U.S. security interests and make the actual lives of actual people in Latin America somewhat better and somewhat freer.



On the Invocation of Universal Values*

FORMER PRESIDENT CARTER'S EMPHASIS on human rights and his assertion of its irreducible role in American foreign policy seem to me a good thing, mainly because they remind us and the rest of the world that this nation's identity and purposes are deeply involved with the assertion of universal human rights. Totalitarian parties and governments have so often tagged us the leading capitalist imperialist colonial power that we may, ourselves, find it hard to remember that the first settlers, in fact, came seeking religious freedom and espousing a political philosophy that linked legitimacy to consent. It may also be hard to remember that Americans pioneered the development of government limited by law, popular accountability, and natural rights.

Candidate Carter's emphasis on these themes was rewarding to people sick to death of having their motives, characters, and policies excoriated. For a long decade, the New Left seemed almost to have preempted the moral perspective on political events—foreign and domestic—not because successive administrations had embraced *Realpolitik* but because (for various reasons) our

* This essay was prepared in response to former President Carter's major human rights policy address given at the University of Notre Dame, May 22, 1977.

leaders preferred to explain their policies in cool rhetoric while critics delivered moral judgments in less measured, more excited voices. One important consequence of Carter's reemphasis of human rights was to break the anti-establishment monopoly on moral rhetoric. Another has been to reassure Americans and others that U.S. policy is guided by a vision of the public good. A third important effect of the human rights campaign was to affirm a moral principle which needs continuing reaffirmation: that there are universal moral rights that men as men (and women as women) are entitled to and that these ought to be respected by governments. Though aware of the pitfalls of conceiving of foreign policy as a crusade, I am convinced that people and governments cannot live on pragmatism and profits alone—however enlightened the former or abundant the latter. It seems likely that the decreasing frequency in a political system of appeals to conscience signals the erosion of moral consensus and also contributes to it. Since democracies have an especially great need for moral consensus, continuing appeals to conscience are both restorative and stabilizing. For having recalled Americans (and others) to historic moral imperatives and for having placed individual rights back on the international agenda, former President Carter wins my applause. This accomplishment seems to me more important than my misgivings about specific applications of the policy.

It should therefore be clear that my comments on Carter's Notre Dame speech do not reflect generalized disapproval of the administration's foreign policy. My comments are directed only to that speech, which seems to me a particularly poor one. My doubts and puzzlements can perhaps best be expressed by way of the following questions.

1. Why was the President "confident that democracies' examples will be compelling," when history so clearly establishes that democratic governments are both rare and difficult to establish? It is true that developments in Portugal, Spain, and Greece testify to the continuing power of the democratic idea and illustrate the possibilities of building democratic institutions on the ruins of traditional autocracies. But each of these happy cases also

demonstrates the perils and problems that confront efforts to construct governments limited by law, based on majority rule, and guaranteeing political competition and respect for minority rights. The less happy experiences of many nations in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and Africa illustrate how much easier it is to establish autocracies than viable democracies. One may hope that the example of freedom provided by the Western democracies will reinforce the human appetite for liberty, but there hardly seem to be adequate grounds for confidence that their example will prove compelling.

2. Why is the arms race "morally deplorable"? Did the President mean that it is intrinsically immoral to spend money on weapons—regardless of the context? Doesn't the moral quality of an arms race depend on the consequences for specified populations of arming or not arming?

3. Why did the President think that "a peaceful world cannot exist one third rich and two thirds hungry"? The implication is that the frustration of poor nations causes war. In fact, the notion that poverty causes war doesn't wash. Poverty causes hardship, suffering, and death among men, women, and children, but there is little evidence to support the notion that it causes war. The Second World War, to take a single example, was not caused by hungry peoples seeking food, but by a rich country seeking living room. Instead of attacking rich states, poor states fight with poor states, while rich states fight with each other. The fighting in Chad, Zaire, Ethiopia, the Sahara, Angola, and Uganda (to choose some conflicts almost at random) reminds us of the many noneconomic causes of war. Poverty does not make poor states indifferent to power and status, any more than wealth makes rich states indifferent to power and status. Poverty is abominable, not because it leads to war, but because it perpetuates human misery. We can approach problems of war and poverty more effectively if we are clear about the relationships between them.

4. A related question: Why did the President think that "we can no longer separate the traditional issues of war and peace from the new global questions of justice, equity, and human rights"?

As most wars are not caused by poverty or hunger, neither are they caused by breaches of "justice, equity, and human rights." Why did the President assert the contrary? Was he prepared to make observance of justice, equity, and human rights a condition of war and peace? Was he suggesting that this nation will or should go to war over such matters? Or that we can achieve peace only with states whose practices meet our standards of justice, equity, and human rights, or that the world will be at peace only if all states achieve justice, equity, and human rights, or what?

5. Why is it "important that we make progress toward normalizing relations with the People's Republic of China"? Is it because the President desires us to have full diplomatic relations with all countries or with all Communist countries? And if so, why? Is that more important than demonstrating the fidelity of our commitments? How would American economic and military interests be better served if we had an ambassador in Peking in place of a high-level representative without the title? Does the President believe that the future of the Sino-Soviet split depends on the title of the American emissary or that the "creative Chinese people" will cease to trade with the United States as long as we have goods and technology they desire?

6. Why, of all African states—or of all states in the world—did the President decide that southern Africa is *the* place in which the "time has come" for a political system based on majority rule and minority rights? I do not doubt Carter's sincerity in advocating a democratic system in Rhodesia, South-West Africa, and South Africa; I do not believe that he meant "black rule" when he said "majority rule" or that he covertly desired to replace white oligarchies with black dictators. But if a white oligarchy does not seem to him more obnoxious than a black dictatorship, on what principle did the President decide that it is more important to establish majority rule and minority rights in southern Africa than, say, in Uganda, or Tanzania, or Zaire, or Togo, or Ghana, or Nigeria, or Benin, or Kenya, or Guinea-Bissau, or Niger, Upper Volta, Chad, Ethiopia, Somalia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Camerons, Mozambique, or Angola? Or for that matter, how did he

decide that it is more important to have majority rule and minority rights in southern Africa than in, say, Cuba, Cambodia, North Korea, or the Soviet Union, or than in Chile, Paraguay, or Panama?

The very question testifies to the difficulties encountered when a government attempts to invoke universal moral rules as the justification for a policy which will necessarily be selectively applied. Obviously, President Carter and his advisers should have moved beyond the invocation of universal values and general principles to the knotty business of applying them in this notoriously imperfect, intractable world.

measures of the testers' preferences. We have watched segregation denounced as racist and reintroduced by black-power advocates. We have seen enemies become allies, and allies become enemies. We have seen intolerance on the Right largely supplanted by intolerance on the Left.

With these changes in belief about the nature of reality have gone equally wide shifts in the choice and interpretation of values. Within our country in this century we have seen such traditional American values as thrift, hard work, and self-denial give way to "consumer" orientations. We have seen the redefinition of patriotism, of rectitude, of national goals. With the revolution of present beliefs has gone the reevaluation of the past—of white settlers, Indians, the frontier, and the American experience.³⁷

The rate of cultural change has sensitized us, too, to the range of behavior models acceptable to people. As late as 1950, the Beatles or the Grateful Dead—their hair, dress, beat, lyrics, drugs, life-style—would have been quite simply incredible as behavior models. From Horatio Alger to the Midnight Cowboy, from the post-Puritan capitalism of the early twentieth century to the romantic anarchism of the sixties, our own cultural revolution has proceeded—creating cultural stereotypes, inspiring new modes of thinking, dressing, listening, loving, politicking, in short, new ways of being, and leaving in its wake the debris of past identifications and habits. Other societies in other times and places provide still more dramatic proof of the range of human adaptability, the variety of acceptable behavior models: the Hindu widows on funeral pyres, the mendicant orders, the flagellants, the sun kings, the slaves, the slave auctioneers, the Adolf Eichmanns, the hangmen, the pacifists, the feet binders, the Inquisitors, the confessed witches and their accusers. Obviously, human patterns of adaptation are many and varied. Given the myriad ways of perceiving reality, conceiving purposes, and modeling behavior, are we justified in arguing that there are limits to human malleability, that there are varieties of ideology that cannot be translated into culture and institutionalized? That is the question with which we are con-

fronted by those who argue that totalitarian ideology defies institutionalization.

This question turns on the nature of totalitarian ideology, the ingenuity and determination of totalitarian ruling elites, and the limits of human malleability. The goals that totalitarian ideologies postulate have some interesting characteristics already alluded to.

First, the goals are universal. They deal not with concrete aspirations of concrete people, but with the presumed ends of collectivities or trans-empirical powers, e.g., classes, races, history.

Second, they are teleological. They are depersonalized in the sense that they do not derive from the aspirations of concrete persons (past, present, or future) but constitute the "destiny" of some collectivity or trans-empirical power. The ruling elite is, of course, merely the "midwife" or agent of these foreordained purposes. Since the purposes are grounded "in the nature of things" (e.g., the laws of history, the cultural creativity of the Aryan) they are not subject to negotiation, nor influenced by human preferences. Marx put it clearly when he said, "It is not a question of what this or that proletarian, or even the entire proletariat, at one time or another imagines to be its goal. It is a matter of what [the proletariat] is, and what in accordance with that being, it will historically be forced to do."³⁸

Third, the goals are final. They involve replacing flux with stability: the permanent ordering of the world, the thousand-year Reich, the end of history. The totalitarian is not interested in tinkering, in piecemeal resolution of problems, but in final solutions. Final solutions resolve conflict, are the *end* of conflict. Order and harmony replace flux and conflict. Marx communicated this sense of ultimate ordering of man and society with such descriptions of Communism as: "It is the true resolution of the conflict between existence and essence, objectification and self-affirmation, freedom and necessity, individual and species."³⁹

Fourth, the goals are comprehensive, involving everyone, involving all aspects of human life and society.

Fifth, the goals are *moral*, in the sense that they postulate the fulfillment of man's moral mission: the end of exploitation of man by man, the ordering of human life for the achievement of higher culture, the elimination of power as a principle of human relations. The vision of a totalitarian ideologist always includes a future in which the masses have been morally elevated by the revolution. Totalitarian ideologues abhor the pedestrian, the personal, the practical, the self-interested, the materialistic, the conflicted. They seek to replace conflict with unity, flux with stability, materialism with dedication to ideals, self-interest with altruism, "muddling through" with comprehensive planning, messiness with order, politics with utopia.⁴⁰

Sixth, they promise an *end to alienation*. Because they identify individual with collective goals and purposes, totalitarian ideologies are not only anti-individualist, they promise an end to disharmony among individuals and *within* individuals. False consciousness, isolation, anomie, separation, loneliness, purposelessness—all are defined as *subjective consequences of objective social ills*, therefore as capable of being eradicated through social engineering. All twentieth-century radical critiques deplore the loss of individual identification with social roles and social purposes as a curse of modern society. All promise to "solve" man's isolation and to restore him to a full sense of social membership. Peter Berger has argued that the very "essence" of totalitarianism is "the intention of overcoming the modern dichotomy of private and public spheres."⁴¹ Whether or not the dichotomy between self and society is a specifically "modern" phenomenon as Berger argues or a more persistent aspect of human experience as it seems to me, modern totalitarians share a commitment to its elimination.

The totalitarian's methods are as distinctive as his goals. He is, as we have seen, distinguished from other utopians by his willingness—no, his determination—to use state power to achieve these goals. "Scientific" socialists are those that organize and use power to achieve their goals. They understand, even if most of the rest of us do not, that revolutions are made by revolutionaries welded into tight, purposeful organizations of dedicated zealots.

Lenin's advocacy of the cadre party was determined and articulate. Hitler's was no less so.⁴²

Organization, they agree, is the scientific instrument for the seizure of political power. Party is crucial.⁴³ Personal discipline is indispensable.

Doctrine, organization, power, redemption: this is the scientific recipe for revolution. Totalitarians are prepared to use violence to achieve the moral redemption of man and history. Hitler and Lenin were explicit about the need for violence. Both denigrated those unwilling to brandish the sword in implementation of the faith. Hitler wrote, "The lack of a great, creative, renewing idea means at all times a limitation of fighting force. Firm belief in the right to apply even the most brutal weapons is always bound up with the existence of a fanatical faith in the necessity of the victory of a revolutionary new order on this earth."⁴⁴

In the speech that became famous as the "silver platter" speech, Lenin commented on the same subject: "Every time I speak on this subject of proletarian government someone . . . shouts dictator . . . You cannot expect . . . that socialism will be delivered on a silver platter . . . Not a single problem of the class struggle has ever been solved in history without violence. . . . Violence when committed by the toiling masses against the exploiters is the kind of violence of which we approve."⁴⁵

Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that neither of these theoreticians and practitioners of totalitarian revolution discusses the uses of violence in the manner that each discusses many other subjects, including organization, relations with other parties and groups, or propaganda. Neither praises violence for its effect on the wielders in the manner of Frantz Fanon. Neither systematically outlines its use in the achievement of total revolution.⁴⁶ Both are relatively silent on the means to the desired ends.

Lenin's neglect of *how* political power can be used to transform society, culture, and personality is probably explained by his economic determinism. There is good reason to think that the old Bolsheviks literally believed that once the structure of ownership had been altered, the transformation of society, culture, and per-

sonality would follow promptly and automatically. The policies of the War Communism period, when men, women, and children were liberated from traditional institutional restraints—of family, school, prison, factory, office—suggest colossal misunderstanding of the power of habit and the persistence of culture, and a touching faith in their own interpretations. Like Marx, they had predicted the human and cultural revolution without planning for it. But as was his wont, when Lenin was confronted with the practical problem of the persistence of old patterns, he reacted with flexibility, ingenuity, and with few inhibitions about using force to accomplish with power what the automatic working of the laws of economic materialism failed to do.

Totalitarian ideologues share a general tendency to underestimate the difficulties of achieving social and cultural character change. The reason doubtless lies in their original assumption that the observed imperfections of man are the result of bad institutions. If, as Marx suggested, the economic system is the root of evil, then it is only necessary to reorder it to abolish evil. If, as Fanon suggested, the political order is the root of all evil, then it is only necessary to reorder it to abolish evil. Just a little violence will eradicate the accumulated resentments.

The possibility that institutions reflect people as much as people reflect institutions is never seriously entertained by the totalitarian ideologue. This possibility would cast doubt on his goals, plans, and prospects; it would endanger the moral status of the outrage which serves as psychological foundation for the whole ideology.

All totalitarian ideologies (and many reformers) underestimate the power of habit. It is no accident that appreciation of the role of habit in sustaining society, culture, and personality is characteristic of conservative political philosophers—of men like Hume, Burke, Bradley. The role of habit in human affairs carries with it a pervasive pessimism about the practicability of blueprints for broad reform. It breeds sensitivity to the possibility that revolution may increase the total of human misery without increasing man's moral, intellectual, or spiritual perfection—as rulers who

underestimate human orneriness turn to terror when persuasion and automatic adjustment fail. Robespierre and his fellow zealots, Cromwell's fanatical lieutenants, the old Bolsheviks, and Adolf Hitler—all progressively widened the scope of coercion as it became clear that it was easier to destroy a ruling class than a dominant culture. For each, imprisonment, torture, execution, and terror became symbols of "liberation." That totalitarian ideologues should prove ruthless in their determination to force reform, merciless in use of force to accomplish their ends, should not surprise us. After all, their contempt for the corrupt, petty, materialistic slob of the existing society has been, in each case, clearly stated. Their moral claim, it should be remembered, derived not from respect for actual men, but from their contemplation of the gap between what men are and what they might become.

But it seems clear that even when they possess the coercive power of government and wield it in the service of their "moral" vision, the odds are against the totalitarians achieving the desired revolution of society, culture, and personality. Totalitarian revolutionaries never start from scratch, but always from an existing society with its existing culture and human types. The revolutionaries themselves have passed through the old culture and are always in jeopardy of falling into the old ways of thinking and being. The big problem is with their goals. Because they affirm the abstract over the concrete, the universal over the particular, the ideal over the material, the social over the personal, unity over conflict, totalitarian goals require that ordinary people renounce the ways of thinking and being that have characterized people known to human history and achieve habitual levels of dedication associated till now with heroes and saints.

Can any revolution bring it off? Can any such ideology be transformed into culture? The question brings us face to face with "human nature"—the extent to which it is biologically or, in Freud's term, constitutionally determined. The question is as old as political philosophy. The terms of the debate on human malleability and politics have remained remarkably stable since Aristotle rejected Plato's blueprint for the ideal state on grounds

that it could never work because it was based on an unrealistic conception of man (and woman). In rejecting Plato's scheme for abolition of the family, strict regulation of sexual unions, and absolute community of possessions, Aristotle stated with consummate clarity the basic attraction and weakness of proposals for revolutionizing human society:

Legislation such as Plato proposes may appear to wear an attractive face and to argue benevolence. The hearer receives it gladly, thinking that everybody will feel towards everybody else some marvelous sense of fraternity—all the more as the evils now existing under ordinary forms of government (lawsuits about contracts, convictions for perjury, and obsequious flatteries of the rich) are denounced as due to the absence of a system of common property. None of these evils, however, is due to the absence of communism. They all arise from the wickedness of human nature.⁴⁷

The debate about the malleability of human nature has achieved special practical importance in this century, when for the first time in human history successive groups of revolutionary leaders determined to alter and control society, culture, and personality through the purposeful use of political power have managed to achieve power and hold on to it long enough to influence the socialization of successive generations. The life span of the Nazi regime was too brief to provide a test. Hitler's impact was intense and devastating, yet the total time from his rise to fall was only twelve years (1933–45).

But the world has already celebrated the sixtieth anniversary of the Soviet Union. Its rulers have had more than half a century to employ formal education, habit, imitation, group pressure, mass media, terror, and other environmental controls to bring about internalization of new norms and new behavior patterns. During their six decades in power, Bolshevik leaders have succeeded in developing a strong government, a military technology and strength that is second to none, and an empire that stretches from

the Berlin Wall to the Sea of Japan, from Mozambique to Mongolia.

But have they managed to reform human consciousness? Have they managed to educate Soviet citizens so that they would freely choose to behave according to the norms of Soviet culture *if the constraints of coercion were removed*? The answer, of course, is that we do not know. Nor is there much opportunity to investigate the question. We know that in Eastern Europe, Communist leaders found it necessary to build a wall and to fortify frontiers to keep their citizens from fleeing those nascent utopias. We know that even now there are thousands of Jews in the USSR who incur drastic penalties for expressing a desire to emigrate. We know that there is a steady trickle of Soviet defectors among the small privileged group of entertainers and scientists allowed outside the Communist bloc. We know that hundreds of thousands of Cubans have fled each time they have had a chance. From intermittent trials and sentences, *samizdat*, expulsions from writers' unions, and official denunciations, from Solzhenitsyn, Sakharov, Synavsky, and Amlarik, we know that till now the Soviet Union has continued to produce artists, writers, and intellectuals whose ways of seeing, thinking, and valuing are unsatisfactory to the overseers of revolution. And, of course, there is that most famous failure of socialization: Stalin's daughter Svetlana, whose predilections for religion and individual freedom must have constituted a special embarrassment to socialist psychological engineering. But we know almost nothing about the subjectivities of Soviet masses. Public opinion polls, competitive elections, free emigration, and other measures of individual attitudes are unavailable to the student of Soviet politics.

It can, in any case, be argued that despite its shorter life, Communist China rather than the Soviet Union is a better testing ground for the achievement of totalitarian goals. At least through the period of the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese worked harder at the thought reform of a whole population. They were, moreover, more innovative, more determined, more clear about the priority of this task for the achievement of their revolution.⁴⁸

The Cultural Revolution had no Soviet equivalent. Its denigration and rejection of traditional culture—including masterpieces of traditional art—contrast starkly with the Soviet and Eastern European assimilation of traditional art; its massive campaign against intellectuals, scientists, managers, and experts and its proliferation of labor universities had no Soviet parallel. By preferring moral goals to industrial ones, purity to efficiency, by improvising new institutions for the tasks of cultural revolution, by the repeated and vigorous use of brutal overwhelming force against old ideas and habits, the rulers of Communist China attempted to succeed where other totalitarian rulers have failed. But the prime example of the “new” Chinese man was only that institutionalized zealot: the Red Guard. More recently, evidence has multiplied that like other revolutionaries the Chinese too may be abandoning the quest. The most experienced China-watchers are agreed that the crest of utopian revolution is past, that after the orgy of the Cultural Revolution, technology, modernization, order, and efficiency have again taken priority over the reform of culture, society, and personality.

It is always possible that improved technology, superior knowledge of social and psychological factors, and the sophisticated and uninhibited use of force will enable some ruling groups to succeed where all other totalitarian reformers have failed. The use of drugs to alter human consciousness presents interesting new possibilities for restructuring personality and culture. But history, pockmarked with the failure of utopian communities, suggests otherwise. Existing evidence suggests that doctrine turns out to be more malleable than human nature, that conformity to totalitarian behavior models is easier to secure than conversion, that the “new” morality turns out to be more effective in coercing than liberating, and that the “new” rulers bear a remarkable and discouraging resemblance to the old tyrants.

In considering whether it is possible that a totalitarian state can be stable and enduring, it is clear, as Carl Friedrich pointed out, that “totalitarian dictatorship, like other political phenomena, is a relative rather than an absolute category.”⁴⁹ It is clear, too,

that total rulers, “once they have seized power and commenced to build a totalitarian system, find themselves seriously troubled by the more utopian aspects of their ideology, as well as by the consequences of trying to put some of them into effect.”⁵⁰ But it is also true that the lack of quick success has not led contemporary totalitarian rulers to cease trying to remold man and to construct and preserve a culture and institutions consistent with their ideology. The rulers of contemporary Communist nations may occasionally feel, like Lenin, that “the vital work we do is sinking in a dead sea of paperwork.”⁵¹ It is conceivable that some are revolted by their own violence. But they have not abandoned their efforts to stay in power and to exercise comprehensive control over society, culture, and personality. These efforts distinguish them from other autocrats and from democrats. Because they have not abandoned the effort, they remain monuments to the danger of mixing utopianism and power.

II. THE LANGUAGE OF DECEPTION

COMMUNIST PARTIES, which we carelessly call Communism, achieve political power through political contests. This fact, which appears almost to be a tautology, is repeatedly, and in some cases systematically, overlooked and obscured. Its implications are of extreme importance. To assert that Communists achieve power by competition at the political level implies, first, that they are not swept into power on the tides of historical inevitability; second, that except where they gain control through military occupation, the success of Communist parties is determined by the political

sort -- the kind that pits nation against nation, splinters societies, scorns compromise and fans conflict.

This threat comes when leaders focus pent-up energies not on the urgent business of building a new society, dedicated to democracy -- but on the settling of old scores; when nations use their new-found freedom not to secure peace, but to feed rage, revenge and anger.

The nations of the world are not defenseless against this threat. Our bulwark remains democracy.

Now, with the ascendancy of the democratic idea -- with the prospect of a new world within our reach..... [etc.]

Democracy means far more than simply the rule of the majority. It means the safeguarding of minority rights -- it means the sanctity of even a single individual against the unchecked power of the state.

For the sake of true democracy, the nations of the world must work together in the name of human rights. / For the sake of true democracy, we must resolve to uphold the rule of law -- so that majority will never degenerates into majority whim. / Yes, we must join forces when need be, as we did in Desert Storm -- to defend sovereignty, and defeat the forces of aggression. But for the sake of true democracy, we must be equally vigilant against the forces that destroy nations from within -- and pull their neighbors into a vortex of violence. //

#

We should have made ratification of this defense agreement by such an institution a condition for implementation. Having failed to do so, we should now follow the agreement with a proper treaty that is openly debated and ultimately ratified by elected legislatures in both countries.

To that end, we must encourage our ally, the Emir of Kuwait, to hold elections in order to convene such a body, as his own citizens demand.

The 10-year agreement we have signed involves a commitment of U.S. resources. Under it, the U.S. will preposition military equipment, conduct joint military exercises with Kuwaiti

Jill Crystal teaches political science at the University of Michigan.

arrangements collapse after the fall of unstable nonelected leaders. Granted, Kuwait's Emir is not the Shah. This agreement does have genuine support among the Kuwaitis. Our embassy in Kuwait probably is our only third world outpost splattered with pro-American graffiti. Our forces were welcomed by Kuwaitis, who despised the Iraqi occupation. Our presence is still welcome, but will it continue to be?

Fortunately, there is a way to know. For most of its independent history, Kuwait has had an elected National Assembly, albeit one with limited suffrage (adult male nationals) and responsibilities. The Emir dissolved that assembly in 1986 and has not reconstituted it, despite popular demands to do so — demands that

the Kuwaitis' continuing support. After all, who knows if the Emir will be in power in 10 years? While the Kuwaiti Cabinet has approved the agreement, it is not enough to have such an accord ratified by an appointed Cabinet, half of whose members also belong to the Emir's family.

We need something more durable. We need to legitimize our continuing presence with the Kuwaiti people, not just their ruler, and we need a mechanism for assessing the continuing popularity of that presence.

We should make a democratically approved treaty — publically debated, popularly sanctioned — the basis of our presence in Kuwait, and we should make that kind of treaty the ideal toward which we work in the other gulf states. □

The 1991 Innovations in State and Local Government Awards Winners

Ten Shining Examples of Government At Its Best

Foreign Affairs

LESLIE H. GELB

Why the U.N. Dog Didn't Bark

Why didn't world leaders and diplomats applaud President Bush's speech to the U.N. on Monday? Wasn't he finally shelving stale cold war rhetoric and moving on to the new agenda in world politics — freedom, democracy and economic progress — the agenda so long so dear to U.N. members?

It may be because of a revolutionary message about humanitarian intervention barely audible throughout the text, a message nonetheless sensed by representatives of despots and democracies alike that frightened all with its implications — seemingly even Mr. Bush by the time he finished.

This explanation seems plausible because otherwise the U.N. dog should have barked at the sound of Mr. Bush's kindly words. His speech, after all, met the usual standards. It was general, pious, uncontaminated by specifics and delivered in the flaccid manner proven to animate diplomatic ovations.

True, Mr. Bush didn't promise to pay the hundreds of millions in back U.S. dues, and nobody likes rich deadbeats. Granted, he also failed to provide the obligatory five-point plan to resuscitate U.N. machinery.

A more grievous Bush error, to many U.N. members, was to propose that the U.N. rescind its resolution condemning Zionism as a form of racism. Most member states (unfamiliar as they are with ill treatment of their citizenry) were upset at the thought of lifting just about the only moral judgment they could ever agree upon.

It would seem that most U.N. mem-

Mr. Bush's incendiary theme.

bers wish U.N. interference in the internal affairs of states to end right there, with Israel. Full stop. But what Mr. Bush was sometimes saying and sometimes hinting was that he would go much further — to question and attack the centuries-old notion of sovereignty that permits states to do what they will with their own people within established borders.

When he spoke of "collective settlement of disputes," he was talking not only of joint action against external aggression but of "international co-operation" against internal feuds and injustices. That could apply to most U.N. member states where freedom and democracy are concepts to be debated only at international conferences far from home. Try China or Syria for starters.

Referring to "nationalist passions," Mr. Bush went on to say that no one can "promise that today's borders will remain fixed. . . ." This must have been like a stake in the heart of most attendees. To begin with, think of Yugoslavia and Tibet, Spain and its Basque separatists, most African states or India.

"Despots ignore the heartening fact that the rest of the world is embarked upon a new age of liberty," Mr. Bush proclaimed. If he had stopped there, his listeners might have shrugged off the rhetoric. But

any doubts about his meaning must have been removed when he made clear that economic sanctions against Iraq would remain in force as long as Saddam Hussein "remains in power." His stated aim was not simply to roll back Iraqi aggression against Kuwait, but to eliminate an undesirable regime.

Mr. Bush was declaring for natural law, for "inalienable human rights" above the laws of states. He was telling his worried listeners that now is the time for the U.N. "to resume the important business of promoting the values that I've discussed today."

What could be more revolutionary, more threatening to the regimes that inhabit the U.N.? But who would decide when states offended natural rights? The U.N.? The U.S.? And who would intervene to protect the oppressed, and how?

Perhaps Bush speechwriters chose this challenging rhetoric without understanding its full implications. In any event, in the last-minute scramble over the draft, someone — perhaps Mr. Bush — must have glimpsed the nearing philosophical precipice. For at the end the text veered unexpectedly off in a contradictory and reassuring direction. Mr. Bush said the U.N. "should not dictate the particular forms of government" for nations, and that in his "new world order" no nation "must surrender one iota of its own sovereignty. . . ."

The speech ended about there. Leaders and delegates applauded politely and respectfully. But they did not like what they thought they had heard, nor the debate it may inspire. □

Inno

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DATE: 9/18


NOTE FOR: CHRISS WINSTON
DAN MCGROARTY

The President has reviewed the attached, and it is forwarded to
you for your:

information

☐

action

☒

Thank you.

James W. Cicconi
Assistant to the President
and Deputy to the Chief of Staff
(x-2702)

cc:

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 15, 1989

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: CHRISS WINSTON *ew*

FROM: DANIEL MCGROARTY *DM*

SUBJECT: UN SPEECH -- PERSONAL REMINISCENCES

As the first former UN Ambassador to address the General Assembly as President, your reminiscences of your days in the UN offer a unique opportunity in your upcoming UN speech.

Brief mention of your recollections at the beginning of your speech would lend a personal tone -- and at the same time establish that you speak as one who knows the UN from the inside. We would appreciate whatever recollections you could provide regarding your thoughts as you sat in the General Assembly at the opening of the 26th Session 18 years ago, your impressions as a new Ambassador on the responsibilities of your assignment, on the opportunities or potential of the UN, etc.

You may be interested to know that eight of the current UN ambassadors served in the same capacity during your ambassadorship in 1971-1973.

1. Be sure we get the proper formal salutation in the very beginning. Joseph Reed can help on UN protocol... But we must properly salute the Sec. general and the Pres. of the General Assembly.

Might mention the names of the perm reps who were there when I was.

also the fact that so many perm reps go on to lead their countries.

Excuse the personal reminiscing but this in a sense is like coming home." As in one's school days one makes fast friends here- friendships that cut across political boundaries:"

"Under our able Sec General the UN is widely recognized as having a renewed role in the important area of Peacekeeping. I salute the efforts of our able Sec General." 9check this with Brent)

Find a subtle way to tease, not ridicule, the length of the speeches....

*DM - Chriss
See below
and over*

Possible:.....

I'll never forget one meeting of the Security Council. I was US Perm Rep. I was 45 minutes late getting to the meeting. One speaker had been going on and on for the full 45 minutes. He saw me walk in and take the US seat at the table. He stopped his remarks and said "Oh I am so glad that the US Perm Rep. could join us. And now for his benefit I will start over. The groan that went up from the room transcended ideological lines, historic alliances, regional differences.... The whole place groaned in unison and the laughter broke out....

I will try not to compete with his record breaking oratory." etc etc

Possible- I'm not hooked on it.

Friendships are formed here; Genuine Understanding is Enhanced Here; a Genuine sense of service prevails here- from the security people, the people who work in the Delegates Lounge, those who work in the dining room, run the elevators, there is a UN spirit a spirit of fraternity and that is good.

09 SEP 18 P12:18

He said, "All right, Molotov will go." Molotov then whispered in his ear, which I couldn't fully hear, but said something to the effect of, "Oh, I can't go, I have other engagements." Stalin said, "Molotov will go," and brushed him aside. That's how Molotov got to the United Nations.

I had sought to carry out Roosevelt's policy objectives. I thought, of course, in carrying out those objectives, that it was very important for the Russians to be there and to have their first team. I didn't think Mr. Molotov was the most cooperative man in the world, and in some ways, I believed much more could have been accomplished with Vishinsky, who was very clever. But as far as the objectives of the United Nations were concerned at that time, I was very much in support of them.

Truman was also very anxious to carry out Roosevelt's ideas. I saw him when I came back from Moscow. He said, "I want to know everything that Roosevelt felt on the issues that are coming up in the United Nations." He said, "It was Roosevelt that was elected president. I wasn't, so I must find out what the Roosevelt ideas are and carry them out." Of course, when he got reelected, he was very much himself and Truman put a stamp on the American political scene in his own right. But in his earliest days, he was very anxious to fully carry out Roosevelt's programs. Of course, he continued to carry them out, . . . the New Deal and that sort of thing, because he believed in them. But in the early days, it was in order to make sure he carried out what was in Roosevelt's mind. There was a certain unity of purpose between Roosevelt and Truman. I think the time [periods] that the two men served as president will be joined together as one period in our history.

It's a great tragedy that the American people haven't been brought to respect the UN more closely. It is very important to have men and women of stature representing the United States at the United Nations. They carry weight with the public as well as with the UN delegates from other countries. I'm not against the bureaucrats in the United Nations, but some important personalities contribute especially effectively. I think George Bush, for example, is one of the very important personalities in the American political scene today. I knew his father intimately; he was my partner. Anything George Bush did I was very respectful of. I hope someday he will be president when we have to have a Republican.

Andrew Young was in charge of leading the American delegation. He was so busy doing so much attention to this subcommittee everything that went on in the representatives. I recognized him; he was very fond of him and I took. But I don't remember denying that. I hope he finally did.

I have always been a strong feeling we ought to give it our full attention to continue to have an influential role using every opportunity that the United Nations and encourage we have to recognize that the war has started. That has probably

Frelinghuysen. The delegation to the General Assembly included Eleanor Roosevelt, Carl Rowan, Marietta Tree, Jane Warner Dick, Sidney Yates, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State (for International Organization Affairs) Richard Gardner, William P. Rogers (later secretary of state under Richard Nixon), Patricia Roberts Harris, Harding Bancroft, Robert Benjamin (of Orion Pictures) and Jean Picker of the UN Association of the United States.

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Security Council, and later as deputy representative under George Bush; W. Tapley Bennett served in the number-three spot in 1971-73, and as deputy representative during 1973-77; and William E. Schaufele served as deputy representative on the Security Council in 1973-75.

The congressional delegates included Senators Jacob Javits, Claiborne Pell, Gale McGee, Charles Percy, Stuart Symington, and George McGovern; Representatives Dante Fascell, John H. Buchanan, Jr., and Donald Fraser. Among the public delegates were Shirley Temple Black, Rita Hauser, Daniel Moynihan, Alan B. Shepard, Margaret B. Young, and William F. Buckley, Jr.

SOURCES

General information about the United Nations and the U.S. Mission during this period may be found in *Everyone's United Nations* (New York: UN Office of Public Information, 1979); *U.N. Annual Yearbook* (New York: United Nations, 1970-78); *Issues Before the General Assembly of the United Nations* (New York: UN Association of the United States, 1970-78); Thomas Hovet, *A Chronology and Fact Book of the United Nations, 1941-1979* (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceania, 1979); *U.S. Participation in the U.N.* (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 1969-76); and Seymour Maxwell Finger, *Your Man At The UN* (New York: New York University Press, 1980). Also useful on specific issues are Daniel Patrick Moynihan (with Suzanne Weaver), *A Dangerous Place* (New York: Berkley, 1980), and William F. Buckley, Jr., *U.N. Journal* (New York: Putnam, 1974).

CHRISTOPHER PHILLIPS
the Security Council, 1969;
United Nations, 1970-73.

I think generally the UN is the Soviet Union and perhaps You could also exclude France with a good deal of cynicism Netherlands, and many of them ever its shortcomings, the effective.

After stints in the Air Force and was elected to the Massachusetts Eisenhower's 1952 presidential In 1953 when he was named special for UN affairs. "I have always In fact, I was born in an American for forty years my father was as assistant to Robert Murphy organizing a local United World "This was just after the war and national affairs. We felt somewhat later became deputy assistant affairs, but he left that post to Commission (1957). In 1958, Economic and Social Council.

When the Kennedy administration Manhattan Bank as manager of adviser on international affairs. of the International Chamber of international economic affairs.

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CHRISTOPHER PHILLIPS: Deputy Permanent Representative on
the Security Council, 1969; Deputy Permanent Representative to the
United Nations, 1970-73.

*I think generally the UN is taken seriously, except by such countries as
the Soviet Union and perhaps China, which is still not very involved.
You could also exclude France, which has tended to look at the UN
with a good deal of cynicism. But the Scandinavian countries, the
Netherlands, and many of the smaller nations really believe that what-
ever its shortcomings, the UN should be supported and made more
effective.*

After stints in the Air Force and as a newspaper reporter, Christopher H. Phillips
was elected to the Massachusetts State Senate in 1948. An active supporter of
Eisenhower's 1952 presidential campaign, Phillips began his foreign-affairs career
in 1953 when he was named special assistant to the assistant secretary of state
for UN affairs. "I have always had a deep interest in foreign affairs," he notes.
"In fact, I was born in an American embassy overseas (in the Netherlands), and
for forty years my father was a career diplomat." Phillips accepted the position
as assistant to Robert Murphy. "At that time I also had been quite active in
organizing a local United World Federalist chapter in Massachusetts," he recalls.
"This was just after the war and many of us . . . were very idealistic about inter-
national affairs. We felt somehow we could change things for the better." Phillips
later became deputy assistant secretary of state for international-organization
affairs, but he left that post to become vice chairman of the U.S. Civil Service
Commission (1957). In 1958, he was appointed U.S. representative to the UN
Economic and Social Council.

When the Kennedy administration took office, Phillips joined the Chase
Manhattan Bank as manager of its Canadian division and as David Rockefeller's
adviser on international affairs. In 1965 he became president of the U.S. Council
of the International Chamber of Commerce, where he maintained his interest in
international economic affairs.

In 1969 Phillips joined the Nixon administration as deputy U.S. representa-
tive to the Security Council (1969-70) and then became deputy representative
to the United Nations (1970-73)—both posts having the rank of ambassador. He
served under Charles Yost and then George Bush. In 1973 Phillips left the

United Nations to become president of the newly created National Council for U.S.-China Trade. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and the U.S. Committee for UNICEF, as well as a director of the UN Association of the United States.

One of my early assignments at the UN concerned the seating of Communist China in the UN. Originally, American policy recognized only the Republic of China [Taiwan] as the government of China. During the earlier years, because the UN's membership was much smaller, our policy of supporting the seating of the Republic of China was relatively easy to maintain. But by the late 1960s, things clearly began to change—if I may say so, somewhat belatedly.

I think the first visible evidence of a shift in our policy was reflected in a speech that I gave before the General Assembly in the fall of 1970. That was the first time that an official of the United States in a UN body referred to what we used to call Communist China as the "People's Republic of China." The speech was played up in the front pages of many papers and it was interpreted as the beginning of a shift.

By that time Washington was beginning to think in terms of a policy, which we always denied was a two-China policy, but which had many of the characteristics of a two-China policy. We hoped that we could maintain a seat for Taiwan in the General Assembly, while admitting the PRC into the Security Council as well as the General Assembly. We finessed the question as to precisely which entity would be China. It would presumably still be the Republic of China, but since Peking's delegation would have been seated in the Security Council, this would have given them a status which most other members would have accepted as the official delegation of China.

We waged a long and strenuous campaign to try to achieve both of these objectives. We said we were in favor of the admission of the PRC but we wished to retain a seat in the General Assembly for the Republic of China. We felt at the mission that we had a better than 50-50 chance of succeeding because we had mobilized substantial support through careful preparation—a lot of hard work and extensive consultation with other delegations. But what probably pulled the rug out from under our efforts more than anything else was the

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newly created National Council for Council on Foreign Relations, the U.S. Committee for UNICEF, the United States.

UN concerned the seating of the Republic of China, American policy recognized the government of China.

UN's membership was much affected by the seating of the Republic of China. But by the late 1960s, things were somewhat belatedly.

of a shift in our policy was made at the General Assembly in the late 1960s that an official of the United States used to call Communist China. The speech was played and it was interpreted as the

beginning to think in terms of a two-China policy, but which was a two-China policy. We hoped to win in the General Assembly, Security Council as well as the question as to precisely which government would be the Republic of China. It would have been seated in the General Assembly and given them a status which most would accept as the official delegation of the

campaign to try to achieve both the admission of the Republic of China to the General Assembly for the first time. We had a better chance than we had mobilized substantial resources. A lot of hard work and extensive. But what probably pulled more than anything else was the

surprise announcement of Henry Kissinger's visit to Peking. None of us had any advance knowledge of this development; I don't believe even George Bush did. I think the whole thing was held very closely to prevent any premature leaks.

From that point on, our position clearly began to be in trouble. We at the mission did feel, just a few weeks before the vote, that we had a fighting chance but that it would be very, very close. We believed that if we could get all of our [supporters] on the floor to vote, we could make it. Japan worked very closely with us and we also had some of the Latin American countries. The Philippines worked closely with us, too, as did Thailand, but not the Indonesians. In Europe, of course, it differed. In the beginning, Belgium was with us, but at the last minute there was again one of those unpleasant surprises. The Belgian ambassador had to inform us, a couple of days before the vote, that he had received instructions to change his vote from supporting us to abstaining. We then began to see an erosion of support the last two or three days. We did meet regularly with the different regional caucuses of the countries that supported our positions, and in cooperation with them, we worked out our strategy. But when we got right down to the last day or two, and, in particular, the night of the vote, we were simply outmaneuvered.

One of the key tactical decisions was taken during the early evening of the day on which the vote took place. It was getting close to the dinner hour. A well-known UN figure, Ambassador Baroud of Saudi Arabia (one of the cleverest tacticians and parliamentarians in the UN), took the floor and proposed an adjournment for dinner. We fought that hard because we knew that the minute all those delegations left the floor and went to dinner, some wouldn't come back; the votes were so close at that point that we couldn't afford to lose one. We were defeated on the vote for adjournment, and at that point I think most of us felt the game was up. Indeed, when the General Assembly reassembled an hour or so later, several of our key votes were missing; some small delegations just didn't show up and could not be found anywhere. I think the other side had gotten to them, and to avoid embarrassment, they decided to absent themselves. So we lost. The U.S. Mission had done its best, but clearly Washington's decision to go ahead as it did undercut any hopes we had of succeeding.

FROM A BOOK CALLED REPRESENTING AMERICA.
DIFFERENT CHAPTERS FROM DIFFERENT US UN
AMBASSADORS

GEORGE BUSH: Permanent Representative and Chief of the U.S.
Mission to the United Nations, 1971-72.

During my early days in politics, I was highly critical of the UN. I felt it was falling short of its promise from the late '40s. I saw it become increasingly unable to be useful in its peacekeeping roles. After I served there, my view changed. I felt that the UN was particularly helpful in the economic and social areas [ECOSOC]. I favored certain of the multilateral efforts in the health field, food field, population field, etc. Sometimes it is much better to use multilateral diplomacy and I saw that clearly after being at the UN.

A former oil-industry executive and Texas Republican congressman, George Herbert Walker Bush was named U.S. representative to the United Nations by President Nixon in 1971. Bush cofounded and developed the Zapata Offshore Company (1956-64), and later advanced to chairman (1964-66). Convinced that businessmen "ought to take an interest in politics," Bush was active in Republican politics in the Houston area. From 1967 to 1970 he served in the U.S. House of Representatives. After losing a Senate race in 1970, Bush was appointed to the UN post. His informal, energetic style, amiable personality, and access to President Nixon won him the respect of fellow delegates. In 1971 Bush advocated the Nixon administration's two-China policy—a compromise under which the United States would support the admission of Communist China while calling for the continued membership of Taiwan. Although Bush tried to win sufficient support for the compromise, the assembly voted to expel Taiwan.

In 1972 he left the United Nations to become chairman of the Republican National Committee; in 1974 President Ford named him head of the U.S. Liaison Office in China. Two years later, he became director of the Central Intelligence Agency, where he instituted structural and procedural reforms. Considered a potential running mate for Nixon and later for Ford, Bush decided to wage his own presidential campaign for 1980. He then became Ronald Reagan's vice-presidential nominee on the Republicans' successful ticket against Carter and Mondale. **AND THEN...**

I felt [after serving there] that the UN was an extremely useful place at which to conduct bilateral diplomacy. It's a fantastic place for meeting future world leaders—getting to know them on a friendship basis. As vice president, I continually run into people from all over the world with whom I served at the United Nations.

It also found the UN to be frustrating in some ways—the attacks on the United States, and so on. The UN passed a lot of irrelevant

You can say that again!

resolutions, and I think that diminished its effectiveness. There's an awful lot of rhetorical overkill at the UN. In the General Assembly, the debates were often not real debates, [with] no real give and take, as in giving a speech and [having] someone exercising a right to reply, for example. But it still was a worthwhile forum in which to vent one's frustrations or one's desires or one's goals.

In securing support of U.S. policies, our home mission worked the diplomatic circuit very, very hard. We had excellent political officers, we contacted everyone—no mission was too small. I, as ambassador, would not hesitate to go to a small African country's representative. The UN job is much more than making speeches and posturing. To be really effective in terms of securing votes, you have to get out and work at it. I liked that part of the job; I liked the politics of the UN.

In terms of cooperation or disagreement with the Western allies, generally speaking, we had very close relations and stayed together on most of the important questions. There were of course exceptions. As for the Soviet Union, we had many differences, and they're on the record. I got along with Ambassador Malik of the Soviet Union and made it a point to work with him. But our differences were pronounced on most political issues.

As to the Group of 77, I became frustrated at group positions that I knew individual members did not support. But again, we had to work on various questions to get the support of different members in the group.

As to the tenor of the times, the biggest questions in the political field were the India/Pakistan War, the Taiwan question—entry of China into the United Nations—and certain events in the Middle East. The principal challenge did relate to the Chinese-representation question. Ours was not a two-China proposal in the technicalities of the proposal. There was a dual-representation proposal which was termed “two Chinas” by some. There is a distinction, given the fact that both Taiwan and Peking consider that there is one China. Given the new U.S. opening to China at the time of the UN debate, it was extraordinarily difficult to keep out votes—votes that had been committed to the dual-representation position. The issue was extraordinarily emotional, but when it was over, the United States properly shifted gears and, in the UN context, dealt with the realities at hand.

In terms of tilting toward Pakistan, the U.S. position is on the record there at the UN. We used our best efforts to try to help stop

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For the permanent relationship between the U.S. and Vietnam is an important component of the U.S. foreign policy. General U Thant and Secretary of State are of the opinion that the relationship do matter a great deal. If there is no friction or if there is no friction, the secretary of state are of the opinion that his instructions through the secretary shall decree. And thus the relationship with the secretary of state sometimes conflicting significantly. The secretary of state rep to the UN does a balance.

The UN's greatest strengths, and its greatest weaknesses, are involved in its efforts to bring peace to troubled situations.

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the war between India and Pakistan. But most of the bilateral diplomacy on that one was conducted by Dr. Kissinger in Washington.

I believe strongly in personal relationships in bilateral diplomacy or multilateral diplomacy. I think the United States should not be above going to the smaller embassies, meeting with the ambassadors from smaller countries, working with the regional groups, etc. Some countries' representatives at the UN have considerable flexibility in their positions, and if you have a personal relationship, you find you can get the benefit of the doubt on certain issues. It's not always true, of course, and it's certainly not true with the big powers. But it does work, and in addition, it is important that the human side of the United States is seen through the eyes of diplomats from other countries. I am not naive enough, however, to believe that people would change their fundamental convictions based on personal relationships.

For the permanent rep, access to the White House is important. It's the perception more than the reality, in my view. The relationship between the U.S. perm rep and the secretary general of the UN is an important component. I had many meetings with Secretary General U Thant and Secretary General Waldheim. These relationships do matter a great deal. Word spreads through the UN if there is friction or if there is indeed compatibility. The relations with the secretary of state are of course important. The UN ambassador gets his instructions through the secretary of state, or as the president shall decree. And thus both the access to the White House and relations with the secretary of state are important. It's not always easy—sometimes conflicting signals come forth, and it is then that the perm rep to the UN does a balancing act.

The UN's greatest strength lies in the economic and social objectives, and its greatest weakness lies in its inability to bring instant peace to troubled situations—particularly when the larger powers are involved.

W. TAPLEY BENNETT, JR.: Deputy Permanent Representative on the Security Council, 1971-72; and Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 1973-76.

We should treat nations fairly and even generously, but, at the same time, defend our own rights. I think we have to stand up for what we believe, and should expect other people to understand our concerns even as we try to understand theirs. I believe in a perfectly honest approach.

Dubbed the "dean of U.S. diplomats" by the *New York Times* when he retired from the Foreign Service in 1983, W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., has had a long and active career as a diplomat, with assignments in Latin America, Europe, and the United Nations. In 1945, only four years after entering the Foreign Service, Bennett served as an adviser to the U.S. delegation at the UN conference in San Francisco. He served again as an adviser to the U.S. delegation at the United Nations in 1950.

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I was at the UN during the Third World's rise in importance, and they were quite unified in the beginning. Now, of course, they've got their own internal differences. But I was there during the period when they were at their maximum of unity, and the Algerians were running it [Group of 77]; Abdelaziz Bouteflika was their foreign minister. They ran it with a whip hand. They'd have these meetings, and if they had trouble, they'd just stay until after midnight, after

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In 1976 we had the Aegean dispute [over rights on the continental shelf] between Greece and Turkey. That was certainly one of my major accomplishments and satisfactions; we worked on that for weeks. We finally got a reasonable resolution out of the Security Council that both countries lived with, and it started them [off] to negotiating again and having exchanges and visits and meetings between the foreign ministers. Nothing really had been resolved, but at least they did not go to war, which they had been close to doing.

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secretary, and the secretary himself, not to speak of the White House. On those very hot affairs, it didn't always mean that the assistant secretary was cut out—he was not; but the kind of preparatory and analytical work that is done at the working level of the State Department did not get done. The basis of general policy was made in this way, and then you would try to shape your tactics, your words, and proposals to the general policy.

President Nixon did not like to be bothered with more minute issues, and I think that shows up in the studies I have seen of his administration. It had to be pretty important for him to get interested. Some perm reps did not like to use whatever clout they had with the White House—they did not want to waste it—so they tended to be sparing. Others would turn to the White House, whenever they got resistance from the State Department or someplace else, and [would] try to get a White House decision, which overrides everything. Very seldom, in my knowledge, did any of them talk directly with the president. I should add that while the perm rep is a member of the cabinet, in every administration so far, meetings of the cabinet have tended to decrease in frequency, the longer the president is in office.

Andrew Young had direct access to the president, and I think that was unusual for two reasons. If you look at the Carter administration, Andy and the president had a relationship before he took office, and Carter was very interested in details and so he didn't object to being talked to about detailed matters. Andy was a very unorthodox politician. I am not saying that he didn't think things out in advance, but he would be more willing to depart from past practice in how he handled his bureaucratic or White House relations. I think Young was almost unique, because Adlai Stevenson didn't have it, Cabot Lodge didn't have it, George Bush didn't have it—I don't know what Moynihan had—John Scali didn't have it; so I wouldn't know of anybody (certainly Yost didn't have it) who had that almost immediate access to the president and on detailed matters simultaneously.

Personalities

George Bush is a politician's politician. He has a very deep sense of responsibility, and he places a great deal of emphasis on his relationships and contacts. He didn't always follow the issues as

it's just unacceptable." Actually, it's a good tactic up to a certain point. You don't offer any amendment, you just tell them [the opposition] it's bad and you're not going to vote for it and you're going to encourage everybody else not to vote for it. That starts them on the procedure of trying to find modifications or amendments which would make it acceptable to us.

The relationship with Washington had a somewhat difficult aspect during the years that I was there because there wasn't a whole lot of enthusiasm for the United Nations in the Nixon administration. They realized they had to cope with it, but they were not inclined to make any significant departures from past factors or even to take any initiatives.

The biggest problem to this day in our relationship with the UN is getting people who can make decisions to focus soon enough on what's coming up. We knew the assembly was coming every year [in September], we knew what 95 percent of the agenda items were, and what the differing viewpoints would be. Every year we would send a message to all embassies abroad to discuss, in various degrees of detail or intensity, the issues of the next General Assembly. These things never went out, at the earliest, until the middle of August, and by that time most of the other governments, especially the smaller ones, had pretty well done their analysis and made the decisions as to where they were headed. It was a little too late for us.

It's partially bureaucratic inertia, and partially because when the telegram goes out [to the embassies], there are certain issues that have to be cleared at a higher level because they may be troublesome issues that present problems in terms of precedence. In other words, there might be an unprecedented effort to make an unprecedented decision. Also, it is the feeling among many people in the foreign-policy establishment that the basic important decisions are not going to be made at the UN. That isn't true in certain issues like the Middle East, where we have traditionally agreed to UN consideration of peacekeeping functions; but they tend to come up without warning, and we don't have to plan for them long in advance.

I thought that the people in Washington were extremely sincere and highly motivated, and a lot had experience. But as far as our own tactics were concerned regarding bureaucratic struggles in Washington, it was not always clear to me how those were carried out. When it was a very hot issue, there was a lot of direct telephoning and talking with the undersecretary of political affairs, the deputy

secretary, and the secretary of the State House. On those very assistant secretary was paratory and analytic the State Department was made in this way, your words, and proposed.

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think, will be protected, and it's very difficult to change that. The Reagan administration, before it came into office, promised that it was going to downgrade the job [of permanent rep]. It didn't, because it desperately needed to appoint a prominent woman to a senior post, and that was one position they could give.

For all of the bad-mouthing of the UN by many people, a lot of people want the job, because it provides instantaneous prominence nationwide and makes the person who knows how to exploit the job into a national figure, if not international. Andy Young received thousands of speaking requests. Nobody else in the government, except the secretary of state and the president, is such a focus of popular attention. That is a big attraction to someone like George Bush, who has national ambitions and [in 1971] lost his race for Congress, yet doesn't want to get out of politics. The UN post got him into the big time. People remember that.

The United States and the Third World

I think the case can be made, and Moynihan at times makes it, that he was doing something constructive: that if he had not conducted a diplomatic temper tantrum [against the Third World], the reaction to the UN in the United States would have been permanent rather than emotional and rhetorical. The country would have lashed out and gotten out of the UN and closed off our contributions. Also, I will acknowledge that I don't think any representative of the United States has ever been provoked as much as Moynihan. He was ambassador at a time when the hubris of the Third World delegates moved to levels of high irresponsibility on some issues. He exaggerated it and made a political case out of it. But I think it was a very difficult period to be ambassador at the UN; the revolution had come with oil prices, and other nations had the whip hand. Even so, I think Moynihan went too far.

I have no problems with taking a tough line. As a matter of fact, when I was assistant secretary, we told the Arabs we would walk out of the World Health Organization—I wrote the speech for Califano—if they punished Israel or Egypt for signing [the] Camp David [accords]. I don't have any problems with that. What I do have a problem with is professional anti-Third Worldism—emotional, reactionary, hateful, bigoted, knee-jerk hostility to the Third World. There are some Third World countries that I think are absolutely reprehensible

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A VERY CIVIL SERVANT

Sir Brian Urquhart reflects on war and peace, idealism and realism, and a lifetime at the United Nations as his organization picks up a Nobel Prize

Rarely has the description "statesman" seemed so appropriate. In his long career, however, Urquhart represented no single state but rather every nation on the globe. During a 41-year career as a senior U.N. official, rising to the rank of Under Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, Urquhart, 69, found himself in the middle of virtually every major international crisis. Though he retired 2½ years ago, Urquhart will be in the delegation that will travel to Oslo next week to receive the 1988 Nobel Peace Prize awarded to the U.N. for its peacekeeping missions in Lebanon, Cyprus, Afghanistan and other volatile places. His efforts over many years not only in promoting the usefulness of the blue-helmeted U.N. soldiers but also in directly supervising their operations earned him the nickname "Mr. Peacekeeper." In 1986 Urquhart became a Scholar-in-Residence at the Ford Foundation, where he spoke with TIME staff writer Scott MacLeod.

Q. Your father was an artist, yet you have had a career in diplomacy.

A. I wasn't a diplomat. I was an international civil servant, which is a completely different thing. I don't like the word diplomat, actually. The ordinary person thinks of people in striped pants at a cocktail party or at a green baize table engaging in circumlocutions about serious matters. I was brought up between the wars, in a very dreary period of European history. I had always wanted to work for the League of Nations, but it went out of business before I got into the game.

Q. When the U.N. was formed, you were the second man recruited. Who got you involved?

A. I left the British army in July 1945 and went to work for Arnold Toynbee at the Foreign Office research department. Gladwyn Jebb, now Lord Gladwyn, the Acting Secretary-General, was looking for a private secretary. Toynbee suggested me. I was 26.

Q. Perhaps it's not too widely known that you were the young intelligence officer portrayed in Cornelius Ryan's *A Bridge Too Far*. What led you to advise against the ill-fated British attack on Arnhem, in German-occupied Holland?

A. I had come to the conclusion that at all levels the attack would be totally disastrous. It didn't take a great deal of brains to see that. Airborne troops were going to land 60 miles ahead of the ground troops and take three main bridges over three big rivers. Then the relieving ground troops had to go across the low country. We learned that two of the best Panzer divisions in the German army, the 9th and 10th S.S. Panzer Divisions, were refitting right where the 1st Airborne Division was going to land. I couldn't see the strategic point of the operation.

Q. Did Field Marshal Montgomery get the advice?

A. He got it from a lot of people. I merely advised my own general, General Browning, who was in charge of the whole Market Garden operation. I said, "Look here, you've got to rethink this. It's going to be a mess." That was completely overruled. Montgomery wanted to have a British masterstroke to end the war. When you're young, you believe that a good argument will win the day, and of course it doesn't. It was a terrible experience because an immense number of soldiers were killed, 12,000 as I remember. I was greatly disillusioned because I then realized that people in high positions were not necessarily always motivated by wisdom and concern for the common cause, but in fact could be motivated by other less desirable emotions, like vanity, ambition and a desire to score a point off somebody.

Q. In more than 40 years at the U.N., you must have set some travel records.

A. You know, when the normal way of crossing the Atlantic was in the big liners that took five days, people were more careful about how they organized things. It seems to me that Andrei Gromyko didn't like flying and almost always went on the *Queen Mary*. Partly it was to have time to have a think and have a rest, which was quite sensible.

Q. How did you view Gromyko? Did his ideology really get in the way of personal relations?

A. To some extent. This was the mistake Dag Hammarskjöld made with Khrushchev. He believed if you could establish a personal relationship with leaders, you could actually do a great deal more in times of crisis. That was true with someone like David Ben-Gurion, who after all was a leader in a democracy. It made a huge difference to be able to get Ben-Gurion on the phone and say, "Now look here, my dear old friend, we have to get this straightened out." You can't do that with someone who's representing an ideologically authoritarian regime. They can't afford to take a personal view of politics. We can.

Q. The U.N. seems lately to be involved in a wide range of diplomatic activities and initiatives. Is the U.N. responsible for peace breaking out?

A. I don't think so. I think the change in the international climate, which I suppose started with Mikhail Gorbachev, is of incalculable importance. Of course, if you want to get out of a conflict with honor, the U.N. and the Secretary-General are the best way of doing it.

Q. No doubt you are pleased that U.N. peacekeeping forces won the Nobel Peace Prize.

A. I think this is recognition long overdue, of an extremely important idea with a very big future, which is the nonvio-



MARIANNE BARCELONA

"This is an extremely important idea, using soldiers as a catalyst for peace rather than as an instrument of war."

lent use of soldiers by the international community, and using soldiers as a catalyst for peace rather than as an instrument of war. If we're in a state of evolution toward a better international arrangement, I think one can see the peacekeeping forces a little bit like the civil-police forces, which were introduced into nations in the beginning of the last century. They were considered to be completely ridiculous at that time, but it turned out this was a very powerful idea. I think peacekeeping forces could become a very important institution. Most people can't understand what the hell all these chaps in blue helmets are doing all over the place. It sounds very pretentious, but we have now developed the art of war to such a point where you really can't use it. I think you need an alternative, and maybe this is the beginning of the alternative.

Q. What's it like out on the peacekeeping beat?

A. It's not like being an ordinary soldier. You can't open fire except in the extreme case of self-defense. You have to stay above the battle, to talk constantly to both sides and defuse misunderstandings. And even to be on hand when somebody's chicken runs over the line into the other people's territory, so you don't start a battle.

Q. One time things didn't work very well was in 1967, when the U.N. agreed to withdraw peacekeeping troops from the Sinai. A war ensued, which led to Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as well as other Arab territories.

A. Nasser ordered the U.N. forces out. U Thant was the only person who went to Nasser and said, "This is crazy. You can't do this." U Thant got all the blame for it because he was a very convenient scapegoat. Nobody ever mentioned that he really didn't have any alternative, particularly since there was no international backing to stop either side from getting into the war.

Q. You thought highly of Dag Hammarskjöld.

A. He had this slightly visionary quality. He did push much further than before, the idea of an active practical organization which could in desperate circumstances actually operate in the field and do something to try to calm things down.

Q. Kurt Waldheim has turned out to be the most controversial of the Secretaries-General.

A. I worked with him for ten years. He was not a very original man. He was a very hardworking, extremely ambitious

Interview

man. I have totally revised my views about him. I have to say, because I find it totally unforgivable that he would have repeatedly given this total misrepresentation of his wartime career. I have never seen any evidence that he was in any normal sense a war criminal. But he was certainly in a particularly tough unit of the German army. To have told lies about this, for a public figure in that position of responsibility, seems to me to be absolutely unforgivable. It's particularly bad in that office because the Secretary-General of the U.N. doesn't have great divisions, or money, or sovereign power. His sole important weapon is his credibility. I had always accepted his own version.

Q. You had discussed his background with him?

A. Yes. It never occurred to me for a single minute that a man in that position would not tell the truth to one of his closest colleagues, particularly someone who was going to defend him. And I deeply resent the idea that I was actually perpetrating a falsehood unknowingly for all that time.

Q. Many Americans came to feel the U.N. had become a forum for Third World radicalism and anti-American actions. How did you see it?

A. I can very well understand American disillusionment and irritation. One must also remember that it was the U.S. that pioneered decolonization, which gave birth to the Third World. There was a kind of adolescent period, I think, in the newly independent developing world where people became, as adolescents often do, extremely radical. The typical example of this trend, the assembly resolution equating Zionism with racism, was a totally counterproductive move.

Q. You worked with Javier Pérez de Cuéllar.

A. I was delighted when he became Secretary-General. He is a very well-qualified person and extremely intelligent man, who knew the job very well, a very quiet extremely self-effacing man. He spent the sort of wilderness years from 1982 to 1987, pretty bad years in the U.N., as the only negotiator on Afghanistan, Iran-Iraq, Western Sahara, Cyprus and a lot of other things, and he established a position of great respect with all the different antagonists in all these situations. When the international climate changed and the outburst of common sense began to take place, he was in a position to act very quickly.

Q. In 1978 U.N. peacekeepers started patrolling the border between Lebanon and Israel, but then in 1982 another war broke out.

A. The Israelis wanted to strike a blow at the P.L.O. I spent a great deal of time trying to persuade rather skeptical Israelis, including Ariel Sharon, that they were better off without an invasion.

Q. Did you agree with the idea of sending the multinational force, a non-U.N. group that included U.S. Marines, into Beirut to help patch Lebanon back together again?

A. No, I think it was a vast misreading of what Lebanon is

really like. They drifted gradually into a very controversial position as the great supporter of the government of Lebanon. Well, to most people in Lebanon, the government is just another faction, and furthermore not a very powerful faction. Amin Gemayel's authority seemed to stop at the gates of the Baabda palace.

The only conceivable way to force them into a union would be by years of negotiation and evolving a whole series of ties of interest, but nobody's been able to do it, not since the French.

Q. You carried a message from Yasser Arafat to Menachem Begin?

A. That was just before the 1982 invasion. I think Arafat is genuinely convinced that he has to find a means of coexistence with Israel. What Arafat was saying was that he was interested in peace, and that if he was disposed of, it was unlikely that anyone else would come along who was as convinced of this as he was. I don't think any of these messages were new or particularly welcome to Begin.

Q. Is the world becoming a safer place?

A. I think at the superpower level one has to believe and hope that the threat has for various reasons decreased. But I think the situation at the intermediate level requires a great deal of attention. There is an enormous arms flow to the developing world.

Q. When you started out at the U.N., it was considered to be a monument to idealism by many people. Did you get discouraged?

A. I don't think you could say that President Roosevelt, Mr. Churchill and Mr. Stalin were starry-eyed idealists. They had been through the fire of war. Did anybody really think in 1945 that every government would renounce the use of force in its relations

with every other government, and agree to settle all disputes with peaceful means, and disarm? This was the aim. The U.N. Charter was a great beacon set on a hill, the great light toward which we were supposed to be working. We haven't had World War III. I don't see any reason to be downhearted. One should be frustrated, and certainly working in the U.N. was a great exercise in that. And one should be more determined than ever to keep after the basic objective.

Q. Your idealism is showing.

A. I am an idealist, I have to admit. I think human nature is self-interested. But there is such a thing as enlightened self-interest. The trick is to engage self-interest at the point where it touches other people's self-interest. Why shouldn't it be done on the international level, particularly when we have invented a way of putting an end to the whole experiment, by nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction. That is what the U.N. should be all about. I maintain that my idealism, which is based on some fairly rough experience, is a great deal more realistic than the totally defeatist notion that human beings are born to suffer and kill each other. If one believes that, one should go dig a deep hole and jump into it. ■

"My idealism is a great deal more realistic than the notion that human beings are born to kill each other."

entrusted Gorbachev with a somewhat paradoxical task: He must dismantle the power of a party from which he draws all of his power If one loses sight of this contradiction, one risks not understanding the nature and importance of the revolution in progress Those who criticize the power grab as contrary to the philosophy of *glasnost* understand very little about the process of change in Moscow and Eastern Europe. —Eugenio Scalfari

LONDON *The Observer* (independent weekly): The revolution in the leadership is an astounding triumph [and] a slap to those, in both the Soviet Union and the West, who have consistently doubted Gorbachev's will and ability to carry *perestroika* forward. But it is still only a political revolution. And what the Soviet Union, and the leadership, need desperately is an economic one.

—Andrew Wilson

The Nobel Peace Prize

FRANKFURT *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (conservative): On a number of occasions the peace prize has been awarded as a kind of advance payment: in 1973 to Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho, in 1978 to Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin, in 1987 to Oscar Arias. Subsequent developments did not deliver the hopes that the prize promised. In Indochina, the Middle East, and Central America, there is as yet no peace. No doubt this year's award to the United Nations peacekeeping forces is also motivated by hope that this year's enhanced role and prestige for the UN will lead to new tasks and assignments for the "Blue Helmets"—in Namibia or Cambodia, for example. Today

there are 10,000 troops from two dozen countries under the command of the UN secretary-general. Their task is to divide warring parties and reduce tension. But wherever an armistice breaks down, they can do little. They have neither the political authority to fight nor the necessary military equipment. Thus far, 550 of these soldiers have been killed. For them, the Nobel Prize is a posthumous and belated honor. —Günther Nonnenmacher

PARIS *Le Monde* (liberal): By designating the peacekeeping forces, the Nobel committee chose precisely that part of the UN that it wanted to reward. To have chosen the UN in its entirety might well have launched a new round of criticism and controversy over one part of the system or another. It is much more difficult, if justified at times, to criticize the soldiers of peace The prize also rewards, in large part, the man scheduled to accept it in Oslo on December 10: Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, the secretary-general of the UN. The diplomatic successes of 1988, in the spring with Afghanistan and in the summer with the Persian Gulf war, owe much to this discreet, tenacious, and effective intermediary.

TORONTO *Globe and Mail* (independent): After several rocky years, the UN is on a roll The UN's lucky stars will stay aligned only while the big powers are in a mood to give the institution some clout to solve, or at least cool, regional conflicts in which they have a stake.

—Jennifer Lewington

LONDON *The Observer* (independent weekly): For the first time in 15 years—some say the first time ever—the UN is working as it was meant to. Good humor and common purpose, scarce commodities at the UN throughout most of the 1970s and 1980s, are now considered almost normal. Class war is out, civility is in. People are listening as well as talking. Old timers pinch themselves and wonder how long it can last.

—Nigel Hawkes



Jenkins/Globe and Mail/Toronto



Rock throwers in West Bank include many youngsters

Army chief Lt. Gen. Dan Shomron insisted that they are meant to minimize deaths among protesters and have done so except in "very isolated incidents." Yet Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin gave an answer with harsher overtones. Beatings and tear gas are no longer effective, he said, and the demonstrators must learn that "more violence will bring more suffering to them." That brought a protest from the U.S. State Department, where one official declared, "We can see no justification for a policy admittedly designed to cause an increase in casualties."

NOBEL PRIZES

Peaceniks in berets

In the last four decades, 733 members of U.N. peacekeeping forces from 58 nations have been killed while serving as human buffers in conflicts around the globe. And many more U.N. troops may soon patrol new hot spots as disputes in the Western Sahara, Southern Africa and Cambodia near resolution. The world has seldom said thanks—until last week, when the 10,000 blue-bereted peacekeepers were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, setting champagne corks popping from Lebanon to Kashmir. One peacekeeper who missed the party was Col. William

U.N. peacekeepers



Higgins, the American Marine abducted by gunmen in Lebanon last February. U.N. officials and Higgins's family hope the Peace Prize will persuade the kidnappers to free him.

Left waiting for the call that never came were Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, who negotiated the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Treaty and were viewed by many as favorites for the prize.

HEALTH

Doctors who run on empty

In 1984, 18-year-old Libby Zion went to a New York hospital with a high fever. Eight hours later, she was dead, the victim of a series of medical mishaps includ-

ing the use of a drug that may have fatally interacted with an antidepressant she was taking. A grand jury put part of the blame on the exhaustion of a resident and an intern, who had been on duty 18 hours. Such work bouts are common in U.S. hospitals, where residents often work 36 hours straight. Last week, New York became the first state to say enough is enough. It limited emergency-room physicians to 12-hour shifts, and plans to hold other specialties to 80-hour workweeks next year.

As other states considered similar moves, new findings challenged the reformers' key premise. A report in last week's *Journal of the American Medical Association* said that 26 surgical residents given mathematical, verbal and dexterity tests did just as well after they had stayed up all night as after they had slept. But the findings, which contradict previous studies, were strongly attacked by sleep researchers, who argued that the experiment failed to pick up differences in performance because even the "rested" doctors were dulled by long-term fatigue. Not tested at all was the quality of care they gave.

Currents contributors: William J. Cook, William F. Allman, David Whitman, Miriam Horn, Joseph L. Galloway, Louise Lief, Joanne Silberner, Gillian Sanford

PEOPLE MAKING NEWS

Capital stumble

The senator is not the first politician accused of hanky-panky. But how many of them ignite their own scandal by trying to pre-empt it? Brock Adams (D-Wash.) expected October's *Washingtonian* magazine to contain allegations by family friend Kari Tupper, 26, that in 1987 he drugged and sexually assaulted her. (Police dropped the case for lack of evidence.) When Adams's efforts to alert friends leaked to the Seattle press, he held a news conference, admitted that Tucker once stayed at his home, denied misconduct and said she had since demanded \$400,000 hush money (a charge her family denies). The *Washingtonian* story didn't appear.

■ Bishop Barbara

Fourteen years ago, Barbara Harris carried the cross during a controversial, unauthorized ceremony ordaining the Episcopal Church's first women priests. Last week, the Episcopal Diocese of Massachusetts elected the 58-year-old black woman as its new suffragan. Colleagues say her demeanor and skills should win her the support of a majority of bishops and dioceses nationally, clearing the way for her consecration early next year as the first female bishop in the Anglican Church's 450-year history.

■ Addams chronicle

He once arrived at a costume party as a "defrocked ghoul," and in art as in life New Yorker magazine cartoonist Charles Addams exhibited a fascination with the macabre. Addams, who died last week at 76, made his reputation with a 1940 cartoon of a skier whose tracks suggested she had skied through a tree. His Addams family (including mother Morticia and a butler resembling Frankenstein's monster) inspired a TV series. Addams's third wife wed him in 1980 while wearing black in a ceremony at a pet cemetery. She said Addams "thought it would be nice and cheerful."



Addams



Harris

World

MIDDLE EAST

Plastic, but Deadly

Palestinian casualties surge

At the 75-bed Al-Ahli Arab Hospital in the Gaza Strip last week, wounded Palestinian protesters jammed the emergency room. After unsuccessful surgery, Abdulatif, 26, fingered the yellowing gauze wrapped around his left leg. Still lodged deep in his left thigh was a plastic bullet. Israel's latest ammunition against the ten-month-old *intifadeh* (uprising) by Palestinians in the occupied territories. Abdulatif pulled aside the bandage to reveal a reddish silver dollar-size hole in his flesh. Explained a nurse: "There is no difference between plastic and real bullets. They both enter the body and destroy."

Since Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin instructed his soldiers in late August to start using cartridges tipped with plastic to break up riots in the occupied territories, Palestinian casualties in Gaza alone have leaped from about 20 in July to more than 170 in September. At close range, the bullets can even kill. Not surprisingly, Rabin's latest gambit to crush the *intifadeh* has provoked yet another round of criticism from abroad and from Israel's far left, which charges Rabin with excessive brutality. But it has also raised a disturbing new question: Are Israeli leaders turning up the violence against Palestinians as a way of pandering to voters before Israel's crucial nationwide election on Nov. 1?

Last week, as seven protesters were killed—two by plastic bullets—and more than 90 others wounded, the U.S. State Department rebuked Israel by saying there is "no justification" for deliberately causing Palestinian casualties. Some U.S. officials charge that Rabin's plastic bullets are aimed at the voters. The Defense Minister, considered the No. 2 figure in Israel's Labor Party, dismisses the notion that his new crackdown is politically motivated. But he makes no apologies about stepping up the army's operations. "The rioters are suffering more casualties," he told reporters during a tour of the West Bank. "That is precisely our aim. Our purpose is to increase the number of [injured] among those who take part in violent activities, but not to kill them."

Rabin contends that other methods of curbing the protests have proved ineffective, including tear gas and the brutal beatings that prompted an international outcry earlier this year. Israeli troops are



Wounded Arab in a Gaza hospital

Aiming to maim with special bullets.

generally barred from using regular ammunition unless their lives are in immediate danger. Israel has tried dispersing protesters by firing rubber bullets, which bruise but rarely penetrate the skin. Aggressive Palestinians were undaunted. The new .556-mm plastic projectiles are

supposedly less lethal than full metal jackets, but they are intended to cause injuries serious enough to put demonstrators out of action.

By design or not, Rabin's new crackdown may have the political benefit of reassuring Israeli voters who deem the Labor Party soft on the Palestinians. The right-wing Likud bloc of Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir refuses to surrender any of the West Bank and Gaza, and some members even boast they could crush the *intifadeh* in weeks. Labor leader Shimon Peres has

endorsed proposals for negotiations that would return some territory to Arab rule, which many interpret as signifying an inability to quell the rebellion. Rabin seems determined to prove them wrong. Said Shamir media adviser Avi Pazner: "If you take the last nine months, it's certainly helped Labor to have a tough Defense Minister."

Ultimately, Rabin's rough tactics may make little difference in Labor's campaign to win a majority in the 120-seat Knesset. The November vote is widely seen as a referendum on whether Israel should keep the occupied lands or get out. The latest opinion polls show Labor and Likud running neck and neck. Israel's two main political groupings thus may be forced to spend yet another four years as uneasy partners in a coalition that must deal with an uprising no kind of bullet has managed to quell.

—By Scott MacLeod.

Reported by Jon D. Hull/Gaza City

PRIZES


Sorry, Ron And Mikhail

A Nobel for U.N. peacekeepers

In Washington they waited. In Moscow they waited. In Oslo they knew. Despite persistent rumors that Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev would share the 1988 Nobel Peace Prize for signing last year's agreement banning intermediate-range nuclear weapons, the prize was awarded last week to the United Nations peacekeeping forces. Egil Aarvik, chairman of the five-member Norwegian Nobel Committee, cited the multinational army of 8,600 for its contribution to "reducing tensions where an armistice has been negotiated but a peace treaty has yet to be established." First sent into action in 1948 as an observer mission between Israel and its Arab neighbors, the peacekeeping forces have enforced an uneasy calm in 14 conflicts and are currently deployed in nine countries. Over the years, the forces have lost more than 700 lives.

The news further lifted morale at the U.N., which, after years of being criticized by the U.S. as irrelevant and ineffectual, has enjoyed notable successes in helping end the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iran-Iraq war. U.N. Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, who will travel to Oslo in early December to accept the medal and \$388,000 on behalf of the soldiers, was also touted as a possible prizewinner.

Though the U.N. forces are obviously a worthy selection, Aarvik did little to dampen speculation that the committee passed over Reagan and Gorbachev out of concern that the award would boost George Bush's presidential chances. Asked if the U.S. election campaign played a part in the decision, Aarvik replied, "We take everything into consideration, everything."



On patrol in southern Lebanon

More than 700 lives lost in 40 years.