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The United Nations

The Charter of the United Nations was signed at San Francisco on 26 June 1945. Its Preamble expresses the common aims of the peoples of the United Nations and their determination to save humanity from the scourge of war. The Second World War was coming to an end at the time the Charter was framed. The Preamble reads:

WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS DETERMINED . . . to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,

AND FOR THESE ENDS . . . to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours, and to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples,

HAVE RESOLVED TO COMBINE OUR EFFORTS TO ACCOMPLISH THESE AIMS. Accordingly, our respective Governments, through representatives assembled in the city of San Francisco, who have exhibited their full powers found to be in good and due form, have agreed to the present Charter of the United Nations and do hereby establish an international organization to be known as the United Nations.

PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES

The purposes of the United Nations are set forth in Article I of the Charter. They are:

1. To maintain international peace and security.
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.
3. To co-operate in solving international problems of an economic,

social, cultural or humanitarian character, and in promoting respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all.

4. To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.

To fulfil the purposes for which it was established, the United Nations acts in accordance with the following principles, as set forth in Article 2 of the Charter:

1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.

2. All Members shall fulfil in good faith the obligations they have assumed under the Charter.

3. They shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means.

4. They shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

5. They shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the Charter, and to refrain from giving assistance to any State against which the Organization is taking preventive or enforcement action.

6. The United Nations is to ensure that non-members act in accordance with these principles so far as is necessary for maintaining international peace and security.

7. The Organization shall not intervene in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State. This provision shall not, however, prejudice the application of enforcement action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression.

(For text of Charter, see Appendix, page 381. For amendments to the Charter, see Legal section, page 333).

STEPS TO THE CHARTER

Inter-Allied Declaration

The first of a series of steps which led to the establishment of the United Nations was the Inter-Allied Declaration, which was signed on 12 June 1941, at St. James's Palace, London, by the representatives of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa and the United Kingdom, of the exiled Governments of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland and Yugoslavia, and of General de Gaulle of France. In the Declaration, the signatories, recognizing that "the only true basis of enduring peace is the willing co-operation of free peoples in a world in which, relieved of the menace of aggression, all may enjoy economic and social security," stated that it was their intention "to work together, and with other free peoples, both in war and peace, to this end."

Atlantic Charter

Two months later, on 14 August 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt of the United States and Prime Minister Winston Churchill of the United Kingdom, meeting "somewhere at sea", issued a joint declaration in which they set forth "certain common principles in the national policies of their respective countries" on which they based their hopes for a better future for the world. In the document, known as the Atlantic Charter, the two signatories stated that "after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want."

They also stated that "they believe that all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons, must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea, or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments."

The two statesmen also expressed, in the document, their desire "to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labour standards, economic advancement and social security."

Declaration by United Nations

On New Year's Day 1942, the representatives of 26 nations that were fighting against the Axis signed at Washington, D.C., the Declaration by United Nations. This document marked the first formal use of the term "United Nations", which had been suggested by President Roosevelt.

In the Declaration, the signatory Governments:

"Having subscribed to a common programme of purposes and principles embodied in the . . . Atlantic Charter,

"Being convinced that complete victory over their enemies is essential to defend life, liberty, independence and religious freedom, and to preserve human rights and justice in their own lands as well as in other lands, and that they are now engaged in a common struggle against savage and brutal forces seeking to subjugate the world,

"Declare:

"(1) Each Government pledges itself to employ its full resources, military or economic, against those members of the Tripartite Pact and its adherents with which such Government is at war.

"(2) Each Government pledges itself to co-operate with the Governments signatory hereto and not to make a separate armistice or peace with the enemies."

The Declaration was left open for signature by other nations "which are, or may be, rendering material assistance and contributions in the struggle for victory over Hitlerism."

The 26 signatories of the Declaration of United Nations were the United States, the United Kingdom, the USSR, China, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Poland, the Union of South Africa and Yugoslavia. Later adherents to the Declaration, in order of the dates of adherence, were Mexico, Philippines, Ethiopia, Iraq, Brazil, Bolivia, Iran, Colombia, Liberia, France, Ecuador, Peru, Chile, Paraguay, Venezuela, Uruguay, Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Lebanon.

France and Denmark were generally regarded as having been identified with the United Nations from the beginning. Free French Forces had fought against the Axis Powers and the Danish Minister in Washington had signified the adherence of all free Danes to the Allied cause. Since the Declaration was signed by Governments, they could not at that time formally adhere to it. When the French National Committee was constituted as a Government, France adhered formally to the Declaration. Denmark, which was not liberated until after the opening of the San Francisco Conference, was admitted as one of the United Nations by the Conference. Poland did not attend the San Francisco Conference because the composition of its new Government was not announced until 28 June—too late for the Conference. A space, however, was left for the signature of Poland, one of the original signatories of the Declaration by United Nations. Poland signed the Charter on 15 October 1945, thus becoming one of the original Members.

Moscow and Teheran Conferences

In a declaration signed in Moscow on 30 October 1943 by V. M. Molotov of the USSR, Anthony Eden of the United Kingdom, Cordell Hull of the United States, and Foo Ping-sheung, the Chinese Ambassador to the Soviet Union, the four Governments proclaimed that "they recognize the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, and open to membership by all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security".

A month later, on 1 December 1943, President Roosevelt, Premier Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill, meeting at Teheran, declared: "We recognize fully the supreme responsibility resting upon us and all the

United Nations to make a peace which will command the goodwill of the overwhelming masses of the peoples of the world and banish the scourge and terror of war for many generations."

Dumbarton Oaks and Yalta Conferences

The first concrete step towards the creation of the United Nations was taken in the late summer of 1944 at a mansion known as Dumbarton Oaks in Washington, D.C. In the first phase of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, from 21 August to 28 September 1944, conversations were held between the representatives of the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States; in the second phase, from 29 September to 7 October, conversations were held between the representatives of China, the United Kingdom and the United States. This arrangement served to respect USSR neutrality in the war against Japan. As a result of the Conference, the four Powers reached a number of agreements which were embodied in proposals for the establishment of a general international organization.

The Dumbarton Oaks proposals were primarily concerned with the purposes and principles of the organization, its membership and principal organs, and arrangements for the maintenance of international peace and security and for international economic and social co-operation. According to the proposals, the key body in the United Nations for preserving world peace was to be the Security Council, on which China, France, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States were to be permanently represented. Agreement was not reached, however, on the question of voting procedure in the Security Council.

That question, among others, was discussed by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Premier Stalin at a conference at Yalta in February 1945. On 11 February 1945, following the conference, a report was issued in which the three leaders declared:

"We are resolved upon the earliest possible establishment with our Allies of a general international organization to maintain peace and security. We believe that this is essential, both to prevent aggression and to remove the political, economic and social causes of war through the close and continuing collaboration of all peace-loving peoples.

"The foundations were laid at Dumbarton Oaks. On the important question of voting procedure, however, agreement was not there reached. The present Conference has been able to resolve this difficulty.

"We have agreed that a Conference of United Nations should be called to meet at San Francisco in the United States on the 25th April 1945, to prepare the charter of such an organization, along the lines proposed in the informal conversations of Dumbarton Oaks."

The report further stated that the Government of China and the Provisional Government of France would be invited to sponsor invitations to the Conference jointly with the United States, the United Kingdom and

the USSR and that as soon as consultations with China and France had been completed, the text of the proposals on voting procedure would be made public. China agreed to join in sponsoring the invitations. France agreed to participate in the Conference but decided not to act as a sponsoring nation.

The invitations to the Conference were issued on 5 March to those nations which had declared war on Germany or Japan by 1 March and had signed the Declaration by United Nations. The text of the invitation contained the provisions for voting in the Security Council which were subsequently adopted at San Francisco.

San Francisco Conference

Before the start of the San Francisco Conference, the Dumbarton Oaks proposals were studied and discussed by the nations of the world both collectively and individually. From 21 February to 8 March 1945, for instance, the representatives of 20 Latin American nations met in Mexico City and adopted a resolution suggesting points to be taken into consideration in the drawing up of the charter of the proposed international organization. From 4 to 13 April 1945, talks were held in London among representatives of the British Commonwealth. A statement issued at the close of the meetings indicated agreement that the Dumbarton Oaks proposals provided the basis for a charter while recognizing that clarification, improvement and expansion were called for in certain respects.

On 25 April, delegates of 50 nations met in San Francisco for the conference known officially as the United Nations Conference on International Organization. Working on the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, the Yalta Agreement and amendments proposed by various Governments, the delegates, meeting both in plenary sessions and in committees, drew up the 111-Article Charter.

On 25 June, the delegates met in full session in the Opera House in San Francisco and unanimously adopted the Charter. The next day, they signed it at a ceremony in the auditorium of the Veterans' Memorial Hall.

The Charter came into force on 24 October 1945, when China, France, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States and a majority of the other signatories had filed their instruments of ratification.

United Nations Day

On 31 October 1947, the General Assembly decided that 24 October, the anniversary of the entry into force of the Charter of the United Nations, should thenceforth be officially called "United Nations Day" and be devoted to informing the peoples of the world of the aims and achievements of the Organization and to obtaining support for its work. Member Gov-

ernments were invited to co-operate in the observance of the anniversary.

MEMBERSHIP

The 51 original Members of the United Nations are States which took part in the San Francisco Conference or had previously signed the Declaration by United Nations, and which signed and ratified the Charter.

Membership in the United Nations is open to all peace-loving countries which accept and, in the judgement of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out the obligations of the Charter. Any country desiring to become a Member must submit an application including a declaration that it accepts the obligations set out in the Charter. New Members are admitted by a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. Membership becomes effective on the date the Assembly accepts the application.

A Member of the United Nations against which preventive or enforcement action has been taken by the Security Council may be suspended from the exercise of the rights and privileges of membership by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council. The exercise of these rights and privileges may be restored by the Security Council.

A Member of the United Nations which has persistently violated the principles of the Charter may be expelled from the Organization by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council. There is no provision in the Charter concerning the re-entry into the Organization of an expelled Member.

After lengthy debate, it was agreed at the San Francisco Conference not to include any provision in the Charter for the withdrawal of Members. It was made clear, however, that it was not the purpose of the Organization to compel a Member "to continue its co-operation in the Organization", if that Member "because of exceptional circumstances" felt constrained to withdraw.

Member States of the United Nations (As of December 1978)

The 151 Member States of the United Nations, and the date of their admission to the Organization, are as follows:

<i>Member</i>	<i>Date of Admission</i>	<i>Member</i>	<i>Date of Admission</i>
Afghanistan	19 Nov. 1946	Angola	1 Dec. 1976
Albania	14 Dec. 1955	*Argentina	24 Oct. 1945
Algeria	8 Oct. 1962	*Australia	1 Nov. 1945
(* denotes original member)		Austria	14 Dec. 1955

<i>Member</i>	<i>Date of Admission</i>	<i>Member</i>	<i>Date of Admission</i>
Bahamas	18 Sep. 1973	Fiji	13 Oct. 1970
Bahrain	21 Sep. 1971	Finland	14 Dec. 1955
Bangladesh	17 Sep. 1974	*France	24 Oct. 1945
Barbados	9 Dec. 1966	Gabon	20 Sep. 1960
*Belgium	27 Dec. 1945	Gambia	21 Sep. 1965
Benin (formerly Dahomey)	20 Sep. 1960	German Democratic Republic	18 Sep. 1973
Bhutan	21 Sep. 1971	Germany, Federal Republic of	18 Sep. 1973
*Bolivia	14 Nov. 1945	Ghana	8 Mar. 1957
Botswana	17 Oct. 1966	*Greece	25 Oct. 1945
*Brazil	24 Oct. 1945	Grenada	17 Sep. 1974
Bulgaria	14 Dec. 1955	*Guatemala	21 Nov. 1945
Burma	19 Apr. 1948	Guinea	12 Dec. 1958
Burundi	18 Sep. 1962	Guinea-Bissau	17 Sep. 1974
*Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic	24 Oct. 1945	Guyana	20 Sep. 1966
*Canada	9 Nov. 1945	*Haiti	24 Oct. 1945
Cape Verde	16 Sep. 1975	*Honduras	17 Dec. 1945
Central African Empire (formerly Central African Republic)	20 Sep. 1960	Hungary	14 Dec. 1955
Chad	20 Sep. 1960	Iceland	19 Dec. 1946
*Chile	24 Oct. 1945	*India	30 Oct. 1945
*China ¹	24 Oct. 1945	Indonesia ³	28 Sep. 1950
*Colombia	5 Nov. 1945	*Iran	24 Oct. 1945
Comoros	12 Nov. 1975	*Iraq	21 Dec. 1945
Congo	20 Sep. 1960	Ireland	14 Dec. 1955
*Costa Rica	2 Nov. 1945	Israel	11 May 1949
*Cuba	24 Oct. 1945	Italy	14 Dec. 1955
Cyprus	20 Sep. 1960	Ivory Coast	20 Sep. 1960
*Czechoslovakia	24 Oct. 1945	Jamaica	18 Sep. 1962
Democratic Kampuchea (formerly Cambodia)	14 Dec. 1955	Japan	18 Dec. 1956
Democratic Yemen	14 Dec. 1967	Jordan	14 Dec. 1955
*Denmark	24 Oct. 1945	Kenya	16 Dec. 1963
Djibouti	20 Sep. 1977	Kuwait	14 May 1963
Dominica	18 Dec. 1978	Lao People's Democratic Republic (formerly Laos) ..	14 Dec. 1955
*Dominican Republic	24 Oct. 1945	*Lebanon	24 Oct. 1945
*Ecuador	21 Dec. 1945	Lesotho	17 Oct. 1966
*Egypt ²	24 Oct. 1945	*Liberia	2 Nov. 1945
*El Salvador	24 Oct. 1945	Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	14 Dec. 1955
Equatorial Guinea	12 Nov. 1968	*Luxembourg	24 Oct. 1945
*Ethiopia	13 Nov. 1945	Madagascar	20 Sep. 1960
		Malawi	1 Dec. 1964
		Malaysia ⁴	17 Sep. 1957

<i>Member</i>	<i>Date of Admission</i>	<i>Member</i>	<i>Date of Admission</i>
Maldives	21 Sep. 1965	Spain	14 Dec. 1955
Mali	28 Sep. 1960	Sri Lanka	14 Dec. 1955
Malta	1 Dec. 1964	Sudan	12 Nov. 1956
Mauritania	27 Oct. 1961	Surinam	4 Dec. 1975
Mauritius	24 Apr. 1968	Swaziland	24 Sep. 1968
*Mexico	7 Nov. 1945	Sweden	19 Nov. 1946
Mongolia	27 Oct. 1961	*Syrian Arab Republic ²	24 Oct. 1945
Morocco	12 Nov. 1956	Thailand	16 Dec. 1946
Mozambique	16 Sep. 1975	Togo	20 Sep. 1960
Nepal	14 Dec. 1955	Trinidad and Tobago	18 Sep. 1962
*Netherlands	10 Dec. 1945	Tunisia	12 Nov. 1956
*New Zealand	24 Oct. 1945	*Turkey	24 Oct. 1945
*Nicaragua	24 Oct. 1945	Uganda	25 Oct. 1962
Niger	20 Sep. 1960	*Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic	24 Oct. 1945
Nigeria	7 Oct. 1960	*Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	24 Oct. 1945
*Norway	27 Nov. 1945	United Arab Emirates	9 Dec. 1971
Oman	7 Oct. 1971	*United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	24 Oct. 1945
Pakistan	30 Sep. 1947	United Republic of Cameroon	20 Sep. 1960
*Panama	13 Nov. 1945	United Republic of Tanzania ⁵	14 Dec. 1961
Papua New Guinea	10 Oct. 1975	*United States of America	24 Oct. 1945
*Paraguay	24 Oct. 1945	Upper Volta	20 Sep. 1960
*Peru	31 Oct. 1945	*Uruguay	18 Dec. 1945
*Philippines	24 Oct. 1945	*Venezuela	15 Nov. 1945
*Poland	24 Oct. 1945	Viet Nam	20 Sept 1977
Portugal	14 Dec. 1955	Yemen	30 Sep. 1947
Qatar	21 Sep. 1971	*Yugoslavia	24 Oct. 1945
Romania	14 Dec. 1955	Zaire	20 Sep. 1960
Rwanda	18 Sep. 1962	Zambia	1 Dec. 1964
Samoa	15 Dec. 1976		
Sao Tome and Principe	16 Sep. 1975		
*Saudi Arabia	24 Oct. 1945		
Senegal	28 Sep. 1960		
Seychelles	21 Sep. 1976		
Sierra Leone	27 Sep. 1961		
Singapore	21 Sep. 1965		
Solomon Islands	19 Sept. 1978		
Somalia	20 Sep. 1960		
*South Africa	7 Nov. 1945		

¹By resolution 2758 (XXVI) of 25 October 1971, the General Assembly decided "to restore all its rights to the People's Republic of China and to recognize the representatives of its Government as the only legitimate representatives of China to the United Nations, and to expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-

Permanent Missions to the United Nations

Since the creation of the United Nations, the practice has developed of establishing permanent missions of Member States at the seat of the Organization. The General Assembly sought to regulate the submission of credentials of permanent representatives on 3 December 1948, when it recommended that credentials be issued by the head of the State, by the head of the Government, or by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and be transmitted to the Secretary-General. It was further recommended that the permanent representative, in case of temporary absence, should notify the Secretary-General of the name of his replacement; that Member States which wanted their permanent representatives to represent them on one or more organs of the United Nations should specify in their credentials the organs concerned; and finally, that changes of members of permanent missions, other than the permanent representative, should be communicated in writing to the Secretary-General by the head of the mission.

Permanent Observers

The following non-member States maintain offices of permanent observers to the United Nations: Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Holy See, Monaco, Republic of Korea and Switzerland.

shek from the place which they unlawfully occupy at the United Nations and in all the organizations related to it".

²Egypt and Syria were original Members of the United Nations from 24 October 1945. Following a plebiscite on 21 February 1958, the United Arab Republic was established by a union of Egypt and Syria and continued as a single Member. On 13 October 1961, Syria resumed its status as an independent State and simultaneously its United Nations membership. On 2 September 1971, the United Arab Republic changed its name to Arab Republic of Egypt.

³By letter of 20 January 1965, Indonesia announced its decision to withdraw from the United Nations "at this stage and under the present circumstances". By telegram of 19 September 1966, it announced its decision "to resume full co-operation with the United Nations and to resume participation in its activities". On 28 September 1966, the General Assembly took note of this decision and the President invited representatives of Indonesia to take seats in the Assembly.

⁴The Federation of Malaya joined the United Nations on 17 September 1957. On 16 September 1963, its name was changed to Malaysia, following the admission to the new federation of Singapore, Sabah (North Borneo) and Sarawak. Singapore became an independent State on 9 August 1965 and a Member of the United Nations on 21 September 1965.

⁵Tanganyika was a Member of the United Nations from 14 December 1961 and Zanzibar was a Member from 16 December 1963. Following the ratification on 26 April 1964 of Articles of Union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar, the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar continued as a single Member, changing its name to United Republic of Tanzania on 1 November 1964.

THE PRINCIPAL ORGANS

The Charter established six principal organs of the United Nations: the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice and the Secretariat.

The official languages of the General Assembly, all its Main Committees and sub-committees, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council and the Trusteeship Council are Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish. Those languages, together with Arabic, are the working languages of the Assembly and its seven Main Committees. The working languages of the Security Council are Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish; those of the Economic and Social Council are English, French and Spanish, and for the Trusteeship Council and the Secretariat they are English and French. The official languages of the International Court of Justice are English and French.

General Assembly

All Members of the United Nations are members of the General Assembly. Each has one vote. The Assembly has no power to compel action by any Government. Its influence is exercised through the weight of its recommendations as an expression of world opinion.

FUNCTIONS AND POWERS. The General Assembly may discuss any question or any matter within the scope of the Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organ provided for in the Charter. It may make recommendations on these questions and matters to the Member States or to the Security Council or to both, with one exception—it may not make recommendations on any dispute or situation which the Security Council has under consideration unless the Council so requests.

The Assembly may consider the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of peace and security, including those governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments.

It may discuss any question relating to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by a Member State, by the Security Council or by a non-member State, if that State accepts in advance the obligations of pacific settlement contained in the Charter. Unless the matter is already being dealt with by the Security Council, the Assembly may make recommendations on any such question to the State or States concerned or to the Security Council or to both.

Subject to the same exception, the Assembly may recommend measures for the peaceful settlement of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations. It may also call to the attention of the Council situations which are likely to endanger international peace and security.

question). The part of a proposal or amendment affected by a request for a separate vote will be dropped unless the relevant majority votes to maintain it. In cases where the simple majority rule applies, this does not greatly affect the total needed for deletion. When the two-thirds rule applies, it means that one-third plus one of the members can drop a provision on a separate vote, but two-thirds would be necessary to drop it on an amendment to delete (as demonstrated by maneuvering on US amendments to a resolution on apartheid in A/39/PV.98-99, 14 Dec. 1984). Hence, requests for votes on parts are the preferred tactic.

Requests for separate votes on parts of proposals are a common feature of Assembly proceedings, ranging from 40 to 130 a session as noted in Table 3.3. Most are accepted without demur. When objections are raised, they are usually defeated. Such requests serve any of several purposes: altering the content of a proposal before it is adopted, indicating different degrees of support or opposition to parts of a proposal, or simply delaying proceedings.

Many proposals have been altered by successful deletions of parts on separate votes. In 1969 a Costa Rican motion led to a vote deleting the words "neo-nazi" from a description of intolerance-breeding movements. This permitted the Declaration on Measures against Intolerance to be read as condemning all forms, not just those associated with right-wing political movements as the Soviet bloc wanted (A/24/PV.1829, 11 Dec. 1976, p. 13; a similar motion had failed in committee on the close vote of 17 to delete, 18 to retain, with 11 abstentions, A/C.3/24/SR.1712, 24 Nov. 1969, p. 361). A vote to delete the words "and expansionism" in the eighth preambular paragraph to the Declaration on Elimination of Racism showed that the Assembly was not ready in 1969 to equate Zionism with racism (A/C.3/18/SR.1225, 9 Oct. 1963, p. 58).

In most cases, and particularly when stable two-thirds majorities exist, votes on parts of a draft do not affect their fate. Yet motions for separate votes may be made so that delegations can indicate different opinions on various parts of the draft before them. Often this involves showing that a delegation had objections to only one part though it will ultimately abstain on the whole resolution. Several Western delegations used this device in 1961 to object to a paragraph in the draft on activities of the United Nations Special Fund calling for it to consider establishing a service to help developing countries find the most appropriate sources of foreign aid (A/C.2/16/SR.777, 6 Dec.

Majority Decisions

Table 3.3 Motions to Change the C

Session	Adopt by consensus	Adopt by vote	Reject by vote
2nd	6	2	1
4th	8	3	6
6th	9	2	4
8th	0	6	6
10th	0	1	1
12th	2	2	1
14th	4	2	1
16th	2	6	1
18th	3	0	2
20th	3	2	0
22nd	3	1	1
24th	1	2	2
26th	6	1	2
28th	1	0	0
30th	0	1	3
32nd	3	0	0
34th	0	4	0
36th	1	0	1
38th	1	0	0

(Note: this includes both motions to change the about whether an amendment should be defined

Source: General Assembly Official Records of meetings in sessions indicated.

1961, p. 344; texts in A/16/Annex 22, Many delegations indicated reservation in draft Article 24 of the International and Political Rights in the same manner:

All persons are equal before the law any discrimination to equal protect respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination to all persons equal and effective on any ground such as race, religion, political or other opinion, property, birth, or other status.

reinforced by debates going back into the late 1960s about whether aid programs as then conceived really did anything for economic development. Significant segments of Western opinion had come to question their effectiveness, dampening enthusiasm even among those who felt the recession should not be an excuse to cut aid. Second, and in the short run more important for the UN budget, Assembly adoption of the resolution equating Zionism with racism touched off vehement opposition in the United States. When the US Congress decided to express the nation's displeasure by reducing US contributions to the voluntary UN aid programs, some Third World states increased their efforts to use the UN regular budget as a mechanism for transfers by putting more aid programs within it (Meagher, 1983, p. 112).

The idea was quickly accepted by the Third World coalition as a whole. Between 1978 and 1980 that coalition used its votes to increase the technical aid components of the UN and specialized agency budgets from \$19 million to \$41 million (Meagher, 1983 p. 114). Even allowing for inflation, this was a formidable increase, and came at a time when the industrial states were again suffering recession worsened by the 1979 oil price increase. For many Western countries, dissatisfaction was increased by the use of regular budget funds for meetings open only to Third World states. The United States also opposed the use of regular budget funds for Secretariat activities on Palestinian affairs, which it views as irremediably anti-Israel, and for meetings of the Preparatory Commission drafting detailed seabed mining regulations to supplement the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention.

The rate of this increase bothered the Western Europeans, many of whom sympathized with Third World desires for automatic transfers. It also caused another attack on the UN budget in the United States Congress. This led first to an attempt during 1979 and 1980 to delete all assessments for technical aid from US payments. Though defeated by narrow margins both times, this initiative forced the Carter administration to take a tougher stance than it might otherwise have done, and encouraged the Reagan administration's anti-UN attitudes. Congressional anger at continued budget increases led to a tougher measure in July 1985. This provides that unless the UN and the specialized agencies move toward weighting votes by size of assessment for the making of budget decisions by January 1987, the US will pay no more than twenty percent of the regular budget (Eckhard, ed., 1985, p. 150).

Though the United States is the most outspoken, other major

Control of the Regular Budget

contributors are also perturbed by recent Western governments caucused regularly in 1982 an *ad hoc* coalition including the US, several Western European states served on the General and the Fifth Committee that to increase in the regular UN budget beyond to compensate for inflation. Despite difficult specific budget measures, this coalition of restraint in spending.

The character of budget arguments has shifted from East-West to a North-South confrontation, simplified by the fact that there is less agreement between the resources and those with the votes. The Third World coalition is seeking money from others who are refusing to pay very much more. Each year one Third World delegate summed up the

We have always shown restraint because much spending can kill the goose that lays the golden egg. The problem is that now it is no longer the rich countries no longer care whether it lives. (Quoted in *Washington Post*, 26 December 1985)

For their part, the Western and Soviet bloc have shown restraint, a mood encouraged by the fact that World delegates have reacted to the new proposals by voting additional programs (Puchala, ed., 1985, p. 150).

Determining who pays what share of the UN finance the budget has always been a difficult task. Assessments are determined in the Fifth Committee on the advice of the Committee on Contributions. Specialists acting in their individual capacities provide an analytical base for formulations, the final decisions are reached by the Assembly, which may modify the specialist advice as political requirements dictate.

In 1946 assessments were initially figured on the basis of member state's national income and population, with deductions for wartime dislocation and needed foreign currency (US dollars). A formula would have assessed the United States at 33.3% of the total, but US delegates got this reduced to 22.2% in 1946 and then in increments to 33.3% by 1965. Arguments that it would not be healthy to place so heavily on one member for its finances (

ch as GATT) where they have greater an in the Assembly. Soviet bloc states are that will save money or reduce Western often pull them in opposite directions.

virtually all members want to be sure that t escape their control while a coalition of and particularly sympathetic members body threatened with abolition. Determin- ICTAD poses particularly difficult prob- hesh as a negotiating forum, its secretariat research and proposal-drafting group for activity has made it what one UN official quoted in Meltzer, 1978, p. 1018). Western erceive it as a good negotiating forum, so hat activity elsewhere. The United States of small consultative groups to deal with gregated approach anathema to the Third lemate. Not only are the Third World and s, but many within the UN system doubt ntly organized could do a good job. The

VI did nothing to reduce that doubt, s taken by the Grenadan acting director timism (Eckhard, ed., 1985, p. 157). ntralization through new Secretariat plan- d evaluation units and merging all twenty- rams except UNICEF into a single UN y have also bogged down. Western coun- merger on efficiency grounds so long as it NEP and the World Food Council. Third tried to link this to rules ensuring the ording to priorities set by the General autonomy for the five regional com-

se central coordination of and General er activities of specialized agencies, par- IF and World Bank group, meet intense from Western governments. They are air relatively greater influence in those ant to maintain the traditional sectoral that they can better resist Third World erious resistance also comes from agency air own realms of autonomy. (Meltzer, 80; and Meltzer, 1983, describe these

The restructuring debates are simply struggles among groups of states eager to create a set of machinery more favorable to their interests. The Third World coalition could end the discussion at any time simply by voting resolutions embodying most of the steps it favors. It cannot alone transform the Economic and Social Council into another organ of the whole since that would require amending the Charter, but could do everything else. The fact that it has not suggests not only that it fears inspiring serious obstruction from the West but also that it is more internally divided than the public debates suggest. Division has manifested itself in Secretariat-delegate coalitions to preserve certain units; it may extend to other questions as well.

The Assembly and the Specialized Agencies

Though the restructuring debate goes on, Assembly-specialized agency relations remain the loose association they have always been. This looseness shows in two ways. First, the Assembly has no obligation to consult them when considering matters within their competence. Though the Assembly usually does, proposals to change the rules of procedure to mandate such consultation have failed (the scant notice given a 1961 proposal described in Ghanaian remarks in A/C.2/21/SR.1067, 11 Nov. 1966, para. 18; a 1968 proposal was laid aside after short debate in A/C.2/23/SR.1229-30, 25 Nov. 1968, and A/C.2/24/SR.1283, 18 Nov. 1969). Second, Assembly resolutions and decisions are not binding on the specialized agencies. The agencies are notified of all Assembly decisions, but take them into account in their work only when their own executive councils or governing assemblies adopt them. Thus, UNESCO's plenary assembly has not accepted and never cites the 1974 "Zionism is a form of racism" resolution in its work (interview with UNESCO staff member, 1983; also see, e.g., the General Conference's "Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice" of 17 December 1978); and in October 1982 the IMF decided to approve a \$1.1 billion loan to South Africa despite an Assembly appeal that it not do so (*New York Times*, 22 October 1982, sec. 4, p. 9). Though the Assembly has urged that both Israel and South Africa be denied participation in agency work, the record is uneven, with some agencies accepting the idea and others rejecting it (see lists of membership in *UN Yearbook*, 1983, part II).

Specialized agencies' independence stems from an independent basis for existence in their own constituent treaties, procedures

1955, the old notion lost appeal. Similarly, Arab efforts to discredit Israel were weakened, not strengthened, by attempts to equate Zionism with racism. Western states reject this equation vehemently, and even the more moderate Third World states have difficulties with it. Much of the current United States discontent with the Assembly rests on a belief that Third World views of the world are hopelessly skewed by Marxist or Fabian socialist notions (Moynihan, 1975) or by a reflexive anticolonialism seeking explanations of all current ills in colonial or neocolonial terms (e.g., Jackson, 1983).

Yet any theory that attracts wide governmental following, no matter how weak it may be intellectually, cannot be ignored while that following remains large or powerful. Most Assembly members are weak states extremely sensitive to attempts at any form of outside influence. This shows up in many ways. The Assembly (or at least the Third Committee) is one of the few places in the world where substituting the words "alien subjugation" for "foreign influence" in the text of a draft resolution could be called without irony a "minor change" (secretary of the committee announcing a translation error in A/C.3/37/SR.18, 21 Oct. 1982, para. 8). Third World states have devoted considerable energy since 1960 to the passage of Assembly resolutions stating that foreign economic influence is as onerous a limit on the freedom of weak states as direct colonial rule or armed intervention, and that independence without strong local government control over the economy is no real independence. While it is easy to point out the intellectual weakness of these ideas, the political climate of suspicion against foreign firms (particularly privately owned ones based in market economy states) is too strong to be ignored by any government or business firm.

Assembly statements about specific situations may be attempts to manage conflict by reminding contestants of the need to settle differences without resort to force or suggesting ways to reduce, if not settle, their differences. Assembly majorities can tap a rich set of symbols for this purpose, ranging from specific provisions of the Charter to general images of the folly of war. However, such statements may also register majority decisions to take sides by endorsing one party or condemning the other. Here, too, a wide range of symbols is available. Charter provisions, rules of international law, statements of what is just or fair and earlier Assembly resolutions can all be used in aid of a particular side.

The form of symbolic politics differs in each type of case. Attempts to foster the reduction or settlement of conflict address appeals to all parties evenly. Though individual members may

Coalition Politics and the Use of Symbols

have views about who is right or included into decisions. Rather, press discussions while public decisions appropriate or to accept mediation or to avoid the dispute. Other members do not simply try to separate and restrain the boxers.

Using the Assembly to take sides to the various sides or individual praises one and condemns the other back one's case more than the other has different degrees of intensity. A within the Third World ensures that routinely and continually condemn terms. Divisions among the Nonaligned condemned for invading Cyprus in taking over Eastern Timor in 1975, by terms.

Coalition Politics and the Use of Symbols

The goals of different coalitions, their Assembly and their mechanisms for influence the way in which Assembly and relative power can be related in Figure 7.1.

		Major chang
Power	Strong Weak	a c

Figure 7.1 Possible relation between

A coalition of strong states with state need not rely very heavily on symbol that it does, symbols are used to together, to encourage active roles in preempt criticism by opponents. This coalition will content itself with mild are modest, its rhetoric may be immo threatened.

The US-led coalition provides an ex

interests. Resolution 1803 (XVII) of 1962
ce that

and nations to permanent sovereignty over
and resources must be exercised in the
onal development and of the well-being of
ite concerned.

s emphasized that foreign investment
the national law of, and by agreements
y, the host state, Compensation in case of
be "appropriate" and, in a precariously
ccordance with the rules in force in the
ires in the exercise of its sovereignty and
national law."

was reaffirmed in resolution 2154 (XXI) of
resolution then endorsed measures for
control over foreign-owned enterprises,
ning local personnel to manage them and
uity participation in the venture. Devel-
d to transfer capital, technology and
in from lowering commodity prices by
stockpiles. Commodity cartels were
ensuring the exercise of the permanent
atural resources of developing states.

conomic Rights and Duties of States,
(X), adopted over Western objections
been broadened to include other forms
f host-state control over foreign invest-
cle 2(1) of Chapter II said that "every
y exercise full permanent sovereignty,
se, and disposal, over all its wealth,
onomic activities." The rest of Article 2
ging definition of the mechanisms for
manent sovereignty".

al Assembly Decisions

extent they are addressed, other actors
ors when deciding how to respond to an
on. Obviously, they consider whether
nmendation appropriate to the matter.
appropriate, but it is also possible that

some supporters of the general goal will think a particular
resolution inappropriate because they feel it suggests a poor way
to gain the goal or a line of action that makes the goal harder to
attain. Both supporters and opponents are influenced by the
legality of methods used to secure the decision and by the size,
composition and solidity of the majority supporting it. Finally,
responses will depend heavily on the balance of costs and benefits
to each individual addressee of complying or not complying.

The political impact of an Assembly resolution depends
heavily on the extent to which governments and other actors
view its terms as appropriate. Governments often ignore those
parts of resolutions that seem extraneous to the matter at hand. In
an extreme case, a government may claim that the extraneous
references vitiate the whole resolution. This has become the
Western mood faced with resolutions on, for instance, women's
rights that devote paragraphs to condemning racism, colonial-
ism, imperialism and apartheid. On the other side, supporting
governments may regard the extraneous references as necessary
because opponents are ducking the issue and have to be reminded
of it as often as possible (e.g., editorial comment on Western
objections to Assembly requests that the IMF deny loans to South
Africa, *The Weekly Review* [Nairobi], 5 November 1982, p. 5).

Sometimes the whole resolution raises strong objections.
Western objections that Resolution 3379 (XXX), the "Zionism is
a form of racism" resolution, improperly equates a nationalist
movement to racist theories have colored its response not only in
the Middle East context inspiring the resolution but in all
Assembly discussion of the problem of racism. That objections
go beyond a belief that the resolution unfairly singles out Israel
can be seen from Western European responses. The European
Community has taken a more pro-Palestinian stance on Middle
East issues than the United States, but objects just as vehemently
to equating Zionism with racism during human rights dis-
cussion.

A state's opposition to a decision may be greater and will be
harder to overcome if it has legal objections to the terms or the
mode of adoption. The Soviet bloc has tended to regard most
criticism of its activities at home as infringements of domestic
jurisdiction and has rejected them out of hand. Such arguments
were the bloc's main line of defense when the Assembly
attempted to discuss the Hungarian situation in the late 1950s.
France rejected the Assembly's call that the island of Mayotte be
joined with the Comoros on grounds the Assembly ought not
ignore the freely expressed wishes of the people when they opted

und. At other times, such as June
bout other things. Since the PLO
ich cares equally intensely about
ve tended to prevail. If a large
are enough long enough to fight
e in serious trouble.

commendations. Their political
es' response to their symbolic
ers or restraint by opponents.
irect; they seek to mold action
n governments and others make
ie symbolic appeals are meant to
secure outcomes with which the
. With opponents, the symbolic
action hindering outcomes or
to the outcome by appealing to
beliefs.

1 Assembly decision depend in
ly proceedings surrounding its
on to the breadth and apparent
rting the decision. They also
ion formation and maintenance
particular symbols or particular

v or shaky coalition are far less
y a wide and solid one. Oppo-
ed by a narrow vote or a vague
disagreements among support-
w such situations as invitations
ntinuing to press their views in
tion. Lukewarm supporters are
ion seems to have a narrow or
are likely to reflect further on
husiasm and defer action until
for desiring an outcome really
ring it.

mation and maintenance affect
is and so influence addressees'
coalition held together by dis-
members' tendency to prefer

disaggregation was reinforced by the fact that only by keeping things separate could the log-rolling that held the coalition together continue. Except on Cold War issues, where an all-out ideological contest with the Soviet bloc mandated strident rhetoric, the symbolic appeals were universalistic but measured. Nothing encouraged supporters or opponents to feel urgency except when warfare had broken out and UN mechanisms were being used to control or stop it. Outcomes were approached gradually and piecemeal. The Third World coalition has a very different style. Both its leading members' philosophical preferences and the coalition's internal dynamics encourage linking issues. Not only do individual issues, such as information questions or the role of women in society, acquire broad definitions, but the individual issues are all linked to the grand overarching concepts of anticolonialism and a New International Economic Order. The appeals remain universalistic, but have an across-the-board stridency lacking in the 1940s and early 1950s. This encourages both supporters and opponents to share a sense of urgency. While the urgency of opposition is highest in the United States, other Western countries share the mood when faced with particular formulations of particular issues. The Soviet bloc, too, has found elements to oppose in Third World demands.

Conditions outside the Assembly have greater effect on governments' responses to Assembly decisions. The nature of the appeal being made or its likely implications are evaluated independently of how it came to be adopted. The relation of control over Assembly decisions and ability to create or influence outcomes outside necessarily affects the implementation of decisions. Finally, individual governments consider the costs and benefits of compliance or noncompliance on a case-by-case and individualistic basis.

Obviously, governments react to the content of a decision. They support or oppose some decisions more than others. Western countries differ greatly in their opposition to specific Third World initiatives on Middle East issues, but all vehemently oppose the 1975 decision defining Zionism as a form of racism. The Soviet bloc supports general calls for a new international economic order, but is happiest about those parts emphasizing the role of state guidance in the economy and least happy about those parts entailing new demands on the UN's regular budget. Third World countries support any general appeal to self-determination, but disagree among themselves about how to define the rights and wrongs of such situations as Moroccan

interpretations of national law in states that voted in favor (e.g., Skubiszewski, 1972; Schreuer, 1978). On the whole, however, national courts have preferred to rely on national law, treaties and customary international law.

Though some states are far more open to outside appeals and influences than others, the difference in effect of Assembly appeals to the public may not be very great. It is clear that in a state like China, where information is closely controlled, only those Assembly appeals the government likes will get publicity. In the West, particularly the United States, low public interest and low press coverage combine to limit the effect of Assembly appeals. Most people in most societies pay little attention to international affairs except in periods of crisis. The relatively small attentive public that follows foreign affairs may or may not pay great attention to the UN depending on how it views the UN. Those who find it particularly helpful or particularly harmful to their country's interests pay the most attention and seek to convert their less attentive compatriots to their views. As with other foreign news, news of UN activities tends to spread only when there is a crisis or some other dramatic event. As Geoffrey Goodwin noted in 1962:

during most of its fifteen years' existence, so far as public interest in Britain in its political activities is concerned, the limited impact the United Nations has had on most of the major issues of peace and war has discouraged "public opinion" from waxing very enthusiastic – or bitter – about it; indeed, though a generally accepted part of international life, it has for long periods languished relatively unnoticed in a diplomatic backwater.

(Goodwin, 1961, p. 581)

When they so desire, however, governments can ensure extra publicity for UN activity. In most cases this means publicizing the government's own stances in ways that make it appear to be defending the right. In 1951 a recently emigrated Polish official noted that the Soviet Union found the Assembly useful not only to speak to the rest of the world, but to help persuade its own population and those of Eastern European states that it was the only defender of peace against US aggression (Rudzinski, 1951, p. 299). Similarly, the Soviet Union has used the 1975 "Zionism is a form of racism" resolution to give legitimacy to its domestic discrimination against Jews (Korey, 1978, p. 9). Third World governments publicize their speeches and Assembly decisions

The Assembly, Governments

in efforts to maintain government, too, used support at home and abroad. pp. 80–1, on the activities.

Assembly decisions in political controversy which discredit the government. In Rhodesia in the early 1960s, the government's position defeated less strict opposition voters. In both campaigns, the government attempted to win concessions as a sign that it was turning the country over to black decisions and mix-ups at the time of the Carter administration. Third World condemnation of Israel in 1978 (Shan, 1980).

Finally, the Assembly and its arguments over public opinion attempted to assess the extent to which the Assembly affects policy-making. Taken in general, the crisis, past and present developments in their assessment of the situation (Siverson, 1973, on Israel). In calmer times, delegates have to others then makes them more concerned and arguments (Erasmus). In countries where the top priority is in the Assembly or other issues produced by service in the Assembly, not necessarily the processes of the decisions. For states which have Assembly experience, most Third World foreign ministers at the Assembly (as well as at the 77 meetings), and many have less common among the individuals. In individual cases, it is possible to have an impact on foreign policies with Soviet delegates and advocates of Western defense (Spaak, 1971, p. 109). F

FROM
DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN'S
BOOK: A DANGEROUS PLACE

9

“Zionism Is a Form of Racism and Racial Discrimination”

AS WITH MANY THINGS instantly known, the proposition that the Soviets were behind the Zionism resolution turned out to be difficult to prove. (It would, to be sure, have been equally difficult to *disprove*.) At the rudimentary level, the Soviets sponsored the resolution; the only developed country to do so. Of the other twenty-five sponsors, twenty-one were Moslem countries, all Arab save Afghanistan and Somalia. Two, Cuba and Guinea, were client states of the Soviets, while Mali, another sponsor, has a large Moslem population. Of all the sponsors, only Dahomey fit none of these patterns.

More fundamental, Soviet propaganda had for some years, by this point, been asserting that Zionism was indeed racist, and more especially that Zionism was virtually indistinguishable from Nazism. For a congeries of reasons, neither the United States government nor the American Jewish community had paid much attention to this, with some prescient exceptions. But the fact was known, and in particular was known to us — Garment, Weaver, myself — at the Mission. Bernard Lewis of Princeton seemed to know most about the history of the subject, which he later recounted in *Foreign Affairs*. Following the Second World War, Soviet propaganda began to link internal pan-Turkish and pan-Iranian movements to Nazism (there may indeed have been Ger-

man links there) and to apply the term *racist* to nationalist movements that tried to connect non-Slavic peoples of the Soviet Union with their kin elsewhere. Other nationalisms within the USSR could be dismissed as feudal, bourgeois, reactionary, or clericalist, but the term *racist* was reserved for these particularly threatening nationalist tendencies. Condemnation of these movements, and of pan-Islamism as well, was, in Lewis's words, "fierce and unrelenting." Then, following the 1967 war, there was a great stirring among Soviet Jews, a people so labeled on their identity cards and even, technically, endowed with a Soviet homeland in Birobidjan. (Malik was fond of the tale of the Soviet Minister of Commerce who, visiting the Jewish Soviet Republic, remarked on the poverty of the people. It was explained to him that, since the place had been reserved for Jews, there were no Russians to cheat.) Outside of the USSR, efforts on behalf of Soviet Jewry increased after 1967. In response, Soviet propaganda began to describe Zionism as anti-Soviet and as racist.

In February, 1971, *Pravda* carried a two-part series called "Anti-Sovietism Is the Profession of Zionists." It was charged in the aftermath of the 1967 war, when all Communist countries but Rumania broke relations with Israel, that Zionist subversive activity had increased. "The first practical test of this theory and policy were the events in Czechoslovakia in 1968," stated Vladimir Bolshakov, the author. A number of the Czech "liberals" having been Jews, it followed that Dubček was part of a Zionist plot. Shortly after the *Pravda* article appeared, Bernard Gwertzman described these events in *The Times*:

Zionist leaders are accused of having collaborated with the Nazis during the war and are charged with practicing a racism of their own.

Soviet television recently showed a 50-minute documentary film largely devoted to the history of Zionism. The Nazi-Zionist theme was emphasized. On several occasions, David Ben-Gurion's face was superimposed on that of Hitler.

Newsreel footage of Israeli forces on parade was followed by similar footage of Nazi storm troopers parading past Hitler. Pictures of inmates of Nazi concentration camps were shown immediately before victims of Israeli air raids in Egypt.*

* It appears that the publication of anti-Semitic literature in the Soviet Union considerably increased after 1975. Professor John Armstrong of the University of Wisconsin reports that books belonging to the genre, published in editions of 100,000 and 200,000, do not distinguish between Zionist and Jew, and blend "the main features of traditional anti-Semitic propaganda, as developed from the Middle Ages through the Nazi press, and including Soviet Cold War clichés in which Jews, Zionists, and Israel replace the Western powers as archvillains." A preferred theme is that Jews collaborated with Nazis during World War II.

"ZIONISM IS A FORM OF RACISM"

Now all this was familiar as a j enormous lie, the mind-numbing of the Zionism resolution. Yet it involved, and probably independent

Evidently the Arabs — the other side of the coin — had shown but little interest. When Arabs attacked Zionism (for being pro-Bolshevik or so), for example, of the Saudis and of the things at length began to change. From the 1960s onward, Bernard

... Arab attacks on the Zionists to make extensive use of such connections between Israel and South Africa, Zionists and Nazis.

Thus in the Palestine National Council list of pejorative adjectives applied to Zionism which Lewis notes was, "significantly, Zionism as a form of racism.

There the matter must rest. To claim to the 1975 Zionism resolution the Soviet connection that preoccupied the question seemingly never occurred to it (matter whose idea it was?) It was using the Zionism resolution to attack Israel — and to intimidate the movement to expel Israel. At the time was that Israel and Egypt moving toward something like peace? Having been expelled from Egypt, were they

On July 14, in his Milwaukee speech, the United States would do many things. They were even so much as *suspended* the July 16, a conference of foreign nations. Even so for the *expulsion* of Israel from national bodies. On July 17, the resolution to "defend and promote the rights of member states and for the existence of Israel's rights were not to be interrupted." It adopted a resolution saying that the United States would consider

a racist to nationalist movements of the Soviet Union with their in the USSR could be dismissed as a racist, but the term *racist* was being used to denigrate nationalist tendencies. Confusion of pan-Islamism as well, was, in 1967. Then, following the 1967 war, Soviet Jews, a people so labeled on the Soviet Union, endowed with a Soviet home, the tale of the Soviet Minister of the Soviet Republic, remarked on him that, since the place no Russians to cheat.) Outside of the Jewry increased after 1967. In to describe Zionism as anti-Soviet

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nitic literature in the Soviet Union con- Armstrong of the University of Wisconsin, published in editions of 100,000 and Jew, and blend "the main features developed from the Middle Ages through the Nazi era in which Jews, Zionists, and villains." A preferred theme is that Jews

Now all this was familiar as a pattern, and unmistakably Soviet: the enormous lie, the mind-numbing accusation. Enough to settle the origins of the Zionism resolution. Yet it is to be insisted that others were also involved, and probably independently involved.

Evidently the Arabs — the other natural source of anti-Israel propaganda — had shown but little interest in the Zionist movement as such. When Arabs attacked Zionism on ideological grounds, it was mainly for being pro-Bolshevik or socialistic. Such was the position, for example, of the Saudis and of King Faisal. Still, even for the Arabs things at length began to change, as the uses of ideology were perceived. From the 1960s onward, Bernard Lewis writes,

. . . Arab attacks on the Zionist enterprise and on Zionist theory began to make extensive use of such terms as *racist*, and to seek resemblances between Israel and South Africa, and, even more remarkably, between Zionists and Nazis.

Thus in the Palestine National Covenant of 1964, *racist* is added to the list of pejorative adjectives applied to Zionism, while a 1965 Arab tract, which Lewis notes was, "significantly," published in English, classifies Zionism as a form of racism.

There the matter must rest. Arab propagandists can lay as good a claim to the 1975 Zionism resolution as can the Soviets, though it was the Soviet connection that preoccupied me at the time. (As usual, the question seemingly never occurred to anyone in Washington. What did it *matter* whose idea it was?) It was in any event clear that the Soviets were using the Zionism resolution as a fallback position from which to attack Israel — and to intimidate Egypt — after the momentum went out of the movement to expel Israel from the U.N. The plain fact of the time was that Israel and Egypt, with American sponsorship, were moving toward something like peace. The Soviets, especially after having been expelled from Egypt, would not have it.

On July 14, in his Milwaukee address, Kissinger made clear that the United States would do many things, possibly drastic things, if Israel were even so much as *suspended* from the coming General Assembly. On July 16, a conference of foreign ministers of forty Islamic countries called even so for the *expulsion* of Israel from the U.N. and from all international bodies. On July 17, the European Nine expressed their intention to "defend and promote respect for the Charter, for the rights of member states and for the existing rules of procedure," meaning that Israel's rights were not to be interfered with. On July 18, the U.S. Senate adopted a resolution saying that if Israel were expelled from the U.N. the United States would consider seriously the implication of continued

American membership in that body. On July 23, Israeli Foreign Minister Yigal Allon appealed to "enlightened" members of the U.N. to try to head off any move to suspend Israel from the Thirtieth Session by serving notice that they themselves would walk out if Israel was suspended. Nothing daunted, on July 25, the foreign ministers of the Organization of African Unity directed that their drafting committee prepare a resolution seeking the suspension of Israel. *Then*, on the same day, July 25, Anwar Sadat, President of Egypt, stated that "Israel must be present at the United Nations if it is expected to comply with its resolutions." He continued that if Israel did not comply, then it should be expelled. But the essential Egyptian statement was that for the moment Israel must remain if the movement toward peace between the two countries was to continue. On July 29, Allon stated that if Israel were ousted from the U.N., the U.N. would be ousted from Israel, and there would be no Geneva peace conference. Events turned. On August 1, the O.A.U. assembly of heads of state approved a resolution which spoke merely of "the possibility of eventually depriving Israel . . . of its membership." On August 30, the ministerial conference of Non-Aligned in Lima adopted a thirty-two-page declaration, which omitted a call for Israel's suspension or expulsion, calling merely for Israel to abide by the Charter and implement all United Nations resolutions concerning the Palestinian and Middle East questions.

The United States had won. Kissinger had won. The Egyptians, having broken with the Russians, succeeded in upholding their new relationship with the United States, and the step-by-step movement toward peace with Israel that rested fundamentally on U.N. resolutions.

The object of the Zionism resolution that followed was to spoil these relations and disrupt such progress, to force Egypt, as Lewis later wrote, "to join in this exercise and to sabotage independent Egyptian moves toward peace." The irony is that this second-best, fallback alternative for the Soviets was potentially far more devastating than expulsion. Instead of merely challenging the right of Israel to participate in the General Assembly, the Zionism resolution challenged the right of Israel to exist. The legitimacy of the Israeli state was denied. The official doctrine of the state, the ideology of the movement to create a Jewish homeland, was declared to be suffused with racism, the one doctrine that the existing world political community had outlawed. The United Nations system, in thirty years, had granted legitimacy to all manner of economic, social, and political arrangements: democratic and totalitarian; capitalist and socialist; pluralist and centralist. All were equally accepted as equally legitimate. *Only regimes based on racism and racial discrimination were held to be unacceptable.* This is not to say that anything that might be accorded the standing of international law held that

a state determined to be racist close to political reality, especially

There were now but three dominated by European white To Israelis, and no doubt to grow it will seem absurd to put them homeland of the Jews. But Africa that Israel is the homeland of there. The rest are Russian Colonizers have no rights. Now was the devastating aspect of it to be a regime of the past.

If I knew little of Israel, I Peace Conference, and was not would make. The treaty of San Remo was an Arab state in Syria and granted at San Remo in 1920 already, in 1919, the Emir Feisal Jewish settlement in Palestine. stateless, so also were the Arabs was the age of Wilson.

This is what I knew. I think Asians, and others, to see this remaining remnant of white, American Jews, and I assumed ing that anyone could see Israel was deadly dangerous. The themselves as the very model society. And of all the things certainly not after the Holocaust under their radar screen; under

A careful history may one issue. What I recount is what and November of 1975, when Reis, we at least knew the U.N. course, were cultural and political that, in Bernard Lewis's words our day is the racist, just as But the United Nations was ing this transition and for growing attitude.

On July 23, Israeli Foreign Minister "members of the U.N. to try to" from the Thirtieth Session by serv- walk out if Israel was suspended. sign ministers of the Organization afting committee prepare a resolu-

Then, on the same day, July 25, ed that "Israel must be present at o comply with its resolutions." He ly, then it should be expelled. But that for the moment Israel must between the two countries was to at if Israel were ousted from the m Israel, and there would be no rned. On August 1, the O.A.U. resolution which spoke merely of ng Israel . . . of its membership." ference of Non-Aligned in Lima 1, which omitted a call for Israel's y for Israel to abide by the Charter resolutions concerning the Pales-

ger had won. The Egyptians, hav- ed in upholding their new rela- the step-by-step movement toward entally on U.N. resolutions. on that followed was to spoil these o force Egypt, as Lewis later wrote, tage independent Egyptian moves is second-best, fallback alternative ore devastating than expulsion. In- ht of Israel to participate in the ation challenged the right of Israel eli state was denied. The official the movement to create a Jewish l with racism, the one doctrine that ity had outlawed. The United Na- anted legitimacy to all manner of ngements: democratic and totali- ist and centralist. All were equally regimes based on racism and racial eptable. This is not to say that any- ding of international law held that

a state determined to be racist had no right to exist, but this *was* very close to political reality, especially at the United Nations.

There were now but three states left in all of Africa or Asia still dominated by European whites: South Africa, Rhodesia — and Israel. To Israelis, and no doubt to great numbers of Americans and Europeans, it will seem absurd to put them in such company. Israel is, after all, the homeland of the Jews. But Africans and Asians so disposed reply to this that Israel is the homeland only of those Jews who have always lived there. The rest are Russian and Polish and Hungarian colonizers. Colonizers have no rights. None, certainly, at the United Nations. This was the devastating aspect of the Zionism resolution: it declared Israel to be a regime of the past.

If I knew little of Israel, I knew a fair amount about the Versailles Peace Conference, and was not impressed by the historical case the Arabs would make. The treaty of Sèvres clearly anticipated that there would be an Arab state in Syria and a Jewish state in Palestine. The Mandate granted at San Remo in 1920 only strengthened this presumption, while already, in 1919, the Emir Feisal and Chaim Weizmann had agreed to a Jewish settlement in Palestine. If the Jews at the time were in some sense stateless, so also were the Arabs. None had states. All would have. This was the age of Wilson.

This is what I knew. I think I also knew that it was quite possible for Asians, and others, to see things quite differently, to see the Israelis as a remaining remnant of white, European colonialists. I also knew that American Jews, and I assumed Israelis, had very great difficulty imagin- ing that anyone could see Israel in such a perspective. Hence this attack was deadly dangerous. The Israelis and their supporters thought of themselves as the very model of the modern anti-imperialist, collectivist society. And of all the things they could never be accused of was racism: certainly not after the Holocaust. And so the jets came screaming in under their radar screen; undetected, utterly unexpected.

A careful history may one day be written of the emergence of this issue. What I recount is what we knew at the U.S. Mission in October and November of 1975, where, thanks to a superb legal officer, Herbert Reis, we at least knew the U.N. background. The large causal events, of course, were cultural and political: the process by which it came to pass that, in Bernard Lewis's words, "the fashionable enemy in the West in our day is the racist, just as a few years back he was the communist." But the United Nations was an ideal institutional structure for facilitat- ing this transition and for giving an institutional structure to the new attitude.

The transition was rapid. In 1965, on the basis of a draft prepared by the Human Rights Commission, the General Assembly took up and adopted the International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. Article I defined the term:

In this Convention, the term "racial discrimination" shall mean any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, employment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.

In the expansive spirit of the proceedings (there was virtually no debate) the United States, with Brazil, proposed adding an additional article:

States Parties condemn anti-Semitism and shall take action as appropriate for its speedy eradication in the territories subject to their jurisdiction.

The United States delegate, William P. Rogers, former Attorney General and future Secretary of State, explained:

Article I makes it quite clear that this Convention is intended to protect ethnic as well as racial groups. Although all members of this Committee who have spoken have argued that the present language of the Convention is broad enough to cover anti-Semitism . . . [the] article proposed by Brazil and the United States would appropriately highlight the application of the Convention to anti-Semitism.

It was understandable that Rogers, with an American sensitivity to the racial language in which the Nazis had expressed their anti-Semitism, should want the U.N. to proclaim its abhorrence of the latter. But in the end the association proved to be a weapon accessible to enemies as well as friends, for it held within it support for the idea of Jews as a race, a complicated idea to begin with, but by 1975 especially dangerous, as enemies of Israel were beginning to claim that Jews justified their nationhood on racial grounds, and accordingly, somehow, did not deserve to have a nation. In 1965 the Soviets proposed an amendment to the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, which suggests they were onto the idea:

States Parties condemn anti-Semitism, Zionism, Nazism, neo-Nazism and all other forms of the policy and ideology of colonialism, national and race hatred and exclusiveness and shall take action as appropriate

"ZIONISM IS A FORM OF RACISM"

for the speedy eradication of territories subject to their jurisdiction.

Brilliant: to oppose *both* anti-Semitism and "Zionism" with racial discrimination by a decision not to give priority to "Zionism," but the idea remains.

This decision also put aside the idea that referred not only to "racial discrimination," but to "racism" as such. Just as the word *racism* was not in the U.N. system till 1965 in a Security Council resolution of independence by Rhodesia. But for the longest while, the vocabulary; speeches, resolutions, "racial discrimination." A very *Fortune* was later to point out that racism a doctrine. The implication.

As a term, *racism* came into the International Convention on Human Rights to observe the twentieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration. Just weeks after the Kerner Commission report had been issued, the term *racism*, especially *white racism*, idea dominated the years that followed, with variants as *sexism* and *ageism*. It was but now too fashionable for an American delegation to the Tehran conference. The Commission, Roy Wilkins, and the Jewish and racial affairs. For while the delegation brought little acknowledgment, initiative on human rights to the U.N. at every opportunity. "recognized," the Afghan *rapprochement* tragic situation in southern Afghanistan, a flagrant violation of human rights. More than the age of Hitler, presumably. American asked for precision. The occupation of Arab territories, continuously associated with the initiative on specific human rights by the Soviets. There had been

for the speedy eradication of those inhuman ideas and practices in the territories subject to their jurisdiction.

Brilliant: to oppose *both* anti-Semitism and *Zionism*! To link "exclusiveness" with racial discrimination! The amendment was put off by a decision not to give priority to "any . . . specific forms of racial discrimination," but the idea remained.

This decision also put aside consideration of a Bolivian amendment that referred not only to "racial discrimination," the going term of the day, but to "racism" as such. Just what prompted the Bolivian delegation to invoke the term *racism* was not clear, but this was the first appearance of the word in the U.N. system that we could discover. It appeared also in 1965 in a Security Council resolution that asserted that the declaration of independence by Rhodesian white settlers had no legal validity. But for the longest while, the term scarcely existed in the U.N. vocabulary; speeches, resolutions, and conventions were directed against "racial discrimination." A very different matter, as Paul Weaver of *Fortune* was later to point out: racial discrimination is a practice, racism a doctrine. The implications differ considerably.

As a term, *racism* came into its own at the U.N. with the Tehran International Convention on Human Rights, convened in April, 1968, to observe the twentieth anniversary of the proclamation of the Universal Declaration. Just weeks before the Tehran conference, the Kerner Commission report had been released in the United States, and the term *racism*, especially *white racism*, achieved a huge vogue. The idea dominated the years that followed, and produced by analogy such variants as *sexism* and *ageism*. It was a clear enough idea to begin with, but now too fashionable for an exact meaning to survive. The American delegation to the Tehran conference included a member of the Kerner Commission, Roy Wilkins, and Morris Abram, a man active in both Jewish and racial affairs. For whatever reason, apart from this new word, the delegation brought little along with it, conceding almost the whole initiative on human rights to the dictatorships, avowing American failings at every opportunity. Language depreciated rapidly. "All recognized," the Afghan *rapporteur* of the conference noted, "that the tragic situation in southern Africa constitutes the vilest and most flagrant violation of human rights ever recorded in history." Worse than the age of Hitler, presumably, or of Stalin, or of Idi Amin. No American asked for precision. No American took exception as Israeli occupation of Arab territories, now a huge fact of Middle East life, was continuously associated with the situation of southern Africa. The initiative on specific human rights issues was almost wholly taken over by the Soviets. There had recently taken place in West Germany (where

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the basis of a draft prepared by General Assembly took up and on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination:

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Rogers, former Attorney General, said:

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ism, Zionism, Nazism, neo-Nazism and ideology of colonialism, national and shall take action as appropriate

a thoroughly democratic government permitted such opposition) an outbreak of small neo-Nazi demonstrations. The governments of the USSR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia obtained from the conference the sternest condemnation of this "Nazism" and "neo-Nazism." Nigeria proposed adding the words *and racism* after "neo-Nazism," and the sponsors agreed. The resolution was thereafter modified only in that the conference rejected the Soviet contention that these outbreaks "constitute a threat to the peace and security of peoples." The Soviets similarly introduced the resolution calling on the General Assembly to declare 1969 "the International Year for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination." In time, the General Assembly expanded the period from a year into a decade, which technically began in 1973. It will be recalled that the resolution to declare Zionism a form of racism and racial discrimination was one of several amendments to the basic charter of the "Decade," and as such had now come before the Thirtieth General Assembly.

In the interval, a more specific attack on Israel had also proceeded. The first direct move against Israel's part in the U.N. system had come in the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, which will seem appropriate to those who believe that the largest political phenomena appear first in the culture. On November 20, 1974, by a vote of 64 in favor to 27 (including the United States) against, with 26 abstentions, the UNESCO General Conference condemned Israel for altering the historical features of Jerusalem and undertaking excavations that constituted a danger to its monuments. (The vote, in percentage terms, was almost precisely that on the Zionism resolution a year later. Fifty-five percent for, 23 percent against, 22 percent abstaining in UNESCO. Fifty-two percent for, 25 percent against, 23 percent abstaining in the General Assembly.) The UNESCO General Conference next rejected a motion to include Israel in UNESCO's European regional group, leaving it the only member state not included in any such grouping. Finally the conference called on the Director-General to supervise the educational and cultural institutions in the occupied Arab territories, in cooperation with the Arab States and the Palestine Liberation Organization, so that these populations might have access to education and culture to preserve their national identity. Much work had been done by the time the Third Committee of the Thirtieth General Assembly convened.

Chaim Herzog, the Israeli Ambassador to the U.N., later recalled that the issue took the Israelis by complete surprise. This suggests the extra-

ordinary vulnerability of that of attack now being made upon struggle and surviving by virtue highest intellectual as well as aircraft carrier in a hostile sea notice. Off would go the siren in seconds, minutes later taking was such a matter of minutes t Yet now there was taking place as such — indeed, the first attack Nations. Before six weeks had agency, would state that surely surely everyone saw it coming. those who had the greatest need

The State of Israel was surely its destruction. Huge majorities in the United Nations. The Union, was openly anti-Semitic generally, and Japan particularly economic difficulty consequent which were also Israel's enemies could be predicted that the Israelis for this, while for aloof. Our support had been had available to us the air base plex world.) Whatever would In the meantime, with the oil prices, the West had entered a period of inflation and unemployment. Parliamentary governments considered responsible, Israel surely would most. Israel would be *regretted*

Somehow this reality was especially to American Jews. If Jewish history seemed to deny could be on the left. Jewish history could be thought guilty of crime of Israel was so new. It was his behavior might display the same Jews imprisoning others? Jewish desecrating the culture of others

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ordinary vulnerability of that nation, and of Jews generally, to the kind
of attack now being made upon them. Here was Israel, born in bloody
struggle and surviving by virtue of intense, unceasing vigilance of the
highest intellectual as well as spiritual order. The nation lived like an
aircraft carrier in a hostile sea, ready to fight on six or seven minutes'
notice. Off would go the sirens, the fighter bombers would be in the air
in seconds, minutes later taking out air bases on another continent. It
was such a matter of minutes that saved the nation in the Six Day War.
Yet now there was taking place an attack on Israel's national movement
as such — indeed, the first attack of this kind in the history of the United
Nations. Before six weeks had passed, dimwitted Tass, the Soviet news
agency, would state that surely the event came as no surprise to anyone,
surely everyone saw it coming. But no, it came as a complete surprise to
those who had the greatest need to see it coming.

The State of Israel was surrounded by nations formally committed to
its destruction. Huge majorities for this proposition could be summoned
in the United Nations. The world's second greatest power, the Soviet
Union, was openly anti-Semitic. The world's greatest power, the West
generally, and Japan particularly, had entered a time of prolonged
economic difficulty consequent upon the decision of the Arab nations,
which were also Israel's enemies, to quintuple the price of energy. It
could be predicted that the Europeans would somehow begin to blame
the Israelis for this, while for certain the Japanese would want to stay
aloof. Our support had been effective in the 1967 war because we still
had available to us the air bases of prerevolutionary Portugal. (A com-
plex world.) Whatever would follow, that regime in Portugal had gone.
In the meantime, with the outcome of that war and the quintupling of
oil prices, the West had entered what was likely to be a protracted pe-
riod of inflation and unemployment, with the normal difficulties of par-
liamentary governments considerably worsened. Whether Israel was
responsible, Israel surely would be blamed: openly by some, privately by
most. Israel would be *regretted*.

Somehow this reality was not making its way through, perhaps
especially to American Jews. Here a long history was proving no guide.
Jewish history seemed to deny the possibility that the enemies of Jews
could be on the left. Jewish history seemed especially to deny that Jews
could be thought guilty of crimes committed by *governments*. The State
of Israel was so new. It was hard to think that *Jewish* thought and be-
havior might display the same characteristics found in other nations.
Jews imprisoning others? Jews occupying the territory of others? Jews
desecrating the culture of others? Surely there was some mistake.

But of course there was no mistake at all, as far as what was being
said and believed. By 1965 the State of Israel had been in existence

longer than most members of the United Nations. A clear majority of the states that sponsored the Zionism resolution were created *after* the establishment of Israel. They found no difficulty conceiving of a *state* of Israel, which might act as other states — as their own — did. Nor, let it be recorded, did the U.S. Permanent Representative.

This helped me to respond. I had no resistance to the evidence of what was going on, no difficulty in believing it possible. Israel was a small democracy to whose survival the United States had made a strong commitment, but not a commitment of a different order from that made to other democracies. I was clear in my mind that anyone wishing to see that commitment sustained should in any event emphasize its general rather than its particular nature. The whole experience was, at one level, rather abstract for me.

But there was another level on which my concern was anything but abstract. The Zionism resolution was aimed not merely at the State of Israel, but at Zionists. Which meant most of the Jews of the United States. I did not represent the State of Israel, but I most assuredly did represent the United States. And the peoples thereof.

Chaim Herzog, the man who did represent Israel, had been born in Ireland, son of the Chief Rabbi of Ireland. He had served in the Guards Armoured Division, and was knighted. He was a man to be in a tank battle with; yet there was the part of him that made him publisher of the *Encyclopaedia Judaica*. A man of courage and grace, and great heart. Settled in law practice, he had been persuaded that spring to come to New York to combat the expected move to expel his country from the General Assembly.

We had met only briefly, and not especially as allies. All summer (indeed through all this period) the Security Council was involved in one negotiation or another having to do with renewing the mandates of various United Nations peacekeeping forces on the Israeli borders, and with the role of the Palestine Liberation Organization in the peace negotiations. Endless discussions would take place as to whether in one instance, in return for Egyptian agreement to a three-month extension, the Council should express its "appreciation" to Cairo or merely its "satisfaction." In all such proceedings, from first to last, I had precise instructions. In the critical moments at the Security Council table I would read from the texts prepared in Washington, without having made the least change. This was the proper thing to do, but it did not make for the warmest relations with the Israelis. They now distrusted Kissinger with great intensity, and even when not dissatisfied with the

outcome of this or that negotiation save defiance. Thus it was that when, on October 1 — two days before the A.F.L.-C.I.O. convention — the resolution, which had been sprung, realized the import of this resolution back Israel; that I was afraid to go on with Israel on the issue. Our proposition when it had been given at the International Women's Year (1975).

Later, in the aftermath of the war, on what grounds we had chosen to counter we would surely lose. First, I had been asked to do something of Israel, which had a claim of its own. Second, my own government had been at the Mexico City conference. Third, the Session given full evidence of the assaults represented by the war were now allowing themselves to be taken. Fourth, the American people had proposed to take. Anyone even in the United States have known this. Fifth, to say that there were less than Israelis, and I had said so.

As we were certain to lose the argument. Herzog and I agreed that the resolution was a small and weak nations that — that the United Nations could be turned against them to prove. Third, that if the Zionism resolution Against Racism and Racial Discrimination was passed.

We agreed that the criticism of the European Nine, who had turned out not to be difficult in the Third Committee, had been a community, stated that they were that if it were to pass, the resolution. This was more than we had exaggerated the Israeli or the Arab. We were not alone.

Our next object was to show that whose own Decade was in so

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save defiance. Thus it was that Herzog and I had no special relationship
when, on October 1 — two days before I was to go to San Francisco for
the A.F.L.-C.I.O. convention — he telephoned about the Zionism reso-
lution, which had been sprung out of the blue. He asked, "Do you
realize the import of this resolution?" I said that I did; that we would
back Israel; that I was afraid, however, that we would remain isolated
with Israel on the issue. Ours had been the only two votes against the
proposition when it had been included in the final declaration of the
International Women's Year Conference just three months before.

Later, in the aftermath of the final vote, we were asked, in effect,
on what grounds we had chosen to enhance the importance of an en-
counter we would surely lose. I can only tell what I thought at the time.
First, I had been asked to do so by the representative of the government
of Israel, which had a claim on any democratic nation and especially our
own. Second, my own government had already opposed the measure at
the Mexico City conference. Third, the United States had at the Special
Session given full evidence of its bona fides. All we had asked was an end
to the assaults represented by this resolution. Instead, the Non-Aligned
were now allowing themselves to be made party to a moral outrage.
Fourth, the American people would absolutely support the position I
proposed to take. Anyone even partially familiar with survey data would
have known this. Fifth, to attack Zionists was to attack Americans no
less than Israelis, and I had said at the outset we would defend ourselves.

As we were certain to lose the vote, it was essential that we win the
argument. Herzog and I agreed we would fight on three grounds. First,
that the resolution was a lie. This we could prove. Second, that the
small and weak nations that voted for it would be voting for a principle
— that the United Nations could lie and would lie — which would one
day be turned against *them*. This was a proposition no one could dis-
prove. Third, that if the Zionism resolution passed, the Decade for Ac-
tion Against Racism and Racial Discrimination would be dead.

We agreed that the critical move would be to obtain the support of
the European Nine, who had not been on our side at Mexico City. This
turned out not to be difficult. On October 3, the day Garment spoke
in the Third Committee, Italy's Piero Vinci, speaking for the Com-
munity, stated that they would not go along with the resolution, and
that if it were to pass, the Nine would not participate in the Decade.
This was more than we had hoped, and suggests that one shouldn't
exaggerate the Israeli or American role in the days that followed.
We were not alone.

Our next object was to dissuade a respectable portion of Africans,
whose own Decade was in some respects at stake, to oppose the resolution

on grounds of principle or prudence, however they liked. Then, to stir opinion in the United States, to which, after all, both Europeans and Africans looked for support in more than a few matters.

To this end Herzog called Rabbi Israel Miller, the President of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, an umbrella group that had been set up at the request of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. In the classic mode of reorganizations, the result of drawing a big box around all the other boxes had been merely to create yet another box. Still, Miller was the appropriate person for the Israelis to look to. Unfortunately, as far as we could tell, instead of in turn calling the organizations he was supposed to represent, Miller commenced to call *me*, a development I reported to Herzog with some testiness. Herzog then saw Miller and asked why we weren't hearing anything from the American Jewish community. There had not been a word. No statements. No advertisements. No petitions. (By contrast, the American Jewish Committee had at least sent a telegram to the President supporting the statements Mitchell and I had made about Amin.) Miller replied, sorrowfully as Herzog judged, that he had raised the matter with the Israeli Embassy in Washington and had been told: "Ignore it, it's nonsense."

This only aroused Herzog further. The Israeli Foreign Minister, Yigal Allon, came through New York on the weekend following my speech to the A.F.L.-C.I.O. and Garment's statement in the Third Committee. Herzog gave him dinner in a kosher Chinese restaurant in the garment district, pitch black and deserted on a Sunday evening, adding rather to the drama of the occasion. We both spoke of the urgency of the matter as we saw it. Allon took the point. His next stop was London, where he spoke to Harold Wilson. The British thereupon became much more active.

As October progressed we were still surrounded by silence, but making some impression within the U.N. itself. Our one bit of leverage — whatever the elegance of our arguments — was the Decade Against Racism, and this began to show effect. The technical situation was as follows: Somalia, acting on behalf of thirteen sponsoring countries, had submitted *seven* amendments. These identified "Zionism as a form of racial discrimination to be included in the Programme of the Decade," proposed to provide "moral and material support to the national liberation movements and victims of apartheid, Zionism, and racial discrimination," and requested a study of the "colonial roots" of Zionism. Faced with the sudden show of Western opposition, Somalia requested that the vote be postponed, which was agreed. Two weeks of lobbying and negotiation followed, with the Africans under pressure from many sides. On October 15, Somalia withdrew the seven amendments and

presented as a substitute, a single resolution that de discrimination." Zionism with the operational pretended as a conciliatory 1 their Decade. But we put acting for the Soviet Un Decade were, as Garment lose the other. We had n but it was at least possib it aside.

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presented as a substitute, this time on behalf of twenty-six cosponsors, a single resolution that declared, "Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination." Zionism was no longer cited in the resolution dealing with the operational programs of the Decade. Evidently this was intended as a conciliatory move toward African nations concerned about their Decade. But we put it about that in our view Somalia was merely acting for the Soviet Union and that the Zionism resolution and the Decade were, as Garment later said, "inseparably linked." Adopt one, lose the other. We had no thought of defeating the resolution outright, but it was at least possible that a majority might be persuaded to put it aside.

The final debate in the Third Committee took place Thursday and Friday, October 16 and 17. I met with Kissinger for lunch in Washington on the Thursday. He supported us completely in a plan to try to table the resolution rather than to defeat it.

Who is to say whether and how debate ever affects the outcome of a vote? This one did, I think, at least somewhat. It was intense and at times vituperative. The Arabs were at their worst, or best, as they might think. Replete with charters and pacts and proclamations of long ago, leering with proofs of Jewish wickedness snipped from the editorials of Israeli newspapers or the pronouncements of anti-Zionist Jews. Bitter with near to thirty years of defeat on the battlefield. Quick to belittle, incapable of praise. They would invoke Saladin, but these descendants had quite lost his largeness, his munificence. If the representative of Haiti said that "no one until today thought to name [Zionism] a crime against humanity," Iraq would then recall that "Haiti was one of the few countries prevailed upon by U.S. pressure to change its vote in 1947 when the General Assembly voted for the partition of Palestine."

The nearest to a tactical success we had was using the leverage of the Decade with southern Africans. As one went southward on the continent, the number of countries with Moslem majorities or sizable Moslem populations decreased. Blyden of Sierra Leone understood our position completely and shared it completely. In the end he voted with us, and led an African effort to table. Yet as I pressed for this or that, he had had continually to remind me that the majority of his cabinet was Moslem. Our principal tactical mistake was not to understand the willingness of the Arabs simply to buy themselves a majority. There had been an anti-Israel majority in the General Assembly for at least a decade. But with the West now for the first time pressing the marginal members of that coalition, the Arabs responded with what the Barbados

representative, Waldo E. Waldron Ramsey, in his speech to the Committee, deftly termed "blandishments." A second error, disastrous and definitive, was to suppose that the Latin American countries, with significant Jewish populations almost everywhere and no direct stake in the issue, would be with us. When the vote came, Brazil and Mexico were against us, and there were many more Latin American abstentions than votes with us. Japan also abstained.

On the morning of October 17, still in committee, Sierra Leone and Zambia moved to postpone consideration for a year. The motion lost with 68 against and only 45 in favor, with 16 abstentions. The Dutch and others were doing their best to find a way to put the whole thing off, but Smid of Czechoslovakia was in the chair. Smid the liberal had become Smid the *apparatchik*; every ruling went against us.

At length Garment spoke. It was clear we would lose; but we wished the majority to be clear what it was about to do.

My delegation has read the new proposal before us. It is unusually straightforward. It asks us to determine "that Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination."

As simple as this language is, we are concerned that what may not be fully understood is that this resolution asks us to commit one of the most grievous errors in the thirty-year life of this organization.

This committee is preparing itself, with deliberation and foreknowledge, to perform a supreme act of deceit, to make a massive attack on the moral realities of the world. Under the guise of a program to eliminate racism the United Nations is at the point of officially endorsing anti-Semitism, one of the oldest and most virulent forms of racism known to human history. This draft explicitly encourages the racism known as anti-Semitism even as it would have us believe that its words will lead to the elimination of racism.

I choose my words carefully when I say that this is an obscene act. The United States protests this act. But protest alone is not enough. In fairness to ourselves we must also issue a warning. This resolution places the work of the United Nations in jeopardy. The language of this resolution distorts and perverts. It changes words with precise meanings into purveyors of confusion. It destroys the moral force of the concept of racism, making it nothing more than an epithet to be flung arbitrarily at one's adversary. It blinds us to areas of agreement and disagreement, and deprives us of the clarity of vision we desperately need to understand and resolve the differences among us. And we are here to overcome our differences, not to deepen them.

Zionism is a movement which has as its contemporary thrust the preservation of the small remnant of the Jewish people that survived the horrors of a racial holocaust. By equating Zionism with racism, this resolution discredits the good faith of our joint efforts to fight actual

"ZIONISM IS A FORM OF

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The United Nations, by the force of majority lived only — I repeat, o tions of the world, as decent and humane in the moral authority of influence upon human

Actions like this do consequences, many of time soon become part make no mistake: at United Nations' only This risk is as reckless

Accordingly, the United Nations applying only to the De work of the United Nations We have taken part in want to be able to do against the third resolution wise. On its adoption to the first two. There States will vote again appreciates the fact that have shown that they before committing the

We then moved to adjourn against, 40 in favor, and crowded, hot, and excited.

Garment sat in our chair taking our presence. I had the British critic Goronwy farewell to Lionel Trilling her husband would have called to ask if I would not show him around. He had gestured he come back for the he described the moment:

There were ghosts ghosts of Hitler and light to hear, not only which would have p

racism. It discredits these efforts morally and it cripples them politically.

The United Nations, throughout its thirty-year history, has not lived by the force of majorities; it has not lived by the force of arms. It has lived only — I repeat, only — because it has been thought that the nations of the world, assembled together, would give voice to the most decent and humane instincts of mankind. From this thought has come the moral authority of the United Nations, and from this thought its influence upon human affairs.

Actions like this do not go unnoticed. They do not succeed without consequences, many of which while only imperfectly perceived at the time soon become part of an ineradicable and regrettable reality. Let us make no mistake: at risk today is the moral authority which is the United Nations' only ultimate claim for the support of our peoples. This risk is as reckless as it is unnecessary. But it is still avoidable. . . .

Accordingly, the United States will support [the first two resolutions applying only to the Decade. . . .] We support, without reservation, the work of the United Nations to combat racism and racial discrimination. We have taken part in these vitally important activities in the past and want to be able to do so without obstruction in the future. We will vote against the third resolution. We call upon other delegations to do likewise. On its adoption the third resolution becomes inseparably linked to the first two. Therefore, if all three are sent to Plenary the United States will vote against all three at that time. . . . My government appreciates the fact that there were so many in this Committee who have shown that they wanted to consider this matter more carefully before committing the United Nations to so serious a step.

We then moved to adjourn without a vote; but this failed, 65 votes against, 40 in favor, and 21 abstentions. The Committee room grew crowded, hot, and excited. Something obscene was about to happen.

Garment sat in our chair. I sat behind him. There was to be no mistaking our presence. I had asked Podhoretz to be there; with him was the British critic Goronwy Rees, who had come to New York to say farewell to Lionel Trilling, but arrived just too late. Diana Trilling, as her husband would have expected, thought of their visitor first and called to ask if I would not find a moment to see him and perhaps to show him around. He had come for coffee that morning and I had suggested he come back for the vote that afternoon. Later, in *Encounter*, he described the moment:

There were ghosts haunting the Third Committee that day; the ghosts of Hitler and Goebbels and Julius Streicher, grinning with delight to hear, not only Israel, but Jews as such denounced in language which would have provoked hysterical applause at any Nuremberg

again, rising to a frenzy. The vote came, racing across the computer screen. 70 in favor, 29 against, with 27 abstentions.* They had picked up two votes over the Sierra Leone motion to postpone, five over ours. A long mocking applause broke out. The Israeli delegation, clearly on instructions, showed not the least emotion.

I rose and walked over to Herzog and embraced him. "Fuck 'em!" I said.

As it happened, on the day of the vote I had accepted an invitation by Zbigniew Brzezinski to speak to a luncheon of the Trilateral Commission, the foreign policy study group of which, we were to learn, Jimmy Carter was a member. I arrived at the Louis XVI Room at the Waldorf full of news from the Third Committee. During lunch I remarked that I feared the pending vote would affect not only world politics, but American domestic politics as well. George W. Ball, former Under Secretary of State and former U.S. Permanent Representative to the U.N., replied, "Nonsense. The campaign finance act has broken the political power of the American Jews."

This was endemic at the Department of State: to suppose that we supported Israel because of Harry Truman's partner in that haberdashery. Because Abraham Feinberg stayed at the White House when Lyndon

* The Third Committee vote was:

In Favor: 70

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussia, Cameroon, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, China, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, East Germany, Egypt, Gabon, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Libya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Somalia, Soviet Union, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Tanzania, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Southern Yemen, and Yugoslavia.

Opposed: 29

Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Finland, France, Haiti, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, and West Germany.

Abstaining: 27

Botswana, Colombia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Honduras, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Nepal, Papua-New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Rumania, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Swaziland, Togo, Upper Volta, Venezuela, Zaire, and Zambia.

Absent: 16

Argentina, Bhutan, Bolivia, Burundi, Central African Republic, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Greece, Guatemala, Maldives, Panama, Paraguay, São Tomé and Príncipe, South Africa, Thailand, and Trinidad-Tobago.

the debate: the ghosts
of the past which had cheered and
led the way to the gas chambers.
The supporters of the resolu-
tion of the Third Committee, was that to
be determined to preserve the
Jewish race.

He spoke:

unbelievable nonsense on
the archetypes of racists.
There is one small country,
a small country which can be
Jews and Arabs, are free and
in countries whose regimes
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to examine the racism prac-
ticing so profusely? Why
is Jewish and small.

a people who have lived
— for centuries. How
who have suffered more
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holocaust in the history
from racism. We suffer to-
including Arab racism as
The sponsors have the
your mouths. You have de-
this anti-Semitic ele-
you may well destroy it

Nations. The Jewish people
are a small people with a
much in our history.
over the centuries.
But we, the Jewish people,
who spoke up for decency
who expressed themselves
not forget those who voted
never forget.

for a moment fell silent.
the stirring commenced

instead to try to shame the countries that voted for the resolution. I wished in particular to make the case that the democracies had been on one side and the dictatorships on the other. (By the Freedom House rating, 76 percent of those who voted for the Zionism resolution were Not Free. Only 7 percent of the favorable vote came from nations listed as Free. Just the reverse was true of those who voted against: only 7 percent were Not Free; 61 percent were Free.)

The Chileans gave me an opening. The previous week a U.N. working group had reported on the human rights situation in that country, this being a matter of special concern to the Soviets. The working group denounced the existence of torture centers in Chile, and reported much political repression. The matter would soon be before the Third Committee, and the Chileans began canvassing delegates, to see if they could not get it put off, much as we were trying to put off the Zionism resolution. On October 17, the Chileans voted in favor of the Zionism resolution. The next morning I called in Paul Hofmann of *The Times* and told him for "background" that the Chileans had been bought. The story made as much or more news than the Committee vote itself. "U.S. Aide Charges Chile Sold U.N. Vote to Arabs" ran on the front page. A "United States official" was quoted saying "The fascists in Chile and some like-minded military regimes are lining up with the anti-Semites." Many other Latins, the official was quoted, "deserted us." On the record I said that "the decent countries" had been with us, adding, "If you had to pick your company in the world, you couldn't pick better." Once again off the record, I pointed to the large number of black African states that had voted against the resolution: "The Africans are standing up for their own interests," I concluded.

This appeared on the *Times* front page Monday, October 20. On Tuesday evening I was scheduled to address the Appeal of Conscience Foundation dinner in New York. This group, while headed by Rabbi Arthur Schneier, was supported by Roman Catholic, Protestant, and Greek Orthodox, as well as by Jewish, religious leaders. (The Jesuits at *America* had, months earlier, asked me to give the speech.) I now found a theme. That the issue was not Israel but democracy. The action of the Third Committee had awakened us, none too soon:

Joyce hit upon the term epiphany for such moments of showing through. "Its soul," he wrote, "its whatness leaps to us from the vestment of its appearance . . . the object achieves its epiphany." This happened Friday last in the Third Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Self-destruction is what first showed through. For some time now the United Nations has been showing a seemingly compulsive urge so to

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was there under Nixon and if Jackson got in. In a word, American foreign policy; that we it was in the United States'

often to tell me that the object form then under way was to I written back to tell him that

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al United Nations Concert at him what Ball had said, and try's better known politicians ny young man starting out in

of Vienna Metternich was ambassador had just dropped it can have been his motive?" he mean by that? To arouse

our failure to head off the have to be in part his own for ittle bit that. To be spiteful ob? Probably. But then there ht that the lights were going ray to postpone the inevitable, ound it. But in the end the would be.

he resolution in the General a majority against either the ours; but given the number vo-to-one against us. I decided

outrage those very principles on which it was founded as to suggest that a sinister transmutation has occurred in an organism that yet enough remembers its own beginnings as to be revulsed by what it has become and somehow to seek expiation in bringing on its own doom. Things like that happen. How else to explain the incessant quest for yet new devices for scandalizing the good opinion on which the survival of the institution depends? I do not refer to the occasional onset of role reversal in which some of the newer nations in the world display a certain disrespect for some of the older ones. Some of the older ones, our own nation included, have a certain amount of disrespect coming, and occasional irreverence will do no one harm. Nor do I refer to the debates over the distribution of wealth among the nations of the world which have much occupied the United Nations in recent years. Sufficiently long ago to suggest that it comes naturally, Aristotle noted that the founding of any truly political forum is the signal for a struggle between rich and poor to commence. It is one of the redeeming qualities of the institution that it has indeed begun at the United Nations.

The real problem is very different, and vastly ominous. It is that the United Nations has become a locus of a general assault by the majority of the nations in the world on the principles of liberal democracy which are now found only in a minority of nations, and for that matter a dwindling minority. It was not Zionism that was condemned at the United Nations on Friday, it was Israel; and not the State of Israel nearly so much as the significance of Israel as one of the very few places, outside of Western Europe and North America and a few offshore islands, where western democratic principles survive, and of all such places, currently the most exposed.

This may not be the view of others, but it is and was the view of the United States Mission to the United Nations, and that view was stated with as much clarity as we could command in the Third Committee debate. . . .

The Committee thereupon voted, and this obscene act, this reckless act was adopted by 70 votes to 29, with 27 abstentions. The epiphany occurred, and nothing more epiphanic than the wholesale decision of the despotisms of the right in the world to side with the despotisms of the left, in common concert against the liberal democracies of the center. It was an awful occasion, but it had about it, most of all, the awfulness of truth. . . .

The question now arises: What are we to do? About this resolution, which has now passed the Third Committee of the United Nations.

The answer is unavoidable. It must not pass the General Assembly. It must not receive that final — and admittedly in most instances automatic — sanction as the judgment of the world community. There can be no community of belief about such a judgment.

One could hope, however, for some common understanding about the

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they were:

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kinds of encounter we are having with one another. The United Nations is now much preoccupied with economic issues of a distributive nature, having to do with the relative condition of various classes of nations, much as the internal politics of many societies are preoccupied with similar issues having to do with classes of citizens. This ought not surprise us, for by all the doctrinal lights of the 20th century, this is what we are *supposed* to be preoccupied with. And yet, as a number of academicians have been arguing with perhaps increasing force, this is not in fact what the Twentieth Century is turning out to be about. To the contrary, it is the ancient and supposedly recessive bonds of race and creed which increasingly occupy the political forums of the world.

Given this, is it not possible for nations caught up in the latest aftermath of the latest world movement to see at very least that the condition is not peculiar to one region or another, or one era or another, but rather is very much the stuff of history, and the experience of almost the whole of mankind? Is it not at very least possible for some of us to see that no matter who prevails in the disputes that so very much absorb us in the world, the ultimate victor in every instance seems to be the state, and the state system, and the increasing forced identity of the individual with the state and the fortunes of the state?

By now Congress was reacting. In the Senate, Javits of New York and Richard Stone of Florida, along with a number of colleagues, introduced a resolution condemning the Third Committee vote. Javits spoke with force: "It is time to speak out and call a halt to this vicious brand of name-calling, which brings echoes of the propaganda machine of Goebbels and his Nazi party colleagues in the nineteen-thirties." In the House of Representatives the Majority Leader, Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., introduced a similar resolution with nearly a hundred cosponsors. On Friday, October 24, the President issued a statement deploring the Committee vote "in the strongest terms," adding: "The spokesmen for the United States in the United Nations have expressed well and forcefully the views of this Administration and the American people on this issue." On Sunday I appeared on television on *Face the Nation*. I tried to be confident with respect to issues that votes as such could not decide. Whatever the outcome, the vote would tell us who we were and who they were:

The President, the Secretary of State, the Congress made it very clear. . . . We will stand with the rights of a liberal democracy. We will stand with racial tolerance, with ethnic tolerance. We will stand against that hideous thing.

That evening J. H. Plumb arrived from England. I knew no one whose judgment of Europe was better. He had been in his own way a man of the left, but absolutely a democrat and as fearless of Communists as, during the war, he had been fearless of the Nazis. Plumb, who had advised caution more than once in the past, now urged audacity. He felt that the European governments were terrified of the combination of the Soviets and the Persian Gulf Arabs, and would abandon the Jews as they had done in 1938 and 1939. But the European *public*, he said, would not have it; already they were beginning to hear what we were saying in New York and they approved.

Next came support from the least expected British source. *The New Statesman* of that week carried a long article, "The Resources of Civilization," by its former editor, Paul Johnson. He began with Gladstone's speech on terrorism, given in 1881: "If it shall appear that there is still to be fought a final conflict in Ireland between law on the one side and sheer lawlessness on the other, if the law purged from defect and any taint of injustice is still to be repelled and refused, and the first conditions of political society to remain unfulfilled then I say, gentlemen, without hesitation, the resources of civilisation against its enemies are not yet exhausted." What an age! thought Johnson. He then went on to events in the Third Committee:

A fortnight ago the U.N. Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Committee — a nomenclature so rich in savage irony as to eclipse even a Swift — passed by 70 votes to 29 a resolution condemning Israel as a "threat to world peace" and Zionism as a "racialist and imperialist ideology." In fact, as all educated people know, Israel, far from being a threat to anyone, stands in perpetual danger of extermination from its bloodthirsty neighbours; and Zionism is neither a racial nor an imperial but a cultural phenomenon. Of course, at the U.N. facts and realities do not matter. What matters is force, money and physical power.

Indeed, the U.N. is rapidly becoming one of the most corrupt and corrupting creations in the whole history of human institutions. How many of the delegates were actually bribed by Arab governments to vote against Israel on this occasion is a matter of speculation; but almost without exception those in the majority came from states notable for racist oppression of every conceivable hue. . . .

The melancholy truth, I fear, is that the candles of civilisation are burning low. The world is increasingly governed not so much by capitalism, or communism, or social democracy, or even tribal barbarism, as by a false lexicon of political clichés, accumulated over half

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In some ways what is said and voted at the U.N. does not matter. There may be a case — not yet, I would say, an overwhelming one — for the United States government to cut off the U.N.'s money, and send the whole squalid circus packing. The slab of steel and glass on the East River might be then put to some useful purpose. But breaking up the U.N. would not end the problem, which springs not from paper votes but from the physical supplies of arms and money which certain states are prepared to pour into the terrorist cauldron. Russia, while ferociously executing dissidents in her own midst (those who hijack Soviet aircraft unsuccessfully know they will never emerge from the KBG interrogation cellars), equips a wide variety of terrorist gangs beyond her sphere of control.

And he ended by speaking of what was to be done:

Has not the time come to change our strategy? What I think the rest of the world is waiting for — indeed hoping for — is some positive sign that the civilised powers are going to uphold the standards of international behaviour set by their forebears; that they are going to do so in the most systematic, relentless and comprehensive manner, and if necessary — while they still possess it — with overwhelming force. All over our tormented planet, there are millions of decent, peaceable and intelligent men and women of all religions, complexions and races, who are praying that the resources of civilisation are not, indeed, exhausted — and that the Brezhnevs and the Amins, the Ghadaffis and the Maos, the Arafats and the O'Sadists will not be allowed to take over the earth.

I had first appeared in print in England in 1958, in a letter to *The New Statesman* protesting an article by G. D. H. Cole describing the American plans for world conquest, which had begun with the "invasion" of North Korea. The letter created a brief stir in London at the time. To have the former editor of *that* journal speak precisely to my purpose a quarter-century later was an event.

In Moscow Andrei D. Sakharov declared, "If this resolution is adopted, it can only contribute to anti-semitic tendencies in many countries, by giving them the appearance of international legality."

But where were the Jews? In Moscow, certainly, they were heard from. On October 26, Soviet Jews from fifteen cities issued a public protest against the resolution, calling it "essentially anti-Semitic." But in New York there was — silence. So also in Israel, where the press paid

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little attention to the event. The first editorial on the resolution — so far as we in New York were aware — appeared only on October 16. I commenced to deplore this to Herzog, who assured me I was not alone. Ivor Richard had told him he was surprised by the lack of Jewish reaction. Von Wechmar of West Germany had told him it would have been helpful if the Jewish community had reacted somewhat more. I telephoned and harangued, but to no visible effect.

Finally Herzog had to take the matter head-on. On October 24 he made his first appearance before the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations. He made a formal speech. He asked, could Jewry be proud of its silence? It was the first major attack on world Jewry since the days of Hitler, and how had they reacted? In the greatest metropolis in the entire world, the greatest concentration of Jews in the entire world, there had been hardly a word of protest in the newspapers. Only on Friday the twenty-fourth, a week after the resolution passed in the Third Committee, did a weak editorial appear in *The New York Times*. In Israel the press was concentrated on the issue of the stevedore strikers at Ashdod Port, not having regard to the fact that there in the U.N. the world community was planning to eliminate Ashdod Port. El Al airline workers were striking against their own government, not realizing that in the United Nations Herzog was fighting for the right of a government in Israel even to exist. The essentials of Herzog's speech were reported in the next day's *Times*: "Herzog Says Jews Let Israelis Down during U.N. Debate." He was quoted at the end saying, "The lead on this issue was taken, to its eternal credit, by the United States delegation." This certainly was how he felt.

All hell broke loose for Herzog. He had insulted the American leadership; by implication affronted the Israeli Embassy in Washington. The matter was raised in the Israeli Cabinet, and the question of recalling him for an explanation was discussed. But he also suddenly found himself a hero with the rank and file of American Jewry and soon with the public in Israel. Sacks of mail arrived, overwhelmingly supportive, strikingly disapproving of the American leadership he had taken to task.

I went on telephoning, but still to little consequence. When I asked the United Nations Association to protest, and it produced a draft that began by deploring racial inequality in the United States, I more or less stopped telephoning.

The Western nations caucused and agreed that when the resolution

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came to the General Assembly we would try once more for a postponement.

There is little trace either in Jewish doctrine or in Zionism of the idea that Jews are a race. The very idea was itself an invention of nineteenth-century anti-Semites such as Houston Stewart Chamberlain and Edouard Drumont, who saw the need for a new justification for excluding and persecuting Jews in a secularized age when the old religious grounds of anti-Semitism were losing force. One cannot choose the race to which one belongs. But in both the Jewish and the Zionist conceptions, any person of any racial stock can be or become a Jew by converting to the Jewish religion. Conversely, as the Israeli courts have said, any person born of a Jewish mother who converts to another religion is no longer a Jew. If one can join or resign from the Chosen People, it is scarcely a racially determined category.

It was equally striking to learn how recent the terms *racist* and *racism* were, not only new to U.N. vocabulary but to the language altogether. Chamberlain and Drumont may have been racists, or have preached racism, but there were no words in the French or English dictionaries of their time to describe who they were or what they were up to. As near as one could learn, the term first appeared in French, having both biological and nationalistic connotations, and made its way into English by way of a 1932 translation of Trotsky's *History of the Russian Revolution*. By 1936, according to the files kept by the *Oxford English Dictionary*, the word as used in English had acquired a definite biological meaning, which it has retained. I began to try to interest various Arab delegations in the problem of language entailed here, but with no success. In fairness, neither English nor French was *their* language; and with respect to the Israelis, the Arabs were pretty much determined that words would mean whatever they chose them to mean.

Word of our linguistic explorations got around. The Kuwaiti ambassador asked me to lunch October 29 to talk about it. I arrived to find Dr. Abdallah al-Sayegh, a Palestinian Arab born in Tiberias, now a Kuwaiti citizen, also present. His life study had been Zionism, and his rage was clear at the people who had overmastered his own, and sent so many into exile. I nonetheless pressed my point that the General Assembly was about to brand the national liberation movement of a member country with a term that the U.N. had never defined. How could we know if Zionism was a form of racism if we had never defined racism?

Al-Sayegh fairly leapt. To the contrary! he exclaimed, the term "racism" is precisely defined in Article I of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, adopted by the General Assembly in 1965. This was a blow. I allowed that I had better learn my texts, and with that, luncheon in a nice town house overlooking the East River came to a close.

I returned to the Mission and told Reis of my humiliation. He replied that the Kuwaiti was quite wrong. Article I of the Convention refers only to "racial discrimination" and does not contain the other term, "racism," much less does it define it. Nor does any other article of the Convention.

I came to see that all this mattered not at all to the Arabs. What mattered was that the Israelis looked down upon them. They were prepared to hit back with any charge that came to hand. That an American might say that this charge was not just any charge, but the most awful accusation that could be hurled at Jews, and a matter for the gravest concern in other parts of the world, especially the Soviet Union, where Sakharov's fears would surely be realized — such argument made no impress whatever.

When the debate came in the General Assembly, al-Sayegh spoke for Kuwait, and picked up exactly where our luncheon conversation had left off:

The United Nations definition of racism and racial discrimination is contained in the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Article 1 of which states that "discrimination between human beings on the ground of race, color, or ethnic origin is an offense to human dignity and shall be condemned"; and in the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which goes even further, in Article 1, by stating that "in this convention, the term 'racial discrimination' shall mean any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, color, descent or national or ethnic origin. We accept no abridgement of this definition."

That the excerpt he quoted defined "racial discrimination" and did not contain the word *racism* would probably not have mattered, but in any event, almost certainly he did not notice.

Charles H. Fairbanks, a young political scientist at Yale, a Straussian, prepared a long memorandum to the effect that words and their meanings do matter:

We have seen that that it involves a dishow bad this is from human rights. We now of meaning will benefit committee. The hope sentiments about racism one has to wonder who give rise in many much worse than Zionism, just

This kind of outcormust step back and see the future of human rights

The members of [the official equation of precedent for future general. . . .

Even those who now cynical about the term will at length cease to feeling in those who have

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Second, the language nations' foreign policy relationships and character is taken, the words which racism can mean anything that the new government

The third important of the United Nations of notions of rights, systematic sphere, on color, tory, a disinterested of human nature has changed pendence in the next can be avoided without this danger shows an of century's events in motion. . . .

We have seen that the equation of Zionism with racism is absurd, that it involves a distortion of the meaning of words. We have seen how bad this is from the point of view of those who do care about human rights. We now need to raise the question whether this reversal of meaning will benefit the nations that voted for it in the [Third] committee. The hope behind this resolution is evidently to transfer our sentiments about racism to Zionism by linking the words. . . . In fact, one has to wonder whether the equation of Zionism with racism will not give rise in many minds to the following reflection: if racism is no worse than Zionism, just how bad is it?

This kind of outcome is a real possibility. To see how likely it is, we must step back and survey for a moment the history and the probable future of human rights language. Let us begin with the future.

The members of [the U.N.] cannot lull themselves into thinking that the official equation of Zionism and racism is an isolated act. It sets a precedent for future speech about racism and human rights issues in general. . . .

Even those who now care about human rights will become ever more cynical about the terms they now use to express this concern. The words will at length cease to stand for anything authentic or to evoke any feeling in those who hear them. . . .

The charge of racism will eventually become something that people laugh at. To call Zionism a form of racism makes a mockery of the struggle against racism as the emperor Caligula made a mockery of the Roman Senate when he appointed to it his horse.

Again, those who are utterly indifferent to human rights may wonder why this matters. It matters for three very important reasons. First, when the terms of human rights speech have lost their specific meaning it will be possible to use them in unforeseen and disturbing ways. . . .

Second, the language of human rights is being used to achieve many nations' foreign policy goals, such as change in international economic relationships and change in Southern Africa. If the Committee's path is taken, the words will soon be made useless for such purposes. When racism can mean anything at all, it will no longer make men indignant that the new government of South Africa is racist. . . .

The third important consideration is this . . . many of the members of the United Nations owe their independence in part to the influence of notions of rights, spreading from the domestic sphere to the international sphere, on colonial powers. Looking at the whole of earlier history, a disinterested observer would be compelled to predict that unless human nature has changed many weak nations will lose their independence in the next century. It is certainly hard to believe that this can be avoided without the help of ideas of rights. . . . To ignore this danger shows an optimism about human nature falsified by the last century's events in many of the very countries supporting the resolution. . . .

It might, finally, be said that when the old language of human rights has become meaningless through abuse there will appear new words expressing the same thing, as in other areas of language. *This is precisely what will not happen.* . . . Human rights is a concern of an unusual kind. Never in human history did the term or the idea of human rights appear before the seventeenth century. When the idea of human rights did appear, it was the product of a specific philosophic doctrine, the social contract school. . . . The question is whether any other philosophic school could produce a doctrine of human rights anew; certainly it is not an indigenous term in the vocabulary of the deepest forms of modern thought, such as existentialism and Marxism. . . . When the old language is worn out and destroyed, no new Jefferson or Woodrow Wilson will arise to renew it. The presuppositions of such renovators have been undermined. . . .

Our specific principles of human rights will not fall and rise again. Any damage done to them is *irreversible*.

To the nations that do not care about human rights I would therefore say: you are giving away real and enduring props of national security in idle skirmishes soon to be forgotten. For the rest of us, we should know what we see before us. What we are witnessing is not merely one of the routine degradations of the United Nations and its ideals. It is, unless we can stand in its way, the most crippling blow yet dealt in the irreversible decline of the concern with human rights as we know it.

The vote came on November 10. The General Assembly was tense, not with uncertainty of the outcome, but rather with the knowledge of it. A succession of resolutions were adopted amending the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination. Most of the resolutions were aimed at Israel. By a vote of 93 to 18, with 27 abstentions, the General Assembly established a Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People to insure that there would be resolutions to vote on next year. When the Zionism resolution was reached, Belgium moved to adjourn debate. We got a fair-size vote, including a good many African countries: Ethiopia, Ghana, the Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Togo, Upper Volta, Zaire, and Zambia. But the Soviet-Arab coalition held, and we lost 67 to 55, with 15 abstentions. Herzog would later contend that this was the highest pro-Israeli vote in a decade, but it wasn't enough. The other side never dropped below 65.

The outcome was so predetermined that only two nations spoke in the formal debate prior to the voting. Afterwards Herzog rose. Like

Tiresias in *Oedipus Rex*, he it throughout a superb text

It is symbolic that the point in the fortunes of the possible continued on November 10th. The history as Kristallnacht night on 10 November launched a coordinated burnt the synagogues in the Holy Books and that night when Jewish homes away, many of them none of all Jewish businesses in the cities of Germany into millions of crystal Night of the Crystals. Theresienstadt and other rifying holocaust in the

As he concluded, he tore the Synagogue in Jerusalem, his Paper announcing the limit

I spoke toward the end. I had the sense to leave us be "The United States rises to United Nations, and before will not abide by, it will not be understood how seriously

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I recounted in detail the affair itself: "In logic, the State things, theoretically included be and could not become turned to the yet larger point

It is precisely a concern or should be precious

Tiresias in *Oedipus Rex*, he began at a peak of intensity and sustained it throughout a superb text:

It is symbolic that this debate, which may well prove to be a turning point in the fortunes of the United Nations and a decisive factor as to the possible continued existence of this Organization, should take place on November 10th. Tonight thirty-seven years ago has gone down in history as Kristallnacht or The Night of the Crystals. This was the night on 10 November 1938, when Hitler's Nazi storm troopers launched a coordinated attack on the Jewish community in Germany, burnt the synagogues in all its cities and made bonfires in the street of the Holy Books and Scrolls of the Holy Law and Bible. It was the night when Jewish homes were attacked and heads of families taken away, many of them never to return. It was the night when the windows of all Jewish businesses and stores were smashed, covering the streets in the cities of Germany with a film of broken glass which dissolved into millions of crystals giving that night the name, Kristallnacht, The Night of the Crystals. It was the night which led eventually to the crematoria and gas chambers, Auschwitz, Birkenau, Dachau, Buchenwald, Theresienstadt and others. It was the night which led to the most terrifying holocaust in the history of man.

As he concluded, he tore the resolution in two. In 1935, in the Yeshurun Synagogue in Jerusalem, his father had torn in two the British White Paper announcing the limitation of Jewish immigration to Palestine.

I spoke toward the end. It was our speech wholly, Washington having had the sense to leave us be. I began with words Podhoretz had written: "The United States rises to declare before the General Assembly of the United Nations, and before the world, that it does not acknowledge, it will not abide by, it will never acquiesce in this infamous act." I let it be understood how seriously we took this matter:

As this day will live in infamy, it behooves those who sought to avert it to declare their thoughts so that historians will know that we fought here, that we were not small in number — not this time — and that while we lost, we fought with full knowledge of what indeed would be lost.

I recounted in detail the argument we presented against the resolution itself: "In logic, the State of Israel could be, or could become, many things, theoretically including many things undesirable, but it could not be and could not become racist unless it ceased to be Zionist." I then turned to the yet larger point we wished to make:

It is precisely a concern for civilization, for civilized values that are or should be precious to all mankind, that arouses us at this moment to

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such special passion. What we have at stake here is not merely the honor and the legitimacy of the State of Israel — although a challenge to the legitimacy of any member nation ought always to arouse the vigilance of all members of the United Nations. For a yet more important matter is at issue. . . .

The terrible lie that has been told here today will have terrible consequences. Not only will people begin to say, indeed they have already begun to say, that the United Nations is a place where lies are told. Far more serious, grave and perhaps irreparable harm will be done to the cause of human rights. The harm will arise first because it will strip from racism the precise and abhorrent meaning that it still precariously holds today. How will the peoples of the world feel about racism, and about the need to struggle against it, when they are told that it is an idea so broad as to include the Jewish national liberation movement?

As this lie spreads, it will do harm in a second way. Many of the members of the United Nations owe their independence in no small part to the notion of human rights, as it has spread from the domestic sphere to the international sphere and exercised its influence over the old colonial powers. We are now coming into a time when that independence is likely to be threatened again. There will be new forces, some of them arising now, new prophets and new despots, who will justify their actions with the help of just such distortions of words as we have sanctioned here today. Today we have drained the word "racism" of its meaning. Tomorrow, terms like "national self-determination" and "national honor" will be perverted in the same way to serve the purposes of conquest and exploitation. And when these claims begin to be made — as they already have begun to be made — it is the small nations of the world whose integrity will suffer. And how will the small nations of the world defend themselves, on what grounds will others be moved to defend and protect them, when the language of human rights, the only language by which the small can be defended, is no longer believed and no longer has a power of its own?

There is this danger, and then a final danger that is the most serious of all. Which is that the damage we now do to the idea of human rights and the language of human rights could well be irreversible. The idea has not always existed in human affairs. It is an idea which appeared at a specific time in the world, and under very special circumstances. It appeared when European philosophers of the seventeenth century began to argue that man was a being whose existence was independent from that of the State, that he need join a political community only if he did not lose by that association more than he gained. From this very specific political philosophy stemmed the idea of political rights, of claims that the individual could justly make against the State; it was because the individual was seen as so separate from the State that he could make legitimate demands upon it.

That was the philosophy from which the idea of domestic and inter-

"ZIONISM IS A FORM

national rights sprang philosophy now. Most thought, in philosophy from and prior to the wide any justification that have no words but words that were given to replace them, for p

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national rights sprang. But most of the world does not hold with that philosophy now. Most of the world believes in newer modes of political thought, in philosophies that do not accept the individual as distinct from and prior to the State, in philosophies that therefore do not provide any justification for the idea of human rights and philosophies that have no words by which to explain their value. If we destroy the words that were given to us by past centuries, we will not have words to replace them, for philosophy today has no such words.

But there are those of us who have not forsaken these older words, still so new to much of the world. Not forsaken them now, not here, not anywhere, not ever.

I closed as I had begun: "The United States of America declares that it does not acknowledge, it will not abide by, it will never acquiesce in this infamous act."

Garment and I then went off to be interviewed on television. For the first time now we were tired, even depressed. All that was left was not to appear so. We made our way back to the Assembly chamber. There, sitting in our row, unannounced, unabashed, outraged, bearing witness, was Hubert H. Humphrey. *Ha-mavin yavin*; those who understand will understand.

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September 19, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR TONY SNOW

FROM: JENNIFER GROSSMAN

SUBJECT: STILL MORE UN MATERIAL (FAX THREE)

Tony, I think I just got in trouble. I was just unceremoniously booted from the library by a very large secret service woman. She called me "unauthorized." Would you please tell them that such epithets can be potentially emotionally scarring to young minds? Anyway, attached:

- 1) Reportage from '46 formation of the United Nations
- 2) Excerpts from Representing America. Chapter by Bush on UN experience.
- 3) more re. founders' vision, a chapter from The United Nations at Forty: A Foundation to Build On, entitled "Shaping World Order."
- 4) Moynihan on "Zionism is Racism."

QUOTES

- 1) "The only dependable foundation of personal liberty is the personal economic security of private property."
--Walter Lippmann
- 2) JAVIER PEREZ DE CUELLAR (On the eve of the 40th anniversary of the United Nations):

"We face today a world of almost infinite promise which is also a world of potentially terminal danger."

"The United Nations cannot -- and was not intended to -- solve all the problems of the international community, but it is the best place to avoid the worst and to strive for improvement."1